SUNScholar - Browsing by Author "Monama, Fankie Lucas"

Browsing by Author "Monama, Fankie Lucas"

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Black workers, typhoid fever and the construction of the Berg River : Saldanha military water pipeline, 1942 – 1943
(AOSIS, 2008-04-11) Visser, Deon; Monama, Fankie Lucas
War creates a huge need for labour to support the war efforts of the belligerent parties. In South Africa tens of thousands of ‘non-white’ workers were mobilised during the Second World War to satisfy the Union Defence Force’s (UDF’s) labour needs at home and abroad. This article, firstly, outlines the role of ‘non-white people’, particularly black Africans, in the UDF with special reference to those employed within the Union of South Africa. Secondly, it briefly delineates typhoid fever as an historical thorn in the flesh of military forces up to the early 20th century. It then looks briefly into the incidence of and perceptions on typhoid fever as a killer disease in South Africa on the eve of the Second World War. Against that background, the article investigates the employment of black workers on the construction of the Berg River-Saldanha Bay military water pipeline and the UDF’s response to the threat and subsequent outbreak of typhoid fever amongst the workers at the Berg River intake site in 1943. The article concludes that the public health authorities and UDF were aware of the threat of typhoid fever with regard to the Berg River water scheme, but did not take sufficient precautionary measures, which could have had serious repercussions for the Allied war effort. This incident should serve as a warning to the South African National Defence Force when deploying on peace support operations on the African continent where typhoid fever remains a serious threat next to Hiv/Aids.
Civil defence and protective services in South Africa during World War Two, 1939–1945
(Historical Association of South Africa, 2019-11) Monama, Fankie Lucas
During World War Two, South Africa inaugurated the Civilian Protective Services organisation as a civil defence effort to deal with, inter alia, the preventive and protective measures in defence of the civilian population against attack from the air and the sea, and against the dangers arising from sabotage and sudden emergency. Between 1940 and 1945, about 80 000 civilians volunteered for service in the air raid precautions and the civilian guard sections of the Civilian Protective Services, to contribute towards a national defence effort of the Union of South Africa. This article examines the origin of the Civilian Protective Services and its development during World War Two, within the context of South Africa’s political and internal security challenges. It contends that the institution of the Civilian Protective Services was a vital element in South Africa’s effort to enhance internal security, to assuage public anxieties and to sustain morale as well as to maintain public support for its war policy.
Knowledge management and early warning systems : the case of Southern African Development Community's conflict prevention strategy
(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2008-12) Monama, Fankie Lucas; Muller, Hans Peter; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. Information Science.
Africa’s socio-economic reconstruction and development is constrained by the spate of violent conflicts afflicting the continent. Internecine strife and humanitarian concerns have prompted international debates surrounding the efficacy of existing conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies. With Africa seemingly in a semi-permanent state of tension and crisis, and the inability of the global and continental systems and structures to effectively deal with these situations, it requires a disentanglement of a “complex interplay of institutional-bureaucratic and political dynamics,” that place the continent at the centre of intervention dilemma. At the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts on the continent did not wither away, but have become so complex, thus confounding efforts to achieve sustainable peace. This complexity requires greater efforts to improve international, regional and subregional institutional capacities and contingency instruments to facilitate effective responses. The key emphasis within the international community is to enhance instruments to facilitate early detection of conflict situations in order to initiate preventive actions. Put differently, conflict prevention can be facilitated through the dynamic improvement of the processes, structures and functions of (conflict) early warning systems (EWS). In addition, political will is crucial towards the operationalisation of such systems to ensure swift and coordinated implementation of preventive actions. Cedric de Coning argues that conflict early warning systems can “improve our ability to generate the political will necessary to authorize preventive action much earlier in the conflict cycle, by improving our ability to estimate the potential future cost of inaction, and the way we bring this information to the attention of decision makers.” Schmeidl also argues that “early warning needs to be seen as a precondition to developing political will, and thus initiate (or better inform) reasonable response strategies.” However, existing organisational structures crucial for facilitating and expediting conflict prevention initiatives, suffer from “inertia” due to entrenched political structures, hierarchies and competing interests. The United Nations (UN) is an international body with the authority to facilitate conflict prevention. However, it is constrained by organisational complexities such as sectional political self-interest and the “bureaucratic red tape in large bureaucracies”, thus hampering its ability to swiftly and with the correct mandate, to respond to a call for preventive intervention. Hence the devolution of the responsibilities for the settlement of conflicts to the regional and subregional bodies. Conflicts have also “tended to pay little respect to State borders, proving the necessity for inter-State cooperation.” Because of the regionalisation of conflicts, the case of inter-regional collaboration has become increasingly vital as the “appropriate initial actors in seeking to defuse tensions and resolve local disputes within the region.” To this end, stronger intergovernmental mechanisms to facilitate early recognition of conflict situations and early intervention to prevent eruption or mitigate escalation have to be maintained. African countries, as a result, bear the burden of peace interventions from the African Union (AU) which consists of 53 members, to regional economic communities (RECs) such as Southern African Development Community (SADC), which consists of 14 members. These organisations are attenuated by bureaucratic ineptitude for adaptive behaviour that impact on swift and flexible responses. Nation states with diverse historical backgrounds, different political systems and unequal economic strengths are inclined to have fundamental inequalities in power and influence. Consequently, opposing political values, national interest and competing rationalities underlining their actions become sources of contention and impede the establishment of a common ground. These hurdles breed tensions and suspicion that impact on coordination of effort and information sharing regarding conflict situations. Thus, to surmount these barriers, it is imperative to reconcile competing interests through comprehensive inclusiveness, cooperation and effective collaborative partnerships among various stakeholders, particularly civil society and political decision makers. ‘Preventive action’ must, insists the International Peace Academy (IPA), “not be considered as an expedient product or event, but as a