Research Articles (Philosophy)

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Arendt, Stiegler en die lewe van die gees
(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2012-03) Roodt, Vasti
The founding manifesto of Ars Industrialis commits the members of the association to a new "industrial politics of the spirit". The manifesto makes it clear that "spirit" is meant to refer to Hannah Arendt's conception of "mind", and that Ars Industrialis is concerned with the worldwide threat to what Arendt calls "the life of the mind". This threat is formulated in terms of Bernard Stiegler's philosophy of technology. According to Stiegler, the emergence of new technologies, particularly the digital media, has delivered the spirit over to the oppressive power of global capitalism. These technologies have come to direct and ultimately fabricate human desire, or "libidinal energy", towards consumer products, so as to maintain the capitalist system of production and consumption. Since individuals and groups singularise themselves in and through the working of their libidinal energy, the fabrication of desire by means of technology entails the fabrication of false singularities. The possibilities for individual and social existence are therefore reduced to a limited set of predetermined possibilities. However, while technology mediates our co-ordination within global consumer society, Stiegler also considers technology to be the means of our liberation from the capitalist logic of consumption. This liberation would entail the creative design of new techniques for the constitution of objects of desire that lie outside the demands of the market. In this way, our libidinal energy would be free to manifest itself in new experiences of singularity, and hence new forms of individual and social existence. These new forms of existence would entail a new politics of the spirit that is able to resist the oppressive forces of consumer society. In this article, I take issue with Stiegler's assumption that such a new politics of the spirit would indeed be the realisation or at least an enhancement of what Arendt understands under "the life of the mind". My claim is that Stiegler's conception of the life of the spirit - at least as it is presented in the Ars Industrialis manifesto - does not accord with Arendt's conception of the free activity of the mind, and that Stiegler's vision of political, economic and spiritual liberation cannot be reconciled with either Arendt's view of mind or her conception of political action. I do not deny that there are points of overlap between these two thinkers, nor do I intend to prove Stiegler's entire project wrong. My aim is simply to demonstrate that one of the underlying assumptions of this project - that the new politics of the spirit would entail the liberation of the life of the mind in Arendt's sense - does not hold. To this end, I undertake a systematic inquiry into Arendt's understanding of the life of the mind. I begin by analysing her distinction between mind and psyche, or soul, which reveals one of the fundamental differences between her work and that of Stiegler. I show that, while Stiegler equates mind with "libidinal energy", Arendt explicitly and consistently distinguishes the free activity of mind from our libidinal life, and criticises attempts to derive the former from the latter. Having set out the differences between Arendt and Stiegler on this point, I then turn to Arendt's treatment of the three mental activities that together constitute the life of the mind, namely thinking, willing and judging. I show that she conceives of each of these as a self-reflexive mental activity that is neither a function of our libidinal life nor of an external political or economic order. In light of this analysis, I argue that Stiegler's views are clearly opposed to those of Arendt in a number of ways. First, to the extent that Stiegler equates "mind" with the "libidinal energy", he denies Arendt's distinction between mind and psyche. Second, to the extent that he advocates the liberation of the mind from the domination of market forces, he understands the freedom of the mind (or its absence) as a function of economic forces. Finally, he assumes a direct relationship between the activity of mind/spirit and political action. That is to say, he assumes that the liberation of the mind - understood as libido - would lead to new forms of individual and social existence. Against this, Arendt insists on the distinction between the free activity of the mind and the political freedom that only comes into being in and through collective action. Stated more strongly: she considers political action as free precisely in so far as it is not the necessary outcome of mental operations. I therefore conclude that, while Stiegler's analysis of technology, his critique of the logic of consumption and his call for renewed care for the world should not be discarded out of hand, the conception of the life of the mind that underlies these arguments does not derive from Arendt.
