
by

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DECLARATION

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Jodi Anne Coetzee

April 2019
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Abstract

Migration, the movement of people across various distances and through various means, has changed significantly in the current global era. Since 2010, migration has taken on a different, more irregular nature, as people are determined to improve their livelihoods, some being driven by desperate circumstances to do so. Migration has also become increasingly feminised. During migration, the human security of migrants is at risk and their vulnerability persists throughout migration. Human security is an issue that reaches far beyond the individual, as human security issues shape national issues. It would be ignorant to assume that the two are mutually exclusive, as the influx of migrants to Europe in the post-Arab Spring context has illustrated.

This thesis employs a gender lens to understand the nature of human security issues that economic migrants, who migrate from North Africa to Europe, experience. By exploring the push and pull factors of migration, the thesis provided an overview of the human security of migrants pre-migration. Conflict in North African and modern-day slavery largely drive migration from North Africa to Europe and exacerbate the human insecurity of migrants. Economic opportunity has been identified as the most significant pull factor for migration to Europe. By analysing the responses of Italy and, to a lesser degree, France, to migrants, the thesis produced insights into the human security of migrants in Europe. The differences between the experiences of men and women migrants were also considered. Using feminist security theory and a human security framework, this thesis maintains that security on the ground is important, perhaps more so than high politics. Valuable insights were provided on how Italy and France have managed migration and the impact of this on how citizens perceive and receive migrants. Central to the study was the focus on the securitisation of state responses to irregular migration, which include measures like border control, search and rescue operations, returns, resettlement and relocation, the closure of ports and refusals to disembark, the Hotspot Approach and detention. From these, successes and shortcomings have been identified, illustrating the nature of state protection to non-citizens. The human insecurity of migrants has been compounded by the lack of provisions, including medical attention and safety provisions, and the unique threats to women migrants. Although men and women migrants face similar risks and experience similar challenges during migration, women remain more susceptible to gender based violence and sexual exploitation and are, therefore, more vulnerable than their counterparts.
Opsomming

Migrasie, die beweging van mense oor verskeie afstande en wyses, het drasties verander in die nuwe globale era. Sedert 2010 het migrasie ’n ander, meer onreëlmatige aard aangeneem, omdat mense, gedryf deur hul desperate omstandighede, vasbeslote is om hul lewenskwaliteite – en bestaan te verbeter. Die feminisering van migrasie is ook besig om toe te neem. Tydens migrasie is die menslike sekuriteit van migrante in gevaar. Migrante bly ook kwesbaar tydens die proses van migrasie. Menslike sekuriteit is ’n probleem wat ver buite die individu strek, aangesien menslike sekuriteitskwessies nasionale kwessies vorm. Beide dié kwessies is afhanklik van mekaar soos geïllustreer deur die vloei van immigrante na Europa tydens die post-Arabiese lente.

Hierdie tesis gebruik ’n genderlens om die aard van menslike sekuriteitskwessies van ekonomiese migrante, wat van Noord-Afrika na Europa migreer, te verstaan. Deur die druk- en trekfaktore van migrasie te ondersoek, gee die tesis ’n oorsig van die menslike sekuriteit van migrante se pre-migrasie. Konflik in Noord-Afrika asook hedendaagse slawerny dryf migrasie grootliks vanaf Noord-Afrika na Europa en benadruk die menslike sekuriteit van migrante. Ekonomiese geleenthede is geïdentifiseer as die belangrikste faktor vir migrasie na Europa. Deur die response van Italië en, in mindere mate, Frankryk, aan migrante te analiseer gee die tesis insig in die menslike sekuriteit van migrante in Europa. Die verskille tussen die ervarings van mans en vroue-migrante is ook ondersoek. Met behulp van feministiese sekuriteitsteorie en ’n menslike sekuriteitsraamwerk, word daar geredeneer dat veiligheid op die grondvlak belangrik is, miskien meer belangrik as hoë politiek. Waardevolle insig word verskaf oor hoe Italië en Frankryk migrasie bestuur, asook hoe burgers migrante waarneem en ontvang. Sentraal tot die studie is die fokus op die sekuritering van staatsreaksies op onreëlmatige migrasie, wat maatreëls insluit soos grensbeheer, soek- en reddingsoperasies, terugstuur, hervestiging en herlokasie. Die sluiting van havens, die weiering van toestemming om af te klim van vaartuie, asook die “hotspot”- benadering en aanhouding is ook onder oë geneem. Hiermee is suksesse en tekortkominge wat die aard van staatsbeskerming aan nie-burgers illustreer, geïdentifiseer. Die gebrek aan menslike sekuriteit van migrante is vererger deur die gebrek aan hulpbronne soos mediese aandag en veiligheidsverkaffing wat unieke bedreigings vir vroue-migrante inhoud. Alhoewel mans en vroue-immigrante dieselfde risiko’s en soortgelyke uitdagings tydens migrasie ervaar, bly vroue meer vatbaar vir geslagsgeweld en
seksuele uitbuiting. Vroue is dus baie meer kwesbaar as hul eweknieë tydens die proses van migrasie.
# List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FST</td>
<td>Feminist Security Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>HST</td>
<td>Human Security Theory</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LCG</td>
<td>The Libyan Coast Guard</td>
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<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Nongovernment Organisations</td>
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<td>NGROs</td>
<td>Nongovernment Rescue Organisations</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

International Relations (IR) has seen a surge of critique by feminist and gender scholars that IR scholarship revolves mostly around issues of war and peace, with the assumption that states protect those who form part of the political community, instead of asking who is being protected by security policies (Blanchard, 2003: 1289-1290). Therefore, that the impact of war on states has received more attention than the impact of war on individuals. Feminist security theory sides (FST)\(^1\) with this critique, questioning the degree to which states protect women in times of war and peace (Blanchard, 2003: 1290). What about the human security and human rights of individuals, security theory asks, as it considers the risks to individuals. One of the processes in which the human security of individuals has the potential to be seriously infringed upon, because of uncertainties and dangers surrounding the process, is migration.

Migration, the movement of people from one place to another often for the sake of improved living conditions and quality of life, continues to mark the contemporary global era. However, migration also poses great challenges to states and individuals, as managing human mobility remains a complex task for destination countries (World Economic Forum, 2017: 10). The Arab Spring and subsequent conflicts have played a crucial role in the migration of people from the Arab region to Europe. As such, European countries continue to grapple with a variety of migration issues, amongst which are migration flows, granting refugee status and managing or preventing border crossings. Therefore, the mass arrivals and accompanying mass deaths that occur en route to the Mediterranean from North Africa and the Middle East, the violent contexts and political deterioration that push migrants from home countries have demanded international attention. Thus, migration directly affects the human security of women worldwide, especially when the means of migration are unconventional and dangerous, as in the case studied in this thesis.

Sami, an eighteen-year old Eritrean male who left his home country for Libya, was taken to an illegal detention centre in Bani Walid where he and many other migrants endured horrific abuses, such as electrocution, beatings and other forms of torture (Naib, 2018). Living there for nine months, he recalled that “many girls and women were raped … [and the men in the neighbouring building] would hear their screams and cries” (Naib, 2018). After two failed

\(^1\) FST refers to Feminist Security Theory, the core theoretical framework for this thesis. It is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
attempts to reach the coast, Sami was amongst a group sold to an Eritrean smuggler, Walid, by Libyan coast guards; a group of about 320 were then kept in a “container-like shed” and shared one toilet. Today, Sami works in a mosque in Tripoli, where he tries to care for other Eritreans trapped in the city and, though he wished to escape life in Eritrea, [he said that] he would rather die at sea with the possibility of reaching Europe than return to the “hell [he] saw in Libya and the hell awaiting [him] in Eritrea” (Naib, 2018).

Esther, a Nigerian migrant residing in a centre for refugee women in Syracuse, Italy, was nine months pregnant when she embarked on her journey to the Mediterranean from Libya and her experience illustrates the complex nature of women’s migration (Plambech, 2017). Some women depart during pregnancy, some fall pregnant on-board ships, whilst others give birth on-board and others miscarry along the journey. A study conducted in 2014 reveals that as many as eleven percent of women migrants arrive pregnant (Plambech, 2017). Stories like this demand further inquiry, as it provides insights into the complex nature of migration in the twenty-first century, highlighting the different contexts of women migration and migration of men.

The stories cited above illustrate that, although migration is accompanied by numerous benefits and can often be an empowering experience, it also comes at elevated risk, as migrants, the most vulnerable group in society, are often exposed to gross human rights violations, abuse and discrimination. Women and child migrants, even more vulnerable face the danger of being drawn or forced into human trafficking and other forms of exploitation (United Nations, 2017: 1). According to statistics, women comprise 48.4% of international migrants and, in Europe, the share of women migrants has increased from 51.6% in 2000 to 52% in 2017 (United Nations, 2017: 15). As the role of women has changed over time and migration has become increasingly feminised, women no longer migrate merely as companions and for family reunion, but in search of employment. Therefore, it is also important to understand the processes that women go through and the risks and dangers they face during migration. Various questions have emerged and prompt inquiry into the migration of women and state protection of women, or lack thereof. One such question is whether the migration of women leads to women’s empowerment or women’s domination. Migration has the potential to increase a woman’s autonomy, yet disintegrate family relations. Furthermore, most migrant women face a double discrimination of being women and foreign (Marinucci, 2007: 17).
This study adopts a gender lens that will include the experience of women and men, but in some instances will highlight the experiences of women. By paying attention to the experience of women migrants, one can better understand the priorities of receiving countries and the general sentiments of states towards migration. The responses of states to crises, and the protection offered or withheld, and measures taken to mitigate crises can provide great insights into the workings of the international community and shortcomings thereof, where it is discriminatory, whom it favours, where it contradicts itself, what it values and who it regards as important. Men, women and child migrants face precarious conditions along the journey and once they arrive in receiving countries, but also during pre-departure and upon return to home countries. For example, detention centres in Libya are ridden with violence, robberies, rape and murder among returned migrants, posing a threat to the wellbeing of vulnerable groups, such as women and children.

A key reason as to why the migration of North African migrants is important for research, is due to the precariousness that is attached to their migration. What is meant by precariousness in this instance, are conditions that contribute to the uncertainty and insecurity of migrants’ lives and futures. Some scholars explore the precariousness associated with transnational identities that migrants possess (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 833). Others have highlighted the vulnerability and agency associated with bodies, which is induced or suppressed under certain social and political conditions (Butler, 2004: 29). In light of these considerations, questions around whose lives matter and whose lives are ‘grieveable’ begin to emerge (Butler, 2004: 20). One could take this a step further by inquiring who has the power to determine the extent to which lives and bodies matter and how these forces go about protecting lives and bodies.

In order to emphasise the role of the state as a unit of analysis, yet at the same time bring gender to the fore, a gender analysis and, what Pessar & Mahler (2003: 815) refer to as a “gendered geographies of power framework” is useful. The framework seeks to examine gender across transnational spaces. The three elements upon which the framework is based are: geographic scales (as gender operates across various spatial and social scales across transnational landscapes), social locations (that is, positions within interconnected power hierarchies created by a range of factors) and power geometries (types and degrees of agency that people exert depending on their social locations) (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 815 – 816). This framework allows the state and gender to play an equal role in the analysis of transnational migration. It is important to understand how the state has related to, impacted on and assisted or suppressed migrant women. Governmentality, which can be considered as the mode of power relating to
the control of people and bodies, operates through various platforms (Butler, 2004: 52). The thesis is mainly concerned with the governmentality of bodies, specifically migrant bodies and, as far as possible, the bodies of migrant women and children.

A transnational approach to migration contributes valuable insights into how state policies contour the experiences of migrants in home and receiving countries (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 821). Therefore, policies around restrictions, such as border and migration control, are analysed to determine the impact of these on the lives of migrants, as the increased restrictions imposed by European Union member states which have exposed “vulnerable migrants to even greater physical other risks” illustrate (ODI, 2015). Another important insight that a gender framework to studying migration provides, is the emphasis on power hierarchies in which migrants find themselves which differ exponentially (Pessar & Mahler, 2003: 822). What this means is that conditions favouring migration itself and arrival in receiving countries differ across various intersections of identities; race, class, age, marital status, sexuality and especially gender. For purposes of this study, it is the gender aspect and some of its intersections that this thesis will focus on.

The study links globalisation to economic migrants, more specifically so by using the Arab Spring in North Africa. It also seeks to understand how the responses of migrant-receiving countries influence the human security of economic migrants. In the current global era, the refugee crisis in Europe has demanded much attention from various intra-state, state and regional organisations, thus providing an intriguing, yet urgent topic of study. It is worthwhile considering the process of migration, which, as we have seen, can become a foreign policy, state security, human security and national political issue and relates to identity politics, citizenship, labour and human rights (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 252). The study recognises the complexity associated with legal terminology, especially where it concerns who is considered a migrant, an asylum seeker and a refugee. However, it works with the assumption that, although not all migrants are considered refugees or asylum seekers, refugees and asylum seekers initially form part of the ‘migrant’ population.

Assistant High Commissioner for Protection at the United Nations, Volker Türk, recently commented that refugees illustrate well that multilateralism is the way forward and highlighted the impact of treating refugees poorly, on society as a whole, not only on the individual, as this

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2 The thesis has chosen to focus on economic migrants as they comprise the majority of persons migrating from Libya. Though they might be considered refugees when they arrive in Libya, as they depart, they take on the role of economic migrants
leads to the “dehumanization of individuals and the brutalization of a society as a whole” (Dobbie, 2017). This study will interrogate the push and pull factors of economic migration, from North Africa, and the power relations involved.

1.2 The Crisis of Refugees and Migrants

The refugee crisis in Europe has had immense political, social and economic global impacts. In 2016, Al Jazeera published an article titled “2016: The year the world stopped caring about refugees”. Such a bold statement demands inquiry. Human Rights Watch, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Eurostat and the World Bank have provided useful resources in understanding the magnitude of the refugee crisis. Statistics show that 145 433 sea arrivals were received in 2017, compared to 362 753 in 2016, 1 015 078 in 2015 and 216 054 in 2014, of which an estimated 2 784 were dead and missing (UNHCR). The demographics of these Mediterranean Sea arrivals indicate that 17.9% were children, 12.9% women and the remaining 69.3% were men, and most arrivals to Italy came from Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Greece (UNHCR). Furthermore, Frontex, the EU’s external border force, which is responsible for monitoring the routes migrants use and numbers arriving at Europe's borders, said that more than 1 800 000 migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 from Africa (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts, 2016).

According to UNHCR (2017), “in recent years, the number of people [believing they can find jobs but end up trying to escape life-threatening insecurity, instability, unfavourable economic conditions and widespread exploitation and abuse] crossing by sea from North Africa to southern Europe has increased”. Three main routes used by refugees and migrants to reach Europe include the Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean routes, with Libya being the most commonly used and dangerous route (UNHCR, 2017). The Displacement Tracking Matrix has revealed the following insights into Libya: of the migrants present in Libya at the time, the main countries of intended destination were Libya, Italy and Germany and those for migrant arrivals were Libya, Italy and France (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2018: 2). Of the migrants recorded for these purposes, 97 per cent of them were adults and three per cent were minors, with 60 per cent of minors being unaccompanied (IOM, 2018: 2). There were said to be approximately 700 000 to one million migrants in Libya in 2016, which currently has a population of 6.3 million (IOM, 2017).

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3 Frontex is the common term given to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, an EU agency given the mandate to control borders of the European Schengen Area. The concept will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Statistics for 2018 so far, reveal that 2,421 migrants have been rescued or intercepted. In February 2018 alone, 375 migrants have been rescued or intercepted and thirty-four bodies retrieved, most of these taking place at Zuwarâ, Azzawiyah and Tripoli, along the coast of Libya (IOM, 2018).

Further statistics reveal that Italy received the second highest number of first-time asylum applicants in the second quarter of 2017, at a total of 34,200, or 23% of all applicants in the EU Member States (Eurostat, 2017). Therefore, the number of asylum seekers in Italy increased by 7,500 more than in 2016. Additionally, Italy issued the third most total first-instance decisions during the second quarter of 2017; 19,200 (Eurostat, 2017). For purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to differentiate between what is mean by the terms ‘asylum seekers’, ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’. An asylum seeker is one who has fled their home country in search of international protection, but whose status has not yet been made ‘refugee’, whereas a refugee is one who has been recognised under the 1951 UN Convention as a refugee, having fled from their home country due to war or persecution and holds the status of refugee. A migrant, on the other hand, is one who has made a conscious decision to leave their home country in search of a better life elsewhere. To reiterate, the purpose of this thesis will be to understand the EU’s relationship to economic migrants from Africa.

1.3 The EU

Human Rights Watch (2016), observing that the EU undercut core values and rights protections with its foreign policy that was dictated by the desires of member states, observed the following:

The EU also started to negotiate and conclude several questionable readmission and other migration cooperation agreements with third countries, paving the way for the return of asylum seekers and migrants to countries that are neither safe nor stable. The hallmark of most of these agreements—that also serve to prevent asylum seekers and migrants from coming to the EU—does not appear to focus on the advancement of protection of the most vulnerable, but on protecting the EU from having to deal with them on its own territory.

As previously mentioned, migration has posed increasingly complex challenges since the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East, especially to neighbouring European states that receives the bulk of migrants. As a regional bloc that is focused on integration and extension, the EU has tried to protect member states from the crisis, whilst trying to mitigate negative
consequences of the Spring in its neighbourhood. With calls from various organisations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Amnesty International and Medecins Sans Frontiers, amongst others, and the media capturing the realities of migrants’ journeys from North Africa to Europe, the EU has had to respond to the refugee crisis with urgency. However, the EU has been criticised for the way it has handled the inflow of migrants from the Middle East and North African region, especially since the outbreak of the refugee crisis.

1.4 Italy & The Libyan Coast Guard

Italy, the case under scrutiny in this thesis, was said to have received approximately 138 000 asylum applications by 2015. EU countries offered asylum to 292,540 refugees and Italy granted 29 615 claims for asylum (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts, 2016). Towards the end of 2016, the Human Rights Watch (2016) found that 164,695 migrants and asylum seekers had reached Italy by sea, comprising mostly Nigerians, Eritreans, and Sudanese. Additionally, the numbers of unaccompanied children had increased significantly, and an estimated 23 000 migrant children were traveling alone to Italy by mid-September 2016, compared to 12 360 in 2015. Though new asylum applications increased in 2016, so did rejection rates, due to tightened border controls by neighbouring countries, which prevented onward movement of refugees and migrants. Though the thesis concerns itself primarily with economic migrants, it is useful to provide a backdrop of the movement of people to Italy.

To address the crisis, Italy intensified negotiations with countries such as Sudan, Gambia, and Libya on migration control, including the facilitation of deportations and, after a memorandum of understanding was reached with Sudan in August 2016, Italy deported 48 Sudanese who had allegedly not applied for asylum amid concerns about the application procedure. In Italy, which has witnessed increased intolerance towards migrants amongst citizens, there has been much anger over the government’s inability to decrease the number of migrants. Schechter (2018) indicates that there were 119 000 illegal Mediterranean crossings to Italy in 2017, despite a reduction of these by a third, highlighting that, since 2013, Italy has absorbed close to 700 000 migrants arriving by boat from Libya.

Figures for 1 January 2018 and 28 February 2018 illustrate that Italy received a total of 5 247 arrivals by sea with 316 deaths, Spain received 2 306 migrants with 102 deaths and Greece and Cyprus received 2 653 migrants and 37 migrants respectively, both without deaths.
According to the International Organisation for Migration, 2832 migrants died whilst making their way from North Africa to Italy in 2017, down from 4581 in 2016 and approximately 119 310 reached Italy alive in 2017, less than the 181 436 in 2016 (Jones & Dalgleish, 2018). Integral to the migration of people from North Africa to Europe, is Libya, the most common departure point for migrants making their way to Europe.

Intended to form part of the solution for the many deaths of Mediterranean crossings is the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), which will also form part of the study’s analysis. Described as a “decentralised force often accused of working with local [Libyan] militias and smugglers”, the LCG also forms part of Europe’s response to the refugee crisis (Campbell, 2017). Despite controlling Libya’s borders and supposedly working towards preventing incidences of deaths during migrant boat crossings, the LCG has also violated the human rights of migrants as various human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, the United Nations and Amnesty International, emphasise. Unable to engage with Libya on land due to continued political conflict, the EU has invested in the LCG and, more importantly, Italy has engaged with Libya’s Government of National Accord and municipalities providing aid in return for border and migration control (Micaleff & Reitano, 2018). The relationship between the Coast Guard and the EU will provide intriguing insights into what this thesis understands human security to be and in understanding the ways in which these stakeholders impact vulnerable persons.

1.5 Research Problem & Justification

The problem with which this thesis will grapple is an issue of human security, with a keen focus on women’s human security. The main objective of the thesis is two-fold. Firstly, the thesis seeks to identify the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to the EU, bearing in mind the consequences of the Arab Spring. Secondly, is seeks to understand how the measures taken by EU Member States have protected, or failed to protect, North African migrants in Europe. By studying Italy, an EU Member State having received the biggest influx of migrants from North Africa, and, to lesser degree, France, a major transit country for migrants, the research seeks to identify how migrants are received and accommodated. Furthermore, it seeks to understand how these states have managed and responded to migration from North Africa. Adding to this study of migration, is a gender lens, which seeks to identify

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4 LCG refers to the Libyan Coast Guard, which forms part of the Libyan Navy. Its role in migration management will be discussed in detail Chapter 4.
the unique challenges that men, women and child migrants face in transit and in Europe. A gender analysis of migration considers how conditions of migration are shaped by migrants’ cultural and social contexts, their membership of social groups and how economic and political conditions impact decisions about migration (Omelaniuk, 2005: 1).

Key to the study of Italy, because it serves as an entry point for migrants, is the island of Lampedusa, located in southern Italy, closer to Africa than Europe but Italian territory, to which many migrants have made their way during the refugee crisis. Understanding the implementation of regulations, initiatives and security measures by Italy and considering the nature and impacts of these, will help answer the research questions. Furthermore, this will help illustrate how these structures advance or hamper the ability of individuals to make choices, illustrate how EU member states perceive the concept of care and reveal the limitations that are imposed on migrants to make choices.

The Arab Spring in North Africa refers to the uprisings that took place towards the end of 2010, spilling over into 2011. There are numerous factors that contributed to these revolutions, though each combination unique to the countries in which they occurred, what will be referred to as ‘push and pull factors’ throughout this thesis. According to Doerschler (2006: 1100), these factors have “a lasting impact beyond the decision to immigrate”, as they also largely influence the integration of migrants in destination countries. Push factors refer to conditions that evoke and aggravate feelings of discontentment and dissatisfaction amongst people in their present locale, whilst pull factors are conditions and characteristics of destination countries that appeal to migrants and attract them to those specific countries. Though economic conditions are usually looked to as the main cause for migration, the importance of social, cultural, environmental and political factors cannot be underestimated. The Arab Spring in North Africa illustrates this well, as these revolutions had such severe consequences for the state and individuals that migration from these countries cannot merely be attributed to economic factors.

The Arab Spring in North Africa was welcomed by citizens of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, as the prospects for freedom, democracy and improved quality of life seemed great. However, the ensuing outbreaks of conflict that resembled civil war in subsequent years, have changed the sentiment amongst citizens to the degree that life elsewhere looks more promising. Crime and violence, deteriorating social conditions and the lack of economic opportunity, and overall disappointment at the failure of democratic transitions, are of the largest factors that have pushed people out of North Africa towards Europe. Europe, a safer and more stable region,
with social welfare and greater economic opportunity, has provided a hope for disappointed and fearful migrants, pulling them out of North Africa towards Europe.

1.6 Research question and Objectives
The research question is the following: using a gender lens, what is the nature of human security issues that economic migrants, who migrate from North Africa to Italy, face?

The research objectives for the thesis are:

- To understand how push and pull factors contribute to the precarious human security of migrants.
- To determine whether EU responses, as implemented by Italy and, to a lesser extent, France compound or alleviate the human insecurity of migrants.
- To understand how the experiences of men and women migrants differ.

1.7 Significance of the research
The devastation caused at various levels by conflict, inequality and regime changes are not often enough acknowledged. In a world where realities can be so contrasted, despite the seeming benefits of globalisation, it is necessary to ask what impact these processes have on states and, more importantly and too often overlooked, the human security of individuals. The study seeks to understand the relationship between economic migration and state responses. It will also consider what it means for migrants to live precariously as a consequence of migration management and the securitisation thereof. While the EU was formed in the name of integration, to allow for the free movement of goods and people across borders to create a larger regional community, it is important to understand how these arrangements are exclusionary and how state protection is sometimes manipulated to serve national and regional interests.

