

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LESSONS
LEARNED FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE
FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

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Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Security and Africa Studies
in the Faculty of Military Science
at Stellenbosch University

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December 2022

DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

Security and Africa studies is a broad subject that is widely researched and documented, particularly the African battlespace. The nature and complexity of the African battlespace is a contemporary subject that requires in-depth research to understand, analyse and align future responses to situations of human insecurity, such as protracted armed conflict.

The lingering conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a case in point. This study aims to provide a critical analysis of the strategic military lessons to be learned from the Republic of South Africa Battalion (RSA BATT) deployed under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) as a troop-contributing country of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). This study looked at the contemporary approach to addressing human insecurity in the DRC from a military perspective by discussing the RSA BATT's contribution from 2013 to date.

This study found that the RSA BATT's contribution is driven by the South African Army Infantry corps' strategy and philosophy, which, regardless of numerous limitations, strives to provide a tailored combat-ready user system (CRUS) to meet operational requirements within a complex African battlespace. Accordingly, this study analysed the SA Army infantry corps' strategy by focusing on the *ends*, *ways* and *means* available to the RSA BATT in the DRC and the possible risks posed in achieving operational requirements.

Few studies have provided an in-depth analysis such as this academic contribution. Therefore, this study joins the pool of understanding of contemporary multilateral military-strategic thinkers, which provides the audience with a South African military viewpoint on addressing contemporary and future multinational peace support operations (PSO).

OPSOMMING

Sekerheid- en Afrikastudies is 'n wye onderwerp wat breedvoerig en voortdurend nagevors en gedokumenteer word, veral die Afrika operasionele gevegsteater wat algemeen bekend staan as “*The African Battle Space*”. Die Afrika operasionele gevegsteater is 'n kontemporêre navorsingsonderwerp weens die karakter, omvang en kompleksiteit daarvan. Dit is hierdie kompleksiteit wat omvattende navorsing inspireer wat ten doel het om die onderliggende redes en omvang van die uitgerekte konflik in Afrika en meelopende menslike basiese sekerheidstragedie te kan verstaan. Dit word bewerkstellig deur 'n kritiese analise van onderliggende redes wat lei tot die menslike tragedie en daardeur antwoorde kan verskaf oor hoe om die probleme in die toekoms aan te spreek.

Die voortslepende konflik in die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) is 'n sprekende voorbeeld van die daaglikse menslike tragedie wat hom afspeel op die kontinent. Daarom het hierdie studie ten doel om 'n kritiese analise te doen van die ontplooiing van die Suid Afrikaanse bataljon wat in die DRK ontplooi is as deel van die Verenigde Nasies se stabiliseringsmissie, beter bekend as MONUSCO (*The United Nations (UN) Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*) en meer spesifiek as troepvoorsienende land aan die FIB (*Force Intervention Brigade*). Die studie het uitsluitlik gefokus op die kontemporêre benadering om menslike sekerheid in die DRK te bewerkstellig vanuit 'n militêre oogpunt en meer spesifiek binne die konteks van die ontplooiing van die Suid Afrikaanse bataljon wat sedert 2013 aktief betrokke is in *MONUSCO* en die *FIB*.

Die studie het bevind dat die betrokkenheid van die Suid Afrikaanse bataljon (RSA BAT) direk daartoe bydra dat menslike sekerheid in die DRK bewerkstellig word. Die onderliggende rede hiervoor is die strategie en filosofie van die Suid Afrikaanse Infanterie Korps (SAIK) om 'n pasgemaakte gevegs gereed mag te verskaf, ongeag talle tekortkomings en kompleksiteit in die Afrika-gevegsteater. Gevolglik het die studie die gefokus op die *doelwitte*, *weë* en *middele* wat die bataljon tot hulle beskikking gehad het om die risiko's die hoof te bied in hulle stewe om die bataljon se operasionele doel te bereik.

Verder lewer hierdie studie 'n in-diepte analise wat min ander soortgelyke studies kon doen. Die studie lewer dus 'n akademiese bydrae tot die bestaande kennis en bydraes wat befaamde internasionale militêr-strategiese kenners oor die onderwerp gemaak het. Die nuanseverskil van hierdie studie baseer sy bevindings op 'n fundamentele Suid Afrikaanse oogpunt ter verbetering van toekomstige vredesteun-operasies in die DRK.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	after action report
ACIRC	African capability for immediate response to crisis
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AG	armed group
AMHU	Area Military Health Unit
ANC	African National Congress
AoO	area of operation
AOR	area of responsibility
APC	armoured personnel carrier
APCLS	Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain
APGRM	African group peer review mechanism
ASF	African standby force
AU	African Union
BAA	Brigade assembly area
BLNS:	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland
CAN:	community alert network
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWS:	continental early warning system
CHATSEC	combating HIV and AIDS through spiritual and ethical conduct
CIMIC	civil military cooperation
C J OPS:	chief joint operations
CMR	civil-military relations
COB	company operational bases
CoE	centres of excellence
COE:	contingent own equipment
CONOPS:	concept of operations
CONPLAN	contingency plan
COS	chief of staff
COSATU:	Confederation of South African Trade Union
CPX	command post exercise
CR	combat-ready
CRUS:	combat-ready user system

CSANDF	Chief of the South African National Defence Force
DDR:	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants
DI:	defence intelligence
DIRCO:	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DFI:	direct foreign investment
DFS:	Department of Field Support
DIMES	diplomacy, information, military power, economic power and social cohesion
DOD	Department of Defence
DRC:	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DPA:	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO:	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
ETD:	education training and development
EU:	European Union
EUS	end-user system
FARDC:	Federal Army of the Republic of the Congo
FC	force commander
FDLR:	Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
FHQ	force headquarters
FIB:	Force Intervention Brigade
FRAGO:	fragmented order
FRDC	Federal Army of the Republic of Congo
FSE:	force structure elements
FTX	field training exercises
GNU:	Government of National Unity
GoDRC	Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
GPA:	global political agreement
GPS	global positioning system
HF	high frequency
HFCR	human factor combat readiness

HoM	head of mission
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR:	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICISS:	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC:	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY:	international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP:	internally displaced people
IED	improvised explosive device
IEMF:	interim emergency multinational force
IGO	international governmental organisations
IHL	international humanitarian law
IO	International organisations
JOMIC	Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
JOPS DIV	Joint Operations Division
JOPS HQ	Joint Operations Headquarters
LOA	letter of assist
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOT	long distance observation telescope
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LTU	leisure time utilisation
MES	mission end state
MHQ	mission headquarters
MINUSMA:	United Nations Multinational Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MONUC:	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO:	United Nations Multinational Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOOTW:	military operations other than war
MOU:	memorandum of understanding
MR	Mission readiness
MS:	member state
MSC:	Military Staff Committee
MSF:	Médecins Sans Frontières
M23:	The 23 March Movement

MTG	medical task group
MTT	ministerial task team
NCC	national contingent commander
NCDP	National Congress for the Defence of the People
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NGO	non-governmental organisations
NIF:	neutral intervention force
NVIS	near-vertical incident skywave
OC	officer commanding
OCHA:	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHS	occupational health and safety
OPCON	operational control
OPFOR	opposing force
ORBAT	order of battle
PET	peace establishment tables
POC:	protection of civilians
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PME	prime mission equipment
PSA:	peace and security architecture
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
PSCF:	peace and security and cooperation framework
PSF	peace support force
PSO:	peace support operation
PTSD	post-traumatic stress disorder
QRF	quick reaction force
RoE:	rules of engagement
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RSA BATT:	Republic of South Africa Battalion
SA:	South Africa
SAAMATT:	South African Army Military Advisory and Training Team

SAASC	SA Army Signal Corps
SAASIC	South African Army Specialised Infantry Capability
SACU:	Southern African Customs Union
SACS:	South African Corps of Signal
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SADF:	South African Defence Force
SAHMS	South African Military Health Service
SAI	South African Infantry
SAMHS:	South African Military Health Service
SAMIM	Southern African Mission in Mozambique
SANDF:	South African National Defence Force
SEA:	sexual exploitation and abuse
SFR:	statement of force requirement
SG	secretary-general
SOFA:	status of force agreement
SOMA:	status of mission agreement
SOOM	staff officer's operational manual
SOP	standard operating procedures
SRSR	special representative to the secretary-general
SSR:	security sector reform
STERP:	short-term economic recovery plan
STTW	special techniques training wing
SUR:	statement of unit requirement
SWOT:	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threat analysis
SWP	standard work procedures
TCC:	troop-contributing country
TEWT	tactical exercises without troops
TIS	tactical intelligence system
TIU	Tactical Intelligence Unit
TOB	temporary operational bases
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UN:	United Nations
UNGA:	United Nations General Assembly
UNIBAM	United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's fund

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USG	under-secretary-general
WET	war establishment tables
WFP:	World Food Program
WTO:	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

1.1 ORIENTATION

Since the end of colonialism in the 1960s and the Cold War in the 1990s, many African countries have gained independence. During this period, more than 80 conflicts occurred between 1960 and 1990, bringing about a shift in the security agenda (Akokpari, 2016). The shift or evolution from the traditional state security threat towards a widening security agenda, namely, human security, prevailed as a continental drive to independence and state-building in a postcolonial era. (Buzan, 1983; Ferreira, 2017; Solomon & Ngubane, 2002). It is against this background that this research topic was selected.

At the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1999 and 2000, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, called upon the international community to find a new consensus on how to approach state sovereignty and the international community's responsibility to prevent mass atrocities such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Sloan, 2014). Following his pleas, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in 2000. This report stated that sovereign states are responsible for protecting their citizens from avoidable catastrophes. However, when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (Sloan, 2014). Based on this sentiment, the complexity of the security situation in the DRC, as well as the deployment of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the argument put forward during this study is that although the DRC is a sovereign state, it is unable to protect its citizens. Therefore, the broader community, in other words, the UN and its member states, bear the responsibility to protect the citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). South Africa (SA) is a member of the UN and a troop-contributing country (TCC) in MONUSCO; therefore, SA collectively shares this responsibility to protect with the broader community.

In the post-apartheid era, SA aspired to play a leading role as a regional peace agent in resolving African problems from a diplomatic and military point of view (Ozkan, 2013). Along with the shift in traditional military threat, the use and role of the military instrument, namely the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), shifted its focus too. The SANDF's focus in response to security threats shifted from the traditional conventional role as its primary role to include military operations other than war (MOOTW), for example, PSO on the African continent.

SA's foreign policy guides the deployment of the SANDF in support of peace and security in Africa, emanating from a domestic, regional, and continental framework. The role of the SANDF is embedded in foreign policy and entails the inclusion of SA under a blanket of multilateralism and political partnership as a regional leader in a global community (Habib, 2009). The deployment of the SANDF

in African PSO has been documented since SA's first contribution in 1999 to Burundi (ACCORD, 2007). Since 1999, the SANDF has deployed in several roles in PSO, amongst which include Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) and the DRC (Neethling, 2009).

In March 2000, the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, initiated a review of UN peace and security activities, leading to the Brahimi Report. This report argued that peacekeeping must be reinvented. It emphasised the importance of the responsibility to protect (R²P) and the need for robustness. Furthermore, the report invoked the Chapter VII mandate authorising the use of force to protect civilians, UN staff, and in some cases, humanitarian workers (Sloan, 2014). The R²P concept, in turn, led to the concept of force intervention in addition to traditional peacekeeping, meaning that where there is no peace to keep, force intervention or enforcement is required.

The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was established in 2013. The SANDF formed part of the Brigade, called the RSA BATT. Its role was to neutralise armed groups (AGs or spoilers of the peace) in the DRC to create space for the peace process to roll-out. Initially, the FIB was discontinued after neutralising the armed group M23 (Tull, 2017). However, after the M23 was neutralised, the FIB continued to be authorised and deployed with the Chapter VII mandate under UN extension resolutions. It is, to date, still deployed in the DRC, specifically in the North Kivu province in Eastern DRC (Tull, 2017). Considering the continuous deployment of the FIB, the military strategist requires a well-defined and understood military strategy to prepare the force and meet operational requirements in the mission area. In this regard, the strategic military lessons learned from past deployments become valuable in the sense that it informs future military-strategic decision-making and is targeted in this study.

The RSA cabinet's decision to deploy the SANDF as a troop-contributing country under FIB in 2013 aligns with its foreign policy as guided by the White Paper on Defence (Republic of South Africa, 1998), and it conforms to the international communities' ideal of R²P. Such a military deployment is a significant departure from the traditional military roles and functions of the SANDF, namely the conventional role of protecting state security. Still, the requirement of a rapid deployment force in Africa and the willingness of the SA government to commit to a military deployment go hand-in-hand in justifying such a deployment. Questions on whether there has been improvement in the DRC's security agenda since the FIB's deployment from 2013 to 2020 remain unanswered. This is particularly so in terms of questions about the efficiency of the FIB in attaining military objectives. In other words, to what *ends*, as illustrated in Lykke's formula, was the FIB deployed since 2013 and what strategic military lessons are there to be learned from these continued deployments.

Uncertainty revolves around the mandate of the FIB. For example, certain scholars, such as Tull (2017), challenged the relevance of the deployment under the Chapter VII mandate (to execute targeted operations). This is set against the changes or lack of improvements and the complexity of the DRC's

security context since the neutralisation of the M23 in 2013. The assumption is that the current deployment of the RSA BATT under FIB is not addressing the concept of widening security but rather robust force intervention coupled with high operational requirements (Tardy, 2011) in a non-improving security environment. This study implies that such high operational requirements have the potential to put a strain on military capabilities, human resources, as well as financial resources. It raises the question of whether the concept of FIB has become more of a burden to maintain or an effective military tool in the pursuit of peace and security in the DRC (Tardy, 2011).

Secondly, the *ways* aspect is questioned regarding deployment concepts used by the RSA BATT to conduct peace-enforcement operations effectively. In the words of Antonio Garcia (2018, p. 22), “How do we fight?” within the broad theme of the future SA Army force deployment strategy. This issue derives from the inherent architecture and strategies of the SANDF in terms of structure, training, doctrine, and prime mission equipment that informs the primary function of defending the country by conventional means (Nibishaka, 2011). The question here revolves around the force preparation and employment strategy and its relevance, success and tailor-made approach for the deployment in a force intervention role. This issue is exacerbated by a “general” (sic) consensus by scholars such as Nibishaha (2011) that the SANDF is in a state of decline, which questions whether the RSA BATT is able to fulfil its military commitments in the DRC effectively.

Thirdly, the *means* aspect is questioned regarding the capabilities available to the RSA BATT to fulfil its operational requirements effectively. Specific reference is made to the quality of troops, leadership, logistics, and finances to sustain itself in executing its mission. In this regard, this study provides a qualitative indication of the correlation or disjuncture between the envisaged desired effect and the actual capability of the RSA BATT.

Finally, according to Lykke’s (2008) model of military strategy, *risk* is associated with strategy and should be brought clearly to leaders' attention. In terms of the military strategy, this study indicates the risks posed to the RSA BATT’s efforts in achieving operational requirements in the DRC. It will address what strategic military lessons are to be learned by those deployed under the FIB in the DRC and whether it is safe to say that risks are sufficiently addressed within the military strategy of the RSA BATT.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The concept of traditional peacekeeping operations is based on the problem statement that traditional multinational PSOs could not provide lasting peace and security in many African countries, specifically in the DRC. To this end, the FIB concept aims to provide a practical and feasible alternative to traditional peacekeeping in an African context. The FIB concept poses high operational requirements, which require tailor-made military-strategic responses.

The research problem for this study is defined as follows: Does the military strategy of the RSA BATT fit the tailor-made military-strategic responses required in the DRC to play an effective peace-enforcement role? This study is demarcated conceptually, geographically and temporally.

The conceptual demarcation pertains to the analysis that was confined to how the RSA addressed the *ends, ways* and *means [risk]* nexus of its military strategy. The geographic demarcation concerns the research focused on the contributions the RSA BATT made in the DRC under the auspices of MONUSCO. This study was based on the assumption that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is highly unlikely to revert to earlier PSOs under a Chapter 6 mandate in the African context when considering the absence of peace to keep in the DRC and the requirement for a more robust application of military forces towards lasting peace and security. The temporal demarcation focuses primarily on the RSA BATT's deployments from 2013 to 2021.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION

The study endeavoured to answer a general research question and three specific questions. The primary research question was formulated as follows:

What strategic military lessons were learned from deploying the RSA BATT under the FIB in the DRC since 2013?

The following specific research questions were formulated to support answering the general research question:

- To what *ends* are the RSA BATT deployed in the DRC?
- How is the SA Army infantry corps force development and employment strategy operationalised for the DRC?
- How are the *means* and *risk* components of the RSA BATT's contribution to the FIB addressed in its military strategy for the DRC?

The conclusions of the above-mentioned secondary questions serve as the premise of a synthesis that indicates the strategic military lessons to be learned from previous RSA BATT deployments in the DRC. To this end, the following research objectives were formulated. Firstly, objective one emanated from secondary question one, namely, to indicate the role and end state of the RSA BATT as a role player within the bigger picture of peacekeeping in the DRC. Objective two emanates from secondary question two, namely, to determine if the force employment strategy of the RSA BATT is tailor-made to meet operational requirements. Objectives three and four emanate from secondary question three, namely, to determine if the range of resources made available to the RSA BATT is optimal and tailor-made to achieve operational requirements in the DRC and to indicate the risks towards achieving operational requirements.

1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY

The study aimed to answer the general research question of what strategic military lessons are to be learned from the deployment of the RSA BATT under the FIB in the DRC since 2013. Furthermore, by providing an analysis of the strategic military lessons to be learned from the RSA BATT under FIB in the DRC, the researcher intends to provide a synthesis of findings that describes and assists academics and officers in the SANDF on whether the military strategy of the RSA BATT is tailored to achieve operational requirements in the DRC.

1.5 PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The contribution of this study is found in the RSA BATT's commitment of forces to peacekeeping in Africa, which includes international and regional organisations. The strategic lessons to be learned during this study are important to continue staying abreast with the ever-changing security environment applicable on a regional and continental level. Knowledge gained through this study is important to any TCC in contemporary peacekeeping in Africa as it provides valuable military-strategic lessons from the past that can be employed in preparing future forces required to achieve the global community's political ends. The benefits of this study are that it will add new knowledge to the already existing knowledge in contemporary peacekeeping, specifically force intervention, which may, in turn, inform military strategies for future deployments similar to the deployment in the DRC. To do research, a qualitative research approach was the preferred choice for this study as it serves as a platform to include a wide variety of ideas and perspectives of personnel and academics in the field of military science related to PSO on the African battlespace.

1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.6.1 Research paradigm and conceptual framework

The following section deals with retired Colonel Alfred. L. Lykke's formulation of military strategy and will serve as a theoretical framework for this study. Lykke served as a teacher in the United States Army College after he graduated from West Point in 1954. Since his graduation, he taught at the Field Artillery School in the United States (US) Army for many years, after which he was approached to act as the Director of Military Strategy at the US Army War College. After two years of intense studying and engagement with senior officers from different arms of service, he noted a 'gap' in the way US Army officers thought about military strategy. He concluded that there is a lack of a clear definition of military strategy. Two events inspired him in his life: a dream of a three-legged stool depicting the idea of defining military strategy and an inspiring message from his father to keep the concept of military strategy as simple as possible. He published his well-known work, also known as the Little Three-Legged Stool formulation of military strategy in *Towards Understanding Military Strategy*. This work has been taught at the US Army War College for the past 40 years (Lykke, Duckenfield, & Whitt, 2020) and at the SANDF Military Academy since 1996.

Apart from the widely acknowledged credit for Lykke's formula on military strategy, it is criticised. One specific critique comes from Major M.L. Cavanaugh, who served as a US Army strategist and a non-resident fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point. According to him, Lykke's formula has become a limitation that undermines the creative thinking of US Army strategists (Cavanaugh, 2020). He lists four flaws in the formula. First, the formula is too prescriptive to be used in the military sense, where many variables and factors influence strategy. Secondly, *ends* do not really end, meaning that strategy does not have a clear start or specific end. For example, here, he referred to the death of Adolf Hitler and the bombing of Hiroshima in World War II, not ending the military-strategic process *per se*. Thirdly, it minimises the adversary, and lastly, since its widespread adoption, its outcomes are unremarkable at best (Cavanaugh, 2020). However, Cavanaugh gives credit to Lykke's formula by mentioning that it is a useful tool that, when used properly, serves as a feasibility check of military strategy (Cavanaugh, 2020).

Lykke's (2000) model of military strategy is selected for this study because military institutions worldwide are teaching it and because its initial intention is simplistic enough to encourage understanding in the field of military strategy (Lykke, Duckenfield, & Whitt, 2020). According to Lykke (2000), military strategy can be formulated as an equation, namely military strategy = military objective (*ends*) + military concepts (*ways*) + military resources (*means*). This formula informed the objectives of this study and will serve as a framework for analysis of the military strategy of RSA BATT in the DRC.

Lykke's formula for military strategy is supported by the work of Baucon (1987), Drew and Snow (1988), Esterhuysen (2000), and Summers (1983), with a main focus on military strategy. The formula provided a framework of analysis that will guide the efforts of answering the specific research questions towards achieving the specific research aims. This specific framework is used because it is the same framework used in the Vision 2045 and Future SA Army Strategy, which touches on relevant aspects of the SA Army's force development and deployment strategies. These are directly addressed during this study. Therefore, a firm reference base is established to do an analysis. For this reason, the academic work of Lykke and that of Esterhuysen was selected to form the framework for this study.

Esterhuysen (2000) in *Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics: Who is Responsible for What in the SANDF?* and Lykke (2000), in *Defining Military Strategy*, provide a well-defined concept of military strategy. According to Lykke (2000), military strategy at its highest level is used as a basis for military planning and operations. It must support national strategy and comply with national policy, defined as a *broad course of action* at a national level in pursuing national objectives. In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of the military strategy (Lykke, 2000). According to Esterhuysen (2000), the value of any strategy depends on the armed forces' ability to mix policy goals with military means. Therefore, it can be argued that military strategy cannot be separated from national

strategy and *vice versa*. For the purpose of this study, the latter principle was maintained. However, the focus remained on the strategic military lessons to be learned from the RSA BATT deployments and how the lessons learned can be used in the FIB deployments. These include deployments in the DRC and others, such as the latest Southern African Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) under the auspices of SADC, namely Operation VIKELA, where RSA forces were part of the military force executing a Scenario 6 operation (De Ridder, 2020).

Similar to Lykke's formula, three central elements formed the pillars of this study. Firstly, objectives, strategic concepts, and resources. What follows is an abridged concept of this formula, which served as a framework for this study. Within this formula, *ends* refer to military objectives, *ways* to the military-strategic concept or course of action, and *means* to the military instrument (resources), and finally, *risk* or the possibility of loss and damages or not achieving the objective (Esterhuyse, 2000; Lykke, 2000). Lykke illustrated this concept in the form of a three-legged stool (see Figure 1.1), symbolising that if the strategy is to be successful, the legs must be balanced, and the tilt angle represents the risk of not achieving the ends.




Figure 1.1: Lykke's Model of Military Strategy

(Lykke, 1989)

The final aspect included in the conceptualisation of strategic military lessons to be learned in this study was determining military strategy. In determining military strategy, two dimensions were critical. Firstly, planning and preparation, which involves force preparation, and secondly, execution of current preparations, which involves force deployment. In the case of the SANDF, the former is the responsibility of the SANDF Chief of Joint Operations (C J OPS) and the latter task force and theatre commanders (Esterhuyse, 2000). Drew and Snow (1998) identified four elements of importance when developing military strategy: development, deployment, employment, and coordination. According to them, development and deployment do not necessarily denote wartime operations and may serve the purpose of a threat or a deterrent that can lead to achieving national objectives. Furthermore, they said that employment entails the ultimate use of force during hostilities. Finally, they purported that

coordination is the relationship within the military instrument of power to recognise the revolution in military affairs in a timely manner to stay ahead of the changing times. During this study, the same sentiment was shared when reflecting on the RSA BATT military-strategic lessons to be learned from the DRC, meaning that aspects of force preparations and deployment, including force employment and coordination prior to and during deployment, all form part of this study. A specific research design was developed to serve this purpose.

1.6.2 Research design

The study was conducted within an applied and qualitative research strategy and was carried out over seven months. A qualitative research strategy enabled the researcher, the primary mechanism of data collection, to interact personally with the documents and participants through data collection techniques such as semi-structured interviews and documentary research. A qualitative research strategy was selected as the best methodology for this study because it provided the flexibility to use interviews and documentary analysis interchangeably to acquire selective information. This study used semi-structured interviews and a literature analysis as opposed to experiments and surveys such as in a quantitative research strategy of inquiry. The reason is that the advantages of a qualitative strategy outweigh that of the quantitative strategy with specific reference to semi-structured interviews, which can provide historical information not documented previously.

The study commenced with conducting semi-structured interviews by the researcher as a key instrument in the form of open-ended questions with military staff that were directly or indirectly involved in force development and force employment strategies in the DRC, specifically the RSA BATT. Interviews were selected as it was useful when participants could not be directly observed, but they could still provide historical information, and the researcher was allowed to control the line of questioning (Creswell, 2009). According to Creswell (2009), the purposeful selection of individuals for a proposed study is best suited for qualitative research to understand the research problem and question. Purposeful selection differs from random sampling or large numbers of participants typically used during quantitative research (Creswell, 2009). According to Creswell (2009), four aspects stand out in this sample selection. Firstly, the *setting* in which the research was conducted; secondly, the *actors* who were interviewed; thirdly, the *events*, referring to what will be questioned; and finally, the *process* concerning the actual interview. The purposeful selection of a sample group best suited this research topic as the setting was dictated by COVID-19 regulations at the time of the study, limiting interviews to be done via the internet streaming application or e-mail responses as preferred by the participants. Secondly, the participants were handpicked based on their direct involvement in the military deployment of the RSA BATT contingents from 2013 to 2021. Thirdly, the events to be investigated and questioned are encapsulated by personal experiences and involvement coupled with their specific experiences and knowledge within the particular field of operations. Finally, the process of interviews

was regulated by authoritative, administrative and ethical guidelines provided by the academic institution where the researcher was registered and authorised to conduct the research. Therefore, the target group was selected because of their first-hand experience and knowledge gained through the deployment of RSA BATT.

Open-ended questions were selected because they centre on the interpretation and rich description within a qualitative approach. It also allows the respondent to give their interpretation according to their social paradigm on the subject under analysis. Furthermore, it allows the researcher to work back and forth between answers to determine the themes in the data (Creswell, 2009). This enabled the researcher to conduct a thematic analysis to describe their perception, meanings, and ideas as strategic lessons to be learned from the RSA BATT in the past and current deployments under FIB in the DRC.

Although interviews were regarded as suitable for this research, they had limitations. Academically, Creswell (2009) listed a number of limitations, including that information provided is received indirectly and filtered through the interviewees' perspectives. Secondly, it predominantly occurs in a designated place rather than in the natural field setting. Thirdly, the presence of the researcher may bias responses. However, this was not the case when all responses were made electronically. Finally, not all people are equally articulate and perceptive. On a more practical note, but still regarded as a limitation, the researcher did not visit the operational area because the respondents were based in the RSA and no longer in the operational area. However, the researcher could still apply the knowledge and information gathered from the sample group deployed in the DRC and who are/were employed in the different headquarters and joint operations environment.

Prior to conducting interviews, the researcher was obligated to adhere to four specific prerequisite procedures regarding authority/clearance to conduct the study. The first was to establish authorisation from the Chief of the SA Army to conduct research within the SA Army. Secondly, permission from the Defence Intelligence (DI) authority was required to conduct research within the Department of Defence to ensure military security. Thirdly, authorisation was required from the South African Military Health Service Directorate Psychology to use data and findings within the field of military psychology (Human Factor Combat Readiness Stressor Model). These three prerequisites were received from the respective offices of the Chief of the SA Army, DI Headquarters and the Directorate of Military Psychology, by forwarding an official request with an abridged version of the research proposal attached. This was approved before the commencement of the study. These authorities requested to scrutinise the study's outcome before publishing any findings.