Arendt, Stiegler en die lewe van die gees
(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2012-03) Roodt, Vasti
Bernard Stiegler en die ondertekenaars van die Ars Industrialis-manifes verbind hulself tot die bevryding van die menslike gees van die logika van die kapitalisme. Die manifes maak dit duidelik dat die begrip “gees” aan die hand van Hannah Arendt se opvatting van die “lewe van die gees” (“life of the mind”) verstaan moet word. Die doel van hierdie artikel is om die opvatting van “gees” wat Stiegler et al. aan Arendt toedig, te bevraagteken. Ek toon eerstens aan dat Stiegler nie erns maak met Arendt se onderskeid tussen gees (“mind”) en siel (“psyche”/”soul”) nie, waarna ek die drie aspekte van die lewe van die gees wat sy van mekaar onderskei, naamlik denke, wil en oordeel, op ’n sistematiese wyse ondersoek. Hierdie ondersoek lei dan tot die insig dat Arendt, anders as Stiegler, hierdie geestesvermoëns as vrye, self-refleksiewe aktiwiteite van die bewussyn verstaan, en nie as funksies van interne psigiese prosesse of van ’n eksterne ekonomiese- of politieke orde nie. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, alhoewel Stiegler se sosiale kritiek ongetwyfeld van waarde is, sy argument in hierdie verband nie berus op ’n begrip van die lewe van die gees wat hy aan Arendt ontleen nie.
Biomedical ethics in South Africa : current challenges and institutional responses
(Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities, Eberhard-Karls-University of Tubingen, 2000) Hattingh, Johan P.
The academic field of biomedical ethics in south Africa is fairly young and is currently going through a phase of properly establishing itself institutionally. At the same time it is confronted with the mulliple challenges of adequately responding to rapidly changing conceptions of the moral dimensions of medical practice. Without claiming to be exhaustive in this regard, this overview intends to highlight a number of the most pressing challenges to biomedical ethics in South Africa today. It will also focus on some of the most salient institutional responses to these challenges, while at the same time referring to a selction of sources where further discussion of these themes can be pursued.
Biomediese verbetering : maakbaarheid of onttowering?
(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2012-12) Van Niekerk, Anton A.
This essay examines some of the most important ethical questions surrounding biomedical enhancement in the light of the question whether such enhancement does not specifically add to the disenchantment problematic in current-day philosophy. The disenchantment of the world associated with the enlightenment onset of modernity may be viewed as the process whereby mystical or supernatural causes and solutions to practical, everyday problems came to be replaced with rational and scientific explanations and technological solutions. This intellectualisation was on the one hand viewed in a positive manner as the increasing mastery of humanity over its existence, not only in terms of the resulting eradication of disease and illness, but also in terms of the improvement of life in general. On the other hand, the intellectualisation and concomitant disenchantment of the world have been associated with negative outcomes. Technology with its resulting emphasis on material existence has, according to many, alienated humanity from other forms of experience – particularly religious experience, blunting our sense of awe and wonder at the unknown. The author posits enhancement as a striving for the improvement of our existing capacities, as being in congruence with endeavours which have long characterised human existence. Examples range from early attempts to improve and organise life, such as numeracy and literacy, through the development of institutions, up to contemporary preventative medicine such as vaccination against a host of diseases. On the other hand, this drive to improve is increasingly leading to the possibility of self-directed evolution, resulting in a radical transformation of the biological identity of the human being and even the possible creation of a new species (“trans-humanism”). This latter interpretation of the possible outcomes or consequences of enhancement has elicited much debate concerning the enhancement project. Arguments against biomedical enhancement are often founded upon a distinction between treatment and enhancement, whereby the former as an intervention to restore normal functioning is deemed permissible. A noted proponent of such a stance is Norman Daniels (2009) who argues that the risks involved in the utilisation of genetic interventions in cases of serious genetic diseases are outweighed by the potential benefits, whereas the same may not hold in cases of enhancement, which can be distinguished from treatment or therapy. The author, however, points out in accordance with thinkers such as Harris (1998) and Holtug (1998), that the enhancement/treatment distinction is not tenable and collapses in the face of particular situations as evidenced by various examples he discusses. The second argument against enhancement discussed by the author is the objection that