Populism and Liberal Democracy: Three Case Studies

By

Werner Vollgraaff

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Supervisor: Prof Pieter Fourie
Co-supervisor: Dr Cindy Steenekamp

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Declaration:

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Abstract:
This study used an exploratory case study design to examine the wave of populism that occurred in 2016. During 2016, numerous notable populist events in Liberal Democracies occurred. These include Rodrigo Duterte becoming the president of the Philippines; the Brexit vote in Britain and Donald Trump winning the presidency in the U.S. This series of populist events sparked a concern that internal failings within the Liberal Democratic system were the cause of the populism. Understanding the underlying causes of these incidents is of utmost importance considering that Liberal Democracy is globally the current dominant political system. The primary goal of this study is to uncover how and why populism has occurred in these Liberal Democracies, and more specifically, whether it is due to internal failings with the Liberal Democratic system. This study adopted and revised two theoretical frameworks to help examine the two points of interest in this study: populism and Liberal Democracy. The populist framework was dubbed the Fifth Approach; took inspiration from various sources and identified several key aspects that characterise populists. This study also adopted the two-strand approach to Liberal Democracy by Canovan. However, the two sides, redemptive and pragmatic, were revised to fit the two aspects of Liberal Democracy uncovered by this study’s theoretical overview, and four indicators were chosen to measure them: The support that Liberal values have in society, the support for Representative Democracy, citizens’ support for direct democracy and satisfaction with the status quo. Examining the three chosen case studies - Brexit, Donald Trump’s win and Rodrigo Duterte’s winning the Philippines’ presidency - revealed several key points of interest. Firstly, it seems that in Western Liberal Democracies, populism garners most of its support from the older white and less educated demographic. Secondly, when populists come into power, there seems to be a tendency towards authoritarianism. Thirdly, and most important, the populism which occurred in 2016 does not seem to be due to internal failings within Liberal Democracy. Examining the indicators, the researcher concluded that the Philippines and Britain had no gap in their Liberal Democracies. Furthermore, all case studies had varying significant factors that influenced their respective populist events. Only the U.S. case study showed any potential link between populism and failings within its system and was the only case study that evidenced a gap between the two sides of its Liberal Democracy. However, with that case study, there were also other significant external factors that influenced the outcome of the presidential election.
Opsomming:

Hierdie studie het ’n verkennende gevallestudie ontwerp gebruik om die golf van populisme in 2016 te ondersoek. Gedurende 2016 het in Liberale Demokrasieë talle noemenswaardige populistiese gebeurtenisse plaasgevind. Dit sluit in Rodrigo Duterte wat die president van die Filippyne word, die Brexit stem in Brittanje en Donald Trump wat die presidentskap wen in die VSA. Die reeks van populistiese gebeurtenisse het kommer gewek dat interne mislukkings met die Liberale Demokratiese sisteem die oorsaak was van die populisme. Die kwessie oor of mislukkings in Liberale Demokrasie die oorsaak van populisme is, is van uiterst belang aangesien Liberale Demokrasie huidig die globale dominante politieke stelsel is.

Die hoof doel van die studie is om te onthul hoe en hoekom populisme in hierdie Liberale Demokrasieë plaasgevind het. Die studie het twee teoretiese raamwerke aangeneem en hersien om te help om die twee punte van belang, populisme en Liberale Demokrasie, te bestudeer. Die populistiese raamwerk was die Vyfde Benadering genoem en het van verskeie bronne inspirasie getrek en voorskrif verskeie sleutel aspekte wat populiste besit. Die studie het die twee string benadering na Liberale Demokrasie aangeneem en dit het meer spesifiek Canovan se twee kante van Liberale Demokrasie aangeneem. Verder, die twee kante, verlossing en pragmaties, was ‘n bietjie verander om te pas met die twee kante van Liberale Demokrasie wat die studie se teoretiese oorsig ontbloot het en vier aanwysers was gekies om hulle te meet. Die ondersteuning vir Liberale waardes in die samelewing, ondosteuning vir Verteenwoordigende Demokrasie, burgers se steun vir Direkte Demokrasie en tevredenheid met die status quo. Die ondersoek van die drie gevallestudies, Brexit, Donald Trump se oorwinning en Rodrigo Duterte wat die presidensie wen in die Filippyne, het verskeie sleutel punte van belang onthul. Eerstens dit lyk asof in Westerse Liberale Demokrasieë die meeste ondersteuning kan gevind word onder die ouer wit en minder opgevoede demografie. Tweedens dit lyk asof populiste ‘n neiging het na outoritarisme wanneer hulle in mag is. Derdens en mees belangrik dit lyk nie asof die populisme in 2016 asgevolg was van interne mislukke met Liberale Demokrasie nie. Met die vier aanwysers het die studie vasgestel dat die Filippyne en Brittanje geen gaping in hul Liberale Demokrasies gehad het nie. Verder, al die gevallestudies het die verskillende betekenisvolle faktore gehad wat hul populistiese gebeure beïnvloed het. Net die VSA gevallestudie het enige potensiale verband tussen populisme en mislukkings met sy sisteem gewys en was die enigste gevallestudie wat ‘n gaping tussen die twee kante van sy Liberale Demokrasie gehad het. Egter, met daai gevallestudie was daar ook ander betekenisvolle eksterne faktore wat die presidensiële verkiesing beïnvloed het.
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Contents

Declaration: .................................................................................................................... i
Abstract: ........................................................................................................................ ii
Opsomming: ................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements: ....................................................................................................... iv
Figures and Tables: ......................................................................................................... vii

Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Background and rationale: ..................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Problem statement and research question: ............................................................. 5
  1.3 Theoretical framework of study: ........................................................................... 6
  1.4 Research design and methods: .............................................................................. 9
  1.5 Outline of Study: .................................................................................................. 11

Chapter 2: Building an analytical framework ............................................................... 12
  2.1 Introduction: ........................................................................................................... 12
  2.2 Liberal Democracy ............................................................................................... 12
    2.2.1 Development of Liberal Democracy: ............................................................... 12
    2.2.2 Liberal Democratic Theory: .......................................................................... 16
    2.2.3 A critique of Liberal Democracies .................................................................. 18
  2.3 Populism: .............................................................................................................. 21
    2.3.1 Various approaches to populism: ..................................................................... 21
      2.3.1.1 Populism as an ideology: ......................................................................... 21
      2.3.1.2 Populism as a political logic: ................................................................. 23
      2.3.1.3 Populism as a discourse: ........................................................................ 25
      2.3.1.4 Populism as a strategy or form of organisation: ..................................... 26
      2.3.1.5 A potential fifth approach to populism: ................................................ 27
    2.3.2 Populist theory and the potential dangers of populism: .................................. 29
    2.4 The link between Populism and Liberal Democracy: ........................................ 37
    2.5 Conclusion: ........................................................................................................ 42

Chapter 3: The Philippines and the case of Rodrigo Duterte ........................................ 44
  3.1 Introduction: ........................................................................................................... 44
  3.2 Contextualisation: ............................................................................................... 45
  3.3 Data on the state of Liberalism: ........................................................................... 52
  3.4 Rodrigo Duterte and Populism: ............................................................................ 56
  3.5 Analysis: ............................................................................................................... 66
3.6 Conclusion: ............................................................................................................................. 70
Chapter 4: The UK and the case of Brexit .................................................................................. 71
  4.1 Introduction: .......................................................................................................................... 71
  4.2 Contextualisation: .................................................................................................................. 71
  4.3 Data on the state of Liberalism: ............................................................................................ 78
  4.4 Brexit and Populism: ............................................................................................................ 82
  4.5 Analysis: ............................................................................................................................... 91
  4.6 Conclusion: .......................................................................................................................... 97
Chapter 5: The United States and the case of Donald Trump ..................................................... 99
  5.1 Introduction: .......................................................................................................................... 99
  5.2 Contextualisation: ................................................................................................................ 99
  5.3 Data on the state of Liberalism: ........................................................................................... 103
  5.4 Trump, Populism and the Presidential election: .................................................................. 111
  5.5 Analysis: ............................................................................................................................... 118
  5.7 Conclusion: .......................................................................................................................... 126
Chapter 6: Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 128
  6.1: Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 128
  6.2 Comparative Analysis: ........................................................................................................ 129
  6.3: Research Question .............................................................................................................. 134
  6.4: Issues encountered .............................................................................................................. 135
  6.5: Areas for future research .................................................................................................... 135
Bibliography: ............................................................................................................................. 137
Figures and Tables:

Figures:

Figure 1: Liberal values in the Philippines ................................................................. 52
Figure 2: Liberal values in Britain ................................................................................. 79
Figure 3: Liberal values in the U.S ............................................................................. 104

Tables:

Table 1.1: Representative Democracy in the Philippines ........................................... 54
Table 1.2: Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy in the Philippines ...... 55
Table 1.3: Satisfaction with the status quo in the Philippines ....................................... 55
Table 2.1: Representative Democracy in Britain ......................................................... 79
Table 2.2: Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy in Britain ............... 80
Table 2.3: Satisfaction with the status quo in Britain .................................................. 81
Table 2.4: Opinions on the Brexit vote ....................................................................... 89
Table 2.5: Claims made by the Leave Campaign ........................................................ 90
Table 3.1: Representative Democracy in the U.S ....................................................... 109
Table 3.2: Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy in the U.S ............... 110
Table 3.3: Satisfaction with the status quo in the U.S ............................................... 110
Table 4: Comparing the three case studies’ Liberal Democracies ............................... 133
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and rationale:

In 2016, *Time* announced that their person of the year was newly elected president of the United States and populist figurehead, Donald Trump. In the article other prominent populist figures of the year were also mentioned. This is indicative of how prominent populism has become in the consciousness of Western media and society. However, prominence alone would not warrant a study dealing with populism. The current upsurge of populism has caused, or at the very least enabled, a number of tragic events. These include thousands of supposed criminals being killed by police and vigilantes in the Philippines (Berehulak, 2016), families being separated, children and innocents being detained in the United States (Criss, 2017), and a nation separating from a union, causing economic ramifications on a global scale (Hunt & Wheeler, 2018). These three examples were arguably all caused by the success of populism. Coinciding with this upsurge in populism, there is an upsurge in right-wing extremism, such as the “alt-right” movement which is particularly prominent in the United States (Collins, 2016).

Globally, populism has experienced unprecedented levels of success. This success is most notable in Europe. Since the 1960s, Europe has seen an upsurge in the number of populist parties and the influence that they exert on their respective political environments. Right-wing populist parties in Europe have doubled their share of votes over the past sixty years. Since 2010, right-wing populist parties have, on average, occupied 13.2% of seats in parliament (Zakaria, 2016: 10). This percentage increased to 16.5% in 2016 (Zakaria, 2016: 10). Furthermore, populist parties occupy the largest share of seats in six European nations: Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Poland, Greece, and Switzerland. Hungary can be seen as the pinnacle of the current European populist wave, with the governing party and the main opposition party both being populist (Mudde, 2016: 26). In Norway, Lithuania, and Finland, populist parties are part of coalition governments (Zakaria, 2016: 10).

However, there are some areas of the world where populism is declining, or where it has yet to gain any significant foothold. Throughout the 20th century, Latin America was home to numerous populist movements that were well-loved, movements such as those of Juan Peron in Argentina, of Venezuela’s Rafael Caldera, and of Fidel Castro (Seligson, 2007: 81). Since the economic downturn in Latin America, however, populism has lost its appeal in the region. There is an important distinction to be made between the loss of popularity of populism in
South America, and its rise in other parts of the world. Populism in Latin America was all of the left-wing variety, while the current global upswing in populism seems to be exclusively right-wing.

There are numerous theories as to why only right-wing populism has experienced an upsurge in popularity and success. Some point to the left-wing’s propensity to focus on economic issues and their relatively “moderate” position on the political spectrum as a contributing factor. Some authors, such as Inglehart and Norris (2016: 1), argue that in advanced Western nations, the focus has shifted towards cultural issues. This issue is something that right-wing populists focus on: the “preservation” of culture. Thus, right-wing populists are simply tapping into current, and relevant, issues in the environment in order to gain success. There are other variations in arguments as to why right-wing populism has achieved recent success. These will, however, be dealt with in Chapter 2.

The environment in which populism has found success provides an interesting conundrum for scholars of political science. Populist upsurges almost all occurred in liberal democracies, the political system which has supposedly dominated the global political arena since the fall of the Soviet Union (Fukuyama, 1989: 1). The fact that populism has achieved such a level of success in liberal democracies implies several things. However, before these can be unpacked, one must first understand the foundation upon which the theory of Liberal Democracy stands, as well as the conceptual framework of populism.

The roots of Liberal Democracy can be traced back to prominent political philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and even Machiavelli (Held, 2014: 58-72). However, the foundation of Liberal Democracy, as we know it today, was predominately shaped by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Born at the end of the Enlightenment, Mill was exposed to an environment where church and state were beginning to separate and where science, and rational thought held a foremost place in society. The English philosopher’s commitment to liberty and his principle of Liberty took centre stage in his works. The principle of Liberty states that government, and individuals, are only allowed to intervene in the private sphere of a person if actions are committed which threaten the safety or liberty of another. Furthermore, institutions are put in place to ensure that individuals are free and secure in their striving for happiness (Held, 2014: 79).

The concept of Liberal Democracy has evolved since the publication of Mill’s works. However, modern Liberal Democracy still has, at its core, the protection of its citizens’
liberty. As the name suggests, Liberal Democracy consists of two concepts, namely *Liberalism* and *democracy*. At its most basic, democracy means rule by the people\(^1\). Liberalism, on the other hand, is an ideology with various interconnected aspects and concepts. Rhoden (2015) lists the following aspects as the core of the ideology: civil liberty, media independence, minority rights, property rights, executive rule of law with constraints and an independent judiciary. Rhoden argues that these core attributes are not a fundamental aspect of democratic rule, but that these core attributes, and Liberalism, are a modern addition to the concept of democracy and democratic rule (Rhoden, 2015: 565). As will be argued in chapter 2, this gap between Liberalism and democracy is where populism has gained its foothold and flourished.

As with democracy, populism also has ancient roots. In Ancient Greek and Roman times, populism and the concept of “the people” were used in three different senses (Müller, 2015: 81). Firstly, they were used to denote the people as a whole; in other words all the citizens within a polity. Secondly, they were used to denote a certain section of the polity: the “common people”. This meaning was, and still is, used as a rhetorical device to evoke images of a “downtrodden” or “forgotten” people. Lastly, the term was used to denote the people as a nation, one that is distinctly based on shared culture (Müller, 2015: 81). Despite these meanings being used in ancient times, they still form a large part of populism, and populist rhetoric, in the modern world.

Populism’s first appearance as a distinct political force occurred in Russia and the United States at about the same time. In the 19\(^{th}\) century, a political movement in Russia dubbed Narodnichestvo\(^2\) was formed, which consisted of members of the “bourgeois” advocating for the rights of serfs: a class of farmers who had essentially no rights (Müller, 2015: 82). At the same time, a third party began to gain prominence in the traditionally two-party political system of the United States. This party was dubbed the Populist Party by journalists and gathered most of its support from poor farmers and workers who felt aggrieved by the immense wealth that industrialists, such as Rockefeller, had created on the backs of these people\(^3\). The party collapsed within three years, but despite this collapse, the use of populism

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\(^1\) The word, democracy, finds its origins in the ancient Greek words, demos (the people) and kratos (rule) (Held, 2014: 1).

\(^2\) The term, when translated, essentially means populism (Müller, 2015: 82).

\(^3\) This situation is eerily similar to the current situation in the U.S. where the middleclass’ wealth is shrinking while the “top 1%’s” wealth is disproportionally increasing at a rapid rate (McElwee, 2017).
in politics had been introduced into the United States political system, and has remained so ever since (Kazin, 2016: 18).

Arguably, the most infamous instance of populism is the rise of Fascism in Europe during the 1930s. Hitler and Mussolini are evocative examples of individuals who used populist rhetoric to gain power. Their rise to power ended in a World War that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 55 million people (United States Holocaust Memorial, 2016). The legacy of Hitler, Mussolini and Fascism is a significant contributing factor to the extreme suspicion with which populism is viewed in Europe (Berman, 2016: 39). However, it remains disputed whether the rise of Fascism in the 1930s can be viewed as truly populist, or at least, populist in a modern sense.

There are significant differences between the Fascists of the past and current populists. Firstly, today’s right-wing populists do not make claims to dismantle democracy, but instead they claim that they want to improve it. According to Berman (2016: 43), “Current right-wing extremists are thus better characterized as populist rather than Fascist, since they claim to speak for everyday men and women against corrupt, debased, and out-of-touch elites and institutions”. As such, these individuals may be considered illiberal, but they are not antidemocratic. Secondly, the broader context in which Nazism in 1934 and populism in 2016 found themselves, are vastly different. Currently, the western world is not faced with the scale and level of political turmoil that was experienced during the interwar period. Furthermore, democracy has developed deep roots in the global political landscape and strong institutions since the interwar period. Democratic governments today display far better competency than the fledging governments of the interwar period (Berman, 2016: 43). However, this does not mean that populism does not hold any dangers for the democratic world. The populist rhetoric that fans citizens’ distrust of politicians and institutions may undermine their faith in the concept of democracy itself (Berman, 2016: 43). This dangerous game has the potential to descend into Fascism, and as Berman succinctly puts it, “Right-wing populism—indeed, populism of any kind—is a symptom of democracy in trouble; fascism and other revolutionary movements are the consequence of democracy in crisis” (Berman, 2016: 44).

There is no single, and universally accepted, definition of populism. However, there are some characteristics that most definitions share. Firstly, Mudde defines populism as a “loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism”
(Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 3). According to Müller, populists hold the belief “that only a part of the people is really ‘the people’ – and that only the populist authentically identifies and represents the real people” (Müller, 2015: 3). Inglehart and Norris argue that, in its most basic form, populism can be understood as “a philosophy that emphasizes faith in the wisdom and virtue of ordinary people (the silent majority) over the ‘corrupt’ establishment” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 3). All these definitions share at least one common theme: the appeal which it holds for the common or ordinary people. However, what constitutes the “common people” is a murky issue which often depends on the particular instance of populism one is looking at. As was seen with the three different meanings attached to the common people in ancient times, multiple and overlapping interpretations of this concept may exist today.

During 2016, populism, and specifically right-wing populism, seemed to have gained an unprecedented level of growth in popularity and success. The first event was the British people voting to leave the European Union, or as it is known by its portmanteau word: Brexit. The Brexit vote was extensively promoted by Nigel Farage, then leader of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party). Many political pundits dubbed him the ‘architect of Brexit’ or ‘Mr Brexit’ for his prominent role in the success of the vote (Shuster, 2016). In June 2016, another populist figure gained success with Rodrigo Duterte winning the Philippine elections for the presidency (Aljazeera, 2016). In the United States, populism became prominent in the presidential election, with candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders using populist rhetoric, albeit from different sides of the political spectrum. The height of this phenomenon was Donald Trump winning the United States elections for the presidency on 8 November 2016 (Shuster, 2016). All three events were spearheaded by populist figures, using populist rhetoric to secure their successes. These three events were also some of the first instances, in modern politics, of right-wing populism achieving success on a national level. The only other example of right-wing populism gaining such success would be the Hungarian Fidesz party’s victory in the 2010 elections (Than & Szakacs, 2010). Coupled with these events, was the prominent presence of populism in Europe: Europe was approaching several elections⁴, with populist parties contending in all of them (CNN, 2017c).

1.2 Problem statement and research question:

Following from the definitions mentioned in the introduction, populism, on the surface, attempts to represent “pure democracy”, one that is “untainted by elitism” and where “the

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⁴ These include elections in France, Netherlands, Austria, and Italy (CNN, 2017c).
people” hold true sovereignty. However, this is in conflict with liberalism and its representative institutions, which are in place to protect all citizens’ rights and the private spheres they inhabit, not only those of “the common people”. Furthermore, current populists question the “democratic legitimacy” of liberal democracies, or in other words, whether they truly represent the citizens of the polity. These are legitimate questions to be asked of Liberal Democracy, especially considering its dominance in the world. Many members of academia question whether the current populist wave highlights legitimate concerns, or whether it has more nefarious ends. In addition, there also must be an examination of why, and how, populism has gained such popularity in Liberal Democracy. Is it due to failings in the political system, or due to other phenomena such as economic, or cultural, backlash? These are the questions that this study will explore.

The primary research question of this study is the following:

Why and how has populism emerged in contemporary Liberal Democracies?

1.3 Theoretical framework of study:

The conceptualisation and operationalisation of populism is heavily contested in academia. Through an examination of prominent views on populism, Mudde concludes that most definitions of populism possess at least the two common aspects: “the people” and “the elite” and argues that populism is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Despite populism being a distinct ideology, it does not possess the same level of refinement and complexity that other ideologies, such as Liberalism, share. As such, Mudde describes populism as a thin-centred ideology, with a restricted core of political concepts. These core concepts of populism are ‘the people’ and the ‘opposing elite’ (Mudde, 2004: 543).

Freeden describes a thin-centred ideology as one “that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts” and one that exhibits “a restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts” (Aslanidis, 2016: 89). Because populism is a thin-centred ideology, it can be combined with various other ideologies, thus making it exceedingly versatile (Mudde, 2004: 543). Mudde’s definition is one of the most prominent conceptualisations of populism and has garnered a great many supporters in academia. However, the definition is not without flaws or criticism.
His definition is exceedingly vague, making it difficult to successfully apply to real-world cases; nor does it incorporate the relationship between Liberal Democracy and populism.

Considering the shortcomings of Mudde’s theory, Canovan’s theory of two democracies seems to be ideal. Firstly, Canovan states that populism in democratic societies is, “…seen as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society” (Canovan, 1999: 3). According to Canovan, this appeal evinces a number of characteristics. Firstly, populism may possess a number of different structural features depending on the establishment that it is railing against. In the case of this study it is railing against Liberal Democracy and its perceived descent into elitism. Secondly, populist rhetoric is characterised by a style that is “democratic”, in the sense that is aimed at the “common people”. Thirdly, populism evokes a mood amongst its supporters that is revivalist. To its supporters, populist politics are separate from “standard politics” and mark a significant shift from the status quo (Canovan, 1999: 6).

Canovan further highlights how populism appeals to “the people” in three ways. Coincidentally, these three mirror the three different meanings of “the people” in the ancient world. Firstly, populists appeal to a “united people”, which contrasts with the parties and factions within a nation that “divides” it (Canovan, 1999: 5). Secondly, there is the appeal to “our people”, which is usually used in the cultural or ethnic sense and to distinguish between the people who “belong” and those who do not, such as illegal immigrants. The last appeal is to the “common people” by separating the nation into the “ordinary people” and the opposing highly educated, privileged, cosmopolitan elite (Canovan, 1999: 5). The appeal is usually used when populist figures speak of the “silent majority” or the “forgotten ones”.

In Populism as a Spectre of Democracy: A Response to Canovan, Arditi (2004) provides a succinct overview of Canovan’s theory, while making some astute contributions of his own. Canovan bases her idea of ‘two democracies’ on Oakeshott’s two styles of European politics through the modern age. One style is the politics of faith, which is the belief that it is possible to achieve perfection, and salvation through effort, and not through the intervention of “divine providence”. The other style is the politics of scepticism, which believes that governments can only do the bare minimum of keeping the peace and improving a system of, “rights and duties and the concomitant system of means of redress, which together compose the superficial order” (Arditi, 2004: 137). According to Oakeshott, neither style can exist on its own and the tension between these two explains the deep ambiguity of the political
vocabulary (Oakeshott, 1996: 91). Canovan essentially built on Oakeshott’s two styles and renamed the two “redemptive” and “pragmatic”. She argued that one can understand modern democracy, i.e. Liberal Democracy, as a point where the redemptive and pragmatic sides of politics intersect. Furthermore, it is between these two sides that there “lies a gap in which populism is liable to appear” (Arditi, 2004: 139).

Canovan further explains that populism arises as a response to an excess of pragmatism and a deficiency of redemption politics (Arditi, 2004: 141). Thus, from Canovan’s point of view, populism is a response to the failings of any modern democracy in which it arises. As Arditi mentions, one can see populism as a spectre of democracy. Arditi uses this instead of Canovan’s initial metaphor of a shadow and states that this is “spectrally” at work in all three modes of appearance of populism. Running with this metaphor, he explains that each mode moves the phenomenon “a notch further in the interval separating a visitation and a more threatening haunting” (Arditi, 2004: 141). To measure the two sides of Liberal Democracy, two indicators for each side will be used. For the pragmatic side, the support that Liberal values have in society and the support for Representative Democracy will be chosen. For the redemptive side, citizens’ support for direct democracy and satisfaction with the status quo will be chosen. As will be explored in section 2.2, the two facets of Liberal Democracy can be divided into Representative Democracy and Direct Democracy. The four chosen indicators will adequately measure these two facets.

The first mode is populism as a mode of representation, more specifically as one that Manin dubbed “audience democracy” (Arditi, 2004: 141). This new style of representation, enabled by advances in communications technology, has provided individuals with personal legitimacy which is independent from those garnered from formal political institutions. The second mode refers to populism as “a mode of participation that departs from the etiquette of political salons without apologising for its brashness” (Arditi, 2004: 142). The final mode is one where individuals in power have a loose adherence to the rule of law that can slip easily into authoritarian practices. Essentially what is meant by this mode is that populists “can get away with undemocratic behaviour as long as their actions are perceived to represent the will of the people” (Arditi, 2004: 142).

One can see why Canovan’s two democracies is a useful theory for this study to adopt, as it focuses on the relationship between populism and modern democracies. It also makes the claim that it is the failings within a system that cause populism. This claim aligns closely
with the research question of this study and provides useful indicators for examining the case studies. However, as Chapter 2 will conclude, Canovan’s theory on its own may not offer enough for a robust analytical framework.

1.4 Research design and methods:
This thesis uses a case study design for analysis. Case studies enable the researcher to focus on a group, community, event, individual, policy, or even nation-state, and to study them in great depth. Due to the fact that this study will analyse nation-wide phenomena, case study seems to be the ideal form of analysis. Furthermore, case studies are also most commonly associated with studies that are primarily qualitative, which this study is. There are, however, some limitations to this approach. Firstly, information gathered from a case study cannot be generalised, due to the case study being unique and not a representative sample of the subject matter (Burnham et al, 2008: 64). Due to this study examining populism in liberal democracies, an object of interest on a macro-scale, very little generalisation is needed. Furthermore, due to this thesis using three case studies, some similarities between the three may be extrapolated, which in turn may potentially be generalised. Thus, using comparative elements, allows this study to potentially generalise findings from the case studies, which on its own would not have allowed such generalisations (Burnham et al, 2008: 66).

A case study was chosen over other methods such as purely comparative, experimental, and statistical, for the following reasons: since each case has a vast number of facets that are each unique, it would make little sense to base the study purely on the comparative method. Although, it is important to note that while this study is not based on the comparative method, it will feature numerous comparative elements. The biggest difficulty with the comparative design is the balancing act of finding cases that have enough similar variables to treat as constants while also having enough differences to allow for meaningful findings (Burnham et al, 2008: 66). The criteria used for selecting the case studies have circumvented this issue. An experimental method was not chosen because, once again, the study deals with points of interest with far too many variables for an experimental method. Furthermore, this study does not deal with a clear line of causation, and as such an experimental method would not be possible where variables are influenced to ascertain direction and existence of causation. A case study method was chosen over a statistical method due to the fact that no databases and very little statistical analysis is used in the study.
An inherent danger of the case study approach is the possibility of it becoming an arbitrary hodgepodge of material from the selected area of analysis. As such, one should have a clear focus when approaching one’s selected case studies (Burnham et al, 2008: 65). Although the case studies of the present study are broad, the focus on the relationship between populism and Liberal Democracy in each respective case study, with help from the theoretical framework, will provide enough focus to prevent this from happening.

Furthermore, the study in this thesis is exploratory in nature, which further supports the choice of case studies, as the study aims to explore a phenomenon, without explicitly focusing on causal effects and variables. The broad nature of an exploratory study fits the flexible nature of a case study design. The case studies will be conducted by using, primarily, secondary sources. These will include academic journals, studies relevant to the case studies, and news reports from reputable news outlets. From these sources, certain key aspects will be focused upon. These aspects will tie in with Canovan’s theory of two democracies, and the gap that lies between them. The four chosen indicators will measure whether there is indeed a gap between the Liberal Democracies of the case studies.

For the case study selection, the study held a set of criteria in mind. The case studies selected were: Donald Trump becoming president of the United States, the national referendum in Britain that resulted in the nation leaving the European Union, and Rodrigo Duterte winning the presidential election in the Philippines. The main criterion for the selection of the cases was that the instance of populism must have been successful on a national level. All three the chosen case studies meet this criterion. There are few other instances of populism meeting this criterion. Hungary is one notable exception. The second criterion is a difference in governmental structure and difference in geographical location, which all three case studies also meet. The last criterion is recency: the populist phenomena must have occurred recently, with, once again, all three case studies meeting this criterion. It should be noted that the Philippines can potentially be viewed as a significant outlier in contrast to the other two chosen nations. It could be argued that the Philippines does not preside over a Liberal Democracy, or at least one that is not comparable to the established Liberal Democracies of the U.S. and Britain. However, as will be discussed further in Chapter 3, this study would argue that the Philippines does indeed possess a Liberal Democracy, and that it is its outlier characteristics which make it uniquely valuable for uncovering facets about the dynamic between populism and Liberal Democracy, and for a comparison with the other two case studies.
1.5 Outline of Study:

Chapter 1 comprises an introduction and rationale for the study; the problem statement and research question, as well as an exploration of the theory underpinning this study. The introduction introduces the concepts of populism and Liberal Democracy and provides a brief overview of the history of populism and its current standing in the world.

Chapter 2 will analyse and critique the academic literature on populism and Liberal Democracy. On the populism side, academics such as Mudde, Inglehart, Norris, Laclau, Canovan, Dahl, and Kaltwasser will be dealt with, while on the Liberal Democracy side works of academics such as Madison, Mill, Zakaria, Fukuyama, and Rhoden will be explored.

The first of the three case study analyses will be conducted in Chapter 3 and will focus on how Rodrigo Duterte used populism to become president of the Philippines. It will also explore the status of Liberal Democracy in the Philippines, which deviates a great deal from the other case studies and will conclude with an analysis of how and why populism grew in the Philippines in 2016.

Chapter 4 will deal with the United Kingdom and Brexit case study by examining how Nigel Farage and the Leave Campaign used populism to sway the national referendum in favour of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. As is the case with the first case study, the status of Liberal Democracy in the United Kingdom will also be examined, and an analysis will be conducted on the how and why of the presence of populism in the U.K.

Chapter 5 will explore the phenomenon of populism in the United States, and more specifically the rise of Donald Trump to the presidency through the use of populist rhetoric. Furthermore, it will examine the status of Liberal Democracy in the United States, especially concerning citizens’ attitudes towards it. This will be done to ascertain if there is indeed a widening gap between the pragmatic and redemptive sides of democracy. As with the previous case studies, an analysis will be conducted to uncover how and why populism appeared in the United States in 2016.

Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the study. The research question will be answered. In this chapter, the researcher will make recommendations for future research and will summarize the study as a whole. Chapter 6 will also contain a comparative analysis between the three case studies.
Chapter 2: Building an analytical framework

2.1 Introduction:

The writer of this study has selected three populist events which occurred in 2016 for examination: Rodrigo Duterte winning the presidency in the Philippines, the Leave Campaign winning the EU referendum in Britain, and Donald Trump winning the presidency in the U.S. The three events were chosen due to their level of success, the degree of difference between the three incidents, and their currency. These three events sparked concern that a populist wave was occurring and that this was partly or wholly due to failings within the Liberal Democratic system. This concern has significant importance considering that Liberal Democracy is the current dominant political system. It is therefore important to understand how and why populism has emerged in Liberal Democracies.

Considering the nature of the research question, this thesis deals with two substantial theoretical bases: populism and Liberal Democracy. This chapter will explore both areas of interest, as well as the potential link between the two.

2.2 Liberal Democracy

Liberal Democracy is a complex political system with a long history. The following section will examine the development of Liberal Democracy because a better understanding of how Liberal Democracy has developed will provide a better understanding of the system and, potentially, of populism.

2.2.1 Development of Liberal Democracy:

All democratic systems and theories can find their genesis in the democracy of Ancient Athens. The Direct Democracy\(^5\) of Ancient Athens has captivated and provided inspiration for political thinkers throughout history. Prominent thinkers such as Montesquieu praised the democratic features of the Athenian system and used its example to further their own theories on democracy. The Athenian system also birthed a concept that we now term populism. After the death of the famous Athenian statesman Pericles, Aristotle noted that a new political class emerged in Athens, a political class that did not consist of men from the old aristocratic families, but of craftsmen and traders, persons whom one would label as self-made (Lane, 2012: 188-192). This coincidentally mirrors the rise of the middle class during the

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\(^5\) A Direct Democracy functions on the sustained participation of its citizens in the processes of governance and politics (Heywood, 2007: 74). In Ancient Athens, this was achieved through an assembly that was held four times every five weeks (Harris, 2009: 1). The assembly was open to any male Athenian citizen over the age of 18 (Finley, 1962: 10).
Enlightenment, in which the majority of liberal democratic thought was formed (Heywood, 2007: 78-79). With the rise of this new political class, a new political term was formed: demagogue. The negative connotations of the term emerged with Plato’s use of the word in his text Sophist (Lane, 2012: 190).

More than a thousand years later, we can see the same negative connotations in the writings of Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532) is a seminal text that explores the ways through which elites can garner power. Many of these techniques revolve around demagoguery and the manipulation of the masses (McCormick, 2001: 297). As a response to the danger that demagoguery poses, Machiavelli proposed a political system in which the people constantly monitor the elites that are in power. He utilized a romanticised view of Republican Rome to recommend democratic institutions such as the popular voting of officials from a selection of nobles, tribunes, popular appeals; and the ability for any citizen to level public accusations against an official or another citizen (McCormick, 2001: 304-305). The recommendations for extra-electoral institutions indicate that there are similarities between Machiavelli’s Roman Democracy, and the Liberal Democracy of today. However, one significant difference is that Machiavelli’s institutions were put in place as checks and balances against the inherently devious elite, or in other words, the ruling class; whereas the Liberal Democratic institutions in the modern era act as checks and balances for people in power, as well as for the people as a whole (McCormick, 2001: 310). Considering that Machiavelli’s system regards the establishment with such abject distrust, it would fit easily into the realm of populism, and it comes as no surprise that Machiavelli’s works are often cited by populists.

This dual aspect of modern Liberal Democracy only began to truly fall into place when Madison wrote The Federalist (1788). Madison incorporated ideas from Locke, Hobbes, and Montesquieu into a structured political theory (Held, 2014: 70). He agreed with Hobbes that politics was based on self-interest. Madison understood, just as Montesquieu had argued, that a separation of powers was crucial for the existence of a legitimate state. He stressed, as Locke had initially posited, the key importance of protecting individual freedom through a governing body that is legally restricted and that is accountable to those whose freedom it is supposed to protect (Held, 2014: 70). The ideas that Madison incorporated from these thinkers all form cornerstones of modern Liberal Democracy. However, it is Madison’s view

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6 In a modern sense, the most common definition of the term is a leader who controls the masses through his ability to foster “hysterical enthusiasm” (Heywood, 2007: 28).
on factions and the Direct Democracy of the Classical Age that has arguably had the most significant impact on the formation of modern Liberal Democracy.