Creswell (2009) listed several ethical issues regarding data analysis. Amongst which informed consent is prioritised. This aspect was addressed in the following way. The prerequisite to conducting the study was ethical clearance from Stellenbosch University's Research Ethics Committee, seeing that

interviews were scheduled as a form of data collection. This was done by applying for clearance via the Faculty Ethics Screening Committee in 2020 and was valid for the entire study duration. Furthermore, all participants were provided with an electronic consent form and recruitment letter, which provided an overview of the research topic. COVID-19 regulations restricted face-to-face contact with participants, which obliged the researcher to rely on electronic consent forms. Creswell (2009) listed a number of important aspects that must be communicated with respondents to ensure informed consent, including aspects such as:

1. Identification of the researcher.
2. Identification of sponsoring institution.
3. Identification of how the participant was selected.
4. Identification of the purpose of the research.
5. Identification of benefit to the participant.
6. Identification of level and type of participation.
7. Notation of risk to the participant.
8. Guarantee of confidentiality.
9. Assurance that the participant can withdraw at any time.
10. Provision of the name of persons to contact if questions arise.

Based on the above criteria forming part of the recruitment letter and electronic consent form, all responding participants gave their respective consent to participate in the research before gathering information. Therefore, it is safe to say that the relevant authorities and governing bodies established the integrity of the findings of this study prior to collecting the data. Finally, it is safe to say that ethical aspects were adhered to throughout the research procedures.

The study included document/literature analysis of public and private documentary sources to describe the contemporary human security threats, relevant policies, strategy, and the PSO capabilities and practices of the SANDF. By using a document analysis to analyse the data from relevant laws, white papers, strategic, operational, and tactical level policies, as well as relevant doctrine and post-mission debriefs, the researcher intended to describe the mandate and functions of the RSA BATT concerning the required national outputs and outcomes regarding force intervention in the DRC. The researcher also analysed relevant literature to describe contemporary security dilemmas that provided the researcher with a platform to analyse and describe policies, strategies, and practices of the SANDF in relation to international trends in the ambit of national and human security threats. Furthermore, the literature also provided context to the current discourse on peace missions in Africa and, more specifically, all the themes and concepts related to the conceptualisation of peace missions in Africa. This analysis included written instructions, surveys and reports to determine the relationship between

policies, military strategy, physical capabilities, and execution to describe the *ends, ways and means [risk]* within RSA military strategy regarding the deployment of the RSA BATT in the DRC.

Two aspects regarding the quality of this study are highlighted: triangulation and data integrity. According to Creswell (2009), the concurrent triangulation approach resembles a mixed method of research, which includes both qualitative and quantitative data collected concurrently. Data triangulation is done via collecting data from multiple sources, such as interviews, observations and document analysis. The researcher applied triangulation as a strategy to ensure data validation. This was done through follow-up interviews and discussions of contributions by participants during interviews to ensure that, after analysis, the information collected was relevant and interpreted accurately by the researcher.

Creswell (2009) highlighted another ethical issue around the interpretation of data, namely the necessity for the interpretation of data to be *member checked*. This process involves sending the completed report to the participant to verify whether their contribution was correctly interpreted. Although some limitations regarding the participant response were evident, their contributions were correctly interpreted by the researcher and included in this study. This was established by forwarding the completed report to all participants for screening and making provisions for follow-up input.

The following figures illustrate this. Within Sector 1, two participants were identified, and both responded positively to recruitment. Only one responded to the question bank and replied positively to the researcher's analysis and interpretation of his contribution to the research. Within Sector 2, four participants were identified, and all four responded positively towards the recruitment. Only three responded to the question bank, of which only two replied positively to the researcher's analysis and interpretation of their contributions to the research, and one did not respond in time to the request by the researcher. Within Sector 3, 16 participants were identified, of which eleven responded positively to recruitment. Only one responded to the question bank and replied positively to the researcher's analysis and interpretation of his contribution to the research. Apart from Sectors 1 to 3, two additional participants were identified, and both responded positively towards the recruitment. Only one responded to the question bank and replied positively to the researcher's analysis and interpretation of his contribution to the research. In total, 24 participants were identified; 19 responded positive to the recruitment, seven replied to the question bank, of which only six replied positively to the researcher's analysis and interpretation of his contribution to the research.

The integrity of data collected from the literature and document analysis was established in two ways. The first was getting the necessary authorisation from DI and the Chief of the SA Army. Secondly, the researcher ensured that all unpublished documents were authenticated by the signatures of the appropriate authorities or collected from specific organisations or units, like instructions, reports, and

military documents. Furthermore, Creswell (2009) listed a very important ethical issue regarding ownership of the collected data. The researcher was obligated to enter into an agreement with the State to conduct the research at state expense and was authorised by the Chief of the SA Army and the Directorate of defence intelligence, therefore, the intellectual property would remain the State's.

It may well be argued that this study is only based on one TCC of the FIB and poses the possibility of generalising the conclusions on the strategic military lessons to be learned from the RSA BATT. However, the reader is reminded that the concept of FIB has never been deployed other than in the DRC. Therefore, focusing on a specific TCC does not discredit the study but may be regarded as a benchmark for future UN intervention missions elsewhere in the world.

1.7 COMMENTS ON THE LITERATURE REVIEW

This study specifically focused on the lessons learned from the RSA BATT deployment in the DRC, meaning it falls within the ambit of peace and security in Africa. Therefore, descriptive thinking of peace and security on the African continent and how international and regional organisations address security-related matters within a contemporary era were obtained by reviewing the literature on existing studies conducted in the field of security and Africa studies. The literature and data provided four main themes. The first theme pertains to a widening security agenda in Africa since 1990, namely human security. Human security is highlighted as opposed to traditional state-centric security. Human security is widely accepted as the departure point for the contemporary paradigm towards peace and stability in Africa.

The second theme revolved around two concepts: R²P and robustness as the latest approach towards conflict resolution in Africa, where military means are involved. These two concepts were closely applied in research and related directly to the concept of FIB in the DRC. Specific note was made that the RSA BATT military strategy must be tailored for the operational requirements and stance as a robust, highly mobile and versatile peace support force within the concept of R²P. Therefore, rendering robustness and versatility were regarded as fundamentally relevant to this study.

A third theme was SA's foreign policy as a guiding framework towards its contribution to peacekeeping in Africa. SA has been under keen international scrutiny, criticised by both the West and African states for its past approach to conflict resolution in Africa. A clear shift from its post-apartheid foreign policy to a far more liberal approach that enjoyed its high tide in the Mbeki era of the African Renaissance reveals itself. African solidarity now had a footrest for African countries to stand in solidarity in addressing the international inequalities and shaping the future agenda of Africa.

A fourth theme that emanated from the literature was SA's role in peacekeeping in Africa since 1994. SA is pursuing peace and stability on a continental and regional level as it has a direct link to its state

security. However, critique of SA's reluctance to act against African leaders that violate human security and instead choose a diplomatic approach has been made on several stages by mostly the West. Irrespective, SA continues to contribute to peacekeeping missions under the UN as TCC in the DRC as part of the FIB. Further critique has been made of this in terms of the capability and quality of SA's contribution over the past number of years.

Considering what is known and recorded on security in Africa and how SA became involved in ensuring lasting peace and stability in Africa, a research problem revealed itself and served as a catalyst for this study. No data or analyses were available to confirm whether the continuous deployment of the RSA BATT under FIB influenced fundamental human security issues. Furthermore, a growing number of analysts argued that human security is such an all-encompassing concept that it has diminished the role of security in terms of human security. As a result, it has become nearly impossible to define defence and security as everything can be related to human security nowadays. In other words, the term has become so wide that it has assimilated all conceptualisation of defence and security. Therefore, fundamental questions remain unanswered around the SANDF's capability to effectively contribute to peacekeeping in the DRC.

The RSA's participation in the DRC conflict was merited in academia because using a military instrument is indispensable when addressing conflict in Africa. Knowing that Africa is still plagued by conflict from a historical and present perspective, the notion to avoid repeating the same mistakes and/or methods that failed to ensure lasting peace and security in Africa becomes important. Therefore, it is paramount to include the strategic military lessons to be learned from the RSA BATT in this study, not only because of the international expectation and leading role SA is expected to play in Africa but also because it reveals valuable considerations that can serve as a paradigm shift towards peace and stability in the future. The literature and data sources consulted for this study included:

Human security: Akokpari (2016), Buzan (1983), Ferreira (2017; 2009), Nathan (2005), Sidiropoulos (2014), and Solomon (2007).

R²P and robustness: Berdal (2018), Ferreira (2017), Garcia (2018), Hunt (2016), Karlsrud (2015), Sloan (2014), Tardy (2011), and Tull (2014).

South Africa's foreign policy: Barber (2005), Ferreira (2011), Habib (2009), Nathan (2005), and Mabera (2018).

South Africa's role in peacekeeping operations in Africa since 1994: Akokpari (2016), Alden (2009), Ferreira (2011), Jordaan (2010), Landsberg (2016), Nibiskaka (2011), Ozkan (2013), and Solomon (2002).

1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

1.8.1 Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis

This chapter provided an introduction and background to the study. It provided the methodology, research themes, problem statement, and demarcation of the study. The literature review within this chapter provides an overview of several sources consulted to plan and conduct this study.

1.8.2 Chapter 2: The ends to the RSA BATT participation in the DRC

This chapter answers the first secondary question: To what *ends* are the RSA BATT deployed in the DRC? The objective of this chapter is to indicate the role and mission end-state of the RSA BATT as a role player within the bigger picture of peacekeeping in the DRC. This chapter is structured into three sections: a discussion on the link between protracted conflict and the contemporary conflict resolution process; the third-party approach to conflict resolution is discussed to indicate the different stakeholders within the process; the role and mission end-state of the RSA BATT as TCC is provided with the lessons to be learned from it.

1.8.3 Chapter 3: The ways to the RSA BATT deployment in the DRC: From force employment strategy to force preparation

This chapter answers the second specific research question: How is the C J OPS force employment strategy (*ways*) operationalised for the DRC? The reader's attention is drawn to the military concepts employed by C J OPS and filtered down to the SA Army Infantry Formation force preparation process. This chapter looks at the African security environment from an African perspective, where problems and actors require force preparations to be put in place to ensure a tailored force is developed to deal with specific challenges within the African battlespace. This chapter is specifically approached through the spirit of African solutions to African problems (Ngoma, 2004), with the intent to provide lessons from past deployments that might enhance knowledge to be applied in future.

1.8.4 Chapter 4: The means [risk] made available to the RSA BATT, and the risks involved during the deployment in the DRC

This chapter answers the third research question: How are the *means* and *risk* components of the RSA BATT's contribution to the FIB addressed in its military strategy for the DRC? The starting point of the argument in this chapter is prefaced by the previous two chapters, which indicate the *ends* respectively. In other words, the military objectives to be reached, and the *ways*, in other words, the how to reach the ends. From this, certain operational requirements are put to the RSA BATT. Questions about whether the resources made available for the RSA BATT are sufficient to ensure a DRC force's effective and efficient deployment are addressed in this chapter. Risk in this regard does not refer to the danger presented by operating in a hostile environment that might lead to loss of life and damage to equipment. Rather it refers to the prevailing risks between achieving operational requirements in the

DRC and the potential failure of the RSA BATT. Here the lessons from experienced military staff in the operational and headquarter (HQ) environment of the SA Army and C J OPS become valuable for future consideration.

1.8.5 Chapter 5: Summary and conclusions

This chapter evaluates and summarises the key findings that address the general research question. It focuses on conclusions made to answer the specific research aim and objectives by answering the specific research questions. It generalises the findings to provide a synthesis in addressing the initial problem statement, namely, does the military strategy of the RSA BATT fit the tailored military-strategic responses required in the DRC to play an effective peace-enforcement role?

1.9 CONCLUSIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, lasting peace and security resembled a mere vision, far from reach for many African countries and remained this way for many still to this day. History informs the field of security and Africa studies and suggests that the causes, course and consequences of insecurity in Africa are far-reaching and complex, let alone addressing such complex security dilemmas. Although African leaders have joined hands with the international community to address these issues, the complexity and dynamics of the contemporary security dilemmas in Africa seem to continue despite the efforts to address them. However, the responsibility to find workable and sustainable solutions to these issues remains the absolute priority of the international community. New ways of dealing with sources of insecurity have led to contemporary peacekeeping methods, such as the FIB in the DRC, to address the importance of the responsibility to protect the vulnerable in Africa. This study implies that one way of addressing the shortcomings of the past is to learn from the lessons that inform the future. Therefore, this study endeavours to determine the strategic military lessons from the RSA BATT as the benchmark for future role players in preparation for future peace intervention operations. Ultimately it aimed to provide new knowledge to stay abreast of the ever-changing security environment in Africa and abroad.

CHAPTER 2: THE *ENDS* TO THE RSA BATT PARTICIPATION IN THE DRC

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter addressed the introductory aspects and formulated the pathway for the remainder of this study. Lykke's model (formula) for strategy within the conceptual framework consists of three main aspects: *ends*, *ways* and *means [risk]*. This chapter highlights the question around to what *ends* are the RSA BATT deployed in the DRC. Within this chapter, three objectives are pursued. The first objective is to provide a holistic viewpoint on the conflict in Africa and conflict resolution mechanisms through PSO, with specific reference to the DRC. The second objective is to analyse the third-party approach to conflict resolution in Africa, particularly MONUSCO. The third and final objective is to analyse the policy guidelines of the SANDF as the foundation of the deployment of the RSA BATT in the DRC.

To achieve the objectives, this chapter is structured in three sections, highlighting three central themes as both foundation and background to understanding the RSA BATT *ends* in the DRC. The three themes are protracted armed conflict, third-party approach to conflict resolution and the RSA BATT as a TCC in the DRC.

The discussion on protracted armed conflict, particularly in the DRC, is useful to indicate the link between protracted conflict and the contemporary conflict resolution process. During this debate, protracted conflict will be defined and characterised to identify what problem needs to be solved. Secondly, PSO will be discussed as a contemporary approach to conflict resolution, such as how to solve the problem. Here the emphasis is placed on traditional and contemporary peacekeeping, focusing on its respective definitions, nature, examples and the change in security environment.

The debate on a third-party approach to conflict resolution is intended to provide the bigger picture of contemporary conflict resolution. In this section, the reader can expect a broad discussion on the relevant stakeholders involved in the conflict resolution process. However, the main emphasis will be on the use of force by external governments, also referred to as TCC. Along with MONUSCO, its stakeholders will be discussed, of which the FIB will serve as an example in this case.

The third and final theme focuses on the RSA BATT as TCC in the DRC. Several aspects will receive attention to indicate the policy guidelines of the RSA BATT as TCC. Firstly, the national security quintet will be discussed in general with a specific emphasis on national interest. Next, the different levels of war will be illustrated, and the level of war that applies to the RSA BATT will be indicated.

The final part of the theme will be allocated to a discussion on the RSA BATT on its role, mandate, stance, mission end state, and mission and related policy guidelines in the DRC.

The reader is reminded that within the formula of strategy = ends + ways + means [risk], the *ends* will be the main focus of this chapter, with a breakdown in levels of war towards the ends of the RSA BATT in the DRC. The theme of protracted conflict and conflict resolution as background and foundation follows next.

2.2 PROTRACTED ARMED CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE DRC

2.2.1 Abridged history of the DRC

An abridged history of the DRC will be highlighted to provide the context regarding the origins of the conflict in the country. By doing so, the reader will gain an overview of the course of the conflict to where it currently stands. The interpretation of Ngoma (2004) and Kok (2013) serves as a reference.

From 1885-1908, the Congo, as it was referred to then, was ruled by Belgium under King Leopold II as his private property, whereafter, the Belgian government took over control of the country. After the independence of the Congo in 1960, violence started after the assassination of its first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba and the passing of the then UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld in an air crash en route to the Congo on a peace mission in 1961 (Ngoma, 2004). General Mobutu Sese Seko took power and renamed the Congo to Zaire, which became an important ally to the United States of America (USA) during the Cold War. After the Cold War, Sese Seko ruled the country as a dictator, ultimately leading to his replacement in 1997 by Laurent Kabila. Kabila ruled the country until his assassination by one of his bodyguards. His son, Joseph Kabila (Ngoma, 2004), replaced him. On 2 August 1998, the country saw a flare-up of violent conflict, which still prevails. The prolonged conflict in the DRC is referred to by scholars such as Howe (2001, p. 1), Ngoma (2004, p. 3) and others as “Africa’s First World War”.

More recently, in April 2012, Joseph Kabila ordered the arrest of two rebel leaders, the leader of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (NCDP), Bosco Ntanga, and a convict, Thomas Lubanga (Kok, 2013). At the time, the NCDP was integrated into the Federal Army of the Republic of the Congo (FRDC) (a reference to the integration agreement on 23 March 2009 between the DRC Government and rebel leaders) with officers placed in strategic positions in North and South Kivu, rendering such positions access to economic interest to prosper. However, after the arrest announcement, officers feared losing their positions and defected from the FRDC, rendering the integration process unsuccessful. Furthermore, MONUSCO failed to stop the rebels, and a general lack of discipline within the ranks of the FRDC contributed much to its inability to stop the rebels (Kok, 2013). Ultimately, in May 2013, photographs of rebel recruits training in the Eastern DRC emerged, indicating the continuation of the activities around armed groups. Joseph Kabila was replaced as

president of the DRC by Felix Tshisekedi in the country's first peaceful election in December 2018 and was inaugurated on 24 January 2019 (DW Live TV Africa Update, 2020).

Since the independence of the DRC, it has seen many years of changes in political leadership accompanied by violence and armed conflict. In fact, the violence in the DRC has continued for over 60 years. Such a prolonged form of conflict has been termed protracted armed conflict and deserves discussion for the sake of context in this particular study. The next section will focus on the protracted armed conflict in Africa, specifically referring to the DRC as a case in point.

2.2.2 Defining protracted armed conflict

Defining protracted armed conflict is important as it forms part of understanding and disseminating knowledge of international humanitarian law that governs armed conflict (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). Three keywords in this theme stand out. The first is *protracted*, meaning longevity and intractability of the conflict (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2017). In the case of the DRC, the conflict lasted from 1960 to date, in other words, 61 years. If one views this from the perspective of an average African person's life expectancy, which is 75.5 years (World Health Organization, 2016), it would suggest that the conflict in the DRC has lasted a lifetime for much of its population and that those individuals would not have known any other lifestyle other than that of war. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), protracted war could last not only over a lifetime, but in many cases, over generations (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2017). Therefore, this study implies that the protracted nature of the conflict creates a culture of war within the society it takes place. Consequently, it becomes extremely complex and dynamic to address based on a required long-term approach.

The second keyword is *armed* conflict. This implies that conflicting parties do not necessarily diplomatically resolve their issues; instead, violence is used (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2017). According to the ICRC, the Geneva Convention of 1949 Article 3 (2008), only two types of armed conflict apply to IHL: international and non-international. The distinction between these two types of conflict lies within its belligerents and their territory. International armed conflict occurs between two or more states, whereas non-international armed conflict occurs between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups or between such groups only (Geneva Convention of 1949 Article 3, 2008). The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) proposed the following definition for international armed conflict: "An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed forces between states" (2008, p. 2). This definition has since been adopted by other international bodies and is also used in this study. In the case of non-international armed conflict, two main legal sources apply. The first is Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, and the second is Article 1 of Protocol II (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008). According to these legal sources, non-international conflict is defined as the following:

Protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more-armed groups or between such groups arising on the territory of the State [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation. (2008, p. 5)

Using these two types of armed conflicts as a yardstick, the DRC conflicting parties, also referred to as belligerents, have taken the form of the most common types in African conflicts, AGs on the one hand and government forces on the other. Firstly, according to the UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), AGs that prevail in the DRC (per region) include the *Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain* (APCLS) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in North Kivu, the Mayi-Mayi Gedeon and the Mayi-Mayi Kata-Katanga in the Katanga Province, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Oriental Province. Finally, the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), also known as the M23, near the Rwandan territories and the city of Goma. The Figure below (Figure 2.1) shows the different areas in which the AGs are active. Please note that this is an overview for reference in the latter part of this chapter when dealing with the causes of protracted armed conflict in the DRC.

Secondly, the DRC government, which bears the primary responsibility for the security, protection, reconciliation, peacebuilding and development of its country and citizens (United Nations, 2013), becomes a belligerent party to the conflict in the DRC. Apart from the Congolese civil administration (police, judiciary and territorial administration), its defence force, namely the FRDC (2013), acts as part of the security forces that must maintain the rule of law and respect for human rights. Therefore, from an armed forces perspective, the FRDC becomes a belligerent party to the conflict representing the government of the day. The location of the capital city, Kinshasa, in the Western District of the DRC, should be noted for future reference in this chapter.

This study defines the dispute in the DRC as a protracted, low-intensity, non-international armed conflict between the Congolese government security forces and several AGs under rebel command, primarily in the North Kivu region and Kasai Province. By characterising protracted armed conflict, an understanding of the concept is created. To achieve this, the causes, course and consequences of such a conflict will be discussed with specific reference to the DRC as a case in point.




Figure 2.1: DRC map with indicated rebel active regions

(Coyne, 2020)

2.2.3 Causes of protracted armed conflict in the DRC

The causes of protracted armed conflict are widely documented and, in many cases, based on individual conflicts, including cases in different geographical areas, between different parties to the conflict and at different times. An example is the military coups in 1970 in Uganda and the armed conflict in 1974 in Ethiopia (Ngwane, 2003). The armed struggle in the 1980s against the oppression of the majority by the apartheid regime in South Africa also serves as an example. It should be clear that the causes are not the same in these cases; however, the result, namely armed conflict, is the common denominator. This study implies that certain causes have shown some similarities and may be regarded as reflecting some aspects of commonality, specifically conflicts in Africa. Such causes range from political instability and seeking power to poor civil-military relations (CMR), religion, ethnicity, and territory, to name a few. This study focuses on the specific causes of the protracted armed conflict in the DRC. The information described here provides a basis for understanding the next section dealing with how to solve the problem. The intention was not to omit certain causes of protracted armed conflict but rather to specify those causes that primarily led to the conflict and its protracted nature.

2.2.3.1 Poor civil-military relations: Military unprofessionalism

The political nature of the state strongly depends on its military professionalism, which includes its military capability, political responsibility, and loyalty to protect the political and economic development of the state (Howe, 2001). Military professionalism specifically refers to the marking out

of certain areas as exclusively allocated for militaries (providing military advice on weapons systems, force levels, military expenditure and budget and political acceptance in terms of diplomacy, etcetera) and those areas forbidden to involve themselves (Chuter, 2011). In other words, keeping the military out of power is also referred to as civil-military relations (CMR). Schiff (1995) stated that civil-military control depends on a professional military to advise its civilian counterparts and defend its nation from foreign threats, but they should never become involved in political decision-making, and instead remain under civilian control. Civil control and civilian control should not be confused in this regard. Civil control refers to the obedience the military, as an instrument of the state, owes to the state and its taxpayers (Chuter, 2000). Whereas civilian control refers to civilian institutions and personnel within a democracy, such as a legislature and government (Williams, 2001). Civilian and civil control become ambiguous regarding where the military is invited to advise on sectors including political society, government, business and civil society. An example is the rise of the armed forces of SA under former President P.W. Botha's rule in 1978-1989, after inviting the military into the executive reaches of state power (Williams, 2001). This study emphasises the problem of poor CMR as a specific cause of protracted armed conflict in Africa. Both the theory of danger and the concordance theory was considered in their argument on military unprofessionalism; also, the thesis provided by Chuter (2011) in his book, *Governing and Managing the Defence Sector*, was considered. He states the following in his thesis:

The institutional military appetite for power is such that CMR in any country largely consists of minimising and controlling the power of the military. But this holds only true if all cases of military intervention are similar, or at least share many common features. If this is not true, then the problem does not really exist. (p. 56)

The Danger Theory highlights the suspicion of the military and the fear of what it will do if not supervised (Chuter, 2011). The theory has three basic sources: an Anglo-Saxon theory concerning the place of the military, a liberal theory on the concept of war and peace by the middle classes and an economic theory on an increase in the role of international donors. The Anglo-Saxon theory holds that the rising middle classes in Britain and colonial America have identified the military with the rising aristocracy and power of the monarch. Therefore, a fear of a powerful military will lead to a fear of the influence the military has on the state and its political affairs (Chuter, 2011). The liberal theory also lies with the middle classes, who dismiss the soldier as stupid and bloodthirsty and war as a state that rational human beings would avoid at all costs. Two actors are prominent in this regard, the military and the civilian politician. This theory highlights the tendency of military intervention in Africa, specifically in the post-independence era (Chuter, 2011). The economic theory highlights an increase in international donors becoming involved in conflict resolution instead of allocating funds only to development. Chuter (2011) also indicates that donors have become increasingly influential in the CMR of developing

countries. The crux of the danger theory, as interpreted by this study, is that the two different actors are the military and the civilian counterparts, the latter fearing a military intervention based on the influence and relative power it has, with the prospect of intervening when given the opportunity.

The Concordance Theory presented by Schiff (1995) views the military, political leadership and citizenry as partners. It predicts that if they agree on the military's role by achieving a mutual accommodation, military interference in political affairs is less likely to occur in the state. Schiff (1995) further emphasises the relationship between the parties, shaped by the cultural and historical context. The cultural and historical context of the relationship between African states and their respective militaries has proven to be complex and problematic and reflects poorly in terms of adherence to good CMR. This study firstly implies that many African states, their citizens and their militaries have failed to agree on the role of the military and for it to refrain from participating in its political affairs. Secondly, in terms of the cultural and historical perspective, this study implies that African states have been subject to many years of armed conflict and have developed a culture of war and reoccurrence of militaries becoming involved in political affairs. In other words, unprofessional African militaries have become the norm instead of the exception and have become a cause of protracted armed conflict in many African countries. Further enquiry as to why African militaries have resembled the notion of being unprofessional will be discussed next.

The reason for the military intervention in African politics is a very complex phenomenon (Ngwane, 2003), yet it has occurred continuously over time since the 1960s independence era. It finds its roots in the desire for power and wealth (Chuter, 2011). Ngwane lists four scenarios in his article *Civil-Military Relations: The Military and Africa Politics*, which illustrates how militaries or soldiers have interfered in several countries' political affairs to come into power. These four scenarios are listed based on different eras, overlapping in some cases, namely soldiers as power-mongers during the 1960s and 1970s, soldiers as power brokers from 1970-1980 (Cold War), soldiers as power-sharers from 1990-2000 and soldiers as statesmen over different eras (2003). The following will serve as a concise summary of his scenarios and as an illustration of how military unprofessionalism has become the primary cause of the protracted armed conflict in the DRC.

According to Ngwane (2003), since 1960, African leadership has failed to cover enough ground in their national territories and has given way for soldiers to act as power-mongers. Military *coup d'état* occurred in many countries, including Algeria (1965) by Colonel Houari Boumedienne; Nigeria (1966) by Major Nzeogwu; Gana (1966) by Colonel Akwasi Amankwaah Afrifa; Togo (1967) by Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema; Mali (1968) by Lieutenant Moussa Traore; and Libya (1969) by Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi (2003, p. 48). Congo (as it was referred to at the time) also makes this list of countries being taken over by soldiers. According to Ngwane, in November 1965,

Colonel Joseph Désiré Mobutu took over leadership of the country and its capital, Kinshasa (2003), establishing a militocracy.

The second scenario is soldiers becoming power brokers (agents) from 1970-1980, where civilian leadership resembled a nationalist phenomenon intending to gain a tyrannical grip on all facets of national life (Ngwane, 2003). Again, weak leadership combined with the pressures of the Cold War opened avenues for soldiers to become dealers, so to speak. Furthermore, many countries make the list of this scenario. Examples include Uganda (1971), committed by Idi Amin Dada; Ethiopia (1974), committed by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam; Nigeria (1975), committed by General Muhammad Murtala; Liberia (1980), committed by Master-Sergeant Samuël K. Doe; Burkina Faso (1983) committed by Captain Thomas Sankara; and others. The DRC, however, does not serve as an example in this regard.

The third scenario is where soldiers become power-sharers, where instead of only being concerned with military affairs (protectors of the state), they become the custodians of political power (Ngwane, 2003). The sharing aspect in this regard was for African countries to formalise debate to include democracy in their political-economic system as opposed to the one-party militocracy. Such aspirations did not materialise for many African countries and the tyranny of soldiers remaining in power through manipulated election results, corruption, and social exclusion prevailed. Examples in this regard include Mali (1991) by Ahmadou Toumani Toure; Nigeria (1993) by General Sani Abacha; Sierra Leone by Foday Sankoh; and the then Zaire, currently the DRC (1997), by Laurent Désiré Kabila.

