RE-THINKING THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN MALAWIAN PRIMARY SCHOOL EDUCATION FOR COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP

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Declaration

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Abstract

The pervasiveness of global interconnectedness has necessitated the re-imagination of the breadth and scope of citizenship. No longer should citizenship conceptualisation be restricted to the nation-state. There is arguable consensus of the normative necessity to cultivate cosmopolitan citizenship whose scope of duties transcends national borders. However, the question of what the form and substance of cosmopolitan citizenship should be remains contested. A given conception of cosmopolitanism directly informs the nature of education for democratic citizenship. The prevalent model of cosmopolitan citizenship outlaws national particularism ostensibly for being inherently inimical to the impartiality of universalism. The underlying logic is that equal concern for all people of the world is achievable only through impartiality over all particularism. There has however not been much research about the normative implications, especially for developing nations, of an impartiality that necessarily extinguishes national belonging. The context of developing nations demands a fundamental re-think of the potentiality of an exclusively impartial cosmopolitanism for such cosmopolitanism risks entrenching global inequality.

The removal of Malawian History from the primary school curriculum and of mother-tongue instruction for the first four years of primary education has normative motivations and implications. This dissertation argues that the systematic diminishing of the role of nationality through the removal of national History from the curriculum in Malawi, and adoption of English as the sole medium of instruction in primary education, are advancing a problematic cosmopolitan citizenship model that is incompatible with ideal human equality. Such a cosmopolitanism undermines the normative value of mother-tongue instruction. The cosmopolitanism also regards national history as inherently promoting parochialism and thus inherently inhibitive of universalist cosmopolitan duties.

Building on Seyla Benhabib’s (1992; 2011) idea of the concrete (differences) standpoint of universalism of human equality, as opposed to the general (commonality) standpoint of universalism, this dissertation argues that since nationality hosts people’s sources of concreteness, nationality has normative value and ideal cosmopolitanism is therefore essentially a duality of the particular and the universal. The two are mutually dependent and regulating ideals such that supplanting one for the other undermines human equality. An essentialist universalism is problematic because by excluding subjectivity and particularism,
it denies normative value to what individuates the peoples of the world as the concrete (not merely generic) human beings that they are.

The dissertation further argues that the idea of the detached transcendent self for whom social relations are not constitutive of being is flawed because it ignores the care he or she receives from others to achieve autonomy. Achievement of autonomy is dependent on the relations and institutions of care-giving typified by such elements of nationality as language, history, common culture and territory. With respect to democracy, nationality, though often assuming a background role, is the principle that makes civic patriotism possible. Civic patriotism cannot sustain democracy without continually drawing from nationality.

The dissertation argues that ideal authenticity-oriented education ought not to avoid subjectivity or else the education will lose meaningfulness to the people. Education should acknowledge that learners as citizens share a common fate through nationality. In education, the marginalisation of the national subjective for citizenship in favour of exclusive impartiality, amounts to tacit assimilation because the ostensible objective impartiality prejudicially marginalises valid moral perspectives of the world’s other peoples.

In Malawi, despite being the motivation and catalyst of colonial resistance, nationality was abused in the independence era. Currently, there are tokenistic commitments to nationality due to a lack of political will coupled with the prevalence of neoliberalism. Global interconnectedness, which necessitates and enables the imagination, of cultivation of cosmopolitan duties is itself characteristically inhered by Eurocentric particularism, neoliberalism and inequality in the representation of global people’s particular interests. Consequently, the marginalisation of the local promotes attitudes that regard local language and local epistemologies as subaltern. In such a context, mother-tongue instruction is stripped of its normative value. National History is regarded as advancing particularity, and narrow-mindedness. However, particularism is an indispensable component of ideal universalism. Further, there are valid relational normative conceptualisations of human nature besides individual-centrism that found a relational (and not individual-centric) universalism.

This research contributes towards the re-imagination of an education for citizenship that challenges the prevailing global homogenisation of the unprivileged and unrepresented epistemologies and voices, marginalised on account of their otherness, ultimately compelled to assimilate involuntarily into the mainstream in the name of impartiality of equality.
Dedication

To my mother Egly, wife Chikondi, daughters Tiyamike and Tikondwe and son Tadala
Manthalu
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Table of Contents

Declaration

Abstract

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Study Introduction

1.2. Focus of study

1.3. Background Context

1.4. Locating the debates: cosmopolitanism and the nation

1.4.1. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship

1.4.2. Nationalist cosmopolitanism

1.4.3. An overview of education for democratic citizenship in Malawi

1.4.4. The place of this research

1.5. Statement of the problem

1.6. Research statement and objectives

1.7. Justification of study

1.8. Theoretical framework

1.9. On method

1.10. Chapter outline

Chapter 2: The value of nationality

2.1. Introduction

2.2. Key aspects of nationality
Chapter 3: Cosmopolitanism .................................................................89

3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................89

3.2. Understanding cosmopolitanism ..................................................90
    3.2.1. Strong cosmopolitanism ......................................................92

3.3. The duality heritage of cosmopolitanism ......................................95
    3.3.1. The community and liberalism ..........................................100

3.4. Is neo-Kantianism the only universalism? .................................102
    3.4.1. On the credibility of other philosophies ..............................107

3.5. The misdiagnosis and wrong prescription of strong cosmopolitanism 113
    3.5.1. An unjust global order and inequalities ...............................120

3.6. Strong cosmopolitanism and emotional motivation ......................125
    3.6.1. Is nationality a source of injustice? .....................................127

3.7. Necessity of a dialogic cosmopolitanism in citizenship ...............132

3.8. Conclusion ....................................................................................137
Chapter 4: Education, citizenship and equality ........................................ 139

4.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 139

4.2. Authenticity and education .............................................................. 140
   4.2.1. Individual, local and global democracy ...................................... 145

4.3. Citizenship and shared fate ............................................................. 148
   4.3.1. Relevance of nationality in modern citizenship ......................... 156
   4.3.2. Patriotism and inclusion ......................................................... 159
   4.3.3. Patriotism and global citizenship ........................................... 166

4.4. Education and cultural responsiveness ........................................... 170

4.5. Cosmopolitan citizenship education in developing nations assimilationist?174
   4.5.1. Global citizenship and pluralism .............................................. 179

4.6. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship and the neoliberal influence .......... 182

4.7. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 189

Chapter 5: Nationality and cosmopolitanism in Malawian citizenship and education ................................................................................. 191

5.1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 191

5.2. Colonial education and citizenship (1891–1964) ............................ 192
   5.2.1. The build-up of colonial resistance .......................................... 196
   5.2.2. Cosmopolitanism and nationality in the colonial era ............... 197

5.3. Post-independence citizenship and education (1964–1994) ............. 203
   5.3.1. Abuse of nationality and the cosmopolitan correction .............. 206
   5.3.2. Language policy ..................................................................... 208
   5.3.3. Ubuntu and citizenship in Malawi .......................................... 209

5.4. Education for citizenship in the pluralism era (1994 to present) ...... 211
   5.4.1. Strong cosmopolitanism dominance and nationality underutilisation ....... 214

5.5. The cost of the enduring deficit of nationality in citizenship .......... 219
   5.5.1. Globality and marginality of local epistemologies .................... 225

5.6. On teaching national history .......................................................... 231
5.6.1. African otherness and globality .............................................................. 236

5.7. Reconfiguring Malawian education for citizenship .................................. 240
5.7.1. Towards a Benhabibian difference communicative universalism .......... 247

5.8. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 252

Chapter 6: Ubuntu in education and citizenship ........................................... 254

6.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 254

6.2. The nature of ubuntu .................................................................................. 255
6.2.1. Ubuntu principles: humanness, connectedness and harmony .............. 259
6.2.2. The individual and community in ubuntu ............................................. 263
6.2.3. Ubuntu and a difference-grounded deliberative universalism .............. 267

6.3. Ubuntu and education for citizenship ....................................................... 271
6.3.1. Ubuntu and education monetarisation .................................................. 273

6.4. Implementing ubuntu in the school .............................................................. 280
6.4.1. Ubuntu citizenship through curriculum and pedagogy ....................... 281
6.4.2. Ubuntu and assessment ....................................................................... 284
6.4.3. Ubuntu and environmentalism ............................................................. 286

6.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 287

Chapter 7: Concluding Reflections: Towards a New Cosmopolitanism ... 289

7.1. Research summary ..................................................................................... 289

7.2. Contribution of the study ......................................................................... 294

7.3. Towards affirmation of the local ............................................................... 296

7.4. Africa’s responsibility .............................................................................. 297

7.5. Study limitations and further research ....................................................... 298

References ...................................................................................................... 299
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Study Introduction

This dissertation is a normative evaluation of the foundation and moral implications of the prevailing model of education for democratic citizenship in the Malawian primary school curriculum. It is about how education for democratic citizenship should be conceptualised in the light of global interconnectedness and particularly what, if any, should be the role of nationality in the cultivation of an ideal citizenship for an individual living in the modern globalised world.

The ever-increasing entrenchedness of global interconnectedness continues to exert pressure to profoundly re-imagine the human condition, re-conceptualise ideal citizenship and how education should help attain the citizenship. For a long time citizenship has been conceived in terms of the nation-state. The citizen’s duties and entitlements have been limited to co-nationals only. This conception of citizenship thrived as the nation-state had the ability to effectively assert sovereignty within its borders through exclusively determining and regulating public policy. However, the rapid weakening of state sovereignty due to the political, economic, security, health, and environmental interconnectedness of all the people of the world, has necessitated a re-constitution of citizenship to emphasise and embrace cosmopolitan values, in order to cater for the unique challenges presented by the globality of modern life.

As a normative ideal, cosmopolitanism is a moral principle, which holds that the individual and not any other collective to which he or she may belong, is the ultimate unit of moral concern and therefore ought to be “entitled to equal consideration regardless of nationality” (Tan, 2006: 1). Cosmopolitanism therefore entails human equality, which it pursues through exclusive recognition and universalisation of impartial duties individuals owe each other as members of the human race and not as members of a national community. The foundational and generally non-controversial implication of the cosmopolitan ideal is that human beings across the globe have certain moral duties towards all humanity of the world, unrestricted by national, cultural, religious, racial, and geographical differences, among others. Growing global interconnectedness, coupled with its challenges have necessitated a new imagination of citizenship beyond the limitation of the nation-state, ultimately contesting the normative value and role of the nation in modern citizenship altogether.
1.2. Focus of study

Whilst the normative claim of human equality transcending national boundaries is not contentious, debates arise as to what should constitute cosmopolitan citizenship, especially with respect to nationality. This debate spills over to the domain of education for democratic citizenship, where questions arise as to what should be the form, content, and mode of implementation of education for democratic citizenship that is meaningful to a 21st-century learner citizen. Whilst the moral and pragmatic necessity of cultivating a cosmopolitan citizenship imagination is arguably indisputable and inevitable, drawing from the Malawian context, this dissertation discusses the following two theoretical questions that pertain to the form and substance of cosmopolitanism:

1) What should be the nature, scope and substance of an ideal cosmopolitan citizenship, and how should education realise it?

2) Does (national) particularism have a place in the normative constitution and implementation of ideal cosmopolitan citizenship?

Whilst cognisant that there are numerous orientations and motivations of cosmopolitan citizenship, this dissertation is concerned with the dominant and mainstream version of cosmopolitanism, to which David Miller (2007: 43) refers as strong cosmopolitanism. Strong cosmopolitanism holds that since the individual is the ultimate unit of, and entitled to, moral concern, all hitherto differentiating attributes, particularly nationality are morally arbitrary (Habermas, 2001: 73; Nussbaum, 2002a: 8; Nielsen, 2005: 274; Nili, 2015: 245; Arneson, 2016: 560). According to this major strand of cosmopolitanism, citizenship and indeed duties of justice, therefore, need not be restricted by national considerations. Thus, the main point is that nationality has no moral weight, and is actually an impediment to achieving the cosmopolitan aspiration of equal concern for all humanity of the world.

In the domain of education for democratic citizenship, strong cosmopolitanism practically demands that education must refrain from offering national history as a subject, as history ostensibly prizes the ‘arbitrary’ local over morally valid universal global obligations (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003; Nili, 2015). The school therefore should neither advance nor nurture aspects of nationality. Instead, education for democratic citizenship in the school, must exclusively develop universalistic impartial global citizens able to fit in every part of the world, now that the world is a global village. The implication one draws from this model of education and citizenship is that mother-tongue instruction wherever
feasible, is justified only on grounds of efficiency in teaching and learning, rather than on a basis grounded in the normative value of nationality. In other words, mother tongue instruction cannot be defended in terms of the normative value of national belonging, since strong cosmopolitanism regards aspects of nationality as being morally arbitrary and therefore ought to be restricted to the private sphere.

This study explores the normative validity of a strong cosmopolitan-inspired education for democratic citizenship in the primary school curriculum of Malawi to determine whether it is consistent with human equality, a norm that is cardinal in cosmopolitan universalism (Tan, 2006).

1.3. Background Context

Located in southern central Africa, Malawi has three administrative regions (Northern, Central and Southern) with each comprising at least two different tribes. For each region, there is generally at least one commonly shared language. The dominant language for the Northern region of Malawi is Tumbuka, Chinyanja for the Central region, Yao and a dialect of Chinyanja are the major languages for the Southern region (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998: 33). The most recent national language census conducted in 1998 reports that 70% of the population use Chichewa or its dialect Nyanja as their household language, while 0.2% use English as their home language (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998: 33). In Malawi, 54% of the population lives below the poverty line and 85% of the population lives in rural areas (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 2006; 2008). With respect to access to information and technological services, 44% of the population own radios; and 17% have access to television. Mobile phone ownership is at 34% of the population, with 4.1% being computer literate (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 2014).

Two major developments that have a direct bearing on education for democratic citizenship have taken place in Malawi. First, Malawian History was removed from the primary curriculum, and has been replaced by Social and Environmental Science (UNESCO, 1994: 9; Hauya, 1997: 22; Ministry of Education, 2005). Social and Environmental Science, although it has sporadic references to and unsystematic accounts of Malawian history, is generally about democratic values and practices, and sustainable environmental management. Part of the justification of this curriculum change is that the world has changed; hence, appropriate responsive reforms are also due (Ministry of Education, 2005: v). In the current curriculum, Social and Environmental Science has substituted History, Geography, and Civics, which previously were standalone subjects (Hauya, 1997: 22). Malawi History was being taught
from the fourth to sixth years of primary school and African, and World history were taught in the last two of the eight years long primary school (Hauya, 1997: 22).

Social and Environmental Science does not contain a chronological account of the (political) history of Malawi. By and large, its focus is on impartial knowledge and skills of democracy. Sporadic historical references to Malawi political history are made only with respect to explaining certain concepts of democracy. Social and Environmental Science is also focused on sustainable environmentalism. Such systematic de-emphasis of locality embedded in nationality is consistent with strong cosmopolitanism commitment to impartial knowledge in the cultivation of global citizenship.

It is worth noting that while there is no systematic learning of Malawi’s political History at the primary level, African History is offered throughout the two years of junior secondary school but does not include Malawi History. World history is offered in the two years of senior secondary school. In other words, the reality is that the profound value of political history to democracy and democratic citizenship notwithstanding, in the Malawian education system, the Malawian learner does not learn Malawian history, but only African and World histories. This dissertation finds this systematic exclusion of learning local history while offering world history, to be adverse for local democratic citizenship and contends that such exclusion is a result of the mode of cosmopolitanism Malawian education is pursuing which ultimately undermines human equality in global citizenship.

The second major policy development is that in 2013, the government changed the law on language of instruction (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78 (1)). Prior to the change, the first four years of primary school used either Chichewa, the national language, or the most convenient vernacular language of the area (Moyo, 2002; Matiki, 2006; Chiuye & Moyo, 2008). Under the new law however, English has been made the language of instruction right from the first year of primary education through to the tertiary level (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78 (1)). The major motivation for this policy shift is to make the Malawian learner an effective participant and competitor in the global world (Ministry of Education, 2005: v; Masina, 2014; Nyondo, 2016). Thus, global considerations are exerting a substantial pressure on the nature of education Malawian learners get as well as the form and content of the ideal citizen that modernity ostensibly demands.

While there are defences of mother-tongue instruction for efficient effective learning in Malawi (Mtenje, 2002; Chiphanda, 2007; Kamwendo, 2016), this dissertation argues for
mother-tongue instruction on the grounds that mother-tongue instruction has normative value and is hence necessary as it is a recognition of a situated learner’s concreteness in the context of global education and global citizenship. A vernacular language is directly connected to an individual’s way of being in the world, as an Other (Benhabib, 1992, 2011), because the language embeds a people’s philosophical perspectives and is hence worthy of active recognition and support especially in endeavours of cosmopolitan citizenship. The otherness of one’s language typifies one’s being in this plural world and should not be extinguished for the sake of global economic convenience. It is arguable that the demand to fit and compete in the global order that informs prevailing forms of cosmopolitan citizenship is overriding such pertinent normative worth of local languages.

Cultivation of cosmopolitan citizenship in education can be analysed through either a critical examination of pedagogical experiences or through an analysis of educational policies that have direct bearing on education for citizenship. This dissertation analyses the impact of the two Malawian educational policies regarding subject content and language of instruction, on the assumption that they have a profound and unique effect on cosmopolitan citizenship education, notwithstanding the nature of pedagogical experiences in the school. This is because such policies are informed by a particular form of cosmopolitanism which they will also perpetuate.

This study finds the two policy decisions problematic for being inherently inhibitive of ideal cosmopolitan equality and universalism. In other words, there is a need to re-think the role of local situatedness as embodied in nationality, in the cosmopolitanism that Malawian primary education is advancing.

In global citizenship education, the relevance of history which is a major property of democratic national communities across the globe lies in that historicity is a major constitutive property of human communities across the world. History is one of the major features that constitute the concreteness or situatedness of a people. It is a fundamental attribute of human communities, partly constitutive of one’s being and the community that forms a democratic community. In so far as education for cosmopolitan citizenship endeavours to achieve human equality across the world, recognising the historicity of the peoples of the world ought to be part of recognising their concreteness and situatedness as different yet equal human beings. Furthermore, history also has a bearing on democracy especially in global citizenship in that democracy and democratisation of a community are devoid of meaning once they are uprooted from their historical context. History makes
democracy meaningful because democratic communities are historical communities that shape and are shaped by their historical contextuality. In cosmopolitan citizenship, exclusion of local history in the name of de-emphasizing nationality to ostensibly avoid narrowmindedness and achieve cosmopolitan universalism and equality is therefore worth exploring in the interest of both the concreteness of communities of peoples across the globe and in the interest of ensuring sustenance of democracy both locally and globally.

1.4. Locating the debates: cosmopolitanism and the nation.

There is arguably, a consensus among thinkers that today the scope of education for democratic citizenship cannot be exclusively about national partiality (Kymlicka, 2002a; Nussbaum, 2002a; Miller, 2007; Arthur, Davies & Hahn, 2008; Hansen, 2011; Papastephanou, 2015). In other words, education for democratic citizenship in the modern interconnected world cannot be about making a choice as to whether learners should cultivate normative values, duties, and entitlements of citizenship that are either restricted to the nation only, or that also have transnational perspectives. Therefore, the moral necessity and practical urgency for a cosmopolitan awareness and skills in education for democratic citizenship is generally no longer debatable. Rather, what is debatable is how cosmopolitanism should be conceptualised especially with respect to the role of national attachments. Should ideal cosmopolitan citizenship necessarily displace and exclude nationality or does nationality have unique moral value indispensable in the realisation of cosmopolitan citizenship? Sub-sections 1.4.1. and 1.4.2. give a brief discussion of arguments that favour a cosmopolitanism that is neutral over national sentiments relegating them to the private sphere, and also those that argue for an active place of the national sentiment in cosmopolitan citizenship conceptualisation respectively. Subsection 1.4.3. gives an overview of how citizenship education has developed in Malawi.

1.4.1. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship

Different thinkers conceive cosmopolitanism differently. One of the key elements that determine a form of cosmopolitanism is the role of the nation in the conceptualisation of the breadth and scope of cosmopolitan citizenship obligations and entitlements. The contentious question is whether national attachments among national members have normative value worth necessitating their inclusion in conceptualisation of cosmopolitan citizenship.

As stated earlier, this dissertation focuses on one prevalent, dominant type of cosmopolitanism which holds that since the human being is the ultimate unit of moral
concern, duties and entitlements of justice must equally extend to all the people of the world, transcending nationality, because nationality has no moral worth to restrict them (Habermas, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015; Costa, 2016). As such, this brand of cosmopolitanism is dismissive of patriotic commitments, holding that equality means treating people equally in a substantive sense hence emphasis on patriotic pride in principle inhibits attainment of cosmopolitan equality. Miller (2007: 43) refers to this brand of cosmopolitanism as strong cosmopolitanism. Henceforth, this dissertation refers to this brand of cosmopolitanism as ‘strong cosmopolitanism’. Defenders of strong cosmopolitanism argue that although, in the nation-state, patriotism may and has historically helped in serving some moral ideals such as justice and equality, it has no inherent moral value. Hence, at the global level patriotism is subversive of the very ideals it serves in the nation-state (Habermas, 2001: 73–74; Nussbaum, 2002a: 4). For such thinkers, in the modern interconnected globe, the moral principles of justice and equality would be better served by a cosmopolitan ideal which demands allegiance to the global community of human beings and democratic cooperation other than to a particularistic nation community (Habermas, 2001: 73–74; Nussbaum, 2002a: 4; Nili, 2015: 245; Arneson, 2016: 560).

According to Martha Nussbaum (2002a), whose work was among the seminal works calling for strong cosmopolitan education for democratic citizenship, this conception of cosmopolitanism does not necessarily demand that people should do away with their local identifications, which she acknowledges can have special meaning in their lives. Rather, she argues that such commitments need not play a role in the way we understand our moral obligations which transcend national borders to all humanity in the world (Nussbaum, 2002a: 9). In other words, national commitments must only pertain to the private discretion of the individual. To be a cosmopolitan for strong cosmopolitanism, is to think of all human beings on the globe as constituting a moral community to whom one must be morally obliged to extend the same duties and obligations one has to co-nationals within the nation-state (Nussbaum, 2002a: 12–14; Nielsen, 2005: 274; Arneson, 2016: 560; Huber, 2016: 4). Thus, nationality is a characteristic that does not have moral relevance, unlike universal moral duties owed to all other human beings in the world on account of their humanity (Habermas, 2001; Callan, 2006; Nili, 2015). Nationality in this case has such major features such as a common language, history, geographical territory, and a public culture (Miller, 1995: 27). Strong cosmopolitanism demands that the moral norms of equal human worth and concern must therefore be the regulative constraint on political actions and political aspirations. As
such, in political deliberations and action we must first and foremost regard ourselves to be global citizens, and not as mere national citizens (Nussbaum, 2002a: 7). This being the case, education for democratic citizenship should cultivate the factual and imaginative prerequisite for recognising humanity in all people across the world (Nussbaum, 2002b: 133). Such a version of cosmopolitanism does not regard patriotic commitments as a morally necessary ingredient for (global) citizenship. Patriotism is its detractor.

This brand of cosmopolitanism holds that patriotic history should not be taught as part of citizenship education in liberal-democracy schools (Brighouse, 2003; Schumann, 2016). For its proponents, the relatively inoffensive national identities that national history advances, intrinsically violate the equality norm in that national identities still embed within them a sense of superiority over other nationalities and ultimately lead to undermining the legitimate normative entitlements of non-nationals as well as other members of the nation (Brighouse, 2003: 164–165). From the strong cosmopolitan perspective, national history as a subject is essentially coercive, and children being uniquely vulnerable, must not be subjected to it so as to respect their capacity of developing fully-fledged views by themselves as to what constitutes the good (Brighouse, 2003: 165). Since, following this reasoning, culture is a private good, determination of the value of culture is up to the autonomous individual, it needs not be presented to learners as an objective good for every human being. Learners should be prevented from taking in the aspects of the nation’s history and culture as valuable just because the state, through the curriculum, considers the history and culture to be so (Brighouse, 2003: 165). Thus, in the interest of individual freedom the curriculum must not be aimed at cultivating or sustaining a national identity as part of efforts towards the realisation and sustenance of democracy in the nation-state.

Thinkers subscribing to strong cosmopolitanism explicitly or implicitly pit cosmopolitanism against patriotic interests, as two distinct and mutually exclusive ideals. Mostly, wherever some concession is made about the role of nationality, it is only instrumental and tokenistic, rather than normative. They esteem cosmopolitan citizenship to be normatively superior to national citizenship on account of the cosmopolitan universalisation of human impartiality, and consider patriotic commitments as morally inferior on the ostensible grounds of its particularism (Nussbaum, 2002a: 16; Nili, 2015; Costa, 2016; Rundell, 2016). The implication of this school of cosmopolitanism is that education for democratic citizenship must rid itself of national particularism. Instead, education must commit itself to cultivating knowledge and skills that are universal, and compatible with all people in the world. Put
differently, strong cosmopolitanism is a discourse of conflict over the inherence of normative value between universalism and particularism in citizenship theorisation where the universal is supreme and must always be prioritised. The ostensible normative superiority and exclusiveness of strong cosmopolitan universalism entails that in education for citizenship, subject content and pedagogy must necessarily be detached from local embeddedness to achieve moral universalism. It is, in other words, a pursuit of moral impartiality, which is regarded as the means to universalism, where the universalism is itself a vehicle for achieving human equality for all humankind globally.

1.4.2. Nationalist cosmopolitanism

The second brand of cosmopolitanism, whilst conceding the fundamentalism of human equality, is against the alleged necessary exclusion of patriotic particularism by universal moral ideals. Such cosmopolitanism acknowledges the existence of universal duties to all humanity of the world. There are however, variations among thinkers over what is to be the scope and breadth of such duties. However, generally this brand of cosmopolitanism is against the regarding of nationality as morally arbitrary. This brand finds nationality as having a unique normative value that is incomparable with the universalism of duties of human equality (Kymlicka, 2002a; Turner, 2002; Miller, 2007; Hansen, 2011; Etzioni, 2014; Papastephanou, 2015). It further finds nationality to be of significance in the actualisation of both local citizenship and global citizenship.

Generally, nationalist or patriotic cosmopolitanism is against the implied hierarchical ranking between the cosmopolitan and the national ideals, where only the ostensibly (superior) value of the cosmopolitan is accorded moral worth and its recognition necessarily excludes the national local (Tan, 2006; Hansen, 2011; Papastephanou, 2013a). For much of patriotic cosmopolitanism, nationality is not morally arbitrary, but has some ethical meaningfulness for its members.

Besides the meaningfulness of nationality, national cosmopolitanism also contends that nationality makes the political community possible and has a role in helping realisation and sustenance of local democracy in such a way that contrary to strong cosmopolitanism, you cannot have a democratic culture only, bereft of nationality (Papastephanou, 2015: 185–186). The self-government movements in established democracies in developed nations, for example in Spain, Canada and Belgium, are cited as instances where national groups are demanding secession despite already participating in vibrant democratic institutions in the
liberal democratic states that they demand to secede from (Kymlicka, 2002a: 91–92). Such trends, for nationalist cosmopolitanism, offer clear evidence that sharing universal democratic principles and sharing the basic structure alone are not sufficient for realisation and sustenance of the political community and citizenship (Kymlicka, 2002a: 92).

Defenders of the value of locality (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003; Etzioni, 2014; Papastephanou, 2015) argue that it is through the voluntary organisations of the civil society (churches, mosques, families, unions, ethnic groups, neighbourhood associations, charities and support groups) that an individual comes to learn civic virtues such as mutual obligation, reciprocity, respect and self-sacrifice. The political society does not form such virtues, although they constitute its foundation and its survival largely depends on them (Kymlicka, 2002a; Etzioni, 2014). For Kymlicka (1997: 18) the civility of mutual obligations that makes democracy work is learnt in these associative networks of the civil society where failure to live up to the responsibilities of these groups, is usually met with members’ disapproval and not state-sanctioned coercion. For Kymlicka (1997: 18) it is not the state’s sanctions, but rather disapproval from family members, friends, comrades, and community, which functions as a powerful incentive for acting responsibly and being sensitive to fellow members’ interests and expectations. Political citizenship does not build these capacities. Rather it is itself built upon the capacities and competencies of voluntary self-restraint, mutual obligation and responsibility that only the civic associations cultivate (Kymlicka, 1997: 18). Thus, this civility is not achieved through laws made by the state, but it is a result of the spirit of community and togetherness. It is in this sense that certain aspects of nationality are worth affirming and supporting by the state, in the interest of democracy.

With respect to education for democratic citizenship, nationalist cosmopolitanism therefore holds that citizenship education should reasonably lean towards developing a critical national identity and not merely be committed to only impartial universal principles of democracy, as these by themselves are incapable of sustaining democracy and democratic citizenship (Kymlicka, 2002a: 295). The national identity it defends is not a ‘thick’ ethno-culture that excludes non-members (Kymlicka, 2002a: 25). Rather, teaching of the nation’s critical history and use of the common language people share as the medium of instruction in schools, are the most basic goods which members share non-coercively (Kymlicka, 2002a: 25). These are the basic and shared cultural elements education for democratic citizenship must promote. Most of the other cultural elements are ‘thicker’, hence cannot be included, as that would amount to undue coercion. For defenders of locality, it is therefore imperative that
citizenship education advances a ‘societal’ culture of a (liberal) democratic nation-state (Kymlicka, 2002a; Meyers, 2005; Etzioni, 2006). Such a culture is inclusive even of those who do not share it. This is in contrast with a monolithic ‘thick’ national culture (that) exists and is advanced for citizenship in non-democratic and illiberal nation-states or in discriminatory liberal nation-states; whose membership depends on discriminatory requirements such as race and nativism (Miller, 1995: 26). Kymlicka argues that it is therefore a legitimate role for schools to promote students’ emotional identification with the history of their nation as their history, taking pride in its accomplishments and feeling shame about its injustices (Kymlicka, 1997: 21).

Perspectives sympathetic to the value and role of nationality in education for democratic citizenship are motivated by a conception in which cosmopolitanism “constitutes an orientation in which people learn to balance reflective openness to the new and reflective loyalty to the known” (Hansen, 2011: 1). Therefore, for Hansen (2011), cosmopolitanism should be about balancing local values with those of general humanity, unbound by territories, and that valuing the local should not include perspectives of fixity of one’s culture. Such perspectives, Hansen (2011) claims, prevent mutual understanding between two different cultural backgrounds. Since all cultures are porous and permeable to external influences and interaction, cosmopolitanism therefore is an orientation that assists people in sustaining their cultural integrity and continuing (not fixity or purity) through change (Hansen, 2011: 87).

With respect to education, Hansen (2011: 98) argues that acquisition of a cosmopolitan awareness does not necessarily depend on having a specific ‘impartial or neutral’ type of body content, which will make the curriculum cosmopolitan. Rather, it is about the kind of perspectives and outlooks that learners develop about the world and other people that make it cosmopolitan. It is about the learners’ thoughtful receptivity, and not about mere familiarisation with a predetermined body content (Hansen, 2011:98). For Hansen (2011), cosmopolitanism is about a way of living, and this does not necessarily demand that learners grasp some final universalistic truths. Instead, it is about respecting the diversity-laden reality of the world, respecting the other and respecting the self (Hansen, 2011: 117). He therefore argues that learning of whatever subject, be it science, training for sports, equation solving, composing music, etc., can be used to expand learners’ orientation towards the wider world (Hansen, 2011: 117). Teaching and learning any other subject should therefore involve traversing between the local and the global, using the same body content as a vehicle. This
shows that cosmopolitanism is not so much about what subject content (national or transnational) learners are taught. It is about cultivating learners’ ability to constantly reflect on how the scope of what they learn bears out on their local context and onto the rest of the world’s humanity with whom they are in a web of mutual dependence (Hansen, 2011).

1.4.3. An overview of education for democratic citizenship in Malawi

Much of the available research on education for democratic citizenship in Malawi, largely focusses on praxis: whether education practice and policy are consistent with established democratic expectations (Hauya, 1993; Kadzamira & Rose, 2003; Chiphandu, 2007; Evans & Rose, 2007; Kendall, 2007; Porter, 2014; Namphande, Clarke, Farren & McCully, 2017). In my literature search I did not come across much literature examining the philosophical foundation of the stated and assumed education for local and cosmopolitan citizenship in Malawi. The most outstanding and relatively comprehensive work on the philosophical examination of education for democratic citizenship in relation to cosmopolitan citizenship is by Divala and Enslin (2008).

Divala and Enslin (2008) explore education for democratic citizenship in Malawi primary education in the context of its historical development. After acquiring political independence from the British in 1964, education for citizenship in Malawi concentrated on the anti-colonial struggle values of unity, loyalty, discipline, and obedience, which the post-independence, one-party state subsequently abused to justify its dictatorial tendencies (Divala & Enslin, 2008: 219). Any perceived deviation from these values faced atrocious state sanctions. These values became constitutive of education for democratic citizenship in Malawi for 30 years (1964–1994) and served to glorify Kamuzu Banda (the dictator declared life president) who abolished multiparty pluralism (Divala & Enslin, 2008: 218). The goal was to have passive and unquestioning, loyal citizens (Divala & Enslin, 2008). This being the case, post-independent Malawi discouraged active critical citizenship, as it was bound to undermine the grip on power of the one party regime. As such, Divala and Enslin (2008: 220) argue that following the struggle against the 30-year dictatorship of that one party, which collapsed in 1993, paving the way for the re-introduction of pluralistic politics, citizens at the dawn of democracy were ill-prepared for and not adequately informed about democracy and cosmopolitan citizenship. Even after the dawn of democracy, education for citizenship in schools took off in an ad hoc manner between 1993 and 1999 (Divala & Enslin, 2008: 220).
After the re-introduction of pluralistic politics, which followed a long period of oppression, a human rights approach to education for democratic citizenship became attractive. There was an urgent need for relief from the oppressive system, and the alternative human rights approach was appealing, while anything to do with the nation was treated with trepidation (Divala & Enslin, 2008: 220). There was a clear abandonment of developing a national identity for citizenship, since this was an unpalatable idea as the memories of the atrocities of the one-party dictatorship were fresh. The regime had abused the very idea of patriotism to suppress dissent and commit human rights violations to maintain its grip on power (Divala & Enslin, 2008). In principle, Divala and Enslin (2008: 220) argue that at this point, a shift towards a sense of belonging that transcends national boundaries started to emerge. With respect to global citizenship, Divala and Enslin (2008: 225) lament that the post-democratic education for democratic citizenship in Malawian schools still retains nationalistic elements that are aimed at passive citizenship. For Divala and Enslin (2008: 225), although it aspires to be global, the content of some of Malawian education for democratic citizenship subjects such as Social Studies does not promote active critical citizenship.

It should be noted that the work by Divala and Enslin (2008) focusses on the 1964–1999 period only. Although they manage to discuss the context and evolution of education for cosmopolitan citizenship in Malawi, their work however does not interrogate the foundation and form of the cosmopolitan citizenship being aspired to in their study, as this dissertation does. Since 1999, different developments have taken place in Malawi, greatly changing the landscape of citizenship education. The Social Studies curriculum has been revised and English has just been declared the sole medium of instruction from the first primary school level through to tertiary education (Ministry of Education, 2005; Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78(1)). These recent developments warrant detailed probing as they have wide normative implications.

1.4.4. The place of this research

This research is in agreement with patriotic cosmopolitanism, which holds that ideal cosmopolitanism essentially ought not to be reducible to a choice between either the local or the global (Miller, 2007: 263; Hansen, 2011: 106; Papastephanou, 2013a: 27) in the selection of curriculum content, and in making curriculum-related policies. Such a choice between ostensibly antagonistic ideals should not exist, because in principle, cosmopolitanism and patriotism are uniquely different, yet mutually reinforcing and regulating ideals (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). As such, ideally, it is not possible to have one without the other.
This dissertation argues that their mutual dependence is not based only on instrumentalist grounds, as in ensuring efficiency in democratic practice and in the teaching and learning processes. Rather, each has unique normative value that cannot be substituted by the other.

There is still room for further research in cosmopolitan education for democracy. First, as can be derived from Sub-sections 1.4.1. and 1.4.2., much of the debate about cosmopolitan citizenship is premised on an explicit and assumed individual-centric conception of human nature as the exclusive determinant in citizenship conceptualisation by both the proponents and opponents of strong cosmopolitanism. However, as this dissertation shows, the individualistic conception of the human being, besides being limited in its capacity to adequately account for the diversity and plurality of global interconnectedness, is not the sole exclusive benchmark for the conceptualisation of human nature and the human condition. It is one of other normatively valid perspectives such as the relational rationality of ubuntu (Murove, 2014: 37).

Secondly, it is also worth highlighting that in much of the literature surveyed about the cosmopolitan citizenship debate, the question of mother-tongue instruction in schools is scarcely emphasized as a normative matter that has a bearing on acceptability of cosmopolitanism. This would partly be due to the fact that much of the research dominating cosmopolitan citizenship discourse originates from the context of developed nations (Parmenter, 2011: 368) where the mother tongue is also the official language. The official language is mostly also the dominant or the sole national language (i.e. the most widely used language in non-official domains). In other words, people do not have to employ a distinct language in the home or public places and a foreign one in the school or in official domains. In such situations, it is tempting to overlook the role of language in cultivating and demonstrating a sense of national community.

In Malawi and much of Africa, however, there are very stark linguistic boundaries between the language of the home and public and the official language or medium of instruction in schools. Therefore, learners have to navigate two distinct linguistic (and ultimately cultural) contexts when they attend school and when they are home. In other words, critics who dismiss the role of nationality in cosmopolitanism overlook the national effect languages possess in creating a sense of national community, which as national members they hardly notice. The members do not notice, just because generally in their contexts, there is only one linguistic community and the official and regular domains are not marked by distinct languages. The reality of a national community sharing a language is hence taken for granted;
yet, it is not inconsequential in as far as creating a sense of nationality is concerned. The question of mother-tongue instruction is therefore urgent in cosmopolitan citizenship, especially in the interests of developing nations who face the ‘necessary’ threat of global homogenisation (Canagarajah, 2005; Pashby, 2011).

Thirdly, it is evident that strong cosmopolitan citizenship theorisation is largely motivated by the reality of global interconnectedness which necessitates cultivation and implementation of impartial universal duties. However, the challenge is that strong cosmopolitanism assumes that the representative nature and outcomes of global interconnectedness are even across the global peoples and that the interconnectedness is a neutral vehicle that must make possible global equality among global equals. Strong Cosmopolitanism scarcely recognises the nature of the prevailing global order that hides and perpetuates linguistic, economic, and cultural imbalances and inequalities as it parades itself as an ostensible vehicle for global equality. Most significant is that, both perpetuation as well as the possible resolution of such global challenges reside in whether cosmopolitanism is sensitive to local particularity or not. This too necessitates exploration of the normative relevance of nationality in global citizenship formulation.

1.5. Statement of the problem

Given the growing prevalence of global interconnectedness, it is necessary that education cultivates cosmopolitan citizenship. The immensity of humankind’s interconnectedness makes vivid the necessity for emphasising the ideal of human equality in education for democratic citizenship. This now necessitates the need for cultivation of universal duties transcending nationality towards all humanity. However, cosmopolitan universalism does not necessarily have to be preconditioned on the exclusion of meaningful particularism. Neither should particularism be regarded as a morally empty category.

This dissertation focusses on the question of the normative justifiability and implications of exclusion of national particularism as the necessary precondition for achieving cosmopolitan equality in education for democratic citizenship in Malawi. The removal of Malawi History from the primary school curriculum and its replacement with a largely nation-neutral impartial subject, Social and Environmental Science in Malawi, as well as the adoption of a global language English as the sole medium of instruction right from the first year of primary school education, in principle undermine the normative value of nationality regarding it as morally arbitrary.
Nationality is still generally the ultimate host to the sources of global peoples’ situatedness, which substantially and substantively contributes to their concreteness. The peculiarity of their concreteness gives meaning to their collectives’ lives as well as to their constituent members’ individuation. Advancing an education for democratic citizenship that extinguishes such concreteness, which informs global diversity, in the ostensible pursuit of strong cosmopolitan impartiality, risks undermining the very ideal of human equality. Questions therefore arise as to whether an impartial and ostensibly only universalistic education for democratic citizenship can be meaningfully just and achieve equality whilst necessarily excluding national particularism from the normative configuration of ideal global citizenship. Is inclusion of national particularism in the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism’s universalism incompatible with and inherently impeding of cosmopolitan citizenship’s equality?

Secondly, there is also the largely unexplored question of the normative and practical implications of the ostensible impartiality of strong cosmopolitanism on developing nations. Upon critical analysis, strong cosmopolitanism’s impartiality (and the education for democratic citizenship it inspires) is discovered to be itself characterised by developed nations’ own Eurocentric particularism, yet it is advanced as the exclusive ultimate standard for universalism. Strong cosmopolitanism’s exclusion of crucial aspects of national particularism therefore has high potential to compel the learner in developing nations to undermine the relevance of his or her linguistic, social, cultural, and historical embeddedness which significantly contribute to giving meaning to his or her being and the democratic community. Therefore, strong cosmopolitanism’s homogenising condition that one regards oneself and all humanity as detached disembodied beings in order to fulfil the duties of human equality’s impartiality is bound to have adverse implications on global people’s concreteness and otherness. As a result, the potential for homogenisation risks undermining both global diversity and human equality. Upon critical examination therefore, strong cosmopolitanism-inspired education for democratic citizenship has a huge potential threat of advancing tacit assimilation.

Lastly, strong cosmopolitanism’s fixation with a detached autonomous self as the exclusive ultimate standard of human equality by implication dismisses alternative valid conceptualisations of human nature and equality that are not necessarily grounded in individual-centrism such as relational conceptions of human nature, that nevertheless value autonomy. There is a need to explore and acknowledge alternative normative frameworks for
imagining cosmopolitan citizenship, that are inherently suited to resolve some of the limitations of strong cosmopolitanism’s exclusiveness of otherness that inevitably and adversely manifest in its global citizenship.

1.6. Research statement and objectives
The aim of this research is to analyse whether the education for democratic citizenship being pursued in Malawian primary education is consistent with ideal equality or needs reconsidering. The central claim of this dissertation is that by diminishing the role of nationality through the removal of national history from the curriculum and adoption of English as the sole medium of instruction in primary schools, primary education in Malawi is advancing a model of cosmopolitanism and citizenship that is incompatible with ideal human equality.

The objectives of this dissertation are to:

- examine the nature, value of and mutual dependence between ideal cosmopolitanism and ideal nationality;
- explore the ideal conditions for the relationship among citizenship, education, and equality;
- evaluate, through the ideal interaction between nationality and cosmopolitanism, the normativity of education for democratic citizenship in Malawi; and
- explore the normative validity of a cosmopolitanism rooted in a relational rationality that also generates community duties;

1.7. Justification of study
Prevalently, strong cosmopolitanism dominates the conceptualisation and practice of education for democratic citizenship. It is effectively substituting aspects of locality in education for democratic citizenship with an ostensibly impartial education for global citizenship.

The necessity for this dissertation lies in its ability to draw out normative implications from three largely ignored assumptions of strong cosmopolitanism, which in principle undermine concreteness and ultimately render strong cosmopolitanism incongruent with ideal human equality. However, resolution of such normative incongruences depends on re-conceptualising the central claims of strong cosmopolitan universalism through inclusion of what is dismissed as subjective and morally arbitrary of human nature.
First, this dissertation joins criticisms of strong cosmopolitanism as being incapable of anchoring and sustaining a just global citizenship owing to the strong cosmopolitanism precondition of excluding nationality. This dissertation takes this discourse further by particularly examining how postulates of strong cosmopolitanism undermine the concreteness of individuals and communities, especially in developing nations, whose social and economic context uniquely makes invisible the iniquities they face under strong cosmopolitan impartiality’s dismissal of (national) particularism (Andreotti, 2011a; Abdi, 2015).

Secondly, this dissertation highlights that Eurocentric particularism and neoliberal motivations inhere strong cosmopolitan citizenship and this also, in principle, makes it amount to assimilation. The dissertation takes cognisance that much of cosmopolitan citizenship theorisation is inspired by Kantian and Rawlsian liberalism. The challenge with such liberalism, as other thinkers, such as Young (1990: 100–101), Benhabib (1992: 152–159, 2011: 58–69) and Code (2012: 88–96) have observed, is that it prejudicially categorises affective attachments as subjective; hence, absolutely disqualifying them from citizenship conceptualisation. This, dissertation goes further by drawing that in principle, strong cosmopolitanism’s universalism dismisses as morally empty, other meaningful and normatively valid reality perspectives and lived experiences of the other of the world (Benhabib, 2011: 68), ultimately making strong cosmopolitan education for democratic citizenship undemocratic and undermining the very equality it sets out to defend. What this dissertation seeks to show is that the lauded impartiality of the prevailing strong cosmopolitanism informing global citizenship conceptualisations, is itself inhered by particularism that ironically outlaws any other particularism on the basis of being particular.

Relatedly, the third theoretical significance of this dissertation is in its examination of the often taken for granted assumptions of global interconnectedness, which necessitate extension and implementation of moral duties beyond the nation (Habermas, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015). This study shows that ideal global interconnectedness for cosmopolitanism ought to presuppose equity among the peoples or individuals of the world. This would inevitably have to concede and include the normativity of diversity of collectives based on national language and history and others. In non-ideal theory, an analysis of strong cosmopolitanism reveals that strong cosmopolitan citizenship claims are based on assumptions of an interconnected globe of equity, yet glaring global inequalities typify the global order. However, there is not much research especially regarding the normative implications of strong cosmopolitan impartiality in education for democratic citizenship on
the moral interests and prospects of people in developing nations who are uniquely situated in the global order. Their unique situatedness demands a unique conceptualisation so as to stop their unique invisibility.

With respect to education policy, this dissertation is valuable in that it calls for a review of how the content of education curriculums is selected and how pedagogy is enacted, especially in developing nations. Cognisant of the embeddedness of particularism and neoliberalism in strong cosmopolitanism leading to denigration of the local, the dissertation demands a new understanding of the value of the local as being uniquely valuable to the learner and constitutive of ideal cosmopolitanism. Significantly, this dissertation contributes towards reinforcing the ground upon which the prevailing, subtly assimilationist education for democratic citizenship may be confronted and reformed so that it is made just. This may inevitably lead to hitherto marginalised and undermined local epistemologies having presence in academic spaces and being developed as alternative paradigms of conceptualising reality.

In education practice, the value of this research is that it would help render what is particular about Malawi and much of Africa become legitimate objects of academic inquiry and debate. Consequently, African and local epistemologies would be equal participants in the global order’s cooperation, bringing unique authentic interests and perspectives to the global order, whilst also being open to hybridisation by adopting some other elements from others. The claims of this research significantly contribute to the re-examination of the prevailing status quo in global cooperation where Malawi and much of Africa are largely only on the receiving end of global interaction and scarcely making solid contributions that the rest of the other global interlocutors would adopt in hybridisation endeavours.

It is worth emphasizing that the central argument of this thesis is not to elevate and promote nationality as an end in itself in cosmopolitanism. Rather this thesis argues that the cosmopolitanism informing education for global citizenship should not be necessarily exclusive of concreteness of the linguistic, historical, and cultural situatedness of the peoples of the world, which in global citizenship are embodied in nationality, regarding them as being morally arbitrary. By necessarily excluding nationality, strong cosmopolitanism simultaneously marginalises the elements of concreteness and situatedness such as language, historicity, and shared public culture as antithetical to cosmopolitan equality and universalism.
1.8. Theoretical framework

This research is grounded in Seyla Benhabib’s (1992: 167–169, 2011: 65–69) idea of a difference-grounded communicative universalism in order to account better for the moral relevance of nationality in the normatively and practically diverse complex global world. Nationality in this case is not a mere tool for realisation of cosmopolitanism, but is one of the elements that constitute it. Unlike other communicative approaches that endeavour to establish universality based on overlapping consensus, i.e. commonality in the context of difference, Benhabib’s model (Benhabib, 2011: 67–69) recognises the value and indispensability of the differences to the moral agents concerned. Since such differences are mostly essential to the other’s being, any legitimate reflection on universality necessarily ought to start from and with the differences as the point of departure, other than exclude them. In other words, ideal universalism must also focus on and include difference rather than avoid it. Anything short of this fails to recognise the full humanness of persons, as it marginalises what individuates them, making the other not only other, but human too, an individuated human (Benhabib, 2011: 130).

Benhabib’s (2011) theory of universalism does not require dismissal of the (non-offensive and non-oppressive) typifying identities of the other’s embeddedness, unlike the prevalent neo-Kantian and Rawlsian conceptions of universalism (Benhabib, 1992: 161) that inform strong cosmopolitanism and build universalism on commonalities only. Rather, for Benhabib (1992, 2011), active recognition of differences is a cornerstone for achieving meaningful universalism that is consistent with ideal human equality. Benhabib (2011: 68) understands universalism to be a lifelong aspiration of attempting to ground commonality across the different, and at times conflicting cultural, political, sociological, and religious divides achieved not through human nature essences alone but more importantly through deliberation among the different (Benhabib, 2011: 68). Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theory is suitable because her universalism is not reducible to an essence or recognition of certain primary attributes applicable to all human beings to which individuals and institutions must conform. Rather, universalism and equality, for her, are realisable from our differences and not just commonalities (Benhabib, 1992: 165; 2011: 68). Ideologically, this is in sharp contrast to strong cosmopolitanism’s universalism advanced by most thinkers discussed before, which also underlies the Malawian primary education curriculum.

The dissertation particularly builds on Benhabib’s conceptualisation of a difference communicative universalism because it offers a critical alternative to the dominant radical
liberal conceptualization of equality, implications of whose postulates are inimical to the very ideal of equality. This is because such neo-Kantian theories validate rights and responsibilities based on human equality that recognizes people’s similarities only as normatively valuable (Benhabib, 2011). Such neo-Kantian theorisations, as Benhabib (1992: 153) holds, only consider the generality of all human beings as the sole foundation for human equality, rights, and duties. She calls this the “general otherness” conception of a human being (Benhabib, 1992: 153). However, only recognising human generality or commonality excludes the particularity and uniqueness of human beings, yet the particularity is what gives the human being concreteness, individuating him or her from the generic of humanity’s commonality. This is why for Benhabib (2011: 67) exclusion of such concreteness of the other (even by other communicative freedom theorists), in essence undermines what makes the other so other, which is in principle also what makes them human. Benhabib (1992: 162) therefore calls for a “concrete otherness” conception of the human person that is built on people’s differences, where through deliberation they achieve a universalism that centrally takes into account the concreteness of the being human for each of those concerned. Under this conception, one fully recognises the worth of the other when one considers and acknowledges him or her as an affective, embodied being who possesses a particular constitutive concrete individual and social history, with unique ties and enmeshed in webs of valued relations with others (Benhabib, 1992: 161).

This dissertation argues that in global citizenship conceptualisation, nationality is the host of global people’s sources of concrete otherness. Unlike strong cosmopolitan citizenship (which exclusively restricts itself to a general otherness standpoint of being human), this dissertation argues that global diversity and embeddedness of the peoples of the world need not be stripped of their moral worth so as to enable realisation of a universalism that serves human generality or commonality only as strong cosmopolitanism entails. A universalism that views all the people of the world in terms of their general commonalities, extinguishing their differences succeeds in undermining and marginalising what makes a particular people the people they are, which also is partly constitutive of the individuation of the individual persons that form the nation group. The possibility, and indeed validity, of a difference-based cosmopolitanism is not only accommodative of mother-tongue instruction and teaching and learning of national history. Rather, the cosmopolitanism is in part largely dependent on the flourishing and nurturing of such particularity.
1.9. On method

The method of the argument of this dissertation is phenomenological in orientation. The thesis adopts a phenomenological approach because of the primacy of values, meanings, feelings, and life experiences of human beings in making a morally comprehensive account about being human (McPhail, 1995: 160) which the dominant cosmopolitan citizenship approaches undermine. Positivistic scientific paradigms as those informing strong cosmopolitanism are incapable of adequately accounting for global citizenship because they necessarily marginalise the subjective meaning-making capacity of human beings (McPhail, 1995: 160).

In evaluating the nature of the cosmopolitanism being advanced by Malawian primary education for cosmopolitan citizenship, this dissertation initially deconstructs the predominant conceptualisations of nationality and cosmopolitanism in order to account for the normativity of the difference embedded in nationality that strong cosmopolitanism maligns. Such a deconstruction of the dominant conceptualisations of both nationality and cosmopolitanism is also necessary to reveal that the two ideals other than being incompatible, are in principle necessarily complementary such that in ideal theory, one does not exist without the other.

Through a critical commentary of the postulates of and conditions for strong cosmopolitan universalism, the dissertation deconstructs the positivistic scientific assumptions of universalism of strong cosmopolitan citizenship that is informing Malawian education for citizenship. The deconstruction exposes the unquestioned metaphysical assumptions about being human and the consequent universalism that anchor strong cosmopolitan citizenship, so as to reconstruct a new model of cosmopolitan citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship education that recognise the normativity of difference.

The dissertation first discusses what constitutes tolerable nationality, and why such nationality has normative value in conceptualisation of citizenship that is consistent with the norms of equality and individual freedom. This is achieved by arguing that when re-imagined under a difference-grounded moral framework, elements of nationality partly, yet significantly, constitute people and an individual’s embeddedness, which is their concreteness. As such, aspects of nationality have normative value and are not inherently inimical to cosmopolitan universalism. Later, the study examines the foundation and normative implications of strong cosmopolitanism, ultimately showing that dismissal of national particularism is inconsistent with the logic of ideal cosmopolitan equality. The two
are, in principle, ideals which mutually correct and regulate each other (Papastephanou, 2013b).

Upon establishing the compatibility and mutual dependence of nationality and ideal cosmopolitanism, the dissertation explores how a just education must realise ideal citizenship, an education that is sensitive and responsive to both embeddedness (concreteness) and general commonality of humanity, without in principle being assimilationist through the parading of an inherently particularistic education for democratic citizenship as impartial.

Having established the normative ground for education to be necessarily compatible with and nurturing of embeddedness, the study makes an examination of trends in citizenship and education for democratic citizenship during the main political epochs of Malawi: the colonial (1890s to 1964), independence (1964–1993), and democratic (1994 to present) eras. The focus is on how consistent education for democratic citizenship in Malawi has been with ideal cosmopolitanism, which is characteristically reflectively open to the global, and critically loyal to the local (Hansen, 2011: 1). The dissertation evaluates the implications of prevailing education for democratic citizenship in the context of the argued-for necessity of the local in the global.

In defence of the necessity of the local in the global, the dissertation argues for a complementary possible paradigm of a normatively valid conception of universalism. The dissertation therefore contends that *ubuntu* universalism, which is characteristically different from the mainstream neo-Kantian and Rawlsian universalism, in that it is grounded in a relational rather than individualistic rationality, is capable of resolving the highlighted limitations of strong cosmopolitan citizenship. Without necessarily pitting the two models of cosmopolitanism against each other, the *ubuntu* one demonstrates that strong cosmopolitanism’s agent-centric universalism is only one of morally valid other alternative perspectives of human nature and equality, and it is not the sole exclusive standard.

It is worth highlighting that this study is not making a case for a nation-only education for democratic citizenship. Neither is it arguing for outlawing of moral impartiality and universality of moral norms. Rather it is arguing that there is normative value in nationality and that cosmopolitanism, necessary as it is, must interactively exist on mutually dependent terms with nationality.
1.10. Chapter outline

Following this introduction to the research, the second chapter argues for the normative validity of nationality for a democracy that is meaningful to its constituent individual members and the collective, whilst still respecting individual autonomy. I argue that members of a democratic community are embedded beings that variously and inescapably have a special attachment to the nation, through its aspects of geographical territoriality, language, shared culture, and common history (Miller, 1995: 27). Usually, such elements of nationality are dismissed as pertaining to the affective and therefore subjective domain of human nature and hence, are unfit for inclusion in moral configurations of citizenship. Employing Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theory of a difference-grounded communicative freedom, the chapter aims to show that such morally undermined aspects of nationality are actually sources of communities’ concreteness for peoples across the world (although in varying degrees), which ultimately enable meaningful choice-making for their autonomous members. The normativity of nationality cannot just be dismissed by a prejudicial, ostensibly objective, category of the universal. Dismissing the public recognition and responsible advancement of inclusive aspects of nationality, by regarding it as a private matter, in principle recognises in the peoples of the world only the generality of their being human, whilst dismissing that which individuates and makes them peculiar as individuals and collectives. It is to deny their concreteness, which is the flipside of denying them equality. I therefore also argue that the substitution of national patriotism with an impartial procedural or constitutional patriotism is unattainable and would not be meaningful to the people concerned.

Chapter 3, examines strong cosmopolitanism. The chapter argues that strong cosmopolitanism’s precondition of impartiality towards all human relationships is informed by an atomistic conception of human nature. This leaves out and outlaws other valid alternative conceptions of universalism of human equality that are not exclusively grounded in human agency alone. The chapter also contends that cosmopolitanism and nationality are not antagonistic, incompatible ideals. Instead, they are mutually reinforcing and correcting ideals, such that the two are ideally inseparable. Meaningful universalism therefore needs both to exist simultaneously. The chapter further argues that the impartiality towards all human relationships as the precondition of ensuring global justice, betrays a misdiagnosis of the primary sources of global injustice, inequality, and tension that motivates strong cosmopolitanism and sets out to resolve. Strong cosmopolitanism leaves untouched the core problem of the skewed nature of the global structure.
Chapter 4, argues for the normative necessity that education for democratic and cosmopolitan citizenship should be responsive to tolerable aspects of nationality. Whilst conceding the paramountcy of developing authenticity and autonomy in learners as arguably one of the fundamental aims of education, the chapter contends that such a fundamental endeavour does not necessarily demand the exclusion of community or patriotic interests reducing them to the private sphere and unworthy of determining public policy. National members in a democratic nation-state share a foundational fate that is grounded in elements of nationality, contestable as the content of such elements may be. The shared fate underlies the people’s public institutions including educational ones. As such meaningful education must necessarily be connected to the lived experiences of the learners. However, in education, the major problem of strong cosmopolitan impartiality is that it presupposes that educational experiences are culture-neutral. However, in the school the formal and hidden curriculum are biased towards one epistemological orientation and metaphysical conception of human nature that ultimately promote attitudes that denigrate and marginalise otherness. Upon close examination, one discovers that the ostensible objectivity and impartiality of strong cosmopolitan universalism that motivates and dominates the epistemology in education and education for global citizenship is inhered by philosophical and cultural particularism. Such an impartiality therefore has the real risk of passively coercing learners especially in developing nations to ignore their particularity and in principle assimilate into the dominant ostensibly ‘impartial’ mainstream.

Chapter 5 is an analysis of the evolution of education for citizenship, with respect to the nature and role of nationality and cosmopolitanism, in Malawi primary school education for citizenship during the colonial era (1891–1964), the independence era (1964–1994), and the democratic era (1994 to the present). The chapter shows that colonialists advanced a generally essentialist, and assimilationist form of cosmopolitanism enacted by colonial education as well as the other-denigrating experiences of colonialism itself. However, during this era, nationality played a crucial liberation role as nationality embodied the people’s concreteness which the people defended from colonial hegemony. Nationality was also the vehicle through which mobilisation for political solidarity against colonialism was achievable.

The 30-year independence era that followed colonial liberation, however, was characterised by a bounded uncritical nationalism under the guise of achieving national unity as there was a one party dictatorship. There was systematic and direct violation of the fundamental
cosmopolitan tenet of the individual having inviolable dignity hence being the ultimate unit of moral concern. The chapter further argues that primary school education for democratic citizenship during the democratic period (1994 to present) in Malawi makes only tokenistic commitments of including morally relevant aspects of nationality. The education is characteristically inspired by strong cosmopolitanism. The chapter attributes this to both a lack of political will on the part of national leadership and the homogenising effects of neoliberalism that informs the global order. The ultimate result of the essentialist strong cosmopolitan impartiality in Malawi is that it is marginalising the concrete and epistemic otherness of the Malawian in the global arena.

The chapter argues that it is normatively imperative that Malawian education for democratic (and global) citizenship affirms and embraces the tolerable aspects of nationality, whilst promoting visions of citizenship that transcend nation boundaries. Malawi must embrace a global citizenship that does not necessarily require sacrificing the local for the universal global or vice versa, because each of the two has incomparable and indispensable worth. The chapter therefore argues for a cosmopolitanism orientation founded on Seyla Benhabib’s (2011) difference-grounded deliberative universalism. It is only such a universalism that would manage to accord due value to the otherness that is constitutive of global peoples without compromising on duties originating from human commonality.

Chapter 6 discusses principles of ubuntu ethics, and how they provide alternative perspectives of human nature in the conceptualisation of global and democratic citizenships. As a representative of relational ethics approaches, ubuntu is a demonstration of how the limitations that originate from the individual-centrism that inspires strong cosmopolitan impartiality can be overcome or avoided by an alternative conceptualisation of human nature. In other words, there is no inherent conflict between relational being and agency as strong cosmopolitanism entails. Community commitments are not antithetical to the human equality value of equal concern. More importantly, the chapter shows that the nature of ubuntu is characteristically deliberative. Ubuntu can therefore anchor a universalism that is grounded in difference thus coming to the aid of the prevailing strong cosmopolitan citizenship that inherently undermines community interests. Lastly, the chapter sketches the practical relevance of ubuntu in education for citizenship in conceptualisation of education aims, in curriculum design and implementation, assessment practice, and environmental education.

The last chapter draws conclusions from the study. It highlights the limitations of this study. It also draws out areas of the study that require further researching into.
Chapter 2:
The value of nationality

2.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the normative value of nationality. I argue that nationality has normative value and that it is therefore indispensable in the conceptualisations of both local and global citizenships. I build on Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) idea of the concrete standpoint of human equality, which regards human subjectivities as equally crucial cornerstones in normative conceptualisations of a human being and the relations he or she establishes. Subjectivities constitute individuality. As such, a full account of human equality must include differences of otherness as an essential part of the foundation of the conception of moral universalism. I therefore argue that nationality is the host of different sources of concreteness that enable the autonomous individual achieve his or her self-determining capacity. Achievement of this capacity is indispensable from the social relations of care, their attendant institutions, and the elements within them that make community life possible, such as shared language, a common way of life, shared history, and a common geographical territory. Actualisation of the ‘objectively’ autonomous person is dependent on these ‘subjective’ relations of care although they are marginalised as normatively inconsequential (Code, 2012).

In this chapter I therefore contend that the strong cosmopolitan conceptualization of the normativity of the relations of the autonomous self-determining individual whose autonomy ostensibly depends on the condition of detachment from social relationships, is a result of an undue privileging of the rational ‘objective’ over the affective ‘subjective’, and is inconsistent with the complexity and irreducibility to essences of human nature. In other words, it is impossible to achieve such an autonomous capacity under such detachment.

With respect to global citizenship, I argue that nationality hosts the sources through which the global peoples self-express their otherness, which is an indispensable ingredient of their concrete being (Benhabib, 2011: 130) in the world. In other words, a global citizenship built on ‘objective’ similarities only, hides away these sources of concrete otherness (Benhabib, 2011); thus, normatively speaking, undermining what makes the people of the world the actual and not abstract peculiar people that they are.

Secondly, in this chapter I further argue that the normative value of nationality renders it indispensable in the realisation and sustenance of a political culture for a flourishing
democracy. Thus, contrary to the advocacy for the sufficiency of a constitutional patriotism alone (Habermas, 1994, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015), the role of nationality in political communities is not restricted to the operational utility of nationality as a mere effective and efficient principle for the organisation of people into communities suitable for political cooperation, and that nationality is in itself devoid of any moral value. Rather, nationality cannot be detached from the political community for nationality is what makes democracy both possible and meaningful. Nationality cannot be substituted by constitutional or civic patriotism because constitutional patriotism is built on aspects of the people’s nationality. Constitutional patriotism cannot therefore single-handedly sustain a democracy without regular national patriotism. Building on the mutual dependence of constitutional patriotism and nationality, I further argue that the inherence of national interests in ostensibly neutral institutions of global cooperation, such as in the global economy, is not due to malfunctioning or mal-structuring of such institutions. Rather, it is a result of the indispensability of nationality from such aspects of global cooperation.

Ultimately, I argue that national history and a national language as elements of nationality must of necessity be included in the curriculum. Critical national history is not a collection of indoctrinations about otherwise gone events now decaying in the past. I argue that national history is an indispensable component of determining the justness of a community’s present, which is always intelligible and meaningful in relation to the past.

In the next section I discuss the major elements of a tolerable nationality and address some of the common criticisms levelled against it. I later discuss Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) idea of a difference-grounded dialogic universalism that offers a clearer framework for the appreciation of the normativity of nationality. In the subsections under Section 2.4., I argue drawing from Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theory of universalism that aspects of nationality qualify as sources of the individual and community’s concrete otherness.

### 2.2. Key aspects of nationality

This section discusses the major aspects of nationality. There are always variations in how different people place value on different aspects of collective life (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003), including nationality. This renders defining ideal nationality complex and complicated. However, according to Miller (1995: 8) there are general elements of nationality that are commonly shared by a people who constitute a nation group, especially those living in a nation-state without necessarily excluding the people’s other sources of identity. Shared elements of nationality, are thus the people’s conscious appropriations that serve as a means
for making sense of their social and political contexts (Miller, 1995: 10). Furthermore, for Miller (1995: 10), even though national allegiance has some instinctual basis, it can however not be reduced to mere irrational emotions and instincts. Nationality, for Miller (1995: 6), is not a force outside the control of human beings despite the fact that they generally conform to its demands (Miller, 1995: 6). The conception of nationality being advanced in this dissertation is not that which is based on religious, racial or ethnic homogeneity. It neither condones the nationalism that regards nations as organic wholes that demand that individual interests should be subject to and secondary to the interests of the nation (Miller, 1995: 8). Rather it is a nationality that is based on shared thin aspects of collective being that are tolerable, inclusive, non-fundamentalist and compatible with individual freedom and democratic life.

Defending the value of nationality and that the state actively supports the different non-excluding forms of nationality is not tantamount to compelling members that they conform their interests to the national interest (Miller, 1995: 46). This perspective of national identity recognises that the individual human being has numerous and complex identities not only with respect to nationality. Human beings are able to have and juggle with different types of identities. The necessity of recognising national identity lies in its worth to the individual member as well as sustenance of the democratic community, which is necessary for human flourishing (Miller, 1995: 67).

Nationality has some outstanding characteristic aspects. These aspects are not always expected to manifest on every national group or every member of a national group in equal measure (Papastephanou, 2015: 195). According to Miller (1995: 23), the first aspect is that members have a belief that they belong to and constitute a common community. In this sense, they recognise themselves to be part of a community under which they have developed and would want to continue together under it. In the process, they recognise the commitments that come with being part of such a community.

The second aspect of nationality is historicity (Miller, 1995: 23). Origins of national groups are traceable to a very distant past whose events and memories not only bond together different individual members, but also urge them to keep preserving the historical past for the future (Miller, 1995). The history of the nation captures both the accomplishments and failures of the ancestors, which the present members of the nation recognise, in which they take pride, and of which they are ashamed when necessary (Kymlicka, 1997: 21). The members appropriate the works of their ancestors, and have passive or active duties towards
the modification, preservation and advancement of the traditions, customs and legacy of their ancestors through to the next generations (Miller, 1995: 23–24). Thus, the historical property of nations renders them to be both backward- and forward-looking. The individual member today looks at himself as part of this history and wants it continued, altering its direction where he or she can.

The third outstanding attribute of nations is that they have an attachment to a particular geographical territory (Miller, 1995: 24). This property is closely connected to the sense of historicity in that nation groups mostly have an actual or aspired homeland, which is at the centre of their identity as well as history (Miller, 1995: 24). Thus one can derive that the histories and identities of national members and nation groups are strongly attached to the territory.

The fourth aspect of national identity is that nations are active and they decide collectively (Miller, 1995: 24). In contemporary times, there is an overlap between nations and states. Most nations actively make decisions over different phenomena that concern them through elected office bearers who are in general terms deemed to be active articulators of the national will (Miller, 1995: 26). The ability of nations to decide collectively has on occasions historically led to inappropriate decisions (Merry, 2009: 379; Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Nevertheless, one can safely argue that this by itself does not take away a nation’s tendency of expressing its will collectively in a favourable constructive way. This property of nations implies that national groups are not obliged to conform rigidly and unreflectively to the ways of life and activities as inherited from their ancestors without refining them or altering them where necessary.

The fifth characteristic of nations is that they are communities, which share a common public culture (Miller, 1995: 25). According to Miller (1995: 26), one should not conflate this with a closed discriminatory nationalism whose common culture is based on biological descent or shared religious convictions. Other than having a monolithic form and content, this common public culture is inclusive of all other would-be members (Miller, 1995: 25). Although one may not exhaustively pick out all the elements that constitute a common public culture, it essentially consists of the members’ explicitly and implicitly agreed mode of living and conducting and arranging its affairs (Miller, 1995: 26). However, one major outstanding element of such a culture is language (Coetzee, 2003: 324; Simpson, 2008: 1). National members collectively, actively, or passively express a will and commitment to preserve the official status and purity of the national language(s) (Miller, 1995: 26). Other elements of
shared public culture may include the form of a nation’s beliefs, common foods, their social norms such as honour, politeness, cultural ideals such as festivals, holidays mostly about events or personalities that had bearing on the history of the community, maintenance of the national language, literature and art, and common architecture (Miller, 1995: 25–27). However, given the prominence of shared language as a marker and common rallying point of shared culture, this dissertation emphasizes on language as a dominant marker of public culture and sometimes interchangeably refers to language as the common public culture element of nationality.