Montesquieu was one of the numerous political thinkers who praised the Direct Democracy of Ancient Athens. According to Montesquieu, the appeal of the democracy of Ancient Athens had only been undermined by the external forces of modernization (Held, 2014: 70). According to Montesquieu, there was nothing wrong with the system of Direct Democracy; it was due to the changing nature of states\(^7\) that it was no longer wholly viable. Madison, however, did not share this view. This is made clear by the fact that Madison describes this political system of pure democracy as unstable, unjust and intolerant. He argues that in such a system “there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual” (Madison, 1788: 20). This is due to the nation-state being steered by the common interest or passion of the majority of the citizenry. In turn, this implies that Direct Democracy is “incompatible with personal security or the rights of property”, something that is at the core of Liberal Democracy (Madison, 1788: 20). Here we see the formation of an intriguing disconnect in the overarching theory of Democracy. The foundation of Liberal Democracy, pure democracy, is incompatible with the system of Liberal Democracy. This paradox is an important point to keep in mind as the analysis of the theories behind Liberal Democracy and populism is conducted. Any weaknesses in the system of Liberal Democracy may be a contributing factor to the emergence of populism, or at the very least, to something that populism may target or exploit.

According to Madison, dealing with the political difficulties of minority interest groups was relatively simple (Madison, 1788: 18). Through voting, the majority is able to defeat any sinister aims or views that a minority interest group may have (Madison, 1788: 18). However, to guard against any sinister machinations from the majority, or the tyranny of the majority\(^8\) as Madison called it, is far more complex. This tyranny of the majority could only be guarded against by constitutional arrangements such as an adequate system of political representation and a large enough electoral body. An adequate system of political representation would

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\(^7\) The difference between the nation-states during Montesquieu’s lifetime and the city-state of Ancient Athens is marked. Just in a geographical sense the difference is already clear. In Ancient Athens, the political system only had to operate effectively on a scale that encompassed the city and the surrounding countryside. However, the political systems of the Enlightenment nation-states had to effectively operate on a scale that covered numerous large cities and large swathes of land (Held, 2014: 56-57). A system that required regular and active participation from the citizenry was clearly not implementable.

\(^8\) The term was first coined by John Adams, one of the founding fathers of the U.S., and later popularised by John Stuart Mill in his famous work, *On Liberty*.
allow representatives to refine public views, and through the electoral process, public issues would be debated and clarified (Madison, 1788: 21). This system of political representation does not guard against the elected to transform into an exploitative faction. For this to be avoided, a nation-state should be constituted of a large territory and population. This is the crux of Madison’s theory, and a central feature of Liberal Democracy, namely the balancing of interests which results in a society where no single group can dominate, notwithstanding whether they are in the majority or the minority.

Mill’s writings represent another key point of development for Liberal Democracy, so much so that his thoughts and ideas are still widely prominent in liberal democracies of the modern age. Mill shared Madison’s fears of a tyranny of the majority. In Considerations on Representative Government (1861), he argued that if the government is run by all citizens, there is then a constant danger that the wisest and ablest individuals will be overshadowed by the lack of knowledge, experience, and skill of the majority. As such, the best form of government is a representative democracy where the citizenry “exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power” (Mill, 1861: 228).

Despite Mill’s apprehension regarding “the masses”, he was also equally apprehensive about the bureaucratic government that is an essential part of Liberal Democracy. As Tocqueville was before him, Mill was concerned about the prospects of an ever-expanding bureaucracy: one which would begin to involve itself in every part of society, and where the positions in the bureaucracy are “the sole objects of ambition” (Mill, 1859: 183). According to Mill, the way to guard against the overexpansion of bureaucracy is the presence of a vigorous democracy. It is also interesting to note that Mill made a sharp distinction between democracy and bureaucracy (Held, 2014: 84). Thus, one can see that as far back as approximately 150 years ago, there was a clear acknowledgement that Liberal Democracy is indeed made of two parts. This distinction is made even clearer when Mill argues that the benefits of popular control and efficient government can only be realised when one recognises that they have two distinct bases. He states that, “There are no means of combining these benefits except by separating the functions which guarantee the one from those which guarantee the other” (Mill, 1861: 241).

The following section will cover more recent theories on Liberal Democracy and its standing in the world. Considering that the study examines three incidents of potential populism in 2016, it is important that the current status of Liberal Democracy is explored.
2.2.2 Liberal Democratic Theory:

In 1989, Fukuyama made the claim that the end of the Cold War would herald the dominance of Liberal Democracy as a political system. Gradually all governments would conform to this “ideal” and the development of ideologies would cease, with Western Liberal Democracy being the final stage. In this sense, it would be the end of history. According to Fukuyama, Liberal Democracy faced two challenges from rival ideologies. The first was Fascism, which had been comprehensively defeated at the end of the Second World War. The second challenge was Communism, of which the end of the Cold War had signalled its lack of viability as a workable political ideology (Fukuyama, 1989: 6).

In *The Future of History* (2012), Fukuyama claims that the declining middle class is now the most significant threat to Liberal Democracy, and that it is a significant contributor to the rise of populism. As Fukuyama explains, there is a possibility that further technological development and globalisation could undermine the middle class, and that it would make it impossible for a great number of people in advanced societies to achieve middle class status (Fukuyama, 2012: 7). There is already evidence that this possibility is coming to fruition. Median incomes in the United States have experienced stagnation since the 1970s (Fukuyama, 2012: 8). Furthermore, recent technological innovations have, “accrued disproportionately to the most talented and well-educated members of society” (Fukuyama, 2012: 8) and this has resulted in the extreme growth of inequality in the United States, among other nations. In 1974, the top 1% of earners constituted 9% of the GDP (Fukuyama, 2012: 8). In 2007, the top 1%’s share has grown to 23.5% (Fukuyama, 2012: 8). The situation in the U.S. is reflected worldwide, with 1% of the world’s population owning more than the other 99% combined (Harrington, 2016: 1). These developments have exacerbated inequality and have weakened the middle class. In turn, this potentially evokes frustration and doubt in a great deal of the citizenry regarding the government and the political system, opening the way for movements which could possibly capitalise on these sentiments.

It is well known that there are various forms of democracy; however, not all of them are capable of protecting liberties and core values. This issue was made clear by Zakaria when he stated that “democracy is flourishing [while] constitutional liberalism is not” (Zakaria, 1997: 23). Zakaria explained that democracies are optimised by elections; however, without a

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9 In the 1970s, the top 1% of income earners earned slightly more than 10% of all income in the United States. In 2016, the top 1% of income earners earn more than 20% of all income. Inversely, in the 1970s, the bottom 50% of income earners earned more than 20% of all income. In 2016, they are earning just about 12% of all income (CNN Money, 2016).
system of checks and balances, elections merely legitimise power grabs with the potential of creating “strongmen”. Zakaria claimed that the focus on elections is the main cause behind the rise of “illiberal” democracies, which are democracies that maintain their legitimacy and credibility through elections, but which lack essential characteristics such as checks and balances, and a truly representative government (Zakaria, 1997: 22-25). As Diamond states on the matter of “illiberal” governments: “it is important to think about how democracy can be strengthened and reformed where it exists and introduced where it does not in ways that restrain populist, illiberal, and crudely majoritarian practices” (Diamond, 2003: 169).

In Zakaria’s *The Rise of Illiberal Democracy* (1997), he outlined the development of Liberal Democracy, and the rise of democracies he classified as “illiberal democracies”. Zakaria quoted Mill on the matter of nations becoming democratic and the people tending to believe that, “much importance had been attached to the limitation of power itself. That… [Democratisation of nations] was a response against rulers whose interests were opposed to those of the people” and that when the people finally were in charge that “The nation did not need to be protected against its own will” (Zakaria, 1997: 30). These beliefs have been shown to be naïve. Zakaria used the ominous statement by Alexandr Lukashenko, elected as president of Belarus in 1994 and still in office to this day, to exemplify this point, “There will be no dictatorship. I am of the people, and I am going to be for the people” (Zakaria, 1997: 30).

Liberalism is the crucial “ingredient” that is needed to avoid cases such as Belarus. Zakaria pointed to the work of Snyder and Mansfield. Snyder and Mansfield (1995: 5), with an extensive and impressive data set, came to the conclusion that over the last 200 years, democratising states had gone to war significantly more often than either liberal democracies or stable autocracies. As Zakaria stated, without the grounding effects of constitutional liberalism, “the rise of democracy often brings with it hyper-nationalism and warmongering” (Zakaria, 1997: 38). Zakaria’s argument echoed those of Madison and Tocqueville in the early years of Liberal Democracy.

Now that it has been established that threats are posed to Liberal Democracy outside of populism and that Liberalism is a key aspect of modern democracies, the dual aspect of Liberal Democracy will be explored further. The view that Liberal Democracy consists of two parts and that the Liberalism part is crucial, is something that can be found often, and in various forms, in academic literature. Similar to Rhoden and Canovan, Urbinati (2014: 7)
conceptualises democracy as something that consists of two constitutive poles: *will* and *opinion*. This model of democracy is a diarchic conception of democracy. The *will* pole consists of the various formal rules and procedures through which decisions can be made collectively in a free and fair manner (Urbinati, 2014: 7). The *opinion* pole refers to the ways through which citizens can affect collective decisions, directly or indirectly. Urbinati explains the opinion pole as “power that is meant to give voice to citizens’ claims, monitor institutions and devise alternative political agendas” (Urbinati, 2014: 7). The will pole represents the Liberal part of Liberal Democracy, while the opinion pole represents pure democracy. As a whole, the model conveys the fact that democracy can only be implemented through institutions and rules that structure the citizens’ active participation.

In this section, we see two prominent points being made. All the authors whose works were discussed believe that liberal democracies are under threat and that this threat has an external source. Also, authors such as Habets, Zakaria, and Diamond make a distinction between *democracy* and *Liberal Democracy*. It should be stressed that this distinction is by no means arbitrary. As was explored in the first section of this chapter, Liberal Democracy and democracy clash on a number of points, and as a result, a paradox exists within the liberal democratic system. However, with the exception of Urbinati, it is interesting to note that the authors in this section did not consider this paradox an internal threat in itself. Instead, it is illiberal democracies exploiting this paradox which pose a threat to established liberal democracies such as the United States. It stands to reason that if the political system of the United States is a Liberal Democracy, then the inherent paradox applies to it as well. As such, there is a likelihood that the United States, and other established liberal democracies are exposed to an internal threat or weakness. Another important point that can be deduced from this section is that the Liberal section of Liberal Democracy is crucial. Authors such as Zakaria, Habets and Urbinati argue convincingly that without formal rules and institutions, individual rights would be under threat.

2.2.3 A critique of Liberal Democracies

Moving away from the mostly positive view of Liberalism and Liberal Democracy, the views that will be discussed in the next section will explore the issues that the system and ideology face; issues that are mainly internal. Many of these issues are used, or exploited, by populism as a means by which to attack the legitimacy of Liberal Democracy. This section will partly cover the “how” of the research question of this study.
One of the authors who argue that Liberal Democracy is being threatened, Pabst, states that Liberal Democracy is facing a “triple threat” (Pabst, 2016: 92). According to Pabst, Liberal Democracy is facing a rising new oligarchy that reinforces the executive’s power at the expense of the people and of parliament. Also, various established liberal democracies, ranging from France to the U.S., are currently experiencing a “crisis of representation” (Pabst, 2016: 92). Public trust in political institutions is falling sharply, and especially in mainstream political parties that have morphed into small elite-dominated organisations, rather than the mass movements they purport to be (Pabst, 2016: 92). With “insurgent populist movements” as opponents, mainstream parties are perceived to be defending their own interests and the interests of their donors, rather than those of their voters (Pabst, 2016: 92). There is also a steep decline in party membership, and a long-term decline in voter turnout, which implies that the “voice of the people” is having an increasingly diminishing impact on governing elites (Pabst, 2016: 92).

Added to the above-mentioned diminishing impact on governing elites, a growing number of political representatives are professional politicians from increasingly narrower socio-economic backgrounds, who are seen, “as neither connecting with ordinary voters, nor governing in the interest of the majority, nor addressing the long-term needs of society” (Pabst, 2016: 92). All of this, according to Pabst, suggests that Liberal Democracy is drifting towards oligarchy. This new oligarchy presides over “old elites” and “new classes”. The “old elites” pertain to captains of industry and political dynasties, while the “new classes” include the “tech oligarchy” in Silicon Valley, various governmental technocrats, and advocates of “capitalist philanthropy” (Pabst, 2016: 92).

The second threat is the continuous threat of illiberal, and populist, forces seeking to destroy individual liberties in the name of free speech. On the other hand, Pabst states that Liberal Democracy can also act as a catalyst for populism and demagoguery; there is a tension between procedural standards and substantive values. As a side note, one can see that this is the same as Canovan’s theory of two democracies and all the other points made about Liberal Democracy’s duality in the previous sections. Any democratic system faces the key dilemma of constantly balancing two needs, these being “respecting majority will and commanding popular assent on the one hand, while protecting individuals and minorities from oppression on the other” (Pabst, 2016: 93).
The third threat that Liberal Democracy is facing is the possible rise of a new form of anarchy. Modern Liberal Democracy has introduced greater opportunities and freedoms by expanding individual rights and replacing “inherent status with natural equality before the law” (Pabst, 2016: 95). Coupled with these advances there are also losses. According to Pabst, there has been an erosion of the social and civic ties on which democracies and markets depend for cooperation and trust (Pabst, 2016: 94). Democracy and especially one that is tied to neoliberal capitalism, paradoxically promotes societies that are more atomised and more interdependent (Pabst, 2016: 94). This is built on Putman’s seminal work in *Bowling Alone* (2000). Using the United States as a case study, Putman argued that the declining levels of political participation and civic engagement that he observed were due to a decline in social capital (Putman, 2000: 183). Putman argued that as the U.S. changed into a society that is more individualistic and devoid of community ties, it negatively affected political participation and civic engagement (Putman, 2000: 277).

This dour view of Liberal Democracy is also shared by Brown, who wrote an article titled *Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy* (2005). According to Brown, neoliberal governmentality pertains to political systems that erode the autonomy of state and democratic institutions from the market and the corporations that influence it. More specifically, this entails an “erosion of oppositional political, moral, or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality yet inside liberal democratic society, that is, the erosion of institutions, venues and values organized by nonmarket rationalities in democracies” (Brown, 2005: 45). Furthermore, as Brown argues, Liberal Democracy is widely recognised as providing an adequate pragmatic and ethical buffer between its citizens and the “free hand” of the market. However, the appearance and construction of prominent neoliberal formations have resulted in a process of capture. This process has resulted in Liberal Democracy no longer representing civic practices, independent institutions and the “principle of popular sovereignty”. Instead, it now signifies “only a state and subjects organised by market rationality” (Brown, 2005: 48).

Brown is arguing that capitalism and specifically neoliberal capitalism has become so dominant that a “thoroughgoing market rationality” has overridden democratic and liberal values to the point where they have become “ideological shells” (Brown, 2005: 55). Furthermore, she states that those critics who are aware of the shortcomings of representative democracy are “compelled to defend liberal principles even as they are being eroded” (Brown, 2005: 56). The points that Brown makes in her article, are ones that populists often
espouse as proof that “the system is broken”. Brown provides a useful reference point for this thesis. If a prominent neoliberal capitalist system is present in one of the case studies, and if the populist movement capitalises on it, then it may support the view that populism arises from a failing Liberal Democratic system.

Academic literature about the status of Liberal Democracy in the world, and its relationship with populism, varies widely. However, there are some trends one can discern. Firstly, there are two camps regarding the status of Liberal Democracy. Some writers, such as Rhoden and Fukuyama, argue that Liberal Democracy is the best form of governance that we have, and that outside factors are affecting its viability. Others, such as Pabst and Brown, argue that the liberal democratic system is flawed, and that its current woes are caused by the system itself. Secondly, it seems that there is consensus that populism is connected to the liberalism component of democracy. As such, populism’s criticisms are directed at liberalism, and at its perceived perversion of democracy. This connection between populism and the liberalism component of democracy also further supports the view that there is a paradox in Liberal Democracy. Therefore, these criticisms espoused by populism offer a promising avenue to explore. However, first, an exploration of literature on populism is required.

2.3 Populism:

As was explored in the section on the development of Liberal Democracy, populism has a long history which can be traced back to the rise of demagogues. However, much has changed since the days of Ancient Greece and Rome. As such, it is important for this study to examine current approaches to populism and the most prominent theories on it. This will provide a clear picture of the concept and will provide a sufficient approach to populism that can be used in the case studies. This approach will then be used to help ascertain whether the selected incidents in 2016 were indeed populist.

2.3.1 Various approaches to populism:

2.3.1.1 Populism as an ideology:

Moffitt and Tormey (2013: 383) argue that one can identify at least four approaches to populism in literature. The first approach is to view populism as an ideology. According to Moffitt and Tormey, this has been the dominant approach in recent years, with Mudde leading the charge. Mudde’s (2004) writings on populism have greatly contributed to the advancement of this approach, as well as setting the agenda for comparative studies on populism. Mudde defines populism as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2016: 23).

In The Populist Zeitgeist (2004), Mudde aims to make a “threefold contribution to the current debate on populism in liberal democracies” (Mudde, 2004: 542). The contributions that are made are a new definition of populism; the normal-pathology thesis is rejected, and a critique of the reactions to and explanations of the phenomenon that Mudde dubs as “Populist Zeitgeist” emerge. Considering that the content of his new definition was covered in Chapter 1 and in the paragraph above, the only aspect which will be discussed in this section is how Mudde developed it. According to Mudde, at the time of his article, there were two dominant conceptualisations of populism in existence. The first conceptualisation views populism as “a highly emotional and simplistic discourse” that targets people’s base feelings (Mudde, 2004: 542). The second conceptualisation views populism as policies that aim to please citizens, potential voters, as quickly as possible. These policies’ only aim is to please potential supporters in the short-term and do not take into account any considerations as to whether the particular policy is the best solution (Mudde, 2004: 542).

Despite these two conceptualisations having intrinsic value, they do possess significant issues. The first conceptualisation is difficult to apply to empirical studies. Mudde poses this rhetorical question: When can one discern when something is emotional rather than rational and serious? What is meant by this is that categorising discourse as “emotional” or “rational” can be an arbitrary process, and as such, deciding which discourse is populist or not can be arbitrary as well. Furthermore, emotional politics, or slogansque politics as Mudde puts it, form the core of campaigning, regardless of where it is found on the political spectrum (Mudde, 2004: 542). The second conceptualisation shares a similar issue, the difficult question of who decides whether policies are populist, or in fact sound decisions. Mudde states that both conceptualisations do not, “go to the core of what is generally considered as populism in the academic literature” (Mudde, 2004: 543). On the contrary, these two conceptualisations are, respectively, examining demagogy and opportunism, rather than populism. Mudde argues that most definitions of populism have two reference points in common, these being the “the people” and “the elite” (Mudde, 2004: 542). Thus, according to Mudde, populism revolves around these two points, and as such, he built his definition on this relationship.
One can see how Mudde’s definition is popular in comparative studies, considering its minimalist nature and its ability to be applied without any cultural bias. However, as Moffitt and Tormey (2013: 383) point out, this definition does have its flaws. Most significantly, there are issues with classifying populism as a “thin-centred ideology”. When one uses the concept of ideology so widely in populism literature, it may blanket other approaches, and as such transform the concept into a catch-all term that loses its initial clarity (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 383). Also, when discussing other ideologies, one is hard-pressed to classify populism in the same category. As Moffitt and Tormey (2013: 383) argue, unlike other ideologies, there are very few which would self-identify as “populists”. While they do not expand on why individuals would be hesitant to self-identify as populists, this study would posit that it is largely due to the negative connotations attached to the word. Furthermore, there is no unified global populist movement, and there are no key philosophers or thinkers who developed the concept of populism as an ideology (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 383). These are aspects that every ideology has, but that populism lacks. As such, to classify populism as an ideology is, at best, dubious. As the reader may have noted, this study does not capitalize the word “populism”. Apart from this being the common practice, it is also due to the fact that this study does not view populism as an ideology, and as such capitalization of the term is not necessary because it is, in the grammatical sense, not a unique entity.

2.3.1.2 Populism as a political logic:

The second approach to populism is to see it as a political logic. Laclau is one of the first, and most prominent, theorists who studied the phenomenon of modern populism. He is also one of the first to provide a comprehensive theory on populism. His initial voyage into modern populism can be found in his 1977 book, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, in the final chapter titled “Towards a theory of Populism” (Laclau, 1977: 143). Laclau based much of his rudimentary theory on Althusser’s work, and more specifically on Althusser’s concept of *interpellation* (Laclau, 1977: 143-144). Althusser states that interpellation has a “double-specular structure” (Krips, 2006: 83). What Althusser means by this is that an ideology hails an individual “in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject”. In turn, this “Unique and Absolute Subject” acts as a mirror image in which an individual can contemplate his own image. Also, it enters into a relationship of “mutual recognition” with individuals, which enables persons’ recognition of others and of themselves (Laclau, 1977: 143). Laclau used

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10 Interpellation is the process whereby an ideology conducts its transformative effects: an ideology “hails” individuals in order to recruit them. What is meant by “hail” is that an ideology calls on individuals and, in the process, gives them a specific identity.
this concept of interpellation in his theory and stated that it was a tool for the more radical sides of politics (Krips, 2006:83).

Laclau’s theory also incorporated Gramsci’s concept of articulation. Laclau claimed that articulation is a generalised process of interpellation. Essentially, individuals are “hailed” with a signifier that presumes to raise their demands. The call draws people together and makes them view their demands as a common signifier, which in turn provides these individuals with a collective identity (Laclau, 2005: 74). As one can see, this is reminiscent of how Althusser’s “Unique and Absolute Subject” functioned (Krips, 2006: 83). These signifiers eventually transform into empty signifiers. This happens due to the numerous, and often contradictory, demands that the signifier takes on board. This process causes the signifier to, progressively, lose any coherent meaning. However, this causes the signifier to also gain authority as it gains more people who identify with the cause. Specifically pertaining to populism, Laclau identified a subtype of articulation that he called “populist articulatory practices” (Laclau, 2005: 131). This type of articulation divides society into two antagonistic groups, one being the established order and the other being the populist, or the “people”, group (Laclau, 2005: 77).

Previous attempts at conceptualising populism, such as the previously discussed ideology approach, have failed due to the fact that they were concerned with ascertaining populism’s ontic content, rather than focusing on the ontological state of the concept. With this in mind, Laclau moves away from the empirical realities of politics, and towards the more abstract realm of politics (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 384). Laclau puts forward that populism is the structuring logic of political life and that “if populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian space, a choice in the crossroads on which the future of a given society hinges, does not populism become synonymous with politics? The answer can only be affirmative” (Laclau, 2005: 47).

Simply put, Laclau believed that populism was the framework through which politics functioned. This definition, however, has some profound flaws. Moffitt and Tormey (2013: 384) point to three central issues. Firstly, Laclau conflates his own key concepts. Initially, Laclau stated that hegemony was the name of the game in which the field of politics took place. However, later, Laclau stated that “populism is the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as such” (Laclau, 2005: 67). This conflation of populism and hegemony led to the, somewhat humorous, title of a review article
by Arditi, *Populism is Hegemony is Politics?* (2010). Secondly, there are political movements and organisations, such as the Zapatistas and the Occupy Movement which actively avoid populist forms of discourse and organisation. The Zapatista national liberation army’s central tenet is the protection of indigenous peasants’ rights and it has controlled most of the Mexican province of Chiapas since 1994 (Vidal, 2018). The Occupy Movement was a short-lived protest movement formed in 2011, as U.S citizens gathered in Manhattan to raise awareness of the issue of growing inequality and the influence of “big money” in politics (Levitin, 2015). This refutes Laclau’s view that populism is the universal framework that underlies all politics. Lastly, this conceptualisation is far too broad to be successfully applied in studies, especially in comparative studies. Empirical examples of populism all contain ‘ontic content’, the exact thing that Laclau attempted to remove from his approach. Therefore this did not result in Laclau’s approach being universally applicable; instead it resulted in one that was too vague to successfully apply to real world examples of populism.

**2.3.1.3 Populism as a discourse:**

The third approach prescribes that populism be viewed as a discourse. Furthermore, under this approach, one can find two sub-approaches, one being the Essex school of discourse analysis, and the other being a classical/quantitative content analysis. Much of the Essex school approach is based on Laclau’s core fundamentals. There were, however, added contributions made by authors such as Howarth and Torfing (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 384). This approach sees populism as an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by dividing society between “the people” and the “other”. As Moffitt and Tormey point out, the major problem with this approach is that the literature often only serves the purpose of attempting to validate the Laclauian framework it utilizes, rather than attempting to analyse the concept of populism (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 385).

The second sub-approach, the classical content analysis, is more empirically oriented than the Essex school approach. This approach has been developed and promoted by figures such as Jagers, Walgrave, and Hawkins (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 385). It attempts to use a qualitative coding scheme that measures the level of populism in a chosen set of discursive texts. However, more recently, figures such as Reungoat and Pauwels have begun a foray into quantitative research by attempting computer-assisted analysis of large amounts of text, with the analysis targeting certain key words (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 385). Both the classical and quantitative content analysis have their issues. Firstly, the classical content analysis has
reliability issues stemming from irregular sampling and potential coding bias (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 385). There is also disagreement over which sources should be analysed. On the other hand, quantitative content analysis suffers from a disconnect with the theory of populism (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 385). As Moffit and Tormey state, it is difficult to see how charting the percentages of the frequency of certain keywords in party material can really do much more than verify or supplement already existing theoretical assumptions (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013:385). Lastly, the content analysis approach is solely focused on populism as a discourse, and as such it ignores important elements of populism, such as style and visual theatre.

2.3.1.4 Populism as a strategy or form of organisation:

The fourth, and last, prominent approach to populism views it as a strategy or form of organisation. This approach is based on Weyland’s definition of populism that states that it is “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland, 2001: 14). Weyland developed this definition, in Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics (2001), as a response to the “conceptual confusion” regarding populism. At the time of writing his article, Weyland pointed to two dominant conceptualisations of populism: populism seen as a political style and populism seen as a strategy. He argued that classifying populism as a political style, “casts too wide a net and hinders the clear delimitation of cases” (Weyland, 2001: 12). On the other hand, Weyland argues that the strategy conceptualisation is better delimited than the style conceptualisation. Therefore, Weyland used this conceptualisation and applied it to Latin America to develop his approach.

There are, however, two issues with this approach. Firstly, Weyland’s definition highlights modes of organisation and strategy that can appear in many different variations that one would normally not identify as populist (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 386). Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that populism can only function in environments with low organisation and institutionalisation. Examples such as the Front National and Partij voor de Vrijheid, populist parties from France and Netherlands respectively, have found relative success and function under rigid party structures (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 386). Weyland’s definition is also based on populism found in Latin America. This brings into question the definition’s applicability to any case outside Latin America. Considering that all the cases that the
researcher will examine in this study are not situated in Latin America, Weyland’s definition will be of questionable usefulness, and as such, will not be used.

2.3.1.5 A potential fifth approach to populism:

As Collier points out in *Populism* (2001), the label of *populism* has been used in such a wide variety of political movements that it is difficult to construct its core meaning, especially one that can work as an analytical concept. Analysts, such as Pipes (1964) and Goodwyn (1976), offer conceptualisations that are amalgamations of traits from specific movements. This can be highly problematic, considering that one cannot use such conceptualisations in a broader and more comparative sense due to their specific origins. Other analysts, such as Laclau (1977) and Taggart (1995), have pursued conceptualisations more fitting for comparative analysis, focusing on particular traits of populism as a whole (Collier, 2001: 11813).

Collier (2001: 11814) cites the following traits as ones often used by the above-mentioned group of analysts to construct their conceptualisation:

- Mobilisation of people, usually with strong ties in local communities;
- A support base constructed through rhetoric that promotes an identity as of the “people”. This group is then juxtaposed against a vague, and adversarial, “other” group. This “other” group usually pertains to elite, foreign, and minority groups, which are framed as conspiratorial and corrupt;
- A particular leadership style that is characterised as strong, charismatic, and personalised. Rhetoric that is anti-intellectual in contrast to analytical and explanatory oration;
- Lastly, an economic model that emphasises growth-and-demand side stimulation, while deriding fiscal and market constraints, usually in the form of state intervention (Collier, 2001: 11814).

Similar to Collier, Moffitt and Tormey (2013: 382) also argue that populism is a concept that is difficult to conceptualise. They expand on this view by stating that there are two ways in which populism’s contested nature can be viewed. Firstly, they argue that populism has been used so widely and often to discredit any political figure that one dislikes, that it has lost its analytical value. This is closely linked to Collier’s argument that populism may have lost its analytical value. Secondly, one can view the contestation about populism as an indication that there is something important and valuable regarding the concept (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, 382). Thus, populism’s contested nature is not an issue, rather an indication that it is important and complex, something that is worth studying.
Inglehart and Norris (2016: 17) put forward that populism can be seen as one pole on a cultural continuum, with cosmopolitan liberal values located on the opposite pole. Cosmopolitanism refers to the idea that all human beings are increasingly living and interacting with one another in a single global community and this is situated on the absolute opposite side of nativism. As Inglehart and Norris outline this contrast,

“nationalist interests (Us) over cosmopolitanism cooperation across borders (Them), protectionist policies regulating the movement of trade, people and finance over global free trade, xenophobia over tolerance of multiculturalism, strong individual leadership over diplomatic bargaining and flexible negotiations, isolationism in foreign and defence policies over international engagement, traditional sex roles for women and men over more fluid gender identities and roles, and traditional over progressive values” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 17).

This is a unique and novel definition of populism. However, the present writer would argue that, on its own, this does not define populism adequately. When one views populism as simply the opposite of cosmopolitan liberal values, one omits essential characteristics such as the construction of “the people”, as well as the fact that populists claim their legitimacy from supposedly representing the true source of power, the aforementioned “people”. Despite the differences between the four previously mentioned approaches to populism, these are characteristics that they all share. As such, it would be crucial to include them into one’s definition of the concept.

Canovan also explores the complexities of defining populism in *Populism for Political Theorists?* (2004). She explains the current wave of populism or “New Populism” as “a collection of movements, broadly on the right of the political spectrum, that have emerged in many established liberal democracies, challenging existing parties and mainstream policies” (Canovan, 2004: 242). On the surface, identifying and characterising “New Populism” seems relatively simple. New Populists are usually confrontational in style, and claim to represent the true source of legitimate power, “the people”, which consists of individuals who have been ignored by “self-interested politicians” and “politically correct intellectuals” (Canovan, 2004: 242). As Canovan posits, while they all share the characteristic of claiming to speak for the forgotten mass of “ordinary people”, “New Populists” also take on “the colour of their surroundings” (Canovan, 2004: 242). This means that the values that they espouse and the issues that they campaign for are dependent on local concerns and the establishment against which they are railing (Canovan, 2004: 242). Furthermore, “New Populists” try to distance themselves as far as possible from the establishment and emphasise their closeness to
grassroots by using undiplomatic and “non-politically correct” language. They are almost always critical of professional politicians and the media and claim that they say things aloud that “the people” think, often things that are supposedly deemed unmentionable by the elite (Canovan, 2004: 243).

Considering the valid criticisms of the four previously mentioned approaches, this study will adopt a fifth approach to populism. This Fifth Approach will be a fluid version that will borrow Canovan’s description of “New Populists”, as well as the view that populism can be found on the opposite end of a continuum from where cosmopolitan liberal values are placed. As such, when dealing with the case studies, the important characteristics to keep in mind are that populists claim to speak for “the people”; that they take on issues and policies that are specific to their context and the establishment that they are supposedly fighting against on behalf of “the people”; and despite focusing on issues and policies specific to their environment, they also share a common value system that can be seen as the opposite of Liberal cosmopolitan values. It should be stressed that that this constructed “Fifth Approach” only applies to right-wing populists. One would not be able to place left-wing populists on the opposite end of cosmopolitan liberal values due to their not possessing any characteristics such as nativism and monoculturalism.

The following section will cover some authors’ theories on how populism has emerged in Liberal Democracy. Examining others’ theories on the subject matter will potentially uncover avenues of interest and “dead ends” that should be avoided.

2.3.2 Populist theory and the potential dangers of populism:
Inglehart and Norris (2016) have provided one of the newest developments in populism literature, with their theory regarding the formation of the current populist wave, or as Mudde would call it, “the Populist Zeitgeist”. Inglehart and Norris, provide two theories which examine why there is an increase in support for populism. The first and most widely held theory is the economic inequality perspective, which focuses on the changes in the workforce and society in post-industrial societies (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 2). Currently, there are significant trends of greater income and wealth inequality in Western democracies. According to the economic inequality perspective, these trends have fuelled popular resentment aimed at the political classes. Furthermore, worsening economic trends have made the “the less secure strata of society” more susceptible to nativist, anti-establishment, and xenophobic scare-mongering tactics that are often employed by populists (Inglehart &
Norris, 2016: 3). This economic inequality perspective is the same theory that Fukuyama posits with regard to the supposed populist wave.

The second theory, the cultural backlash thesis, proposes that the increase in support for populist parties is not solely due to economic disparities, but that it can be largely attributed to a backlash against progressive cultural change. This theory uses the silent ‘revolution’ theory of value change as its basis (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 3). The cultural backlash thesis states that the high levels of existential security experienced by citizens of developed nations in the West have caused an intergenerational shift towards post-material values - values such as multiculturalism (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 3). This shift has, in turn, increased support for progressive parties holding core values such as human rights, environmental protection, and ethnic and gender equality. This surge in post-materialist values has, however, triggered a backlash that largely originates from older generations, white men, and the “less educated” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 3).

Inglehart and Norris’ findings seem to support the cultural backlash theory on populism. In Europe, populist support is generally higher among “the older generation, men, the less educated, the religious, and ethnic majorities” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 4). When examining the economic inequality theory, the results were inconsistent and mixed. The only two economic indicators that did have a connection with populism were employment and making ends meet. The findings indicated that populist parties received significantly greater support from people who were unemployed and struggled to make ends meet (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 4). Other economic indicators such as occupational class and dependency on social welfare were not reliable indicators for populist support. On the contrary, the findings showed that people living on social welfare were significantly less likely to support populist parties (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 4).

Lastly, Inglehart and Norris (2016) make interesting comments on the implications of the cultural backlash theory being potentially correct. They argue that if the theory is correct, then as the generational gap grows in Western societies, the salience of the cultural cleavage in party politics will increase, irrespective of economic wellbeing or the status of globalisation. In turn, this cleavage creates tension and divisions within mainstream parties, and creates opportunities for populist leaders to mobilize support. Essentially, Western democracies face, “more unpredictable contests, anti-establishment populist challenges to the legitimacy of Liberal Democracy, and potential disruptions to long-established patterns of
party competition” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 31). Inglehart and Norris’ theory is similar to Mudde’s Populist Zeitgeist, but it does provide a deeper exploration of cognitive mobilisation and a potential, and overlapping, alternative to the economic inequality theory. When looking at the case studies, the cultural backlash theory will be considered as a potential cause of how populism gained prominence in 2016.

Fukuyama (2012) attempts to explain why specifically right-wing populism has seen a resurgence, while also attempting to explore why left-wing populism has not experienced a similar resurgence. According to him, this is due to recent left-wing populism failing to produce a coherent conceptual framework and tools for mobilisation (Fukuyama, 2012: 9). After the collapse of Marxism, the academic left replaced the ideology with multiculturalism, critical theory, feminism, postmodernism, and a vast number of other intellectual trends that are focused more on cultural issues than on economic issues (Fukuyama, 2012: 9). On the other hand, the academic right focuses on economic and security issues, which often crosscuts cultural ones (Fukuyama, 2012: 9). Thus, right-wing populist forces can form unified movements, and they focus on issues that are currently at the forefront. This statement can be contested by Inglehart and Norris’s post-material backlash theory on populism. As was stated, Inglehart and Norris argue that the rise of right-wing populism is due to these movements tapping into a backlash that is present in some sections of society against the dominant position of a progressive liberal culture, which their study seems to support (Inglehart & Norris, 2015: 1).

