Mindchangeability - Objectivity in the Time of Post-Truth Politics

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dc.contributor.advisorRoodt, Vastien_ZA
dc.contributor.advisorSmit, JPen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorFroneman, Hanikaen_ZA
dc.contributor.otherStellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-23T18:44:08Zen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-16T12:53:53Zen_ZA
dc.date.available2022-11-23T18:44:08Zen_ZA
dc.date.available2023-01-16T12:53:53Zen_ZA
dc.date.issued2022en_ZA
dc.descriptionThesis (MPhil) -- Stellenbosch University, 2022en_ZA
dc.description.abstractENGLISH ABSTRACT: The post-truth lament points to a perceived decline in the objectivity of public opinion. In this thesis, I contribute to the academic discussion of post-truth politics by proposing a conceptual shift from naïve objectivity to critical objectivity. Following the critical rationalism of Karl Popper, I argue that objectivity, as a procedural norm of inquiry, is defined by a receptivity to refutation. Based on this conception, I propose a distinct approach to interpreting and ameliorating the historical problems signified by post-truth politics. Given the fact that these problems persist within the framework of modern democracy, I also address the apparent tension between a demand for objective standards in the formation of public opinion, and the democratic norms of freedom and pluralism. I advocate for a discursive approach to conceptualising the role of objective constraints in public opinion and deliberation that extends to matters of evaluative judgement. This, however, requires a response to the challenge of delineating an ideal of evaluative objective that does not succumb to the problematic assumption that there exist normative facts independent of the construction of moral-political ideals by the subjects of democratic deliberation. I address this challenge, relying on Habermasian discourse ethics to provide a basis for theorising ‘objectivity without objects’. I subsequently reintroduce the arguments for critical objectivity at the level of normative political discourse, and set out the theory of what I call ‘mindchangeability’ – a characterisation of political objectivity by means of the same critical attitude that describes critical objectivity in the context of epistemic inquiry. I explore some of the implications of this approach for addressing the deeper problems of post-truth politics – including not only the problem of misinformation, but also political polarisation.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractAFRIKAANS OPSOMMING: Die postwaarheidklagte veronderstel ’n afname in die objektiwiteit van openbare mening. In hierdie tesis poog ek om ’n bydrae te maak tot die akademiese diskoers rondom die verskynsel van post-waarheidpolitiek deur ’n konseptuele skuif vanaf naïewe objektiwiteit na kritiese objektiwiteit voor te stel. Gegrond in die kritiese rasionalisme van Karl Popper, argumenteer ek dat objektiwiteit, as a prosedurele norm, gedefinieer word deur ’n ontvanklikheid tot weerlegging. Hierdie konseptualisering dui op ’n kenmerkende benadering ten opsigte van die probleme en moontlike oplossings tot postwaarheidpolitiek. Gegewe die feit dat hierdie problem plaasvind binne die raamwerk van die modern demokrasie, spreek ek ook die oënskynlike spanning aan tussen objektiwiteit en die demokratiese norme van vryheid en pluralisme. Ek argumenteer ten gunste van ’n diskursiewe benader jeens die rol wat objektiewe beperkings speel in die evaluerende domein van openbare mening en meningswisseling. So ’n benadering kom egter met die uitdaging om ’n ideaal van evaluerende objektiwiteit voor te stel wat nie staat maak op die problematiese aanname dat die demokratiese diskoers afhang van normatiewe feite onafhanklik van die konstruktiewe rol wat subjekte speel in die voorstelling van moreel-politieke ideale nie. Ek reageer op hierdie uitdaging deur ’n beroep te doen op Habermas se diskoersetiek as ’n basis vir ‘objektiwiteit sonder objekte’. Ek herhaal, vervolgens, die argument vir kritiese objektiwiteit op die vlak van normatiewe politieke diskoers, en stel die teorie van ‘mindchangeability’ voor – ’n formulering van politieke objektiwiteit gebaseer op dieselfde kritiese houding wat kritiese objektiwiteit in the konsteks van epistemiese ondersoek omskryf. Ek verken dan die implikasies van hierdie konsepsie van objektiwiteit as ‘mindchangeability’ vir die hantering van die diepere problem van postwaarheidpolitiek – insluitend nie net die problem vanaf_ZA
dc.description.versionMastersen_ZA
dc.format.extent127 pagesen_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/126174en_ZA
dc.language.isoen_ZAen_ZA
dc.publisherStellenbosch : Stellenbosch Universityen_ZA
dc.rights.holderStellenbosch Universityen_ZA
dc.subjectTruthfulness and falsehooden_ZA
dc.subjectObjectivism (Philosophy)en_ZA
dc.subjectPolitical science – Philosophyen_ZA
dc.subjectCritical theoryen_ZA
dc.subjectNormativity (Ethics)en_ZA
dc.subjectRationalism -- Political aspectsen_ZA
dc.subjectUCTDen_ZA
dc.titleMindchangeability - Objectivity in the Time of Post-Truth Politicsen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
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