How not to be a metaethical naturalist - Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals

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dc.contributor.authorDe Villiers-Botha, Tanya
dc.contributor.otherAfrica Centre for HIV/AIDS Managementen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-23T09:02:44Z
dc.date.issued2014-07
dc.description.abstractJesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative ethical theories, (2) that moral progress is possible, despite the relativistic implications of his own position, and (3) that this undermining of the is–ought gap should hold true on any naturalistic metaethical theory, the extent to which his project succeeds becomes significant.en_ZA
dc.description.urihttp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02580136.2014.923689#.U8N7dvmSzy0en_ZA
dc.description.versionPost-printen_ZA
dc.embargo.lift2035
dc.embargo.terms2035/12/31en_ZA
dc.format.extent13 p.
dc.identifier.citation"How not to be a metaethical naturalist Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals", S. Afr. J. Philos. 2014, 33(3): 145-154en_ZA
dc.identifier.other10.1080/02580136.2014.923689 Tanya de Villiers-Bothaa*
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/96489
dc.language.isoen_ZAen_ZA
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_ZA
dc.rights.holderTaylor & Francisen_ZA
dc.subjectPrinz, Jesse J.en_ZA
dc.subjectMetaethical naturalismen_ZA
dc.subjectMoral psychologyen_ZA
dc.titleHow not to be a metaethical naturalist - Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of moralsen_ZA
dc.typeArticleen_ZA
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