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Some lessons from Kripke’s a puzzle about belief

Smit, J. P. (2011)

CITATION: Smit, J. P. 2011. Some lessons from Kripke’s A Puzzle About Belief. Stellenbosch Papers in Linguistics, 40:39-56, doi: 10.5774/40-0-38.

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ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The literature on Kripke’s A Puzzle About Belief has delivered convincing answers to the problem raised by Kripke. This is so both for referentialists and descriptivists. In this article I consider what I take to be the best responses of both parties and what we can learn from these responses. I argue, firstly, that the most basic cleavage when considering the semantics of belief-attribution is between theories that claim content to be transparent and theories that do not, secondly, that such substitutivitypuzzles cannot be of much use in deciding the issue between referentialist and descriptivist theories of belief-attribution and, thirdly, that the most basic challenge facing the descriptivist is to come up with a notion of content on which such content is epistemically transparent.

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