Formalizing auctions

Date
2020-12
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University
Abstract
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Auctions have proven to be an efficient economical instrument over the years. Since the advent of internet-based commerce, some of their many forms have become important. To avoid problems related to the dependence on a central entity, distribution of such an instrument is crucial. In this thesis as in general Auction Theory, we consider auctions as games. Classifying their rules in two sets, we first study their mechanisms and characterize their relative optimality. Then we present a distributed sealed-bid auction protocol and a tie-breaking mechanism for that setting.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Veilings is oor die jare heen 'n doeltreffende ekonomiese instrument. Sedert die koms van internetgebaseerde handel het sommige van hul vele vorme belangrik geword. Om probleme te vermy wat verband hou met die afhanklikheid van 'n sentrale entiteit, is die verspreiding van so 'n instrument van deurslaggewende belang. In hierdie tesis soos in die algemene Veilingteorie, beskou ons veilings as speletjies. Ons klassifiseer hul reëls in twee stelle, bestudeer hul meganismes en kenmerk hulle relatiewe optimiteit. Daarna bied ons 'n verspreide verseëlde bod veilingsprotokol aan en 'n breukbinding meganisme vir daardie instelling.
Description
Thesis (MSc)--Stellenbosch University, 2020.
Keywords
Auctions -- Mathematics, Internet-based commerce, Auction theory, Game theory, UCTD
Citation