1.8 Theoretical Underpinning
This thesis is grounded on Feminist Security Theory and Human Security Theory. Pettman and Hall (2014: 251) emphasise that studying migration through a gender lens is important, especially since women are increasingly moving across international borders and because their experience of migration differs from that of men. This thesis, like Pettman and Hall (2014:

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5 Securitisation refers to the responses of states towards migration, as it is regarded as a security issue, and migrants, as they are perceived and handles as threats to national security. Furthermore, it refers to the politicisation in which refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants are portrayed as threats to national security and national identity.
185), acknowledges that “the decision to go, the process of moving, [and] the consequences of displacement or resettlement” are experienced differently by migrant men and women, as family politics, opportunities and constraints at borders and in new states, wars and the global political economy treat women differently to men. Furthermore, it is important to recognise political resistance of citizens to migrants and the resulting need to study individual state immigration policies and practices (Pettman, 2014: 253).

A gendered perspective of migration and the human security of migrants is valuable, as the analysis of the situations that women and child migrants endure produce different insights to analysing those of migrant men. These insights illustrate the impact of legislation, cultural practices, policies and programs on women and child migrants. According to Pettman and Hall (2014: 251) gendering migration has a number of virtues: it provides insights of migration flows and patterns, and various stages of migration, which include post-migration identity politics. Furthermore, it poses questions around the functioning of different kinds of boundaries, the racialisation of migration, and why some bodies are more visible than others (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 251). FST asks who is welcome and allowed, and who is not and recognises that “migrant bodies are racialised as well as classed and gendered” (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 254).

A gendered perspective of migration points out that the entire process, despite whose decision it is to leave, is gendered according to roles and relationships in the home, available work at home and abroad, forms of violence, exploitation, violence and discrimination in new states and are also related to other body differences, such as race, class and nationality (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 254). Furthermore, a gendered perspective emphasises that one cannot generalise, as migration is filled with complexities. In the current global era, FST also considers citizenship, asking how membership impacts insiders and outsiders, how they are engaged and holding that “how a state treats its non-citizens is as important for democracy, gender equality and human rights, as how it treats its citizens” (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 261). According to Blanchard (2003: 1290), FST asks: who is being secured by security policies and recovers women’s experiences, bearing in mind gender-based exclusion from decision-making roles, and questions the degree to which women are “secured by state ‘protection’ in times of war and peace”.

As such, security is no longer confined to the realm of ‘high politics’ but considers the ordinary lives of women. It is FST’s critique of the state, focus on emancipation, investigation into and
problematisation of the relationships between women, security and peace and war/conflict that is particularly useful for this thesis (Blanchard, 2003: 1298-1299). By challenging ideas of protection by problematising the state in its role as protector and power to protect and emphasising the effects and consequences of migration on migrants, FST is a valuable framework through which to approach the topic of this thesis. The utility in Human Security theory lies in what Gazizullin (2016) refers to as its “‘human-centric’ vision”, which calls for the assessment of security risks and the understanding that “when a human faces a threat, so does international security”. Therefore, the focus shifts from the state to the individual. Human Security theory will provide this study with key insights and considerations, as it will deal with the question “How do threats to refugees and migrants impact international security”? In the current global era, globalisation has ensured that no state goes unaffected by global phenomena, the migrant crisis being evidence of this.

As Tsai (2009: 19) cited the UN’s Commission on Human Security, “[the state] often fails to fulfil its security obligations [and] that is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people – to human security”. This is important to this thesis, as it will undertake a study on whether and how EU member states have failed to fulfil their obligations towards refugees and migrants from North Africa. Using Human Security Theory, this thesis concerns itself mainly with the objective of understanding the security of individuals, specifically migrants and refugees in the EU and the threats that they continue to face despite having migrated. The thesis wants to determine how macro level actions, specifically those of states, autonomously and in relation to one another, influence social relations. By adopting the Feminist Security and Human Security theoretical approaches, the migrant crisis and events on the ground can explore the treatment of migrants. The study recognises the incomparable value of FST and will, for this reason, employ its theoretical insights to answer the research question and meet the research objectives.

1.9 Research Question, Objectives & Methodology

To answer the research questions and meet the research objectives of this thesis, a unique investigation and critical analysis will be required. The chosen method of inquiry for this thesis, is to conduct research by means of an exploratory case study and desktop research that illustrates arguments with examples from Italy and France. This ought to assist in determining the extent to which states are committed to adhering to national and regional legislation and policies and how these compete with their national interests.
The reason why Italy has been selected as the primary study area for this thesis, is the influx of economic migrants from North Africa that have arrived in Europe since the migrant crisis broke out in 2015. Furthermore, by identifying the push and pull factors of people to the European Union, the relationship between these factors ought to provide some insights into legislation and policy, considering the changes brought about by globalisation. By studying the case of Italy, as an example of an EU country, this thesis hopes to provide a clearer understanding of how big of a priority migrants are in Europe, to what extent these states provide refugee seekers with protection and to which social services migrants have access. The primary study of Italy will be coupled with a brief study of France to better understand certain aspects of migratory experiences. This seeks to showcase specific instances of human rights abuses, especially concerning women and children, living conditions inside refugee camps, the treatment of women and children in refugee camps and during screening processes, opportunities afforded to displaced women and children and integration into society. This thesis seeks to understand the ‘push and pull’ factors and the precariousness this causes in migrants’ lives and journeys.

1.10 Data Collection
Secondary data has been consulted in this thesis, most being collected by studying online news articles, resources created by transnational bodies and consulting a broad spectrum of grey literature with the inclusion of a few EU policy documents. A limitation of this thesis is that no empirical data collection has been undertaken.

1.11 Limitations
There were several limitations to the study conducted, mostly concerning time demands and limitations to the nature of the study. Firstly, the wealth of information available to the researcher was, at times, overwhelming and data collection and analysis demanded a significant amount of time. It was also integral to determine which sources were deemed appropriate, credible and unbiased during the process of data collection. These were identified and provided great insights. Furthermore, the focus of the study had to be slightly adapted due to the limited amount of information currently available to study the topic from a gendered perspective. Finally, the complexity of irregular migration within North Africa and from the region to Europe, posed a challenge during the stage of the secondary data analysis. Segregating information into sections or themes proved challenging, as many of these overlap with one another, and the researcher had to be careful not to repeat content.
1.12 Overview of Chapters

Chapter 1
The first chapter of the thesis introduces the study by describing the post-Arab Spring refugee crisis and, especially, the European Union’s (EU) role therein. It also briefly discusses the importance of a gendered framework for studying migration and describes the study’s research problem, question and objectives, as well as describes the theoretical foundation and methodology of the study.

Chapter 2
The second chapter consists of a literature review of contemporary literature relating to the topic. Since not much has been written, some information will come from the internet.

Chapter 3
This chapter describes the philosophical underpinnings and theoretical framework of the study and provides justification for the methods and approach adopted as well as the reason for selecting Italy and, to a lesser extent, France as the countries under study. It also explains how research will be conducted and why, and identifies central concepts of the study, whilst providing motivation for the type of data collection and analysis undertaken and highlighting the implications of the study.

Chapter 4
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the data collected during the research process, to achieve the desired research objectives and, importantly, to answer the research question of the study. The chapter commences with a description of the concept of the ‘carceral state’ and identifies the main push and pull factors for migration from North Africa to Europe. Push factors are those pushing migrants out of North Africa whereas pull factors are those attracting migrants to Europe. Push factors of migration from North Africa include conflict and modern-day slavery and economic opportunities in Europe has emerged as the leading pull factor.

The chapter then moves on to describe the responses of EU member states to the influx of North African migrants post-Arab Spring, by, firstly, describing EU entry policies and, subsequently, considering those of Italy and France. Then, the securitisation measures that Italy and France have adopted are explored, of which include border control, search and rescue operations, returns, resettlements and relocations of migrants and refugees, the closing of ports.
and refusal to disembark and, finally, the Hotspot Approach\(^6\) and detention. Subsequently, the responses of citizens towards migrants from North Africa are described and, finally, the threats and dangers that migrant women face before, during and post-migration to the EU, with specific focus on detention and reception conditions, sexual exploitation and reproductive challenges they face.

**Chapter 5**

This final chapter of the thesis concludes the thesis and conveys the major findings and results of the study, which has sought to understand the gendered nature of EU policies and processes towards North African migrants. Furthermore, the implications of findings for further research will be identified, as will suggestions and recommendations for future research on the topic.

\(^6\) The Hotspot Approach, a migration management strategy developed by the European Commission, has been used to provide EU member states located at the external border with assistance (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/hotspot-approach_en). The concept will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review will explore existing literature concerned with migration from North Africa to Europe, policies of migrant-receiving countries and the gendered perspective of these, to provide an overview of the scholarship related to the topic. This section will, thus, be divided into three sections: The Arab Spring, Push and Pull Factors of Migration and Women’s Migration post-Arab Spring and Regulations of migrant-receiving countries in the European Union. The contributions of the Arab Uprisings coupled with push factors out of Africa and pull factors to Europe will provide insights as to why women migrate from Africa to Europe, providing a clear outline of the literature that covers the topic of this thesis. Due to the lack of academic literature on the migrant crisis in Europe, the EU’s response to it and the threats and dangers posed to the human security of women who migrate from North Africa to Europe, these have been excluded from the literature review. Perhaps the lack of academic literature is due to the recent and rapidly evolving nature of these events and the contexts in which they occur, however, it is hoped that literature will emerge and become academic priority in the coming years.

Various insights into the impact of the Arab Spring on migration, the reasons for migration from North Africa to Europe, the nature of women’s migration post-Arab Spring and the regulations of migrant-receiving countries will be provided. Overall, evidence has suggested that the nature of migration has changed in the post-Arab Spring context as has the relationship between the MENA region and Europe. Furthermore, whilst conflict, economic opportunity and democracy are driving forces behind migration from North Africa to Europe, scholars have illustrated how Europe has fallen short in migration management, externalising it and becoming more concerned with national security rather than human security, especially as it has provided transit countries with support in efforts to curb migration. Although the nature of migration differs significantly for North African migrant women than it does for migrant men, literature suggests that not enough attention has been paid to these differences and the implications thereof. The review has also found that EU regulations have largely proved to be inadequate and unhelpful for the cause of migrants and Member States alike, and pitfalls have been identified across academia and, moreover, how a lack of consensus around migration management has harmed human and national security alike.
2.2 The Arab Spring

In December 2010, a young Tunisian man, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself alight in front of municipal buildings in December 2010, after being assaulted by police. News of his death travelled fast and eventually culminated in what has been called the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring refers to the democratic uprisings that broke out in North Africa, starting in Tunisia and spreading across the Middle East and North Africa, to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Central to the series of uprisings, is the role of social media, since news of Bouazizi’s self-immolation travelled fast via various social media platforms. Thus, similarly frustrated and oppressed citizens across the Middle East and North Africa, were sharing stories and could band together to protest authoritarian regimes. Social media has been considered as one of the causes for the spread of protests across the region, as it provided a platform in which ordinary people could engage in political conversation. Quite important for the revolution, was the fact that many young, urban, educated youth, of whom many were women, could coordinate protest action despite where they were geographically (Howard, Duffy, Freelon, Hussain, Mari, Mazaid, 2011: 2). Therefore, the Arab Spring was often described as a digital revolution.

Since the uprisings allowed young and educated women to partake in protests, it is important to consider the treatment of women protestors by authorities, especially since the patriarchal and authoritarian nature of these states were being challenged. Women played a significant role in the Spring through various activities not limited to protesting. These included blogging, hunger strikes, and they provided support services to protestors, including medical assistance at protest sites (Rice, Marsh, Finn, Sherwood, Chrisafis and Booth, 2011). However, responses to women during the uprisings illustrate that women participants of the revolutions risked their human security and safety. In Egypt, for example, women protestors and observers were threatened and assaulted, as the case of Lara Logan, a journalist who was sexually assaulted by approximately 40 men in Tahrir Square, Egypt, illustrates (FIDH, n.d. Women and the Arab Spring: taking their place?, 18). Overall, the treatment of women during the Spring did not bode well for women, as they were arrested and beaten across the region, especially in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain, where many of whom were medical staff (Rice et al., 2011).

Though many scholars have recognised the significant contribution of the Arab Spring of 2010/2011 to IR scholarship, as it has challenged long-held theories, especially concerning the resilience of authoritarian regimes, effective structures and strategies and the importance of oil wealth, ethnic polarization and external support, it is literature and scholarly debates around
the Arab Spring’s role in insecurity which has led to migration that this particular literature review is interested in. To start with, De Sousa Ferreira (2014: 73) acknowledges that, although the intention of the Spring was to improve standards of living and prospects for Arabs, the revolutions caused so much instability that has culminated in refugee crises (Libya and Syria), irregular migration and an overall threat to human security not only to Arab states, but also the Mediterranean region. An alarming aspect that has emerged, is the threat posed by organised crime networks for irregular migration and, thus, to human security (de Sousa Ferreira, 2014: 80). Likening migration to an alternative form of protest, some (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012: 2-3) have inquired whether the revolts provoked an increase in irregular border crossings to the EU.

Scholars (Aral, 2014 & Johannsson-Nogues, 2013) have highlighted how the responses of regimes to the uprisings have led to human insecurity. Aral (2014: 194), by providing an overview of the revolts in Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, considers how the United Nations’ Security Council was selective in its responses to these revolts, especially with regards to sanctions and military enforcement actions. In this sense, the Arab Spring exacerbated human insecurity that contributed to migration, as security forces were ordered to fire on demonstrators, when demonstrators were arrested, and prisoners tortured by regimes who were being protested against (Aral, 2014: 184). For example, at the end of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia, women were subjected to sexual harassment or rape by security forces (Johannsson-Nogues, 2013: 399 – 400). In Egypt, female protestors were “violently attacked by state-paid thugs” and tortured, sexually degraded and underwent virginity tests (Johannsson-Nogues, 2013: 399 – 400). In Libya, aggression towards women was used to humiliate men (Johannsson-Nogues, 2013: 399 – 400). Thus, the extent of civilian deaths and displacements, have emerged as the common result of regimes’ responses to the uprisings. Johannsson-Nogues, 2013), who devotes her work to understanding the impact of the Arab Spring on women, has emphasised the hypermasculinist mode that Arab states eventually entered, as they employed what was an effective tool – gender violence. The conclusion that most women have fled Libya for fear of sexual assault by state forces as opposed to the war and armed violence itself illustrates the degree to which human security has been threatened by the Arab Spring and, more so by the response of regimes to the Arab Spring (Johannsson-Nogues, 2013: 401).

Analysing the role of human security concerns in the Arab Spring, Nuruzzaman (2013: 52) has found that NATO-led intervention into Libya was counterproductive and exacerbated human insecurity in the Arab region. Though motivations for intervention were justified, as gross
human rights violations had indeed been committed by the Gaddafi regime, the approach to the Arab Spring’s aftermath increased human insecurity: NATO intervention forces killed many civilians, civilian sites were targeted during military operations, rebels were given arms and ammunition and air coverage, despite there being a no-fly zone (Nuruzzaman, 2013: 60).

Shifting the gaze to post-Arab Spring human security of women, the inclusion or exclusion from political transitions remains dismal.

Although political rights have been advanced, women’s representation and access to policymakers remains limited. In Tunisia, the role of women has experienced setbacks and rights are diffuse, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood government and new Constitution do not hold much hope for women’s rights and, in Libya, women’s rights remain weak (Johansson-Nogues, 2013: 403 – 405). Furthermore, the Arab Spring, and the long-term effects of war and war-making, has entrenched male guardianship over women in MENA and the legal status of women remains precarious (Maktabi, 2017: 7 & 20). Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos (2012: 12) agree that the denial of citizens’ rights by flawed constitutions and unjust laws, the prohibition of establishing political parties and imposing limitations on the activities of opposition parties and the same approach towards civil organisations increased human insecurity in the Arab region.

Though there might be assumptions that the Arab Spring caused increased migration to Europe, this can also be attributed to the opportunity presented by the lack of border control, and not the structural changes brought on by the Arab Spring. Therefore, the revolutions rerouted migrants instead of stimulating new flows (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012: 4). De Sousa Ferreira (2014: 79 & 88) agrees that the deficit in border control created a window of opportunity for migrants who flee from revolutions and those who were already participating in migratory processes and believes that the Arab Spring did not cause a “massive influx of migration to Europe” as movement was predominantly of a south-south nature. Additionally, de Sousa Ferreira (2014:72) introduces another aspect, that is the fear of large-scale migration and insecurity amongst Europeans, hence the human insecurity of Arabs and Europeans enter the scholarly debate. As migrants risk their lives to pursue ambitions of a better life in Europe, the Mediterranean becomes a geopolitical region plagued with concerns about human (in)security (de Sousa Ferreira, 2014: 74).

Perthes (2011: 74) highlights that Europe, as immediate neighbour to the Arab region, is the only major international actor tied to the Mediterranean and North African region by political
and security relations and trade, economic and development interests. Thus, the role of the EU in and response to the Arab Spring remains a key topic of interest. Hollis (2012:1) has found that EU policies helped trigger Arab Spring, as the EU “departed from its own normative principles and aspirations for Arab reform [whilst] consistently prioritising European security interests over ‘shared prosperity’ and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean”. Additionally, by offering financial support, increasing border control, Frontex joint operations, supporting democratic transition, making its expertise available and calling on the participation of civil society and non-government organisations, the EU failed to devise new approaches and in doing so, reaffirmed old positions towards migration (de Sousa Ferreira, 2014: 84). Agreements with dictatorial regimes of the Arab region and the EU’s counterterrorism policies, fears of political Islam and support for Arab states, meant upholding authoritarian Arab regimes by affording Arab states with leverage (Hollis, 2012: 21 – 23)

Bauer (2013) also criticises the EU for neglecting potential risk discourses, despite its emphasis on domestic democracy and civil society, thus failing to respond to the evolving security situation in the Mediterranean. Similarly, Whitman and Junco (2012: 147) recall the EU’s failure to act accordingly during the Libyan crisis, however, they ascribe the reasons for the EU’s inability to positively impact the region to the following factors: the sovereign debt crisis, institutional problems related to the implementation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and a lack of consensus among member states. Perthes (2011: 75, 77) recognises the need for a clearer stance of the EU towards the Middle East and North Africa region and its societies and highlights a need for the EU to present itself as an open Europe, to people and goods, offering states undergoing transitions a “new form of partnership”. Though efforts were made to deepen democracy, Whitman and Juncos (2012: 160) find that the EU’s capacity for active crisis management remains vague. Similarly, Asseburg (2013) also discovered a weakness in the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management roles. Thus, the EU’s failure to effectively support transformation and assist in overcoming obstacles to democratic transition remains neglected (Asseburg, 2013: 56). To some (Asseburg, 2013: 48, 56), the uprisings were seemingly welcomed by the EU, especially since the liberalisation of political and economic systems would contribute towards long-term stabilisation. This would strengthen EU-Arab relations and transform the EU’s Southern neighbourhood. The EU has also been criticised for imposing Western concepts on Arab states, as responses in Libya and Syria illustrate (Asseburg, 2013: 57, Bauer 2013: 9). If the EU was not imposing, it was neglecting a duty to intervene, as in Libya where Islamist militants flourished (Asseburg, 2013: 50).
Many scholars (Whitman and Juncos (2012), Bauer (2013), Ayadi and Sessa (2013), Asseburg (2013) and Del Sarto (2016) have unpacked the significant implications of the Arab Spring for European-Mediterranean and North African relations. The Arab Spring did not only affect the countries in which it took place, but also in the region. In a world increasingly focused on security, questions around how these uprisings affected the Mediterranean region, and to what extent, emerged. Much literature has also been devoted to determining potential outcomes for Arab States and the immediate region. De Sousa Ferreira (2014: 72 & 82) points out that priority divergences have characterised these relations and that the political and social upheavals of the Arab Spring as well as the aftermath pose a threat to regional and international security.

Salamey (2015: 15), who has identified several democracy development prerequisites for establishing accountable governments, highlights the implications of corruption and large-scale financial scandals for the already-struggling economies of North Africa. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood has also emerged as an obstacle to the democratisation of North African states (Salamey, 2015: 125). On the contrary, Dalacoura (2011: 71), who considers the prospects for democratic change in the Arab states, regards “thinking in terms of a ‘transition’ to democracy” as naïve and one dimensional, assuming that there is one path for these different Arab states to follow to democracy. According to some (Bauer 2013, Ayadi & Sessa, 2013), the prospects of a Mediterranean security community look uncertain and the Arab Spring has played a significant part in changing migration policy and governance. Additionally, some scholars ask about addressing the most urgent problems and security needs in the Arab region, support for transitional and democratisation processes and how the EU is influencing economic recovery and security (Bauer, 2013: 13). Ayadi and Sessa (2013: 5) has since found that the EU is trapped in a ‘business as usual’ scenario. Linked to the impact of the Arab Spring on the region, Aras and Falk (2016: 2252) list the various “transformations” that have taken place as a result: state-society relations, resilience of authoritarian regimes, state failures, failed transitions to democracy and shifting alliances within the MENA region.

The violent confrontation and threat of civil war in Syria, weak state institutions in Yemen and the same coupled with weak civil society, the presence of armed militias and the absence of a strong central authority in Libya force some to disregard the prospects of democracy (Dalacoura, 2011: 72). Furthermore, if support for border control increases the strength of forces of repression, thus increasing human insecurity, it could jeopardise democratic transition (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012: 14). The role of Islam post-Arab Spring and implications for
human security have also been questioned by some (Dalacoura, 2011: 74 – 75). Fargues and Fandrich (2012: 1) have agreed that a failure in the transition to democracy, and more so the failure to achieve intended political freedoms and economic security, would cause post-Arab Spring migration to increase.

2.3 Migration of Women post-Arab Spring

Literature focused on the feminisation of migration in the context of the Arab Spring and thereafter has been somewhat limited. However, a range of literature has contributed to this topic, forming a foundation upon which future scholarly debates can be built. Key to these debates are the relationship between the Arab Spring and migration flows, the causes of post-Arab Spring migration and the nature thereof and the participation of women and the youth in migration from North Africa to Europe. Another important aspect, which resonates deeply with this thesis, are the dangers and threats posed to the human security of migrant women.

Looking at migration more broadly at first, irregular migration and a type of new migration created by the Arab Spring has received a lot of scholarly attention. Mihalciouiu (2013: 42), for example, has discussed this irregular migration, where migrants enter transit and destination countries illegally and stay there, or are victims of trafficking and rejected asylum, in depth. Considering the relationship between the Arab Spring and migration shortly after the uprisings, Fargues (2011: 4) found that, if governments were responsive to the people’s demands and economic conditions were favourable, return migration could be expected, and if not, increased emigration could be expected. Another dimension of importance is reasons for migration to Europe, and the role of the impression of Europe held by migrants. For example, Fargues (2011: 4) finds that migrants, especially those in Tunisia, thought Europe to be in closer proximity to Africa than it is. Thus, Europe appealed more during the political unrest in Libya, already a transit country for migrants from across Africa, and, thus, migrants and civilians in Libya fled insecurity for Europe. Coupled with this, Abdelfattah (2011: 1) agrees insecurity and chaos in Libya, especially, pushed foreign workers and natives abroad. By analysing the impact of the Arab Spring on migrant sending and receiving Arab states, (Abdelfattah, 2011: 8) has found that studying new waves of potential migrants in the younger generation, such as in Egypt, to be useful. Parshotam (2018: 9) highlights the misconception that African migrants are uneducated or semi-skilled and notes that, as a result of this, European states and African countries establish agreements that enhance border control under the guise of development assistance programmes.
Turning to the feminisation of migration, described by Gouws (2010: 170) as “the migration of women independent of men”, some have contributed meaningful insights into why and how women have migrated post-Arab Spring (Killian, Olmsted and Doyle 2012, Gerard and Pickering 2013, Fierke 2015, Virkama 2015, Bartels 2015, Boucherf 2017, Miletto, Caretta, Burchi and Zanlucchi 2017). For a pre-Arab Spring context, Gouws (2010: 169) identifies push factors for women’s migration as the severe gender-based violence women in Africa experience as a result of civil wars, food insecurity, economic decline, corruption, human rights violations and attempts to escape human trafficking. Virkama (2015) and Bartels (2015) have studied migration in two different Arab states: Morocco and Tunisia. They both find that rising levels of education and the consequent increase of women entering and competing in and saturated labour markets have played a role in migration out of North Africa to Europe (Virkama, 2015: 2, 4 & Bartels, 2015: 64). Virkama (2015: 2) and Bartels (2015: 64) both emphasise a resistance towards the patriarchal ideals and systems that excluded the youth and women. Additionally, they agree that the response to this was a pursuit of individual and personal freedom, which included freedom of movement (Virkama, 2015: 10 & Bartels, 2015: 66). As such, migration post-Arab Spring can be regarded as challenging gender roles and escaping discrimination. Whereas women used to migrate for other reasons, they increasingly do so for reasons of survival and, thus, gender roles within families and societies change (Gouws, 2010: 170).