The fourth scenario includes examples where soldiers as statesmen continued into the 20th century playing the role of African leadership concerning the independence of African countries (Ngwane, 2003). Despite the notion of soldiers remaining concerned with military affairs only, also referred to as sticking to their legitimate places in the barracks, soldiers have stepped up to the plate in political affairs far beyond the state alone. An example includes the 1999 case where Colonel Muḥammad Ghaddai called for continental debate, which eventually led to the African Union Treaty Article 30, stating that governments coming into power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union (Ngwane, 2003).

Regardless of the actions mentioned above, military coups in the 20th century continued on the continent and include examples such as Côte d'Ivoire by Robert Guei; Central African Republic (CAR) by François Bozize; Guinea Bissau by General Veríssimo Correia Seabra; and others (Ngwane, 2003).

In testing Chuter's thesis, this study deduces that military unprofessionalism has shown one specific common feature: the desire for power and wealth, whether as a power-monger, sharer, broker or statesman. Furthermore, several examples in Africa were cited, suggesting a lack of agreement between

the state, citizenry and the military on the place of the military, which ultimately led to poor CMR. Therefore, military unprofessionalism is regarded as a cause of protracted armed conflict in Africa.

The DRC experienced poor civil-military relations over its post-independence history in two ways, either by soldiers acting as power-mongers or as power-sharers. The result is a country deprived of a truly democratic political system and plagued by corruption, election result manipulation and tyrannical rule over the civilian population over an extended period. Such a predicament of a lack of true civil leadership free from military interference, sets the stage for resentment and conflict. The unfortunate reality in African conflicts is that the result of dealing with such issues is not resolved around a table, or as Fisher puts it, “Protracted intergroup conflict is rooted in the denial of basic human needs and is unlikely to be resolved by traditional methods of conflict management and resolution” (Fisher, 1993). Instead, violence is the norm rather than the exception, which leads to the formation of AGs and the culmination in armed conflict. The DRC is a clear example of this.

Armed conflict is made up of military activities which require financial sourcing or funding. In principle, the state is funded by its national income and, in turn, funds the armed forces' military requirements. However, this is not the case on the side of AGs, who also require funding for their military activities, but do not receive funding from state coffers to do so. The next section will discuss a secondary cause of protracted armed conflict regarding the DRC's richness in valuable natural resources.

2.2.3.2 Valuable natural resources

Valuable natural resources in resource-rich African countries are susceptible to protracted armed conflict. According to Le Billon, valuable natural resources have become a cause of armed conflict in the Post-Cold War era (Le Billon, 2001). He implied that belligerents depend on natural resources to fund their respective military activities instead of funding the state's political ends. He cites the DRC as a specific example where the control and the exploitation of natural resources have motivated and financed the party's response to continuing the conflict. In doing so, the vulnerability of the conflict increased. In other words, valuable natural resources have become a source of instability instead of aiding economic growth. However, the fact that natural resources are available alone does not imply conflict *per se*; rather, the desire or greed to acquire it becomes a source of violence as a means to arbitration. This study identifies four aspects that stand out in this regard. The first aspect is scarcity, the second is abundance, the third is lootability, and the fourth is geographical location.

The abundance of valuable resources relates to the relative ease of acquiring resources based on the availability of a large quantity and its taxability. The higher it can be taxed, the more attractive it becomes to the ruling elites and their competitors (Le Billon, 2001). Therefore, there is a need to

increase the price and control the areas in which it is found. A sense of wealth is created, which becomes a motivating factor and ultimately causes violence in the form of armed conflict.

Scarcity, however, relates to the shortage or relative difficulty in acquiring a specific commodity, which exacerbates a sense of value. For example, the promotion slogan of diamonds sold by the SA Company De Beers, *A Girls Best Friend*, seems to create a sense of desirability, but the fact that it costs so much, and is difficult to get, hypes up desirability as a status symbol related to the value of scarce diamonds. In this case, a commodity is regarded as more valuable due to its increased scarcity, ultimately motivating people and nations to compete over such resources. In many cases, the greater the scarcity, the fiercer the fight (Le Billon, 2001).

According to Le Billion (2001), lootability refers to the relative ease with which government and rebels extract valuable natural resources with minimum bureaucratic infrastructure (2001, p. 569). An important aspect regarding lootability is maintaining access to resource-rich areas by its contenders, such as rebel groups controlling trade routes and export points by focusing military activities on such identified areas. Another aspect of relevance is how rebels loot or extract these resources in the DRC. For example, forcibly conscripted child soldiers are used to corral armies of enslaved civilians to mine coltan, a key component in mobile phones (BBC News, 2020).

In terms of geographical location, valuable natural resources close to the capital are less likely to be looted by rebels (Le Billon, 2001). Instead, areas close to borders are more likely to be controlled by rebels (See Figure 2.2). These areas are classified as “distant or proximate” (Le Billon, 2001, p. 272), meaning, the further the distance from the capital, the more intense the prolonged conflict. The DRC’s geographical area in the figure below indicates this principle by illustrating the areas rich in diamonds, copper, cobalt, gold and others.

The abundance of these valuable natural resources in the DRC and their lootability are well documented. Violent conflicts in resource-rich geographical locations near the borders of neighbouring countries and distance to the capital (Kinshasa) support the theory of proximate areas and suggest that natural resources are indeed a cause of the conflict and the prolonged nature of the conflict in the DRC. An example is the *modus operandi* of rebels in Eastern DRC to control these areas. The violence is conducted by annihilating enemy communities, raping women, conscripting child soldiers and driving survivors into the jungles to die of either starvation or disease (BBC News, 2020). The notion that the DRC is cursed by its natural wealth (2020) sums up the aspect of valuable natural resources well.




Figure 2.2: Map of DRC illustrating the location of different valuable natural resources in the different regions of the DRC

(Coyne, 2020)

The third aspect regarding the character of protracted armed conflict, namely the course of the conflict, will now be presented in a concise discussion to illustrate the flow of events typically associated with protracted armed conflict in Africa and specifically referring to the DRC.

2.2.4 The course of protracted armed conflict in the DRC

The course of protracted armed conflict in failed or failing states is well documented by Geib in the International Review of the Red Cross and by Kofi Annan in Peacekeeping, Military International and National Sovereignty in International Armed Conflict. According to Annan (1998), contemporary protracted armed conflict, specifically those instances in Africa, is no longer characterised by the same attributes as past armed conflicts. According to Geib (2009), several general aspects regarding protracted armed conflict are prevalent. For this study, a list of those aspects that indicates commonalities in the armed conflict in the DRC will serve as a reference.

Armed conflict in Africa shows levels of violence and sporadic outbreaks of hostilities limited to sustained combat and large-scale military operations using an array of weapons, including small arms and crude tools, such as machetes, axes, and prevalent weapons. In addition, fighters are partly child soldiers and undergo forced recruitment (Geib, 2009). Although this form of recruitment is noted as

forced, studies have indicated that child soldiers in Africa have shown evidence of voluntarily choosing to become parties to the conflict (Ben-Ari, 2009).

Large-scale military confrontations are avoided, and cross-border activities are not uncommon. These activities aim to gain and maintain regional control over individual strategic economic focal points rather than controlling the entire country's territory (Geib, 2009). The motivation behind such hostilities is primarily for economic gain (refer to the previous discussion on valuable natural resources). Regarding the civilian population, AGs tend to act independently and are indifferent to the civilian population, with little to no interest in exercising state functions (Geib, 2009). In fact, the civilian population is not only caught up in the conflict's crossfire but is also targeted by AGs to achieve its ends (Annan, 1998). AGs are less interested in defeating their enemy (Ngwane, 2003) (state security forces), including the military, the police, the justice system, and the intelligence service (Chuter, 2011). Rather, their focus is to create and maintain social instability, disrupt and dissolve traditional communal networks, and prevent the re-emergence of effective state control over specific parts of the country (Geib, 2009). A good representation of this is provided by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) as they described the deliberate targeting of civilians to create an entire fabric of social relations as a means of social control. For context, during World War I, 80% of the casualties were combatants, whereas, after 1990, most casualties were civilians, hence the term "dirty wars" (Ramsbotham et al., 2005).

Finally, typical of these kinds of armed conflicts is that a territorial spillover effect to neighbouring countries becomes probable. Due to the territorial demarcation and international borders not being recognised by AGs, cross-border activities tend to be the norm rather than the exception (Geib, 2009). It would not be surprising to argue that if protracted armed conflict tends to have a territorial spillover effect, it would most probably lead to regional instability. Therefore, this study includes regional instability as a culmination of protracted armed conflict.

The course of the conflict in the DRC is summarised by the UN Resolution 2098 (2013) dated 28 March 2013 and serves as a comparison to the above-mentioned course, as presented by Geib (2009) and Annan's elaboration (1998). This report states that the humanitarian situation in Eastern DRC is of great concern. It elaborates on the widespread violence and abuse of IHL. In the report, a good overview is provided on the course by reporting on the targeting of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, systematic recruitment and use of child soldiers by certain parts of the parties to the conflict, the displacement of significant numbers of civilians, extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests (United Nations, 2013). The DRC is a typical example of protracted armed conflict when comparing the situation in the DRC to the typical course of protracted armed conflict in other cases in Africa.

Thus far, the definition, the causes and the course of protracted armed conflict in the DRC have been presented. The next aspect, namely the consequences of the conflict, will now be presented in a concise discussion to conclude the characterisation of protracted armed conflict in Africa, specifically referring to the DRC.

2.2.5 Consequences of protracted armed conflict

The consequences of protracted conflict in the DRC have been well documented and monitored closely by international organisations, regional organisations and other role players. Reports by the World Health Organisation (WHO), SADC, and World Food Program (WFP), to mention only a few, serve as examples. The information generated by such reports is used in literature to formulate arguments, make estimates and draw conclusions. Specific examples include estimates on population size and growth, fertility rates, infant mortality rates, etcetera. These consequences are documented and relevant to a specific security sector of human security. More detail on these sectors will be provided in the next section on this theme. For example, high infant mortality rates resulting from a lack of clinics to administer immunisations due to the destruction of infrastructure may be linked to the conflict and the effect felt in the societal sector. Likewise, high levels of poverty and famine due to the loss of economic gains may be linked to the conflict and the effect felt in the economic sector of human security.

This study highlights armed conflict-related deaths in the military sector of human security. According to the estimate provided by Ngoma (2004), the number of deaths in the DRC, namely 3 million, was directly linked to armed conflict. More recently, in 2019, a BBC documentary *DRC (2020): Cursed by its natural wealth*, set the figure at 5 million. Therefore, this study will accept this figure as a basis for the following calculation.

According to the Worldometer 2019 results, the population in the DRC in 1960 was estimated at 152 482 251 (Worldometer, 2020), and according to the World Fact Book (2020), in 2020, it was 101 780 263. Using these figures, one can estimate the average population over 20 years to be 127 131 257. These figures are questioned in many ways, but most significantly against the fact that the DRC's last successful population census was done in 1984 (Brandt & De Herdt, 2019). Considering 5 million lives lost during the protracted armed conflict that lasted from 1960 to date, it implies that an estimated 9.6% of the total population of the DRC was annihilated. Such a figure is significant because it sets the stage for a ripple effect that leads to secondary consequences for the populations in the DRC. Examples are systemic rape and torture, which are commonly used tools of war in the DRC, and more than 1,7 million people were reduced to the status of either internationally displaced persons or refugees (Ngoma, 2004). The livelihoods of millions were lost, and infrastructure was destroyed. In terms of livelihoods, the argument is that when the family is broken up, especially African families, which have an age-old tradition and culture grounded on strong family ties and specific roles to play by different members in the family, the entire fabric of the livelihood is destroyed.

Apart from the consequence occurring within the DRC, its nine neighbouring countries are also involved regarding refugees and the loss of livelihoods. The entire central African region is no stranger to the movement of refugees fleeing the dangers of the conflict. Refugees regularly cross borders between neighbouring countries with very few prospects of large-scale repatriation and self-repatriation (UNHCR, 2019). The total refugee population in the DRC by 2019, amounting to 546 000 living in communities, camps and urban areas (UNHCR, 2019), serves as an example. The DRC citizens affected by the conflict flee to neighbouring countries, including Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Central African Republic and Uganda and other countries, which require protection and other sector-related needs, resulting in the unintended involvement of an entire region (UNHCR, 2019). Neighbouring countries also caught up in armed conflict experience the same movement of refugees to the DRC. Like the total refugee population from the Central African Republic finding refuge in the DRC in 2018 was 187 000 (UNHCR, 2019).

The consequences of the conflict (within the military sector) in the DRC and its neighbouring countries take the shape of not only having the same territorial spill-over effect as mentioned earlier in this chapter but also indicate that the consequences emanating from the armed conflict overlap and exacerbate other consequences across the different sectors of human security. Therefore, the dynamics and complexity of the conflict indicate far-reaching consequences to the fabric of society and the instability of the region as a whole. Such a predicament presents challenges and elevates the magnitude of responses required to intervene compared to that of the Congolese government itself. Instead, the international community has become involved in the DRC in what will be discussed next: PSO.

2.2.6 Peace support operations

This section will highlight three aspects to provide context to PSO as a response to the conflict. Firstly, the changing security environment will be discussed to illustrate the evolution security threats have taken over the years with specific reference to human security. Secondly, traditional peacekeeping operations will be presented as a foundation for how contemporary peacekeeping has evolved to respond to protracted armed conflict.

2.2.6.1 The changed security environment

The concept of protracted armed conflict suggests that the entire existence of security is being threatened. Ayoob (1995) provides a view of security from a Western and Third-World perspective. The Western concept of security makes two assumptions in terms of international relations. The first is that most threats to the state arise from beyond its borders. Secondly, threats are primarily military and require a military response (Ayoob, 1995). Ayoob's (1995) construct of security focuses on the extent to which a nation is in danger of sacrificing its core values if it wishes to avoid war and, when challenged, can maintain them by victory in such a war. In short, the ability of a nation to protect its

internal values from external threats, which is political in nature, originated externally and militarily in response.

From a Third-World perspective, security is less prone to take on the nature of an external threat; instead, it is more inclined to be interstate-orientated with a tendency to spill over to neighbouring countries (Ayoob, 1995). Two aspects stand out; firstly, insecurity is defined in terms of vulnerabilities from both internal and external. Secondly, the threat to bring down or weaken the state structures must go beyond the traditional Western definition of security and include other variables across other realms (Ayoob, 1995). The latter refers to the changed security environment as provided by Buzan, namely human security. Buzan's interpretation of human security encompasses far more than traditional state security. He classifies threats and vulnerabilities into five sectors, the political sector, the societal sector, the economic sector and the ecological sector, and the military sector (Buzan, 1983). Scholars such as Ramsbotham et al. defined human security in terms of freedom from fear (conflict management and resolution), freedom from want (economic development and growth) and sustaining the future (caring for the environment, its resources and ecosystems) (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). For this study, an abridged version of those sectors of human security that form part of a new security paradigm on collective security will be presented in short.

The political sector deals with the organisational stability of the state and the threat to its sovereignty, recognition and legitimacy (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, 1998). Political threats exist when a government is pressurised on a certain policy or when attempts are made to overthrow the government, fomenting secessionism and/or disrupting the political fabric of the state (Buzan et al., 1998). Furthermore, the political threat stems from a diversity of ideas differing from the ideas of the state, such as democracy *versus* communism. According to Buzan (1983), political threats are complex and difficult to identify. This study implies that political threats require diplomatic responses to resolve differences up to a tolerated point where military actions are required and legitimised as a last resort.

The societal sector centres on threats to social levels and attacks on national identity issues such as language, religion, local culture, and traditions (Buzan et al., 1998). Such threats require defence and protection from other cultures and are mostly internal. Religion and ethnicity were discussed during the previous section on the different causes of protracted armed conflict.

The economic sector centres on how the nominal conditions of actors within the economic market are at risk of aggressive competition and uncertainty (Buzan et al., 1998). Markets are dominant models of sound economic practices sustained by production, distribution, innovation and growth. The challenge with economic security is that governments tend to interfere in the markets and due to the complexity and many actors in the market, the state's interest is not always clearly indicated (Buzan et al., 1998). Market-related threats include fierce competition, export restrictions, price regulations, manipulated

interest rates, defaulting on debt, etcetera. It is worth noting that if the economic threats reach the political and military sectors, they become a national security threat. The link is based on the argument that along with economic capability goes military capability that contributes to power and sound political stability. In a case of economic decline, domestic stability leads to over-reliance on trade and export of raw materials, which ultimately neglects industrialisation, locking a nation into poverty and underdevelopment (Buzan, 1983), and the state is no longer able to provide basic needs for the population (Buzan et al., 1998).

The ecological sector centres on the damage to the physical base of the state, for example, earthquakes, floods, droughts, etcetera (Buzan et al., 1998). This threat is based on a scenario of human activities versus nature. It becomes complex as the impact may be trans-frontier; for example, pollution in one country might be experienced in the next where rivers cross borders. Therefore, a global collective approach is required in this sector to address the threat (Buzan, 1983).

The military sector centres on the traditional use of military force where the state is the objective (Buzan et al., 1998). Traditionally the military instrument is used to protect the state; however, the contemporary approach includes military operations in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and other tasks (Buzan et al., 1998). This study focuses on the military sector regarding how PSO addresses threats to human security in the DRC.

In light of the aforementioned presentation of the changed/wider security environment, the response to security threats has also undergone some form of evolution. This study concurs with scholars such as Neethling (1998) and others to argue that the traditional responses (peacekeeping) have evolved over time to a contemporary peacekeeping format. The following section will exemplify the shift from traditional to contemporary peacekeeping in response to modern human security threats with specific reference to Africa.

2.2.6.2 Current approaches to peacekeeping operations

The end of an era defined by wars and conflict does not necessarily lead to an era of security and stability; in fact, it might prompt the emergence of an era with a new face but the same identity as the previous one (Neethling, 1998). As Neethling explains, a case in point is how the end of the Cold War failed to produce worldwide peace and stability but caused the emergence of inter-state armed conflicts, especially in Africa (Neethling, 1998). Annan implied similarly on the changed face of military intervention. According to Neethling (1998), not only has the scope of conflict in Africa changed, but so has the number of conflicts and the response to them.

Peacekeeping tasks under a Chapter VI mandate, primarily executed by the UN, made way for an adapted approach to creating space for preventative diplomacy and peace support operations. For

example, UN military forces were placed between belligerents to monitor ceasefire agreements, report on peace agreements and support tasks such as organising elections, repatriations of refugees and displaced persons, and disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants (Annan, 1998). Peacekeeping is characterised by three generations, namely first- to third-generation peacekeeping (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). First and second-generation peacekeeping (1956-1999) was based on the consent of the conflicting parties, adhering to the principles of non-use of violence (except in self-defence), political neutrality (not taking sides), impartiality (committed to mandate) and legitimacy (sanctioned by and accountable to the UNSC and advised by the UNSG) (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). Second-generation peacekeeping has taken the shape of multilateral operations (involving several countries), multidimensional operations (incorporating military, political, civil, economic and other components to the mission), and multicultural operations (involving a culturally diverse aspect of the mission) (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). For this study, the term “traditional PSO”, as also used by scholars such as Neethling (1998) and Ramsbotham et al. (2005), will serve as a term that includes first- and second-generation PSO, and contemporary PSO as a term to include third-generation PSO.

Table 2.1 compares the nature of traditional and contemporary PSO and war. *First, consent* is a prerequisite for a successful PSO and vehicle to commit to negotiations and dialogue between belligerents to admit that armed forces have failed and that military solutions are no longer viable (Annan, 1998). Second, *impartiality* enables the UN to enter the warzone and be accepted by all parties to the conflict in good faith as a presence for humanitarian objectives and peace (Annan, 1998). *Third, neutrality* refers to the UN remaining a neutral party to the conflict. Here the reader’s attention is drawn to the similarity between neutrality during contemporary PSO and war, as opposed to traditional PSO. Finally, *mandate* and the use of force imply that in some circumstances, a more military assertive mandate is required and justified (Annan, 1998).

Third-generation peacekeeping, or contemporary peacekeeping, has taken its shape based on two questions, lessons learned and critique on past peacekeeping approaches that fulfil the purpose of criterion for legitimacy. Firstly, the ineffectiveness of impartial and non-forcible interventions. Secondly, a sense of inappropriateness of imposing Western liberal democratic systems and conflict resolution assumptions and self-interest of the rich and powerful countries (Ramsbotham et al., 2005).

Table 2.1: Traditional peacekeeping, peace support operations and war comparison

Traditional peacekeeping 1st and 2nd generation peacekeeping	PSO Contemporary peacekeeping	War
Universal consent	General consent of target populations, not of spoilers	No consent
Political neutrality between main conflicting parties	No neutrality if a conflicting party opposes the mandate	No neutrality
Impartiality in fulfilling its mandate	Impartiality in fulfilling its mandate	No impartiality
Non-use of force except in self-defence	Full spectrum of force needed to fulfil its mandate	Full spectrum of force
International mandate	Normally uphold UN Charter purposes and principles	National interest

(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005)

Several valuable lessons were learned from the Panel on UN Peace Operations and following the findings of the Brahimi Report in August 2000. First, on the operational level, it was concluded that operational planning could no longer be separated from MOOTW and that the use of military capabilities over the full spectrum of the conflict to combat spoilers of the peace would be more beneficial (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). On the tactical level, actions by commanders, factions, and civilians regards to mediation, negotiations, and consent establishment becomes invaluable to creating a more flexible, robust, combat-ready, but still recognising the sensitivity of the overall purpose of the peace support purpose of the mission (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). This study highlights one specific aspect in this regard, namely robustness.

This study challenges the notion of the robustness and whether it is frowned upon by the West, Africa, and elsewhere in the world or whether it is accepted as the norm. From the Brahimi report, several talks have emanated between African leaders and Western leaders. The International Peace Academy conducted several conferences in Johannesburg (Africa), London (Europe), Singapore (Asia) and Buenos Aires (South America) and concluded, but more importantly, agreed on the need for robustness to deal with the spoilers of the peace (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). In other words, contemporary peacekeeping has evolved into a mission that upholds international peace and stability by resolving conflict through prevention, conciliation, deterrence, containment or stabilisation. The crux in the evolution from traditional peacekeeping to contemporary peacekeeping is found from a force perspective, whereby the robust approach to contemporary peacekeeping is a universally accepted option to ensure that peace and stability are established, restored and maintained.

Research on peacekeeping focused on theoretical desirables, but little attention was given to the high expectations of peacekeeping and whether such roles are achievable (Neethling, 1998). This study

implies that creating a tailored response with specific requirements to one era's security threats does not necessarily remain relevant to the next era's security requirements. The same argument applies to the international community's response to contemporary security threats. Although traditional and contemporary PSO may have indicated an array of differences and similarities over the years, one common denominator between traditional and contemporary peacekeeping operations is identified, namely its *ends*, being the maintenance of international peace and stability.

To maintain international peace and stability, the UN Charter serves as an authority by providing measures to achieve the ends in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. First, these measures are aimed at taking effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace. Secondly, to suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. Thirdly, to bring about by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations might lead to a breach of the peace (Neethling, 1998). The UN response to the conflict in the DRC is no exception; although it has been ongoing since 1960 with many adaptations in the nature, localities, and actors to the war, etcetera, the principle of intervening towards peace and stability remains unchanged.

The term PSO *per se* is widely used as doctrine (Neethling, 1998) and covers all peacekeeping, enforcement, and related operations. This section will now include definitions to avoid ambiguity concerning the context of what peace support operations entail. Including these definitions is to place peace enforcement within the range of options into the context under which the FIB is mandated to deploy in the DRC. Although PSO is an overarching concept which offers choices like peacekeeping and peace enforcement and others, the following definitions are listed as contemporary PSO Neethling 1998:

“Preventative diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and limit[ing] the spread of the latter when they occur.”

“Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.”

“Peacekeeping is the development of the UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

“Peacekeeping is also a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”

“Post-conflict peace building is action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”

“Peace enforcement is the activity of using force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities.”

By analysing the above-mentioned definitions of PSO, one might ask, what type of PSO is performed by the FIB? Is it a peacekeeping mission, or is it a peace-enforcement mission? This paper interprets the definitions as indicated above by referring to the defining term, use of force (Chapter VII of the UN Charter). The first term deals with the parties to the conflict where armed groups are targeted as spoilers of the peace within the hostilities and the FIB as a peace support force. More will be said in this regard later on in the chapter. The term, enforce (targeted operations), implies that military use of force is intended to force a situation where peace and stability are envisaged.

Therefore, this study does not question whether the intervention in the DRC is a traditional or a contemporary PSO; rather, it questions the tailored nature of the MONUSCO in the DRC in response to the conflict. The reader is urged to keep this foundation in mind for further analysis in the final theme of the chapter when the RSA BATT is addressed in terms of its policy guidelines.

2.3 THE THIRD-PARTY APPROACH

During this discussion on the third-party approach to conflict resolution, the reader is reminded of the phrase that protracted armed conflict as “the problem to be solved”. This section will deal with the third-party approach as “how to solve the problem”. MONUSCO will be used as an example throughout the discussion. Three aspects will be highlighted during this theme; the first aspect is defining the third-party approach, and the second aspect relates to the different stakeholders and their roles which will be illustrated to provide a broad overview of their different roles and activities. The third aspect is the use of the military instrument, which will be discussed as a policy guideline stipulated in the SANDF Joint Warfare Procedures (JWP 106 Part 2) from a DIMES paradigm (diplomacy, information, military power, economic power, social cohesion). Finally, an illustration of the process of establishing and the order of battle (ORBAT) of the RSA BATT will be provided.

2.3.1 Defining the third-party approach

The deliberate targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to the civilian population compromises international peace and security. This predicament is exacerbated by the overwhelming demands on the UN’s capacity to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians. Therefore, a call is made to other actors to become involved in a more robust role in third-generation peacekeeping missions in Africa. The response to the DRC conflict serves as an example of the third-party approach.

Peace requires three approaches: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding (Fisher, 1993). The third-party approach is centred on three specific activities that require a link between peacekeeping and peacemaking. These activities are listed by Fisher (1993) as, firstly, establishing ceasefire agreements via initial mediation and the containment of hostilities via peacekeeping. Secondly, Fisher (1993) lists a political settlement via peacemaking through negotiations between the conflicting parties. The final activity requires peacebuilding to improve relationships and the basic needs of the parties in the conflict (Fisher, 1993). The concept of peacebuilding acts as a bridge between peacekeeping and peacemaking and, therefore, deserves some attention in this study.

Peacebuilding is critical in resolving conflict as it creates a structure of peace within and amongst nations; in other words, structures to remove the causes of the war and, ultimately, the war itself (Fisher, 1993). Within the peacebuilding concept lies three contingencies. The first contingency is referred to as *parallelism*, which addresses peacemaking and peacebuilding simultaneously while peacekeeping addresses violence. The second contingency is a *multifaceted approach*, including wider preventative diplomacy and peace-enforcement initiatives. The third contingency is the *contingency approach*, which deals with the sequencing of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, prioritising the conflict's certain characteristics at any given time (Fisher, 1993). Based on the above, this study defines the third-party approach as a third-generation peacekeeping mission in response to a non-international armed conflict, comprising a combination of political initiatives, military and humanitarian activities by a range of stakeholders that act in concert to improve the relationship and basic needs of the parties to the conflict.

2.3.2 Stakeholders in the third-party approach

Stakeholders in a peace mission are those representatives from the international community working with the affected parties to the conflict to regenerate key facets of the society or nation within the peace mission framework (SANDF Joint Operations Division, 2006). Their numbers depend on the mandate and include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations (IOs), international governmental organisations (IGOs), regional organisations, external governments, neighbouring governments, indigenous political parties, and local political parties (SANDF Joint Operations Division 2006). De Coning (2007) terms the notion of joint or integrated stakeholders in PSO as the integrated mission concept. The UN mission in the DRC is part of the integrated mission concept in terms of its different role players and structure in the sense that it has a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of priorities and types of programme interventions (De Coning, 2007).