enhancement compromises the autonomy of those who are enhanced – an argument of which Habermas (2003) is the primary exponent. For Habermas, the association of enhancement with eugenics is inescapable. He views such interventions as a violation of the equality and autonomy of human beings due to their subjection to the intentions of third parties. Responses to this position are discussed, such as Buchanan’s (2011) counter-argument that such a position is indicative of genetic determinism in its exclusive focus on genotype and its denial of the vastly influential role played by environmental factors in forming the identity of an individual. A third argument against enhancement discussed by the author, is put forward by Sandel (2007). Sandel regards the aim to enhance as characterised by a desire for perfection and control over the world, a denial of the “giftedness of life” as well as an erosion of the typical love and acceptance a parent ought to feel for its child “as it is”. The author argues that Sandel’s admonishments to appreciate the giftedness of life are evidence of a deeper objection to the perceived disenchantment of life wrought by technological change. However, objections to this argument generally draw attention to its inconsistency. Sandel regards changes achieved through genetic manipulation as a violation of the giftedness of life, but appears to have no objection to the non-genetic modes of influence and manipulation that we exert upon our offspring in an attempt to shape them to our perceived desires. The example highlighted by the author relates to the way in which we “direct and shape the development of children” and thus aims to improve them through education. Why, he asks, does Sandel see such aims of improvement as acceptable but not improvement through genetic interventions? Further objections to Sandel’s argument are discussed, such as the implications of granting moral preference to the gifted or given state of life, as well as Sandel’s seemingly teleological view of evolution. The author then discusses “transhumanism”, a movement advocating radical enhancement which may ultimately result in the emergence of a new species that developed out of human beings. Objections to the transhumanist acceptance of such a possibility have focused on the moral imperative to keep human nature intact. Various responses to this position are discussed, one of which is Daniels’ argument (2009), which views human nature as a “dispositional, selective population concept”. A further objection to radical enhancement is also discussed, namely concern regarding the practical implications of the creation of a highly superior transhuman species for humans who choose to remain unenhanced. Wikler (2009), for example, asks in this respect whether such a species would be justified in assuming a paternalistic attitude towards the unenhanced in the same way we make decisions regarding the well-being of children and mentally disabled people. Buchanan’s response in terms of the devising of a threshold level of competence is then explained and preferred by the author. The author also engages with several suggestions regarding the seeming impasse with which the enhancement debate has been characterised. As he points out, humanity has always tried to improve itself, thus to oppose enhancement is in a sense to oppose the inevitable. This inevitability suggests that we should focus upon specific projects of enhancement that may be more problematic than others, rather than rejecting enhancement outright. Our guiding principles for adjudicating such projects ought to be whether or not they are to our benefit or disadvantage as a species, as well as whether or not they respect human rights, persons and human dignity. Useful work that may be used as a guide is Bostrom and Sandberg’s (2009) heuristic which challenges alleged intuitions regarding the “wisdom of nature”. In addition, Buchanan’s (2011) “cautionary guidelines for future research” provide valuable suggestions regarding the avoidance of “cascading negative consequences”. Rather than viewing biomedical enhancement as a disillusionment of the world or a blunting of our sense of mystery and awe, the author concludes that we should allow the possibilities opened up by modern science to stimulate our sense of wonder. A sense of awe need not be limited solely in response to the unknown but may also arise from a disclosure of the unknown. An enchantment with the world need not be the outcome of darkness but rather an anticipation and result of discovery.
Certificate of need : dead and buried, or hibernating?
(Health & Medical Publishing Group, 2006) De Roubaix, Malcolm
On 2 May 2005, ten of the twelve chapters of the National Health Act (Act No. 61 of 2003) came into effect, generally with favourable reviews. I restrict myself to the motivation and ideology fundamental to Chapter 6 of the Draft Bill which (together with Chapter 8) was omitted in the Act, or rather, as the official government communiqué ominously asserted, ‘not yet proclaimed’. Chapter 6 deals among other things with the classification of health establishments as a precursor to the notorious Certificate of Need.