It should be underlined that neither of these aspects of nationality should imply inherent exclusion of those who do not share them (Miller, 1995: 26). Since the public common culture is not monolithic, its content and magnitude vary across members. There need not be a standard way of expressing it. Nevertheless, given the numerous explicit and implicit relevances of modes of nationality expression, it is inconceivable how a member of a nation-state can escape participating in it altogether as nationality underlies even the seemingly neutral affairs of individual life as well as of social cooperation (Miller, 1995: 164). Furthermore, members are not compelled to display the public culture in some minimum measure or have their interests conform to those of the nation (MacIntyre, 2002: 69; Papastephanou, 2011: 221). For Miller (1995: 26), this means that such a conception of nationality is tolerant of any would-be member or immigrant willing to become part of the life of the community.

In summary, the five aspects of nationality which this research will constantly refer to as representative of nationality are belief about a community, a history, ability to decide actively and collectively, connection to a geographical territory and possession of a shared public culture, including and especially a common language. Individual members’ identities are shaped by these features in varying degrees.

2.2.1. Re-imagining nationality

The concept of nationality or patriotism mostly invokes negative and extremist attitudes. Nationality is usually associated with extremist and exclusive political ideologies that place premium moral value on nativism, race, religion or a mixture of these as essential attributes for membership into the group (Miller, 1995: 26; Papastephanou, 2013a). Such conceptions of essentialist patriotism are not only exclusive about membership, but the exclusion is reinforced by claims or insinuations of national superiority, which esteem the group as
morally, culturally and intellectually superior over all other groups and people in general (Williams, 2003: 208; Papastephanou, 2013a: 23). Such a conception of nationality always comes with horrible results, and history is replete with such forms of nationalism, such as the Holocaust, the two world wars, and genocide and ethnic cleansing being the recent outputs of such a nationalism. Today, racist and supremacist nationalism are emerging, manifesting among others through a rise in the support for right-wing political ideologies and parties in Europe (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015) and related groups in the United States of America (Goodheart, 2018).

Nationality critics generally drawing from a Rawlsian veil of ignorance perspective (Rawls, 1999: 118–130), argue that nationality has no moral value worth promoting and inclusion in citizenship, contending that since it is unchosen, nationality is among the accidents of birth that render nationality morally arbitrary (Beitz, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Bader, 2005; Caney, 2005, 2015; Callan, 2006; Kateb, 2006; Abizadeh, 2008; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). Such nationality opponents argue that whilst the relationships that exist between an individual and his or her family have strong bonds of affection that would necessitate some form of partiality, the same cannot be said to be the case with nationality whose bonds with fellow members rests on imagination (Arneson, 2016). Critics such as Arneson (2016: 560) extend this position further, to argue that although patriotic attachments are regarded as meaningful, it is hard to draw a line on what constitutes special attachments (especially based on characteristics that are not a result of one’s moral choice). Nationality can therefore not be distinguished from ‘moderate’ racists who without advancing racial supremacy, argue that it is important that they form a common group that will promote their interests as a racial group (Arneson, 2016: 560).

Given this background, the tendency has been to regard nationality as inherently immoral (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Nationality is thus understood as not only something that should be excluded from normative configurations of citizenship, but rather it is an ideal that must be overcome altogether. However, as I intend to show in this chapter, nationality does not inhere evil. The thrust of this dissertation is that there are normatively valid conceptualisations of nationality that are necessarily worth defending especially in the light of globalisation of citizenship. It is worth noting that essentialism of culture, religion, race, nativism or a mixture of any of these does not constitute a morally defensible nationalism. The nationality or patriotism being defended in this dissertation is moderate and not only inclusive of but
welcoming of new membership. Whilst acknowledging a special affection for one’s country, nationality is incompatible with beliefs of its superiority over others, and whilst national belonging seeks the country’s flourishing, it is incompatible with dominating other nations since it also acknowledges the moral or cosmopolitan dimension of pursuit of national interest (Nathanson, 2007: 76; Papastephanou, 2013b: 173). The type of nationality being defended in this dissertation is one characterised by “critical, non-chauvinistic” perspectives (Nathanson, 2007: 76) and therefore is incompatible with national exceptionalism and domination of other nations.

Having discussed the elements of nationality and the challenges it faces, the sub-sections under Section 2.5. make a case for the normative justification of nationality in both local and global citizenship. However, to effectively account for the normativity of nationality and complementarity of nationality with human equality especially in global citizenship conceptualisation, it is necessary to employ a paradigm of universalism that is not rigidly dismissive of otherness but recognises the normativity of otherness to individuation and collective being. Therefore, I first discuss Seyla Benhabib’s difference-grounded universalism (Benhabib, 1992, 2011) in the next section. Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) universalism that recognises normativity in both difference and similarity is remarkably distinct from the Rawlsian universalism (Rawls, 1999: 118–139) and essentialist neo-Kantian universalism (Code, 2012) that inherently dismiss (national) difference and otherness as inherently morally arbitrary.

### 2.3. Seyla Benhabib’s universalism

This section discusses Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) theorization about the problem of the nature and conditions of ideal universalism that should inform modern political systems, especially in the light of global diversity. The relevance of her theory for this dissertation constitutes in the theory’s grounding of the the universalism of human equality in not only the commonalities people have as human beings, but more importantly in their differences.

Benhabib holds that human equality resides in the fact that all human beings have the fundamental “right to have rights” (Benhabib, 2011: 26). This fundamental right is itself rooted in an individual’s right to communicative freedom, which is “your capacity to agree or disagree with me on the basis of reasons the validity of which you accept or reject” (Benhabib, 2011: 26). In other words, this means that by virtue of being language speakers, all human beings have the capability of communicative freedom. Thus, an individual has an
“ability to say “yes” or “no” to an utterance whose validity claims [he or she] comprehends and according to which [he or she] can act” (Benhabib, 2011: 67).

What this reasoning means is that besides being an agent capable of formulating my own goals, I am also embedded in a shared social world (Benhabib, 2011: 68). I therefore have to acknowledge and respect those others (in the shared social world who will be affected in one way or the other by my actions). The others too have agency like me. Just like me, the others too have the capacity to agree or disagree with my action and the validity of the reasons of the action (Benhabib, 2011: 68). Sharing these two (agency and embeddedness) is what makes us equal (Benhabib, 2011: 68–69). What this means is that by respecting the other people’s capacity to agree or disagree with the validity of the reasons for my action, I am not necessarily looking for the other people’s approval, clearance, or endorsement of my action. Rather, I am only respecting the other people’s communicative freedom. Like me, the other people are beings capable of agreeing or disagreeing with the validity of my or anybody else’s claims or reasons for action. One can see that such considerations for action necessarily entail a dialogical relationship. As interlocutors, we are not looking for conformity to a predetermined acceptable position, nor are we looking for a common stand over a particular matter. Rather, our engagement with each other is motivated by our looking for mutual understanding, recognition and respect of the forcefulness, value, and relevance of the other’s position to him or her. My agency thus understood, is for Benhabib (2011: 68) the flipside of my communicative freedom and hence the conclusion that the capacity to justify goals is prior to the agency to formulate them.

For Benhabib (2011: 68), the reasons for my action serve two purposes. Firstly, the reasons are the grounds, which motivate me as a being with agency. Secondly they are –

[Also accounts of my actions as I project myself as a “doer” unto a social world which I share with others, and through which others recognize me as a person capable of, and responsible for, certain courses of action. [Therefore] agency and communication are two sides of the same coin: I only know myself as an agent, because I can anticipate being part of a social space in which others recognize me as the initiator of certain deeds and the speaker of certain words for which I must be able to provide an account (Benhabib, 2011: 68).

What Benhabib (2011) demands is that an individual be understood not only as an agent capable of formulating own goals and pursuing them. Rather, this human being, with agency, should be understood as one situated in a social context of mutual recognition with others. It can be drawn that in this context, one is responsible for not only pursuing one’s
autonomously formulated goals, but also recognising that one must account for one’s deeds to the other members of society though not necessarily for approval. I do not have only the agency to act, but for every action I undertake I have a justification or reasons, whose validity I would ideally expect everybody to accept. Nevertheless, I realise that, in reality, some may not accept the validity of the reasons. But after explaining my reasons to the others and they disagree with and reject the reasons, I still expect the other individuals to recognise and respect the value of my self-set goals to me. In other words, the obligation to respect my capacity for agency necessarily entails an obligation to respect the mode and substance of my self-expression which is the exercise of my communicative freedom (Benhabib, 2011: 68).

Ideally I would desire everyone to approve of my reasons for action. The other individuals too – by virtue of being equal to me – have the same legitimate expectation from me. I also therefore have the same ‘obligation’ to them. I must hear their reasons for their position and consequently accept the validity to the others of the norms underlying their reasons even when I find them unsatisfactory to me personally. All this requires that I recognise the capacity of the other (as well as my own) to provide reasons for actions and to accept or reject their validity (Benhabib, 2011: 69).

What one draws is that this capacity to initially have reasons for action and later exercise agency, expecting others to recognise and respect my value of the reasons for the exercise of my agency makes universality of human equality place human differences at the center. The terms for the validity of the norms are not universal or abstract, demanding unconditional strict conformity from moral agents. The terms of such a validity are not prior to or external to the experiences of each of us, and is neither in a binding hierarchy to which all of us must conform. Rather, the validity is established through “justificatory processes through which you and I, in dialogue must convince each other of the validity of certain norms [which are] general rules of action” (Benhabib, 2011: 67). Thus universalism must be dialogical.

In Benhabib’s (2011: 67) communicative universalism, unlike the essentialist one propounded by thinkers like Kant, the pivotal argument is not that the individual undertakes a moral thought experiment to identify absolute and universal moral maxims of action which every rational individual would will. A universalism rooted in discourse does not require that I establish principles through an imaginary process that is independent of and mutes my social, gender, cultural and historical experiences and circumstances in a quest of arriving at impartial moral principles as does the Rawlsian universalism (Benhabib, 2011: 67). Instead, for Benhabib (2011), the centrality of the discourse is that the theoretical justification of
human rights and human freedom is based on the processes of justification through which two different people in a dialogue convince each other of the validity of each other’s norms (Benhabib, 2011: 68).

What one draws is that the uniqueness of the deliberative approach to universalism lies in that the validity of the norms is not prior to the deliberation. The interlocutors embark on a conversation to ground the validity of the norms. The uniqueness of this model of universalism of human freedom and equality is that the model accords significance to two distinct but related conceptions of the ‘other’ involved in the discourse: the generalised other and the concrete other moral standpoints (Benhabib, 2011: 69). Through these conceptions, Benhabib’s (2011: 67) universalism avoids committing the error of elevating one conception of being human over another conception as the Rawlsian (Rawls, 1999: 118–139) and Kantian ethics do (Code, 2012). Ultimately denying all difference normative value. In the next sub-sections I discuss these two conceptualizations of the general and concrete moral standpoints of being human.

2.3.1. The generalised other
A comprehensive discussion of Behabib’s notions of generalised and concrete conceptualizations of the being human is in her earlier book Situating the self (1992). In this book, Benhabib (1992) is critical of Western tradition’s moral theories from Hobbes to Rawls for being substitutionalist. Such ethical theories only recognise the generalised common identity of all human beings as a basis for grounding universalism and human rights. Such theories completely exclude the relevance of concrete being, which they consider as having no moral value in establishing universal ethics (Benhabib, 1992: 152).

The generalised other standpoint demands that we regard every individual human being as rational and entitled to the exact rights and duties which we ascribe to ourselves and this is achieved by abstracting “from the individuality and concrete identity of the other” (Benhabib, 1992: 158). Thus, one recognises that just like one, the other is a being who has concrete needs, desires and concrete affects, nevertheless, his or her moral dignity does not reside in such attributes that differentiate us from each other (which conversely make each of us unique). His or her dignity instead is constituted in the commonality of our rationality as speaking and acting agents (Benhabib, 1992: 158). One relates with the other under the governance of formal equality and reciprocity and our interactions “are primarily public and institutional” (Benhabib, 1992: 158). This is why my interaction with the other occurs in a
context shaped by the moral categories of the duty and obligation we owe each other as beings with inherent dignity (Benhabib, 1992: 159).

For Benhabib (1992: 152–153), much of political theory since Hobbes has been about universalism grounded on the standpoint of the general other where the universalism (of moral dignity and human rights) is based only on the general similarities human beings have in common with each other. In the choice of moral principles of justice, the Rawlsian original position makes the differences among those behind the veil of ignorance irrelevant but only common interests (Rawls, 1999: 118). However, such approaches, as Benhabib (1992) argues, ignore the crucially relevant standpoint of the concrete other. For Benhabib (1992: 161), the individuals behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (who are ignorant of their gender and social-economic situated-ness in order to effectively arrive at impartial and impersonal moral principles) are not human selves at all. In the quest of achieving objectivity and impartiality of moral principles, Rawls’ employment of Immanuel Kant’s *noumenal* agency (Benhabib, 1992: 161) lands into a problem in that *noumenal* selves cannot be individuated. This, as Benhabib (1992: 161) argues, is because individuated beings are “embodied, affective, suffering creatures [with] memory and history, [and] ties and relations to others” and they pertain to the phenomenal realm. Regrettably, in Kantian ethics, the phenomenon realm is not a site for objective moral principles. The generalised standpoint is therefore ultimately empty; it refers to everyone (that which pertains to all human beings); yet, at the same time it also refers to no one (as it dismisses people’s embeddedness in their social contexts that accord them distinctiveness) (Benhabib, 1992: 161).

What I glean from the general other standpoint is that it ignores the individuating peculiar differences of human beings in its conception of equality and freedom. I further glean that the profoundness of the limitation of the general other moral standpoint lies in that what gives the actual human being a sense of individuation are not the similarities he or she shares with everybody. Rather it is what makes him or her different from others. Otherness has some unique differences that do not only make me different but authentic. The erroneous assumption made by the generalised other standpoint is that it is only the public and institutional relationships the individual has that have normative value, and that such relationships are distinct and separate from the non-public or private ones the person has (Benhabib, 1992: 158–159). However, what the terms of interaction in public institutions do by extinguishing the differentiating features of a human person, in principle denies what individuates the person.
2.3.2. The concrete other

The concrete moral standpoint demands that in acknowledging equality with the other, I must regard the other as an embodied individual rational being “with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotion constitution” (Benhabib, 1992: 159). Besides abstracting that which constitutes my commonality with the other, I must also “focus on individuality” (Benhabib, 1992: 159). I therefore must endeavour to understand the other’s needs, what motivates him or her, what he or she values and how he or she values it. The norms of equity and complementary reciprocity govern our relationships with each other, as each legitimately expects forms of behaviour that will make him or her feel “recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents and capacities” (Benhabib, 1992: 159).

Our differences complement us in our relationships, unlike in the generalised other where our differences exclude us in our relationships (Benhabib, 1992: 159). For Benhabib (1992: 159), the norms of our interaction are largely, although not always, non-institutional and they are private – “norms of friendship, love, and care” sympathy, and solidarity. Relating with the other through such norms and feelings confirms my recognition of not only his or her humanity (as does the general other standpoint), but rather his or her individuality.

The individuality of the other not only constitutes in his or her being a rational being. The individuality is in his or her experiences as an embodied being with affections, a being with a particular memory, history and with interrelations with others (Benhabib, 1992: 159). Thus understanding the other only as an impersonal being undermines his or her being human (Benhabib, 1992: 161). The general otherness moral standpoint considers only our commonality whilst dismissing our differences as not being central in understanding the basis of equality and the attendant human rights and obligations derived from human equality. The implication one draws from the general otherness standpoint is that it deems aspects of concrete otherness as inhibitive of any prospects and endeavours of attaining the impartial conditions under which human dignity can be respected through autonomous agency.

The goal of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance is that I who know who or what I am, must ignore all such knowledge to reflect and deliberate effectively on impartial principles of justice for society (Rawls, 1999: 118). I should equally freeze all such peculiarities about the other. However, for Benhabib (1992), such a thought experiment is defective. The fault lies in the fact that during the deliberation for principles of justice there is no way I will know who the others are or what constitutes and motivates them (Benhabib, 1992: 167). This is because, according to the Rawlsian universalism tradition (Rawls, 1999: 118), all knowledge,
assumptions and prejudices I have about others must be extinguished once we are deliberating about principles of justice, behind the veil of ignorance. All I should know about others with whom I will relate in a scheme of social cooperation are our similar situatedness as impersonal beings. The alleged aim is to achieve symmetry; hence, impartiality in the way each relates to everyone else (Rawls, 1999: 123–125).

However, for Benhabib (1992), the dismissal of such assumptions and prejudices has no meaningful role to play in the deliberation and realisation of the principles of justice. The dismissal only yields a morally problematic outcome. This is because these assumptions and prejudices that touch on the individuality of the concrete others are never accorded the space to be heard, shared, discussed, worked out and worked through dialogically (Benhabib, 1992: 167–168). For Benhabib, (1992) unless these assumptions and prejudices about otherness are confronted and deliberatively considered, there exists a real danger of misunderstanding and undermining the moral weight of what individuates the other. Ultimately, the Rawlsian original position still entrenches within it misunderstandings about and hostilities towards the other hidden behind the impartiality and impersonality of the veil of ignorance (Benhabib, 1992: 167). One draws out that unfortunately, these prejudices and misunderstandings will still determine how the people as concrete beings will relate in the implementation of the ‘impartial’ principles they will have agreed.

Given this context, Benhabib (1992) therefore concludes that the identity of any human self cannot be defined with reference to his or her capacity for agency alone. The identity also must include the actuality of my choices. It is about how as a “finite, concrete, embodied individual”, I re-create and shape “the circumstances of my birth and family, linguistic, cultural and gender identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my life’s story” (Benhabib, 1992: 167).

The case for the normativity of nationality which this dissertation is making (see section 2.5.) is informed by Benhabib’s (1992) position about concreteness that basically holds that individuation does not pertain only to a transcendental self (to the disdain of neo-Kantians and Rawlsians) that is delinked from the empirical and distinctive aspects of particularity of the self. In agreement with Benhabib (1992), I argue in this dissertation that in cosmopolitan education for citizenship, a normatively full account of being human must actively take into consideration the individual’s context of social, economic, linguistic, cultural, gender and historical embeddedness. As I will argue later (see section 2.4.2. and 2.4.3.), this perspective of universalism must accommodate nationality as being important in our understanding of
individuals’ identities in the modern globalised world. We must avoid basing global relationships – that are based on the generalised other moral standpoint – on the exclusion of the concreteness of people’s nationality on the essentialist basis that national particularism is anti-ethical to cosmopolitan impartiality.

Remarkably, both the concreteness and the otherness of the concrete other cannot be known satisfactorily as long as the other’s own voice is absent, when he or she cannot self-define his or her concreteness and his or her otherness (Benhabib, 1992: 165). I become aware of the other’s concreteness as well as his or her otherness only after the other him- or herself has made me aware of his or her otherness and concreteness. In the absence of dialogue, engagement and confrontation we may (usually unsuccessfully) only assume what constitutes the other’s otherness or, at worst, ignore it altogether in indifference. For Benhabib (1992: 165), this is where the distinction between “substitutionalist” universalism of the generalised moral standpoint and the “interactive universalism” of the concrete standpoint lies (1992: 165). For Benhabib, (1992) moral universalism does not reside in an essence or human nature that we all allegedly have or possess as the generalised other perspective supposes. Instead, universalism consists in experiences of finding commonality in a context of mutually acknowledged diversity, conflict, divide and struggle (Benhabib, 2011: 68). I argue that such a universalism must include one’s nationality as part of one’s embeddedness, concreteness and otherness in forms of global relationships. Universalism is thus a perennial moral aspiration to strive for in the context of acknowledged divides and diversity (Benhabib, 2011: 70). For Benhabib (2011: 70), universalism is neither a fact nor a description of the essence of the human being or of the world (Benhabib, 2011: 68). It is dialogical.

For Benhabib (1992), such a discourse ethics does not regard the moral standpoint as primarily an abstract thought process, which the moral agent or moral philosopher singlehandedly undertakes. Rather, it is supposed to be a result of an actual dialogue context with other moral agents about what constitutes otherness and concreteness of the concrete other. Benhabib (1992: 169) further holds that the discourse model of ethics does not place restrictions on the object of moral reasoning or moral disputation as does the general other standpoint. The more the knowledge moral agents have about the other’s concreteness, the peculiarities of his or her society, how it intends to approach its future, the more meaningful will be the deliberations for the terms of cooperation and relation with each other among the moral agents (Benhabib, 1992: 169). Thus as Benhabib (1992: 169) highlights further,
communicative or discourse ethics enlarges the domain of moral theory since not only issues of justice but also questions of the good life come to form the discourse.

Interactive universalism, as Benhabib (1992: 153) argues, acknowledges the role of reason in resolution of normative matters since moral deliberation requires the elements of fairness, reciprocity and some mode of universalisability. More importantly, however, interactive universalism regards difference (and this may include nationality) other than commonality as the crucial point of departure in moral discourse (Benhabib, 1992: 169). Such universability acknowledges the inescapability and relevance of the embodiment and embeddedness of the human identity in moral evaluations. The more moral agents have more knowledge about each other, the other’s history, “the particulars of their society, its structure and future, the more rational will be the outcome of their deliberations” (Benhabib, 1992: 169).

2.3.3. Democratic iterations as moderator of communicative discourse

One of the possible main counteractions to Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) difference-grounded dialogic universalism would be that it is bound to promote agent-relativism and oppression of minorities and the marginalised. A critic would hold, for example, that through the concrete other perspective, a community may justify gender, cultural or religious domination, by claiming that the community is just expressing what makes the community distinctively other and concrete in contrast with moral standards and way of life of any other human communities. The standpoint of concrete otherness, so would the critic possibly argue, can only serve to consolidate the unequal power balances in the society (e.g. gender inequalities where women are already both marginalised and disempowered to deliberate and take a position that really reflects their authentic interests).

To counter this possibility, Benhabib (2011) proposes conditions for the deliberative processes and outcomes to be morally acceptable, that is to be non-coercive, non-exclusionary and inoppressive. The concept of “democratic iterations” is what can check against the vices of marginalization, power imbalances, and insulation of a community’s culture from critique (2011: 89). Democratic iterations refer to the complex processes of public debate and deliberation, aimed at modifying, customising and recasting universalist rights claims through “public and free processes of democratic opinion and will-formation” (Benhabib, 2011: 89). Upon undergoing these processes, the people contextualise the universalist claims. The legal, political and civil institutions of society now acquire and express the localised form of the universalist claims (Benhabib, 2011: 128–30). For Benhabib (2011), besides giving the replica of the original intended meaning and or usage, the
repetition of terms or concepts produces a form of variation. As such, she claims that iterations are about making sense of the original, enhancing and transforming its meaning (Benhabib, 2011: 129). Ultimately, this leads to creative venacularisation, a local appropriation which strips the original of its ‘foreign’ authority on the local (Benhabib, 2011: 126). The local or the vernacular now becomes the authoritative for us. Democratic iterations localise the global and globalise the local (Benhabib, 2011).

One gleans that democratic iterations are crucial in determining whether a particular community’s social and cultural interpretations of human rights claims and social obligations are morally legitimate. A key condition in determining legitimate democratic iterations is that all affected members must be dialogically involved in legislation procedures and their consent must be given (Benhabib, 2011: 128–130). The condition to include of all affected can only be realised if the concerned community has a “communicative framework” underlying its institutions (Benhabib, 2011: 129). Thus, the individual participates in the collective will-formation about the nature and scope of laws that will govern the lives of their community. The major merit one can derive from such participation is that it guarantees that a community member’s autonomy and capacity to spell out and make sense of claims of rights in dialogue with others is respected. Under Benhabib’s (2011: 129) discourse ethics model, for the norms to be valid, all concerned must approve them. If there is arbitrary exclusion of individuals and communities from participating in the norms-formulating deliberation, then the consequent norms would be invalid. It is therefore necessary that the discourse of justification of the norms of the community should not be permanently stopped until the others’ objections have been taken into consideration and not just ignored (Benhabib, 2011: 173). With respect to possible concerns of nationality being defended by this dissertation degenerating into right wing segregationist nationalism, the concept of democratic iterations would function as the regulative safeguard against exclusive nationalism.

Although Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) conception of universalism is suitable and has been employed by this dissertation to found defence for normativity of nationality in global citizenship conceptualization, it is worth highlighting that she is indifferent regarding the normativity of nationality (Benhabib, 2011: 142). For Benhabib (2011: 142), the nation-state today has lost its popular sovereignty (where the people are expected to be both legislators as well as obeyers of the law). This loss of people’s sovereignty is due to economic globalisation under which multinational corporations have in principle and practice somehow
assumed the ability to force down their own preferred legislation for usually disempowered developing nations to attract the investment of the corporations (Benhabib, 2011: 104). Loss of the people’s sovereignty as Benhabib (2011: 104) holds, has resulted in the emergence of self-generated laws, particularly in global trade, which ironically are incongruent with the people’s interests. Global law that itself shapes the global economy lacks the representation of the opinion and will of the individual (Benhabib, 2011: 105). Such tendencies of lack of representation of the people’s interests also extend to the law of the nation-state as it is influenced by the conveniences of multinational corporations and not by the will of the people (Benhabib, 2011: 105). As such, Benhabib (2011) holds that the nation-state is no longer the site for popular sovereignty it has always been because global systems and economic institutions have compromised this ability by tacitly coercing nation-states to prioritise global economic interests. Benhabib (2011: 142) therefore does not regard nationality as having normativity in the modern global order and that as long as alternative structures of human organization besides the weakened nation-state could be established the outcome would still be acceptable. However, the position of this dissertation despite leaning on the conceptual cannons of Benhabib’s (2011) universalism, in contrast makes a case for the normative necessity to recognize the nationality in the conceptualization of ideal cosmopolitanism.

Benhabib (2011: 142) is indifferent about the role of nationality as an important source of concrete otherness, holding that the principle of representation of the individual’s interests in different forms of legislation that concerns him or her is what justifies the existence of whatever form of units of democratic collective life (Benhabib, 2011: 142). For Benhabib (2011: 142), whether the peoples of the world may coalesce into a world government, supra-federation or even break into smaller units, as long as the logic of representation is what guides any such decisions, such arrangements would be legitimate and acceptable. Benhabib’s (2011) position and justification of boundaries (not just national boundaries since she accommodates the possibility of national boundaries being re-drawn expansively or in a shrinking manner depending on what the concerned members may freely will) is based on and restricted to “the logic of representation and not on the primacy of some attachment to the national” (Benhabib, 2011: 142). Implicitly, she excludes nationality as a source of concrete otherness.

In this dissertation, despite the non-recognition by Benhabib (2011), I show that nationality generally constitutes a background and bedrock for the preservation of different sources of
concrete otherness especially in global citizenship. I argue that a national identity that conforms to democratic iterations is an acceptable norm that is welcoming and inclusive of non-native members who seek to be part of the nation. Given the fact that nationality is subject to democratic iterations, it is accommodative of multi-cultural identities as part and result of the iteration processes. National belonging is thus compatible with and a necessary unit of global citizenship.

2.4. Nationality: Host of sources of concrete otherness

In the next subsections, I argue for the normativity of nationality in local and global citizenship conceptualizations. I argue that realization of the autonomous transcendent self pursued by strong cosmopolitanism is inextricably dependent on provision of care by others. A recipient of such care is also obligated to provide it to others, thus perpetuating the sense of community as an indispensable component of individual self-actualization. I show that the community has different institutions of care that provide support to the individual for the development of the coveted capacity for rational choice. However, these institutions are, not detached from each other but cohere through elements such as shared language, public culture, common history, and geographical situatedness, which are also elements of nationality (Miller, 1995: 27). It is the coherence among these elements hosted by nationality that gives the sense of community. As such I argue that nationality, though mostly unrecognized because of its passive background role, informs the elements that make possible interaction among institutions of care and public life in a democratic society. Being the host of different sources of concreteness to the individual and the collective, nationality can neither be substituted by a purely political patriotism. The hosting of sources of concreteness for individualization and collective being further shows that global (economic) cooperation among the peoples of the world ought to and does recognise the value of nationality to be meaningful.

The nationality being defended in this dissertation is not that which is based on nativism, race, and religion. The nationality neither entails subjection of one’s values and ways of life to that of the nation nor that the thick culture of the nation should underlie each of one’s conceptions of the good life. Rather, it is a nationality that is cognisant of the indispensability of individual freedom and of the pluralistic ways of being. The ideal national community defended by this dissertation is one that characteristically respects an individual’s right to
have rights by having functional and accessible institutions of communicative freedom for collective will-formation (Benhabib, 2011: 89).

2.4.1. Dependence of autonomy on community care

In this section I argue that realization of the autonomous individual (who is the end of strong cosmopolitanism) is necessarily dependent on care provision by the institutions of care of a community. As such, ignoring the role of care and the community is denying the concrete otherness (Benhabib, 1992) of the autonomous individual member of the community. The care and community are substantially informed by aspects of nationality.

The cornerstones of liberal equality are individual agency, individual freedom and toleration (Tan, 2000: 2). Liberal equality thus prioritises the individual capacity to self-determine what counts as good for him or her (Tan, 2000: 2). Social goods, which the individual must value and which necessitate a partial curtailment of his or her autonomous choice-making over the good life are justified only in so far as they optimise the realisation of personal freedom (Kymlicka, 2002b: 55). Thus, the only justification for limiting individual freedom is the condition that the limitation will yield even more freedom, infringing liberty only for liberty’s sake (Rawls, 1999: 56). The coercive duties of justice in the nation-state are justified on this basis of maximizing individual self-actualization despite their limiting of individual freedom (Kymlicka, 2002b: 62). In other words, the coercion for civic cooperation in the democratic society, although it restricts individual freedom, is a good that optimises the attainment of individual freedom for every person. However, some goods, such as patriotism, are usually not considered part of such inevitable and necessary primary social goods that help preserve the democratic liberal society (Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). The implication is that in liberal thought, at a maximum, the common good that necessitates coercion is that which secures optimizes the freedom of the individual to make own choices about what constitutes the good and promote political justice for the citizens (Rawls, 1999: 71). The common good the state imposes on citizens is deemed ‘objective’ for it is necessary and in the interest of every citizen despite his or her preferences. However, goods like patriotism are deemed too substantive and in conflict with preferences of some individuals (Tan, 2000: 22), hence patriotism must be a private matter because it is subjective.

Positions against patriotism within the nation-state build on this premise, claiming that nationality does not constitute an objective primary good that is of fundamental value to every member of the community (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015). Valuations of nationality are
up to the agency of the individual hence, they pertain to the private sphere only. Valuations of national life should not be part of public policy, such as constituting education for democratic citizenship, as such actions ostensibly amount to an imposition of one good on an autonomous individual (Brighouse, 2003: 165). In other words, patriotism and patriotic education are understood as elements that effectively undermine the individual’s choice-making capacity of what constitutes the good life for him or her. Opposition to nationality in education for democratic citizenship is mounted on the argument that valuation of nationality is a private matter, it should not constitute conceptualisations of citizenship, and citizenship must be grounded in universalism and optimisation of individual freedom as a means for achieving individual autonomy, which is what characterises human equality (Brighouse, 2003: 165).

Conversely, owing to the prevailing global interconnectedness, the critics of nationality (Nussbaum, 2002a; Merryfield & Duty, 2008; Arneson, 2016) further contend that nationality ought not to delimit duties of justice among the people of the world. Such perspectives demand that learners should essentially learn only about universal principles ideal for global co-existence and toleration without giving due recourse to the partialities of national citizenship (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003; Demaine, 2004; Divala & Enslin, 2008). In other words, opponents of nationality demand that citizenship conceptualisation should include only universalisable attributes of the human being (such as human rights, freedoms and duties that establish and sustain the human rights framework) as the only relevant normative considerations (Nussbaum, 2002a). For this perspective, particularity has no inherent moral value. Such is the case in the Malawian education context, where national history has been removed from the education curriculum at the primary level and it does not form part of the secondary school curriculum either (Ministry of Education, 2005). Instead, learners now learn Social and Environmental Science, which essentially is about impartial democratic values (Ministry of Education, 2005). Furthermore, to compete effectively in the global arena, all mother-tongue instruction in the first four years of primary education has been removed in preference of English-only instruction (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78(1); Masina, 2014). In other words, the goal is that the nation’s learners must compete effectively in the global arena where English is the language of science, trade and technology.

However, the concept of the autonomous impartial individual of liberalism (which informs strong cosmopolitanism) who is the ultimate precondition for individual freedom and human
equality is problematic in that realization of the impartiality is based on universalisation of rational self-interests only, whilst necessarily excluding the normative value of the human relationships that are the indispensable enablers of achievement of personal autonomy (Held, 2006: 81). An instance of such autonomy-enabling relationships are relationships of care in the society (Held, 2006: 76).

The idea of the autonomous and detached person is drawn from an essentialist conception of human nature and interests as always reducible to the domains of the objective and subjective. Relegating the commitments derived from the relationships of care of the community as subjective and hence pertaining to the private sphere only, undermines what indispensably enables individual autonomy. Recognising such care and communal commitments therefore does not impose on the individual what he or she must autonomously value. Such commitments as enablers of freedom are necessary for every individual, hence deserve public recognition and reasonable state support in the public domain. Such commitments are denied their due normativity because they are categorised as ‘subjective’ and hence private (Held, 2006: 82). However, such categorisation of the communal commitments as not being objective is arguably due to some embedded influence in the criteria for classifying objective and impersonal human interests such as patriarchy (Young, 1990: 100; Benhabib, 1992: 161; Code, 2012: 92).

The radical liberalism concept of the impartial citizenship detached from particularistic commitments has no place for care, its providers and their hosts, as well as the necessary interactions for provision of such care to be sustained, partly due to the association that exists between care provisions and femininity (Held, 2006: 76; Code, 2012: 92). Likewise, one of the weaknesses of strong cosmopolitanism is that it is only preoccupied with the idea of a global citizen who is necessarily detached from the duties of particularistic national commitments ostensibly in order to impartially execute commitments to universal humanity globally. The ultimate consequence for such a weakness is that there is very little regard for the processes and institutions that enable and develop this individual to achieve the much sought-after self-determining capacity, which freedom adherents so much emphasise.

Extreme liberalism, which founds strong cosmopolitanism, conceives the human being as an abstract independent individual not under webs of interrelationships with others, and that such relationships pertain only to the personal level and cannot be generalised for configuration in moral theorisation (Held, 2006: 76). Most liberal theorists “fear that if we
conceptualize citizens in terms of their personal connections, we threaten [the citizen’s] autonomy and risk treating them paternalistically” (Held, 2006: 77). However, undermining such background and hidden institutions, networks and procedures in the name of pursuing individual autonomy and impartiality is in principle undermining the normativity of these much-targeted enablers of individuation.

According to McIntyre (2002: 101) one of the unique features of rational human beings is that they have a capacity of understanding their being human through time and experiences. McIntyre (2002: 101) holds that among others rational human beings identify themselves with reference to their time of birth, the present and their coming death. All these stages of life are characterised by the need to receive and give care to both significant others and other members in one’s community (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). In the community, the individual, receives care from different sets of individuals from birth until death, and is expected in turn to give back related care later, although not necessarily to the same set of individuals, from whom he or she had received care since repayment is never determined by strict reciprocity (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). It is clear therefore that the self-determining individual owes a debt to the relationships from which he or she emerges from childhood and which also sustain him or her throughout adult life. Care in the context of this discussion does not refer to provision of basic needs only, but also to acts of common concern, responsibility over the weak and vulnerable, benevolence, self-sacrifice and togetherness that different individuals in the institutions of care in the community perform to a person from childhood to adulthood. According to (Held, 2006: 81), a glaring deficiency of the liberal impartial citizen is that –

[I]t abstracts from an interconnected social reality, taking the ideal circumstances of an adult, independent head of a household as paradigmatic and ignoring all the rest. It overlooks the social relations of an economy that makes its members (including heads of household) highly interdependent.

Different institutions in the society provide the care, among others, families, schools, neighbourhoods, churches, local associations and community centres (Kymlicka, 1997: 18; MacIntyre, 2002: 100; Etzioni, 2014: 48). These institutions are not detached from each other. The institutions mutually interact and influence each other. It is instructive to note that there are certain common bonds that synchronise and cohere these various institutions of care within the community. For instance, language and other related aspects of non-linguistic communication, shared geographical territory, a shared history and public culture thin as the
culture may be (Kymlicka, 1997), mutually interact mostly in subtle ways to provide the individual with care and support mechanism to enable achievement of self-determination (MacIntyre, 2002: 69). The essence of a community lies in how the institutions of care mutually depend on each other in non-reciprocally providing care (MacIntyre, 2002: 101) for the achievement of individual autonomy.

What is evident is that this dependence on institutions of care challenges the contractarian tradition of conceiving human relationships in self-interest and contractarian terms in that the detached impartial self-interest-driven autonomous individual can neither exist nor flourish in the absence of such institutions. In other words, these institutions of care make community possible, holding the community together despite the diversity of the individual members of the community. For instance, virtues such as mutual responsibility, forgiveness, reconciliation and togetherness are cultivated in these spheres, transmitted and shared by a common language, revised and refined by such common institutions as the family, neighbourhood, friends, schools and local associations (Kymlicka, 1997: 6). No institution can cultivate them independently and neither can an independent individual single-handedly cultivate them without being in concert with others (Kymlicka, 1997: 6). What they help develop in the individual are what enables him or her as an autonomous rational chooser to have a range of meaningful and contextualised options in the exercise of his or her self-determination. They are dialogical in nature (MacIntyre, 2002: 107; Taylor, 2003: 33; Etzioni, 2014: 48).

Institutions of care and the individuals within them embed and incessantly re-define a shared public culture that defines interactions and relationships among members through democratic contestations (Held, 2006: 43). Thus, there is, underlying these relationships of care, a public culture in the community that influences the content and scope of the care to be provided to the others in society and also about when and how to provide this care. The expectation to provide care is not enforced by any state legislation. Care provision lies outside the ambit of procedural justice; yet, it is constitutive of the individual (Taylor, 2003), and the possibility of the existence of the institutions of procedural justice themselves, is rooted in them.

Since the content and scope of the expectations to provide care are in part shaped and influenced by the public culture, the nature and contexts of care and care-giving distinctly vary across different societies. For self-determining beings, what actually constitutes generosity and respect varies from one community to another. However, as an autonomous
person living in such institutions of care, I have the liberty to ignore and not value the perspectives I encounter and acquire in these institutions. Nevertheless, I am constituted by and largely still acknowledge the immense value of the care I have received from significant others and all the institutions of care that I not only value but to which I am indebted. As MacIntyre (2002: 100) observes, much of the care I receive from the institutions of care is given unconditionally. This has a profound effect on the relationships that develop between the institutions and myself. The relationships provide me with perspectives through which I will exercise my self-determination. The autonomous individual cannot exercise his or her autonomy without making recourse to those with whom he or she shares care and care-giving. The individual’s dependency on care-givers does not entail supremacy of society over the individual as a potential critic would hold. Such criticisms manifest the very problematic binary compartmentalisation of the social vs the individual, as though the two could successfully be disentangled from each other.

Over and above relationships based on procedural justice obligations, there exist in democratic communities unique public cultures, which ultimately contribute towards the autonomous individual’s choice-making. According to Taylor (2003: 33), in a liberal democratic society, identity formation for an autonomous individual requires an “acquisition of rich human languages of expression”. By languages, Taylor (2003: 33) refers not only to the words we use in speech, but primarily also to the different modes of expression by which a person defines him- or herself, such as the expressions of love and of one’s artistic and aesthetic values. What is crucial for Taylor (2003: 34) is that no one acquires all these different forms of language for self-definition without exchanges with others who matter to the individual. Identity formation is usually done in dialogue and at times in confrontation with the explicit and implicit identities, which others who matter in our lives expect in us (Taylor, 2003: 34). It is worth noting that the languages of expression and shared frames of meaning-making have a cultural and historical dimension (Kymlicka, 2002a: 245). The acquisition of such languages is dialogical and inevitably rooted in a societal culture and history which are elements of nationality (Miller, 1995: 27).

The dialogues occur not only at the genesis of identity formation. We continue to engage in them throughout our lives. Among others, as autonomous rational choosers, we place value on certain goods – in part owing to our deriving satisfaction from them through common satisfaction with our significant others (Taylor, 2003: 33). As such –
[Identity] is “who” we are, “where we are coming from.” [Identity] is the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense. If some of the things I value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes internal to my identity (Taylor, 2003: 34).

The formation of my identity and opinion is thus dependent on others so that in choosing what is valuable for me, I consider whether it has intelligible significance to others who matter in my life (Taylor, 2003: 34). My choices are not just empty feelings; therefore, even my choices that run counter to the others’ probable expectation and conventions, are made and implemented with a recognition and respect of others’ interests. According to Taylor (2003: 34), individual identity is a matter of both who one is and where one is coming from. What one gleans from this is that the fact that an individual’s choices differ from the common expectations of the community does not necessarily nullify the value of the community to him or her.

The autonomous individual, free as he or she is from state coercion in as far as choice of his or her preferred way of life is concerned, yet still leaves room for the others’ influence, which may either support or urge him or her to reconsider his or her choice (MacIntyre, 2002: 96). It is not a violation of individual autonomy for an individual to choose to accommodate the interests of his or her significant others by revising his or her interests or altering his or her initial goals of life. What one gleans from the autonomous individual’s dependence on others is that the dependence demonstrates that there are some relationships that have a type of coercion and influence over the individual unparalleled by the political coercion of the state. Furthermore, it can be drawn that the place of such relationships in influencing and being taken into consideration in an autonomous individual’s life is usually ignored in strong cosmopolitanism discourses about a transcendent self and individual freedom. The context of relationships with one’s significant others in the community can conveniently compel an autonomous individual to reconsider or re-arrange the priority of his or her choices (MacIntyre, 2002: 96). The relationships also partly have the privileged capacity to prompt the autonomous individual to identify errors in his or her purely personal choices or priorities and necessitate a voluntary change (MacIntyre, 2002: 96).

2.4.2. Interaction among institutions of care

What is worth emphasising about the autonomous individual is that the institutions providing the care he or she receives are not detached from each other. In the community, the
institutions of care are a coalescent scheme, cohered with each other by such factors as a common language and a common way of life (MacIntyre, 2002: 100–101). Because people in a community share a “a dense web of customs, practices, implicit understandings” (Miller, 1995: 41), the nature of care and terms of care provision therefore are not exclusively arrived at in isolation from the historical, linguistic, social, and cultural background of the community. Though everyone does not necessarily equally value the shared values and conventions of the community, such values and conventions nevertheless substantially and inescapably overlap individual members’ lives (Miller, 1995: 41) as autonomous practical reasoners (MacIntyre, 2002: 66). The thriving of common virtues in the private spheres has an inevitable dimension of historicity. Sharing of a common culture and language are not arbitrary and merely spontaneous but are linked to events, to past experiences, and to some common values (Coetzee, 2003: 324). One can thus derive that a shared language and a societal culture are the flipside of the community’s history.

It is also worth noting that receiving care obligates the recipient in turn, even upon attaining the autonomous capacities, to provide care to others (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). This implies sharing common understandings of duty and entitlements, common frames of linguistic and non-linguistic communication, common understandings of appropriate and inappropriate conduct, as well as valued virtues since the care is not exclusively provided by one detached agent who does not draw from shared conventions and values (Coetzee, 2003: 324; Pettit, 2014: 1656–1657). Given the foregoing, it is almost impossible to meaningfully conceptualise care and modes of care provision outside the linguistic, public culture, historical and geographical situatedness of the community.

Claiming that the individual human being is embedded in and obligated to relationships of care and that his or her life choices are in a way dependent on others does not put the demands of the community over those of the individual. The claim neither demands that each of the choices of the individual human being should be coloured by the interests of the community (MacIntyre, 2002: 66). Furthermore, consideration of human relationships in moral theorisation does not entail that the ideal of autonomy is inferior and hence be replaced with a care ethics. Rather, the demand to recognise the normativity of care is a corrective position that highlights the obsession with a pursuit of a transcendent self as the only most primary moral ideal whose realisation necessarily excludes social relationships under which a self-determining individual develops (Held, 2006: 84). The idea of a detached impartial
autonomous person is incongruent with the affective nature of human beings that is neither morally arbitrary nor separable from the attainment and sustenance of their self-determining capacity. The autonomous rational member of the community is indeed at liberty to question, revise or reject the virtues one has received down from one’s significant others and all others in the community (MacIntyre, 2002: 71).

What is worth noting however, is that I learn my individual good not through abstract theoretical reflections but through the shared activities of everyday life, as well as evaluations of different alternatives presented by those activities (MacIntyre, 2002: 136). In other words, community interests and values may not necessarily restrict the autonomy and the primary ways of being of the individual. However, some other aspects of life, some other ways and modes of being, and sometimes even a way of actually implementing certain moral ideals, or expression of one’s preferred way of life are largely shaped by relational life (Meyers, 2005: 38). What makes a community a unity of characteristically and functionally distinct institutions that coherently coalesce are the shared values, languages, discourse systems, procedural protocols (Gay, 2000: 81), common understandings of success or failure, politeness, respect, and shame etc. These are collectively shared in the home, school, neighbourhood, community meetings, media, public life, and religious institutions of the community among others. The community and its constitutive units, such as the family, exist in interwoven and mutually dependent relationships. This is why a meaningful education is one that confronts, examines, interrogates, analyses and interacts with (although not restricted to) the situated context of the learner, namely his or her community (Waghid, 2004; Freire, 2014).

Calling for recognition of social relationships does not romanticise the heritage of one’s development from childhood in all its entirety. Actually, part of such a heritage may be tantamount to indoctrination in some cases. However, the most important aspect of this position is that there is a significant role played by the public culture and tradition that characterise the homes, schools, public life, communities and ultimately nations in which one develops one’s ability to make meaningful choices about one’s own life. Schools, homes and neighbourhoods are not isolated and insulated from each other. They variously interact with, influence and get influenced by the culture of the community. The detached impartial human being of strong cosmopolitanism is therefore not detached from their contexts of development and history.
2.4.3. Care relationships and national concreteness

In as far as relationships of care occur in and are made possible by a coherent linguistic, common cultural, historical, and geographical location context, such relationships are grounded in nationality. These elements that form the background context for relationships of care are generally the major elements of nationality (Miller, 1995: 27). In other words, autonomous individuals living in these institutions shape and are shaped by the common societal culture contested as the culture may be, shared linguistic and no-linguistic codes of communication and common values all of which have a historical dimension. The usually background passive influence of common public culture over autonomous individuals’ lives (Nieto, 2008: 128–129) is, for instance, the reason why an independent and free family and the shared public culture of the community (which essentially is the national culture) interact and influence each other mutually (MacIntyre, 2002: 133). It is worth noting that in a nation the influence of a common culture on institutions of care is mostly subtle, often taken for granted, and mostly not usually consciously and recognised by the agent (Gay, 2000: 77; Gay & Howard, 2000: 7; Nieto, 2008: 128–129).

In their evaluation of marital and family therapy protocols, Platt and Laszloffy (2013) show how the socio-cultural context of the institutions of care under which an individual has developed, are influenced by the nationality of that context. The authors argue that in marital and family therapy (MFT) in developed nations (whose demographics include significant immigrant populations), it is necessary that nationality be considered among the variables shaping the context which determines human behaviour (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 442). This, they argue, is imperative citing a core MFT principle, which holds that an understanding of the context of occurrence of both behaviour and interaction is primary in comprehending family and marital problems with which therapists are confronted to help resolve (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 442). Platt and Laszloffy (2013) thus contend that an awareness of the client’s nationality is necessary because it would help therapists to determine how they are to shape and direct their interaction with clients of different nationalities to establish both a diagnosis and prognosis, even when the client does not make an overt connection between his or her problems and nationality. Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 446) hold that in MFT, the values, history and beliefs background of the client as well as those of the therapist greatly influence what the therapist can see or not see as pertinent in the analysis of a client’s problem and the background would also determine the response of the therapist to the problem.
This demonstrates that different nationalities, owing to their differentiated cultures, understand and actualise family and marital relationships in diverse ways. The therapist’s interpretation of family and marital phenomenon and choice of possible solutions are also influenced by the shared culture embedded in his or her nationality (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 445). This for Platt and Laszloffy (2013), is more pronounced in multicultural societies where different nationalities and their associated cultures appear in the context of the dominant culture of the host multiculturtal nation that embeds public institutions and everyday life. Besides the individuals in families among migrant communities in developed nations being private and self-determining beings, the mode in which they exercise their autonomy is owed in part to their shared public culture which is generally historically attached to a particular territory (Miller, 1995: 32; Kymlicka, 2002a: 25). One therefore observes that private autonomous institutions and a public culture mutually reinforce each other. It is important to realise that this very public culture and its associated elements of historicity, territoriality and a sense of community are what define a nation (Miller, 1995: 164). What can be derived is that in global citizenship, should such institutions be extinguished by an ostensible impartiality, such extinguishing will compromise the meaningfulness of being a concrete individual and the capacity of the detached person to self-determine. 

Platt & Laszloffy (2013) further argue that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) tool (a standard statistical diagnostic tool employed worldwide in family and mental therapy) is generally individual-centric, ignoring other relationships within which the client is enmeshed (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 444). As such, the DSM conceptualises clients’ problems as being only internal to the individual and not external, that is, unrelated to people’s socio-historical contexts which Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 444) argue, is a manifestation of the influence of the dominance of the individual-centric conception of the human person in MFT. 

Such individual-centric values embedded in the DSM diagnostic tool ultimately influence how therapists (most of whom have a Eurocentric conception of human nature and relationships) conceptualise health and pathology as well as how they go about settling for ideal treatment (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013). Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 444) further hold that the DSM assumes that treatment of human suffering can only be achieved through biological means, ultimately excluding spiritual, relational, cultural and similar variables in human suffering. Platt and Laszloffy (2013: 444) cite an example of a condition where a client is
suffering from the effects of severe abuse or trauma, which in the United States, the DSM will diagnose as depression and only recommend treatment by prescription of drugs. However, Platt and Laszloffy (2013) argue that different cultures across the globe have alternative paradigms, which among others would understand depression as in part having a relational or spiritual dimension for example; hence, necessitating performance of certain spiritual rituals depending on the patient’s background and life outlook (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 444). The point of the authors is that MFT therapists in multicultural developed nations must be aware of the value of their client’s nationality and its associated culture in influencing how both the client and therapist are to understand suffering and treatment in a particular context. Platt and Laszloffy (2013) call for this awareness principally because in a multicultural society, human relationships, behaviour, understanding and treating human suffering are not reducible to a single universal and exclusive paradigm, although the DSM paradigm implies such in its conceptualisation of disorders and therapy in marital and mental phenomena. Furthermore, one gleans that conceptualisations of what constitutes care and how to provide it have some peculiar differences across national and cultural backgrounds (Haegert, 2000: 497–498).

It is evident that MFT and general mental health conceptualisations and practice are partly shaped by the values of the background cultures of both the client and therapist. Adequate information from the client about his or her background is as cardinal as the practitioner transcending his her individual-centric background in the processing of the client’s case to make both a diagnosis and prognosis (Platt & Laszloffy, 2013: 445–446). In a multicultural setup, it is worth recognising that the therapist has a particularistic conception of community, the family, and the nature and value of relationships that matter (Haegert, 2000; Platt & Laszloffy, 2013). So too does the client. The perspectives of the client and practitioner about the operative paradigm for ideal family or community relationships are not always compatible with nor always reducible to a single universal model. The relevance of nationality in the family sphere reinforces the position of this dissertation that the unit of the family, although a private institution left to the intents of individual autonomy, is still under some influence of the shared public culture and values of nationality. Though mostly ignored and taken for granted or sometimes denied by the agent, the national culture influence is significantly constitutive of the being of the autonomous individual and therefore is an inescapable part of the individual’s concreteness.
A potential critic would likely argue that the mutual influence between nationality and the family pertains to the private sphere since nationality and the family are private institutions, and that since they already flourish as private institutions. There is therefore no need for the intervening hand of the state to actively support nationality in the public domain.

However, demanding that the state recognises nationality in the public domain is not tantamount to the state coercing the valuing of every element of nationality. Recognising nationality as this dissertation is arguing is about recognising the representative and the most easily identifiable and non-exclusionist aspects of the nation community such as shared culture, supporting and according public functional status to national language, and a critical learning of national history in public education systems. These aspects are what enable the community to exist making individual autonomy possible and self-actualization meaningful by giving the individual a horizon of possible life choices to reflect on and revise (Taylor, 2003: 52). Such elements of nationality or a shared public culture are what Kymlicka (1997: 25) calls a “societal culture”, and they still partly define and characterise a people. Such a culture cannot just be dismissed because it is not objective and that it pertains to the affective private sphere. Its functional role for everyday life renders is indispensable in enabling self-actualization. The contention of this dissertation is that the shared, public culture, common language and shared history are largely the substance of the social coherence that enables the possibility of a sense of community among diverse individual personalities with diverse and at times contesting goals. Worse still, in the context of global citizenship, substituting nationality for impartiality in education for citizenship is catastrophic for the situatedness of global peoples.

By marginalising the affective – which is the domain of individual concreteness – the strong cosmopolitan impartial human being is only conceived in generalised terms (Benhabib, 1992). The consequence is that the social relationships that exist in institutions of care, which enable achievement of individual autonomy, are undermined as morally irrelevant; yet, without them the self-determination capacity cannot be achieved. The common linguistic and non-linguistic codes of communication, the shared virtues of mutual responsibility and respect, forgiveness, reconciliation, the coercive restraining sense of shame, a commitment to personal sacrifice and altruism, not only enable establishment of a political society, but also in significant proportions, they constitute an individual’s being, his or her way of
understanding humanity and relating with it. The autonomous individual can never be independent of these shared virtues. They are his or her sources of concreteness.

A critic may possibly contend that developed capitalist nations are thriving with the independent individual model of contractual relationships among strangers who are motivated by self-interest. However, as Held (2006: 80) argues, the fact that there are relations established on this model does not make it a morally good model to sustain. This is why, for instance, in the advent of the challenges of global financial, climate, and migration crises, developed nations most of whom are based on the detached rational self model, have struggled to appropriately avert or manage such crises (Mierinya & Koroleva, 2015: 186) in the best interest of all affected. Arguably it is partly due to a deficiency of the moral ideal of care in their democratic and economic ideologies that are based on the rational self model.

This dissertation argues that recognition of the value of frameworks of relationships and care (by implication recognising the value of nationality) is even more paramount in justice and citizenship theorisation at the global level, than at local level. The argument is that the depth and complexity of global diversity demands global citizenship conceptualisations that consider global peoples’ concreteness. Recognition of only the generality of humanity across the globe, snubbing people’s languages, their shared ways of life, the historicity of their communities, and the meaningfulness of the placed-ness of the communities highly risks undermining these sources of concrete being, resulting in understanding the peoples of the world only through an ‘equalising’ prism of generality. Assigning normativity only to the generality of global peoples in principle effectively denies the people of their concreteness (Benhabib, 1992). Denying to recognise the concreteness of the global peoples inevitably leads to cultural homogeneity where as chapter 4 will show, globally, some dominant culture(s) will have to take the place of the displaced concreteness, resulting in assimilation.

The relevance of geographical placed-ness, common culture, shared history and common language, to both individual and community concreteness which are essentially elements of nationality (Miller, 1995: 27), is usually either taken for granted or downplayed in developed nations based on a detached autonomous person conception of citizenship. Largely, I argue, this is due to the deep entrenched-ness of such national concreteness underlying the economic, political and social structures of the community on which all the routines of ‘normal’ everyday life revolve. Members in most developed nations, most of whose thinkers dominate the discourse about global citizenship theorisation (Parmenter, 2011: 368), do not
have to confront the everyday reality of negotiating between two worlds, one marked by one’s Bantu mother tongue for example, and another of official spaces marked by an incongruent European language such as English at school, which only less than 1% of the population use as their household languages such as in Malawi (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998: 33).

In most developed nations, the role of language as an attribute of a shared national culture is often taken for granted and downplayed because the mother tongue (usually the national language) is also the official language (Simpson, 2008: 5–7). When the mother tongue is the official language, its effect as a nationality marker tends to be downplayed; yet, it is real. In developing nations, like Malawi, where global languages are not only effectively taking over, but effectively threatening the very survival of national languages, in the normative sense, a people’s way of life is at stake. A new and non-voluntarily chosen mode of perceiving reality linguistically is imposing itself on the people. Gradually, their literature and art is being forced into extinction, eroding differences unique to communities and individuals across the globe (Kamwendo, 1998; Moyo, 2001). The sense of national community and public culture in the national languages of developed nations is usually taken for granted and usually ‘unfelt’ only because the predecessors acknowledged its worth and endeavoured that it be developed to be both the mother tongue and official language. However, although mostly unrecognised and denied, the nationality still embeds the languages today. The language retains national value through its having both the official and ‘national’ language statuses. Furthermore, in the communities of developed nations, nationality prevails and is sustained in schools among others through the very use of the mother-tongue as language of instruction, and through literature peculiar to the nation and linked to the history of the nation. The argument I advance is that the national cultures of developed nations, thin as they may be (Kymlicka, 1997), mutually interact with and reinforce the culture underlying both public institutions and institutions of care in the community.

A critic would also contend that these public cultures are not worth protecting just because they have demonstrated persistence since national members are only entangled in and captured by the fate of birth, therefore, active recognition of nationality should not reinforce their unchosen fate (Famakinwa, 2010: 162). However, what is problematic with such a criticism is that it presupposes a reductionist conception of an individual human being, abstracted from the social and cultural contexts of his or her situatedness. Such a criticism is
steeped in the dichotomies of rational versus affective, objective versus subjective evaluative categories of all phenomena where ostensibly the affective and subjective are deficient of value worth constituting a universalistic conceptualisation of ideal citizenship. However, such ‘subjective’ categories are what constitute being a human being. The subjectivities of the particular relationships with others inextricably constitute the concreteness of the individuation of the autonomous person. My individuation is not based on my abstracted universal rational self. Instead it is my historicity I share with others, the attachment to a particular geographical territory with its memories that individuate me from the rest of the equal human folk. Therefore, stripping the linguistic, historical and cultural subjectivities as the strong cosmopolitan concept of impartiality demands, in principle, spurns what concretely individuates the being expected to act impartially and globally (Benhabib, 2011: 130).

It should however, be borne in mind that the ideal nationality being advanced in this dissertation is that of a democratic society with functional institutions guaranteeing the fundamental “right to have rights” which in principle is prioritising communicative freedom of individual members of the the community (Benhabib, 2011: 59). Through democratic deliberation, members have freedom to contest what should not constitute their collective culture. In a society characterised by democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89), the assumption is that the members have in principle either explicitly or tacitly endorsed their public culture. Besides all this, the culture is incessantly open to more questioning, revising and re-constituting by its members as the collective will-formation must necessarily be all-inclusive (Benhabib, 2011: 89). Furthermore, it is not mandatory that every member display the nation’s public culture, neither is it a monolithic thick culture (Miller, 1995: 26).

2.4.4. A concreteness-grounded universalism

Hitherto, the argument has been that a conceptualisation of citizenship must include frameworks of relationships which the impartial individual depends on to achieve autonomy and which strong cosmopolitanism dismisses on account of being subjective and hence private, unworthy of inclusion in the normative conceptualisations of citizenship. My argument however, attracts the inevitable question of how to include such ‘subjective’ and ‘arbitrary’ aspects of human nature and still have a normative theory of universal equality that does not get entangled by relativism. To begin with, it is worth bearing in mind that the position for inclusion of frameworks of human relationships in the quest for universalism and equality does not undermine the normative value of ‘objective’ ideals. Furthermore, the position of this dissertation does not require replacement of the ‘objective’ category of moral
ideals with aspects of individual concreteness. Whilst acknowledging the immense value of individual autonomy and moral universalism, this dissertation contends that the strong cosmopolitanism perspective that you cannot have moral universalism and individual equality whilst essentially conceding the normative value of concreteness is essentially a false dilemma. The two types of ideals can be had simultaneously and they are compatible if not reinforcing of each other. Realising both of them, however, demands a re-imagining of what is normatively essential in human nature. Actualizing the moral worth of both the objective and subjective necessarily demands discarding the generalised fundamentalist dualistic conception of human nature. This is where a different universalism, as argued by Benhabib (1992: 153), becomes relevant.

There is a need to change the framework in which universalism is conceptualised if we are to achieve a universalism in global citizenship that equally places the differences of concreteness at the centre of moral reflection. This dissertation argues that achieving a meaningful universalism based on human nature essences is the surest way of denying individuals and communities of the world their concreteness. For Benhabib (1992: 169) what individuates persons and what makes the communities under which they achieve their individuation, are not similarities with the rest of other humanity. Rather, the concreteness of individuation and community peculiarity resides in difference from the rest (Benhabib, 1992: 61). This is why a dialogical type of universalism is necessary because in moral reflection, it starts with difference without excluding difference in preference of similarity, which is hardly telling of the concreteness of the autonomous but embodied individual’s social, cultural, geographical, historical embeddedness that mould his or her individuation (Benhabib, 2011: 130). Individual concreteness and community peculiarity draw from such differences contrary to universalisms inspired by Kant (Meyers, 2005: 27–28) and Rawls (Rawls, 1999: 118–123). Therefore, the validity of the norms of universalism must be dialogical and not based on mere projections of human essences in order to take into account what makes the other other (Benhabib, 2011: 69). This is meant to ensure mutual confirmation of not only each other’s humanity but individuation so as not to undermine what typifies the other (Benhabib, 1992: 159).

This dissertation therefore argues that it is problematic to restrict equality and universalism to a detached autonomous transcendent self as the only cardinal consideration in cosmopolitan citizenship, ignoring the host of the sources of the situatedness and concreteness of the self. Inclusion of nationality in global citizenship is necessary because among the peoples of the
world, it is elements of nationality that generally embody the concreteness and otherness of global communities through language, history and common culture, among others. These are embedded in the social, economic and political structures of the people (MacIntyre, 2002: 107). They are also constitutive of the sense of being of the individuals. This is why meaningful education for citizenship cannot only be about transcendental selves. For education to be meaningful and just, it necessarily ought to include aspects of particularity (Waghid, 2004: 57). Understood this way, nationality can therefore no longer be conceived as inherently antagonistic to citizenship, especially cosmopolitan citizenship. The false choice between cosmopolitan impartiality and local partiality therefore collapses.

Recognition of tolerable inclusive aspects of nationality across the peoples of the world secures and preserves the people’s sources of concreteness, which could be rendered invisible and irrelevant by citizenship that is based only on a transcendent self. The recognition thus sets the ground for difference-grounded dialogues among the people of the world that aim at achieving a universalism that recognises the others’ concreteness without necessarily undermining the commonality of the generality of the humanity they all share.

2.4.5. The concreteness of history and territoriality
In modern education theory and practice, critics have questioned the relevance of including national history in the curriculum (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003). National history is dismissed as being particularistic. National history is as such considered morally irrelevant, since it is incompatible with the norms of universalism (Brighouse, 2003). Making learners learn their national history is deemed as tantamount to indoctrination and imposition of patriotic values on learners who might have a completely different regard for nationality (Brighouse, 2003). In Malawi primary education national history has been removed (it is not offered at the secondary level either) and has been replaced with Social an Environmental Science, which essentially is about universal democratic principles (Hauya, 1997: 22; Ministry of Education, 2005).

A characteristic of the nation is that it is a community with shared interests and commitments and the character is shown in its collective decision-making (Miller, 1995: 25). This dissertation’s contention is that what is usually ignored, however, is that communities demand and realise specific forms of democratic principles due to and in the context of the nation’s history. Further, most specific forms of democratic models and reforms result from historical experiences such as those relating to injustice and oppression. In other words, never are democratic forms and ideals demanded in and of themselves, removed from their
Historicity.Democratic forms and reforms are therefore meant to correct the structure of a society owing to historical and particular experiences of the particular society, and not as a society in general. It is the submission of this dissertation that a people’s experiences (their history) cannot be divorced from the democratic form for which a society struggles and which the society realises. In other words, there cannot be divorce because historical struggles are generally a collective quest for a fair and just structure (Gay & Howard, 2000: 13). Justice is essentially a property of our interactions and schemes of cooperation, i.e. how the community should be arranged and how it should distribute various social goods (Rawls, 2002: 6). Being a property of the structures of a community, justice itself has a historic dimension.

Why do human beings strive for just relationships and just communities? Usually, it is because they want their community, whose structure affects their options and potentialities in life, not to be inhibitive of people’s self-realisation (Rawls, 1999: 3). The actual contexts in which human beings exist are usually far removed from those aspired for as ideal. The human being constantly exists in a situation of (individual, social, economic and political) struggle. Every society or community has its own history of the struggles they faced and continue facing. It is self-evident that the goals for human struggles are as diverse as they are innumerable. The community into which one is born, is both a unit and a result of the incessant continuing historical struggles, which determine the scope and the breadth of justice and its attendant institutions. Every community is in a way a product of actual histories of real people and events which the community faced and confronted. Sometimes the histories constitute certain acts of (in)justice the community’s predecessors perpetuated (Miller, 1995: 164) which the political institutions and public culture of the current community are a result of and to which the community must always be sensitive.

The foregoing background entails that as a member embedded in a given community today, my individual as well as my collective demands for fairness and justice are in a way fully intelligible with reference to the past. I am not just a general human being, in a generalized community. Specifically, I am an individual who is a member in this continuing chain of history (Miller, 1995: 24). This is why this dissertation argues that to political communities, history is not a mere impotent collection of organic events that occurred in time and are in every sense gone. In other words, to the national community members, history is the benchmark for evaluating the moral and political progress of this particular community. The justness of a society largely refers to how the society compares and contrasts with its past
(Ramphele, 2012: 41). Thus, removing the historical past from public life such as removal of national history from the school curriculum makes democracy, collective aspirations and achievements hollow and devoid of meaning. The strong cosmopolitan transcendental self of the contractarian tradition therefore is stripped of not only a sense of community but also of how such a democratic community is a result and continuation of collective struggles and aspirations for a fairer social re-arrangement.

It is worth noting that social cooperation models vary across societies owing to the unique attributes of the societies. Justice is a means of restructuring the frameworks of cooperation in a community so that inviolable dignity of each of the members is respected and not sacrificed for the benefit of others (Rawls, 1999: 3). Among others, this is articulated in demands of ensuring gender, economic, cultural and political equality among the people (Rawls, 1999: 6). Social cooperation also includes recognising and treating disadvantaged groups in terms that will affirm their equality, both morally and practically (Rawls, 1999: 72). It is in these senses that what actually constitutes justice is largely tied to the history of a community. As highlighted earlier, for Benhabib (1992: 159), the transcendent and detached conception of a person hides such historicity, which entrenches the inequalities that characterise the global society, by considering only a generalised other conception of equal human beings, which entails equal abilities and opportunities. Once the same people are viewed from the perspective of their concreteness, glaring and self-perpetuating inequalities become manifest.

One therefore establishes that the idea of the detached autonomous individual – where society is only an aggregation of other rational self-interested transcendental selves – undermines the place of historical experiences in people’s political communities, which enables the achievement of capacity for authentic agency. Put differently, such a conception of autonomy regards as private and morally arbitrary the fact that this individual is not a detached unit but a participant in re-making the collective life he or she joined at birth. In a myriad of ways, such as through democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89), the individual community member constantly and normatively re-evaluates the nature, structure and operation of the community’s institutions of care provision to determine whether the institutions conform to human dignity terms. The significant implication one draws therefore is that there is both individual and collective determination of what is worth retaining and promoting in the community. In the community, decisions must also be made over what is worth discarding as well as what should be guarded against and what measures must be instituted to avert
recurrence of morally unacceptable experiences in future. It is in this vein that constitutions, although espousing ideal and universal principles of equality, create institutions and systems that are directly responsive to the history of the national community. This is because inequalities and injustices are not incidental. They are created, sustained and perpetuated by historical experiences. Therefore, conceptualisations and the realisation of citizenship cannot be divorced from the history of the community.

My society today is in a way a continuation of the history of my forebears’ arguable pursuit of justice such that today, we overtly and covertly make reference to their moral failures and moral achievements in structuring our ideal community (Kymlicka, 1997). An awareness of the histories of injustices my society suffered and exacted on fellow members as well as outsiders is what makes us persistently demand specific democratic reforms, which we value and vigilantly guard in the context of our history (Ramphele, 2012: 41). Thus, whether the history is noble or ignoble, it still influences the type of democratic institutions we have and should have in our community today. Our community is part of the continuing story. It is a unit of the history.

It is that affective attachment to the territory, the connection to and participation in its history, that compels and inspires citizens (some of whom later become iconic global leaders) to fight against injustice, despite facing different forms of risk to their personal lives although they have the convenient option of moving out of their home community. They risk their lives and of their families for this particular nation to whose territory they have an affective attachment unlike they have to any other part of the world. Nelson Mandela aspired to see justice everywhere in the world, but it was specifically the injustices of apartheid South Africa, particularly owing to his attachment to its territory and history, that made him ready to go the lengths he had gone in his struggle against oppression (Mandela, 1995: 35). Upon achieving political freedom in South Africa, we could not blame him for not having migrated to the next country in the world, such as Sudan’s Darfur, Siri Lanka or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to equally coordinate and lead a struggle against political injustices with exact sacrifices he made for South Africa. Not because to him the people of South Africa had a higher moral value than those of DRC. Rather it is because confrontation of injustice and oppression is mostly a result of ill-formed and malfunctioning particular local structures of social cooperation and human relationships in a community that is uniquely attached to one’s sense of being (Mandela, 1995; Ngwane, 2014). Rarely is it a result of pursuit of abstract ideas of justice. Interestingly, though, as Martin Luther King Jr. held, locally inspired
struggles against injustices are also an implicit statement against related injustices everywhere outside the local boundaries (King, 1963).

Such affective attachments to a particular territory and community do not in any way undermine the moral worth of individuals in related struggles elsewhere. The attachments only demonstrate that territoriality is a source of an individual’s concreteness, despite the existence of global interconnectedness and the moral obligations one has towards all human beings of the world. This dissertation therefore argues that the moment such embeddedness is dismissed in favour of only the general allegiances one has to the wider and general humanity, we fail to recognise aspects of the individual’s concrete being.