Table 2.2 illustrates an abridged version of the different stakeholders within peacebuilding and some of the roles and activities they are involved in from the integrated mission concept viewpoint. The reader is reminded that MONUSCO is a case in point, and by using this table as a reference, the role and place of the RSA BATT in peacebuilding should enjoy attention. Not all the relevant stakeholders are listed

with all the roles and activities, as this will result in an extended illustration that would serve a better purpose in other studies in the same field.

Table 2.2: Stakeholders to third-generation peacekeeping operations

Stakeholder	Examples	Role	Activities
International and regional organisations	UN, AU, SADC	Promote international peace, security, and stability	PSO, diplomatic initiatives, peace talks, hosting summits and international conferences, establishing resolutions and many more
Humanitarian organisations	OCHA	Coordinate global emergency response to save lives and protect people during humanitarian crises	Humanitarian aid missions and reporting to international and regional organisations and many more
Neighbouring governments	Burundi, Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, Zambia, Tanzania and others	Member states to international and regional organisations, contributors to peace support	Negotiations, mediating ceasefire agreements, peace talks, conferences, treaties and many more
Indigenous political parties AGs	DRC has more than 100 parties M23, Mai-Mai, ADF, FDLR, etcetera	Opposition to the ruling party of the day; representing the people Spoiler of the peace	Parliamentary duties, service delivery and many more Insurgency, targeting civilians in attacks, war crimes, human rights violations
External governments	TCC, RSA, Tanzania, Malawi, Pakistan	Promoting peace, security and stability in the region and continent	Separating combatants, disarmament of irregular forces, demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into unified forces, assist with the reintegration of civil society, and assist with elections of new governments

(SANDF Joint Operations Division, 2006).

2.3.3 The use of military instrument: DIMES paradigm

The SANDF's contribution in the DRC is guided by doctrine (Joint Warfare Procedures Part 2 PSO promulgated on 24 February 2006) and focuses on the military as an instrument of national policy, which gauges the nation's power in five key planks (SANDF Joint Operations Division, 2006). These are diplomacy, information, military power, economic power, and social cohesion (2006) and indicate the commitment and role SA plays in sub-Saharan Africa, where it commits forces such as the RSA BATT towards PSO.

Diplomacy refers to SA's willingness to promote peace and security in the region and the continent through diplomatic means. Information refers to SA's intent to convey its national and international intention, while military power refers to SA's willingness to commit military forces for deployment. Fourthly, economic power refers to the commitment of economic resources in the form of contingent

equipment for deployment. Finally, social cohesion refers to the willingness to act as good, global citizens in committing to the deployment towards regional and continental peace and security. This study focuses primarily on the military power plank of the DIMES paradigm and will illustrate the commitment of military forces in terms of the ORBAT of the RSA BATT as TCC in the FIB.

This study regards the process that leads to establishing the ORBAT of the RSA BATT as important as it provides insight into the commitment to forces in the FIB, illustrated in Figure 2.3. Key role players in this regard are the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the SANDF, which includes the Joint Operation Division (J Op Div), Joint Operations Headquarters (J Op HQ), SA Army Force Preparation (SA Army F Prep), and the SA Army Formations (SA Army Fmns). Figure 2.4 illustrates the RSA BATT ORBAT.




Figure 2.3: Joint Operations ORBAT establishment process

(Visagie, 2020)

The ORBAT of the RSA BATT is subject to change depending on each rotation of troops and amendments made by UN DPKO, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 above. As of the 2017/18 rotation, the ORBAT of the RSA BATT is illustrated as an example. Please take note of the level of forces committed to executing the role and tasks as illustrated in Table 2.2.




Figure 2.4: The RSA BATT ORBAT during the 2017/18 rotation

(De Ridder, 2020)

2.4 THE RSA BATT AS A TCC IN THE DRC

The pathway towards identifying the *ends* to which the RSA BATT is deployed in the DRC requires an understanding of the different levels of war, as well as what Bester refers to as the national security quintet of a nation. This theme will firstly focus on the latter before discussing the RSA BATT policy guidelines towards achieving its *ends* in the DRC.

2.4.1 National security quintet

According to Bester (1019), the national security quintet is a useful model to illustrate a nation's national security and focuses on five elements supporting the state's ultimate governance in securing its constitution. These elements are national values, national identity, national will, national power and national interest. The national security quintet is applied to the state and its inhabitants, and the outcome is to ensure each individual is free from fear and want (Bester, 2019). Furthermore, national security is influenced by external (regional) and internal (municipal, provincial, and national) factors and therefore, the state's focus is also on external and internal factors. This study will focus on the external notion seeing that the RSA BATT deployment is an external deployment. Bester (2019) also stated that this model is based on the security environment of the RSA; however, it can be applied in any country.

Therefore, this study will use the same model to explain the example in the DRC by shortly referring to each element emphasising national interest. Figure 2.5 illustrates the national security quintet in detail.

The National Security Quintet




Figure 2.5: The National Security Quintet

(Adopted from Bester, 2019).

The first element, national values, includes those aspects that, if not checked, threaten the survival of the individual or the group, such as culture, religion, customs and history (Bester, 2019). These fundamental principles define the state's physical, social and economic existence (2019, p. 14). The second element, national identity, refers to who the individual is as well as the identity of the nation, which is a multifaceted concept that shows the distinct identity in terms of ideologies, ethnicity, culture, language and ancestry (Bester, 2019). The third element, national will, is an intangible element that speaks to a nation's collective willingness to fight a war manifested in four ways. Firstly, by dedication and support to government policies; secondly, in times of national crisis; thirdly, when there is a clear indication that the general population identify with the actions and objectives of the government; and finally, when there is a patriotic feeling among the population that the government is prioritising their welfare (Bester, 2019). National will is closely linked to the application of military power and the willingness to commit forces to defend national values, identity and interests (Bester, 2019). The

deployment of the RSA BATT is an example of how the RSA shows national will to ensure the welfare of its population by contributing to security and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The fourth element is national power in either hard power, for example, military power, or soft power, for example, political power. Power, in this case, refers to the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through coercion, payment, or attrition (Bester, 2019). Bester (2019) also included a third application of power in the form of combining hard and soft power to establish smart power. Figure 2.6 illustrates national power in more detail. The RSA Constitution justifies the inclusion of national power in Section 198(a), where it states that “national power can be utilised to influence, deter or destroy any threat against South Africa and its inhabitants” (Republic of South Africa, 1996). This study implies that although the RSA is involved in applying soft power within the region, it shows commitment to peace and security by committing hard power (military force) within the region.




Figure 2.6: An integrated theoretical framework of national power

(Adopted from Bester, 2019).

The fifth and final element is national interest, which Bester defined as “[c]ommon material and spiritual need of all people and nation-states. In material terms, a nation needs security and development. In spiritual terms, a nation needs respect and recognition from the international community” (2019, p. 15). The SA Defence Review of 2015 defines national interest as: “[t]he collective concept that defines the accumulation of things that ensure national sovereignty, and that guarantee the survival and the development of a nation” (Bester, 2015, pp. 3-4). The material aspect stands out in these definitions and therefore requires clarity. The *Defence Review of 2015* (2015)

stipulated RSA's specific interest. These interests are state independence of decision-making, freedom of SA trade, security of internal and external strategic resources and infrastructure, the safety and security of the SA people, and the integrity and functioning of the core system of the state. This study agrees with Bester and implies that the interest of the SA people and the state is threatened by conflict and its spillover effect because of regional instability, which has the potential to compromise sovereignty, independence and the survival of liberty for the RSA and its citizens.

Based on the overview of the national security quintet, this study concludes that the *ends* to the RSA's national strategy are captured within these five elements, which do not stand isolated. Instead, it is interrelated towards the ultimate survival of the state and its citizens, free from fear and want. One should understand that the *ends*, as mentioned here, is on a national strategic level and do not address the *ends* to the RSA BATT directly. Therefore, the different levels of war require discussion.

2.4.2 Levels of war

According to Garcia (2019), an interrelation between the manoeuvre theory and the attrition theory exists, providing an abstract framework for studying military operations. The RSA BATT deployment in the DRC is indeed a contribution to a military operation; therefore, these two theories were considered theoretical frameworks to discuss the levels of war. These two theories are discussed in Antonio Garcia's work on *The First Campaign Victory of the Great War* and the *South African Army Staff Officer's Operational Manual (SOOM) Part VII* (South African Army, 1996).

The attrition theory is based on the premise that one force will seek victory over its enemy by destroying the enemy's masses through material superiority and firepower by inflicting maximum casualties and material losses on the enemy's side in a static/linear deployment of forces (Garcia, 2019). The manoeuvre theory, on the other hand, is based on the premise of pre-emption (manoeuvre to prevent the breakout of conflict) and dislocating the enemy (apply movement when conflict breaks out) (Garcia, 2019). Furthermore, it depends on rapid decision-making, a lower level of command initiative, and a decentralised command system executed faster than the enemy (Garcia, 2019). The SOOM identifies another distinction between these two theories: the attrition theory aims to hold ground, whereas the manoeuvre theory is less likely to focus on holding ground; instead, it focuses on keeping the initiative (South African Army, 1996). One aspect that requires noting is that the relationship between these theories is based on the perspective that as soon as manoeuvring starts the fighting, attrition takes over, thus providing an anchor for manoeuvring (South African Army, 1996).

This study implies that the manoeuvre theory best suits the FIB concept in the DRC based on the mobile nature in which the FIB operates, as opposed to the static linear approach of the attrition theory. Furthermore, the policy guidelines applicable to the RSA BATT better suit the manoeuvre theory. The work of Esterhuyse, Garcia, the SOOM and the *Joint Warfare Procedures 106 Part 2: Peace Support*

Operations on the levels of war will serve as the foundation for this study's argument. This being that the *ends* at each level of strategy cannot stand in isolation; rather, it is linked in such a way that commanders on each level must understand the *ends* on each level of war to be effective and successful in achieving the highest strategic ends. Furthermore, actions, decisions and outcomes can affect the strategic ends on different levels, either positively or negatively.

Each level of war is defined by its intended outcome and not by the level of command or size of the unit involved (South African Army, 1996). The levels of war are national strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical (SANDF Joint Operations Division, 2006). On the military-strategic level, policy objectives are on a national level and are authorised by the national command (Garcia, 2019). At the operational level, operational objectives are pursued by joint campaigns and organised around armies and corps (Garcia, 2019). These operations aim to achieve strategic objectives (South African Army, 1996). The operational level links strategic military objectives and tactical activities in the theatre of operations. Furthermore, at the operational level, strategy is translated to operational design that links battles and engagements to achieve the strategic aim (South African Army, 1996). Operational objectives are pursued through battles and engagements by divisions, brigades, and battalions on the tactical level (Garcia, 2009).

According to Garcia (2019), manoeuvre warfare is conducted on the strategic military, operational and tactical levels of war to experience the fewest casualties and minimum losses at a rapid pace towards victory. He also acknowledges that some scholars argue that manoeuvre warfare is conducted at the operational level. The manoeuvre and attrition theory are interwoven on the tactical level since mobility and firepower are combined to conduct the fight (Garcia, 2019). Figure 2.7 illustrates the hierarchy of the levels of war, and illustrates where the UN, MONUSCO, FIB and the RSA BATT feature in these levels of war, as these are the role players in the multinational deployment in the DRC, followed by the *ends* of the RSA BATT on its applicable level of war.



Figure 2.7: Hierarchy of the levels of war included examples of role players

(Garcia, 2019; SANDF Joint Operations Division, 2006).

2.4.3 The RSA BATT's ends

This section is the third and final aspect to be addressed in this theme: the RSA BATT's policy guidelines in executing its mandate in the DRC. Aspects included in this section are its mandate, stance/posture, its mission and the lessons that can be learned from these aspects. Please note that the following should be viewed from the tactical level of war, but not limited to the tactical level, rather as part of achieving national strategic ends in the DRC.

2.4.3.1 Mandate

The RSA BATT plays an integral role within the DRC's peace support force (PSF), namely force intervention. To fulfil its role in the DRC, it must conduct all its activities within a specific mandate to act within international law. The FIB receives its mandate from the UNSC in the form of a UNSC Resolution. According to the UNSC Resolution 2098 (2013), the Intervention Brigade is mandated to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a mandate is subject to adoption based on the evolution of the situation on the ground and is intended to achieve the following two objectives (2013). Firstly, to reduce the threat posed by the Congolese and AGs through the operations of the Intervention Brigade. Secondly, to reduce violence against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children, to a level that the Congolese government can manage. Thirdly, to ensure stabilisation through establishing functional state security institutions in conflict-affected areas and strengthening democratic order to reduce the risk of instability. This includes adequate political space, observance of human rights and a credible electorate process.

This mandate firstly stipulates the protection of civilians in areas of operations (United Nations, 2013). It refers to the protection of civilians before, during and after any military operation under imminent threat of violence and specifies civilians as those in refugee camps, humanitarian aid workers and human rights defenders. It also refers to protecting UN personnel, installations, facilities and equipment

and entails working with the DRC and MONUSCO to identify threats to civilians and implement response plans to ensure the protection of civilians (2013). Secondly, the mandate includes neutralising AGs through the Intervention Brigade (2013) to disarm them, reduce their expansion and the threat they pose to the state authority, and make space for stabilising activities. Specific reference is made to allow the FIB to conduct targeted operations jointly with the FRDC against AGs in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law (2013). Thirdly, the mandate includes monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo as described in resolution 2078 (2012). In these efforts, specific reference is made to observe and report on flows of military personnel, arms, and related material across the Eastern border of the DRC. Finally, the mandate includes the provision of support to national and international judicial processes by working with the Congolese government in arresting and bringing to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including comprehensive cooperation with states of the region and the ICC (United Nations, 2013).

2.4.3.2 Stance/posture

As stipulated in the mandate, the required posture of the FIB, and therefore the RSA BATT, is addressed by three elements: to be robust, highly mobile and versatile (United Nations, 2013). At this stage of the study, mentioning the RSA BATT's posture to the reader serves as an introduction only. More on this concept will be discussed in the next chapter, which deals with the *ways* of Lykke's formula, where the RSA BATT addresses these elements during its force preparation and force employment strategy.

2.4.3.3 Mission

The RSA BATT receives several missions from MONUSCO Force Headquarters (FHQ) stationed in the city of Goma, North Kivu Province, Eastern DRC. Each TCC receives its orders as fragmented (FRAGO) based on the tactical situation, which differs from time to time. One particular case was during the 2017-2018 MONUSCO deployment, where the DRC underwent a critical registration period in the prelude to the scheduled elections between the former president Joseph Kabila and the current president, Félix Tshisekedi.

The FIB was very much involved in monitoring the registration process and reporting any irregularities. A typical example of such a FRAGO is FRAGO 59/2017 (MONUSCO Force Headquarters G35, 2017), which serves as a complementary order to the deployment of the RSA BATT to the Kasai Provinces in 2017, in this particular case. The mission read as follows (2017, p.3): "FIB will deploy one company to the Kasai Provinces no later than 07 July 2017, under the operational control of HQ South Sector, in order to establish a protective environment, creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, promot[ing] human rights and enabl[ing] a smooth registration process". Such orders also stipulate the focus of the main effort and end state of the mission. In this particular case, the main focus was "to provide a protective environment and support to humanitarian and human rights

pillars in the Kasai [P]rovince” (2017, p. 3). The end state was indicated as (2017, p. 3), “when humanitarian freedom of action is restored, and the security situation is conducive for the return of internationally displaced people (IDPs) to their villages for an effective and safe registration period”.

Another FRAGO mission reads (MONUSCO Force Headquarters G3, 2017), “FIB will establish a temporary operational base in the area of responsibility to create a secure environment from which civil affairs divisions can operate”. Its main focus was establishing a secure environment where civil affairs and NGOs can operate with the end state to redeploy the force (2017). A number of FRAGOs that were analysed resemble a similar line of mission, focus of main effort and end state. The common denominator was the protection of civilians and UN Staff and installations and the support of humanitarian aid, human rights organisations, and other civil affairs to ensure a secure environment where these role players could conduct their affairs.

Tasks during a mission such as the aforementioned example include supporting civil investigating agencies in human rights violations investigations; providing integrated, timely and proactive support to the FARDC in response to incidents; supporting humanitarian actors by protecting the route to the civilian population; relocating temporary operational bases in response to any change of threat in the area; proactively protecting the civilian population and preventing any electoral-based violence (MONUSCO FIB Headquarters G5, 2017). In a more offensive role, the RSA BATT executes tasks such as identifying targets to be reported to the FHQ; planning and executing unilateral offensive operations against AGs in the area of operations (MONUSCO Headquarters FIB Brigade Commander, 2017). Examples include OP HAMMER FIST and OP PHENIX RISING, as was executed by the RSA BATT (OP MISTRAL XXV, 5 South African Battalion during the 2017/18 rotation), which this study recommends for future studying. Such tasks can translate to military objectives becoming building blocks for achieving operational goals once completed successfully.

At this stage, it should be clear that the RSA BATT receives and executes its mission on the tactical level, which stipulates a variety of military objectives, which builds up to the end state, ultimately leading to the achievement of operational goals, and it, in turn, leads to the achievement of military-strategic ends. This illustrates the interrelated nature of the *ends* to the strategy of deploying a TCC such as the RSA BATT.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Protracted armed conflict in the DRC is a complex form of conflict, creating a culture of war in its society. The conflict is characterised by identifying two primary causes of the war: unprofessional militaries and valuable natural resources used to fuel a systematic violent war between AGs and the Congolese Government through deliberately targeting civilians and crimes that violate human rights. This war has left instability and insecurity in the DRC, exacerbated by a spillover effect that culminates

in regional instability. It thus threatens human security and international peace and security, therefore, requiring international intervention as a response in the form of PSO.

The third-party approach to PSO addresses the question of how to solve the problem of armed conflict. Three approaches were identified: peacekeeping, peacemaking and the bridge between the former and the latter, peacebuilding. A combination of different stakeholders was identified that functions in concert during peacebuilding towards regional peace and stability. The RSA BATT was introduced as a stakeholder in the PSO in the DRC, namely MONUSCO, focusing on its specific role as a contributing country to the PSF, namely the FIB.

The RSA BATT as TCC illustrated the RSA's willingness to contribute to multinational PSO in the DRC as part of ensuring its national interest, namely the survival of the state and ensuring that its population can live free from fear and want, which is threatened by regional instability if not addressed adequately.

These *ends* at each level of war act as building blocks towards achieving the ends on the higher level. The *ends* to the RSA BATT are to ensure a secure environment for other role players in the mission to conduct their affairs while simultaneously protecting civilians and UN staff and installations, executing offensive targeted operations against AGs and supporting those that require the assistance of the PSF component in the areas of operations.

CHAPTER 3:

THE WAYS TO THE RSA BATT DEPLOYMENT IN THE DRC: FORCE GENERATION, FORCE EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY, TO FORCE PREPARATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will deal with the *ways* aspect of Lykke's formula in terms of the RSA BATT's force preparation and force employment strategy and how it is operationalised in the DRC. Based on the research of Esterhuysen (2000), which concurred with Lykke's argument on strategy, it can be argued that each level of war exists in two dimensions, namely the planning and preparation of forces (force preparation), and the other is the execution of the current operation (force employment). He implies that these two strategies define the military objectives (*ends*), the military concepts (*ways*) and the military resources (*means*) available.

This chapter aims to provide an analysis of the force development and force employment strategy of the SA Army to demonstrate whether it is tailor-made for the RSA BATT to fulfil its mandate and its responsibility to protect. Such analysis will be conducted from the point of view of the RSA BATT being robust, highly mobile and versatile towards achieving its *ends*, as discussed in Chapter 2.

A South African perspective on the "way" in which the RSA BATT is prepared to be applied in the DRC was achieved by engaging with commanders and staff officers on different levels to provide their views on the subject at hand. In addition, the researcher was able to analyse participants' personal views on the lessons to be learned from their personal experiences in the DRC. This chapter will discuss the conclusions from the information acquired in the process.

This chapter pursues three objectives, firstly, to provide an overview of the UN force generation process and concept of operations (CONOPS). This objective is necessitated by the notion of what is required from the UN to satisfy the operational requirements for member states that commit to participate in multinational PSOs. The second objective is to investigate the C J OPS force employment strategy for the RSA BATT. This objective is useful to establish a clear understanding of the compliance to operational requirements placed on the forces to be deployed under FIB in the DRC. The final objective is to investigate the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy on force preparation of forces destined to deploy as the RSA BATT in the DRC. This objective is useful to indicate whether a disjunction is prevalent between the outcome of the force preparation and the operational requirements as determined by the force employment strategy.

To achieve the objectives, this chapter is structured into three sections which highlight three central themes: one, the UN concept of operations (CONOPS) for the deployment of the FIB; two, the SANDF C J OPS force employment strategy for forces deployed under FIB with specific reference to the RSA BATT; and three, the SA Army infantry corps' force preparation strategy. During the first section, emphasis will be on aspects such as the CONOPS, command and control (C²), force preparation and performance management, and finally, a brief mention of UN doctrine on multinational PSOs. The second section deals with the operational requirements of the RSA BATT and the guidelines received from C J OPS, which in turn, informs the force preparation by the SA Army formations. The third section addresses the SA Army infantry corps' force preparation process for forces deployed under FIB. Here the emphasis is on the education training and development (ETD) and other related training and preparations before and during the mobilisation phase towards the deployment. Aspects omitted during these themes are the SANDF forces in the DRC, such as the SANDF Air Force component, military observers, and military staff in the MONUSCO HQ environment, amongst others, which are not specifically attached or detached to the RSA BATT. This is done intentionally to remain within the scope and focus of this study.

Data that informed this chapter was collected from two avenues. Firstly, from UN and SANDF document analysis and, secondly, from semi-structured electronic interviews with participants grouped in three sample sectors. Each sample sector comprised members of chiefs of services and senior staff officers at the Joint Operations Division (J OPS Div) who participated in the RSA BATT force employment strategy. A second sample sector comprised general commanding officers, directors of force preparation and senior staff officers at the infantry formation level who have been involved in the force preparation strategies of the RSA BATT. The third sample sector comprised unit commanders and regiment sergeant majors deployed under the RSA BATT since 2013. Interviews with the first sample sector aimed to determine the operational requirements to be met during an RSA BATT deployment in the DRC. The interviews with the second sample sector, at a formation level, aimed to gain insight into what force preparation strategies are applied to prepare the RSA BATT for its deployment in the DRC. Specific attention was given to principles, policy guidance, specific outcomes, critical success factors, challenges, opportunities, and lessons. Interviews with the third sample sector aimed to gather information about the actual employment of the strategies to deploy the RSA BATT. This included information on mission, mandate, operations, lessons learned over time regarding challenges, operational successes, logistics, required technology and prime mission equipment and opportunities.

3.2 THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE GENERATION PROCESS AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3.2.1 The UN force generation process

The activities and aspects regarding the force generation process of forces to be deployed during a UN multinational PSO derive from the UN Assistant Secretary-General's Office of Military Affairs, Force Generation Department in New York, United States of America (Heyns, 2020). Figure 3.1 provides an abridged illustration of the UN force generation process. It is scheduled to be completed within four to six months with three phases identified: the planning, generation and deployment phases. The activities run parallel or overlap, and the output of each phase is regarded as important to note during this study, as it informs the next phase of the process and, in effect, determines the force preparation of member states that are committed to participating in a UN multinational PSO by providing agreements and guiding documentation, which spells out the detail of the mission at hand.

Key documents produced during this process include UN resolutions, mandate, the concept of operations (CONOPS), the rules of engagement (RoE), the memorandum of understanding (MOU), the statement of force requirement (SFR), the statement of unit requirement (SUR), the status of force agreement (SOFA), the status of mission agreement (SOMA) and the letter of assist (LOA). All these documents are mission-specific (Heyns, 2020) and tailored to the mission at hand. These documents are paramount to member states as it becomes signed agreements between the UN and the member state that will be applied, managed and measured throughout the mission. Therefore, this study implies that a contractual obligation is established between the UN and member states, who are obligated to adopt their respective force preparation and force employment strategies to honour such agreements. Furthermore, this study argues that all commanders, troops and peacekeepers deployed under MONUSCO must understand the force generation process and the key documents and their content in detail to know why and how they are to go about their business in the deployment area. If this aspect is neglected within the force employment and force preparation strategies, gaps are created that will compromise the operational effectiveness in the “ways” aspect of Lykke's formula of strategy.




Figure 3.1: The UN force generation process

(Adopted from Heyns, 2021).

3.2.2 The MONUSCO concept of operations

The CONOPS provides strategic direction to the military component of MONUSCO and prescribes the employment and deployment of forces in the area of operation (AoO). It informs the military campaign plan, contingency plan (CONPLAN) and standard operating procedures (SOP) (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). The CONOPS is reviewed every second year, and the reviewed CONOPS supersedes all previous directions as determined by the under-secretary-general of peacekeeping operations (Under-secretary-general DPKO) after consultation with the DPKO military adviser, MONUSCO head of mission (HoM) and force commander (FC) (2016). Within the CONOPS, the strategic conditions are coined by stating the mandate, mission concept, political end state, strategic political objectives, the military-strategic end state, military objectives and planning parameters (2016). This study highlights the military-strategic end state and the military objectives as concept guidelines that shape the *ways* in which the RSA BATT will be employed under the FIB in the DRC.

According to the MONUSCO concept of operations, the military-strategic end state is “a stable DRC under the control of the Government, where the UN military component is no longer required” (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). Whereas the military objectives are listed as follows:

1. that AG’s capacity to threaten the population and State authority is reduced to a level that can be routinely contained by the FRDC and the PNC,
2. that security responsibility, including the protection of civilians (POC) and the neutralisation of AGs is handed over to the Government of the DRC (GoDRC) in all areas, and
3. that the DRC’s territorial integrity is secured against the impact of instability or malign interests within the neighbouring states and the potential support to foreign and domestic AGs.

The mission statement of the MONUSCO force component according to the CONOPS is (2016):

The Force, in close cooperation with the whole of MONUSCO and through its support to the GoDRC, will protect civilians, neutralise the capacity of illegal AGs to harm civilian populations and undermine the establishment of a stable political and security environment, and to protect MONUSCO staff and infrastructure in order to contribute to the establishment of a credible and accountable government authority.

To this end, as documented in the CONOPS, the FIB is to first act as the primary manoeuvre brigade of force to conduct unilateral or joint offensive operations to neutralise AGs throughout the DRC (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). All the FIB activities will be conducted in cooperation with the rest of the mission and will not be geographically fixed. Instead, it will maintain its mobility and agility to outmatch the abilities of the AGs. Furthermore, unless operational circumstances dictate otherwise, elements of the FIB will not be placed under the command of another brigade unless temporarily required. Finally, when not engaged in offensive operations, units will continue with framework protection and security tasks (2016).

After an analysis of the CONOPS, four aspects stood out. Firstly, the FIB is regarded as force troops capable of deploying throughout the DRC, assigned to a temporary AoO and tasked with its Security Council resolution to protect civilians as a priority through targeting AGs (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). Secondly, the CONOPS divides military operations into three phases and allocates several strategic objectives per phase. Phase 1 is the support of the government security apparatus; phase 2 is neutralising the capacity of AGs while setting the conditions for the handover of security responsibilities to the GoDRC; and finally, phase 3 is handing over security responsibilities to the GoDRC. The focus of the main effort is protecting civilians across

the area of operations through the neutralisation of priority AGs (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). Thirdly, the strategic focus is centred on the cooperation and trust relations required between FIB forces and the GoDRC security forces. Lastly, seeing that MONUSCO is still deployed in the DRC and that the security responsibilities have not been fully handed over to the GoDRC, and that several targeted operations have been conducted against AGs since 2013, it would be safe to assume that phase 3 of the mission has not yet been finalised.

Based on the aforementioned, this study highlights that the notion of TCCs contributing to the fighting of a civil war is contested by the fact that the UN strategic objectives are not to defeat a foe or win a war but rather to capacitate the GoDRC to ensure a secure environment that is within its reach in terms of capabilities and capacity. However, this notion requires some clarity regarding the obligation of a TCC to conduct continuous offensive operations “against” AGs if the intention is not to fight a war against a foe but rather to protect civilians in the process. Part of the answer lies in the concept of rules of engagement (RoE) provided by the CONOPS, which binds all force personnel in their actions (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). Such a form of strategic guidelines binds a TCC to, under no circumstance, perform any enquiries, interpretations, administrative or other tasks to remove the contingent’s obligation to act promptly and effectively to an immediate threat to civilian and/or UN staff. In fact, failure to react will result in a subsequent investigation and appropriate additional actions taken by either MONUSCO or UN HQ (2016). Thus, this highlights that a TCC, such as the RSA BATT, has an obligation to execute its mandate, regardless of the phase in which it finds itself. This is prescribed by the RoE and determined by the UN to achieve the strategic end state, adequately adapting and preparing its forces.