In The Responses of Populism to Dahl’s Democratic Dilemmas (2014), Kaltwasser provides an analysis of populism in liberal democracies while drawing from the works of Dahl. Dahl’s (1970) perspective of democracy was that one should combine its normative and empirical aspects into one theoretical approach. Dahl argues (1970) that we should be aware of democracy as an ideal, and as actual regimes that fail to live up to this ideal. Furthermore, this double meaning of democracy is not only confusing, but it also highlights the “productive tension between empirical and normative approaches” (Kaltwasser, 2014: 471). Dahl identified two dilemmas regarding democracy’s dual and confusing nature. This dual nature is the oft-mentioned liberal democratic paradox that has been ever present in this chapter.

11 After the financial crisis of 2008, economic security and inequality became highly salient in the consciousness of citizens around the world. Parties and political movements on the right, such as the Tea Party movement in the U.S., began to focus on these issues. On the other hand, most of the parties and movements on the left are still focusing more on cultural issues, rather than economic ones (Fukuyama, 2012: 9).
The first dilemma is the boundary problem and refers to the question of what constitutes the “people” in the sense of political governance and sovereignty. Both the empirical and normative approaches tend to overlook this question due to the fact that they assume that “the people” already exists (Dahl, 1970: 45). Even if one confronts this question, a paradox arises. One cannot define “the people” by state boundaries due to the fact that “the people” constitute the highest political authority in charge of creating the institutions and framework of government. This highlights how modern democratic theory assumes that “the people” authorise the state’s establishment, and not the reverse (Yack, 2001: 523). What defines “the people” is far more likely to be determined by political action and conflict, often including coercion and violence, rather than reasoned conclusions based on democratic principles and practices (Dahl, 1981: 209). This highlights the dual nature of democracy. The reality is that “the people” are formed by political action and conflict, while the democratic ideal would be that “the people” were formed by consensus based on principles and practices of democracy.

Dahl (1989) provided the all-subjected principle to deal with this, seemingly, dark reality where violence holds a great deal of sway in democracy. The all-subjected principle prescribes that “the demos must include all adult members of the association except transients and persons proved to be mentally defective” (Dahl, 1989: 129). This may seem harsh to many, and even though it is far from straightforward to define *transients* and *mentally defective individuals*, this principle does provide inclusiveness and a semblance of clarity for the formation of a sovereign people and state. However, Dahl’s principle also falls into the same trap that he criticises the normative and empirical approaches of falling into. As an empirical critique of the principle states, a democracy can only be established when the people living in the territory reach an agreement on who may participate in the collective-decision-making process (Kaltwasser, 2014: 474).

The second dilemma identified by Dahl pertains to the complex relationship between popular sovereignty and constitutionalism. It is important to have independent institutions which protect fundamental rights; they are fundamental aspects of modern democracy. However, Dahl also believed that there are downsides to this aspect, in particular regarding the impact it can have on the people’s capacity to monitor these institutions and to wield the popular will (Dahl, 1989: 119). Kaltwasser points out that the concept of democracy implies that the highest form of political authority lies with the people and not with groups of unelected
experts. Thus, Dahl’s view of this crucial aspect of modern democracy is not necessarily new or rare (Kaltwasser, 2014: 475).

Dahl (1989: 188) called these institutions that are indicative of Liberal Democracy, “quasi guardians” but had a cautious view of these quasi guardians. “There is necessarily an inverse ratio between the authority of the quasi guardians and the authority of the demos and its representatives. If the authority of the quasi guardians were comprehensive the demos would alienate its control over the agenda of public affairs and the democratic process would be gutted…. The more the scope of the rights and interests the quasi guardians are authorized to protect, the more they must take on the functions of making law and policy” (Dahl, 1989: 188).

Dahl (1989) believed that the more authority the quasi guardians gained, the less authority the people had, and vice versa. As a solution to this conundrum, he proposed that the quasi guardians should have a clear and constrained area of operation and that these institutions should protect the democratic process. In particular, this would pertain to the protection of basic rights, and to ensure that no majority unreasonably uses its political rights to deprive a minority of theirs. However, Dahl admitted that there was no perfect way of dealing with the conflict between the people’s sovereignty and constitutionalism (Kaltwasser, 2014: 477).

Populism attempts to provide solutions to the two above-mentioned dilemmas that Dahl identified. In terms of the boundary problem, populism advocates two answers, these being ethnos and plebs. Ethnos pertains to “an organic conception of the pure people” (Kaltwasser, 2014: 479). Furthermore, this conception works along clear racial and cultural attributes in order to create a national identity. As Kaltwasser states, “a singular ethnic group living in a specific territory has the right of self-determination” (Kaltwasser, 2014: 479). This answer has some disturbing implications. This conception of “the people” implies discrimination against any ethnic or cultural out-group, and as Kaltwasser outlines, this can at its most extreme, develop into the exclusion or cleansing of said out-group/s from the territory. On the other hand, the plebs’ solution pertains to a more stratified concept of the “pure people”. The solution conceptualises the “ordinary people” in relation to the elite. This conceptualisation lowers the status of the upper classes, and raises the status of the underdogs (Kaltwasser, 2014: 480).
Abts and Rummens (2007) make interesting observations regarding populist parties coming into power. Supposedly, democracy is able to neutralize the threat of populism through the fact that populists need to manifest themselves in the representative democratic system that they, themselves, claim is undemocratic (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 420). The representative democratic system may act as a safe outlet for populist grievances. However, as Abts and Rummens (2007) state, democracy’s neutralising capabilities must not be overestimated. According to them, there are two paths a populist, and a populist party, can possibly follow on the path to power. These two paths are also mentioned by many other authors. The first path is that a populist party can come into power and abandon its strong populist rhetoric and assume a moderate stance (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 421). On the other hand, and the more likely path according to Abts and Rummens, is that a populist party or figure may see the constitution, parliament, and opponents as obstacles to be removed or ignored in their pursuit of representing the “will of the people” (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 421).

Furthermore, the survival of a populist regime would require the continuation of the fictional image of the “people-as-one”. As such, this would require a continuous de-legitimization of opponents, and suppression of any possible political divergence. In turn, this might descend into proto-totalitarianism, which in turn could eventually lead to fully-fledged totalitarianism. Abts and Rummens clarify that in current democratic systems this seems highly unlikely, however, the remote possibility of this happening is still a worrisome sign of democracy’s vulnerabilities (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 421). This is similar to Arditi’s progression of the three modes of populism, where the final mode comprises populist individuals in power who have a loose adherence to the rule of law, and as such, they can easily slip into authoritarian practices. The views of Arditi, Abts and Rummens on the progression of populism are particularly useful for this thesis. Their arguments showcase the potential danger of populism, and in turn, showcase why it is important to understand the relationship between populism and Liberal Democracy.

Concluding his analysis, Kaltwasser states that populism is neither democratic nor anti-democratic on its own. Instead of seeing populism as a disease or pathology of democracy, we should view it as a thin-centred ideology\(^\text{12}\) that raises legitimate questions of democracy that is difficult, if not impossible, to solve through democratic means. Lastly, Kaltwasser agrees with Arditi and Canovan that populism is “something internal to democracy”, rather

\(^{12}\)Kaltwasser borrowed this conceptualisation of populism from Mudde.
than something which is an external “threat” to democracy (Kaltwasser, 2014: 484). “Given that the core concepts of the populist ideology – the pure people, the corrupt elite and popular sovereignty – can be easily used to refer to the gap between democratic ideals and real existing democracies, we should not be surprised at the rise of populist actors who seek to enact the redemptive side of politics, and re-politicise those problems that intentionally or unintentionally are not being addressed by the establishment” (Kaltwasser, 2014: 484). Thus, Kaltwasser is arguing that populism is acting as a helpful corrective for Liberal Democracy. This is a view that is not shared by all.

Müller posits the opposite view to that of Kaltwasser by stating that populism is separate from democracy and suggests that populism is a “particular moralistic imagination of politics” (Müller, 2015: 83). It is a way to view the political landscape as a place where the morally pure and right people are placed against elites, or other minorities that are deemed not to belong to the “authentic people” (Müller, 2015: 83). As Müller, and many other authors such as Canovan and Mudde, point out, according to this view, “the people” does not appear on the basis of voting or other political procedures to be the “popular will”. Müller quotes Lefort’s statement, that for populists “the people must be extracted from within the people” (Müller, 2015: 83). This is something that should be kept in mind when this study examines the case studies: how populists in each scenario extract their version of “the people” from the general population.

The moral conception of politics espoused by populists has two implications. The first implication is that a populist does not necessarily have to be opposed to the idea of political representation. Rather, he promotes a specific version of it. As Müller states, “Populists are fine with representation so long as the right representatives represent the right people, are making the right judgment and consequently willing the right thing, so to speak” (Müller, 2015: 84). Müller does admit that there are populists who demand more referenda. However, this is only to confirm the popular will that they have already identified. Populists see the masses as passive, once the correct popular will, aimed at the correct common good, has been identified (Müller, 2015: 84).

The second implication is that populists are not simply anti-elitist, but that they are also anti-pluralist (Müller, 2015: 85). The populist conceptualisation of “the people” is merely hypothetical and it exists outside of real-world democratic procedures. This hypothetical, and homogeneous, entity can be used against actual election results. This relates to the populist
notion of the “silent majority”, made famous by Richard Nixon (Müller, 2015: 85). What is meant, or more accurately implied, by this term is that if the majority of citizens were not silent, a government that truly represents the people would be in place. Also, when a populist is trailing in polls, it can simply be attributed to the majority not yet letting their voices be heard, instead of the populist not representing the majority (Müller, 2015: 85).

Building on populism straining the boundaries of Representative Democracy, Müller (2015: 86) outlines the four crucial differences between populism and democracy. Firstly, democracy enables majorities to put in place representatives who may or may not conform to what the majority expects from them (Müller, 2015: 86). This echoes one of the two mechanisms that Madison recommended to guard against the tyranny of the majority: representatives who are separate from the majority. Populism on the other hand, pretends that actions made by a populist government cannot be questioned, due to it being the “will of the people” (Müller, 2015, 86). Secondly, democracy accepts that there are fallible and contestable judgements by changing majorities, while populism espouses the idea of a homogenous entity that is independent from all institutions and that can be characterised as an elite. Thirdly, in a democracy, after proper procedures have been conducted, decisions are not presumed to be “moral” in a way that any opposition is deemed as “immoral” (Müller, 2015, 86). On the other hand, populism posits that there is only one proper and moral decision, despite there being deep disagreement over said decision. Lastly, democracy accepts that “the people” cannot exist in a non-institutionalised manner. Further, even a majority in a parliament does not constitute “the people” and therefore it cannot speak on behalf of the entirety of the citizenry (Müller, 2015, 86).

From these differences, and his analysis, Müller states that populism should not be seen as a “helpful corrective for democracies which have somehow become too distant from citizens” (Müller, 2015, 88). Furthermore, not all criticism of elites should be seen as populist. There needs to be an anti-pluralist sentiment present for the application of the populist label to be considered (Müller, 2015, 88). Müller’s work provides an interesting counterpoint, and its conclusion represents the second camp in the populism debate; however it does not exist without some issues. Müller does not differentiate between left and right-wing populism, nor does he differentiate between current day Liberal Democracy, and the concept of democracy itself. Furthermore, there seems to be a great deal of overlap between populism and autocracy when Müller conducts his analysis. All these issues impact on how Müller
conceptualised populism, and how he conducted his analysis. As such, one should interpret his conclusions with caution. However, a valid point that one can extrapolate from Müller’s work is that populism does pose potential dangers to Liberal Democracy, and that its moralistic view of a “will of the people” can descend into authoritarianism or totalitarianism.

2.4 The link between Populism and Liberal Democracy:

The link between populism and Liberal Democracy is a crucial point of interest regarding how and why populism has emerged in Liberal Democracy. Understanding the nature, if any, of the dynamic between populism and Liberal Democracy can reveal more information relevant to this study’s research question: how and why populism has emerged in Liberal Democracy. In the previous section, it was lightly touched upon in the discussion of some aspects of Müller and Kaltwasser’s respective views. However, a closer analysis of the finer dynamics between the two is necessary. Considering that two aspects are being examined in the study, namely populism and the Liberal Democracy which populism potentially finds itself in, an approach to Liberal Democracy will also be outlined.

In Populism and liberal democracy – business as usual (2017), Thompson explores the connections between Liberal Democracy and populism. Thompson (2017: 47) argues that there are three different categories for “the people”: the multitude, citizens, and an aggregation of persons. Populists are “supremely committed to a notion of the people conceived as an undifferentiated, disadvantaged and forgotten majority” (Thompson, 2017: 47). Thus, populism’s view of “the people” aligns closely to the category of the multitude. However, the concept of the multitude clashes with liberalism’s view of “the people”, and specifically with Rawlsian liberalism that views “the people” as being “… made up of autonomous individuals and is highly suspicious of collective entities like the state” (Thompson, 2017: 47). Thompson points out that both sides (populism and liberalism) tend to lack a developed notion of citizenship, with populism being the most egregious offender of the two. Citizenship is mentioned, but as Thompson clarifies, “it very much appears there in passing as something secondarily secured in the shadow of these other frameworks and mechanisms” (Thompson, 2017: 48).

Secondly, the issue of representation is closely linked to populism, and many authors, such as Laclau, claim that a crisis of representation is the cause of this current rise in populism. However, populism falls into the same trap that has caught many others with regard to this issue. Thompson argues (2017: 48) that representation is an “impossible” process, because all
theories on the operationalisation of representation rely on the notion of the “absent present”, meaning that the theories attempt to make something which is absent, present. This endeavour is impossible, because it is logically impossible for something to be absent as well as present. As Thompson points out, “Indeed, representative democracy is precisely designed so as not to need the constituents to be present: that is its rationale” (Thompson, 2017: 48). Representative Democracy and Liberal Democracy avoid this impossibility. This, therefore, means that Representative Democracy’s issue of whether the interest of the people is properly represented comes from the paradox of representation itself. Following this logic, while populism does expose a flaw in Representative Democracy, it cannot effectively address this flaw because it also relies on a representational claim structure (Thompson, 2017: 49). From Thompson’s argument, one can extrapolate that the issue of representation is closely connected, or is itself, the link between populism and Liberal Democracy.

This crisis of representation has been an issue that has been extensively discussed, and as was previously mentioned, cognitive mobilisation is one theory that attempts to explain it. Invernizzi and Wolkenstein explore this in The Crisis of Party Democracy, Cognitive Mobilization, and the Case for Making Parties More Deliberative (2017) and they argue that it is common for individuals to state that political parties are in crisis. This is exemplified by Mair’s statement that “The age of party democracy has passed” (Mair, 2013: 1). Although the parties themselves remain, they have become so disconnected from the wider society, and pursue a form of competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer seem capable of sustaining democracy in its present form” (Mair, 2013: 1).

Mair’s (2013) statement also argues that this political party crisis feeds into a larger crisis of democracy itself, and more specifically, of modern democracy. Invernizzi and Wolkenstein (2017: 99) explain that this logic is due to the perception that political parties are essential to democratic regimes, in that they link state and society. This link also provides a mediating relationship between the two that allows political power to be utilized from the bottom-up and top-down. However, many would argue that this relationship has become skewed towards the top-down utilization of power. Regardless, Invernizzi and Wolkenstein argue that it seems that parties appear to be less and less capable of providing the mediating relationship between state and society (Invernizzi & Wolkenstein, 2017: 99). Furthermore, it is hard to argue that parties’ transformation of their organisational structure from “mass organisations” to “electoral machines” has not gone hand-in-hand with the steady decline of their traditional support base (Invernizzi & Wolkenstein, 2017: 99). Subsequently, this has reinforced the
public’s view that “political parties are self-referential political enterprises, interested only in the pursuit of office, and without any real link to the broader interests of society” (Invernizzi & Wolkenstein, 2017: 99).

Lastly, Invernizzi & Wolkenstein (2017: 98-99) explore the two theories for the existence of the crisis of representation. As previously mentioned, one theory is the cognitive mobilisation theory, which pertains to people’s greater access to resources and knowledge, which in turn makes them potentially more knowledgeable about various issues. The second theory is Putman’s theory in his influential book, *Bowling Alone*. As was briefly mentioned in section 2.1.2, Putman argues that this crisis of representation is due to society becoming more individualistic and self-absorbed, which is due to the following factors: “constraints of time and money”; the extensive proliferation of television as a mass medium of entertainment and information; and the “decline of the traditional family structure” (Putman, 2000: 183). Both theories do not place the “blame” on the democratic system itself for the crisis, but instead on the transformation of society in a variety of ways, which in turn has made political parties, and the democratic system, outdated.

The crisis of representation is, however, only one potential link between populism and Liberal Democracy. The gap between the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy is another link that closely aligns with the crisis of representation. Canovan (2004) explores the link between populism and Liberal Democracy and discusses the two-strand model. As the two-strand model dictates, populism threatens the fragile compromise of Liberal Democracy. The compromise is found in checks and balances by liberal institutions at the expense of direct rule by the people. The issue, therefore, is that “All populist movements speak and behave as if democracy meant the power of the people and only the power of the people” (Canovan, 2004: 224). While these are valid points, Canovan argues that the two-strand model has challenges. She argues that the model gives the impression that populism’s theoretical significance is limited, despite raising practical problems for Liberal Democracy. The two-strand model is in some ways “a misleading oversimplification, for reflections on populism raise wider questions about democracy” (Canovan, 2004: 224).

In response to these challenges with the two-strand model, Canovan (2004) outlines the wider questions that populism raises about modern democracy. These wider questions are very similar to the argument that Thompson will make regarding the links between populism and Liberal Democracy more than a decade later. Just like Thompson, Canovan outlines the
democratic paradox, however, with some slight differences. “The democratic project is to bring the mass of the people into politics; but making this possible requires institutional arrangements that are too complex for most people to grasp in imagination” (Canovan, 2004: 245). From the grassroots level, it does not seem that we can exercise our power, or that if we do, that it makes any difference. To overcome the complexity of modern politics, and to enable it to be comprehensible for most members of the population, ideologies are used. However, democratic ideology is centred on the notion of the sovereign people, and as such, it creates expectations that will “inevitably disappoint” (Canovan, 2004: 245). Furthermore, as all Liberal Democratic theorists have argued, for any power to be given to the “people-as-population” in a large and complex society, intricate institutions and procedures are needed. On the other hand, populists argue that power has been stolen from “the people” (Canovan, 2004: 245). Therefore, the compromise between Liberalism and democracy is a complex issue - one where populism raises valid points.

Urbinati (2014: 128) highlights three forms of “perverted liberal democracy” which can occur when there is an imbalance between the two poles: will and opinion. The first form is the epistemic disfiguration. The second form is plebiscitarianism, and the third form is populism. For the purposes of this study, only the third form will be examined in detail. According to the diarchic conception of Democracy, populism occurs when the will and opinion poles are merged (Urbinati, 2014: 128). With this merging, a single entity of popular will is created, one that supersedes the formal institutions of a representative democracy. The issue with this is that the single entity of popular will makes it hard to differentiate between differences of opinion within the public (Urbinati, 2014: 135). As such, pluralism and individual rights (two crucial aspects of Liberal Democracy) are under threat. While Urbinati’s work does adequately showcase the two parts of Liberal Democracy, its handling of populism leaves much to be desired. As previously stated, no differentiation is made when referring to “the people” or “the public”. Thus, populism’s crucial aspect of an artificially constructed popular will is not taken into consideration. Also, arguing that populism forms when the will and opinion poles merge, is misleading. Populists criticise and forego the formal institutions and rules, i.e. the will pole, due to them supposedly diluting or muting “the people’s” sovereignty.

It would be more accurate to describe the formation of populism as the opinion pole superseding the will pole. While Urbinati’s model is not useful for this study and its examination of populism, it does further highlight the dual nature of Liberal Democracy, and how populism is connected to that.
Abts and Rummens (2007) share Müller’s view that populism should not be seen as a “helpful corrective for democracies”. Furthermore, Abts and Rummens use the term, ‘two-strand model’, to describe the view that authors such as Arditi and Canovan hold of Liberal Democracy. In terms of their outline, the model states that constitutional democracy consists of two pillars. These two pillars form a paradoxical combination of, “a liberal or constitutional pillar, emphasizing individual rights and the rule of law, and a democratic pillar, emphasizing participation and popular sovereignty” (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 406).

Abts and Rummens state that there are two significant shortcomings pertaining to the model. Firstly, according to them, the model overestimates the paradoxical nature of constitutional democracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 406). As such, it fails to capture the coherence of constitutional democracy, as well as some of its crucial characteristics. Secondly, they claim that, by emphasising the “conceptual continuity between populism and the democratic pillar, the model no longer provides the conceptual capabilities to analyse how and when populism becomes dangerous” (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 406). It is interesting to note that Canovan mentions similar issues when, as was discussed previously, she outlines the issues related to the two-strand model.

Abts and Rummens’ answer to these criticisms is their model of three logics. This model builds on the work of Lefort. According to them, constitutional democracy is characterised by its own inherent logic. This logic is dictated by the demand that the locus of power should be an empty place. However, this logic can degenerate into two pathologies. The one is Liberalism, where the “locus of power disappears and is replaced by a totally anonymous rule of law” (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 406). The other pathology is populism, where the locus of power is filled by an image of the people as a homogeneous unity.

One significant issue with the Abts and Rummens theory is their handling of democracy. When they analyse the differences between populism and democracy, many of the characteristics of democracy that they point out are, in fact, characteristics of Liberal Democracy. This is despite the fact that they claim that democracy can degenerate into a pathology based on Liberalism. Furthermore, despite the claim that the three logics model is an improvement on the two-strand model, it is still significantly similar. One can easily replace the “degeneration in the liberal direction” with Canovan’s concept of a democracy shifting too far to the pragmatic side of politics. Considering these points, and that a reworked approach of Canovan’s model is being used in the Fifth Approach, this study will abide by the two-strand model for Liberal Democracy when discussing the case studies. As
such, when examining the case studies, the Fifth Approach and two-strand model will be used in tandem. To examine the two sides of Liberal Democracy, various indicators will be used. Considering that the Pragmatic side revolves around Liberal institutions and Liberalism, aspects that deal with Liberal values and Liberal institutions have been chosen. The same has been done with the Redemptive side and its dealings with “pure democracy” and the sovereignty of the people.

When one views the academic literature on the link between populism and Liberal Democracy, one identifies two camps, as was the case with the literature on Liberal Democracy. The first camp, consisting of authors such as Kaltwasser and Arditi, believe that populism is something internal, or connected to democracy. In a way, populism is the Mr Hyde to the Dr Jekyll that is the liberal democratic system. However, it does not necessarily mean that populism is negative for Liberal Democracy, as Mr Hyde was portrayed negatively in the classic piece of literature. This camp argues that populism can potentially be seen as a helpful corrective; one that may right the ship of a liberal democratic system that has lost its balance. The other camp consisting of authors such as Müller, Abts and Rummens believe that populism is an external development or aberration that has befallen Liberal Democracy. Following this reasoning, the appearance of populism is not indicative of some deeper symptom that there is something wrong with the liberal democracies that it appears in. Instead, populism should be seen as a threat to Liberal Democracy, and rarely something more. This study will consider both camps when examining the case studies. However, despite all the differences between the approaches of the various examined authors, there is one shared aspect: that Liberal Democracy consists of two parts and that populism’s connection to Liberal Democracy has to do with the balance between the two parts.

2.5 Conclusion:

From the first section, it was determined that Liberal Democracy consists of two conflicting parts, and that throughout its development, political theorists have tried to balance the two. From the section on the theory of Liberal Democracy, one can surmise that Liberal Democracy’s tie to populism lies in its liberal, modern, ideological component. Furthermore, as many authors argue, the Liberalism part of Liberal Democracy is crucial to the political system; without it, individual rights would be under threat. Therefore, doing away with Liberalism, as populists propose, does not seem to be a preferable route. The section also revealed that the current duality in Liberal Democracy can be seen in the clash between the concepts of popular sovereignty and indirect democracy with a professional bureaucracy.
This has alienated large parts of the population, who feel that politicians and government have grown detached from the citizenry they serve. Essentially, the concept of indirect political representation and professional bureaucracy has “gone too far” and represents failings on the part of the Liberal Democratic system.

Populists prey on these sentiments and “failings” by employing an “us vs. them” rhetoric that pits “the people” against elites and the government. It also seems that there is a consensus that Liberal Democracy is under threat. However, a point of contestation arises when the origin of this threat is discussed. Some argue that it is external to Liberal Democracy; some argue that it is internal, and others state that it is a combination of both. This is an important distinction. If one assumes that the threat is internal, then one also assumes that there are faults within the liberal democratic system. On the other hand, if one assumes that the threat is external, the liberal democratic system is still sound and is simply a victim of malevolent outside forces. This study will consider both sides of the argument when examining the case studies. However, a presumptive hypothesis will be held that the threat to Liberal Democracy is indeed internal and that it is indeed due to indirect political representation and bureaucracy having gone too far. Furthermore, as was discussed, this study will approach Liberal Democracy through the two-strand model.

When exploring the four dominant approaches to populism, the present researcher concluded that a fifth approach was required. For this reason, Canovan’s concept of “New Populists” was combined with the ideological continuum conceptualisation of Inglehart and Norris. This provides a robust approach to populism that is still flexible enough to be applied to the three different case studies. The Fifth Approach will be used in the case studies to identify whether populism has indeed occurred. Following this, the study will attempt to ascertain how the instance of populism took root in the nation. As was stated earlier, this study will hold the presumptive hypothesis that the populism, if it has occurred, was caused by defects in the Liberal Democracy of the chosen case study: more specifically the defects in the balance between the two sides of Liberal Democracy.

The following chapter will contain the first of the three case studies which will be dealt with in this study. In it, the nation of the Philippines and the election of its newest president, Rodrigo Duterte, will be explored. The chapter will start with contextualisation of the Philippines and the state of its Liberal Democracy. Following that, an in-depth analysis will be conducted to ascertain how and why populism occurred in the Philippines in 2016.
Chapter 3: The Philippines and the case of Rodrigo Duterte

3.1 Introduction:

In the previous chapter, a theoretical foundation of the study was built which will be applied to case studies to gain a better picture of the presence of populism in Liberal Democracy. The Fifth Approach to populism will be used to identify populism within the case study. As was outlined, the Fifth Approach dictates that populists construct a concept of “the people” that is opposed to another constructed antagonistic “out group”, or “groups”. The approach also outlines the view that on a cultural continuum, populism and cosmopolitan liberal values can be found on opposite ends and that populists shape their prominent talking points according to their environment and according to the establishment that they are railing against. Furthermore, the study accepts the two-strand approach to Liberal Democracy, and as such will approach the political system using the two-strand approach in the case studies. The two-strand approach to Liberal Democracy claims that Liberal Democracy consists of two parts: the pragmatic and the redemptive sides. As the analysis will be conducted near the end of the chapter, the presumptive hypothesis that populism was caused by a lack of balance between the two sides of democracy should be kept in mind.

This chapter will provide an extensive contextualisation of the Philippines, with an emphasis on the nation’s history, issues it is currently experiencing, and features in its current political system. The state of Liberal Democracy in the Philippines will be examined, followed by Rodrigo Duterte’s rise to power in 2016 in order to ascertain how and why populism occurred in the Philippines. The case of the Philippines is an interesting one, markedly different from the other two case studies. The Philippines was chosen also due to the marked media attention Duterte’s election garnered, and the numerous comparisons made between Duterte and Donald Trump. Therefore, it is a potentially useful case study to analyse in the pursuit of uncovering how and why populism is appearing in Liberal Democracies. As was briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, the Philippines can also be viewed as an outlier in this study. It can be argued that the Philippines’ political system cannot be classified as a Liberal Democracy, due to the various unique aspects found within the nation’s political landscape that will be further discussed in section 3.2. However, this chapter will conclude that the Philippines does indeed possess a Liberal Democracy comparable to the other case studies, and that its unique characteristics provide valuable insights into the dynamic between populism and Liberal Democracy.
3.2 Contextualisation:

This contextualisation of the Philippines will focus on its political history and on the current issues that the nation is experiencing. This section will provide the necessary context for when the chapter moves on to the state of Liberalism, and populism, in the nation. One cannot study Liberalism, and especially populism, without the context within which it is found.

Since the late 1980s, the Philippines has been espoused as a beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia. “The Philippines was praised worldwide in 1986, when the so-called bloodless revolution erupted, called the EDSA People Power Revolution. February 25, 1986 marked a significant national event that has been engraven in the hearts and minds of every Filipino. This part of Philippine history gives us a strong sense of pride especially that other nations had attempted to emulate what we have shown the world of the true power of democracy” (Philippine History, 2016). However, many in the Philippines have yet to benefit from the nation’s democratisation.

After being free of autocratic rule for two decades, the Philippines has yet to consolidate its democratic regime (Regilme Jr, 2016: 221). Regilme Jr categorises the failures of Philippine’s democracy into five areas: civil society; the nature of the elite class; electoral and representative politics; political economy; and internal security (Regilme Jr, 2016: 221).

Regarding the nature of the elite class, on the surface, it seems similar to Western nations with a distinct presence of capitalists and other powerful economic actors who rely on the labour of “urban and rural proletariat” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 223). However, in the Philippines there is a distinct, and binary, gap between the poor and rich in society. Individuals either identify themselves as part of the masses or part of the bourgeoisie. A large part of this elite class can trace their origins back to the long colonial rule of Spain and the United States (Regilme Jr, 2016: 223). The Spanish colonisation that lasted for more than three hundred years created “extremely powerful landed elites”, and the American era of colonial rule created the “next cadre of Filipino leadership” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 223). During Howard Taft’s tenure as U.S. president, the American colonial government had a policy of preferentially recruiting “famed individuals from the ilustrado (middle-class intellectuals during the Spanish colonial period) and principalia (economically wealthy class)” for the bureaucracy (Regilme Jr, 2016: 223).
Two key strategies have been used by families of the elite class to ensure that they remain pivotal actors in the nation’s political economy. Firstly, these families spend large amounts of resources to undermine the state and to broaden their acquisitive opportunities. Secondly, these families use financial resources from the central bank to diversify their business interests into various economic sectors. These tactics are indicative of a broader pattern at work in the Philippines’ political economy; this pattern being “a predatory oligarchy [that] extracts undue privileges from a patrimonial and weak state and, consequently, long-term development goals are hindered by these overtly particularistic and short-term demands from the powerful few” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 224).

However, it is not only elite families that make up the elite class; there are also local politicians and “political clans” that form part of the elite class. They enjoy political longevity and economic prosperity and have a monopolistic standing in their respective constituencies through “landownership, commercial networks, logging or mining concessions, transportation companies, and/or control over illegal economic activities” (Sidel, 2004: 3). Sidel introduced the concepts of “bossism” and “bosses”, who are different from patrons. Sidel explains that these new concepts were constructed due to his observation of the “prevalence of local power brokers who achieved sustained monopolistic control over both coercive and economic resources within given territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks” (Sidel, 1997: 952). “Bosses” are different from patrons, because patrons are more dependent on coercion rather than on public affection or social standing.

However, local elites and “bosses” still use coercion in the form of political violence. An example of this would be the incident in November 2009 where fifty-seven journalists and media personnel were brutally murdered (Regilme Jr, 2016: 225). The suspect was the incumbent mayor of the province of Maguindanao’s, who was a member of a weapons-armed political clan that has governed the province for the past several decades (Regilme Jr, 2016: 225). The journalists were murdered while en route to document the filing for electoral candidacy of an opponent of the incumbent mayor (Regilme Jr, 2016: 225). The case remains unsolved to this day (Rauhala, 2014).

After the People Power Revolution of 1986, the people of the Philippines expected electoral processes and legal checks and balances ensuring political succession. This, in turn, would lead to a promotion of a broader sense of political representation with leaders representing various public interests. However, the electoral politics in the Philippines has been plagued
by the dominance of political clans and families. One can see this most clearly in the Philippine Congress, where, in 2007, two-thirds of the legislature consisted of members of political families (Regilme Jr, 2016: 228). Furthermore, 70 percent of them are second and third generation politicians, and nearly all of them have multiple family members in the public sector. During the same year, it was estimated that there were 250 political families in the country (Regilme Jr, 2016: 228).

Political families in the Philippines utilize “adaptive actions” to ensure their survival and prosperity (Teehankee, 2006: 228). These actions would include: “the establishment and maintenance of a kinship network”; the “organization of political machines”; the “mobilization of wealth and property”; “access to state resources”; the “use of violence and coercion”; and the “cultivation of issues, image, and popularity” (Teehankee, 2006: 228). The Philippines’ electoral landscape is notable for its “undistinctive” political parties and undeveloped political party system. The situation in the Philippines is therefore almost the opposite of the supposed political party crisis experienced by some countries in the West, where the political party system has, in a way, become ‘overdeveloped’. Characterising its distinctness even further, are Quimpo’s statements that political parties in the Philippines “are built around personalities, rather than around political programs or platforms,” and that “ideologies and platforms are just adornments for them,” with “lavish spending, vote-buying, fraud and violence” occurring in every national election (Quimpo, 2007: 277).

Furthermore, according to Quimpo, political violence is prevalent during elections:

“The Philippines is perhaps the only democracy in the world where violence has become a regular feature of elections—dozens get killed in every election. At least 87 people were killed and 45 injured in 183 violent incidents relating to the elections for barangay (village) leaders in 2002. In the May 2004 national elections, at least 147 people were killed in election-related violence, making the elections the bloodiest since 1986. Immediately after both the 2002 and 2004 ballots, President Arroyo declared that the elections had generally been peaceful” (Quimpo, 2007: 283).

There are profound issues with the Philippine party and electoral landscape. One can identify two reasons for this. Firstly, Philippine parties lack a “common programmatic or ideological core”. Secondly, parties find it difficult to discipline legislators or enforce coherent policies due to the individualistic nature of the local party chapters. As Quimpo stated, Philippine politics are built around personalities (Quimpo, 2007: 283). This feature of Philippine politics makes it ideal for populism, as Colliers and many other authors have stated, and charismatic leadership and close ties to communities are key features of populism.
Lastly, and most indicative of the negative state of the Philippines’ electoral politics, repression, political violence, and coercion have reached their highest levels since the Marcos regime in 2009. In the 1990s, a few years after the revolution, the number of election-related incidents of violence and killings decreased (Quimpo, 2007: 345). However, since the start of the 2000s, the number of these incidents have increased sharply. An example of this would be the 2004 elections. The incumbent President, Arroyo, allegedly rigged the elections, and a total of 189 people were killed, with 279 being wounded (Quimpo, 2007: 345). During the run of the election, a total of 249 election-related incidents of violence were recorded, making it the most violent elections since 1971 (Quimpo, 2007: 345).

Civil society appears to be more promising for the Philippines. The Philippines has the third largest NGO community in the world, and there has been a 160 percent increase in the number of NGOs between 1986 and 1996 (Regilme Jr, 2016: 231). However, Regilme Jr cautions that the number of NGOs is not necessarily indicative of the presence of a strong and meaningful civil society (Regilme Jr, 2016: 231). On the contrary, Wurfel argues that these NGOs have not helped to strengthen the prospects of democratic consolidation due to the fact that they are also affected by the extensive patron-client system in the Philippines (Wurfel, 2004: 222). Ferrer (2004: 554) supports this view, by providing three reasons why NGOs should not be viewed in a wholly altruistic light. “The civil society sector’s effectiveness is undermined by multifarious competing agendas among themselves”, “partisan politics and ideological, cultural, and gender differences weaken their credibility”, and “a large number of big NGOs based in the urban centres reinforce the dependency of small-scale yet meaningful efforts of rural based NGOs and interests groups toward effective collective action for socioeconomic justice” (Ferrer, 2004: 554).