All this however, does not mean that beneficiaries of one’s sacrifices against injustice must exclusively be your co-nationals or those with whom you have attachments. On the contrary, as this dissertation contends, such sacrifices against injustice demonstrate the relevance of the autonomous individual’s attachments to a particular territory, history and culture and how such belongingness has some quite forceful compulsion on the individuals and development of the democratic communities. This orientation is still compatible with cosmopolitan commitments. One need not eliminate the reality of such attachments as a condition for cosmopolitan commitments. This perspective about the value of local attachments neither implies that one should accord a purity and fixed status to one’s local way of life. Rather, one must be a patriot who, whilst being critically loyal to the local, must at the same time be reflectively open to embrace the moral duties one owes humanity beyond your locality (Hansen, 2011: 9).

2.4.6. Inadequacy of constitutional patriotism
In this section I argue that patriotism based only on shared political values is incapable of sustaining a democracy without nationality-grounded patriotism. I also argue that a patriotism based on shared cultures is itself inextricably linked to elements of a people’s nationality.

Criticisms against the moral relevance of nationality in the modern state hold that although national consciousness gave birth to republican freedom, which makes possible individual freedom, that was only necessary in the genesis and formative era of the state and that as such, citizenship conceptualisation need not be tied to national identity (Habermas, 1994, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). For Habermas (1994: 23), republicanism and nationality have only a “historically contingent” connection and not a conceptual one. Habermas (1994: 27) dismisses the requirement that procedural justice,
expressed among others through constitutionalism, should be necessarily rooted in the situatedness of a people’s national identity, citing the multicultural societies of the United States and Switzerland as examples.

Habermas (1994: 32) argues for an interconnected world (starting with a supranational European Union) whose deliberative democracy is not based on “the people” of a given national community as “macro-subjects” but based on anonymously interlinked discourses. Ultimately, Habermas (1994: 32) holds that “citizenship can today only be enacted in the paradoxical sense of compliance with the procedural rationality of a political will formation”.

As a result of globalisation, the spectrum of those affected by the self-determination of a nation is much wider than the territorial delimitedness of the members (Habermas, 2001: 70). Habermas (2001: 70, 2003: 86) therefore urges caution against the trap of territorial limitedness in theorisation of democracy in the global era since national interests today are no longer confined to local boundaries.

For critics of nationality (Nili, 2015: 245; Arneson, 2016: 557), democracy must be embedded in an inclusive shared political (not necessarily national) culture where new others would not be required to conform to the cultural community of the nation. At this level, the cultural community that provided the solidarity upon which the nation was founded, now loses its value as the political culture of individual opinion formation and democratic collective will-formation now cohere society and are friendly to strangers (Habermas, 2001: 73–74). As such, only constitutional patriotism remains relevant (Habermas, 2001: 73).

Critics of nationality, are inspired by the fact that global interconnectedness has profoundly altered the human condition (Nussbaum, 2002a; Habermas, 2003). Elements of interconnectedness, such as global markets that determine almost all the world people’s condition and fate, transcend national limitedness (Habermas, 2003: 86). The implication here is that elements of global interconnectedness that ostensibly shape the modern-state are sensitive to market forces only and are insensitive to nationality (Habermas, 2003: 86). Habermas (1994: 28) is among those who believe that economic integration runs on its own logic, which excludes national sentiments.

However, positions that substitute constitutional patriotism for nationality-based patriotism ignore the inescapable reality that the political community and its culture are embedded by and built upon the societal culture, language, history and conception of care provision of a community. Nationality and constitutional or civic patriotism inextricably interact with and
depend on each other such that it is impossible for political ideology to divorce itself from the elements of nationality. Such substitutionalist positions about civic patriotism are based on a generalised conception of a human being as an abstract citizen who is detached from institutions and networks of interdependence that give him or her a sense of being and of individuation.

As this dissertation highlights, such substitutionalist positions take for granted the entrenched-ness of nationality in everyday life up to the point of mistaking it for being non-existent. For instance, developed nations have their mother tongue as home language and as official language, with the learners not facing linguistic and cultural boundaries to negotiate between the home and the school. Their schools are full of their local literature, with which the learners easily identify. As a consequence, epistemologically there is close proximity between academic content in the school and the local experiences of the home. In such a social context, knowledge information and technology are accessible to all the citizen, making them effectively participate and compete in the global arena.

A community is an inheritance and a critical evolution of actual languages of communication, an actual history, actual art, actual architecture, actual literature and actual cultural traditions from the past (Miller, 1995: 41). In the context of liberty and individual self-determination, a democratic community in time, sifts what to reject, what to retain or what to revise through incessant contestations. New and necessary economic, technological and political developments compel us to modify cultures, traditions and practices into ways that are compatible with new normative standards we have now discovered and embraced which the predecessors did not value. In the end, not all different forms of technological change would annihilate nationality and its consequent public culture. Since locality and modern developments such as technological ones mutually influence each other, nationality necessitates and enables localisation of such modern technological and political systems. Nationality only vernacularizes (Benhabib, 2011: 128) or adapts these modern systems to a new form as the new systems also conform to national localness. The national local and the modern new systems mutually interact because to be intelligible the new systems must be part of shared public cultures.

Furthermore, competence in the public culture of a community enhances one’s meaningful participation in its political community (Kymlicka, 2002a: 245). I would be utterly disadvantaged in my participation in the key public institutions of the political community if I do not share certain elements of the public culture, such as its language and social values.
(Kymlicka, 2002a: 245). I will not be able to participate meaningfully in its political deliberations as I will lack its shared linguistic and non-linguistic competences and skills for communication. I need more than linguistic competence to achieve communication because in the political community, what dominates or keeps recurring in the discourse is usually attached to the social, historical and cultural experiences of the nation. Without familiarisation with such, I would be out of touch with the actual discourse.

According to Pettit (2014: 1656), individual (or group) agency entails self-representation of the agent through his or her behaviour. Collective life implies and demands that the two or more self-represented subjects relate with one another in a “conversational or dialogical” manner. They each “each understand – typically as a matter of shared awareness – that in order to organise our relations with the other in a congenial pattern, we have to be sure to use words in representation of ourselves that will attract a desired interpretation and response” (Pettit, 2014: 1656). Each of the subjects operates “under conversational conventions – say, the conventions establishing what is an assertion or commitment or request – to make ourselves interpretable by the other and of course to interpret the other in turn” (Pettit, 2014: 1656–1657). For Pettit (2014), successful communication in groups is achieved when there is –

\[\text{An important form of mutual influence, capable of determining how each of us responds to the other and what we consequently achieve together. [Such a] form of influence will presuppose our each being able to adopt the conversational stance and our each being able to use conversational practice to our personal or mutual advantage (Pettit, 2014: 1657).}\]

Thus, achieving communication in a community requires more than linguistic competence. To be a meaningful citizen and to be intelligible in a given social, cultural and political context, one must acquire idiosyncratic competences, meaning-making frames, knowledge of dominant communal values, and non-linguistic codes of communication associated with and grounded in the particular way of life of the community.

Evidently, practical everyday life is immersed in the public culture of society. How one negotiates one’s way in interactions with others is what makes everyday life meaningful. How people go about their routines of life, their language and their common traditions, are all as important as observing demands of procedural justice.

Political and public culture are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Miller, 1995: 164; MacIntyre, 2002: 107). It is thus worth noting that, in the context of shared democratic
principles, there is an anchoring and enabling common public culture (Miller, 1995: 164; MacIntyre, 2002: 107). The position of this dissertation is that the interest of communities in democratic principles is not in the value of the principles themselves. Rather, these principles are valued because they make possible realisation of a context that is conducive to optimum flourishing of the individual. In other words, democratic ideals have value in so far as they shape and sustain the structure of our concrete collective life to enable self-actualisation.

The civic patriotism and its attendant value for political procedures that will ensure justice are not ends in themselves. I contend that civic patriotism and value for political procedures are a means through which a community as a collective agent should structure itself in terms of what is of common concern as well as what optimises individual flourishing. A commitment to democratic procedures therefore cannot substitute national patriotism. The autonomous individual’s will is expressed and is part of the collective general will of the community that is democratically established. The substance and mode of deliberation are however inspired by the common culture. For instance, public positions about social welfare, tax cuts, and subsidies, are not uniformly managed and resolved purely by principles of economic utility across world democracies. Therefore, that questions of whether there should be reduced public spending towards national museums, national sports teams, and what should be the curriculum content that schools should offer, are political questions that ultimately appeal to a common culture and history in resolving them.

The mutually reinforcing interaction between the political culture and the public culture is made possible by vernacularisation (Benhabib, 2011: 128–130). Democratic communities are always pursuing the ideal structure of society. However, such abstract ideals of the desired society are realised through democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89) where the universal and abstract ideas are through contestations and debate, modified, customised and stripped of their foreignness (Benhabib, 2011: 128–129). Looked at this way, there is no way one can divorce civic patriotism from the public culture, without emptying patriotism of its meaningfulness.

This is why in Malawi, for example, the Local Government Act, includes Traditional Authority chiefs as unelected and non-voting members of district councils (Malawi Government, 2004, sec. 5(1c)). The law also stipulates that whenever deemed necessary, the council may bring up to three more special interest members with non-voting power (Malawi Government, 2004, sec. 5(1d)). This is an expression of the Malawian vernacularisation of the democratic principles of devolution of participation and representation. One may wonder
why include unelected traditional chiefs in local governments for democratic communities. It is cultural and historical contexts that determine what shape of democracy people need to have. Traditional leaders, although not elected, are historically central players in the management of communities in Malawi (Eggen, 2011: 319; Russell & Dobson, 2011: 739–740). Besides being custodians and embodiments of community culture, they have a capacity for community mobilisation and for achieving attitude change, which the state may lack. One must, however, concede that like any form of representation, such frameworks are likely fraught with certain entrenched inequalities, such as patriarchy, which requires constant contestations about how to actualise such frameworks. How to address such challenges is however a different discourse not under focus in this study. However, what is being emphasised here is that such scenarios demonstrate that democratic principles are neither an end in themselves nor are they one-size-fits-all standards for all societies. They cannot be meaningful without being vernacularised. The necessity of such appropriation is that the systems should be intelligible to the people’s common culture and values.

Vernacularisation (Benhabib, 2011: 89) is motivated by the need to improve the people’s existent nature and mode of social cooperation by adopting new concepts and reforms in a manner intelligible and compatible with the people’s concrete situatedness. The people integrate principles of democracy into the people’s history-inspired way of life. The people do not integrate their way of life into the democracy as though to the people, democracy has meaning by and in itself, independent of the people’s situatedness. Doing so would be attempting to live an abstract life that would be empty and meaningless. Such a denial of the people’s public cultural distinctiveness would amount to restricting being human to the generalised other standpoint only. It would rob the people of their authenticity and uniqueness, i.e. the people’s concrete otherness.

It is worth noting that the people are not only looking for political principles under which to regulate their lives. They are more importantly making their way of life democratic. This is what motivates them. This is what they want to become. The people want to better their context of existence and its associated way of life into a more just one. They are living their lives embedded in this common culture. Its way of life shapes their outlook on life. Among others, the culture based on relationships and practices in the institutions of care in the community contributes towards the shape and content of the people’s non-political obligations and expectations to give and receive care from others (MacIntyre, 2002: 131).
The objects of common culture to be recognised by the state must however not oppress the members or undermine their liberty (Etzioni, 2006: 74). As already highlighted, the societal culture being defended is not fixed but is always under revision and modification by the members through democratic iterations (Miller, 1995: 6; Benhabib, 2011: 89). It can not be reduced to a mere political culture for this would fail to account for that which binds together members in institutions and relationships of care. Such relationships are outside the realm of procedural justice (Kymlicka, 1997). Thus one can hold that the public culture of a nation has practical dimensions that inspire the routines of everyday life that cannot be replicated by the state. The virtues of politeness, forgiveness, self-sacrifice, reconciliation, togetherness, conceptions of honour, and shame are not necessarily generated by the state through legislative coercion. These nevertheless shape the form and languages of political discourse (Baldock, 1999: 459). These virtues are still largely expressions of an actual historical and shared way of life. Objects of nationality are not mere social contructions but actual aspects expressing community and individual concreteness. Much of a people’s public culture cannot be captured by legislation. In other words, much of the substance of the societal culture that enables the solidarity upon which political action is founded cannot necessarily and fully be codified into state laws yet the the practicality of the political community depends on this uncodified public culture. In the individual’s daily routines, he or she voluntarily participates in societal culture that gives a practical sense of community without undermining one’s capacity for self-determination.

2.4.7. Endurance of nationality in global cooperation
This section argues that, since nationality constitutes the identities of the individual and of the community, it necessarily persists even in forms of global cooperation that operate on a logic that excludes national interests. I argue that the global economic order is inevitably sensitive to national interests, which trade liberalisation seeks to eliminate, because nationality is the site hosting sources of individual members’ embeddedness: the concreteness of their otherness. Although in varying degrees, nationality is integral in communities and in individuals’ constitution. As such, it is nearly impossible to ignore the relevance of nationality in all forms of global cooperation, for nationality is inseparable from communities and from the integration structures diverse national communities form together. Ultimately the argument is that each of the nations participating in the liberalised global economic order is so other and with concrete peculiarities. The implication is that such definitive
idiosyncrasies cannot be ignored and substituted by a generalizable and universal form suitable and fitting for all human beings in the world as market liberalization demands.

Nationality both constitutes a people’s identity (Miller, 1995: 164) and as this dissertation is arguing, contributes towards shaping the people’s political and economic systems and institutions of cooperation. In other words, nationality contributes towards the shape of the people’s political and economic institutions. I have argued that it is not possible for such institutions to be insensitive to nationality when they are meant to serve the people’s interests. Therefore, the prevalence of national interests in the global economy is not necessarily due to malfunctioning global frameworks, but rather due to people’s concreteness which cannot be dispensed with. Nationality just cannot be stripped from the collective affairs of the people since it is constitutive of the people and will always inevitably and necessarily creep in consciously or unintentionally (Miller, 1995: 163) because nationality embeds a people’s concreteness.

The goal of liberalised markets is to render global trade free and unimpeded by the barriers of national interests which are regarded as arbitrary (Oxfam, 2002: 5). Free trade is meant to ensure free flow of goods and capital, self-regulated only by market forces, which are deemed to operate under an own rational logic (Habermas, 1994: 28; Dobos, 2011). Free trade is against active of interference by nation-states who may seek either to guard or to advance their national interests by intervening in the market (Ben & Woll, 2012).

However, recent major global economic crises have exposed how individual economies of the global economy are still largely informed by national considerations also called economic patriotism (Dobos, 2011; Pogge, 2011). Economic patriotism refers to the practice whereby states (and even individuals) make economic choices in such a way that they favour the interests of their nation (Ben & Woll, 2012: 308).

In response to the global financial crisis of 2008, there were suddenly enormous national interventions in the hitherto self-regulating global markets that had been thriving on neo-liberal policies (Ben & Woll, 2012: 307). Among others, governments intervened through financial bailouts to big private corporations, such as banks and car manufacturing corporations to stimulate local consumption to prevent the collapse of the industries (Ben & Woll, 2012: 307). Despite the public being outraged, they still tolerated it because it was a ‘necessary evil’ to be done or else many of their fellow citizens would be jobless and lose their sources of income. Nation-state neutralism over markets that has powered and nurtured
globalisation in general, was necessarily suspended as national interest actively re-appeared. Economic patriotism was invoked (Ben & Woll, 2012: 307).

Economic patriotism is not activated in times of economic crisis alone. It is noteworthy that even in times of stability, the global economy is largely influenced by national interests although it is expected to run fully on liberal principles with respect to state de-regulation (Ben & Woll, 2012: 316). According to Ben and Woll (2012: 308), such crises only unearth the way even regional economic and trade integrations work. The authors argue that trade integration frameworks are designed not to be neutral about national intervention, since the interests of national governments are embedded in international economy and trade integration frameworks (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317). In other words, even the global frameworks integrating and driving global liberalised trade are primarily guided by strategic national economic interests (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317). In reality, according to Ben and Woll (2012: 317), compliance with the free trade requirement that national governments deregulate markets (remove restrictions) has in practice resulted in re-regulation: that is, recasting national considerations into the integration frameworks. Even after integration into the liberalised global market, nations still retain the obligation and mandate to set nation-specific standards for goods into their market that are more difficult for outsiders to meet than for insiders (Bandelj, 2011: 966; Ben & Woll, 2012: 318).

Market liberalisation regards nationality as an arbitrary and irrelevant attribute not worth considering in global trade, which ostensibly operates on its own economic logic that excludes national sentiments (Habermas, 1994: 28) but the reality of the complexity of human nature has just proved the contrary (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317–318). As much as trade practices share the same universal principles, the motivations for participation of the people taking part in the trade practices have numerous and different sources. The people have different interests to safeguard. When nations commit to global or regional integration and deregulation frameworks, they do so in the context of interests of national members such that in principle the deregulation of markets is in essence re-regulation (Ben & Woll, 2012: 317). These motivations and interests cannot be generalised into some single universal form for all human beings in the world. Behind the economic integration agreements in global trade are embedded human beings with interests tied to their public way of life in their respective nations. Ignoring the embeddedness of the people is committing the same error committed by the generalised other standpoint of universalism (Benhabib, 1992: 161), namely to deny their individuality, their concreteness, which is their being human. Human beings have concrete
histories and territories from which they not only operate, but to which their identities and meaningfulness of life are attached. What one can glean from the scenario of economic patriotism is that people’s economic institutions are in part motivated by and embedded by the peculiarities of social contexts that have a unique way of life. Therefore, ignoring nationality, liberalized global trade thus effectively denies people their concrete otherness.

Nation-states still retain some regulative control to protect the interests of their people from undue domination by external global forces. There are many dominating agencies – states, as well as economic pressure – in the global order today (Pettit, 2010: 77). Pettit (2010: 73) argues that an ideal non-dominating global order must be characterised by nation-states that are representative of their people’s aspirations in so far as each nation accords its people space and institutions for contestation. This is because non-dominating democratic communities thrive on shared beliefs and unique “channels of mutual control” (Pettit, 2010: 76), and therefore the way in which they realise such ideals will remarkably vary and cannot be homogenised without compromising realisation of the ultimate output of individual freedom. This is because these individual and social beliefs and channels of mutual control, which are community-particular pre-exist the political community, and the community is built on them (Kymlicka, 2002a; Etzioni, 2014). As an active collective agent (Miller, 1995: 24), nationality is the principle which makes intelligible collective aspirations and the demands of the individual members for the removal of subtle forms of domination of one by another peculiar to and only meaningful in the context of the community of the members.

It is because of the relevance of the nation to make meaningful forms of domination that Pettit (2010: 76) therefore argues that in the context of global integration, it is imperative that the nation-state be not under the domination of another wider supra-state institution. Such supra-state institutions risk dominating the constituent members of the nation-state. Pettit (2010) therefore defends a non-dominating and non-interfering republican model of state as it ensures realisation of these ideals. He extends the spirit of republicanism to the global order to ensure the same ideals among the peoples of the world (Pettit, 2010: 76). For this reason, it is necessary, according to Pettit (2010: 77), that global arrangements should always be under the surveillance of nation-states to avoid global domination over the aspirations of nation-states, which are the representation of non-dominated individual members. This necessitates the persistence of national interest in the global order. Two non-dominating nation-states are not exactly the same despite their sharing common political ideologies. Since non-dominating democratic communities thrive on shared beliefs and unique “channels of mutual control”
(Pettit, 2010: 76), the way in which they realise such ideals will vary remarkably and cannot therefore be homogenised without compromising realisation of ultimate output of individual freedom.

The position this dissertation is advancing is that individual human beings who are embedded in their social and cultural contexts cannot manage to discard their particularised being and hence make global trade to be about purely transcendent selves detached from the concreteness of their territory, history and way of life (public culture). In most cases, the ultimate motivation for engaging in global trade is to ensure sustenance of people’s cherished way of life as the case of economic patriotism (Ben & Woll, 2012) has shown.

What one gleans from the economic patriotism account of Ben & Woll (2012), is that in the event of global crises like the financial global crisis the primary concern of an individual is not in terms of how impersonal detached human beings across the world in general are going to survive it (although one still regards all people irrespective of nationality as being equal without qualification). Rather, one is specifically mindful about one’s community, which forms the backbone of the nation to which he or she is attached, and with which he or she identifies. In other words, the reality with such crises is that one does not conceive them in an abstract manner in terms of how they have hurt abstract humanity across the world. Responding to a global crisis in the impartialist manner would be hollow and a disregard of human affectivity. Rather, the response is consistent with our reasonable intuitions that besides sincere concern for the fate of humanity worldwide, it is usually the concrete terms in which the crisis has affected the real community and nation, of which one is affectively part of that makes vivid the effect of the harm.

What is worth cognizance is that one meaningfully comprehends the adverse outcome of such crises on co-nationals, not because one has personal knowledge and encounter with each of the victims of the crisis one is in a more concrete community with apart from the very general global human community. Rather it is because you relate to the shared way of life with the co-national that has been adversely affected and you can more relate with what this entails in terms of one’s sense of concrete being. As a co-national, one might be in a position to relate with what concretely constitutes as loss, not only as general others but as concrete others with whom you share common particularised perspectives of reality, and interests, through your shared culture, history and territory. One can more easily and closely identify with the implications and reality of job losses in your community than you would about the same in a different nation. What a job loss would mean in a nation that is characteristically atomistic
with a nuclear family tradition would radically differ from a nation that characteristically has extended family tradition with more people beyond the immediate family depended on one person’s income. We all find meaning to our lives by attachments to the nation, its shared public culture; we all share a rootedness in this territory (Appiah, 2005: 233). It is hence not unreasonable for instance to expect that should a business enterprise of a co-national in one’s community fail and whose owner one will possibly never know or encounter, one gets concerned that somehow this has potential of affecting the continuance and sustenance of the commonly valued interests and institutions of the national community into which one is rooted and which gives context to one’s choices of life.

A possible criticism against this position may claim that this argument is committing the is–implies–ought fallacy: drawing imperatives from prevailing practice. The fact that national interests drive the global market is not an ideal we should accept as given; so would argue the potential critic. The critic would further argue that the prevailing nature of the global economy is not acceptable and is itself in need of moral restructuring to the standards of ideal liberalised trade, insensitive to national interest as most of the challenges of the global order are a result of the pursuit of national interest by developed nations. The character of the prevailing global economic order therefore should not constitute justification for the acceptability of nationality. The potential critic would thus conclude that the resilience of nationality does not tell us anything about the moral status of nationality.

Drawing the conclusions of the justifiability of nationality from the operations of the global economy is not committing the it-implies-ought fallacy. It is worth conceding that the way the global economy operates favours the developed nations whose interests shape and dominate the global order (Singer, 2002; Collste, 2015). The ideal alternative in this case would be to reform the global order so that all nations have equitable benefit and bear proportionate obligations arising from global institutions. This is a valid moral concern but not the focus of this discussion.

The presence of national interest in the deregulation orders of global integration is not preventable. It proves that nationality is not a social construct that can intentionally be extinguished. Contrary to strong cosmopolitanism, global integration of nations is not a mere aggregation of transcendent selves of the world detached from their situatedness and cooperating exclusively under norms that are based on economic principles and rational self-interest only as Habermas, (2001: 28) holds. Instead what one draws from the character of global integration is that the national economy is embedded in a web of localised
interdependent social relationships, where although the relations among members are not intimately close, such situated relationships nevertheless generate obligations of and entitlements to care. What motivates the autonomous member to get into schemes of interdependent cooperation in the nation, is the will to realise particular contextually meaningful “public policies and arrangements that will enable us to provide care to those we care about … and that will [also] enable us to receive care when we need it” (Held, 2006: 81). Conceptions of such care are not universal but vernacularized across different societies. This does not imply duties of care to non-nationals are inferior. Rather duties of care to co-nationals and those to non-nationals belong to incomparable distinct categories of moral obligations.

The fact that national interests have at times distorted global trade and the global economy to the detriment of others (Singer, 2002) still does not in itself nullify the positive normative potentiality of nationality. The distortion is a result of inequalities in power and representation of national interest in the global order. It is not about an ostensible inherent iniquitous nature of nationality.

The persistence of national interests in national and global economies in a way expresses the inextricable link between being an individual or collective and the concreteness of your situatedness. The implication is that national economies are meant to serve the constitutes members’ concrete and not generalised interests. In other words, they are shaped in part by the values of the community. Economies are generally embedded by national interests with which they must mostly be compatible to be meaningful to the people. This requirement for national economies to be consistent with and be relevant to national concreteness is transferred to frameworks of global integration. This is why in the ostensibly neutral free global economy, as economic patriotism shows, nation-state communities cannot discard national interest, and become neutral as this risks annihilating their concreteness. The people behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1999: 118) are expected to detach themselves from their concreteness, their culture, their belongingness and their history, to arrive at impersonal universal principles of justice. This, however, has serious defective outcomes, which deny people’s differences, which are their idiosyncrasies (Benhabib, 1992: 167–168). One can therefore draw that by extinguishing the reality of the concreteness of nationality, global liberalised trade commits the same grave error committed by the Rawlsian veil of ignorance of extinguishing the concreteness of the people, their being actual equal human beings.
It is by now evident that economics cannot be divorced from people’s situatedness. The nation-state, its democracy and its economic institutions are not value-neutral. The meaning and relevance of such institutions lie in their service of their members’ interests. I do not value the institutions in and of themselves. My valuing them is based on how in cooperation with co-nationals the institutions enable my self-actualization and realization of the national community’s collective aspiration; individual and collective concreteness actualization. Arguably, this partly explains why democratic nation-states predictably have varying if not contrasting tax regimes.

Although national economies are integrated into liberalised frameworks, national members always expect their governments to represent their interests in the context of the expectations of other nations (Morgan, 2001: 374). This is why ideal economic patriotism does not entail the unreasonableness of unconditionally prioritising national economic interests at whatever cost. Rather, it acknowledges the moral weight of serving insiders’ interests without being oblivious to the validity, implications and moral demands of global interdependence with other non-member human beings in other cooperating nation units (Morgan, 2001: 385; Papastephanou, 2013b: 171).

It is evidently inescapable that there is a need for interdependence among national economies of the world. However, interdependence needs not be conflated with homogeneous fusion of the outlooks of different nations into one. Interdependence, in principle, presupposes some independence and distinctiveness of the involved agents. By implication, it recognises both overlaps and remarkable differences. By being sensitive to national interests, despite being under a liberalised framework, global trade and the global economy are just conforming to the idiosyncrasy that derives from the nation’s sense of community. Being a community acting under a common culture and prioritising this culture ought not necessarily mean that the others, the non-members, the outsiders, are of lesser moral weight.

Persistence of patriotism (obviously this excludes unethical and segregationist nationalism) is not necessarily indicative of faltering concern for universal humanity, neither is its diminishing a mark of strengthening concern for humanity across the globe. The challenges of globalisation, such as the global financial crisis, have demonstrated that nationality – expressed through the agency of the nation-state – today still functions as a meaningful source of communities and hence individual identities (Miller, 2002). The challenge with a global integration that extinguishes national interest is that it creates space for people’s domination by either other state actors or transnational corporations that are hard to regulate.
Such transnational entities that transcend nationality undermine the national spirit of communities and channels of mutual control (Pettit, 2010: 79).

As a first time presidential candidate, Barack Obama explicitly declared in a speech to thousands in Berlin that he was a global citizen when he stated that the challenges facing humanity today must be confronted with cooperation with the rest of the world (Croucher, 2015). However, according to Croucher (2015: 9), an analysis of Obama’s subsequent inauguration speeches in his presidency as well as state of the union addresses have revealed remarkably more patriotic themes than cosmopolitan ones. For example, Croucher (2015: 1) cites President Obama’s constant urges for American patriotism and exceptionalism in the technology race with China and India. For Croucher (2015), such tendencies are not to the benefit, but rather to the detriment of the development of cosmopolitanism. Croucher’s position is that patriotism cannot flourish whilst also doing service to cosmopolitan ideals (2015: 1). The implication from this position is that flourishing cosmopolitanism demands, as a necessary condition, weakening of patriotic attachments. Put differently, the two are incompatible and each displaces the other.

However, it is important to highlight that patriotic concerns about a nation’s competitiveness on the global technological and economic fronts should not be conflated with particularism that is not tolerant of cosmopolitanism, such as supremacist ideologies. Individuals, groups and nations characteristically have aspirations for development and flourishing (Miller, 1995: 24). Demanding that one’s nation grows its economy to make sure such a nation favourably competes and leads in information and communication technology (ICT) is not to claim that your nation is superior to the rest. In other words, ignoring local interests for impartial ones does not in itself lead to morally permissible cosmopolitanism. Sometimes, this may paradoxically serve to suffocate cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism and nationality are not mutually exclusive ideals.

Both nationality and cosmopolitanism have unique moral forces and are complementary to each other. What this complementary nature entails is that one needs not to be compelled to suppress the reality of nationality so as to fulfil cosmopolitan obligations. The tendency of undermining nationality and displacing it with neutral universal principles is therefore itself a form of cultural domination over all world cultures where abstract individualism is being elevated at the expense of many other diverse socio-cultural outlooks of reality (Bowden, 2003: 354). It can be drawn that such alleged liberal impartiality that ignores people’s nationality, which embraces their wider embeddedness in global relationships, would
ultimately promote only the generalised conception of the human being that fits persons and their communities into a universalism that undermines particularism, which is what gives concreteness to individuals and their respective communities. As a result, such a cosmopolitan universalism undermines the normative value of the otherness of global diversity, which in essence is denying the diverse people’s humanness. Ultimately, this undermines the essence of human equality, which resides in recognising the normativity of differences (Benhabib, 1992, 2011).

2.4.8. On the dangers of nationality
A shared history effectively makes possible a sense of national community among people who have a range of diversities among them. However, it is undeniable that national leaders have ever abused the goods of history and that patriotism leads to untold human rights abuses. Sometimes patriotism is disdained because political elites use it to abdicate global justice duties they owe others outside their borders (Singer, 2002). But like any other object, historicity and the sense of community it generates can be utilised for good or for worse (Papastephanou, 2013a).

Although political leaders may abuse nationality and indeed at times have abused it, nationality is not in and of itself bad, nor is nationality a fictitious community constructed by political elites (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Although it has aspects of myth, a national community is actual and real. It has a concrete history and territory that partly identifies the members themselves. The very fact that political leaders can use national sentiments as a common rallying point in the context of the diversities that characterise national membership is revealing of how nationality is a prominent component of citizens’ identities and belongingness. Nationality is largely an actual appropriation of the members and not political leaders, though the leaders may variously help contribute towards it and at worst abuse it.

It is worth recognising that the reality of past historical events and experiences found in national attachments is the same tool that inspires members to rise up and hold political leaders accountable when they deviate from good governance and practice undemocratic tendencies. Since 2016, there has been a non-partisan movement (#ThisFlag movement) in Zimbabwe that was mobilising resistance against President Robert Mugabe’s dictatorial regime (before his resignation in 2017) by making reference to the inconsistencies of the practices his regime not only with democratic principles, but more importantly, with the aspirations of the nation’s history and founders as typified by the national flag. The symbol of the movement is the Zimbabwean flag representing the aspirations of the heroes who fought
the injustice of colonisation (Sevenzo, 2016). In the same vein, historical national monuments, such as public squares such as Tahrir Square, the epicentre of the Egyptian version of the Arab Spring revolution, and the pulling down of statues for persons who embody historical injustices such as that of Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, and those of confederate generals in the United States of America, are used as inspiration for fighting modern injustice.

The nation-state is usually erroneously incriminated because of conflating the nation with the state, which others regard as a construction of the 19th century yet dates back to as far as the 5th century BC, long before the emergence of the modern state (Papastephanou, 2015: 51). The nation has always been more than a political aspect of the individual’s being and ought not be dismissed as either private, obsolete or exclusionary (Papastephanou, 2015: 185). For Papastephanou (2013a: 27), ideal patriotism is not just inward-looking, that is only critically concerned about the justness of its internal workings. Rather, it is also outward-looking where patriots are expected to be critical of the role and responsibility of their collective in ensuring global justice as well as refraining from perpetuating global injustices (Papastephanou, 2015: 190). Politics and nationality are mutually reinforcing ideals and cannot be detached from each other (Papastephanou, 2015: 194) in both local and global citizenship. As such, it is erroneous and not necessary to disconnect political nationalism from its cultural heritage (Papastephanou, 2015: 186).

National consciousness has historically aided justice such as through galvanising territorial and linguistic justice, where it provides the means and flesh to abstract democratic principles (Papastephanou, 2015: 194–195). The demand for national independence still persisting in modern times, such as in Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec, where people demand secession from developed democracies (Burridge, Carter & North, 2014), is largely driven by national considerations, some of which are linguistic and not mere democratic ones. It is worth noting that an individual’s national identities are usually at political rest until some threats emerge, which activate a situation of contestation of some space (Papastephanou, 2015: 195). The people in a particular democratic community are not only democratic beings. Rather they are people embedded in a particular history and in a particular territory with which they identify themselves. These are inseparable from the democratic society they create for individual members to flourish.

Discussing the events around the tragic death of the president of Poland, his wife and his delegation in a plane crash that occurred in 2010, Szeligowska (2014: 491) holds that during
the tragedy, there was generally a sense of patriotism as in Poland people of different political leanings united in mourning the president (whose approval ratings by the time of the crash were very low) as a community, as one nation. Szeligowska (2014: 493–495) however, holds that when a decision was unilaterally made by some few key public officials to bury the first couple at a revered site for national heroes alone, it sparked debate between liberal parties and democratic conservatives about whether the president deserved to be buried there. In other words, these were questions about whether the president’s legacy, apart from the tragic circumstances of his death, qualified him to be a national hero. Szeligowska (2014: 494) holds that during the mourning period, this led to claims and counter-claims about who is or who is not a patriot. For Szeligowska (2014), the sense of national unity was shattered by such a division that followed partisan allegiances between conservatives and liberals.

This disagreement was occurring on the heels of a perennial debate between the left wing and conservatives, prior to the tragedy, about the substance and magnitude of the nation’s history and what should constitute Polish patriotism (Szeligowska, 2014: 505). Szeligowska (2014) nevertheless argues that, in the context of national tragedy, the ensuing debate was an attempt by the citizens to try to understand whether conception of citizenship in terms of civic virtues alone was sufficient for the nation to handle the shock collectively. For Szeligowska (2014), appeals to the historical patriotism of the nation provided strong symbols and discourses with which people could identify in a somewhat more emotional way. Szeligowska (2014) however holds that the unity of the nation lasted only in the early period after the tragedy. The consequent divisions over the president’s suitability to be buried at the national heroes’ site, Szeligowska (2014: 505) concludes, showed a departure from identifying patriotism with historical symbols to identifying it with civic virtues.

However, contrary to Szeligowska’s (2014) analysis, the burial-site controversy that resulted in split of opinion over the suitability of the deceased president’s legacy does not necessarily amount to the people no longer valuing national patriotism. Rather what one gleans is that both sides of the burial-site controversy had a sense of patriotic attachment to their nation and its heritage symbolised by their common valuing of the heroes’ site. The disagreement over the (un)suitability of the deceased president to be buried at the national heroes’ site, on the other hand, presupposes an implicit consensus of the value of having such a revered site, in the first place, exclusively for Polish national heroes. In the burial-site controversy, the people only disagreed on what should be the constitution of the legacy of a Polish individual for him or her to be buried there. They thus value both democratic principles as well as
Polish-ness simultaneously, not valuing one in substitution of the other. The symbolic value of the nation is thus generally incontestable to each of the disagreeing sides. Ironically, the symbolic value of the nation was in principle the very source of their polarised positions.

Moments such as this political tragedy or an economic tragedy and natural disasters shake the stability of the democratic state. Surviving such crises relies in part on drawing from members’ affective attachment to this nation’s territory and its history symbolised by such national institutions as the heroes’ burial site (Miller, 1995: 164). Such tragedies, without the role of a shared history and territory may threaten the sustenance of the very democratic virtues upon which constitutional patriotism is built. It is therefore evident that the sense of membership to the community through bonds of shared history and territory secures the democratic ideals.

The autonomous individual of the social contract tradition, is in essence not detached from the history of his or her community. This dissertation argues that history and placed-ness are not impotent irrational marks left by time to decay in the past. The individual is an active participant in the continuation and re-making of the history of the community. A people’s history constitutes their concreteness. The obligation towards struggles of injustice is more forceful in those places to which one has an attachment. Therefore, the teaching of a critical national history that allows learners to interpret and re-interpret the history in relation to the prevalent injustices is imperative for the sustenance of democracy. The particular struggles in different national communities of the world cannot just be left in the past to decompose hoping that humanity will flourish in the democracy that ensues from the struggles. The resurgence of racial supremacism, anti-migration hostility (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015) and arms races are developments few ever thought would recur. Thus the necessity for critical history today to arm citizens against such directions cannot be over-emphasised. Indifference and muteness over the past would scarcely keep it away from recurring. The indifference may encourage recurrence.

The strong cosmopolitanism critical conception of the nation as being antithetical to the realisation of the ideal detached autonomous person as a basis for human equality, amounts to an overplaying of human freedom. Take the ideal democratic state that is committed to justice and respecting individual agency for example. During a vote over non-fundamental rights issues, such as secession and local government development plans, it is generally ultimately the ‘majority’ that determines direction of policy of common concern. Thus, even where I passionately disagree with the outcome, ideal democracy expects that I still accept
the decision as an expression of our collective will. The basis for my accepting a policy with which I greatly disagree but will respect, is on the premise that it is tolerable, and if I always have to have my way in absolute terms, the very institution of social cooperation that guarantees minimum conditions for my autonomous agency is going to collapse. The ensuing state of nature will erode any minimal prospects of fully being what I choose. The same applies with aspects of nationality. Not everybody may value the common history, meaningfulness of the geographical territory, the language and shared culture in equal measure. Nevertheless, these elements are what make this democratic community able to exist in the first place. If my and our language is not supported by the state, there is a real risk that my perspectives of reality and how I articulate it will be under threat. Democratic deliberation will be compromised.

In other words, given how foundational nationality is to the very existence of a political institution, one can expect that every member who seeks to continue under such a political cooperation must necessarily and implicitly endorse the tolerant, inclusive and open-to-contestation aspects of nationality, that enable the aggregate of humans to be a community, in the political sense. The individual does not have to endorse every substance constituting tolerable nationality. Aspects of nationality generally conceived are what make the political community, the community it particularly is.

2.5. Conclusion

The strong cosmopolitan conception of the disembodied individual detached from social relationships and motivated by rational self-interest only is drawn from an exaggerated comprehensiveness of the generality of human kind. Such a disembodied being undermines the affective domain, which is what makes expressing of individuation and otherness possible. In the affective concreteness and otherness reside the core of being a particular human being beyond the common generic ‘objective’ attributes all humans share. The ‘subjective’ is not an inherently morally empty nor inferior nor secondary category. In moral reflection, what pertains to the subjective is equally paramount as the host of the concreteness of the individual and the collective such that undermining the subjective in principle undermines the individual’s very humanity. This is because an actual individual feels recognised as human especially on account of the difference that individuates him or her.

In the light of this, the national languages, geographical territory, national history and common culture of the global peoples (contestable as they may be) are not morally arbitrary on account of their ostensible subjectivity. Such subjectivities constitute the way of being of
the communities and the members constituting the communities. This is why people have historically staged successful political resistance movements against external forces whenever such elements of nationality have been suppressed or marginalised. Not only have people fought for recognition of elements of their nationality, but they also employ nationality as the vehicle for resistance. A fair account of human equality and universalism of norms must not exclude the subjectivities of global peoples as encapsulated in nationality, but rather the moral reflection about human equality must start from and with such global subjectivities.

People’s communities cannot be divorced from the embeddedness of their shared history. The justness of present political orders, is always with reference to the past. Injustices and inequalities of the present largely have roots in the past. The political systems that prevail today are significantly responses to the past without which they lose the meaningfulness of their peculiarity.

Such an indispensable attachment with the past renders a constitutional patriotism existing independent of national patriotism inadequate to single-handedly sustain a democratic political culture. Nationality also avails the linguistic and non-linguistic competences of communication in a democratic society. Without acquisition of such competences, one cannot meaningfully participate in the democratic life of a community.

Tolerable nationality does and ought to persist even when state sovereignty is declining because the two have distinct logics and groundings. The idea of global economic integration established only on rational economic principles is unattainable as it in principle undermines the host of the concreteness of the very people whose cooperation it seeks. Whilst guarding against the real possibility of nationality being abused as an exclusionary and paternalising force, we need to be aware that it is nevertheless an ideal with normative value and it is necessarily indispensable in ideal global citizenship conceptualisations.

It is worth emphasizing that this thesis does not regard introduction of history and mother-tongue instruction to be the ultimate embodiments of ideal cosmopolitan citizenship. Rather the thesis highlights how a marginalization of these sources of concreteness adversely undermines concrete human equality in cosmopolitan citizenship. While only integrating the two in cosmopolitan citizenship endeavours does not translate into achieving ideal global citizenship, the thesis contends that an ideal cosmopolitan citizenship ought to necessarily include such concreteness sources as satisfaction of human equality conditions.
Having established the normativity of nationality, the next chapter makes a critical evaluation of strong cosmopolitanism. The chapter shows how inextricably dependent on each other the two ideals are. Ultimately, decoupling them undermines human equality.
Chapter 3: Cosmopolitanism

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is a critical examination of strong cosmopolitanism. The first argument I advance is that ideal cosmopolitanism constitutes in achieving unity in moral action between the particular and universal opposites without sacrificing one for the other. In other words, each of the two is distinctive, incomparable and inseparable from the other. The historical origins of the ideology of cosmopolitanism were informed by this dual nature of human existence and moral duties.

The second argument is that the demand for impartiality towards all relationships of belonging that the universalism of human equality of strong cosmopolitanism places on an individual is informed by a neo-Kantian atomistic conception of human nature, human freedom and the human condition. In so doing, it does not leave any room for alternative conceptions of the universalism of human equality that are morally valid, although they are not ultimately reducible to exclusive respect for human agency only as the foundational moral determinant. In other words, there are other morally valid perspectives of universalism of human equality that simultaneously value both individual agency and relational belonging in a mutually sustaining manner. Given the necessity and uniqueness of both values, the question of conflict between individual interest and the common good and the universal and the particular does not arise.

The third argument is that as a response to global inequalities, the demand of strong cosmopolitanism that we assume impartiality towards all relationships and global inequalities is a wrong prescription due to a misdiagnosis of the root causes of global inequality. The prescription of the unqualified priority of duties of impartiality is a result of undermining the principle of responsibility, which is paramount in apportioning moral duties. As such, I argue that extinguishing national attachments would by far fail to resolve modern global challenges. This is because other than nationality, the major sources of global injustices are traceable to the iniquitous global structure that drives modern global interconnectedness. The prevailing global interconnectedness from which strong cosmopolitanism draws inspiration is neither value-neutral nor itself impartial in its distribution of burdens and benefits.
Ultimately, the chapter calls for a re-conceptualisation of universalism in global citizenship. A dialogical universalism that inherently recognises difference as being partly definitive of being must inform the conception of equality of the concrete human beings of the world.

3.2. Understanding cosmopolitanism

Although there are different formulations of cosmopolitanism, there are still some common principles that bind much of it together. Cosmopolitanism generally rests on the common premise that the individual human being is the ultimate unit of moral concern and, as such, is “owed equal concern and respect” (Wiens, 2017: 95). This being the case, humans have entitlements that place obligations on the wider humanity unrestricted by any other form of differentiation such as national boundaries (Tan, 2004; Helliwell & Hindess, 2015). Put differently, cosmopolitanism holds that because the individual is the ultimate unit of moral concern, there are binding moral duties of justice that demand impartiality in fulfilling them. Therefore, even strangers outside one’s nation, whom one may not encounter, have legitimate moral entitlements on one that should not be restricted by any other sort of boundaries. It is rooted in the ideal of human equality. Cosmopolitanism is therefore meant to realise all human beings’ equality of freedom, entitlements and obligations beyond the local boundaries of the nation, which for so long have been the indisputable host and delineator of social justice and its distributive schemes (Tan, 2004: 1).

However, the question that subjects cosmopolitanism to perennial debate is: What constitutes cosmopolitan duties? In other words, what is the breadth and scope of cosmopolitan duties and entitlements (Tan, 2004: 6)? Answers to these questions have a bearing on conceptualisations of citizenship and education for democratic citizenship. There are many variations of cosmopolitanism based on the nature of responses given to such questions. Nevertheless, the dominant characterisation of cosmopolitanism is based on what should be the relationship between the core cosmopolitan values of universalism and impartiality on the one hand, and particularistic relational commitments that individuals have and which also generate unique moral obligations on the other hand (Tan, 2004; Armstrong, 2009). With respect to nationality, the question is about whether national boundaries should confine the scope of distributive justice (Armstrong, 2009). This also determines the type of citizenship policy and ultimately the nature of education for democratic citizenship offered to learners through the national curriculum.

This dissertation focuses on a dominant cosmopolitanism that essentially holds that the universalism of human equality demands equal concern for all humanity, as constituting
primary moral duties, thereby necessarily extinguishing any moral relevance of national duties. In other words, the cosmopolitan principle of equal moral concern for all humanity of the world, outlaws the normativity of particularistic patriotic duties co-nationals have to each other, besides cosmopolitan ones. To fulfill such universal and impartial duties, one must override any duties of partiality one may have that emanate from any special attachments from particularistic relationships (especially national) in which one may find oneself (Habermas, 1994, 2001; Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). For this position, national affinities, although of value to individuals, have no moral value to restrict distributive duties, because the nation is arbitrary, morally speaking: The (dis)advantages of being under a nation’s distributive scheme that later determines one’s opportunities and chances in life are not a result of one’s choices (Nussbaum, 2002a; Habermas, 2003; Nili, 2015). It is a result of an accident of birth. This model of cosmopolitanism, which I henceforth refer to as “strong cosmopolitanism” (Miller, 2007: 43), is further motivated by the states of both global interconnectedness and global inequalities. For this position, due to the level of global interconnection, an act (of poverty, trade, the environment, insecurity and epidemic) in one part of the world affects humanity as an actual single global community (Tan, 2004; Pogge, 2008; Schumann, 2016). The ensuing glaring global inequalities have overwhelmed national sovereignty, which ostensibly now functions as a barrier in addressing such inequalities and does not have moral significance (Beitz, 2001; Habermas, 2001; Caney, 2005). Global inequalities global poverty as well as voluntary and forced migration due to global conflict have, in the interest of equal moral concern, inspired cosmopolitans to normatively dismiss nationality in determining the duties and justice entitlements of individuals (Habermas, 2001; Caney, 2015). This is because nationality is understood to be a cause of conflict and must hence be extinguished.

The following sections explore and later examine the different justifications offered for strong cosmopolitanism. It is later shown that other than advancing human equality, strong cosmopolitanism in essence undermines and violates this core ideal whose principles are also realisable by other perspectives other than that which prioritise individual agency. By being grounded in an essentialist conception of human nature, strong cosmopolitanism violates the necessity that human equality must consider an individual’s or community’s concrete otherness (Benhabib, 2011) most of which sources are anchored by the nation.
3.2.1. **Strong cosmopolitanism**

Strong cosmopolitanism demands that because duties of justice transcend national boundaries, national belonging has no moral worth (Habermas, 2001; Nussbaum, 2002a; Arneson, 2016). Such cosmopolitanism requires detachment from one’s local cultural affinities and does not expect that citizenship should be based on, among others, a common national identity. Instead, in education, it is about citizens and would-be-citizens on their own terms and convenience “learning from and about, others” without active support for locality in schools (Rundell, 2016: 120). Such positions hold that one needs not highly regard, maintain and reproduce the cultural inheritance of one’s locality (Costa, 2016: 1005). This, as strong cosmopolitanism holds, is because to have a fulfilling life, one should not necessarily value one’s inherited culture and national membership in the constitution of one’s identity. Rather, what one needs is an open-endedness attitude, readying one to explore some other ways of being besides that of one’s homeland (Costa, 2016: 1011).

Strong cosmopolitanism denies the assigning of moral value to any group relationships and reduces any value they have to being merely extrinsic (Arneson, 2016). While acknowledging the affection that exists between family and friends as based on acquaintanceship, strong cosmopolitanism however holds that such an acquaintanceship does not apply to national communities where one has ties to unanimous compatriots. For this position, the individual who lacks family and friendship ties is really deprived of important human goods. However, the same cannot be said of individuals who lack national and clan ties (Arneson, 2016: 558).

From the perspective of strong cosmopolitanism, the versions of cosmopolitanism that acknowledge both patriotic obligations to co-nationals and more substantive duties to all human beings of the world are deficient. Strong cosmopolitanism does not tolerate the idea of duties towards national partiality (Nili, 2015: 249). It nevertheless regards as only morally permissible (but not morally necessary) the commitments one has to one’s particularistic relationships (Bader, 2005; Arneson, 2016). Therefore, the different duties of beneficence one owes all human beings do not include the duties arising from voluntary associations one can have, such as duty to compatriots. As such, Arneson (2016: 559–560) challenges any inclusion of national belonging in formulations of cosmopolitanism, holding that they are not different from racism justifications:

> After all, a morally sophisticated racist does not hold that her race has special merit or worth, but rather that it is morally important for members of each race to stand by their own and
give priority to advancing the interests of their group even at cost to others. This morally sophisticated racism is still racism and still morally offensive.

For Arneson (2016: 562), “there are norms internal to social practices including friendship that are distinct from moral norms”. As such, he holds that a good friend is partial to his or her friend. However, for Arneson (2016: 562), since friendship commitments are grounded in social norms and not necessarily moral norms, the partial commitments of friendship are incomparable with and by implication inferior to the commitments of moral impartiality. The position that a good friend must be partial to his or her friends pertains to norms of friendship that fall under the umbrella of mere norms of social practices that are however distinct from moral norms (Arneson, 2016: 562).

Strong cosmopolitanism contends that there are many more other complex relationships in which one is embedded besides nationality that have special commitments and contribute towards identity constitution. Adherents question how one determines which special relationships have special moral duties, and even if some have, the question of when they should compete with general duties originating from equal concern for wider humanity still persists (Bader, 2005: 86). The proponents argue that justification of special duties (such as national duties) should not lie in their permissibility but rather in their moral necessity (Bader, 2005: 86). Therefore, special attachments of nationality are permissible morally, yet they remain not morally necessary in terms of the weight of the duties they generate.

Callan (2006) claims that although parents (representative of special relationships that ground partiality duties) are free to love their children as they would (as a form of particular attachments), we would be right in calling their love misplaced if they make unconditional defences for their children’s evil acts. This failure is about not loving well what is worth loving, and hence “[t]he fatal error of those who revere a quasi-deified nation is not their love of country but their idolatrous disregard of the proper reverence for individual human lives both within and outside the nation” (Callan, 2006: 531).

Callan (2006: 531) contends that a loss of truthful perception leads to misplaced love, not just because the object of love is not real and only misperceived, but also because it is a fantasy unworthy of one’s loving. To such, pertains patriotism that disregards global egalitarianism (Callan, 2006: 531). National identity has no moral value because any nation evokes a wide range of traits through its policies and character that cause members to make diverse evaluative judgements about their love (and sometimes hate) for the nation in different proportions (Callan, 2006: 539).
Although not all, some strong cosmopolitans argue that cosmopolitanism should necessarily lead to the establishment of a world state. For Nili (2015), a global sovereign is necessary for the cosmopolitan ideal to be valid and realisable. Nili (2015: 245) opposes the objection against cosmopolitanism that holds that a world state would undermine and endanger the inherently valuable cultural pluralism of the world that is hosted and preserved by the current national system. Nili (2015: 245) holds that a global state would be favourable, because unlike under the prevailing multiple states system, under the then global political community the arbitrariness of birth will not determine people’s life chances, as is currently the case, and national belonging will be a purely individual preference. There will be equality of opportunity for all people of the world (Nili, 2015: 245).

In response to the liberal nationalist position that the global sphere lacks the solidarity that is necessary for distributive cooperation, Nili (2015: 248) holds that among citizens, it is shared political institutions that develop mutual feelings and ‘bonds of civic friendship’. Adherents of this perspective hold that the sense of justice on which liberalism flourishes does not necessarily depend on national solidarity, although national solidarity helped in its origins (Habermas, 1994: 27). Rather, it is living under the influences of procedural justice that generates this sense (Habermas, 2003: 73–74; Nili, 2015: 248). According to Habermas (1994: 27), the modern state and nationality have only a “historically contingent connection”, but not a conceptual one. A liberal world state will enable realisation of sentiments of solidarity that make it possible for democratic societies to cohere and pull together (Habermas, 1994: 32; Nili, 2015: 245). Therefore, for this position, the most relevant interest for human beings are political principles that will enable a democratic community that will ultimately guarantee individual flourishing (Habermas, 2001: 73–74).

Strong cosmopolitanism demands that when we act, we must acknowledge the equal worth of all humanity in the world and that as such, the commitments arising from our collective affiliations must be secondary to cosmopolitan ideals (Nussbaum, 2002a: 8&14; Nielsen, 2005: 274). Our foremost allegiance should be to the worldwide human moral community and not to a particular government whose basis of inclusion and exclusion is the morally arbitrary element of nationality (Nielsen, 2005: 274–275). For Huber (2016: 678), the fact that states have moral authority to make laws and make these laws binding for a particular territorial jurisdiction as exercise of political authority within that jurisdiction effectively means that they need to provide normative justification to those non-members whose situation is altered by not being members of that state.
It can be drawn that strong cosmopolitans basically looks at actual duties human beings have to one another as being reducible to either a universalist nature or a particularistic one. Universal duties are regarded as the highest moral duties consistent with equal human concern. Particular duties, on the other hand, are weaker in their moral compulsion and relevance. It is on this basis that strong cosmopolitans further proceed to dismiss any moral worth of nationality. With respect to global justice, their position entails that there must be an egalitarian global distributive scheme that is neither characterised nor limited by national identities (Nili, 2015). In relation to citizenship, it entails that there be fewer constraints on border controls, with some demanding their abolition (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015; Huber, 2016). The bearing of strong cosmopolitanism on education systems is that learners should now be understood as global (not national) citizens and that as such, nation-specific content and skills in their curriculum must be nuanced and toned down (Brighouse, 2003; Schumann, 2016). Learners must rather be prepared for a global citizenship, with duties to wider humanity being paramount over and above any other morally permissible yet unnecessary local commitments (Nussbaum, 2002a; Brighouse, 2003; Costa, 2016: 1005; Rundell, 2016). National belonging in education for democratic citizenship is in this light regarded as morally inferior and an obstacle in the realisation of cosmopolitan justice.

It should be made clear that the nationality this dissertation defends is deliberative. It is open to the engagement and inclusion of others. It acknowledges human equality and the concreteness of others (Benhabib, 2011). It is neither closed nor narrow nor prejudiced. Rather, it is dialogic and dynamic. Any other interested human being is welcome to become part of it. It is broadening and not shrinking in its scope. A community founded on morally insignificant elements such as race cannot be accessible and inviting in this regard. The nationality being defended is not assimilationist, as this would amount to compelling any would-be-member to embrace and conform to its way of life as constituting the good life.

At the same time, it is worth acknowledging that most of the aspects of the nation are in some way, although not always, traceable to the history, culture and heritage of the community. However, as Kymlicka (2002a) holds, the culture attributed to nationality as defended here is not thick, but thin, and is capacious for individual goals and aspirations. In the following sections I examine the latent deficiencies underlying strong cosmopolitanism.

### 3.3. The duality heritage of cosmopolitanism

The critique of strong cosmopolitanism in the following sections essentially targets the strong cosmopolitan claim that duties of impartiality have overriding moral worth and that they are
incompatible with any other particularistic duties one may have. Although the universality of the moral norms of human equality and equal moral concern (on which strong cosmopolitanism is rooted) are indisputable (Ingram, 2016: 67), cosmopolitanism should not necessarily be understood as a morally superior ideal that is in competition with and (always) excludes legitimate particularism.

Since its origin, cosmopolitanism has distinguished dualistically (in both the Judeo-Christian and philosophical traditions) between a higher city that is ideal and universal and a lower city that is particular, with each having unique worth (Papastephanou, 2015: 24; Alexander, 2016: 171). Originally, cosmopolitanism was a duality: This city, the near, the particular, was distinguished from another higher city, the distant and universal (Alexander, 2016: 171). Modern strong cosmopolitanism, however, extinguishes this duality by imposing only one ideal. Ultimately, the human being is seen only dynamically and not statically as well (Alexander, 2016: 173). Originally, the individual was morally speaking compelled to adhere to the compatible demands and limits of each of the aspects of the dualism: the experienced and (not versus) the metaphysical. However, today cosmopolitanism has excluded one constituent of the duality (the local) and only ascribes moral value to the universal (Alexander, 2016: 173).

Strong cosmopolitanism in its quest to establish a monist understanding of human equality takes the major risk of annihilating the dualism valued in the heritage of cosmopolitanism that is still necessary and relevant today. The problem is summed in the question: Is ‘the city’ of strong cosmopolitanism “the only city, or one city of the two” (Alexander, 2016: 172)?

Both cosmopolitanism and patriotism are in the strictest sense boundary discourses that ought to be complementary rather than antagonistic. Patriotism is a legitimate consideration of the “concrete claims to justice” of “a specific collectivity”, whereas cosmopolitanism is about enlarging “one’s specific ethical-political demands and just claims” (Papastephanou, 2015: 139). As such, cosmopolitanism and patriotism ought to be understood as “mutual correctives”, where each also bridles the other from attaining forms that are morally repugnant (Papastephanou, 2015: 139). They are not oppositional, but are “mutual counterdiscourses”, because each exposes the excesses or deficiencies of the other (Papastephanou, 2015: 139).

The individual human being existing in the actual world has both particular and universal interests and obligations, each category with an own uniqueness. However, for Alexander
(2016: 173), the fundamental challenge posed by strong cosmopolitanism is that it surreptitiously deviates from the postulation of its foundational heritage that recognised two compatible modes or worlds of being and belonging (e.g. the material and the spiritual, the near and the distant, the particular and the universal). According to Alexander (2016), strong cosmopolitanism later claimed that there is only the universal that trumps down and overrides the legitimate moral worth of the particular. Therefore, in this sense, the universal in the strictest sense of the duality is particular, because the universal has displaced everything that necessarily fell under the particular and has taken the stead of the particular (Alexander, 2016: 174). Now the universal is just like any of the numerous other separate particulars. Simultaneously, the universal is alleged to include all the “other particulars within itself” (Alexander, 2016: 174). What this implies is that although an individual needs both the universal and the particular, strong cosmopolitanism will give one only the universal and the universal instead of the particular and the universal. No wonder Alexander (2016: 174) calls this a fundamental contradiction inherent in strong cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism must be dualistic. The danger of reducing cosmopolitanism to only one way of life, or attempting to value only one constituent of the duality (i.e. the universal or the particular) comparatively, ultimately results in a contradiction of the very notion of cosmopolitanism. Both the particular and the universal must be understood as having unique and incomparable worth, such that none can substitute the other. This position is different from and against the tokenism by some cosmopolitans (such as Nussbaum (2002a)) who bestow mere instrumental or secondary value to the particular, in contrast to the universal.

It is erroneous to denigrate nationality by apportioning to it blame for the failure to realise justice for the suffering humankind of the globe, who are entitled to help from every other person of the world undifferentiated by national boundaries. Many of the people of the world are “necessarily situated in particular webs of belonging, with access to particular others but not to humanity in general” and this being the case, the abstractness and neutrality of strong cosmopolitanism are meaningless to actual human beings (Calhoun, 2008: 443).

What ails strong cosmopolitanism is its fundamental absolutism and transcendence that compel acting and viewing the world “from above”, yet the cure to this ailment lies in looking at the world and acting “from below” (Ingram, 2016: 73). Therefore, cosmopolitanism must be understood not as a precast mould to which all must conform, as this is tantamount to domineering (Ingram, 2016: 73). Such a dominating attribute of universalism, for Ingram (2016), owes its heritage and foundations to the spread of
Christianity, later the ‘civilisation’ of imperialism and in contemporary times, modernity. Instead, he argues that cosmopolitanism is supposed to be modelled as “a process and practice of contestation” aimed at confronting “domination and its false universals” (Ingram, 2016: 73).

Strong cosmopolitanism dismissal of local belonging, although it appears unobjectionable, tends to promote only a particular perspective that is different from the local and usually not always relatable and imaginable to the many. Arguably, it is mostly a privilege of only the elite at the top (Ingram, 2016: 70). Transcendent universalism is therefore not a neutral ideal and ironically it has an inherent bias. Such a perspective of strong cosmopolitanism is associated with those with global experiences, mostly those in globalised metropolitan communities (Ingram, 2016: 70). Transcendent cosmopolitanism is a perspective that largely serves the interests of global elites (Ingram, 2016). There does exist correlation between adopting the globalist perspective of universalism and the global elites’ interests, prejudices and general good (Papastephanou, 2015). However, the pervasiveness of the enabling tools for cosmopolitan imagination in developing nations is starkly different from the West.

That all human beings across the world have equal moral worth is indisputable. It is worth acknowledging, however, that the breadth and scope of global interconnection experiences greatly vary across the people of the world. Experiencing the immensity of this interconnection is largely determined by accessing some privileges such as technology, global education and global travel (Calhoun, 2008: 443). It is even prudent to distinguish between being affected or being on the receiving end of global interconnectedness on the one hand, from being an active free participant in choosing how to benefit from the treasure of global interconnectedness on the other hand. The former is characterised by passivity. The majority of people in developing nations fall in the category of passive recipients not availed with the privilege of having alternatives and choices about what their life should be like in a global order, as they are deprived of enabling educational, economic and technological amenities.

What this shows is that the capacity to imagine oneself ‘from above’ as a citizen of the world is not evenly distributed across the people of the world (Calhoun, 2008: 434). What this further implies is that the value assigned to local attachments varies between active global participants and passive ones. This is partly influenced by the fact that other interests of those with ability to criss-cross the world can better be served in a borderless world, where nationality acts as a barrier. This seeks to underscore the fact that it is the privileged of the
world, owing to their advantaged capacities, who have a wide range of interests across different national boundaries. This enables them to easily imagine a nationless world. However, such an imagination arising from privilege is not accessible to many others who still find value in national interests. As shall later be argued, coincidentally the majority of the developed nations have an atomistic conception of the individual. The same, arguably, cannot be generalised about most parts of the developing world, such as Malawi. Therefore, it is not simply a matter of elites, but of elites with a particular perspective of human nature.

Claiming that global interconnectedness, largely an initiative by elites who shape and monopolise its opportunities, has brought humanity together should not make us ignore the rate of the unevenly distributed opportunities mostly accessible by possession of foreign language (English) (Calhoun, 2008: 444–445), wealth and education, which enable acquisition of a cosmopolitan perspective of cultural neutrality (Papastephanou, 2015). Most people of the world experience such interconnectedness, but not in proportions that would warrant denying the more actual embeddedness of the people. This neither suggests that they should be tied to their particularistic contexts only, nor does it entail that they are bereft of (universal) commitments that transcend local affinities and boundaries. Rather, although they lack the privileges of modern global interconnectedness, they nevertheless have and do encounter otherness in their locality and are able to recognise both local and cross-border duties and that each domain has unique duties (Calhoun, 2008: 434).

The human nature conception of ideal cosmopolitanism must concede that “humanity is more complex” and “irreducible to a duality” of the particular versus the universal because being human implies being “distinctively individual or particular” (Lu, 2000: 257). As such, in ideal cosmopolitanism, human beings ought to be understood as “one and many things” (Lu, 2000: 257). An absolutist hierarchical conception of cosmopolitanism carries with it the inevitable danger of undermining the complex distinctiveness of individuals and societies because the cosmopolitanism reduces the diverse and contrasting sources of the self across the world into a single one. Undermining humanity lies in both denying that the other is also like you, a human being, and disregarding the different “roots that embed [him or her] in a particular but common set of human relationships, producing an unaccommodated humanity deprived of names, nationality, citizenship, religion, ethnicity … ethical convictions, political, economic or social position” (Lu, 2000: 258). Cosmopolitanism must therefore acknowledge both the common worth of all human beings and their belonging to particular contexts that vary across human societies (Calhoun, 2008: 445).
For most people of the world, their local and particular ways of life are not mere imperfect and debased forms towards an aspired life of impartiality. Rather, they are actual and significant modes through which ordinary people keep attempting to make meaning of life and find and occupy their place in the interconnected world they attempt to alter for their well-being as much as it alters them for their benefit too (Calhoun, 2008: 441).

People are capable of having multiple, mutual and at times even conflicting identities. As such, the cosmopolitan ought not to displace the local with the universal. Instead, there must be vernacularisation of the universal (Benhabib, 2011: 89) under which the universal must be contested in a process of local meaning-making. What this means is that in global people’s meaning-rich local embeddedness there should be an interaction between the ‘known’ and the ‘unknown’ other brought in by global interconnection. Neither of the two is complete and self-sufficient. Actually, moderation of each to prevent excessive obsession is possible only through the co-existence with and flourishing of the other. It is only after the ‘universal’ has undergone the democratic iterations that it becomes both a local concept, that is yet at the same time a universal one (Benhabib, 2011).

3.3.1. The community and liberalism
Strong cosmopolitanism is grounded in a neo-Kantian conception of equality. Relationships and the moral value of their subsequent duties are determined only on the basis of individual autonomy and impartiality towards all human relationships. One should, however, be cognisant that there are other different and valid formulations of equality whose considerations are not founded solely on atomism. Some foundations of universalism value both the autonomy of the individual and other moral ideals without necessarily compromising the agency capacity of the self-determining person.

Before looking at alternative perspectives of the conceptualisation of human nature and equality, it is worth noting that in the liberal conception of equality, the community also has moral value. In the liberal society, there are different levels of belonging that generate obligations. Belonging to communities is unique in its own right. For Etzioni (2014), although individual human beings have an exclusive entitlement of rights, they nevertheless often act in consideration of collective interests. Social bonds function as a major and unique source of social order, also called “soft control” (Etzioni, 2014: 48). Social order refers to the constraints that acting on one’s preferences requires (Etzioni, 2014: 48). As such, one cannot prioritise individual autonomy only by excluding and discarding relationships anchoring the social order, as one will not manage to attain the desired autonomy. Although non-coercive,
which is quite unlike the formal coercion for political cooperation by the state, soft control tends to have more voluntary regulative and restraining power over human conduct (Kymlicka, 2002a: 293; Coetzee, 2003: 324). It is necessary in that it is the regulative framework in one’s making and acting on preferences (MacIntyre, 2002: 62; Coetzee, 2003: 324; Taylor, 2003: 33). Therefore, autonomy and social order ought to go together: One cannot maximise one only without losing the other; ultimately losing both (Etzioni, 2006: 76). For Meyers (2005: 38), exercising autonomy does not entail that one be outlandish. Rather, through the interpersonal relationships of culture, “people express their values, needs, interests, and so forth in fashioning their relationships” and “act autonomously in maintaining these ties” (Meyers, 2005: 38). For Meyers (2005: 38), culture does not only transmit doctrines. It imparts skills that help the individual to obtain either social approval or tolerance or both, in one’s personal projects.

Balancing between individual rights and responsibilities varies across societies, as it depends on historical and cultural experiences (Etzioni, 2014: 246). This does not mean that the individual must be at the mercy of his or her particular community. Yet, at the same time, individuals’ rights are only realisable after certain responsibilities have been fulfilled in relation to the other members of the community. It is not something that is universal for all human beings across the world. Through socialisation in families, community and other voluntary associations such as religious institutions, individuals get to freely embrace some of society’s values (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003; Etzioni, 2014). These voluntary associations ensure some soft or informal controls upon which the state and all other forms of public life build to establish democracy but the state and public life cannot generate on their own (MacIntyre, 2002: 107; Held, 2006: 81). The virtues of mutual respect, reasonable and fair deliberation and restraint from violating certain norms so as not to lose face before one’s significant others and community are not generated by the state or democracy (Kymlicka, 1997: 6; MacIntyre, 2002: 107). The virtues develop in voluntary associations of the home, religious centres, school cultures and neighbourhood life, among others (Kymlicka, 1997: 6). These are largely derived from the locale’s history, shared culture, shared territory and language – embodied in the nationality. Yet ultimately, individuals freely make their own preferences in the context of the social approbation and reasonable censure of their communities (Etzioni, 2014: 48).

101
3.4. Is neo-Kantianism the only universalism?

A major challenge of, strong cosmopolitanism is that it promotes one of many other philosophical perspectives about human nature and the universal norm of human equality deriving from the human nature conception. Strong cosmopolitanism is largely grounded in an individual-centric perspective of equality and conception of the self. As a result, the exclusive atomistic conception of the self outlaws relational aspects of the self that distinctively mould actual “people’s way of being in the world” (Lehman, 2002: 433). The exclusiveness of the neo-Kantian transcendent self that informs strong cosmopolitan impartiality, is incompatible with alternative conceptualisations of human nature that place normativity on relational being without necessarily undermining individual freedom.

Although human identities in a community are not homogeneous and as such do not uniformly display their group’s or locale’s ascription, there still exist certain idiosyncratic features that are “salient in a locale” not common elsewhere, thereby remarkably differentiating one locality from the rest (Metz, 2015: 1176). To hold that certain values are identifiable with a particular community does not necessarily entail that other societies and communities elsewhere do not have instances where such values are demonstrated. Rather, the distinction lies in that in the society identified with the values, the values underlie much of the life of the society: their commerce, ethics, politics, education, conceptions of health and healthcare provision and general way of life (Miller, 1995: 164; Ramose, 2004: 149; Metz, 2015: 1176).

