Browsing by Author "Muller, M. A."

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    Die aantrekking van die Logos Baptiste Kerk op lidmate van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk : 'n teologiese en sielkundige ondersoek
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 1989-11) Muller, M. A.; Muller, B. A.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Theology. Dept. of Practical Theology and Missiology.
    AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING:
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    Combining uncertainties in a court of law using Bayesian networks
    (Obiter Law Journal: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU), Faculty of Law, 2017) Muller, M. A.
    People generally have difficulty dealing with the counter-intuitive notion of probability, and therefore they often misunderstand aspects of uncertainty. This is particularly significant in a court of law when for example an estimate of the probability of the evidence gets confused with an estimate of the probability of guilt. The circumstantial evidence is especially prone to being handled incorrectly. Professor Fenton at the Queen Mary University of London said, “You could argue that virtually every case with circumstantial evidence is ripe for being improved by Bayesian arguments”.1 In this paper, the evidence in a famous court case is revisited in the context of Bayesian networks.
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    Handling uncertainty in a court of law
    (Stellenbosch Law Review : Juta Law, 2012) Muller, M. A.
    The ability to analyse uncertainty does not reside within most people's experience. Certain fallacies frequently appear. An important example is the so-called prosecutor's fallacy. It is a specific error of logic commonly made when arguments involving probabilities are considered. Since these errors keep happening and people tend to avoid reasoning in terms of probability theory, courts do not always come to the best possible conclusion in matters involving uncertainty. In this paper we discuss different aspects of faulty reasoning concerning uncertainty in legal matters.
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    Underestimating the probability of coincidence
    (Obiter Law Journal: Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU), Faculty of Law, 2014) Muller, M. A.
    Coincidences are more common than most people might expect. It is quite possible that different pieces of evidence that seem to point in the same direction do so coincidentally. We come to the best possible conclusion about (say) the probability of guilt only after careful analysis of the combination of probabilities of the respective pieces of evidence has been performed in conformance with the principles of probability theory. Several methods are available for the evaluation and handling of such contingencies. Depending on the way a particular situation presents itself, Bayes’s theorem in one of its equivalent guises is often used. The danger in avoiding this type of reasoning is that incorrect conclusions may be drawn, believing that events are somehow beyond coincidence. When it happens in a court of law it may be extremely prejudicial to the defendant. Coincidences are best understood within the context of probability theory.
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    Weighing evidence
    (Author retain copyright, 2019-12) Muller, M. A.
    Often different pieces of evidence of different degrees of credibility are submitted in legal proceedings. Then a court “weighs” the evidence and arrives at a conclusion. But how should evidence be weighed? The use of probability theory comes to mind. Examples in this article illustrate this approach.