3.2.3 Command and control during UN PSO

The other part of the answer lies within the concept of C² over the force element in the DRC. To provide an overview of the C² applicable to MONUSCO (see Figure 3.2), the main bodies at the different levels of war of UN peacekeeping will be discussed in an abridged format. On the strategic level of authority, command authority lies with the General Assembly and the Security Council, under which the secretary-general (SG) holds operational authority at the UN HQ in New York (NY). The SG delegates overall responsibility for all peacekeeping operations to the under-secretary-general (USG) for the DPKO, the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Military Affairs, 2016). From the DPKO, the SG appoints a special representative (SRSG) as HoM who is responsible for implementing the mission’s mandate and exercising overall UN authority over all components of MONUSCO (2016). MONUSCO commands the mission headquarters (MHQ) and its leadership team, which executes its operational authority through field base management of peacekeeping operations at the Mission HQ in Goma, DRC. At this point, the component heads, which include civilian units, police units, regional

offices and military units, execute their tactical authority by managing police, military and civilian operations and supervising individual personnel down to the lowest level of command (Heyns, 2020). The FC is directly answerable to the SRSG and is responsible for establishing and maintaining a dynamic military chain of command that reflects the increasingly mobile nature of the Force (see Figure 3.2 below) (2016). Such authority allows the FIB and Force troops (including the RSA BATT) to operate effectively within the area of responsibility (AOR). The FC has operational control (OPCON) of all MONUSCO military personnel (2016).



Figure 3.2: The main bodies of UN peacekeeping

(Adopted from Heyns, 2020)

Command affiliation during UN PSO is similar to those applicable to SANDF command affiliations but specifically accepted by the UN PSO (Heyns, 2020). TCCs to the UN will be under a specific command affiliation provided by the UN, as opposed to a notion of the TCC being under the command of the contributing country's national military command system. In other words, the TCC is divorced from its command affiliation as soon as it sets foot in the operational area until departure, and no national interference in operational matters is possible. Attention is required in this regard to indicate the command affiliation applicable to different entities, including the RSA BATT in the DRC (See Table 3.1). This study will only focus on the command affiliation applicable to the TCC to remain within the scope of this study.

Table 3.1: The accepted C² during UN PSO

Accepted C ² during UN PSO	
Operational control	United Nations
Under command	Special representative for the secretary-general/head-of-mission
Operational command	Force commander
Unity of command	National contingent commander/sector commander
Tactical command	National contingent commander
Under functional command	Staff officers
Administrative command	Troop-contributing country

(Adopted from Heyns, 2020)

TCCs are under administrative command, this being defined by Heyns (2020) as the following:

The authority over subordinate or other organisations with the national contingents for administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services and other non-operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations. Administrative control is a national responsibility given to the national contingent commander (NCC) in peacekeeping operations.

Therefore, based on the command affiliation applicable to the NCC and that the NCC is subject to this affiliation, this study highlights the fact that the commanding officer (OC) of the RSA BATT is ultimately responsible for all personnel and equipment under administrative command in the theatre of operations in terms of accountability. Furthermore, this study implies that the OC of the TCC is, in effect, responsible for the training and application of their forces according to a set doctrine within the operational area. For this reason, the question to be asked is what doctrine is followed to train forces to operate during the deployment of the RSA BATT in the DRC, seeing that the latter is a UN PSO. The answer to this question is provided later in this chapter during the discussion on training.

3.3 SANDF CHIEF JOINT OPERATIONS FORCE EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY FOR THE RSA BATT IN THE DRC

After analysing the MONUSCO CONOPS, it was ascertained that the office of C J OPS HQ situated in Pretoria, RSA, would conduct a planning process that culminates in providing the force structure elements (FSE) destined for the DRC with operational guidelines. It is important to note that these requirements are mission-specific, requiring force preparation that is also mission-specific. For this reason, this study focuses on deploying the RSA BATT in the DRC.

3.3.1 The RSA BATT operational requirements

The operational requirements for the RSA BATT derive from the J OPS HQ in Pretoria. These requirements are generated by J OPS HQ and tailored to guide the force preparation of forces destined

for internal and external deployments. According to the Acting Director of Peace Support Operations (Act D PSO) J OPS (Arlow, 2021), the RSA BATT forms part of the FIB, under the operational control of the FIB commander. It must be concentrated in the Eastern DRC and reserved for (but not limited to) offensive operations against AGs in the assigned AOR, by denying the AGs freedom of movement and restricting their activities. This ensures a secure environment exists for the local population to carry on with daily activities safely. These offensive operations will be conducted unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC throughout the DRC and constitute the primary manoeuvring force of the FIB (Arlow, 2021).

Regarding the concept of multinational PSO, the RSA BATT actions will be conducted in cooperation with the rest of the mission, including “in support” of UN military forces (Arlow, 2021). In terms of time and space, operations will be conducted over 12 months, will not be geographically fixed, and will reserve their mobility and agility to outmatch the threat posed by any of the AGs. Where necessary, the FIB may be reinforced by the FSE, such as special forces, or engineers, although they would only be expected to be in a supporting role for FIB offensive operations. Such reinforcements will be tasked under the mission’s military CONOPS in the DRC to address emerging threats and security situations. The RSA BATT will play a key role in neutralising the threat of the AGs as the force transitions its responsibility for security to the security forces of the GoDRC (Arlow, 2021).

This study emphasises the RSA BATT's critical role by forming part of MONUSCO’s deterrence strategy across the DRC. To be effective, the battalion should understand the dynamics of the AGs and other perpetrators of violence in its AOR to counteract it. The RSA BATT will have the mindset and the capacity to operate with the conviction to neutralise the AGs and to protect civilians from physical violence. The battalion should be able to operate day and night, at short notice, throughout the DRC. The FIB HQ will determine the main operating bases (main operating location). It will be configured to deploy at least two companies, either in a single wave or in a phased approach, and sustain itself for some time without external assistance (Arlow, 2021). When the focus is shifted to the SA Army infantry corps’ philosophy and military strategy in the next section, it will be indicated that the mindset mentioned here is indeed addressed to adhere to this specific requirement.

In executing the operational aims and objectives, the following execution guideline serves to provide direction (Arlow, 2021). Services and divisions are to provide combat-ready (CR), FSE and individuals as required by J OPS HQ for staffing the FIB’s structure (Arlow, 2021). This study identified that the output of the ETD of SA Army infantry corps forces is to provide C J OPS HQ with a combat-ready user system (CRUS) (Kotze, 2021). In the next section, the different stages of ETD for forces destined for deployment, internal and external to the borders of RSA, will be addressed in more detail. It will be shown at which point the CRUS is verified and handed over to the UN for deployment according to these mentioned operational requirements.

In addition to the above-mentioned, the following specific planning guidelines are applicable to provide direction to achieve effective force preparation for the mission (Arlow, 2021). Again, the emphasis is clearly on the notion of tailored forces and mission-specific training for the DRC. Firstly, combat readiness jungle warfare training must be conducted with the FSE destined for the DRC. This study considers it critical to operating in a specific terrain under certain conditions, and forces need to be adapted to such circumstances before deployment can be operationally effective. Secondly, mission readiness (MR) training should be conducted as part of the mobilising process (Arlow, 2021). During the discussion on the force preparation of the SA Army infantry formation, more detail will be provided on the CR and MR training conducted within the RSA BATT forces destined for the DRC.

The following eight requirements (Arlow, 2021) are listed to highlight the correlation between the POSTEDFIT (B) model, as will be discussed in the next section.

1. Plan to ensure a continuous supply of mission-ready personal equipment and main equipment to the mission area, but be mindful that RSA's forces are expected to be engaged in offensive actions against skilled adversaries.
2. Ensure all personnel identified for deployment are capable and mission trained to function at high intensity in highly mobile offensive and robust operations.
3. Plan for operational and tactical intelligence capacity that will provide real-time operational intelligence. The newly formed Tactical Intelligence Unit (TIU) will carry out this task.
4. Deploy troops, at least three platoons (one in each Coy), which have been equipped and trained in riot/crowd/management in anticipation of public demonstrations.
5. Plan for improvised explosive device (IED) capacity.
6. Plan to support UN communication requirements but ensure that the RSA contingent is not dependent on external equipment support.
7. Ensure effective medical support and medical contingencies to ensure maximum survival of wounded, injured or sick personnel.
8. Prepare to be deployed in any part of the DRC, depending on the security situation, as the FC directs.

In summary, the MONUSCO military force CONOPS provided the requirements to be satisfied by TCC to adjust its force employment strategies to fit the tailored concept for forces destined to deploy in the DRC. These requirements are then applied to generate operational requirements for the FSE destined to deploy under the FIB. The next section will focus on those aspects that deal with the force preparation executed by the FSE destined to deploy under the FIB to meet the tailored operational requirements set out by C J OPS HQ.

3.4 SA ARMY INFANTRY CORPS FORCE PREPARATION

To adhere to the operational requirements C J OPS provides, the SA Army infantry corps is guided by its strategy and philosophy as provided by the SA Army Vision 2045. Therefore, the next three sections will deal with the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and military strategy to provide an understanding of how the RSA BATT operationalises its military strategy for deployment under the FIB in the DRC.

3.4.1 SA Army infantry corps philosophy

The SA Army infantry corps follows a philosophy and strategy derived from the *SA Army Vision 2020*, later revised to *SA Army Vision 2045* (SA Army Infantry School Advanced Training Wing Presentation, 2021). The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy aim to enable the Infantry to play the leading role in the landward defence capability of the SA Army during joint and multinational operations (South African Army, 2017). The deployment in the DRC is a typical and relevant deployment of this nature. To play such a role, it is of utmost importance that the SA Army infantry corps defines the *ends*, *ways* and *means* to maintain this role. Furthermore, the SA Army infantry corps must determine its current standard and improve it to stay ahead of the situation on the ground, emphasising the African continent within the framework of the SA Army Strategy 2045. Its philosophy is developed based on the *ends*, or the SA Army infantry corps, and the strategy is based on the *ways* and *means*, or the how and with what to improve the SA Army infantry corps' capability (South African Army, 2017). This study acknowledges that the *SA Army Vision 2045* concurs with the framework of Lykke's formula for strategy and the deployment of the RSA BATT in the DRC.

The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy synopsis serves as a useful tool in understanding the thinking around the force preparation within the corps for joint multinational operations such as deploying forces to the DRC. As presented at the SA Army infantry corps' centre of excellence (CoE), the infantry school based in Oudtshoorn in the Western Cape is a dynamic force that serves its country and its people with men and women of character and courage. The SA Army infantry corps is a high-technology, hardcore, combat-ready system with rugged, fearless, patriotic soldiers who are physically tough and mentally robust. In addition, the infanteer is a sophisticated world-wise warrior (SA Army Infantry School Advanced Training Wing Presentation, 2021). This notion will be challenged later on in the study. The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy is a vision of what it intends to be regarding force preparation. However, four aspects stand out in its philosophy: the basis of its core business, leadership, organisation and sustainment.

The first aspect related to the basis of its core business is for the SA Army infantry corps to engage the enemy, destroy them and hold ground. During a joint multinational peacekeeping operation such as the MONUSCO, terms such as enemy, destroy, and holding of ground are not in line with what was discussed during the MONUSCO CONOPS. This study acknowledges that the core business of the RSA BATT is similar to the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy but placed in the context of UN

peacekeeping operations. Its core business is also spelt out in its operational requirements, namely, to engage AGs, neutralise them, and deny them freedom of movement. Thus, it is safe to argue that the RSA BATT deployment in the DRC is within the parameters of its philosophy.

Regarding leadership, the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy aims to provide men and women led by a world-wise warrior (officer) who can plan strategically and operate in a complex environment. The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy holds that quality officers can outmaneuver the enemy by quick thinking and decision-making on all levels within the framework of mission command. Furthermore, the philosophy seems to expect an infantry leader to be able to cope with harsh combat situations while applying supreme leadership to influence subordinates in such harsh operational circumstances. The importance of the non-commissioned officer (NCO) is acknowledged within the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy regarding not only training troops for deployment but also under operational circumstances such as that in the DRC (SA Army Infantry School Advanced Training Wing Presentation, 2021).

The SA Army infantry corps addresses the organisation factor by organising the infantry battalion in combat groups with a combat-orientated posture to enable them to participate in conventional operations and MOOTW. A well-structured combat service support system sustains the combat group, enabling it to deploy over vast distances and protracted periods in undeveloped theatres with no or limited support from the host nation. Training is based on ETD, emphasising the concept "[w]e train as we fight". Although gender mainstream is accommodated in training, all training is based on one standard. Equipment is developed according to the end user's needs based on the requirements in the African battlespace. Doctrine is directed at the future and influenced by the latest technology.

The SA Army infantry corps takes ownership of its professional facilities, sustainment and maintenance and equips its forces with the latest technology on the market. Technology is employed as a force multiplier to enable the SA Army infantry corps to compete with the best military institutions in the world. The SA Army infantry corps utilises information warfare as a tool required to succeed in the modern and digitised battlefield. A feeding system of lessons learned enables the SA Army infantry corps to continually update its systems and stay in touch with improvement and development. The SA Army infantry corps is managed within a cost-effective budget. Again, resources (*means*) will be addressed in the next chapter.

3.4.2 The SA Army Infantry Corps' strategy

The strategy of the SA Army infantry corps is based on the *ways* and *means* of the future SA Army infantry corps. It is derived from the strategies of the SANDF and SA Army, respectively. The Army infantry corps supplies a CRUS to the SA Army as a component of the landward defence capability (SA ARMY, 2017). The strategy is based on the POSTEDFIT (B) model (See Figure 3.3) with the

necessary enablers (inputs) and deliverables (outputs) (2017, pp. 1-3). The SA Army infantry corps' strategy aims to realise the ways and means to achieve the aims of the future Infantry Corps in the SA Army. The model is an abbreviation that represents personnel (P), organisation (O), sustainment (S), training (T), equipment (E), doctrine (D), facilities (F), intelligence (I), technology (T) and budget (B) (see Figure 3.3). This chapter will only discuss the training and doctrine of the model to provide an understanding of how forces destined for the DRC are trained to declare them as CRUS-tailored for deployment in the DRC mission area as part of the MONUSCO and the FIB. The other aspects will be dealt with as the *means* in the next chapter.




Figure 3.3: SA Army infantry corps POSTEDFIT (B) Model

(SA ARMY 2017)

3.4.2.1 Training approach

The members of the SA Army infantry corps must be introduced to military operational concepts at a junior level to enable junior leaders to conceptualise already on a lower tactical level. For the SA Army infantry corps to remain relevant and ready at all times to contend successfully with complex challenges in the future, all infantryers must diligently apply their minds and intellect to formulate new concepts and derive new capabilities concerning doctrine. For the SA Army infantry corps to be a high-technology, hardcore CRUS, continuous research, benchmarking, and training have to be done to develop the SA Army infantry corps into a highly sophisticated and technological system to stay ahead of global competency (SA ARMY, 2017).

The SA Army infantry corps conducts two types of ETD to achieve the above-mentioned approach. Firstly, common corps training and, secondly, mission-specific training. Common corps training is based on formal training and continuation training to maintain the standard of a highly qualified and professional combat-ready corps (Visagie, 2020). To prepare the infantry for battle, rigorous and aggressive training is conducted without compromise. Thus, contributing greatly to enhancing the

concept of a learning organisation, Infanteers should satisfy pre-entry requirements to complete the necessary learning programmes. Theoretical and individual work is conducted at training institutions, but practical and syndicate work should necessitate residential phases (SA ARMY, 2017).

The centres of excellence (CoEs) invest in specialisation with the concept of multi-skilling, adopting an approach to building capacity (SA ARMY, 2017). This study has identified the following COEs and their respective fields of expertise within the SA Army infantry corps. One is the Infantry School in Oudtshoorn which facilitates all functional courses. The second is the 44 Parachute Regiment in Bloemfontein, which presents airborne training, and the 101 Air Supply Unit (101 ASU) in Pretoria, which offers air supply courses. Three is the 1 South African Infantry Battalion (1 SAI Bn) in Bloemfontein, which presents mechanised training, and finally, the South African Army Specialised Infantry Capability (SAASIC) in Potchefstroom, which offers specialised infantry training, including K9, equestrian and motorcycle riding courses (Visagie, 2020).

The following requirements regarding ETD, in general, were identified and serve as guiding policy for all training during force preparation within the SA Army infantry corps. The emphasis of ETD centres on simulation with an experimentation capability to discuss and assess tactics, techniques and procedures and cut training costs. Practical training emphasises realism regarding live simulation, creating an opposing force (OPFOR) and tailored training areas. Training is conducted with complete combat-ready equipment for the real African battlespace. Training is based on “developmental training”. The SA Army infantry corps members are trained in multiple roles with all capabilities embedded in the operational functions of C², intelligence, firepower (effect), protection, manoeuvring (mobility), and sustainment. Therefore, the SA Army infantry corps ensures that all training culminates in a practical exercise that combines the roles and functions to be included in a realistic, practical field exercise (SA ARMY, 2017). An example is EX NYATHI, which is hosted at infantry school after courses such as battalion commanders, company commanders, company sergeant major, company quartermaster sergeant, and support weapons courses. Others participate in field exercises in their respective roles (Visagie, 2020). During such exercises, live ammunition and combat drills are executed to provide authenticity and AAR is compiled to identify lessons learned.

3.4.2.2 Doctrine

Doctrine is one aspect that cannot be overlooked when reference is made to force generation, employment and preparation and performance management. First and foremost, doctrine informs ETD and operational procedures to be followed by forces during any internal and/or external deployment. Doctrine is the principal foundation of the force preparation of the RSA BATT, namely, training according to the current SA Army doctrine (Kotze, 2021). In terms of lessons learned from previous deployments in the DRC, there will be a disjuncture regarding the doctrine applied by different TCCs subscribing to the country’s doctrine (Gysman, 2014). TCCs must adapt to the FC's command style

(2014) regardless of whether it is contrary to the national doctrine applicable to the operation, seeing that it is a UN operation and not an SANDF operation. This leads to the question of whether TCCs are obligated to follow a prescribed doctrine during deployment under FIB in the DRC or whether TCCs are bound to follow their national doctrine during training and operations abroad.

The UN (United Nations, 2021) provides several manuals available to UN forces to utilise as guidance during the preparation of forces and during operations. Manuals include the *UN Infantry Battalion Manual* (UNIBAM) Volume I and II, *UN Force HQ Handbook*, *UN Multinational PKOs Manual*, *UN Task Force Manual*, *UN Aviation Unit Manual*, *UN Military Engineer Manual*, *UN Military Force HQ Support Unit Manual*, *UN Logistics Unit Manual*, *UN military Police Unit Manual*, *UN Military Reconnaissance Unit Manual* and others. These manuals prescribe many aspects related to UN PKO and address conceptual aspects related to a generic approach to UN PKO. However, a specific observation was made during these manuals' analysis: no reference is made to TCC-specific doctrine, also referred to as combat battle handling procedures. Therefore, this suggests that TCCs are free to apply their doctrine in terms of combat battle handling during operations as long as it doesn't go against the UN's doctrine.

The importance of maintaining standards is addressed by conducting refresher training as part of continuation training. This ensures that the SA Army infantry corps remains a CRUS based on the practice-makes-perfect principle. The body responsible for measuring and reporting on standards is The South African Infantry Corps Advisory and Training Team (SA Army infantry corps ATT) (SA ARMY, 2017), which acts as a force multiplier in training. Four pillars of ETD within the SA Army infantry corps were identified: formal training, continuation training, CR training and MR training (Visagie, 2020). The next section will address each pillar separately to provide the reader with an understanding of the pathway followed to prepare the SA Army infantry corps soldier for external deployments, such as the deployment of the RSA BATT to the DRC.

3.4.2.3 Formal training

Formal training learning programmes educate, train and develop the infanteer progressively, emphasising qualifying soldiers to be appointed in a specific post (SA ARMY, 2017). The infantry soldier is equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills in conventional warfare to perform all possible and implied tasks in the African battlespace. Training programmes are instituted to ensure the SA Army infantry corps complies with the circumstances of the African continent. Curriculums of the respective learning programmes include the tasks of the various appointments, for example, the tasks of a platoon commander in the unit and the operational environment.

Training in the SA Army infantry corps starts with basic military training as the foundation of all infanters. The output of basic military training qualifies a rifleman for the SA Army infantry corps to

enable them to continue with their career as an infanteer. The output of the learning programme qualifies the member as a platoon commander and not necessarily for promotional purposes. The curriculum of the respective learning programmes includes the tasks of the various appointments, for example, the tasks of a platoon commander in his unit and the operational environment. To expose all infanteers to tactics, tactical exercises with troops; and tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) are conducted during all learning programmes. PSOs are introduced from the lowest level (SA ARMY, 2017). Therefore, this study implies that the foundation of any soldier in the SA Army infantry corps starts with an already tailored approach to equipping soldiers with the necessary knowledge, attitude, and skills to be deployed as FIB in the DRC and anywhere in the African battlespace.

Compared to continuation training within the SA Army infantry corps, the main focus during formal training is based on a 20/80 per cent principle (Visagie, 2020). This means that formal training of the infantry soldier at the COE should take up 20% of the time, and the remaining 80% of time and effort should be spent during continuation training at the unit itself. Therefore, it is safe to argue that formal training within the SA Army infantry corps aims to equip the infantry soldier with the basic knowledge, attitude, and skills in preparation for deployment. Refining this knowledge, attitude and skills is conducted at their unit as it prepares for deployments as a collective, such as deployment in the DRC. An example is when an infanteer undergoes a seven-week driving and maintenance learning programme at infantry school to qualify as a driver of an armed personnel-carrying (APC) vehicle. However, to master the skills and combat battle handling during realistic exercises, the driver will conduct continuation training at their unit as part of the unit force preparation for deployments. The following section will address the concept of continuation training in more detail.

3.4.2.4 Continuation training

During continuation training, emphasis (80%) must be on the human resources currently in the SA Army infantry corps (Visagie, 2020). The focus of continuation training is based on a mission-specific training approach, which provides all possible contingencies to ensure the SA Army infantry corps is combat-ready for the African battlespace (SA ARMY, 2017). SA Army infantry corps members are educated, trained and developed in physical training and musketry. Basic PT and table shooting assessment serve as the basis to groom the infanteer. To enable the SA Army infantry corps to provide a CRUS, combat PT and combat musketry form part of a quarterly assessment.

During continuation training, SA Army infantry corps ATT is utilised as a tool to present combat-ready training based on specialisation with capacity building. This tool also assesses exercises and monitors and verifies CR (SA ARMY, 2017). Therefore, this study implies that the SA Army infantry corps' core business is to ensure that training, both formal and continuation training, receives the same attention regarding verifying standards and CR to ensure that the unit is ready for external deployments. At such a point, all unit members staffed according to the unit structure should be adequately trained to be

rugged, fearless, patriotic and mentally robust infanteer ready for combat, meaning a CRUS. Therefore, the emphasis of training now shifts to mission-specific training, namely CR and MR training. The unit is then handed over by C SA Army (see Figure 3.4) to the JOPS Div to conduct mission-specific training (SA Army Infantry School Advanced Training Wing Presentation, 2021).

Following the cycle of formal training and continuation training, the SA Army infantry corps force preparation strategy's focus is shifted to preparing mission-specific training, such as the deployment in the DRC. The next section will address this training cycle in more detail. Figure 3.4 (below) shows the shift in mandate during the force preparation process from a force provision to a force employment mandate.




Figure 3.4: C J Ops force preparation cycle as derived from SA Army Infantry philosophy presentation

(SA Army Infantry School Advanced Training Wing Presentation, 2021).

3.4.2.5 Final preparations prior to deployment

This final section of the chapter will be approached to provide a simple model to describe both CR training and MR training as final preparatory steps prior to the deployment of the RSA BATT to the mission area. The 5Ws model, as commonly used within the SA Army infantry corps, will serve this purpose. The five 5Ws answer five simple questions to any mission or order. They are, “who must do what, where, when and what thereafter?”

SA Army's CR priorities are formulated under five priorities. Priority 1 is the African capability for immediate response to crisis (ACIRC) force, which includes elements from the SA Army Airborne and conventional mobile capability. Priority 2 addresses external deployments (Op MISTRAL and Reserve PSO Bn). Priority 3 includes training and force training exercises conducted by SA Army airborne and mobile conventional capability for Chief of the SANDF Reaction Force/SADC Standby Force or Presidential Support. Priority 4 includes border safeguarding (Op CORONA), and finally, priority 5 includes support to government departments (Op PROSPER, ARABELLA, CHARIOT, ISIPHO) (SA Army Infantry Formation, 2021). This study only addresses priority 2, namely external deployments in specific Op MISTRAL to the DRC.

After the continuation training cycle is complete, the unit's training is verified by SA Army infantry corps ATT and the SA Army Infantry Formation HQ's CR section regarding possible unit and individual training gaps that require intervention. This part of the training is concluded with a verification certificate on behalf of the General Officer Commanding SA Army Infantry Formation declaring the SA infantry corps battalion destined to deploy to the DRC "combat-ready". The SA infantry corps conducts CR training under the auspices of the SA Army infantry formation directive force preparation situated at the Infantry Formation Headquarters in Pretoria as priority 2. The objective is to prepare, provide and sustain CR infantry forces and capabilities on behalf of the Chief SA Army for employment by Chief of the SANDF to promote peace, stability, safety and security in the region (SA Army Infantry Formation, 2021). Two sections of the SA Army Infantry Formation head this process as the custodians of CR training: combat readiness and force training. The former is responsible for the certification of a CRUS, and the latter for all practical exercises conducted by the force (Prins, 2021). Subjects include specialised training, such as hostage negotiations, helicopter training, resilience training and combating HIV and AIDS through spiritual and ethical conduct (CHATSEC) training and others.

Following the CR training cycle and the verification process, the force then prepares for exercise (EX) PHIRIMA, which is a further verification process of level 2 (SA Army level) to Joint Operational Division. EX PHIRIMA is conducted to expose the entire force to a real-time, practical simulated exercise that includes the entire force as a combat group, conducted at the General De La Rey training area in Potchefstroom (RSA). The training is structured on two pillars. Firstly, a command post exercise (CPX) (See Figure 3.5) is conducted through a conflict simulation system, with the leading group based on a UN mission to expose them to simulated scenarios, as would be expected in the mission area. Secondly, a field training exercise (FTX) is done and includes the troops, leader group and the OPFOR in applying the "Chaka System" (See Figure 3.6) in a real-time combat simulated exercise. These exercises are followed by an after-action briefing to review the outcomes of the exercise and identify lessons learned down to the lowest level (see pictures below).



Figure 3.5: The conflict simulation system utilised during CPX and after-action briefing

(Picture provided by Infantry School)




Figure 3.6: The Chaka System applied during the FPX

(Picture provided by the Infantry School)

Following EX PHIRIMA, the mission readiness training, or the so-called jungle warfare phase commences. Previously it was conducted at the training area in Port St John's, Eastern Cape; however, the training area recently shifted to the Untabeni training area in the Limpopo Province (RSA). The cycle aims to mentally and physically prepare the RSA BATT to cope with the terrain and conditions expected in the DRC, or the so-called triangle within the ambit of asymmetric warfare (Du Preez, 2021). At this point, other role players, such as the medical task group (MTG), the engineering capability, legal representatives, air liaison and others, link up with the force and any identified gaps are addressed. 43 SA Army Brigade (43 Bgd) provides a headquarters and command system for the training, while the SA Infantry (SAI) units offer a company strength OPFOR. The SAI units rotate on an annual basis to provide such an OPFOR. In terms of combat support, air support is provided by Air Force Base Makhadu in the form of three Saab JAS 39 Gripen fighter planes, one Rooivalk attack helicopter and

one onboard command BK117 helicopter. Further support includes six Baracuda vessels, two from 4 Special Forces Regt, Infantry School and Engineer HQ, respectively, for the watermanship cycle; and finally, two snipers from 5 Special Forces Regt (Prins, 2021). The training is supported by the Area Military Health Unit (AMHU) of the province where the training takes place regarding medical support. 15 South African Infantry Battalion provides logistical support for the duration of the exercise. In terms of training and monitoring standards, the infantry school provides instructors from its special techniques training wing (STTW) to present the jungle warfare training cycle and SA Army infantry corps ATT to monitor standards (Prins, 2021). The reader is reminded of the specific operational requirement from Joint Operations according to the MONUSCO concept of operations in terms of jungle warfare training and the SA infantry corps' approach to achieve this requirement through their CR training.