The liberal conception of equality prizes properties that are internal to the human being, such as individual agency and rationality (Metz, 2015: 1178). However, one may argue that the universalism grounded in duties and entitlements only is one of other available formulations of universalism of the ideal of human equality. There are other philosophical perspectives that conceptualise human equality in a different mode other than through the prism of prioritisation of individual autonomy only. Human equality and human dignity in Afro-communitarian thought, for instance, largely constitute not in the exercise of individual autonomy alone. Rather, in as much as it values individual autonomy, it also includes considerations of how one should relate with the humanity in others in the community (Metz, 2015).

The concept of ubuntu shapes African thought about human nature, human dignity and equality. Ubuntu refers to an “interconnectedness-towards-wholeness” of humaness (Krog, 2008: 355). It is pivoted on the virtues of “altruism, solidarity, sharing and caring … respect,
reciprocity, hospitality, and connectedness” (Ngcoya, 2015: 253). It is about an awareness of the necessity of “compassion, justice, reciprocity, dignity, harmony and humanity in the interest of building, maintaining and strengthening the community” and its relationships (Letseka, 2012: 54). For this perspective, human beings can only (and actually do) actualise themselves in partnership with others, and not in isolation. Individual human flourishing is realised in common with others. On this account, autonomy is not dismissed, yet it is not the sole determinant normative value, as is the case in individual-centric formulations.

Through an analysis of the proceedings during the hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Oelofsen (2015) gleaned fundamental differences in how a moral act such as forgiveness is conceived between African thought that is largely influenced by *ubuntu* and individual-centric ethics. In other words, the differences originated from different conceptions of human nature of the two philosophical traditions. Oelofsen (2015: 372) holds that surviving victims and relations of tortured and murdered anti-apartheid activists during the apartheid regime had their personhood compromised and distorted by the atrocities served by the perpetrators. However, further to such disturbing and damaging violent acts, after attainment of political freedom, Oelofsen (2015: 372) holds that the victimised parties had their personhood diminished by the coexistence in society with the perpetrators whose humanity too remained impaired. In part, this is because the perpetrators were not fully human, as they lost their humanity through committing the dehumanising acts (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). In this way, both the victims and the perpetrators’ humanity was damaged such that after the tragic experiences, they both required restoration to their dignified states (Oko Elechi, Morris & Schauer, 2010: 74; Oelofsen, 2015: 373). The victimised parties cannot manage to live in a society that is not ‘fully human’, as one cannot trust it unless it is repaired and corrected (Oelofsen, 2015). Only after everybody’s humanity is repaired would wholeness be attained. The goal of justice is not only restricted to serve the individual’s retributive and restorative entitlements (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). It is also about restoring harmony and wholeness of humanity as embedded in social relationships (Oko Elechi *et al.*, 2010: 74). According to *ubuntu* ethics, one’s meaningful existence is achieved in a context of the fullness of that which is around one, in both a physical and a metaphysical sense (Oelofsen, 2015: 371). This being the case, forgiveness and reconciliation are necessary in *ubuntu* ethics, in order to achieve wholeness of the community (Oelofsen, 2015: 373).

For Oelofsen (2015: 372), in the individual-centric conception of human nature, forgiveness and reconciliation are ideals that are at the discretion of the victimised moral agent. The
injured individual may out of self-interest perform forgiveness if and when it has therapeutic utility. In contrast, Oelofsen (2015: 372) argues that in the communalistic conception of the individual, forgiveness is necessitated by both individual and communal interests in almost equal complementary measures. Therefore, for Oelofsen (2015: 373), in the *ubuntu* communalistic perspective, the goal of forgiveness is not merely to restore the political harmony that existed prior to the victimisation; rather, it aims at grounding relationships in human equality without necessarily demanding a continuing of the relationship as it was prior to the harm. Understood in this sense, when the circle of forgiveness is completed (by the transformation of the perpetrators’ taking of responsibility and sincere expression of remorse), both the perpetrators and victims can have whole humanity (in the normative sense) restored (Oko Elechi *et al.*, 2010; Oelofsen, 2015). As Oelofsen (2015: 374) holds, “forgiveness is not meant to, nor can it, provide closure for the victim(s). It is, instead, the beginning of the journey towards humanisation”.

The Afro-communitarian forgiveness perspective is by its nature bilateral and perpetrators are expected to not only pay reparations, but also to ensure that they get to a realisation of the moral unacceptability of their actions, take responsibility and later transform themselves in tandem with communal wholeness (Oelofsen, 2015: 374). The condition for wholeness of Afro-communitarianism is that the perpetrators, now accepted back into the moral society, must respect both humanity and the relevant conditions for the realisation of other people’s flourishing (Oelofsen, 2015: 374). What is outstanding here is that in as much as the victimised legitimately seek retributive justice, which is emphasised in the atomistic perspective of the individual, in *ubuntu* thought, what is also necessary beyond serving the individual interest, is the state of humanity and wholeness in the community that is affected by an act of injustice against an individual. In other words, beyond one’s self-interest, of primary concern too is the wholeness of the community that has been violated by the perpetrators’ horrible act. This must be repaired. That is why despite retributive justice entitlements, the perpetrators as fellow members of the community need to re-align themselves with the community’s humanness. Besides making the offenders be held accountable for their misdeeds, they must also be re-integrated into the world of human interconnectedness by among others ensuring that relationships are restored to harmony (Oko Elechi *et al.*, 2010: 74).

What one gleans is that in *ubuntu* ethics individual flourishing is not detached from the harmony and wholeness of the community. An unjust act violates individual integrity and
also the harmony and wholeness of the community necessary for individual flourishing. The *ubuntu* principle of harmony entails that violating the humanness in one set of relationships between two individuals affects the well-being of the entire community. Thus, what is at stake are not only the victim’s interests, but also the wholeness of the community. Repairing the relationship between the victim and victimised is a moral necessity for the individuals and community too. However, forgiveness is not necessarily in lieu of restoration.

What is observable is that *ubuntu* ethics, unlike individual-centric ethics, does not restrict the ideal of human dignity to exclusively reside in the “rational and regulative ideals for freedom” (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). Furthermore, *ubuntu* personhood, unlike in Eurocentric philosophy, is not a detached abstract or intrinsic ideal one is born with. Rather, “it is achieved and is subject to degrees of one’s fulfilment of obligations to the self, the household, and community” (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). *Ubuntu* ethics is therefore motivated by ideals of care thus recognising the normativity of certain aspects of human nature for which the other dominant ethical approaches of deontology (the root of strong cosmopolitanism) and consequentialism fail to adequately account for (Pettersen, 2011: 52). This is so because ethics of care is grounded in “relational ontology”, depicting the individual as being “mutually interconnected, vulnerable and dependent, often in asymmetric ways” (Pettersen, 2011: 52).

The *ubuntu* worldview regards relationships among human beings as constitutive and formative and not as merely instrumental or as a good that is subject to one’s preferences (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). For Ngcoya (2015: 255), what this entails is that a peculiar and particular set of social relationships is necessary for human flourishing and as such, members of the community have a duty to preserve, sustain and nourish those relationships (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). This is unlike the neo-Kantian perspective, where the individual human being is autonomous and hence can flourish independent of relationships with others. The value of social goods under the Kantian perspective is discretionary to the individual and only serves extrinsic purposes.

One can thus far hold that there are different perspectives of personhood besides the neo-Kantian and that we ought not to necessarily and summarily undermine the normative value of certain goods, such as communal relationships. It is therefore dangerous and at times tantamount to domination to reduce the value of all particular relationships as having secondary value to an alleged superior universal norm. It is due to this awareness that Ngcoya (2015: 259) advocates for “emancipatory cosmopolitanism”, which seeks to liberate strong
cosmopolitanism from its neo-Kantian and Eurocentric bias and its trapping legalistic procedures. The Kantian deontological conception of the human person and conditions for individual flourishing are radically opposed to those of ubuntu, which has an immense moral regard for social relationships. It is worth emphasising, as notes Ngcoya (2015: 260), that highlighting such alternative perspectives is not meant to either summarily dismiss Kantian-anchored cosmopolitanism or to promote an indigenous one while proofing it with immunity from external critique. It is also not about presenting ubuntu as self-sufficiently insulated from the insights of other perspectives. Rather, the aim is that we acknowledge that there are alternative conceptions of personhood consistent with human equality and freedom that need to be acknowledged in cosmopolitan theorisation without expecting the conceptions to communicate in “idioms and concepts that we are already familiar with – in isomorphic phrases of equivalence” (Ngcoya, 2015: 260).

One can therefore hold that single-handedly, the atomistic and essentialist perspectives of strong cosmopolitanism cannot adequately establish terms for equal human concern across the world without necessarily undermining alternative normatively valid perspectives about human nature that realise human equality under different social structures. The strong cosmopolitan position is deficient and not fully compatible with perspectives of human nature and equality that have a collectivist foundation. Strong cosmopolitanism only prioritises and elevates the individualistic conception of human nature over and above alternative others. The failure of strong cosmopolitanism to recognise that such essentialism of universalism in principle amounts to undue displacement of one conception of human nature and substituting it with another alternative that is not fully identifiable with other peoples of the world who ought to embrace it, amounts to domination. Such an anomaly, however, can be avoided if we have a formulation of cosmopolitanism that while acknowledging the primacy of human equality and human agency, also concedes that it is hard, if not impossible, to deny moral value to some significant relationships with others. In other words, the transcendent self ought not to be the exclusive prototype of the individual in the conceptualisation of global citizenship.

The evolution and subsequent spread of neo-Kantian strong cosmopolitan universalism have not been as impartial and without bias as paraded. Therefore, it should not be advanced as the sole and ultimate standard upon which all other perspectives must be assessed and improved (Ramose, 2004). According to Ramose (2004: 140), colonial conquests had an adverse impact on the sustenance and development of African philosophy. Ramose (2004) attributes
this to the fact that colonialists and their civilising mission operated from a perspective that
the indigenous people needed civilisation and that they did not have any epistemology, let
alone a philosophy, or that where any semblance of such seemed to exist, it was inferior by
their standard.

The effects of such an encounter are still manifest today. Most African higher institutions of
learning do not have a well-developed African philosophy, let alone an African philosophy of
education (Ramose, 2004: 155–156). For instance, Metz (2015: 1176) observes that there are
some outstanding idiosyncrasies in the aims of education in either African or neo-Kantian
ethical thought. Given its atomistic perspective informed by Kantian autonomy, education for
Eurocentric approaches aims at developing skills that emphasise individual agency:
competition, individual attainment, self-realisation and independence in creating one’s good
life (Metz, 2015: 1178). On the other hand, traditional African thought (that was stifled by
colonialism) emphasized collective values such as acquiring knowledge and skills to facilitate
playing one’s role in the community towards one’s independence as well as improving and
sustaining the wholeness and well-being of humanity as embodied in the community (Metz,
2015: 1179).

All this shows that apart from the neo-Kantian conception of human nature and universalism,
other alternative and morally valid formulations of human nature do exist and are not
exclusively shaped by the ideal of individual agency alone. Formulations of universalism of
human equality that ensure compatibility between individual autonomy and relational
commitments are neither a logical absurdity, nor are they inferior to a formulation that prizes
individual agency alone.

3.4.1. On the credibility of other philosophies
A possible challenge against the position of alternative philosophical perspectives would be
that most of the developing nations with their peculiar cultures distinct from Western values
have no fully developed philosophy or indigenous thought system. As such, they have no
fully-fledged objective philosophical structures and procedures for tackling particular moral
problems and that ultimately, the emphasized alleged richness of such cultures is in principle
reactionary and tantamount to mere romanticism (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino &
Kwindingwi, 2013).

Such a position, however, ignores the fact that the development of African thought and
indeed of others in most developing nations had been either disrupted or made nearly
impossible by the effects of colonial imperialism (Metz, 2015; Ngcoya, 2015). These domineering forces actively ensured that the local indigenous ways did not thrive alongside the ‘civilised’. The indigenous was categorised as subjective, trivialised and stripped of any moral and/or intellectual worth. This suffocated efforts of developing these perspectives. The fact that today such perspectives may contain imperfections, moral and logical inconsistencies and sometimes contradictions does not necessarily warrant their dismissal. In reality, such a dismissal only makes sense when one employs Eurocentric standards as the benchmark for determining and assigning worth and relevance. Furthermore, such an erroneous approach conveniently disregards the fact that there always exist imperfect and contradicting positions in any philosophy, even in the now-refined Western philosophy. Therefore, every philosophy is a product of deliberate sustained revision and improvement. Such an improvement usually spans over a long period of intellectual critique and refinement. Even if some forms of African ethnophilosophy may not conform to the rational categorisation of Western philosophy, it still qualifies for participating in any dialogue, because meaningful dialogue should not exclude others from participation on account of the otherness of the nature of their views or mode of articulation (Waghid, 2004: 60).

Despite the self being conceived as free, Jordaan (2011: 2380) also argues that throughout the history of Western philosophy, the self is characterised as vulnerable. Besides natural threats of disasters and disease, the growing interconnectedness of the world since ancient times has made the self vulnerable to the other the self has encountered or is yet to encounter (Jordaan, 2011). As such, the approach of Western philosophy has historically been that the strange and the other “must be reduced to intelligible terms, categorized, and arranged and contained in a larger totality” (Jordaan, 2011: 2380). This reductionism and categorisation have led to stripping off of the other’s peculiarities in the quest of conforming them to the predetermined rigid conceptualisation that is Eurocentric. The ultimate consequence, Jordaan (2011) argues, has been that there has been no meaningful attention to exploring and understanding what defines and motivates the other; what makes the other complete. This is due to the fact that interest has been only on those dimensions of the other that are deemed intelligible and fitting into the Western paradigms of understanding human nature reality. For Jordaan (2011: 2381) the otherness of the other is ignored and its individuality in essence violated by denying it recognition on account of its failure to fit in the prescribed framework of social order. However, the other has a uniqueness that is irreducible to the dominant Western categories (Jordaan, 2011: 2381). Therefore, the fact that the neo-Kantian perspective dominates
philosophical discourse does not accord it exclusivist pre-eminence over all the others that are not as dominant and developed.

The exclusiveness of neo-Kantian and Eurocentric conceptions of human nature that firstly emerged through colonial imperialism still inhere and inform the global order today that in turn accelerates and perpetuates the exclusiveness of otherness (Pieterse, 2006: 1252). Globally, Eurocentric perspectives and epistemology also underlie education discourse and practice, as education worldwide is ‘forced’ to conform to the core values of the “rational egoist” conception of the self as being primarily profit-driven (Papastephanou, 2015: 147). Thus today, education is shaped by competition-associated terms of the rational egoistic conception of selfhood such as choice, self-interest, competition and attainment, which are moulding education thought and practice today (Ramose, 2010: 297; Papastephanou, 2015: 148).

It is instructive that we be mindful of how the dominance and exclusiveness of such a thought system ultimately tramples down the just entitlements of different communities across the world. Despite the other celebrated opportunities it avails to people, globalisation (inhered by neo-Kantianism) has the potential of obstructing and undermining development of other alternative thought systems such as ubuntu. Globalisation is arguably a replication of neoliberalism and is largely shaped by Eurocentrism (Ramose, 2004; Pieterse, 2006). The lack of African philosophy development should in part be looked at through such prisms. This is not to squarely blame external forces as being solely responsible for the lack of development of African thought. There is much African culpability in the lack of development of African thought in post-colonial Africa. Much of this is owed to poor governance characterised by permanent political and economic instability (Moyo, 2009). Poor governance has largely resulted in escalating near-institutionalised levels of corruption in Africa (Moyo, 2009). Obviously, this has adversely affected the financing and support for education and research in African thought.

It is necessary that African nations have their own philosophy of education that inscribes and develops indigenous people’s philosophy (Ramose, 2004: 139). Just like with any other people’s philosophy or approaches to understanding reality and the human condition, there are always aspects that are universalisable and some which are particular to the context. However, a people’s motivation for developing their particular philosophy is largely their social and cultural situatedness. Despite the universality of Western moral and epistemological ideals, it should not elude one that the motivation for developing and
perpetuating a particular perspective by those born and raised in such contexts is that the philosophy helps them better understand their context and world. However, there are both universalisable elements in any people’s outlook and some that are not. Even for those that are universalisable, it is worth recognising that they are not the sole way of understanding reality, their universalisability notwithstanding.

The evolution of moral norms largely hinges on the people’s historical experiences. The evolution and subsequent achievement of certain ethical regimes such as human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are primarily motivated by “pragmatism rather than principle” (Ramose, 2004: 152). For Ramose (2004: 152), such ethical regimes are a concrete universality that is moulded in the particular social and historical contextuality of the people, and it is essentially an actualisation of the wider general abstract universalism. It is on this basis that for Ramose (2004: 152), as a principle, abstract universality is more general than particularistic concrete universalism, which is an appropriation or vernacularisation of the universal ideal.

What one sees is that as a general principle, abstract universalism of human equality is the foundation of all different valid concrete relationships that adhere to certain conditions of the universalism. This position concedes the distinctiveness and incompatibility of human relationships one may have. However, distinct as such relationships could be, they are all grounded in abstract human equality. However, this does not outlaw the possibility of a conflict of duties arising between two sets of relationships in the domain of concrete universalism despite such sets of relationships being grounded in abstract universalism. In resolving such conflict of duties of relationships, however, we need not appeal to the abstract principle itself that legitimately anchors the conflicting duties and relationships. There obviously are other moral principles that have been violated to result into the conflict. It is therefore worth noting that particularistic commitments people have to each other, are grounded in and are a concretisation of abstract universalism of human equality. In other words it is normatively legitimate to have particularistic commitments on the one hand, and have duties to wider humanity also originating from the principle of human equality. Non-observance of other moral principles however, may result in a conflict of duties. Such conflict cannot be resolved by demanding impartiality over all relationships. Failure to comply with other moral principles such as the principle of responsibility, may result in conflict of duties between two sets of relationships despite both being grounded in the more general abstract universalism principle of human equality. The general abstract principle of equality does not
necessarily elevate one concrete universal derived from it over another. Concrete universality (Ramose, 2004: 152) is a dimension in which abstract universalism is realised in such a way that it is the moral standard for determining normativity of a people’s conduct, yet it achieves this by adapting to the people’s peculiarity. This shows that abstract universal principles can be actualized differently, across societies without necessarily undermining the fundamental ideals anchoring the principles at the abstract level. Furthermore, we cannot have an essentialist position about the normative value of relational being for all people of the world as being normatively subjective as individual-centric ethics does.

The implicit imposition of strong cosmopolitanism of an exclusive transcendent self is therefore problematic. It is worth acknowledging that there exist alternative and morally valid conceptions of human nature that simultaneously in similar measures accord moral value to both individual agency and a sense of responsibility towards the community as an actualisation of abstract universalism. Being human is neither only an essence, nor merely abstract, nor is it restricted to individual agency (Benhabib, 2011: 68). For example, although there are ambivalent positions in African ethnophilosophy, there still exists a dominant perspective about how human beings and nature relate. In one dominant particular African conception of the individual, for instance, the individual and the non-human animals are connected (Breugel, 2001; Taringa, 2006). There is no detachment between the human being and the non-human animals as well as the entire nature and ecosystem (Le Grange, 2012: 334; Oviawe, 2016: 5). The origin of some of these positions is that ancestors embody the non-human life. Identification with nature as a link with the spiritual ancestral world has been quite pervasive in African thought, as is entailed by the fact that individual human beings or their clans have names of animals, mountains and forests and the like (Mbiti, 1977; Taringa, 2006). The point here is that individual human beings are not separate from their environment that constitutes both human as well as non-human animals’ community. It is not something they have to go out and conquer as is the case in the anthropocentric approach to environmental ethics is (Oviawe, 2016: 5). Human beings are participants in nature. They are mindful of the vitality of nature as being an extension of their community – a community of ancestors.

Mystical as such perspectives appear, they nevertheless have a unique perspective about environmentalism and togetherness with the other. They contain unique opportunities and challenges in developing African traditional thought so that it coexists as an independent, alternative or complementary source of knowledge (A-Magid, 2011).
The universalism of human equality that prizes individual autonomy and agency may not be fully compatible with such perspectives of being one with one another and with nature. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge that individual human beings across the world are embedded in societies with different perspectives of looking at the same truth, such as that of human equality. This neither valorises all indigenous perspectives, neither does it demonise the treasures of Western liberalism. Rather, the goal is to show that no one formulation of normative ideals such as equality is sufficient and fitting for all humanity across the globe. At the same time, whatever contextual perspective different societies of the world may have is not exempt from critique, as the potential of it being insulated from criticism and used as a tool for internal oppression of the weak and vulnerable within it is always high.

Human beings as concrete beings embedded in their historic, linguistic and territorial contexts criticise and revise, but still retain and use their collective ways of life as substance that constitutes their personal identities, giving them idiosyncratic perspectives. Their embeddedness, being the site of the sources of their care (MacIntyre, 2002), influences the perspectives through which to actualise such ideals as equality. Despite the moral principle of human equality being universal, it is erroneous to conclude that all societies across the world actualise it in the same form. It is equally erroneous to assign a moral value to all human communities across the globe, in relation to the individual. Such reductionism may be consistent with some selected perspectives, but not always with others that are still nevertheless morally valid.

A criticism may be levelled: National embeddedness is merely a means of proofing internal injustices from legitimate external criticism and condemnation. It is one of the means where the powerful few in preservation of their narrow interests sustain the marginalisation and oppression of the rest of the population by appealing to cultural uniqueness. How does a community-tolerant cosmopolitanism address national excesses that warrant condemnation and where need be intervention on the globe?

What is being defended in this dissertation is not an essentialist and romanticised form of nationalism that is not reflective. Rather, it is one that must itself give way to incessant and unclosed critical debate regarding its constitution (Hansen, 2011: 1). Such a conception of nationality mindful of the abuses that are meted out in the name of local solidarity or patriotism demands as a prerequisite that the nations themselves provide for individual communicative freedom (Benhabib, 2011: 69). Given that within a nation the substance of patriotism is always contentious, it is therefore necessary that the form of nationality a nation
assumes must be contestatory. It must always be open to debate. The normative defence for community should not be mistaken for an endorsement of all particular national practices for every national group, including unconsented coercion over members, particularly minorities and the vulnerable. This dissertation calls for ideal national communities that would better satisfy the ideal of cosmopolitanism, maintaining their loyalty to both the local and the fundamental norm of human equality (Hansen, 2011: 1). What this implies is that there ought to be explicit conditions for a nation group to be regarded as ensuring communicative freedom of its members that cannot be substituted or varied under any circumstances (Benhabib, 2011). Since communicative freedom is non-negotiable, the ideal national community must provide room and procedures for collective will-formation to be as free and as deliberative as can be (Benhabib, 2011: 89).

3.5. The misdiagnosis and wrong prescription of strong cosmopolitanism

The strong cosmopolitan demand of impartiality over particularistic commitments is motivated by global inequalities (Tan, 2004: 5). Nationality is regarded as an impediment to treating humanity of the world with common concern to achieve human equality. For strong cosmopolitanism, national particularity commitments have no moral worth and are hence inferior to the equality demand of common concern (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015). Human communities across the world must therefore under the compulsion of human equality, de-emphasize and extinguish normativity assigned to nationality (Nussbaum, 2002a; Nielsen, 2005). This section however argues that commitment to the cosmopolitan principle of equal concern does not necessarily render national commitments normatively invalid. Particularistic commitments do not inherently undermine duties of impartiality. The section therefore argues that the disqualification of nationality as being inhibitive of human equality’s common concern is premised on an erroneous assumption about the context and root causes of global inequalities. Reducing the problem of global inequality to a conflict between particular and universal commitments is being simplistic about the actual forces behind global inequalities, which if unaddressed will still perpetuate inequalities, even in a post-nation context.

It is necessary to properly establish the causes of global inequalities and injustices, or else we make a wrong prescription for the problem that ultimately aggravates the problem (Miller, 2007: 111). Much of the world’s inequality problems are due to unjust global institutions in global trade, global politics, and global environments that are ultimately driven by capitalist profit (Singer, 2002; Pillay, 2004; Glenn, 2008; Pogge, 2008).
Arguably, as previously hinted, global inequality is at the centre of the motivation for cosmopolitanism as global justice (Lu, 2000; Beitz, 2001; Singer, 2002; Pogge, 2011; Caney, 2015). Abolition of national boundaries is not sought for as an end in itself. Rather, it is demanded as a means of attaining economic, political, gender (Padhee, 2015) as well as environmental justice globally. Resolving global poverty would result in most of these inequalities being resolved, because global poverty is at the heart of most prevailing global inequalities.

For the strong cosmopolitan position, global redistribution is the most morally relevant mode of resolving global poverty. Therefore, the cosmopolitanism demands that national distributive schemes should be replaced by an egalitarian global distributive scheme (Gilabert, 2004; Caney, 2005; Brown, 2008), as nationality is deemed as a morally arbitrary factor restricting distribution. The ultimate goal for this is that all humanity of the earth must be under one global distributive scheme. Therefore, all global citizens will have distributive justice duties to one another in conformity with the impartiality of strong cosmopolitanism.

But how should we normatively understand world poverty and global inequalities? Is global inequality a matter of an absent global egalitarian distribution? Is it caused or perpetuated by national boundaries? Without answers to such questions, apportioning of moral blame and responsibility becomes a problem. The generality of the notion of the universality of human equality should not necessarily entail moral emptiness of other particular relationships. The two cannot be put in a hierarchy, as ideally both relationships, (one’s duties to all humanity and duties from one’s particularistic relationships), are rooted in a framework of human equality. Ideally, all relationships one has with both unencountered strangers and close associates are founded on and underlined by the ideal of equality. My partiality relationships are based on the fundamental ideal of equality. I initially regard my wife as an equal human being. Upon this equality basis, we develop and sustain special duties pertaining to a more intimate relationship. Ideally, when I treat her differently from how I treat all other humanity, I do so in the context of human equality. This entails that when confronted with (global) inequalities, appealing to the very foundational principle of human equality that anchors two sets duties originating from two morally valid but distinct types of relationships cannot help resolve the problem of obligations and entitlements leading up to the inequalities. Possibly the problem of the conflict is due to certain other principles such as moral responsibility.

It is worth emphasising that the universalist equality norm is foundational and is the basic principle that determines moral acceptability of all actions and relationships, whether with
one’s own children, spouse, clan, community, nation or world. It constitutes the regulative framework for exercising different duties. When does one violate it? When one actively excludes and undermines the worth of others out of motivations meant to undermine the generality of human equality such as race, ethnicity, gender and religion; when others legitimately expect equal consideration from one. This occurs when in establishing or maintaining one’s relationships, one explicitly or implicitly negates the tenet of the equality principle. For instance, this would occur if I hold that my special relationship with others is based on the fact that either my race is superior or that we ‘freely choose’ to stay away from interacting with individuals of another race. A related scenario would be when I say that because I have legitimately earned my money, I, being the sole determinant of how to spend it, have chosen not to buy a loaf of bread for a near-death starving stranger whose last chance of survival is the encounter with me. Instead, I choose to buy flowers for my wife. The motivations for my actions are negating the generality of the universality of equality. For instance, one would hold that human equality places on me the obligation to save any fellow human being who is in a humanitarian crisis when I have the capacity of doing so and when there is no possibility of anyone else with direct responsibility ever coming to the aid of the victim.

On the other hand, not all inequalities that exist alongside with commitments of special relationships require deference or defaulting of the commitments such special relationships generate (Miller, 2007: 52–55). Suppose while going to buy a toy for my daughter, I find a girl of her age I have never met, shivering in the bitter cold of winter. I cancel satisfying my daughter’s pleasure from toys I was to buy her. I use the money to buy her stranger shivering age-mate winter clothing. Such an action is consistent with the universal and impartial norm of equality. This is because equality stipulates (intuitively) a certain minimum threshold of subsistence below which no human being should fall (Miller, 2007: 53). However, suppose a few days later, my daughter sees a set of winter clothing branded with her favourite book character on sale. She requests me to buy them for her despite still having adequate winter clothes, only for the sake of her favourite book character. Suppose on my way to buy it I meet the girl for whom I bought winter clothes and learn that she has only the clothes I bought her for winter, which of course are keeping her warm effectively. I do not violate the universal principle of equality and impartiality if this time I proceed and buy for my daughter a luxurious extra set of winter clothing while I do not do so for her stranger friend, neither is such an act an implicit negation of the principle of impartiality. This is because I have
secured the minimum threshold for a humane life (Rawls, 2002: 106–110) for the stranger girl. In other words, my partiality is compatible with duties of impartiality, and is also consistent with the universalism of human equality. The inequality that now exists between my daughter and her stranger friend has a different foundation. It is different from the inequality that would have existed had I gone ahead to buy my daughter a toy while her stranger friend faced the prospect of freezing to death: a humanitarian crisis (Rawls, 2002: 109).

The inequality that exists beyond my meeting the stranger’s humanitarian need (of prevention of her freezing to death) can now, after I assist her, be interrogated as to what created it: Is it orphanhood or destitution due to a broken home? Upon probing it thoroughly, we would then be able to determine who defaulted duty, compromising the little girl’s welfare. Is it parents or community leaders? The ultimate task would be to establish whose duty it is now to take care of the girl so that she does not again fall below the minimum conditions for a dignified human life (Rawls, 2002: 117; Miller, 2007: 86–90). If I decide to adopt her so that I equally and always impartially treat her like my daughter, it will largely be under the principle of generosity because of how the uniqueness of her situation has touched me personally. My choice for adoption would in no way be under the compulsion of the principle of impartiality, for this would mean that I adopt every other child I encounter who is in that situation.

When it is incumbent upon you to equally provide goods and you default this duty towards H due to serving P beyond what P deserves, you are depriving H from accessing an entitled good just because you want maximise P’s access to it. In this case, you make P have an undue advantage in accessing the good. But how should we correct the situation? Your special commitment to P in and of itself is not problematic normatively. However, your scheming against H in order that P has much more from you than what you owe him in the context of other people’s (such as H’s) legitimate entitlements from you is wrong. What is problematic is your favouritism (not P’s entitlements in themselves) in ensuring undue access to the goods by one party at the expense of another. The problem has everything to do with your non-adherence to the terms of accessing the goods, and nothing to do with the acceptability of the goods or of each’s legitimate entitlements on you. By implication, human equality does not mean I establish equal value relationships with each of the world. This will undermine the equality of human agency.

Ultimately, the inequalities resulting from globalisation today are a result of the violation of certain duties (that are ideally compatible with and also rooted in equality). Global inequality
is a result of inappropriate motivations on the part of national agents. The inequality is not necessarily the ostensible normative unacceptability of the targeted patriotic relationships. Following this principle, one can be morally faulted for not fulfilling certain duties deriving from special commitments one has, even if one claims one defaulted on the grounds of commitments to wider humanity (Bowden, 2003: 354; Pettersen, 2011: 59).

What all this reinforces is that the individual should be understood as having different domains of duties with at least minimal conditions of when to perform them or default them for the other. Although these domains interact with one another they are distinct and incomparable (Calhoun, 2008: 439). Understood this way, there would be no basis for rigid absolute dismissal of special relationships or attachments as lacking normative value. The domains do not relate with one another in a competitive hierarchy of moral superiority or inferiority. Rather, each is necessary as it pertains to the actuality of human nature, which cannot be reduced completely to either the ‘objective impartial’ or the ‘subjective particularistic’ (Pettersen, 2011: 62).

We cannot simply put all human relationships in a rigid hierarchy on which to prioritise some and strip others of moral relevance. When we establish who is responsible for an immoral global outcome, we will apportion due moral blame and duties over environmental pollution, lack of democracy, collective national choices, and so forth. The question of what is owed to another is not determined merely by disparity, because responsibility plays a crucial role in making such determinations (Miller, 2007: 108). There are nevertheless some minimum obligations a human being or collectives unconditionally owe the worse-off for them not to fall below a certain minimum threshold (Rawls, 2002: 37).

The ideal cosmopolitan norm about the equality of moral worth of human beings entails that if it is equally unacceptable for person A to suffer to extent Y, then the same obtains for any other person irrespective of the community he or she hails from or his or her race or socio-economic status (Miller, 2002: 81). However, such an acceptable fundamental equality claim does not on its own apportion responsibility and duty as to what particular agents should do about the harm (Miller, 2002: 81). There is a need to establish a valid link between our generally uncontroversial moral assessment that the situation of inequality is not acceptable on the one hand, and the justification for assignment of moral duties to remove the inequalities on the other hand (Miller, 2002: 81). For Miller (2002), strong cosmopolitanism fails to account for the gap between the premise that all human beings are equal and the conclusion that therefore, all human beings all over the world, undifferentiated by nationality,
have equal distributive duties to one another (Miller, 2002: 81). Strong cosmopolitanism overlooks the crucial necessity of initially establishing causation so as to apportion blame and responsibility. According to Miller (2002: 81–82), there are three distinct (but possibly interacting) moral principles about globality from which strong cosmopolitanism surreptitiously derives its conclusion of stringent duties of impartiality towards all humanity:

- All people have equal moral worth and entitlements.
- Global inequalities are not acceptable.
- Some subject is responsible for causing the inequalities, in other words, we must identify the agent responsible for the inequalities and consequently put the responsibility of fixing the inequalities on the subject (with the exception of humanitarian crises that are binding on all humanity).

Strong cosmopolitanism therefore surreptitiously comes up with a conclusion that in light of these principles, human impartiality demands that we dismiss all particularistic duties in the interest of transcendence of equal moral worth (Miller, 2002: 82). In the process, all national commitments are unduly rendered morally arbitrary.

Leaping into a worldwide distribution of equal duties without initially establishing responsibility will inevitably lead to an erroneous prescription. Such a prescription undermines aspects of particularistic relationships. It reflects failure to appreciate the elements behind the problem of global inequality. For example, a strong cosmopolitan position implies that there must be some form of global distributive justice which necessarily depend on an ostensible normative arbitrariness of nationality (Gilabert, 2004; Brown, 2008; Caney, 2015; Nili, 2015). However, it is worth bearing in mind that different societies have different shapes of distributive schemes owing to their traditions and ways of life. Among other factors, public policy is significantly shaped by the community’s shared beliefs and culture (Rawls, 2002: 117; Kukathas, 2006: 8; Miller, 2007: 126). The pension system, population policies, judicial system and tax regimes, of a nation for instance, shape its distributive structure (of opportunities and burdens) (Rao & Walton, 2004; Sen, 2004; Kahan & Braman, 2006). It should be made clear that claiming that a society’s shared culture actively and uniquely contributes towards shaping different social institutions does not imply that there are no other unique and significant factors that shape them (Miller, 2007: 126). Instead, it is an acknowledgement that shared history and culture are among the key factors that influence such institutions, but not the only necessary ones (Sen, 2004).
If the entire world were to have one global distributive structure, such a structure would presuppose that there is a common understanding of what we should collectively value, prioritise and contribute towards through our tax system for example. It is difficult if not impossible to realise such a global distributive structure that is insensitive to people’s national embeddedness. Impartial public institutions in democracies are reasonably shaped by the national aspirations of the nation community. Public policy legislation about the same good varies between two national democracies. In principle, national aspirations cannot be divorced from public policy. Take the case of healthcare: In some parts of the world, healthcare is regarded as a private matter (Kymlicka, 2002a: 342). It is something that every individual must endeavour to pay for whenever one needs it. Yet in some parts of the world, this is not the case. Such differences should not just be reduced to differences of mere implementation of a mode of distributing healthcare, in other words as a mere administrative matter. Instead, it is in part rooted in social evaluative judgements of the concerned nations (Kymlicka, 2002a: 255; Miller, 2007: 7). Since nations collectively express their aspirations and collectively decide (Miller, 1995: 24) such public policies reveal differences of values among nations. Existence and or nature of social welfare programs, pension schemes, industrial law and educational policies about nature and content of school curriculums are dependent on the collective preferences of a nation.

It is reasonable to hold that a people’s shared philosophical perspectives underlying their shared life have significant influence on the nature of their social distributive schemes (Rawls, 2002: 117). For instance, in societies that are collectivist in orientation, sickness, death and suffering are expected to be borne by the entire community irrespective of one’s perceived or actual self-sufficiency (Metz & Gaie, 2010: 279). Given the interconnectedness of community, the suffering of one individual is felt and is expected to be shared and alleviated by everybody in any minimal way possible. This is why, for example, in much of Malawi, visiting the sick and attending funerals in one’s community are binding responsibilities on a free agent. Even attending the funeral of someone in one’s neighbourhood whom one barely encountered, let alone knew, is an expected voluntary act of solidarity.

I encountered the distinctiveness of such perspectives. At the place of worship in a ‘cosmopolitan’ city with so many different nationalities, a fellow worshiper was recuperating after she had suddenly fallen gravely ill. Two things happened. Firstly, when making a public announcement to the group, we were only informed that our colleague was sick and that
when they get permission they would inform us what she was suffering from. Later on, the consent was sought and we were informed of the particular ailment. Most members of Malawi origin later on were amazed that consent regarding what someone was suffering from had to be formally sought before the colleagues were informed. Secondly, we were informed that only selected individuals representing our group could visit the patient recovering at home. We were actively advised not to visit the patient at home individually and out of our volition. The constraints were not necessarily a matter of medical advice other than cultural or traditional.

Barely a month later, a Malawian member was admitted to hospital. There were messages sent to the Malawians’ association living in that city about the admission to hospital and subsequent discharge. More importantly, there was a plea that each of us was supposed to try as much as possible to pay him a visit at home as he was recovering.

The point is not to show which perspective is flawed or better than the other. Rather, it is to appreciate that different societies have different and valid perspectives about human nature and the human condition. Distributive structures and public policy that people have, are not value-neutral besides in principle serving common ends across the world. A people’s situatedness inspires the shape and content of their distributive structures. As such, a global egalitarian distribution or a world state that necessarily extinguishes global people’s nationality in principle would undermine the host of the sources of concreteness of the people. Given that the ethics of strong cosmopolitanism is inhered by Eurocentric partiality, strong cosmopolitanism impartiality would ultimately be domineering, as it would inevitably prioritise one perspective of being human over another, effectively unduly annihilating the others.

3.5.1. An unjust global order and inequalities
The global order that drives global interconnectedness is mal-structured and is the source of the major causes of global inequalities (Pogge, 2007: 319). This order “comprises treaty- and convention-based norms regulating territorial sovereignty, security and trade, some property rights, human rights, and the environment” (Risse, 2011: 3). The Bretton Woods institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), jointly “with more powerful states … shape the [global] economic order” (Risse, 2011: 3). The prevailing global order greatly influences both individuals’ and nations’ access to basic needs and goods (Tan, 2006: 328) because it is no longer voluntary, but coercive. However, the operations of the global order are characterised by inherent biases
disadvantaging developing nations (Singer, 2002), while benefiting developed nations (Oxfam, 2002) as the operations of the global order “undermine basic moral concepts such as justice, dignity, and fairness” (Kapeller, Schütz & Tamesberger, 2016: 320). While calling for free trade and outlawing protectionism in much of the developing nations, the situation is different in the developed nations that host most multinational corporations (Oxfam, 2002: 5). The perils of a polluted environment are being borne by developing nations that scarcely pollute it (Singer, 2002). Therefore, most major global inequalities are substantially traceable to the twisted global order that is also reasonably influenced by economic interests of developed nations (Oxfam, 2002; Young, 2006).

For Pieterse (2006: 1248), the human interconnectedness we are experiencing today feeds on financial and corporate globalisation that have outpaced political and social globalisation. Therefore, the forces of the perceived interconnection are largely based on economic interests and advantages mostly few developed nations. The profoundness of global interconnectedness, however, is differently experienced and appreciated, depending on how one relates with the available opportunities and privileges the global order is generating. However, as argued earlier, the fact that national interests of developed nations are at the centre of the skewed global order that generates inequalities, does not necessarily entail the inherent unacceptability of nationality. The problem of global inequalities is a problem due to abusing nationality than it is about the inherence of evil in nationality (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). As the next chapter will show an ethics of absolute impartiality over nationality in education is counter-productive for developing nations.

Meaningful cosmopolitanism is one which is emancipatory and particularly one that contests the nature and motivations of the interconnectedness of the prevailing globalisation in its corporate, political and social forms (Pieterse, 2006: 1248). The prevailing global order has asymmetrical flows of influences among the world’s cultures. In general, the developed nations’ cultures (where each of the developed nations intentionally manages to preserve its interests and culture) (Singer, 2002) influence much of the way of life for the global South through art, music, sports, technology and trade. The global South is on the receiving end of global influences inhered by Northern values (Pogge, 2007: 326). Were this about mutual influence and exchange, it would actually be worth commending. Unfortunately, the flow is largely asymmetrical: with the South constantly on the receiving end, making no substantial contribution to North-influenced globalisation (Pogge, 2007: 326; Papastephanou, 2015).
Currently, despite the existence of a promising potential for more meaningful global cooperation in the face of global challenges, it is only the United Nations’ Security Council – comprising the richest five developed member nations of the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia (Tharoor, 2011) – (who are themselves representatives of fellow developed nations) who are permanent members with veto power. In effect, they determine the fate of global politics and global peace on the subjective terms of only their national interests (Farrall, 2008: 930). The solution to such underrepresentation of the interests of the peoples of the world does not lie in extinguishing national belonging. This would in principle exacerbate the marginalisation of the situated people of the world that however have no voice. Rather, the solution ought to include restructuring, if not overhauling, the way such global institutions distribute power and privileges among the nations of the world in deciding the direction of global affairs (Kagwanja, 2008: 38). It is by ensuring meaningful inclusion that all the nations of the world are adequately represented with due weight accorded to their voices and concerns in determining global affairs. The ideal reform global institutions such as the United Nations need, is not one where representation of the world’s interests should be insensitive to nationality where transcendent non-situated impartial representatives from across the globe participate in making global decisions. Such a nation-neutral global order would be even more elientating.

As shown in the previous chapter, the historical, cultural, linguistic, and territorial situatedness of the people of the world is not an impotent accident of birth. Such elements are what give individual and collectives concreteness, their being human. Their lives flourish and have meaning in the context of attachment to their nations although the people can freely move across the world. For instance, Coetzee (2003: 324), holds that in much of Africa a shared local language of a national community ultimately personifies the community’s peculiar modes of experiencing life. It is a common vehicle through which the speakers express the significance of their collective historical events. In the end, it is not just a mere value-neutral means for communicating “or for identifying the contents of actions – rather language itself is content, a value-laden reference for communal loyalties and animosities” (Coetzee, 2003: 328). The significance of historical events and shared ideas are not ideally communicable in any other language (Coetzee, 2003: 324). As such, dissolving national identities which host a people’s communicative languages in global citizenship would ultimately disadvantage most people of the world.
The human context for actual people embedded in different geographical and cultural contexts of the world is one characterised by struggles (Calhoun, 2008: 441; Ingram, 2016: 76). The social, political and economic ideals actual suffering people actualise and keep refining are responses to actual and particular imbalances in their socio-political conditions. In other words, the universal is intelligible in relation to their particular situationality.

The prevailing global interconnectedness largely thrives “at the cost of vast international stability and rising worldwide social inequality” (Pieterse, 2006: 1249). After imperialism and colonialism, nation-states could no longer easily get into other nations’ borders to advance their interests (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). Instead, multinational corporations greatly supported by nations took up this task and also accelerated the development and utilisation of information technologies (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). We need not conflate global economic interconnectedness with a political global community that would actualise cosmopolitan duties. If at all such a single global political community were to exist, it would necessarily have to have commonalities. Such a community cannot thrive meaningfully whilst detached from the concreteness of a people’s language, history and territoriality among others.

According to Pieterse (2006: 1250), neoliberalism’s market “deregulation, liberalization, privatization, the WTO [World Trade Organization] and the intellectual property rights regime” are aimed at overcoming all national boundary obstacles so as to ensure the thriving of a free enterprise. It is instructive to bear in mind that global interconnectedness is largely facilitated by global capitalism (Calhoun, 2008: 434). Although global interconnectedness makes imagination of cosmopolitan duties possible, we need not be unmindful of the profit motivations of the global order, whose exploitative effects on humanity are effectively curtailed by the nation-state. He further holds that to achieve this end, corporate cosmopolitanism requires a global economic regime that circumvents barriers particular communities and nations put in place. What is often ignored is that such national boundaries have been serving as a mechanism for protecting the human dignity and interests of defenceless national members rendered vulnerable by an unbridled capitalism that would thrive in a borderless setting (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). National borders acting in the interest of vulnerable members for instance, restrict free and rapid capital mobility and the existence of tax havens. Since neoliberalism is also in principle about the “‘economisation’ of non-economic spheres and practices” (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4), the nation-state is the only active defender of the elements and aspects of the people’s lives that may be preyed upon by neoliberalism. Preserving that which is valuable for a particular people from economisation
cannot be achieved under an impartiality that regards the people of the world as transcendent selves only. Regrettably, the flourishing of most multinational corporations largely depends on establishing themselves in national governments with very weak legal instruments regulating corporations’ practices (Pieterse, 2006: 1250).

Capitalist cosmopolitanism is aimed at maximising profits and growing its global market base (Pieterse, 2006: 1252). Although it brings change in the world, mostly its more beneficial changes exclude the majority of the world (Calhoun, 2008: 434). It is worth noting that for the efficiency and effectiveness of capitalist cosmopolitanism to be realised, the “economic, political, military, social and cultural forces” it rides on must necessarily spread across national boundaries (Pieterse, 2006: 1252).

Although strong cosmopolitanism holds that it is advancing impartial ideals, its norms are rooted in a theoretical and historical continuity of neo-liberalism and eurocentrism (Pieterse, 2006: 1252; Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). As such, declaring it as an abstract impartial norm unattached to its historical context of origin is to rationalise its inherent motivation (Pieterse, 2006: 1252). There is therefore need for “emancipatory cosmopolitanism”, which entails “engaging alternative cosmovisions beyond Eurocentrism” (Pieterse, 2006: 1255). This is because each culture has its unique modes of interpreting reality, such as conceptions of hospitality, respect for human dignity, human flourishing and how to realise human equality (Pieterse, 2006: 1255).

It should be highlighted that this dissertation is not absolving African nation-states from responsibility over their failure to emerge as equal competitors in the global economic arena. They are culpable in so many ways and degrees. Yet this does not dismiss the forcefulness of global systems and institutions in obstructing their progress. Furthermore, the globalization critique is not tantamount to calls to outlaw globalisation and instead replace it with reactionary romanticised and essentialist patriotism. Rather, what we need in modern citizenship is the sense of awareness that we are simultaneously existing in particular localised contexts with unique interests and in an interconnected world with all humanity to whom we owe legitimate moral entitlements and obligations. The two domains are not opposites, but “positions combined in complicated ways” (Wallerstein, 2002: 124) with unique incomparable normative value.
3.6. Strong cosmopolitanism and emotional motivation

People’s adoption of strong cosmopolitan impartiality as an intellectual moral position does not and has not however necessarily translated into active practices at the individual or national levels where individuals act and compel their governments to act in tandem with the strong cosmopolitan positions they accept (Long, 2009; Jordaan, 2011). According to Long (2009: 321–322), there is a deficiency in motivation that would ensure that people do not only accept the intellectual justifications and duties of strong cosmopolitanism, but that more importantly, people are equally driven to act accordingly.

For Long (2009: 328), the cosmopolitan position that the universal moral imperative of human equality is in conflict with and must overcome sentimental ties of partiality, has a strong justification force as a normative ideal. Long (2009: 325), however, holds that such an intellectually sound ideal is not realised by individual and state agents because of a lack of motivational (sentimental) force to invoke appropriate action. For Long (2009: 329), such a lack of sentimental motivation is not a weakness of the (strong) cosmopolitan thesis. Rather, it is because cosmopolitanism theorists only develop intellectual motivations whilst ignoring cultivation of sentimental motivations for people to act. As a result, Long (2009: 330) argues that cosmopolitan arguments must also be concerned with further developing the “extent and nature of our attachments to others”, particularly those sentiments that have moral significance to justify and motivate moral action. The emotional motivation, Long (2009) holds, is what drives a human being to practically act on the intellectual moral positions he or she finds valid and compelling. In his defence for strong cosmopolitanism, Long (2009: 331) argues that besides being an intellectually forceful norm, it nevertheless needs to employ an equally forceful sentimental appeal to generate the force that propels people into acting on their intellectual belief of impartiality and equal concern for all the people of the world. Strong cosmopolitanism, for Long (2009: 329), must therefore also commit itself to establishing means of developing emotional attachment with all the people of the world beyond the nation. Such a sentimental cosmopolitanism would result in changes in our local attachments, as it is more radical than a duty-oriented cosmopolitanism (Long, 2009: 336).

Long’s (2009) emphasis that there must be interaction between moral and emotional motivations to achieve moral action in cosmopolitanism is sound. The claim that the deficiency of sentimental motivation in strong cosmopolitan arguments is responsible for inaction of both individuals and states, towards fulfilment of strong cosmopolitan demands is also plausible. However, other than seeking to ‘construct’ sentimental solidarity with all the
people of the world everywhere, as Long (2009) argues, we ought to ensure that the sentiment is attached to a particular responsibility and/or duty individuals and nations have due to their performing certain actions and/or lack of performance of certain actions in the global order. In other words, cosmopolitan sentiment would inevitably follow whenever global justice responsibilities are clearly established be based on either fulfilment or violation of the duties of non-maleficence and beneficence we owe the other.

The major drawback with attempts of developing worldwide sentiments of solidarity that will equally distribute duties of justice across the world’s individuals is that in all likelihood no sense of solidarity will have been cultivated in the end. Just how does one configure in practical terms what one owes all humanity in the world and how to fulfil those obligations? Holding that everyone has equal duties that override all other duties to all the people of the world without delineating the context and conditions when responsibility for such duties arises robs life of its meaning (through special relationships) and undermines individual agency. The human agency to act on global injustices will be motivated by establishment of direct or indirect responsibility by the agent. Agency should not be motivated by need or inequality as though the inequalities are natural and not a result of human action. In such a life of categorical self-sacrifice bereft of identifying individual responsibility as motivation for action, “[d]edicating oneself to others can be a way of dehumanizing oneself” (Pettersen, 2011: 59). You cannot develop emotional motivation where particular responsibility for action has not been established. In the course of developing such responsibility we will realise that there are distinct spheres of relationships, particular and universal ones. Therefore cosmopolitan duties will not necessarily demand stripping particular relationships of normativity. Rather, it will be about what duties to the whole humanity one has and establishing whether they have been performed. This ought not to demand extinguishing particular relationships.

The lack of sentimental motivation in strong cosmopolitanism arguments can also be attributed to the fact that strong cosmopolitanism itself, necessarily dismisses the normative relevance of human affectivity in political cooperation. Ironically strong cosmopolitanism intends to construct sentimental attachment whilst marginalising the nationality host of such attachments: shared language, common culture, history, and geographical territoriality.

Furthermore, some cosmopolitan demands cannot be appreciated by having only global transcendent selves unless one has the privilege of viewing life from the concerned embodied concrete individuals’ perspectives. It may be hard for a native speaker of English (a global
language of trade and science) to perceive teaching and learning in the vernacular as being central to understanding oneself and the world in the modern era. Out of utilitarian and pragmatic considerations, such a person would not adequately see the normative value some indigenous communities in the globalised world would find in demanding that their history and their languages be granted due recognition too, just like with the dominant global history and languages. It is only after one recognises the diversity of sources of the concreteness for the people of the world in non-essentialist terms that one would appreciate the normative value of such demands that originate from situatedness.

Cultivating a sustained emotional attachment with all people of the world is nearly impossible. The most appropriate way of addressing the deficiency of sentimental motivation in cosmopolitanism is to identify, recognise and stipulate what duties a nation owes outsiders. This could be based on such grounds as past encounters that generated restitution duties (Collste, 2010; Papastephanou, 2013a), national responsibility in the manipulation of global institutions, contributions towards global pollution, roles in global political destabilisation and global trade. In other words, ideal cosmopolitan attachments are better served when the general requirements of global interconnectedness demand of all national communities to mutually respect and engage with one another besides having duties of humanitarian assistance (Rawls, 2002; Miller, 2007). Given this background, performance of cosmopolitan duties ought not necessarily dismiss the relevance and normativity of particularistic commitments such as national ones.

3.6.1. Is nationality a source of injustice?
A possible challenge may be mounted against the position of this dissertation that active recognition of nationality must go together with cosmopolitan conceptualisations: Is nationality not the evil we must uproot in the context of prevailing xenophobic exclusion, such as of some nationalities from entering the United States (Goodheart, 2018) as well as violent xenophobic attacks on immigrants in South Africa (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011), both of which are traceable to national belonging?

It is worth acknowledging that advancing a position that calls for relevance of nationality in cosmopolitanism should not be conflated with a substitutionary approach where the nation takes over the roles and relevance of cosmopolitan ideals. The levelled criticism rightly acknowledges the historical fact that national belonging can be pursued by individuals or states in its absolute and segregative forms to advance narrow positions that exclude others on account of their nationality, race or religion. As this dissertation emphasizes, such
patriotism is morally unacceptable. Equally, unequivocally morally unjustifiable are the inhumane acts largely perpetrated on innocent undocumented immigrants in South Africa.

With respect to the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, there are different factors which the perpetrators put forth to justify their inhuman acts. The general motivation for such attacks is the perception that many jobs in South Africa are occupied by immigrants at the expense of the nationals (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 123). What is evident in such sentiments is the prevalence of global forces. In general, South Africa has been the sole African destination, with a number of pull factors on the continent given the failings of political and economic systems in most African nations (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 122). Most African economies have been underperforming and, given the easier mobility among nations, inevitably more people migrate to South Africa, whose economy is generally better off on the African continent (Wotela & Letsiri, 2015; Tella, 2016). On the other hand, in South Africa, migration is advantageous for corporations, small-scale business firms and even middle-class domestic workers’ employers who benefit from the undocumented migrants’ cheap labour, as it maximises profits (Preiss, 2014). However, such labour is cheap because of the invisibility, before the protecting state institutions, of the undocumented migrant workers who as a consequence cannot stand up to claim their due industrial rights and certain minimum working conditions on account of the legality of their residence status (Wotela & Letsiri, 2015: 105). In short, migrant workers are more attractive to only profit-oriented employers than (and at the expense of) local workers who demand better employment practices. In the end, a misdirected resentment towards the immigrants and not the state develops, which unfortunately leads to violence (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 123).

It is therefore evident that resolving the challenge of immigration into South Africa cannot be unilaterally achieved by the nation of South Africa. It is both a moral and a pragmatic necessity that the political and economic situation in the southern Africa region be fixed: a moral duty incumbent upon all regional nations. The immigration challenge attests to the position being advanced in this dissertation that the challenges of the modern world cannot be resolved by a cosmopolitan perspective that is inimical to national belonging. At the same time, the modern challenges cannot be properly and morally addressed by the old-time and internal-looking type of nationality only. Instead, what we need is a blend of both cosmopolitan and national interests, not merely as means for ensuring desirable outcomes, but also as values that have peculiar worth in themselves.
Besides South Africa being a pull nation to the disillusioned youths of Africa, it is noteworthy that most of the nations from which most of the immigrants originate have failed miserably in both political and economic governance, leading to great frustration of their largely youthful populations and leaving them with the resort of migrating to South Africa in pursuit of a comparatively much better life despite the difficulty of the conditions associated with being an undocumented immigrant (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011; Wotela & Letsiri, 2015; Unemployment is creating economic migrants, 2017). Such a case shows that nationality on its own is insufficient to resolve the challenges of the human condition today.

Much of Africa has abused the idea of national sovereignty leading to crumbling of economies that were once thriving due to unaccountability and abuse of power. Zimbabwe is a case that easily comes to mind. South Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member nations have on defining occasions looked away with indifference and hence have been in material collaboration in the deliberate corrosion of democracy by rubberstamping fraudulent Zimbabwean elections (Hopstock & Nicola, 2011: 126). In other words, SADC was indifferent when the right to have rights (Benhabib, 2011: 69) or communicative freedom of Zimbabwe citizens was being violated. In the end, the avoidable collapse of the Zimbabwean economy has resulted in huge emigration to South Africa. In Malawi, economic mismanagement and rampant corrupt practices among the nation’s leadership have led to rocketing unemployment rates and disaffection, driving youths to migrate to South Africa, despite facing the simmering threat of xenophobic violence there (Chitsulo, 2017: 4; Unemployment is creating economic migrants, 2017: 4). Such tendencies involuntarily push youths out of their countries for a better life elsewhere.

What it all means is that the happenings in one sovereign nation sooner or later spill over into another. This ideally demands that certain political reforms need to take place in continental regions, demanded by nations who are likely affected and sometimes overwhelmed by runaway immigration of people from neighbouring nations. It is morally necessary that regional institutions such as the SADC or even the continental African Union must have enforceable shared trade, legal and political frameworks ideal for human flourishing that will ultimately benefit and boost each member nation’s economic and political prospects. It is sad to realise that African solidarity only emerges when one member nation is demanded to account for certain actual manmade humanitarian disasters before global institutions, such as the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of Kenyan and Sudanese leadership (Kayange, 2013: 22). On other equally crucial matters, there is lukewarm response from
Africa. When the migration crisis over the Mediterranean Sea reached unprecedented proportions, there was an emergency summit of the leaders of the European Union (EU) member states, Europe being the destination for the ill-fated migrants (Migrant Crisis: more drown as EU leaders meet, 2015). However, no equivalent or even low-level meeting was ever conducted by the African Union, whose people were the ones perishing without dignity on the sea fleeing from Africa. Modern challenges are cross-border and place a moral as well as pragmatic demand that there be peer-review mechanisms among regional nations for economic development and sound political governance. It is therefore on this basis that one can conclude that the problems relating to migration today are double-edged and require a double-edged sword of both nationality and cosmopolitanism to confront them.

A likely counterargument to ideal cosmopolitanism that coexists with the local as a matter of moral necessity would be that the community consideration is problematic in that it pitches the community’s values against the rights of the individual, thereby giving primacy to the community over individual liberty. The counterargument would claim that however, the value of the community must pertain to cultural taste and not morality and hence it must pertain to one’s private choice making (Famakinwa, 2010: 155).

Criticisms of the community such as the foregoing, themselves emanate from a problematic position: They look at the community through the foundational prism of atomism (which is only one of alternative perspectives for conceptualising human nature and freedom) to evaluate the worth of community interest against atomism itself. Despite its role in enabling care and support for autonomy, the community is still marginalised as subjective and unfit for moral conceptualisation of citizenship.

Furthermore, such criticisms are based on an inaccurate understanding of the common good. The assumption one gets from such criticisms of the common good is that it is inherited, static and incontestable. Yet the ideal community being defended here is one whose shape and content are determined by the members and always subject to re-examination. This incessant re-examination is not merely a means towards achieving one end (of realising a desired community), but it is also a guarantee of safeguarding individual liberties from the preying of a bounded community. In this way, “the communal structure cannot foreclose the meaningfulness and reality of the quality of self-assertiveness” (Gyekye, 2003: 359).

Critics would further dismiss defence for communalistic approaches on the basis that although communal solidarity is based on shared values, communities are marked by
conflicts of goals and values (Famakinwa, 2010: 159). However, other than being evidence of the communal thesis trumping individual and other forms of freedom, this criticism is instead a demonstration that collective values co-exist with individual or other projects at a micro level in the community. This is why ideally in the community common values are cherished, preserved, challenged and revised by members of the community to ensure that they are incorporative and compatible with the numerous projects that may possibly be pursued in the community (Meyers, 2005). In other words, defence for nationality does not entail homogeneous conception of nationality.

Assessing the value of the community in terms of its standing to individual autonomy is very reductionist of the capacity to make choices. The individual’s development of the capacity for autonomy greatly benefits from the disproportional care that he or she gets from providers in the community. They give it in a supererogatory manner (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). Ultimately, although one is at liberty to make choices about one’s life freely, one’s freedom is contextualised in the expectations of significant others as well as what one owes society, not necessarily the caregivers who provided it to one (MacIntyre, 2002; Taylor, 2003). It is equally erroneous to restrict individual choice-making as residing only in rational considerations of entitlement and obligation. As Benhabib (1992: 161) observes, individuation is not dependent on the rational capacity of agency alone, as this pertains to the generalised other moral standpoint only, which does not tell us anything about concreteness. However, understanding individuals as concrete beings requires that we also consider their affective and emotional constitution, for it is what gives them peculiarity (Benhabib, 1992: 159). This is why the care that individuals receive from their local units anchored in their community is necessary in individual identity constitution, although it is not the exclusive element.

Even when one has the capacity of making choices that exclude caregivers’ interests, their interests are determinant in moderating one’s personal projects, showing that one’s autonomy is so tied to the others (Taylor, 2003: 33). The others are part of one’s choice making. One is not detached from them. These institutions of care help us realise our autonomy because the self, besides rational will, has relational will and power (Meyers, 2005: 33). One cannot reciprocate the care that givers availed to one; one must reciprocate to others (MacIntyre, 2002: 101). The strong cosmopolitan idea of transcendent selves gives a false sense of being human where the ostensibly impartial abstract human beings are so impersonal that they do not owe other members of their society provision and reciprocation of care. The concept of
the transcendent self readily embraces and builds on the given capacity for choice-making the individual has, yet vehemently refuses to acknowledge the normativity of the institutions that enable attainment of the autonomous capacity.

### 3.7. Necessity of a dialogic cosmopolitanism in citizenship

In the light of the equally morally weighty ideals of cosmopolitan values and national belonging, it is necessary to advance a dialogical cosmopolitanism in citizenship conceptualisation (Benhabib, 2011: 76). Under this model of cosmopolitanism, other than superimposing one universal ideal on the many diverse cultural perspectives of the world, there should be mutual and at times multipolar understandings of how to conceptualise human equality where norms and values are contested and deliberated to bring out an all-encompassing cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitanism must be one that builds on differences and not commonalities only (Benhabib, 1992: 153). Such an approach does not have an established form or content.

An appropriate cosmopolitanism is one which must be sensitive to concrete (and not only general) otherness (Benhabib, 2011) and must as such be contestatory (Ingram, 2016: 74). Contestatory cosmopolitanism aims at challenging forms of “exclusion, domination, exploitation, and marginalization” by its victims (Ingram, 2016: 74). This implies activation and recognition of the victims’ way of life, their perspectives and their concreteness. As a result, through particular contexts, those marginalised by transcendent strong cosmopolitan essentialism will negate the implied negations of the cosmopolitanism in order to discover how to concretely express universalism (Ingram, 2016: 74). Cosmopolitanism must therefore be about re-appropriation and re-articulation of universalism.

Contestatory cosmopolitanism, according to Ingram (2016: 76), prescribes neither our duties nor institutional reforms we must adopt. Instead, a contestatory cosmopolitanism provides a general moral orientation, highlighting “the dilemmas and contradictions likely to arise in politics, while nevertheless providing a normative and political basis on which to choose sides, assess strategies and rough out compromises in particular situations” (Ingram, 2016: 76). Therefore, the respects in which particularised people advance universal values contextually vary depending on the particular struggle that necessitates it. The universal must be expressed in the local because the local always has a dimension of the universal (Ingram, 2016: 77).
A dialogical universalism does not regard difference as an obstacle to establishing equality because it is cognisant that difference is what gives individuation to the concrete, and not just generalised other (Benhabib, 1992: 159). As such, any moral theorisation that excludes difference but dwells on commonality only effectively undermines the core of the concreteness of the other’s being. Equality, as Benhabib (1992: 165–168) holds, must start from that which makes me so other, as our commonalities by themselves without our differences will miserably fail in pinning down that which makes me me. This being the case, otherness can only be comprehended when it is actively engaged in a free dialogue where we learn, and not assume or project, what defines the other: the other self-defines him- or herself (Benhabib, 1992: 168). I may not always understand the prism through which people look at reality. I should not endorse others’ outlooks only after I have been fully persuaded by the standards of their outlook (Paulsen, 2011). Rather, when I understand how others perceive the world, even without fully comprehending why they value that particular perspective, I will respect and support them. Such cosmopolitanism depends on allowing and creating space for the other to bring forward for normative consideration that which makes him or her other, and a concrete being. In cosmopolitanism citizenship configuration, essentialist conceptualisations of nationality are outrightly inimical to such endeavours.

It is imperative that I ensure that differences must constitute why I respect others and how they too respect me as an equal (although different) being whose equality lies in our respecting each’s capacity to freely choose what makes each of us ourselves. This is why universalism is neither a rigid essence nor an attribute of human nature (Pettersen, 2011: 55), but rather a result of discourse (Benhabib, 2011: 67).

The necessity of a dialogic universalism is more urgent in the current state of globalisation. Globalisation is largely being driven by global systems that are thriving on legal frameworks that (due to weakening of state sovereignty) severely lack representation and will of the people they affect (Benhabib, 2011: 104). Largely, such laws are driven by capitalist interests of multinational corporations (Sen, 2004; Pieterse, 2006; Calhoun, 2008; Papastephanou, 2015) and are bereft of the key fundamentals for the rule of law, such as transparency and consistency in application (Benhabib, 2011). The prevailing global interconnectedness, despite its other benefits, largely satiates global capitalism (Cheah, 2006: 492).

This is why education for citizenship for transcendent global selves that is not sensitive to local considerations risks undermining the otherness of those cultures of the world whose languages are not languages of science and trade. In an absence of deliberation where each
nation or culture is not regarded as an equal other and is deprived of economic muscle, strong cosmopolitanism will only collude in the annihilation of the other in the name of an alleged impartiality that itself inheres bias.

The realities of national members’ concrete otherness across the world, human equality and global interconnectedness necessitate democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2011: 89) at the global level. Democratic iterations refer to processes whereby principles behind universal right and duty claims are contextualised after undergoing public deliberation (Benhabib, 2011: 129). Universalist claims are contested and ultimately vernacularised, thereby according them legitimacy (Benhabib, 2011: 89). Such contestation and ultimate vernacularisation ensure that the universal conforms to the local frameworks of meaning making (Ingram, 2016: 77).

Global democratic iterations would demand that education for democratic citizenship should not be about being passive recipients of other people’s perspectives about universalism and equality. Rather, the iterations are about making sense of the global in the embedded context of the local. To grasp the obligations one has to the world’s humanity, one need not discard one’s concrete otherness as embodied in national belonging. Failure to recognise the concrete otherness of the other is the flipside of denying them individuation, which in other words is denying them human equality.

Universalism that is deliberative entails acknowledging the concreteness of one’s otherness as well as that of the other (Benhabib, 1992). It is not about extinguishing differences. For some time, developed nations of the West have sneered at their own national being in domestic democratic discourse and summarily dismissed it as a vice incompatible with equality (Brodie, 2004: 328). They have operated from the transcendent selves paradigm.

Racist and segregative right-wing ideologies have emerged because right wing parties are the only ones that have filled the void created by mainstream parties staying away from acknowledging the national concreteness of oneself and of the other in global economic integration for instance. Strong cosmopolitanism dismisses national belonging as morally empty (Habermas, 2001) and instead it only demands a one-size-fits-all basis of commonality.

The increasing weakening capacity for nation-states to reasonably assert and protect national members’ interests against the forces of economic globalisation and financial institutions’ devastating over-drive for profit guised in the free trade of neo-liberalism, whilst also acknowledging integration left a space now occupied and abused by right-wing ideologies.
The widely bemoaned EU democratic deficit in binding EU legislation affecting trade, for example, alienated the interests of embedded selves in Europe (Chryssochoou, Stavridis & Tsinisizelis, 1998; Yalçın, 2014). On the other hand, some needless global wars, in the name of the demand of impartiality for individual liberty, have backfired with refugee migration. Despite the universal aspiration for civil liberties for all, including in the Middle East, it was unnecessary to militarily impose a regime change in the hope that this would yield freedom, without understanding the otherness of the would-be beneficiaries, despite their outstanding need for freedom – what it would take for them to realise the freedom they obviously need. It goes beyond regime change. Mostly, it is about ensuring change of attitudes in government and civil society leaders who in pursuit of their self-serving interests supress inclusion and open collective will-formation and prevent critical citizenship in the name of preserving religious or cultural integrity (Waghid & Davids, 2014: 344). To realise change in such contexts, military force would cause further damage rather than good.

The idea of a global communicative discourse among the peoples of the world suggests that there should be no pre-set conditions in public education, for example, of the content and knowledge that satisfy cosmopolitan ideals (Benhabib, 2011). Cosmopolitanism does not reside in a neutrality over one’s historical and social embeddedness. Different human communities have encountered otherness differently and responded differently. There has been no uniform response to such encounters so as to summarily dismiss the worth of nationality as being toxic to the ideal of equality. The challenges emerging from such encounters are equally uniquely different.

Dialogic universalism, unlike mainstream strong cosmopolitanism, is not ‘legislative’ and as such does not aspire to establish the ‘ideal’ response to moral and political problems and later prescribe human nature conceptions that are only one of many other valid moral perspectives as the only standard in global economic, political and legal institutions (Ingram, 2016). Most people in Africa and Malawi are far removed from influencing and directing the global order. Their metaphysical outlooks and epistemologies are regrettably not only being challenged, but being systematically undermined and involuntarily discarded. However, although there is almost no voluntariness in participating in the coercive global scheme, the distribution of its burdens and opportunities unevenly varies across nations (Barry & Valentini, 2009: 495; Bozac, 2012). Not all nations have the ability to influence and the economic, political, legal, academic and cultural textures of globalisation. This is in part due to the weak economic condition of developing nation-states that ultimately affects their
citizens’ life chances and access to opportunities (Glenn, 2008). Ultimately, education policies most African nations pursue are not authentic. They are only default positions of convenience in relation to the dominant cultural influences and outlooks in globalisation discourse. Ultimately, Malawi like most developing nations is being systematically compelled by the prevailing global structure to choose either just get along and conform to globalist demands or feebly demand that global systems transform and embrace their perspectives.

