Browsing by Author "Van der Walt, A. J."
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- ItemConstitutional analysis of intellectual property(ASSAF, 2014) Van der Walt, A. J.; Shay, R. M.This article analyses the Constitutional Court's treatment of property interests in the face of state regulation to gain an understanding of the type of state interference that is justifiable in terms of section 25(1) of the Bill of Rights. This is done by examining the Constitutional Court's dicta relating to the meaning of deprivation and how these inform the meaning of property in the constitutional context. The methodology that the Constitutional Court has formulated to assess if state interference complies with the provisions of section 25 is explained to show the type of state regulation that has been found legitimate. We then consider how this understanding of constitutional property and the state's legitimate exercise of its inherent police power interact in the setting of intellectual property by contrasting the various policy objectives underlying the different statutory regimes governing intellectual property. This theoretical analysis is then applied to two contemporary examples of feasible state interference with existing intellectual property interests, namely the proposed plain packaging measures which severely restrict the use of tobacco trade marks, and a fair dealing exception allowing the use of copyright works for the purpose of parody. These examples serve to illustrate the context and manner in which intellectual property interests may come before the Court and the necessary differentiation with which these interests should be treated. The appropriate judicial assessment of the true impact that state action could have on vested property interests is explained and contrasted with the balancing exercise that is employed at the earlier stage of policy making. This discussion is concluded by highlighting some of the interpretational issues that will arise and how some constitutional values could be curtailed in the absence of legislative intervention.
- ItemDeveloping the law on unlawful squatting and spoliation(Juta Law, 2008-01) Van der Walt, A. J.The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) made it clear from the outset that it was determined somehow to rectify the situation. The court pointed out that the illegal eviction did not merely violate the constitutional and statutory warrant against unauthorized eviction, but also the occupiers' right to personal security, privacy, and property in their materials and belongings, and that it trampled upon their dignity, their feelings and their social standing (para 15).
- ItemEiendomsverlies deur verkrygende verjaring : onteiening sonder vergoeding - of nie(LitNet Academic, 2012-12) Van der Walt, A. J.; Marais, E.OPSOMMING: Verkrygende verjaring word meestal beskou as ’n gedeelte van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg wat redelik regseker en onproblematies is. Die klaarblyklik onkontroversiële aard van hierdie regsreël is egter onlangs in twyfel getrek deur die vierde kamer van die Europese hof vir menseregte in die Pye-saak, waar bevind is dat adverse possession – die common law-eweknie van verjaring – ’n onteiening sonder vergoeding behels, welke gevolg strydig met artikel 1 van die eerste protokol tot die Europese Verdrag vir Menseregte, 1950 is. Alhoewel hierdie bevinding op appèl omvergewerp is, beklemtoon dit die belangrikheid van die vraag of verjaring (wat ook eiendomsverlies sonder vergoeding tot gevolg het) op een lyn met artikel 25 van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet is. Om dit te beantwoord, ontleed ons die prosesse oor verjaring met verwysing na die FNB-metodologie. Hierdie artikel fokus spesifiek op die onteieningsvraagstuk, naamlik of verjaring ’n onteiening van regte ingevolge artikel 25(2) meebring. Ten einde dié kwessie aan te spreek ontleed ons hierdie regsreël teen die agtergrond van sekere kernaspekte van die Suid-Afrikaanse onteieningsreg, naamlik die aard van die onteieningsbegrip, die relevansie van staatsverkryging, welke regsbronne onteiening magtig, asook die metodes waarvolgens onteiening kan geskied. Laastens ondersoek ons die vraag of verjaring moontlik konstruktiewe onteiening behels. Deur hierdie ondersoek word getoon dat dit hoogs onwaarskynlik is dat verjaring onteiening meebring. Verjaring vind bykans altyd tussen private individue plaas en dus kan daar geen sprake van staatsverkryging van onteiende regte wees nie. Verder verleen die verjaringswette geensins onteieningsbevoegdheid aan die staat nie en maak hulle ook nie voorsiening vir vergoeding nie. Daarby kan verjaring ook nie maklik onder enige van die bestaande onteieningsmetodes tuisgebring word nie. Laastens redeneer ons dat konstruktiewe onteiening waarskynlik nie in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg bestaan nie. Gevolglik is dit dogmaties beter om verjaring te beskou as ’n nie-arbitrêre ontneming van eiendomsreg, welke ontneming nie ’n onteiening van regte tot gevolg het nie.
