Browsing by Author "De Roubaix, J. A. M. (John Addey Malcolm)"
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Results Per Page
Sort Options
- Itemn Postmoderne uitdaging aan die 'paradigmale biomediese etiek model' met verwysing na kompleksiteitsteorie(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2002-12) De Roubaix, J. A. M. (John Addey Malcolm); Cilliers, F. P.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Introduction From the postmodern ethical perspective [the postmodernist would say Jrom the ethical perspective], there is something suspicious and inherently unethical in a system of ethics supported by a comprehensive, cohesive and universal metanarrative, a set of fixed and unbending ethical rules and laws, without the ready possibility of revision [Cilliers, 1998, pp.114, 137-140; Cilliers, 2001, p. 3; Cilliers, 1995, p.125]. Based on the ideas of especially Winkler [1993, pp. 343-365] I have concluded that contemporary mainstream biomedical ethics, represented and directed by the work of Beauchamp and Childress [1994] are caught in such a crush. The primary objective of this assignment is to evaluate the 'principles' of biomedical ethics [respect Jar autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice] which were developed in their water-shed publication [Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University Press, first published in 1979, and now in a fifth edition, 2002] against a background of postmodern ethics. Methodology and conclusions I have argued that Beauchamp and Childress' conception of principlism is a contextual legalistic-philosophical response to the contemporary American situation, developed primarily from legal decisions [often litigation]. It may be regarded as acceptable practice guidelines, but represents a system of ethics without morality. I have given a concise rendering of Winkler's notion of context-based bioethics with the criticism that this also does not guarantee morality. Following that, there is a description of postmodern society in terms of complexity theory. I have indicated how the characteristics of complexity can be developed and applied contextually in bioethics. The postmodern moral society is the locus where morality develops in a non-controllable agonistic interactive process within which the postmodern moral agent unintentionally finds himself. The postmodern ethical position is not an unethical, come-as-you-may anything-goes position; it simply is not predictable, controllable, universal, rational [in a Kantian context] and eternal. Modernity, it can be argued exhibits a far greater degree of relativism. The postmodern ethical position represents a return to morality in ethics, morality of a very personal, face-to-face responsibility from which we as participants of society cannot hide. From a postmodern ethical perspective, an analysis of principlism and its underlying principles exhibits the characteristics of modernity: eternal moral rules which as such cannot be presented as morality. I have acknowleged Beauchamp and Childress' attempts at adding morality to their conception [in the 4th edition] by means of employing character ethics. They have nevertheless not made any radical changes in the format of their presentation and maintain the central and primary role of principles. I have also argued the limitations of the postmodern approach in terms of enclaves of strictly controlled modernity and artificial witholding of information in medicine which limit the free flow of information essential to the postmodern approach. My conception of complexity and the postmodern approach do not pretend to be a panacea for biomedical ethics. It attempts to redefine the meaning of morality in bioethics and questions the unbridled application of this conception of principIism. Finally I have discussed the burning issue of justice in the practice of medicine from the postmodern perspective. Do I as a person have a right to health care; what are the moral issues of dealing with 'life's lotteries'; what is the state's responsibility in health care, and: what are my personal responsibilities in health care? In contradistinction to libertarian concepts, the postmodern approach clearly argues in favour of the acceptance by the state of its role in health care [a responsibility abrogated in many societies, none more so than contemporary South-African society].
- ItemValue, utility and autonomy : a moral-critical analysis of utilitarian positions on the value of prenatal life(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2005-04) De Roubaix, J. A. M. (John Addey Malcolm); Van Niekerk, Anton A.; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Dept. of Philosophy.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Problem statement For utilitarians, human beings have intrinsic moral significance based on only two acquired characteristics: sentience, or the ability to suffer, and psychological personhood. Sentience is the entrance-requirement for moral significance, but does not justify a "right to life" claim; at most a "right" not to suffer. Personhood, described as some sort of self-conscious awareness with a concept of the future, may justify a "right to life" claim. However, since personhood is absent in prenatal beings, and only develops some time after birth, the implication is that such beings have little moral significance and may, for instance, be killed "at will". The moral problem that I address in this dissertation is to investigate, assess and evaluate the utilitarian position on the moral status or value of prenatal life. Methodology and results I firstly, on the basis of an extensive literature study, make a detailed analysis of the utilitarian position with reference to a number of themes that I have identified in their argument. This is followed by a critical philosophical evaluation of the utilitarian position, based on six particular arguments: • Utilitarianism is philosophically incoherent. It over-simplifies the moral argument in claiming that consequences are all that matter morally. Its underlying moral theory is at odds with moral claims contained in contemporary notions of human rights and individual justice. It ignores the moral significance of special obligations to special groups. • Utilitarianism potentially has unacceptable consequences. It IS inherently discriminatory and may lead to legitimate "slippery slope" fears. • Utilitarianism clashes with our fundamental moral intuitions on the value of prenatal life. These intuitions are cherished in most world religions. • Contrary to the utilitarian position, speciesism is inevitable to the human condition, especially argued from a position of existential phenomenology. Self- constitution, simultaneous constitution of the world as we know it, and the very possibility of morality are possible only within a particular notion of speciesism. • The potentiality of pre-persons to develop into persons cannot be as convincingly ignored as is done by the utilitarian. • There is a basic and underlying need and intuition to protect vulnerable human beings, of which pre-persons are exemplars. These notions clash with utilitarian theory. As an alternative, I introduce, set out and evaluate a two-phased position on the moral significance of pre-personal human life, a position of respectfulness of prenatal and pre-personal human life based upon its humanity, potentiality and separation-viability. This leads, firstly, to the conclusion of a graded, sliding scale conception of human prepersonal moral significance in line with the level of development and with the actuation of potentiality. Secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the advent of separationsurvivability (viability) is a morally significant cut-off point beyond which the human fetus may "normally" have a justifiable right to the continuation of its life. In as far as the application of my argument is concerned, I develop a "moderate" position with reference to the abortion debate. Whilst I recognize that all human prenatal beings of which it can be argued that they have a reasonable chance to develop their intrinsic potentiality, i.e., to become full-fledged persons, should have the opportunity to do so, I also recognize that neither this position, nor the complexities of life make it possible to hold "absolute" positions on the justifiability of abortion. I explore this extremely problematic notion in the text. That having been said, the advent of separation-survivability may imply a "moral cut-off point", beyond which termination is only rarely justified. I argue that I find no moral hindrance to wellmotivated research on human pre-embryos and stem cells.