An analysis of security protocols for lightweight systems

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dc.contributor.advisorSanders, Jeffen_ZA
dc.contributor.authorKamkuemah, Martha Ndeyapeuomaganoen_ZA
dc.contributor.otherStellenbosch University. Faculty of Science. Dept. of Mathematical Sciences.en_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-15T07:07:38Zen_ZA
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-29T09:31:15Zen_ZA
dc.date.available2022-03-15T07:07:38Zen_ZA
dc.date.available2022-04-29T09:31:15Zen_ZA
dc.date.issued2022-04en_ZA
dc.descriptionThesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2022.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractENGLISH SUMMARY: Security is hard to maintain in distributed systems especially for communicating agents restricted to lightweight computations, as in the Internet of Things, which struggle to implement strong cryptographic security. A methodology is developed for specifying and reasoning algebraically about security in such systems which combines epistemic logic and a state-based formalism. The knowledge modality K is used to define a uthentication a nd s ecrecy i n t erms o f w hat e ach agent knows. Operations are defined a s s tate t ransitions. Having g ained c onfidence in our methodology by applying it to the benchmark case studies Needham-Schroeder and Diffie-Hellman protocols, we then apply it to the contemporary examples Signal and Long-Range Wide-Area Network protocols. A mitigation is proposed and verified for a Long-Range Wide-Area Network.en_ZA
dc.description.abstractAFRIKAANS OPSOMMING: Sekuriteit is moeilik om te handhaaf in verspreide stelsels, veral vir kommunikasieagente met beperkte berekenings vermoë, soos Internet van Dinge, wat sukkel om sterk kriptografiese s ekuriteit t e i mplimenteer. ‘n Metodologie word ontwikkel vir die spesifikasie e n a lgebraïes r edenering a angaande s ekuriteit v ir s ulke sisteme. Hierdie metodologie maak van epistemiese logika en ‘n staat gebaseerde formalisme gebruik. Die kennismodaliteit K word gebruik om verifikasie e n geheimhouding te definieer i n t erme van wat e lke a gent w eet. Operasies word a s staatsoorgange gedefinieer. Nadat vertroue in die metodologie verkry word deur dit op die maatstaf gevallestudies van die Needham-Schroeder- en Diffie-Hellman protokolle toe te pas, word dit vervolgens op die hedendaagse voorbeelde van Sein en Langafstand Wye-area netwerk protokolle toegepas. ‘n Versagting word vir ‘n Langafstand Wye-area netwerk voorgestel en geverifieer.af_ZA
dc.description.versionDoctoralen_ZA
dc.format.extentxii, 132 pages : illustrationsen_ZA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/124762en_ZA
dc.language.isoen_ZAen_ZA
dc.publisherStellenbosch : Stellenbosch Universityen_ZA
dc.rights.holderStellenbosch Universityen_ZA
dc.subjectLightweight computationsen_ZA
dc.subjectComputer programmingen_ZA
dc.subjectComputer system securityen_ZA
dc.subjectUCTDen_ZA
dc.titleAn analysis of security protocols for lightweight systemsen_ZA
dc.typeThesisen_ZA
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