Citizenship today must be a co-existence of cosmopolitanism and a critical patriotism; one that combines domestic justice realised through local frameworks, that nevertheless has appropriate regard for the moral entitlements and interests of other human beings with whom we share the world. Such a patriotism is not only inward-looking, but also outward-oriented, conscious of the ramifications of its collective decisions on the world’s other human beings and nations (Hansen, 2011: 1; Papastephanou, 2015: 190; Schumann, 2016: 270). Such a patriotism is not only compatible with but also mutually reinforces cosmopolitan ideals. The inward-looking should not be a form of tokenism, but a matter of moral necessity.

We need a new understanding of cosmopolitan duties today. This new understanding should be based on the idea that our primary duties in global cooperation are duties of non-malefcaence: not to cause harm to humanity. But how do nations and individuals determine what will not harm the other? If we do not depart from conceiving our obligations to the other based only on our common humanity, we will be stuck at the not-so-meaningful generalised other perspective of equality. International relations and individual relationships with others will be about everything else except what defines them: their concreteness and individuality.

All this implies that duties of non-maleficence towards individuals or nations are possible only if there is dialogue where the other self-defines himself or herself (Benhabib, 2011) and not leaving the definition of what makes the other other to derive from mere conjecture. Therefore, if nations and individuals are to refrain from causing harm to the other, they must initially have a very clear understanding of others through their self-definition. This will allow for recognition of both the generality and concreteness of being individuals and collectives in the world.

Our duties of beneficence to the people of the world should be determined on a case-by-case basis because the normativity of such duties depends on the context under which inequalities have emerged, and not just on the general human equality principle or on the mere existence
of inequalities. Such duties are contextualised in responsibility (Miller, 2007). Therefore, the first global justice duty a nation has is not to participate in causing inequities in global order.

The weakening of state sovereignty is not tantamount to the weakening of nation belonging. Therefore, people will still exist in collectives primarily in the form of nation-states. This is because, as shown in Chapter 2, states may lose their power and become part of new federated suprastates. Despite such transformations, nationality, owing to its linguistic, cultural, historical and territorial value will always remain a point for political solidarity, as nationality has been for centuries (Papastephanou, 2015: 33). National solidarity can be utilised for efficient economic and political re-organisation.

In addition, in a world without nation-states, individuals organised based on the features of the nation as their common interests, will still advance these common national interests as worthy of political recognition and preservation. Nationality will therefore always manifest itself as both a political means and a political end across the world and hence cosmopolitanism cannot afford to exclude it. Nationality will still as a matter of necessity be the default basis for human organisation in different geo-political units of the world that would still prevail even in a post-nation-state era (Bowden, 2003: 356). What has changed and weakened due to globalisation is the sovereignty of nation-states and not national belonging, which is ancient and enduring as it is constitutive of being. Other than being mere global citizens, we should be globally minded citizens, aware that (economic, political and environmental) decisions made from one part of the world have an effect on the condition of others’ way of life (Bowden, 2003: 359; Hansen, 2011: 103), hence we need to act with care.

### 3.8. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that cosmopolitanism is by nature and origin a duality. The particular and universal opposites are complementary constituents with incomparable and indispensable value. By indicting national belonging and its associated particular relationships, strong cosmopolitanism commits a hasty normative generalisation. It is instructive to bear in mind that the paraded strong cosmopolitan exclusivity of human equality as only residing in a detached atomistic self is not a comprehensive account of all possible and existing ethically valid perspectives of human nature. Alternative perspectives of human nature exist that without necessarily undermining personhood, inextricably value both individual agency and relational obligations. Therefore, there is compatibility and symbiosis between human flourishing and community belonging.
Despite being driven by the good intention of addressing global inequalities and injustices, strong cosmopolitanism fails to comprehend the root causes of global inequalities. The heart of global interconnectedness is ultimately pumped by unbridled capitalist interests (Oxfam, 2002; Kapeller et al., 2016) that also influence skewed international relations between developed and developing nations. Therefore, the iniquitous outcomes of the prevailing global structure cannot cease even if national boundaries are deactivated globally. If anything, the iniquitous outcomes would only escalate.

Only a universalism of human equality that takes difference, other than commonality, as its crucial starting point of reflection is relevant and morally compatible with other diverse yet valid ethical perspectives of the world. At a global level, such a universalism engages the other’s concreteness and not just generality (Benhabib, 2011). The diverse other of the world and their respective valuation of community should not be forced to fit in and conform to the mould of neo-Kantianism.

Having established the possibility of having a universalism of human equality, and hence a subsequent citizenship conception that depends on mutual interaction between the nation’s local and the cosmopolitan, the next chapter aims to show how such a cosmopolitanism ought to relate with education, to achieve ideal education for cosmopolitan citizenship.
Chapter 4: Education, citizenship and equality

4.1. Introduction

This chapter argues that it is normatively necessary that education for democratic and cosmopolitan citizenship actively include relevant and tolerable aspects of nationality. Such aspects include teaching and learning of national history and relevant use of the mother tongue in instruction. The chapter achieves this by firstly contending that the general and arguably fundamental educational aim of developing authentic beings in learners does not inherently require, as a precondition, the exclusion of community or patriotic considerations. Members in a nation-state share a foundational fate rooted in common and contestable elements of nationality.

Secondly, the chapter contends that exclusion of patriotism in education for cosmopolitan citizenship ill-serves the normatively valid entitlements of people in developing nations. This is because what is usually paraded as impersonal (strong) cosmopolitan education is not in essence neutral, despite its dominance. Instead, it has some inherent particularistic perspectives. Such education for citizenship furthermore dismisses as non-objective and excludes for normative consideration any other valid epistemological perspectives on the mere basis of their otherness. As such, a strong cosmopolitanism-inspired global citizenship that is exclusively oriented towards universalism and global impartiality risks amounting to passive coercive demands to assimilate into the dominant mainstream. By de-politicising nationality, strong cosmopolitan citizenship hides and entrenches global inequalities that are based on the subjugation of weak nations’ histories, languages and cultures through an ostensible impartiality of global equality. In this respect, education for democratic citizenship of strong cosmopolitanism has adverse implications for the educational justice entitlements of people in developing nations of Africa, such as Malawi, unlike in developed nations.

Lastly, the chapter argues that global interconnectedness, which is what validates the necessity of (strong) cosmopolitan citizenship education, is not necessarily in the interest of the just entitlements of the peoples of the world, particularly those in economically weak nations. Rather, capitalist tendencies have in principle hijacked the education discipline worldwide, pushing to the peripheral major concerns of justice in education conceptualisation, planning and implementation. Merely taking the interconnectedness as a given and hence the motivation for education for global citizenship without initially
demanding re-structuring of the interconnectedness as a moral necessity, unproblematises global interconnection. The consequent education for democratic citizenship founded on the prevailing global interconnectedness colludes in perpetuating the iniquities of global capitalism. The ultimate position of this chapter therefore is that contrary to the common narrative, patriotism today is very crucial, not only in ensuring global justice, but also in that in its absence, global interconnectedness will continue producing iniquitous outcomes.

4.2. Authenticity and education

The perennial question regarding the aim of education always draws diverse responses. However, arguably, most positions about the goal of education include or are ultimately reducible to the necessity for education to facilitate the learner’s achievement of authenticity (Dewey, 2004; Freire, 2014). In other words, there is arguably general consensus about authenticity constituting the core aims of education.

Authenticity is the flipside of freedom (Sarid, 2015: 477). It is achieved when the subject is free from coercion, indoctrination and arbitrary restraints, among other things (Sarid, 2015: 477). The authentic subject must act freely, independent of the external influences he or she has not consented to. Therefore, independence and autonomy are crucial (although not exclusive, as shown in the previous chapter) in the project of authenticity. The two are some of the necessary conditions, although not the only ones.

Education for authenticity ensures the school does not produce individuals loyal and conforming to society’s perspectives (Dewey, 2004). It is therefore necessary that both as a means and an end of the educating process, a critical consciousness be developed in learners to enable them to question and uncover defective perspectives and knowledge that are nevertheless driving their society. Ultimately, they should be able to reconstruct society by becoming the authentic individuals they have critically and reasonably reflected upon.

Given these conditions for the realisation of an authentic self, the role of the community or lack of it has come to the fore in designing an ideal education for the authentic self. With respect to the development of citizenship, in much of political and education theorisation, the community is regarded as a barrier to authenticity and hence needs to be overcome (Brighouse, 2003; Nili, 2015; Peters, 2015). The community is regarded as intrinsically suspicious, if not already condemned as a tool for coercion, suppression and restraint in efforts of achieving authenticity. By and large, aspects of the desired critical citizenship usually embrace only very thin inconsequential elements of the community. The community
is therefore understood as a ‘necessary evil’ whenever concessions of its role and relevance are made.

However, with respect to education, we cannot fully and naively abstract what freedom actually entails for all people everywhere (Freire, 2014: 81). It is instructive to always bear in mind that both education theory and education practice need not be entirely abstract from and independent of social and cultural situatedness (Freire, 2014: 81). Education for freedom in part entails an alignment with the concrete needs and aspirations of individuals in relation to their particular community, and the needs are themselves in part shaped by their community’s uniqueness (Waghid, 2004; Freire, 2014). This, however, does not imply that education should be aimed at reproducing society.

Universal positions that revere individualism as constituting an independent transcendent self that is identical to any other self in the world and is insensitive to the considerations of its context, are not valid (Papastephanou, 2003: 397). The invalidity is based on the argument that “if education by definition concerns processes of shaping subjectivity via community or forming communities via free and insular subjectivities”, then the ideals of individualism and community as goals of education are not antagonistic, but complementary (Papastephanou, 2003: 399). This is because separatist commitment to individualism only “favours the private sphere of life and is egocentric”, while on the other hand, an exclusive focus on community considerations only “can be too integrative and unreflective” (Papastephanou, 2003: 399).

The liberal conception of education aims at enabling the individual to realise freedom from external and internal constraints originating from “ignorance, prejudice, or unfamiliarity with possible ways of life and sources of satisfaction or commitment” (Jonathan, 1997: 183). These constraints are usually regarded as embodied in the society and its shared ideals. At the same time, however, liberalism should duly balance between its neutralism over community interests on the one hand and retaining social practice which liberalism itself expects to be deregulated as the requirement of the adherence to the neutralist norm on the other hand (Jonathan, 1997: 182). Although neutralist liberalism requires that the public sphere be characterised by proceduralist values only, realisation of the liberal ideals has however been dependent on “the public provision of a social practice which cannot – either logically or empirically – itself instantiate neutrality” (Jonathan, 1997: 184). Therefore, the possibility of the autonomous individual is in essence premised on the presupposed prior existence of society.
Emphasis on autonomy in liberal education neither has to entail nor demand that we be “indifferent to the understandings, tastes and values of the next generation” of citizens, who are now learners, so long as the education we are giving them develops a preference-making capacity in them (Jonathan, 1997: 188). Rather, the fostering of autonomy should be based on the belief that the education learners receive offers them a “range of worthwhile options” as available and accessible in their particular community and that these options are not imposed on them, but offered, hence “they will freely choose what is worthwhile” (Jonathan, 1997: 188). This is not tantamount to indoctrination, socialisation, reproduction of society or suffocation of achievement of individual emancipation and evolution of society (Jonathan, 1997: 188). Aspirations for achieving individual autonomy do not necessarily reside in negative duties only with respect to the role of the community towards the individual’s freedom project. Rather, they also reside in positive obligations with substantive social commitments (Jonathan, 1997: 188–189; Sarid, 2015: 478).

The most pivotal thing here is the worthwhileness of the options that are offered by society to learners to accept, reject or revise. Similarly, parents do not in the name of autonomy let their children make every choice the children wish to make and the parents only accept and respect it (Jonathan, 1997: 188; MacIntyre, 2002: 93). There is a broad range of worthwhile options which the chooser can deliberate on, modify and recreate, but within a range of substantive ethical liberalism.

Ethical liberalism, unlike neutralism, embraces the fact that in the normative interests of both society and individual, outcomes of education need not be characterised with indifference about the value and values of the community, and that offering learners certain worthwhile options is acceptable in so far as the learners freely choose them (Jonathan, 1997: 189). In other words, there are certain refined and contested worthwhile options society provides and must provide to learners to choose from, revise or reject as authentic selves. It is impossible for the autonomous self to in principle achieve authenticity by oneself from a clean slate (Sarid, 2015: 481). Therefore, the limitation of neutralism is that it implies that “worthwhile social options” from which the autonomous individual chooses will inevitably and mysteriously derive from the “aggregate preferences of autonomous individuals” (Jonathan, 1997: 189). The expectation that citizens in the state should share and preserve only the society founded on the procedural institutions of democracy through which each is guaranteed of achieving authenticity without dependence on a fellow citizen is therefore flawed.
The worthwhile options that constitute fodder for the realisation of the authentic individual are partly rooted in society’s cooperation (Taylor, 2003: 33). It is hence necessary that in education, society’s “substantive judgements of value” be deliberatively contested and “publicly instantiated and continually revised” (Jonathan, 1997: 189). The problem with democratic citizenship formulations whose nature is essentially civic or constitutional (unrooted in the community’s peculiarities) is that its conception of human nature is one that depoliticises the social and communal values and ideals that cohere and give idiosyncrasy to a community. Such education furthermore decouples and compartmentalises the communal and the political (Habermas, 2001: 73–74). Its civic patriot then prefers the constitutional only, over commonly shared substance that nevertheless is the matter that enables and necessitates the cherished civic or constitutional patriotism. For concrete people, value of a civic or political culture of democracy is hardly an end in itself. The value is a means of rearranging what as a community of shared fate they all share or do not share. Valuing a political culture is about how to or not to structure society’s distribution scheme that is deeply rooted in the shared and contested values of the community whose tool for incessant contestation is constitutionalism.

Constitutional or civic patriotism therefore runs the risk of treating a very efficient tool for realisation of justice as an end in itself. Concrete people in concrete democracies need constitutionalism as a means of determining how their welfare system must be structured, which past injustices need avoidance and who needs compensation or affirmative action based on the nation’s history. Their concrete needs further include how minorities are being excluded from the structures of society, what constitutes shared history and culture, what is worth public expenditure to preserve and how to support maintenance of the local language in the light of threatening global challenges. This is the context in which concrete human beings in concrete societies sharing concrete values and history understand constitutionalism.

Meaningful education should draw from the philosophy of its people’s context of lived experiences (Waghid, 2004: 57). The educating process is a human action that necessarily involves the people’s cooperation in their quest to achieve the individual ‘good life’ as they seek to establish shared ways of interacting with and deriving meaning from the socio-cultural environment they commonly share (Waghid, 2004: 56). Given the social embeddedness of education and freedom, the idea of educating for a disembodied, impersonal non-national being that only maximises self-interest while being detached from substantial
social obligations is in principle not possible, and in practice ruins the ideals of both freedom and meaningful education.

While eagerly guarding against reproduction of social mores and structures, still, the school should provide learners with a critical analysis of the fundamental features of the wider society based on its practices, history and shared values, while confronting and later sieving out unacceptable elements of the wider environment. In the interest of authenticity, it is the role of the school to accord every learner with an opportunity “to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born” (Dewey, 2004: 22). The school environment must “eliminate, so far as possible, the unworthy features of the existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes” (Dewey, 2004: 22).

Educating for individual independence need not imply that interdependence, which presupposes community interests, is a vice nor that it is expendable in the autonomy project (Winch, 1996: 40). In other words, is sustained by independence is sustained by interdependence. Endeavours of ensuring freedom in the world that regard subjectivity in contrast with universalisable objectivity as antithetical to realisation of universalism are both simplistic and a negation of the reality of human nature, as the two exist in mutual interaction (Freire, 2014: 50).

What a learner learns in school must not be detached from “the existential experience of the [learners]” where “words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity” (Freire, 2014: 71). The authenticity, empathy and critical thinking aims of education imply freedom of the subject, among other things. In other words, their realisation is preconditioned on a subject who is free. It is erroneous to conflate such a free subject with one that is detached from his or her situatedness. In any case, the contrary is what holds, as argues Freire (2014: 81):

Education as the practice of freedom – as opposed to education as the practice of domination – denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people. Authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, but people in their relations with the world. In these relations consciousness and world are simultaneous: consciousness neither precedes the world nor follows it.

A quest for developing authentic, autonomous and critical citizens by treating the sources of the citizens’ concreteness (local language, history, shared culture and common territory) as inherently suspect and inimical to the freedom project is flawed. Through a community’s
non-reciprocal relationships in its institutions of care, for instance, an individual is accorded with a wide range of normatively valid options he or she may accept, reject or revise (MacIntyre, 2002: 91). Despite the potentiality and actuality of the anti-freedom tendencies of socialisation, it is equally valid that the different modes of legitimate non-political restraints society exacts over the individual enhance his or her range of preferences or what to consider or not in preference making (Kymlicka, 2002a; Etzioni, 2014).

The worthwhile preferences with which the individual engages can never exist outside the ambit of the community. Without its existence, they are just not possible. Therefore, in as much as we need global-conscious citizens, with an awareness of universal duties and rights transcending the local, this should never be achieved at the expense of the local sources of concreteness. Education for democratic citizenship should therefore not afford to discard substantive local or national considerations in the name of a cosmopolitan citizenship development. The local and the nation need not be merely included. They are necessary for realisation of a just citizenship.

4.2.1. Individual, local and global democracy

The scope of civic education includes the implicit foundational aim of propagation of democracy through structures and practices that host, preserve and perpetuate values of democracy. The nation-state is one of such structures that has the capacity to facilitate political organisation and sustain political order, which are catalysts for democracy (Weinstein, 2004). Perpetuation of democratic values is largely dependent on this political order. Once the democratic project takes off and flourishes, the political order as well as its foundation (the nation) assume a very passive background role. However, their passivity does not imply their dispensability.

As democracy advances the tenets of equality, the primacy of the right to individual self-determination, freedom of movement and association to relate with the world’s people, there is strong temptation to undermine the bedrock of the political solidarity that hosts democracy in the state. There is neglect of the fundamental that the reality of the coherent political community on which the democratic state builds is made possible by such cohering elements as a shared geographical territory and a common language – aspects of nationality (Miller, 1995: 164). The relevance and necessity of such elements are not restricted only to the founding or origin of the (nation-state’s) democratic atmosphere that is catalytic of individual autonomy as Habermas (1994: 23) holds. What is often ignored is that for the members, their
particular democratic project must continue together through and for their language (out of all the world’s languages) of agency. It must continue in this particular territory (Miller, 1995: 24) to which they have unique attachment, unlike any other territory of the world. Therefore, in as much as a citizen needs freedom to become whatever his or her imagined self prefers, he or she is also simultaneously and implicitly obliged to ensure propagation of the nation bedrock that hosts and makes possible individual freedom.

It is in the interest of autonomous individuals that their language be actively maintained and sustained. The language is how the individual expresses himself or herself. The language is also the medium through which I project myself onto others with whom I interact and share social space. No wonder agency and linguistic communication are inextricably linked: “I can anticipate being part of a social space in which others recognise me as an initiator of certain deeds and the speaker of certain words for which I must be able to provide an account” (Benhabib, 2011: 68). In communication for agency, there is therefore an implicit centrality of common language as well as of a localised community or society, territoriality, common culture and history as hallmarks of nations.

People want democracy not as an end in itself, but as a means for arranging their society. However, such a community of diverse independent personalities nevertheless has shared political and social values that ought to underlie its education theory and practice (Higgs, 2012: 38). The community’s shared culture and practices give meaning, purpose and context for individual flourishing and it must be safeguarded from assimilationist forces (Fernandez & Sundstrom, 2011: 371) of neutral universalism. Philosophy and education must “contribute effectively towards the amelioration of the human condition, the lived and existing human condition” (Higgs, 2012: 43). What this means is that education must directly connect with, if not be inspired by, the situatedness of the people: their language, their history, their systems, and of course their universal humanness they share with the wider humanity of the world.

In democratic citizenship education, the critical thinking that must be promoted should not merely be about informal logic, but one that depends on the contextual criteria originating from one’s experiences (Weinstein, 2004: 243). Over and above logic, critical thinking has a social nature, and hence has “elements of caring thinking and creative thinking as well” in the creation of its “communicative tools” (Weinstein, 2004: 243). The critical thinking occurs in a context of relations of care; for some contexts such as most African societies such obligations of care are owed not only to significant others, but even to members of the wider community (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3). The community in this regard is valued not just
because of the collective’s sake, but because it anchors and provides the sources of care to the individual. This is not to suggest that it is equally valued by every member.

The goal for critical thinking is not merely to cultivate an intellectual capacity for maximising one’s self-interests. Rather, it is to develop a disposition for action in learners (Weinstein, 2004: 243–244). This is a disposition for them to act on realities, imbalances and injustices that twist the outcomes of their particular social cooperation that also affects them. Expecting them to acquire skills that will simply universally apply to challenges or conflicts they will encounter some other time with some other person in the world is to negate and be naïve about the contextuality of education that draws from people’s lived experiences. The community (not necessarily the state) of which the learner is a member has issues that require confronting and rearranging. This has nothing to do with advancing aspects of democracy as ends in themselves (e.g. pursuing constitutionalism). While aspects of democracy in society provide the individual with the framework for achieving freedom, the community provides the substance for self-actualisation. In the quest of achieving an authentic citizen, critical thinking in education for democratic citizenship should not regard all human thought and action as exclusively and essentially only logical and never emotional – this would undermine the complexity of human nature (Weinstein, 2004: 245). It is such ill-conceived conceptions of human nature that further necessarily require detachment and independence from others, claiming this inhibits individual freedom.

In national citizenship, pursuit for the authentic self that is necessarily detached from the community has inspired citizenship conceptualisation. At the global level, strong cosmopolitan citizenship depoliticises nationality, regarding it as deficient of any moral import in understanding human equality. The nation is perceived as arbitrarily restricting what ought to be a worldwide scope of distribution of the entitlements and duties accruing from the universality of human equality (Nili, 2015; Arneson, 2016). The global citizen is urged to overcome the ostensible parochialism of national boundaries to realise his or her full freedom as well as prevent the ‘arbitrary’ exclusion and failure to service the interests of outsiders. It is in this vein that education for democratic (global) citizenship of the strong cosmopolitan orientation systematically de-emphasises aspects of nationality, so as to realise a global citizen.

Recognition of nationality at the global sphere is in the interest of global democracy. The prospects of a global democracy necessarily build on and ought to build on prevailing national democracies. In global democracy, apart from the relevance of nationality as an
efficient structure upon which global peoples are organised, national democracies also have normative justifications. The people under a world democracy are geographically, historically, linguistically and culturally situated. These elements of their situatedness do not only enable democratic cooperation. Equally important, they make the democracy meaningful and relatable to the people. Not only should the democracy use such elements as instruments, but it should also aim at preserving and perpetuating these hosts of the sources for concrete collective life. Such elements give the community as well as the individual otherness and concreteness.

It is necessary that the school has an active role in perpetuating the democratic order both globally and locally. Globally, the meaningfulness of democracy is significantly tied to the nation. However, the passive bedrock role of nationality should not be taken for granted and as less fundamental. More crucially, we should not ignore the particularism dimension of democracies that resides in nationality.

As we endeavour to conceptualise global citizenship, such particularism necessitates deliberate and contestable acknowledgement of nationalities in democratic citizenship education to retain people’s concreteness and meaningfulness of democracy. Global democracy is incapable of fulfilling these roles without making recourse to people’s nationality. A particular democratic nation has a territory and a history. It has specific elements of injustice or oppression that need to be guarded against, as they have a very high likelihood of recurring. How injustice and oppression manifest in one society is different from any other. The injustice and oppression are also shaped by peculiar socio-cultural and historical contexts that also constitute members’ meaning-making structures (Gay, 2000: 77) and/or identity constitution. Although undergird by the same democratic ideals, why and how such ideals are translated and realised in this society differ from another. The value of such ideals therefore does not lie in themselves, but in concert with how they refine and better our community. Their value is tied to the actual lived experiences and history of the members of the society. Therefore, ironically, the abstract universal ideals of democracy are only concretised in a community’s particularism. A community’s education for democratic citizenship must therefore reflect this.

4.3. Citizenship and shared fate
This section argues that even in the light of global interconnectedness and where individuals have different commitments outside the national community, and besides the fact of the weakening of state sovereignty, education for democratic citizenship that contains aspects of
national solidarity is defensible and worth promoting. I argue, using Ben-Porath’s (2012) idea of citizenship as shared fate, that global interconnectedness in principle necessitates that aspects of national belonging be actively included in citizenship conceptualisation. In as much as citizens are a collective of individuals who share different politics-based institutions and systems (DesRoches, 2016), what anchors and sustains such institutions and systems is the national fate. The possibility and sustenance of the other schemes of cooperation in the state are indebted to the solidarity founded on shared nationality.

In any nation state, citizens share two general interrelated and interdependent forms of solidarity. They share common political institutions that shape and run their polity. These include laws, democratic systems, institutions and processes, a constitution and a commonly shared economic or distributive scheme (Rawls, 2002; Ben-Porath, 2012). They also share aspects of their nationality as in a common language, history, territory and shared culture (Miller, 2007: 27; Ben-Porath, 2012: 381). Contrary to positions of other thinkers (Habermas, 2001; Nili, 2015), these forms of solidarity have unique value and mutually reinforce and regulate one another. None is self-sufficient so as to dispense with the other.

The idea of citizenship as shared fate, according to Ben-Porath (2012: 381), refers to different manifestations of civic and political life citizens commonly share or identify with, embodied in different institutions and systems. These encompass democratic governance institutions such as representative agencies in central and local governments, laws and the constitution. It also includes …

… historical understandings of the nation, including contested dimensions and struggles over interpretation languages and forms of expression, including contestations over desirable forms of communication in the public sphere; understandings of national ethos, symbols, myths and values, and even views about issues such as typical national traits and aspirations (Ben-Porath, 2012: 381).

Citizenship as shared fate is therefore duo-faced, with solidarity and multiplicity dimensions (DesRoches, 2016: 539). It acknowledges the historical and social ties members share as being central in the establishment and sustenance of their political project (Ben & Woll, 2012: 381). This conception of citizenship acknowledges the diversity and at times contrasting nature of individual or subgroup commitments and values that exist inside the community. Therefore, citizenship as shared fate is not grounded only in the common dimension of nationality members collectively share. Rather, it is also about incessant engagement of the members in a dialogue where some aspects of membership are contested
such that some are accepted or rejected and others left for ongoing deliberation (Ben-Porath, 2012: 382).

Citizenship as shared fate values both procedural democratic ideals and national belonging as mutually reinforcing and regulative elements in their nation state’s project without displacing one for the other. Citizenship is a shared fate, because despite the inevitable variations in levels of commitment among members to their political project, they are all ultimately affected by it in a number of ways (Ben-Porath, 2012: 385).

What is remarkable about citizenship as shared fate is that it is not insensitive to the people’s historical, cultural and social situatedness. Instead, it “acknowledges and promotes visions of shared histories, struggles, institutions, languages, and value commitments” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 385). It has both “responsive and aspirational components” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 386). Thus, it responds to the attachments arising from the shared territory, language, history, culture and traditions. These underlie the form of the community’s civil society. The civil society is about voluntary associations of a society demanding retention, reformation or transformation of some of their common life. Although usually the civil society realises its aspirations through political means, it also achieves some of its aspirations through non-political means (Kymlicka, 2002a: 298). These nevertheless also shape the political life.

Citizenship understood as shared fate is not only backward-looking, but also forward-looking, therefore aspirational (Ben-Porath, 2012: 385). It seeks to cultivate skills and attitudes that will ensure a sense of belonging for each of the members who has other uncommon values and commitments apart from the shared national one without expecting them to assimilate. It is therefore “rooted both in the present, with its social realities, and in the future vision of what society might be like for the next generation” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 386).

According to Ide (2009), the Japanese nation, for instance, has been having an enduring debate about the substance of patriotic education. At the centre of the contention is the interpretation of human suffering and Japan’s role in committed war crimes during the Second World War, whether the war crimes should be understood as such or that in the grand scheme of things they amount to unintended outcomes of Japan’s ostensible defence for noble ideals then (Ide, 2009: 449). For opponents of ‘sanitization’ of Japan’s war crimes role in the war in school history, these crimes should not be concealed but should represent the horrors of war to ultimately buttress the moral supremacy of a peaceful and democratic
constitutional culture over national patriotism (Ide, 2009). On the other side of the debate are the defenders of the teaching of Japanese virtue as underlying ostensibly often ignored Japanese motivations actions during the war, arguing that such virtuous motivations are not considered and studied in Japanese history owing to its overemphasis on war crimes (Ide, 2009: 449). Given the fundamentalist nature of either side, Ide (2009: 449) holds that she agrees with neither position.

Ide’s (2009: 449) position is that the debate only shows the immense influence of Eurocentrism on Japanese traditions and especially educational values since the late 19th century when Japan had been following pacifist ideologies and not competitiveness (with other nations) it later embraced. Ide (2009: 449) therefore contends that both sides of the debate are so fixated on the Second World War only, which for her is not fully representative of ideal Japanese values prior to their being ‘compromised’ through hybridisation with Eurocentric values. To face the future, Ide (2009) holds that without necessarily promoting indoctrination, Japan’s patriotic education should be about Japanese ideals that have been resilient prior and after the war, although they are marginalised by politics-generated conceptions of patriotism (Ide, 2009: 450). Put differently, Ide’s (2009: 450) position is that both sides of the debate need to reconceptualise what ideal patriotism is, as currently both sides’ conception of the ideal is rooted in obedience (which further entails transcendence of either civic patriotism or sanitised history) and authority (which entails supremacy of constitutionalism over sanitised history or vice versa) (Ide, 2009: 451). For her there are enduring Japanese traditions that exist independent of the recent war politics that nevertheless shaped Japanese politics in general prior to the dominance of Eurocentric values (Ide, 2009: 451). This reinforces the point that citizens indeed share a national fate beyond political solidarity and that the constitution of such a fate must necessarily be open to incessant contestation. Schools, however, should provide spaces for deliberating, contesting and reconstituting the shared fate.

It is an obvious fact that so much has changed at the advent of globalisation. National sovereignty has been greatly weakened and uncoupled from the nation-state (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). Most thinkers have drawn conclusions about the fate of the nation due to the weakening of the nation-state. Most of such conclusions, however, are based on erroneously extending the nature and extent of the weakening of state sovereignty as being almost exactly applicable to the nation. The nation however, is a much older community than the state and
furthermore, national attachments are still enduring and relevant despite global interconnection (Barrow, 2005: 129; Papastephanou, 2015: 166).

It is undeniable that due to the changes arising from global migration and connectedness, which result in a myriad of individual interests, identities and loyalties transcending the nation-state, what constitutes the nation for a community of free members can no more be “stable and bound” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 382), but is necessarily under continuous re-interpretation. It is therefore necessary that our response to the modern world should neither be reactionary, thereby stuck in a romanticised past national solidarity that is impervious to reform. However, conversely, our adjusting to the realities of an interconnected world and its associated duties should not be conceived as necessitating people’s detachment from the concreteness of their embeddedness that accords them group as well as individual peculiarity. The weakening of state sovereignty does not amount to dissolution of enduring national interests that were particularly and exclusively met by the state (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). The obligation to serve certain national interests will always remain outstanding despite the relocation of sovereignty from the nation-state.

Ross (2007: 297) holds that essentially, citizenship is about establishing rights and that such rights are now uncoupled from the nation-state as supranational institutions and communities such as the European Union and European Union Courts, which supersede national legal institutions, now ground these rights. For Ross (2007: 297), national citizenship has been the vehicle for realisation of rights and identity, hence the strong link between these ideals and the nation. Today, however, identity and rights have “become increasingly complex and contested” and viable citizenship should no longer be based on local attachments, as people now participate in different societies outside the nation (Ross, 2007: 299). This being the case, only a rights-based citizenship model must be embraced as the ideal citizenship for a globalised world (Ross, 2007: 299) and education for citizenship must assume such a globalist form that transcends ostensibly morally arbitrary national boundaries.

It is worth noting that the necessity of such rights cannot be divorced from the people’s lived experiences in their locality. Human rights are not an absolute end in themselves. In any case, they presuppose interaction and cooperation for social action. The cooperation largely takes place, among others, in the institutions of the civil society. The nature of and terms of the cooperation are never universal across all humanity. What should constitute the range of goods to be demanded from the state by citizens, scope of the role of the state over the market and tax regimes are instances of how peculiarities of a society mould the concretisation (not
relativism) of different rights. This is why the purpose of learning for democratic citizenship should not just be for the learners to merely accumulate knowledge about the universality of rights.

Education for democratic citizenship must aim at equipping learners with principles and skills with which they should be able to construct and reconstruct knowledge of the experiences they are living now, not some imaginary ones they will experience beyond their borders. It is noteworthy that there are certain unique prerequisites for learner’s knowledge construction and independence that are assumed as given or are not acknowledged in theorisations of a just global citizenship. However, indispensible as such prerequisites are, they ultimately reside in national solidarity. For instance, the language of instruction in which learners would construct their knowledge about different phenomena has a national rootedness.

If all peoples find value from literature and art with whose language and content they identify, then the gradual displacement of their local language by a global one that cannot effectively and efficiently communicate a people’s culture is a concern about equality and fairness. The history of a people and their common way of life contribute towards the meaningfulness of the individuals’ lives as well as their democratic education. The historical situatedness gives vividness to the discourse of human rights conceived not as mere abstract realities learners will later encounter in life. The lived experiences of the people and learners in their particular geographical and historical contexts are full of struggles which such rights discourses are employed to address (Gay & Howard, 2000: 13).

The relevance of shared nationality and history is more than traditions, practices and holidays (Nieto, 2008: 128). Shared nationality through history and common culture largely anchor social and political relationships under which members bound by a common territory and language (Nieto, 2008: 129) share frameworks of cooperation in which individual projects are both possible and meaningful. The values are under a constant process of revision and the members, through their relationships and encounters, create and share worldviews which they also continually transform (Nieto, 2008: 129). All people have a culture, as the social and political relationships through which an individual participates in the world is informed by the elements of culture such as language, history and shared territory, ultimately having a bearing on one’s values and how one looks at the world (Nieto, 2008: 128). Culture is a product of people’s experiences (Nieto, 2008: 137). Therefore, a nation’s political or economic encounters as victims or perpetrators of atrocities and injustice, how they collectively rallied to overcome the oppression and how they collectively resolved to account
for the suffered injustices as they endeavour to move onto the future are all shaped by and result in concrete national values peculiar to their historical, geographical and political situatedness.

Shared nationality in education for democracy should be preserved not just because it is a default ‘given’. Rather, it is because it hosts tools that significantly constitute the perspectives and frameworks through which the autonomous individual encounters the world and processes experiences. It is part of the currency for meaning-making to individuals, hence it must necessarily be taken into consideration in political and education discourses. Such a consideration should occur while subjecting cultural frameworks to incessant questioning and revision, as they obviously contain impurities. There hence just cannot be a disconnect between the rights approach and belonging to the nation locality.

In the context of globalisation, one can therefore hold that despite the world’s interconnectedness, the learner still has situated experiences. Global interconnectedness cannot be dismissed as having no consequences in people’s lives. We should however desist from valorising such interconnection as being equal to, if not replacing, local belongingness and its incomparable significance to the individual. Despite globalisation affording us different tools to see, feel and imagine, what is happening beyond my locale, the frameworks in which I process such experiences are largely attributable to the elements of my locale’s way of life. Human beings just cannot be free-floating, unattached, disembodied and transcendent rational selves.

In the global context, a shared fate cosmopolitan citizenship orientation would not prefer escapism (from the peculiarity of the other) to engaging the concreteness of nations’ otherness in any formulations of equality and global citizenship. A shared fate cosmopolitanism would instead confront and embrace sources of concreteness as crucial for both the meaningfulness and fairness of global universalism. The more we depoliticise and neutralise aspects of nationality in (education for) citizenship, the more we risk compromising people’s relevant and meaningful opportunities and modes of being that are available to them in situated contexts. This is because they will be expected to assimilate into the mainstream dominant out of practical necessity other than free choice.

Education for democratic citizenship that focuses on rights and individual autonomy only results in the privatisation of “political interest, a loss of faith in public action and a decreasing interest in the significance for individuals of the wider social framework”
Such instrumentisation of the social environment and its relationships in essence denies and negates the concreteness of the world’s communities and individuals. Their relationships and community are not only of extrinsic value.

What all this means, therefore, is that citizenship as shared fate must necessarily persist in the context of globalisation. Conceptions of global citizenship must actively and sufficiently embrace both solidarity and multiplicity aspects of being. The conceptions should not only emphasise that the individual now has multiple ties in the interconnected world, but also that the individuals with increasing multiple ties have special ties traceable to the nation. This is because despite their innumerable differences, national members share ties among themselves that make political cooperation possible (Miller, 1995: 41). This political cooperation (a fate in its own right) is ultimately rooted in the linguistic, historical, territorial and common cultural fates (Miller, 1995: 41) upon which they order their social actions as well as self-actualisation. A global citizenship conception that erases and excludes national belonging cannot manage to single-handedly replicate the ability of nationality to ground and sustain democracy, justice and freedom. In shared fate citizenship, “[t]he nation is often the backdrop rather than the topic of these contexts (in other words, these are often activities that are not explicitly political), but they are enabled and limited by national borders” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 386).

The nation therefore has some peculiarity, which, however, should not be reduced into a deified object, but rather regarded as something that is foundational for democratic diversity. Because shared fate citizenship promotes solidarity and diversity, it is necessary that its education should be “context-responsive and address the specific realms in which children and families live, as well as specific diversities within the nation” (Ben-Porath, 2012: 387). It is not merely about learning abstract conceptions of equality or reciprocity; there must be adequate space for confronting the local experiences in the spirit of shared fate citizenship.

In Malawi, for instance, citizenship as shared fate entails not running away from the local tensions of resolving national language debates and constitution of national history. It is in confronting the actual, the near, that such a citizenship could be realised. It is in confronting the inherent inequalities, bias and prejudices latent in subjugation of local languages the learner uses only at home but never in the school that such attitudes can be cultivated. It is in continuously scrutinising and reinterpreting the national history that has shaped the civil society as well as challenge political systems and tendencies that a shared fate citizenship could be realised.
4.3.1. Relevance of nationality in modern citizenship

A question might arise as to why, out of all the commitments individuals freely make on account of their preferences, national belonging is to be valued to an extent of necessitating its inclusion in the conceptualisation of citizenship. What of people who have weaker affinities to the nation or those who do not value it altogether?

The nation affects all members in a number of ways. Although affinity to the nation varies among members, some of whom have even stronger affinities to some subgroups within the nation, still the nation has potential to and does affect the members in significant ways. Nationality is generally the host for diverse individuals’ “shared interests, needs, and preferences” that make possible political action and political expression for both the individual and the collective through social practice (Ben-Porath, 2012: 389).

Some would argue that citizenship is about sharing multiple fates (in plural, not Ben Poreth’s singular form), largely informed by power, hence as one of the numerous fates, national belonging has very insignificant moral weight (DesRoches, 2016: 545). For such proponents, such a citizenship recognises that almost in the entirety of our lives and in our society almost all our identities and differences are constructed by power and nationality has no special relevance (DesRoches, 2016: 545). This being the case, democracy is not something which we may choose depending on convenience to either get into or out of. This is because democracy is in constant occurrence in every context and is not static, but continuously happening (DesRoches, 2016: 545).

This position is compelling in that irrespective of the intensity of one’s attachment to the nation, politics does undergird all the domains of one’s existence. However, we need to bear in mind that the political power that shapes almost every facet of the life of the citizen in the nation is not value-neutral. The relevance, scope and nature of the power is largely attributable to the shared cultural experiences and outlooks of a society. This is why the further allusion that a citizenship of fates should be based only on “an allegiance to the principles of freedom and equality” (DesRoches, 2016: 544) is problematic, as has been shown in the previous section.

A similar problematic position is advanced by Merry (2009: 393), who argues for a critical patriotism against loyal patriotism (one is unsure why Merry (2009) picks the most extreme and generally unacceptable form of patriotism), claiming that “given the trappings of loyal patriotism, it might seem desirable to advocate a kind of ‘world citizenship’, an allegiance as
it were not to one national context but to the wider human community”. For such positions, depoliticisation of nationality is necessary in order to reduce nationality to a mere private good, ostensibly to avoid nurturing populism that may result in the majority suppressing individual liberty (Vázquez-Arroyo, 2008: 145).

Similarly, Gorski (2012) is dismissive of education for citizenship practices that are sensitive to learners’ cultural backgrounds as a means of achieving educational equity in the school in multicultural societies. For Gorski (2012), culture is just a dimension of an individual’s numerous and complex identities and as such no fundamental predictions can be made about an individual based on his or her cultural identity. Doing so, Gorski (2012: 223) argues, amounts to stereotyping and essentialism, that “there is a single and constituent true nature shared among large groups of people” and as such we cannot be able to grasp who the learner actually is. For Gorski (2012: 224), cultural proficiency and competence are insufficient if not incapable of ensuring a just power distribution, which he attributes to be the major cause of inequality, and emphasising culture weakens emphasis on justice. For such perspectives, a shared national identity is not necessary to ground democratic citizenship whose education should not be about allegiance to certain commitments such as patriotism, because it soon becomes a basis for excluding those whose ideas and behaviour are deemed as departing from the standard of patriotic citizenship (Williams, 2003:208).

Possibilities of patriotism being abused are replete in history and cannot be denied. However, this does not establish inherent unacceptability of patriotism, particularly in its tolerant and democratic forms. If, among others, patriotism constitutes in preservation of inclusive forms of national belonging, heritage and ways of life, it is difficult to establish how it may be deemed unacceptable.

Furthermore, if in the global citizenship education recognising aspects of patriotism include use and maintenance of national language(s), the relevance of shared national history and shared territory that evokes a myriad of different and usually unique levels of emotional attachment to a particular nation among members than to any other land, then it becomes hard to imagine how patriotism can be perceived as a social construct or a mere tool for others’ exclusion. In the pervasiveness of global interconnectedness, we need neither conflate nor synonymise the nation with the nation-state. The nation is prior to the state, such that loss of state sovereignty does not necessarily extinguish it (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). People who share national membership also share certain common ways of life, no matter how minimally (Miller, 1995: 41).
Besides national belonging being of varying value to the people, their shared language is a means through which they share common modes of meaning-making. It is very easy for individuals in nation-states that are monolingual and whose languages have a very strong international presence as languages of science and scholarship, to tend to think that they have no national sentiments (Nieto, 2008: 136). However, were the situation otherwise and the people were expected to juggle between a mother tongue at home and an exclusively official and foreign language in the school and official domains, the complexities in navigating the two linguistic and national worlds would become vivid. The reality of the value of one’s cultural belonging becomes starkly glaring. Such tendencies result in competition and undue compromising of the identity and cultural self-expression embedded in the language of the community.

In arguing for the uncoupling of citizenship from the nation-state, Williams (2003: 209) holds that “most of our current understandings of citizenship are based on the historic convergence of boundaries of citizenship (territorial, cultural/national/linguistic, institutional, and moral) that are now pulling apart”. But are these sites (not essentially boundaries) of citizenship pulling apart? They may not all be, once we are mindful of the enduring distinction between the nation and the nation-state. State sovereignty is indisputably in rapid decline. The same cannot be said to be the case with nationality, whose rate of change is much lower than that of the state and does not entail a decline (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). Furthermore, if the citizenship boundaries are pulling apart at all, in what manner or pattern are they pulling apart? If we are to closely observe the manner and implications of the said pulling apart now occurring, our response would actually be the opposite: Other than annihilation of nationality, we would call for its protection in its tolerable forms. Take language, for instance.

The manner in which linguistic changes are occurring in the world today is lopsided. The dominant languages of the developed nations dominate and are indeed ‘pulling apart’ (with pun intended) all other national languages that cannot match the economic and political dominance of the developed nations. As to whether the causes behind this linguistic domination is justified or not, that is a different question altogether. Suffice to say, though, that one of the causes of such domination is the neoliberalism drive that is compelling all political and social institutions to be arranged based on free market fundamentalism (Giroux, 2005: 210). The ultimate implication of neoliberalism is that all nations must sacrifice some of the uncommodified aspects of their collective ways of life in which they find meaning, out of economic prudence (Giroux, 2005: 210).
4.3.2. Patriotism and inclusion

Opponents of patriotism advance an alternative citizenship as shared fate without any particularistic content, one where one’s fate is tied to that of others on a different common platform (Habermas, 2001; Williams, 2003; Merry, 2009; Gorski, 2012; Nili, 2015). They argue that the only meaningful fate citizens share does not depend on common national culture, but more importantly on “institutional [and] material linkages”, among other things (Williams, 2003: 230). But how can this be without a shared language and deliberate collective commitment to maintain it? How can this be without referencing to shared territory? How can this be without a shared political and social history they have all experienced and of which they are in a way products? Such impartial and neutral positions seek to develop a detached citizenship that only shares universal attributes across nations and the world. It is denying people’s concreteness, which they must instead regard as a stumbling block. This is perilous.

This reductionism of how human beings are situated needs to be avoided. We cannot conclude that all human beings have the same comprehensive value of their territory, for example. However, it is even more problematic to understand human beings as having no sense of placed-ness, therefore devoid of an attachment to their place of development and habitation. Natives who have alternative places to which to relocate with similar political and economic structures as those in their home country do not, however, do so in dire times of crisis and hardship out of this sense of attachment. Migrants who volitionally move to one nation for resettlement embrace that place as part of their belonging, though not necessarily substituting the value of their initial homeland. National belonging is accommodative of either dual citizenship or multi-citizenship.

Opponents of nationality call for a critical patriotism that is not characteristically patriotic, ostensibly because a critical patriotism advocates tolerance in contrast to national patriotism. Apparently, in contrast to national patriotism, “the critical patriot will embrace what is wonderful about one’s homeland on the understanding that its ideals extend to all citizens irrespective of one’s colour … creed or political affiliation” (Merry, 2009: 379) (my emphasis). The critical patriot “will consider the welfare of those outside of one’s borders and understand one’s role as citizen in ways not confined by national borders or geopolitical expediency” (Merry, 2009: 379).
In as much as critical patriotism is expected to be all-inclusive and welcoming of any would-be member irrespective of arbitrary factors such as race, creed or gender, we need not equate such tolerance with value neutrality. Political systems and institutions are shaped by linguistic, historical, territorial and cultural experiences, and the political is supposed to respond to contestations and reconstructions based on such experiences. We also need not to regard any national affinities particular to a place and people as inherently morally reprehensible. Aspersions of a patriotism associated with the nation are a distortion, because an “uncritical patriotic sentiment” is not “inherent in the notion” of patriotism *qua* patriotism (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22).

One wonders how patriotic at all such critical patriotism oriented towards the civic life only is. Its regard for the value of the common national heritage is one of mere tokenism and is not only indifferent to but actively bolsters a detachment from and a denial of a people’s rootedness. Citizens being advocated for by this brand of critical patriotism are by implication expected to be patriotic to all democratic communities in the world, regarding every place of the earth as having equal affective value to them like any other. Ultimately, this is a negation of what patriotism essentially ought to be. Critical patriotism should invite us to a reflective and responsible celebration of that which makes us us, without attaching a sense of unjustifiable guilt to any such inclusive celebration of one’s heritage (White, 1996: 328; Hansen, 2011).

Furthermore, it is erroneous to allege, as does Gorski (2012: 224), that in education for citizenship emphasising culture de-emphasises justice, ostensibly because the foundational inequalities that matter for learners are rooted in power imbalances and remain untouched by emphasis on learners’ culture or nationality in the school. In both a multicultural society and a globalised world, education for democratic citizenship perspective that fails to attach sensitivity to the force of cultural background assumes that the routines and practices in the local school are themselves devoid of cultural import. However, a dominant culture, dominant in number of members or economic power or both, shapes the school culture and the wider society outside the school (Yosso, 2005; Nieto, 2008; Ladson-Billings, 2014). One’s fitting into the school as well as in official roles outside the school is heavily biased and at times prejudiced towards one getting into the mainstream culture first. By calling for allegiance to democratic ideals only and claiming that injustice resides in power distribution only in the multicultural and global community, such versions of critical patriotism overlook the fact that although in some way inequalities are traceable to power inequalities, such
power inequalities are themselves established in the privileging of one culture or nationality over others.

If I am not proficient in the dominant language of the community, my achievement in school will be adversely affected. Outside the school, in the wider society, with such a proficiency I will likely encounter subtle prejudice from employers (if they lack multicultural awareness). My background, betrayed by my language non-proficiency, will instigate attitudes of unsuitability, as they will interpret my non-proficiency as a likely shortage of certain knowledge and skills regarding the dominant culture that may be deemed necessary for effective and efficient performance in a particular job. Conversely, my non-proficiency may consciously or unconsciously direct the prospective employer’s attention to prevailing biases and prejudices against the ethnic group associated with my accent or dominant language skills. Therefore, contrary to claims of critical patriotism, it is necessary that today people living in multicultural societies as well as in the modern interconnected globe should be aware of the otherness of the other as not constituting a barrier. It is necessary that nationality that hosts the other’s history, language and culture be included and not excluded in modern education for democratic citizenship configurations to avoid subtle marginalisation of the other.

Unmoderated hypersensitivity to cultural or national identification of learners may indeed obscure the actual identity of learners and has the risk of promoting stereotypes, as Gorski (2012: 223) observes. However, it is worth noting that sensitivity to learners’ culture is not the only means of ensuring equity, although in the global world and multicultural society, a lack of such sensitivity hosts some profound inequalities. Despite its aforementioned limitations, sensitivity to cultural and linguistic diversity captures much of the sources of marginalisation learners as individuals would experience in a school that is obviously dominated by a given language and culture that could be both explicitly and subtly expressed. Conversely, education that fails to attach sensitivity to the force of cultural background assumes that the routines and practices in the multicultural school and global world are culture- and value-free. However, as shall be later argued in subsequent sections (5.4. and 5.5.), the dominant culture of the school setup requires one to first get into the mainstream culture if one is to attain academic achievement.

The discourse of patriotism needs to be saved from both (uncritical) nationalism and anti-nationalism currents currently prevailing (Papastephanou, 2013a: 23). Patriotism that has an attachment to the nation “has been incriminated for lack of resistance to public policies and
for blind commitment to the country’s interest, right or wrong” and is usually associated with lack of criticality (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). Only constitutional patriotism is usually regarded as the only acceptable form of patriotism (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). However, the anti-national patriotism conception of citizenship chooses to ignore the political solidarity mobilisation value of nationality, such as its indispensable utility in inspiring movements aimed at achieving independence from colonial oppression (Papastephanou, 2013a: 23). Therefore, with respect to the state and democracy, the nation is not a mere “reactive principle”, but rather the very principle that coheres and drives movements aimed at restoring both justice and the state in aftermaths of different threats and catastrophes (Hutchinson, 2000: 653). Patriotism is therefore “an important regulatory principle of contemporary politics, concerned with questions of the moral content and boundaries of a collectivity over which power is exercised, rather than of power, per se” (Hutchinson, 2000: 653).

The nation and the state are distinct, but they have been collaborating. The collaboration the nation has with the political (encompassing the economic, legal, environmental) locally is now being extended to the globe. This is in such a way that the agents of globalisation are also in part being informed by and serving national interests (Hutchinson, 2000: 667). Despite globalisation being a multilateral process, its context is one of inequalities among nations, politically and economically, and most of the economically weaker nation states are under the deep influence of developed nations that shape globalisation structures (Barrow, 2005: 129). Therefore, globalisation today is not about an eclipse of the nation as is the case with the state, but rather essentially about the nation aligning its interests with agents of globalisation (Barrow, 2005: 129).

The ‘nationalisation’ of globalisation by powerful nations is evident in much of Africa and Malawi. The extinguishing of national belonging in citizenship conceptualisation, achieved through the use of English as the only exclusive medium of instruction in the school for instance, and the removal of national History from the curriculum temptingly see as an inconsequential. The justification of such ‘inevitable’ acts is not in principles that are normative. Rather, it is grounded in principles of efficient organisation of global integration (Akteruzzaman & Islam, 2017: 195). The ‘necessary and inevitable’ convenience of global integration strip the removal of mother-tongue instruction and local history from the curriculum of normativity rendering such a removal as merely a matter of the pragmatism of global integration convenience. People in economically weaker nations such as Malawi will, due to strong cosmopolitan citizenship preconditions, have their linguistic as well as
historical heritage that constitute their meaning-making frameworks systematically displaced and done away with (Kamwendo, 2010). Inevitably, the death of nationality, as the goal of the strong cosmopolitanism project, will coerce them to become something, that which embeds the cosmopolitan and global way of life. We should, however, not lose cognisance that so long as emphasising nationality enables them be and freely become in a globalised world without coercion, then in principle, there is an obligation to preserve nationality. In as far as extinguishing of nationality will make them not to be and to become only by embracing the universal, which is also in other respects a ‘particular other’, such becoming is passively imposed and amounts to domination (Pettit, 1997: 52), hence needs to be prevented.

A critic would argue that recognition of national groups’ cultures even with their validation tag of the right to exit is unfavourable to the group’s marginalised, such as women, girls and minorities. Such a recognition, so would continue the critic, will only serve to perpetrate oppression that occurs in cultural groups that will be insulated from public critique (Okin, 2003: 325). This is because the nature of the structures of oppression within cultural institutions is usually so intricate that the oppressed women are far much less likely restrained from exercising the right to exit even when they so wish (Okin, 2003: 325). It should, however, be noted that the national culture being defended here is not synonymous with closed ethnic or religious cultures that are not subject to critique, fairness and inclusion. Rather, this is defence for citizenship whose configuration has adequate consideration to local or national elements the people freely share in contrast to extinguishing such elements in the spirit of (strong) cosmopolitanism. It is thin, not thick, nationality (Kymlicka, 2002a) and it is open to incessant contestation and does not compromise on communicative freedom of the individual as one of the individual’s most foundational rights (Benhabib, 2011: 129). Therefore, preservation of patriotism or national belonging does not entail exclusion of non-native members. It need not be ethnically exclusionist in nature. Despite having some emotive value, a shared culture whose origins and foundations are undeniably ethnic is and indeed must be accommodative and open to others to join.

In addition, it is necessary to include aspects of the nation’s historical and linguistic heritage in the school curriculum other than being neutral about them. The patriotism being defended here does not merely aim at preservation and continuity of inheritances of national history and languages to be passed on to the next generation. Rather, such a form of patriotic citizenship contests and reinterprets the history so that the next generation of citizens independently draw meaning and value from the history (Ben-Porath, 2012). The learners
themselves as critical beings are also active participants in this reinterpretation. Therefore, the content of the nation’s history as well as its interpretation are subject to incessant contestation.

Since reciprocity is very central in democratic citizenship (Kymlicka, 2002a: 225), patriotic citizenship demands much more than civic learning about governance and its systems. It goes further demanding that individuals acquire as much knowledge as possible about the other, whether locally or globally, and how to engage with them at both the political and the civil society levels (Ben-Porath, 2012). Therefore, besides cultivating solidarity, the school and the state alike must also have a commitment to ensuring respect for the well-being and flourishing of those with other loyalties and identities apart from the national ones (Ben-Porath, 2012: 383).

It is apparent that inclusion of nationality in citizenship neither excludes otherness nor does it push down on everybody solidarity values at the expense of individual freedom. What happens when other members join in? Firstly, such a shared nation culture is capacious (Kymlicka, 2002a: 245) and accommodative of other aspects of being. It does not require assimilation. Secondly, the incessant contestation of what should constitute patriotic is aimed at ultimately including its minority cultures in the constitution of the patriotic project. In the end, the narrative of the nation will be a product of liberally hybridised experiences and stories. It will neither be clinging on to the romanticised old past before others migrated in, nor will it be assimilationist or detached from the people’s actual and lived experiences: their otherness and their concreteness. Furthermore, the multiplicity of its national composition will not entail neutrality, for that does not adequately serve anyone in the project. Just as civic solidarity requires that individuals and groups confront, review and reform aspects of their being to align with democratic tolerance while still retaining individuality, hence making political cooperation possible, so too with national patriotism.

Those who join a community, in as much as they may likely have other loyalties elsewhere, should be reasonably expected to embrace sharable aspects of their new fate, such as learning its language, now as a member among those sharing a common fate. This will enhance not only new members’ (political) participation in the community of shared fate; more importantly, it will accord the new members the opportunity and ability to help determine the direction of the community in sync with their otherwise minority interests (Kymlicka, 2002b: 26). It is therefore necessary that the substance of patriotism must always check against exclusion and marginalisation of minorities. This is why, for instance, it should accommodate
duo or multi-nationality (Macedo, 2003: 420) among its members. This is because “nations are Janus-faced”, looking into an ancient past on the one hand while mobilising members to achieve “collective autonomy and progress” on the other hand (Hutchinson, 2000: 651).

Most nations are not culturally homogenous. They are characterised by differences manifested in contestations in the nature and content of their “symbolic and political projects” (Hutchinson, 2000: 654). Rival positions within a nation show differences in social visions regarding historical, linguistic, social, economic and political relationships within and outside the group (Hutchinson, 2000: 662). Such competing social visions result in debates about and from which the nation’s common heritage is established through drawing from each side of the debate without necessarily aiming to have one unanimous definition of national heritage (Hutchinson, 2000: 664). This shows that contrary to critics, patriotism is not synonymous with overt assimilation.

Ideal patriotism is both reactive and active in its character (Papastephanou, 2011: 222). It is reactive when it is the rallying point for solidarity against threats to the collectivity (Papastephanou, 2011: 221), including internal injustices and inequalities. Further, it must be active “in opening ever-new paths to justice: if you love a collectivity, you critically approach its dominant values and combat its exclusions, its narrowness and its nationalisms” (Papastephanou, 2011: 221). There is no intrinsic hostility and oppression in national belongingness. As objects that are perpetually developing and evolving, cultures are not a threat to political stabilisation and individual liberty within the nation or across the globe.

There must be incessant dialogue among subjectivities to ensure that there is no oppression of any subjectivity. An absence of dialogue among members as to what constitutes patriotism or nationality merely serves the narrow interests of those with unevenly distributed privileges to preserve unfair imbalances that advantage them within the community (Freire, 2014: 179). Put differently:

Dialogical cultural action [aims] at surmounting the antagonistic contradictions of the social structure, thereby achieving the liberation of human beings. Anti-dialogical cultural action, on the other hand, aims at mythicizing such contradictions, thereby hoping to avoid (or hinder insofar as possible) the radical transformation of reality. (Freire, 2014: 179)

Nation-states are the centre for the preservation, sustenance and development of nationality in both developed and developing nations (Kuvaldin & Ryabov, 1999: 127). Other than for economic or democratic procedural interests, secessionist movements in even developed
democratic nation-states are motivated by and aim at perpetuating the most tolerable forms of
their nation by invoking the right to national self-determination (Kuvaldin & Ryabov, 1999: 127; Kymlicka, 2002a: 252). The same is the case for developing nations whose cultures (contested as they always are and should be) face an annihilation through the extinguishing of their active recognition in strong cosmopolitan citizenship configuration. The means for retaining their linguistic, historical as well as national identity in education are under threat through the exclusion of national considerations in education for democratic citizenship. Patriotism is therefore still necessary for its normative value as well as its role in sustenance of local democracy. The following section seeks to argue for the defensibility and necessity of patriotism in configurations of global citizenship.

4.3.3. Patriotism and global citizenship

Education for democratic citizenship that is largely oriented towards a civic rather than national patriotism ignores the necessity of learning about the nation’s particularism. This ultimately undermines the necessity of certain crucial aspects of nationality, usually taken for granted by global citizenship and yet indispensable in the achievement of both civic and global citizenship.

Patriotism has two complementary dimensions: the inward and the outward (Papastephanou, 2013b). The inward has the national community as its central locus, dealing with social visions about “improving its laws, regulating citizens’ actions, coordinating diverse expectations of social groups within the state, and fulfilling political promises within the community” (Papastephanou, 2013b: 170). The outward-looking dimension of patriotism “faces toward what is located outside the national community yet is entangled with it in one way or other” (Papastephanou, 2013b: 170). Patriotism necessarily has these two faces because “as a particularist collective ethos, ideal and virtue, [patriotism] concerns both belonging in a collectivity and differentiation from other collectivities” (Papastephanou, 2013b: 171).

With respect to internal patriotism, it is not possible to have a meaningful and sustainable education for democratic citizenship that is detached from the community’s history as well as linguistic heritage. If selection of content for a curriculum does not involve interrogating the community’s history and relations with other nations, then knowledge about democratic ideals will be passive and merely informative, incapable of invoking appropriate action. What ideals to include and emphasise in a curriculum ought to be informed by both local and
emerging experiences. Cosmopolitan citizenship is supposed to be understood as a “double-stranded tradition: universality plus difference” (Appiah, 2008: 92). Practically, the different local comes first.

Although democratic ideals and values are universal, the USA, for instance, perennially characterised by effects of the heritage of systematic racial inequality, might obviously be expected to emphasise interrogation of its concrete history through the democratic values of tolerance and inclusion. The situation would be different for another country, such as Norway, which has neither had such a type of history nor is having such pervasive effects prevailing strongly today. The point here is that we cannot avoid to include a nation’s history in education for democratic citizenship, as it is what gives context and meaning to the otherwise passive and abstract principles of civic patriotism. The reason why nation X must necessarily emphasise one democratic value over another is due to its ambivalent histories that are not only past experiences but whose structures and effects are still active, forming and malformed present life. Such politics can neither be comprehended nor corrected without making recourse to the particularism of their histories.

In the global sphere, exclusion of national history in education for democratic citizenship ignores how the nation has been and continues to be a perpetrator of injustice towards other nations around the world (Papastephanou, 2013b). A global citizenship formulation that is antagonistic to patriotism is incapable of precisely identifying, confronting and addressing prevalent global inequalities. Most of such inequalities have a national taproot, with some being an enduring result of national encounters that led to historical injustices such as colonialism, military conquests and neglect of moral global duty. By focusing only on procedural justice, civic patriotism implicitly unproblematises the prevailing implications of such encounters and absolves the current and next generations of responsibility where any exists. Worse still, it fails to equip the responsible nation’s citizens and the world at large with an awareness of how to stop the repetition and perpetuation of the mistakes of the past, some of which are still prevailing in mutated forms.

Contrary to the common refrain of inherent evil, outward patriotism, because of its active recognition of the dominant shared idiosyncrasies of the nation, is not only compatible with cosmopolitanism, but more importantly it is its indispensable collaborator (Papastephanou, 2013b: 173). As shown earlier, nationality precedes the state and can possibly outlive it. This is because due to the loss of the nation-state’s sovereignty following globalisation, national interest has subtly aligned itself with agents of globalisation. Not only has nationality
survived, but it also now informs the operation of agents of global political power (Hutchinson, 2000). Today, through their economic, military and scientific advantages, ‘strong’ nations actively and/or passively produce global inequalities through their deeds or misdeeds.

Unless there is recognition of other nations outside, who are impacted by such powerful nations’ actions, assuming responsibility becomes difficult, if not impossible. This is so because nation-neutral global citizenship lacks the capacity to consider the concreteness of other global nations’ otherness because it acknowledges commonality only among nations. Therefore, only the generality of otherness, not its concreteness, guides relations with nations of the world. Such commonality-only terms of engagement ignore profound difference and its meaningful value to the other. The range of what is in all people’s interests is quite contestable and should neither be taken for granted nor always generalised. Therefore, defence for nationality lies beyond its internal optics where it is essentially about the social visions members share and contestably rally behind together in the nation (Papastephanou, 2013a: 24). It is crucial for ethical international relations.

The outward dimension of patriotism ensures that the “quality and value of the community’s conduct in the world” is not exclusively determined solely by standards set and endorsed by itself without relevant external considerations (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). Rather, in acting, the nation must in fair measure consider the evaluative standards, different as they may be, of other nations likely to be affected by its action. The recognition of there being other nations in the world, and not just similar people like us, but other than us, will call for caution, empathy and reasonableness. Contrary to popular claims, outward patriotism is therefore “less ethnocentric and self-absorbed” (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27) than inward patriotism, which encompasses civic patriotism. Outward patriotism is sensitive to concrete otherness outside the nation-state. The fundamental precondition for nations to ensure mutual concern and respect when acting globally is grounded in the recognition of the otherness of the global nations. Seen this way, there is no longer a binary opposition between patriotism and cosmopolitanism. An ethical conceptualisation of cosmopolitan citizenship therefore feeds on recognition of nationality across the globe.

Patriotism’s outward-looking dimension is very crucial in the modern interconnected, diverse world that is also characterised by inequalities. The nation’s relevance is not only with respect to how its members share common ways of life on which common political institutions are established. Rather, in the global arena, when relating with an other nation,
with unfavourable social economic conditions, with insignificant influence in global science (with its attendant global linguistic medium), technology, economy, politics and security, we will be mindful of the potential and actuality of national domination over others with a weaker status.

As earlier highlighted, the nation predates the state. Economic, political and legal institutions agglutinate on aspects of nationality to capture the shared interests and shared meaning-making frameworks of collective agency. Now that some of the roles of the state are delegated to or taken over by global forces and institutions, it necessarily justifies why collective national interests have not been left behind alone. Because nationality substantially gives meaning to political and economic systems, nationality cannot be and should not be left behind, stuck in the now impotent nation-state. Global cooperation is and should be responsive to national interests. However, the consequent challenge in the prevailing global order is that some nations’ interests may dominate, some may tend to exclude others, while some simply may not have the economic and political tenacity to affirm themselves and hence preserve their mediums and frameworks of meaning making. The challenge, therefore, is to conceptualise an ideal globalisation where diverse cultures are equitably represented and sustained in the global arena. At the global level, it is only through such a recognition of nationality that subtle forms of national domination that persist and are embedded in both cosmopolitan universalism and globalising forces will be identified and addressed. Global citizenship critically considered in this way will neither lead to exclusion, nor will it lead to domination.

In the case of a developed nation, at the global sphere, the major limitation common to both inward and civic patriotism is that each implies and thrives on indifference to the unfair global outcomes of the agency of the collective that though inspired by national interest nevertheless dominate and shape global structures (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27). It is therefore necessary that inward patriotism should not be absolute in content and radically unconditional in its demands to such an extent that the patriotic interests are pursued at the expense of global justice obligations (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27).

Furthermore, constitutional or civic patriotism in the interest of global citizenship also has the potential of extolling a particular form of political processes and interactions as the most superior in relation to many other equally valid forms (Papastephanou, 2013a: 28). This is because patriotism has with it an element of possession of something (it could be culture, practices, language, etc.), only that in this case the object of possession will be “the civic
systems and procedures” that will not only be appropriated, but also accorded a form of supremacy, demanding that any other forms (now deemed inferior) be improved. Constitutional patriotism therefore has the potential to commit the very excesses it allegedly seeks to guard against from nationalism (Papastephanou, 2013a: 28). Civic patriotism can therefore still degenerate into love, not of the heritage of ethnic origin or common political consciousness, but rather of traits that places or communities have and which everyone who comes in must exude (Papastephanou, 2013a: 28). All this shows that civic patriotism is not a guaranteed insulation from excesses of bad patriotism associated with bad nationalism.

All in all, citizenship in the globalised world cannot dismiss inward and outward patriotism existing simultaneously. The demand of strong cosmopolitanism of depoliticising national belonging and promotion of civic patriotism in education for democratic citizenship commits two normative errors. Firstly, extinguishing nationality eliminates the bedrock host of sources of concreteness for peoples of the world whose concreteness cannot be generalised as being equal across the globe. This only serves to entrench and perpetuate global inequalities. Secondly, extinguishing of nationality disadvantages those in economically weak nations whose linguistic, social, cultural and historical languages are not part of the global language.

4.4. Education and cultural responsiveness

Contexts for human existence are inevitably and unconsciously culturally marked. As such, both formal and informal school curricula as well as textbooks embed traits and influences of the mainstream culture (Gay & Howard, 2000; Nieto, 2000: 184), hence educators need to be sensitive to potential and actual subtle cultural domination (García & Guerra, 2004: 162). As long as education concedes that there must be no chasm between teaching and learning experiences in the school and the learner’s lived experiences at home, we tacitly endorse the inclusion of culture in the school. In other words, it is necessary that the school connects with learners’ cultural experiences for the education to be relevant and meaningful to them. The school is therefore inevitably a cultured institution. The question therefore should be about the nature, breadth and scope of the school’s cultural marked-ness in relation to its learners. It should also be about how cultural responsiveness of the school should not trump individual liberty and indeed the individuality of the learners.

We cannot decouple culture from education. Defence for a culturally responsive education and schools is based on the normative relevance of culture to the individual’s being as well as that of society. Culture “provides the tools to pursue the search for meaning and to convey our understanding to others” (Gay, 2000: 77). Against this background, there is mutual
dependence between culture and communication. Communication is itself the lifeline for meaningful teaching and learning (Gay, 2000: 77). Cognisant that education should never be detached from learners’ lived experiences (Waghid, 2004), there is therefore no way we can isolate culture and education from constantly interacting with and influencing each other.

Language as an object of culture and indispensable medium for communication to achieve teaching and learning captures this interdependence more vividly. Learners’ linguistic ability and communication style in relation to the mainstream and school culture have a great influence as either a barrier or an advantage in effective learning as well as academic achievement (Gay, 2000: 78). Where a learner’s proficiency in the school language is weaker, and if his or her cultural communication style is somewhat different from that of the school, the learner will, despite knowing enough or much, fail to communicate with the teachers (Gay, 2000: 78). Learners from ‘minority’ backgrounds whose mother tongues and school languages radically differ from that of school, are therefore more disadvantaged. This is unlike privileged learners who come to school with bigger cultural capital in the form of possession of the standard language as their natural language, which they effortlessly acquired in the home (Nieto, 2008: 136).

