Browsing by Author "Knoetze, Fred"
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- ItemThe deliberate design argument for the predictive success of science(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2023-07) Knoetze, Fred; De Villiers-Botha, Tanya; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis I offer an antirealist, non-truth-based account for the predictive success of science. This is in direct contrast to classic scientific realism, in which predictive success is attributed to the approximate truth of scientific theories. I start by giving an overview of the history of scientific realism, the role of the no-miracles argument and several critiques of scientific realism. The critiques include both traditional antirealist arguments against realism, like the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and more contemporary critiques like the base-rate fallacy. Following these critiques, I begin to lay out an alternative to a truth-based account for predictive success. Instead of focusing on the approximate truth of our theories I suggest that the scientific method itself acts as a kind of cognitive tool. I define what a cognitive tool is and how it might develop at the hand of three theories: radical constructivism, evolutionary epistemology, and pragmatism. I argue that the scientific method as a cognitive tool is aimed at not delivering approximately true theories, but rather at delivering theories that enable us to reliably causally influence the external world. Having established a potential alternative account for the predictive success of science, I elaborate on what I call the deliberate-design argument. I distinguish this from other antirealist explanations, specifically van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and surrealism. I then establish the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic stances of this explanation for predictive success. Metaphysically, I argue that the mind-independent world is primarily causally accessible. Epistemically, I argue that we can know our theories can lead to predictive success but not that they are approximately true. Semantically, I argue that the primary purpose of theories is to provide reproducible steps for the successful causal influence of external reality. I then address some anticipated objections, including: whether the scientific method selects for anything but approximate truth, the value Stellenbosch of novel predictive success for establishing a theory’s approximate truth and, lastly, the threat of epistemic relativism. Ultimately, this thesis is intended to argue against classical scientific realism and the role approximate truth plays in its explanation for predictive success. The deliberate design argument is intended as an antirealist alternative for predictive success that does not require our theories to be approximately true of the external world.