Complexity, postmodernism and the bioethical dilemma
(SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein, 2008) De Roubaix, Malcolm; Cilliers, Paul
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This article examines the implications of a postmodern ethics for bioethical problems. Traditional approaches to bioethics, with specific reference to “principlism”, depend on a modernist strategy which attempts to produce generalised solutions. Making use of complexity theory, it is shown that the factors specific to each instance cannot be reduced in an objective way. The contingency of each individual case has to be considered. This leads to an ethics which cannot be the result of following universal rules, but one that has to accept the responsibility for the outcome of our decisions, even if these outcomes are not fully predictable. The responsibility for our choices cannot be shifted onto some a priori principle.
Conceptualizing ecological sustainability and ecologically sustainable development in ethical terms : issues and challenges
(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2001-03) Hattingh, Johan P.
The twin concepts of ecological sustainability and ecologically sustainable development have been in circulation in international circles for about three decades. In South Africa these concepts have become cornerstones of both our new Constitution and our National Environmental Management Policy. And yet, there is still a highly intensive and wide ranging debate going on in international as well as national contexts in which both the meaning and implementation of these concepts are contested from different angles. In this article the reasons for this slate of affairs are explored from an ethical perspective, and a number of proposals are made on a philosophical and policy level to respond to the contested nature of these concepts. In an overview of the historical development of the concepts of ecological sustainability and ecologically sustainable development it is shown that they have emerged from different, and to some extent mutually exclusive, contexts. The paper then proceeds 10 a systematic discussion of a number of "fault lines~ within these concepts, in which the focus falls on certain internal tensions that make their interpretation very difficult, if not highly controversial. These tensions are associated with different ethical and ideological positions that can be assumed with regards to questions such as the following: 1. What is so valuable that it can and should be sustainable? 2. With a view to whom or what is the sustainability of this valuable something pursued? 3. How is sustain ability pursued? 4. What are the criteria for sustainabililY? - so that the question whether and when we have reached a state of sustainability can be answered. On the basis of an overview of these "fault lines" it becomes possible to distinguish between different conceptions and different models of ecological sustainabifity and ecologically sustainable development. The value of this taxonomy lies in the clarification that it brings to the muddy waters of ideological posturing about the meaning and implementation of the concepts of ecological sustainability and ecologically sustainable development.
Dare we rethink informed consent?
(Health and Medical Publishing Group, 2017) De Roubaix, Malcolm
Current informed consent practices conform to the informed consent paradigm (ICP). Our intention is finally to promote patient autonomy through the provision of information intended to remove the information (i.e. power) differential between doctor and patient. ICP is fundamentally flawed, since it is impossible to comprehensively and explicitly inform. A fundamental problem is our reliance on the container-conduit metaphor of informing. As a linguistic act, this metaphor conceptualises the process of informing as passive, when in reality informing and consequent sense-making are parts of an individualised, personal and active process. The difficulties of the ICP are discussed, as are possible alternative strategies (reverting to paternalism, retaining the illusion of autonomy, and de-linking informing/consent, or the moral and legal aspects of consent). Alternative models are also discussed (e.g. Manson and O’Neill’s notion of informed consent as a transaction). Concluding suggestions include drawing on an ethics of responsibility, incorporating the notion of informed consent as a transaction, debating the issues raised here and promoting the ethical empowerment of practising doctors.
Deliberating about race as a variable in biomedical research
(Health & Medical Publishing Group, 2011-04-04) Van Niekerk, Anton A.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Race as a variable in research ethics is investigated: to what extent is it morally appropriate to regard the race of research subjects as pivotal for research outcomes? The challenges it poses to deliberation in research ethics committees are considered, and it is concluded that race sometimes must be considered, subject to clearly stated qualifications.
Ecological sustainability in a developing country such as South Africa? A philosophical and ethical inquiry.