Language is a mechanism through which people usually cipher, analyse, classify into categories and ultimately interpret experiences (Gay, 2000: 80). Therefore, language is not merely a neutral mechanical instrument for relaying information. It is also a people’s shared way of experiencing and expressing the world (Coetzee, 2003: 208). This is why crucial accompaniments and contexts for language such as “[d]iscourse logic and dynamics, delivery, styles, social functions, role expectations, norms of interaction, and non-verbal features”, among other things, are as important as the communication dimension of linguistic structure (Gay, 2000: 79). Such aspects and contexts of language and communication are defined by and dependent on culture. What is noteworthy is that I do not autonomously generate these aspects of communication accompanying language and neither do I autonomously give meaning to the contexts of language use. I obtain them in dialogue with others (Taylor, 2003). I share them in common with others. I may revise them or improve them, but they remain a crucial aspect of my projection and expression of myself onto others (Benhabib, 2011).

All this means that besides its structure, language embodies other culturally shaped modes of communication. These include how and when the language is employed, other non-linguistic aspects and behaviours that may or not be used in sync with the language. Such dimensions
of communication are largely grounded in the culture in which one participates. Their value is anchored in shared systems and structures of meaning-making and how to relay it. Therefore, shared language encompasses the people’s loyalties and animosities (Coetzee, 2003: 324). Ultimately, it is through meanings derived from such aspects of communication that one establishes whether the interlocutor is “caring, sharing, loving, teaching, or learning” (Gay, 2000: 80). Given all this, whenever there is diversity of cultural background between the teacher and learners, it is necessary that there be “shared communicative frames of reference, procedural protocols, rules of etiquette, and discourse systems” (Gay, 2000: 81).

Given the necessity of schools’ responsiveness to culture, it is imperative that the school ensures that it is in synchronisation with learners’ culture both in the content of the curriculum and in pedagogical experiences. Communication, which is the epicentre of teaching and learning, is itself shaped by the interlocutors’ culture, whether they concede that they have one or not (Gay & Howard, 2000: 10; Nieto, 2008). How learners and teachers of different cultural backgrounds talk, think, listen, disagree and engage in a conversation equally differs largely due to their cultural orientation (Gay & Howard, 2000: 10). Different ethnic groups have particular concrete forms of such notions as “protest, power, politics, change, and the struggle for social justice” (Gay & Howard, 2000: 13; Nieto, 2008). What is usually ignored is that in most contexts, these ideals are linked to and indeed shaped by the community’s cultural or philosophical understanding of human nature. Prevalently the Eurocentric one dominates in education theory and practice (Andreotti, 2011a: 385; Abdi, 2015: 15).

Self-expression and justice, for instance, are largely understood in the sense of the primacy of individual interests only. However, there is variation in how one communicates one’s opposing opinions and how non-negotiable ideals are actualised across communities. How a child protests the authority of a teacher is expected to be in the context of mutual respect, not as an abstract norm, but as respect between an adult and a youth is understood in their society. The learner’s self-expression and demand for justice will have to consider among others, shared conceptions of respect and politeness that are themselves cleared of any potential for suppression. This, it must be emphasised, is not synonymous with preserving unjust power imbalances. Rather, it is about cultivating fitting forms of protest that will both empower the learner and challenge the teacher’s injustice as well as maintain (in a reflective manner) shared collective ideals that cohere the community.
This variation is, in reasonable measure, with respect to the community’s models of communication and self-expression that are informed by culture. For some cultures, justice and protest may not just be about the interests of the individual only, but must occur in tandem with or consideration of certain collective interests (Oko Elechi et al., 2010: 74; Metz, 2015). This is not to insinuate that the individual always suffers or should be forced to compromise his or her legitimate interests for the sake of community solidarity. Rather, it is to highlight that for concrete communities, protest and demands for justice exist in a framework of consonant interaction with other collective interests. In as much as individual liberty is a non-negotiable fundamental ideal, its realisation does not necessarily require structures that are characteristically individual-centric. Therefore, it is possible for some human communities to value both individual freedom and collective values without either contradicting or compromising any. The attainment of both should not be hindered by a false dilemma of either one or the other, for each has incomparable worth.

Due to variations in shared interests and values across different communities, actualisation of even fundamental and universally recognised educational goals reasonably and necessarily varies too. For instance, in some communities’ school setups, pedagogical approaches that involve teamwork are likely to effectively and meaningfully involve most of the learners in relative comparison with doing the same task individually (Venter, 2004; Metz, 2015). As such, educational planning and implementation must also be largely motivated by a synchronisation with the community’s shared values that anchor both the society and education systems so that there should be no disparity between the home and the school (Venter, 2004: 158).

In summary, the necessity that the school should synchronise with learners’ prior (home) experiences cannot be over-emphasised in education discourse. Its implication, however, is that by ensuring such a connection, the school in principle welcomes culture into its domains. In any case, naturally, the school, being a microcosm of the wider society, is expected to be characterised by the cultures of the learners and teachers as they associate not as learners, but as members of the wider society who now happen to be in the school.

It is hence normatively imperative that the school and home (with its culture) interact, if at all the education is to be meaningful. At the same time, we must always ensure that home cultures are not displaced from the school either by a dominant culture or in the name of universalism that is itself laden with aspects of particularism. This is where mother tongue instruction, where feasible, and learning of one’s community and nation’s history become
very crucial. Education for democratic citizenship that displaces national history and mother tongue instruction effectively severs this connection. This renders the education morally problematic. The following section discusses how strong cosmopolitan citizenship education embodies this normative problem.

4.5. Cosmopolitan citizenship education in developing nations: Assimilationist?

Societies usually have disproportionate inequalities. Such inequalities manifest in the school with unfair consequences to learners whose social class, mother tongue, ethnic background, race and gender substantially differ from the mainstream (Nieto, 2000: 181). In much of education theory, curriculum design and content as well as school practices, educationists’ treatment of diversity has generally been assimilationist. This is so in that if a learner is to attain academic excellence, very rarely is the learner’s cultural otherness, which crucially informs his or communication frameworks, regarded as a vital resource, not a barrier, in the teaching and learning processes (Nieto, 2000: 183). The school’s epistemological orientation that is normatively and pragmatically inseparable from culture is unfortunately characterised by “hegemonic domination” by a mainstream culture only (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 556).

In contexts where learners’ cultural background is trumped down by expecting them to disregard their cultural situatedness and assimilate into society’s dominant mainstream culture that also undergirds the school’s culture, minority background learners achieve academic success usually at the cost of their “cultural and psychosocial well-being” (Ladson-Billings, 1995: 475). In education that is not responsive to the cultural situatedness of the learners, “the goal of education becomes how to ‘fit’ students constructed as ‘other’ by virtue of their race, ethnicity, language, or social class into a hierarchical structure that is defined as a meritocracy”, ultimately perpetuating inequities (Ladson-Billings, 1995: 467). Culturally relevant education, however, must ensure “criteria of academic success, cultural competence, and critical consciousness” in the learners (Ladson-Billings, 1995: 477).

Those from developed nations and mostly individualistic backgrounds usually retort that they have no culture and are not influenced by any. They hold that their institutions are shaped and characterised by objective scientific principles. However, such claims overlook the social, economic and political power their culture has acquired, “as the officially sanctioned and high-status culture, it just is” (Nieto, 2008: 130). The culture subtly and deeply embeds the economic and political institutions of society: “tastes, values, languages, or dialects” of the group with the greatest power tend to have higher social privilege and dominate (Nieto, 2008:
135). Although an individual from such a context of prestigious international influence and dominance may have certain ‘neutral’ positions regarding society’s culture, it does not necessarily negate the existence and influence of the cultural context in which the neutral principles thrive. In other words, the universalism and efficiency of the neutral principles (in achieving a non-oppressive and inclusive society) do not as a matter of necessity deny the existence of and dependence on local culture.

Given this background, approaches of strong cosmopolitanism citizenship education face the following challenge: How do you determine the form and content of the neutral and non-neutral that will be compatible with the perspectives of all the people of the world? Usually, in both curriculum design and implementation through school practices, “what is taught, how it is taught, who is taught, and whose fault it is when what is taught is not learned are often manifestations of what is considered the legitimate body of knowledge” (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 556). Thus, the curriculum and school practice are in essence determined by principles that are grounded in the dominant culture, which effectively downgrades the ostensible purity status of the knowledge and practices that are paraded as impartial. Success in the school is therefore not only an epistemological matter, but also one of “power, ethics, politics, and survival” (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 556).

Education for democratic citizenship that is rooted in orientations of strong cosmopolitanism is insensitive to this reality, as it advances a ‘universal’ non-contextualised conception of citizenship. However, such a universalism has inherent cultured dimensions that may not be universalisable, hence the necessity for context responsiveness. It is hence imperative that we re-evaluate what values should be included and excluded in the quest of establishing the essentials for a globally-aware citizen. Epistemology, being about the nature, status and acquisition of knowledge, need not be understood as wholly essentialist and hence as entirely incontestable. Rather, a critical epistemology located in a people’s worldview must question the now dominant positivist universality orientation of knowledge of eurocentrism, especially its “objective truth versus subjective emotion” assertions (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 560). The epistemological positivist orientation has spread into the other disciplines, including in the human sciences, where inquiry for ultimate knowledge is modelled on natural scientific inquiry, implying that the process of knowing human nature is objective and grounded in establishing predictable and manipulable principles shaping their behaviour (Code, 2012: 88).

Mainstream epistemology that shapes and informs different disciplines today generally recognises and venerates only what it regards as objective knowledge, which must be value-
neutral and independent of context, and must “transcend the particularities of experience to achieve purity” (Code, 2012: 88). For this dominant knowledge model, subjectivity is not part of pure knowledge (Code, 2012: 88). Objective knowledge is ostensibly accorded purity because it is governed by “the norms of formal sameness”, which necessarily exclude “practical and experiential differences” in order to achieve homogeneity accessible only by a “disinterested and dislocated view from nowhere” (Code, 2012: 88).

What is however often crucially ignored is that in the history of Western philosophy, the rationality and objectivity core ideals of mainstream epistemology have been built on the suppression of properties and experiences that prejudice against other experiences, such as those associated with femininity and the underclasses on the social status hierarchy (Code, 2012: 91). Such attributes as “emotion, connection, practicality, sensitivity, idiosyncrasy” and so forth are regarded as inhibitive to acquisition of pure knowledge and their exclusion is part of the normative conduct in epistemic inquiry (Code, 2012: 91). This implies that …

… ideal objectivity is a tacit generalization from the subjectivity of quite a small social group, albeit a group that has the power, security, and prestige to believe that its experiences and normative ideals hold generally across the social order, thus producing a group of like-minded practitioners (“we”) and dismissing “others” as deviant, aberrant (“they”). These groupings are generated more as a by-product of systematically ignoring concrete experiences, of working with an idealized conception of experience “in general,” to speak, than as a conscious and intentional practice of reifying experiences that are specifically theirs (Code, 2012: 91–92).

According to Code (2012: 91–92), in essence, the ideology of objectivity is simply one of other knowledge perspectives that are appealing to and better advance the interests of one group of society (powerful white men) out of many other groups of the society. Its summary dismissal of experience and otherness is largely based on group interests other than purity of knowledge. There is therefore now necessity for “case-by-case analysis and critique of the sources out of which claims to objectivity and neutrality are made” (Code, 2012: 92). Objectivity fails to meet its own cardinal term of consistence, as its own conclusions about the nature of experiences that constitute knowledge are prejudicially and exclusively selected, hence objectivity is inherently (though unintentionally) designed to be inconsistent with all the (other) otherwise valid knowledge there is. This, for Code (2012: 92), necessitates caution before accepting the “theoretical hegemony” claims of objectivity. We need to take subjectivity into account before accepting ‘objective’ claims, because the veracity of such
knowledge is preconditioned on the inherent exclusion of other legitimate sources of knowledge. For Code (2012), such claims may also in principle conceal essentially subjective experiences that are institutionalised as pure and objective.

Even for the legitimately objective knowledge with universally applicable criteria for evidence, the characteristics and contexts of the knowledge constructors matter, and this ranges from their motivation for inquiry, emotional attachment and their cultural and historical influences to their social class (Code, 2012: 92). Such subjectivity considerations may not alter the provability and veracity of the objective knowledge claims. However, they are crucial in debates about the worth of such claims. The worth of such claims has bearings on such issues as how to establish credibility, how knowledge and power relate, the nature of the knowledge and procedures for its acquisition, and also has bearings on “the place of knowledge in ethical and aesthetic judgments” (Code, 2012: 93). Knowledge generation and its hierarchical positioning in terms of alleged relevance and veracity are therefore neither neutral, nor objective, nor disinterested endeavours.

Western societies are largely shaped by “liberal-utilitarian moral values”, among other values, and their intellectual orientation is largely influenced by “empirical-positivist values” (Code, 2012: 93). In collaboration, these two shape the “epistemic and moral-political ideals that govern inquiry in technological, capitalist, free-enterprise western societies” (Code, 2012: 93). This is why even in public discourse, claims that are drawn from a scientific model of inquiry are given the highest credibility by the wider public (Code, 2012: 93). Furthermore, such claims are effectively used as a basis of discrediting any other subjective and non-conforming accounts (Code, 2012: 93; Nyamnjoh, 2012: 131). It is erroneous to conclude that every human society across the world should have its economic, technological, political and educational institutions modelled on positivist values only. Even worse is the measuring up of all communities of the world to an ostensibly positivist and individual-centric evaluation standard to establish the compatibility of their experiences with human dignity and universalism of human equality.

A global citizenship based on the positivist model of knowledge strips nations’ otherness of its meaningful value to their constituent individuals or communities. By excluding the diversity of the other and embracing only the commonality of human beings, it recognises only one form of being an individual in the world that must be applicable to all people. The ultimate result, ironically, is that it is those that do not fit into this positivist model that need to adjust, and not the model itself, whose veracity and superiority in determining matters
regarding human nature and the human condition are ostensibly un paralleled and absolutely final.

The claim that all human interests, aspirations, values and emotions can be understood in some objective, universal disinterested way is wrong (Nyamnjoh, 2012). Education for democratic citizenship that only concentrates on and emphasises universal norms and ideals, necessarily precluding local (national) norms and ideals, falls prey to such positivist scientific hegemony about human nature. Despite that the ostensibly universal and neutral, strong cosmopolitan citizenship education is laden with particularistic perspectives and values, its hegemony exacerbates the marginalisation of the concreteness and otherness of those local experiences that the universal discourse deems subjective. From a global perspective, depoliticisation and privatisation of culture in education, in the name of culture’s subjectivity, is not an initiative in favour of objectivity. Objective global citizenship must not only tolerate, but also embrace as a crucial part of its project the subjectivity of nationality.

The dichotomy between the universal objective and the particular subjectivities is a false one. Positivist facts are always compatible with subjective values and both need to be subjected to critical debate. Therefore, the idea of the neutrality over national subjectivity in formulations of cosmopolitan citizenship is neither always nor the sole universal way of grounding a citizenship responsive to global equality. We need to consider subjectivity as well in knowledge claims and not only objectivity, which is exclusive of others, because “the ideal objectivity of the universal knower” is so limited and never universal in all epistemic inquiries (Code, 2012: 97). Endeavours of ensuring individual freedom in the world that regard subjectivity in contrast with universalisable objectivity as antithetical to its realisation are both simplistic and a negation of the reality of human nature, as the two exist in mutual interaction (Freire, 2014: 50).

Because people do not “exist apart from the world, apart from reality”, meaningful and liberating education must always start from the perspective of “men and women in the ‘here and now’, which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene” (Freire, 2014: 85). This is because …

… [p]eople, as beings “in a situation,” find themselves rooted in temporal-spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. They will tend to reflect on their own “situationality” to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it. Human beings are because they are in a situation. And they will be more the more they not only critically
reflect upon their existence but critically act upon it (Freire, 2014: 109) (emphasis in original).

Similarly, the universal and objective pronouncements of strong cosmopolitan citizenship and their alleged truth power may potentially serve to alienate and disempower people in other parts of the world, while empowering some as well as perpetuating their dominance. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship achieves this through advancing Eurocentric perspectives embedded in the curriculum content where for instance, such content actively suggests that political recognition of the local and cultural are unconditionally incompatible with cosmopolitan impartiality and universalism. In other words, ultimately, perspectives holding that among the absolute preconditions for cosmopolitan citizenship is depoliticisation and privatisation of the national and the local are assimilationist.

There is therefore a need for a “culturally relevant pedagogy” in education for global citizenship under which the learners in nations without dominance in the global sphere should always be “repositioned into a place of normativity” where they become “subjects” other than mere objects in the teaching and learning experiences (Ladson-Billings, 2014: 76). A cosmopolitan citizenship that depoliticises nationality aspects in the curriculum and school practices only coerces learners to assimilate into the mainstream ostensibly culture-neutral universalism.

4.5.1. Global citizenship and pluralism

A nation-neutral cosmopolitan education creates a needless conflict between the ideals of equality and pluralism, presenting the valuable ideals as being in conflict unless pluralism is privatised. Equality entails impartiality in the distribution of relevant obligations and entitlements. Pluralism presupposes distinctiveness and concreteness of the other. Depoliticisation of the nation in strong cosmopolitan citizenship education as a condition for achieving equality undermines the worth of pluralism and otherness on the global sphere. It is erroneous to assume that achieving equality in the global sphere implies being neutral about particular peculiarities embodied in nationality among the diverse people of the world. A major consequence of this in the global context is that one fails to meaningfully account for injustices being suffered by marginalised and minority people around the globe. This is a result of the tendency of viewing all people of the world in general terms of commonality that disregard the relevance of other bases of inequality unique to the minorities (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 558).
According to Delgado Bernal (1998: 558), mainstream feminism in the USA, for instance, stands to be criticised as being inadequate to confront the injustices faced by Chicana women. This is because Chicana women have significantly different and fewer structures of opportunity in contrast not only with Chicana men (not to mention white men), but even with white women, who also seek liberation from patriarchy (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 560). This, she holds, is because mainstream feminism understands discrimination suffered by all women only in the general terms of gender inequality, yet there are racial and socio-economic dimensions to Chicana women’s inequality that exacerbate it (Delgado Bernal, 1998: 560).

Therefore, in its equality and universalism endeavours, strong cosmopolitanism citizenship education is similarly problematic for its lack of response and opposition to concreteness and ultimately to the otherness of the other. It summarily ascribes negative value to otherness and difference. Such perspectives of liberalism as well as universalism perceive the sources of concreteness and otherness traceable to linguistic, cultural, territorial and historical dimensions of learners’ identities as barriers to flourishing global democratic co-existence. They are erroneously conceived as sources of conflict to be done away with.

Unless education is responsive to people’s situatedness, it runs the risk of just co-opting the ‘appropriate and relevant’ of the marginalised others’ culture into the mainstream. Ideally, however, the cultural and historic concreteness of the marginalised other learner must be the subject of education theorisation and practice in the quest of ensuring educational justice (Yosso, 2005: 82). Societies and national communities that have for so long been marginalised should not just be expected to respond to changes taking place in the global world as mere objects in a globalising process whose response to such changes should be of mere conforming integration (Freire, 2014: 33). Their experiences must be part of the core agenda of the education processes and experiences.

Given the adverse implications of the exclusion of the concreteness of nationality in education for global citizenship that has a strong cosmopolitan orientation, it is evident that the neutrality commitment of the education greatly compromises the education goal to achieve global justice. The neutrality and impartiality of such an education are the only apparent and ironically inimical to the realisation of justice to the situated peoples of the world. Such an education only serves to integrate into the mainstream. It fails to achieve equality and freedom because of its failure to be sensitive and responsive to learners’ national situatedness, in the case of education for cosmopolitan citizenship.
But how compatible would education as freedom be, with the demand of nationality-responsive education given the contestability of culture? The culture being defended here is an anchor against the threats of global homogenisation to a nation. The contents of national culture are constantly up for contestation by its members and may not be permanently fixed. However, it may be something that is contestably representative of their lived experiences. Such a culture will result from and lead to freedom, because the culture is not imposed, closed and static. It is contested and can never be ignored or dispensed with, such as is the case with a shared language. Unless the cultural paradigms of the local are preserved through nationality, the people will lose their perspectives and be compelled to adopt one non-volitionally.

A mainstream culture pervades (citizenship) education for democracy both at the global and national levels, even in those curricula and school practices touted as culturally neutral (Nieto, 2000: 183; García & Guerra, 2004: 162; Yosso, 2005: 74). Most school textbooks are directly or indirectly the products of the control and influence of a given cultural group whose “subjective experiences and interpretations of reality are presented as [the sole] objective truth” (Gay, 2000: 113). The perspectives of such textbooks are usually about a unitary conception of reason, emphasising commonalities while being very silent on diversity and difference (Gay, 2000: 113). In the mainstream, resistance to embrace other resurgent perspectives is due to “a near-universal disdain for an account or ‘story’ that deviates too much from one upon which we have been relying to construct and order our social world” and this perpetuates “imperial scholarship” (Delgado, 1992: 1372).

Owing to the subtlety of convenience of domination, it is not uncommon for such mainstream dominating education not to be identified as what it is, even by the dominated (Freire, 2014: 45). Similarly, in strong cosmopolitan citizenship, there is an ostensible ‘necessity’ in the name of global convenience, for there to be neutrality over national history and culture so as to achieve universalism-conscious global citizens, unattached to and unrestricted by the ostensible arbitrariness of nationality. Adoption of educational reforms driven by the demands of global integration such as letting go of one’s mother-tongue in instruction is an instance of such.

Following Freire (2014: 47–49), one can however argue that acceptance and tolerance of the domination of the structure of the prevailing global order occur because we regard it as deterministic. Despite such domination, weaker nations resign to it in the name of the costliness and risks involved in rearranging the global order to generate equality.
Alternatively, those under the domination of such an order must as a matter of necessity recognise the reality of their being dominated not as a sealed fate they are helpless about. Rather, it is a limitation they can and need to overcome, albeit at a cost. Any education for global citizenship that in the name of equality systematically extinguishes the normative value of pluralism among the people of the world concretised through their nationality, by depoliticising and privatising it, is grounded in a false dilemma between equality and pluralism. Again, each has incomparable value.

In summary, by extinguishing the concreteness of the people of the world, embodied in nationality, strong cosmopolitanism education for democratic citizenship prioritises a conception of equality that undermines the moral relevance of pluralism and its concomitant situatedness. This effectively hides particular forms of injustice and inequalities, suffered on account of and in terms of national situatedness. The ultimate result of this is that such inequalities can never come to the fore to be addressed in so far as at the global sphere nationality has been depoliticised and relegated to the private sphere.

4.6. **Strong cosmopolitan citizenship and the neoliberal influence**

The reality of global interconnectedness underlies motivation for the arguments for (education for) global citizenship, as the possibility of such a citizenship is in direct proportion with increased connectivity. There are many agents driving this interconnectedness. The most outstanding and influential one, though, is economic in nature, and it has moral implications that should neither be left unconsidered nor taken for granted (Calhoun, 2008: 434). This section argues that strong cosmopolitanism-oriented education for democratic citizenship takes as given and unproblematic the global interconnectedness that is the primary motivation for a worldwide citizenship. In so doing, strong cosmopolitan education for citizenship ignores the domination tendencies subtly inherent in the celebrated global connectedness.

The objective of strong cosmopolitanism is to achieve equality in terms of obligations and entitlements of (global) justice (Tan, 2004). Its aspiration is that all human beings across the world universally and equally share the duties and benefits of justice without being hindered by the arbitrariness of nationality. The indictment of nationality in justice conceptualisation is owed to the prevailing global interconnectedness. That we can today learn of the manmade or natural calamity, global poverty and global environmental crisis facing non-compatriot others awakens the sense of global justice and compels us to act through numerous avenues global
interconnectedness avails (Miller, 2007: 2). Therefore, global interconnectedness makes vivid human interaction and the universality of being human.

The idea of a global citizenship also gets its inspiration from this interconnectedness. In any case, the shift in emphasis from social to global justice is indebted to this interconnectedness. However, careful attention has not been given to the nature and normative implications of this interconnection prior to embracing it as the basis for global citizenship. By dismissing nationality, strong cosmopolitanism exacerbates implications of this unattended to interconnectedness.

Around the world today, fundamental education aims, such as promoting self-realisation and cultivation of democratic values, are in escalating conflict with the dominance of market values driven by the demand of neoliberalism, where education is aimed at training prospective workers for jobs in the global economy and its industries (Giroux, 2005: 209). Therefore, the education goals of ensuring self-actualization, human emancipation and social justice have largely been hijacked by the neoliberal agenda (Giroux, 2005: 209; Divala, 2016). Gradually, education is to a lesser degree emphasising creation of a just society than it is emphasizing on a narrow and economic conception of authenticity (Pais & Costa, 2017: 10).

The logic of “free market fundamentalism” is not only driving economics and politics globally, but now also embeds and reproduces in all social relationships ultimately mirroring attributes of its characteristic profit-centeredness and supplier–customer conception of all relationships (Giroux, 2005: 210). The market has in the modern globalised world become the organising principle for the social, political and economic relationships and structures of society, ultimately posing serious threats to “democracy, public goods, the welfare state, and non-commodified values” (Giroux, 2005: 210). The market now even drives the education agenda (Divala, 2016).

We should question globalising tendencies advanced through universalism, particularly with respect to the necessity of global homogeneity for global citizenship. It should be possible to have an interconnected world that respects human rights (as well as human cultures) without demanding neutrality over nationality as a precondition for universalism. Without falling into conspiracy traps, it is indeed evident that neoliberalism has become the motivating principle in politics, economics as well as education globally. For neoliberalism, national boundaries inhibit the realisation of a universalism that is not essentially moral, but facilitates
achievement of efficient profiting that hinges on free movement of human labour and capital across borders (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). This has resulted in the labelling of national boundaries as an obstacle that curtails free mobility of both individuals and capital across borders (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). However, such barriers to such profit-oriented free movement of people and capital in a way significantly serves the defensible normatively grounded role of protecting the weak and vulnerable from the ravages of unbridled global capitalism (Pieterse, 2006: 1250).

Neoliberalism builds on the universal need and right for economic sufficiency, which is a manifestation of as well as a condition for individual freedom. However, the substance constituting this right and its prioritisation are far from being universal across societies and are perennially contentious even within one society. The local and the particular are, before neoliberalism, barriers to the progress of corporate and individual economic interests. National boundaries are inhibitive. It is in the interest of corporate aspirations that the whole world not only become easily accessible, but that the whole idea of being rooted and grounded hence accountable and committed to this particular national community and its unique interests effectively be overridden by profit-making optimisation (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). What stands out is that this is a universalism that is based only on deification of the individual’s economic interests, as an epitome of individual freedom. The implications of such an autonomous interest-maximising economic self on other normative aspects of being are ignored or consigned secondary value. With respect to education, the major interest of global capitalist tendencies is that the whole world should become a pool of available labour resource that also shares the same language skills (Ramose, 2010: 293). Prioritisation of economic interests in education planning now largely serves the interests of (global) capitalism and it is usually at the expense of other pertinent, concrete needs of the situated people.

In developing nations, the economic regime of neoliberalism is imposing its market-based values through powerful global financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO to enforce, among other things, free market and structural adjustment policies (Pieterse, 2006: 1250). Such policies are motivated by financial efficiency and profit at the cost of the fabric of state welfarism (Giroux, 2005: 211). Nations’ aspirations, interests and ideologies have to adapt to the market ideals of neoliberalism, or else they lose their place in the global world (Giroux, 2005: 210; Pais & Costa, 2017: 4).
Just like in much of the world today, in most developing nations, palatability with the capitalist considerations of neoliberalism is at the heart of reforms and agenda setting in the education discipline. Certain valuable aspects of society that have no commodified value yet require more public financing from national governments are relegated to secondary importance (Nyamnjoh, 2012; Divala, 2016). Sustaining them is usually perceived as, and indeed is, costly to the nation’s economic aspirations of integrating into and becoming competitive in the global economic order. In that category fall national considerations in developing nations. The direct influence of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank have demanded structural adjustment programmes in sub-Saharan Africa nation-states, which translated into huge cuts in public spending (e.g. education and health), privatisation of state enterprises and market liberalisation (Kennedy, 1999: 444).

The nation-state is therefore to make the morally costly decision of whether to maintain its public service expenditure on its authentic interests or to adopt externally recommended economic-utilitarian structural reforms that demand cuts to national museums, public health, welfarism, education and so forth. Should education be availed at a reasonable subsidised fee, or should it be privatised? What should be the form and substance of such an education that is neoliberalism-compliant? Such are some of the vexing questions with which developing nations have to grapple. In general, answering such questions demands that all aspects of public life should initially be converted into financial efficiency terms. Such terms have surreptitiously become definitive of all worthiness. Governments now regard as financially burdensome expenditures aimed at supporting and sustaining national cultures, education, health systems, literature and museums. The curriculum is expected to largely concentrate on skills on demand at the market that is itself global and ‘universal’. Neoliberalism highly values neutral non-localised education, just as its global market regards the nation as a barrier to free trade. The global market needs global citizens, not national ones.

Besides an absence of interference and mastery over the self, freedom also constitutes in an absence of mastery by others, in other words non-domination (Pettit, 1997: 22). Non-domination is not just an intermediate between the ideals of non-interference and self-mastery, but also an alternative condition of freedom: It is also an ideal of freedom (Pettit, 1997: 27). Someone dominates another, to the extent that “they have the capacity to interfere, on an arbitrary basis, and in certain choices that the other is in a position to make” (Pettit, 1997: 52). However, not all interference is tantamount to domination, so long as the
interfered freely chooses the interfering agent to interfere for mutual benefit or that of the interfered.

One enjoys non-interference when one avoids coercion (Pettit, 1997: 24). For the interference to be non-domination, the interference need not be practised arbitrarily by an agent. Rather, it must be something one fully permits and is on one’s terms (Pettit, 1997: 24). For the non-interference world to be a non-domination one, its non-interference by arbitrary powers must be “by virtue of [weak nations] being secured against the powerful” (Pettit, 1997: 24). This is how the differences in global relations and distribution need to be understood. Most nations, including those in Africa, are free from interference, but yet not free from neoliberal domination. Although there is little interference in developing nations across the globe, still more different forms of domination prevail. Most developing nations have no capacity to counteract the domineering force of neoliberalism. This reflects in their choice of curriculum content, medium of instruction and related aspects (Higgs, 2012: 52).

The compromise over mother tongue instruction is far from being a free choice. It is largely determined by neoliberal domination. Acquiring the official and international languages of commerce and science becomes a major pursuit even when it violates linguistic and educational justice. The taking away of space for exploring, probing, contesting, re-interpreting and making new, more meaningful belonging attachments to one’s nation, by removal of learning national history in the school, to embrace a neutral universalism that devalues such attachments, is a form of passively succumbing to the domination of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism quests for an accessible and detached employee, ready for deployment from and to every part of the world to which global capitalism extends. What one gleans from neoliberalism is that one can realise oneself only when one is in terms with the interests of the powerful. This is the domination of neoliberalism.

Advancing a universal neutral justice in the current global setup without firstly uprooting injustice, inherent in global interconnectedness structures, and disadvantaging those in weaker nations ill-serves equality. Neoliberal global and state institutions side-line and silence the voice of people in developing nations, as they cannot actively participate in affairs that directly concern them (Bohman, 2015: 521).

Neoliberalism that is powering global interconnectedness is producing unjust outcomes to most developing nations in that it is undermining what is concrete about a people by assigning it little or no worth based on the financial efficiency benchmark of neoliberalism.
Catching up for competitive integration into the globe interconnectedness costs compromises on linguistic justice and any other financially inefficient, though normatively necessary, public expenditure.

Global interconnectedness does not give the non-situated and impersonal global citizen for which strong cosmopolitan citizenship aspires, the capacity to transcend borders only. By participating in the global interconnection, the citizen also inherits its unjust and undeserved prioritisation of economic interests over other incomparable moral ideals across nations.

Such criticism of global interconnectedness does not however outlaw all globalisation, for there indeed is also much benefit from it. However, in most cases, globalising forces that thrive on systematic devaluation of national boundaries and hence overcome any form of accountability and fair representation of the affected people’s interests, stand to be condemned. Self-generating globalisation (Benhabib, 2011: 104) that puts the affected as mere objects on the receiving end and never as subjects of the interconnection needs to be put right before we build on it a scheme of moral duties. Strong cosmopolitan citizenship education needs to re-examine the moral acceptability of the interconnectedness before standing on it to make calls that demand nationality annihilation, which risks serving only narrow other than justice interests. Just like strong cosmopolitanism, what is problematic with this interconnectedness is that it is based on an essentialist conception of human nature as always prioritising self-economic interests.

Global justice can be ensured only when a situated people’s interests, values and shared ways of life are given due acknowledgement and consideration. This involves acknowledging otherness in its concrete forms. Knowing the concreteness of the other only results after engagement through dialogue. For the communicative discourse to be fair, everyone must introduce themselves and articulate their otherness and concreteness all by themselves, without being projected by another (Benhabib, 1992: 165). The same principle applies to all forms of representation. Globally, this entails acknowledging national otherness as concretised in nationality. In the global context, concreteness of nations’ otherness is grounded in their rationality and generally articulated through their language and histories. These should not be ignored, displaced or rendered incompatible with universalism.

Non-domination in democratic societies of the world is realised only when a member of the democratic scheme has an ability to avoid “having its terms set by the other members, and thus having potentially, if not actually, a minimum of normative and political control over
one’s statuses” (Bohman, 2015: 532). Side-lining and silencing the other’s otherness therefore obstructs the realisation of non-domination, as political and normative control over one’s statuses is ceded to others (Bohman, 2015: 523). This is the case in the global arena when one considers the influence of neoliberalism in setting the educational agenda that largely undermines the value of developing and maintaining national language, history, shared ways of life, local art and literature.

Once we examine the context that nurtures global interconnectedness, which renders strong cosmopolitanism vivid and meaningful, we cannot fail to notice the neoliberalism force that is embedded in such an education for cosmopolitan citizenship. Because of its aggressive universalism, neoliberalism dislodges and devalues other moral interests of people around the world by explicitly and subtly denouncing boundaries as inherently bad and borderless-ness as inherently liberating. It is on this premise that global interconnectedness is mistakenly accepted and embraced as given. The denigration of nationality inherited by strong cosmopolitanism is problematic once we examine the impetus of global interconnection. At the national level, policies of global economic institutions such as the WTO and the World Bank are no longer economic in nature, but political, as their implementation puts restrictions on the form and content of political policies nations may pursue (Brinkman & Brinkman, 2008: 430).

A potential criticism to the defence for a consideration of national concreteness in conceptualisations of global citizenship would be that such an approach promotes moral relativism. As such, it is difficult, if not impossible, to hold accountable cultures of the world, as there would no longer be standard universal benchmarks for moral evaluation. The critic would further protest that politicising nationality in education for democratic citizenship will serve to implicitly endorse and perpetuate inequities embedded in national culture.

It is worth bearing in mind that the position being advanced here defends and is compatible with universalism. Other than promoting moral relativism, this position only recognises that what is relative across human communities are concrete actualisations of universally binding moral ideals. There is no single way of realising them (Peters, 2015: 1131). This does not in any way entail tolerance of inequalities and injustices embedded in national cultures. The inward dimension of patriotism (Papastephanou, 2013a) is specifically meant to counteract such within the nation-state.
The global interconnectedness celebrated and that propels the necessity of realisation of strong cosmopolitanism global citizenship education is normatively contaminated by the excesses of neoliberalism. Global citizenship based on such a framework is bound to not only be unjust to the marginalised legitimate interests of people of the world; it is also iniquitous.

4.7. Conclusion

The educational aim of achieving the authentic self ought not to be understood as being exclusive to aspects of shared collective life. The autonomous self needs access to a range of given worthwhile options to meaningfully exercise its autonomy. The community provides these. Education must therefore include aspects of collective life as it aspires to produce critical citizens.

Despite the diversity and autonomously embraced values of the good life, citizens in democratic societies commonly share a fate grounded in aspects of their nationality. Their common language, geographical territory, common history and shared culture underpin their collective way of life and interactions. Although mostly unrecognised, taken for granted hence at times undermined, nationality is a profound part of the foundation of meaningful democracy and greatly contributes to sustaining it. Any alternative global rearrangement in so far as it depoliticises nationality cannot replicate the unique solidarity role towards democracy and justice that nationality performs. Extinguishing nationality in global citizenship conceptualisation ultimately suffocates and renders impossible the realisation of global justice. Therefore, in the modern interconnected world, nationality is in essence an indispensable precondition for a just global democracy.

By depoliticising nationality at the global level, strong cosmopolitan citizenship education collapses the last bulwark that protects the peoples of the world from educational and global injustice. Such ostensibly impartial education for democratic citizenship is essentially laden with biases and subjectivity. Through its insistence on neutrality over aspects of nationality in the interest of impartiality ideals, strong cosmopolitan education for democratic citizenship ultimately compels people in economically weak nations to assimilate into the mainstream epistemological perspectives.

Education for (global) citizenship that recognises nationality acknowledges the diversity that hosts and expresses the concreteness of the otherness of the people of the world. Education for global citizenship education that recognises nationality is cognisant of the worth and meaningfulness of the people’s otherness whose value is as incomparable and indispensable
as the general commonality of their humanity. In other words, the localness of the otherness constitutes frames for meaning-making through which universal ideals are actualised and appropriated through vernacularisation (Benhabib, 2011: 89) (debate and deliberation as to how the abstract universal should be realised in a particular social context). Unless education for democratic and cosmopolitan citizenship duly recognises the normativity of nationality, the endeavours of the education will merely be coercive and assimilationist. It is in this vein that education for democratic citizenship informed by such cosmopolitanism is potentially harmful to the educational and global justice entitlements of those in developing nations such as Malawi. This, ironically, is contrary to the central theses of strong cosmopolitanism that it promotes equality and justice globally. The next chapter concretely presents the way in which the Malawian education for citizenship scenario best captures this irony.
Chapter 5:
Nationality and cosmopolitanism in Malawian citizenship and education

5.1. Introduction
Having established the ideal relationship among cosmopolitanism, education and nationality in education for democratic citizenship, this chapter examines the nature and role of nationality and cosmopolitanism in Malawian primary school education for citizenship during the political epochs of the colonial era (1891–1964), the independence era (1964–1994) and the democratic era (1994–present). I argue that colonial era citizenship was characteristic of an essentialising, binary and paternalistic form of cosmopolitanism advanced through colonial education as well as the exploitative practice of colonialism itself. Colonialism and its education theory and practice advanced a subaltern conception of the native as intellectually and morally inferior, hence in need of transformation. In most respects, the natives, on the other hand, demonstrated practices that are consistent with a deliberative, unlike an essentialist, strong cosmopolitanism, through their embracing of values and practices introduced by Eurocentrism without necessarily having to discard their native concreteness. Furthermore, during this era, nationality played a crucial liberating role as both an embodiment of the people’s concreteness, which they were struggling to redeem from colonial hegemony, and national concreteness was also the political vehicle for mobilising resistance solidarity.

In this chapter I further posit that however, promotion of a bounded and uncritical patriotism under a purported pursuit of national unity characterised the subsequent 30-year independence period. Tendencies of cosmopolitanism were systematically supressed. However, the general otherness standpoint of cosmopolitan universalism significantly contributed towards demolition of the one-party tyranny through different forms of international sanctions and pressure against the one-party dictatorship.

I further contend that in the democratic period, Malawi’s education for democratic citizenship is essentially strong cosmopolitan in its orientation and only makes largely tokenistic inclusions of national particularism without due regard for the normative value of nationality. This, I argue, is due to a lack of political will coupled with the hegemonic pressure of neoliberalism. Ultimately, the ostensible impartiality and purported anti-essentialist nature of
Malawian education for democratic citizenship inspired by strong cosmopolitanism, marginalises the concrete and epistemic otherness of the Malawian local in education and global citizenship.

Facing the future, the chapter contends that Malawian education for democratic (and global) citizenship must affirm and embrace the tolerable aspects of nationality that have normative weight, while simultaneously promoting visions of moral duties whose scope transcends nation-boundedness. The argument is that such an education for citizenship is necessary in that it will be consistent with and respect human diversity across the globe. As such, the chapter argues for a cosmopolitanism whose universalism is grounded in Seyla Benhabib’s (2011) difference-originating deliberative universalism in order to accord due value to the otherness that constitutes global diversity.

5.2. Colonial education and citizenship (1891–1964)

Modern education in Malawi was introduced by European Christian missionaries. The first Scottish explorer and missionary, David Livingstone, visited Malawi in 1858 (Pike, 1968: 70). Early missionary pioneers’ aim for education was primarily to both proselyte and introduce commerce in order to curb slave trade, which was flourishing during the mid-19th century (Pike, 1968: 71; Pachai, 1973: 71). Introduction of schools in areas where Christian missionaries did not settle in, such as in the southeastern part of Malawi, was motivated by the need to effectively engage in trade with Arab traders (Rafael, 1980: 36–41).

The first school in Malawi was started by missionaries at Cape Maclear in 1875 (Pachai, 1973: 169). The learning mainly aimed at numeracy and literacy in order to study the Bible better and other home and trade crafts such as carpentry, needlework and bricklaying (Pachai, 1973: 169). Most missionaries’ attitudes towards natives and their way of life were generally denigrating. Some were against the idea of having Africans engaged in teaching in schools as well as evangelising, on account that the native is incapable of performing ‘civilising’ endeavours (Pachai, 1973: 90–91). On the other hand, some other missionaries, although they were in a minority, believed that Christianity and difference are compatible, and therefore they localised education and religion as much as possible (Pachai, 1973: 91).

British colonial government was established in Malawi in 1891, 30 years after missionary education had started (Murray, 1932: 47). Colonialism brought white settlers and colonial administrators. Subsequently, there was a need for education for their children. Together with Asian settlers and workers of the colonial administration, they demanded separate schools for
their children (Pachai, 1973: 178). Demand for more systematic education in colonial Malawi was motivated by reasons ranging from racist ones (such as that settlers, colonial administrators and Asians wanted their children to learn in separate schools) to religious ones, where chiefs in Islam-dominated areas demanded education that was Islamic and not Christian in nature (Pachai, 1973: 178–179). In subsequent years, the natives expressed their need for government to provide quality education worth for employment, effective participation and communication in tribal communities as well as for capacity for self-reliance of the Nyasaland (pre-independence name for Malawi) community to cut dependence on colonialists (Pachai, 1973: 180).

Despite its establishment in 1891, the colonial government only formally (although not substantively) took control of education in 1926, 35 years after colonial government establishment and 51 years since missionaries’ education had started (Hauya, 1997: 2). As a consequence, there was synonymy between Christianity and educational aims and contexts, such that Christianity in effect became the prerequisite for enrolment into some schools (Hauya, 1997: 2).

Colonial education aimed at developing individual character grounded in religion (Banda, 1982: 63). Because of church control and influence in education, indigenous traditional culture and its expressions such as music and dance were systematically undermined and excluded, with only Western culture and music being taught and valorised in schools (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–12). Such detachment of the local led to low school attendance, as there was alienation of learners’ traditional ways of life from the school experiences (Banda, 1982: 67). Harmless traditional practices that were acceptable to the learner were considered unacceptable and intolerable in the school domain (Banda, 1982: 67). While being mindful of the school’s ability to overcome mere reproduction of the unexamined society, it is noteworthy that the conflict between education and the community was not entirely about universal knowledge and defective cultural practices, but also one between British culture and African culture. In as much as there are certain foundational universal principles of right and wrong, it is worth noting that the moral education in schools was also largely about the missionaries employing their own standards to evaluate the unfamiliar traditional ways of life for native Africans.

The impact of colonial education and missionary education was such that most educated Malawians (most of whom later became elites) associated being educated with having a denigrating attitude towards indigenous culture and knowledge (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–13).
Interestingly, such contempt for the local still persisted in Malawi through the 30-year-old post-independence period, and it is noteworthy that this attitude survived even until the democratic era that commenced in 1993. Government’s 20-year development plan in 1998 observed as follows:

Malawians have low self-esteem. They have no confidence in local products and in their culture. The challenge is to restore self-confidence and pride in being Malawian. Malawians must be able to identify themselves with their country, their cultural heritage and their indigenous products. Malawians must also be assertive and confident and be free from servitude and low self-esteem (Malawi National Economic Council, 1998: 35).

Among other strategies to combat this challenge was to develop a national cultural policy (Malawi National Economic Council, 1998: 35).

Despite the active marginalisation of the local by educators, the curriculum content of colonial education was alienating as well (Banda, 1982: 90). During my literature survey, I did not find much literature on the colonial primary school curriculum and its specific citizenship content. Colonial secondary education curriculum, however, best reflects such alienation of Malawian learners from the education process. For instance, the secondary school curriculum offered the following subjects: Mathematics, History, English Literature and Language, Geography, General Science, Chichewa, Religious Education and Latin (Banda, 1982: 90). There was very little of Africa and completely nothing about Malawi in the History content (Banda, 1982: 90). As Banda (1982: 90) further notes, Geography content was exclusively about the British Isles and the Commonwealth. On the other hand, English literature required an almost impossible imagination from the learners about Britishness (Banda, 1982: 90). Although studying classical Latin had been a prestigious and strategic endeavour in the West, its relevance in Malawi and Africa was not given. In Mathematics, concepts and experiences were captured in non-African frames, for instance involving train travels and British towns in the learning of speed and time, thereby rendering it difficult for Africans to imagine such experiences (Banda, 1982: 92). Given that this was during the pioneering era of education in Malawi, one may understand that there was no developed content tailored for Africa and that as such, education just had to start from somewhere. One cannot, however, excuse modern independent Africa for maintaining and promoting such revocable Eurocentric tendencies that alienate the local as prevailing strong cosmopolitanism tendencies do reflect.
When the colonial government took over active provision of education that had been under the control of the missionaries, their objective was to ‘civilise’ the natives to embrace Western values. The goal of the colonial government, as stated in the 1911–1912 Annual Report for the Nyasaland Protectorate, was that through its local affairs council, the new generations emerging after colonial establishment would find …

… themselves without the restraining influences to which their parents were accustomed, [as the young] have of recent years evinced an inclination to emancipate themselves from the disciplinary responsibilities of village life and obedience to authority and to adopt habits prejudicial to native family life (Annual Report on the Protectorate for 1912–1913, cited in Murray, 1932: 129).

African ways of life and traditions were therefore regarded as “barbaric and less perfect” by Western standards during colonialism (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–11). Colonialism regarded natives’ life and perspectives as being incompatible with the emancipating ideals of modern government and society. Indigenous life was a barrier to be overcome. The ideal citizen was therefore one that was detached from the incompatible values of local life.

Reverend John Chilembwe was a local indigenous missionary, mentored by a Western missionary whose approach actively demanded African liberation as part and parcel of the evangelisation project (Phiri, 2004: 171). Chilembwe’s mentor missionary had been running his evangelising work on the basis of the interrelation among spirituality, politics and economic freedom (Phiri, 2004: 151). Chilembwe, the mentee, therefore promoted industrialisation among his people in his missionary work (Phiri, 2004: 171). In the schools run by Chilembwe’s church, they were openly challenging European racial superiority and land appropriation from natives as being inconsistent with central tenets of the Christian faith that all people are equal before God (McCracken, 2012: 135). His schools, due to the radical and revolutionary nature of their curricula, were resented and systematically suppressed by European settlers, missionaries as well as the colonial government (White, 1987: 130–131; Phiri, 2004: 264–265). He was to later spearhead the first (and only armed) resistance against colonialism, which, though unsuccessful, inspired subsequent successful movements (McCracken, 2012: 214–215).

In his struggle against colonialism and racism and affirmation of native values, Chilembwe did not discard the Christian faith (an alien and non-native European religion). In fact, he believed in Africans acquiring Western education, which achieves the social, industrial and economic development his people clearly lacked and ought to have had (Phiri, 2004: 171).
Therefore, Western education was his indispensable value and medium for emancipation. For Chilembwe, the new global religion, western education and the local fodder for the politics of national freedom were inextricably bound (McCracken, 2012: 141). In his schools’ ‘curriculum’ (then intermingled with sermonising, for the two then were inseparable) he sought to develop a consciousness not grounded in and aimed at returning to a pristine tribal past that had its own deficiencies, but to founding an independent and free national future (McCracken, 2012: 127–128).

5.2.1. The build-up of colonial resistance
When colonial rule was established, there was no intention of actively including Africans such as chiefs in the influential structures of government. The colonialists had no confidence in African leadership despite persuasion attempts by some missionaries whose engagement with natives was both much older and deeper (Pachai, 1973). As such, colonialists, right from the beginning, started establishing the authority of government through military force through an army of few hundreds from India (Pachai, 1973: 181). The rule was from the onset characteristically based on martial law (Pachai, 1973: 181).

The colonial administration employed English law, which was made supreme to traditional law, as the latter was regarded as ineffectual and irrelevant for human progress (Pachai, 1973: 182). Therefore, two distinct worldviews were in competition. With differences in conception of human nature and social structure between the British and African perspectives, further trouble was obviously inevitable. For instance, there were stark differences in conceptualisations of land appropriation and ownership, human labour and communal responsibilities between the British and local legal systems (White, 1987: 89).

In 1915, the 24-year-old colonial rule faced an insurrection. A number of grievances had been raised for redress (Pachai, 1973: 214). They were ignored, as the colonialists undermined the capacity of the local Africans rebelling (Pachai, 1973: 214–215; Phiri, 2004: 261).

The uprising was mainly inspired by three injustices. Firstly, Reverend John Chilembwe, the native missionary who spearheaded the uprising, was being severely restrained by the colonial government from opening more schools whose Afro-conscious and liberating curriculum was critical of colonial injustices (Phiri, 2004: 262–265). Secondly, land appropriation by the colonial settlers effectively dispossessed locals of land and made them provide labour on the new settler owners’ estates as a form of rent payment (Phiri, 2004: 265; McCracken, 2012: 145).
Besides these outstanding two grievances, the third cause that ultimately triggered the uprising was the recruitment of locals under Britain’s King’s African Rifles (KAR) to fight the Germans in the northern part of Malawi, Somalia, Ghana and Mauritius during the First World War (McCracken, 2012: 154). Thousands of Malawians served in the First World War as soldiers, porters and carriers of military supplies. As the war took its toll, recruitment in the empire’s military service now became coercive and villages were being raided to forcefully recruit male adults into the army (McCracken, 2012: 151–152). Chilembwe severely condemned the unjustifiability of poor Africans dying in a ‘world’ war in which they had no stakes and which would serve to benefit only the rich coloniser (Pachai, 1973: 216).

The insurrection, however, was ill planned and ill coordinated. It was almost immediately repressed by the colonial forces. Chilembwe, the leader, was killed in one of the battles. However, this gave further impetus to the momentum for resistance (Mtewa, 1977: 242). Years after successful repression of the uprising, the first political organisations established by natives, called Native Associations, emerged (Pachai, 1973: 225). They were based at district and provincial levels. Among others, their aims were to inform the colonial government of the African public’s opinion as well as to “keep the Africans informed of the laws introduced by the government and thus to assist them understand the objects of such laws” and to organise meetings that deliberated on the issues of “general or special interest” to Africans (Pachai, 1973: 225).

5.2.2. Cosmopolitanism and nationality in the colonial era
What one would glean from the colonial situation is that the idea of citizenship (subjects to the British king in colonial Malawi) involved two worlds: the colonial world and the local world. Laws and institutions of the political society were carved in British values and imported for the Africans to embrace, and not to question, adjust and blend with their local situatedness. It was a matter of shedding off the local lived and meaningful experiences and adopting a ‘modern’ global progressive arrangement of society. Coexistence of values was out of the question owing to the ostensible incompatibility of the two cultural worlds.

It is instructive to always be mindful that globalisation has not started with modern-day interconnectedness that is owed to technological and scientific advances. The processes of trade before colonialism (Rafael, 1980: 36–37), explorers, missionaries and foreign settlers in Malawi were all activities of globalisation where distinct races encountered and engaged the other. Understood this way, colonialism was therefore a framework of cosmopolitanism, on the part of the coloniser albeit a morally bankrupt one.
In the late 19th Century there had been a heavy Portuguese, Arab, German and British presence in Central Africa, largely for trade as well as expansion of colonies to amass natural resources, territory and subjects (Rafael, 1980: 36–41). There was therefore globalisation as diverse cultures encountered and engaged with one another, although it was largely characterised by conquest and unjust land appropriation, rather than by mutual respect that translates into an exchange of ideas (such as through trade and education) that is dignifying and all-empowering.

Morally speaking, the nature of the globalisation was largely iniquitous with respect to the interests that drove it. This is deduced from the fact that natives welcomed and cooperated with the European and Arab others characteristically without hostility. The welcome was premised on the natives’ expectation that trade and cooperation were to define their common relationships rather than domination. As depicted by other anti-colonial strugglers, much of traditional African society did not own land privately (Mandela, 1995: 22; Achebe, 2006: 134). In general, land was for sharing based on need, such that when European settlers came, Africans freely shared their land (Mandela, 1995: 22). They usually shared it freely because they understood it as a fundamental resource every human being needs, not as a mere object for mere self-aggrandisement (Mandela, 1995: 22; Achebe, 2006: 134).

One can argue that the natives’ sharing and concessions of the need to learn and borrow ideas from the other through trade and missionary exchange of ideas that are arguably reflected through natives’ welcoming of the other, represent an enactment of ideal cosmopolitanism. The welcoming and adoption of some of the other’s values do not entail inherent and absolute deficiency of the natives’ perspectives. Recognition of value in the other’s culture presupposes respect for otherness; not only of the other, but of oneself too. It entails an engagement based on mutual respect. It is in this vein that one concedes of the positive transformation that missionary education and the benefits of certain selected aspects of colonialism introduced to Malawi, such as education and an end to slave trade (Rafael, 1980).

It must be emphasised, as earlier highlighted, that claiming that colonialism was a morally unacceptable experience does not disregard other advantages that came along with missionaries and colonial government, especially education and modern health amenities. Natives greatly benefitted from these modern developments and were welcoming of them. Indigenous missionaries and native educated elites encouraged their people to get the education brought by the missionaries to improve and empower themselves and ultimately the condition of the African people (Pachai, 1973: 232; Phiri, 2004: 131). Such positive
outcomes cannot however, compensate nor mitigate the general dehumanisation of colonialism. In the normative sense, the violence and dehumanisation of colonialism were rooted in its rational–irrational binary conception of human nature and all reality. The major limitation of such an essentialist dichotomous perspective lies in its failure to recognise alternative perspectives about aspects of human nature in non-generalised forms. Rather than recognise and engage with otherness, the colonial commitment was to force all otherness to conform to its objective–subjective dualistic categories, failing which any such difference should be suppressed through ostensible civilising efforts.

What was very problematic of colonialism was its denigration of the natives’ human beingness, their dignity and the systematic and sustained degrading, inhumane treatment natives suffered. The failure to recognise and acknowledge the concreteness of the natives without disparaging it with physical and epistemic violence was gravely problematic. Demanding recognition and respect for the other’s otherness does not suggest ethical relativism. It does not entail that there are no foundational moral truths, hence moral critique of one culture by a person from another is impossible. On the contrary, while acknowledging the generality of human equality based on sameness, getting to comprehend the other is not and ought not be based on projections and assumptions based on fixed categories, but on non-paternalistic engagement, deliberation and communication (Benhabib, 1992: 167). One can conveniently deduce that the colonial perspective was consistent with postulations of strong cosmopolitanism in its essentialist conceptualisation and categorisation of human nature and of the moral worthiness of the aspects of social relations for all the people of the world.

It is remarkable that what birthed the anti-colonial struggle was not the mere fact that the Western other race, the other religion, the other perspective had come and become part of the natives’ community. Rather, it was the denigration of the people’s concreteness by colonialism that awakened the compulsion in natives to assert themselves and their ways of life. It is noteworthy that the struggle was not conceived in reactionary and romanticised terms of a return to the past and a summary condemnation of everything the European other had introduced (Mtewa, 1977: 241–242). In any case, natives had embraced so much from the West and were introducing appropriate changes and relevant reforms to their society. They valued the transformation resulting from trade, missionary education and provision of modern health services brought by globalisation (Pachai, 1973: 232; Phiri, 2004: 247–250). Yet, they also understood the resilient value of their ways of life such as in land ownership laws, which were trumped down by colonial law.
Political leaders who mobilised people against colonial domination both during the Chilembwe uprising and the subsequent successful political party-based movements in the early 1960s acknowledged certain merits and benefits that missionary education and colonial administration brought. It is almost apparent that they protested against racial and colonial injustices, and were not in any way demanding a return to a pristine past before they came in contact with the other. For instance, Chilembwe the anti-colonialism native church leader urged his people to be educated and to be smartly dressed by wearing European-fashioned clothes, and was himself mostly dressed in fancy modern European fashions (McCracken, 2012: 135). He at the same time preached racial equality and condemned colonial exploitation (Pachai, 1973: 222).

Chilembwe, the native missionary and uprising leader, did not discard Christianity, but both understood and propagated it as a medium for ensuring racial, social and global justice. He therefore embodied the vernacularisation of global ideals (Benhabib, 2011: 89), where the global or universal is domesticated in local frames of meaning-making and communication. When universalist ideals undergo vernacularisation, absolutist summary outlawing of cultural situatedness as inherently problematic becomes hollow and needless. It was difficult, if not impossible, for the colonial framework that was largely consistent with strong cosmopolitanism to realise that the African way of life is compatible with and can adapt conventional education. Only a cosmopolitanism whose universalism is deliberative and not essentialist can achieve this.

Resistance against colonialism in Malawi was inspired by not only common moral repudiation of colonialism, but also by nationality. Nationality was not just a rallying point for solidarity against colonialism. Rather, it gave meaning to the nature and scope of colonial injustices. In the development of the anti-colonialism movement, in the late 1950s, it was necessary that the African interests and aspirations be coalesced under one common rallying point, and nationality was the backdrop (McCracken, 2012: 366). It was not just for instrumentalist purposes; rather, it was because the injustices people were suffering were concretised and reducible to denigration of their values, customs and laws about property (land ownership, for instance), depossession of their land and territory, suppression of their way of being in the world (McCracken, 2012: 135–136) and general alienation from political processes that affected them but would not have them involved on account of their lack of English language proficiency and other related Western skills.
Claiming that nationality played a crucial role in the struggle neither entails that there is one homogeneous nation group in Malawi, nor does it entail cultural boundedness. There were a number of nation groups, in the strictest sense of word, in Malawi prior to and during colonialism who had much in common, such as language. However, missionaries across the country had only one medium of instruction even before the colonial government established any control of education (Pachai, 1973: 169; McCracken, 2012: 404). Therefore, in the general sense, Malawi was a nation, although in the strictest sense it likely was a composite of nations that had strong commonalities. Such a ‘multination’ understood that colonial independence was in the interest of each constituent national group. Historically, confronting the domination of colonialism has effectively utilised national consciousness both as the central motivation and as the means for achieving the aspirations of liberty and equality (Papastephanou, 2013a: 23).

In the build-up to political independence in the 1960s, a nationalist movement was built and led by a deified leader Kamuzu Banda, who in 1960 was made the party’s life president. Raving up the nationalist movement was unfortunately done at the expense of tender intra-party democratic and multiparty politics (McCracken, 2012: 374). After the 1961 elections that saw the attainment of self-government (where Africans voted for the first time) under a new ‘inclusive’ colonial constitution, no other multiparty election was to take place even after independence (1964) until 1993, when the dictatorship was confronted and voted out (McCracken, 2012: 378).

However, the problem with such nationalist movements, not as moral ideals but as solidarity vehicles for achieving moral ideals in a political struggle, is that they tend to deify traditions, practices, history and the personality of the leader. Malawian history is no exception. The leader, Kamuzu Banda, was deliberately deified as the messiah for the nation (Pachai, 1973; McCracken, 2012). For a context where communication across the nation for mass engagement was so challenging, coupled with very low standards of education, pragmatically, achieving national independence was prioritised over developing a critical mass (McCracken, 2012: 410). Unfortunately, to achieve their goals, the political leaders adopted a cultural essentialism posture. Such posture that necessitated prioritisation of a bounded nationalism, however, conceals other distinct layers of injustices within the nation based on class, power, gender, ethnic group, and so forth, which the people experiencing them wanted addressed, although only after completing the struggle.
National liberation ought not to be regarded as the ultimate end for the quest of freedom. In the Malawian scenario, the assumption was that developing a critical mass as well as embracing pluralism and democratic practices within natives’ political movements after independence would, in the pre-liberation period, likely compromise the success of the liberation (McCracken, 2012: 374). The idea was to pend intra-party dissent and democratic practice until after independence. This proved to be too fantastic and far removed from the reality of power.

Predictably, there was a cabinet crisis, just two months after independence, when other senior leaders who now expected to be treated as colleagues by Banda the leader, with whom they now expected to be deliberating and debating issues, had their contrary opinions construed as rebellion and insubordination by Banda (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 412). It ended with all of them becoming real dissidents, with some of them staging failed military insurrections against the tyranny (McCracken, 2012: 429–438). Those not killed in military revolts fled into exile, even before the nation clocked one year of independence. What this shows is that as national movements develop, they should simultaneously develop structures tolerant of intra-nation freedom. The discourse of intra-nation freedom should never be postponed or withheld, unless it is for the sake of achieving more guaranteed greater freedom, restricting liberty for liberty itself (Rawls, 1999: 214).

Developments towards a homogenising twisted nationalism in Malawi nevertheless started to emerge during the anti-colonialism struggle. In as early as the penultimate year to independence, members of religious organisations, especially Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Providence Industrial Mission, whose beliefs discouraged active citizenship such as voting, faced systematic persecution, including murder from the dominant national party (McCracken, 2012: 419).

All in all, with respect to cosmopolitanism and nationality in the colonial era, one can generally conclude that the natives’ tolerance and embracing of certain aspects of the colonial other demonstrated sound discursive cosmopolitanism (Benhabib, 1992: 165). The colonial cosmopolitanism grounded in essentialism was morally problematic. On the other hand, the national movement against colonialism embodied and concretised the moral struggle against colonialism. However, its inability to look inward (Papastephanou, 2013a: 27) and tolerate internal critique engendered paternalism.
5.3. Post-independence citizenship and education (1964–1994)

Malawi attained political independence in 1964. As stated earlier, two months afterwards there was a cabinet crisis, where most senior ministers who were also founding members of the majority ruling party challenged (then prime minister) Kamuzu Banda’s dictatorial leadership style, delayed Africanisation of the public service and generally unilateral determination of strategic public and foreign policy, which was characterised by lack of consultation and intolerance for dissent (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 410; McCracken, 2012: 429). This culminated in a huge fallout as seven senior ministers resigned, subsequently leading to two separate unsuccessful military struggles mounted by two of the expelled cabinet ministers, with the rest fleeing into exile (McCracken, 2012: 429).

The most profound and lasting outcome of the cabinet crisis was in the aftermath responses. A legitimacy deficit was apparent in the ruling party. Public confidence in the government was compromised and the state had to assert control. On the other hand was pressure to prove to colonialists and all, that Africans had capacity for viable self-government (McCracken, 2012: 434). In response to all this, the one-party regime resorted to trumping up a form of patriotism that was incompatible with dissent. All associates of the ‘rebels’ were removed from positions of leadership. Loyalty to party leadership was what mattered (McCracken, 2012: 451).

The Banda regime employed coercion to maintain its power grip. There were detentions without trial of perceived dissidents and the separation between party and public policy was dissolved among others leading to compulsory buying of party membership cards without which one could not gain access to hospitals, schools, markets or public transport (Chirambo, 2009: 78). Banda’s nationalism also appropriated cultural artefacts such as traditional dances that were performed for him as well as paternalistic cultural titles, for example nkhoswe ya Amayi (mentor and guardian for women), Ngwazi (indomitable conqueror), Father and Founder of the Malawi Nation, Messiah and Destroyer of the Federation (Kendall, 2007: 286; Chirambo, 2009: 78).

Kamuzu Banda exploited these titles in order to develop a culturally “intimate and fraternal relationship with the people” (Chirambo, 2009: 78). The goal was that despite the legitimacy deficit and dismal governance performance, the people should be compelled to regard the regime as defenders and heroes of culture (Chirambo, 2009: 81). Citizenship under Banda’s rule was embodied in a loyalty to the personality of the presidency (Kendall, 2007: 286). The leadership particularly was regarded as all-knowing and the best articulator of the people’s
aspirations, who lacked the wisdom and sophistication to determine what is in their best interest.

Furthermore, there was absolutely no academic freedom at any level of learning (Ihonvbere, 1997: 225; Nkhata, 2012: 189). Banda actively and deliberately suffocated all opportunities for democratic growth right after independence, as he established a one-party state with him as its constitutionally declared life president (Ihonvbere, 1997: 226). The life president had to approve parliamentary candidates and would dismiss cabinet and parliament at his own will (Ihonvbere, 1997: 225). The one-party regime emphasised and inculcated in both learners and citizens its anti-colonialism nationalistic ideology, summed up in what it called the “four cornerstones”, namely “unity, loyalty, obedience, and discipline” (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 412). The Malawi Young Pioneers, a paramilitary wing of the one-party regime, had instructors in every secondary school who exclusively taught unflinching observance of these nationalistic cornerstones (Banda, 1982: 96). Schools therefore produced passive, loyal and uncritical citizenship. There was systematic, brutal, usually fatal suppression of dissent, both at the grassroots and at leadership levels. Detention without trial, lack of separation of party and state affairs, rampant disappearance of critics and harassment of religious organisations whose beliefs were deemed against the state prevailed (O’Malley, 2000).

The independent Malawian primary education system was at conception in the independence era understood to have two main functions, namely developing the individual and developing the society, on the understanding that the individual interest and the community are not in conflict, but that each presupposes the other (Reyes, 1973: 17). The stated aims of the primary school curriculum were intended to provide learners with occupational skills and to achieve literacy so as to, among other things, take pride in their local cultural heritage as embodied in local institutions (Hauya, 1997: 11). Ironically, however, even a pass in Chichewa the national language was not and has never been a pre-requisite for the award of any certificate in the three national examinations. An uncritical patriotism synonymous with loyalty, not to collective ideals but to the personality of Banda and his one-party regime, dominated all education levels.

The primary education curriculum during the Banda era was meant to create submissive and passive citizens trained to prioritise obedience and loyalty over inquiry (Kendall, 2007: 286). Education policy was informed by the resolutions of the annual conference of the one-party regime as well as the president’s own directives, and all these revolved around achieving unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline (Hauya, 1997: 10–11). After the cabinet crisis of
1964, the nation’s authorised history was re-written with a heavy and over-exaggerated bias towards Kamuzu Banda as the sole messiah and hero who singlehandedly fought colonialists (McCracken, 2012: 451). The twisted history was based on errors and never included accounts of the roles of other struggle leaders who founded the party nor of the pivotal cabinet crisis. Banda’s leadership was based on a twisted conception of nationalism that thrived on inaccuracies and lack of academic freedom for free research and inquiry (Nkhata, 2012: 189).

The regime’s disdain for criticality only increased as years progressed. In 1963, in order to expand access to secondary school education in Malawi, government opened doors to 179 American Peace Corps volunteer teachers who constituted almost half the secondary school teachers’ population (McCracken, 2012: 401). Unlike British teachers, the American volunteer teachers had a disdain of colonialism, its prejudices and its imposed social distance from native colleagues and learners (McCracken, 2012: 401). Their liberal approach to teaching and learning that was likely to produce inquisitive and freely inquiring learners was of serious concern to government, which was concerned with losing its hegemony over the people, and as such the Peace Corps volunteers were banned and expelled from Malawi in 1971, seven years after independence (McCracken, 2012: 402). The political establishment was intolerant of any education that would facilitate independent thinking.

The political suppression of dissent and inculcation of passive citizenship were occurring in a context of very thin distribution of critical education among the population. Most citizens were disempowered to actively and meaningfully engage in the political discourse beyond demanding political independence. Having a nationalistic citizenship education that characteristically countered criticality in the learners for 30 years created a citizenry that largely has an erroneous conceptualisation of the ideal relations between leaders and electors (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 418). The attitude of helplessness and the belief that the leaders know best for the people still endure and are variously perpetuated in democratic Malawi today (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 417). This is the legacy of the dictatorship.

In 1966, the primary education curriculum was revised to correct the colonial errors (Hauya, 1997: 11). This resulted in the expansion of the subject content for Geography, History and Civics subjects. Regrettably, because this development occurred just two years after the cabinet crisis, the content, especially for History and Civics, was biased and twisted and was tantamount to indoctrination (Mtumbuka, 1998: 109–110). Further opportunistic and tokenistic educational reforms were made to ‘restore pride in indigenous culture’, although
they were informed by partisan interests (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–29). Up to the present for instance, indigenous music is still not studied in the University of Malawi, Malawi’s oldest and biggest public university (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–27).

5.3.1. Abuse of nationality and the cosmopolitan correction
The sense of nationality that was crucial for colonial struggle in Malawi was, in the subsequent independence era, twisted by the dictatorship to achieve a false and self-serving sense of national unity. Ideal nationality ought to be inward-looking (Papastephanou, 2013a: 170), regarding the internal distribution of social goods within the nation’s political community (Rawls, 1999: 6). It must also be outward-looking in relation to other collectives so as to assume duties and demand benefits due to it as a collective agent in the global arena (Papastephanou, 2013a).

The problem with the Malawian situation was that when time for the nation’s internal probing and inner appraisal was due, the probing was stopped violently. The consequence was a warped nationality that commanded only unquestioning loyalty in order to maintain a dubitable sense of unity and stability. All this notwithstanding does not make nationality inherently evil in citizenship conceptualisations, more especially in global citizenship (Papastephanou, 2013a: 22). For 30 years, possibly in hysterical response to the cabinet crisis, Malawi’s nation building was regrettably based on self-serving values for Banda and his one-party regime so as to fasten their grip on unchecked power (Mtumbuka, 1998: 309). Constitutionalism was alien to nation building and instead it was Banda’s four cornerstones of unity, loyalty, discipline and obedience that prevailed (Mtumbuka, 1998).

