School for Security and Africa Studies

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Browsing School for Security and Africa Studies by browse.metadata.advisor "Liebenberg, Ian"

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    Fighting Springboks : C Company, Royal Natal carbineers : from Premier Mine to Po Valley, 1939 - 1945
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013-12) Bentz, Gustav; Van der Waag, I. J.; Liebenberg, Ian; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. Dept. of Military History.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Germany’s declaration of war on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the consequent war in Europe not only found the Union of South Africa politically divided but militarily unprepared to fight a modern war let alone make any worthwhile contribution toward its European allies’ war effort. The task of getting South Africa into the fight fell to newly appointed Prime Minister J.C. Smuts who cleverly outmanoeuvred J.B.M. Hertzog as leader of the nation. Not only was the Union Defence Force (UDF) severely ravaged by several budget cuts during and after the depression but it seemed to have no inclination of embracing the kind of mechanisation that was the hallmark of most European armies. Within the space of a year Smuts managed to transform the UDF and on 17 July 1940 the 1st South African Infantry Brigade set sail for East Africa where Mussolini’s Italians reigned supreme after brushing aside a couple of British border guards and laying claim to a few miles of British territory. One of the units dispatched by Smuts was the 1st Royal Natal Carbineers from Pietermaritzburg in Natal. Throughout the campaign the Regiment’s C Company fought with distinction but had the dubious honour of being the South African unit that suffered the most casualties during the whole campaign. Several of C Company’s men then become the vehicles through which the remainder of the war is experienced as the men were moved from one theatre of battle to another. Through their eyes the hunting trips into the East African bush and the death of their Commanding Officer, among other things, are relived. The victorious Springboks are then sent to Egypt where they were needed in an effort to break the deadlock that existed between the British 8th Army and the German Afrika Korps. Amidst the ebb and flow of the battle the men of C Company still found time to experience the sights and sounds of Africa’s most populous cities, Cairo and Alexandria. Here many young soldiers were exposed to pleasures and pastimes not to be had back in the Union. In spite of the eventual defeat of the German forces North Africa C Company witnessed the destruction of the 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh and suffered the loss of a combined platoon when Tobruk capitulated on 21 June 1942. After a brief period on home leave in 1943 C Company was back in action, this time in Italy as part of the 6th South African Armoured Division. Here they faced mountains, heavy snow and an enemy desperately fighting for every hill, stream and building. In the months which followed C Company were often in the midst of the action and many men lost close friends on the slopes of the Italian mountains. As final victory became apparent during the first months of 1945, C Company’s men began preparing for their post-war lives and when the first planes and ships left for the union at the end of April 1945 the men felt that they have served their country well and did their regiment proud.
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    A matter of survival? An exploratory study of cooperation and benefits for the South African maritime defence industry within the BRICS context
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2021-12) Beukes, Jacobus Petrus; Liebenberg, Ian; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Sciences. School for Security and Africa Studies. Dept. of Political Science.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The South African defence industry (SADI) was built up and became a strong industry during the 1970s and 1980s, supplying the South African Defence Force with equipment, weapons and logistic support. Between 1989 and 1994 the defence budget shrank by approximately 50%. Acquisition and procurement from the defence force was reduced by roughly 80% and the research and development (R&D) budget was reduced by 70%. As the defence force and the defence industry are closely linked, the budget cuts had a direct impact on the SADI. Many defence companies restructured, diversified into other industrial endeavours or closed down. Manpower also shrank from approximately 131 000 in the 1980s to 15 000 today. Currently the SADI is in dire straits to survive. A dying defence industry is counter-productive to the South African economy, its industries and the country as a whole. It also has a detrimental effect on the defence force’s capabilities. South Africa is a maritime nation with an island economy and is dependent on trade via maritime transport, with 95% of South Africa’s trade being by sea transport. Maritime security is important for South Africa to keep sea lanes safe for merchant travel; and maritime resources underdeveloped. The navy and certain air force elements as part of the broader South African National Defence Force (SANDF) are critical to ensure maritime security. The navy was always treated as the “step-child” of the SANDF purely because threats were always perceived as being landward and not from the sea. As such, the SADI was always more landward focused than maritime. Development and human security are priorities for South Africa. Being the most important priorities, it is unlikely that the defence budget will increase to levels needed to remedy the precarious situation of the defence force and the defence industry. The defence budget cannot ensure the survival and growth of the SADI but it provides seeding funding for R&D and much needed capabilities for the SANDF. Currently, the survival of the SADI is dependent on exports. It is also advantageous to the SADI to market and promote products that are in use in the SANDF, as it gives the products credibility on the international market. The defence review, approved by Parliament in 2015, is a good document which lays out the roles and functions of the SANDF, its needed force structure and force design; and the importance of a vibrant and strong defence industry. Without the budget to implement this, it will however remain a paper exercise. It is also clear that it is unlikely that defence will move up on the government’s list of priorities, which means no increase in funding, which leaves the question, what must the defence force be ready for? That determines what the design and structure must look like. One of the possibilities for survival of the SADI is cooperation with other countries. As part of the BRICS forum, this research explored the possibilities of cooperation with BRICS partners as an option. The research showed that cooperation is only one aspect. The survival of the SADI requires policy changes and implementation, diplomatic efforts, strategic decisions regarding the “ready for what?” of the defence force, focus on R&D funding, and embracing the underdeveloped blue economy for the betterment of South Africa and the regional/international village South Africa finds itself in.
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    Military Intervention in Africa after the Cold War
    (Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2010-03) Ramuhala, Mashudu Godfrey; Vrey, Francois; Liebenberg, Ian; University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies. Dept. of Military Strategy.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success.