To illustrate the extent to which migration has become feminised, Fierke (2015: 185) highlights how war and poverty has caused migration to become increasingly feminised, such that women are estimated to make up at least half of the world’s migrant population, while specific migratory flows, for instance, from the Philippines and Somalia, have been composed primarily of women. 75 per cent of contemporary victims in war are civilian, and most of them women and children. Miletto, Caretta, Burchi & Zanlucchi (2017: 13 & 21) have highlighted the share of women migrants in 2015, globally, the share of women migrants globally was 48.2 per cent and women constituted 52 per cent of international migrants in Europe, with 46.5 per cent being young women and girls. Furthermore, Gouws (2010: 169) explains that currently, many single women or those with children migrate.

Killian et al. (2012: 432) attribute Arab women’s migration to political, educational and employment-related reasons, whilst at the same time acknowledging political and economic forces, educational and familial motives. Furthermore, Boucherf (2017) provides valuable insights, by illustrating how the nature of women’s migration has changed. Previously, women
in Arab Mediterranean countries migrated as family members and mostly for purposes of family reunification, however, women now have higher levels of education, which allows them to migrate without an accompanying man (Boucherf, 2017: 7). At the same time, however, the migration of women remains limited by their status and position in countries where conservative values persist.

Gerard and Pickering (2013: 342), have found that academic empirical research concerned with the gendered dimensions of the experiences of migrants through Africa is limited and, therefore, providing an overview of the feminisation of migration from North Africa to Europe has been challenging. They have, however, engaged with refugee women who have travelled from Somalia to Malta, and have been in transit through countries marked by sustained conflict, famine and political instability (Gerard & Pickering, 2013: 344). Others (Miletto et al. 2017: 20), however, still believe that the mobility of women in the global south is limited and as a result, they migrate later than men, often leaving behind children and leaving the responsibility of care to other family members, associating the feminisation of migration with the disintegration of families. Furthermore, it has been suggested that hierarchies existed during migration, where women were at the bottom and given the most precarious positions on boats and at most risk to onboard injuries (Gerard & Pickering, 2013: 352). Gouws (2010: 173) reiterates that the exclusion and subordination of women is founded on sexual divisions of labour. Though the impact of migration post-Arab Spring requires further inquiry, Miletto et al. (2017: 20) have touched on this topic by highlighting the intense psychological impacts of the process on women, as they also carry the burden of tending to the emotional needs of family and are exposed to sexual violence in transit. The precariousness of women and child migrants also makes them more vulnerable to abuse (Miletto et al. 2017: 20).

A key area of interest for the topic is the dangers posed to the human security of women migrants, especially considering what is known as the Libyan Corridor and associated slavery, however, finding literature on this has proven difficult. Gouws (2010: 171) also highlights the risks associated with women’s migration, which has as a result of increased globalisation changed the nature of women’s labour to include sex work and associated gender-based violence and exploitation. Despite these concerns, basic amenities, applications for asylum, and conditions at reception centres and refugee camps are amongst the biggest concerns. As a point of departure for looking at the dangers that threaten women migrants, the REACH report (2017: 22) have found that access to basic amenities such as healthcare services, shops and municipal services is more limited for refugee women than men, especially when there are no
males to accompany them. To illustrate, the FIDH (2012: 50 – 51), who met with women refugees who had been in Libya for several years, found that some had not been able to meet with a representative of their embassy and another whom had been very ill but had no access to medication nor a doctor and many pregnant. After being intercepted at sea, most migrants are taken to Libyan camps run by militias with often no access to doctors, without trauma counselling and locked up in cells and subject to poor hygienic conditions (FIDH, 2012: 50).

Women are also put into a more precarious position, as their applications for asylum are generally less successful than their male counterparts. The lack of evidence makes their applications less credible, as they do not actually have proof of persecution, whereas men often to have in the form of proof of belonging to a party (Bonewit & Shreesves, 2016: 12). Furthermore, discriminatory cultural and traditional beliefs and practices and customary and traditional laws enforcing these also put migrant women at risk during transit and in the host country (Sansonetti, 2016: 23). This means that migrant women, who are subjected to discrimination in their country of origin and even transit countries, might not be able to or choose to defend themselves against the same treatment, and sexual assault, whilst in transit and in Europe, either out of fear or because they are unaware of their rights. Furthermore, there is the lack of consideration of gender when new migration policies are developed (Gouws, 2010: 179). Additionally, overcrowded reception centres with little space and privacy make women and child migrants a lot more vulnerable to sexual violence and other violence, especially when they are sent to collective accommodation centres (Bonewit & Shreesves, 2016: 13 & 21). Single women and single mothers fall victim to sexual assault more so than married women as they are unaccompanied and even despised by men in reception centres (Bonewit & Shreesves, 2016: 27). For example, in Libyan refugee camps, men and women are kept separate and couples are not allowed to see each other (FIDH, 2012: 47).

2.4 Push & Pull Factors of Migration

This section of the literature review provides an overview of existing literature that focuses on the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to Europe. As previously noted, many migrants making the journey from North Africa to Europe, though they depart from Libya, are mostly foreign nationals and not Libyan. Most irregular migrants in Libya are Egyptian, Nigerien, Chadian, Sudanese, Ghanaian, Nigerian, Malian and Bangladeshi and Senegalese (International Organisation for Migration, DTM: Libya Migrant Report, 2017). This complexity in the migration process necessitates that literature that focuses on both push factors, which cause migration out of North African countries to Libya and push factors, which
cause for migration from Libya to Europe, be considered. Vice versa, it is useful to consider factors that pull migrants to Libya and to Europe. Dorigo and Tobler (1983: 1) distinguish between push factors as “life situations that give one reason to be dissatisfied with one’s present locale [and] pull factors are those attributes of distant places that make them appear appealing”. Emerging themes related to push factors include: sources of frustration that existed pre-Arab Spring, especially illiberal democracy and corruption, and post-Arab Spring results, such as a failure to establish democratic institutions, worsening violence and insecurity and migration management by regimes. Those related to pull factors include: existing migrant communities in Europe, education, rights and democracy in Europe.

Migrants in Libya were already in precarious conditions prior to the Arab Spring, as, prior to the 1990s, the country’s migration policy allowed entry to foreign workers as the economy required them, but getting rid of them during times of economic downturn (The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 2012: 11). Environmental factors, such as drought and famine, coupled with conflict and instability have also pushed people from neighbouring countries into Libya (FIDH), 2012: 10). Generally, Yazgan, Utku and Sirkeci (2015: 182) attribute migration to Northern African states to “discomforts, difficulties, restrictions, clashes and violence and wars at the country of origin”. Across the region, however, various characteristics of Arab states have caused frustration and resulted in the Arab Spring. Monopolised media, the use of oil to build alliances, the manipulation of electoral processes and uneven economic development were sources of frustration for local populations (Daoud, 2012: 176). Similarly, unemployment, income inequality, urbanisation, the suppression of minorities and opposition and the youth bulge also spurred on the Arab Spring (La Graffe, 2012: 73 & Yazgan, Utku and Sirkeci, 2015: 183). Illiberal democracy was used to entrench the power of autocratic regimes repressed and limited openness in Arab States, as the constant threat of repression in Egypt and Tunisia, deeply fragmented civil society and corruption and intolerance towards opposition, especially so in Libya, illustrate (Joffe, 2011: 512 – 514, 521). Other factors pushing migrants out of Africa include Libya’s long history of immigration, economic and political instability, civil war and the presence of a growing Islamist threat as well as Tunisia’s political instability (Cummings et al., 2015: 25 – 26).

The effects of the inability to replace authoritarian regimes with a functioning state and society has been one of the main reasons for migration towards Europe, as life in the MENA region appear as dire as before the Arab Spring, perhaps even more so. Hinnebusch (2015: 205) echoes that even four years after the revolutions, evidence of democratisation was limited, as was the
establishment of stable and inclusive democratic institutions. Additionally, Salamey (2015: 112) recalls failure of the Arab Spring to become a Democratic Spring, as monarchies proved resilient. Hence, the ‘Islamist Winter’ that followed the Arab Spring. This state-weakening and state collapse, especially evident in Libya and Syria, have been caused by the simultaneous processes of democratisation, authoritarian adaptation or succession and state failure (Hinnebusch, 2015: 206 & Magen, 2012: 2). Identifying reasons for state failure, Magen (2012: 8 – 11) has listed four major causes of state failure in the region: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes and genocides or politicides. In the aftermath, structural economic conditions have not been conducive to democracy and the region has displayed a lack in security, credibility and capacity to provide necessary welfare-enhancing public goods (Magen, 2012: 7). Furthermore, the impact of the so-called Islamic Winter on individual liberties and regional stability has been counter to what was hoped to have been achieved by the Arab Spring, fuelling migration to Europe (Behr, 2013: 20).

Cummings, Pacitto, Lauro and Foresti (2015: 21) explicitly point to the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, caused by political instability in Libya, as the reason for people migrating from Libya. This suggests that state collapse is perhaps the most important push factor for migration from North Africa to Europe, as other factors exist and did so before the Arab Spring, but this one factor alone could be enough to push people out of North Africa to Europe. Therefore, even though precarious conditions pre-existed, the degree of conflict became too big a threat and the insecurity too much, for migrants to stay put (Yazgan et al., 2015: 182). The persistence of armed struggles, violence clashes, states plunged in anarchy, the institutionalisation of corruption and persistent and worsening poverty continues to mark the region and pushing migrants out of a seemingly hopeless situation (Salamey, 2015: 112 & 125 & Park, 2015).

After the Arab Spring, the foreign population, considered by the FIDH (2012: 20) as more vulnerable due to violence, unemployment and insecurity than Libyan citizens constituted a substantial proportion of those migrating to Europe. Nigerian women, for example, many of whom were in Libya prior to the Arab Spring, were fearful, as militiamen targeted foreign women, arresting, killing and beating them and wives were detained whilst husbands worked (FIDH, 2012: 55). Mass detention was a strategy of Libya’s migration management, and irregular migrants were detained at overcrowded and unhygienic camps, however, as Gaddafi’s government was overthrown, migrants had an opportunity to flee the camps (FIDH, 2012: 44). Additionally, migrants face the risks of labour exploitation, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention and human trafficking (Cummings et al., 2015: 21).
Though one could envision the pull factors to Europe as the opposites of the push factors mentioned above, it is useful to discuss. The *African Research Bulletin* (2011: 18854) gives credibility to the sizeable migrant communities that already exist in Europe, such as those of East Africans in the United Kingdom, as a factor that pulls migrants from Africa to Europe. Since unemployment and income inequality characterised many Arab States, the youth, seeking the right to education and work that is available across Europe, migrate in the hope of gaining these ideals and rights for themselves (Yazgan et al., 2015: 186). Though migration is certainly not limited to the youth, one ought to acknowledge that the youth’s disaffectedness and dissatisfaction, that fuelled the Arab Spring, can certainly fuel the process of migration from North Africa to Europe. The expansion of modern and global education and a culture of rights is what Salamey (2015: 116) believes continues to lure migrants to Europe. Democracy, the main prize that sparked the Arab Spring, and something that marks MENA’s neighbours, is an ideal that many migrants hope for. The recognition of their liberties and rights, which democracy would secure, is what migrants from authoritarian and oppressive conditions want most. Thus, democracy is probably the biggest factor pulling them towards Europe.

### 2.5 Regulations of Migrant-receiving countries

This section will provide an overview of the literature that exists around the regulations of migrant-receiving countries, and the EU at large. The main themes that have emerged around these regulations in the post-Arab Spring context, centre mainly around reception conditions within the EU, the Dublin Regulation, burden sharing, relocation and resettlement, border control and the hotspot approach. To provide an idea of what scholars have found; the migrant crisis was said to have gone from a human security issue to a national security issue, highlighting the tension between controlling migration and protecting the rights and safety of migrants and the prominence of Fortress Europe\(^7\) which has guided regulations (Park, 2015: 5 & Carling and Hernández -Carretero, 2011: 43).

The Dublin Regulation, which stipulates that asylum seekers have to have their cases processed in the first European country of registration, has come under great criticism post-Arab Spring. The Regulation has received criticism for inconsistent implementation and losing its leverage and putting immense capacity and structural pressures on frontline member states, such as Italy and Greece (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014: 146, 148 & Carrera, Blockmans, Cassarino, Gros & Guild, 2017: 4). La Rive (2015:10) and Park (2015: 4) also agree that the post-Arab Spring has

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\(^7\) Fortress Europe refers to the manner in which Europe controls its borders, detains immigrants and the (often negative) sentiments of citizens towards immigration and immigrants. *Moving People Changing Places Org.*
illustrated the limits of the Dublin Regulation, as issues around the distribution of migrants across the EU persist. According to Carrera et al. (2017:31), the Dublin Regulation, and disproportionate responsibilities within the EU, has left gaps and has led to the involvement of defence and military actors in migration management. This ties into another persistent issue in the EU - burden sharing.

According to some (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 350), burden sharing has existed on a predominantly voluntary basis and the European Commission maintained that the EU was not fully equipped to assist EU member states that were most under pressure from migratory flows (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 359). As a result, Italy requested that the EU transform Frontex into an operational agency and appealed that the principle of burden sharing between member states be revisited (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 343 – 344 & Trauner, 2016: 315). Another strategy employed was the ‘hotspot’ approach and resettlement and relocation.

The hotspot approach was intended to strengthen EU Home Affairs agencies, especially in Italy and Greece, as Frontex, Europol and EASO assisted in screening migrants and support Europol in establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy Operation in the Mediterranean in response to smugglers and trafficking and went hand in hand with the relocation of refugees across the continent (Carrera et al., 2015: 3 – 4, 7 & Larive, 2015: 13). Relocation measures meant that asylum seekers from EU with higher numbers of arrivals were relocated to those with lower numbers of arrivals and the Temporary EU Relocation System was said to have detracted and deviated from the Dublin Regulation (Trauner, 2016: 318 and Carrera, Blockmans, Gros and Guild, 2015: 5).

The inclusion of relocation as a provision of the European Agenda on Migration, in May 2015, has been criticised for attempting to solve short term symptoms of emergency without implementing the Temporary Protection Directive (Jakulevičiene, 2016: 97 & 103). Trauner (2014: 322), though agreeing that the relocation scheme and hotspot approach provide an additional layer to the Dublin Regulation without replacing it, questions the sustainability thereof. More bluntly, however, Carrera et al. (2015: 14) and Carrera et al. (2017: 5) find that the approach is insufficient as reception conditions remain deficient, home affairs agencies lack support and the temporary relocation system has failed in practice. Despite the belief that the EU lacked solidarity and consensus around how to manage the migration crisis, as relations between Italy and France have illustrated, the need for border patrol and the Return Directive, which required respect for nonrefoulement and information sharing to ensure re-entry bans,
was agreed upon by member states (Richey, 2013: 412–414, 424 & Carrera et al., 2017: 10). Border control mechanisms, one of the EU’s main instruments of migration management has also come under scrutiny. Carrera, den Hertog & Parkin (2012: 4–5) highlight the failure of Frontex and Europol to protect the human rights of migrants.

Operation Sophia\(^8\) has been considered a sensitive matter, a vacuum has been left as Mare Nostrum\(^9\) has not been replaced by another initiative, thus resulting in increased deaths in the Mediterranean, and, finally, the EU has not yet devised a list of coast guard functions (Carrera et al., 2015: 17 & Carrera et al., 2017: 19 & 30). Richey (2013: 416), however, appraises Frontex for successfully displacing migrant routes. Border control and asylum seeking or readmission, as per the Dublin Regulation, are two activities that have formed part of the EU’s externalisation of migration management, which has seemingly played into the repressive activities of autocratic regimes and accommodated human rights violations, therefore linking them to gate-keeping strategies used to control migration and asylum in the EU (Triandafyllidou, 2014: 9 & Richey, 2013: 419–420, 423).

2.6 Chapter Summary
The literature reviewed for purposes of this study has found interesting insights as to what scholars have written about the Arab Spring, women’s migration thereafter, the push and pull factors of migration and regulations of migrant-receiving countries, as various perspectives have been used to analyse and debate these topics, which are certainly open to further research, especially since the Arab Spring occurred only seven to eight years ago. By considering each subject separately, the relationship between the Arab Spring and the regulations of migrant-receiving countries in the EU and how these have impacted the push and pull factors of migration as well as the migration of women have been shown. As such, they have also illustrated the human security concerns and implications of the Arab Spring and state responses to the uprisings and the irregular migration that resulted from them.

Literature written on the Arab Spring has focused on various aspects of the uprisings, revolving largely around how they impacted human security, how governments took on a more realist approach, how the lack of border control impacted migration, and the responses of the EU to the uprisings as well as how these impacted EU-Mediterranean and North African relations.

\(^8\) Operation Sophia refers to the EU-launched military operation in response to the shipwrecks of migrant-carrying boats in April 2015, more formally known as European Union Naval Force Mediterranean.
\(^9\) Operation Mare Nostrum was a year-long sea and air operation carried out by the Italian government in October 2013 to prevent increased immigration and wrecksages of migrant-carrying ships.
Overall, scholars have reached consensus that the responses of regimes and external actors to the Arab Spring exacerbated human insecurity, highlighting the threats and violence women were exposed to and the hypermasculinist mode and male guardianship over women that emerged in the North African and Arab region. As a result, some have found that women’s migration was impacted by fear of sexual violence as opposed to war and armed violence alone. Contrary to popular belief, scholars have found that, instead of stimulating new flows of migrants, the Arab Spring simply rerouted migrants due to the lack of border control. This same lack of border control has been regarded as increasing repression, as organised crime has room to flourish. Another aspect largely considered, is the role of the EU in the Arab Spring and subsequent regime changes.

Many scholars have found that the EU’s response lacked protection of civilians and supported dictatorial regimes instead, therefore, failing to adequately intervene, provide support for democratic transitions across North Africa and effectively manage the crises that broke out in the neighbouring region. Whereas some criticise the EU for imposing Western concepts on MENA states, others criticise them for failing to intervene and, moreover, sympathetic scholars have been more sympathetic towards the EU, as they provide reasons for the EU’s lack of response. Highlighting priority divergences in European-Mediterranean and North Africa relations, some scholars continue to question how the EU provided assistance to the most urgent problems, meeting security needs and providing economic recovery to the region.

Considering the feminisation of migration and women’s migration post-Arab Spring, despite debates around the causes of and reasons for women’s migration post-Arab Spring as well as the impact of this, literature remains limited overall. As previously mentioned, the changed nature of migration because of the Arab Spring has been highlighted, and various reasons for migration have been identified by scholars. Some have attributed the increased feminisation of migration to rising levels of education, the increase of women in saturated labour markets, resistance of patriarchal ideals and structures, the pursuit of personal freedom, political reasons and familial motives. On the contrary, others point to insecurity, chaos, war and poverty as reasons for the increasingly feminised nature of migration. Scholars have also inquired about the impact of the feminisation of migration post-Arab Spring on gender roles and concerns about the disintegration of families have emerged. Scholars highlight that, whereas before women mostly migrated for family purposes and for family reunification, women migrate and leave children and responsibilities of care behind. Despite this feminisation, however, some scholars continue to point out that migration of women is limited by their status, as hierarchies
emerge during the process of migration, resulting in unequal vulnerability experienced by women and children as opposed to men. Much of the literature that relates to the threats posed to the human security of women migrants focuses largely on access to basic amenities, asylum applications, and conditions at reception centres.

There is consensus around the vulnerabilities of women migrants, especially single women, their risk of falling victim to sexual violence and other violence and their position of disadvantage. Scholars have found that women are much more vulnerable than men with regard to these aspects, again highlighting the hierarchical nature of migration and receipt of migrants. To illustrate, scholars point to the lack of evidence that women are able to provide for asylum applications, which make them less credible and less successful at being granted asylum. Additionally, cultural and traditional beliefs and practices and laws also put women migrants at a disadvantage to their male counterparts. Despite these insights, however, literature on the experiences of North African women migrants remains limited and requires further research, as does literature on the role of the Libyan Corridor and slavery in North Africa on women’s migration.

Scholars are in agreement about the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to Europe, although some pay more attention to the pre-Arab Spring frustrations and post-Arab Spring disappointments. Therefore, some emphasise the illiberal democracy and corruption that characterised North African and Arab states, whereas others looked more to the failure of the Arab Spring to result in democratic institutions but leading to violence and insecurity instead. Scholars have identified various reasons for the Arab Spring, which are insightful for understanding the context in which migration has occurred, as well as the reasons for the uprisings to emerge. Some highlight limitations on media freedom, oil wealth, manipulation of electoral processes, uneven economic development, whereas others focus more on economic circumstances, such as income inequality and urbanisation. Moreover, others recall the political conditions: suppression of minorities, the youth bulge and fragmented civil society.

Libya is a major transit country for migrants who migrate due to unemployment, environmental factors, conflict and instability in their home countries. Scholars have identified a long list of reasons for their migration from North Africa and, particularly, Libya. Some regard inadequate political and economic institutions, civil war and the Islamist threat as more influential in the decision to migrate, other scholars point to the conditions of society post-Arab Spring and state weakening, whilst another group pays attention to foreign nationals who are more vulnerable
and increasingly targeted by militia post-Arab Spring. However, there is consensus that the resulting state collapse post-Arab Spring has been a major factor pushing migrants and nationals out of Libya. Lastly, literature indicates that four factors pull migrants towards the EU, with each factor being identified and discussed by different scholars. These range from existing migrant communities in Europe, the appeal of rights to education and employment in Europe to North African and Arab youth and an overall recognition of rights. All of these point the largest contributing pull factor, which is the ideal of democracy and, more importantly, the active entrenchment of these.

Literature written about the regulations of migrant-receiving countries has focused on five key characteristics: the Dublin Regulation, burden sharing, the Hotspot Approach, border control and the lack of consensus across the EU as to how migration, and the migrant crisis, should have been managed. The Dublin Regulation, meant to provide clear guidelines for receiving and processing migrants and asylum applicants, has been regarded as inherently flawed, and discussions centre around the inconsistent implementation, and associated pressure on member states, limitations thereof, especially in the complexities of the migrant crisis and gaps that have been identified. Furthermore, inquiry has increased around the way in which this Regulation increased defence and military involvement in migration management. This characteristic closely relates to burden sharing, which some scholars have identified as voluntary in nature and others have zoomed in on Italy’s response to burden sharing and the lack thereof.

Thirdly, many scholars have critiqued the Hotspot Approach’s, its inadequacy in providing migrants with proper reception conditions, whilst others question the Approach’s sustainability despite what it contributes to the Dublin Regulation. Scholars have also criticised the relocation and resettlement efforts across the EU. Border control, a central theme of the study, draws attention to the efforts of Frontex and Europol. Whereas some praise Frontex for displacing migrant routes, others highlight how efforts and initiatives failed to protect human rights. Adding to this, is widespread discussion about the end of Operation Mare Nostrum and the subsequent vacuum left. Lastly, the lack of consensus between member states on border control has been the focus of literature on the EU’s response to the migrant crisis. Much literature about the regulations of migrant-receiving countries echoes the sentiments that these regulations and the implementation thereof have responded to a migrant crisis that is perceived as an issue of national security rather than human security. Furthermore, the literature has
remained largely focused on the EU’s externalisation of migration management and ways in which the bloc accommodated human rights violations.

The most prevalent themes that have emerged from the literature include the increase in human insecurity and the failure to protect human rights during and after the Arab Spring and during the migrant crisis. Scholars agree about the role of patriarchal norms, war, poverty and conflict as factors causing migration from North Africa to Europe, however, there is a group of scholars who emphasise the role of a lack of economic opportunities. There are also those who focus more on post-Arab Spring failures, such as state collapse and failure of achieving democratic transition. Scholars who seek to understand pull factors of migration, mostly consider democracy and economic opportunities in the EU. Themes around which authors, who have written about the EU and the Arab Spring, have expressed concern also include the failure of the EU to respond sufficiently, limitations of EU regulations, the sustainability of measures taken by EU agencies and a lack of consensus around migration management.

Much of the existing literature on the topic of migration has a North American, Filipino or Asian focus, therefore, a gap in literature on migration from Africa to Europe persists. Due to the recent nature of the Arab Spring and migrant crisis, there is more room for the development of literature on the aspects considered in this review. Though various insights have been provided on what the current themes in academia on the topic are, further inquiry is especially necessary where it concerns, firstly, the feminisation of migration from North Africa to Europe and, secondly, the regulations of migrant-receiving countries, especially related to the gender component of the study and the dangers posed to the human security of migrant women post-Arab Spring needs further research.
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the theoretical framework of this thesis as well as substantiate why the method used for data collection has been selected. Therefore, this section elaborates the theoretical assumptions of the thesis, factors considered in selecting the type of study and what this study contributes to the topic at large. The human security approach and Feminist Security Theory (FST), the main theoretical tools that will underpin this thesis, will be explored to identify their value for this thesis, the one as a theoretical framework and the other as a theoretical approach. An overview of how these challenge realism as an alternative International Relations Theory will also be provided.