(Frank Cass Publishers, 2002) Hattingh, Johan P.; Attfield, Robin
Although South Africa has adopted the notion of ecologically sustainable development not only as a human right entrenched in its Constitution, but also as one of its major policy objectives, there are major practical, conceptual, and ethical stumbling blocks impeding the achievement of this goal. In this article we investigate the conceptual and some of the ethical problems, including apparent conflicts with other pressing goals such as the alleviation of poverty. We conclude that the concept of ecologically sustainable development has a substantive core, and that radical reforms of human systems allow this right and goal to be reconciled with other human needs.
Erkenning van kulturele verskille
(South African Academy for Science and Arts, 2001) Van der Merwe, W. L.
'n Lang en ryk tradisie in die filosofie gaan daarvan uit dat die behoefte aan erkenning 'n universele en wesenlike menslike gegewe is. 1 Dit word nie net in abstraksie beredeneer nie, maar ook onderskryf deur spesifieke interpretasies van die mitologie, die tragedie, antler literere vorme, asook studies in die psigologie, sosiale antropologie en die fenomenologie van godsdiens. In hierdie bydrae gaan daar egter spesifiek gefokus word op die problematiek van erkenning van kulturele verskille omdat dit in hedendaagse samelewings so 'n belangrike rol speel. 2 Suid-Afrika is in die verband geen uitsondering nie, hoewel die tekstuur van kulturele verskeidenheid en veral die wyse waarop dit in die koloniale en apartheidsverlede verpolitiseer is, ons situasie verskillend maak. Die algemene bewussyn in die wereld vandag van die belang van kulturele verskille en die probleme wat die erkenning daarvan oproep, word ook gereflekteer in die hedendaagse filosofie, byvoorbeeld in bepaalde vorme van multikulturalisme, feminisme en postmodemisme, in debatte oor die begronding en begrensing van groepspesifieke ofkulturele regte, en in die herwaardering van die etiese appel wat van die antler, ook die "kulturele antler", uitgaan. 3 Waarop meer spesifiek gefokus gaan word - veral in die tweede en derde dee! van hierdie betoog - is die vraag onder watter voorwaardes erkenning van kulturele verskille gevra en gegee kan word. Die antwoord van 'n bepaalde vorm van kulturele relatiwisme op hierdie vraag is die "gelykheidstese", dit wil se die opvatting dat die gelykwaardigheid van kulture erken moet word. Deur 'n kritiek van die opvatting been, sal betoog word dat die voorwaardes vir die erkenning van kulturele verskille op 'n antler, in feite aporetiese wyse verstaan moet word. Met die oog daarop word daar eers gewys op die verband tussen kultuur en erkenning.
The ethics of responsibility : the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas
(SUN MeDIA Bloemfontein, 2008-06) Van der Merwe, Willie; De Voss, Vida
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics is based on the Other/other. He argues that we are in an asymmetrical relationship with our neighbour that pre-destines us to ethical responsibility even before consciousness or choice. In the face-to-face encounter an infinity and alterity about our neighbour is revealed, which is irreducible to our ontological grasp, and thereby compels us to respond to him. It is also through this relation that our humanity is released as our solipsistic “all-for-myself” becomes a “being-for-the-other”. Furthermore, the “I” is irreplaceable, thereby making each of us ethically responsible for our neighbour, even to the point of responsibility for his material misery. This paper introduces and, in the main, supports this idea of Levinas’s.