Further, foreign aid is not exempt from corruption. An illustrative example of this would be a corruption scandal which occurred in 2012. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) conducted an investigation into the operations of the Visayan Forum Foundation, the Philippines’ largest NGO dedicated to combating the issue of human trafficking. The investigation uncovered that the Visayan Forum Foundation was falsifying documents, which subsequently were used to defraud donors of the Foundation, donors such as USAID who were funding a 1.65 million US dollar project by the Foundation (Regilme Jr, 2016: 231). Added to the issue of corruption, the state’s approach to civil society has further hampered progress. During the Arroyo presidency, from 2001 to 2009, the state was accused of thousands of extrajudicial killings, with the victims suspected of being committed
supporters of progressive left-wing civil society groups (Regilme Jr, 2016: 232). Many of these groups, as well as members of other political opposition, have been branded terrorists, despite their not being involved in violence of any form (Regilme Jr, 2016: 232).

There are two problems that have become obstacles toward equal economic development since the People’s Revolution of 1986: increasing material inequalities and agrarian reform. Firstly, inequality in Philippines is extensive. In 1985, the Philippines’ GINI coefficient\(^\text{13}\) was 0.45, and in the years after the revolution until 2003, the GINI coefficient hovered between 0.45 and 0.47 (Regilme Jr, 2016: 233). After having gained democracy, the Philippines has remained just as unequal, or even more so than was the case under the autocratic regime it had freed itself from. However, the Philippines is not an outlier, not even in its own region. Examining the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, Regilme Jr outlined that, “the top ten most affluent families in Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand own 58%, 53%, and 46%, respectively of the entire market capitalization of the country. This constrains the economic odds of the rest of the population to rise from poverty and to meaningfully engage in democratic politics” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 233). The cases of these three countries support Pabst and Brown’s respective theories that many democracies have slid into a neoliberal capitalist system where the economy, and the rich who control it, have an inordinate amount of power and control.

These inequalities in Philippine society have been reflected in widespread dissatisfaction shown by the people. Since 1986, there have been “six coup d’état attempts during the Aquino regime; regular massive protests against undue privileging of foreign capital against small- and medium scale enterprises during the Ramos regime; the eventual collapse of the democratically instituted regime of Estrada due to his inability to solve endemic poverty amidst enriching his favoured cronies; and the numerous systemic attempts to topple Arroyo during her nine-year presidency due to numerous political scandals” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 234). These incidents are a clear indication that the Philippine democracy is in a frail state, and that the people are unhappy with the status quo - a status quo which is characterised by high levels of inequality and corruption.

Examining internal security does not improve the picture that has been painted of the state of the Philippines. In the southern islands of the Philippines, Muslim Mindanao, there has been constant fighting between the state and Muslim rebels who want to form an independent

\(^{13}\) A statistical measure used to ascertain inequality, where it ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being the most unequal.
Islamic state, breaking away from the, largely Catholic nation. Despite peace talks and a supposed ceasefire in 2003, violence has continued unabated. The state seems wholly incapable of combating, or even monitoring, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which has approximately 12,000 members and 9,000 firearms (Rodell, 2004: 190). The state has also displayed an inability to combat the communist insurgency in the nation, which has had a sharp decline in support since the 1986 revolution. Despite this decline in support, the communist revolutionary movement has managed to survive since the late 1960s (Nathan, 1987: 2201).

One can gain two insights from the insurgency situation in the Philippines. Firstly, many of these conflicts are “all reflective of the sharp material inequalities in many areas of the country that were deprived of the state’s public goods due to the imperial dominance of Manila and the Catholic-dominated regions of the country” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 237). Secondly, the continued presence of these internal security threats is “symptomatic of the moral and democratic deficit of the country’s elected national and local political leaders and the rotten state apparatus that supports them” (Regilme Jr, 2016: 237). Furthermore, the military is also beset with incidents of corruption, lack of professionalism, violence against civilians, and an inability to effectively combat the insurgents (Schulzke, 2010: 320).

As one can see from this contextualisation of the Philippines, numerous issues present themselves. These issues provide an environment rife for populism, and they also reflect a society that is still in the process of democratisation. The Philippines’ high levels of corruption and inequality alienate many in Philippine society, which often translates into civil unrest and protests. The Philippines’ unique political environment, where politics revolve around personalities rather than policies, and the high level of autonomy of local “bosses” and political clans, align closely with the key characteristics of populism. Therefore, it is no surprise that Rodrigo Duterte was not the first example of populism in the Philippines’ history of burgeoning Liberal Democracy.

Joseph E. Estrada was a Philippine movie star who turned to the world of politics and won the presidency by a significant margin during the 1998 elections (Thompson, 2017: 253). During his campaign, Estrada portrayed himself as an advocate for the poor, and managed to translate the large number of fans from his movie days into large numbers of supporters. Despite the fact that Estrada came from a wealthy family, his political outsider status allowed him to attack more easily the “selfish elites” and fight for the “downtrodden masses”
(Thompson, 2017: 253). However, Estrada did not espouse Marxist rhetoric, nor did he rely on “peasant” organisations for ground level support. Instead, Estrada relied on what Hedman called, “movie star” populism. Estrada had mostly starred in “proletarian potboilers” where he had played a downtrodden hero fighting for their rights against sinister and corrupt elites (Hedman, 2001: 5). This type of film garnered massive audiences from the poor people of the Philippines, which in turn, could be transformed into votes (Hedman, 2001: 5).

Looking at Estrada’s 1999 election campaign, it is clear that he appealed to the poor. Estrada’s campaign slogan was “Er**ap** para sa mahirap”, which means “Erap for the poor”. ‘Erap’, Estrada’s nickname, is the inverse version of the Tagalog word, ‘Pera’, meaning ‘friend’ (Thompson, 2016: 254). Essentially, Estrada was trying to say that he was a friend to the friendless poor. When in office, this rhetoric was not hollow. In his short term of only two years, Estrada managed to produce a number of pro-poor policy successes, especially in terms of small-denominated government bonds which helped those with limited finances, as well as with land reform (Thompson, 2017: 254). The manner in which Estrada’s term ended is also indicative of his relationship with the elites, and by extension, with the poor of the Philippines. As Thompson explains, his main “crime” seems to have been to have challenged the elite conception of the democratic good with his direct appeals to poor voters (Thompson, 2017: 256). Estrada may have discredited himself in the eyes of the upper classes, but he did not lose his support base among the poor. Rather, he was overthrown by a coalition of NGO activists, the Catholic Church hierarchy, the big business community, and ultimately, the military hierarchy (Thompson, 2017: 256). This coalition of various elites and members of the patronage network in the Philippines produced a “people powered” military coup that unconstitutionally overthrew Estrada in 2001 (Thompson, 2017: 256).

Many draw parallels between Estrada and Rodrigo Duterte, and many political commentators have compared the two, due to both having outlandish campaign styles, especially regarding their use of slang and misogynist rhetoric (Thompson, 2017: 258). However, as will be discussed, there are significant differences between the two populists.

Following this detailed exploration of the state of the Philippines’ history, as well as its history with populism, the state of Liberalism will be examined in the next section.
3.3 Data on the state of Liberalism:

An international study\textsuperscript{14} by the Pew Research Centre examined the support for democratic values in the citizenry of various nations. As was discussed in Chapter 2, there is often a spurious equation, or overlap, of the concepts of democracy and Liberalism. While the Pew international study claims to measure support for democracy, it is in actuality measuring support for Liberalism. Religious freedom, gender rights, freedom of speech, and competitive elections are all hallmarks of Liberalism. Democracy, on the other hand, only pertains to popular sovereignty. As such, the following statistics will help to create a picture of the level of support for Liberalism in the Philippines, and as such, of the state of Liberalism in the nation.

Considering that this study is approaching Liberal Democracy through the two-strand model, this section will examine the Philippines’ Liberal Democracy in two ways. Firstly, the support that Liberal values have in society and the support for Representative Democracy will be used as indicators of how strong the pragmatic side of the Philippines’ Liberal Democracy is. Secondly, citizens’ support for Direct Democracy and satisfaction with the status quo will be used as indicators of how strong the redemptive side of the Philippines’ Liberal Democracy is. More support for Liberal values and Representative Democracy will positively impact on the Pragmatic side. More support for Direct Democracy and less satisfaction with the status quo will positively impact on the Redemptive side.

![Figure 1: Liberal Values in the Philippines](https://scholar.sun.ac.za)

Source: Wike & Simmons, 2015

\textsuperscript{14} The study was conducted in 38 countries with a total of 40,786 respondents, during the months of April and May 2015. The data was collected through a series of face-to-face and telephone interviews. In the case of the Philippines, data collection was conducted through face-to-face interviews. With the Philippine survey, the sample size was 1000 and the margin of error was 4.1% (Wike & Simmons, 2015).
Figure 1 represents the data from the Pew international study. In order to measure liberal values, respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought the following statements were “very important” in their respective country:

- Value 1: “People can practise their religion freely.”
- Value 2: “Women have the same rights as men.”
- Value 3: “Honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at least two parties.”
- Value 4: “People can say what they want without state or government censorship.”
- Value 5: “The media can report the news without state or government censorship.”
- Value 6: “People can use the internet without state or government censorship.”

As one can see from Figure 1, the support for Liberalism in the Philippines seems somewhat uneven, with the support for religious freedom being the highest. There are also some aspects that can be a cause for concern. Support for independent media reflects virtually only half of the citizenry responses, while support for value 6 gains only about 40%. Furthermore, from a liberal viewpoint, things that are universally desirable, such as equal rights for men and women, fair and competitive elections, and freedom of speech gain only 59%, 55% and 50% of support respectively. The average for all six values combined is 55%. As such, one can infer that only 55% of the Philippines’ population support Liberal values. One can state, therefore, that the Philippines still has a way to go to become a consolidated Liberal Democracy, and that Liberalism is still a relatively weak presence in society.

The Philippines has a political system that is very similar to that of the U.S - a legacy from the nation’s time as a U.S colony. The majority of Philippine legislature consists of members who represent their respective constituents (Dressel, 2011: 533); a small fraction of the House of Representatives is filled by party lists. As with the U.S system, the executive is primarily the President who is voted for by the citizenry. The judiciary presides over a Supreme Court which ensures that no laws violate the constitution (Dressel, 2011: 534). As one can see, the Philippines possesses all the necessary institutions and separation of powers to be called a Liberal Democracy. However, while on paper, this political system seems to follow the Liberal Democratic ideal, as with the U.S system, there are de facto factors that impact it negatively. These factors include the previously mentioned endemic issue of corruption and the unique way that local politics is conducted.
The following tables in this section all represent data from another Pew Research Centre international study\textsuperscript{15} which examined citizens’ opinions on their government and various forms of democracy.

\textit{Table 1.1:} Representative Democracy in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to Representative Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Committed”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

N.B: The total does not reach 100% due to the “don’t know” category not having been factored into this index.

For the purposes of this study, Tables 1.1\textsuperscript{16} and 1.2\textsuperscript{17} are indicators of the support that Representative Democracy has in the Philippines. As one can see, attitudes towards Representative Democracy are mixed. On the one hand, only 15\% of respondents indicated that they are “committed” to Representative Democracy, while two thirds (67\%) indicated that they are “less committed” to this form of governance. On the other hand, 82\% of respondents are favourable towards a democratic system where representatives elected by citizens decide what will become law.

Overall, one can see that the pragmatic side has a moderate standing in the Philippines.

The following section will examine the Philippines’ redemptive side.

\textsuperscript{15} This international study was conducted in 38 countries with 41,953 respondents overall. Data collection was done from February to May 2017 through face-to-face or telephone interviews. The Philippine survey had 1000 respondents, was conducted face-to-face and had a margin of error of 4.3\% (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017).

\textsuperscript{16} Table 1.1 represents an index that Pew Research Centre created. Respondents were classified as committed democrats when they support a representative system, and reject rule by experts, the military or a strong leader (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017). Respondents were classified as less committed democrats when they support a representative system, but also support at least one of the non-democratic political systems. Respondents were classified as non-democratic when they do not support a representative system, and instead support at least one of the non-democratic political systems (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017).

\textsuperscript{17} For Table 1.2, respondents were asked to decide whether a democratic system where representatives elected by citizens decide what becomes law is a good or bad way of governing the country, and whether a democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law, would be a good or bad way of governing this country. Respondents were given the following choices: “very good”, “somewhat good”, “somewhat bad”, “very bad” and “don’t know” (Wike Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017). For purposes of the present study, “very good” and “somewhat good” were collapsed into one category, and “somewhat bad” and “very bad” into another.
### Table 1.2: Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of representative and direct democracy</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would a democratic system where representatives elected by citizens decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country?</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would a democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country?</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

As Table 1.2\(^{18}\) shows, a majority of citizens believe that a Direct Democracy would be a good system of governance. However, comparing the two indicators, one can see that Representative Democracy enjoys significantly more support than Direct Democracy.

### Table 1.3: Satisfaction with the status quo in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country?</th>
<th>“Not Satisfied”</th>
<th>“Satisfied”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

Table 1.3\(^{19}\) indicates that the majority of citizens are satisfied with how democracy is currently working in their country. Therefore, this indicator impacts negatively on the redemptive side. One should note that the data was collected a few months after Duterte’s win. However, the fact remains that despite having a populist President in office, the broader political system is still a Representative Democracy.

In summary, Liberal values have a relatively substantial presence in Philippine society, however it still has a way to go before becoming a dominant presence. The majority of citizens also believe that the representative system is a good system of governance and are committed to it. The Philippines’ political system, modelled on the U.S. political system,

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\(^{18}\) With Table 1.3, respondents were asked how satisfied they were with the “way democracy is working in our country” and were given the following possible answers: “very satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied”, “not too satisfied”, “not at all satisfied” or “don’t know” (Wike Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017). For purposes of the present study, the categories of “very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied” were collapsed into one category named ‘satisfied’, while the “not too satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” were collapsed into ‘not satisfied’.

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seems to align closely with the ideal of Liberal Democracy, with extensive separation of powers and checks and balances. However, there are significant issues that hamper this system. Considering all of this, it seems that the Philippines’ pragmatic side is somewhat lacking, while still having a moderate presence. On the redemptive side, a significant number of Filipinos think that Direct Democracy would be a good system of governance. However, more Filipinos believe that Representative Democracy is a good system of governance. Also, the majority of citizens are satisfied with the status quo. Therefore, it seems that the Philippines’ redemptive side is also lacking, but to a slightly greater extent than the pragmatic side. Added to the Philippines’ history of populism, it should maybe come as no surprise that an individual such as Duterte has come into power. However, the details of how exactly Duterte has achieved this feat have yet to be examined. The following section will strive to do just that.

3.4 Rodrigo Duterte and Populism:

In Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? (2016), Curato argues that Duterte’s win was part of a larger pattern, one where the presidency is won alternately by “reformists” and “populists”. The beginning of this pattern had been when Estrada had replaced Fidel Ramos as president of the Philippines. Ramos had been a military reformer who was able to deftly manipulate the Philippines’ patronage networks, while, as was discussed, Estrada was a former movie star turned populist champion of the poor (Curato, 2016: 2). After Estrada had been unconstitutionally ousted from power by a coalition of elites, his vice president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, took control of the presidency. Despite promoting an agenda of good governance, Arroyo’s presidency was marked by corruption and issues regarding her legitimacy as president (Curato, 2016: 2). There is no better example of this than her narrow win over Fernando Poe Jr, another movie star populist and close friend of Estrada, in the 2004 elections. However, as Curato explains, “It was an election marked by credible reports of electoral fraud, with some precincts known to be Poe’s bailiwicks registering zero votes” (Curato, 2016: 2). Arroyo completed her term but was easily defeated in the 2010 election by another reformer, Aquino. Aquino ran on a campaign of reform, with a campaign slogan of “where there is no corruption, there is no poverty” (Curato, 2016: 2).

However, in the 2016 elections, Philippine society seemed to gravitate back towards populism. As Curato (2016) highlights, this was even before Rodrigo Duterte came on to the scene as an electoral candidate. In the early months of 2015, Jejomar Binay was the presidential candidate who first assumed the populist mantle. At the time, Binay had been the
incumbent vice president since 2010. Before 2010, he had been acting mayor of Makati City for more than twenty years. During those twenty plus years, Binay had fulfilled the role of the local “boss” and as Garrido states, he “reoriented the machinery of Makati politics around his person as its peerless boss, as well as successfully styled himself the preeminent advocate for the ‘other’ [poor] Makati” (Garrido, 2013: 179). Binay used the personal connections he had fostered with the people, as well as promises such as removing income tax for low-wage earners, as his campaign platform. However, Binay’s campaign failed completely when the Anti-Money Laundering Council sought a court order to freeze 139 bank accounts and 19 real estate properties owned by Binay, his family, and close associates (Curato, 2016: 3). Binay refused to attend any of the corruption hearings and used populist rhetoric to defend himself. He stated that these allegations were due to the “elitist government’s anti-poor agenda” and that “They don’t want us poor to come together” (Curato, 2016: 3). These statements, however, did little to save his campaign, as his poll numbers dropped from 34% to 13% in slightly under a year.

As Binay’s campaign declined, another populist came onto the scene, namely Grace Poe. A junior senator of the Philippine Senate, as she entered the race, her poll numbers experienced a steady increase. However, Poe’s campaign was also not without controversy. She faced cases in the Supreme Court regarding whether she was a natural born Filipino. As with the U.S. system, this was a necessary pre-requisite for becoming president (Curato, 2016: 4). Poe had spent most of her adult life in the United States, and she was found and adopted by Fernando Poe Jr when she had been abandoned at the steps of Jaro Cathedral, or so it supposedly transpired. Poe incorporated her life story, and the attacks upon her status as a Filipino, into her campaign. She equated the “persecution” she was experiencing with the trials and tribulations of the poor Filipino. Furthermore, Poe ran on a campaign similar to Binay, with promises of expanding social services and other poor-focused policies. Poe was even endorsed by her father’s friend, renowned former populist president, Estrada (Curato, 2016: 4).

Despite Poe’s appeal to populism, she also attempted to gain support from the reformists. Poe associated herself with progressives and technocrats, and the Freedom of Information Bill was one of the keystone issues of her campaign. Having it both ways seemed to work for Poe, until her support peaked in the polls with 27%, two months before the elections (Curato, 2016: 5).
Duterte’s entrance into the electoral race was indicative of his campaign as a whole: filled with drama and theatre. Months before Duterte filed his candidacy, there were rumours that he was going to run for president. However, Duterte denied those rumours, stating that he was “too old, too tired and too poor to run for president” (Curato, 2016: 5). Despite these denials, Duterte was travelling the length and breadth of the Philippines, giving speeches about Federalism. This tour even further fuelled rumours about a run. However, Duterte still insisted that he would not run for president. He even told his supporters to vote for other candidates because his presidency would be bloody (Curato, 2016: 5). This statement was only a small taste of the extensive “machismo” rhetoric that Duterte would further employ.

The swirling rumours about a possible Duterte electoral run seemed to have been put to rest when on the final day for filing candidacy; Duterte only filed his candidacy for mayor of Davao City. However, an opening seemed to appear when a relatively unknown individual from Duterte’s party filed a candidacy for president. According to Philippine law, substitution of candidates was allowed, and as such, the possibility of a Duterte presidential campaign was kept alive (Curato, 2016: 5). Anticipation and rumours once again flared up, and fund-raisining appeals, mass gatherings, and online petitions were launched in support of Duterte running for president. Finally, in November 2015, only five months away from the elections, Duterte filed to be a substitute for his party’s candidate (Curato, 2016: 5).

Duterte subsequently ran a campaign with a clear message, one that targeted the pervasive issue of criminality, and especially drugs, in the Philippines. Furthermore, Duterte had a reputation for being honest and tough, and as was seen in the run-up to his filing for candidacy, he was wildly popular with large sections of the Philippine society (Thompson, 2016: 5). Looking at Duterte’s campaign, one can argue that he ran an exceedingly strategic campaign. His late entrance into the race gave little time for opponents to attack his credibility and reputation. Furthermore, any potential scandals would have little time to derail his campaign, as was the case with the accusations of a large bank account he held (Thompson, 2016: 5).

Duterte’s speeches are characterised as “rambling”, “conversational”, and “long”. Duncan McCargo’s description of Duterte’s final election rally, two nights before the voting started, paints an evocative picture. Ten of thousands were packed into the Luneta Park venue. As Duterte began his speech, he boasted about his libido and stated that he would have the bodies of criminals thrown into Manila Bay, which garnered raucous cheers from the massive
crowd. His eighty-minute speech was “delivered not from a podium, but standing on a crowded platform among a group of his allies and close supporters, like a local boss figure hanging out with his barkada, or gang” (McCargo, 2016: 185).

Duterte’s core image is built on two interwoven themes: authenticity and masculinity. His “authenticity” came from how Duterte code-switched between English and Tagalog, and how he did not shy away from slang and crude language. The Philippine Daily Inquirer called Duterte the “trash-talking mayor” for his frequent swearing in both languages, swearing which he directed at anyone or everyone. Notable examples would be Duterte calling Pope Francis and the then U.S President, Barack Obama a “son of a whore”. Connected with this, Duterte portrays his crudeness as a sign of his masculinity. This is evident in the incidents of his “boasting of his womanizing, claiming that he wished he had raped an Australian missionary, and after the election cat-called a female reporter at a press conference” (McCargo, 2016: 188). Despite the shocking nature of these incidents, especially the rape comment\(^{20}\), many of his supporters saw this as a sign of his masculinity and strength, while it simply did not bother others. As one supporter stated on Facebook, “Better a bad joke, than a bad government” (Curato, 2016: 6). This fulfils the Fifth Approach’s requirement that a populist is placed on the opposite side of liberal cosmopolitan values.

Considering that 94% of Filipinos have access to the internet and social media, the “digital realm” also played a significant role in Duterte’s win (Curato, 2016: 5). In the run-up to Duterte filing to be the substitution for his party, one of his daughters posted a picture of herself on Instagram with a shaved head. This post had the added hashtags of #NoHairWeCare and #justDuIt, which were conveyed as an act of support for a Duterte run. The post gained added significance, considering that Duterte’s family members were supposedly against a presidential run, and subsequently, the post went viral on social media. Duterte garnered significant success on Facebook as well. Looking at the respective candidates’ activity on Facebook, one sees that Duterte’s posts had most shares, almost twice those of the nearest opponent (Sinpeng, 2016). Shares are vital to the proliferation of a message and considering that Duterte’s posts had by far the most shares, one can state that Duterte reached a far wider audience than his opponents. This supports Pabst’s argument

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\(^{20}\) This comment came about during a “rambling” speech, when Duterte was recounting a prison siege in Davao City, 27 years previously. This was while he had been mayor of the city. During the siege, Jaqueline Hamill, a 36-year-old Australian missionary, had been “raped, used as human shield, and brutally murdered”. Upon encountering her body, Duterte commented on what he was thinking, “What went through my head was that they raped her…. That everyone had lined up to rape her. I got angry. That she was raped? Yes, that too. But it was that she was so beautiful – the mayor should have been first. What a waste” (Curato, 2016: 93).
regarding the increasing use of advertising and PR techniques, as well as media technologies, and how this may possibly push democracy towards demagoguery. This element of demagoguery can be glimpsed in the nature of large segments of Duterte’s support on social media.

Duterte’s social media supporters were the most active, with approximately 400 000 people interacting with each of his posts (Singpeng, 2016). Duterte’s social media campaign was lacklustre and impersonal, with him posting far fewer times than his opponents. Thus, his impressive performance was due to passionate fans that were “eager to be part of his political machine” (Singpeng, 2016). Essentially, Duterte’s popularity in the “real world” translated to a great number of political surrogates on social media. There is nothing sinister about individuals eagerly supporting their chosen candidate; however, many of these surrogates are as vicious as they are loyal, with groups attacking any individual deemed to be an “opponent” of Duterte. One student from the University of Philippines confronted Duterte over his long-winded answering of his question. Subsequently, the student received death threats, which progressed to the extent that supporters created a Facebook group calling for his murder (Curato, 2016: 6). Another example would be that of a human rights activist who was harassed after posting “Duterte is a lazy choice. No one man can solve the problem. Discipline comes from ourselves” on Facebook. These threats included statements such as “Hey, stupid! I hope you get raped and your family massacred. Only then can you say your opinion,” (Curato, 2016: 6).

What is most telling is that “the Facebook profiles of these commentators reveal that the comments were written not by a fringe group of reactionary fanatics but “normal” citizens. They were mostly middle class and educated employees in call centres and banks who post photos of Jesus on Twitter and take selfies with Starbucks mugs” (Curato, 2016: 7). Thus, Duterte’s fanatical support on social media cannot be written off as a product of fringe groups. Instead, it seems that Duterte had managed to wholly sweep up ordinary citizens through his populist rhetoric. As such, this seems to be text-book demagoguery. This contradicts Norris and Inglehart’s theory that most of populism’s supporters can be found in the older generations. However, this can be potentially explained by the fact that the Philippines is still a relatively new Liberal Democracy, and as was seen in the section on Liberalism, Liberal values do not have a dominant presence in society. As such, there is no dominant Liberal, and cosmopolitan, culture for older generations to launch a backlash against.
Duterte’s campaign, and its supporters, were distinct from the patronage politics that were the norm in Philippine society. In Philippine politics, it is the norm to pay for a *hakot* crowd. A *hakot* crowd one in which politicians pay individuals to attend their rallies and speeches (Curato, 2016: 104). However, with Duterte, this was not the case. As one respondent stated, “I still went to [the other candidate’s] sortie because they paid us, but the feeling was different with Duterte” and “I persuaded pedicab drivers to give me a lift [for free] … and so we went and waited for Duterte. It’s really worth going [to the rally]. I cried when I saw him. I don’t know why. I’m proud I was there. I really found a way to be there… I don’t know what happened to the pedicab driver, maybe he did not earn anything that day. But I’m sure he wanted to be there too” (Curato, 2016: 104). Here one can see that the woman, and pedicab driver, truly wanted to attend a Duterte rally, despite the woman not gaining any material benefit and the pedicab driver potentially losing a day’s pay. For these two individuals, a Duterte rally signified something different from the norm, something that they felt they needed to witness.

Since Duterte has taken office, 2538 drug suspects have been killed and 52,521 arrested (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017). Furthermore, there have been more than 4049 deaths allegedly caused by vigilantes (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017). A chilling report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) states, “At one point as many as 35 people were being gunned down in Manila every night” (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017). Investigating whether the country is gripped by a drug crisis, HRW states that the Philippines is facing methamphetamine use that is approximately equivalent to that of the United States. Methamphetamine is the most popular drug in the Philippines, especially among the poor. They state that there is no evidence to suggest that the Philippines is being ravaged by a severe drug crisis. Instead, they argue that Duterte has created this “myth” and has advocated for extrajudicial acts of violence against “drug lords” as the only solution. However, from HRW’s findings, the overwhelming majority of those that are killed are “very poor urban slum dwellers” (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017).

Duterte fits a common populist mould through the “myth” that he has built around himself that he is the champion of the poor, despite coming from a powerful and affluent political dynasty (Teehankee & Thompson, 2016: 131). Furthermore, from HRW’s field research, they state that many individuals did not know that innocent civilians were being killed by the police and vigilantes until a family member of their own was killed. A mother of a victim said to them, “We voted for Duterte, and now he’s declaring war on us – he’s killing us like
chickens” (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017). The police claim that these killings were justified and that they were only protecting themselves from armed criminals. The “criminals” shoot first and in the ensuing shootout, they are killed. However, as Bouckaert and Hancock point out, the victims come from poverty-ridden slums where they cannot afford a sufficient meal, let alone a gun. Furthermore, family members of the victims who were interviewed candidly talked about them. However, they were adamant that the victims had not possessed guns (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017). Bouckaert and Hancock also found witnesses that stated that the police were planting guns and drugs on the victims (Bouckaert & Hancock, 2017).

Due to this spree of killings, the Philippines’ prison and rehabilitation system is being overwhelmed. One prison in a metro of Manila has received nine times the number of detainees its maximum capacity would normally allow. The prison would normally hold 100 prisoners, but in November 2016, it held 911 (Maretti, 2016). Overcrowding has become such an issue that prisoners are forced to sleep on one another. The Philippines has 40 private and public rehabilitation centres, and since the start of Duterte’s presidency, these institutions have been flooded by patients (Maretti, 2016). People choose to go for rehabilitation to avoid the police and vigilante groups (Maretti, 2016). There are many rehabilitation centres that have seen their number of patients double, such as the Bicutan rehabilitation centre in Manila. The Bicutan centre can hold a maximum of 550 (Maretti, 2016). However, in November 2016, the centre held 1383 patients (Maretti, 2016). In a somewhat surprising development, on 13 December 2016, Duterte announced that he would release $20 million for the medication of individuals undergoing drug rehabilitation (Maretti, 2016). However, in a return to form, Duterte stated that “I hope one billion (pesos or $20m) will go a long way to treat you this Christmas… Now, if you have really gone crazy and there is no more chance to get fixed, I will just send you a rope. You can just hang yourself” (Maretti, 2016).

It seems, therefore that in the Philippines there is currently a nation-wide “mission” of eradicating criminals and undesirables, without knowing whether or not they are innocent. However, one should not be surprised that this is happening. During the campaign, Duterte was candid about his desire to do exactly what is currently transpiring. At campaign speeches, Duterte often mentioned things such as “my rule will be bloody” and “Forget the laws on human rights. If I make it to the presidential palace, I will do just what I did as mayor. You drug pushers, hold-up men and do-nothings, you better go out. Because I’d kill you…. I’ll dump all of you into Manila Bay, and fatten all the fish there” (BBC, 2016). Arguably the most outrageous comment of his would be that “Hitler massacred three million
Jews. Now, there is three million drug addicts. I'd be happy to slaughter them.... At least Germany had Hitler. The Philippines wouldn't" (BCC, 2016). As many have pointed out, Hitler killed approximately six million Jews, however, the sentiment still stands. Duterte compared himself to Hitler, something that no other politician would ever consider doing, or at least not without the knowledge that they would be seemingly committing “political suicide”.

Furthermore, if one reviews Duterte’s history as mayor of Davao City, one sees this campaign against “criminals” being enacted during that time, but on a smaller scale. Duterte was Davao City’s first mayor in the post-Marcos era (Rauhala, 2016). At the time, the city had been plagued by ceaseless crime and violence, so much so, that the city was nicknamed “Murder City”. Duterte had set out to change this, and he did succeed. Today, Davao City is orderly, with a curfew for unaccompanied minors after 10 pm, smoking only allowed in designated places, and the sale of liquor being prohibited after 2 am (Rauhala, 2016). These laws may seem draconian; however, Davao is a relatively safe city with an inhabitant of the city stating that, “Even if you sleep on the sidewalk, nobody will harm you”. On the subject of the infamous Davao death squads, contract killers whom Duterte reportedly financed and backed, inhabitants did not have much to say. However, one inhabitant did state that “He’s a good guy, but don’t break his rules” (Rauhala, 2016).

On the contrary, Duterte, and many of his supporters, find pride in the “death squad” issue. In response to a question in May 2016, Duterte said, “Am I the death squad? True” (Rauhala, 2016). During his first years in office as mayor of Davao City, he boasted to journalists that he “went to the hospital and unplugged the life support system” of a drug dealer, and that he pushed a drug dealer out of a helicopter (Coronel, 2016). Regardless of whether or not these were simply hyperbole, the fact remains that during Duterte’s extensive tenure as mayor, police and masked vigilantes would routinely kill suspected criminals (BBC, 2016).

Looking at how the inhabitants of Davao City view their former mayor, it is not hard to see how Duterte could have portrayed his populist strongman image so easily on the campaign trail. Street vendors in the city sell novelty license plates engraved with Du30, the pronunciation of Duterte’s name. Other popular items include a red T-shirt for children, with an image on it of Duterte firing a gun, and a piece of merchandise reflecting the mayor riding a motorcycle, and the tagline “Change is coming” (Rauhala, 2016). The stories that the inhabitants of Davao City tell of their mayor support the machismo narrative that the hawked
goods convey. Supposedly, once when a tourist was smoking in a restaurant, which was a non-smoking area, Duterte stormed into the establishment with a revolver and forced the tourist to eat the cigarette butt. There are countless other stories of Duterte patrolling the streets of his city on his motorcycle, protecting citizens and dispatching criminals (Rauhala, 2016). Once again, like with many other controversial aspects about him, Duterte does not shy away from these stories. As he stated, “And I’d go around in Davao with a motorcycle, with a big bike around, and I would just patrol the streets, looking for trouble also…. I was really looking for a confrontation, so I could kill” (Goldman, 2016). It comes as little surprise then that Duterte possesses the nicknames of “Duterte Harry” and “The Punisher” (Bremmer, 2016).

It seems that while many populists throw around the term “strongman” to strengthen their image, Duterte is truly a strongman. He has seemingly brought order and relative peace to his former incumbent city of Davao, albeit through extreme and illiberal measures. As one inhabitant of the city stated, “If Duterte doesn’t do those killings, there are a lot of victims, especially the young generation…. Be a good person in Davao and the mayor will help you” (Rauhala, 2016). However, this may only be an imagined narrative, another rhetorical device that Duterte employed to reach the presidency, and data released in 2015 by the Philippine National Police (PNP) seems to support this. According to the PNP, Davao has the highest murder rate in the country, with 1032 reported murder cases from 2010 to 2015 (Frialde, 2016). Duterte attempted to explain this away by stating, “You have to ask who are being murdered… they are the criminals gunned down by the vigilantes”. However, one statistic that Duterte could not explain was the fact Davao City ranked second in the number of rape incidents, with 843 cases (Frialde, 2016). Thus, it seems that the image of a city restored, and saved from crime, may be a myth.

There have been “strongmen” before Duterte. In the 2004 presidential elections, former Police Chief Panfilo Lacson ran with a campaign slogan of “Iron Fist”. In the 2010 elections, Metro Manila Development Authority’s Bayani Fernando ran with the slogan “Political Will”. Both these individuals ran under a “strongman” image, however, both were also unsuccessful. Duterte was the exception due to the example of Davao City as a “compelling narrative” and proof of what Duterte has to offer (Curato, 2016: 9). Praises are being touted such as Davao being named as one of the Top 20 Most Liveable Cities in Asia; a streamlined process of procuring business permits and other government services, and an effective 911 response system that is being replicated nationwide (Curato, 2016: 8). Regardless of whether
these things were due to Duterte’s time as mayor, this narrative provides wide appeal. As Curato outlines,

“For those who grew up in the conflict zones of Mindanao, Davao City offered the hope that a city in the south could become peaceful and prosperous. For wealthy Filipino-Chinese mothers terrified of kidnappings, Davao City is a peace and order paradise where there is a curfew for unaccompanied minors, taxi drivers are reliable, and laws on smoking and drinking are consistently enforced. For domestic workers in Hong Kong, Davao City offers the possibility of how government officials can work for the people, instead of scamming the people. For feminists, Davao presents a model for a progressive city with gender-sensitive ordinances which can overshadow Duterte’s sexist comments” (Curato, 2016: 9).

It seems that the broad appeal of the narrative of Davao City may have worked, considering the broad range of support that Duterte received during his campaign.