As previously stated, the research question of the thesis is: using a gender lens, what is the nature of human security issues that economic migrants, who migrate from North Africa to Italy, face? The research objectives are: to understand how push and pull factors contribute to the precarious human security of migrants, to determine whether EU responses as implemented by Italy and, to a lesser extent France, compound or alleviate the human insecurity of migrants and, finally, to understand how the experiences of men and women migrants differ. The preferred methodology for this study is an exploratory case study, where arguments are illustrated with examples from Italy and France. An in-depth discussion of the value for this chosen methodology for the thesis follows towards the latter part of the chapter.

The cases at hand, predominantly Italy and, to a lesser extent and for illustrative purposes, France, will be studied and analysed through secondary data, most of which will be collected from the internet, since this is where the wealth of data on the topic exists and is most easily accessible for research purposes. Substantiation for the selection of these cases will also ensue, to assure the reader that the best possible cases for the purposes of the study have been chosen. After describing the research methodology and design and the data collection process, potential shortcomings of the selected method will be discussed.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

As Abend (2008: 173) writes, theories explain, predict and understand phenomena and, oftentimes, challenge and extend knowledge. Additionally, Crowe, Cresswell, Robertson, Huby, Avery and Sheikh (2011: 7) point out the importance of a theoretical framework for the methodology of a study, as it helps integrate diverse sources of data and examine emerging themes. Realism is one such theory that could be used to understand migration and the response
and role of states in the process of migration. Realism centers on the notion that global politics is characterised by self-interested states operating in an anarchic world (Baldwin 1993: 4, Buzan 1996: 60, Morgenthau 1978). Therefore, states are the most important actors in global politics, external factors guide their objectives and, because no state will risk its own interests for the sake of global peace, an imbalance of power is necessary and better than anarchy (Lascurettes, 2002: 878). Realism does not focus on the security of individuals, but of states.

The two theoretical tools that have proven particularly useful for this thesis, especially when used together, are feminist security theory and the human security approach. These tools are most appropriate and useful, in terms of explanatory use and have guided the process of formulating research questions and the selection of a research method, adding substance to the why and how of this thesis. Since the thesis grapples with whether state responses exacerbate or lessen human insecurity of migrants and uses a gendered approach as far as possible, feminist security theory and human security are most insightful. The theories discussed below help identify and define the research questions and discern which insights and information are useful and which are not.

Various concepts, theories and models are used to study migration processes and policies. Everett Lee’s Theory of Migration, for example, describes factors that determine the decision to migrate and the process of migration, whereas Duncan posits a theory of migration that is concerned with the causes of migration of population engaged in agriculture and Standing Guy’s theory of Materialism. There is also the Neoclassical theory, which has been criticised for not considering country-specific institutional and structural variables (Kurekova, 2011: 1). Ravenstein’s Laws of Migration in 1885, which was the first work attempting to theorise migration, identifies generalisations that are accepted even today, and Stouffer introduced his model in 1960, suggesting that the number of migrants is proportionate to the number of opportunities at a destination.

### 3.3 Human Security: A Human-Centric approach

The value of the Human Security approach lies in what Gazizullin (2016) refers to as its “‘human-centric’ vision”, which calls for the assessment of security risks and the understanding that “when a human faces a threat, so does international security”. Therefore, the focus shifts from the state to the individual. Human Security theory will provide this study with key insights and considerations, as it will deal with the question: ‘How do threats to migrants impact
international security’? In the current global era, globalisation has ensured that no state goes unaffected by global phenomena. The migrant crisis is evidence of this.

According to Amartya Sen (2014: 17), human security can be understood as “the protection and preservation of human ‘survival’ and ‘daily life’ […] and the avoidance of various indignities that can shower injury, insult and contempt on our lives”. Furthermore, the following elements, thus, characterise human security theory: a focus on individual lives, acknowledging the role of society and social arrangements in protecting citizens, emphasising risks of human lives as opposed to their freedoms and pin-pointing more elementary human rights (Sen, 2014: 18). Important for this thesis, is the institutionalising of human security; as the UN Commission on Human Security launched in 2001 presented a report in 2003, highlighting the need for “policies and institutions [to] respond in new ways to protect individuals and communities and to empower them to thrive” (Sen, 2014: 26). Therefore, security needs to be people-centred, rather than state-centred. Lastly, human security seeks to forge an alliance between individuals and the state (Sen, 2014: 27). This highlights that human security theory does not regard individuals and the state as completely autonomous but acknowledges that the relationship between the two is mutual.

Central to human security theory are concepts such as vulnerability and capability, which the theory is said to moderate and manage (Gasper, 2014: 35). Gasper (2014: 37 – 39) points out that human security theory’s success depends largely on the contexts of its use, as it has the capacity to generate fresh case-specific insights, and highlights issues of system re-redesign to reduce chances of crises, instead of merely responses, for purposes of policy-design, serving a reorientation purpose for policy analysis, and, lastly, builds a type of intellectual bridge and promotes solidarity. Just like this thesis hopes to achieve, human security theory advances the ability to imagine how others live and feel (Gasper, 2014: 39).

Christie (2010: 175) cites critical feminist literature as the first body of scholarship that employs human security, not only as a subject of study but as a framework for analysis and policy. In doing so, he uses the theory to emphasise insecurities, re-defining security to focus on women and children, addressing gendered insecurities, whilst challenging dominant patriarchal definitions of what security is and whom it protects (Christie, 2010: 180). Therefore, the specific challenges and threats by women and children are recognised. A drawback of emphasising this, however, remains that this might reproduce or reinforce narratives and practices that response to the woman victim (Christie, 2010: 184).
According to Fierke (2015: 157), the vulnerability of individuals poses a threat to global security, therefore the following are intrinsic to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. States do, however, indeed influence the creation and maintaining structures of authority and responsibility (Fierke, 2015: 159 and Sjoberg, 2009: 205 – 206). This is useful for the study, in that it seeks to understand the role that EU Member States play in the protection of migrants, how they have maintained authority amidst the changes that have taken place post-Arab Spring and what they consider their responsibilities.

Vietti and Scribner (2013) undertake the task of comparing the human security model to the state security model and find that the human security model provides a more effective approach to challenges posed by mass migration. They believe that a human security approach seeks to put into place “systems that ‘complement state security, enhance human rights and strengthen human development’” and protect individuals against threats and empower them (Vietti & Scribner, 2013: 18). A human security approach is also intended to emphasise the factors that contribute to migration flows and seeks to address these prior to migration (Vietti & Scribner, 2013: 23). Human security highlights the need to introduce legal protection for migrants as well as establish institutions and structures that enforce these, especially as migrants are vulnerable to sexual abuse, sexual and physical violence in transit and human trafficking and smuggling (Vietti & Scribner, 2013: 26).

According to Gasper and Sinatti (2016: 3 – 5), human security is a people-centred framework, rather than a precise theoretical model, that explores specificity, diversity and complexity whilst focusing on basic human rights and needs, yet simultaneously acknowledging the role of power and the state. They have also differentiated four scales of ambition of this framework and the second, “human security analysis as a distinctive approach to analysing human/social realities/problems”, is the most applicable to this study (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 5). Similar to FST, HST asks whose security, security of what and security as judged by whom (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 6). In line with the aims of the study, HST emphasises vulnerabilities, risks and forces of disruption and destruction, seeks to identify structural barriers migrants face, including those of power (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 8, 10).

Gasper and Sinatti (2016: 18) provide insights into the shortcomings of HST, which has often been criticised for securitising issues and generalising, however, it tries to counter this by focusing on specifics in cases. Furthermore, the framework should be coupled with other
approaches so as to prevent vague and broad findings (Gasper and Sinatti, 2016: 20). Furthermore, Sjoberg (2009: 206 – 207) points out critique of HST as being atheoretical, indeterminate and potentially causing a return to a top-down approach. HST has been criticised for being such a broad concept and that it can be used in a way that legimitises state control over society for protection (Fierke, 2015: 159 – 160).

3.4 Feminist Security Theory: Linking everyday experiences to security

Feminist Security Theory asks who is welcome and allowed, and who is not and recognises that “migrant bodies are racialised as well as classed and gendered” (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 254). A gendered perspective of migration points out that the entire process, despite whose decision it is to leave, is gendered according to roles and relationships in the home, available work at home and abroad, forms of violence, exploitation, violence and discrimination in new states and are also related to other body differences, such as race, class and nationality (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 254).

The theory also considers citizenship, asking how membership impacts insiders and outsiders, how they are engaged and holding that “how a state treats its non-citizens is as important for democracy, gender equality and human rights, as how it treats its citizens” (Pettman & Hall, 2014: 261). According to Blanchard (2003: 1290), the theory asks: who is being secured by security policies and recovers women’s experiences, bearing in mind gender-based exclusion from decision-making roles, and questions the degree to which women are “secured by state ‘protection’ in times of war and peace”. By challenging ideas of protection by problematising the state in its role as protector and power to protect and emphasising the effects and consequences of migration on migrants, Feminist Security Theory is a valuable framework through which to approach the topic of this thesis.

IR scholarship traditionally focused on states rather than people, however, feminist critical theory examines prevailing assumptions about women and men, on people rather than the state (Whitworth, 2008: 106). According to feminist theorists, gender-neutral scholarship focuses on interactions between states and other groups, neglecting consequences for people, and, where they do focus on people, it is mostly on men as participants (Whitworth, 2008: 107 – 108). Therefore, feminist accounts focus on the impacts of war on women and men and considers the agency of women in these processes. Sjoberg (2009: 206) argues that feminist security theorists use gender as the central category for analyses of inequality surrounding social structures, namely gender hierarchies and how they negatively impact the security of
people. Feminist scholars challenge the traditional view of IR that international security revolves around issues of war and peace, focusing on military strategy and, instead, ask who is secured by security policies (Blanchard, 2003: 1289 – 1290).

Feminist Security Theory makes several key contributions to IR theory. Firstly, it considers everyday politics of security rather than ‘high politics’ and recasts the state, problematising it and questioning it as the protector of women (Blanchard, 2003: 1294 & 1297). This means that it is no longer only high politics that are studied, but also security on the ground, asking what the role of the state is as protector of women. Furthermore, it redesigns violence to include structural forms of violence where the economic and environmental insecurity of individuals is caused by domestic and international structures of political and economic oppression (Blanchard, 2003: 1297 – 1298). Furthermore, it highlights the connection between women’s everyday experiences and security, critiquing the state, acknowledging the effects of structural violence and focusing on inequality and emancipation (Blanchard, 2003: 1298). In its consideration of peace, war and masculinity, FST magnifies women’s wartime roles as victims, protestors, promoters and participants and pays close attention to the effects of war on civilians (Blanchard, 2003: 1300). Therefore, FST provides a type of revision of security if it would prioritise gender and, in doing so, it seeks to expose gendered hierarchies, eliminate patriarchal structural violence and achieve a common security (Blanchard, 2003: 1305).

Important for this thesis, which focuses on the human security of migrants, feminist security theory contributes as it focuses on protection, and the relationship between protection and state power (Blanchard, 2003: 1297). Tickner (2004: 45), using a bottom-up approach and analysing the impact of conflict at the micro level, whilst making sense of how physical and structural violence compromises the security of individuals and groups, highlights how Feminist Security Theory explains how social, political and economic structures of inequality that oppress people are legitimated and maintained.

3.5 Why the Human Security framework & Feminist Security Theory?

Alternative theoretical approaches could have contributed well to this study. For example, a realist or liberal approach would focus on the interests and actions of the European Union and individual states in migration processes and policies towards migrants from North Africa. A constructivist approach would have highlighted the role of ideas and beliefs, and the relationship between agency and structures, in migration to Europe, whereas a Marxist approach would have focused on the repressive role of capitalism, as borders exacerbate
inequality and dependency, and limitations to the labour market. However, the Human Security framework emphasises the individual experience and micro-level implications of macro-level decisions. Though not the same, feminist security theory and human security theory share common values, as they both recognise the importance of studying those who are at the margins of global politics, sharing what Ann Tickner calls a ‘bottom-up’ strategy to security that focuses on the individual rather than the state (Sjoberg, 2009: 206).

Feminism forces IR to acknowledge intersectionalities that interact with gender, such as class, race and ethnicity and to understand that the combination of these has implications, not merely each intersectionality on its own (Smith, 2018). This compels one to identify how women and men’s roles have been constructed, how each group is included and excluded from decision making processes and power. The aim of this study is to identify the nature of migration processes, policies and responses towards economic migrants in the EU and, to best illustrate this, the human security approach the first theoretical point of departure. Secondly, because the study seeks to include women, the Feminist Security Theory is the second theoretical contribution to this study. A combination of the two should provide IR scholarship with more insight on how migration processes and policies are gendered towards economic migrants from North Africa. As Steans (2006: 64) wrote, “one does not have to be a feminist to embrace a broad conception of ‘human security’, but there is a great deal of overlap between feminist interests and concerns and the human security approach”.

Steans (2006: 63) believes that feminist perspectives on security include the economic, political, social and personal circumstances of individuals. Furthermore, a people-centred approach allows for women to show that “gender hierarchies and inequalities in powers constitute a major source of domination and obstacles to the achievement of genuine security” (Steans, 2006: 76). It is also important to pay attention to indirect and structural violence. Whereas human security focuses on individual security needs of individuals, feminist security theory looks at social security, emphasising the need to pair a normative approach with an interpretative approach, thus requiring clarification of who is being discussed, in which context, where and for what purposes (Sjoberg, 2009: 206). Gasper and Sinatti (2016: 22) recommend that human security analysis be paired with gender analysis and feminist theory to best provide insights into the vulnerabilities and exploitation of migrant women.
3.6 Challenging Realism

Realism, at its core, holds that the state is the principle actor in IR and, though other bodies exist and exert influence over IR, the state holds more power in this regard than other actors (Antunes & Camisão, 2018: 15). However, the theoretical tools employed in this study counter realist notions and concepts in a several ways. Firstly, the study recognises the impact of migration and bodies of migrants as very powerful in shaping IR, such to the degree that the phenomenon has been dubbed a ‘crisis’, thus illustrating the limited control of the state. Additionally, the notion of the state having ‘no one to call’ during international emergencies and having to rely upon itself, is also challenged, especially as it is the EU that is being studied (Antunes & Camisão, 2018: 15).

As a regional bloc, the EU is expected to act in unison and the study will also make sense of how member states have banded together, or not, in response to irregular migration from North Africa. Despite realism’s focus on protecting the state and its interests, this study holds the interests of the individual in higher regard. Thus, the intended goal is not to perpetuate violent or highly-securitised responses to migration, but rather cooperative and human security-focused responses. This study highlights the actions of migrants, the risks and threats they face at the micro level and, in doing so, concerns itself with aspects of IR that are not central to realism. Another concept of realism challenged by this study is the ‘balance of power’ concept, which concerns itself with how the state, in continuous competition with other states for power, advances itself (Antunes & Camisão, 2018: 18). Rather, this study considers how states have responded to migration and in doing so, seeking to protect itself and the region, not with the goal of gaining power and, by taking a bottom-up approach, the study counters realism’s top-down approach.

3.7 Research design & Methodology

To answer the research questions and meet the research objectives of this thesis, a unique investigation and critical analysis will be required. The chosen method of inquiry for this thesis, is to conduct research by using migration from Libya in North Africa to the EU through secondary sources. This ought to assist in determining the extent to which states are committed to adhering to national and regional legislation and policies and how these compete with their national interests. According to Castles (2007: 13), most migration research take on mixed-method approaches, since quantitative research obtains comparative data to describe macro-social changes and qualitative methods provide insight into individual and community-level actions and contexts.
Mouton (2001) provides great insights into different research designs, differentiating between empirical and non-empirical studies, primary data and existing/secondary data, numerical versus textual data and the extent of control in either highly structured conditions or natural field settings. The study that is being undertaken is an analysis of secondary data (Mouton, 2001: 144). Since textual data will be consulted and the extent of control in the study is low, the study can be categorised as a textual analysis (Mouton, 2001: 146).

3.8 A Case in Study

The selected research method for the study, is the exploratory case study approach, which draws on Italy and France to demonstrate arguments and seeks to provide in-depth insights. As such, the study draws on the case study approach to guide the research process. Therefore, through the exploration and investigation of the processes undergone by and policies applicable to economic migrants from North Africa to two EU member states will be presented. Zainal (2007: 2) has described the case study method as unique and particularly useful for observing data and providing insights at the micro level. Though some scholars differ on the ability of the case study approach to do so, this approach is especially useful for providing descriptive insights, such as questions pertaining to the who, what, where, why and how, though quantitative analysis is said to be more useful for the how and why (Kitchenham, 2010: 564 & Crowe et al., 2011: 4).

Case studies can be grouped into three distinct categories: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Exploratory case studies explore phenomena that appeal to the interest of the researcher, descriptive case studies describe phenomena and explanatory case studies examine data at surface and a deeper level to explain the phenomena (Zainal, 2007: 3). Crowe et al. (2011: 2 & 5) attribute the selection of a case that will be studied to a range of factors, depending on the type of study, of which there are three: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. An intrinsic study is taken on to learn about a phenomenon, whilst being defined by its uniqueness, an instrumental study focuses on a specific case to gain a broader understanding of a phenomenon and a collective study considers more than one cases (Crowe et al., 2011: 1 – 2).

An exploratory case study method has provided value for the study in that it is deemed useful for its contributions that allow one to study a phenomenon in-depth and in a real-life, or natural, context (Zainal, 2007: 2, 5 & Crowe et al. 2011: 7 – 8). The research approach adopted, to conduct a study and illustrate using Italy and France, has been selected for its relevance to the
study’s research question and objectives as well as its relationship to the theoretical framework. In using this research approach, the study hopes to produce insightful and useful findings that are without bias and align with the theoretical framework. Most valuable for the study, according to the thesis’s theoretical underpinnings, is the fact that this research method allows for insight at the micro level, therefore, aligning with the human-centric goal of the thesis.

3.9 Italy & France

Crowe et al. (2011: 5) point out the necessity to define the case being studied and to explain its selection and highlight the role of the research questions, existing literature and theoretical issues in this process. The reason why Italy has been selected as the main case of study for this thesis, is the influx of economic migrants from North Africa that arrived in Italy when migration intensified in 2015 and the ways in which the Italian government has responded to and managed this influx. Furthermore, by identifying the push and pull factors of people to the European Union, the relationship between these factors ought to provide clarity on the nature of migration management, considering the changes brought about by globalisation. By studying the case of Italy, as an example of an EU Member State, this thesis hopes to provide a clearer understanding of how big of a priority migrants are in Europe, to what extent these states provide migrants with protection and access to a higher standard of living. Though Italy is the main study site for the thesis, France will also be analysed and used to illustrate aspects of migration management in order to provide further insights for the study.

Furthermore, specific instances of human rights abuses, especially concerning women and children, living conditions inside camps, the treatment of migrants during screening processes, and actions taken by security forces will be discussed. This thesis seeks to understand the ‘push and pull’ factors and the precariousness these cause in migrants’ lives and journeys. Although the study considers the period between 2011 and mid-2018, it focuses predominantly on 2015 and thereafter. The Arab Spring started in 2010, gained momentum in 2011 and the migrant crisis broke out in 2015. Furthermore, 2011 was the year that the migration crisis entered the stage of the international community with such prominence and captured the world’s attention. Since 2015, it has continued to feature in news media across the world, but more so, migration from North Africa to Europe persists to this day, despite the horrors that have occurred and the increased securitisation measures that have been taken.

Before providing an overview and discussion of Italy and France, it is necessary to elaborate how the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis resonates with these cases. In other words,
providing a theory-driven approach to define the cases that will be studied should strongly and adequately substantiate the reason for selecting these specific cases. It is important to recall the central concerns and concepts of the two theoretical frameworks shaping this thesis. Firstly, FST, challenging ideas of protection and focusing on everyday politics, asks who is welcome and who not, reminding us that how a state treats non-citizens is as important for democracy as how it treats its citizens. This thesis has employed FST to consider the experience of migrant men and women and will include and concentrate on women wherever possible. Thus, the cases of Italy and France are important sites to answer questions posed by FST, as the thesis goes on to identify how their governments have responded to the migrant crisis and taken up the responsibility to protect.

By looking at how these states treat migrants, especially where it concerns the conditions of reception facilities, relocation and security measures, these questions will be answered. Studying these cases should also provide meaningful insights about structural forms of violence and the relationship between state power and the protection of migrants. Secondly, as human security theory does, this study will focus on the security of individuals, and the responses of policies and institutions, to determine whether migrants are protected and how. Lastly, the study will produce findings about the vulnerabilities of migrants in Italy and France, as a reflection of the vulnerabilities they face across Europe, and their capabilities and agency. Italy, and France have experienced the migrant crisis in diverse ways; Italy, for example, is a popular destination country for migrants, whereas France is a popular transit country, especially for migrants hoping to reach the United Kingdom.

Each of these states has been characterised by a unique set of challenges related to migration, however, combined, they convey a message of the challenges posed to the EU and pitfalls of its migration management strategies. The biggest challenges these states have had to deal with have demanded attention and clearly illustrate how the human security of migrants is under threat. In Italy, the trafficking of migrant women, lack of care for survivors of violence as well as gender-based violence, increased border controls, the toxic political debate around migration and the barriers to migrant women receiving abortions have emerged as the biggest issues related to migration. Demanding global attention towards France, has been the conditions of previous refugee camp Calais, which was dismantled in 2016, but continues to house migrants, the sexual exploitation, violence and forced labour that unaccompanied minors are subjected to, relocations to seemingly substandard facilities and police harassment towards migrants and aid workers, especially in Calais (Human Rights Watch, 2017 & 2018). These issues are
directly related to human security and, therefore, qualify Italy and France as relevant and suitable cases to be studied for the thesis. The similarities as destination countries for migrants, the challenges they face, and their responses are enough to relate them to one another, yet the differences are enough to require that all three feature in this study.

Towards the end of 2016, the Human Rights Watch (2016) found that 164,695 migrants and asylum seekers had reached Italy by sea, comprising mostly Nigerians, Eritreans, and Sudanese and France had received 2091 asylum seekers relocated from Greece and 231 from Italy. Additionally, the numbers of unaccompanied children had increased significantly, and an estimated 23,000 migrant children were traveling alone to Italy by mid-September 2016, compared to 12,360 in 2015. Though new asylum applications increased in 2016, so did rejection rates, due to tightened border controls by neighbouring countries, which prevented onward movement of refugees and migrants. On the list of top desired destination countries for migrants between 2010 and 2015, France ranks Italy, which trails by only 0.2 per cent. One could reason that France is preferred because it is often used to access the UK, which is ranked as the second most desired destination country (IOM, 2018).

Since the crisis of 2015, Italy has intensified negotiations with countries such as Sudan, Gambia, and Libya on migration control. In Italy, which has witnessed increased intolerance towards migrants amongst citizens, there has been much anger over the government’s inability to decrease the number of migrants. 2014 (2018) indicates that there were 119,000 illegal Mediterranean crossings to Italy in 2017, despite a reduction of these by a third, highlighting that, since 2013, Italy has absorbed close to 700,000 migrants arriving by boat from Libya. Figures for 1 January 2018 and 28 February 2018 illustrate that Italy received a total of 5,247 arrivals by sea with 316 deaths, Spain received 2,306 migrants with 102 deaths and Greece and Cyprus received 2,653 migrants and 37 migrants respectively, both without deaths (Mediterranean Update, 2018). Unable to engage with Libya on land due to continued political conflict, the EU has invested in the LCG and, more importantly, Italy has engaged with Libya’s Government of National Accord and municipalities providing aid in return for border and migration control (Micaleff & Reitano, 2018). The UNHCR also provides up-to-date data, where statistics read that 16,739 migrants have travelled to Italy and 18,723 to Spain in 2018 thus far (UNHCR, 2018).
3.10 Analysis of Secondary Data

Secondary data will be consulted in this thesis, most being collected by studying news articles, articles featuring on the websites of non-profit and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)\(^\text{10}\) that carry out research on issues relating to human rights, human security, academic literature and official statements released by these states. Grey literature will also be consulted for the value it provides in conveying urgent issues and illustrations thereof. For example, there is very limited scholarly literature available that deals with the dangers and threats women migrants face, however, these issues abound in grey literature.

There is a wealth of information available on this topic and this could cause the process to take longer. An important aspect that has been considered in this regard, is that sources be carefully selected to ensure that the study’s findings are reliable and unbiased. Only English sources were used for the study. Due to budgetary constraints, primary data will not be collected. To travel to these states and be granted permission to access refugees at specific sites would prove a giant task and would require more time and resources than possible. Therefore, sources such as Human Rights Watch, which is also constantly updated, and the International Organisation for Migration will be particularly useful for data and staying abreast of developments.

3.11 Shortcomings & Limitations

Several shortcomings surround the particular methodology selected for this study, however, being mindful of them throughout the process could help reduce the effects of these on the study and, more importantly, its findings. Because an exploratory case study approach has shaped the study, results cannot be easily generalisable (Mouton, 2001: 150). Thus, the research findings and conclusions might not be applicable to other countries in the European Union. Furthermore, it is expected that the examples in the study will illustrate and carry the sentiments of the greater EU, therefore, this concern, though valid do not pose a great challenge to this study.