The timing of mission readiness training is determined by a D-day system scheduled over the six months prior to deployment to the DRC (Du Preez, 2021). The end state of the training is to get the infantry force battle-ready for deployment as the FIB in the DRC (Prins, 2021). To certify such an end state, the General Officer Commanding SA Army Infantry Formation certifies via the CR section in November of each year that the force is CR and CSA Army then hands over the forces to Joint Operations Division (SA Army Infantry Formation, 2021) as a complete force ready for deployment in the DRC. At this point, the force undergoes mission-specific training at De Brug Mobilisation Centre (Mob Centre) in Bloemfontein. At the Mob Centre, the focus of preparation is mission-specific to Op MISTRAL (Koose, 2021). Training/preparations are clustered into five aspects. Firstly, consolidation of administration includes completing deployment files, medicals, and serviceability of personal equipment and other actions.

Secondly, it entails theoretical presentations, which include an introduction to the host country (DRC), defence intelligence briefings, UN subjects such as MOU, rules of engagement (RoE), the law of armed conflict (LOAC), sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), own contingent equipment (COE), allowances and other presentations. Thirdly, it entails operational training, including hostage negotiations, driver training, chef orientation, UN logistic system, trooping and other topics. Finally, confirmatory training on the CPX and FTX is conducted, which is similar to the training conducted during the CR training cycle. Finally, the mobilisation process is concluded with weighing and loading equipment, pregnancy testing of female soldiers, advance payments, receiving medical starter packs, and projection of forces in four flights to the DRC (Koose, 2021).

On completing the entire preparatory cycle as discussed in this section, the RSA BATT combat group is now complete as a CRUS deployed in the mission area under the banner of the FIB as a force structure element of MONUSCO. Henceforth, the force is handed over to the force commander on arrival in the DRC and will be deployed as determined by FIB headquarters and UN resolution and mandate.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter indicated that the chief of joint operations force preparation and employment strategy is tailored to ensure that the RSA BATT fulfils its mandate and R²P by being a robust, versatile CRUS. This was achieved by establishing a clear link between the UN concept of operations in the DRC and the chief joint operations force preparation and employment strategy. By providing an overview of the UN force generation process and concept of operations, it became clear that the chief of joint operations force preparation and employment strategy is derived from a tailored multinational PSO such as MONUSCO. Furthermore, it became clear that the SA Army infantry corps strategy and philosophy also resemble an approach that prepares soldiers to meet operational requirements for multinational PSOs. The education training and development approach of the RSA BATT soldiers destined for the DRC deployment indicated this. The next chapter will address those aspects of the POSTEDFIT (B) model, which include the resources (*means*) not addressed in this chapter as a continuation of the discussion on the military strategy applied by the SA Army infantry corps.

CHAPTER 4:

THE *MEANS* TO THE RSA BATT DEPLOYMENT IN THE DRC: FORCE EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter addressed the “*ways*”, as defined by Lykke (Lykke, Duckenfield, & Whitt, 2020) in which the RSA BATT is deployed in the DRC. Esterhuysen (2000) implied that part of a force development strategy is comprised of mobilising a nation's resources or a coalition of nations in support of military efforts. He highlighted the important roles regarding the force development strategy, which is the responsibility of the SANDF C J OPS; namely, developing possible future scenarios; determining the military capabilities required to counter such threats; and developing strategic military concepts for the employment of these resources (2000). This chapter highlights the question of how the resources, *means* and *risk* components of the RSA BATT's contribution to the FIB are addressed in its military strategy for the DRC

When one considers that the RSA BATT is well prepared and certified as a robust, highly mobile and versatile CRUS to execute its mandate, certain specific resources are required. The chapter aims to provide an analysis of how the force employment and force sustainment strategy of the SA Army infantry corps addresses the means required for the RSA BATT to fulfil its mandate and its R²P from the point of view of being robust, highly mobile, and versatile, towards the *ends* as discussed in previous chapters. The RSA BATT's preparation for application in the DRC was gleaned through the experience and knowledge from commanders and staff officers deployed under the FIB from 2013 to the present, who formed part of the sample group of those interviewed during the study (2021).

This chapter pursues two objectives, firstly, to determine whether the resources made available to the RSA BATT are optimal and whether these resources are tailored to achieve operational requirements. This objective is necessitated by the notion of what the UN requires in terms of the SUR. It also includes the nature of the deployment in the theatre of operations to achieve the operational requirements of member states that commit to participate in multinational PSO. The second objective is to list the identified risks in achieving operational requirements. This objective is useful to establish a clear understanding of the operational experiences of the RSA BATT peacekeepers deployed under the banner of the FIB in the DRC and how the SA Army infantry corps addressed these identified risks.

To achieve the objectives, this chapter is structured into two main sections. The first section will focus on the South African Military Health Service (SAHMS) Human Factor Combat Readiness Stressor Model (Du Toit, 2019) to provide an understanding of those aspects identified as positive and negative aspects of the motivation/morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers deployed in the DRC under FIB. The

second framework of analysis highlights the remainder of the POSTEDFIT (B) components of the SA Army Infantry's philosophy and strategy, which were not yet addressed in this study, namely organisation, sustainment, equipment, technology, facilities, intelligence, and budget. In other words, the force sustainment aspects of the military strategy of the RSA BATT.

Data that informed this chapter was collected from two primary sources. Firstly, the UN (SUR), SANDF (SA Army and *SA Army infantry Risk Management Policies and Procedures*) and related public publications (independent analysis), and the Ministerial Task Team's (MTT) report on sexual harassment, sexual exploitation, sexual abuse and sexual offences, within the Department of Defence (DoD) dated December 2020. Secondly, data was collected from research conducted between 2013 and 2020 by the SAHMS Military Psychological Institute: Human Factor Combat Readiness (HFCR) Section, stationed in Pretoria.

The aim of the HFCR Section's research was, first, to connote the effect of different deployment timeframes as well as the nature of the deployment on the psychological well-being of the SANDF personnel during the demobilisation (Visagie, Du Toit, Du Toit, Van Wyk & Schoeman, 2013). Secondly, to compare the perspectives of personnel in different deployment areas to gain insight into positive contributions to the psychological well-being of members and to provide insight into the stressors negatively impacting psychological well-being. Finally, a mission-specific matrix of mission-related stressors is referred to as the Stressor Model (Du Toit, 2019). Furthermore, the study focused on both the six-month and one-year deployments of the RSA BATT in the DRC. The study was conducted using a qualitative approach and utilising retrospective data gathered from the SANDF peacekeepers resulting from combat service support and combat forces from different mission areas under the FIB (Visagie et al., 2013).

This study emphasises the psychological aspect of "motivation" and uses it synonymously with the military term "maintenance of morale", thus focusing on the human factor. The maintenance of morale is a principle of war in various nations such as the United Kingdom, Australia, the former Soviet Union and the former People's Republic of China (Starry, 1981) and in the SANDF (South African Army Headquarters, 1979). Within the doctrine of the SANDF Combat Group Operations, the maintenance of morale highlights three important points that coincide with the theory, as will be discussed below. Firstly, no matter how sound the aim the commander selects or how they apply the principles to the situation, they will not succeed unless they have the skills and the will to carry their plan through (1979). Secondly, their soldiers must be well trained, capable of operating in sub-units, skilled at arms, well administrated, physically fit, and instilled with high morale, for, in the end, to achieve the ultimate aim, one is bound to depend on the human factor. Finally, high morale is fostered by participating in a well-organised and well-understood plan, which all concerned feel is within their power, under leaders they know and trust (1979).

According to Visagie et al. (2013), motivation is a key concept to understanding how soldiers behave since motivation can either positively or negatively influence a soldier's attitude and behaviour. Motivation is especially important within a military organisation, which demands that soldiers remain dedicated and perform their duty (2013). Furthermore, certain driving forces and incentives help the individual to decide to maintain, overcome and finish the job at hand. In other words, meet operational requirements. Furthermore, troops seek to do the right thing and want to believe that their efforts are worthwhile and valued, especially during PSOs involving unusual psycho-social and operational stressors for participating soldiers (Visagie et al., 2013). Finally, those conditions soldiers are exposed to during a PSO have been linked to outcomes such as a soldiers' mental health, physical health, interpersonal functioning, job performance and operational effectiveness (2013).

This study parallels the theory stated above in the following way: Firstly, without well-trained, well-organised, well-equipped and properly-motivated peacekeepers, no PSO such as Op MISTRAL in the DRC would be able to achieve operational objectives. Secondly, operational effectiveness depends on a successful strategy that includes attainable ends, well-defined ways, and tailored means, as in Lykke's formula. Thirdly, resources should be tailored for the job at hand because if not, it would negatively influence the motivation/morale of personnel, negatively affect operational effectiveness and ultimately become a risk towards achieving operational requirements. Aspects that did not feature in the findings of the HFCR Section's research or the risk management policy of the SA Army infantry corps will be recommended as future research fields.

In the following sections, the different elements of the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy, also referred to as the POSTEDFIT (B) model, will be used as a yardstick to compare the findings of the HFCR Sections Stressor Model. The researcher opted to include the publications of well-known South African defence analyst Helmoed-Römer Heitman in the discussion to identify possible risks in achieving the operational requirements in the DRC. Finally, the SA Army and SA Army infantry corps risk management process informed the discussion to indicate two aspects: firstly, to show those risks not mentioned by Heitman, and secondly, how risks are addressed in the SA Army infantry corps' strategy to ensure a CRUS is deployed to the DRC.

"*Risk*" has been defined as the effect of uncertainty on outputs/objectives, measured by the following criteria (Department of Defence [SA Army], 2012). Firstly, an effect is a deviation from the expected, which can be positive or negative. Secondly, objectives can address different aspects, such as financial, health and safety and environmental goals and can apply at different levels, such as strategic, organisational, project, product, and process. Thirdly, risk is characterised and expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event/s, including changes in circumstances and the associated likelihood of occurrences. The DoD (Department of Defence [SA Army], 2012) acknowledges that risk is unavoidable; therefore, the DoD's accounting officer has implemented its risk management process

through the chief of the SA Army and aimed at identifying potential events that may affect the organisation's outputs. According to the DoD, risk management is defined as (Department of Defence [SA Army], 2012):

Coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation concerning the effect of uncertainty on objectives/outputs. Risk management is a systematic and formalised process that identifies, assesses, manages and monitors risk.

Henceforth, the risks encountered during the DRC deployment of the RSA BATT will be viewed as follows – those aspects that the RSA BATT peacekeepers regard as negative stressors to their motivation/morale during deployment (the effect of uncertainty) that harms the achievement of operational requirements (outputs/objectives).

4.2 SAMHS HUMAN FACTOR COMBAT READINESS STRESSOR MODEL

The SAMHS Human Factor Combat Readiness Stressor Model was developed with a focus on the psychological aspects through administering a survey questionnaire and conducting focus group discussions on the experiences of members deployed in the DRC (Du Toit, 2019). The questionnaire comprised 42 items focusing on deployment history, aspects related to the deployment and personal perspectives. According to Du Toit (2020), who formed part of the research on the RSA BATT peacekeepers deployed in the DRC and a SAMHS Human Factor Combat Readiness Department member, the FIB is a unique deployment. Therefore, a third item was included in the model: the impact of the length of deployment on the soldier. In addition, the study identified positive and negative experiences, as indicated by the RSA BATT contingent in the DRC, which either positively or negatively impact the soldier's morale.

The findings of the study showed that positive factors boosting morale included teamwork, communication with family at home, support from family at home, trust in each other, a sense of helping the people of the DRC, winning the firefight (M23), encouragement from commanders and leisure time utilisation (LTU) activities. Those aspects regarded as the best experiences during the deployment included operational success, morale, operational experience, interaction with other contingents (Malawi, Tanzania and Pakistan) and the ability to deal with challenges regardless of lack of support (Du Toit, 2019).

The negative experiences included the lack of support from SA and JOPS, which proved to be the most dominant theme according to the RSA BATT peacekeepers. Also included were reduced allowances, non-delivery of parcels from home, non-availability of the C-130 [aircraft] for logistical support, unclear policies with regards to leave, empty promises from SANDF J OPS, fruitless visits by senior officers from SANDF J OPS, poor conditions for sanitation and accommodation, lack of information,


missing home, routine, food shortages and uniforms not lasting the deployment duration [of one year] (Du Toit, 2019).

During his research, Du Toit (2019) identified several key issues related to the positive and negative aspects affecting the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers. First and foremost, the deployment duration, which was extended from six months to a year, amplified the stressors of the deployment, which contributed to high levels of fatigue on an emotional and mental level. Secondly, the nature of the deployment was a key factor. In this regard, specific mention was made of the targeted operations against AGs in the DRC. According to the responses of the RSA BATT peacekeepers, the offensive is related to positive and negative experiences, and the experience of being real soldiers and operational successes were positive. On the other hand, exposure to contact was stressful and thus could be experienced as negative (Du Toit, 2019). The third key issue regarded family and social stressors caused by several factors. The fourth key issue included a lack of, and in many cases, poor command and leadership (Du Toit, 2019). The fifth and final key issue that Du Toit's research identified was a lack of or inadequate support from RSA.

Apart from the five key issues mentioned above, two additional aspects were revealed in consecutive post-deployment debriefs, namely the use of alcohol during the deployment and SEA by the RSA BATT soldiers deployed in the DRC. These two aspects are regarded as important to include in this study, as it has the potential to tarnish the image of the RSA BATT contingent in the DRC and to the rest of the world. Therefore, these two aspects will be included in the final section of this chapter as a separate discussion of the remainder of the POSTEDFIT (B) model.

After analysing the findings of the HFCR Stressor Model, several positive (boosters) and negative (stressors) that impacted the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers was linked to the SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy (POSTEDFIT (B) model). The following tables (See Table 4.1) illustrate identifying how these stressors and boosters reveal themselves in the SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy and the actual deployment experiences of the RSA BATT peacekeepers, as will be discussed in the second section.

Table 4.1: The impact of aspects regarding POSTEDFIT (B) on the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC derived from the findings of the Human Factor Combat Readiness Stressor Model



(Du Toit, 1019)

4.3 THE RSA BATT ORGANISATION

With specific reference to PSOs such as the DRC, the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy addresses organisation in the following ways: The SA Army infantry corps should be re-organised into combat groups as a combat capability in the SA Army, led by commanders effectively applying command and control (C²) (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). The SA Army infantry corps should provide combat-ready forces to participate in MOOW in the short, medium, long and extended long term, with the focus on, amongst other tasks, PSO (peacekeeping and peace enforcement), intervention operations, stabilisation and reconstruction operations, and rapid response operations (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the RSA BATT ORBAT illustrates the level of forces committed to the DRC. This study links the principle of war regarding the unity of command (South African Army, 1996) as a critical success factor in providing leadership and C² to function optimally to achieve operational requirements. The first aspect linked to an organisation with the findings of the HFCR section's research is C² of a combat group size force. The RSA BATT peacekeepers placed C² within the brackets of both minor booster and best booster of morale, with command and control falling within the brackets of minor stressor and worst minor stressor. However, it suggests that there are both negative and positive aspects within the C² of the RSA BATT leadership in the field, which affects the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers.

Therefore, this study implies that space for improvement exists in selecting and staffing the leaders' group of the RSA BATT for future deployment. Furthermore, results indicate that the leaders' group should be evaluated in terms of profile, leadership, and problem-solving skills from the lowest level, be it section leaders right through to the commanding officer during the force preparation and mobilisation stages of the deployment. The latter refers to officer and NCO rank groupings, coupled with a tailored monitoring and rectification plan during and after the deployment. By doing so, it is expected to shift the C² ratings away from the stressor bracket towards the booster bracket, ultimately reinforcing the peacekeepers' morale towards an increase in operational effectiveness and meeting operational requirements. The stressor aspect is discussed below in the identified risk section.

The second aspect that stood out is how the RSA BATT peacekeepers rated teamwork and unity. The latter is reflected as a major booster to morale, which reflects a strong feeling of togetherness and the unit operating as a team. Examples mentioned as responses from the RSA BATT peacekeepers include working with colleagues that understood one another, healthy working relations and members supporting one another (Du Toit, 2019). This study views teamwork and unity as critical success factors in meeting operational requirements, and such a positive reflection should be exploited during the force preparation phase and deployment. Furthermore, the RSA BATT contingents preparing for the deployment rotation emphasised unity during training on all levels and promoted the *esprit de corps* in all its activities. By doing so, the unity amongst peacekeepers should strengthen the unit's morale and add value to operational effectiveness in meeting operational requirements. Finally, unity and teamwork have the potential to increase discipline and a sense of pride, which in turn would alleviate the bad image and reputation of criminal cases against the RSA BATT peacekeepers during deployment. More will be said in this regard at the end of this chapter.

The study also found combat-related success as one of the major positive experiences of deployment. Examples mentioned as responses by the RSA BATT peacekeepers include knowing their work, accomplishing their mission and meeting operational requirements (Du Toit, 2019). The fact that mission success claims to boost the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers suggests that the peacekeepers regard their efforts during a PSO as valuable and worthwhile. Therefore, this study highlights mission-related outcomes potentially resulting in success to be communicated to all the RSA BATT forces to create a further sense of achievement as a unit. An example is the victory over the M23 in Goma, which elevated the image and operational effectiveness of the RSA BATT in the DRC (Du Toit, 2019). Furthermore, this study recommends that mission successes other than combat-related successes, such as CIMIC operations, also be regarded as meeting operational requirements. An example includes the school "adopted" by the RSA BATT in Sake. Children and teachers were given donations such as books, stationery, and other commodities at this school. Another example is when the female RSA BATT peacekeepers deployed in the Kasai Oriental Province near Mbuji Mayi during

the 2017/18 deployment donated sanitary items to teenage girls incarcerated in a local prison (Pieterse, 2017). By communicating the mission successes to the RSA BATT peacekeepers and the UN, the image and reputation of the RSA BATT contingent were uplifted, and high morale was maintained, ultimately reinforcing operational effectiveness and requirements.

A fifth aspect shown to be a minor morale booster is the low casualty rate during the deployment (Du Toit, 2019). Some respondents to Du Toit's research indicated that their colleagues committing suicide and others losing their lives in combat was stressful (2019). However, this study interprets that the relatively low levels of casualties during the DRC deployment positively affected the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers as a combat group because the size of the force is sufficient to fulfil its mandate. Therefore, this study suggests that the combat group's size should remain unchanged for future deployments. However, such a decision does not solely rest with the RSA but is dictated by the UN in its SUR. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter 3, there is a phase within the UN force generation strategy where the RSA is involved in negotiations with the UN in terms of the SUR, of which it is suggested that the current size of the force, namely a combat group, should be maintained for future deployments in the DRC under the current offensive mandate.

The aspects that negatively affect the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers are reflected as stressors according to Du Toit's research and are regarded by this study as risks towards achieving operational requirements. This statement is in line with the argument that without well-trained, well-organised, well-equipped and properly-motivated peacekeepers, in other words, high-morale peacekeepers, no PSO such as Op MISTRAL in the DRC would be able to achieve operational requirements. The C² matters that are reflected as stressors include leaders victimising juniors, leaders that do not take subordinates' concerns seriously, officers threatening subordinates with charges, giving unclear orders and cases of favouritism (Du Toit, 2019). This study retains the suggestion made during the positive boosters on morale mentioned above and will not repeat it here. However, this study does regard morale as an identified risk that should enjoy priority and be addressed and managed for future deployment in the DRC.

Heitman states that the SA Army is under-strengthened, overaged and handicapped by obsolete equipment resulting in a capability gap (Heitman, 2021). In his argument (2021), he includes the size of the SA Army as a concern in terms of meeting operational requirements. He also commented on the personnel that makes up the organisation, and according to him, an immediate concern for the SA Army is personnel in terms of age, fitness, and health of troops.

This study recognises that the SA Army infantry corps is re-organised into combat groups as a combat capability in the SA Army, led by commanders effectively applying C². However, it was identified that room for improvement exists in staffing a strong, capable leader group within the organisation of the

RSA BATT to increase the levels of C² and positively affect the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers deployed in the DRC. The SA Army infantry corps provides combat-ready forces to participate in MOOW in the short, medium, long and extended long term with the focus on, amongst other tasks, PSO (peacekeeping and peace enforcement), intervention operations, stabilisation, reconstruction operations, and rapid response operations. The RSA BATT deployment from 2013 to 2021 has proven to be a true reflection of achieving its strategy and philosophy effectively. However, critique identified as a risk in achieving operational requirements was discussed and is viewed on a strategic level, which requiring attention, as opposed to on tactical level.

4.4 THE RSA BATT SUSTAINMENT

The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy address sustainment as follows. Firstly, infantry commanders must have their own support structures to maintain accounting status (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). Secondly, the SA Army infantry corps should be in a position to project over a vast distance to fulfil its tasks in the African battlespace with special consideration for the challenges of political networks, security risks, possible enemies and the morale of the soldiers (2017). Thirdly, the SA Army infantry corps should be able to protect logistical installations and the long lines of communication within the scope of the battlefield (2017). Finally, training should be based on well-supported and well-structured learning environments (2017). This study interprets support in terms of logistics, meaning the logistical support from C J OPS to the RSA BATT deployed in the DRC should not be misinterpreted as logistical support from the UN.

The theme identified as support from the RSA was a minor morale booster. Such forms of support made the RSA BATT peacekeepers experience a sense of support from their higher headquarters and an appreciation that they were updated about the situation of the RSA while deployed abroad. Furthermore, the sense of having sufficient ammunition to sustain the deployment had an uplifting effect on their morale. Therefore, this study suggests that regular staff visits to deployed peacekeepers be scheduled and executed with a predetermined agenda based on the needs of the deployed soldiers. In this regard, staff work is required to determine the needs of the soldiers in the mission area to be met in terms of providing credible information and communication from the higher headquarters.

Support, or rather the lack of support, was also identified as a major stressor to the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers in Du Toit's research. His research shows examples such as sustainment flights being delayed, parcels from home being delayed, unreliable sustainment flights as "promised" by chief joint operations, not receiving salary advice in the mission area and a lack of logistical support and other related examples.

This study reiterates that the examples mentioned here are from the feedback received from the RSA BATT peacekeepers and are not the researcher's opinion. Furthermore, this study acknowledges that

support over an extended communication line is complex and, in many cases, challenging. It is a major stressor to the morale of the deployed peacekeepers and, therefore, has the potential to affect operational effectiveness negatively and ultimately meet operational requirements. For this reason, it is suggested that more sustainment flights should be allocated to Op MISTRAL; thereby, the RSA contingent is adequately supported in the mission area. If sustainment flights are limited for various reasons, peacekeepers should be informed instead of making promises that are impossible to keep.

As findings on how the SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy address sustainment, it was shown that infantry commanders have their own support structures to maintain accounting status by sustaining the RSA BATT forces through chief joint operations. Secondly, it was found that the projection over a vast distance to fulfil its tasks in the African battlespace is a complex and challenging task to fulfil. Special consideration of such complexity includes challenges of political networks, security risks, possible enemies, the morale of the soldiers in the mission area, and long communication lines. Thirdly, in terms of protecting logistical installations and the long lines of communication within the scope of the battlefield, the lines of communication are less vulnerable to a military threat than the actual geographical distance from the RSA to the mission area, coupled with associated challenges of administration and logistics. This has a greater negative effect on the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers due to delay and absence of logistical and administrative sustainment.

4.5 ALLOCATED PRIME MISSION EQUIPMENT TO THE RSA BATT

The SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy address equipment as follows. Equipment should be of a high standard to enable the SA Army infantry corps to operate on any terrain in all weather conditions (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). Second, equipment should fit all sizes irrespective of male or female soldiers, and projects must be based on stakeholderism to ensure that the end user is a stakeholder of the equipment being developed. Third, the development of new equipment should be based on an exceptional concept to ensure that the user's stated requirements are developed with the latest technology and future strategic tasking (2017). Finally, battle groups should be fully equipped according to the war establishment tables (WETs) and peace establishment tables (PETs) (2017).

According to the findings of Du Toit's research, equipment/vehicles were, at best, minor boosters of the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers (Du Toit, 2019). Responses from the RSA BATT peacekeepers in this regard showed that the soldiers on the tactical level were satisfied with the equipment and vehicles available to them to execute their mission from a capability point of view. This study emphasises the importance of differentiation between capability and serviceability to guide against ambiguity and potential confusion. Capability (protective security and mobility) refers to the effect of the battlefield and the intended combat handling of vehicles, weapons and ammunition. An example is the Mamba Armoured Personnel Vehicle (APC), which is equipped with four-wheel drive

capability that is well suited for road conditions in the DRC that are regularly muddy and non-negotiable to regular sedan soft-skin vehicles without four-wheel drive capability. The same description applies to the SAMIL 20 logistical vehicle with a four-wheel drive with a high ground clearance to counter the poor road conditions. The deployment of A Company, 5 SAI Bn in Mbuji Mayi demonstrated the capability advantage of four-wheel drive vehicles with high ground clearance during its demobilisation from Mbuji Mayi to Kananga in November 2017/18 (Pieterse, 2017). The route was a 75-kilometre expedition over muddy roads and was only negotiable for the Mamba (APC), SAMIL 20 and SAMIL 50 recovery trucks. The expedition lasted four days, and heavy vehicle damages and losses were incurred. It is the researcher's opinion that such a trip would not have been feasible without the vehicles' capabilities.

Regarding weapons and ammunition, responses from the RSA BATT peacekeepers suggested that their morale is boosted by the firepower of the weapons and ammunition available to them (Du Toit, 2019). An example is the effect the RSA BATT 120 mm Artillery shells had during the battle of Motomo in 2019 when ADF camps were pre-bombarded. It led to heavy casualties on the side of the ADF, among which was the ADF leader at the time (Grundlingh, 2021). This study implies that high casualties on the opposing force delivered by the maximal use of firepower with minimal commitment of human resources create trust in equipment to reduce the vulnerability of own forces to unfriendly fire. The same vulnerability argument applies to protecting own forces in APCs during offensive operations.

Serviceability, on the other hand, refers to the status quo of the condition and workability of equipment, weapons, ammunition and other equipment. This study implies that regardless of the capability of any certain piece of equipment might offer, if it is not serviceable, the capability is regarded as null and void. For example, a scenario might be that a Browning machine gun firing pin is unserviceable due to wear and tear, breakages, or lack of maintenance, thus rendering that specific weapon's capability useless.

In summary, the equipment and vehicles made available to the RSA BATT in the DRC are suitable for the terrain and protection of their own forces and provide suitable firepower. The desired effect on the battlefield is achieved with a combination of protection of own forces and high firepower, the peacekeepers' morale is maintained in accordance with the corresponding principle of war. However, serviceability dictates the application of prime mission equipment (PME), which will be discussed next.

According to Heitman, the SA Army is equipped with obsolete equipment and faces a capability gap (Heitman, 2021). Heitman alluded that the SA Army faces obvious challenges regarding its PME (Heitman, 2021). Heitman (2021) stated that a capability gap exists within the SA Army due to the poor state of these aged pieces. Heitman (2021) furthermore included the delay in the replacement of PME

as a result of indecision, funding cuts and problems with Denel Weapons Manufacturer within the same argument.

According to Du Toit's (2019) research, the poor state of serviceability of PME in the DRC is reflected as a major stressor to the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers. This study implies that a reduced level of morale due to the unserviceability of the equipment, vehicles, weapons, and ammunition intended to provide both firepower and protection to own forces, might negatively affect the achievement of operational requirements. Therefore, it becomes an identified risk requiring mitigation measures by higher HQs.