The narrative of Davao City also potentially provides deeper insight into the grievances of those who voted for Duterte. As was discussed, a Transparency International study revealed that most citizens have a negative view towards state institutions and the potential of corruption within them. However, this negativity does not extend to the concept of Democracy itself. Social Weathers Station, a survey institution in the Philippines, conducted a survey in December 2015, asking: “On the whole are you (very satisfied; fairly satisfied; not very satisfied; not at all satisfied) with the way democracy works in the Philippines?” (Tubadeza, 2016). 76% of respondents stated that they were very satisfied, or fairly satisfied, with the way democracy works in the Philippines (Tubadeza, 2016). Furthermore, 58% of respondents stated that “democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government” (Tubadeza, 2016).

In August 2016, Senator Leila de Lima opened a Senate investigation into the extrajudicial killings (Rauhala, 2016). In response, Duterte urged de Lima to hang herself. When de Lima presented a witness, who claimed that he had murdered people for Duterte during his mayoral days, she was ousted from her position as chair of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights (Rauhala, 2016). Her ousting ended the Senate investigation. Since losing her position, de Lima has been accused of sleeping with her driver and taking bribes from drug dealers. Her number and address were also broadcast on television, which inevitably led to threats on her life. In response to the situation, Duterte joked, “She was not only screwing her driver, she was screwing the nation” (Rauhala, 2016). De Lima’s fall from grace seems to indicate that Duterte’s legitimacy, and by extension his actions, are unassailable.
Furthermore, approximately three months into his election, Duterte scored incredibly high numbers in a Pulse Asia Research Poll that measured trust in the President. The poll indicated that 91% of Filipinos trust Duterte, the highest trust percentage of any President since the poll was first conducted in 1999 (Pulse Asia Research, 2016). Judging from this poll, it seems that many in the Philippines see the killings, and other unsavoury activities, as a necessary part of ridding the country of crime and turning it into a national scale Davao City.

3.5 Analysis:

As was stated, Duterte ran a campaign largely focused on the issue of criminality and drugs in the Philippines. Furthermore, what separates Duterte from previous Philippine populists is that Duterte’s populist support is not based on class (Curato, 2016: 98). This classification makes sense, due to Duterte possessing virtually all the traits of a right-wing populist, rather than of the left-wing variety. Here one can see the New Populist aspect of the Fifth Approach: Duterte took on the salient issues of corruption and drug abuse as his focus points for his campaign, while other candidates such as Poe and Binay focused on the standard campaign issues such as the economy.

Duterte cultivated a ‘politics of anxiety’ through his rhetoric that depicted the Philippines as a nation on the verge of collapse, with drugs being the primary culprit (Curato, 2016: 98). Having evoked this fear, Duterte offered a swift and decisive solution. However, this solution came at the expense of liberal rights. Duterte would close down Congress if they attempted to impeach him; he would declare martial law if the Supreme Court also interfered in his “crusade”; his presidency would be “bloody” and many would die; but this way was the only way for “salvation” (Curato, 2016: 98). Evoking the fear of a drug epidemic also created a convenient opposing group against “the people”. This tactic ties into the Fifth Approach’s prescribed characteristic of the creation of opposing groups.

The better life that Duterte offered in his campaign rhetoric is tied to the redemptive side of democracy. While it is true that Duterte’s campaign employed a great deal of “doomsday” rhetoric, it also contained elements of hope. The campaign expanded citizens’ political horizons. What is meant by this is that it allowed citizens to participate in politics in a way that they had not done before and a relationship of reciprocity was formed. A driver of a truck covered with the face of Duterte stated that “We’ve always been on the receiving end of help…. But now we are in the position to help [Duterte in the campaign] […] that makes me feel good” (Curato, 2016: 102). Furthermore, in the city of Tacloban, which had been
devastated by Typhoon Haiyan three years earlier, there was a banner stating “It’s our turn to help him. Rody Duterte for President. From victims of Typhoon Yolanda [Haiyan]” (Curato, 2016: 102). This opportunity to help Duterte’s campaign gave citizens a feeling of agency and hope.

This in turn, ties in to the concept of politics that is revivalist, or not “normal”, that Canovan outlined in her exploration of populism. This can be seen in the actions of Duterte’s supporters and how they view him. When referencing the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, interviewees stated that opposed to most politicians who came to the town to “talk to the media”, Duterte “was present to actually do something” (Curato, 2016: 95). Many individuals that Curato interviewed made a clear distinction between trapos, meaning traditional politicians, and Duterte, who is perceived as authentic and empathetic (Curato, 2016: 95). This is a common theme that will be encountered throughout all three case studies examined in this study.

Looking at the characteristics of the nation, it seems that the Philippines finds itself in a political environment that is ideal for populism. The nation has highly independent and powerful local political clans and individuals who rule their respective constituencies through patronage politics, or “bossism”. Furthermore, the Philippines have high levels of inequality and it seems that a great deal of the population sees the government, and government institutions, as corrupt. However, it also seems that most Filipinos still support democracy and view it as the best option. Yet, looking at the data on Liberalism, one can see that Liberalism is far from being a dominant presence within the citizenry of the Philippines. It seems that without significant popular support for Liberalism, the likelihood of populism is high. This is something that will be explored further in the following two case studies. It comes as no surprise then that Duterte was not the first populist to occupy the office of the presidency. However, as was discussed, a coalition of elites ousted Estrada, the “movie star populist”.

As the case study revealed, Duterte’s populist credentials are clear. His rhetoric against criminals, and the Manila establishment that is ineffective in dealing with them, created the populist dynamic of “us vs. them”. Essentially, it means the “good” citizens of Philippines against the criminals and undesirables. This fulfils the Fifth Approach’s requirement of creating the artificial concept of “a people” and the concept of an opposing group that needs to be defeated.
Duterte’s talk about bypassing liberal institutions to deal with criminals and the supposed drug epidemic is a warning sign for populism that it can potentially descend into proto-totalitarianism, and subsequently fully-fledged totalitarianism. Duterte also clearly fits into the opposite side of liberal cosmopolitan values on the scale. His repeated vulgar and sexist comments highlight that. One can also see that Duterte took on prominent, and current, issues in his campaign. This fits the New Populist classification of the Fifth Approach. Further, Duterte’s narrative of Davao City provides something that no other populist reviewed in this thesis, or very few overall, have. This “extra something” is a proven track record, supposed proof that he can meet his populist promises. As was discussed, the story of Davao City provides an appealing narrative for a wide range of the Philippine population, something that can be seen in the fact that Duterte’s support crossed all lines of class, culture, and geographic location.

Once again, the favourable polls, the incident with De Lima, and Duterte’s troubling comments about democratic institutions closely mirror Abts and Rummens’ progression of populists in power, as well as Arditi’s three stages of populism. What is of utmost concern is that Duterte’s presidency seems to closely mirror the most dangerous stance of a populist disregarding democratic institutions, which in turn opens the possibility of proto-totalitarianism and fully-fledged totalitarianism.

Here one can clearly see Canovan’s two faces of democracy coming into play. Duterte is evoking the sense that the Liberal institutions, and rights, of the country are hampering the citizens’ progress towards a better life. Furthermore, Duterte’s comments clearly mirror Arditi’s three modes of populism, especially the final mode. Populists in power, who have a loose adherence to the law, can easily slip into authoritarian practices (Arditi, 2004: 142). One can apply Abts and Rummens’ progression of populism in power to this as well, with the final stage of proto-totalitarianism being the most applicable. However, the difference between these two theoretical concepts and the real-world events is that Duterte was open about the fact that he would “slip” into authoritarian practices, even before he was in power. It seems that Arditi, and other authors, may have underestimated the allure of populism, or the “inoffensiveness” of authoritarian practices to some.

Duterte’s victory bears all the hallmarks of a straightforward populist victory: widespread support driven by a construction of “a people” and opposing groups; a focus on current issues, and a style of politics that stands on the opposite end of Liberal cosmopolitan values.
There do not seem to be any other significant factors that could have influenced Duterte’s victory in the presidential race, such as the meddling in the elections by another nation, or unique circumstances that could have influenced the vote. One can attempt to argue, such as thinkers like Laclau would, that a crisis of representation helped Duterte’s win. However, it should be kept in mind that the crisis of representation theory is only talked about in the context of Western Liberal Democracies and not in the context of newly formed Liberal Democracies outside of the West. One can see why when one looks at the voter turnout during the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. In 2010, the voter turnout for the presidential elections was 74.8% (Hegina, 2016). In 2013, the voter turnout rose to 77%, and in 2016 it rose further to 81% (Hegina, 2016). As one can see, there is certainly no crisis of representation occurring in the Philippines. Considering that populism clearly occurred during the 2016 elections, this places doubt on whether the crisis of representation is the cause of the supposed 2016 wave of populism.

It seems that this case study supports the view that populism can be caused by something internal to Liberal Democracy. However, it does not seem to be due to the failings of Liberal Democracy as authors such as Kaltwasser and Brown would argue. On the contrary, it seems that it may be due to the fact there is not “enough” Liberal Democracy. The Philippines’ Liberal Democracy is still relatively new, and as was outlined, Liberalism is not yet a significant presence in Philippine society. Furthermore, the Philippines does preside over robust liberal institutions that are intended to act as checks and balances; however de facto issues such as widespread corruption have hampered the effectiveness of these institutions. On the other hand, the Philippines has had a significant history of populism since its transition into a democratic nation, and the election in 2016 contained numerous candidates with populist leanings. It simply seems that Duterte was the most populist of them all, with a strategic campaign that further secured his chances of winning. As such, for now, one can tentatively state that a weak presence of Liberalism in a democracy may heighten the chances of populism.

The Philippine case study also refutes the view by Kaltwasser that populism can be seen as a helpful corrective to Liberal Democracy. Since Duterte’s rise to presidency, there have been no signs of greater “democracy” or that the redemptive side has come closer to the pragmatic side. On the other hand, it seems that the case study supports Abts and Rummens, and Arditi’s concerns about the possibility of populism developing into totalitarianism. Duterte’s crusade against criminals that disregards human rights and due process, his blatant disdain for
liberal democratic institutions, and his manner of dealing with challenges against his authority all indicate burgeoning totalitarianism.

3.6 Conclusion:

The Philippines’ history as an independent nation is relatively short. After having been a colony of the Spanish and then of the U.S, the Philippines achieved independence only to be subjected to dictatorial rule. It was only after a (largely peaceful), revolution in 1986 that the nation become a democracy. Coupled with the Philippines’ relative inexperience with democracy, there are numerous issues that the Philippines is grappling with. Despite having a Liberal Democratic political system with all the necessary institutions, and a presence of Liberal values in society, albeit not a significant presence, the nation has an issue of extensive corruption at every level of politics. Furthermore, there are some areas in the Philippines that are controlled by insurgency groups. The Philippines also presides over a unique local political environment, with an individualistic style of politics termed “Bossism”. This study used four indicators to measure the two sides of its Liberal Democracy, and has concluded that both sides are lacking, with the redemptive side slightly weaker than the pragmatic side. As such, no notable gap was noted between the two sides of its Liberal Democracy. Thus, this case study refutes the presumptive hypothesis that the 2016 wave of populism was due to failings within the liberal democratic system, specifically due to the gap between the two aspects of it.

On the subject of Rodrigo Duterte, the tactics he used in his campaign can be traced back to his time as the mayor of Davao. The portrayal is that of an “everyman strongman” with sharp distinctions made between lawful citizens, and “criminals” who should be stopped by any means necessary. Furthermore, Duterte ran a strategic campaign unfettered by scandal while focusing on concrete issues such as crime and drug use. Duterte also fits all the criteria that the Fifth Approach outlines. He espouses values that are on the opposite side of the spectrum from Liberal cosmopolitan values. Duterte also constructed an “us vs. them” of citizens against criminals and the elites, and he took on issues that were salient and unique: the constructed narrative of a drug epidemic. This case study also seems to indicate that populism does indeed have the potential to lead into totalitarianism.

The next chapter will explore the Brexit vote in Britain, and its implications regarding Liberal Democracy and populism.
Chapter 4: The UK and the case of Brexit

4.1 Introduction:
The Philippines has provided an excellent case study of a nation that fosters an ideal environment for populism. The Philippines’ Liberal Democracy is still relatively new and both its redemptive and pragmatic sides leave much to be desired. Furthermore, its unique style of local politics caters to charismatic and individualistic politicians. The results of the first case study analysis are in conflict with the presumptive hypothesis that the supposed wave of populism in 2016 was caused by failings in the Liberal Democratic system. In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the study will be applied to Britain and its Brexit vote with the aim of further building a picture of how and why populism has occurred in Liberal Democracy.

Britain’s Liberal Democracy is well-established, and one of the oldest in the world. The fact that the United Kingdom consists of various countries forming the single state, and that it is part of a political and economic regional union, provides a unique case. As with the other case studies in this study, Brexit was cited by media outlets and many academics as a prominent incident of populism. Whether this is indeed the case is obviously this study’s task to determine. As with Chapter 3, this chapter will firstly provide an extensive contextualisation and then an in-depth analysis will be conducted. Secondly, the state of Liberal Democracy in Britain will be examined. Thirdly, the Brexit vote and campaigns will be examined. Lastly, the in-depth analysis will then be conducted. As with the Philippine case study, the Fifth Approach will be used to identify whether an appropriate individual or movement is indeed populist; the two-strand conceptualisation of Liberal Democracy and the chosen indicators will be used to identify whether there is a notable gap between the two sides of Britain’s Liberal Democracy.

4.2 Contextualisation:
Populism has been a mainstream occurrence in British politics since the 1980s. During that period of time, some individuals on the left-wing of the political spectrum referred to the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as an authoritarian populist. These individuals on the left-wing derived this label from “five pillars” (Sanders et al, 2015: 1). The first pillar was Thatcher’s desire to roll back the state through extensive privatisation and the curbing of unions (Sanders et al, 2015: 2). The second pillar was the wish to “make Britain, Great
Britain” again through adopting a more forceful, and security-minded, approach to international relations (Sanders et al, 2015: 2). Thirdly, Thatcher had a negative outlook on immigration, and often, she would speak publicly about how communities are swamped with immigrants. The fourth pillar comprises the strong doubts that Thatcher held about the value of laws protecting civil liberties in so far as they could be easily exploited by criminals and “undesirables”. The last pillar was the fact that Thatcher was a Eurosceptic and was strongly opposed to the European Economic Community’s (EEC) core principle of an “ever closer union” (Sanders et al, 2015: 3). Instead, she believed that the European Union should consist of “independent sovereign states cooperating primarily in terms of ensuring free trade and the removal of barriers to genuine economic competition in goods and services” (Sanders et al, 2015: 3).

Thatcher’s “Authoritarian Populism” is extremely similar to right-wing populism and represents the form which right-wing populism potentially takes in Britain: Eurosceptic and nativist in nature. However, after Thatcher’s time in office, the two biggest parties in British politics, the Conservatives and New Labour, gradually became increasingly centrist. As such, the white working class struggled to align itself with the reinvented New Labour, led by Tony Blair, which embraced a more cosmopolitan and “Europhilic” attitude (Vines, 2015: 369). It also could not relate to the Conservatives who adopted more liberal ideals, such as gay marriages; and moved away from “overt” Euroscepticism. As such, this opened the way for parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) who were appealing, successfully, to what they termed the “left-behindiers” (Vines, 2015: 369). Similar to American populism, there is a rhetoric that conveys the sense of a section of society that has “lost out” and who has been neglected by the establishment. In both the American and British strains, this section of society is the white working and middle class.

March (2017: 287) examines key differences between left and right-wing populism in Britain; whether mainstream parties also exhibit features of populism, and whether this confirms that there is a “Populist Zeitgeist” in Britain. March uses Mudde’s definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology, and all that it entails. March’s study uses three indices, these being anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular sovereignty (March, 2017: 287). Using these three indices is especially useful when one examines the average scores of parties. When looking at the average, mainstream parties are not far behind populist parties, with respective scores of

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21 This is reminiscent of Trump’s campaign slogan decades later, “Make America Great Again”.

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13.43 and 19.62. Furthermore, there are instances where mainstream parties even surpass populist parties, such as the 2010 Conservative manifesto with a score of 22.12, and the 2015 Labour manifesto with a score of 19.35 (March, 2017: 287). Keeping in mind the averages, one would be tempted to confirm that a Populist Zeitgeist is indeed occurring in Britain.

However, when one views the three indices individually, this casts doubt on the matter. Firstly, the mainstream parties have scores that are heavily concentrated on people-centrism, with an average of 10.96, while the scores on popular sovereignty and anti-elitism are very low, with scores of 2.14 and 0.33, respectively. On the other hand, the scores of populist parties have a more even spread. The average for people-centrism is 9.41, the average for popular sovereignty is 4.92, and the average for anti-elitism is 5.29 (March, 2017: 289). Examining the contents of the manifestos closely further reveals the difference between mainstream and populist parties. As March outlines, there are instances where parties evoke the “pure people” in such a way that is almost identical to populist parties. However, generally, “the people” come second to other more preferred terms such as “the public” and “citizens”. Furthermore, when people-centrism is evoked, it is used implicitly and is used to promote the “catch-all” appeal of the party (March, 2017: 292). As was discussed with the scores, anti-elitism and popular sovereignty rarely feature in the manifestos, and on the rare occasion that they feature, they are “nebulously expressed” or used in a “banal” manner (March, 2017: 292).

Considering that our focus is on right-wing populist parties, only March’s in-depth analysis of right-wing populist parties’ manifestos will be discussed. The British National Party (BNP) “was once an ‘extreme right’ party notorious for xenophobic authoritarianism. It has gradually moderated, moving from biological to cultural racism and becoming populist, although its substantive commitment to democracy is debatable” (March, 2017: 292). On the other hand, UKIP has transformed from being solely a “Euro-rejectionist” pressure group, to being a populist right-wing party which has a “neoliberal and anti-EU ideological core” (March, 2017: 292). In terms of people-centrism, the BNP’s “nativist subtext” features heavily. When referring to the people, BNP uses terms such as the “native or indigenous British people”, as well as using overtly nationalistic terms such as “once proud nation”. On the other hand, UKIP defines the people in a cultural sense. However, they oppose

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22 The score consists of the percentage of populist sentences (or relating to anti-elitism, people-centrism, and popular sovereignty) in the respective parties’ manifestos.
multiculturalism, and instead aim to promote “uniculturalism” through the creation of a “single British culture embracing all races and religions” (March, 2017: 293).

In terms of anti-elitism, both parties have three targets, these being foreign elites, corrupt politicians and parties, and intermediaries such as the bureaucracy through which the elites allegedly control the people. In this category, the BNP scores far higher than UKIP. The BNP constantly attacks various groups and uses phrases such as “Orwellian methods of intellectual terrorism” when discussing the government, or claim that the European Union (EU) aims for the “eventual liquidation of Britain as a nation and a people”, and that the frustrating intermediaries are rife with left-wing ideologies such as egalitarianism and the “cult of global warming” (BNP, 2005) (BNP, 2010). On the other hand, UKIP is far tamer, with most of their anti-elitist sentiments directed at the EU. However, they do share the BNP’s ire against “political correctness and multiculturalism” (March, 2017: 293). In terms of popular sovereignty, both parties use similar phrases to those used by the mainstream parties. However, these notions of popular involvement are augmented by a focus on border control, national sovereignty, and “freeing the people from the control of the EU” (March, 2017: 294). In conclusion, March states that no Populist Zeitgeist is currently occurring in Britain. As his study has shown, only parties on the far right and left employ populism, with UKIP being the only one that has gained moderate success (March, 2017: 300).

To uncover how UKIP has gained this level of success, Stoker and Hay (2017) conducted a study of British citizens’ attitudes towards politics. For their study, they tried to measure “stealth attitudes”, or alternatively “stealth populism”. Stealth attitudes are a concept that they took from Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) and reframed in a way that it is “less as the expression of a commitment to a particular and preferred vision of democracy and more as an expression of populist angst about the current practice of politics” (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 5). As such, stealth populism is the view that in a democracy the political system should deliver according to the people’s needs without the people continuously monitoring it. This attitude closely aligns with the redemptive face of democracy, and coincidentally, Stoker and Hay utilize Canovan’s theory on populism as their own basis. Following the logic of stealth populism, any perceived failings of the political system would be due to too much “politicking”, politicians making promises that they do not deliver on and making too many compromises with special interest groups (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 5).
On the other hand, there are also “sunshine views”. These views entail that citizens “see politics as operating in a manner close to long-established and familiar principles of liberal representative democracy” (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 5). This is another term that Stoker and Hay garnered from Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002); however, with the difference that “stealth attitudes/populism” and “sunshine views” are not mutually exclusive (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 5). As one can see, sunshine views closely align with the pragmatic face of democracy. Stoker and Hay utilized sample surveys that measure stealth and sunshine attitudes. In measuring stealth attitudes, they used the following question items:

- “Politicians should stop talking and take action”
- “Compromise is selling out one’s principles”
- “Leave decisions to successful business people”
- “Leave decisions to non-elected experts” (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 15).

In measuring the sunshine attitudes, the following question items were used:

- “Elected politicians need to debate before making decisions”
- “Openness and willingness to compromise are important to politics”
- “Important differences exist between running a government and a business”
- “Important for elected politicians to decide rather than leaving it to experts” (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 19).

For all the questions, the responses ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” on a six point scale.

From their sample surveys, Stoker and Hay (2017: 15) came to the following conclusions: it seems that age is a key driver of stealth attitudes, and stealth attitudes are far more pronounced in respondents of the age categories of 35-54 and 55+. Other key factors include the following features: Firstly, it seemed that citizens’ attitudes towards the system of governing significantly impacts on stealth attitudes. According to Stoker and Hay’s findings, respondents who think that the system of governing is doing well are, approximately, half as likely to adopt a stealth attitude as those who do not think that the system of governing is doing well (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 15). Secondly, respondents who state that they have an interest in politics are also, approximately, half as likely to adopt stealth attitudes as those who state that they have no interest in politics. Lastly, respondents who support more extensive use of referendums for important decisions are at least twice as likely to adopt stealth attitudes as those who do not support this. Taking all this into consideration, one can
state that the bulk of British populists, or individuals who possess “populist angst”, consist of older individuals who have a negative attitude towards the system of governing; have no interest in politics, and who support greater use of referendums (Stoker & Hay, 2017, 15). These attitudes and factors are the standard features of populists, which many academics agree upon. The fact that the populist angst is mostly concentrated in older demographics aligns with Inglehart and Norris’ postmaterial backlash theory.

Examining the sunshine attitude items provides interesting revelations. It seems that there is greater support for the sunshine items than for the stealth items, with the exception being the question item regarding “Politicians should stop talking and take action” (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 18). To put it more clearly, Stoker and Hay (2017: 18) found that 64% of respondents supported three or more sunshine views. Thus, even though stealth attitudes and populist angst do exist in Britain, it seems that sunshine attitudes are far more prevalent (Stoker & Hay, 2017: 18). This supports March’s findings that there is currently no Populist Zeitgeist in Britain.

An Ipsos poll conducted in January 2016, months before the EU referendum, asked members of the British public whether things were on the right track for the country at the start of a new year. The poll uncovered that 41% thought that the country was on the right track, while 59% of respondents thought that Britain was on the wrong track. This may seem rather negative, however, when placed in the context of other countries, the results take on a different light (Ipsos, 2016b). This poll was conducted in 24 countries, and the average was that 38% believed that their country was on the right track, while 62% believed that it was on the wrong track. Furthermore, Great Britain was the EU member with the most favourable percentages. Belgium was the EU member that was the closest, with 35% believing that their country was on the right track, and 65% believing that it was on the wrong track (Ipsos, 2016b).

It seems that there are mixed results regarding populist attitudes and the presence of populism in Britain. Stoker and Hay’s study, as well as that of March, seem to indicate that populism’s presence is weak in Britain, and that optimistic views towards the government and politics are more prevalent. However, a Transparency International survey indicates that a significant number of citizens believe that key liberal democratic institutions, and political parties, are “corrupt/extremely corrupt” (Transparency International, 2016). The feat of squaring these conflicting pieces of information seems to be an exceedingly difficult process. However, the
fact remains that UKIP achieved moderate success in elections, and more important, they were successful in spearheading the Leave Campaign for the Brexit referendum.

Røren and Todd examined speeches by UKIP and the Norwegian Progress Party, a populist party in Norway, to ascertain their populist appeal (Røren & Todd, 2014: 25). They uncovered three key aspects of the speech made by Farage, then leader of UKIP. Firstly, there is a focus on immigration in the speech. Farage states that immigration is the “biggest single issue facing this country” and that immigration affects a great number of other challenges in Britain. According to Røren and Todd, by framing immigration in this way, it helped Farage construct a notion of “self and others” (Røren & Todd, 2014: 25). This is evident when Farage states, “And while you can’t blame them [immigrants arriving in Britain] – is it fair? Is it fair for the people who are already here in this country? Who’ve paid in to the system? That migrants can come and immediately start drawing benefits? When we, the host country, are strapped for cash, when youth unemployment is at a million, when the NHS is groaning and the deficit is a burden on every family?” (The Spectator, 2013). From the above quote, one can see that Farage makes the distinction between those already in the country, those who have “paid in to the system”, and immigrants who only put further strain on the country. Farage uses terms such as “fair” to evoke an ethical dimension to the distinction. He is attempting to convey the image that immigrants coming to the country are harming citizens and the country, in some shape or form, and that this is “unfair” to said citizens. Farage further builds on this separation of “them vs. us”, by discussing the issue of crime. Farage states in the speech that “There have been an astounding 27,500 arrests in the Metropolitan Police area in the last five years. 92 percent of ATM crime is committed by Romanians” (The Spectator, 2013). One can see that this is a blatant attempt to stoke fear in citizens that immigrants are committing crimes and that they pose an imminent danger to citizens’ safety.

Secondly, there is a strong sense of libertarianism in the speech. Libertarianism involves the belief that the state should be as small as possible and that taxes inhibit economic productivity (Røren & Todd, 2014: 26). This ideology also contains authoritarian elements such as the expectation that the state should be “hard on crime”. Libertarianism manifests itself in Farage’s speech in his condemnation of the EU and immigration (Røren & Todd, 2014: 26). Farage points to certain groups and individuals as being responsible for the issue of immigrants and crime, “If they [Mr Cameron, Clegg and Miliband] are listening there’s nothing they can do. They are tied up in the cat’s cradle of EU laws, regulations, directives and treaties” (The Spectator, 2013). As one can see, Farage points to the EU as being
responsible for this. Farage argues further that the EU inhibits economic prosperity, “We know that only by leaving the union can we regain control of our borders, our parliament, democracy, and our ability to trade freely with the fastest-growing economies in the world” (The Spectator, 2013). Farage attempts to convey the idea that the EU has taken control over Britain; that the country has essentially lost its sovereignty and identity.

Lastly, Røren and Todd identify a trend of the establishment versus the people. In the speech, Farage attempts to differentiate his party as radically different from the alternatives, and aligns himself with “the people” against the ruling establishment. This portrayal consists of various parts. Farage refers to the “normal, decent people” in towns around the United Kingdom, and in contrast, “the London commentariat” (The Spectator, 2013). Coincidentally, most of UKIP’s support comes from rural towns, rather than from cosmopolitan hubs like London. Furthermore, Farage claims that these “decent people” are disconnected from all the other parties, especially from the mainstream ones. He also states that members of the UKIP party are from all walks of life and from the whole range of the political spectrum; as such, they are “the people”.

According to Farage, people all over Britain are united in their dissatisfaction with the politicians of Westminster. Farage argues that these people “aren’t disconnected from politics. They’re disconnected from politicians” (The Spectator, 2013). He goes one step further by stating that “One thing many have in common: they are fed up to the back teeth with the cardboard cut-out careerists in Westminster” (The Spectator, 2013). Therefore, with all these statements, Farage conveys the image that UKIP represents the people, who in turn are “decent people” who are fed up with the establishment, i.e. with the politicians of Westminster. This is traditional right-wing populist rhetoric, and closely mirrors what was employed by Donald Trump during his election campaign. This also clearly fulfils the requirement of the Fifth Approach of the construction of “the people” and an opposing group.

4.3 Data on the state of Liberalism:

As with the Philippines case study, this section will follow the two-strand model and will examine Britain’s Liberal Democracy in two ways. As with the Philippine case study, this section will use four indicators to examine Britain’s pragmatic and redemptive sides of its Liberal Democracy.
As one can see, this is the same Pew Research Centre study as used in Chapter 3 to measure the strength of Liberalism in the Philippines. As such, this will provide a useful means of measurement between the three case studies. Looking at figure 2, it seems that Liberalism is relatively prominent in British society. Value 1 and value 2 have 68% and 92% support from the public, respectively. Public support for value 3 is at 76%. On the other hand, testing the limits of Liberalism, people saying what they want without censorship garnered 57% of public support, while reporting the news and using the internet without censorship garnered 58% and 53% of public support, respectively. The average for all six values is 67%. This is a great deal higher than the Philippines’ average of 55%. As such, one can state that the presence of Liberalism is far more prevalent in Britain than it is in the Philippines.

Table 2.1: Representative Democracy in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to Representative Democracy</th>
<th>“Committed”</th>
<th>“Less committed”</th>
<th>“Nondemocratic”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

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23 This is the same international study conducted in 2015 that was mentioned in the Philippines case study. The British survey was conducted through telephone interviews, with a sample size of 999 and a margin of error of 3.7% (Wike & Simmons, 2015).
From table 2.1\textsuperscript{24}, one can see that the majority of citizens (83\%) are committed to Representative Democracy in varying degrees. However, the larger percentage of citizens (47\% versus 36\%), are less committed to Representative Democracy. This is quite a significant fact, considering that Britain is a well-established Liberal Democracy. However, comparing these percentages with those of the Philippines, there are significantly more British citizens that are wholly committed to Representative Democracy than Filipinos: 36\% versus 15\%. Furthermore, as can be seen in table 2.2, a significant majority of British citizens believe that Representative Democracy is a good way of governance. Britain and the Philippines share similar percentages with the Representative Democracy indicator in table 2.2 and table 1.2, with Britain having slightly more respondents who believe that a Representative Democracy is good.

Table 2.2: Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of representative and direct democracy</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would a democratic system where representatives elected by citizens decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country?</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would a democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country?</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

From the above, one can state that the pragmatic side of Britain’s Liberal Democracy has a moderate to significant presence. A healthy majority of citizens support Liberal values, and a significant majority support Representative Democracy. However, there is a significant percentage of citizens who can be classified as “less committed” to Representative Democracy. The following section will examine Britain’s redemptive side.

From table 2.2, one can see that a majority of citizens believe that a Direct Democracy would be a good system of governance. However, this is significantly lower than the number of citizens who believe a Representative Democracy is good. This is also lower than the number of Filipinos who believe the same thing: 56\% versus 67\%.

\textsuperscript{24} The data in the following tables in this section are all from the Pew Research Centre study that was conducted in 2017. The British survey was conducted through telephone interviews, with a sample size of 1066 and a margin of error of 3.7\% (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017).
As table 2.3 indicates, only a slight majority of British citizens are satisfied with the status quo. This is markedly different from the 69% of Filipinos who are satisfied with the status quo. It seems that British citizens are polarised regarding whether they are satisfied with their political system. However, considering that a slight majority are satisfied, this indicator will have little impact on the redemptive side.

Britain’s political system has a number of institutions to provide checks and balances. It is a parliamentary system with the legislature divided between the House of Commons and House of Lords. Most of the power is, however, concentrated in the House of Commons, with the House of Lords only being able to debate, and potentially delay, bills proposed by the House of Commons (Gov.uk, 2018). The party elected as the majority virtually has complete control over the government, with the Prime Minister and cabinet members being selected from its ranks. Furthermore, Britain has no constitution, and therefore the judicial branch is not able to deem any problematic laws as unconstitutional (Gov.uk, 2018). As one can see, despite being a proclaimed Liberal Democracy, power is heavily concentrated with the majority party in government. This is something that clashes with Liberal Democracy’s preoccupation with the separation of powers. However, support for Liberal Democratic values in Britain is relatively high, far higher than in the Philippines. Lastly, an overwhelming majority believe that Representative Democracy is a good system of governance. Considering all this, this researcher can state that Britain presides over a moderate to significant pragmatic side.

As was seen in table 2.2, a slight majority of citizens believe that Direct Democracy would be a good system of governance; however it is significantly lower than the number of individuals who believe the same of Representative Democracy. Also, only a slight majority of citizens are satisfied with the status quo. Taking all this into consideration, this researcher will state that Britain’s redemptive side has a moderate presence. While there is a slight difference between the two sides of Britain’s Liberal Democracy, it is far too insignificant to be classified as a noticeable gap.
4.4 Brexit and Populism:

In 2012, the then Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, refused demands for a referendum on the UK’s membership to the EU. However, less than a year later, Cameron announced that a referendum would be held if his Conservative party were to be re-elected in the 2015 national elections (Iyengar, 2016). In 2015, Cameron, and the Conservative party, were re-elected and the European Union Referendum Act 2015 was introduced to Parliament in order to start the process (Iyengar, 2016). Interestingly enough, this was not the first instance of a referendum of this type in the United Kingdom. The ruling Labour party in 1975 had held a referendum on whether Britain should leave the EEC (the EU’s precursor) (Iyengar, 2016). The referendum asked the simple question of “Do you think the UK should stay in the European Community?”, and the results were that 67% of Brits said “yes”, with a turnout of 64.5% (Iyengar, 2016). As part of their election campaign for the 1983 election, the Labour Party promised a withdrawal from the EEC (Iyengar, 2016). However, Thatcher and the Conservative Party won the election convincingly, and as such, the promise never came to fruition (Iyengar, 2016). Later, in 1997, Sir James Goldsmith and his newly formed Referendum Party ran on a campaign of holding a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. The Referendum party, however, only garnered 2.6% of votes and no seat in parliament (Iyengar, 2016). As one can see, there has been a history of parties using the promise of a referendum as part of their election campaigns. The difference it seems is that Cameron chose the opportune time to use this tactic.

There are a number of factors why this was the case. UKIP’s rise in profile brought the issue of immigration, unfounded or not, into the forefront of the public eye. Extensive populist and nativist rhetoric by populist figures such as Farage caused many to question Britain’s membership of the EU. Also, since 2011, a devastating civil war has been waged between the Assad Regime and various militant groups. Notwithstanding the political machinations of the war, the United Nations has stated that an estimated 400 000 Syrians have been killed in the war’s, as of now, six-year run (CNN, 2017a). More than five million Syrians have fled the country, almost all of them fleeing to Europe (CNN, 2017a). Coupled with the “standard” number of refugees and immigrants Europe receives; this influx of fleeing Syrians has caused a Refugee/Immigrant crisis.

In 2015, more than a million refugees and migrants entered Europe. Germany and Hungary have been the two EU countries which have been most affected, with more than 476 000 and 177 000 asylum applications received respectively (BBC, 2016). Hungary, which is governed...
by a right-wing populist party, closed its borders with Croatia in October 2015 in order to stop the flow of migrants (BBC, 2016). Germany has opted to keep their borders open and has been struggling to process the huge influx of refugees and the large number of asylum applications. The UK has received a relatively small number of asylum applications. The average for the number of applications for every 100,000 of a nation’s population is 260, while the UK has only 60 applications for every 100,000 citizens (BBC, 2016). Despite this low number, right-wing populist groups such as UKIP have used the larger immigration crisis in Europe to substantiate their arguments for leaving the EU and “strengthening the borders” (Røren & Todd, 2014: 25-26).

