Browsing by Author "Mbete, Luvuyo"

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    An evaluation of oversight and accountability by the fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2016-12) Mbete, Luvuyo; Burger, Johan; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. School of Public Leadership.
    ENGLISH SUMMARY : Internationally oversight and accountability are regarded as two sides of the same coin, which are essential in ensuring that the electorate receives public value through service delivery and good governance. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa obliges Parliament to ensure that mechanisms are in place for the executive to account in Parliament and Parliament to be able to maintain oversight on the executive’s actions and/ or lack of action. The main aim of this study is to evaluate whether the oversight and accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa are effective and if members of Parliament understand their role, function and mandate in overseeing the executive, thus holding the executive accountable for its actions and/ or lack of action. Once the research problem and the rationale of the study are provided, an overview of the research design and methodology is given. The study proceeds to discuss the theoretical context on oversight and accountability and conveys the state of oversight and accountability in a number of selected international Parliaments to provide a limited international perspective on oversight and accountability. The study proceeds to explore the application of oversight and accountability within the South African context with the main focus being on the South African model of oversight and accountability, policy framework for oversight and accountability, and the mechanisms for conducting oversight and accountability employed by the fourth Parliament. The study then provides an in-depth discussion on the research design and methodology to given an understanding of the hypothesis, conceptualisation and key variables. The discussion also includes issues of measurement, sampling methods and the research methodology that discusses the data collection methods, data capturing and data analysis. It concludes by considering the limitations of the study. In order to provide evidence to support or disprove the hypothesis, an investigation was conducted on the mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament in exercising its Constitutional mandate to oversee the executive and hold it to account. Two semi-structured questionnaires were administered to members of Parliament and managers that dealt with oversight and accountability during the fourth Parliament and the responses were processed by means of content analysis, consisting of tabulating the occurrences of content units by characterising the meaning in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion. From the findings, it is clear that challenges regarding how the mandate of oversight and accountability is implemented should be addressed and the results of Parliament’s efforts to oversee the executive need to be supported with stronger systems to ensure effective oversight and accountability. Although the negative factors outweigh the positive factors, some positive factors are identified. Generally, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the policy base that informs the institutional processes and programmes on oversight and accountability. In terms of the Parliamentary mandate to oversee the executive members of Parliament understand the mandate and are supported with a budget in each financial year to oversee the executive. The programme of the fourth Parliament is not aligned to the established time frames for certain processes of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act no 9 of 2009. Members of Parliament enjoy immunity from prosecution and detention when in the chamber when it comes to issues of conduct. The fourth Parliament Constitutionally understood legislative, policy and strategic framework matters, but there is no policy in place as an integral aspect of Parliament’s strategic plan in relation to oversight and accountability, which reflects gaps in business planning and specific implementation activities. The institution lacks an administrative unit to carry out oversight and accountability implementation plans. No institutional arrangements for the oversight of state institutions such as the South African Reserve Bank exist. There are no processes and guidelines for interaction and engagement of members of Parliament with ministers on issues of public concern. Parliament does not have electronic or manual systems in place for oversight and accountability. There is no database management system and tracking system, e.g. for resolution tracking. Parliamentary debates, including questions and replies by the executive, are identified as of poor standard. With regard to petitions, there are no formal regulations in place to formally process submitted petitions and no standardised processes to submit petitions. The role of committees is important in Parliamentary oversight, but the findings indicate that the quality of reports that are produced by committees is of concern and contributes negatively to effective oversight of the executive. The quality of contributions in the preparation of the national budget is good and important. Parliament does not give enough value to the reports of Chapter 9 institutions and the time allocated for engagement with the institutions is not adequate. The role of the opposition to hold the executive accountable is not exclusive. The findings reveal that the electoral system hinders effective oversight. In addition, there are challenges in the implementation of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. The analysis of the findings and the main challenges identified provides sufficient evidence for the hypothesis of the study, namely that the oversight and accountability mechanisms employed by the fourth Parliament were ineffective and that members of Parliament did not understand their role, function and mandate in overseeing the executive and thus fails in holding the executive accountable for its actions and/ or lack of action. The study concluded by providing a number of recommendations for addressing the challenges emanating from the analysis of the findings in order to enhance oversight and accountability. Only once the recommendations are implemented, it will be possible for the mechanisms employed by Parliament to generate effective oversight and thus ensure executive accountability.