Masters Degrees (Security and Africa Studies)

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    Insurgency and National Security Management in Nigeria : a Case study (2009 - 2019)
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2024-03) Teubes, Kenne Nicolaas; Bester, Petrus Corneluis; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies. Dept. of Political Science (Mil)
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The face of conflict on the African continent is changing and subsequently challenges how governments respond to ensure security. One such form of conflict is the impact and expansion of extremism across the continent, which is the focus of this study. Central to this study are certain concepts related to extremism, including national security, terrorism, insurgency, and security management. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, being complex in nature, provided the required setting to assess the impact of an insurgency on a government’s security response. With Nigeria as a research setting, the purpose of this study was twofold: firstly, to analyse insurgency in detail; and, secondly, to assess the Federal Government (FG) of Nigeria’s security response to the insurgency over the period 2009 to 2019. Utilising securitisation theory as the theoretical framework, this study was executed utilising a combination of the positivist social science and the interpretivist paradigms and followed a descriptive research design within a qualitative approach. Following the case study as a research strategy, the researcher collected data using Charmaz’s (2006) interpretative grounded theory method. Open coding revealed 70 codes, which were further refined through axial coding to 16 categories. Selective coding is the final step of grounded theory and the five categories were further refined into the Emergent Theory of Distorted Security Response as the core category. A literature review was conducted during the data collection as proposed by Charmaz (2016). The literature review focused on the period 2009 to 2019 and presented an in-depth assessment of the motivating factors from an insurgency perspective and a state’s reaction in mitigating the conflict. The establishment of a Muslim caliphate became the desired end state for Boko Haram in the late 1990s. The organisation developed into a formidable adversary that was prepared to apply all means necessary to achieve that goal. The tempo at which the extremist threat expanded and manifested in Nigeria exposed the limitations and shortcomings of the security management effort by the Nigerian government and, by implication, the Nigerian security forces. The response by the Nigerian FG, as the focus of the study, indicates how the state initially underestimated the potential threat, which presented Boko Haram with the opportunity to expand its influence. Later on, the Nigerian FG responded by applying a robust military force against an adversary that applies asymmetric tactics. This distorted response highlighted the different forms of power available to a state against a non-state actor. With several states in Africa, including South Africa, confronted by the same phenomenon, there are certain lessons to be drawn from the Nigerian case study. After integrating the empirical and theoretical findings, the results are displayed and described by the Conceptual Model of the Emergent Theory of Distorted Security Response. The study concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications, as well as the strengths and limitations of the study, with an overall assessment of the study in terms of its value add to theory, methodology, and practice. Recommendations for future research are made, whereafter the researcher reflects on his personal research journey. Thereafter, recommendations are made regarding rethinking national security and security management.
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    Homeland security: the domestic deployment of the South African Armed Forces
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2024-03 ) Andreas, Jan; Esterhuyse, Abel; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military Strategy.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Historically, South Africa has deployed the military domestically since its colonial era. Domestic military deployments in South Africa have occurred during various periods of government, including those of the Dutch, British, Union, and republican governments. The domestic deployment of the military by all previous governments was for all practical purposes intended to suppress rebellions against the government, enforce government policies, and maintain stability. The South African military has also deployed domestically several times to assist with disaster relief, to maintain law and order, and to protect the borders. The purpose of this research was to explore the idea of homeland security as a guiding framework for the domestic deployment of the South African armed forces. It aimed to address a number of key questions about the conceptualisation of homeland security in South Africa to determine the key drivers for the domestic deployment, doctrine, training, and resourcing of the South African military. In terms of homeland security, it refers to the efforts and measures taken by a government in order to safeguard its citizens, critical infrastructure, and territorial integrity from internal and external threats. It includes a wide range of initiatives aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to dangers that include cyber-attacks, natural catastrophes, orchestrated violent political unrest, and other events that may endanger a country’s security or the general wellbeing of the nation. These efforts by the government involve a multiplicity of government departments, agencies, and private sector organisations