Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being
Date
2018-03
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Abstract
The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly
defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the
most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed,
since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend
the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper,
I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact
that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the
inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit
considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported
neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons
that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this
neutrality is illusory.
Description
CITATION: De Villiers-Botha, T. 2018. Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being, South African Journal of Philosophy, (37)1:1-17, doi:10.1080/02580136.2017.1393246.
The original publication is available at https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsph20
The original publication is available at https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsph20
Keywords
Harm, Counterfactual Comparative Account, Pre-emption Problem, Omission Problem, Hanna, Well-being
Citation
De Villiers-Botha, T. 2018. Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being, South African Journal of Philosophy, (37)1:1-17, doi:10.1080/02580136.2017.1393246.