3.12 Value for international, migration and gender studies

The first contribution that this thesis will make to the field of study is that it seeks to inform theory; it will illustrate the use of the Human Security framework and Feminist Security Theory in the current global era. By applying it to the context of migration to Europe, it offers a link to international relations theories and migration and gender studies. Practically, it will provide

\(^{10}\) NGO refers to non-state actors and organisations that have provided assistance to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers during the migrant crisis.
insights into the perception of migration and migrants held within the EU, as well as the sentiments amongst local populations. In the pursuit of meeting the research objectives, the thesis will provide the field with an overview of the factors pushing migrants out of Africa and towards Europe and how these add to the precariousness of migrant women’s lives and to understand the EU’s role in this process too.

This thesis hopes to contribute to political science and international studies, a gendered consideration of the processes of migration in order to achieve the same objective that Fierke (2015: 10) set out to: “expose the silences and exclusions and highlight the insecurity of those marginalised by practices of state or global security”. It seeks to reiterate that the security of individuals is important for state security and draw attention to the deficits of EU protection in its response to and management of the migrant crisis. By highlighting the vulnerabilities and inadequate protection of migrants from a gender perspective, it will provide the opportunity to recognise the issues that need to be addressed so that the human security of migrants can feature at the top of the EU’s agenda.

3.13 Chapter Summary
This chapter has explained in detail the methodology of the study, as it has discussed various aspects that comprise the study, that will form the basis of the thesis. Starting with the theoretical frameworks, the Human Security approach and Feminist Security Theory have proven to be the most suitable and comprehensive tools from which to develop the study. They resonate deeply with the research question and objectives and adopt a human-centric approach that emphasises insecurities of migrants, re-defining security and challenge patriarchal forms of security to include women and children and prioritise the individual above the state. These theoretical tools also challenge realism in that they, very importantly, acknowledge the agency of individuals to shape international relations, emphasise the power of individuals and question the responses of states in times of crises.

Providing substantiation for the exploratory case study method and approach that has been chosen for this study has highlighted the value thereof. This method will produce impact and focus for the study, will allow for a certain degree of flexibility so that new findings may be incorporated and will make for intriguing insights into the cases under study. The most prominent features common to both cases that will be studied are the conditions at various facilities, whether it be reception facilities, detention facilities or camps, challenges that come with relocation and resettlement programs, the role played by security forces and how these
have been criticised and, lastly, how they have served as destinations and/or transit countries that migrants travel through to reach other destinations.
Chapter 4: Secondary Data Analysis

4.1. Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the thesis with data to answer the research question and to meet its objectives in a clear and comprehensive manner. By conducting research in line with the methodology described in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide necessary insights that will allow the thesis to meet its objectives. An exploratory case study method, in which arguments will be illustrated by using examples from Italy and France, has been adopted in conjunction with a set of criteria, which has been listed below. Italy and France will be studied in relation to this set of criteria, with documentary sources, internet sources and grey literature providing the sources for data collection. The theoretical frameworks, FST and Human Security Theory, have formed the basis of the research and have provided the lenses through which to approach, select and extract data that is most useful to the outcomes of the thesis. As such, the theoretical basis of the thesis has helped identify a set of criteria that guided the study’s analysis of secondary data. These include: push and pull factors, state responses to migration and migrants, through its policies, the categorisation process that migrants undergo, securitisation as a response to the influx of migrants and the responses of citizens as a mirror of state response. Furthermore, the threats and dangers that migrant women and children face during the process of migration, at reception, their sexual exploitation and reproductive challenges, have guided the research and provided insights to meet the research objectives.

The chapter commences with a brief overview of the notion of the carceral state and how the detention of migrants is a human security issue and then moves onto a discussion of the push and pull factors of migration from North Africa to Europe. To understand the gendered nature of the policies and processes towards North African migrants in the EU, a set of criteria has been identified. The first two items are entry policies and how these have related to EU regulation, and the categorisation of persons upon arrival, asking whether they are classified as asylum seekers, migrants or refugees and, importantly, what does this process look like.

Then, biases towards countries of origin on the part of receiving countries and securitisation activities will be analysed. The latter will focus on how states have responded to the migrant crisis and the inflow of migrants, highlighting how these responses project the idea of this inflow as a security issue rather than a humanitarian one. Under this topic, the Hotspot Approach, border control measures, the idea of Fortress Europe and role-players in this, search
and rescue (SAR)\textsuperscript{11} activities, relocation and resettlement of arrivals to the EU, and the recent increase in port closures will be discussed. Finally, data on the sentiments and responses of citizens to these migrants will be included, as will insights on the threats and dangers that women migrants who travel from North Africa experience and the gender-specific challenges they are faced with.

As discussed in Chapter 3, certain concepts are central to the human security framework. Vulnerability and agency, for example, are central to the framework, as the threats and ensuing vulnerabilities people face are considered. Furthermore, their capabilities and limitations on these are also important. Additionally, FST also provides useful conceptual tools such as the consideration of economic, political, social and personal circumstances of individuals. These impact the decision to migrate, the migration experience and the success of migration to Europe. Structural violence is also an important concept to consider, as states that consider the migrant crisis as a security threat, respond to economic migrants with various forms of structural violence, which will also be illustrated in this chapter. These theoretical contributions will be used to analyse the data collected, to illustrate how the data relates to theory. The chapter will provide various insights that will contribute to the conclusions and findings that will be discussed in the fifth and concluding chapter of the thesis.

\subsection*{4.2 The Carceral State}

Some have noted that the most regular, direct and evident contact people have had with the government, has been through prisons, courts or police stations (Weaver and Lerman, 2010: 2–3). The carceral state, a state modelled on the idea of a prison where physical boundaries are employed to control urban space, though restrictive to citizens, is especially intimidating to vulnerable groups, such as migrants, who are detained. When irregular migrants are considered as criminal and a threat to security, they are stripped of their rights, privileges and social support (Weaver and Lerman, 2010: 4).

Furthermore, efforts to control immigration steer the dynamics that policing and confinement have on society and determines who is defined and policed as deportable (Hernandez, Muhammad and Thompson, 2015: 19 & Hester, 2015: 141–142). Therefore, whilst the power of states and police to increase surveillance and detain is strengthened, the vulnerability of migrants is exacerbated. This chapter seeks to identify what makes Italy and France carceral.

\textsuperscript{11} SAR refers to search and rescue activities that involve the patrolling of the Mediterranean ocean in search of vessels and persons in distress, rescue missions to those people and vessels, the provision of aid to organisations rescuing people at sea and the return of people to mainland Europe.
states, considering their response to the inflow of irregular migrants. Therefore, it interrogates the methods used to determine refugee status, conduct SAR operations, to control borders and close ports and decisions that are made about where to send migrants that have not been given refugee status.

4.3 Push & Pull Factors

Push and pull factors are those which push migrants out of their countries of origin and, in the case of the Arab Spring, transit countries, and those which pull migrants towards destination countries. It is necessary to highlight these factors, as these are the reasons migrants leave North Africa, despite the ominous journeys that lie ahead, and the reasons that pull them toward Europe, as opposed to other regions. In doing so, one can understand that which is threatening the wellbeing of migrants, yet providing them with hope. Without these factors, the migrant crisis would not have looked the same as it has. The conflict in North Africa, democratic ideals and economic opportunity emerge as the main driving factors for migration from North Africa to Europe and, though some factors weigh heavier in the decision to migrate, they are not exclusive of one another.

4.3.1 Push Factors

4.3.1.1 Conflict in North Africa

Although North Africa has a history of instability, after the Arab Spring of 2011 this instability has taken on a new form. Tunisia, for example, which was successfully transitioning to democratic rule, has been undermined by lawlessness in its neighbour, Libya. Libya, an infamous state of departure for irregular migration to Europe, has witnessed disputes between rival authorities, and various abuses against refugees and migrants have been committed in the country, especially in detention camps run by militias, including modern-day slavery (Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2018). Libya is characterised by pervasive corruption in the private sector and in government, as oil interests, foreign governments, smuggling syndicates and armed groups exert major influence, causing crime and corruption to flourish without functioning institutions (Freedom House, Libya Profile, 2018).

With media, academic, religious and organisational freedom sorely lacking, restrictions on freedom of movement and the low regard of civilian’s physical security, Libya is an oppressive country to call home or seek refuge in (Freedom House, Libya Profile, 2018). Women in Libya are especially vulnerable, as a decree issued by the LNA in 2017 bans women under the age of 60 from traveling outside of Libya without a male guardian illustrates (Freedom House, Libya
Rape and sexual violence have also become increasingly problematic in Libya’s lawless environment (Freedom House, *Libya Profile*, 2018). Owing the migrant crisis to conflict, de Orellana (2015) who regards the increased violence in Libya as incentive enough for people to migrate, writes that people fleeing these conditions are refugees and not economic migrants. During a 2017 screening conducted in Sicily, African and Middle Eastern migrants who had been rescued explained that they were fleeing the “chaos, general climate of insecurity and violence in Libya” (*Rescue ship brings 606 migrants to Italy*, BBC, 2017).

Systematic human rights violations towards migrants remains another major push factor for migration out of North Africa including those occurring in countries of origin and transit states, especially Libya, where migrants are robbed, beaten, extorted by employers, common criminals, security forces and militias (Huma Rights Watch, *The Mediterranean Migration Crisis*, 2015: 3 & 19). Many migrants migrating from North Africa to Europe are Eritreans and Somalians who are fleeing oppression in their own countries. Eritrea’s open-ended military conscription, forced labour during conscription, detentions, restrictions of various freedoms, land expropriation and ethnic discrimination are amongst the factors pushing Eritreans, who want to escape one of the least developed countries and failed states in the world, to North Africa and beyond Huma Rights Watch, *The Mediterranean Migration Crisis*, 2015: 13). Somalians, on the other hand, flee sustained armed conflict, attacks by Islamist group Al-Shabaab, African Union troops and militias, sexual violence, detention and conditions that threaten their basic security and rights (Huma Rights Watch, *The Mediterranean Migration Crisis*, 2015: 15 – 16). Therefore, most migrants departing North Africa are pushed out by the turmoil, poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa and instability in Libya, where the safety and employment that existed before the Arab Spring is no longer available (Bajekal, 2015).

Coupled with poor governance and political instability, is the spread of *jihadism* and the impact of ISIS on North Africa and the Sahel region. Thus, ISIS, which has significantly impacted migratory flows from North Africa to Europe, can be regarded as a push factor. With no legitimate government maintaining control and the ISIS has increasingly succeeded in taking over territory, especially in cities such as Benghazi, Derna, Sirte and, the capital, Tripoli (Truhin, Lesovaya & Sultan, 2016: 982). Additionally, the collapse of Libya’s judicial system has accommodated the enforcement of Sharia Law by jihadists. In Libya alone, ISIS has threatened security and peace as attacks on foreign symbols and the raid expansion of the group’s membership in Libya demonstrates (Engel, 2015: 2 – 3). ISIS has also played on the migrant crisis to demonstrate its power and threaten Europe, as a threat made in 2015 to flood
Europe with half a million refugees through Libya and a claim that 4000 jihadist fighters would be commissioned to Europe demonstrates (Schmid, 2016: 8).

4.3.1.2 Modern-day Slavery

Though slavery is not uncommon to North Africa, the International Organisation for Migration has reported findings that produce evidence of slavery in Libya since April 2017. Furthermore, in November 2017, CNN released footage of men being sold by smugglers for approximately $400 at an auction nearby Libya’s capital, Tripoli. International outcry ensued when, the UN human rights office reports the buying and selling of migrants in Libya’s ‘open slave markets’ as well as slavery along migratory routes in North Africa, and especially in Libya, which hosts approximately 700 000 – 1 000 000 migrants, in March 2018 (Naib, 2018 & Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018). The southern Tunisia director of an aid group, the Red Crescent, which shelters migrants arriving in Tunisia from Libya, has said that since mid-2016 there has been an increase in migrant arrivals reporting being traded and sold as slaves (Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018). Events prior to and since illustrate the dark reality that many African migrants face, the reality of men, and sometimes women, travelling to Libya falling prey to slave markets along the migrant routes of North Africa. The lack of rule of law in Libya and the current worsening of the country’s political situation has meant that smuggling, trafficking and the slave trade flourish. However, Nigerian, Somali, Ethiopian, Senegalese, Nigerien and Eritrean victims and survivors, are now sharing their stories of being sold as slaves.

The video released in 2017, showed young Nigerian and other Sub-Saharan African men being sold for $400, described as strong and fit, for the purposes of farm workers (BBC, Libya migrants ‘slave market’ footage sparks outrage, 2017). Most recently, victims of modern-day slavery in Libya are initially held captive as detainees in Libya’s infamous and numerous detention centres, where after, prison guards trade them as slaves, sometimes leasing them out for day labour, where they are exploited (BBC, Migrant Slavery in Libya: Nigerians tell of being used as slaves, 2018). Though each victim’s journey is different, there is a general trend of being misled by smugglers or traffickers, being held ransom and tortured and being sold if they cannot afford the ransom, often repeatedly so. The story of a Gambian man, who was detained and sold describes the business of modern-day slavery in Libya, as one where migrants are bought from one detention centre and sold to another for profit, where migrants are sold for between 300 and 200 dinars, that is $150 and $350 (Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018).
The experience of Harun Ahmed, a young Ethiopian man, who eventually reached Germany and was granted refugee status, illustrates the complexities around the slave trade of migrants in North Africa. His journey started with migration to Sudan and was followed by a journey to Libya, for which he paid $600 to smugglers, however, upon reaching the border, the group he was part of was kidnapped and taken to Chad, where they were taken to a slave market and bought for $4000 each (BBC, *Migrant Crisis: ‘I was sold three times by slave traders’,* 2017). After nearly three months, he and other migrants were resold to a Libyan buyer for $3000 each, less than before because they were malnourished and weaker than before (BBC, *Migrant Crisis: ‘I was sold three times by slave traders’,* 2017). The group was tortured and suffered more abuse in Libya than they had in Chad, but some were released when their families sent ransoms, only to be ambushed by another criminal group and taken to a warehouse, where their freedom would cost them $1000 (BBC, *Migrant Crisis: ‘I was sold three times by slave traders’,* 2017). Eventually, Harun reached Tripoli, where he was lucky enough to work and depart to Italy, and move on to Germany, where he was granted asylum.

In January 2018, Al Jazeera published the testimonies of two Eritreans who had been sold as slaves in Libya on multiple occasions. Sami, who had travelled 3634km to reach Tripoli, was held in an illegal detention centre in Bani Walid where he was forced to witness the torture and death of his friend, who had travelled with him from Eritrea (Naib, 2018). He left but after being caught, was taken back to Bani Walid, where he was removed and taken “to do farming work in return for food and shelter” (Naib, 2018). The other young man, Yonathan, fled Eritrea in 2016 and was smuggled into Libya, where he and the group he was with was sold to smugglers by Libyan guards and held in tin containers without water unless they could pay $5000 to be released (Naib, 2018). In another instance, a Nigerian man, who was part of a group that was intercepted at sea by the LCG, was taken to a detention centre in Gharyan, where, one night, a prison guard entered the prison, removed twenty men who were blindfolded and then discussed prices before putting the men into a vehicle and transporting them to a farm where they performed slave labour, slept on plywood, were unfed for days and guarded by armed men at night (BBC, *Migrant Slavery in Libya: Nigerians tell of being used as slaves,* 2018).

As the experiences of these migrants’ journeys are complex, so are the reasons for their sales. Whereas some are kidnapped by criminal gangs, and told to pay a ransom for their release, others are tortured so that their families, some of whom are in Europe, will pay fees for their release, and others are sold for labour purposes. In some cases, migrants are bought and sold...
for bonded labour or debt slavery, where they work for someone who has paid for their release. The story of a twenty-year-old Nigerien man, Mohammed, who fled his country when he was seventeen years old and was smuggled into Libya, illustrates this, as he was detained by Libyan militia and, eventually, bought and sold into bonded labour (Sherlock & al-Arian, 2018). In such cases, there are no terms of employment for these migrants, as their duration of bonded labour could be indefinite and, regarded as commodities, they sleep and live in extremely dire and inhumane conditions, leading to malnourishment. In another case, a Senegalese man who had been rescued, told that he paid to pass through Niger and a pick-up driver had been arranged, however, the pick-up driver claimed that because the trafficker had not paid him, he would take them to a park, which ended up being a slave market, where he was bought and thereafter held hostage with one hundred other migrants (IOM, IOM Learns of ‘Slave Market’ Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa, 2017). He also told the IOM that women were also bought, and many forced to become sex slaves (IOM, IOM Learns of ‘Slave Market’ Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa, 2017).

4.3.2 Pull Factors

4.3.2.1 Economic Opportunity

Although the largest single category of people displaced by the Arab Spring, especially so in Libya, has been migrant workers, these migrants are not usually legally entitled to claim refugee status, as the status of refugee depends on conditions in the migrant’s country of origin (Koser, 2012). Therefore, legal gaps in the in the international system for the protection or assisting of displaced economic migrants exist. This lack of protection also pushes people out of North Africa in search of a state that will protect them and their human rights, which Europe has to offer. Egypt and Tunisia have closed their borders to most migrants, except for Libyan nationals and those who possess valid documents and stay for a short transit stay (Amnesty International Ltd., Europe’s Sinking Shame, 2015: 8).

Though most migrants travelling from North Africa to Europe are economic migrants from elsewhere in Africa, Libyans themselves also have less incentive to stay in Libya, as the standard of living has dramatically deteriorated post-Arab Spring. Under the rule of Gaddafi, Libya was Africa’s wealthiest nation and had the highest GDP per capita and life expectancy on the African continent, however, post-Arab Spring, Libya’s economy is barely under the government’s control with militias gaining more control over the state’s resources (Chengu, 2014). Before the Gaddafi was overthrown, Libyans had free access to healthcare, education, electricity and interest-free loans, however, today the health-care sector is on the brink of
collapse, many higher education institutions are shut down and the capital experiences power outages (Chengu, 2014). Therefore, Libyan nationals have very little left to stay for themselves. In the hopes of receiving welfare benefits, education and employment, they would rather migrate to Europe than remain in Libya. Economic opportunities in the EU and educational opportunities are especially attractive pull factors for child migrants (Human Rights Watch, Boat Ride to Detention, 2012: 18).

4.4 State Responses

4.4.1 EU Entry Policies

Since the EU’s Schengen Border Code allows for the free movement of EU-member state citizens across borders, more efficient external border controls had to be introduced (European Commission, 2018). Along with this, comes the task of managing inflows of migrants, regardless of origin, to the region. Frontex is tasked with assisting member states with managing migratory flows at external borders and EUROSUR (European Border Surveillance System), an information sharing and cooperation mechanism, helps member states counter cross-border crime, unauthorised border crossings and managing the death toll of migrants at sea (European Commission, 2018). Of the migrants entering the EU, many from North Africa are comprised of asylum seekers, who require international protection, and economic migrants, who are in search of improved living conditions and economic opportunities. Furthermore, and important to the thesis, EU regulation stipulates that victims of human trafficking are supposed to have access to assistance, with the possibility of temporary residence in the EU (European Commission, Irregular Migration & Return, 2018). Common to the case of irregular migrants is that they enter the EU on short-stay visas but remain there for economic purposes after their visas have expired (European Commission, Irregular Migration & Return, 2018).

According to international law, though refugees receive international protection on the grounds of well-founded fear of persecution, those who are at risk of facing serious harm if they return to their country of origin may receive subsidiary protection (Papademetriou, 2016). For the case of illegal economic migrants, however, law requires that they be returned to their country of origin (Papademetriou, 2016). It is with this group of illegal migrants, who are clearly in need of protection and have well-founded reasons for migrating to Europe, that the implementation of international law and standards becomes unclear. The cases of Italy and France illustrate how, despite valid reasons for irregular and illegal migration, migrants do not in reality receive the legal protection and rights that international treaties, such as United Nations Treaty Collection, guarantee to them.
To prevent irregular migration to the EU efforts such as strengthening the mandate of Frontex, introducing evaluation mechanisms of Schengen rules, increasing cooperation between border surveillance authorities and determining rules for surveillance of external sea borders by Frontex, have been made (European Commission, *Irregular Migration & Return*, 2018). Furthermore, the EU ascribes to a humane and effective return policy, which is based on the principle of preference to voluntary return, in accordance with the Return Directive, which guides the return of non-EU nationals who reside in the EU irregularly (European Commission, *Irregular Migration & Return*, 2018).

Member States are, according to EU regulations, expected to guarantee the rights of arrivals to effectively make claims for international protection without hindrances or delay and have to ensure that applicants are able to submit applications with the appropriate authorities (Papademetriou, 2016). The Common Procedures Directive prescribes that well-equipped and qualified personnel handle asylum claims, trained by the EASO and that interviewers accommodate the interviewees (Papademetriou, 2016). Applicants are also subject to interviews and, in the case of large influxes of migrants applying simultaneously, personnel from various national authorities may temporarily conduct these and sufficient time needs to be given for interviewees to present evidence for substantiation of their application (Papademetriou, 2016, Directive 2013/32/EU). Medical examinations may be ordered, if the applicant consents, covered by public funds if the authority deems it necessary (Papademetriou, 2016, Directive 2013/32/EU).

Furthermore, arrivals have the following substantive rights: the right to legal and procedural information in a language they understand, which includes information relating to the right of appeal in the case of negative decisions (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, supra note 32, art. 2, paras. 1 & 2. - Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013), the right to legal assistance, the right to liaise with the UNCHR, the right to remedy (review of negative asylum decision before a court or tribunal), the right to remain in the Member State where they applied until a decision has been made, the right to move freely within that state or an area assigned to them and permission to leave that area, the right to material reception and healthcare (Directive 2013/33/EU). Member States are expected to consider applicants’ age, gender and needs of vulnerable people when housing them, the right of minors to access the state educational system within three months of application as well as preparatory classes, the right to access the labour market within nine months of their application and to vocational training despite access to the labour market (Directive 2011/95/EU). Finally, the detention of applicants for international protection is not
allowed, except on the following grounds: to verify nationality or identity, to determine on which aspects application was based, to review the applicant’s right to enter the territory, where the person is subject to a return procedure, or when it is required to protect national security or public order (Directive 2013/32/EU). Detention needs to be ordered in writing with the grounds for detention stated and the duration needs to be as short as possible, being subject to judicial review and applicants are to have free access to legal representation and assistance (Directive 2013/32/EU).

4.4.1.1 The Dublin Regulation

The Dublin Regulation stipulates the criteria and protocol for determining which member state is responsible for applications for international protection, that is refugee status. In order to prevent individuals from abusing the system by applying for asylum in more than one state and too circumvent having applicants sent from one member state to another by national authorities, it requires that refugees be sent to first country of entry to the EU for processing asylum claims (Papademetriou, 2016). However, the migrant crisis has highlighted how it persists as a structural problem since it places unequal burdens on member states, as the cases of Italy and Greece illustrate. The Regulation allows for the processing of a case, claim or refusal of permission to enter, to be delegated to other national authorities (Papademetriou, 2016). According to the criteria, which includes the existence of family in a member state, the possession of a visa or residence permit for a state and entry into a member state, the member state of in which the application was first submitted takes responsibility for examining it (Papademetriou, 2016).

4.4.1.2. EURODAC

On 20 July 2015, this Regulation came into effect, and a computerised, encrypted and centralised fingerprint database was established, requiring that member states take the fingerprints of all applicants of international protection who are fourteen years and older be taken and forward these, along with other information, to the Central System within seventy-two hours of submitting applications (Papademetriou, 2016). Additionally, the fingerprints of all fingers of all third-country nationals or stateless persons fourteen years and older who are detained by border patrol agencies for irregular border crossings must also be obtained (Papademetriou, 2016). The purpose of this regulation is to maintain a record and verify who is in territory illegally but has filed an application for asylum in another state.
4.4.1.3. The Common European Asylum System

Those who flee their country of origin for fear of persecution or serious harm and need international protection, are considered asylum seekers. CEAS stipulates the minimum standards and procedures for processing and decision-making about asylum applications, the treatment of those regarded as asylum seekers and refugees, however, on the ground twenty-eight different asylum systems are at work (Open Society Foundations, *Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union*, 2018). According to law, asylum seekers are not compelled to claim asylum in the first EU state they arrive in, however, the Dublin Regulation gives permission to states to return asylum seekers to the country of first entry to the EU so that they can process their claim for asylum there (Open Society Foundations, *Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union*, 2018). According to CEAS, states need to agree about the standards of refugee protection and procedures need to be fair and effective throughout the entire bloc, with asylum seekers being welcomed “in a dignified manner”, receiving fair treatment and having their cases “examined to uniformed standards” (European Commission, *Common European Asylum System*, 2018).