As repeatedly emphasised, this dissertation does not fall into the dichotomous trap of extolling either nationality or cosmopolitanism. Rather, it argues that each has unique and incomparable normative worth. More importantly, the two ideals are mutually reinforcing and correcting (Papastephanou, 2015). The Malawian political experience reflects a neglect of this ideal mutually regulating relationship. The relevance of cosmopolitan ideals to the human condition in the midst of the Banda dictatorship is better captured by the role of external forces in pressuring for respect for human dignity and rights between the late 1980s and when the one party collapsed in 1993. International actors have variously contributed to democratic consolidation in Africa and Malawi, helping in ending one-party rule, largely through economic sanctions. The withdrawal of foreign aid by Western donors (who supported 40% of government’s annual national budget), especially the United Kingdom in
1993, due to bad governance and human rights violations forced the one-party regime to make concessions for democracy (Ihonvbere, 1997: 226).

The question of other states and non-state actors intervening in the affairs of another nation on the basis of state violation of fundamental human rights usually draws controversy. The controversy ranges from whether it is acceptable to intervene, to when and how to intervene if permissible. This dissertation does not focus on addressing these questions. However, as Benhabib (2011: 62) holds, the most fundamental human right every individual has is the “right to have rights”. This right entails respect for the agency of individuals: their communicative freedom (Benhabib, 2011: 62). Usually, political elites who thrive on paternalising and repressive regimes appeal to culture or religious uniqueness of their society, claiming that it is only those familiar with their culture who may participate in the discourse on the acceptability of their regimes. This is said in a background where the society members who expected to participate in the society’s collective will-formation are systematically disempowered and repressed and perpetually coerced to conform to the state (Waghid & Davids, 2014). Such appeals to national sovereignty or culture are merely opportunistic.

The systematic oppression of dissent and freedom by the one party dictatorship in Malawi would not have been successfully challenged by Malawians single-handedly. By every standard, one would argue that the people of Malawi were denied the right to have rights through the systematic suppression of alternative voices that effectively denied the realisation of communicative freedom. Such tendencies undermine the generality of humanness irrespective of culture or nationality differentiation. There may be disagreements as to what should constitute the full schedule of rights people around the world should have. However, violation of the communicative freedom of human beings anywhere in the world irrespective of circumstances is inherently unacceptable.

Therefore, the international community’s exertion of pressure on Malawi through aid withdrawal and other related sanctions is consistent with a deliberative universalism for which this dissertation is arguing. In other words, such interventions are justified by the general otherness standpoint of communicative universalism. Every systematic act by the state or any agent that takes away a person’s right to have rights, in other words communicative freedom, is normatively illegitimate and demands all possible interventions so long as the interventions also guarantee preservation of the victims’ life and general stability of their social environment. This dispels the challenge that a deliberative
cosmopolitanism entails moral relativism and frustrates humanitarian intervention and condemnation of human rights repression.

5.3.2. Language policy
At independence in 1964, Malawi had three official languages: English, Chichewa and Tumbuka (Hauya, 1997: 12; Moto, 1999: 63). However, the single party’s declaration in 1968, four years after independence, making Chichewa the national language, further attests to the twisted nationalism that was being pursued (Matiki, 2003: 158). Chichewa was to be used in mass communication and as medium of instruction in the first four years of primary school education at the expense of other major provincial languages such as Tumbuka in the north and Yao in the south (Moyo, 2003: 128). Instead of developing a due multination nationality, Banda pursued a nationality biased towards his own tribe, elevating it to the national level (Moto, 1999: 64).

The nationality which Banda built was a concealment of power consolidation and centralisation only self-serving his ulterior motives. It fell short of any minimal standards of critical patriotism. Such national discourse that is exclusionary, repressive, narrow and devoid of criticality is not nationality qua nationality, but selfish interests in forced garbs of patriotism. Banda had no commitment to developing a transparent, inclusive, deliberative patriotism that would accommodate contestations. His endeavours towards patriotism were dubious and inconsistent with the very ideal of patriotism.

Ironically, this is seen in contradictory policies the regime took: Chichewa the national language was not used in parliament and prospective members had to prove English proficiency (Moto, 1999: 66). Furthermore, despite being imposed as the national language, there were no institutionalisation and systematic development of Chichewa, as evidenced by the lack of a Chichewa dictionary despite there being a government Chichewa Board, which never formally added new vocabulary into the lexicon as its minimum mandate expected of it (Moto, 1999: 66). Worse still, Banda himself always addressed mass rallies and national addresses in English with a vernacular interpreter (Moto, 1999: 67). A pass in English at every national certificate examination was included as (and still is) a prerequisite for awarding of a certificate. With national language, on the other hand, this was not the case even today. It is evident that there was glaring failure on the part of Malawian leadership to make meaningful attempts towards educational decolonisation, free of undue Eurocentrism. Therefore, it is important to take note that the weak status and perpetuation of the denigration of native languages across much of Africa as official languages (Kamwendo, 2010) are not
owed to colonialism alone. Much of post-colonial Africa has been ignoring the active development of local languages as languages of science, trade and official communication, and instead retained the colonial languages as official languages while they had the opportunity to make a radical shift, albeit gradually (Moyo, 2003: 130). There is therefore glaring African culpability in the prevailing Eurocentric linguistic hegemony across Africa. Denying functional roles to the other dominant native languages and compelling their native speakers to learn in a second local language and later a foreign official language was marginalising. This is because it affects the “conceptual and cognitive development of learners” (Moyo, 2003: 128). Speakers of such marginalised languages lose the socio-economic and political relevance of their languages (Moyo, 2003: 129) under which they can effectively self-actualise.

Post-independence Malawi, in its quest for national unity, unfortunately had a very erroneous conception of nationality informed by non-national motivations. There was linguistic, social, cultural and political engineering to achieve a coercive integration of all cultures. The result was arbitrary marginalisation of other indigenous languages in Malawi since independence in the name of a morally feeble nation-building project. After re-introduction of political pluralism in 1993, there have been only a tokenistic recognition and elevation of indigenous languages in Malawi with little or no functional value (Moyo, 2002: 270).

The nationality pursued was homogenising and convenient for authoritarianism. It was incompatible and inherently antagonistic with the characteristic internal diversity and differences of the nation. Just like the prevalent form of strong cosmopolitan citizenship, difference and diversity that characterised the cabinet crisis were to be muted as elements that are inimical to the national solidarity project. Little did it occur to the political leadership that national solidarity, which once motivated the political anti-colonial movement, was meaningful only in the context of its prospects to enable the individual to flourish and have his or her aspirations actualised in the subsequent political units realised in the framework of nationality.

5.3.3. *Ubuntu and citizenship in Malawi*
Despite the characteristic corruption of local life and of citizenship, one of the aspects of community life the one-party regime attempted to put to proper use in its citizenship configuration in education systems was the idea of collective or communal work. All students, from primary school through to university, together with their communities
annually participated in community work for one week of the school calendar, called the Youth Week (Banda, 1982: 112). This approach to citizenship is congruent with the then dominant traditional Malawian value of *thangata* (literally ‘caring for’) in pre-colonial times, where members of a village would go out on a particular day and help cultivate one of their member’s fields, sometimes rotating until each one’s field is cultivated (White, 1987: 89). However, colonialists and settler farmers abused the system by forcing natives to provide compulsory labour (as a form of rent payment) on settler farms, leaving them without any time to attend to their own fields (White, 1987: 89).

More significant is that the original pre-colonial *thangata* system, whose collectivism principles informed the Youth Week projects, was consistent with the tenets of *ubuntu*: collective responsibility, care, empathy, togetherness and interconnectedness (Mkabela, 2014; Ngcoya, 2015). Under the Youth Week, students from primary school through to university worked on common roads, erected simple bridges across local streams, erected bus shelters and even constructed teacher houses and classrooms, among other tasks (Banda, 1982: 112; Nyondo, 2012). The net value of this aspect of citizenship was that it engendered senses of collectivism, ownership, responsibility and togetherness in learners. This was consistent with *ubuntu* values that characterise much of Malawi (Mtumbuka, 1998). This was one of the very rare things people in the democratic era decry to have been abolished in 1994 in the re-democratisation hysteria, as it was then deemed repressive and coercive of people to provide services that ostensibly the state failed to deliver to the people (Nyondo, 2012; Phiri, 2016).

It is apparent that during the time, there was symmetry between the Youth Week practice and the people’s lived experiences that were anchored in *ubuntu* values. It is equally apparent that the individual-centric conception of (strong cosmopolitan) citizenship embraced after democratisation that summarily dismissed enacted aspects of collectivism was incongruent with the people’s lived experiences and situatedness. The concept of *ubuntu*, for instance, entails a unique understanding of human dignity and identity, not as constituting in only individual self-realisation, but as being “achieved through mutualism, empathy, generosity, and community commitment” (Swanson, 2015: 35). These ideals were and have been at odds with the adopted exclusively individual-centric frameworks that carried promises of democratic liberation. It is only after relative stabilisation of democracy that the deficit caused by the absence of *ubuntu* values would be felt and calls for the Youth Week restoration have emerged (Nyondo, 2012; Phiri, 2016).
5.4. Education for citizenship in the pluralism era (1994 to present)

After internal and external resistance against the atrocities of the one-party state, Malawians voted for the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1993. In 1994, the one-party tyranny was replaced by a democratically elected government following a general election, starting a new journey towards democracy after 30 years of autocratic rule. Almost every political and state institution required reforms to shed off elements of the 30-year dictatorship.

In primary education, a number of reforms were almost immediately implemented with differing degrees of success in conceptualisation as well as output. Chichewa, the language that the one-party regime unilaterally imposed as the medium of instruction for the first four primary school years, was dropped as the sole medium of instruction. Instead, teachers would use the dominant local language in the area (Malawi has about four regionally-based dominant languages in the three administrative regions) (Moyo, 2001: 146). It is also during this period that the twisted, heavily biased Malawi History, Civics and Geography subjects were removed from the curriculum (UNESCO, 1994: 9; Hauya, 1997: 22). All three were replaced by one encompassing subject, Social Studies (Ministry of Education, 2005). The political dimension of Social Studies is essentially about neutral principles of democracy discussed with reference to their manifestation in Malawi and regional and global arenas.

The policy requiring the use of mother-tongue language in instruction for the first four years of primary education was haphazardly introduced without any articulated commitments of developing indigenous languages to employ them for instruction in schools (Matiki, 2006; Chiuye & Moyo, 2008). The policy changes had largely been merely tokenistic and superficial. Ultimately, these feeble attempts could not inspire confidence among the public, which had an entrenched denigration of the local languages in public domains owing to colonialism and the one-party’s regime tacit neo-colonial orientations (Matiki, 2003; Kamwendo, 2010).

As a consequence, in plural Malawi, most people still find literacy in English as being more rewarding than proficiency in the mother tongue (Matiki, 2006: 251). The neoliberal order has exacerbated the situation. It is against this background that in 2013, the language of instruction was changed again, making English the medium of instruction for all Malawi education (Malawi Government, 2013, sec. 78(1); Masina, 2014). Convenience to integrate into the neoliberal frameworks anchoring education locally and globally sacrifices cultural competence. What is largely impeding the development of local languages is a lack of political will that is necessary to standardise and develop terminologies for the hitherto
marginalised languages (Chiuye & Moyo, 2008: 138) and assign them meaningful functional roles.

Furthermore, the one-party regime had also abused the role of certain dominant cultural norms such as discipline. Most Malawian cultures have had forms of initiation, which essentially mark adulthood. Despite the differences in forms and content of the initiation ceremonies across cultures, their objective remains generally one: to develop an individual who is well acquainted with his or her responsibility to society and family as major considerations in his or her pursuit of self-determination endeavours (Ott, 1998: 61–62). No wonder even after democratisation, certain forms of school practice steeped in tradition were defended by both teachers and their community. For instance, parents were concerned with the threats excessively individual-centric democratic reforms were posing to learners with respect to enduring discipline practices (excluding corporal punishment) as well as how the schools should retain social marks of politeness and respect for elders tolerable in their communities but actively discouraged by the new democratic order (Kendall, 2007: 294). Placing such expectations on the school, at face value, usually attracts criticisms of paternalism and social reproduction, where the school is accused of reproducing society despite the society having some oppressive properties.

However, as has been highlighted before, such absolutist summary dismissal of the value of traditional ways is problematic and risks undermining the concreteness and otherness of the local. Such a dismissal is based on a particular conception of human nature: the human being as primarily individual-centric who needs collective solidarity only for extrinsic purposes. In such an individual-centric conception of the autonomous individual and autonomy-oriented education, teachers are expected to detach themselves from any other roles they have in society and must impartially and impersonally facilitate only critical development in learners.

However, in a characteristically communalistic society, it would be reasonable to expect the teacher to be multifaceted and must wisely wear different hats in the school. The teacher is as much a facilitator of the impersonal pursuit of knowledge as he or she is expected to guide, advise, correct and inspire learners on matters unrelated to the teachers’ subject domain. As the popular communalism-grounded African dictum holds, ‘It takes a village to raise a child’, and not just parents. It is in this sense, that most parents in Africa expect teachers to be more than teachers only. They expect teachers to assume parents’ role in their absence. Dismissing all such approaches from an individual-centric perspective of fear of paternalism would be missing the whole point. While one concedes that there are real possibilities of such positions
degenerating into paternalism that in itself is insufficient to condemn the approach, because there is no moral approach that is in itself immune to degenerating into a moral crisis. It is not in the scope of this dissertation to establish how the teacher can avoid being paternalistic towards the learner in such a context.

Respect for elders is characteristic of most African societies (Mbiti, 1977; Chidammodzi, 1999). Tasks expected of learners and youths, such as helping with teachers’ load or helping elderly people in their community, cannot be summarily categorised as absolutely paternalistic. In a way, they are traditional modes of teaching of respect, care and responsibility. In any case, it is only prudent that the school should refine rather than dismiss a thriving social order. However, respecting elders entails neither that all elders are wise nor that non-elders are inferior in insight, wisdom and criticality. Rather, it is based on the idea that as a reasonable munthu (one full of humanness) who is characteristically reflective, critical, considerate and caring, the elderly individual is a personification of the moral law and “the repository (or archive) of empirical evidence necessary for empirical [moral] problems” (Chidammodzi, 1999: 101). In other words, such a one is expected to be wise, where wisdom is regarded as a virtue.

Just like the Aristotelean virtue is acquired through habituation, practice and experience, it is generally reasonable to expect an elderly munthu person to have richer and meaningful insight into human character and conduct. On the account of his or her age, the ideal elderly person is well situated to guide on what injures or betters the individual and community. In any case, even though his or her experience may not always and necessarily encourage breaking ranks with the social establishment and common tradition, it nevertheless better prepares the free individual who seeks to revise or ignore the community’s perspectives in considering what to anticipate in the exercise of his or her self-determination. It is therefore erroneous to view such aspects of local life as incompatible with freedom and citizenship and exclude them, as is currently the case in Malawi.

Rather than building nationalism based on inclusion and deliberation that ultimately serves the interests of the people, democratic Malawi has generally made opportunistic and exclusivist pursuits of nationality. Most African and Malawian leaders rarely win elections based on issues, but usually win through controversially managed elections, with almost every election result being contested in court because of alleged electoral fraud (Chirambo, 2009: 79). With this recurrent legitimacy deficit, the leaders usually resort to political populism to reinforce their usually fickle legitimacy (Chirambo, 2009: 79). President Bingu
Mutharika (from 2004 to 2012) formed the Mulhakho wa Alomwe (association for the Lomwe tribe), sustained by President Peter Mutharika (from 2014 to present), while President Joyce Banda (2012–2013) attempted to form the Chiwanja cha Ayao (forum for Yao people), where the presidents serve as patrons of cultural conservation groups of their tribes (Nyasatimes, 2013; Muheya, 2016). Although not illegal, it is nevertheless unethical to have a head of state in a multi-ethnic nation assuming the position of patron for his or her ethnic group, which is only one of many.

A potential critic would claim that efforts of active inclusion of the nation in citizenship education would run the risk of generating into cultural populism. However, it is very difficult for cultural populism to flourish as it did in the one-party era. This is because democracy entails competition of different ideas and interests. People of the same ethnic group now have competing, if not contrasting, socio-economic interests and political loyalties (Chirambo, 2009: 90). When people are armed with freedom and information, they get to realise their entitlements and what political leaders owe them in relation to the people’s concrete needs. Populism alone in the face of state corruption and economic hardship cannot sustain a fragile legitimacy. This is why in Malawi in 2011, people fiercely demonstrated against Bingu wa Mutharika’s regime across the whole country, weakening his grip on power until his death of natural causes in 2012 despite his populist mobilisation.

Furthermore, democratic pluralism founded on the right to have rights (Benhabib, 2011: 62) is the effective moderator against populist nationalism. As Chirambo (2009: 92) argues, so long as there is devolution of power and vibrant local government where the people are as much as possible fully equipped to manage their own affairs and hold leadership accountable locally without the frustrating bottlenecks of bureaucracy, it is hard to imagine the emergence of populism. Therefore, the people would not be paying homage to some executive politician, but will fully direct their local affairs locally. More importantly, the type of patriotism being defended here is not one that is tantamount to indoctrination. It is one whose fundamental attributes are inclusivity and criticality.

5.4.1. **Strong cosmopolitanism dominance and nationality underutilisation**

This section shows that multiparty and plural Malawi, owing to the abuse of nationality by the dictatorship, makes an unexamined summary dismissal of everything local so as to embrace the ‘modern’ strong cosmopolitan currency of strong cosmopolitan human equality and individual freedom. The section shows that besides the rhetoric and superficial attempts of localising citizenship and democracy, there is generally a disproportionately immense
influence of strong cosmopolitanism, at least in as far as disregard, neglect and denigration of the local national are concerned.

Language and citizenship have always been interacting in political thought (Guilherme, 2007: 72). Among others, language generally serves two purposes: a medium of communication and a carrier of perspectives or culture (Wa Thiong’o, 1987: 13). Although one may communicate and be linguistically competent in one language, there has to be a simultaneous cultural competence behind the language in order to achieve more meaningful self-expression (Wa Thiong’o, 1987).

According to Wa Thiong’o (1987: 13), one can communicate in say a second language, but fail to adequately express oneself, according to the socio-cultural frame of thought of one’s first language. This position is corroborated by Matiki’s (2003) research among Malawian members of parliament who are compelled to transact in English only, a language in which most have little proficiency, not to mention that it is spoken as a home language by less than 1% of the population (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998), yet 75% understand Chichewa, the local language. What was observed was that on emotive and controversy-rousing topics, most members not holding the floor would make background interjections in the vernacular language, and not in English (Matiki, 2003: 195).

Because languages have a cultural dimension, there is usually a form of alienation when one employs (particularly) a foreign language. This alienation involves “an active (or passive) distancing of oneself from the reality around; and an active (passive) identification with that which is most external to one’s environment” (Wa Thiong’o, 1987: 28).

In the wider democratic Malawi, merely embracing the conventional structures of democracy and governance is inadequate. Largely, there is a disconnect between the political elites and the majority of the population at the grassroots levels, who are linguistically marginalised. The majority cannot have a first-hand interpretation of parliamentary proceedings that are in English. As a result, the interests and concerns of political elites are incongruent with those of the local communities on the ground (Gaynor, 2010: 812). Therefore, rather than developing citizenship, there is development of clientelism (Gaynor, 2010: 812).

Language policies that are congruent with the local context would help to make the scenario meaningful and just, for example if indigenous languages are used in parliament. While we have to concede that the unexplained underdevelopment of African languages over the years renders them difficult to utilise in scientific and economic discourses, there is much in local
councils, national parliament, education, and so forth that can be communicated in the vernacular. It is odd that state of the nation address and parliamentary debate are strictly in English, a foreign language used by 0.2% of the population as a home language (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998: 33) that alienates the majority of the population whose literacy level is at 64% (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 2008: 14).

Exclusion of indigenous languages and alternatively maintaining colonial languages as languages of instruction in early primary school, as the official language used for the judiciary and legislature, adversely affects democracy, as linguistic impediments create distance between democratic institutions and the people (Matiki, 2003: 134). In Malawi, statutory laws are written in English, a home language for less than 1% of the population (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998), and this inhibits the development of a constitutional culture (Matiki, 2003: 134).

The underdevelopment and displacement of vernacular languages coupled with the prestige of English compels the pushing out of vernacular languages from the school domain. The urgency and necessity to acquire the most prestigious language compel schools to impose sanctions on learners’ use of mother tongues. A similar phenomenon also occurs in other African nations, such as Kenya (Bunyi, 2005: 133).

I encountered such experiences during my teaching period at a public boarding secondary school in Malawi between the years 2005 and 2012. One outstanding incident was when the whole teaching area of the school campus (cafeteria, classrooms, staff rooms and administration area) was declared an English-speaking zone by the school management as a way of enhancing learners’ acquisition of English. After introduction of the policy, English teachers complained during a staff meeting that science teachers were frequently overheard by fellow teachers teaching in the vernacular as they attempted to explain concepts. In response, science teachers protested that the code-switching guarantees learners’ understanding of scientific concepts, most of which seem alien to the learners. Again, a similar phenomenon is also reported to be prevalent in Kenyan public schools (Bunyi, 2005: 133).

These attitudes towards the otherness of vernacular languages as being incompatible with the objective, in selection of content, pedagogy and general formality, in essence downgrades the value of local languages to a subaltern level. The assumption is that vernacular languages are unfit for the school and official domains. Not only do such tendencies boldly mark out a
boundary between the familiar local and the unfamiliar ‘alien’ of the school, but they also convey attitudes of denigration and inferiority of the local through which the learners have developed and concretise themselves as individuals. Not only do they feel the compulsion to acquire the prestigious language, but they simultaneously interpret that achieving such a feat necessarily excludes and at worst denigrates the local and the vernacular. Such undervaluing of the local may therefore not necessarily be restricted to local languages alone, but may extend to valuing of local art, local literature, local traditions and local architecture, among other things (Chanunkha, 2005: 2–11). The production and appreciation of local literature, for instance, have remarkably depreciated in Malawi (Kamwendo, 1998). There is no standard orthography for all the other languages, except Chichewa, whose corpus remains underdeveloped (Kamwendo, 1998: 35). There are hardly any novels in the other indigenous languages (Kamwendo, 1998: 34; Moyo, 2001: 143).

In South Africa, a Language in Education Policy was introduced in 1997, aimed at achieving political, economic and social transformation from the legacy of apartheid and to address its injustices and iniquitous heritage (Probyn, 2005: 155). This policy paved the way for the employment of the nine, now constitutionally official and previously marginalised, indigenous languages in schools (Probyn, 2005: 155). However, such provisions have not effectively contributed towards “boosting the role of indigenous languages in public affairs” (Probyn, 2005: 155). Instead, rather than flourish, what has gained dominance is the use of English, a mother tongue for 9% of the nation’s population (Probyn, 2005: 155). Therefore, the official status accorded to the indigenous languages appears to be only symbolic, and for the more pertinent climbing the social ladder, English as the dominant global language is the key language (Probyn, 2005: 155).

In South Africa, approximately 80% of primary school learners are in township or rural schools, which are relatively disadvantaged (Probyn, 2005). The instruction in such schools in the early three years is in English, yet the learners have very narrow opportunities to encounter and acquire English outside the classroom (Probyn, 2005: 158). What appears to be the case is that the legal restrictions that the apartheid regime established in the access of quality educational opportunities have mutated into an economic form and hence still persist despite the achievement of political equality.

As Probyn (2005: 162) further observes, in South Africa, few of the formerly segregatory privileged schools that are now multiracial are committed to multilingual instruction, apart from teaching African languages as subjects and offering instruction in English for African
learners when the school’s main language is Afrikaans (Probyn, 2005: 162). Terminology development and planning for teaching and learning from primary school through to tertiary level in South Africa, just like in Malawi and much of Africa, are constrained partly by resource availability, and largely by a lack of political will (Moto, 1999; Probyn, 2005: 165; Chiuye & Moyo, 2008). The situation is exacerbated by increasing and prevailing neocolonial perceptions about English as the ideal language of education and the dominance of English in the global economic and technological orders (Probyn, 2005: 165). This undermines efforts of correcting cultural imbalances and injustices (Probyn, 2005: 166; Kamwendo, 2010). It is imperative to always bear in mind that the use of English in teaching and learning around the world is both critical and not without normative consequence. This is because English is Janus-faced: “it is the language of imperialism, consumerism, marketing, Hollywood, multinationals, war and oppression as well as of opportunity, science, social movements, peace processes [and] human rights” (Guilherme, 2007: 74).

Upon achieving independence, Malawi was expected to decontaminate their education from colonial imperialism. However, before the nation even started critically undertaking this endeavour, globalisation with its embedded subtle forms of neo-imperialism had emerged (Paulsen, 2011). The economic convenience of using English regretfully exclusively tramples down the normativity embedded in cultural self-expression.

One can glean that attitudes and the fate of indigenous languages in Malawi are under the hands of two forces: the oddly reluctant African political elite and the influence (on the elite) of neoliberalism. There is, however, so much affirmative action African governments can perform to assert and uplift indigenous languages, not only for symbolic cultural purposes, but also to accord them meaningful functional roles to stop the marginalisation of the larger section of their populations. Such efforts can also be contributions towards other efforts of resisting neoliberalism. Unless African leaders and scholars take initiative against neoliberalism, they in principle are in material cooperation with its advancement. Neoliberalism may be deeply entrenched in modern life, but it is not an invincible law of nature. It is important to take note that politically decolonised independent African nations such as Malawi did not have unproblematic linguistic diversity. Malawi, like such other nations, was also fraught with the challenge of linguistic pluralism and choice in public policy (Moyo, 2003). The challenge to forge an open and just national unity just as it lurked after independence still persists even today. Therefore, problems of linguistic and cultural
iniquities are both social and global justice matters (Moyo, 2002; Matiki, 2006; Guilherme, 2007).

After independence, frightened by diversity, which they erroneously conceived as a source for trouble and something to be done away with, Malawi’s one-party regime imposed one language across the entire nation, thereby being a dominant local language threatening other majority and ‘minority’ local languages alike. After overcoming one-party tyranny, the democratic era, rather than meaningfully confronting and addressing linguistic injustices, instead had escaped addressing the real challenge of linguistic diversity by employing the use of English as a “symbolic instrument for claiming democracy [and] economic justice” (Guilherme, 2007: 78) in the quest of achieving global economic integration. It is necessary to bear in mind that such global integration is hegemonic, where some ideologies are just arbitrarily subordinated to others, and that in the categorising narratives of local–global, some voices are muted and some absent, while others are permanently discounted (Guilherme, 2007: 78).

5.5. The cost of the enduring deficit of nationality in citizenship

This section argues that throughout the colonial, independent and the current democratic eras, the marginalisation of the local is still prevailing in different modes. Unless such tendencies are actively and purposively confronted, the prevailing unity of strong cosmopolitanism and its enabling neoliberalism vehicle will continue alienating the people of Malawi. This section shows that attempts of adjusting to (or assimilating into) the mainstream and its attendant global languages and neutering of nationality as a matter of global convenience far from correcting iniquities serve only to entrench them in the ‘new’ world, where languages and national history are stripped off of their situatedness import.

Language is both a communication and a cultural medium. For some cultures, communication is achieved by the surface meanings of words, whereas for some, and mostly in Africa, communication involves deciphering the embedded meaning beyond what someone says (Brett, Behfar & Kern, 2006). Age, social relations, proverbs and so forth may at times constitute the tools required to decipher meaning. In an African context, a foreign language such as English, for example, may not have the capacity to embed the cultural meaning of expressions. In Achebe’s *Things fall apart* the white colonial governor reflects this idea when he claims that natives’ communication is usually winding and not straight to the point (Achebe, 2006: 183). The fact that such cultural frameworks are not freely chosen by an autonomous individual does not deprive them of moral worth. Recognising them as
frameworks of communication for a people is neither being essentialist or homogeneous, nor undermining individual autonomy. In fact, they are frameworks through which an individual achieves autonomy and articulates his or her individuation.

Free self-determining individuals are embedded in social, cultural and geographic contexts. They are not therefore only members of the all-embracing human race, but are also crucially products of particular cultures. The cultures may not be absolute or homogeneous and are mostly hybridised through interacting with others such as Westernism (Kishindo, 2001: 5). As such, if democratic values have to be respected in the actualisation and operation of democratic institutions, we must seriously consider recognition of the worth of local situatedness in the translation of democratic ideals into reality. Most African nations are attempting endeavours to engender the rule of law in their young democracies. However, little do they consider the role of indigenous language in achieving democratic justice in terms of the law. The realisation of democratic values in the legal domain in Malawi must of necessity confront the question of the interrelationship among language, society and democracy (Kishindo, 2001: 5). The law, although espousing universal ideals, is informed by varying “cognitive categories, norms, and values” peculiar to a community, language or nation (Kishindo, 2001: 5).

African communities have enduring conceptions, systems and institutions of justice, such as customary law (Mwaungulu, 2006: 270), which are neither inept nor perfect, but need blending, revising, and so forth. Under the new constitution from the one-party regime, in a rather hasty and politically motivated move, traditional community courts were abolished (Chimombo, 1999: 54). This took away the opportunity for a more lively embodiment of both traditional and local aspirations and values in the law. This is because timely and efficient access to justice in the conventional legal system is for the average Malawian expensive due to legal costs accompanying the procedures (Chimombo, 1999: 54). Furthermore, the legal system and procedures are largely anglicised, hence not ‘accessible’ by everyone, thereby alienating the majority because of the employment of foreign language as medium of communication (Chimombo, 1999: 54).

It is cardinal to be cognisant that the way in which to uphold the same universal democratic ideals varies across cultures. As such, locality and its mediums are not morally insignificant. For instance, Kishindo (2001) draws attention to the fact that natives under colonial law saw a huge discrepancy between how they and colonial law conceived the magnitude of the offence of adultery. In much of the Malawian natives’ law, adultery was tantamount to a
serious criminal act and not a civil one, as European law conceived it (Kishindo, 2001: 6). The Western perspective considers it to be up to the individuals involved in the offence to determine any grievance, if any at all arise. On the other hand, the African perspective found adultery to undermine the dignity of the cheated partner as well as the values that hold society together, such as commitment, responsibility and mutual trust. No wonder they regarded committing such an offence as *kupasula mudzi* (breaking social cohesion) (Kishindo, 2001: 5). From all this, one can ultimately glean that differences in cultures among nations substantially determine the aspect, scope and breadth of human relationships that should be subject to formal legal processes (Kishindo, 2001: 20). In other words, in moral reflection particularity and concrete otherness are not normatively anomalous. Linguistic concreteness too cannot be fully substituted by any other ‘universal’ language.

It is necessary that in Malawi, and much of Africa, local languages be accorded more space in domains that closely affect people, such as in education, parliament, courts, public communication, and so forth. Referring to the South African context, Swanepoel (2013: 23) concedes that replacing the role of English in education, “the courts and general public communication” as the lingua franca, although it is “not the first language of the overwhelming majority of the population”, may not be easy or simple (Swanepoel, 2013: 23). This is so in that it could be achieved at the expense of other disruptions, which at times individuals and communities may not be ready to undertake (Swanepoel, 2013: 23).

Africa, however, still has an obligation to develop and empower its languages “in all high-status public, scientific technological and educational functions” (Swanepoel, 2013: 23) to have its voice adequately represented, not merely interpreted, entailed or projected through the dominant prototype frames of communication and academic thought expression. This way, Africa will have meaningful participation in the global space. Multinational business firms, for example, encounter the relationship that exists between culture and language. In their contexts, they frequently confront the often ignored reality that communication is much more than deciphering the lexical meaning of words. Communication in some cultures, for instance Western culture, is mostly direct and as explicit as can be (Brett *et al.*, 2006). While interacting with persons with non-Western cultural backgrounds, business firm managers of a Western background discover that their addressees tied the meaning of words to a context or the relationship with the interlocutor. As such their (non-Western) employees express (dis)agreement over a position not with a bold ‘yes’ or ‘no’ but rather determining their position depends on the interlocutor making inferences from the hints the employees give in
their non-straight-forward responses (Brett et al., 2006). Sometimes people would say ‘yes’, only to mean that they are closely listening to your position and not necessarily that they are in agreement with you (Brett et al., 2006).

The legacy of colonialism for African education is that it alienated learners from their communities, largely by employing a language (both literally and figuratively) not identifiable with the community and its interests, but with those of the colonisers (Masemula, 2015: 176). The most outstanding legacy of such an education was the reinforcing of the perspective that the local, the indigenous, the African way of life is inferior and the European one superior (Masemula, 2015: 176).

In the post-colonial era, African leaders, universities and scholars have not critically scrutinised the inherited Eurocentric paradigms and epistemological frameworks in their academic practice, but have only reproduced them. This is partly manifested through the retention of European languages in education while simultaneously and exclusively sidelining the development of indigenous languages as worthwhile tools for education and critical public deliberation (Masemula, 2015: 176).

Efforts of supporting indigenous languages in the light of the convenience of dominant global languages should not be regarded as futile on the grounds that, as a critic would contend, local communities around the globe will domesticate and localise global languages to express their concreteness. Such a position stems from a wrong conception of what the problem of linguistic under-representation in the global arena entails. It is simplistic to assume that a global linguistic hegemony is a solution to equality other than a concealment of the inequalities. The recognition and making visible of linguistic under-representation reveals the current hitherto unconsidered deeply seated imbalances that highlight the need for achieving linguistic, educational, social and global justice for ‘minority’ communities whose interests are marginalised within different institutions and discourses (Canagarajah, 2005: 195). In other words, such linguistic complexities manifest enduring problems of justice. Escaping such complexities by hiding behind adopting neutral and ‘non-culture-affiliated’ dominant languages does not succeed in taking away the injustices. In other words, deproblematising linguistic-cultural aspirations deproblematises unattended to social and global justice problems.

The prevailing model of education and education for citizenship in Malawi follows a “positivist tradition”, which is based on an assumption that efficient social policies must be
grounded in “objective assessments of the needs, processes, and outcomes” of human interactions (Canagarajah, 2005: 195). This requires and results in social engineering to establish a pre-conceived impartial ideal educational and linguistic model rather than developing one that is responsive to the people’s lived experiences (Waghid, 2004; Canagarajah, 2005: 195). However, what such an approach ignores is that “considerations of language allegiance, sociolinguistic identity, and linguistic attitudes are rarely rational, pragmatic, or objective. They are ideological” (Canagarajah, 2005: 195). Therefore, one perspective of reality as represented by a global language dominates and displaces another represented by a minority indigenous language.

By demanding equity of representation of situatedness in global citizenship through the role of indigenous languages in education and teaching and learning of history, this dissertation is not defending an essentialist and reductionist conception of culture or being African in the global arena. Rather, the case is that situatedness ought to be essential in cosmopolitan education. Furthermore, familiarisation with one’s history and that of the wider world is the best posture for understanding one’s as well as humanity’s position and prospects in relation to the condition of the world today with respect to justice and injustice.

In universalist citizenship discourses we need to be mindful of the differences of other groups of people who experience “structural exclusion and discrimination” in the public and global arenas (Banks, 2013: 110). Unless deliberate attempts are made to hear their marginalised voice by attending to their difference, equity cannot be attained (Banks, 2013: 110). In the context of universality of certain dimensions of knowledge, such as moral knowledge and global interdependence, calling for recognition of African epistemology is not essentially about constructing ‘great narratives’ that are purely African in nature, that out-compete other dominant narratives in the global world today. Instead, it is and should be about probing and reconceptualising the foundational frameworks, relationships and contexts from which discourses, including the grand ones, originate in terms that are congruent with and responsive to African embeddedness (Cawood, 2015: 359).

In most African nations, the legacy of colonialism left the challenge of resisting Eurocentric linguistic dominance and developing capacity for national autonomy. Before such a project even neared completion, globalisation had made porous the borders of nation-states. Through multinational corporations, global markets, popular culture and digital technology, globalisation has made English the most important language for all communities across the world (Canagarajah, 2005: 196). Demanding contextual responsiveness from global
citizenship therefore does not imply doing away with English. Rather, it is about a critical use of English as a medium of instruction, mindful of its hegemony and suppression of native languages. At the same time, it is about deliberately undertaking efforts to uplift and develop native languages, as in their current status they simply cannot compete with and challenge the privileged domination of English language.

The linguistic hegemony and nation neutrality embedded in modern education, especially education for global citizenship, are aimed at producing in learners citizens who can operate effectively anywhere in the world. However, such an education is defective in that it does not emphasise the knowledge and skills learners “need to care for and appreciate the places in which they grow up, [and] it also fails to provide them with an understanding of what place means in the lives of people” (Noddings, 2005: 57).

It is worth recognising that “homeplaces have both personal and symbolic meaning” (Noddings, 2005: 58). Meaningful global citizenship education should actively consider the meaningfulness of situatedness to people across the world, and this is satisfied among others by the teaching of local history (Noddings, 2005: 65). Placed-ness should be recognised in democratic education and should not be annihilated by the commitments of strong cosmopolitanism. This is because homeplaces have attached to them past experiences, “presence, and influence”: containing a people’s roots and “traces of their prior existence” (Noddings, 2005: 58).

It is erroneous to conclude that a capacity to freely traverse and migrate to any place in the world, as afforded by global interconnectedness, and the binding universal duties owed to humanity as humanity, necessarily translate into a devaluation of place. Strangely enough, the more one moves out of one’s homeplace, the more symbolic and meaningful the place, its history and practices become (Wiesel, 1996).

With respect to global citizenship, it is imperative that the “curriculum should not be pre-packaged and separate from the interests and needs of students, but instead intimately associated with them through genuine problem-solving activities” (Glass, 2000: 277) connected with their concrete lived experiences (Waghid, 2004). The reality and experiences of the world are too complex to be reducible into either of the absolutist dichotomous categories of the objective-versus-subjective. In education and moral theorisation we need not conflate between “normative truth elements of paradigms [or] frameworks or discourse [with] their a-normative (ideological) distortions” (Cawood, 2015: 358). It is one (normative) thing
to endorse the non-negotiability and non-relativism of a foundational universal moral ideal such as human equality, and yet another thing (usually ideological) to make absolutist claims about particular aspects of human relationships as inherently having no moral worth for all the people of the world.

5.5.1. **Globality and marginality of local epistemologies**
A scrutiny of strong cosmopolitanism reveals that its “conceptual as well as practical formulations of global citizenship” have a Eurocentric origin and this framework informs and sustains how global citizenship education should be conceived and realised (Abdi, 2015: 15). A fundamental problem of this humanist and predominant Eurocentric global citizenship orientation is that it is “exclusionist in its historical and cultural assumptions, and it certainly prioritises epistemic prisms that see almost everything from non-indigenous platforms” (Abdi, 2015: 15).

Much of the discourse of cosmopolitanism citizenship is informed by the Enlightenment objective–subjective categories of thought of Eurocentrism that entail that strong impartiality best serves all peoples of the world (Swanson, 2015: 28). However, this impartiality character in principle and practice serves to hide “difference in power relationships, the cultural imperialism, the individualistic orientation and self-interestedness” embedded in global citizenship (Swanson, 2015: 28). Much of the prevailing global citizenship education only helps to maintain the “structural conditions of inequality while claiming to work towards their elimination” (Swanson, 2015: 28). The absolute categories of the objective-versus-subjective of strong cosmopolitan global citizenship that outlaw the value of aspects of nationality in moral consideration imply “knowing on behalf of the Other what is good for them” (Swanson, 2015: 31). Such cosmopolitanism has an absolutist position on the worth of placed-ness in a given territory, indigenous languages as a form of common culture and national history for all the people of the world as being a private and subject matter not worthy of constituting the normativity of individuation and collective being.

Critics of active recognition of aspects of nationality in cosmopolitan citizenship contend, “a defense of patriotism is an attack on the Enlightenment” (Kateb, 2006: 4) and –

> You can love particular persons without having to dislike or hate others; but you cannot love an abstract entity like a country and not dislike or hate other countries, because countries are, from their nature as organizations of and for power, in actual or latent competition (Kateb, 2006: 9).
For such critics, patriotism is not a universal moral ideal, because “a moral principle must be conceived as universalist, and ask for consistent application; and it aims at respect for persons or individuals, not abstract entities of the imagination” (Kateb, 2006: 9).

What such strong cosmopolitanism crucially ignores is that ideal cosmopolitanism must as a matter of necessity always embed “a sense of self-awareness concerning one’s own positionality in the world”, which is represented in the local (Toivanen, 2017: 197). This is something that the runaway openness of strong cosmopolitanism strangely advocates against. Individual subjects are expected to develop the cosmopolitan capacities of openness and embracing diversity with an implicit precondition of de-emphasising their own concreteness, their being. It is almost as if acknowledging and recognising one’s concreteness is morally offensive and illegitimate, while interacting and engaging with other ways of life availed by global plurality are moral imperatives.

The neo-Kantian rational–irrational dichotomy, which dismisses nationality, now shapes and drives education, politics and culture globally. It actively and passively prescribes for education globally what is ‘universally’ necessary, unnecessary and relevant for all learners. Partly, this is why today most African leaders and some scholars and elites unfortunately regard global competitiveness as the most paramount goal for Africa (Nkuna, 2013: 70), at the expense of developing certain aspects of the local life that contribute towards the people’s overall well-being, including cultural well-being. In the prevailing practice, the process of developing global competitiveness implies, among other things, tacit neglect and abandon of indigenous languages in deference for foreign ones (Nkuna, 2013: 70). It implies neglecting the value of one’s national histories. It is therefore incumbent upon Africans themselves, more than on anybody else, to develop and elevate the role and capacity of their indigenous languages (Nkuna, 2013: 71), epistemologies and histories. Most African people cannot access and participate in scientific and technological discourses because of language constraints unless they gain proficiency in a foreign language (Nkuna, 2013: 75).

Before Africa settles for the domestication of English as a global language, on the logic that developing its local languages is costly and not worthwhile, it needs to do so only after accounting for the fact that the ‘inferior’ and weak status of its languages and their underdevelopment were initiated by colonialism and are being sustained by neoliberalism (Canagarajah, 2005: 196). The failure of independent Malawi to recognise the value in the development and official use of indigenous languages was in a way a manifestation of submission to the colonial mindset that prevailed in most of the political leaders of Africa,
who had been educated in colonial institutions and regarded as progressive that which is not local (Kamwendo, 2010; Nkuna, 2013: 81). Kamuzu Banda, the independence president for Malawi for 30 years, never addressed public rallies and meetings in Chichewa, the national language and mother tongue, throughout his 30 years’ rule (Moyo, 2002; Kamwendo, 2010). There are hardly any pictures of him where he was not dressed in the strictly British formal outfit of a three-piece suit (Kamwendo, 2010: 274–275; Nyamnjoh, 2012: 139). It is apparent that neocolonialism was entrenched by the very liberation leaders who not only failed to develop local knowledge perspectives and local languages, but were at worst actively preserving the colonial heritage.

Banda, the Malawi one-party regime president, built an elite secondary school that admitted the nation’s best learners: two selected from each of the nation’s 24 districts. Among other subjects, the school taught the classical languages Greek and Latin, but never Chichewa (Kamwendo, 2010: 275). Furthermore, the school had a clear policy of not employing black teachers so as to be internationally competitive, a policy that was changed only after Banda’s death in 1997 (Kamwendo, 2010: 275; Nyamnjoh, 2012: 139).

With respect to African epistemology, some contend that it is almost impossible, contentious at least, to establish what is purely African. According to this line of thinking –

[Being] African is no longer understood as being in opposition to the European, but as incorporating Europeans, Asians, and the rest of the world … Identity, like culture, is delocalised. Place and origin are no longer exclusive markers of identity, even if they still play vital roles in many people’s self-reading (Eze, 2014: 238).


It is indeed the case that African identity need not be defined in opposition to European ways of life. However, calling for cultural hybridity of African perspectives on the understanding that the world is now interconnected and that there is no more anything purely Africa presupposes a world of cultural equity. However, epistemologically and in terms of power relations, there is no parity in terms of global cultures and knowledge production (Nyamnjoh, 2012: 130). In fact, what is being achieved in bringing different cultures together is assimilation, because in most fundamental dimensions of the global life, the African is only the affected and hardly the affecting, be it in global education, entertainment, sports, science, politics or economy. There is no fair global framework in terms of hybridisation other than
supporting the annihilation of African ways of life. Epistemologically speaking, in both practice and principle, in the ostensible diverse globalised world, much of Africa only comes to pick rather than offer an authentic (although hybridised) alternative of reality and meaning-making frames. This is why even in the academic discourse of global citizenship, the African voice is so faint and largely unnoticed, mostly because it is not availed as it ought to be (Parmenter, 2011).

In a literature mapping survey, Parmenter (2011) searched the WorldCat database for academic titles published in English for the period between 1977 and 2009 with the key search phrase ‘global citizenship education’. Basing on the location of the authors’ institutions of affiliations, it was established that 94% of the academic articles were authored by academicians in the developed world: the USA 56%, the United Kingdom 18%, Australia 6% and Canada 5% (Parmenter, 2011: 368). South Africa, the only major African contributor, and India each contributed 1% (Parmenter, 2011: 368).

What can be generally gleaned from these survey results is that there are power imbalances in knowledge production where the narratives from the global North dominate the discourse of global citizenship education. The implication of such a situation is that the conceptualisations of human nature and human relationships in citizenship that dominate scholarship and shape public and global policy are anchored in or at least influenced by the socially, culturally, economically and morally situated experiences of the authors. Therefore, global citizenship discourse is concentrated by the perspectives of developed nations’ scholars. As such, the discourse may not necessarily be global.

The point is not to blame developed nations for the dominance, because at least in a way one would equally hold African scholars and leaders responsible for their absence in participating in the discourse. Needless to say, one should be mindful of the structural factors and hegemonic tendencies that ‘disqualify’ non-Eurocentric narratives from the discourse (Nyamnjoh, 2012: 130). In order to be fitting, the African narratives are expected to conceptualise the relationship among the individual, culture, capital and nation-state as aspiring immature versions of some Eurocentric conceptualisation prototype (Beck, 2002: 23). However, how the ideal global citizen should relate with different aspects of the local cannot be conceptualised in absolutist terms binding and valid for every community, owing to people’s different lived experiences.
The perspectives of neutrality over locality in strong cosmopolitan global citizenship essentially amount to the lack of confidence Eurocentrism has in difference and otherness as constitutive of being and knowledge. As such, the global citizenship project must ask anew as to which ideals “are the non-negotiable universals in a global citizenship project” (Andreotti, 2011a: 393) and by what criterion. Another pertinent question is whether it is impossible and problematic to extend the scope of global citizenship from emphasising “individual skills, towards a broader understanding of ideology, culture, and political economies” (Andreotti, 2011a: 393). This way, for practitioners in nations such as Malawi, education will in the quest of cultivating global imagination be cognisant of and address the unpleasant side of neocolonialism by understanding the “colonialism [of global power] as constitutive of modernity rather than derivative from it” (Andreotti, 2011a: 392). They will realise that theories of global citizenship education embed assumptions about human nature and well-being that are in substantial degrees different and at times even contrasting with typical Malawian learners’ lived experiences. Therefore, claims in the discipline of education for democratic citizenship for local and global democracy can never be adopted at face value by ignoring the assumptions of the frameworks for production of such knowledge.

Malawi and Africa must therefore identify elements and modes that create and sustain “subordination and invisibility as well as [Malawi and Africa’s] own complicity with patterns of domination” (Andreotti, 2011a: 393). Such procedures should be more about looking for and bringing into the global discourse absent voices than looking for traces of imperial hegemony (Andreotti, 2011a: 393). Malawian and African educationists need to refrain from largely compelling their concrete and peculiar situatedness to adapt to the dominant discourse. There should be more effort in seeking to have a fitting epistemic framework that is consistent with and addresses the uniqueness of Malawi and Africa (Nyamnjoh, 2012: 143).

Against this position, some critics argue that Africanism must constitute in diversity, as claims of culture purity can no longer be binding today, and that we are almost by default ‘cosmopolitans’, as our lives are characterised by music, art, literature and films that come from different places of the globe, ultimately exerting different permanent influences on us (Eze, 2014: 239). Such positions are accurate, except that they exclude also emphasising that such objects of ‘cosmopolitan’ culture rarely originate from certain other parts of the world, as the greatest proportion is from the West (McChesney, 2001; Esser, 2016). While the African consumer is consuming Hollywood movies, global news and British culture through
the BBC, not much would be said about the diversity of sources of entertainment consumption by the counterpart of the African consumer in the United Kingdom, for example.

It is indisputable that cosmopolitanism entails an intellectual and cultural openness to the experiences of the world’s different people as a mode of achieving meaning in a mutually connected world of cultural diversity (Eze, 2014: 239). However, one wonders why this awareness or capacity for openness should necessarily imply negation of one’s own culture. Conceding that the world is culturally diverse is in principle a concession of not only multiplicity, but also cultural distinctiveness. The concession implies a moral obligation for one to treat each of the numerous cultures one will encounter in the world with due respect and openness. Given this background, it is therefore a logical absurdity that simultaneously making active attempts and endeavours to affirm what one’s culture constitutes is strangely morally disdained. Strong cosmopolitan orientations regard affirmation of the local as not worth undertaking. Instead, one is obliged to be committed to openness only. In principle, this is not openness, but annihilation and assimilation. While categorically conceding the moral invalidity of cultural purity and its thick conceptions of membership, acknowledging that say a particular language requires active support from its nation-state and passive support from others in the global order is not being exclusivist, but rather an attempt towards equality and equity.

Strong cosmopolitanism (or its Afropolitanism variation) is claimed to be based on open-mindedness and embracing of diversity (Eze, 2014: 245). These are noble values and non-negotiable, except that they are, generally speaking, not distinct to Africa, but for all humanity. Such narratives of merely appropriating for Africa what is generally universal for all humanity without simultaneously attending to the frameworks for African situatedness only escalates Africa’s epistemic subjugation and absence from the global level. Such commitments to universalism without working on one’s excluded cultural framework to give it its due presence in the global order is ultimately empty and self-defeating. It is never in the interest of pluralism and diversity themselves.

Modernity, which essentially informs the global order, and to which Malawian and African education aspire to conform, is essentially a translation of Eurocentrism before which arguably all other native histories and systems of value are subaltern (Andreotti, 2011a: 385). As a result, in strong cosmopolitanism, non-Eurocentric “epistemologies and ontologies are translated into universalised [Eurocentric] epistemological parameters” (Andreotti, 2011a:
Where and when they do not fit, they are regarded as “inferior, less evolved, primitive, erroneous or eccentric ‘culturally tainted’ derivatives” (Andreotti, 2011a: 385). Andreotti (2011a: 385) refers to such “subalternisation” as “epistemic violence”. For (Andreotti, 2011a: 387), even the criticisms of Eurocentrism that do not bring to the centre “questions of spatiality and coloniality, fail to challenge … the geopolitics of knowledge” in modern scholarship, and such criticisms of Eurocentrism ultimately reproduce epistemic violence. Discourses on multiculturalism, inclusion, and global hybridity of the other are mostly not as meaningful, largely because they seek to “domesticate otherness”, to make it palatable and fit into the frame of Eurocentric universalism (Andreotti, 2011: 388).

Arguing for this position should not be misconstrued as blame shifting towards the West for all of Africa’s calamity and current position of weakness in the global order. It need not elude one that post-colonial Africa is as culpable for stagnating and at times retrogressing the continent as colonialism was. Rather, this position is about highlighting that the imbalances generated by colonialism do not only persist today, but are being sustained by different global agents in different global processes.

5.6. On teaching national history

In the modern world, through forms of education, global citizenship, the global economy, and so forth, many citizens of the world are marginalised (through language and an absence of their historicity) to the extent that “marginality appears to be the hidden other of global citizenship” (Balarin, 2011: 355). Snubbing a people’s historicity in global citizenship education is ostensibly understood as implementing a commitment to impartiality, which is a precondition for respecting and achieving the moral ideal of human equality. Ignoring individuals’ historicity and reducing their normatively relevant interest to rational self-interest only and that the worth of their social relationships too is reducible to the promotion of self-interest only, obscures rather than deals with the predicament of the human condition for most people in Africa (Lalu, 2012: 4).

Meaningful education for local and democratic citizenship is neither just about getting an understanding of ideas of and about democracy, nor is it just about acquiring a democracy consciousness. Instead, it must achieve liberation from institutional and structural oppressions that restrict the knowledge and means to determine one’s future through development of individuals’ capacity to mould their future through their participation “in the production of language, knowledge, culture, and history” (Glass, 2000: 280). In other words, it is about
engaging a mode of “being-in-the-world that engages real struggles” (Glass, 2000: 280). This implies incessant engagement with and critique of one’s national history, among other things. Communities are historical in nature and this largely constitutes their shared identities whose substance is however incessantly contested.

[The individual or community’s] identity irrevocably embodies historicity [as] human beings are born into a historical, social, and cultural context … that sets the possible horizons of identity. Who one is and who one might become is shaped by the specific customs and rules of the particular family, language [and so forth] (Glass, 2000: 283).

Historical experiences shape and constrain individuals as well as society:

As human beings, we also make the history that is always at the same time making us. Situations cannot preordain our existence, nor are they completely subject to be made into whatever we individually will. Any particular horizon always contains room to move, and situational limits are dynamic and susceptible to transformation through human action (Glass, 2000: 283).

Because human beings are not disembodied and ahistorical, meaningful education, as Abdi (2015: 11) observes, must be substantially attached to the “observational prospects and possibilities” that “amelioratively impact the lived contexts of concerned populations” (Abdi, 2015: 11). Therefore, with respect to education for global citizenship, the “contextual enhancement of people’s lived realities and expectations of the future” (Abdi, 2015: 11) requires active interrogation of how one and one’s formative locale have interacted and continue relating with the wider world.

Despite the often taken-for-granted global interconnectedness, the majority of global citizens are marginalised, lacking the capacity and means for mobility (Balarin, 2011: 359). For such people, taking away the utility and meaningfulness of their local languages and their local history will seal and cement their marginality. The nation-state has been weakened as a “mediator of social conflicts and social differences in the context of a neoliberal globalisation that generates a very individualised and fragmented imagination of citizenship” (Balarin, 2011: 361). The danger of having all people of the world conceived in terms of commonality that necessarily excludes their history that accords them peculiarity and value of their differences is that this will hide structural injustice. Such injustice results from and perpetuates the exclusion of the only significant means through which the educationally and economically marginalised other would articulate their interests without the hegemonic mainstream making a projection about them (Benhabib, 1992: 165).
The condition for humanity around the world is in part owed to past historical encounters with different others. Even much of the prospects of the present are influenced by factors significantly connected to the past, such that meaningful progress is not tenable until the past, with its mutating tentacles affecting the present, is confronted. The condition would remain the same even upon the realisation of a post-nation world order at any time in the future. In order for whatever imagined global structure responsible for distributing burdens and benefits to people (a hitherto role of the nation-state) to ensure that people’s concreteness, which is both meaningful and a vehicle through which they express themselves, is protected, the new order would still have to be responsive to aspects of nationality, such as language and historicity, as a moral obligation of justice (Balarin, 2011: 361). Just like there was a modernity-and-colonialism composite, so too there now exists in the ostensible interconnected world a composite of globalisation-and-marginalisation (Balarin, 2011: 361), and exclusion of historicity entrenches the marginalisation.

Teaching and learning of national history in education for democratic and global citizenship need not be depoliticised, because ultimately, the people will be “de-narrativised and de-historicised” (Balarin, 2011: 362). There will be delinking of their history from their sense of being as well as from understanding the nature, origin and scope of their conditions, which profoundly affect their becoming.

In Malawi, the criticality learners would develop through and towards critical national history would enable them to challenge local injustices. Globally, it would be a relevant, meaningful springboard from which they would further interrogate the nature and justness of globalisation and prevailing discourses of cosmopolitan citizenship. Just as ‘the self-evident facts’ of national history are not always matters of fact, but of ideological interpretation, so too are strong cosmopolitanism and the globalisation upon which it rides. The learners need not be presented with cosmopolitanism as being neutral, value-free and devoid of tensions and power imbalances. While all human beings are equal, as the central tenet of cosmopolitanism holds, it is necessary that learners engage the global practices that subtly and passively undermine such a fundamental normative ideal and that real commitment to this moral ideal lies beyond the rhetoric of a cosmopolitan citizenship equality rooted in human essences and abstract human nature. Rather, it largely lies in confronting the concrete structures and frameworks in which the human being exists.

Confronting such frameworks requires identifying such frameworks in the first place. The identification necessarily involves probing the soundness of universality claims of such
frameworks. This involves relating the universalist claims to the local condition. It is here that national history becomes pertinent. It is through the lens of national history that learners get to identify local and international factors that undermine meaningful democratic life. It is through the lens of criticality exercised in engaging their history that Malawian learners would ultimately discover that some of the local injustices during the independence dictatorship are subtly concealed and still effective in the modern democratic era (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010). It is through criticality achieved through the study of Malawian colonial history that they would realise that certain marginalisation that flourished during colonialism is today camouflaged in globalisation and its strong cosmopolitan citizenship.

While cognisant of the documented and potential risks of nationalism and essentialism, in the global arena, dreading to identify with certain consistent and tolerable forms of African-ness (such as in the teaching and learning of national history) is in principle an expression of “surrender and defeat … instead of contributing to the dismantling of [the intolerable] associations, and reloading [nationality] with more accurate associations” (Musila, 2016: 109). Therefore, in education for global citizenship there should be critical examination of shared local experiences, unfixed as they could be, about being African. Being cosmopolitan should not be preconditioned on dismantling other localised and particularistic experiences.

Despite the ravages of neoliberalism and the inequalities of global capitalism, the point being argued for here is not that all inequalities in Malawi are due to globalisation. Rather, the position is that there are structural inequalities among the peoples of the world such that any theorisation of cosmopolitanism that either ignores them or suppresses the means (such as critical history) through which these injustices can meaningfully be understood and addressed is morally incomplete, if not illegitimate.

The demand that critical national history be included in the curriculum is based on the idea that the nation is a crucial ideal that is indispensable in any cosmopolitanism conceptualisation. Those who are averse to nationality inclusion and indeed of the role of nationality in the modern global world contend that national history promotes indoctrination and blind loyalty (Nussbaum, 2002a: 14; Brighouse, 2003: 157; Nielsen, 2005: 274) and frustrates criticality. Such positions ignore the fact that “a critical approach has to be rooted in students’ lives and background knowledge and stimulate their intellectual curiosity and emotional involvement in order to lead them to further their knowledge about alternatives found in different cultural frames” (Guilherme, 2007: 78).
How will the youths of Malawi develop criticality if not when they are accorded the opportunity to interrogate and reconstruct their nation’s history? The national history is in this case not just some impotent academic knowledge that instils irrational loyalty to the homeland. Rather, by critiquing the history and reconstructing it, they develop a criticality that enables them to better reflect on and demand concrete structural changes rather than superficial ones. For instance, the challenges that led to the cabinet crisis of 1964, a few months into colonial independence, were not part of the History curriculum, as the single party then regarded the dissenting by the inner circle of the then dictator president as amounting to disloyalty, disunity and indiscipline, hence a treasonous threat to political stability (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010). Interestingly, in democratic Malawi, among political leaders as well as citizens, the executive is still generally regarded as sacred, unchallengeable and all-knowing (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 425). Attitudes of intolerance of dissent by ruling political leadership and among most citizens are still dominant in Malawi. Through the teaching and learning of critical national History in schools, meaningful criticality was supposed to originate from an interrogation of the past as well as comparing and contrasting it to the present, which is still rife with suffocating traits of oppression (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010: 417).

A critic would argue that the nation is arbitrarily chosen as the custodian of cultural or meaningful ways of life for the people, and hence does not warrant special inclusion in the curriculum (Brighouse, 2003; Nili, 2015). Such criticisms recognise being human for all the world’s human community in its ‘objective’ commonality terms only. However, restricting conception of what fully defines human beings only to the similarities individuals share over-draws from the commonality of humanity. The world’s people, sharing certain general commonalities, nevertheless find their concreteness through their language, traditions, history and territory, among other things. They find meaning from such situatedness. Regarding such aspects of concreteness as subjective and hence morally arbitrary in discourses of equality and justice is to undermine the people’s very uniqueness and humanity.

In as far as national history is subject to open-ended contestations and re-interpretations, it is very necessary as part of an individual and group’s embeddedness. The value is not only in recollecting the past, hence promoting cultural boundedness as critics would claim. Rather, the value of nationality lies in that it is part of the individual’s embeddedness and that one’s being and possibilities of becoming are profoundly affected by one’s history. Besides contributing towards one’s identity constitution, critical history is crucial in understanding the
fate, prospects and future of a collective as a scheme of cooperation. The case of Malawi shows that if critical history was being taught in Malawi after re-democratisation, a sense of critical citizenship in the population would today have uprooted the peculiar and persistent anti-democratic attitudes that have survived and characterised Malawian politics since independence (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2010). There is no way these can be uprooted from the politics without making meaningful recourse to Malawian history in learning for citizenship. If education for democratic citizenship is not merely about accumulating knowledge, but enactment, it is imperative that Malawian history be part of education for the democratic citizenship curricula.

5.6.1. African otherness and globality
An indigenous language is central especially in global citizenship as the most significant vehicle that meaningfully and uniquely communicates concrete ideas and experiences among a people than any other alternative language would do. As a medium of instruction, it is a facilitator for effective and efficient communication that will optimally spur learner interest, involvement and criticality (Probyn, 2005: 166). This is so because it ensures a connection between the school and learners’ immediate community as one unified world where the two domains inform and refine each other, without requiring learners to ignore and shed off, the worth of the local (which partly and significantly constitutes their identity) and seek to become what they have not experienced and can hardly imagine in order to succeed (Ladson-Billings, 1995; Gay, 2000).

In the context of globalisation, the problem of ensuring linguistic and global justice is the flipside of addressing the question of depoliticisation of nationality. In general, in most marginalised communities of the world, the lingua franca is the language of the nation or multination. Global justice and citizenship must therefore concede the worth of aspects of nationality. It must start from not only acknowledging, but also encouraging subjugated forms of marginalised concreteness as represented by indigenous language and national history.

Proponents of strong cosmopolitanism are motivated by the idea that if the world’s learners who are its citizens recognise common humanity only and give their allegiance to universal ideals of equality only, and can no more recognise the ‘divisive and othering’ of nationality, the world would ideally achieve global peace and global justice (Nielsen, 2005: 274; Arneson, 2016: 559). However, as Harris (2003: 50) argues, sharing the same values about common humanity only would not necessarily end global inequities, suffering and injustice.
This is because the human being has complex needs whose satisfaction would remain unaddressed even after such an approach has been taken. Recognising common values would not address and stop injustices that are historical or linguistic in nature. It would not address conflicts that will arise from people’s different social values. All it would achieve would be to hide the actual sources of the injustices (Harris, 2003: 50).

The problems of strong cosmopolitanism approaches for developing nations such as Malawi are contained in positions such as that advanced by Osler and Starkey (2005), who find difference as being inimical to realisation of the cosmopolitan equality:

Cosmopolitan citizenship does not deny the validity and indeed the importance of a national perspective; rather, it recognises universal values as its standard for all contexts, including national contexts. It stresses those things that unite human beings rather than what divides them (Osler & Starkey, 2005: 21).

This conscious de-emphasis of difference is what results in hiding the sources of injustice. Focusing on similarities alone makes pretentious assumptions about linguistic and cultural equity as well as about an absence of hegemony. Given this context, Osler & Starkey’s (2005) concessions of the value of nationality are only merely tokenistic.

Similarly, some thinkers of the Afropolitanism orientation argue that being African should no longer be understood in non-African other terms. The ultimate hope is to achieve a future where “difference is so superfluous that abject difference, the Other, breaks down entirely” (Balakrishnan, 2017: 2). One wonders as to what it is that accords the ‘Afro-’ tag to such thought that in principle extinguishes African otherness. The orientation of such thought is essentially strong cosmopolitanism. The problem with such a perspective is that in principle it reduces otherness in African-ness in the global context to neutrality, and ultimately this is assimilationist. Furthermore, this aversion of distinctiveness, leading to annihilation of difference, is very problematic for Africa. One concedes that there is diversity among Africans and that this precludes a thick homogenous and exclusionary conception of what being African is. However, it does not dismiss the fact that there are certain perspectives that are predominantly African.

The Afropolitan dictum, “there could never be an African cultural integrity to preserve” (Membe, 2007, cited in Balakrishnan, 2017: 7) in a way implies a stance against a homogenous being-African but ironically also rejects African otherness. In as far as it invites being African to hybridity, to diversity, and that being African is neither static nor stuck in
the remote monolithic past nor averse to self-critique, it is a valid proposition. However, in as far as it insinuates (which it does) that there should be no attempts to identify something in the modern globalised world as being African (for fear of ungrounded perceptions of cultural essentialism and hegemony), and that Africans must move on and along with prevailing global hybridity (to which they must essentially conform and assimilate), this dictum is not only un-liberating, but also endorses the embedded exclusivity of modernity in as far as global citizenship is concerned. If we cannot identify the integrity of African languages as the languages of instruction or trade in the ‘hybridised’ world, we perpetuate African exclusion. If national histories cannot be critiqued as comprehensively as possible and form part of the curriculum, one wonders how certain local and global injustices could be identified, addressed and avoided. Such failure results from African cultures, epistemologies and ways of life scarcely constituting part of the allegedly global ‘hybridised’ culture. There is no substantial presence of much that is African in school epistemologies in politics, science, trade and technology globally. The demand to de-emphasise Africa’s distinctiveness or commonalities (contentious as the may be) does not emancipate and empower the marginalised African in the ostensibly neutral global order that is essentially cultured. Ultimately, there is no hybridisation, but only a shift from the local to anything non-local. Ideal hybridity would expect and require of Africa too to bring something African for the hybridisation process of globalisation to be fair and just.

A neutral world of strong cosmopolitanism that over-emphasises diversity and openness and simultaneously mutes recognising and presenting to the world one’s different voice, as another of the many other diverse voices, hence worth supporting and maintaining (and not necessarily essentialising), is only suitable for those privileged Africans who have the capacity to maintain roots in different places of the world and call many places home (Dabiri, 2016: 105). While the rest of the developed world have their cultural frameworks robust and well developed and have the capacity to freely move around the world, “most Africans have almost absolute immobility in a contemporary world that works very hard to keep Africans in their place on the African continent [and] a major bias against African global mobility abounds in African international media” (Dabiri, 2016: 106). Therefore, it is not only the majority of African people that are incapable of mobility across the globe; African culture, art, literature and epistemology are scantily available for choice and hybridisation at the global level, except for mostly tokenistic recognition.
However, an ideal cosmopolitan position must be equally committed to difference while it emphasises sameness. This will enable the confrontation of Africa’s internal and external forces of individual or collective subjugation that thrive on generality (ostensible sameness), which in principle effectively marginalises all otherness. The individuality and peculiarity of moral subjects’ collectivity that reside in otherness therefore need not be pushed outside the discourse of being both African and global. This is because it is not just a random and inconsistent attribute of human beings. Rather, it is in the first place a crucial part of being human.

Advancing such a position is not squarely blaming external agents as being solely responsible for Africa’s current condition, for as stated earlier, Africans are themselves also culpable for presiding over and perpetuating the continent’s condition. Rather, the point is that muting difference is tantamount to backstabbing the very heart of cosmopolitanism, which has the individual human being as the ultimate unit of moral concern. Ideal cosmopolitanism should ensure not only that the African should be open to difference, but that the African too should have the right and privilege of being meaningfully different without raising undue accusations of essentialism, inhibiting diversity and pluralism, as is usually the case. In this context, being committed to difference implies starting with acknowledging, not only rhetorically, but as contestatiously as can be and should be, debating and deliberating as to what should constitute one’s own otherness before one talks of embracing that of others. Ideal cosmopolitanism must allow for “an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, which include otherness of the other. It puts the negotiation of contradictory cultural experiences into a centre of activities: in the political, economic, scientific and the social” (Beck, 2002: 18). It must not extinguish and eliminate contradictions across global cultures in regarding them as a problem to be dealt with. Rather, it must approach them as manifestations of people’s situatedness and concreteness, which must be respected and harnessed.

The logic of cosmopolitanism ought to be one of “inclusive oppositions” rather than one of exclusive oppositions because cosmopolitanism cannot exist without localism (Beck, 2002: 19). The moral demand for the African to be cosmopolitan and open-minded about numerous others from across the world does not negate the necessity to theorise and comprehend “the specificities of the experiences of being African and living in Africa” (Robbe, 2014: 257).
In knowledge consumption in Africa today, people are variously mingling the local and foreign in various degrees and for different roles. However, due to the power relationships behind the dominant epistemologies, African cultural ideas are generally neither being ‘exported’ internationally in the same proportion as Africa imports (Robbe, 2014: 268), nor are they being imported by the outside world in the same proportion in which Africa is importing or having other epistemologies exported to it.

5.7. Reconfiguring Malawian education for citizenship

This section argues that reconfiguring education for democratic (and global) citizenship in Malawi must start by abandoning the de-ontological ethics paradigms that anchor strong cosmopolitanism, rendering the citizenship education absolutist about the sources of value for all the people of the world. Doing so would lead to inclusion into the global justice discourse of hitherto absent voices. In global justice theorisation, this will also create space for and bring to the fore (contestations about) aspects of collective life wherever they have moral relevance. Such global theorisation is important because it is cognisant of the power imbalances that characterise global interconnectedness. Ultimately, the section suggests that Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) deliberative universalism is much better placed to anchor education for global citizenship that is necessarily founded on difference and not only rhetorically including it. Global citizenship so conceptualised will ensure that the learner is reflectively open to the new and critically loyal to the local (Hansen, 2011: 1).