Another factor that provided an opportune time for this referendum was the relatively “weak” state of the EU. During the time of the referendum, the EU was grappling with an economic crisis, dubbed the “Eurozone crisis”. The Eurozone crisis had its origins in the global financial crisis of 2008. The financial crisis can be divided into three parts: the financial turmoil in September 2008, the global financial crisis which lasted from September 2008 to May 2010, and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis which has been ongoing since May 2010 (Auel & Höing, 2014: 2). The Eurozone crisis started when Greece asked for financial assistance in early 2010. In a timespan of two years, since Greece’s plea for financial assistance, the crisis spread to other countries in the EU as well; the most notable of these being Ireland, Spain and Portugal. In order to help Greece, the Eurozone members agreed to further cut Greece’s debt by 40 billion Euros and to provide 44 billion in bailout money and aid (BBC, 2012). Considering that in May 2010 the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided 110 billion Euros as bailout loans, as well as a 130 billion bailout in 2012, it is clear that this crisis is one of considerable magnitude (BBC, 2012).

The Eurozone crisis has caused the EU to resort to increasingly centralised, and top-down, decision-making. There have been three consequences of this. Firstly, national parliaments of member countries who are facing financial difficulty face strict obligations to structure their budgets. For example, the “Memoranda of Understanding” focus heavily on pension and salary cuts or the retrenchment of social welfare programs as obligations for balancing the budget (Auel & Höing, 2014: 3). However, donor countries, i.e. countries providing the funds for the financial aid and bailouts, also face strict demands on their national budgets. These demands are all dictated by the Fiscal Compact, which consists of the revised Stability and

25 Eurozone refers to all the nations who share the Euro as their currency.
Growth Pact or the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) (Auel & Höing, 2014: 3).

Secondly, as was stated, the Eurozone crisis has made decision-making more centralised and top-down; subsequently it has strengthened the power of “European executives”. As Auel and Höing state, “With the EU in full crisis mode, the European Council has become the most important forum for decision-making in EMU affairs” (Auel & Höing, 2014: 3), and as a prominent German politician, Martin Schulz, stated, “Crisis management ‘by summit’ has become the norm” (Schulz, 2012). All these factors have caused European executives to, even more easily, bypass the national assemblies and parliaments of member states.

Thirdly, the crisis has resulted in some measures being implemented within the EU legal framework, and others outside of it. Agreements such as the Fiscal Compact are based on treaties outside the EU legal framework, and as such, they only apply to countries participating in the treaties (Auel & Höing, 2014: 3). This causes added confusion, as countries in the Eurozone and EU face different legal and political set-ups. Furthermore, governments treated these agreements as foreign rather than EU policy, which limited their respective parliaments’ involvement in them (Auel & Höing, 2014: 3).

The Eurozone crisis, just as the Immigration crisis, had little direct impact on Britain, considering that it does not share the Euro as a currency with the rest of the EU. However, the Eurozone crisis did portray the EU as a dangerous and unstable economic union, with financial policies being forced upon its members. This portrayal had a negative impact on how Britain’s membership with the EU was viewed, and this was especially visible with the ruling Conservative Party’s actions and rhetoric.

In a speech made in 2012, George Osborne, then Chancellor of the Exchequer26, promised that Britain would stay out of any further economic integration with the European Union, which includes any banking union in the Eurozone. Furthermore, Osborne stated that he would “protect our taxpayers from lasting euro zone entanglements that would cost us dearly” (Castle, 2012). In 2011, David Cameron became the first British Prime Minister to veto a new EU treaty. This new treaty was meant to combat the Eurozone crisis, and included various obligations for Eurozone countries, as well as an EU-wide tax on financial transactions. This EU-wide tax, dubbed the Tobin tax, was a sticking point for Cameron, as he and other British political figures claimed that it would hit the city of London

26 Essentially the Minister of the Economy
disproportionately (Hewitt, 2011). Some saw Cameron’s actions resulting in Britain’s isolating itself from its allies, while Eurosceptics, populist or not, were encouraged by his actions and demanded more.

After the introduction of the European Union Referendum Act 2015 to Parliament, a campaign arose with camps for and against leaving the European Union. UKIP were the most prominent figures in the Leave Campaign, however, they were not the only ones (Calamur, 2016). Various members from other parties also supported the Leave Campaign. Most notable was Boris Johnson, former mayor of London and famously eccentric member of the Conservative Party (Calamur, 2016).

The Brexit vote took place on 23 June 2016 and resulted in 17 410 742 (51.9%) citizens voting to leave and 16 141 241 (48.1%) citizens voting to remain within the EU, with a voter turnout of 72.2% (BBC, 2016b). Breaking down the votes according to region provides some interesting points of interest. England and Wales were the two nations in the United Kingdom that voted to leave, with 53.4 and 52.5 percent respectively (BBC, 2016b). On the other hand, Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in the EU, with 55.8 and 62 percent respectively (BBC, 2016b). As one can see, the United Kingdom was evenly split between leaving and remaining; however, due to England’s significant population advantage with 15 188 406 million votes against Scotland’s 1 018 322 million votes, it swung the referendum in favour of leaving (BBC, 2016b).

Henning and Dorling (2016) provide an in-depth analysis of the EU referendum. They point out that of the approximately seven million eligible adults who did not register to vote, a disproportionate number were “the young, flat-dwellers, especially renters; members of ethnic minorities; [and] recent movers”. As one can see, this is by no means the “left behinders” that UKIP appeal to. Many of these people chose not to register due to the fear of debt collection agencies, because these agencies are allowed access to the electoral register. Furthermore, the vote did not include the millions of mainland EU citizens living in the UK (Henning & Dorling, 2016: 20).

Polls indicated that older people voted most, and on average, that they voted to leave. On the other hand, the youngest demographics showed the strongest support for remaining in the EU. In the demographic of 18-24, 73% voted to remain. Furthermore, most people who voted to leave, live in the South of England (Henning & Dorling, 2016: 20). This clashes with many pundits’ statements that the Brexit vote was mainly caused by the working-class people in the
North of England. Dividing it into class, 59% who voted to leave were middle class and 41% were working class. Only 24% of the Leave votes came from the lowest two social classes. The middle class was pivotal in the Leave vote. However, this is also simply due to the fact that the middle class constituted two thirds of all voters (Henning & Dorling, 2016: 20).

Scotland and London were the two areas with the highest concentration of Remain votes. However, a disproportionate number of people abstained from voting in these two areas. The EU referendum was not successful due to protest voting per se, but instead because of a lack of voting in Scotland, London, and among the young (Henning & Dorling, 2016: 20).

Another reason why the Leave Campaign may have won this close victory was the difference in message and organisation between the two campaigns. The Leave Campaign focused on a simple message and repeated it at every opportunity, this being “Take Back Control” (Berry, 2016: 1). This message was simple and open to interpretation, which enabled various groups to get behind it, or as a PR specialist put it, “it resonated across the extraordinary Leave patchwork of parliamentary fundamentalists, elderly nostalgics and quasi racists as well as large sections of the discontented working poor. In a world where very few people other than the very rich feel they have much control over their lives, it promised an alternative future” (Berry, 2016: 1). It is also important to note that the Leave Campaign heavily employed targeted messages through social media. This effective utilization of social media is reminiscent of the way that Duterte’s supporters used social media to benefit his campaign.

The Leave Campaign espoused the following points, as stated on their website: They stated that if citizens vote to leave, “We will be able to save £350 million a week…. We can spend our money on our priorities like the NHS, schools, and housing”, “We’ll be in charge of our own borders…. In a world with so many threats, it’s safer to control our own borders and decide for ourselves who can come into this country, not be overruled by EU judges”, “We can control immigration and have a fairer system which welcomes people to the UK based on the skills they have, not the passport they hold”, “We’ll be free to trade with the whole world…. The EU stops us signing our own trade deals with key allies like Australia or New Zealand, and growing economies like India, China or Brazil…”, and “We can make our own laws…. Our laws should be made by people we can elect and kick out – that’s more democratic” (Voteleaveandtakecontrol, 2016).

The Leave Campaign also provided points on what would happen if Britain stayed in the EU. These points are the following: according to them the EU would cost Britain “more and
more”; immigration would also “continue to be out of control” and as they stated “nearly 2 million came to the UK from the EU over the last ten years. Imagine what it would be like in future decades when new, poorer countries join” Also, they argued that Britain would have to keep “bailing out the Euro” and as they put it, “You will be paying the bill for the Euro’s failure”; and that the European court would still be in charge of Britain’s laws and that “it already overrules us on everything from how much tax we pay, to who we can let in our country, and on what terms” (Voteleaveandtakecontrol, 2016). As one can see, the Leave Campaign placed a great deal of focus on immigration and the control of borders as arguments for leaving.

On the other hand, the Stay Campaign lacked a cohesive and simple message on why Britain should remain in the EU. A significant reason for this was the fact that the two mainstream parties were running two separate campaigns that often conflicted with each other on key issues such as immigration and the economic consequences of Britain’s leaving the EU (Berry, 2016: 1). This lack of a clear message also hampered advertising agencies’ ability to produce effective ad campaigns. Furthermore, even though there was an official cross-party “Stronger in” team that were hiring top ad agencies, in-fighting prevented most of the “hard hitting” messages from being employed in ads (Berry, 2016: 1).

The chosen issues in the poll in late 2015, months before the referendum, paint a revealing picture. Immigration was by far the most chosen issue, with a percentage of approximately 50%. On the other hand, the EU and NHS hovered at around 30% (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 2). Therefore, the fact that the Leave Campaign extensively focused on immigration may have helped their campaign a great deal. A Gallup poll in 2012-2013 supported this idea. Nearly 7 of every 10 British respondents stated that immigration should be decreased, while only 5% of respondents believed that it should increase. Furthermore, nearly 60% of those that stated that it should decrease, stated that it should be decreased by a lot (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 3).

The Migration Observatory also casts doubt on the idea that the anti-immigration sentiment is a new one. In 1964, concerns about the “New Commonwealth” immigration prompted the British Election Study to poll the population on immigration. During the period 1964 to 1984, the overwhelming majority of citizens stated that there were too many immigrants in the UK. The highest percentage recorded was nearly 90% during 1970, and the lowest was approximately 77% during 1987 (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 4). There has been a downward
trend from 90% in 1970 to approximately 59% in 2010 (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 4). However, the Migration Observatory points out that this downward trend is most likely due to how the questions were worded and the different options given to the respondents. For example, the beginning of a slight downward trend in 1999 coincides with a change from the BES’ question of “if there are too many immigrants in Britain”, to one that asked if immigration has “gone too far” (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 4).

Transatlantic Trend conducted a poll in 2013, in various European nations and in the United States exploring how many respondents were worried about legal and illegal immigration. In Britain, approximately 40% of respondents were worried about legal immigration, and approximately 77% of respondents were worried about illegal immigration (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 5). The percentage of respondents who were worried about legal immigration is far higher than any other nation polled, with France and Netherlands having 30% of respondents sharing the sentiment. In terms of illegal immigration, only Italy surpasses Britain, with about 85% of respondents worried about this issue (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 5).

As the Migration Observatory mentions, the British public displays mixed beliefs about immigrants’ economic and cultural impacts. The British Social Attitudes surveys were conducted from 2011 to 2015. One question asked, “Is it generally bad or good for Britain's economy that migrants come to Britain from other countries?” in order to ascertain how the public views the impact of immigration on the British economy (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 7). Looking over the course of the four years, one can see that the public’s negative views on this matter had decreased. In 2011, approximately 30% of respondents believed that migrants are good for Britain’s economy while 52% believed it to be bad. However, in 2015, 42% believed that migrants were good for Britain’s economy, and approximately 33% believed that migrants were bad for the economy. While this is not a total reversal from 2011, it shows a downward trend in negative views regarding the economy and immigration (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 7).

The British Social Attitudes surveys’ measurement of the public’s view on immigration and culture, however, tells a slightly different story. In 2011, in response to being asked “Would you say that Britain's cultural life is undermined or enriched by migrants coming to live here from other countries?”, approximately 35% of respondents stated that they believed it enriched cultural life, while 48% stated that it undermined it (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 8). In 2015, the split between respondents stating that it undermined or enriched cultural life evened
out, with both having 40%. While this view also seems to indicate a downturn in negative views towards immigration, its decrease is far slower than the view on immigration and the economy (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 8). Therefore, examining these polls, it seems that a few months before the referendum, 33% believed that migrants were bad for the economy and 40% believed that migrants undermined cultural life in Britain. This was a significant portion of the population that could be potentially mobilised for a national referendum.

A few weeks before the EU referendum, Ipsos conducted a poll that explored the public’s views on immigration more extensively. The poll revealed that 39% of respondents believed that immigration from the EU has been good for Britain on the whole, while 42% of respondents stated that it has been bad (Ipsos, 2016c). One can see the key role that this issue played in the referendum through the fact that 65% of respondents who supported the Leave vote stated that immigration has been bad for Britain overall, and on the other hand, 62% of respondents who supported the Remain vote believed that immigration has been good for the country (Ipsos, 2016a). Dividing it into age demographics further supports Henning and Dorling’s argument that the older segment of the population helped the Leave Campaign to victory. People who fall in the age bracket of 18 to 34 were twice as likely as those that are over 55 to believe that EU immigration is good for the country. Another crucial statistic is that only 27% of respondents believed that EU immigration has been good for the NHS, while 55% believe that it has been bad for the NHS (Ipsos, 2016a). The state of the NHS was another key issue during the time of the EU referendum and this may have fed into support for the Leave Campaign. If one assumes that the Brexit vote was a populist occurrence, the demographics, once again, support the view of authors such as Inglehart and Norris who believe that populism has its home amidst the older generations and the cultural backlash that they are experiencing.

Opinions on the Brexit vote: Table 2.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>If Britain stayed</th>
<th>If Britain Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Better off</strong></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Difference</strong></td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worse off</strong></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ipsos, 2016a

Table 2.5 depicts a poll conducted by Ipsos to measure the various attitudes of citizens towards the upcoming vote just a few weeks before the EU referendum (Ipsos, 2016d). As one can see, the poll asked respondents whether they would be “better off”, “worse off”, or if
it would make “no difference” if Britain left/stayed in the EU. The majority of respondents believed that it would make no difference if Britain stayed. While it is tempting to assign this to apathy, one should also consider that some citizens may have been satisfied with the status quo. On the other hand, it seems that Britain’s leaving was the more polarising prospect. Respondents were almost equally spilt regarding whether they would be better or worse off, while a minority of people believed it would make no difference.

The IPSOS poll also asked respondents whether politicians from the Leave and Remain campaign were mostly telling lies, or mostly telling the truth. In response to this question, 46% believed that both sides were mostly telling lies, while only 19% believed that both sides were mostly telling the truth. This distrust is also reflected in how citizens viewed the key claims made by both sides (Ipsos, 2016d). Considering that the Leave Campaign won, and that UKIP was one of its champions, their claims will be focused upon.

*Claims made by the Leave Campaign: Table 2.5*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>True</th>
<th>False</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Turkey will be fast-tracked into the European Union and their population of 75 million people will have the right to free movement to the UK”.</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain would be forced to pay billions of bailouts for Eurozone countries in the future.</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There would be a higher risk of sex attacks on women.</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Britain sends £350 million a week to the European Union”.</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ipsos, 2016d

Above, one can see the claims that the Leave Campaign made and the percentage of respondents who believed it to be true and the percentage of respondents who believed it to be false. With two of the claims, slightly more people believed it to be true. Only the claim that there would be a higher risk of sex attacks on women saw the overwhelming majority believing it to be false. As such, it seems that the Leave Campaign’s spurious claims found some footing in British society, which stands to reason now, considering that this campaign won.
4.5 Analysis:

Nigel Farage, as leader of UKIP, played a pivotal role in the success of the referendum. Coupled with the populist speeches by Farage, which were analysed in section 4.2, he also cultivated a populist image which fitted within the Fifth Approach framework. Kelsey analysed Mail Online articles about Nigel Farage and how a populist hero mythology has been created around him. Kelsey explains that the Mail is one of the most popular right-wing newspapers in Britain, and its website is one of the most popular newspaper sites in the world (Kelsey, 2016: 976). The two headlines of the analysed articles are “Foaming with Farage: 11AM at a pub and a gloriously non-PC audience (and beer) with the irresistible force behind Britain’s third party … sorry Mr Clegg, that really is UKIP” and “So, Mr Farage, why does UKIP’s leader have a German wife? … and did she make you kip in the spare room over that ‘seven-times-a-night fling’ with a Latvian?” (Kelsey, 2016: 976).

Both headlines have a certain style to them: both are exceedingly conversational and treat Farage as just one of the “lads”. However, as Kelsey also points out, both headlines play with Farage’s controversial characteristics, and from the construction of the headlines one can glean the Mail’s, and much of Farage’s, ideological traits: EU scepticism, preservation of “traditional British values”, discourse of pro-Thatcherism, critical outlook on political correctness, and a critical view of the nanny state (Kelsey, 2016: 977). Farage was portrayed as the individual who embraced all these traits, and who was fighting against political correctness and the EU that was attempting to suppress these traits. This fulfils the Fifth Approach’s requirement that a populist should be on the opposite spectrum of cosmopolitan liberal values. Farage intentionally shirked political correctness, and in turn, embraced conservative ideals.

Some of the highlights of the second articles were “Love him or loathe him, Nigel Farage is impossible to ignore”, “He dresses like a City trader, smells of fags and speaks from the hip”, “The UKIP leader has been at death’s door three times in his 48 years”, and “Circumstances have changed, things could really happen now” (Kelsey, 2016: 977). The first three quotations clearly constructed a populist, or “everyman”, image of Nigel Farage: an image of a charismatic individual who is “normal”, and who has faced hardships and has overcome them. In article 2 there is also a segment highlighting Farage’s dedication to his cause, “‘I’ve felt from day one that being part of the European Union was a very, very, VERY BAD thing for this country. I can’t explain it, but I just KNOW I’m right. And I’ve dedicated myself to it in a way I don’t suppose has been wholly rational.’ He’s not joking. In order to spread his
message, he gets up at 5am, works seven days a week, travels on average eight hours a day to speak in town halls and rugby clubs and barely sees his second wife, Kirsten and two daughters…” (Kelsey, 2016: 978). Here one can see that Farage, and his party, focused on a current issue. As was explored in section 4.4, the relationship between Britain and the EU was strained. As such, the relationship and Britain’s place in it was a salient topic. This fulfils the Fifth Approach’s aspect that populists take on current and prominent issues in their campaigns.

There is a biblical or religious slant to the above-mentioned quotation (Kelsey, 2016: 978). As Farage stated, “he can’t explain it, but I just KNOW I’m right” and that he had dedicated himself to this belief that does not seem wholly rational. When talking about his travels, Farage even referenced a Christian evangelical as a joke. All these aspects portray the image that Farage’s beliefs were beyond the standard political standpoints of “traditional” politicians, and that they verged on something spiritual.

Farage’s three brushes with death further convey the sense that he is on a “mission”. However, the account of these three incidents also conveys other added aspects. The first incident was when Farage, aged 21, was run over whilst walking over a pelican crossing. The article pays particular notice to the fact that “He was in hospital for over three months, in plaster for 11 and plagued by tinnitus for years” (Kelsey, 2016: 979). This builds a theme of suffering and endurance, which the second incident builds on even further. When Farage was 22 he was diagnosed with testicular cancer and as he recounts, “After spending 11 months saving my life, the NHS [National Health Service] nearly killed me. They kept misdiagnosing me. I kept going back every week… It was awful. AWFUL!” (Kelsey, 2016: 979). Here the blame is placed on the NHS, not on the cancer, as the cause of Farage’s near-death experience. This is a reflection of Farage’s, and the Mail’s, ideological standpoint on the NHS.

His final brush with death was in 2010, when an UKIP banner became tangled in the tailfin of the light aircraft, and it subsequently crashed with Farage in it. The retelling of this incident contains the most blatant rhetorical efforts to portray a certain image of Farage, “Needless to say, when he finally struggled out, he didn’t embrace post-traumatic therapy… [When they offered therapy, I did rather scoff—it’s just not my thing]. Unsurprisingly, his recipe for recovery was a bottle of red, a pack of fags and counting his blessings” (Kelsey, 2016: 979). By referencing Farage’s refusal of therapy, and his use of alcohol and cigarettes for coping,
the Mail continued to build the image of Farage as a tough “everyman”, who is far removed from PC culture and the concept of “talking about one’s feelings”. As Inglehart and Norris have argued, much of populism’s rise in popularity is due to a backlash against the dominant culture, which is liberalism that often travels into PC territory. This portrayal of Farage also differentiates him from professional politicians, who traditionally portray themselves as “safe and respectful”. This further supports the view that Farage can be found on the opposite side of the spectrum from cosmopolitan liberal values. One can see that Farage and Trump closely share similar populist characteristics to a great extent which stands to reason, considering that Trump can also be found on the opposite end of the cosmopolitan liberal values spectrum.

Furthermore, Farage and UKIP fulfil the requirement of creating a concept of “the people”. As was outlined in section 4.2, Farage often focused on immigration in his speeches. More specifically, he discussed the “unfairness” of immigrants drawing benefits and putting greater strain on public services, while citizens paid for all this. Farage clearly created an “us vs. them” distinction between immigrants coming into the country and the “true citizens” that are forced to support them (The Spectator, 2013). Farage also created a second distinction between two groups: the one being between European Union politicians subverting Britain’s sovereignty and the other the “true British citizen” living in the countryside, far removed from the insidious machinations of the EU politicians.

It is hard to dispute that Farage is not a right-wing populist, and that among certain members of Britain’s society he, and UKIP, found ardent supporters. However, as was discussed earlier, polls seem to indicate that no populist zeitgeist is occurring in Britain, and that the British people do, by and large, still support mainstream parties. This is evident when one examines the results of the 2015 national election. In the 2015 election, UKIP garnered 12.5% of the vote, seemingly making them the new third party, with the Liberal Democrats only garnering 7.9% of the vote (BBC, 2015). This result is also a vast improvement over UKIP’s performance in the 2010 election, in which they only managed 3.1% of the vote. However, UKIP only managed to gain one seat in parliament, while the Liberal Democrats managed to obtain seven. This may be indicative of UKIP’s lack of mass appeal across the whole of Britain. Furthermore, the two main parties, i.e. the establishment, had not lost any votes since the 2010 election. On the contrary, the Labour Party gained 1.5% of votes, while the Conservative Party gained 0.8% of the votes (BBC, 2015).
The Liberal Democrats party was the primary “loser” of the 2015 election, losing 15.2% of the vote share from 2010 (BBC, 2015). Thus, it seems that UKIP’s success was not due to dissatisfaction with the establishment, but rather, to the failings of the third party. The snap elections held in 2017 further supported this view. Theresa May, Prime Minister of Britain and leader of the Conservative Party, called for early elections in 2017. In the aftermath, once again, the two mainstream parties increased their share of the vote, with the Labour Party garnering a 10.3% increase from 2015, and the Conservative Party obtaining a 4.6% increase. On the other hand, UKIP experienced a significant decrease of 12.1%, and lost their only seat in parliament (BBC, 2017). When one reviews both elections, it seems that populism rarely had, or has, a foothold in Britain. As such, the Leave Campaign closely winning in the EU referendum may have been due to other factors, such as the poor performance of the opposition campaign and a low turnout among key demographics.

Finally, from examining the four indicators and various other studies mentioned in this chapter, one is hard pressed to clearly identify a significant gap between the two faces of democracy, let alone any populist zeitgeist currently present in Britain. Support for Liberal values is relatively high in British society, with an average percentage of 67%, which is a great deal higher than the support found in the Philippines but also significantly lower than the support found in the U.S. However, formal Liberal institutions are not as robust as in the U.S. or even in the Philippines. While this may seem like a potential gap between the two sides of democracy, there seem to be fewer de facto issues, such as extensive corruption, than is the case in the other two case studies. Furthermore, the fact that the two mainstream parties have seen a growing number of votes during recent national elections seems to further support the argument that there is no significant populist presence in Britain.

One can attempt to construct the argument that due to the “crisis of representation”, as mentioned by Pabst and Mair, the mainstream parties have merely increased their share of a diminishing number of votes. If one reviews the voter turnout during the past five elections, this argument, however, does not seem to carry weight. In 2001, the voter turnout was the lowest it has ever been: 59.4% (BBC, 2001). The 2001 voter turnout showed a significant 12% drop from turnout of the previous elections. The main explanation given for this was the seemingly unassailable position that the Labour party held at the time (BBC, 2001). During the 2005 elections, the voter turnout was 61.3% (BBC, 2005). The voter turnout increased to 65.1% in 2010 (BBC, 2010). During the 2015 elections, the voter turnout further increased slightly to 66.2% (BBC, 2015). And finally, in 2017, the voter turnout increased further to
69.1% (BBC, 2017). Studying the voter turnout, one can tentatively state that there was indeed a crisis of representation in Britain in 2001. However, while there was indeed a severe drop in voter turnout in 2001, it seems to be recovering. As such, it seems that citizens are becoming more involved in traditional politics and parties. Considering that authors such as Laclau claim that the crisis of representation causes populism, the fact that there does not seem to be a crisis of representation in Britain further contributes to the conclusion that there is no significant presence of populism, and it brings into question the validity of Laclau’s claim. Interestingly, both the Philippines and Britain have experienced similar increases in voter turnout since 2010, with the difference being that the Philippines has approximately a 10% turnout advantage.

It also seems that the news media played a role in the referendum. Berry cites research done by Loughborough University indicating that news media covered the Leave arguments more often than the Remain arguments. Furthermore, the press reports on the EU have been mostly negative. Apart from the Independent, newspapers such as the Guardian and Mirror have employed negative language, and reporting, when covering the EU. As Berry puts it, “From meddling ‘pointy head Eurocrats’ squandering our membership fees to the European project the press has employed a shifting selection of negative themes” (Berry, 2016: 1). Research also shows that broadcast news media, while not as negative as the press, did not provide a more positive counterpoint. When the EU was covered, it would most often be about summits and disputes between the EU and the UK. Furthermore, broadcast media reported most on the two main parties, and especially on the incumbent Conservatives. Thus, Eurosceptic Conservatives were given more airtime to air their grievances about the EU, than political figures from the more “Europhile” Labour party (Berry, 2016: 1).

Reporting on immigration, especially in tabloid press, has been largely negative. Countless stories have been published about how immigrants are “sponging” on the welfare system; that they are sapping the National Healthcare Service’s (NHS) resources, and that they are involved in criminal activities (Berry, 2016: 2). This issue has been a long-standing one. In a study of immigration framing in news media in Canada and Britain, Lawlor uncovered that, since 2003, the tone of media coverage on immigration in Britain has been largely negative (Lawlor, 2015: 348). Lawlor also found that framing immigrants as a refugee and illegality issue is the most common framing device (Lawlor, 2015: 348).

95
The negative slant of the media coverage of immigration is reflected in the public’s attitude towards immigration. Ipsos MORI has been conducting a poll for more than a decade that asks respondents to name their most important issue, and then to name other important issues (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 2). Since 2000, immigration has been on an upward trend as one of the most important issues, and in recent years, it has been consistently chosen as one of the top five issues (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 2). Furthermore, in August 2016, a couple of months after the referendum, immigration was the most chosen issue, with 34% of respondents choosing it (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 2). The other issues that were chosen during the same round of polling were the NHS (31%), the EU (31%), the economy (30%), housing (22%), and defence/terrorism (19%). Both, the NHS and EU were connected to the immigration crisis and the referendum, and as such, it stands to reason that they would rank jointly as the second most important issue (Blinder and Allen, 2016: 2).

As Henning and Dorling (2016), posited, the Leave Campaign’s victory does not seem to have been due to protest votes. Furthermore, immigration, and the media’s coverage of it, seems to have played a large role. From the polls that were discussed in section 4.4, it seems that large parts of the British public have a negative view of immigration, and this may have been reinforced by media coverage, especially from right-wing outlets. As such, the EU referendum may have been a vote on the immigration issue, rather than a protest against the establishment and the EU. Regardless, the issue of immigration is something that is closely linked to populism. As Canovan and other authors argue, one of the three appeals “to the people” that populists utilize is the appeal to the people in a cultural or ethnic sense. As has been stated, this appeal separates those belonging in the country, and those who do not, such as illegal immigrants. Furthermore, immigration can be framed as a security issue. As was seen with UKIP, and with various right-wing media outlets, rhetoric of “dangerous” illegal immigrants that come and commit crimes in Britain was rife. Immigration can also be seen as one of the issues that tie in to the cultural backlash thesis of Inglehart and Norris. Older generations exhibit outrage that immigrants are potentially diluting the culture in which they grew up. One should, however, be wary of closely aligning the roles of immigration and populism in the Brexit vote. As studies have shown, a negative perception of immigration has been a long-standing feature in British society. On the contrary, in recent years it seems to be experiencing a slight downward trend. Considering this, one is hard pressed to state that the supposed new wave of populism also coincided, or influenced, an anti-immigration sentiment.
Another factor that played a large role was the weak state of the EU and the Eurozone crisis. Many in Britain simply could have voted to leave the EU as a decision to separate their nation from a perceived failing economic and political union. The lack of an effective Remain campaign may also have contributed to the outcome of Brexit. Considering UKIP’s lack of success as a party and the prominent issues present during the Brexit campaigns, it seems that there was no populist wave in Britain, and that the Brexit vote was not due to an upsurge in populism. On the contrary, it seems that a confluence of events is the most likely cause. Past events had strained the relationship between the EU and Britain, which had led to the introduction of Brexit as a prospect. An effective Leave Campaign, a disorganised Stay Campaign, and a lack of voter turnout from key demographics significantly contributed to the Brexit win. Furthermore, immigration has been a long-standing issue in Britain, which gained further prominence during the Brexit campaigns. Considering that the Leave Campaign provided potential solutions to the issue, while the Stay Campaign did not, it stands to reason that voters would be inclined towards the Leave Campaign. It should also be kept in mind that it was a close victory for the Leave Campaign; it was by no means an overwhelming victory caused by a supposed “populist upsurge”.

4.6 Conclusion:

Populism appeared in Britain’s modern political landscape in the 80s and has remained in various forms throughout the decades. However, despite its longevity, it does not seem that populism has a significant presence. There have been various small populist parties in Britain who garnered few to no votes, and populist sentiment in British society does not seem to be prominent. However, the chance for an exit referendum was made rife by two factors. Firstly, the Eurozone crisis that was still hampering the economic block’s growth was souring the relationship between Britain and certain prominent members of the EU. Secondly, the refugee/immigrant crisis, primarily caused by the conflict in Syria, created the conundrum of whether to accept these high numbers of refugees with open arms or to close the borders to their plight. Some nations chose to close their borders, while nations such as Germany and France chose to accommodate substantial numbers of refugees. Regardless of the fashion in which Eurozone nations responded, an upsurge in interest in the immigration issue occurred. This increased saliency of the immigration issue created an ideal environment for a referendum that revolved around a nation’s sovereignty and its control over its borders. The Brexit vote consisted of two campaigns. One was for leaving the European Union, while the other was for staying. The Leave Campaign’s most ardent proponents were UKIP and its
leader, Nigel Farage. Furthermore, the Brexit vote was a closely fought contest, with the Leave Campaign barely winning. This case study also leads to the conclusion that there is no populist wave present in Britain. The most prominent populist party, UKIP, has experienced a steady decline in its number of votes since 2015. Examining the four indicators, the researcher further concludes that there is no significant gap between the two sides of Britain’s Liberal Democracy. As such, this case study refutes the presumptive hypothesis that the populism in 2016 was caused by internal failings in Liberal Democracies, more specifically in the imbalance between their two sides.

The following chapter will explore the 2016 U.S. elections and populism in the U.S.
Chapter 5: The United States and the case of Donald Trump

5.1 Introduction:

Britain’s case study provided vastly different results to those of the Philippines case study. There seems to be little evidence that populism is a dominant presence in Britain while Liberal Democracy has strong support among its citizens. On the other hand, the Philippines have had populist leaders in the past and its Liberal Democracy has had ample space for growth. Furthermore, while Rodrigo Duterte’s win can be attributed to his populist credentials and tactics, the same cannot be said of the close victory that the Leave Campaign achieved with Brexit. The findings from these two case studies stand in contention with the presumptive hypothesis of this thesis that the wave of populism was caused by internal failings within Liberal Democracy. Furthermore, from examining the four indicators, the study concluded that neither nation showed a gap in their Liberal Democracies.

The United States presidential elections of 2016 present another potential example of populism. Examining this event will provide potentially crucial insights into how and why populism occurred in a Liberal Democracy. The United States is a well-established Liberal Democracy, and the most fervent proponent of Liberal Democracy. As such, the presence of populism in such an environment will be significant to the present study.

As with the previous two case studies, this will be done through an initial process of contextualisation and a subsequent analysis conducted with the help of the theoretical framework: the theoretical framework being the Fifth Approach and the two-strand conceptualisation of Liberal Democracy. The Fifth Approach will help to identify whether Donald Trump is indeed a populist, while the two-strand conceptualisation and the chosen indicators will reveal whether there is a notable gap between the two sides of its Liberal Democracy. As the presumptive hypothesis of this study states, the populism in 2016 was caused by internal failings in the Liberal Democracies, more specifically, an imbalance between its two sides. As such, Trump being identified as populist and a gap being noted within the Liberal Democracy will imply that the latter may have helped the former. However, various other significant variables will also be sought to explain this populist event.

5.2 Contextualisation:

The United States has a surprisingly long history of populism. There are two types of American populist, and both originated at approximately the same time. The one type of populist directs its criticism upward, toward “corporate elites and their enablers in
government who have allegedly betrayed the interests of the men and women who do the nation’s essential work” (Kazin, 2016: 17). Furthermore, these populists base their conception of “the people” on class, and they avoid portraying themselves as supporters or opponents of ethnic, or cultural, groups. This type of populist can be broadly identified as a left-wing populist (Kazin, 2016: 17).

The other type of American populist also directs criticism at elites in government and big business for undermining the common people of the U.S. However, where the two diverge is that this type of populist embraces a conceptualisation of the people that is “narrower and more ethnically exclusive” (Kazin, 2016: 17). In terms of the United States, this conceptualisation implied “the people” as citizens of European descent. Following this logic, the type of populist prescribes to the notion that there is a “nefarious alliance” between corrupt elites and the “unworthy” and poor minorities, and that this alliance threatens the values and interests of the patriotic, and white, majority that is caught in the middle (Kazin, 2016: 17). This type of populism can be broadly identified as right-wing populism. Drawing on modern examples, Bernie Sanders can be seen as a populist from the first type, and Donald Trump as an example of the second type.

Both these types emerged during the 1890s; however, they had different origins. The first type, which will be dubbed left-wing for convenience, found its origins in the emergence of a large third political party in the 1890s. Journalists dubbed this new movement the Populist, or People’s, party. This party “powerfully articulated the progressive, civic-nationalist strain of American populism” and it sought to free politics from the influence of money (Kazin, 2016: 18). Most of its figureheads and proponents came from the South and West of the country and focused on the common interests of the labour class in urban and rural areas, while criticising monopolies in finance and industry for “impoverishing” the masses. One can see this in Ignatius Donnelly’s statement in his keynote speech during the party’s founding convention in 1892, “We seek to restore the Government of the Republic to the hands of the ‘plain people’ with whom it originated…” (Kazin, 2016: 18). During that same year, the Populist party’s nominee for president, James Weaver, won twenty-two electoral votes, and the party seemed to be on the verge of winning some states in the South and Great Plains region. However, four years later, the Populist party convention found itself divided, with the majority of the delegates backing the Democratic nominee, William Jennings Bryan, who embraced some of the party’s key proposals. Bryan, however, lost the 1896 election, and
subsequently the Populist party rapidly declined and eventually vanished from the U.S. political landscape (Kazin, 2016: 18).

Right-wing populism emerged during the same period of time as left-wing populism, and it also came into existence due to the concern regarding the inequality between unregulated big business, and small farmers and ordinary workers. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, proponents of right-wing American populism used xenophobic appeals to lobby government to ban all Japanese and Chinese workers from immigrating to the U.S. As Kazin outlines, the overwhelming bulk of this movement consisted of working and middle-class white Americans, with some belonging to struggling labour unions (Kazin, 2016: 19).