Several items of the Geneva Convention ensure the rights of international migrants and refugees. The principle of non-refoulment in article 33, for example, which is central to CEAS, prohibits a member state from returning refugees or asylum seekers to countries where they could be faced with persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership of a certain social or political group (Papademetriou, 2016). Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU safeguards the right to asylum (article 18) and bans the return of a person to a country where a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of torture or degrading treatment exists (Papademetriou, 2016). The European Court of Human Rights judges human rights violations committed by state parties of the European Convention, making provision for bans on inhuman and degrading treatment as well as collective expulsions, the rights to liberty, security, family and private life as well as effective remedy, especially where it concerns reception and detention conditions (Papademetriou, 2016). Lastly, since most of the tragedies of migration from North Africa to Europe occur at sea, maritime law becomes pertinent. According to maritime law, all ships have an obligation to aid vessels in distress and to take rescued passengers to a place of safety (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues put lives at risk*, 2018).
4.4.1.4. French Policies

France has recently signed a new asylum and immigration bill, which has largely impacted the time frame for asylum applications, duration of detainment, rules for deportation, the withdrawal of refugee status, when work in France may resume and family reunification. According to this bill, migrants have 90 days to submit asylum applications, whereas before they had 120 days (Dockery, 2018). Asylum seekers may now be detained for 90 days, twice the previous duration (Dockery, 2018). Asylum seekers can work in France as soon as six months after arrival, as opposed to the previous nine months and, lastly, family reunification can be extended to siblings and children (Dockery, 2018). Furthermore, France now has authority to withdraw refugee status from those who have committed crimes in the EU or a third country that is considered ‘democratic’ (Dockery, 2018). Although some aspects are positive, concerns persist about how this bill limits the scope of asylum cases and doubles the duration of detention, for adult and child migrants alike (France24, Macron’s government passes controversial asylum and immigration law, 2018). Detention, according to international law and EU regulation, should be the last resort, however, the French government appears to be employing it as a normal way of handling migrants.

Where the rights of child migrants and refugees are protected by the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the French government has acted contrary, especially in the manner it has handled child refugees from the refugee camp in Calais, known as the ‘Jungle’. Out of the two thousand children assessed before and after the clearance of the camp, 750 were transferred to the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of 2016, and the 1300 children whose refusal to do so were provided with insufficient reasons (Smith, 2018). Therefore, the French government ignored the rights of these children to information as well as their right to review. Correspondence between UK Border Staff and French officials have illustrated that the French Home Office chose not to provide more information for fear of legal action over the refusals (Smith, 2018). This has resulted in hundreds of unaccompanied children being left to fend for themselves in Calais, without legal protection and denies the rights of child refugees to protection and safe passage.

In July 2018, a migrant camp in Nantes was evacuated due to appalling conditions, however, only 100 could be accommodated in emergency shelters, leaving approximately 300 migrants without shelter (The Local, France, French Police Clear 450 Migrants from Camp in Nantes, 2018). This and efforts to speed up deportations of migrants illustrate a neglect of the human rights of migrants travelling from North Africa in France (The Local, France, French Police Clear 450 Migrants from Camp in Nantes, 2018).
4.4.1.5 Italian Policies

Italy, despite its initial welcoming response when the migrant crisis first broke out, has adopted an increasingly hard-line approach, as the push-back on SAR operations demonstrates. Vessels with migrants on them have been blocked, delayed and prevented from disembarking and nongovernmental rescue organisations (NGROs)\textsuperscript{12} prohibited from carrying out SAR activities in the Mediterranean (Human Rights Watch, \textit{EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues put lives at risk}, 2018). As previously noted, international law requires that those at risk of harm should receive subsidiary protection, however, Italy’s refusal of migrant-carrying vessels and the closing of its ports illustrate its unwillingness to conform to international law. Contravening maritime and refugee law, since Libya is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Italy knowingly returns migrants to a country where their right to apply for asylum is ignored and, thus, where their safety and rights are not safeguarded. Contravening CEAS, Italy does not welcome migrants at all, let alone in a dignified manner. Additionally, humane return policies have also been contravened, as Italy has entered a Memorandum of Understanding with Sudanese police authorities and nationals returned to Sudan where brutality awaits them (Amnesty International, \textit{Italy: Beatings and unlawful expulsions amid EU push to get tough on refugees and migrants}, 2016).

In February 2017, Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya’s Government of National Accord, taking the lead in EU’s building of Libya’s capacity to secure its borders and patrol the Mediterranean (Human Rights Watch, \textit{EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues put lives at risk}, 2018). Contravening the principle of non-refoulment, Italy has breached international law by allowing the LCG to intercept boats carrying migrants and sending them back to Libya for detention, where extreme risk of persecution, torture and degrading treatment is rife. Italy has also contravened the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, which stipulates that a state is legally obliged to provide shelter for a refugee and may not expel or return a refugee to a place where their life or freedom would be endangered, as migrants have been forcibly returned to Libya, where no refugee law or procedure exist (Human Rights Watch, \textit{EU/Italy/Libya: Disputes over rescues put lives at risk}, 2018 & Prakash, 2015). By endorsing the LCG and providing vessels and equipment, Italy is strengthening SAR activities that endanger migrants and leave them more vulnerable. To this day, people trapped in Libyan detention centres endure torture, indefinite detention, extortion and abuse and concerns about

\textsuperscript{12} NGROs refer to non-governmental rescue organisations, which have directed resources and efforts to search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean during the migrant crisis.
the voluntary return programme continuing to expose migrants to abuse in their country of origin remain (Amnesty International, *A year after Italy-Libya migration deal, time to release thousands trapped in misery*, 2018).

Italy has also fallen short where basic provisions for migrants are concerned. Having run out of dry clothes and water for those who arrived with hypothermia, having hundreds sleep outside due to inadequate housing capacity, overcrowding centers, sleeping on dirty mattresses and the inability to provide sufficient towels, blankets or soap, and not separating men and women at reception facilities, Italy’s reception has been poor (Doctors Without Borders, *Italy: Failure to Provide Humane Conditions for Migrants and Refugees*, 2011). Priority treatment, which is meant to include specialised healthcare and mental health support, and a process of informing migrants of their rights and legal procedures available has also been greatly lacking in the past (Doctors Without Borders, *Italy: Failure to Provide Humane Conditions for Migrants and Refugees*, 2011). These inadequacies of Italy’s reception system and the country’s failure to prioritise the health and psychological wellbeing of migrants persisted to the extent that, in 2015, Doctors Without Borders withdrew its medical activities in reception centres in the Ragusa Province of Italy (Doctors Without Borders, *Italy: MSF Ends Activities in Pozzallo Reception Center*, 2015).

The Hotspot Approach has also placed refugees and migrants in vulnerable positions, as authorities beat, electrically shock and sexually humiliate them and forcibly obtain fingerprints (Amnesty International, *Italy: Beatings and unlawful expulsions amid EU push to get tough on refugees and migrants*, 2016). If not through these screening processes, Italy exposes migrants and refugees to abuse by adopting measures to close off migratory routes to Europe, including entering agreements with local authorities in Libya and prohibiting rescue operations by non-governmental rescue organisations (Amnesty International, *Libya: European governments complicit in horrific human rights abuse of refugees and migrants*, 2017).

### 4.4.2 Categorisation of Persons

The UN classifies international migrants as people who change their country of usual residence and this term encompasses asylum-seekers and economic migrants, those who move to improve their living conditions or job opportunities (Bajekal, 2015). Refugees, on the other hand, are those who flee conflict or persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality or membership of a certain social group or political union, whereas asylum-seekers are those who have applied for asylum but whose statuses have not been determined (Bajekal, 2015). Policies define who
is wanted and who is unwanted, which migrants are welcome, and which are not. As such, it is
important to distinguish between the types of migrants in Europe, each of whom differ in
characteristics; different migration motives, type of homeland, gender and ethnicity (Mugge
and van der Haar, 2016: 77). By identifying different characteristics, the realities of migrants
can be understood, according to these unique characteristics. The purpose of this section is to
understand how migrant arrivals to the European Union from North Africa are categorised and,
importantly, to understand the role of the country of origin in processes of categorisation.
Highlighting the impact of a migrant’s country of origin his or her future, Mugge and van der
Heer (2016: 81) summarise that the country of origin determines whether the migrant becomes
a target of integration policy or return policy. Furthermore, migrants from outside the EU are
not simply categorised as ‘third country nationals’ but rather on the basis of their admission
labels; that is, labour migrant, asylum seeker, family migrant, refugee and postcolonial migrant
(Mugge & van der Heer, 2016: 83).

Whereas labour migrants migrate for employment purposes, family migrants migrate to form
a family or be reunited with family members and postcolonial and colonial migrants originate
from countries previously colonised by the destination country (Mugge & van der Heer, 2016:
83). Important to note is the overlap between these categories. In Italy, before the Hotspot
approach was implemented, most arrivals were directly channelled to the asylum system,
however, early identification of irregular migrants became a strategy for separating asylum
seekers from migrants (Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 32). The three main
categories that emerged were, firstly, those claiming asylum, secondly and amongst them, those
who qualified for relocation to another EU state and, lastly, those deemed not in need of
international protection.

The Hotspot Approach, a strategy adopted in Italy to identify and fingerprint arrivals from
North Africa, screen and repatriate those whose asylum applications were refused was integral
to the categorisation of migrant arrivals in Italy. More specifically, screening procedures were
conducted to separate asylum seekers from others who were considered to be irregular migrants
(Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 12). Pre-identification screening in Italy
comprised of interviews of arrivals with police officials, where personal details are registered
and an indication of whether or not they are applying for asylum or not and allows for asylum
seekers to be differentiated from irregularly present persons (Amnesty International, *Hotspot
Italy*, 2016: 12). Though screening processes for the purpose of assessing whether arrivals are
entitled to remain in the EU based on their protection needs, or not, the screening process needs
to consider and protect the human rights of arrivals, considering how these have been abused on the journey to the EU and the trauma caused as a result (Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 32). With a screening process that identified persons not in need of international protection and would consequently be deported or returned to their country of origin, Italy’s screening process breached the principle of non-refoulment (Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 33).

The extent of the involvement of police in this process has also been cause for concern, as law enforcement is not qualified nor trained to handle asylum matters. Whereas before police would merely be present and ask a set of questions upon disembarkation of migrants, the Hotspot Approach allowed them to be involved in questioning around reasons for migration (Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 33). Additionally, this questioning took place after arrivals had been transported to hotspots immediately after disembarkation, whilst some are in shock, and questioning appears simple, with arrivals having limited chance to explain their circumstances and an expectation to provide a clear and concise explanation of their reason for migrating (Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 12). Categories that police officers categorise arrivals into are: ‘job search’, ‘rejoining family’, ‘fleeing from poverty’, ‘fleeing for other reasons’ and ‘to request political asylum’ (Amnesty International, *Hotspot Italy*, 2016: 35). Contravening international and domestic law that refugee status is determined by the situation an individual would face if returned to their country of origin rather than their reasons for leaving, Italy neglects its duty to protect these migrants.

Although the categorisation of migrants looks different in France, there are practices of this process that are cause for concern. Although France is more of a ‘passage’ that migrants use to access the rest of Europe, France has received a large number of refugees, and, to illustrate, in 2015 the state offered asylum to 20 630 refugees (BBC News, *EU migrant crisis: France plans asylum ‘hotspots’ in Libya*, 2017). Despite the initial welcoming spirit towards arrivals from North Africa, France has increasingly adopted a hardline approach towards arrivals, especially since 2017. Now, only refugees threatened by war and political prisoners are welcomed whilst economic migrants have been accommodated in other ways. In December 2017, regional authorities were ordered to form “mobile teams” that were tasked with forcing undocumented migrants out of emergency shelters confirming Interior Minister Collomb’s stance that France welcomes refugees but not economic migrants (Kern, 2018). Following suit, France planned to introduce hotspots for processing asylum claims in 2017. These hotspots, however, are set to be established in Libya instead of France (BBC News, *EU migrant crisis: France plans asylum*
‘hotspots’ in Libya, 2017). The purpose of these hotspots would be to pre-screen asylum applicants and determine who is ineligible for asylum. Another, and equally infamous aspect of France’s categorisation of migrants, is its age-determination process, which seeks to differentiate between migrant children and adults.

What has been described as a “flawed age assessment system” has left many child migrants without shelter in France (The Local France, Paris: Hundreds of migrant children ‘left homeless due to flawed process’, 2018). The process is meant to distinguish between adult and child migrants in order to determine which migrants are entitled to protection under international law and provisions guaranteed. Many instances in which children are wrongly categorised as adults, based on an inspection of appearance and a short interview, have occurred (The Local France, Paris: Hundreds of migrant children ‘left homeless due to flawed process’, 2018). Further exacerbating the vulnerability of child migrants during this procedure, is that child migrants are often denied interviews when they are unable to provide identity papers (The Local France, Paris: Hundreds of migrant children ‘left homeless due to flawed process’, 2018). Despite the treacherous journeys these child migrants endure, the state of France deals somewhat ruthlessly with them, not accommodating their circumstances, nor responding leniently towards them.

Cases of Italian authorities displaying discriminatory deportation and detention practices illustrate biases towards certain countries of origin. For example, the request of the Interior Minister to reserve 95 places for Nigerian nationals in CPRs/CIEs for their deportation to Nigeria, as agreed to by the Nigerian embassy (Global Detention Project, 2018: 10-11). Italian police were to trace undocumented Nigerian citizens, despite contravening the principle of non-refoulment and non-discrimination (Global Detention Project, 2018: 11). Sudanese nationals have also been on the receiving end of police brutality during fingerprinting procedures (Global Detention Project, 2018: 11). Agreements with countries of origin have also been made, as Italy’s agreement with Sudan illustrates. A group of forty-eight Sudanese refugees were taken from Ventimiglia to a hotspot in Taranto and once on board a flight in Turin, were deported back to Sudan (Global Detention Project, 2018: 12).

4.4.3. Securitisation & Externalisation

Various measures of securitisation and externalisation have been adopted in response to the migrant crisis. France and Italy, though different in detail, have both employed methods of responses that have relied on military, police and coast guard forces, resulting in a highly
securitised environment for migrants, in which states are protecting borders from migrants instead of migrants from human rights abuses. With the end goal of understanding how the migrant crisis has been securitised and how the inflow of migrants has been regarded as a security issue rather than a humanitarian issue, this section draws attention to various components of how Italy and France have employed securitisation in its response to the crisis. These aspects include measures of border control, SAR activities and associated complexities, relocation and resettlement (R&R), the closing of ports and refusal of disembarkation and the Hotspot Approach.

4.4.3.1 Border Control

The idea of ‘Fortress Europe’ has come to sum up the “increasingly impenetrable fortress” that has been built to keep irregular migrants out of Europe, to defend its borders using sophisticated surveillance measures (Amnesty International, *The Human Cost of Fortress Europe*, 2014: 5). Measures have included the closing off safe routes by erecting fences, increased surveillance and the deployment of security forces and the detention of migrants and refugees in transit countries where rights are abused. This comprises ‘Fortress Europe’ (Amnesty International, *The Human Cost of Fortress Europe*, 2014: 6). Financial support for these measures compared to that given to the support of asylum procedures illustrate this (Amnesty International, *The Human Cost of Fortress Europe*, 2014: 9). Central to ‘Fortress Europe’, has been border control measures that have been adopted by EU member states and third countries, such as Libya, as part of efforts to monitor borders to regulate the movement of people. The most prominent border control measures adopted have included Frontex operations, clampdowns on NGROs and the increased capacity and mandate of the Libyan Coastguard in managing migration from North Africa to Europe.

4.4.3.2 Frontex

Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, responsible for co-ordinating joint operations between EU member states on the external sea, land and air borders of the EU, has resumed patrolling activities outside of EU’s territory. According to Regulation (EU) 656/2014 SAR activities are to be initiated whenever it appears a vessel’s conditions does not allow for safe travel (Amnesty International, *Lives Adrift*, 2014: 56). The principle of non-refoulment also holds for non-state actors, such as Frontex (Amnesty International, *The Human Cost*, 2014: 13). To illustrate the disproportionate resources given towards border control and refugee support, in 2014, Frontex had a budget of €89.2 million whereas the European Asylum Support Office had €15.6 million (Amnesty International, *The Human Cost*, 2014: 16).
In August 2014, Operation Triton was set up to assist Italy with patrolling Europe’s southern sea borders after Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), acclaimed for its humanitarian results and the extension of its activities into Maltese and Libyan SAR zones, ended (Amnesty International, *Lives Adrift*, 2014: 8, 23 & Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 10). Operation Triton, however, patrolled a much smaller zone than OMN had. Frontex has also been instrumental to the plight of reducing the presence of NGROs, as, since 2016, reports have explained the presence of these as a contributing factor to illegal immigration (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 47). EUNAVFORMED, the joint military operation launched in June 2015, aimed at identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels to curb human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean, also carried out SAR activities (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 11). In June 2016, the naval operation mandate was amended to include capacity-building and training of the Libyan navy and the LCG (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 45). Concerns about an agency tasked with controlling borders focusing on SAR and guaranteeing access to asylum persist.

4.4.3.3 NGROs

Events in 2013 magnified the need for increased SAR activities, humanitarian aid and presence of vessels in the Mediterranean. To illustrate the contribution to SAR made by NGOs, statistics reveal the following: in 2015, NGOs rescued 20 063 lives, whereas Frontex saved 15 428, in 2016, NGOs rescued 46 796 lives in comparison to Frontex’s 13 616 and, between January and April 2017, NGOs rescued 12 647, with Frontex only rescuing 2726 lives (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 16). Lately, however, these NGROs have come under fire, with Italy launching parliamentary inquiries after claims of collusion between NGOs and smugglers in 2017, and the LCG retaliating too (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 17 & 25 & Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 47). Italy has implemented measures to restrict NGO activity at sea since the Italian Senate Defence Committee’s recommendations for stricter regulation of their activities since May 2017, culminating in the signing of a code of conduct by NGOs in July 2017 (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 17 & 25 & Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 47 – 48). As a result, NGROs may not conduct SAR activities in Libyan waters and limits on the transferral of people from one vessel to another have been imposed and, though not legally binding, refusal to sign or contravention of the code will meet action by Italian authorities and a range of unspecified consequences (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 4). Although the Italian coastguard and customs police have carried out
rescue activities, since mid-2009, these have intercepted vessels at sea and returned passengers
to Libya, in what is called push-backs (Amnesty International, *S.O.S. Europe*, 2012: 10 &

Many rescue operations have been delayed as a result of being ordered to wait for LCG
intervention before rescuing people, as an incident on 15 August 2017 illustrates, when a
Migrant Offshore Aid Station vessel, following the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in
Rome’s orders, waited two hours for the LCG to intervene before it could take people on board
and return to Italy (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 48). The
LCG has also restricted SAR work performed by NGROs. Various accounts tell of NGRO
vessels being put in dangerous situations by the LCG in international waters. Three incidents
have stood out: an attack on a Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders) rescue
vessel, which had no rescue personnel on board, in August 2016, the LCG cutting in front of a
lifeboat lowered by NGO rescue boat Sea-Watch 2 to assist migrants in a nearby wooden boat
which was later boarded by LCG officials and returned to Italy in May 2017, and, in May 2017,
LCG speedboats approached and opened fire during a rescue operation conducted by NGOs
Jugend Rettet, SOS Mediterranea and Save the Children (Amnesty International, *A Perfect
Storm*, 2017: 23 – 25). This year alone, an Open Arms rescue vessel was seized in Pozzallo, a
Sicilian port, in March, and Italian authorities seized a Spanish NGO boat after its refusal to
hand over rescued migrants and refugees to LCG after which it was impounded (Amnesty
International, *Italy Targeting of NGO Ship Displays Reckless Disregard for Common Decency*,
2018).

4.4.3.4 The Libyan Coast Guard (LCG)

The LCG, which forms part of the Libyan navy and operates under the Ministry of Defence,
has attracted militia members who had ambitions of controlling the sea and its smuggling route
performed SAR activities, it has taken on a harsher stance, in that coastguards have reportedly
committed acts of abuse during rescue operations and returns to Libya, neglecting its SAR
duties. The LCG attributed the initial lack of SAR operations to a “grave lack of resources for
however, EU member states, especially Italy, have provided the coastguard with increased
Italy has led EU efforts to increase capacity of Libya to secure its borders and patrol the
Mediterranean, by signing the MOU with the Government of National Accord in early 2017
which included the provision of vessels for SAR functions and assistance in setting up a maritime rescue coordination centre (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya disputes over rescues put lives at risk*, 2018).

To this day, Libya is receiving support. In August 2018, Italy’s parliament approved the donation of another twelve patrol vessel to the LCG, thus strengthening the LCG’s ability to perform push-back activities without the EU’s assistance, the training of LCG officials and naval authorities, an aid package that amounts to €2.5 million (*Italy confirms patrol boat donation to Libya*, 2018). The failure of the LCG to perform SAR functions in alignment with international law and standards is blatant, as interceptions are violent and delayed, and people are returned to inhumane conditions in Libya. The control of the LCG over the sea is growing, especially following the release of a statement by the EU in late June 2018, which stipulates that vessels in the Mediterranean are not to interfere or obstruct operations of the LCG (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya disputes over rescues put lives at risk*, 2018).

Cooperation with the LCG by migrants and refugees on boats oftentimes results in human rights violations and arbitrary detention in Libya and SAR does not appear to be at the top of the LCG’s agenda. During an interception by the LCG November 2017, it failed to deploy its vessel’s rigid-hulled inflatable boat to help migrants and refugees at sea, resulting in the death of approximately 50 people (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 34). The incidents recalled in the previous sub-section illustrate the LCG’s disregard of human rights and the violent approach it has adopted, toward NGOs, migrants and refugees alike. Recently, a Spanish NGO found a survivor and two corpses on a destroyed rubber boat 80 nautical miles from Libya’s coast, whom they suspect the LCG had left after boarding passengers and returning to Libya (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya disputes over rescues put lives at risk*, 2018).

Furthermore, is the alleged collaboration between human smugglers and the LCG, which involved smugglers marking boats once they have paid the LCG so that the LCG can easily identify them at sea and exchange safe passage for payment (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 38 – 39). Various accounts of refugees and migrants confirm these suspicions (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion*, 2017: 39 – 40). However, EU aid and support has led to increased push-backs to Libya, with approximately 18 904 people intercepted at sea and returned to Libya in 2016 and 19 452 in 2017 (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 21 & Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of
These raise questions and concerns about the human rights of migrants and refugees and contradicts the principle of non-refoulment, as these people are returned to a country without an asylum system, no protection for refugees and where torture of detainees and various abuses are rife.

4.4.3.5. Search & Rescue (SAR)

The SAR landscape has changed significantly since the migrant crisis ensued, with initial efforts on the part of the EU seemingly slow and ineffective, the recent influence of Libyan authorities increasing, NGROs being criminalised and the fate of migrants and refugees and their protection significantly restricted. A tragedy that occurred in the Mediterranean in March 2011 illustrated the failure of the EU and Libyan authorities to launch effective SAR responses at the start of the migrant crisis. A boat carrying 72 people, of which only nine survived, was in distress at sea for over two weeks and, despite being alerted, the Italian and Maltese national Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres, Frontex and NATO left distress calls unanswered (Amnesty International, *S.O.S. Europe*, 2012: 12 – 13).

In an effort to provide an adequate and sufficient humanitarian response to the crisis after two major shipwrecks occurred in the Mediterranean, Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), an operation that required the Italian government spend over €9 million per month, was launched by Italy in October 2013, and the operation achieved the rescue and safe disembarkation of approximately 166 000 people (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 10). After it was ended in 2014 for fear of a political backlash, however, the death rate in the Mediterranean increased to 6.2%, or one person in 16, between January and April 2015 (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 10). This resulted in continued critique of Europe’s response and NGROs, merchant vessels and commercial vessels had to fill the gap left by OMN’s termination. To illustrate, on 3 March 2015, eight ad-hoc SAR operations in the Strait of Sicily were responsible for rescuing approximately 941 lives (Amnesty International, *Latest Mediterranean tragedy exposes EU’s failure on rescue operations*, 2015). As some kind of replacement, Operation Triton was launched, however, its SAR capabilities were significantly less than OMN’s, as it had less assets, which were inadequate to address the crisis and its ability to enhance SAR operations was also limited (Amnesty International, *Europe’s Sinking Shame*, 2015: 20).

Operation Triton’s SAR focus was severely reduced in scale, it operated in international waters inconsistently, had a much smaller operational area than OMN and did not primarily focus on
SAR activities, but more so on border monitoring (Amnesty International, *EU ‘burying heads in the sand’ as hundreds more migrants die at sea off Italy*, 2015 & Amnesty International, *Europe’s response: "Face-saving not a life-saving operation”*, 2015 & Amnesty International, *Europe’s Sinking Shame*, 2015: 19). Since the EU’s expectation of reduced migration to Europe from North Africa was sorely disappointed, eventually a surge in financial resources and assets extended Triton’s operational area and capacity to perform SAR more effectively to the extent that it could surpass OMN (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 10). Since 2016, there has been an increase in SAR cases as well as double digit multiple SAR cases, which are often protracted for days on end, especially close to the Libyan coast resulting in more complex SAR operations. The necessary assets for specific SAR purposes have not been provided (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 14).