The ethics of responsibility: fallibilism, futurity and phronesis
(Pieter de Waal Neethling Trust, 2020) Van Niekerk, Anton A.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this article, I deal with the issue of a possible ethics of responsibility (ER) from a philosophical perspective in general, and bioethics in particular. My aim is to explore whether an ER is able to incorporate or integrate some, if not most, of the valid (and valuable) aspects of utilitarianism and deontology, without succumbing to most of the glaring shortcomings of these two famous frameworks. If such an enterprise could be successful, I would venture to infer that the ER could indeed be highly relevant for the time in which we live. I develop three central ideas of the framework of the ethics of responsibility. These three ideas are, firstly, that an appropriate framework for moral decision-making requires us to make room for the possibility of failure; secondly, we must see the implications of Jonas' emphasis on the need for an ethics of futurity for taking cognisance of the consequences of acts, and, thirdly, that although consequences of actions may be important, as utilitarianism has always insisted, consequences are not enough. Moral actions are also of necessity guided by rules and principles when making moral decisions. It is particularly in this respect that I shall, at the end, draw on the insights of Aristotle in respect of his notion of phronesis. The crux of my argument is to be found in what Aristotle identifies as the essence of moral knowledge. Moral knowledge respects and often builds upon the norms and action guides that pervade social life. However, merely drawing on deep-seated norms and conventions is not enough. These norms and conventions require application in a host of practical situations. Exactly how they are to be applied, is far from self-evident. That is something that we learn in the practice of daily life by the deliberation that essentially characterises phronesis or prudence (practical wisdom).
Finding creativity in the diversity of environmental ethics
(Environmental Education Association of Southern Africa, 1999) Hattingh, Johan P.
The contribution is a comprehensive if abbreviated review of different philosophical perspectives on human-environment relationships. Extensively referenced, it outlines historical trends and current debates in the field of environmental ethics. The author argues that the diversity and disagreements amongst environmental philosophers is not a cause for concern, but rather an opening in which new and. better positions can be sought, towards a philosophy which can meaningfully enable environmental practice.
The formation of the self : Nietzsche and complexity
(Philosophical Society of South Africa., 2002) Cilliers, Paul, 1956-; Roodt, Vasti; De Villiers, Tanya
The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between the formation of the self and the worldly horizon within which this self achieves its meaning. Our inquiry takes place from two perspectives: the first derived from the Nietzschean analysis of how one becomes what one is; the other from current developments in complexity theory. This two-angled approach opens up different, yet related dimensions of a non-essentialist understanding of the self that is none the less neither arbitrary nor deterministic. Indeed, at the meeting point of these two perspectives on the self lies a conception of a dynamic, worldly self, whose identity is bound up with its appearance in a world shared with others. After examining this argument from the respective view points offered by Nietzsche and complexity theory, the article concludes with a consideration of some of the political and ethical implications of representing our situatedness within a shared human domain as a condition for self-formation.
From dis-enclosure to decolonisation : in dialogue with Nancy and Mbembe on self-determination and the other
(MDPI, 2018-04-13) Gerber, Schalk Hendrik
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What might a sense of decolonisation (not)/be? Or, what comes after the logic of the coloniser? This question is at the centre of many debates in South Africa and extends to all countries worldwide who are faced with the challenge of self-determination by rethinking the world we live in after the domination of the world by the so-called “all enclosingWestern world-view” incarnated in various oppressive political, economic, social and intellectual practices. The challenge of rethinking the world following the demotion of the West from its centre, as will be argued, is not only for those who are particularly living in a previously colonised world, but also for those who were/ still are in the position of dominance, which is a universal task. It is at this point where the various philosophical traditions meet, more precisely that of continental philosophy of religion and African philosophy. Accordingly, this article seeks to explore the question in two parts by way of an inter-cultural approach. Part one retraces the critique of (a certain) Western metaphysics in terms of its onto-theological constitution. Subsequently, this onto-theological constitution is discussed in relation to the notions of identity and political to outline what a sense of decolonisation might not be, that is a re-enforcement of the logic of the coloniser, which denies the full existence of an-other. In part two, four suggestions are made on what a sense of decolonisation might be in dialogue with Jean-Luc Nancy and Achille Mbembe. The suggestions include a two-sided attitude of reticence/dissidence against falling back into the problematic logic. A move to consider decolonisation as the dis-enclosure of the world, which in turn, opens up a space for an alternative ontology that acknowledges our existence as always being-in-the-word with others. The fourth suggestion concerns the implications of this alternative ontology regarding a non-substantialist notion of identity as mêlée, which is the action of constant struggle within the re-opened space for what it means to live in the world. Finally, it is concluded that the alternative ontology of decolonisation as dis-enclosure implies a universal task of taking responsibility for the reparation of the dignity of the whole of humanity within our shared world.