The SA Army infantry corps identifies and acknowledges that PME is a risk within its primary tasks in the SANDF. According to its risk management register, the state of its PME has resulted in a situation where the SA Army infantry corps will not be able to conduct operations both externally and internally, owing to limited resources. Therefore, the provision of PME, a full spectrum of training, operations and equipment for the day-to-day running of the units, is a critical requirement, and the current realities of ACIRC commitments were a revelation (South African Infantry Formation Headquarters, 2019).

On 24 January 2019, a decision was taken at the meeting between GOC SA Army Inf Fmn and CD FS that all PME of infantry formation units with ACIRC must be stack transferred to a special account and that task was given to director SA Army logistics to facilitate. The PME will be replaced with new vehicles, which is in process at this stage, with SA Army Inf Fmn submitting quarterly updates (28 June 2019, 27 September 2019, 13 December 2019 and 13 March 2020) (South African Infantry Formation Headquarters, 2019).

Regarding the findings on how the SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy addresses equipment, the current PME available to the RSA BATT has the required capabilities to achieve intended operational requirements. However, in terms of serviceability, a risk to enable the SA Army infantry corps to operate on any terrain and in all-weather conditions is identified. Evidence has shown that PME is in a state of poor serviceability due to ageing PME, dilapidation and poor maintenance, thus negatively affecting the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC. This study highlights the importance of fulfilling its philosophy and strategy regarding PME to fit all sizes, irrespective of male or female soldiers. Projects must be based on stakeholder ship to ensure that the end user is a stakeholder of the developed equipment and that current projects to replace aged PME must be finalised and rolled out in the mission area. The same sentiment applies to developing new equipment based on an exceptional concept to ensure that the user's stated requirements are developed with the latest technology and future strategic tasking. Furthermore, this study emphasises the importance of battle groups being fully equipped according to the WETs and PETs.

4.6 TECHNOLOGY UTILISED BY THE RSA BATT

The SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy addresses technology as follows: The SA Army infantry corps should be a creator of technology and not only the end user and should be able to identify, manage and exploit technology that will shape the African battlespace (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). Secondly, to be a CRUS, the SA Army infantry corps should develop and invest in its human resources to operate the latest technology because, without the infanteer, the highly sophisticated technological system will be null and void (2017).

This study emphasises radio communication as a point of importance due to it being a critical success factor on the battlefield for C². Effective C² will shape the battlefield because commanders predominantly project, sustain control, and command forces by communicating via radio. The researcher was deployed during 2017/18 as a COB commander in the DRC under FIB in Kasai Oriental Province, 1 200 kilometres from the Brigade assembly area (BAA) deployed at Sake North Kivu (Pieterse, 2017). During the deployment, no radio communication was possible between the COB and the Bn HQ due to the extensive geographical distance between bases. At the time, the alternative mode of communication was reverted to cellular phones. The predicament rendered the radio communication capability in the COB null and void. This suggests that the SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy in this regard are dependent on technology that should be compatible with any situation during PSO in the DRC and beyond.

This study implies that radio communication has proven to be an identified risk towards achieving FIB operational requirements in the DRC with specific reference to the RSA BATT. According to Du Toit's research, the shortage of serviceable radio equipment was reflected as a major stressor to the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC (Du Toit, 2019). This study alludes to the fact that radio equipment shortage and poor serviceability are closely related to the poor state of serviceability of PME. This directly influences C² on the tactical level because commanders cannot communicate directly with base Headquarters (HQs) and each other over long and medium ranges.

In 2020, Du Buisson, a senior officer in the SA Army Signal Corps (SAASC), wrote a report to the SA Army HQ as an after-action report regarding the replacement of signal equipment employed by the RSA BATT in the DRC. Du Buisson served in the South African Corps of Signal (SACS) from 1996 to date as signal instructor, signal troop commander, signal squadron commander, Staff Officer 1 (SO1) tactical and mobile telecommunications and SO1 operations officer, which he deployed as tactical and mobile telecommunications officer the African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur) in 2006, as well as MONUSCO in 2009.

According to Du Buisson (2018), since the establishment of the FIB in 2003, the radio end-user system (EUS) applied in the RSA BATT was the BARRET 2090 high frequency (HF) radio system as well as

the hand-held KENWOOD radio system used during vehicle and foot patrols. These systems' serviceability deteriorated with time between rotations because of a lack of maintenance, resulting in damages, incompleteness and non-serviceability (2018). This point resonates with the commonly used phrase in the military, "*no Comms, no Ops*", which means that no operation is feasible in the event of insufficient radio communication. This study revealed that the implication of lacking radio communication during operations, especially offensive operations, has the potential to result in commanders being faced with undesirable outcomes. For example, medical evacuations, logistical support, situational reports, close air support and other C² aspects are unable to reach their desired location in time due to a break in the communication cycle, thus, risking the possibility of not achieving operational requirements due to operational challenges and loss of life. According to Du Buisson's (2018) report, near-vertical incident skywave (NVIS) communication was identified as a challenge in the DRC. The latter is an operational requirement to ensure clear radio communication.

The challenge with NVIS was addressed in 2018 by replacing the BARRET HF system with the new-generation RADIATE MCR 1025 HF system (Du Buisson, 2018). The RADIATE system is equipped with a loop antenna tested over three years in the Northern Cape and KwaZulu Natal. The location and terrain in which the system was tested ensured that the EUS manager could simulate the terrain (jungle) in the DRC to test the system effectively. The EUS project was rolled out to the RSA BATT in the DRC between 21 November and 14 December 2018, using installation training for the RSA BATT peacekeepers as end-users (2018). The training was essential to close the skills gap of radio operators and commanders identified as system end-users. The training included theory, practical hands-on training, and installation and maintenance of the system (2018).

Although the RADIATE system proved to be reliable, it had its flaws. Firstly, the system proved to experience high levels of noise with unknown causes. This is currently being investigated for implementing future mitigation (Du Buisson, 2018). Secondly, it was found that the first FST 400 broadband antennas installed on an operational basis were not resonating at lower frequencies used for NVIS communication between 4-6 Megahertz, which resulted in power input challenges on the system (2018). Therefore, it was recommended that external antenna tuning units be included in the MCR 1025 operational base stations for future installations to ensure broadband capabilities deliver maximum forward power (2018).

Out-dated and unserviceable radio communication technology was identified as a risk in achieving operational requirements for the RSA BATT. However, the SA Army infantry corps made up ground in addressing the shortfalls by exploiting new-generation radio equipment and other technology forms to address the mission area challenge. This study implies that keeping abreast with modern technology will boost the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC, which in turn, may lead to higher

levels of operational effectiveness culminating in achieving operational requirements set out by the UN during current and future PSOs.

Regarding the findings on how the SA Army infantry corps addresses technology within its military strategy and philosophy, specifically signal communications, this study found that the SA Army infantry corps plays the role of creator of technology by identifying the shortfalls experienced by the end user (RSA BATT). Firstly, the SA Army infantry corps manages and exploits technology by rolling out contemporary products available to the SANDF to keep abreast of modern state-of-the-art signal equipment, which will shape the African battlespace as is the case in the DRC. Secondly, this study acknowledges that the SA Army infantry corps managed to be a CRUS in signal equipment, by developing and investing in its human resources to operate the latest technology. The roll-out of the RADIATE system and its training is a clear example of the RSA BATT's efforts to maintain its status of remaining a CRUS in the DRC.

4.7. FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE RSA BATT

The SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy addresses facilities as follows: The SA Army infantry corps should be accommodated in professional facilities with highly technological systems and equipment to compete with the best in the world (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). Commanders should be mandated to maintain such facilities and not depend on the Department of Public Works to do major works. Furthermore, the SA Army infantry corps should take ownership of its facilities, including training facilities, in terms of its maintenance and keeping them up to standard (2017).

According to the UN SUR, the RSA BATT is obligated to use the contingent's own equipment (COE) (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2013). Firstly, the SUR details the COE in terms of providing major equipment such as vehicles, weapons and ammunition (2013). Secondly, it does it in terms of administration and logistics, which includes accommodation such as camping equipment (tentage) and ablutions, communication equipment, catering equipment, electrical equipment, light engineer capability (water purification), laundry, fire detection and alarms, basic firefighting, and finally, miscellaneous general stores (2013). Therefore, in terms of facilities, the RSA BATT is obligated to establish its own facilities in the mission area. Facilities in this regard include field kitchens, stores, LTU facilities, tactical headquarters, temporary operational bases (TOBs), and company operational bases (COBs), including all operational facilities during the deployment. As mentioned during the discussion of equipment, much of the equipment, specifically camping equipment used by the RSA BATT, is dilapidated and in a poor serviceability state.

According to Du Toit's research, COE is regarded by the RSA BATT peacekeepers as unserviceable, old and requiring exchange and is reflected as a major stressor and a worst minor stressor, causing a

decrease in morale (Du Toit, 2019). This study implies that a disjuncture between COE and the remuneration of COE by the UN to the TCC is created if old and dilapidated equipment is used to meet operational requirements set out in the UN SUR. The argument is based on the notion that during COE inspections held regularly during the deployment, facilities and equipment are inspected and declared either serviceable or unserviceable, which is an indicator of the agreed amount of remuneration the TCC will receive for its commitment to the mission. However, even though the TCC is remunerated for the COE employed in the mission area, the effect of dilapidated equipment is felt during operations. An example is the RSA BATT peacekeepers' responses regarding tents used as accommodation in the COBs and TOBs. According to Du Toit's (2019) research, peacekeepers made it clear that tents were leaking and unsuitable for the DRC's high rainfall. Similar responses included overcrowding in tents at COBs and TOBs, unserviceable beds and mattresses, blocked drains, lack of ventilation, pests and insects in accommodation, a shortage of cupboards, and other related complaints (2019).

According to Du Toit's (2019) research, LTU, religious and social activities proved to be a booster for the RSA BATT peacekeeper's morale. Some examples are sports days, chaplain periods, visits to the gymnasium, and time off in the bar. These types of facilities are subject to COE inspections and are also remunerated by the UN. This study implies that to maintain high levels of morale as well as high levels of *esprit de corps* within the unit, especially over an extended deployment period, LTU, religious and social facilities should be established and maintained in such a way that all deployed soldiers of the RSA BATT can make maximum use thereof during their time of deployment, regardless of the remuneration aspect of the deployment. In successfully maintaining morale and *esprit de corps*, the expectation of meeting other operations might be increased and *vice versa*.

This study highlights occupational health and safety (OHS) as a risk towards achieving operational requirements in the DRC. Based on the discussion above, two specific risks in terms of facilities were identified, specifically the lack of sufficient facilities available to the RSA BATT peacekeepers. According to Du Toit's research, concerns were highlighted as a worst stressor to their morale (Du Toit, 2019). The fear of contracting diseases such as malaria, Ebola and an infestation of pests creates a psychological strain on the RSA BATT peacekeepers (2019). As stipulated in the UN SUR, all TCCs must deploy with two Medical Level 1 Field Hospitals (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2013), which includes a pharmacy and dispensary. Although these facilities are deployed, the RSA BATT peacekeepers fear for their health due to insufficient facilities being made available to them, such as accommodation, kitchens, stores, pantries, ablutions, and a shortage of malaria tablets (Du Toit, 2019). This study implies that if soldiers fear for their health due to limited resources, it will negatively affect their morale and, therefore, the operational effectiveness of troops on the tactical level.

The health of deployed soldiers is at risk if facilities are firstly not adequately established, secondly not well managed, and thirdly not maintained in the mission area. In the first aspect, namely established, a standard working procedure has been the practice since 2003 to date where contingent battalions' hand-and take over operational bases on an annual basis which leans to the practice of commanders inheriting operational bases and all their facilities as they find them.

In terms of managing facilities, commanders are faced with the challenge of adapting to the prevailing conditions of facilities and are expected to maintain existing facilities with limited resources available on the ground. In addition to managing facilities with regards to OHS, it is the SAMHS medical task team specialist capability responsible for the monitoring of pest control coupled with the environmental specialist of the RSA BATT who is responsible for identifying risks of pest infestation and subsequently the implementation of control measures, such as regular fumigation and pest eradication.

Maintaining facilities has been demonstrated to be especially challenging for the RSA BATT commanders. A primary cause for the lack of sustaining facilities is limited resources and a lack of funds (budget cuts). An example is a COB established in Mbuji Mayi, Kasai Oriental Province, during the 2017/18 rotation of 5 SAI Bn (Pieterse, 2017). Over the 10-month deployment, the shortage and poor serviceability of tents utilised as facilities in the COB were reported, and via the logistical channels, requested replacements on several occasions. In response to such requests, a continuous reply was indicated as *dues out*, meaning there is zero in stock. Repetitive requests and replies remained unchanged for the duration of the COB deployment in Mbuji Mayi. Therefore, this study emphasises the magnitude of the lack of resources available to the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC and the possible risk it poses to the OHS of deployed soldiers.

The second risk identified in this study will be referred to as operational boredom. A study was conducted at the Naval Health Research Centre in San Diego by screening 1 543 marines with an average age of 26. In this group, 46% served in several deployments, stationed at Camps Pendleton, Twentynine Palms, Calif and Marine Base Okinawa (Japan). The study concluded that operational boredom increased the possibility for deployed soldiers to be involved in misconduct after returning from deployment (Perry, 2010). Related incidents of misconduct included disobeying orders, involvement in physical confrontations, neglecting family and run-ins with [military] police (2010). Perry's (2010) research found that a quarter of deployed marines showed repeated instances of misconduct during the first months of returning from deployment, and 17.1% screened positive for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). An interesting finding deserving of mention during Perry's research was that PTSD and misconduct outweighed combat as a stressor to morale during deployment.

Operational boredom during military operations stems from boredom, monotony, lack of privacy and lack of days off duty, exacerbated by family worries, money problems and run-ins with deployment

leadership. This results in alienation, resentment, and anger (Perry, 2010). In this regard, Perry (2010) ascribed troops conducting non-combat routine tasks such as standing posts, security convoys, preparing vehicles and equipment, manning communication stations and administrative tasks as a manifestation of operational boredom. The latter resulting in commanders being challenged by maintaining morale and the importance of the mission. Perry's findings are very similar to the peace support operations conducted in the DRC, where the RSA BATT is deployed. Although the UN Chapter VII mandate is in effect, the RSA BATT conducts Chapter VI missions such as security escorts, safeguarding UN staff and installations, and routine tasks as mentioned above. These can all be subject to operational boredom.

Du Toit's (2019) research found that the deployment length of the RSA BATT in the DRC was a major stressor to the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers. This study implies that a correlation between the length of the deployment and the availability of LTU facilities may either exacerbate or counter the effects of operational boredom on deployed peacekeepers, similar to the findings of Perry's research. The latter is a case of routine tasks executed over an extended deployment period of 12 months, leading to operational boredom. Clear signs of similarities in Du Toit's findings correspond to Perry's findings, such as the lack of privacy and overcrowding in accommodation, run-ins with deployment leadership, family, and money problems. On the other hand, the availability of a variety of LTU facilities allows peacekeepers to relieve stress related to operational boredom and, therefore, maintain a high level of morale, which counters the effect of operational boredom that may lead to misconduct if unchecked.

This study highlights the importance of establishing and regularly maintaining LTU facilities in this regard. Furthermore, this study recommends that chief of joint operations invest in providing the RSA BATT peacekeepers with LTU facilities, which include gaming rooms, television rooms, internet cafes, libraries, canteens, designated bars, and others to maintain and build on the current status quo of being a morale booster for the deployed RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC. In the absence thereof, it might be argued that operational boredom might manifest within the RSA BATT peacekeepers and lead to misconduct and possible PTSD and, therefore, negatively affect the operational effectiveness of the contingent towards achieving operational requirements.

SA Army infantry corps faces many challenges in accommodating its forces in the DRC in professional facilities with highly technological systems and equipment to compete with the best in the world. Evidence showed that the poor state of facilities such as tentage has a credible negative effect on the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC. On the other hand, evidence has shown that LTU facilities have a clear positive impact on the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC and counter operational boredom and the potential inheriting negative effects. Therefore, this study emphasises the importance of commanders having the mandate to maintain such facilities and having

funds available to repair or replace old, dilapidated facilities and take ownership of facilities in terms of their maintenance and keeping them up to standard.

4.8 PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE TO THE RSA BATT

The SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy address intelligence as follows. Although the SANDF has a defensive posture, the SA Army infantry corps should always remain proactive in mind and action and should have its own information system to enable it to process intelligence as part of the higher intelligence process (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). The MOU between the RSA BATT and MONUSCO requires the battalion to maintain situational awareness throughout all tactical operations during day and night in all weather and/or climate conditions (Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Office of Military Affairs: Military Planning Service, 2013). This study implies that in terms of situational awareness, real-time battlefield intelligence is of critical importance to the RSA BATT commander in the DRC, who is mandated to conduct offensive operations within the area of operations. This ensures a feedersystem for information required for commanders on the tactical level to make informed decisions to project forces at the right time, at the right location, and with the right equipment to ensure the desired effect on the battlefield.

According to Du Toit's research, no specific mention was made of the RSA BATT peacekeepers' morale being boosted or stressed due to good or poor battlefield surveillance in the DRC. This study regards situational awareness, otherwise referred to as battlefield surveillance, and deserves attention within this discussion point as part of SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy.

The question around the provision of battlefield surveillance has been addressed in two ways by the RSA BATT since 2013. The first is providing observation equipment as PME to the RSA BATT peacekeepers in COBs and TOBs. Observation equipment includes night vision equipment, binoculars, a global positioning system (GPS) and rangefinders (Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Office of Military Affairs: Military Planning Service, 2013). According to the MOU (2013), three aspects are specified regarding observation: general observation, night observation and positioning. General observation implies that the RSA BATT is obligated to have the capacity to observe 24/7 with section-level hand-held binoculars and night vision equipment. Night observations are to be equipped with passive and/or active infrared, thermal or image night-time line-of-sight observation. Furthermore (2013), human-sized objects are to be identified within a 1000-metre range, and units must be capable of conducting fire missions in support of the manoeuvre units' night patrols, using integrated or individual night vision devices. Finally, in terms of positioning, the contingent is obligated to have the capacity to acquire a geographical fix on their own locations with GPS equipment and laser range finders (2013). To date, the RSA BATT peacekeepers are equipped with the required observation equipment on the tactical level (See Table 4.2), namely COBs and TOBs. Equipment issued to the RSA BATT to meet operational requirements regarding observation is listed in the table below. By

comparing the required observation capabilities according to the MOU and the current capabilities employed in the mission area, this study considers it safe to say that the RSA BATT sufficiently addresses operational requirements to ensure situational awareness during tactical operations.

Table 4.2: Observation, night vision, global positioning system and range finding capabilities employed by the SA Army

SNo	Requirement A	Issued equipment in mission area B
1	General observation	Fujinon binoculars
2	Night observation	Image intensifier night vision BIG II Image intensifier night vision LOT Image intensifier night vision MOT II Image intensifier night vision KOT
3	Positioning	Garmin GPS
4	Range finding	Bushnell range finder

Apart from the current employment of observation equipment, the RSA BATT has also employed a tactical intelligence system (TIS), also referred to as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drones in the mission area to provide real-time battlefield surveillance (Grundlingh, 2021). Grundlingh is an officer of the SA Army, 1 Tactical Intelligence Regiment employed as the RSA BATT military information officer who is directly involved in the employment of the UAV team detached to the RSA BATT in the DRC as part of FIB MONUSCO. According to Grundlingh (2021), in a report to the SA Army Infantry Formation HQ in February 2021, the UAV is employed to provide effective surveillance, information gathering and intelligence processing capability in a logical order to enable an assessment of threats in the form of opposing forces in the area of operations. His (2021) report emphasised the importance of real-time information provided to the commander to enhance the situational awareness of key areas where traditional observation is not feasible. An example of exploiting the UAV capability was demonstrated during the 2019 Matombo Base operation planning cycle conducted at the Brigade HQ during a joint offensive operation between the RSA BATT, FARDC and 120 mm artillery battery in North Kivu (Grundlingh, 2021).

The UAV capabilities, which include day and night observation capability, were successfully applied to identify and register serial objectives such as ADF camps, storage depots and command posts (2021, p. 3-4), followed by continuous night surveillance (2021, p. 7). This study emphasises three observations that serve as an advantage to be exploited by the RSA BATT in the employment of the UAV. Firstly, the UAV capability provides real-time information that requires little verification, enabling the commander to make quick, informed decisions. Secondly, the commander maintains the advantage of initiative within the theatre of operations and can project resources to key points without the risk of exhausting human resources and military equipment, which is affected by the time-and-space

factor. Furthermore, the UAV forward observation capability enables the commander to direct offensive actions to the desired location with accuracy and enable rapid corrections where required, as was shown during the Matombo Base artillery bombardment in 2019. Finally, the fact that real-time information, heat signature (during night operations) and GPS registration capabilities are available, the UAV enables the commander to monitor the location of their own forces, movement and distance from the target also referred to as the frontline of own troops (Grundlingh, 2021). This ensures the safety of its own forces from its own fire and adheres to safety measures dictated by SA Army infantry corps' doctrine. It also accurately determines opposing force positions regardless of night or day operations.

Apart from the observation capability of the UAV, Grundlingh (2021) found that the UAV becomes a force multiplier in support of ground forces to the commander by including operational capabilities such as long-range patrols, patrols, quick reaction force (QRF), indirect fire support and reconnaissance. Where traditional observation techniques have their limitations, such as terrain, more specifically jungle-type circumstances in North Kivu DRC, UAVs are not limited as it is operated from the air and provide a "bird's eye view" of the situation (2021). To give context to the value and importance of the use of UAVs in MOOTW in the contemporary PSO, such as the MONUSCO in the DRC, a quotation made by Brigadier-General Chико (FARDC) to the Contingent Commander RSA BATT after successfully capturing the ADF Madina HQ, will serve as an example (2021, p.6): "It would not have been possible if it were not for the support received from RSA BATT in terms of intelligence, surveillance (UAV) and indirect fire support (120mm Artillery Battery)."

After analysis of Grundlingh's (2021) report to the SA Army Infantry HQ, several limitations were listed concerning the employment of UAVs. This study implies that if UAVs are selected as the preferred surveillance method as opposed to traditional observation equipment due to the terrain limitations, a situation of over-reliance on modern technology might be created. In such a case, the RSA BATT risks neglecting battlefield surveillance if the UAV system fails the commander. Failure to be successful is a reality in this regard. According to Grundlingh's (2021) report, the UAV system has the following limitations: crashes, breakages, maintenance/service and camera failure, which may require repairs or replacement. In such a case, Grundlingh (2021) identifies long turn-around times for parts and repairs that hamper the system's application on call. According to Grundlingh, a second limitation is that the UAV metric system is incompatible with the UN COE specifications, affecting the results of COE inspections and, in effect, reimbursement.

A second risk related to intelligence towards achieving operational requirements is identified, namely the poor state of observation equipment as part of PME available to the RSA BATT. The argument of dilapidated and unserviceable equipment was discussed during the equipment discussion earlier in this chapter. Although it will not be repeated here, the argument's premise remains unchanged; the poor

serviceability state negatively affects the operational effectiveness of the RSA BATT and, in turn, the achievement of operational requirements in the DRC.

SA Army infantry corps remains proactive in mind and action and has its own information system to enable it to process intelligence as part of the higher intelligence process by applying and complying with the operational requirements set out by the UN MOU for MONUSCO. Furthermore, the SA Army infantry corps managed to exploit technology by applying surveillance equipment available to the SANDF to maintain high levels of situational awareness, as is the case in the DRC. The dilapidated and poor serviceability state remains a hurdle to be addressed in future planning and force preparation regarding all PME's assigned to the RSA BATT in PSO, such as MONUSCO.

4.9 ALLOCATED BUDGET

The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy address the budget as follows: The budget should support the SA Army infantry corps philosophy and strategy to render it realistic, and a fixed budget should be allocated to a battle group according to the WETs and PETs (South African Army Landward Doctrine, 2017). The commander should only budget for additional funds required in the unit (2017). Although an allocated budget is available to the SA Army infantry corps to sustain its efforts in both the primary and secondary roles, this study alludes to the fact that the budget allocated to the SA Army infantry corps is insufficient to satisfy the latter due to continuous budget cuts over the past years. This might be regarded as a bold statement; however, it is formed by several aspects related to the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy that may be linked to a lack of funds available to the SA Army infantry corps within its day-to-day and sustainment budgets, respectively. Examples include the delay in replacing dilapidated PME and budget cuts to units from both day-to-day and operational budgets. Therefore, this study will regard allocated budgets or a lack of allocated funds as an identified risk towards achieving operational requirements specific to PSO, such as the RSA BATT in the DRC.

According to Du Toit's research findings, there is no direct link between budget and the positive or negative effect it might have on the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers deployed in the DRC. However, day-to-day and operational activities require funds allocated within the units' budget. Furthermore, the commander of a unit will not be able to fund activities from both a day-to-day and operational perspective in the absence of allocated funds. It is not uncommon for SA Army infantry corps units to receive additional operational requirements, which in turn require additional funding. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient funds to satisfy the budget of SA Army infantry corps units, the commander would not be able to fund all day-to-day operating funds and additional funds required to sustain operational requirements put to the unit. This will render the budget an identified risk towards achieving operational requirements.

According to Heitman (2020), the SANDF accepts many tasks it receives, but there is no discussion of its precarious position in terms of finances. Instead, Heitman elaborates on the shortage of funds made available to the SANDF regarding equipment maintenance and operational funding. In his article (2020), he mentions that the SANDF is army-heavy and that personnel levels have remained steady, whereas operational commitments increased, while the defence budget has shrunk. An example is where the *1996 White Paper on Defence* and the *1998 Defence Review* were both based on the assumption that SA would commit one battalion for one year of PSOs. However, by 2004, there were three battalions deployed on extended missions in Burundi, Darfur and the DRC, and in 2006, a brief deployment to the Comores overstretched the SA Army. Heitman (2020) made a final remark that if the SA Army keeps on performing its duties effectively amidst continuous budget cuts, further budget cuts are more likely to be the case rather than increasing the defence budget allocation.

According to the *SA Army Infantry Risk Management Report*, formal training and combat readiness of infantry units are identified as risks (South African Infantry Formation Headquarters, 2019). According to the report (2019), the effectiveness of formal training and combat readiness of infantry units will progressively decline due to a lack of personnel adequately qualified to execute their primary function because of the large reduction in formal courses due to budget constraints presented at the infantry centres of excellence. This will impact the SA Army infantry corps' ability to place adequately qualified personnel in operational posts. The career progression of infantry members will be negatively affected, possibly leading to a large-scale exit from the SA Army infantry corps. Thus, specialised capabilities are progressively declining due to the unavailability of necessary skills and knowledge (2019). To address this risk, the SA Army infantry corps and its units ensure that the allocation of slots on courses is completely "needs-driven" and that no members are accepted on courses that do not urgently require it for operational purposes (2019).

The allocated budget does not support the SA Army infantry corps' philosophy and strategy to render it realistic and a fixed budget to sustain a battle group according to the WETs and PETs. Therefore, the commander will not be able to budget for additional funds required in the unit to sufficiently cover all the costs necessary for additional tasks other than its primary role, such as PSO, to meet all operational requirements set out by the UN and other regional organisations without financial challenges to be overcome. This might potentially negatively affect the morale of the personnel and ultimately fail to achieve operational requirements.

4.10 ADDITIONAL RISKS IDENTIFIED

This study regards the consumption of alcohol in the mission area as an additional identified risk towards achieving operational requirements for the following reason: The consumption (use), or rather the misuse of alcohol in the mission area contributes to an increase in disciplinary incidents, such as drunkenness, misconduct, assault, disorderly behaviour, promoting prostitution, SEA, murder and other

related incidents (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). All of the aforementioned behaviours are prohibited within the code of conduct of a UN Peacekeeper, and any contingent member found guilty of a charge resulting from such behaviour will be repatriated from the DRC back to RSA. The result will be a vacant post within the battalion, compromising the unit's combat readiness and ultimately compromising the achievement of operational requirements as set out by the UN. However, the consumption of alcohol is permitted on the RSA BATT military base in the DRC. Bars are established, and they maintain regular bar hours to accommodate members of the RSA BATT, serving alcoholic beverages during the week and weekends. The question to be asked is, why, then would the RSA BATT commanders allow the consumption of alcohol within the base during the Op MISTRAL deployment if it has the potential to contribute to the disorderly conduct of their peacekeepers abroad?

