School for Security and Africa Studies

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Browsing School for Security and Africa Studies by browse.metadata.advisor "Esterhuyse, A. J."

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    Armoured warfare : the South African experience in East Africa 1940-1941
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2014-12) Kleynhans, Evert Philippus; Van der Waag, Ian J.; Esterhuyse, A. J.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Following South African entry into the Second World War on 6 September 1939, the Union Defence Force (UDF) transformed from an ageing peacetime defence force into a modern armed force capable of projecting offensive power. During the interwar period a certain state of melancholia had existed in the UDF in terms of military innovation, which resulted in muddled thinking in the UDF in terms of armoured warfare and mechanisation. The offensive potential of armoured forces was simply not understood by the South African defence planners, with the result that there was only a token armoured force in the UDF in September 1939. The South African entry into the war was the impetus for the development of a viable armoured force within the UDF, and the South African Tank Corps (SATC) was established in May 1940. Changes in both the nature and organisational structure of the South African defence establishment followed. The Italian presence in Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland was seen as a direct threat to the neighbouring British East African territories, and South Africa deployed to Kenya during June 1940, soon after the Italian declaration of war. The South African deployment to East Africa was the first deployment of the UDF in a situation of regular war since the First World War. Despite the doctrine that underpinned the South African deployment of armoured forces in East Africa, the SATC units soon learned that the accepted doctrine, borrowed from the British War Office during the interwar period, was but a mere guide to offensive employment. The story of the South African deployment to East Africa during the war is used as a lens through which to investigate the role and employment of both the UDF armoured cars and light tanks. By separately discussing the Allied offensives through Italian Somaliland and southern Abyssinia during 1940-1941, the tactical and operational employment of the South African armour during this time becomes paramount when evaluated against their successes and failures. The nature of the opposing Italian forces in East Africa, the ever-changing topography and climate of the theatre of operations, and the nature of the South African offensive operations throughout the campaign, all combined to shape the novel way in which the armoured cars and tanks of the SATC were employed throughout 1940-1941. The operational experiences that the UDF gained during the campaign in East Africa shaped the further deployments of South African armour to North Africa, Madagascar and Italy during the remainder of the war.
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    South African defence since 1994 : a study of policy-making
    (Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2005-04) Jordaan, Evert; Seegers, A.; Esterhuyse, A. J.; University of Stellenbosch. Faculty of Military Sciences. Dept. of School for Security and Africa Studies. Military Strategy.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, its defence policy changed fundamentally. The African National Congress (ANC) as the upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence policy. Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states. The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence. NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its power projection capabilities. Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models. Secondly, models can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy. NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their interests. Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified. Firstly, that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important. This makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible. Defence policy therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views. Secondly, although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority. Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making.