For a long time, NGROs appeared to be the only group dedicated humanitarian missions in patrolling close to Libyan waters (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 14 – 15). Though they filled the gaps and performed significant SAR operations, achieving great results, there has been a recent clampdown on NGROs, as governments are taking hostile action against them and restricting their activities to prevent migration to Europe. The recent approval of Italy’s code of conduct for NGOs illustrates this (Freedom House, *Italy Profile*, 2018). Whereas before, EU Member States assumed responsibility for saving lives in the Mediterranean, especially after the tragedy nearby Lampedusa, Italy, in 2013, and NGROs were embraced for their capabilities and vigour, these NGROs have now been obstructed by the EU and responsibility for SAR activities has been handed over to the LCG (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives at Risk*, 2018). NGROs have focussed activities around human rights. In 2017, several issued complaints that EU states were not sufficiently supporting rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and not doing enough to intervene in the exploitation of migrants in Libya by smugglers (BBC, *Rescue ship brings 606 migrants to Italy*, 2017).

The EU has also, especially since 2016, engaged with states of departure and entered bilateral agreements to manage migration, where the reduction of migration towards Europe in exchange for aid becomes the key interest. Before the migrant crisis, Libya and Italy had entered into agreements in the name of curbing illegal migration, with another signed between Italy and new Libyan authorities in April 2012 (Amnesty International, *S.O.S. Europe*, 2012: 8). Despite reports of abuse by guards and smugglers, aggression on the part of coastguard officials, collusion between coastguard officials and smugglers, Italy has continued to support the LCG,
even bolstering support, fully aware of the poor conditions that await migrants in Libya (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya Disputes over Rescues Put Lives at Risk*, 2018). SAR responsibility has increasingly shifted to the court of Libya and its coastguard, as NGROs, which picked up the slack in SAR operations, have become restricted and the capacity of the LCG strengthened by aid from Europe, mainly Italy (Amnesty International, *A Perfect Storm*, 2017: 20). The Italian Maritime Centre’s instructions for boats in distress and rescue vessels to defer to LCG instructions have caused delays in rescues and sometimes migrants jump overboard for fear of being handed over to Libyan forces (Human Rights Watch, *EU/Italy/Libya Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives at Risk*, 2018). A result of increased LCG interceptions at sea, albeit for SAR purposes, more people are detained in Libya’s overcrowded, inadequate, poorly conditioned detention centres.

Disconcertingly, returns to departure points by states also increasingly characterise SAR operations, as a recent incident illustrates. In July 2018, an Italian towboat rescued over one hundred migrants and, instead of taking them to Italy so that they could apply for asylum, they were returned to Libya (Reuters News Agency, *Italian ship accused of taking migrants back to Libya for first time*, 2018). Human rights violations and abuses are likely to follow disembarkation, when migrants and refugees are handed over to Libya’s Department for Combatting Irregular Migration of the Ministry of Interior and detained (Amnesty International, *Lives Adrift*, 2014: 34). Considering the principle of nonrefoulment, this directly breaches international law, as migrants are not to be returned to a country where they or their human rights will be at risk of abuse. Despite obscurity about who conducted the rescue, the fact that EU states, such as Italy, are increasingly adopting harder line approaches to curb migration to Europe, even if it means returning migrants and refugees to states where their protection is not guaranteed. Whereas previously the priority of disembarking those rescued at a place of safety, that is a location where survivor’s lives or safety is no longer threatened, which was for some time Italy, those rescued are now returned or pushed back to Libya (Amnesty International, *Lives Adrift*, 2014: 25 & 29). Actions taken illustrate how states have indeed given in to temptation to limit their responsibilities towards refugees and migrants and avoid disembarking them on their territory, thus breaching their rights to “life, safety and access to protection” (Amnesty International, *Lives Adrift*, 2014: 31).
4.4.3.6 Returns, Resettlement & Relocation

According to Italy’s Consolidated Immigration Act, returns of irregular migrants from border-entry point to departure points are allowed, as is the refusal of entry for those without the necessary documentation and their return to the country of departure (Amnesty International, *Turned Away*, 2013: 26). However, in instances where there are claims for political asylum, refugee status and temporary protection, these measures are prohibited for humanitarian purposes as is the expulsion of unaccompanied minors unless for security reasons (Amnesty International, *Turned Away*, 2013: 27). The Act also compels destination states to provide these arrivals with assistance at the border, with all returns being recorded (Amnesty International, *Turned Away*, 2013: 27). Since 2015, the EU has tried to prevent departures to Europe. This was initially characterised by an EU-Africa trust fund that was created in November 2015, where EU leaders offered €2 billion to help deport unwanted migrants (Rice-Oxley & Rankin, 2017). In 2017, news of prospective camps being set up in Africa by the EU for screening processes emerged. The purpose of proposed camps would be to prevent the migration of economic migrants, who do not need protection from persecution, and take those who do, ‘genuine refugees’ to Europe (*EU looks to fund camps in Africa to cut migration*, 2017). Accompanying these, however, were concerns that returning people to Libya where even the UN-backed government lacks control over its territory, would violate their rights and international law, since their lives would be in danger in such a lawless country (*EU looks to fund camps in Africa to cut migration*, 2017).

In Bari, a port in Italy, the police have authority to determine who gains access to the asylum system, with most of those without the necessary documentation being returned to Greece, as figures have indicated. Between January 2011 and June 2012, only twelve out of 900 migrants were granted permission to remain in Italy to apply for asylum (Amnesty International, *Turned Away*, 2013: 30). Liiban, a twenty-two-year old Somalian man was one such migrant who was returned to Greece, though being told he would arrive at a refugee camp, was taken to Patras, a high security port (Amnesty International, *Turned Away*, 2013: 39). Reports of detention on vessels have also been reported. Amnesty International interviewed migrants, some of whom told of poor conditions on ferries that took them from Italy to Greece, where there was inadequate food, water, sanitation, and some were locked in rooms without bathrooms, others held in machine rooms or parking areas, and some handcuffed to pipes (Amnesty International, *Turned Away*, 2013:40 – 41). This contravenes law which requires that returns be conducted
humanely, and that detention occur only when there are no other alternatives available, with children also not being detained (Amnesty International, *Europe’s Refugee Crisis*, 2015: 15).

In 2018, nearly 1100 people have died or vanished whilst trying to reach the EU from North Africa and between January and July, the death rate was almost triple that of the same period in 2015, the height of the migration crisis (Smith, 2018). Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of returns to Libya as opposed to the number of those taken to Italy, since the LCG, with its growing influence and independence to control borders and stave migration from Libya, returns migrants to shore (Smith, 2018). Additionally, politicians are assuming increasingly hard-line approaches. Italy’s Minister of Interior, Matteo Salvini, is one of them, as he recently prevented the disembarkation of 177 asylum seekers onboard the Ubaldo Diciotti for ten days (Tondo, 2018). The two cases under study currently have opposing stances towards the migration of migrants from North Africa. Whereas France is taking a migrant-friendly approach, Italy would rather protect its borders. With regards to burden sharing and the relocation of migrants, Italy is pushing for the distribution of migrants across the EU and has given the bloc until the end of August to devise a clear relocation scheme (Tondo, 2018). With reports that have found that Italy spent at least €200 000 EU funds in its rejection of the migrant rescue boat *Aquarius*, the political priority of preventing arrivals to the EU is clearly illustrated, as this was a move that was mostly politically motivated rather than logistically or organisationally (Barnes, 2018).

4.4.3.7 Closing Ports & Disembarkation

Italy has borne the brunt of most of Europe’s influx of migrants from North Africa, as approximately 650 000 migrants have landed in the coastal state since 2014 (*EU Ignores Italy’s call to open ports to migrants*, 2018). As a result, it has appealed to the rest of the EU’s member states to assume responsibility for the burden sharing of receiving and processing these migrants. Despite having welcomed migrants with open arms, Italy’s stance is increasingly taking on a less-welcome, tougher approach towards migrants, as is evident in the closure of ports for rescue ships to dock and the prevention of disembarkation of those rescued. Despite calls to member states for the rotation of ports for rescue ships to dock at, Italy has been met with rejection, which has fuelled the closure of ports until other states agree to share the burden. Several incidents have occurred in 2018, illustrating the increasingly hard-line approach being adopted towards migrants.
Following the arrival of nearly 11,000 refugees to Italy within 5 days in 2017, the Italian government proposed the closure of its ports to vessels carrying migrants, in what was described as a measure of panic (Wintour, 2017). Subsequently, Italy requested the “drastic revision of EU asylum procedures” occur and confirmed the refusal of docking privileges to boats without Italian flags. Debates about the role of NGOs as a pull factor ensued at the same time and it was confirmed that previous efforts, including the bolstering of LCG capacity and resources, had been unsuccessful. Italy’s deputy prime minister and interior minister, Matteo Salvini, who has campaigned against NGROs who carry out activities in the Mediterranean, has refused and delayed vessels from disembarking migrants rescued at sea, with the five-week exception of military ships partaking in EUNAVFOR MED ((Human Rights Watch, EU/Italy/Libya Disputes Over Rescues Put Lives Risk, 2018).

In July 2018, Italy closed its ports to the rescue ship Aquarius that had 630 migrants on board and was stranded at sea for approximately ten days (Smith, 2018). On another occasion in July 2018, after an Italian police ship and a British ship belonging to Frontex picked up approximately 450 migrants, Italy allowed these to dock in Italy after France, Malta, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Ireland agreed to take migrants for processing (Deutsche Welle, Italy Threatens, 2018). Another incident that demanded international attention was the refusal of the rescue ship Sarost 5, which was stranded at sea for almost two weeks and had approximately forty migrants onboard, two of whom were pregnant and one injured, by Malta, Italy, France and Tunisia, with Tunisia eventually allowing the vessel to disembark at its port (Mezzofiore, Andrews, Bradpiece & McGann, 2018, InfoMigrants, 2018 & North Africa Post, 2018). In August, Aquarius was again denied safe harbour, when it had 141 people onboard, of whom a quarter of the passengers were between the ages of thirteen and fifteen years old and many of whom require urgent medical assistance, until five countries agreed to take them after disembarkation (Amnesty International, Italy/Malta: Stop Playing, 2018 & The Local France, Exhausted Migrants, 2018). Despite Libya having been deemed unfit for the disembarkation of migrants, Italy unloaded a ship with 100 people onboard at a port nearby Libya’s capital, Tripoli (Nielson, 2018).

4.4.3.8 Hotspot Approach & Detention
The Hotspot Approach and detention are another two aspects of state responses to the Migrant Crisis that have been met with concern and criticism. Specifically, hotspots have become increasingly securitised with allegations of fuelling abuse and have fallen short of international standards to the extent that they have been closed and fended off humanitarian assistance. This
last section, dedicated to understanding how securitisation has been looked at as a solution, will also consider the demolition of refugee camps in France, proposals for the establishment of centres in North Africa by the EU, detention centres and conditions in Libya and the provisions made for unaccompanied migrant minors in France. With hotspots initially established to identify and fingerprint new arrivals to the EU with the purpose of swiftly determining their protection needs and processing applications for asylum or returning them to their country of origin, reports have found that migrants are, instead, met with ill treatment, abuse and unlawful expulsion (Amnesty International, *Italy: Beatings and unlawful expulsions amid EU push to get tough on refugees and migrants*, 2016). Detention, which is by law meant to serve as a last-resort solution, has become the looked-to method of housing and maintaining control over migrants, in the EU and North Africa alike. To illustrate, approximately 9000 people have been arbitrarily detained in Libyan detention centres, as at the end of June 2018 (Amnesty International, *EU: New migration plans “dangerous and self-serving”*, 2018).

In Italy and France alike, police authorities have securitised the environment of refugees and migrants, as the EU has encouraged member states to “get tough on refugees”, resulting in unlawful expulsions and ill-treatment at hotspots and camps (Amnesty International, *Italy: Beatings* 2016). With Frontex’s continued presence at Italian hotspots, forced fingerprinting, and the detention of migrants without court orders, a requirement by law, Italy’s stance towards housing migrants has become highly-securitised (ASGI, *Hotspots*, no date). Furthermore, the Association regards the Hotspot Approach, and Lampedusa in particular, as characterised by “the violation of the right to asylum, the implementation of collective returns and unlawful detention” (ASGI, *Migrants disembarked in Lampedusa: compliance with the law must be guaranteed*, 2018).

In France, Calais is decorated with five-metre high fences topped with razor wire that run along train tracks and the presence of armed police at the port, to prevent the travel of migrants from France to the UK (Burton, 2018). Since Calais’s refugee camp, ‘The Jungle’, which housed approximately 6500 migrants, being demolished in 2016, thousands now sleep in the forests of Northern France (Burton, 2018). The police’s intimidation and abusive actions taken towards asylum seekers and migrants to clear the camp, have included the use of pepper spray on children and adults by riot police, when they are asleep or pose no threat, the spraying of pepper spray on water and food, the confiscation of bedding, clothing, the disruption of humanitarian assistance, threatening and acts of intimidation towards migrants and harassment of aid workers (Human Rights Watch, *Living in Hell*, 2017: 15, 23, 31). Excessive use of force by police
against refugees, including children, and the deployment of forces meant to deal with crowd and riot control illustrates the highly securitised response of France towards migrants, the precarious and vulnerable conditions they are subject to and the abuse that has been condoned.

The closure of hotspot facilities, reception centres and camps due to sub-standard conditions and provisions has occurred, albeit temporarily in some cases. During the Arab Spring, Italy was unable to accommodate the migrants that rushed to its shores, as reception centres received hundreds more than could be accommodated by the facility’s capacity and these arrivals could not receive the health care and mental health support they required (MSF, *Italy: Failure to provide*, 2011). In 2015, the Lampedusa reception, built to house 380 people, was filled with more than 1400 due to the influx of rescued migrants (Fortune, 2015). Later that year, *Medecins Sans Frontiers* (Doctors Without Borders) announced the end of its activities in Pozzallo, Sicily, and others in Italy’s Ragusa Province, due to unacceptable conditions, which included overcrowding and a lack of protection for vulnerable migrants, amongst whom were pregnant women, minors and victims of torture (MSF, *Italy: MSF ends activities in Pozzallo*, 2015).

Lampedusa was closed again in March 2018 for renovations following protests by migrants and refugees and the raising of concerns by NGOs and civil society organisations that the facility was inhumane, the lengthy period of detention, systemic human rights violations and the lack of a proper exit for the centre (Gostoli, 2018). In France, the forced eviction of up to 200 migrants and asylum seekers took place, followed by the demolition of The Jungle in Calais in 2016, after which thousands were distributed across France and sent to immigration centres (Amnesty International, *France: Fears over the fate*, 2015 & Burton, 2018). In 2018, approximately 450 people were cleared from a park due to concerning sanitary conditions and incidents of scabies, of whom only 100 had been allocated to emergency shelters (The Local France, 2018).

In June 2018, what some consider a policy of detention, an EU agreement issued detailed the plans for controlled centres for asylum seekers and migrants in the EU with landing areas outside of the EU, in transit countries, where their applications would be processed (Amnesty International, *EU: New Migration Plans*, 2018, OxFam, 2018 & InfoMigrants, 2018). Furthermore, the EU has failed to stipulate what would be done to address human rights violations in Libya (Amnesty International, *EU: New Migration Plans*, 2018). This proposal has been met with refusal by Libya’s Prime Minister, Serraj, but the notion remains on the EU’s agenda (InfoMigrants, *Tripoli rules out EU migrant camps in Libya*, 2018). Detention centres in Libya have been coupled with EU’s inadequate response to the migrant crisis.
Undocumented migrants and refugees, including unaccompanied minors, face risk of arbitrary and indefinite detention in Libya, where detention centres are overcrowded and run by the state and militias, who beat, whip, torture and abuse them in other ways (Amnesty International, *The Human Cost of Fortress Europe*, 2014: 25). Since the LCG has gained traction over migration management in the Mediterranean Sea, Libyan detention centres have become overcrowded, as boats intercepted by the LCG and, recently, EU member states, return migrants to Libya instead of the EU. At the end of July, it was confirmed that 11 800 migrants had been returned to Libya, though the centres to which they are returned remain unregulated and migrants are held in inhuman conditions and become victims of sexual violence, exploitation, trafficking and torture (MSF, *Stop Arbitrary Detention*, 2018).

To illustrate the conditions that detainees are held in, MSF reports the following about Libyan detention centres:

> MSF treats detainees with second degree burns, scabies, respiratory infections, dehydration. In Khoms, over 300 migrants are locked in an overcrowded detention centre, without ventilation, limited access to drinking water and detainees resort to escape attempts and hunger strikes. There are no registration nor record-keeping activities performed. As a result, the number of voluntary returns to countries of origin has increased.

*(Doctors Without Borders, *Stop Arbitrary Detention*, 2018)*

The recent outbreak of violence between rival groups in Tripoli, which has culminated in a State of Emergency being declared in September, has endangered residents and the approximate 8000 refugees and migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in arbitrary detention, with some having been trapped for 48 hours without food (MSF, *Conflict in Tripoli*, 2018 & Deutshce Welle, *Libya imposes SOE*, 2018). Rockets have been reported to have landed next to detention centres, leaving thousands trapped inside (Libyan Express, *MSF demands evacuation of thousands from Libya*, 2018). As a result, the dangers faced by migrants trapped in Libya is leaving them extremely vulnerable. Leaving them more helpless, is the fact that international organisations had to suspend their activities in Tripoli (Libyan Express, *MSF demands evacuation of thousands from Libya*, 2018).

Where it has concerned unaccompanied migrant minors, the French government has dealt with migrant minors unfairly and unlawfully, despite them having rights to special protection under international law. This was especially so after it had cleared the Jungle in Calais in 2016, where
1300 of the 2000 child migrants had been refused passage to the UK without adequate reasons, if any (Smith, 2018). In December 2016, unaccompanied minors left temporary reception centres and, by the time these were closed in 2017, 700 had already left and gone missing, trying to reach Paris, sleeping on the roadside, under bridges or along the riverbank along the way (Smith, 2018 & Human Rights Watch, *Living in Hell*, 2017: 11). Though the state becomes separated and unaccompanied children’s de facto caregiver and despite them being able to have access to education whilst outside their country of origin, unaccompanied child migrants in France live a contrary reality (Human Rights Watch, *Like a Lottery*, 2018: 53 & 55). Without adequate child protection and social services for these children, the question of whose duty it is to provide care emerges.

4.4.4. Citizen Responses

Necessary to determine the environment into which migrants are received, that is whether the environment is hostile or welcoming, is understanding the general sentiments amongst the native population that received migrants. As such, this sub-section illustrates citizen responses, as shaped by state responses, to the migrant crisis and to understand what the rhetoric is towards North African migrants. As taxpayers and recipients of state provisions, the responses of native populations can tell a lot about the attitude with which migrants have been, are being and will be received. With Italy’s New Populist Government, this section seeks to identify whether there has been an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments towards migrants to make sense of what this means for the precariousness of North African migrants’ positions, and whether these are aggravated by anti-immigrant sentiments or not. To illustrate the discrepancy between the perceived number of non-EU immigrants to the actual proportion, the results of a Eurobarometer survey published in 2018, revealed that in 19 out of the 28 Member States, the perceived estimate of present non-European migrants was double the actual proportion (European Commission, 2018).

In the year of the Arab Spring, Human Rights Watch (2011: 3) wrote the following in its publication, based on research conducted between December 2009 and December 2010, that, in Italy “worrying signs already exist that increasing diversity has led to increasing intolerance, with some resorting to or choosing violence to express racist or xenophobic sentiments”. This could perhaps be due to the negative portrayal of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the country and the impact of the media on perceptions of the public (Human Rights Watch, *Everyday Intolerance*, 2011: 10). Migration, the dominant topic of Italy’s most recent electoral campaign has overwhelmed Italian politics and has been regarded as epitomising economic
and social issues and the reason for increased securitisation and, more recently, containment (Tazziolo, 2018). Violent and racist attacks have plagued Italy with nine shootings having occurred within 50 days in July and August, and the number of racially-motivated incidents significantly increasing, with 33 having occurred in a space of two months since June, whereas incidents of the same nature for 2016 amounted to 28 (Speak, 2018 & Gostoli, 2018).

With the frequency and severity of attacks increasing, incidents have come to illustrate the surge of racism and xenophobia in Italy. Many have attributed a rise in these anti-immigrant sentiments to the climate of hatred that has been fostered by Italy’s Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Salvini, who has publicly expressed his own anti-immigrant stance and has depicted migrants as posing a threat to Italy (Speak, 2018). Another factor adding fuel to the xenophobic fire is the populist coalition government of Italy which has been clear about the way it will respond to illegal migrants and irregular migration. With the signing in of the new coalition government, between the Populist Five Star Movement and right-wing Salvini’s League, in June 2018, the anti-immigrant atmosphere appears to be spreading (Italy’s Senate passes tough anti-migrant decree, 2018).

One of the first decisions the government made, was to prevent a vessel, which had rescued hundreds of migrants, from docking in Italy (Basu, 2018). Salvini has also confirmed his anti-immigrant approach, as he has met with Hungary’s Orbán and both have agreed to establish a type of anti-immigrant axis (Kern, 2018). Thus, the populist government has displayed its potential to serve as a threatening force, despite constitutional checks and balances. Despite protests by citizens, the government has gained the support of anti-immigrant, nationalist citizens who have come to regard, perhaps due to the government and media’s depictions, migrants as a threat to their livelihoods. These anti-immigrant sentiments have also trickled down to the Italian and French youth. Many youngsters participated in an anti-immigrant protest organised by the far-right Generation Nation, previously National Front Youth, and Youth League, the youth leagues of the French National Rally and Italy’s League (Ksiazek, 2018).

4.5 Threats & Dangers to Migrant Women

The World Migration Report (IOM, 2018: 50) indicates that migrants in North Africa face a wide range of abuses: deaths at sea, in the desert and other transit locations, exploitation, physical and emotional abuse, trafficking, smuggling, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary detention, forced labour, ransom demands and extortion. Although men, women and
children alike are exposed to a variety of abuses and exploitation during the process of irregular migration, women face a unique set of challenges. According to UNODC, 79% of all detected trafficking victims across the world are women and children, with most of them being trafficked for purposes of sexual exploitation, sham or forced marriages, begging and domestic servitude (IOM, *Trafficking in Human Beings*, 2018: 36). UNICEF has also reported that three-quarters of all children and one half of all women migration across Africa experience sexual violence (Sanderson, 2018). This illustrates the attempts of women to escape the threats that endanger their human rights and wellbeing in their countries of origin, which force them to migrate. They are met with various forms of sexual violence along their migration journeys.

The threats and dangers posed to women migrants, the subject of this closing section of the chapter, highlight the gendered differences in the experiences of migration and the challenges that aggravate the precariousness of migrant women’s lives. Scrutiny of gender-based violence, the sexual violence migrant women experience and the sexual exploitation they are subjected to throughout the process of migration, a gendered experience of human rights abuses is illustrated. Additionally, the threat posed by trafficking and torture at reception centres and camps in Italy and France, as well as detentions centres and camps in Libya, depict just how vulnerable women migrants are. Lastly, by understanding the reproductive challenges these migrant women face where it concerns pregnancy, abortion and access to medical assistance, one can make sense of how state responses have left women migrants unprotected.

### 4.5.1 Reception Conditions

There is a higher probability that violence against women is more prevalent in conditions that lack privacy and where men and women are housed together, with overcrowding putting women and children at risk of violence, even sexual violence (Bonewit, 2016: 12 – 13). Conditions in Libyan detention centres and camps as well as those in European reception centres and refugee camps are predominantly sub-standard and have exposed women and child migrants to extreme violence. In 2012, the FIDH reported a lack of basic services and inhuman living conditions at places of detention in Libya, finding that women at the Toweisha Camp in Tripoli housed a group of forty-eight Nigerian women, some of whom were pregnant, that had been held there for over three months and had no regular access to medication or doctors (FIDH, 2012: 50 – 51). The Bou Rashada camp, the largest in Libya’s western region, which housed detainees in sheds with sheet-metal roofs, ringed by iron bars, appearing like cages, housed 120 women and seven babies at the time (FIDH, 2012: 53).
In some facilities in Libya, men, women and children, some of whom are sick or elderly are held together, depending on the facility (Amnesty International, *Libya's Dark Web of Collusion* 2017: 30). Furthermore, all rooms are guarded by men, making women especially vulnerable to beatings and other forms of torture, such as the intrusive strip—searches that are conducted by these male guards (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion* 2017: 30 & Amnesty International, *The Human Cost of Fortress Europe*, 2014: 25). The account of a twenty-two year old Eritrean woman, who was detained in Libya for eight months told of being in a room with twelve other women in a Libyan detention centre, where this one room was meant for sleeping, using the toilet, drink water in and wash laundry and where their belongings were stolen, illustrates the horrific and inhumane living situation of migrant women (MSF, *From North Africa to Italy*, 2018). Furthermore, these women experience abuse and torture, without their right to protection.