continuous, organic process that necessitates a highest degree of inclusiveness and multisectoral participation in dialogue and peace-building. These aspects should be institutionalised within the inter-regional organisations to establish the culture of common effort for common purpose. In the interest of collective effort and to expand AU’s capacity for conflict prevention, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2003. The PSC is defined as “a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situation in Africa. Apparently, the PSC, as an instrument of conflict prevention on the continent, is also aimed at achieving unity of thought in dealing with the threats to peace and stability. In conflict situations, state sovereignty, political desirability and competing goals often render peace processes ineffective due to differences regarding the best course of action. The PSC is regarded as the means to create a platform for shared understanding and common vision regarding the challenge of conflict prevention. Still, to be more effective, it requires a strong collaboration with subregional organisations (e.g. SADC) and multisectoral participation of, for example academics, research institutes, civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs). The main thrust should be to create a shared framework for political decision makers to make “collective sense” of the problems on the continent, and be in a position to synchronise efforts to achieve peace and stability. Conversely, the AU and also SADC remain politically diverse organisations. As such, operationalisation of conflict prevention initiatives is likely to encounter obstacles emanating from, as Gina van Schalkwyk indicated, “conflict around political values amongst states in the [sub]region and …disputes on the basis of divergent interpretations [of policies]. This creates a paradox between the necessity of conflict prevention and the divergent national interests. Convergent thinking and creating a shared outlook in the existing organisational frameworks (e.g. SADC) is imperative in order to generate political will and to facilitate improved decision making and implementation of proactive responses in the prevention of conflicts.
South African propaganda agencies and the battle for public opinion during the Second World War, 1939–1945
(Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 2016) Monama, Fankie Lucas
South Africa’s entry into the Second World War in 1939 was complex. The Smuts government lacked nation-wide support and experienced hostile reactions from opponents of its war policy. It was also subjected to Nazi propaganda offensives, which intensified national divisions and undermined public morale. In response, the Union authorities adopted a volunteer policy for military service and embarked on a massive drive to secure positive public opinion and national support for the war policy. This move led to the establishment of various publicity and propaganda organisations to influence public opinion and to stimulate enthusiasm for the war. However, inadequate policy direction and lacking a solid framework to guide propaganda organisation and operations created inter-agency frictions and rivalries. The study on which this article is based, examined the main propaganda agencies, the Bureau of Information (BOI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which contested one another for jurisdiction, authority and power to shape public opinion in South Africa during the war. The analysis focused on the rationale for their establishment, their purpose, objectives and activities. Then the article reports on the inter-institutional relationships, organisational politics and competition, and how these aspects affected the Union’s propaganda enterprise, mobilisation drive and the prosecution of the war effort.
Wartime propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939 - 1945
(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014-04) Monama, Fankie Lucas; Nasson, William Richard; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of History.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern history, where whole populations, not just military forces, became participants in the war effort, the potential power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass communication media to manipulate public opinion. Alongside politico-diplomatic, economic and military manoeuvres, governments needed to mobilise the minds of their population to secure support, to mobilise them behind the war policy and to avoid discontent and dissension. This was particularly crucial to South Africa during the Second World War (1939-1945), especially as the country was threatened by deeply ingrained political tensions and internal divisions. The wartime Union, under General Jan Smuts, experienced an escalation of political extremism and militancy from radical sections of white Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the government’s war policy. Furthermore, some elements within even the Union Defence Force (UDF) displayed disloyal tendencies which threatened the morale of the armed forces. Thus, in response, the government waged a massive propaganda campaign during the war aimed at stimulating recruitment, at preserving national morale, at combating anti-war resistance and at minimising disruptions to the implementation of its war policy. To this end, the authorities exploited information avenues such as radio broadcasts, the press, films, mobile recruiting tours and military demonstrations for publicity and propaganda purposes. As propaganda delivery channels, radio, the press and films were potentially powerful. However, the strategy pursued by the authorities failed to maximise their full impact. The government also did not enjoy a media monopoly for the conduct of its war propaganda. The SABC continued operating independently and its airtime was not handed over to the authorities. Similarly, while the government relied on the support of sympathetic newspaper editors for its propaganda campaign, newspapers themselves sometimes ignored censorship regulations and published material which was unhelpful to the national war effort. Meanwhile, the opposition press also contested the propaganda terrain by waging anti-war campaigns. Films were the weakest link due to limited government control, production obstacles and an English language dominance which alienated the majority of white Afrikaans speakers. Another problem was persistent rivalry among various official and semiofficial propaganda agencies and a lack of clarity over a common propaganda policy. When it came to recruitment, government propaganda achieved particularly limited success. Despite patriotic appeals for volunteer enlistment, the shortage of manpower remained a persistent problem throughout the war. Alongside this, social and economic problems such as food and housing shortages also had a negative impact on public morale. The positive reach of propaganda efforts within the military, especially education, information and social welfare services, was also limited in that they were unable to dispel dissatisfaction resulting from poor service conditions, military policies, and the growing influence of war weariness. Towards the end of hostilities, there was a perceptible decline in troop discipline and morale. In general, therefore, the Union government’s overall war publicity and propaganda effort failed to produce a solid sense of national war cohesion or war unity. Although the country remained stable and was able to sustain war participation, it could not be said that South Africa’s leadership was able to persuade inhabitants – whether white or black - to participate in the Second World War as a war to be embraced as a people’s war.

Browsing by Author "Monama, Fankie Lucas"

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