Denis Kearny, a small businessman from San Francisco, founded the Workingmen’s Party of California (WPC) in 1877, a prime example of a right-wing populist movement. This titbit of Kearny’s statements provides an example of the kind of rhetoric employed, “bloated aristocracy… rakes the slums of Asia to find the meanest slave on earth - the Chinese coolie - and imports him here to meet the free American in the labor market, and still further widens the breach between the rich and the poor, still further to degrade white labor.” (Kazin, 2016: 19). Kearny’s party quickly gained success, which resulted in the party gaining control of San Francisco and other smaller cities. The party also played a substantial part in rewriting California’s constitution to exclude the Chinese, and to regulate the Central Pacific Railroad, a company that was a titan in the state’s economy (Kazin, 2016: 19). However, just like the Populist party, soon after the success of the WPC, it collapsed under internal conflicts. The party essentially split into two factions. The one followed Kearny and wanted to keep the focus on the “Chinese menace”, while the other faction wanted to shift more focus on government jobs for the unemployed, demands for shorter working days, and higher taxation for the rich (Kazin, 2016: 19). It becomes clear that to some extent Kearny’s party split into the two types of American populism, with Kearny still espousing the right-wing variety.

However, despite the death of this party and a great number more similar to it, right-wing populism seemed to endure with far more tenacity than left-wing populism. Movements such as the Ku Klux Klan and segregationists appeared routinely throughout the 20th century. However, left-wing populism did have a prominent champion in the early 20th century. This champion would be Huey Long, also known by his self-coined nickname “The Kingfish” (Schott, 1986: 133). Long became the governor of Louisiana in 1928, a state plagued by poverty, poor infrastructure, and illiteracy at the time (Schott, 1986: 135). With the Great
Depression starting to develop, Long’s pro-poor message and railings against “big-oil” and “city-slickers” made him an appealing candidate (Schott, 1986: 137). Acts like asking poor farmers for lodging rather than staying at hotels further endeared him to the working class and the poor (Vaughn, 1979: 94). As governor, Long did deliver on his pro-poor message with public infrastructure programs such as a highway program and improvement to ports, creating night schools and cutting tuition expenses for colleges. He also made the first $2000 in assessment tax free, exempting half of Louisiana’s homeowners from property tax (Vaughn, 1979: 100). Long is also notable for being one of the extremely few Southern politicians at the time to not practise “race baiting” 27; many of his policies even benefited the black people of Louisiana (Vaughn, 1979: 99).

However, Long’s political career was not without controversy. His opponents and some in the media called him America’s Hitler, citing perceived Fascist machinations. These criticisms were not unwarranted. Long enacted laws providing him with inordinate control over the militia, police, the Attorney General, and civil service commission. Furthermore, incidents of Long-backed candidates running unopposed were not a rare occurrence. One such incident resulted in violence between angry citizens and the state police (Vaughn, 1979: 98). Long was also connected with criminal elements such as the mafia, inviting infamous mafia boss Frank Costello to bring slot machines to Louisiana (Vaughn, 1979: 95). In 1932, Long became a U.S senator where he continued with his “everyman” persona which was optimised by incidents where he would disrespect or antagonise fellow senators, and even the President (Vaughn, 1979: 96). During that time, he began the Share-our-Wealth movement, which was a precursor to a Share-our-Wealth party and Long’s bid for presidency. However, before this came to fruition, Long was assassinated in 1935 (Lowe, 2008: 239). With Long’s death, the Share-our-Wealth movement fell apart, and no prominent left-wing populist appeared in U.S. politics until Bernie Sanders in the 2016 presidential election.

Right-wing populism had a more sustained history in the U.S. This can be seen with political figures such as George Wallace, whose impact was so great that some describe right-populism in America as Wallace’s “middle American radicalism” (Purdy, 2016: 28). In 1972, supporters of Wallace were in favour of federal spending on middle-class support programs, and they saw themselves as caught between the “overindulgent rich” and “undeserving poor” (Purdy, 2016: 28). Wallace, an Alabama governor, was also a supporter of “segregation

27 Race baiting is the tactic of using rhetoric that stokes up racial hatred for political purposes (Dictionary.com, 2018).
forever” and his campaign helped to promote the future trend within right-wing circles to label anti-poverty programs as ones that benefits “welfare queens” (Purdy, 2016: 28).

It seems that the 2008 financial crisis was the event that ignited the current populist challenge. In the United States, this economic disaster helped the formation of the Tea Party movement on the right of the political spectrum, and the Occupy Wall Street movement on the left of the spectrum (Purdy, 2016: 28). However, the Occupy Wall Street movement quickly fizzled out, while the Tea Party movement grew in influence and strength, up until today where some claim that it forms the core of the Republican party. The Tea Party movement came into existence in 2009, with its initial focus on high taxes, financial bailouts, and federal spending (Jamieson, 2017). Ever since its inception, the Tea Party movement has been a force in the Republican party, as it helped the party gain House seats in the 2010 election (Jamieson, 2017). The movement also helped to propel Herman Cain into the presidential primary race, until issues of sexual harassment caused his campaign to fail (Mercado, 2011). These movements indicate that large parts of the United States population are not satisfied with the way that their government is handling issues, implying a widening gap between the redemptive and pragmatic sides of democracy in the U.S.

5.3 Data on the state of Liberalism:

As with the two previous case studies, the examination of the U.S Liberal Democracy will be conducted in two sections. The first half of this section will discuss the U.S pragmatic side of its Liberal Democracy by looking at its two indicators: support for Liberal values and support for Representative Democracy. The other half of this section will examine the redemptive side of the U.S Liberal Democracy though its two indicators: support for Direct Democracy and satisfaction with the status quo. Identifying a gap between the two sides of the Liberal Democracy of the U.S will provide a potential cause for the populist event.
Just a cursory glance at figure 3 shows one that in the U.S. the support for Liberal values is relatively healthy. The average for all six Liberal values is 77%, which is higher than that found in both the other case studies (67% for Britain and 55% for the Philippines). Therefore, one can tentatively state that the culture of Liberalism is stronger in the United States than in Britain and the Philippines.

Looking at Liberal institutions further reinforces the perception that Liberalism is well-established in the United States. The United States government is divided between the executive, legislature, and judiciary (USA.gov, 2018). The system has extensive checks and balances built into it, with almost every policy or proposed bill by the President needing to be approved by the legislature (USA.gov, 2018). Furthermore, the U.S judiciary has the ability to override any executive action that is deemed unconstitutional. Policy made by the legislature is also subject to extensive debate and must be voted on by its members, who represent their respective constituents (USA.gov, 2018). These extensive measures to check the power of individuals and institutions, and in turn to protect citizens’ freedom and rights, are the cornerstone of Liberal Democracy. However, it may also potentially give rise to gridlock in government, as will be explored in the following pages.

Since 2010, the legislative branch of the United States government has experienced numerous gridlocks and dysfunctions. The height of this dysfunction occurred in 2012, when the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 was passed after its official deadline of December 31, 2012 (Kesselman, 2013). However, as Kesselman states about this act, “… a short-term fix to the self-imposed fiscal crisis” and “… the last-minute agreement simply postponed the day(s) of reckoning for several months” (Kesselman, 2013).

This dramatic instance of gridlock is unfortunately not unique. In April 2011, the government was nearly forced to a halt, which would have entailed stopping all non-essential federal services and furloughing 800 000 federal workers, when Congress refused to pass a budget (Kane, Rucker & Fahrenthold, 2011). Later in the same year, on 2 August, the United States narrowly avoided, by a few hours, defaulting on federal debt when Congress finally agreed to raise the debt ceiling (Kesselman, 2013). Kesselman points to a number of factors that may be contributing to the current dysfunction in the United States government.

Firstly, the gridlock may be influenced by the design of U.S. political systems. The political system of the United States allocates independent powers to the executive and the legislature. For legislation to be passed, it needs to be successfully passed through the two houses of Congress and to be approved by the President (Kesselman, 2013). This division of powers is intended to act as checks and balances on both branches; however, it also enables opposing parties to control the various institutions, which in turn can lead to partisanship which in turn can interfere with the functioning of government. As has been the case since 2008, the Democrats control the Senate and the Presidency, while the Republicans control the House of Representatives. However, as Kesselman rightly points out, this division of power between parties does not guarantee gridlock. For example, during the 1980s, the Republican President, Ronald Reagan, and democratic Speaker of the House, Thomas O’Neill, had an amiable relationship which allowed them to negotiate compromises (Kesselman, 2013). Some point to the personalities of key political figures as a factor which may impact the gridlock. However, as Kesselman argued at the time, President Barack Obama possessed extraordinary oratory talents, and Speaker of the House, John Boehner, displayed an ability to garner support from his party peers even for choices that they found distasteful. As such, arguing that the government dysfunction is due to the failings of political leaders is not convincing (Kesselman, 2013).

Secondly, one factor that does seem to play a convincing role in the dysfunction is the absence of earmarks. Material incentives, or earmarks, previously helped to ease the tension in ideological differences, and caused legislators to negotiate deals across the party line.
These earmarks were authorised expenditures by Congress that were meant for specific local public works projects (Kesselman, 2013). Furthermore, these earmarks allowed legislators to court their constituents with these local projects. However, after pressure from the Tea Party movement, Congress prohibited earmarks. The prohibition of earmarks has lessened legislators’ incentives to reach bipartisan agreements, due to there being no potential reward of constituency favour (Kesselman, 2013). It is tempting to place the blame of government dysfunction on the U.S’ liberal democratic institutions and structure. While the checks and balances that the system provides follow the ideals of Liberal Democracy, they can possibly lead to gridlock, as has been mentioned. However, while the system does allow for this to happen, it seems that this is not the reason why it is happening.

The most heinous factor and primary cause, however, in government dysfunction has been party polarisation, and it seems to be polarisation that is primarily caused by one side. According to Kesselman (2013), the Republican Party is much farther right than the Democratic Party is left, and it seems that the Republican Party is far less willing to compromise than their counterparts. There is merit to this view. Unlike the Republican Party, the Democratic Party has no populist movement that operates within its structures. In 2013, approximately one quarter of the House Republicans were members of the Tea Party Congressional Caucus (Kesselman, 2013). Therefore, the Tea Party’s attitude of no compromise, minimal federal government, and increased taxes, had a significant presence in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives (Jamieson, 2017).

This presence is clearly seen in the obstructionism that Republicans engaged in during President Obama’s two terms. A year into Obama’s presidency, future Republican speaker of the House at the time, John Boehner, said regarding Obama’s agenda, “We're going to do everything — and I mean everything we can do — to kill it, stop it, slow it down, whatever we can” (Barr, 2010). Furthermore, the Republican leader for the Senate, Mitch McConnell, said, “The single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president” (Barr, 2010). This policy of obstructionism resulted in hundreds of bills being blocked, and as of April 2017, approximately sixty-eight presidential nominees were blocked from appointment (Graves, 2017). It also resulted in absurd incidents such as Republican senator, Ted Cruz giving a 21-hour long speech that included readings from Dr Seuss’ works and reading constituents’ tweets (Everett, 2013).
While at a quick glance this speech may seem to have had no rhyme or reason, its true purpose was to be a filibuster\(^{29}\) against a doomed Republican bill for defunding Obamacare. Cruz was essentially delaying the bill being voted down. Furthermore, Ted Cruz’s speech was the longest filibuster in U.S. history (Everett, 2013). However, the delayed bill comprised more than simply a provision to defund Obamacare. The bill’s main purpose was to be a continuing resolution to fund the government; a resolution that needed to be passed within a deadline. Republicans simply added the defunding of Obamacare as an added provision to the continuing resolution (Everett, 2013). Here one can see a clear reason for government dysfunction. Republicans were willing to risk shutting down the government to oppose a policy by Obama. Furthermore, some, such as Ted Cruz, were willing to engage in blatant obstructionism which delayed funding the government.

In a study of political corruption in the United States, Etzioni, highlights various instances of corruption, which he groups into the following categories: *diluting regulation, debilitating restrictions, weakened enforcement, and weakened penalties* (Etzioni, 2014: 11). An instance of corruption in the category of *diluting regulation* would be the weakening of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Act was a reform of corporate governance, and it left the details of the regulations up to the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, after extensive lobbying by the accounting industry, the SEC used a definition of auditing that created a loophole allowing accountants to still engage in practices that had initially been targeted for prohibition (Etzioni, 2014: 11). In 2006, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was even further weakened when rules were revised so that auditors were only required to investigate accounting issues that have a “reasonable possibility” of damaging a company’s finances, rather than investigating when issues have a “more than remote” possibility (Etzioni, 2014: 11). Furthermore, in 2009, small business owners were exempt from confirming “the integrity of their firms’ internal accounting procedures” and the requirement of outside auditing of said procedures (Etzioni, 2014: 11). As Etzioni points out, the dilution of this Act is evident in the fact that its size has decreased from its initial 180 pages, to only 65 (Etzioni, 2014: 11).

An instance of corruption in the *debilitating restrictions* category would be the immense influence that the National Rifle Association (NRA) wields over government. Influenced by the NRA through lobbying and other means, Congress has often limited the Bureau of

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\(^{29}\) A filibuster is a political tactic where one or more members of a legislative body debate a proposed piece of legislation in order to delay or prevent a decision being made on said proposed piece of legislation.
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) ability to enforce gun laws. For example, the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 prohibits the ATF of inspecting gun dealers more than once in a twelve-month period, even if violations are discovered (Etzioni, 2014: 11). Furthermore, in 2003 and 2004, the Tiahrt amendments introduced the following laws, “records from the background checks of gun buyers be destroyed within 24 hours; bar the ATF from requiring gun dealers to conduct inventory checks to monitor gun thefts; and prevent crime gun trace data from being used in court even when a dealer has broken the law” (Etzioni, 2014: 11). One can clearly see that these laws would make it extremely difficult for the ATF to successfully conduct investigations regarding guns. Even worse, Congress has blocked the creation of a computerised database by the ATF, meaning that detectives need to look through countless paper documents to simply trace a firearm to an owner or dealer. Also, at the time that Etzioni was writing his article, Congress had left the ATF without a permanent director for six years (Etzioni, 2014: 11).

On the subject of weakened enforcement, an instance of corruption here would be the Federal Election Commission (FEC)’s weakening ability to enforce campaign finance laws, which is largely due to the three Republican members of the commission who hold a hands-off approach to campaign finance law. From 2006 to 2010, the average fine issued by the FEC decreased from $180 000 to $42 000 (Etzioni, 2014: 12). Some argue that the FEC is so ineffective, because the members of Congress whose campaign activities it needs to monitor, intend it to be so. Studies by Wertheimer and Simon (2013), and Correia (2012), have found that firms contributing finances to members of Congress connected to the SEC and using finances to directly lobby the SEC, are less likely to be subject to SEC enforcement actions and, on average, receive lower penalties (Wertheimer and Simon, 2013) (Correia, 2012: 3).

Weakened penalties tie in to the above-mentioned form of corruption. Weak penalties are often not accidently imposed by regulatory agencies. Instead, this is reflective of second order corruption, which is a term used when individuals charged with fighting corruption are co-opted by other interests. Etzioni provides the following example to illustrate this form of corruption: in 1989, the United States Sentencing Commission created new guidelines for punishing corporate crime, such as fines of up to $364 million being imposed for crimes which would previously merely have received penalties of tens of thousands of dollars (Etzioni, 2014: 12).
These new guidelines, however, came under intense criticism from trade associations and large corporations, and as such, the Commission withdrew the proposed guidelines. Approximately a year later, the Commission proposed revised guidelines that decreased most of the penalties, with some even experiencing a decrease of 97%. Illustrative of the rollback, the $364 million fine was decreased to only $12.6 million (Etzioni, 2014: 12). Lastly, a study by Yu and Yu found that firms involved in fraud, but who had lobbied, were 38% less likely to be picked up by the regulators than those that had not lobbied (Yu & Yu, 2011: 2). These instances of corruption discussed by Etzioni, all highlight various facets of the political corruption within Washington; corruption that has understandably angered and frustrated many citizens.

Table 3.1: Liberal Values in the U.S

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment to Representative Democracy</th>
<th>“Committed”</th>
<th>“Less committed”</th>
<th>“Nondemocratic”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

From table 3.1, one can see that 40% of U.S. citizens are committed to Representative Democracy to some degree, and 46% of citizens are less committed to the system. The number of citizens committed to Representative Democracy is higher than in the other two case studies. Table 3.2 indicates that a significant majority of U.S. citizens (86%) believe that a Representative Democracy is a good form of governance. The U.S. and Britain share similar percentages, with the U.S. only having 2% and 1% advantages in the “Good” and “Bad” sections respectively.

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30 As with the Philippine and British case studies, all the data of the following tables are from the Pew Research Centre’s international study which was conducted in 2017. For the U.S. survey, the data collection was conducted through telephone interviews and the sample size was 1505, with a margin of error of 3% (Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017).
Table 3.2: Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy in the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of representative and direct democracy</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would a democratic system where representatives elected by citizens decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country?</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would a democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country?</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

Considering the two indicators, the researcher will state that the U.S. possesses a moderate pragmatic side. There are significant de facto issues plaguing the U.S. political system. However, support for Representative Democracy and Liberal values is still significantly high. The following section will examine the redemptive side of the U.S.

Table 3.2 shows that a majority of citizens believe that Direct Democracy would be a good system of governance. While this is still lower than the number of people believing the same thing about Representative Democracy, it is higher than Britain’s percentage of 56% and the same as that of the Philippines.

Table 3.3: Satisfaction with the status quo in the U.S:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country</th>
<th>“Not Satisfied”</th>
<th>“Satisfied”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Not Satisfied”</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes & Fetterolf, 2017

Table 3.3 reveals a significant result. A slight majority of U.S. citizens are dissatisfied with the status quo. This is a reversal of Britain’s results, and significantly different from the Philippines case study where 68% of citizens are satisfied with the status quo. As with the British case study, these percentages indicate a polarisation amongst citizens. However, due to the slight majority not being satisfied with the status quo, this indicator will impact positively on the redemptive side.

From the above two indicators, the researcher will state that the U.S. possesses a significant redemptive side. As such, there does seem to be a gap between the U.S pragmatic and
redemptive sides. Canovan would posit that the gap is a result of citizens feeling dissatisfied with the Liberalism component and wanting more popular sovereignty. However, this study suggests that this gap is being caused by the extreme partisanship and obstructionism present in government. It seems that a significant number of U.S. citizens still support Representative Democracy and Liberal values. However the fact remains that a slight majority is dissatisfied with the way the system is working and support for Direct Democracy equals that of the Philippines. Both Britain and the U.S. are well-established Liberal Democracies, but only the U.S. possesses a gap. The most noticeable difference between the two systems at the moment is the absence of extreme partisanship and obstructionism in Britain. Thus, the U.S. gap has not been made by some flaw inherent to Liberal Democracy, but by a flaw unique to the U.S.

5.4 Trump, Populism and the Presidential election:

Now that one has an idea of the history of populism in the United States, the state of its Liberal Democracy, and citizens’ current attitudes towards the government, Donald Trump’s rise to presidency can be explored. On 16 June 16 2015, Trump announced his bid for the presidency during a speech at Trump Tower. Trump was, however, not completely new to the realm of politics. In 1999, Trump had formed a presidential exploratory committee in order to challenge Pat Buchanan for the Reform Party’s nomination spot for President. However, a year later, Trump announced that he had abandoned his bid, blaming “discord” within the party as the reason (CNN, 2017b).

In 2011, in an interview on ABC’s Good Morning America show, Trump questioned whether President Barack Obama had been born in the U.S. (Barbado, 2016). With this statement, Trump became part of the Birther Movement, rhetoric espousing that Obama had been born in Kenya, and which is mostly used by members of the far-right to discredit the U.S’s first black president. Trump’s statement in 2011 was also not a “one-time” thing, as he clung to this theory until the day that he won the presidency. In 2012, Trump stated on Twitter that an “extremely credible source” had called him at his office to tell him that President Obama’s birth certificate was a fraud (Barbado, 2016). Later, in 2014, Trump invited hackers to hack Obama’s college records to check the place of birth (Barbado, 2016). The Birther Movement is closely aligned to right-wing American populism’s notion that the United States only belongs to its citizens of European descent.

Trump displays many of the characteristics of traditional right-wing American populism. However, these characteristics also fulfil the requirements of the Fifth Approach. Like the
populists of earlier decades, Trump has criticised the “global elite” of promoting and forcing “open borders”, allowing immigrants into the United States who steal jobs from American workers, and who drive down workers’ standards of living (Chokshi, 2016). Furthermore, just like previous populists, Trump has chosen specific minority groups, Mexicans and Muslims, to signify this threat from immigrants. In various speeches, Trump has said that Mexican immigrants have brought drugs, rape, and crime to the “peaceful nation” of the United States (Reilly, 2016). On the subject of Muslims, Trump has accused Muslim immigrants of favouring “horrendous attacks by people that believe only in jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human life” (Kazin, 2016: 20). This fulfils the characteristic of a creation of “the people” and of an opposing outgroup.

Furthermore, Trump’s rhetoric against “elites” and the government, and the opposing “people”, creates another outgroup. A particularly dominant line in Trump’s rhetoric was the role of free trade and factory closings in disenfranchising the American white middleclass worker. One can see this narrative in almost all his speeches. Trump repeatedly promised the “return of jobs” to the United States and that no company would be allowed to relocate their factories outside the U.S - something that the government had allowed through their “inept” negotiation of trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

However, one should be cautious when buying into the idea that Trump’s blue-collar narrative was the factor that guaranteed victory. As Walley states, “While Trump made a strong bid for votes in industrial and post-industrial areas through promises to renegotiate trade deals and bring back manufacturing jobs, exit polls from the primaries showed that those who voted for him earned each year an average $72,000, well above the US median yearly income of $56,000” (Walley, 2017: 232). Authors such as Gusterson argue that the media were overzealous in their portrayal of Trump as a “blue-collar billionaire”. Breaking down the demographics of Trump’s votes tells a vastly different story. Trump lost the majority of each race group, except for whites. Trump lost the young but won the majority of people over 45. He won 81% of the white evangelical vote (Gusterson, 2017: 210). Looking at the statistics, it seems that Trump’s win aligns closely to the standard Republican voter base, and therefore is far from the traditional populist ideal. However, one should keep in mind that Trump is an American right-wing populist, and as such, his target audience is the white middleclass, the supposed “true and patriotic Americans”.

112
Examining Trump’s voter demographics and speeches seems to imply two different things. Trump’s support consisted of the “traditional” Republican support base, this being white middleclass, or higher, and evangelicals. This clashes with the “man of the people” rhetoric that is being employed in his speeches, and the image that many media outlets portrayed of him. However, considering right-wing populism in the United States, the demographics and rhetoric still fit. Furthermore, this fits in with Inglehart and Norris’ cultural backlash theory that the majority of populist support can be found in older demographics.

One key factor of Trump’s populist persona was his claim that he was a Washington outsider, a person removed from the dysfunction and corruption that many citizens have attributed to the Capitol, one that would “drain the swamp” (Page & Heath, 2016). Considering the gridlock and extensive lobbying in Washington, this portrayed image was immensely effective, especially when in contrast to the polished, and professional, politicians that he had competed with in the primaries, and eventually in the election (Page & Heath, 2016). Trump’s combative and “unpolished” rhetoric and portrayed image was evident from the beginning of the electoral cycle. In the primary debates against the other Republican National Committee (RNC) candidates, Trump deployed less than conventional tactics.

He often resorted to personal attacks and “name calling”. Examples of these would be Trump calling senators Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, “Little Marco” and “Lyin’ Ted” respectively, and Trump stating to Jeb Bush “You’re trying to build up your energy, Jeb, but it’s not working” (Hampson, 2016). Trump also often “played to the crowd”. On occasions where he was booed, Trump would claim that the event was “papered”, “You know who has the tickets? Donors, special interests. The RNC told us…” (Hampson, 2016). When Trump was later laughed at for his explanation of how he would replace Obamacare, he retorted with, “Part of the reason we have some people laughing (is) you have insurance people that take care of everybody up here” (Hampson, 2016). There was, and is, no evidence to support both these claims, but the millions of people who were watching the debate on television did not know that. Also, Trump would always claim victory after a debate, even if the polls stated otherwise. For example, after the second primary debate, which most polls indicated that Carly Fiorina had won, Trump claimed that, “All the polls seem to say I did very well…” (Hampson, 2016). Lastly, Trump employed other methods, apart from the insults, to belittle his opponents. These would include Trump interrupting other candidates’ speaking turns, calling his opponents by their first names, and never apologizing for his insults. Alternatively, Trump would “apologize” in a way that did not include a direct apology. For example, when
Jeb Bush demanded an apology from Trump for insulting his wife, Trump replied with, “I won’t do that, because I’ve said nothing wrong... But I do hear she's a lovely woman” (Hampson, 2016). For some, these tactics evoked the image of a crude bully, while others saw it as refreshing and a sign that Trump was truly a political outsider who was not afraid to flout political correctness.

Regardless of this, Trump’s tactics seemed to have worked and as a result, his campaign was truly “unsinkable”. No matter how shocking the words or statements were, nothing seemed to have made Trump’s campaign lose momentum. Arguably, the most shocking example of this was the incident of the leaked Access Hollywood tape of Trump and Billy Bush on a bus in 2005. Highlights of this shocking exchange would include Trump saying, “I did try and fuck her. She was married”, “I moved on her like a bitch. But I couldn’t get there. And she was married… she’s now got the big phony tits and everything. She’s totally changed her look” and “I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything... Grab ’em by the pussy. You can do anything” (The New York Times, 2016). These comments by Trump are abhorrent, and one would be hard pressed to find any individual who would be able to defend them. Despite this, Trump still managed to win the primaries convincingly: with 97% of votes counted, Trump held 53.2% of the votes, with his closest competitor only having 36.7% (Collinson, 2016).

However, it also should be kept in mind that the Republican primaries were quite extraordinary, a running theme with the presidential elections as a whole. The Republican primaries started on 23 March 2015, when Ted Cruz announced his bid for the presidency. From 23 March 23 to 29 July 29, sixteen individuals, excluding Ted Cruz, announced that they would enter the Republican primaries (Bialik, 2016). To put this in perspective, the Democratic Party’s primaries consisted of only three individuals (CNN, 2016b). Even looking at the Republican primaries of 2012, the process consisted of only seven individuals running (CNN, 2012). This immense number of people running for the primaries undoubtedly provided Trump with a better chance of winning. Votes were divided amongst numerous candidates, and only looking at the top three candidates, one can see this clearly. Marco Rubio received 3.5 million votes, Ted Cruz received 7.3 million votes, and John Kasich received 3.8 million votes (Bialik, 2016).

From February to June 2016, the primaries were conducted in virtually every state of the U.S., with numerous primary candidates exiting the race as their campaigns sank. At the end
of June, Trump won the primaries with a total of 13.3 million votes (Doran, 2016). While it is indeed an impressive number of votes, (so much so that it still numbers most votes in the history of Republican primaries) there is still a caveat. While Trump received an impressive number of votes, he also achieved the record of being the Republican candidate with the most votes cast against him in the history of the party (Doran, 2016). Furthermore, he is one of a handful of modern Republican candidates who have received less than half the primary votes (Doran, 2016). Considering that, together, the top three contenders received almost 15 million votes, one can state that the divided nature of the Republican primaries indeed helped Trump.

Now with Trump in office, there have been interesting developments, especially regarding how Americans view him and the trajectory of their country. According to a Pew survey, the majority of citizens - 64% of respondents - believe that wealthy people will gain influence with Trump as president. 8% of respondents believe that they will lose influence, and 27% expect the influence of the wealthy to stay the same (Pew Research Centre, 2017a). There are only three other groups whom the majority of respondents believe will gain influence under Trump’s presidency. These are whites, (51% believe this); men (51% of respondents believe this); and conservative Christians, (52% of respondents stating that this group will gain influence) (Pew Research Centre, 2017a). These groups all form the traditional Republican base, and it seems to indicate that many citizens see Trump as a continuation of Republican practices, rather than as a populist outsider (Pew Research Centre, 2017a).

Pew Research Centre’s study on the public’s view of Trump also offers interesting details. In February 2017, President Trump’s job approval rating was 39%. By April, this approval rating had remained the same. This percentage is especially abysmal when compared to previous presidents. President Barack Obama’s job approval rating, in February 2009, was 64%, and in April it had dropped slightly to 61%. The previous Republican president, George W. Bush, had a job approval rating of 53% in February 2001, and in April it had slightly increased to 55%. Once again, Trump’s low approval rating clashes with the mass support that one would traditionally associate with a populist (Pew Research Centre, 2017b). However, it does fit with the Fifth Approach and the creation of an artificial group of true citizens.

Dividing the statistics into various demographics provides a deeper insight into President Trump’s low approval ratings. According to gender, 48% of men approve of “the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president”, and only 33% of women approve of the same thing.
(Pew Research Centre, 2017b). According to race, the differences are stark: 50% of white respondents approve of Donald Trump’s handling of his job, while only 14% of black, and 17% of Hispanics, approve of that (Pew Research Centre, 2017b). According to age, the data suggests that older respondents view Trump more favourably, with 48% of respondents aged 50-64 approving of Trump’s handling of the presidency, and 46% of respondents aged 65 plus believing the same thing. However, for respondents aged 18-29, the approval rating is only 30%, and for those aged 30-49 the approval rating is 35%. According to education, the data indicates that the more highly educated segments of American society tend to view Trump less favourably. Only 26% and 39% of postgraduate and college-educated respondents, respectively, indicated that they approved of President Trump’s job performance. 39% and 44% of respondents with some college and High School education or less, respectively, indicated that they approved (Pew Research Centre, 2017b). Thus, Donald Trump’s most ardent supporters can be found in the demographic of older white males with a “low level” of education. However, even in these groups, Trump still does not garner the majority of support. This is in stark contrast to Duterte’s impressive trust rating of 91% amongst the Filipinos.

Trump’s abysmal approval ratings may be indicative of the manner of his win of the presidency. If one reviews the statistics, one sees that Trump’s votes were concentrated in certain areas and communities. Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, won almost all the states on both coasts of the U.S., home to its biggest metropolises (CNN, 2016c). These areas are traditionally centres of power for democrats, and it comes as no surprise that Clinton won these. The areas of contention were, however, the Rust Belt and Florida (CNN, 2016c). The Rust Belt consists of states such as Michigan, which find themselves in the area from the Great Lakes to the upper Midwest States that lie on the border of Canada. This once industrial powerhouse area gained the moniker of “Rust Belt” due to the de-industrialisation, population loss, and overall economic downturn that it has experienced since the 90s (Feyrer et al, 2007: 1).

However, recently there have been signs of improvement in the Rust Belt. There has been an increase in jobs, especially in manufacturing jobs, as big factories such as large automobile factories in Detroit are churning out products. Unfortunately, despite this increase in jobs, the manufacturing jobs of old, with a salary of $30 an hour, have not returned (Long, 2017). Some argue that this is due to mechanisation as jobs are being replaced by robots; while others, such as Trump, argue that the jobs have been outsourced to Mexico, China, and an
assortment of other nations. Regardless of the cause, as one CEO of a small manufacturing business in Detroit stated, “There's kind of this quiet depression that's going on…. People are OK, they're getting by, but no one's really in their happy place” (Long, 2017).

This “quiet depression” was a key reason for Trump’s winning the Rust Belt. In Trump’s campaigning of Michigan, he promised good jobs, something that allowed him to win the state by 10 704 votes. This feat made him the first Republican candidate to win the state since George H.W Bush in 1988 (CNN, 2017b). However, promising jobs is hardly a tactic rife with populism and revivalist rhetoric; it is a promise that virtually all politicians make in their careers. There are however some examples of Trump’s rhetoric, connected with the prospects of jobs, that were somewhat unique, and which did help with winning the state. This would be Trump’s promise that he would get out of the TPP deal with Asia, as well as renegotiate or withdraw from the NAFTA agreement (CNN, 2017b). As CNN reported, in a week of interviews in Michigan, almost every individual stated that they believed that deals like NAFTA have caused the decrease in wages and the decrease in available manufacturing jobs (CNN, 2017b).

Trump’s win of Florida was another key factor in his winning the presidency. The win was by no means easy, with Trump narrowly beating Clinton with approximately 110 000 votes, in a state where both had votes of 4 million plus (Caputo & Cheney, 2016). Trump’s win in Florida was a reflection of what was happening on the national stage as well: despite the fact that Trump lost by big margins in diverse urban areas, he dominated in every other area of a state and outperformed previous Republican candidates regarding the older, white and blue-collar vote (Caputo & Cheney, 2016). The white vote was a key factor for Trump in this state, and many others. The white vote heavily trended towards Trump and considering that this group provided 64% of the whole state’s voter registration roll, it provided the bulk of Trump’s support and counteracted the overwhelming support by Hispanics and blacks for Clinton (Caputo & Cheney, 2016).

It was these two wins, Florida and the Rust Belt which secured the presidency for Trump. However, one should keep in mind that Trump lost the “popular vote”, which means that he gained fewer overall votes than Clinton. On the national stage, Clinton gained 65,853,516 (48.5%) votes, while Trump only garnered 62,984,825 (46.4%) votes (CNN, 2016a). This fact was a point of confusion for many outside the United States, and also for many of its citizens. Trump’s win was due to his winning the Electoral College. The Electoral College is
a system whereby a candidate is awarded a certain number of seats for the College, for every state they win. A candidate needs to garner the threshold of 270 Electoral College seats to win. The seats vary from state to state, with the primary determining factor being the population of the states (Moody, 2016). For example, California has most seats (55) and the highest population of any state in the United States. On the other hand, there are a number of states that only have 3 seats, and who have relatively small populations, such as Delaware and Montana (Moody, 2016). Through winning certain strategic states, Trump managed to win 306 Electoral College votes, with Clinton only winning 232 (Moody, 2016).

5.5 Analysis:

Trump’s win hardly inspires a populist image. Instead, it seems to be a close victory which was won through a mixture of luck and strategic campaigning, similar to the Leave Campaign of Brexit. From the previous analysis of populist elements in Trump’s rhetoric, it is hard to dispute that populism did not help in this close victory. However, to argue that Trump won due to rising populist elements in the United States, born out of the gap between redemptive and pragmatic democracy, is a complex and almost far-reaching task, no matter how tempting it is to ascribe it to Trump’s overt use of populist rhetoric.

There are, however, some facts that one can discern. Firstly, corruption and lobbying are significant issues in the United States. Secondly, citizens of the U.S. have an unfavourable view of their federal government, and of how the rich in their society are being advantaged. Thirdly, there are parts of American society that have experienced a loss of jobs, especially in the manufacturing sector, and people living in these parts often attribute it to unfair trade deals and job outsourcing. These factors all imply that, to an extent, the redemptive and pragmatic sides of democracy have indeed drifted apart, and that failings are present in the American political system. As section 5.2.1 showed, support for Liberal values is robust in U.S. society and its formal institutions follow the ideals of Liberal Democracy. However, there are significant real-world issues facing the U.S. government, and support for the government is at an all-time low. All these factors are indicative of a society where the redemptive qualities of Liberal Democracy are in abundance, while the pragmatic aspects are lacking.