- ItemThe enforceability of tenants rights (part 2)(Juta Law, 2012-01) Van der Walt, A. J.; Maass, S.In terms of the doctrine of notice the holder of an unregistered real right is protected to the extent that the right can be enforced against outside parties on the basis of their prior knowledge of it. The doctrine originates from the principle that "nobody may derive a benefit or advantage from his own bad faith". According to the doctrine, if the acquirer of a real right had knowledge of the existence of a prior personal right that would establish a competing real right upon registration, the acquirer of the first-mentioned real right must give effect to the prior personal right that would give rise to the acquisition of the latter real right.
- ItemThe importance of the commons in the context of intellectual property(Juta Law Publishing, 2013-01) Van der Walt, A. J.; Du Bois, M.The intellectual commons or public domain is an important part of intellectual property law scholarship. In this regard it is necessary to examine the origins of the commons, what exactly the intellectual commons is and how the notion of the intellectual commons may be further developed. Especially in the United States of America there are concerns that the intellectual commons is currently being enclosed by extending intellectual property protection to areas of intellectual activity that were previously excluded from propertisation; and by extending intellectual property protection of existing rights. It may be argued that some intellectual products should remain in the commons or revert back to the commons in order to ensure that enough remains so that new intellectual products may be developed based on these existing products. However, there must also be enough of a property-right based incentive in order to ensure continued investment in the creation of new intellectual products. The important question is then, how may these two interests be balanced? This article examines the issues related to the commons in order to provide a framework which future revisions to intellectual property legislation may use as a point of departure to ensure that South African legislation does not encroach on the intellectual commons unduly. Examples from copyright law, patent law and traditional knowledge are used to demonstrate how the intellectual commons and intellectual property statutes interact.
- ItemProcedurally arbitrary deprivation of property(Juta, 2012-01) Van der Walt, A. J.ENGLISH ABSTRACT : Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC), the Constitutional Court explained that a deprivation of property will fall foul of section 25(1) either when there is insufficient reason for the deprivation (as further explained in that decision) or if the deprivation is procedurally unfair. Nothing further is said in that decision about procedurally unfair deprivation. In subsequent case law the Constitutional Court picked up on the distinction between substantively and procedurally arbitrary deprivation, without making it clear when a deprivation will be procedurally unfair or how procedural unfairness in terms of section 25(1) should be distinguished from procedural unfairness in terms of section 33 or PAJA. The author argues that the notion of procedurally unfair deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) only makes sense to the extent that it refers to deprivation of property that does not result from administrative action. Consequently, deprivation of property brought about by administrative action should in the first place be adjudicated in terms of PAJA and not in terms of section 25(1) and only deprivation of property that occurs outside of the sphere of PAJA should be adjudicated in terms of section 25(1). However, as the author argues, the test for section 25(1) procedural unfairness will in any event probably resemble the PAJA test.
- ItemThe right to a view reconsidered(Juta Law, 2015-01) Van der Walt, A. J.Traditionally, an existing, unimpeded view over or across neighbouring properties is considered a mere incidental advantage, interference with which is generally not actionable. Contrary to popular belief, the advantage of enjoying a beautiful view from one's property is generally considered an "incidental" benefit and not as an incident of landownership. In that sense, there is no inherent right to a view. In one sense, this should not be surprising, since the view from one's property is not so much an incident or quality of that property as it is an advantage of a certain state of affairs, namely the absence of obstructive buildings or plants, on the adjoining property or properties over which the view is enjoyed. Insofar as it is legally interesting, a view from one property is always a view over other properties. In that sense, the view from one property is not an incident or quality of that property but rather an incidental benefit resulting from the quality of the adjoining properties. From first principles, this suggests that the notion of a right to a view is self-defeating, since ownership of one property does not automatically bring with it any entitlements with regard to the state or the qualities of adjoining land.
- ItemSport and nuisance law(Juta Law, 2010-01) Van der Walt, A. J.The author analyses the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Allaclas Investments (Pty) Ltd v Milnerton Golf Club and concludes that there is a good explanation for the seemingly harsh decision to interdict the golf club from proceeding with its normal business until the danger posed for the appellants by stray golf balls had been eliminated. Comparing the decision to the Cape High Court decision in Laskey v Showzone CC, where the offending neighbour was allowed to continue doing business while eliminating the cause of the nuisance, the author argues that the difference between the two decisions is explained by the long-established distinction between nuisance in the narrow sense (annoyance), which disturbs or hinders neighbours in the use and enjoyment of their property, and nuisance in the wider sense, which involves actual damage to property or personal injury. With reference to comparable case law regarding stray golf and cricket balls in English, Australian, Canadian and German law, the author concludes that the normal reasonable tolerance principle should not find application in the latter category of cases, where the mere fact of significant harm or damage renders the action unlawful and actionable. The article also explores the implications of this conclusion for the notions of abuse of rights and 'coming to the nuisance'.