From dis-enclosure to decolonisation : in dialogue with Nancy and Mbembe on self-determination and the other
(MDPI, 2011-04-13) Gerber, Schalk Hendrik
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What might a sense of decolonisation (not)/be? Or, what comes after the logic of the coloniser? This question is at the centre of many debates in South Africa and extends to all countries worldwide who are faced with the challenge of self-determination by rethinking the world we live in after the domination of the world by the so-called “all enclosingWestern world-view” incarnated in various oppressive political, economic, social and intellectual practices. The challenge of rethinking the world following the demotion of the West from its centre, as will be argued, is not only for those who are particularly living in a previously colonised world, but also for those who were/ still are in the position of dominance, which is a universal task. It is at this point where the various philosophical traditions meet, more precisely that of continental philosophy of religion and African philosophy. Accordingly, this article seeks to explore the question in two parts by way of an inter-cultural approach. Part one retraces the critique of (a certain) Western metaphysics in terms of its onto-theological constitution. Subsequently, this onto-theological constitution is discussed in relation to the notions of identity and political to outline what a sense of decolonisation might not be, that is a re-enforcement of the logic of the coloniser, which denies the full existence of an-other. In part two, four suggestions are made on what a sense of decolonisation might be in dialogue with Jean-Luc Nancy and Achille Mbembe. The suggestions include a two-sided attitude of reticence/dissidence against falling back into the problematic logic. A move to consider decolonisation as the dis-enclosure of the world, which in turn, opens up a space for an alternative ontology that acknowledges our existence as always being-in-the-word with others. The fourth suggestion concerns the implications of this alternative ontology regarding a non-substantialist notion of identity as mêlée, which is the action of constant struggle within the re-opened space for what it means to live in the world. Finally, it is concluded that the alternative ontology of decolonisation as dis-enclosure implies a universal task of taking responsibility for the reparation of the dignity of the whole of humanity within our shared world.
From inequality to equality : evaluating normative justifications for affirmative action as racial redress
(SUNMeDIA, 2014-11) Hall, Susan; Woermann, Minka
We investigate whether, and to what extent, Nozick’s entitlement theory and Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness can normatively ground affirmative action policies. Our findings are that, whereas the Nozickean project offers no guidance for large-scale redress, the Rawlsian position supports affirmative action as redress, but only in its softer forms. Therefore, if one accepts the assumptions of equal liberty and fairness upon which Rawls’s theory is based, one is left with two alternatives: either to reject Rawls’s theory because it fails to support quota systems, or to accept Rawls’s theory and reject quota systems as a legitimate form of redress. We argue for the latter option.
Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being
(Taylor & Francis, 2018-03) De Villiers-Botha, Tanya; Philosophy
The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory.
Hermeneutics and historical consciousness : an appraisal of the contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer
(African Journals Online -- AJOL, 2002) Van Niekerk, Anton A.
In this introductory article to the volume of the South African Journal of Philosophy in tribute of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author, first, makes a few remarks about the nature of hermeneutics and Gadamer's views on the universality of the hermeneutical experience. This universality is, in particular, explained from the perspective of the "linguistic turn" in Gadamer's thought. Secondly, there is a brief discussion of certain particular aspects of Gadamer's contribution. Aspects of that contribution that are emphasized are: Gadamer's reevaluation of prejudice, authority and tradition, his idea of "Wirkungs-geschichte", his idea of meaning as a process rather than a given entity, his analogy between game-playing and the interpretation of art, and his dialogical conception of interpretation. The author concludes by developing his own estimate of the main thrust of Gadamer's contribution. This contribution consists of the way in which Gadamer's thought, on the one hand, represents a demonstration and embodiment of the kind of historical consciousness so typical of our times, but, on the other hand, also accomplishes this exemplification of historical consciousness while imaginatively avoiding the kind of relativistic historicism so typical of many other manifestations of the same trend.

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