working together to prevent and respond to threats. Among them are law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, emergency management agencies, the military, and the private sector. Overall, the goal of homeland security is to ensure that the nation remains safe, secure, and resilient in the face of a wide range of threats and risks. Homeland security should not be viewed as exclusively or even primarily a military task. Security cluster departments, provincial and local government organisations, the private sector, and the populace must carry out several activities in an integrated manner to secure the domestic security domain as a highly complex environment (Tomisek, 2002). In post-1994 South Africa, the domestic security situation has become particularly contentious, where the South African Police Service (SAPS) is mandated to address domestic security, but often relies on the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to assist in this role. The SANDF is not always trained, structured, or equipped to address contemporary domestic security issues such as recurrent xenophobic unrest, gangsterism, and, most recently, the July 2021 civil unrest. These security occurrences have caught the South African security structures off guard and unprepared to respond appropriately. The lack of coordination among security organisations highlights the weakness in the South African security cluster concept, or the application thereof, which creates the perception of an ineffective national security system. Homeland security is an emerging concept that guides the domestic utilisation of militaries globally. The South African security reconceptualisation of the early 1990s provided the foundation for the concept of homeland security; the SANDF therefore needed to develop a doctrine for the purpose of understanding its role in conducting homeland security missions within a whole-of-government system. However, homeland security has never been deliberately explored as an organising concept for the domestic deployment of the South African military in democratic South Africa.
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    Rwanda and South Africa’s anti-corruption programmes: A comparative study
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2020-04) Snyman, Frans Jacobus; Theletsane, K. I.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Despite South Africa’s written commitment to fight corruption, its anti-corruption programme has failed to reduce the level of corruption as confirmed by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Indicator. Failure to improve South Africa’s success in combating corruption will have a negative effect on the achievement of sustainable social and economic development and the reduction of poverty and inequality. In order to determine which areas of South Africa’s anti-corruption programme must be addressed to improve its success in fighting corruption, a comparative analysis of Rwanda and South Africa’s anti-corruption programmes was done. Rwanda was chosen due to its perceived successful anti-corruption programme and the fact that scholars suggest that it can be used for peer learning. The strengths and weaknesses of the two programmes were analysed against the extent of corruption, anti-corruption legislative and institutional frameworks, compliance with the mandatory articles of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Chapters II and III with a focus on Articles 5 and 6, as well as the level of political will to fight corruption using Brinkerhoff’s (2010) seven factors. The study was conducted using the document analysis method. The study found that South Africa complies with the mandatory articles of UNCAC, has the best anti-corruption legislation in Africa and a comprehensive decentralised institutional framework. However, in reality the country’s anti-corruption institutions are not sufficiently independent and free from political interference and are not adequately resourced in terms of material needs and skilled staff. There are serious concerns over the poor co-ordination of South Africa’s anti-corruption programme, the overlapping mandates of anti-corruption institutions and poor public awareness of the anti-corruption programme. Accountability and civil participation were also identified as weaknesses. The study also quantifiably proved that South Africa has a low level of political will to fight corruption. The application of credible sanctions, continuity of effort, public commitment and allocation of resources and the learning and adaptation factors of political will were identified as serious weaknesses in South Africa’s fight against corruption. If South Africa implements the recommendations of this study, corruption will decrease, the National Development Plan Vision 2030’s goals will become more attainable which will lead to lower levels of poverty and inequality. The end result will be that South Africa will be able achieve its envisioned goals of sustainable social and economic development. The contributions of the findings of this study are twofold regarding the existing literature on successfully combating corruption. Firstly, it provided proof of the importance of the implementation of UNCAC through principles such as proper coordination, participation of civil society, integrity, independence, transparency, accountability and the sufficient allocation of material and human resources. Secondly, South Africa’s level of political will to combat corruption was quantifiably measured for the first time.
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    Armoured warfare : the South African experience in East Africa 1940-1941
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014-12) Kleynhans, Evert Philippus; Van der Waag, Ian J.; Esterhuyse, A. J.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war.