Doctoral Degrees (Military History)
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Browsing Doctoral Degrees (Military History) by browse.metadata.advisor "Mandrup, Thomas"
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- ItemSouth African Defence Policy-Making, 1994-2015(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2023-12 ) Jordaan, Evert; Esterhuyse, Abel; Mandrup, Thomas; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study focused on the making of South African defence policy from 1994 to 2015. Since democratisation, South African defence spending declined as socio-economic development became the national priority. After integration, the South African National Defence Force struggled with affordability regarding its personnel, main equipment, internal deployments, and increasing operational involvement in African missions. The research question was to determine why there is a disconnect between the means and ends in South African defence policy since 1994. To answer this question, a theoretical case study with emphasis on domestic policy-making was done. The work of Graham Allison was used to analyse South African defence policy-making in terms of rational choice, organisational process, and bureaucratic politics. This study found that South African defence policy is not made in a rational, logical, or cost-effective manner – as society expects – but is predominantly influenced by party-political considerations and vested military institutional interests. Established strategy processes of rational choice within the military, including threat assessments and cost–benefit analysis are prevented from informing defence policy or from addressing the separation between the means and ends of policy. From a perspective of organisational process, the military has, in the absence of coherent and knowledgeable political direction, protected its institutional interests, culture, and expensive conventional equipment by using standard procedures, conventional warfare doctrine, and secrecy to resist civilian-led policy processes, legislative oversight, affordability, and austerity measures. As a result, the military has become isolated from government and society, making it politically ineffective to convince Treasury and Cabinet to fund defence appropriately. In terms of bureaucratic politics, the liberation struggle norms, values, culture, and subjective practice of civil–military relations within the African National Congress, dominate the making of defence policy within the executive branch of government and the legislature, with little distinction between party and state. Although defence ministers have significant power to determine defence policy, most lack the expertise, skill, and influence in cabinet to curb ambitious foreign policy, obtain support for a bigger defence budget or to deal with difficult trade-offs involving matters such as personnel nationalisation. The prominent role of Treasury in national planning and budgeting, as well as the skill and influence of its leaders within cabinet and the presidency, created a tense relationship with the military. Military leaders encultured with a war-funding model never adjusted to the bureaucratic politics in a democracy where the defence budget has to be justified in terms of national priorities and financial principles. Treasury was never consulted regarding the available funding for new defence policy, and the military avoided deal-making and compromise with Treasury. Consequently, since democratisation, South African defence was unaffordable. A key argument is that South African defence policy is based on the ruling party’s fears about what the military could do to jeopardise democracy and domestic and regional security rather than objective security realities, budgets, and threats. To address these fears, the military was willingly and conveniently tied to a conventional role, force design, and funding pattern, from which it could not escape.