Examining Trump’s speeches reveals glimpses of traditional U.S. right-wing populist rhetoric. Trump’s campaign speech in Wisconsin is a prime example. He makes references to previous crucial points he had made, “Last week, I laid out my plan to bring jobs back to our
country.... Yesterday, I laid out my plan to defeat Radical Islamic Terrorism” before ‘outlying’ the focus for this speech, “Tonight, I am going to talk about how to make our communities safe again from crime and lawlessness” (Politico, 2016). As one can see, these focus points all deal with issues that right-wing populists focus on: jobs and economic security, security from outside threats, and law and order. One can also see that Trump is focusing on salient issues that will provide him with the most traction with his crowd: jobs, terrorism and crime.

Then as a jab at his opponent, Hillary Clinton, Trump states that, “Just like Hillary Clinton is against the miners, she is against the police. You know it, and I know it” and “Those peddling the narrative of cops as a racist force in our society – a narrative supported with a nod by my opponent – share directly in the responsibility for the unrest in Milwaukee, and many other places within our country… They have fostered the dangerous anti-police atmosphere in America” (Politico, 2016). Here Trump attempts to paint Clinton as someone who is set against the innocent police, and whose actions and words have only worsened the situation. Trump’s use of “they” in the above quote implicates not only his opponent, but also the Washington establishment.

This rhetoric is ratcheted up to the verge of conspiracy with the words “they have fostered the dangerous anti-police atmosphere in America” (Politico, 2016). In contrast, Trump states about himself that “I care too much about my country to let that happen” and that “We all care too much about our country to let that happen” (Politico, 2016). Thus, conveying that he is a true patriot of the country and that just like the people, he wishes the best for his country. To optimise this contrast between Trump and “the people”, and Clinton and “the elite”, Trump states that “It’s easy for Hillary Clinton to turn a blind eye to crime when she has her own private security force…. I believe all Americans, not just the powerful, are entitled to security” (Politico, 2016). This separation of the “ruling elite” and “the people” is quite clear throughout Trump’s campaign. This is optimised by the speech he gave a few days before Election Day regarding changes in ethics he would make as president, especially regarding lobbying. It was in this speech that he first used the, now famous, catchphrase “drain the swamp” (Meyer, 2017). The “swamp” refers to the “corrupt” Washington establishment that is controlled through lobbying by large corporations.

The above-mentioned distinction between “the people” and “the swamp” was not the only populist dichotomy that Trump created. As was mentioned in section 5.3, Trump made two
dichotomies. “The people” against the establishment, and “the people” against immigrants. Added to the above creation of true citizens and opposing groups, on a scale Trump also clearly lands on the opposite end to Liberal cosmopolitan values. As has been explored earlier, Trump made numerous crude comments during his campaign. Furthermore, he made numerous comments deriding international trade treaties and immigration, claiming that some trade treaties such as NAFTA were “hurting the United States”, and calling for measures such as banning all Muslims from entering the country and building a wall on the border with Mexico (Diamond, 2016).

Lastly, as with Duterte and Farage to a lesser extent, Trump has fostered an image of machismo through crude and vulgar comments framing him as simply talking like the “everyman” and shirking political correctness. This ties in with populists positioning themselves on the opposite side of the Liberal cosmopolitan values scale. As mentioned in section 5.3, the epitome of Trump’s machismo image was the infamous Access Hollywood bus incident. However, Trump’s response to the backlash paints an equally illuminating image of the “everyman” persona he is trying to portray. Trump called the things he had said on the tape “locker room talk” (Diaz, 2016). He used this explanation three times when asked to comment on the tape. When asked during a presidential debate Trump said, "I don't think you understood what was - this was locker room talk. I'm not proud of it. I apologize to my family. I apologize to the American people. Certainly I'm not proud of it. But this is locker room talk" (Diaz, 2016). Trump defended his words by claiming that he had simply been talking like “one of the boys”; that this was a normal conversation between men in a private setting. This sparked an intense, but short-lived, debate about whether this was indeed “locker room talk”, with some men defending Trump and others stating that men do not and should not talk like that to each other, even in a private setting.

In one response to the backlash, Trump quickly switched to another subject that fostered a machismo image. When asked about the incident again in a debate he responded with, “Yes, I'm very embarrassed by it. I hate it. But it's locker room talk, and it's one of those things. I will knock the hell out of ISIS. We're going to defeat ISIS. ISIS happened a number of years ago in a vacuum that was left because of bad judgment. And I will tell you, I will take care of ISIS” (Diaz, 2016). Here one can see Trump switching from his locker room defence to “knocking the hell” out of ISIS. He moves from being an “everyman” to the “strongman” that will simply beat ISIS through brute force. This is similar to Duterte’s use of rhetoric to foster an “everyman”, and “strongman”, image.
Since Trump has attained the office of the presidency, he has shown tendencies that lean worryingly towards authoritarianism. The most notable of these tendencies is his stance towards most of the news media in the United States. He routinely calls any outlet that publishes a negative article about him and his government “fake news” (Collinson, 2017). Trump also made the off-hand comment in public that “It's frankly disgusting the way the press is able to write whatever they want to write, and people should look into it” (Collinson, 2017). Furthermore, after an NBC report about how Trump had stated that he wanted to increase the U.S. nuclear arsenal tenfold, he tweeted that “Network news has become so partisan, distorted and fake that licenses must be challenged and, if appropriate, revoked. Not fair to public!” (Collinson, 2017). It is common knowledge that authoritarians attempt, and often succeed, in controlling the news media in order to curb any negative coverage and to promote propaganda. However, at the moment, Trump has only displayed the rhetoric that forms a part of this. The U.S. has extensive checks and balances that prohibit Trump from taking any steps towards going that far.

Trump has also shown a propensity for propaganda, another well-known tool in the authoritarian arsenal. A famous example of this would be Trump’s insistence that his inauguration crowd was larger than it was. This went as far as Trump’s then spokesman, Sean Spicer, claiming in a press briefing that the 2017 inauguration was “the largest audience to ever witness an inauguration, period, both in person and around the globe” (Abrams, 2018). Despite the fact that there was existing photographic evidence proving that this was not the case, Trump and Spicer stood by their claim. Trump’s presidency has been littered with incidents where officials have claimed that there are “alternative facts”31 to things that seem to be clearly false, and where Trump has made claims that are clearly false32. Furthermore, Trump has praised numerous authoritarian figures, figures such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping from China, and even this study’s Rodrigo Duterte (Collinson, 2017).

While Trump has clearly shown authoritarian tendencies, and admiration for fully fledged authoritarians, the U.S. checks and balances are strong enough to stop him from acting out on these tendencies. Examples of this would be multiple U.S. district judges blocking Trump’s

31 The term “alternative facts” sprang into the U.S. national consciousness when Kellyanne Conway, a White House councillor, stated during an NBC interview that Sean Spicer was using “alternative facts” to support his spurious claim regarding the inauguration crowd (Cummings, 2018).

32 The fact that Politifact has 10 pages, 3 of them since he took office, of false claims that he made, showcases Trump’s disregard for the truth (Politifact, 2018).
decision to end DACA. The DACA program protects immigrants, who were illegally brought to the U.S. as children, from deportation (Levine, 2018). Multiple Federal Judges have also blocked Trump’s proposed travel ban (Zapotosky, 2017). The first version of the ban targeted virtually all Muslim majority countries. Subsequent revisions changed this, however, Federal Judges successfully blocked the third revised version as well (Zapotosky, 2017). While these actions by the President are not necessarily authoritarian, the pushback by the judicial branch showcases that there are robust checks in place if authoritarian actions were to take place.

From the above, it is clear that Trump is a populist. However, this does not necessarily mean that Trump’s win could be attributed to a rise in populist sentiment in the general population. One should also keep in mind the extensive meddling by Russia in the presidential elections, as well as the significant issues that plagued Clinton’s campaign, and the prevalence of fake news stories on social media. Without these three factors, the likelihood that Trump would have won the presidency is extremely low. Therefore, Trump winning the presidency presents a unique case. It is clear that he used populist rhetoric; however, it can be strongly argued that without a number of external factors removed from populism, Trump would not have won the presidency. The following section will examine these other factors which contributed to Trump’s winning the presidency.

There are other factors that also contributed to Trump’s win, which are, for the most part external, but which should be examined nonetheless. During the election, there were incidents of hacking of political officials - virtually exclusively those from Clinton’s campaign. This hacking led to Wikileaks making tens of thousands of emails public. With many in the public, especially those on the right, still fixated on Clinton’s “email scandal” and Benghazi, this did little to help her public image (Iacob, 2016). For the sake of clarity, the email scandal will be quickly discussed. On 13 January 2009, a private email domain (clintonemail.com) was registered for Ms Clinton by one of her aides. This was done on the same day that she was undergoing confirmation hearings for her appointment to Secretary of State. Individuals who received email accounts under this private domain included Ms Clinton, her husband, former president Bill Clinton, her daughter Chelsea, and a number of aides (Iacob, 2016).

On 11 September 2012, Islamic militants attacked a U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, and as a result, a U.S. ambassador and three other U.S. citizens were killed. Subsequently, several committees and investigations were launched to ascertain why and how
it had happened, with particular focus on gaps in security leading up to the incident (CNN, 2018). The investigations included committee hearings, such as one where Ms Clinton was questioned for six hours about every conceivable aspect of the Benghazi attacks (Iacob, 2016). For many Republicans, however, these hearings and investigations were not enough, and they demanded the formation of a new House-select committee.

In August 2014, the State Department provided the new committee with 15 000 pages of documents pertaining to the Benghazi incident. Examining the documents, the committee noticed eight emails to or from Ms Clinton. It was noted that some of these emails had been sent from private email accounts, while the origins of others could not be identified (The Select Committee of Benghazi, 2016). Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated Clinton and her aides’ use of her private email service, which revealed “salacious” details such as a private email server in the basement of Ms Clinton’s home, and the deletion of a number of emails by her aides (Iacob, 2016).

This resulted in a media frenzy, in which speculation was thrown about whether the use of her private email violated State Department rules, and whether, through the use of this private email, Ms Clinton had disclosed classified information (Iacob, 2016). On 28 June 2015, the Benghazi committee concluded their investigation and stated that there was no evidence of culpability on the part of Clinton for the Benghazi attacks (The Select Committee of Benghazi, 2016). Despite this, the FBI investigation continued until only days before the election, and concerns over her trustworthiness persisted.

Coupled with these issues regarding the public image of Trump’s opponent, multiple intelligence agencies reported, on 6 January 2017, that there was extensive intervention by Russia into the presidential election. This intervention was, however, not a one-time thing, with intelligence agencies reporting a long-running information war that included activities such as hacked private emails, and social media campaigns used to smear its enemies and to sow false information. Furthermore, the report stated that, “Putin and the Russian government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavourably to him…” (Shane, 2017). Nowhere was this clearer than the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and of Clinton’s emails, and those of her aides, Throughout her campaign, Clinton’s staff were hacked, and the emails were subsequently leaked, often by WikiLeaks. As the intelligence agencies, which included the FBI, CIA, and NSA, reported, the Russian government’s “main
military intelligence unit, the G.R.U., created a ‘persona’ called Guccifer 2.0 and a website, DCLeaks.com, to release the emails of the Democratic National Committee and of the chairman of the Clinton campaign, John D. Podesta” (Sanger, 2017). Furthermore, when these leaks did not seem to gain enough attention, the G.R.U “relayed material it acquired from the D.N.C. and senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks…” (Sanger, 2017). Despite these emails not containing anything more damning than the standard machinations of election politics, segments were taken out of context and Clinton’s integrity and trustworthiness were continuously questioned, and as it seems, considering that Trump won the presidency, Russia’s information war was successful.

The hacking of the United States’ elections ties into Zakaria, and Pabst’s view that Liberal Democracy is being threatened by illiberal forces, or as Zakaria would put it, “illiberal democracies”. However, Clinton argues that this was not only done to attack the United States, and the state of its democracy, it was also done due to a personal grudge that Putin holds against her. According to Clinton, Putin has never forgiven her for her comments in 2011, as the then Secretary of State, that the parliamentary elections in his country had been rigged (Chozick, 2016). As Clinton said in a speech, months after her loss in the election, “Putin publicly blamed me for the outpouring of outrage by his own people, and that is the direct line between what he said back then and what he did in this election” (Chozick, 2016). Regardless of whether the meddling was largely due to a personal vendetta, the fact remains that the elections of a major Liberal Democracy were undermined by a nation that Zakaria would label as an “illiberal democracy”.

Russia’s meddling in the elections is closely linked to another significant factor in the elections - the proliferation of “fake news” on social media sites. Facebook and other social media platforms possess a dramatically different structure from other media technologies. One significant difference is that users can relay content between each other without any “significant third party filtering, fact-checking, or editorial judgment” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017: 211). This becomes more worrisome, when one considers that users can reach an audience as big, or larger, than any other traditional news media outlet such as CNN or The New York Times. Social media playing a large role in this populist incident echoes the roles that social media played in the other two case studies.

Recent studies have shown that 62% of adults in the United States obtain their news from social media (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016: 2). Secondly, many people state that they believe
fake news stories when they see them (Silverman & Singer-Vine 2016: 4). Thirdly, the most popular fake news stories were more widely shared on Facebook than mainstream news stories. Lastly, the most popular fake news stories tended to favour Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton (Silverman 2016: 3).

Allcott and Gentzkow’s (2017) study confirm this favouritism of Trump. Their database contains 115 pro-Trump fake news stories that were shared on Facebook approximately 30 million times, while there are only 41 pro-Clinton fake news stories which were shared approximately 7.6 million times (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017: 212). Furthermore, their study uncovers that the average U.S. adult saw and remembered 1.14 fake news stories. Regarding their list of fake news sites, on which slightly more than half the stories are false, these sites received 159 million hits during the month of the election. Examples of fake news stories would be, for example, the widely shared article from the site denverguardian.com. The headline of this article was “FBI agent suspected in Hillary email leaks found dead in apparent murder-suicide” (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 212).

Another example of a fake news story would be the website, wtoe5news.com, reporting that Pope Francis had endorsed Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy. As Allcott and Grentzkow point out, on the “about” section of the website, it states that it is “a fantasy news site” and that “Most articles on wtoe5news.com are satire or pure fantasy” (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 214). However, this disclaimer was not included in the article regarding Pope Francis’ apparent endorsement. A worrisome detail, considering that the article was shared more than a million times on Facebook, and that some of the respondents in Allcott and Grentzkow’s study reported seeing it (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 214). Both sites, wtoe5news.com and denverguardian.com, are now defunct. This is by no means unusual, as most fake news sites tend to have short lifespans, and many of the prominent sites during the election cycle have now vanished (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 217).

The motivations, and individuals, behind these sites are varied. Investigations by the Guardian and Buzzfeed revealed that more than a hundred fake news sites were being run by teenagers in the small town of Veles, in Macedonia. The site, Endingthefed.com, was run by a 24-year old Romanian man (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 217). Endingthefed.com was responsible for four of the ten most widely shared fake news stories on Facebook. There are also U.S.-based companies and owners, such as Disinfomedia that own numerous fake news sites and employ, according to claims, as many as twenty-five writers; as well as Paul Horner,
a U.S. citizen who owned a fake news site, National Report, for years prior to the start of the election (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 217).

According to Allcott and Grentzkow (2017), one can discern two reasons why individuals are engaged in this. Firstly, this is done for monetary gain. Fake news articles that “go viral” can produce large sums of advertising revenue. The teenagers in the small town in Macedonia produced fake news stories about both candidates in the presidential race, and it earned them tens of thousands of dollars (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 217). The Romanian man behind Endingthefed.com claimed that he had started the site to help Donald Trump’s campaign. Paul Horner created pro-Trump fake news stories for profit, despite being opposed to him. There are even some creators, and suppliers of right-wing fake news stories who, identifying themselves as left-wing, wanted to embarrass those on the right for credulously circulating, “obviously”, false stories (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 217). No matter what the motivations of these individuals are, it seems to be clear that it did play a role in the 2016 Presidential elections.

Allcott and Grentzkow, however, urge some caution in seeing the role of fake news as one that significantly altered the course of the elections. For their study, they “consider the number of stories voters read regardless of whether they believed them… do not account for diminishing returns, which could reduce fake news effect to the extent that a small number of voters see a large number of stories… rough calculation does not explicitly take into account the fact that a large share of pro-Trump fake news is seen by voters who are already predisposed to vote for Trump” (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 232). As they admit, their database is incomplete and it does not fully explore the impact that fake news stories can have on an individual’s potential vote (Allcott & Grentzkow, 2017: 232).

These are all factors that need to be considered when viewing Trump’s rise to presidency: his opponent’s extensive image issues and the fact that a foreign power meddled in the nation’s election with the purpose of helping him be elected. Looking at the overall picture of Trump’s win, one is hard-pressed to attribute it to populism and the failings of Liberal Democracy. There are too many significant variables that coalesced, similar to Brexit, to state that populism and failings within Liberal Democracy caused Trump’s victory.

5.7 Conclusion:
The United States has a long history of populism, since it was one of the first nations to experience “modern populism”. Despite its more than 100 year-long history of populism, the
ideology never achieved any lasting mainstream success. Although the United States has a long history of populism, it has an even longer history of Liberal Democracy. This has culminated in a robust presence of Liberal Democracy within the political system and society. The United States is, however, not without its problems. Currently, public confidence in and support of the government are at an all-time low, with extensive gridlock and corruption being the two most prominent issues. Furthermore, certain areas of the U.S are experiencing a significant economic downturn. Coincidentally, these are areas that Trump focused on and where the majority of his base can be found. The 2016 presidential election saw Donald Trump winning despite not being able to capture the popular vote. This fact runs counter to the notion of populism’s supposed appeal to the masses. However, as the Fifth Approach outlines, populists create “the people”. As such, their support need not come from the masses.

The application of the Fifth Approach also revealed that Donald Trump can be classified as a populist. Trump meets all the criteria; through his rhetoric it is evident that he espouses values that are on the opposite end of Liberal cosmopolitan values. Trump also created the dichotomy of common Americans against the various “other” groups, such as Washington elites and illegal immigrants. Looking at the four indicators associated with Liberal Democracy and its two sides, this study concludes that there was indeed a gap between the redemptive and pragmatic sides of the U.S. This is a significant finding due to the fact that it has been the only case study to show a notable gap in its Liberal Democracy. However, despite the presence of a gap in the U.S Liberal Democracy, the case study analysis shows that there were too many significant variables, outside of populism and Liberal Democracy, to support the presumptive hypothesis that Trump’s win was due to an imbalance between the two sides of its Liberal Democracy.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1: Introduction

The appearance of populism in various Liberal Democracies in 2016 sparked concern that there was an internal flaw in this globally dominant political system. As was discussed in Chapter 2, there are various theories regarding the nature of this flaw and how it connects with populism. This study chose to focus on, and utilize, Canovan’s approach to Liberal Democracy and how it ties in to populism. This approach entails that Liberal Democracy has two sides: a pragmatic and redemptive side. Furthermore, these two sides coincide with how Liberal Democracy consists of Liberalism and the concept of popular sovereignty. Populism comes into play when the gap between these two sides grows too large and populists prey on the grievances that citizens have with this. Four indicators were chosen to help identify the gap. Two indicators measured support for Liberal values and Representative Democracy, while the other two measured support for Direct Democracy and satisfaction with the status quo. More support for Liberal values and Representative Democracy would positively impact on the Pragmatic side. More support for Direct Democracy and less satisfaction with the status quo would positively impact on the Redemptive side. Canovan’s theory and the four indicators were, however, not sufficient to adequately explore the populist events. A Fifth Approach was created to identify accurately whether the populist individuals, and movements, were indeed populist. This Fifth Approach incorporated shared characteristics from various approaches to populism and Inglehart and Norris’ (2016) Liberal cosmopolitan values concept. Thus, a populist creates a concept of “the people” and an opposing group/s; focuses on issues that are salient to their environment; and espouses values that can be found on the opposite side of a spectrum to Liberal cosmopolitan values.

Three case studies were chosen for this study: Rodrigo Duterte winning the presidency in the Philippines; the Leave Campaign winning the Brexit vote; and Donald Trump winning the presidency in the U.S. These three events were chosen for the national levels of success they attained, the time-frame in which they occurred, and the differences between the nations. Choosing a case study design allowed for flexibility in the application of the two theoretical concepts, and for the exploration of other significant factors that may have influenced the chosen events.

This chapter will first conduct a brief comparative analysis of the three case studies. Thereafter, the research question will be answered. Following that, issues that this study encountered, and further areas of research, will be discussed.
6.2 Comparative Analysis:

As with the other two case studies, one can potentially argue that a crisis of representation helped Trump win the presidency. Looking at the data, it seems that this may have indeed been the case. In 2000, the voter turnout was 56.6% (Wallace, 2016). This percentage is even lower than Britain’s record low voter turnout of 59.4% in 2001 (BBC, 2001). In 2004, the voter turnout rose to 62.1% (Wallace, 2016). For comparison, in 2005, the voter turnout in Britain was 61.3% (BBC, 2005). In 2008, the voter turnout rose slightly to 63.7% (Wallace, 2016). As was discussed in section 4.4, Britain’s voter turnout significantly rose to 65.1% in 2010 (BBC, 2010). As one can see, both nations had experienced an upward trend in voter turnout since 2000. However, after the 2008 elections, the U.S. deviated from this trend. In 2012, the voter turnout dropped to 60%, while Britain’s turnout rose further to 66.2% in 2015 (Wallace, 2016) (BBC, 2015). The U.S voter turnout in 2016 remained almost the same at 61.4%33, while in 2017, Britain’s turnout rose further to 69.1% (File, 2017) (BCC, 2017). As one can see from this, it seems that the U.S. is indeed suffering from a crisis of representation. The U.S. has only slightly recovered from its dismal turnout in 2000, and unlike Britain, there is no indication of a continuous upward trend. Considering the dysfunction in government and the citizens’ displeasure with this, it should maybe come as no surprise that this is occurring.

There are a number of similarities one can draw between the U.S. and British case studies. As was stated, both possessed numerous factors that all seemed to have contributed to the supposed populist incident. Both, the Leave Campaign and Trump won by extremely close margins. This dispels the narrative that appeared in 2016 that populism was experiencing a significant upsurge. Furthermore, the majority of Trump’s and the Leave Campaign’s votes came from older and “less educated” demographics. This supports Inglehart and Norris’ cultural backlash theory. The leaders, and main proponents, of the two campaigns were indeed populist, as was identified by the Fifth Approach. However, this does not necessarily entail that their victory could be assigned to populism. As was stated, there were various other factors that had an impact. In the case of Trump and the U.S; it was Russian meddling, fake news, and an opponent who was beset with issues. In the case of Brexit and the Leave Campaign; it was a longstanding negative attitude towards immigration present in parts of

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33 It should be noted that the United States Census Bureau states that 2012’s voter turnout was 61.8% (File, 2017). Seeing slight deviations in percentages, from different sources, for voter turnout is common. These differences are caused by the usage of different methods for the collection of data and its analysis.
British society, a worsening relationship between Britain and the EU due to the Eurozone and Immigrant crises, and an opposing campaign that was uncoordinated.

There are, however, also some differences between the two case studies of the U.S. and Britain. While both nations possess significant presences of Liberal values in their societies, the U.S. does possess a stronger presence by 10%. Furthermore, the U.S. possesses more robust formal Liberal institutions than Britain, with the U.S. possessing independent institutions that act as checks and balances on each other while Britain is more susceptible to one group dominating due to its legislature and executive being connected. On the other hand, it seems that there is a greater displeasure with the government in the U.S. than in Britain. Confidence in the U.S. government is at an all-time low, while in Britain its mainstream incumbent party has increased its share of votes since 2015. This is to be expected, considering that dysfunction in the U.S. government is far more pronounced than in Britain, with extreme partisanship, gridlock, and obstructionism becoming an ever-present feature. Another aspect that ties into this is the prospect of a crisis of representation and its potential effect on populism. However, each of the three case studies provided different results. The Philippines is experiencing no crisis of representation, with voter turnout continuously growing. It seems that Britain is also not experiencing a crisis of representation. While it is true that Britain had a significantly low voter turnout in 2000, it has been consistently increasing since then. On the other hand, the U.S. had a low voter turnout and there has been no sign of an upward trend. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the section of the study dealing with Liberal Democracy indicates that Britain’s pragmatic side has a moderate to significant presence, while the U.S only has a moderate presence. The mixed results, along with voter turnout, and the prospect of a crisis of representation, also cast doubt on the argument by authors such as Laclau that populism is caused by this crisis of representation.

The Philippines seems to be the “odd one out” out of the three case studies. Support for Liberal values in its society is far lower than was the case with the other two case studies: 55% in the Philippines against 67% and 77% in Britain and the United States respectively. On the subject of formal Liberal Democratic institutions, the Philippines has a system similar to the U.S. However, as with the U.S., there are de facto issues that are plaguing the system. Support for Representative Democracy is also lower than that found in Britain and the U.S. Also, despite the extensive issues that the Philippines faces in its political system, a significant majority of citizens are satisfied with the status quo. Therefore, it seems that both
aspects of Liberal Democracy are underdeveloped in the Philippines. This is an expected observation, considering that the Philippines has a far shorter history of Liberal Democracy than the other two countries featured in the case studies. Furthermore, even with its short history of Liberal Democracy, the Philippines has had far more extensive experience with populism during its current run as a Liberal Democratic nation than the other two nations. The Philippines has already had a populist head of state, and during the 2016 presidential elections there were multiple candidates, excluding Duterte, who espoused populist standpoints.

The Philippines’ familiarity with populism can be potentially attributed to two factors. Firstly, it can be attributed to the Philippines’ unique characteristics regarding its local political system. In contrast to Britain and the U.S., local politics in the Philippines is far more individualistic. Political parties have virtually no control over their members, while these members engage in what is labelled as “bossism”. This local level patronage politics “on steroids” is something that the other two case studies lack and is something that can foster an environment ideal for populism. Secondly, as was said, the Philippines is still a relatively new Liberal Democracy. As was seen from the data, Liberalism is still in the process of becoming a more significant presence in the Philippines. This, coupled with the significant issues that Liberal institutions are facing, seems to provide opportunities for populism to arise. This conflicts with the presumptive hypothesis that populism was due to internal failings of Liberal Democracy: more specifically due to a widening gap between the two sides. It may be that “more” Liberal Democracy is the answer to Populism, rather than rebalancing its two aspects.

As with the other two case studies, the Fifth Approach identified Rodrigo Duterte, and his campaign, as populist. Notably, Duterte and Trump share many similarities in their populist images. Both have made crude comments towards women and advocated violence to solve issues, such as ISIS for Trump and criminals and drugs for Duterte. This helped to create a two-fold image, one of a “machismo everyman” and a “strongman”. Furthermore, both have revealed authoritarian tendencies since they have been in office. However, Duterte’s authoritarian tendencies are far more pronounced than Trump’s. As was discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4, Duterte has shown a blatant disregard for checks and balances on his office. Trump, on the other hand, has shown more nuanced tendencies towards authoritarianism with his statements about the media, the powers afforded to the president, and authoritarian world leaders. Also, as was mentioned, the difference between Trump and Duterte is that Duterte
had already showcased his machismo-fuelled strongman image in real-world situations during his time as mayor of Davao city. Another difference between the two is that there are far more robust checks and balances in place against Trump than there are against Duterte. As was discussed in section 5.4, there have been instances where the judicial branch has blocked Trump’s policies. On the other hand, it seems that Duterte has been virtually free to do what he wants. From the U.S. and Philippine case studies, it does seem that populism has a propensity to lean into authoritarianism when in power, as Arditi and others argued. However, it also seems that strong checks and balances are effective in curbing these tendencies.

Furthermore, it may seem that the fact that Duterte was a populist did play a significant role in his win. While it is true that other candidates also attempted to foster a populist image, it was only Duterte who fully committed to it and who fulfilled the Fifth Approach’s requirements completely. Duterte’s strategic campaign and “everyman strongman” image seemed to have garnered him support that crossed demographic lines. This contrasts with the other two case studies, where one can pinpoint that the majority of their support comes from an older, less educated, section of society. This seems to support Inglehart and Norris’ cultural backlash theory. As was outlined, the presence of Liberal values in the Philippines is still not nearly as dominant as it is in Britain and in the U.S. Therefore, it stands to reason that there would be no reason for older generations to launch “a backlash” against values that are in conflict with the ones that they grew up with.

Examining the data on Liberal Democracy reveals key differences between the three case studies. The Philippines has the lowest percentage, 55%, of public support for Liberal Democratic values. Britain is second of the three case studies, with 67% public support for Liberal Democratic values. The United States has the highest percentage of public support for Liberal Democratic values with 77%. It stands to reason that the U.S. would have the highest amount of public support for these Liberal ideals. The U.S. is, after all, considered the birthplace of modern Liberal Democracy. However, coupled with the fact that a slight majority is dissatisfied with the status quo and that the U.S. equals the Philippines for support for Direct Democracy, this implies that the redemptive side of the U.S Liberal Democracy is robust. At first glance, the significant checks and balances, and Liberal Democratic institutions of the U.S seem to indicate that the pragmatic side is healthy as well. However, as section 5.2.1 outlined, there are currently unprecedented levels of partisanship in U.S. politics, which in turn have led to obstructionism and gridlock. The majority of citizens also
believe that the government is beset by corruption and that it is being controlled by entities acting in self-interest. This is exemplified by the fact that a slight majority of citizens are not satisfied with the political system. Considering these two facts, it seems that the U.S pragmatic side is indeed lacking in contrast to its redemptive side.

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<tr>
<th>Philippines</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pragmatic Side</td>
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<td>Pragmatic Side</td>
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<td>Lacking to Moderate</td>
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Table 4: Comparing the three case studies’ Liberal Democracies

However, the other two case studies provide different results. As was mentioned, the Philippines possesses a relatively low amount of public support for Liberal Democratic values, and support for Representative Democracy is the lowest of the three case studies. These two facts provide the image that the Philippines’ redemptive side still has space to grow. Furthermore, its government is plagued by corruption and dominant political families. Looking at the two indicators for the redemptive side; support for Direct Democracy ties with the U.S as the highest, and a majority of citizens are satisfied with the status quo. Thus, the Philippines’ pragmatic side, like its redemptive side, also has space to grow. Considering that populism is a significant presence in the Philippines and yet its two Liberal Democratic sides are relatively close to each other, this seems to imply that a gap between the two sides is not the cause of populism. Even a more traditional example of a Liberal Democratic nation such as Britain showcases the same result: there does not seem to be a significant gap between its two sides. The U.S is the only case study that seems to show a gap between the two sides of its Liberal Democracy. However, as was posited, the gap seems to be caused by issues that are unique to the U.S. setting and are not inherent to Liberal Democracy.

While it is true that all three countries in these case studies face problems with their political systems, in varied degrees and for varied reasons, it does not seem that this is due to internal failings of Liberal Democracy. It should be made clear that there is a difference between the movements being populist, and the reason for their success being a populist upsurge in their respective societies due to the failings of Liberal Democracy. As identified through the Fifth Approach, all the individuals and groups were indeed populist. However, with Britain and the U.S. there are too many other significant factors which influenced the outcomes to state that Trump and the Leave Campaign’s success were due to populist upsurges in their respective societies. The British case study, especially, has shown little evidence of a gap between the
redemptive and pragmatic sides of its democracy. Furthermore, the Philippines already has a long-standing history of populism and as such, Duterte’s victory seems to simply have been a “normal” occurrence for the nation. The abnormal aspect of Duterte is his crusade against drug dealers and criminals; the fact that he is a populist is not abnormal. All these points cast doubt on the perception that a “populist wave” occurred in 2016, and that this populist wave was a sign of future trends.

6.3: Research Question
Two of the three case studies refuted outright the presumptive hypothesis that populism had been caused by an imbalance between the two sides of Liberal Democracy. The Fifth Approach did identify all three events as populist. By extension, all three populist movements, or individuals, utilized the construction of the people and opposing groups, and they espoused rhetoric that could be found on the opposite side of Liberal cosmopolitan values when plotted on a spectrum. Thus, it can be concluded that these aspects are indeed universal features of populism. Looking at the four indicators, the Philippines and Britain showed no notable gap with their Liberal Democracies. The U.S, on the other hand, did show a notable gap in its Liberal Democracy. The researcher has concluded that this gap was most likely caused by the extreme levels of partisanship, and the presence of obstructionism and gridlock within the government - issues that are not inherent to the Liberal Democratic system. While the U.S. does possess all the necessary ingredients to support the theory that a widening gap between the two sides of Liberal Democracy can potentially cause populism, there are other significant factors that influenced the 2016 U.S presidential elections. Russian meddling in the presidential elections, the prevalence of fake news, and an opponent beset by issues are factors one cannot simply ignore in favour of a narrative that states that issues with Liberal Democracy caused Donald Trump’s electoral win.

Considering all the above, the research question of how and why populism occurred in Liberal Democracies in 2016 has only one answer. The populism in 2016 was not caused by internal failings within the Liberal Democratic system, but instead was due to a multitude of factors. Each case study possessed different significant factors that influenced their respective events. With the U.S. it was the above-mentioned factors, and with Britain it was a worsening relationship with the EU, a longstanding negative attitude towards immigration, and the Eurozone and immigrant crises. The Philippines was the only case study that displayed a clear instance of a populist winning purely through populist support and rhetoric, however it possessed no gap in its Liberal Democracy. Instead, as the case study outlined, this populist
victory was due to the Philippines’ unique political environment that fosters populism. Its local politics that revolve around individualism and “bossism” is a feature that is not present in Britain or the U.S.

6.4: Issues encountered

Considering the scope of the study, there was difficulty with maintaining focus on the dynamic between populism and Liberal Democracy. As is the danger with case studies, at some points there was a tendency towards the study becoming a random hodgepodge of material from the selected area of analysis - this was especially present in the contextualisation sections. Another issue that was encountered was connecting the presence of a gap and the success of populism. While the theoretical framework of the study could identify this gap and occurrences of populism, it could not help with connecting the two. This issue was fortunately circumvented by the fact that only one case study evinced a gap in its Liberal Democracy: the U.S. Furthermore, that case study presided over other clear significant factors that had influenced the populist event, and as such, cast further doubt on whether faults in its Liberal Democracy caused the populist success.

6.5: Areas for future research

A closer look at the Philippines’ unique politics and how it fosters populism would potentially provide greater insights into how populism takes shape and what fuels it. A further area of interest would be the rhetoric that all three populist events shared. Duterte, Trump, and individuals in the Leave Campaign all used rhetoric that intentionally flouts political correctness and can be classified as directly opposite to Liberal cosmopolitan values. In the case of Britain and the U.S, this rhetoric seems to have gained a foothold with older white demographics. More studies such as that of Inglehart and Norris would provide a better picture of whether there is indeed a connection between that demographic and populism in Western Liberal Democracies.

Another area of interest would be the connection between populism and Liberal Democracy. While this study has found no direct connection between the potential failings of Liberal Democracy and the appearance of populism, more research needs to be conducted on this subject. While failings in Liberal Democracy do not seem to impact directly on populism, it does seem that a stronger presence of Liberalism and its institutions do curb populism. Britain was the only case whose two sides were relatively healthy and close together; it was also the only case study that did not have any signs of significant populism. On the other
hand, as the case studies seem to indicate, government dysfunction and corruption do seem to influence the presence of populism. However, as is common sense, government dysfunction and corruption can occur in other political systems as well.

Furthermore, the use of social media was one aspect that all three case studies shared. Duterte’s followers used social media to effectively campaign on behalf of their chosen candidate. The Leave Campaign used targeted social media advertisements to effectively convey their messages to a wide audience. Fake news had a significant presence on social media during the U.S presidential elections and undoubtedly affected some citizens’ views on the candidates. The presence of social media and fake news to a lesser extent, in these incidences is something that should be examined. With the continuous advancement of technology, social media will play an ever-growing role in pivotal political events, populist or not. The presence of fake news will make it easier for individuals such as populists to skew the perception of reality in their favour.
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139


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145


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