According to Du Toit's (2019) research, the use of alcohol was found to be an LTU activity that may relieve stress and provide an opportunity for deployed soldiers to relax. Furthermore, it was found (2019) that alcohol is freely available in the DRC and banning it would create opportunities for alternative measures to acquire it. Controlling the use of alcohol, for example, serving it in allocated bar areas within the base, is more fruitful than focusing on the non-use of alcohol.

It should be clear that the use of alcohol is not such a high risk in the mission area, but rather the misuse of it that may result in misconduct and possible repatriation. Therefore, this study is more likely to agree with Du Toit's findings in controlling alcohol rather than banning its use. It is recommended that the RSA BATT units destined to be deployed in the DRC be made aware of the risks involved in the misuse of alcohol and other substance abuse within a training programme prior to, during and post-deployment demobilisation phases. Furthermore, commanders must have the necessary standard work procedures (SWP) included in their base standing orders, which must be concurrent with the rules and regulations of the UN regarding the consumption of alcohol in the mission area, and that all commanders on all levels be conversant with such procedures in the SWP and base standing orders. If soldiers overstep such boundaries, the law must take its course, and those individuals committing acts of misconduct due to the misuse of alcohol must bear the consequences of their actions.

As mentioned above, SEA has the potential to manifest itself as a result of the misuse of alcohol and, in many cases, the use of illegal substances. The second additional identified risk is SEA, which poses a potential risk towards achieving operational requirements in a similar, but far more serious way than the misuse of alcohol in the mission area. First and foremost, the RSA BATT peacekeepers that commit SEAs, tarnish the image of several entities. These entities include the RSA, the SANDF, the contingent, their personal reputation, the credibility and integrity before peacekeepers of other contingents, and the host country and its population (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). The definition of SEA, according to the MTT Report on Sexual Harassment, Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse and Sexual Offences Within the DoD dated December 2020 (2020), SEA is:

any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential powers, or trust for sexual purposes including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of others.

The UN's standpoint on SEA is reflected clearly in its establishment of a set of special measures (See Table 4.3) for the protection of SEA in its Secretary-General's bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 dated 09 October 2003 (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). It listed the following six points (2020):

Table 4.3: Set of special measures for the protection of SEA in its Secretary-General's bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 dated 09 October 2003

1	Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse constitute acts of serious misconduct and are grounds for disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal.
2	Sexual activity with children (persons under 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or local consent. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defence.
3	Exchange of money, employment of goods or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour, is prohibited. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries of assistance.
4	Sexual relationships between UN staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics, undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the UN and are strongly discouraged.
5	Where a UN staff member develops concerns or suspicions regarding sexual exploitation or sexual abuse by a fellow worker, whether in the same agency or not or within the UN system, they must report such concerns via established reporting mechanisms.
6	UN staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Managers at all levels are responsible for supporting and developing systems that maintain this environment.

(Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020)

When reference is made to SEA (2020), it is done specifically to the sexual misconduct between SANDF members deployed in the DRC under the auspices of the UN and the local population of the DRC. According to the RSA Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, the UN (2020) has re-flagged SA for SEA, raising concerns about the negative impact of RSA peacekeepers in the DRC and the integrity of RSA's military and republic. It is a known and reported (2020) fact that the RSA BATT soldiers have committed SEA in the DRC, and the manner in which it was committed reflects the approach towards SEA amongst RSA peacekeepers. To provide context, the following statistics serve as a reference. In 2019, 21 cases of SEA were reported, which included one allegation of rape, two cases of transactional sex, three cases of SEA relations, a further 15 committed by the RSA BATT soldiers, one by an SA Air force soldier and three by SAMHS members (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020).

Statistically, this study implies that apart from the systems in place regarding the legal framework, prosecuted cases, and other related matters, it still reflects an increase in SEA-related cases, thus,

creating a dilemma that requires a solution. Why is there not a decrease in SEA cases considering the approach and standpoint of the UN on SEA and the statistics as reflected by the MTT report?

According to the MTT report, a disjointed approach prevails between what is constituted as SEA by the UN and RSA. There is also a lack of coordinated mechanisms to deal with SEA (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). In this regard, three aspects stand out, the prosecution of SEA cases lies with the legal division, the paternity aspects lie with the surgeon general of the SAHMS and the training and related matters elsewhere. The MTT made three recommendations as a possible solution to the dilemma, addressing the three aspects as follows. Firstly, the MTT recommends that a multidisciplinary committee on SEA be established with the SANDF Chief of Staff (COS) as the responsible person for dealing with SEA-related matters comprehensively (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). Such a committee includes matters of paternity, instigations and prosecution, training, policies and procedures, engagements with the UN and reporting of incidents (2020). Coupled with such endeavours is the need to meet regularly, maintaining confidentiality with the overarching responsibility to reduce SEA via a victim-centred approach (2020).

Secondly, the MTT report recommends that children born from SEA cases be entitled to access their rights to support in terms of maintenance and RSA citizenship (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020) by December 2020. At the time of this study, the latter could not be determined, and therefore, it is recommended that it is ascertained whether this suggestion has indeed manifested itself within the policies and procedures of the SANDF as it has a direct link to the RSA BATT soldiers deployed in the DRC.

Thirdly, training must be conducted to inform all personnel destined to be deployed in the DRC as the RSA BATT contingent on SEA-related matters, policy and procedures in the field of operations (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). This is the current practice with all the RSA BATT soldiers being prepared, mobilised and deployed to the DRC under FIB. Such training takes place during mission readiness training prior to deployment at De Brug Mobilisation Unit in Bloemfontein, during the deployment in the mission area at the Brigade assembly area (BAA), all COBs and TOBs. The SEA officer conducts the training for the RSA BATT and has a specific task to deal with all SEA-related matters. Furthermore, it should be noted that such training is not done once-off but is conducted regularly over the one-year deployment tour of duty. Record is kept of all personnel that attend such training, which is conducted on a compulsory basis. Therefore, the MTT reports the third recommendation as being implemented as intended; however, the statistics suggest the opposite.

Further analysis of the continuous rising statistics in SEA-related matters lead to the conclusion in the MTT report that the prevailing problem is not entirely ascribed to a lack of training but rather to the sexual culture within the DoD and UN policies differing from RSA policies. This makes laws difficult

to enforce in military courts (Office of the Minister of Defence, 2020). The culture referred to here can be defined as the pattern of shared basic assumptions that a group learned as they solved their problems of external adaptation and integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid, which are taught to new members of the group as a correct way to perceive, think about, and feel concerning those problems (2020). Putting this into the perspective of the RSA BATT deployment and SEA, one may interpret it as members of the RSA BATT committing SEA have become so accustomed to dealing with their sexual needs (problem) and how to commit SEA without being reported or caught, that such a deed is valid or rather not wrong in their interpretation. Therefore, to continue committing SEA is not a serious issue, and the *modus operandi* is taught or adopted by new peacekeepers deployed in the DRC.

It was found that there was use/misuse of alcohol and SEA by the RSA BATT soldiers deployed in the DRC under the FIB. With regards to the consumption of alcohol, the conclusion was made that stricter control over the consumption of beverages within bases under regulated serving hours would be a better option than banning the commodity entirely. Regarding SEA, it was found that the matter is serious and requires comprehensive actions to reduce cases in the DRC and eradicate the practice. It is recommended that further in-depth research be conducted on these matters, as it directly influences the SANDF, RSA contingents deployed in PSO and the country as a member of the UN. In both cases, one common denominator exists, namely that cases related to the misuse of alcohol and SEA are criminal offences and studies have shown that such cases have been convicted in the past. Furthermore, within the code of conduct of uniformed members of the SANDF, two specific codes state the following: “I accept personal responsibility for my actions” and “I will not abuse my authority position or public funds for personal gain, political motive or any other reason” (SANDF, 1996). Furthermore, within the rules of war, again, two rules stand out. They are (SANDF, 1996): “I will treat all civilians with humanity” and “I will not tolerate or engage in rape or looting.”

Therefore, this study firstly emphasises that all uniformed members are obligated to honour the code of conduct for uniformed members and take full responsibility for their actions, both lawful and unlawful. Secondly, this study shares the sentiment of the SA Minister of Defence (Tshikalanga, 2021) that apart from dealing with such unlawful activities, all uniformed members of the SANDF engaged in ill-discipline and criminal activities within the military community will not be tolerated, and those that engage in such activities will be dealt with in accordance with the law of the country. The latter applies to all uniformed members of the SANDF, regardless of appointment in the SANDF. Thus, this forces soldiers that commit such unlawful acts to bear the full consequences of their actions responsibly. In doing so, a belief is created that a sexual culture within the DoD will be changed to a culture of respect for civilians and their dignity and humanity, including those regarded as vulnerable and in need of enjoying the R²P from the RSA BATT peacekeepers in the DRC.

The misuse of alcohol and other substances and the SEA committed by the RSA BATT peacekeepers can tarnish the image of the SANDF, which outweighs the current mitigation measures applied to date. Therefore, this study emphasises the importance of including the “image of the SANDF” as (I) an additional aspect to the POSTEDFIT (B) model within the SA Army infantry corps’ philosophy and strategy to become the POSTEDFIT (BI) model. This will ensure that during the force preparation as well as force employment stages, the image of the SANDF will be included as a strategic objective that filters down to the tactical level to ultimately counter the negative effect it has on the image of the RSA forces during future PSO in the African battlespace and beyond.

4.11 CONCLUSION

The SA Army infantry corps’ force employment and force sustainment strategy address the means required for the RSA BATT to fulfil its mandate, and its R²P is indeed tailored from the point of view of being robust, highly mobile and versatile towards its intended ends. However, identified risks are unavoidable due to the nature of military operations in a contemporary era which requires mitigation measures to stay abreast with changing situations as dictated by several factors influencing the SANDF military contribution in ensuring the security and stability of the African continent.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 INTRODUCTION

According to the researcher, lasting peace and security for many African countries remains a mere vision far from reach based on the continuous and reoccurring nature of armed conflicts on the continent. Since the end of the Cold War, history has informed the field of security and Africa studies and suggests that the causes, course, and consequences of insecurity in Africa are far-reaching and complex, to say the least, let alone addressing such complex security scenarios. Although African leaders have joined efforts with the international community to address these issues, the complexity and dynamics of the contemporary security dilemmas in Africa seem (not) to stay abreast, despite the efforts to address them. The responsibility to find workable and sustainable solutions to these issues remains an absolute priority of the international community. The ways of dealing with sources of insecurity have led to contemporary ways of conducting peacekeeping, such as the FIB in the DRC, to address the importance of the R²P for the vulnerable in Africa.

This study suggests that one way of addressing the shortcomings of the past is to use lessons learned to inform future decisions by adjusting current military strategies in such a way as to ensure a tailored approach to future operational requirements. Therefore, this study endeavoured to determine the strategic military lessons from the RSA BATT's deployment in the DRC. These lessons can serve as the benchmark for future role players preparing for peace intervention operations. The lessons ultimately provide new knowledge for the military to stay abreast of the ever-changing security environment in Africa and abroad.

5.2 OVERVIEW

At the onset of this study, the concept of traditional peacekeeping operations was based on the problem statement that traditional multinational PSOs could not provide lasting peace and security in many African countries, specifically in the DRC. The purpose of this study was to provide a critical analysis of the strategic military lessons to be learned from the RSA BATT's contribution as TCC of the FIB under the auspices of MONUSCO from 2013 to date. To this end, the FIB concept was aimed at providing a practical and feasible alternative to traditional peacekeeping in an African context. Furthermore, it was argued that the FIB concept poses high operational requirements, which ask for tailor-made strategic military responses.

Therefore, the research problem for this study was defined as follows: Does the military strategy of the RSA BATT fit the tailor-made military-strategic responses required in the DRC to play an effective peace-enforcement role? Flowing from this problem is the research question of this study: What are the strategic military lessons to be learned from the deployment of the RSA BATT under the FIB in the

DRC since 2013? Three specific research questions were formulated to support answering the general research question:

- To what *ends* are the RSA BATT deployed in the DRC?
- How is the SA Army Infantry (SA Army infantry corps) force development and employment strategy operationalised for the DRC?
- How are the *means* and *risk* components of the RSA BATT's contribution to the FIB addressed in its military strategy for the DRC?

The conclusions of the above-mentioned secondary questions served as the premise of a synthesis that indicated the strategic military lessons to be learned from previous RSA BATT deployments in the DRC. For this purpose, the following research objectives were formulated. Firstly, to indicate the role and end state of the RSA BATT as a role player within the bigger picture of peacekeeping in the DRC. Objective two was to determine whether the force employment strategy of the RSA BATT is tailor-made to meet operational requirements. Objectives three and four were to determine if the range of resources made available to the RSA BATT is optimal and tailor-made to achieve operational requirements in the DRC and to indicate the risks towards achieving operational requirements.

To achieve the objectives, this study was approached from a qualitative research design and structured in five chapters, of which chapters two to four addressed the *Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means [risk]* formula as a conceptual framework. A qualitative research design was selected because it provided the flexibility to use interviews and documentary analysis interchangeably to acquire selective information on the specific topic of this study.

5.3 FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The discussion on the *ends* of the RSA BATT's contribution to the DRC found that the conflict in the DRC resembles that of protracted armed conflict, which left in its wake a culture of war in its society. The conflict was characterised by identifying two primary causes of the protracted armed conflict: unprofessional militaries and valuable natural resources. Valuable natural resources are used to fuel a systematic, violent war between AGs and the Congolese Government by deliberately targeting civilians and crimes that violate human rights. The implication was that this war had left instability and insecurity in the DRC, exacerbated by a spillover effect that culminated in regional instability, thus threatening human security and international peace and security. These results in a requirement for international intervention as a response in the form of PSOs.

The discussion on the third-party approach to PSO concluded that this approach addresses how to solve the problem of protracted armed conflict. Three approaches were identified, namely peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. A combination of different stakeholders was identified that functions in concert during peacebuilding towards regional peace and stability. The RSA BATT was introduced

as a stakeholder in the PSO in the DRC, namely MONUSCO, focusing on its specific role as a contributing country to the PSF, namely the FIB. The implication here is that the RSA has inherited an obligation as an important role player to participate in PSO in the DRC and, for that matter, elsewhere on the African continent in the interest of the region and the continental peace and security as a whole.

The theme around the RSA BATT as TCC illustrated RSA's willingness to contribute to multinational PSOs in the DRC as part of ensuring its national interest, namely the survival of the state and ensuring that its population can live free from fear and want, which is threatened by regional instability if not addressed adequately. During this discussion, the focus remained on breaking down the different levels of war and illustrating the ends of each level. These ends were portrayed in such a way that it should become clear that the ends to each level of war act as building blocks towards achieving the ends on the next higher level. The *ends* to the RSA BATT were identified to ensure a secure environment for other role players in the mission to conduct their affairs while simultaneously protecting civilians and UN staff and installations, executing offensive targeted operations against AGs and supporting those that require the assistance of the PSF component in the areas of operations. The implication of RSA's willingness to participate in the interest of its own national interest is that the RSA is obligated to provide a comprehensive military strategy to ensure its combat readiness and operational effectiveness of forces allocated to perform such an important task.

During the discussion on the *ways* of the RSA BATT military strategy, it was found that the UN force generation process generates contractual obligations between the UN and member states which, in turn, inform force preparation and employment strategies. Furthermore, it was found that each commander and peacekeeper must understand the latter's output to avoid compromised operational effectiveness. This is specifically important in the case of the RSA BATT as TCC to execute its mandate promptly and effectively during all phases of its operations to achieve its strategic end state. More specifically, this affects the commanding officers of the RSA BATT as they are ultimately responsible for the personnel, equipment and force preparation according to the country-specific unique military doctrine of the FSE deployed under the administrative command in the theatre of operations. The implication is that the SANDF chief joint operations is compelled to adjust its force preparation and employment strategies to conform to the prerequisites of IOs acting as regulating authorities over multinational PSOs. This dictates a tailored approach that guides formations and units within the SA Army in preparation for future deployments.

Furthermore, it was found that the SA Army infantry corps' education, training and development approach, accompanied by a mission-specific combat readiness and mission readiness training approach, is tailored for the external deployment in the African battlespace, such as the MONUSCO in the DRC, with specific reference to jungle warfare to adhere to the high operational requirements as derived from the MONUSCO CONOPS. The SA Army infantry corps' philosophy was in line with

Lykke's formula for strategy and within the required framework and parameters of the deployment in the DRC. The force preparation in terms of training was based on four pillars: formal training, continuation training, combat readiness training and mission readiness training conducted under realistic simulated conditions tailored to the deployment in the DRC. Finally, it was demonstrated that training within the SA Army infantry corps starts and ends on all levels of development with an emphasis on standards with a tailored approach towards PSO to verify that the RSA BATT is indeed a "combat-ready user system" to be deployed in the African battlespace. The implication here is that although the education, training and development approach of the SA Army infantry corps is regarded as tailored for PSO, it does not limit the SA Army infantry corps to refrain from further research and development to keep abreast with the latest military developments and technology available for employment in contemporary military operations globally.

The discussion on the SA Army infantry corps' force employment and force sustainment strategy addressed the *means* required for the RSA BATT to fulfil its mandate, and its R²P is indeed tailored from the point of view of being robust, highly mobile and versatile towards its intended *ends*. However, it was found that several aspects regarding the resources available to the RSA BATT and the poor serviceability thereof negatively affect the morale of the peacekeepers in the DRC. The implication is that a peacekeeper with low morale becomes a risk towards achieving operational goals and, ultimately, the end state of the mission. Although the identified *risks* threaten the achievement of operational requirements, the inevitable nature of military operations in a contemporary era requires mitigating measures to remain abreast of changing situations as dictated by several factors influencing the SANDF's military contribution to ensuring security and stability in the African continent. Therefore, the implication is that the SANDF chief joint operations, chief of the SA Army and general commanding officers of different formations need to find workable solutions based on long and extended long-term sustainability to address the current shortcomings experienced in the mission area effectively. In the event that this is not achieved, a bleak forecast for the future deployment of the RSA BATT is predicted.

5.4 OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The overall achievement of the research question and the objectives of this study may be stated as follows. The strategic military lesson to learn from the RSA BATT's deployment in the DRC in terms of the *ends* (objective one) of committing a contingent to the MONUSCO derives from the national strategic level and makes its way down the levels of war right to the tactical level. The fact that an entire region's stability is impacted by protracted armed conflict within a specific country and that the risk of a spillover effect is more likely to become the norm rather than the exception revealed a valuable lesson to the SANDF. It revealed that the military-strategic approach of the SANDF's force preparation and force employment strategies must be aligned to achieve multinational peace operational support ends. This will ensure that the building blocks towards ensuring national security remain tangible.

Furthermore, it was illustrated that an extended long-term expectation for regional instability is exacerbated by the causes, course and consequences of protracted armed conflict and that a “quick fix” to the problem is not viable. Instead, a combination of DIMES efforts is required. Therefore, the military contribution to the DRC requires an extended long-term approach to fit the tailored operational requirements, which dictates an extended long-term approach in force preparation and force employment strategies.

The strategic military lessons to be learned from the *ways* (objective two) perspective is that the SA Army infantry corps’ strategy and philosophy indeed address the concepts of robustness, high mobility and versatility by how its soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers are educated, trained and developed to lead the RSA BATT as CRUS. This applies to deployment in the DRC and within the ambit of future PSOs within the African battlespace.

Three important lessons must be learned in terms of the means [risk] (objective three) aspect. Firstly, the effective combination of the latest technology, effective mission-specific training and competent human resources leads to the successful achievement of operational requirements in the DRC. Secondly, a combination of limited resources, ageing personnel, dilapidated prime mission equipment, and the effect of budget cuts on the defence industry negatively affects maintaining the morale of the RSA BATT peacekeepers. Consequently, it poses the risk of not achieving operational requirements in the DRC. Therefore, it was indicated that the strategic focus of the main effort should be directed at addressing the means issues, not only to arrest a further decline in this regard but to correct matters that have detracted from the SA Army’s Vision 2045.

Apart from achieving the study’s objectives as intended, additional value was added to the outcome of this study. It was determined that the image of the SANDF is tarnished by poor discipline and sexual exploitation and abuse in the DRC. The fact that no evidence was found of this being specifically addressed in the SA Army infantry corps’ military strategy and that measures already put in place to address these issues are countered by a military culture not recognising the impact of such activities suggests that the image of the SANDF is likely to remain vulnerable if not addressed. Therefore, this study indicates that more effort and resources be committed to realigning the SANDF’s approach in dealing with such aspects and how to include it in its military strategies.

The nature of the conflict in the DRC has proven to be complex and highly dynamic. It was also demonstrated that the RSA BATT is equipped with conventional prime mission equipment, and the education, training and development approach is based on conventional warfare doctrine and MOOTW to execute its mandate within an asymmetric theatre of operations. Therefore, this study has identified that in-depth research is conducted in the field of MOOTW and how to enhance the SA Army infantry corps’ military strategy and philosophy further to align itself with MOOTW for future force preparation.

Furthermore, possibly to adjust its current force preparation approach and military capabilities to enable the forces on the tactical level to increase operational effectiveness towards achieving operational requirements.

The researcher decided to add an abridged strong points, weak points, opportunities and threat analysis (*SWOT*) to conduct this study as a reference for future research. This *SWOT* analysis may serve as academic lessons learned during this study and is the researcher's personal opinion. The strong points identified are twofold. Firstly, the fact that chief of the SA Army and defence intelligence approved authority to conduct the study clearly indicates the transparency and openness of the SANDF leadership to learn from the present and the past in an effort to improve in the future. Secondly, the cooperation and speedy response of different defence departments and participants to this study amplified the findings of this study by providing verified and valid data to the researcher for analysis. Such data was crucial to ensure compatibility with the qualitative research design.

The researcher identified one specific weak point during his research: the endless time spent on administrative red-tape that had to be dealt with for the authority to engage with individuals to collect data. This was evident in the responses to recruiting participants and gaining their confidence to provide answers to the interview schedule. Although this was frustrating at times, the researcher overcame the challenge by following the military environment's given processes and command channels.

The researcher identified three main opportunities for conducting similar research endeavours. Firstly, a more tactical-orientated approach to deploying the RSA BATT is recognised as an avenue for collecting data. In other words, data to be collected from troops and junior commanders might be useful in future. Thus, creating opportunity to roll out a follow-up study to compare the findings of this study with the responses of the junior ranks. Finally, based on the fact that the researcher was deployed under the FIB as a frontline commander, the researcher suggests that a civilian researcher conduct the same study to test such findings from a non-military perspective.

The researcher identified one main threat during this study, namely the COVID-19 pandemic that occurred at the onset of this study. COVID-19 restricted face-to-face contact between the researcher and the respondents. Such restrictions resulted in fear for the personal safety of both the researcher and the participants. However, the researcher overcame this threat by reverting to compulsory virtual contact online. Regardless of how this issue was managed, it proved to be a challenge and should be regarded as a future anticipated threat to be included in the research design for future studies.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The lessons learned from the RSA BATT deployment in the DRC have served as the benchmark for current and future commanders and leaders in preparation for future military operations within the SA Army. These lessons ultimately provide new knowledge and a better understanding of the military strategy applied for current and future operations in an ever-changing security environment in Africa and abroad.

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Appendix A to A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LESSONS LEARNED FROM SOUTH AFRICA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

Interviews will be conducted with participants grouped in three sample sectors, namely a sample sector comprised of members of Chiefs of Services and Senior Staff Officers at Joint Operations who participated in the force employment strategy of RSA BATT in the DRC; a second sample sector comprised of General Officer Commanding's, Directors Force Preparation and Senior Staff Officers at Infantry Formation level who have been involved in the force preparation strategies of RSA BATT; and a third sample sector comprised of Unit Commanders and Regiment Sergeant Majors who were deployed under RSA BATT since 2013.

A semi-structured interview protocol will be applied. Interviews with the first sample sector will be aimed at getting a sense of to what ends are the RSA BATT deployed and what are the operational requirements to be met. The interviews with the second sample sector, at formation level, will be aimed at asking questions about force preparation strategies. Specific attention will be given to principles, policy guidance, specific outcomes, critical success factors, challenges, opportunities and lessons learned. Interviews with the third sample sector will be aimed at gathering information about the actual employment of the strategies set in place to deploy the RSA BATT; mission, mandate, operations, lessons learned over time in terms of challenges, operational successes; logistics; required technology and prime mission equipment and opportunities.

Each Interview Schedule will provide for detail about the date, time, place and duration of the interview; the only detail about the participants will include job description deployment experience in terms of deployment year. The following additional questions will be included per sample sector:

QUESTIONS FOR SAMPLE SECTOR 1: JOINT OPS LEVEL

1. What is your current Job description? What is your experience in the deployment of the RSA BATT since 2013?
2. What is the Mission End State (MES) of the RSA BATT? What entity or organisation determines the mission end statement of the RSA BATT? Is it the same mission end state as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) mission end state? Has the mission end state changed since 2013 to date? How does the force employment strategy cater for the mission end state? Do you experience challenges in achieving the mission ends state? If yes, what were those challenges? How do you think can these challenges be addressed prior to deployment?
3. What are the operational requirements set out for the RSA BATT? Is the mission end state and the operational requirements of RSA BATT compatible/achievable? What opportunities are foreseeable for future deployments of RSA BATT?
4. What are the most predominant lessons learned from previous deployments of the RSA BATT in terms of the force employment strategy?

5. Do you think that the current force employment strategy is sufficiently addressing the operational requirements in the DRC? Has there been any adjustments made to the force employment strategy since 2013? If yes, what were those changes and why were they made?
6. Compared to other Troop-Contributing Countries of the FIB, how would you rate RSA BATT's contribution in the DRC?
7. Do you have any information that might serve a purpose for this study that you want to provide to the researcher?

QUESTIONS FOR SAMPLE SECTOR 2: INFANTRY FORMATION LEVEL

8. What is your current Job description? What is your experience in the deployment of the RSA BATT since 2013?
9. What is the mission end state of the force preparation strategy of the RSA BATT units in your formation? What is the force preparation strategic approach for the RSA BATT units in your specific environment? What are the principle foundation for force preparation in your formation?
10. What policies guide the force preparation strategy, environment specific, for the RSA BATT units to deploy in the DRC? Would you agree that the force preparation strategy addresses the operational requirements for RSA BATT in the DRC? Has the force preparation strategy change since 2013? If yes, in what way/s?
11. What do you regard as critical success factors, environment specific, during force preparation for RSA BATT under FIB? How are these critical success factors achieved within your environment?
12. Can you identify any challenges during the execution of your force preparation strategy? If yes, what are these challenges? What are the foreseeable opportunities for future force preparation, environment specific?
13. What are the most predominant lessons learned from previous deployments of the RSA BATT in terms of force preparation in your environment? Compared to other Troop-Contributing Countries of the FIB, how would you rate RSA BATT's contribution in the DRC?
14. Do you have any information that might serve a purpose for this study that you want to provide to the researcher?

QUESTIONS FOR SAMPLE SECTOR 3: UNIT COMMANDERS AND RSM's

15. What is your current Job description? What is your experience in the deployment of the RSA BATT since 2013?
16. What was your mission during your tour of duty in the DRC? What was your mandate during your tour of duty in the DRC? Did you strictly execute operations according to the mission and mandate during your tour of duty in the DRC? If not, what other operations did you execute in the DRC?
17. What do you regard as operational successes during your tour of duty in the DRC? What challenges did you experience during your tour of duty in the DRC? If any, how did you overcome challenges during your tour of duty in the DRC?
18. What were the most predominant lessons learned during your tour of duty in the DRC? Did you experience any opportunities during your tour of duty in the DRC?

19. In terms of force preparation, do you think that your unit was adequately prepared for your tour of duty? Were your unit adequately equipped for your tour of duty? Were your unit adequately supported during the tour of duty?

20. In terms of force employment, do you think that the force commitment for RSA BATT is sufficient to execute your mission successfully? In what way would you say did the RSA BATT address the security environment in your area of responsibility during your tour of duty? Compared to other Troop-Contributing Countries of the FIB, how would you rate RSA BATT's contribution in the DRC?

21. Do you have any information that might serve a purpose for this study that you want to provide to the researcher?

22. Follow-up questions may be included based on the answers participants provide during the interview. These answers will also form part of the data gathered during the interview.