Women are also at a disadvantage when it comes to departure, as they are required to pay more than men. In 2017, women were required to pay 1500 dinars whereas men were only required to pay 1000 dinars (Amnesty International, *Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion* 2017: 41). Along the journey from Libya to Europe, women are no less at risk of abuse, as the rape and torture of women survivors, who were saved from a trawler that caught fire off the coast of Lampedusa in 2013, by organisers of the trip highlights (Amnesty International, *Lives Adrift*, 2014: 15). In Italy, these risks persist. For example, reception centres have had inadequate separation between men and women, and what Doctors Without Borders has deemed “a lack of tailor-made care to the most vulnerable”, which includes victims of torture and violence, unaccompanied minors and single women (MSF, *From North Africa to Italy*, 2018). Separating men and women is important for safeguarding the privacy and security of women migrants, who are more vulnerable, as is the provision of a safe and comfortable living space. Where these are not guaranteed, women who have undergone severe trauma live in fear of abuse by men whom they are housed with. Accounts given by a sixty-seven year old Tunisian woman, speaks of the fear women migrants live with, as she fended off a man when she went to the toilet one night and another, a twenty-two year old Eritrean, whose room had been flooded with women from the room next to hers because a man had entered theirs (MSF, *From North Africa to Italy*, 2018). The hotspot at Lampedusa, which was temporarily closed, was also reported as having insufficient privacy and security, as the spaces that minors and women lived in were easily accessible by others, to the extent that one migrant child witnessed an attempted rape of her mother (Gostoli, 2018). Women have also been exposed to torture in Italy’s Cara di Mineo
refugee camp, notorious for sex work within the camp and in its immediate surroundings, where a twenty-six-year-old woman was allegedly murdered by her boyfriend in January 2018 (Tory-Murphy, 2018).

In France too, women migrants are fearful for their safety, as they lack protection and, unless they are accompanied by male companions, remain vulnerable. In 2015, Calais’s women’s shelters were full, and women had to reside in the main camp, the ‘Jungle’, where there was “no security or street lighting, let alone dedicated toilets or bathrooms for women” (Graham-Harrison, 2015). Since the clearance of the ‘Jungle’, outnumbered by men, these women are especially vulnerable to rape, trafficking and exploitation, especially without shelter (Taylor, 2017). At the end of 2017, the number of lone migrant women residing in the Calais region was said to be at 20, most of whom younger than thirty years old (Bulman, 2017). This illustrates the grim reality that women, especially those without male family members, spouses or companions, face in Europe.

4.5.2 Sexually Exploited in Transit & Abroad

Women migrants are also at elevated risk of sexual exploitation, whether it be in their home country, transit countries, or when they arrive in Europe. It appears to be the pattern that those who have been trafficked are most likely going to exposed to some form of exploitation, with men being subjected to forced labour and women to sexual exploitation. To illustrate, 80% of the Nigerian women who arrived in Sicily in 2017 were trafficked and will live in prostitution (Kelly, 2017). With the increased presence of trafficking gangs and militias controlling the Mediterranean, migrants fall prey to these in efforts to reach Europe. Human trafficking in North Africa is also rife, as a report released by Human Rights Watch on the trafficking of Eritreans in Egypt illustrates. Victims of human trafficking experience horrific abuses and violations, with women often used as a tool to get male victims to comply. In Egypt traffickers rape these women and plastic objects get inserted into their vaginas and anuses, their genitalia and breasts are burnt and they are stripped naked and beaten, whilst in Israel the same abuse persists, yet Eritrean males who are held captive also assault these women, as they are forced by traffickers to sexually abuse them (Human Rights Watch, I wanted to lie down and die, 2014: 31 & 36).

In Libya, the same exploitation is found, with people-smugglers sexually abusing women migrants (BBC, Rescue ship brings 606 to Italy, 2017). Libya’s notorious slave trade is also responsible for the sexual exploitation of migrant women. Before dying from thirst or in car
accidents, women are often held for ransom or forced into prostitution and sexual exploitation by those who have captured and smuggled them (Younes, 2017). A man who witnessed the sale of five women told journalists that they were “sold by one commander to another who immediately forced them into prostitution”, and others were instructed to work in private night clubs (Younes, 2017). In Europe, sexual exploitation of migrant women continues, with children also being exploited to reach their destinations. The exploitation of children who want to travel from Italy to France is common. Children performs sex acts to paying drivers, if they are unable to afford the 50 and 150 Euros the service costs, and in exchange for food and shelter, as in Ventimiglia where migrant minors are now on the streets because the camp that housed them was cleared in April this year (Giuffrida, 2018). Not limited to Ventimiglia, sexual exploitation is common in other part of Italy, such as Rome, Veneto, Abruzzo, Marche and Sardinia, areas accounting for the sexual exploitation of more than 1900 girls between January 2017 and March 2018, of which 160 were children (Giuffrida, 2018).

4.5.3 Reproductive Challenges

As has been established, single migrant women are at more risk of violence and exploitation and, therefore, these women turn to migrant men for protection and sometimes engage in sex with the men who they regard as their protectors. Thus, many migrant women fall pregnant during the process of migration. Although anti-immigrant phrases such as ‘anchor babies’ have been used to describe the pregnancies of migrant women, this overlooks the complex dynamics that exist between migrant men and women, which sometimes includes sexual exploitation, and the fact that during migration they are without access to birth control measures and abortion procedures (Plambech, 2017). In Milan, seven out of eight women who are victims of sexual exploitation have reportedly requested abortions (Plambech, 2017). The reproductive challenges women migrants face in detention, transit and reception cannot be overlooked. A study conducted in 2014 found that eleven per cent of women migrants arrive pregnant (Plambech, 2017). With many women and children susceptible to sexual exploitation and violence, pregnancies are common.

Pregnant migrants need regular medical attention and are physically more susceptible to serious illness or death if they do not get the necessary medical attention. They also need to be able to access counsellors and legal representation so that they can report sexual assaults (Bonewit, 2018).

13 The term ‘anchor babies’ has been used to describe babies who have been conceived so that the parents can claim citizenship in the country the babies are born, thus allowing the parents to receive government benefits. (https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=anchor%20baby)
2016). Some women arrive pregnant, others have given birth onboard SAR vessels and others fall pregnant shortly after their arrival in Europe (Plambech, 2017). An obstetrician in France confirmed that most of the women and girls he treated in Calais were physically or sexually abused, and because of the precarious living conditions in forests, lack of food and sanitation, these women are at risk of infection and, because they do not undergo regular check-ups, they are at risk of going into labour prematurely or suffering miscarriages (Taylor, 2018). Because some women are too scared to seek professional medical assistance for fear of deportation, this problem only persists (Plambech, 2017). To aggravate the vulnerable position of women prone to rape and prostitution, the police in Calais do not intervene in cases of trafficking or sexual abuse and there is said to be nobody to report these incidences to (Taylor, 2017).

4.6 Chapter Summary

The main reasons for the migration of migrants from North Africa to the EU have been discussed above, as have the entry policies, categorisation of migrants and responses of Italy and France. This has been provided to illustrate how migrants have been handled in the EU. The responses of citizens also reflect realities that migrants face and, importantly, the threats and dangers that women face during the migration process from North Africa to the EU depict the gendered nature of the migration process and impact of policies on migrant women. With security measures focused on protecting the state as opposed to protecting the individual, the carceral nature of these states has been illustrated by security measures such as: border control, the changed nature of SAR operations, the way returns, resettlement and relocations are conducted, the closures of ports and refusal to disembark migrants, and, lastly, the Hotspot Approach and detention.

The core push and pull factors that drive the migration of migrants from North Africa to Europe span across countries of origin, transit countries and destination countries. With restrictions on media, academic, religious and organisational freedom, limited freedom of movement, the increase of violence, including sexual violence, and systematic human rights violations, migrants and Libyans alike have increased desires to migrate to Europe. Furthermore, arbitrary and open-ended military conscription, forced labour, detention, ethnic discrimination, armed conflict and sexual violence are among the causes for migration from countries of origin to Libya, for migration to the EU and the lack of legal protections for displaced economic migrants exacerbates the vulnerability of migrants in Libya. Modern-day slavery, which has become more prevalent along migratory routes in Africa, especially in North Africa, is a horrific reality many seek to escape. Misled by smugglers and traffickers, held ransom, being
tortured in exchange for release fees and being sold for (bonder) labour or debt slavery, Sub-Saharan Africans do their best to cross the Mediterranean to safety in the EU. Coupled with the lack of legal protection and provisions for displaced economic migrants and others alike, migrants undertake dangerous journeys to escape the deteriorated standard of living in post-Arab Spring North Africa, as welfare provisions that were previously available no longer are and as the grip of militias over state resources increase. The economic opportunity and democratic ideals that characterises the EU then become enticing to migrants.

EU entry policies make provisions for migrants and refugees and are clear about the provision of subsidiary protection for those who face serious harm should they return to their country of origin, however, uncertainties regarding provisions for illegal migrants persist. A number of the rights of migrant arrivals have been imposed upon. These include rights to legal and procedural information, information regarding appealing their cases, legal assistance, liaison with the UNCHR, rights to remain in member states they applied for asylum and to move freely within that state or in an area allocated to them. They also have the right to material reception and healthcare, and minors have the right to access the education system but these have gone largely ignored. The cases of France and Italy illustrate how these rights have not been guaranteed. Furthermore, the prohibition of detention of applicants unless in exceptional circumstances, has also been breached.

The Dublin Regulation has emerged as a structural problem, authorities have gone to extreme lengths to obtain fingerprints according to EURODAC and the provision of CEAS that asylum seekers be welcomed in a dignified manner and receive fair treatment has been neglected. Additionally, the principle of non-refoulement has been breached in several cases, as has international maritime law, which stipulates the obligation of ships to aid vessels in distress and take passengers to a place of safety. France’s new Immigration Bill has disregarded the provisions made by these policies and regulations and has also increased the precariousness of child migrants. Italy has also breached these in various ways, of which include the agreements entered into with African states, support for the LCG’s capacity and control over the Mediterranean, preventing aid vessels from disembarking rescued from north and redirecting them to Libya and by failing to provide adequate reception facilities.

Not limited to these cases, Italy and France’s securitisation methods and strategies have become increasingly carceral in nature, as more sophisticated border control and surveillance measures have been adopted. As a result, a Fortress Europe is emerging, even if it means
cooperating with countries in which systemic human rights abuses occur on a regular basis. With Frontex’s activities functioning with fewer resources and capacity, the Italian Senate Defence Committee’s recommendations for stricter regulation of NGROs, increased push-back by Italian authorities, the use of delay tactics and the increased support and strengthening of LCG capacity and resources, despite the Guard’s collusion with smugglers and the abuses they commit, Italy and France are increasing control over spaces and adopting migration management strategies that protect the state from migrants, instead of vice versa.

Though a humanitarian response was initially a high priority of Italy’s, the nature of SAR has changed significantly. Despite the obvious humanitarian contributions made by NGROs, and their operation in Libyan waters, they have become increasingly obstructed and the number of LCG interceptions have increased significantly as a result, and the breaching of the principle of non-refoulment persists. The conditions of returns, resettlement and relocation have also been sub-standard in that migrants lack the basic provisions guaranteed by international law and EU regulations. The recent closure of ports and refusals to disembark also illustrate the tough approach taken towards migrants as incidents in July and August of 2018 illustrate. The Hotspot Approach has become highly securitised over the years, with more abuses and ill treatment being reported and detention, which is by international law only meant to be the last resort, is taking on a popular and inadequate nature. The closure of facilities, camps and reception centres due to inadequate conditions and provisions, police intimidation and detention conditions illustrate the shift towards securitisation instead of a humanitarian approach towards migrants.

Furthermore, the EU’s proposal to establish centres in Libya as well as returns to Libya, where many migrants already reside in arbitrary detention under horrific conditions and which has seen a recent outbreak of violence in the capital city Tripoli, makes no provisions for the protection of migrants, especially those who are already vulnerable. With the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments, especially in Italy where Salvini has bluntly expressed his stance towards them, migrants are less welcome to seek refuge and opportunity in Europe. Lastly, the threats and dangers that migrant women face put them in even more precarious conditions as they are considered more vulnerable than their male counterparts, as they also experience gender-based violence. Within overcrowded conditions of detention and without sufficient security in reception, single women and children are most vulnerable. Women, who also pay more to depart for Europe, are also particularly vulnerable to trafficking and many are forced into into sex work and prostitution to sustain their livelihoods, as are unaccompanied migrant
children. Lastly, the migration process of women is often characterised by complex dynamics and reproductive challenges. Many women fall pregnant during the process, but have very limited access to birth control measures, medical services and provisions as well as counselling. Under these circumstances, women are at increased risk of violence, sexual exploitation, illness and death.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

This final chapter will demonstrate the findings of the research undertaken, provide an interpretation thereof and convey the conclusions drawn from these findings. A discussion of the objectives of the study and consideration of how the research questions have been answered will also make it possible for the study to contribute towards an understanding of the implications of the findings. A summary of the approach used is important, as it reiterates the methods and procedures employed, giving clarity to the findings and results and, lastly, drawing a link between the findings and the research objectives. Additionally, the chapter highlights the theoretical contributions of the study, limitations thereof and finally, recommendations for future research related to the topic.

The study has determined that the EU has assumed an increasingly securitised response to migration, especially irregular migration, and has placed greater value on national security than human security. Border control, SAR operations, relocation, resettlement and returns, the closure of ports, refusal to disembark migrant-carrying vessels and the Hotspot Approach have illustrated a highly securitised response to migrants from North Africa. The study has also discovered interesting dynamics within the process of migration from North Africa as well as between the process and receiving and sending states alike. Migration from North Africa has taken on an increasingly irregular nature and has been the source of great discomfort for EU member states. As such, EU member states have turned to transit and origin states to prevent irregular migration, without calculating the costs to human rights and human security.

It has also determined that conflict, violence and exploitation have played a huge role in the migration of people from North Africa and that economic opportunities and democratic ideals are what attract them to Europe. The study has illustrated how these factors threaten the human security of migrants throughout the process of migration; that is, when they depart their home country, along migratory routes, in transit destinations and upon departure. Furthermore, the study determines the specific contexts that contribute to the precariousness of migrants and, as far as possible, has illustrated the specific precariousness of women and child migrants. The Arab Spring has been found to be a turning point for migration from North Africa and the impact thereof has been demonstrated during the study. By adopting a gender lens to the study of migration from North Africa to Europe the unique threats to the human security of women and child migrants have been determined. This has been achieved by focusing on the
experience of women and child migrants, recalling cases of gender-specific violence, exploitation, discriminatory treatment and reproductive challenges.

5.2 Findings
Adopting a gender lens has drawn attention to the importance of including women when studying migration, as theirs is a unique experience, as they are vulnerable to and suffer different forms of violence and exploitation than migrant men. Therefore, the double curse that migrant women face is evident, as they experience discrimination and are more vulnerable as they are women migrants. Although migration challenges cultural power hierarchies, these persist nonetheless, affecting the experience of women’s migration, receipt and what happens thereafter. Therefore, women need to be explicitly and intentionally included in literature on migration. Furthermore, there is the urgent need to focus on the individual level of state responses to migration and, moreover, the impact of securitisation measures employed by states on the human rights and human security of migrants.

Conflict, economic opportunity and slavery are three of the most influential factors that have contributed to migration from North Africa to Europe in the post-Arab Spring context. Migrants departing from Libya either seek to escape conflict or slavery in their home country or Libya, or they seek economic opportunities and improved living conditions abroad in Europe. These factors, driving migration, have also contributed to the precariousness of migrants’ migration experiences and, thus, their lives. The post-Arab Spring conflict and reign by militia in Libya, smuggling and trafficking across North Africa and to Europe and the lack of adequate responses to these have left migrants in more precarious situations than before. Therefore, the driving factors of their migration exacerbate the threat to their security.

The criteria used in this study to assess the nature of migration processes and policies, listed in the fourth chapter’s overview, toward economic migrants from North Africa in Europe provides certain insights. That is, that migrant-receiving states have responded in ways that can be described as protectionist, state-centric, highly-securitised and carceral in nature, where law or policy is contravened for the sake of state security and aid-providing actors are eliminated, therefore, placing state security above human security. As a result, citizen responses have increasingly started matching the anti-immigrant sentiment and responses of states, based on how these have chosen to respond to the migrant crisis. Though entry policies guarantee the rights of migrants, realities on the ground reflect otherwise.
Central to the study’s theoretical foundation, discussed in chapters one and three, has been the concept of protection and the responsibility to protect. The study has found that, despite initial efforts to protect migrants from North Africa, Italy’s responses to migrants have been protectionist and increasingly securitised. Furthermore, Italy has to a large degree externalised its migrant crisis, as stemming migration at departure points has become a policy priority. Although there are policies that stipulate the responsibilities of receiving states, Italy, overwhelmed and resentful towards the rest of Europe for being unhelpful, has devised its own strategy, which has shown increasingly restrictive measures. The closing of its ports, refusals of ships to disembark rescued migrants, tighter restrictions on NGROs and granting border control responsibilities the LCG illustrate the state-centric and anti-immigrant attitude of Italy.

The study has also highlighted that Italy’s responses to the migrant crisis, especially over the last few years, reflect that migrant bodies are less important than indigenous bodies. Furthermore, Italy has governed migrant bodies in ways that reduce the value thereof, as the categorisation of persons, conditions of reception, relocation, return and resettlement and the Hotspot Approach illustrate. The study has also found that women migrants’ bodies are also misgoverned and unprotected as human trafficking, sexual exploitation, gender-based violence and reproductive health issues and complications plague these women during migration from North Africa to Europe. Furthermore, migrants who escape conditions which increase the precariousness of their wellbeing at home and transit countries are met with the same, if not more, precariousness during and after migration. Proposals for the establishment of processing centres in North Africa made by Italy and returns to Libya where migrants are held in overcrowded, unsanitary and dangerous centres reiterate how responses by migrant-receiving countries exacerbate the precariousness of migrants’ lives. As Parshotam (2018: 10) holds, measures such as those taken by EU member states might have limited long-term effects for migration, both regular and irregular. Furthermore, securitisation and externalisation of migration management illustrate that only those “with the correct profile” are afforded human rights (Parshotam, 2018: 10).

The study has also discovered that varying geographies of power characterise migration from North Africa to Europe. A focus on the threats and dangers North African migrant women face has illustrated the existence of gendered geographies of power, as the vulnerability of women depends on their social locations that is according to intersections of race, class, age, marital status, sexuality and gender. Single migrant women, those who have no choice but to work as sex labourers, those who are trafficked and young and elderly women are more vulnerable to
violence and exploitation. However, migrant men also experience geographies of power, as their poverty, race, age and sexuality also expose them to certain dangers and exploitation, as the modern-day slave trade illustrates. Migrants from North Africa are received and handled as criminals, despite their lack of representation, rights and agency. As a result, EU member states have responded by exerting control over spaces, restricting migrants and those who help them and increasing surveillance as a means to manage migration.

5.3 Implications of the study
The study has provided detailed and in-depth insights on how migration has been managed in and by Italy and, to a lesser extent, France. Moreover, it has provided human-centric, micro-level insights for a global phenomenon and has remained flexible throughout. Firstly, the identification of factors that push and pull migrants out of their countries of origin as well as transit countries and those that pull them towards Europe, has illustrated the reasons for migration from North Africa and, more importantly, over the last decade. Therefore, the insights into migration from Africa to Europe are specific to the period following the Arab Spring. The study links the consequences of the Arab Spring and for migration to Europe and illustrates the changed nature of migration. Furthermore, the concept of the carceral state has illustrated how EU member states have taken measures that are akin to carceral states, contributing to the perception that migrants are a threat to national security, despite entry policies as dictated by EU legislation that protect the human rights of migrants.

Methods of categorisation and state responses in the form of securitisation, which includes a vast number of measures taken to mitigate migration, illustrate restrictive governmentality of bodies, where these state responses compound the human insecurity of migrants, instead of alleviating it. These sentiments have trickled from the macro level to the micro level, where xenophobia and associated violence are increasing. Important for FST, are the insights provided on the unique risks and threats that women face, as well as how states have failed to respond to their security, health, reproductive and care needs in a number of instances.

5.4 Informing Human Security & Feminist Security Theory
The study has kept in step with the human security framework and FST throughout and has given voice to aspects of each theoretical tool. For example, by focusing on migrants and individual experiences, the study has illustrated the threats to the human security of migrants. It has also recalled instances in which the state, looked to by migrants as protector and caregiver, has failed to protect them and, even worse, been responsible for the violation of their
human rights and placed them in precarious and vulnerable positions as they protect national security instead. This recalls the idea that the state is responsible for creating and maintaining structures of responsibility.

The study has clearly painted a picture for Feminist Security theorists as well, by describing, firstly, the forms of violence and discrimination that exist in the case of North African migrants in Europe, then, how Italy and indigenous populations treat non-citizens and, finally, the security of migrants on the ground. The thesis has also informed theory through its emphasis on the factors that cause migration flows, whilst recognising the complexities of the irregular migration that has marked the North African and Mediterranean regions. Lastly, and quite importantly, the study contributes valuable insights for migration studies on the impact of migrant bodies, which can be approached from various perspectives, as the impact on these bodies, though not prioritised, remains significant.

5.6 Gaps for Further Study
The study has identified gaps in the literature related to the topic, especially where it concerns the feminisation of North African migration and associated changes in gender roles and hierarchies, entry policies of the EU and Arab Spring-related factors of migration. Other gaps concern the specific consequences of securitisation measures used by receiving countries for migrants’ human security and biases towards countries of origin. Literature on the feminisation of migration in North Africa would contribute to a wider understanding of the reasons for and nature of women’s migration from North Africa to Europe, as well as the implications thereof in the public and personal domains. Literature focusing on the entry policies and regulations of the EU towards African migrants would highlight provisions for African and irregular migrants and pitfalls thereof. Linked to this, literature could also offer practical value, and be used to contribute towards less securitised and more human-security focused migration management strategies. Similarly, work dedicated to determining biases towards countries of origins could be used to identify and negotiate biases for the sake of human security, which would in turn benefit national security.

5.7 Conclusion
The study set out to describe the nature of migration policies and processes towards economic migrants from North Africa to Italy and France and adopted a gender lens to do so. It set out to identify the factors that push economic migrants out of North Africa and pull them towards Europe, considering the role of the Arab Spring. Then, it sought to determine how these factors
impact the security of these migrants and, lastly, to understand the implications of EU responses for these migrants’ human security. The meeting of these objectives was expected to result in a description of contemporary migration from North Africa to Europe and the issues associated with this process. Furthermore, it hoped to consider the human security and human rights implications in order to understand the climate of migrant reception in Europe, to determine what about the migrant policies and processes need to change.

Although there are hopes to stem migration from North Africa to Europe, the study found that the persistence of modern-day slavery, conflict and poverty will only continue to encourage migration, and more so irregular migration, from North Africa. As the feminisation of migration has revealed, more women are migrating and gender roles are changing, therefore, the chances of familial migration increasing is also likely. Special attention needs to be paid to the protection of women migrants as well as child migrants, as they are most vulnerable to various forms of exploitation and violence. European states need to provide adequate health care and basic amenities to pregnant women and children, and states need to display more support of anti-trafficking and anti-exploitation initiatives and provide child migrants with the care, schooling, housing and provisions that international law guarantees.

The relationship between globalisation and migration is complex and, as a result, states cannot manage migration and migratory flows as they previously did. Due to the impact of globalisation on migration, states need to reconsider the manner in which they receive migrants, how they respond to high inflows of migrants and the agreements they make with third countries to manage migration. Highly-securitised and externalised responses to migration will likely change the patterns and routes of irregular migration, rather than put a stop to it. Although the EU has shifted its focus to protecting its borders from migrants, the human cost has been enormous and, therefore, the EU should reconsider its responses and strategy towards irregular migration, as these currently do not align with entry policies and international law. Moreover, it should reconsider harsh restrictions towards those who perform SAR activities, the closure of ports and sub-standard facilities that house migrants. Without sounding overly idealistic, it is recommended that the EU reach consensus about united migration management, where burden is shared and penalties for human rights violations are imposed on member states who deviate from the agreement.

Human security is linked to international security. Therefore, by guaranteeing the security of individuals, the international community becomes more secure. As American reformer and
activist, Jane Addams, once said, “The good we secure for ourselves is precarious and uncertain until it is secured for all of us and incorporated into our common life” (Bush, 1993: 48 – 49). Migration, as an earnest and genuine quest for survival, let alone happiness, is a complex process. Migrants needs to be protected against threats to human security, not vilified as threats to national security.
6. Bibliography


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