Education in democratic Malawi should, among others, aim at providing opportunities for the nation to develop modes of its collective life as part of participating in global pluralism, unlike the conformism to Eurocentrism now prevalent in most respects (Guest, 1998: 85). Democracy is an enabling means for achieving the ultimate goal of human flourishing and welfare (Chidammodzi, 1999: 94). Democracy in Africa should not be a wholesale displacement of unharmful African values and practices. Any uncritical adoption of particular forms of cosmopolitanism that essentially invalidate African norms and values will leave legitimate African interests stuck on the peripherals in addressing global human challenges (Chidammodzi, 1999: 97).

African political leadership and scholarship must dispense with the assumptions that African ways of life are inherently alien to democracy. For instance, it is worth recognising that African communities and judicial institutions prior to and after colonialism were substantially sensitive to the democratic values of tolerance and dissent (Chidammodzi, 1999: 99). Chiefs’ councils and courts in resolving conflicting perspectives heavily relied on and accorded
paramountcy to deliberation (which was essentially about attempting to consider and reconcile competing viewpoints) rather than only relying on majority vote (Chidammodzi, 1999: 99).

Like any other system, there were obviously some limitations in the form and extent of such democratic tolerance (Chidammodzi, 1999: 99). What is fundamental, though, is that the practices and aspirations of the community’s way of life were consistent with democratic ideals and practices. The existence of contradictory aspects in the enactment of a particular thought system and practices does not disqualify the potentiality of the system to realise normative ideals. This is because actualisation of the ideal always requires incessant refinement. In any case, democratic Europe had embraced democratic ideals at home, yet advanced and maintained, through colonial imperialist agendas worldwide, the employment of ideas and practices antithetical to democracy, such as racist attitudes and policies towards colonised natives. The United States had embraced democratic ideals while maintaining racial discrimination against black people. Apartheid South Africa’s regime operated on democratic principles (exclusive to white people only), yet it thrived on systematically dehumanising and humiliating non-white races. Therefore, achieving democracy is always an ongoing struggle against apparent and concealed contradictions in a particular community’s thought system and practices. Instances of apparent or implied contradictions in a society do not in themselves mean that the people’s practices are absolutely incompatible with democracy.

What is evident here is that adopting a particular form of democracy or cosmopolitanism in order to silence ‘alien’ values in cultures does not guarantee democracy. Different cultures have unique conceptualisations and actualisation of the universal ideals of democracy. Therefore, democracy ought to be about communities confronting their own structures in their own language and reconstructing them to advance human freedom and well-being.

Other than being restricted to a general otherness conception of human nature, traditional African systems of governance “cherished social responsibility, discipline, conversation and dialogue, peace, and harmony” (Chidammodzi, 1999: 100), all of which seek and engage with an individual’s concreteness. Much of African thought is generally committed to seeking “interpretation, expression, understanding, and moral and social harmony, rather than being preoccupied with verification, rationalism, prediction, and control” (Swanson, 2015: 35). No wonder that, prior to colonisation, traditional African education actively placed at the centre the needs of the community (Masemula, 2015: 173). Besides self-knowledge, the
education also engaged with cultural and environmental knowledge and social issues (Masemula, 2015: 173). The capacity to engage with the other on the basis of his or her concreteness is a dominant aspiration that ought to have been recognised and developed further, rather than being denigrated.

A major limitation of strong cosmopolitan global citizenship is that it restricts the conceptualisation and actualisation of moral universals only to a deontological approach that absolutely specifies the objects that have moral worth for all human beings of the world irrespective of their situatedness (Peterson, 2012). As repeatedly highlighted in this research, it is almost impossible to pre-set for all peoples of the world as to how much value and meaning they find in different aspects of nationality. Cosmopolitan citizenship would be better served by orientations that are not exclusively deontological, those which can take into consideration situatedness. The diversity and peculiarity of global cultures would therefore greatly benefit from utilisation of virtue-based perspectives. Such perspectives generally entail critical deliberation of the community’s good. They do not merely enforce a pre-set schedule of goods with pre-assigned value, despite their being detached from the community, as deontological strong cosmopolitanism does.

Most societies and communities have unique values encapsulated in virtues (Glass, 2000: 283). The challenge with the deontological perspective towards cosmopolitanism is that it must place moral value on all the objects involved in human relationships for all people of the world. In global citizenship ethics, strong cosmopolitanism raises the question of what criteria will be used in assigning objective value to different practices, conduct, relationships, expectations and requirements for all the human communities of the world whose outlooks while having similarities and are diverse and contrasting.

Unlike preoccupation with acts and duties, for some communities, virtues constitute a greater deal of what it means to be a moral person (Grönum, 2015: 1). The composition and exercising of virtues requires (not exclusively) the fulfilment of some duties as well as adopting a certain moral disposition that cannot necessarily be translated into obligations (Grönum, 2015: 1). For some communities the concern of what type of person one should be is as weighty as what acts are right and what sort of community we should have (Grönum, 2015: 5). This is much more than performing certain duties. This runs against the absolute assignment and deprivation of moral worth to ‘irrational’ aspects of human nature and human relationships. This is because, for a virtue perspective, the type of person one should become is more fundamental and rich in outreach than the schedule of moral objects that generate the
individual’s duty. Therefore, if a community has the virtue of care and respect, the most important and more meaningful challenge for the member of the community is not necessarily to make a count of what objects require and demand respect and what degree of respect. Restricting oneself to a strong cosmopolitan deontological approach risks, by implication, having a scope in the member’s mind of what objects do not necessarily deserve respect.

A virtue-based approach would instead require of individuals to determine the mode they should assume when confronted with anyone in need of respect and care. The focus here is not only on who needs the care or respect, it is also on how one should relate with whomsoever it is that is in need of such goods. In other words, it is a relational matter that, although it embeds criteria of who should be the beneficiary, is much more aimed at higher issues of what sort of person the agent should become in relation to a concrete context and what capacities to develop in order to provide such care and respect. Therefore, beyond the superficiality of conforming to legal or political constraints of deontological duties, a virtue-based approach esteems self-criticism, as it is largely based on the moral agent imagining what better recognises and respects the other’s otherness.

Other than emphasising and categorising what things are different and hence subjective, the implied focus for virtue is how to relate with everything different. A virtue-oriented person, who must exercise the virtue of compassion or care will least be obstructed by purely national considerations in identifying beneficiaries of the care. Instead, giving care and showing compassion may easily spread to whoever is in a material condition that requires care or compassion. All this implies that one need not de-emphasise the local in the curriculum to grow an awareness in learners of their requirement to treat strangers and outsiders in a morally appropriate manner. Through the lens of a virtue-based approach, the local does not have an inherent restrictive weight, unlike as conceived by deontological strong cosmopolitanism. It is therefore evident that “there is value in conceiving the moral relationships between citizens living in different nation-states in terms of the possession of certain attributes, capacities and dispositions – virtues – rather than in an abstract, rule-based formulation” (Peterson, 2012: 237–239).

Global citizenship must be about important mind capacities of the agent, such as the “ability to make comparisons and contrasts [and consequently] an ability to ‘see’ plurally, … the ability to understand that both ‘reality’ and language come in versions, [and] the ability to see power relations and understand them systematically” (McIntosh, 2005: 23).
The focus, perspective and form of education for global citizenship across the world cannot always be uniform. For instance, much of the developed world had an active agency in the perpetuation of Western supremacy through colonialism. It is therefore reasonable to expect that nations that suffered colonialism must attempt to overcome prevailing subtle forms of supremacy of Eurocentrism, among others, through having their citizenship education cultivating a critical approach aimed at not mere reproduction of systems, but those that confront “conflicts and controversies by incorporating a level of self-critique and critical consciousness-raising” (Pashby, 2011: 432).

On the other hand, in the African context it is reasonable to expect, in addition to the afore-stated, this critical consciousness to affirm the value of the local ways, languages and modes of open, inclusive and critical deliberation. Africa must hybridise the global systems to make them local-sensitive. This is because the local is being denigrated even by the natives themselves, as they regard the Eurocentric global as the indispensable default to which they must adjust with much effort and cost (Malawi National Economic Council, 1998; Matiki, 2006; Kamwendo, 2010). This position is not calling for a return to the past and isolation of national groups into localised islands. Rather, the argument is that the denigrated heritage that has a mix of the desirable, valuable and offensive must be scrutinised in the fairest terms possible, and while being continuously refined, be accepted alongside the foreign, dominant and necessary.

Just education for global citizenship therefore is one that will acknowledge the absent, admit the need to recognise the absent and recognise that the absence of the absent raises questions about power relations, and this will ultimately redefine the world of knowledge to be all-inclusive (McIntosh, 2005: 23). The meaning of global citizenship largely depends on “contextually situated assumptions about globalisation, citizenship and education, that prompt questions about boundaries, flows, power, relations, belonging, rights, responsibilities, otherness, interdependence as well as social reproduction and/or contestation” (Andreotti, 2011b: 307). Education for global citizenship must be modelled in such a manner that seeks to eliminate the imbalance of the power relations that embed the patterns of globalisation (Pashby, 2011: 428). Education for global citizenship may, if not well contextualised, entrench rather than transform global inequities that are rooted in power imbalances (Pashby, 2011: 428).

In education, social justice should amount to recognising and removing every form of oppression in educational policies and practices (Hytten & Bettez, 2011: 8). Social and global
justice are multifaceted: They are about equity in distribution of goods and their access, and they are also about recognition, where all cultures are availed for value among the people concerned (Hytten & Bettez, 2011: 11). Oppression that is largely characteristic of globalisation has historical, conceptual and contextual dimensions (Hytten & Bettez, 2011: 12). Therefore, the implementation of any moral theory of global citizenship as a conceptual tool must also consider the situatedness under which it is to be applied.

The stance of strong cosmopolitanism against the moral value of aspects of collectivism, in principle and practice, embeds and aids neoliberalism, which is ostensibly committed to individual freedom. In the name of pursuing individual liberty, in Malawi and much of Africa, education has been stripped of its “collectively motivated goal” (Pais & Costa, 2017: 8) as though the two are incompatible. The individual subject is understood to be an “economically self-interested” being who is a “rational optimizer and the best judge of [his or] her own interests and needs” (Olssen, Codd & O’Neill, 2004: 138). Achievement of individual freedom is pre-conditioned on a particular conception of human nature. Such a freedom essentially restricts the positive duties of the state to creating an ideal market through enacting and enforcing relevant legal instruments and creating institutions necessary for the operation of such a market (Olssen et al., 2004: 136). The goal is to realise an individual who is “an enterprising and competitive entrepreneur” and hence ideologically, state intervention that is conceived as “collectivist” and therefore inimical to individual freedom must be severely fought against (Olssen et al., 2004: 137).

With the individual thus conceived, the role of the state is mediatory in nature merely to ensure the successful operation of market forces. As such, the state should “neither promote social justice nor develop public monopolies” for in so doing it goes against the central tenets of neoliberal ideology (Olssen et al., 2004: 138). Ultimately, a society’s conception of human nature ultimately determines the nature and substance of democracy and “public policy-making and outcomes” (Olssen et al., 2004: 138). What stands out in this ideology is that state support for egalitarianism, for instance, is conceived as an attack on individual self-actualisation endeavours and self-imposed sacrifice, which are hallmarks of the self-dependence of the autonomous individual (Olssen et al., 2004: 138).

Despite its protestations against neoliberalism, as Pais and Costa (2017: 10) argue, strong cosmopolitan global citizenship materially cooperates with neoliberalism in its attempt to fix and reconcile the “contradictions inhering in the role of schools”, in other words between individual liberty (competition) and community solidarity (Pais & Costa, 2017: 10).
Therefore, strong cosmopolitan neutrality over difference, despite its commitment to the ideals of equality and diversity, in its quest to eliminate the perennial contradiction between solidarity and individual actualisation, ultimately reduces citizenship to an “empty container” used to extinguish the many differences in meanings that are mutually exclusive (Pais & Costa, 2017: 10). In other words, it has a disdain for difference. This is the cost of neutrality over nationality. However, it is necessary that in discourses of ideal education for global citizenship, the contradictions in education between the individual and solidarity interests must be left as they are. They should continuously and contestably be managed at the local level. None should trump down the other, and neither should we normatively legislate about their value in absolute terms.

In other words and more importantly, education for global citizenship must emphasise “‘dissensus’ in order to support learners in the development of their ability to hold paradoxes and not be overwhelmed by complexity, ambiguity, conflict, uncertainty, and difference” (Andreotti, 2011a: 395). Contradictions and difference should not be extinguished and overcome. They should be left to be constitutive of the concerned situated individuals as well as of a meaningful global citizenship. As Andreotti (2011a: 395) argues, this does not condone “ethnocentrisms and absolute relativism; essentialism and anti-essentialism; dogmatic communitarianism and narcissistic individualism”. Rather, it only points us to the worth of incessant contestations about concepts and conceptualisations across different human societies in actualisation of universal ideals to ensure respectful and non-paternalistic attitudes towards otherness.

Citizenship is not and need not be conceived as some immutable category that is constructed to manifest certain obligatory universal ideals (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 671). Rather, it is constructed in concert with “political, economic, and social processes that operate within a particular geographic and temporal contexts” (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 671). The promotion of cosmopolitan citizenship that is indifferent to the situatedness and actual struggles of the learners and their community and that demonstrates no potential for transforming their community is tantamount to indoctrination (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 678).

According to Andreotti (2011a: 395), it is imperative that global citizenship engage otherness and its epistemologies. While cognisant of “the geopolitics of knowledge production”, it must “focus on the development of hyper-self-reflexivity, not as a form of hyper-rationality, but as an opening to modes of being not anchored in (allegedly) universal
reason” (Andreotti, 2011a: 395). Inclusion and exclusion of what counts as a stable and meaningful education and citizenship have been over-dependent on an individual-centric (Western) reason. Such reason has for so long, on paternalistic grounds, excluded other meaningful forms of being, such as care, feeling, imagination, and so forth. Therefore, valid elements that would fall under the ‘rational’ have been unduly excluded (Code, 2012). On the other hand, some subjective elements that may not fall under reason and those that are collectivist are unfairly dismissed, yet they are meaningful to the people (Code, 2012).

It is necessary that the substance of education for global citizenship should be left for dialogue and deliberation locally. This is because the extent and effects of globalisation vary across the world and more importantly among the particularly different cultures of the world. The form as well as content of education for global citizenship, although undergirded by the same moral principles, is likely to at least vary and utmost contrast among the cultures of the world. It is specific people in given contexts who for specific purposes take specific perspectives in the discourse of global citizenship education (Parmenter, 2011). For instance, much of the literature in the USA on global citizenship education has reference to or was in the context of national security (Parmenter, 2011: 372). Without necessarily undermining the globality of security with respect to problems of global terrorism, it is also a reality that different parts of the world have different levels of urgency with respect to the ranking of national security in their citizenship. For some, the most urgent citizenship issues are matters of ensuring basic minimum living conditions. Such prioritisation, however, does not discount the non-selective global reach of the violence of global terrorism.

The ideal global citizen should, among other key things, possess such virtues or values that Parmenter (2011: 373–375) extracted from research involving 642 university students from different parts of the world with questionnaires administered in their native languages: human-beingness, engagement, connectedness (with the global other through compassion and empathy) and transformation of both oneself and of global institutions. These virtues presuppose an acknowledgement of both one’s and the other’s concreteness. This is going beyond mere sameness.

5.7.1. Towards a Benhabibian difference communicative universalism

The profound limitations of deontological outlooks and the relevance of otherness in the world today call for a different conceptualisation of universalism in global citizenship. The most ideal framework for conceptualising universalism in global citizenship, as this subsection shows, is one based on Seyla Benhabib’s (1992, 2011) communicative universalism.
Therefore, instead of pre-assigning value to different aspects of human nature, which is inexhaustive of human nature and the human condition, universalism must be based on deliberation. This is only deliberation that considers as its starting point the differences, uniqueness and concreteness of the other (Benhabib, 1992: 159).

However, how do we at the same time demand recognition for a people’s concrete situatedness and account for individual freedom without falling into traps of cultural essentialism or boundedness? Achieving this balance need not suppress or eliminate difference. Rather, as Benhabib (2011: 59–60) argues, achieving this must initially start with conceding and recognising that all human beings undifferentiated by culture have one non-negotiable fundamental right: “the right to have rights”, which demands the moral subject “to be recognized by others and to recognize others in turn, as persons entitled to moral respect and legally protected rights in a human community” (Benhabib, 2011: 59–60). This right presupposes and guarantees the individual’s communicative freedom, in that, for Benhabib (2011: 66), rights claims entail that two individuals or more can dialogically exchange appropriate justifications as to why they should each respect the demands and entitlements of the other so that reciprocally they (do not) act in certain ways in their social cooperation as well as in the distribution of benefits and burdens of the community.

This entails that communicative freedom for each and every individual is more paramount than sweeping generalisations about how all human beings of the world should relate with and evaluate the meaningfulness of aspects (of nationality) or of collective life. Unlike the neo-Kantian roots of strong cosmopolitanism, where validity of moral positions is achieved through a thought experiment where one abstracts what a disembodied rational being would consider valid, hence universalisable, Benhabib’s (2011: 67) universalism is discursive.

In neo-Kantianism, human equality entails impartiality and is conceived as central for moral reason in that it is meant to best serve the search for an objective and universal “moral point of view” that all rational agents would accept (Young, 1990: 100). The objective moral point of view is arrived at when a rational agent abstracts …

… from all the particularities of the circumstances on which moral reason reflects. The impartial reasoner is detached: reason abstracts from the particular experiences and histories that constitute a situation. The impartial reasoner must also be dispassionate, abstracting from feelings, desires, interests, and commitments that he or she may have regarding the situation, or that others may have. The impartial reasoner is, finally, a universal reasoner (Young, 1990: 100).
By adopting a point of view that necessarily excludes concrete situatedness, impartial reason only remains with and accepts “a transcendental ‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attributes, character, and interests of no particular subject or set of subjects” (Young, 1990: 100). The concept of the transcendental subject represses difference in that “it denies the particularity of situations”; it also “seeks to master or eliminate heterogeneity in the form of feeling … by expelling desire or affectivity from reason” in order for impartiality to achieve its unity (Young, 1990: 100). This is because the concept of the transcendental subject expects that we abstract from the “particularity of bodily being, its needs and inclinations, and from the feelings that attach to the experienced particularity of things and events” (Young, 1990: 100). Ultimately …

…the ideal of impartiality reduces particularity to unity [by] reducing the plurality of moral subjects to one subjectivity. In its requirement of universality, the ideal of impartial reason is supposed to represent a point of view that any and all rational subjects can adopt (Young, 1990: 100).

The uniting of all particularity and collapsing of human plurality into a single subjectivity has the serious implication of absolutely discounting everything deemed particular as not only lacking moral worth, but also as of no consequence to the actuality of being human. However, this position fails to consider that what constitutes the act of being human are too complex to be reduced to either the particular or universal categories. What individuates the human being are not the common and abstract impartial elements. The ultimate consequence of such positions is that difference, which is a source of a people’s concreteness and individuality, is regarded as morally arbitrary and empty. In so doing, this consequently undermines the very being of the moral subject, which resides in otherness. A universalism constructed on this ethics is hollow and inconclusive in that it makes generalisations about individuated particular human beings, which it concedes are such, yet it at the same time surreptitiously denies the normative relevance of this very particularity or individuality. It is a universalism grounded in selected common aspects of human nature that rejects the core ones (differences). It is therefore not a meaningful universalism.

On the other hand, communicative universalism rests on the acceptability to each of those to be affected by an act of the processes of justification through which the validity for reciprocal moral claims of entitlements and obligations must dialogically be arrived at (Benhabib, 2011: 67). To preserve the integrity of and not to be prejudiced about individuality, this approach
places the highest value on the nature of the deliberative justificatory processes, rather than on precast dichotomies of the universal and particular (Benhabib, 2011: 67).

Because the universalism is deliberative, there is therefore no threat of sliding into perpetuation of individual oppression by appealing to dubious claims of cultural consensus to maintain subjugation of disempowered members of a group, as protests against appeals for toleration of reasonable aspects of nationality usually charge. The deliberative nature also ensures that peoples across the world are not ensnared by radical individualism, which denies moral worth to most forms of relational life. All this is regulated by the communicative freedom every individual ought to have and through which every consensus should be arrived at (Benhabib, 2011: 62). Therefore, the fears of cultural boundedness and essentialism in as far as active recognition of meaningful elements of nationality are concerned have no firm basis in so far as decisions about content and nature of nationality are transacted in a communicative framework.

At no other time and conditions than in the diverse and unequal global world in which we are living is Benhabib’s (2011) communicative universalism so necessary and crucial in achieving social and global justice. This is because the dialoguing among individuals who are to convince each other about the validity of certain norms, obligations and responsibilities (Benhabib, 2011: 67) implies concession of mutual respect, where one not only acknowledges one’s agency as a moral being. Rather, what gives meaning to one’s agency is the fact that there are others with whom one shares the global and social spaces, who recognise one’s ability to initiate certain actions through uttering certain words (Benhabib, 2011: 68). Therefore, the flipside of one’s agency is respecting the ability of others to exercise a similar capacity and their being able to listen to one’s reasons for action and accept or reject the reasons based on what individuates them as others. Even though one may disagree with what individuates the others, one nevertheless is obliged to respect what individuates the other as a basis for the others’ judgements. This is why Benhabib (2011: 68–69) argues, “embedded agency” and the exercising of “communicative freedom” are one, because one must accept the peculiarity, the embeddedness and the otherness of the other as one’s basis for either accepting or rejecting one’s justificatory reasons for a particular action (Benhabib, 2011: 68–69).

It is for this reason that under the deliberative paradigm of universalism, the concrete otherness of the other is indispensable in seeking to achieve a meaningful and valid consensus over a certain action. It is an acknowledgement of the other’s individuation and
peculiarity, such that excluding it is to undermine the being, dignity and moral integrity of the other. On this account, it is morally erroneous to determine in advance and absolute terms the value and meaning of aspects of nationality across the globe as being morally arbitrary. What local languages mean to different people of the world is varying and different. We cannot reduce languages to mere extrinsic categories for all people of the world as mere vehicles for communication. Even to those who allege they have no culture, their languages carry with them cultural outlooks and experiences without the people being actively conscious about it, because language is a double-edged sword: a medium of culture and a vehicle for communication (Wa Thiong’o, 1987).

Value for collective life in Malawi should neither be understood in essentialist terms nor its aspects dismissed as subjective to the democratic global citizenship project. Accountability, representation and engagement in Malawi rural areas have been achieved successfully through collective communalistic citizenship where members interrogate and engage public officials and community leaders (Gaynor, 2010: 815). Certainly, this cannot substitute individual citizenship or agency. Yet, on the other hand, such a communalistic approach cannot just be understood as a mere efficient alternative to achieving common goods, which free members would otherwise have individually achieved with success too. Instead, such a communalistic approach is a mode of expressing communalistic interests as well as a unique collective dimension of being an individual. Such communalism is an actualisation of (some aspects of) universal, international concepts that tend to have an abstract character. The success of such models lies in their being congruent with the local lived experiences (Eggen, 2013: 697). Even more significant is that the language (both literally and metaphorically) for doing politics is accessible by the people involved.

With respect to education for global citizenship, a communicative universalism framework ought to necessarily acknowledge and include situatedness. This dissertation consistently argues that in the realm of globality, the situatedness largely rests in the aspects of nationality of language, territoriality, history and shared culture embedded peoples of the world share in their particular contexts. In the interest of comprehending the other’s self-articulated otherness to achieve just universalism, meaningful global citizenship must demand utilisation of the vernacular language in the school domain. This is because the development of global citizenship in learners is not about them adapting and conforming to certain absolute essences. Their language best represents who they are and better captures the struggles and lived experiences they must alter through education (Staeheli & Hammett, 2010: 678).
The individual and his or her entitlements alone have been the centre of the discourse on education for democratic citizenship. Mostly, this has been at the cost of neglecting certain equally pertinent normative ideals. The idea of citizenship has two implications. It implies the rights and entitlements of the individual and their attendant responsibilities. It also implies a kind of community of and with other moral subjects (Benhabib, 2011: 68). The two are each other’s flipside. In as much as there are universal principles that the individual citizen and the other moral subjects with whom he or she is cooperating share, we cannot generalise about this community’s unique shared interests, because what makes it a political community is not entirely political (Papastephanou, 2015: 186). However, the sense of community is largely cultural, linguistic, historical and geographical traits.

Mother-tongue instruction and the teaching and learning of national history provide learners with their concreteness and location in the global world. In the absence of their confronting their histories that shape their being in the local and global worlds and hence partly determine their future, education for democratic citizenship becomes hollow. Therefore, national history and mother-tongue instruction (wherever possible) are indispensable for just global citizenship education.

5.8. Conclusion
Colonialism alienated nationality in Malawi, but inadvertently and subsequently consolidated it. Nationality was the means for rallying all colonial resistance. It served this end because it was the embodiment of the people’s concreteness, which was under incessant subjugation by colonialism. Colonialism was in principle a translation of the essentialist binary categories of rational-versus-irrational. The framework for these categories is related to the one that shapes strong cosmopolitanism. The revulsion of diversity during the independence era on the other hand resulted in the development of an uncritical nationalism, aversive to difference and dissent. The general otherness standpoint of universalism successfully motivated external intervention in demanding political reforms, leading to the fall of the tyranny of the one-party regime.

The onset of the democratic era has, however, embraced a strong cosmopolitan form of citizenship that basically undermines the local. Neoliberalism that keeps serving as the enabler of strong cosmopolitanism is perpetuating the marginalisation of the local. Prevailing globality, although it cherishes hybridity, inclusiveness and openness, is deficient and marginalising of Malawian otherness. Use of mother-tongue instruction where tenable and
teaching of critical history will significantly contribute towards stopping the invisibility of African and Malawian epistemologies.

Malawian education for democratic citizenship should not continue on the deontological foundation of strong cosmopolitanism, which is limited and limiting. Benhabib’s (2011: 68–69) difference-grounded communicative universalism is best suited for meeting these deficiencies, because in moral reflection about citizenship it starts with and from diversity, which is definitive of globality. There must be incessant interaction between the universal and the particular through the processes of vernacularisation to ensure that the universal does not alienate the local and that the local too should not be insulated from external criticism. Malawi’s education for democratic and global citizenship must therefore be grounded in a difference-rooted deliberative universalism. Only then will it be on the path to achieving social and global justice.

Nationality in the Malawian political history has been a troubling and is now a troubled ideal. By and large, it has been conceived as a vice that always undermines moral universalism which the globalised world and its citizens urgently need to possess. While acknowledging the manmade tragedies based on uncritical nationalism, dismissal of the nation from cosmopolitan citizenship conceptualisation is equally morally erroneous. This error is rooted in the fact that in strong cosmopolitanism, nationality is usually, if not always, exclusively understood in its political ideology sense. That nationality embeds aspects of the being human and collective being for most situated peoples of the (developing nations of the) world and hence is central to their sense of being in the global world is usually ignored. In other words, the territorial, linguistic, cultural and historical situatedness aspects of nationality constitute the moral otherness rather than a mere populist ideological dimension of a people’s ways of being. Failure to actively and meaningfully utilise nationality in education for democratic citizenship through continued pursuit of strong cosmopolitanism-oriented neutrality will perpetuate the huge justice deficit now prevailing in globalisation.

The next chapter sketches the possibility of an education for global citizenship that is grounded in a relational rationality other than an individual-centric one. The chapter uses ubuntu as an alternative ethics to the individual-centrism of strong cosmopolitanism.
Chapter 6:  

Ubuntu in education and citizenship

6.1. Introduction

The argument this dissertation has been advancing is that strong cosmopolitanism, through its excessive commitment to individual-centrism, ultimately outlawing community interests as devoid of any moral worth, is problematic. Community interests are, not only morally legitimate in citizenship conceptualisation, but also necessary. As such in education, mother-tongue instruction and teaching of history are integral to a meaningful education for democratic and global citizenship.

In this chapter, I explore ubuntu ethics and how it may offer alternative perspectives in configuration of global and democratic citizenships, given the limitations of individual-centric strong cosmopolitanism as highlighted in the previous chapters (see sections 3.4, 4.5, and 5.7.1.). Ubuntu ethics has been chosen as a representative of ethical orientations that are not exclusively individual-centric, but also communalistic. The relational rationality of ubuntu accords it a capacity ideal for addressing the systematic exclusion of mother-tongue instruction and history teaching in education for cosmopolitan citizenship, because ubuntu values the “communal embeddedness and connectedness of a person to other persons and highlights the importance attached to people and to human relationships” (Higgs, 2012: 48).

Thus ubuntu ethics is a normatively contrasting alternative to strong cosmopolitan global citizenship whose major limitation is that it is “to a very large extent resistant to the need to live fluidity, complexity and indeterminacy” (Ramose, 2014: 31). It is also an ethics whose ideals are generally connected and identifiable with the social practice for much of sub-Saharan Africa.

In the chapter, I first discuss the nature of ubuntu, its core principles (of humanness, interconnectedness and harmony) and their implications. I later discuss how ubuntu ethics manages individual and community interests without sacrificing one for the other. Later in the chapter, I highlight the suitability of ubuntu to advance a deliberative universalism that is rooted in difference as argued in previous chapters (see sections 2.5.4, 3.6, and 5.7.1.) as an inevitable part of the solution for the prevailing community-undermining strong cosmopolitan global citizenship. Lastly, I explore the relevance of ubuntu in education for citizenship, especially through showing how it can better help fill the gaps in the prevalent and dominant framework of citizenship. This includes showing how ubuntu can be practically realised in
conceptualisation of education aims, its engagement with the curriculum, assessment practice and environmental education.

6.2. The nature of *ubuntu*

Characteristic of philosophy, there are variations of the ideal shape and substance of *ubuntu* ethics. I am cognisant that *ubuntu* ethics needs further research, debate and development to enrich it, not as an ideology, but as a more systematised philosophical theory. This, in all fairness, does take time because systematic written African philosophy has not existed in the same period of time of development as has Western philosophy. However, despite the shortage of very thoroughly developed *ubuntu* ethics theories, this chapter is based on those foundational principles that are generally uncontroversial among *ubuntu* theorists.

The social contract tradition conceives the (Hobbesian) human being as belonging to society, either for security and expectation, or as a (Kantian) member of the moral kingdom of ends all rational beings belong to, where each individual rationally wills to conform to a rational moral law (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3). According to such thinking, the moral value of society is therefore extrinsic and varies across individuals. On the other hand, the *ubuntu* conception of society is based on the moral prominence of social bonds alongside the prominence of individual interest (Ngcoya, 2015: 253–255). Thus “*ubuntu* is both the African principle of transcendence for the individual, and the law of the social bond” (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012).

*Ubuntu* means humanness (Murove, 2014: 37). It is a moral orientation whose origin draws from traditional African thought and practice which are or were predominantly relational other than individualistic (Bewaji, 2004: 396). As an ethic, *ubuntu* understands human beings as –

[Intertwined in a world of ethical relations and obligations from the time they are born. The social bond, then, is not imagined as one of separate individuals (as in both of the versions of the social contract just described). This inscription by the other is fundamental in that we are born into a language, a kinship group, a tribe, a nation. But this inscription is not simply reduced to a social fact. We come into the world obligated to others, and in turn these others are obligated to us, to the individual. Thus, it is a profound misunderstanding of Ubuntu to confuse it with simple-minded communitarianism. It is only through the engagement and support of others that we are able to realize a true individuality and rise above our biological distinctiveness into a fully developed person whose uniqueness is inseparable from the journey to moral and ethical development (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3).]
In *ubuntu* thought, what assigns an action ethicality, is that it is “an action in relation to another being” (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012) and my individuation is supported by others. As such, my being is interconnected with that of the other. The connection one has with others that is rooted in the shared humanness is not a mere impotent abstract metaphysical property. Rather, it also places an active obligation on the agent to consider both his or her individuation, and well-being of others one is in community with, as not only overlapping, but as having equal moral compulsion on agency. Social cohesion and harmony in *ubuntu* thought are not valued as ends in themselves, but rather as serving the achievement of humanness (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 5).

Asserting the centrality of communalism does not entail denying the recognition of individuality (Kaphagawani, 2004: 338). The communal thesis of *ubuntu* “underscores the processual nature of personhood, the gradual remaking of persons through, inter alia, the acquisition and mastery of both cultural and esoteric knowledge” (Kaphagawani, 2004: 338). Personhood in *ubuntu* is therefore not reducible to an abstract fixed essence of human nature only. In *ubuntu*, personhood is a process of being and becoming in interaction with others (Ngcoya, 2015: 255). It is about achieving a desirable condition, of harmony that requires consideration of other moral aspects besides the self and its interests. It is about achieving harmony between the self and community.

*Ubuntu* is not a mere reproduction of a romanticised pre-colonial Africa as some critics tend to argue (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013). It is not a mere elevation of traditional African communalistic way of life into a philosophy. This is not to deny the huge debt *ubuntu* owes to African ethnophilosophy. However, as a philosophical ethics approach, *ubuntu* goes beyond the African traditions and practices, while being cognisant that a society’s cultural and linguistic facts are motivated by covert philosophical insights from which critical thinkers can glean and philosophise further (Bello, 2004: 266).

*Ubuntu* theory is derived from the communal way of life of the Bantu people of Southern Africa (Mangena, 2016: 69). However, that *ubuntu* is connected to the past as the largest repository of lived African experiences, does not reduce its ethics to either restorative or reflective nostalgia (Müller, 2015: 3), neither does this make *ubuntu* a revivalism enterprise aimed at returning to a pristine past allegedly destroyed by colonialism (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 202). *Ubuntu* is therefore not a narrative of return to a romanticised past as some critics (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013) contend. The criticism that *ubuntu* ethics amounts to a romanticised narrative of return to the past could
only make sense, at least if *ubuntu* ethics the object of the return, was during the past, given
the same room and space to exist and co-exist with competing ethical orientations to become
and flourish freely, yet it still somehow failed to do so, ultimately losing any appeal it had.
However, in mainstream philosophy, the same cannot be said about African thought, which
was not only suppressed by colonialism, but also actively denigrated at a time when formal
conventional education had just been introduced in Africa, and hence the thought was denied
the privilege to develop as a systematic philosophy. Thus, criticisms of return presuppose that
the opportunity to become and flourish was availed, and that the African philosophy declined
in development due to its inherent lack of intellectual appeal. Such presuppositions however
generally do not apply to much of the context of Africa and African philosophy.

Furthermore, even if one were to concede that the return is indeed taking place, such
criticisms presuppose that there is a departure from an exclusive philosophy whose
metaphysics and epistemology are in earnest impartial, and exclusively disconnected from
any people’s lived experiences and culture. But as the previous chapters have laboured to
show (see sections 4.4, 4.5, and 5.5.1), dominant epistemologies and philosophies, in schools
today are grounded in Eurocentric particularism, despite having universalistic dimensions
(Andreotti, 2011a: 385; Abdi, 2015: 15; Swanson, 2015: 28). It is therefore worth recognising
that there are particularistic and alternative although contrasting conceptions of reality that
nevertheless actualise the same universal moral principles.

One cannot deny the existence of some essentialist, nostalgic and romanticised theories of
*ubuntu* ethics largely drawn from a very subjective pristine past in African philosophy. Such
positions however, can hardly be sustained philosophically. It is also worth conceding that
the actual structures of comminualistic African societies from which much of the ideal
objective *ubuntu* principles are derived, no longer exist at present in the same way they did in
the past. However, although most societies are becoming industrialised and in principle
individualised, *Ubuntu* as an ethical approach is sustainable and relevant for modern societies
not only African societies. However, the extinction of the traditional African communities
would not necessarily entail irrelevance of *ubuntu* ethics because besides an actual
community, a (people’s) philosophy may embed such elements as their language (Coetzez, 2003: 324; Assie’-Lumumba, 2016: 22) and traditions.

The implication of these rebuttals against criticisms of obsoleteness of *ubuntu* is that *ubuntu*
ethics need not be compelled to integrate into mainstream ethics by subjecting *ubuntu* to an
assimilationist other-dismissing mode of hybridisation. It is proper that *ubuntu* philosophy be
recognised and be adequately developed through contestations to become part of a truly global hybridity, unlike the homogenising current one. African philosophy need not be reduced to making tokenistic inclusions of African aspects into the mainstream philosophy and ethics. Such an African philosophy only comes to adapt into the modus operandi. Rather, African philosophy should be allowed to raise its questions not raised by the mainstream. It should question the mainstream’s exclusivity character. This will achieve the ideal hybridity global ethics needs. Thus, references to manifestations of ubuntu in the past in so far as they are not essentialist but meant to fix the incompleteness and deficiencies of the present ethical order, are in no way morally problematic. Recollection of ways of life that were so long denigrated by colonialism and mainstream scholarship is relevant as long as it helps build a non-exclusive moral theory. This is not to say that the African past was tension-free and that the societies were homogenous.

In moral theorisation, there are arguably two broad approaches: one regards moral agents’ concreteness as primary in that they offer “decision procedures which run on such particularistic contingencies as ethnicity, race, gender, culture, and language” (Coetzee, 2003: 321). In the second approach, thinkers abstract from the concreteness of the people in order to establish “a universal stand-point, one operating with a minimal definition of what is morally relevant, such as rationality, or human nature, or the common factors in our understanding of moral problems” (Coetzee, 2003: 321). Most ubuntu critics ignore the relevance of the first approach that takes into consideration concreteness. In this chapter, without necessarily prizing one of these approaches over the other, I actively recognise the normative implications of people’s concreteness as being an inextricable ideal with the abstract, especially in conceptualisations of global citizenship.

The established practices of a community reveal its moral life as well as models for contesting forms of the good life, in a way rendering its social practice as an exercise of its practical reason (Coetzee, 2003: 323). Understood this way, “culture is an open-ended resource of social meanings on which members of a community draw to mediate the contingencies of their everyday lives” and it “denotes the resources of a community’s material and moral worlds” (Coetzee, 2003: 322). What this entails is that people through culture express the value and foundation of certain moral principles as well as how to realise them. The philosopher may abstract these from the people’s culture. Furthermore, the fact that the people may seem to be living their concrete lives in a manner not always consistent with the principles, does not necessarily imply the principles lack moral validity.
Philosophical reflection can further develop the foundational principles abstracted from the community by drawing implications, which may not necessarily be prevalent in the society. It is therefore instructive to know that “though practical reason is tied to social practice, it is not the slave of practice, for practical reason can modify practice” (Coetzee, 2003: 327).

6.2.1. **Ubuntu principles: humanness, connectedness and harmony**

*Ubuntu* regards humanness as the highest moral good all human action must achieve (Menkiti, 2004: 326). Achieving humanness is not an individual project (Ramose, 2003). It is always in concert with others or their interests. The essence of humanness lies in recognising that one’s moral status as a moral person is meaningful only through and in relation with others. Though in *ubuntu* thought, one is a human being by virtue of being a *Homo sapiens*, personhood however, is “the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing which individuals could fail” to achieve (Menkiti, 2004: 326). This is quite distinct from the Eurocentric concept of personhood that resides in possession of immutable and inherent essences. Personhood in individual-centric ethics is achieved independent of other humanity. It is fixed. With respect to others, all the autonomous person needs to do is to make sure he or she observes certain moral laws in the pursuit of his or her interests, where consideration for the other is usually only with respect to negative duties emanating from a social contract meant to optimise each member’s interests (Meyers, 2005: 28). Unlike in the social contract orientation, in *ubuntu* the community is not a mere institution of strategic cooperation that is primarily rooted in individual self-interest. Personhood is a result of achieving humanness (Menkiti, 2004: 326). This entails recognising and engaging the interests of others affected by one’s exercise of agency as the ultimate mark for respect for humanness in the other.

*Ubuntu* thought also cherishes the principle of people’s connectedness that makes possible sharing of humanness (Coetzee, 2003: 330; Wiredu, 2003: 341). In *ubuntu* ethics, becoming a person “stretches beyond the raw capacities of the isolated individual, and it is a project which is laden with the possibility of triumph, but also of failure” (Menkiti, 2004: 326). Personhood is not an isolated property. Rather, it substantially derives from relationship with other persons, and as such, “it is not an incorrigible property of the individual but something that is shared with others and finds nourishment and flourishing in relationships with others” (Murove, 2014: 42). Personhood “articulates our inter-connectedness, our common humanity and the responsibility to each that flows from our connection” (Letseka, 2012: 54). My actions achieve humanness when they promote well-being not only in me, but in others too.
Such interconnectedness also includes attachment with the non-human world of nature (Le Grange, 2012: 334).

The interconnectedness derived from our shared humanness founds another crucial principle that must be considered in all exercises of individual agency: the principle of harmony (Ramose, 2003: 276; Wiredu, 2003: 347). Sharing humanness is not merely a metaphysical property that only serves to justify individual self-determination. Rather, there is a more substantial mutual consideration of the other, whether a human being or non-human nature (Le Grange, 2012: 334) in one’s actions. There is an obligation to ensure that one’s action is considerate of particular interests of others who are likely to be affected directly or indirectly by your action (Metz, 2007a: 340).

Metz’s (2007a) theory of ubuntu attempts to coalesce these principles (humanness, connectedness and harmony) into one theory of ubuntu. His theory holds that in ubuntu ethics “an action is right just insofar as it produces harmony and reduces discord; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to develop community” (Metz, 2007a: 335). However, this theory that he endorses out of other hypothesised theories he himself proposes and later faults, risks being criticised for demanding social conformism and expending the individual’s freedom. Prior to settling for this theory, he hypothesises another and dismisses it almost entirely. This hypothesised theory held that “an action is right just insofar as it promotes the well-being of others without violating their rights; [and that] an act is wrong to the extent that it either violates rights or fails to enhance the welfare of one’s fellows without violating rights” (Metz, 2007a: 330). However, I find both some valuable merits and some deficiencies in both the hypothesis and his favoured theory stated earlier in this paragraph. My submission is that a more ideal theory would be obtained from marrying some elements of the hypothesis Metz (2007a) rejects with some elements of the ubuntu moral theory Metz (2007a) settles for. The marriage would give us a theory that holds that, in ubuntu ethics, an action is right insofar as it achieves harmony and reduces discord with others, without violating their rights; an act is wrong to the extent that it either violates rights or fails to achieve harmony with others. The most important thing here is the unity between and moral paramountcy of both human rights and responsibility towards harmony with others that personhood must always achieve. Restricting ourselves to promotion of harmony only, as does Metz’s (2007a) ultimate theory, may tolerate essentialising tendencies or sacrifice of legitimate individual interests in cases of social tyranny. An ubuntu ethics is therefore as committed to individual freedom as it is to harmony with others with whom the self is interconnected.
The harmony that *ubuntu* promotes is one that concedes humanity’s common identity as concretely embedded beings and is “grounded on good-will” (Metz, 2007a: 338). Rights-based (essentially individual-centric) approaches to ethics generally regard such moral virtues as “love, generosity, and compassion” as having no intrinsic worth (Bell, 2002: 71). The danger with such a position is that in principle it makes civic life devoid of the human responsibility human beings have towards each other as the human beings they are, before assuming entitlements and rights-based relationships established on political cooperation. Such other Considering values of humanness and interconnectedness when duly considered make one realise that one’s personhood is inextricably tied to the humanness in others too. The intensity of the reality of my personhood (my concreteness) simultaneously gives me the recognition of (not only the generality of human beings in others), but rather that the other too shares the same capacity for concreteness worthy of my recognition, respect and compassion just as does my personhood. One achieves personhood or being fully human by affirming the “being-ness” (Etieyibo, 2017: 318) of others which in principle is their concreteness and not generality.

Interconnectedness is fundamental for humanness. My being a person resides in recognising this interconnectedness. Humanness is a state at which I cannot independently or singlehandedly arrive. It is neither in me alone, so as to restrict the scope of moral considerations to my interest only, or ignore the concreteness of the other as having no intrinsic worth and hence undeserving of my moral concern (Murungi, 2004: 523). Humanness is in relation to how my thoughtful and considerate actions will affect the well-being of others, because humanness is shared and not in me alone. Recognising my personhood or being a person implies recognising the existence of the concrete exercise of the agency capacity that demands I also respect such concreteness in the other. In this case, whenever I am in a moral situation, my individual interests are as cardinal as are the implications of my agency towards harmony with those with whom I am entangled (Bell, 2002: 72). One can glean that what is distinct about *ubuntu* ethics is its respect for the concrete agency (not only agency capacity) of the other guided by, a desire for harmony that is guaranteed by incessant interaction and togetherness so as not to only project about the well-being of the other.

The practical implications of an orientation of connectedness are many. For instance, I encountered associated practices at my former place of work in my seven years of working there. Together with colleagues, we were sharing an office with 15 workstations. Typically,
daily morning greetings were more informative than a mere exchange of pleasantries or just words of recognition of the other’s presence. When a person enters the room he or she greets individually those present with the greeting, “[m]wadzuka bwanji?” ([h]ow are you this morning?). The one being greeted is in principle expected to describe his or her personal condition of well-being such as “ndadzuka bwino kaya inu” (I have woken up fine, what about you).

When greeting the immediate neighbours close to one’s workstation, the one greeting further asks, “kaya kunyumba kwacha bwanji?” (how have the people at home woken up this morning?). The phrase ‘people at home’ in this context refers to both one’s household and one’s wider community. As such the respondent may for example inform the one greeting, about a sick child in the home or bereavement in the neighbourhood where applicable. It is common for colleagues to continue following up for updates about an unfavourable condition regarding one’s ‘home’ they were told of the previous day. The one who extended the greeting, is also similarly expected to inform the other of the well-being of his or her ‘home’.

Two things can be drawn from such common routine occurrences. First, is the fact that greetings in the Malawi society are not only about recognising the presence of the other but they are also informative. Second and more importantly, the concept of individual well-being is not restricted to an isolated detached sense of personhood. In most cases the concept is connected to the condition of those in your community beyond the self. The deep entrenchment of such common practices must be understood in the context of the fact that social structures and arrangements are inspired by their people’s particular conceptions of personhood (Gyekye, 2003: 348).

Individual well-being is not a matter of satisfaction of the autonomous person’s interests only. One’s failure to flourish due to some inabilities is everybody’s concern. This is not to romanticise the African community, for it is fraught with its own moral challenges. Nevertheless, such enactment of connectedness of humanness, reveals how ubuntu ethics demands that recognising and respecting the other should go beyond mere respect of the other’s capacity for agency. Rather, ubuntu demands that virtues such as of care about the concrete well-being of the other must also constitute my respect for the other’s agency. Establishment of the other’s concrete well-being is only achievable through interaction with the other. Thus ubuntu recognises that most aspects of the art of being a concrete individual person are largely sharable, and that one affects and is affected by the concreteness of others. This necessitates achievement of harmony in the exercise of one’s agency.
Claiming that one should consider the others’ interests does not necessarily entail regulation, or final authorisation by the interests of the community. Rather, this position implies that in actual moral situations, besides freedom of agency, what you freely do, when you freely do it, and even how you as an autonomous individual do it, is not entirely restricted to individualistic considerations. This is because my action in some way affects the other, who may be different from me, and possibly against my position, but yet I still share humanness with this other. This obliges me to be caring, considerate, and sensitive in being myself.

These considerations are not just a matter of a range of things affected in the exercise of my agency. Considering the humanness of the other in my action is not just a matter of an awareness of likely inevitable unintended outcomes of my action that will unfavourably affect the other. Rather, it is about considering such probable effects on concrete others not as mere aftermaths of my action, but as crucial considerations in my designing of my personal project such that even where there is divergence of preference, my project should not disorient, humiliate, undermine and ignore the different concrete (and not abstract only) interests of others with whom I share humanness. This is why ubuntu demands “mutual recognition and respect complemented by mutual care and sharing” (Ramose, 2003: 386).

Unlike the individual-centric community, the community in African thought does not understand relationships between persons to be “merely contingent, voluntary and optional” (Gyekye, 2003: 353). Relationships have normative weight.

6.2.2. The individual and community in ubuntu

The most unique attribute of ubuntu ethics is the idea of expecting moral agents always to exercise their agency with responsibility so as to achieve harmony with others (Metz, 2007a: 340). Claiming that personhood is relational, does not entail that the self is enslaved by and cannot assume values that are against the community which the agent deems repressive and against human dignity (Gyekye, 2003: 358). The individual has the capacity to affirm, revise and even reject the common goals, values and practices (Gyekye, 2003: 358–359). Thus, community values are not immutable. At the same time, such a ‘free’ person who disapproves of the society’s values, still exercises his or her moral autonomy within the framework of the common humanness he or she shares with others. Should one completely ignore and disregard the common interconnectedness, he or she may achieve individual autonomy, but not necessarily “self-completeness” (Gyekye, 2003: 359) as a human being, because being human is inherently shareable. This is why consideration of the other in the exercise of agency is not only an abstract metaphysical phenomenon. Self-determination must as a matter
of necessity be contextualised in the, different, but morally legitimate concrete interests of other human beings. This is why ubuntu values the role of moral virtues in all moral actions (Ngcoya, 2015: 253).

The most dominant virtues of ubuntu are “kindness, compassion, respect, and care” (Murove, 2014: 37). The relevance of these virtues largely derives from the reality that personhood is not exclusively grounded in the concept of a detached independent self only but also in how the independent self relates with other concrete selves. The social contract conceptions of the individual as one who is economically and politically primarily driven by self-interest have shaped the prevalent (Western) conception of society as merely an efficient structure for maximization of self-interest (Held, 2006: 82; Murove, 2014: 39). Ubuntu thought, however, understands that placing the individual’s rational self-interest at the centre in the context of competition for scarce resources in social cooperation, hence understanding human relations solely in rights terms anchored in individual-centric conceptions only, is an incomplete account of what being human is (Ramose, 2010: 300). Ubuntu is cognisant of the fact that for concrete human beings aspiring to meaningful social cooperation, “the human resources of love, patronage, recognition, compassion or companionship, etc. are also scarce, and require deliberate efforts in both their generation and equitable distribution” (Bewaji, 2004: 397). Being a person is much more than having individual autonomy, unless such autonomy constantly considers and engages concrete relations one has with others (Murove, 2014: 42).

Ubuntu is therefore, not mere advancement and prioritisation of community interests and values in deference of individual interests. Contrary to Enslin and Horsthemke (2004: 555), communalism in Africa is not accepted or promoted in an uncritical manner just because it is or was once a common practice. Related criticisms are levelled by Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 199), who hold that ubuntu ethics owing to its emphasis on interconnectedness is hegemonic, depriving the individual of independent thought. Ubuntu however, is about taking into consideration human interconnectedness with humanity not merely as an inevitable unintended horizon affected by the consequence of one’s action, but rather as what to crucially consider in exercising one’s agency. Ubuntu draws from African tendencies and these are not necessarily essences; hence, the charge of ubuntu being essentialist and therefore demanding homogenous African communities does not hold (Metz, 2007b: 333).

Contrary to the individual-centric conceptions that the community is a social construct, in ubuntu thought, “human beings are not social beings because they socialise with one another [but rather] they socialise with one another because they are social beings” (Murungi,
2004: 523). This, according to Murungi (2004: 523), should not be understood as entailing that Africa communities are “communistic or totalitarian social systems”. Thus, whilst we should guard against social tyranny, it is still worth recognising that in ubuntu thought, society is not reducible to a mere aggregation of self-interested individuals whose cooperation is based on an overlap of individual rational interests. The idea of community in ubuntu is not reducible to a collective of individuals whose autonomous lives coincidentally overlap (Etieyibo, 2017: 319) where the value of the cooperation is primarily with respect to optimisation of individual interest. In ubuntu thought, such a conception of the individual, and indeed of society, would alienate the individual from achieving humanness (Murungi, 2004: 523), an enterprise that is interactive and not isolative. Rather, in ubuntu, the community is valuable because achieving humanness is a shareable enterprise as humanness is interconnected. Achieving humanness is in concert with the concrete being of the other I am in community with.

Criticisms that ubuntu insinuates paternalism by the community over the individual are therefore ungrounded. All ubuntu requires in the exercise of agency is –

[T]hat an individual has to consider not only how a course of action contemplated by him will affect him personally, but also how it will affect his family [and all those affected], either directly or in terms of the way in which they will be perceived in the society (Bewaji, 2004: 396).

The ideal ubuntu community is one which does not foreclose debate and deliberation about common values and practices (Gyekye, 2003: 359).

It should be noted that requiring the moral agent to consider the other through acquisition, and utilisation of social virtues does not entail that the substance and source of communalistic values are esoteric, or paternalistic, or non-negotiable and absolute over the individual. Contrary to such positions, ubuntu thought values the role of consensus in moral disputes where mediation involves communal and individual considerations, in such a way that neither should trump the other (Coetzee, 2003: 328). In ubuntu ethics, “justice is a harmony of social arrangements. But harmony is not given; it has to be worked out” in order to ensure that the individual and others’ interests in the community are synchronised (Coetzee, 2003: 328). The deliberative nature of social practice ensures sustenance of a contested dialogue that “re-negotiates and redefines the boundary between ‘private’ and ‘public’”. Therefore there is in principle no closure to “the nature of the issues that get pushed onto the agenda of the public dialogue” (Coetzee, 2003: 328). Thus, ubuntu demands that decision-making must occur after
comprehensive deliberation aimed at achieving “consensus and inclusiveness” (Radebe & Phooko, 2017: 246).

Calling for inclusion of a predominantly communalistic conception of education for democratic citizenship (Gyekye, 2003: 349) is not tantamount to re-creating a grand African narrative that competes with other narratives. It should not also be conceived as the dismissal of universal ideals binding for every human community across the globe. Rather, calling for ubuntu perspectives is a recognition that universal ideals are realisable in alternative forms, such as the one of ubuntu that is dominant in Africa. Furthermore, the call for ubuntu perspectives is a recognition of the role of embeddedness in actualising universal ideals, and that the particularism of embeddedness is not inherently incompatible with nor counteracts the universality of the moral ideals. Ultimately, it is a recognition of the reality that normative ideals cannot be realised in an absolutist form uniform for all situated peoples of the world indifferent to the people’s particular lived experiences and situations. In the end, the universality of moral ideals is not necessarily lost by the vernacularisations (Benhabib, 2011: 89) of the ideals by the people’s situatedness. Ideal moral theorisation ought to be about achieving universal ideals through negotiation between universal norms and the concrete situations that give them meaning.

The essential implication, among others, of ubuntu ethics is that “the human person is naturally oriented toward other persons and must have relationships with them [and that] social relationships are not contingent but necessary” (Gyekye, 2003: 352). Calling for education for cosmopolitan citizenship to be informed by an ethic that does not inherently deny normativity to social relationships and the structures that enable such structures is based on the premise that such ethical perspectives as ubuntu have capacity to contribute solutions in those areas where the prevalent mainstream individual-centric global citizenship theory has deficiencies. Contrary to common criticism, ubuntu thought is compatible with individual freedom and diversity. What is entailed in ubuntu thought is the idea that in a moral situation, it is not only one’s interests and their acceptability or conformance with abstract moral contexts that are paramount for human agency. What equally matters, besides exercising agency, are the numerous concrete relationships one has with others. Inasmuch as I have freedom to be, ubuntu calls upon me not to stop there, but to consider the concrete implication of my action on the concrete relationships affected by that material action, by taking into consideration their morally reasonable concrete interests. The efficacy of ubuntu resides in it being a “relational rationality” (Murove, 2014: 37), which the moral agent uses in
exercising self-determination because human beings depend on others for the ultimate attainment of well-being.

Ultimately, one can draw that in the ubuntu community the individual should not and cannot be left to choose between authenticity and its attendant exclusive individual entitlements on the one hand, and on the other, belonging to the community through active recognition of and responsibilities to relationships with others. In ubuntu ethics, the two mutually reinforce each other and each is insufficient and incomplete without the other. The individual needs both and whenever the two are in conflict, one is not left with an individual-centric default choice between entitlements and relationships, because whatever choice one makes, there must be active consideration of the other normative sphere.

6.2.3. **Ubuntu and a difference-grounded deliberative universalism**

Realisation of the Ubuntu principles of harmony, interconnectedness and humanness inevitably requires interaction with the concrete and not only general other (Cornell & Van Marle, 2012: 353). On this ground one can postulate that Ubuntu ethics accords paramountcy to people’s embeddedness towards both individual and collective flourishing. Social embeddedness and its subsequent social bonds are not mere accidents of nature with extrinsic and secondary value in relation to an ostensibly exclusively primary individual interest. Social bonds have normative value in that humanness is achieved by how my action enhances the humanness of the other, beyond my self-satisfaction.

In Ubuntu ethics, shared humanness and interconnectedness generate a responsibility on each unit of the interconnection (Letseka, 2012: 54). This interconnection obliges me to ensure that both my individuation and what sustains the community of concrete others who support my being and who also share humanness are not undermined. The interconnection entails exercising my agency with an active awareness, derived from interaction with concrete others, how my agency would in concrete terms affect the other. Even though I may not agree with the motivation of the other’s concreteness, the other is still worth my respect even as I differ with them. Their well-being is a concrete consideration in, though not necessarily the regulator of, my choices and actions.

In other words, the ubuntu call for conformity to humanness through achievement of harmony and its attendant virtues of care, compassion, love and generosity entail a due consideration of the well-being of the other in the exercising of one’s agency. This, as Benhabib (1992: 159) contends, can only be achieved through deliberation, engaging the
other, or acknowledging the worthiness of the interests of the other in one’s action, and not just being driven by self-interest. The implication for this is profound. In the Kantian deontological ethics, all what matters is whether my action conforms to the moral law. In the ubuntu paradigm, however, I may have the choice of performing an action, which is morally acceptable. However, my action may undermine (even without actively violating) some reasonable interests of other people and their sensibilities. The ubuntu paradigm is not merely preoccupied with my self-interest only. It will require that I be mindful of the likely moral offence my action may have on others. To achieve this, the other and I must, if possible, deliberate to exchange perspectives. Even where we cannot have a deliberation, I must act mindfully of the other’s concrete interests, which although not necessarily constituting a basis for outlawing my action, they are nevertheless worth considering as he or she is a sharer of the humanness we both participate in.

Ubuntu is an “interactive ethic … in which who and how we can be as human beings is always shaped in our interaction with each other” (Cornell & Van Marle, 2012: 353). Its most profound interactive nature calls for an exercise of freedoms in a manner where the concreteness of the other is acknowledged and although it may not restrict acts of individuation or self-expression, one nevertheless, through interaction or reflection, considers the other. It therefore requires, as a crucial requirement, constant connection with the concrete interests, sensitivities, feelings, aspirations and interests of the other even though they may be strange, contradictory and in opposition to your familiar and morally legitimate motivations of self-expression. The humanness in the other is connected to the humanness in me such that “the Other is not simply the friend, but becomes the teacher, the possibility of transcendence” (Waghid & Smeyers, 2012: 13).

In calling for morally appropriate conduct, for instance in most Malawian communities, one often hears the expression “muzichita zinthu mwa umunthu” (act with humanness). This claim embeds two crucial congruent and interactive principles: agency and humanness. Agency in this context is entailed by concession and recognition of the capacity for self-determination, which is the preoccupation of individualistic ethics. Humanness on the other hand, entails the moral context which must exist for self-determination to be fully morally acceptable, which is a situation that calls for observance of moral ideals that lie beyond those captured in a rights perspective. Humanness is about the wider concrete context under which one self-actualises, where the interests of others in a community are not merely abstract, imaginary and impersonal. Humanness therefore is about acting with care for the other’s
concrete being. In other words, the thought experiment in the self-actualisation process in the detached human being paradigm (Benhabib, 2011: 67) almost reduces the process to a mathematical calculation, lacking feeling, care and connection with others.

For ubuntu, it is wrong to advance your interests insensitively, without care for the others’ interests. In a way, ubuntu is caring even for the strangest other whose otherness you should not just assume and project (Benhabib, 1992: 168). Even where the other is morally on the wrong side, you still must help their restoration. You must ensure that there is constant engagement with them so that they re-assume their humanness too (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). It is seeing, and expecting to see, humanness not only in oneself, but in others too. It is in this vein that, according to Cornell and Van Marle (2012: 353), in ubuntu thought, one’s freedom is as much as one’s responsibility especially to care for the other. My flourishing must be in the context of the flourishing of the other. This does not imply social conformism or that the community is the gatekeeper of the moral action, as a potential critic would argue. Rather this is about an emphasis of meaningful caring respect of the other, through engagement, deliberation and mutual concern. Ubuntu is therefore compatible with individuality and diversity. The deliberation is not meant always to arrive at a single position. The deliberating parties may end up holding contrasting positions. The most significant thing however, is that the deliberation was not merely procedural, but an expression of respect for the other. Even though the parties cannot share a substantially common position, they still get to appreciate what constitutes the otherness of the other and consider it in their respective self-actualisation projects. In the prevailing global order, the relevance of ubuntu in global citizenship lies in its ability to cultivate the virtues of care, empathy, connectedness, mutuality and interactive engagement with otherness, which are typically absent from the mainstream conceptions of global citizenship. An absence of such virtues is ultimately escalating marginalisation of otherness on the basis of the convenience of global integration.

The idea of endeavours to achieve harmony with humanness extends to those others who transgress and violate it. In ubuntu, morally inappropriate action disrupts the humanness in both the offender and offended (Oelofsen, 2015: 372). This is why ubuntu justice is aimed at restoring the humanness of the perpetrator, just as it also seeks to make restitution for the victim (Oko Elechi et al., 2010; Oelofsen, 2015). This is not equalising the levels of harm suffered, nor undermining the impact of the harm. Rather, it is meant to restore personhood in every individual including the offender, showing him or her that his or her complete personhood lies in seeing humanness and worthiness in the concrete other and that by failing
to achieve this, those in whom humanness is still intact must help restore him or her to his or her full personhood besides restitution duties he or she has. This is why African justice, in its aspiration to restore the humanness of the offender too, also greatly prides the moral values of forgiveness, reconciliation and care (Oelofsen, 2015: 373).

Given the primacy of achieving harmony with others, *ubuntu* places a premium on the ideals of sharing and caring as both the ends and means for social cohesion (Etieyibo, 2017: 319). Thus, *ubuntu* is incompatible with an agent’s indifference to the other just because the agent has not violated the rights of the other. Therefore, for instance, whereas a rights-approach to morality would be content with an individual who has achieved one’s goals and is now guaranteed of a thriving life of provision and self-sufficiency, the *ubuntu* approach, through its quest for harmony as well as its principles of connection, will not be indifferent to the plight and relative disadvantage of the other. *Ubuntu* will at least demand efforts to understand the other’s plight and its source and help in any way possible to change it. Thus, *Ubuntu* ethics goes beyond relating on the terms of entitlements to relating with the other in broader terms of care giving. Globally, an *ubuntu* ethic in considering the well-being of all people in the world would ensure not only tolerance of the morally inoffensive concreteness of otherness, but also (active or passive) support of such concreteness in whichever feasible way to ensure its flourishing.

Critics such as Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013: 202) argue that *ubuntu* ethics depends on traditionally close ethnic communities whose foundation is based on unquestioning loyalty to the communal ethos and excludes the stranger other. They further argue that Africans like “any other people on earth are not predisposed metaphysically to be social, communal, anti-social, altruistic or any other moral quality. On the contrary, such qualities are born of specific contexts and are driven by specific aims” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 203). One agrees that communalistic philosophy is not exclusively African. However, one disagrees with the claim that the non-existence of the traditional social structures necessarily implies the end of the philosophy that underpinned the life. The decline of traditional African communities does not translate into an end of the philosophy that characterised the traditional life. This is because among others intangible linguistic structures that still prevail today have the capacity of retaining the ideals of the philosophy (Assie’-Lumumba, 2016: 22–23). In other words, although *ubuntu* is connected to traditional life, as a philosophy it is nevertheless independent of it in its foundation and relevance.
The second criticism that communalism is not peculiar to Africa does not manage to dismiss that a particularly and arguably morally legitimate philosophy and ethics can peculiarly be embraced and developed in one social context while another society promotes a different one, yet both actualise the same universal moral ideals. The goal of philosophy is to keep refining communities’ moralities, through critiquing and hybridising them. Traceability of communalistic principles to African life should not be conflated with developing a descriptive morality about all Bantu-speaking people to which every constituent must conform. Rather it is an endeavour of abstracting dominant and consistent principles that characterise(d) their social practice for systematic normative theoretical development. This does not preclude the existence of competing and contradictory normative positions in the actual experiences of the people, both in the past and in the present, from which the abstraction is taking place. This therefore means that even global ethics stands to benefit from the ideals of *ubuntu* ethics. The ideals of *ubuntu*, despite being predominantly rooted in Africa, should not be reduced to African ethnophilosophy. *Ubuntu* moral pronouncements can help improve globe ethics, as will be shown in the next section.

### 6.3. *Ubuntu* and education for citizenship

Without necessarily making a relativism claim, it is necessary that a philosophy of education be connected with the theoretical foundations of the moral thought underlying the social context of the philosophy. It must be connected with the people’s philosophy of life to better serve their shared interests and ultimately advance the well-being of the societies and the constituent individual members (Venter, 2004: 155; Etieyibo, 2016). Thus education, just like the other disciplines of politics, economics, literature, art and education, needs a cultural anchor from the community in which the education is occurring. Education is meaningless when alienated from the community (Venter, 2004:156).

Arguably, all open human communities despite having diverse social practices, in principle ultimately pursue the same universal moral ideals, but each community is characterised by a particular philosophy. As a result, it is the aspiration of communities that their institutions and systems embed their contestable common philosophies and ethical orientations in order for such elements to be meaningful. Arguably, most African communities are undergirded by *ubuntu* ethical principles, although the moral validity of such principles is not restricted to Africa (Cornell & Muvangua, 2012: 3).

Given their communalistic orientation, most African communities’ conception of justice, for instance, is in some respects remarkably different from the Eurocentric one. Apart from
emphasising on reparations, *ubuntu* also values restoration of moral harmony in the administration of justice. The implication here is that an agent may violate or lose humanness by his or her misdeeds, or as a result of the morally harmful acts by another on him or her (Oelofsen, 2015). The ultimate aim of the restorative justice of *ubuntu* is not only to affirm the equality of the victim with all other human beings by compensating and making reparations to him or her when he or she is harmed. Rather, besides making restitution for the loss and making reparation for the harm caused or suffered by the victim, *ubuntu* justice also aims at restoring the humanness in the offended, offender and community (Oelofsen, 2015: 373). This is why it emphasises the values of forgiveness and reconciliation, although not necessarily in lieu of the other demands of justice (Oelofsen, 2015: 374).

Mogale (2012: 242) highlights the struggles in the nursing profession, where one is trained in Eurocentric conceptualisation of care, yet in the daily provision of nursing care in an African setting certain aspects of such orientations are inadequate and sometimes incompatible with the patient’s conceptualisations of care (Mogale, 2012: 242). Therefore, practising nursing under *ubuntu* ethics requires the practitioner to go beyond fulfilling universalistic duties and obligations and instead give a contextualised understanding of care meaningful to the people involved in the situation (Haegert, 2000: 492).

Just as health and justice provision are context responsive, schools too exist in peculiar social and cultural contexts which have their own peculiar localised challenges. Such socio-cultural contexts generate unique challenges that education and the school aims must resolve. In other words, the concept of education presupposes a particular shared (ideal) conception of social relations for a particular community, the school is expected to cultivate in learners (Piper, 2016: 109; Etieyibo, 2017: 315) owing to the ability of the school to bring together the community’s or nation’s diverse people for a shared end.

If we concede that learners require facilitation to develop an interest in and achieve a capacity for moral criticality, we need to be cognisant that inasmuch as there are issues where the learners will exercise their criticality in the future (such as voting when the learners are adults), there are still other challenges that the learners are currently experiencing whilst still minors that are tied to the learners’ social context. Such challenges may threaten even their very lives. In developing criticality, the school cannot skirt away from addressing such challenges that are tied to the society’s operational cultured structure. For instance, issues such as sexually transmitted diseases, gang violence, drug and substance abuse, physical and cyber bullying and teenage pregnancies are an imminent threat even to learners who are still
minors. The school therefore cannot be indifferent to the substance of education for citizenship by ignoring the learners’ situatedness and the unique challenges and opportunities the situatedness raises for their communities. The point being made is that an impartial and detached education for citizenship would alienate the lived experiences and situatedness of learners and their communities. In other words, it is necessary that a people’s lived philosophy informs their education for citizenship for the education to be meaningful.

6.3.1. *Ubuntu and education monetarisation*

One of the challenges of conventional education is that it is obsessed with individual pursuit of success which has in principle and practice monetarised education (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). Much of education practice in the school is centred on interests of the individual learner who has an own seat, must do homework and most scholastic activities alone, and also fights for individual attainment the higher he or she climbs the educational ladder, ultimately giving very little consideration to the other and community interests (Brock-Utne, 2016: 30). Relational considerations are de-emphasised.

Whilst conceding the indispensable value of individual achievement, which partly reflects individual responsibility, an *ubuntu* education emphasises “co-operative endeavour rather than individual advancement” only (Nyerere, 1968: 52). For Nyerere (1968) it is consistent with *ubuntu* ethics that educational success should more importantly be measured in “terms of human well-being, not prestige, buildings, cars, or other such things whether privately or publicly owned” (Nyerere, 1968: 52). The obsessive commitment to competition and individual achievement which characterise individual-centric education has an adverse impact on individuals and communities as it ultimately undermines the moral ideal of human equality. As Nyerere (1968: 55) holds, modern education is by and large elitist, hierarchically arranging people in favour of those “who are intellectually stronger than their fellows, inducing among those who succeed a feeling of superiority, and leaves the majority of the others hankering after something they will never obtain”. It is instructive to bear in mind that the distribution of intelligence and natural talents is morally arbitrary (Rawls, 1999) such that individual attainment is not always a reflection of individual investment. This entails that by implementing such stratifying and now monetarised education, new hierarchies emerge that split learners and communities exclusively in terms of ability, breaking the fabric of interconnectedness of *ubuntu*. Ultimately, education creates ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisations.

Demanding that education be informed by *ubuntu* to achieve harmony and humanness as is being done here, does not entail that individual achievement is inferior, morally speaking, and
that it is not worth of reward. Despite the fact that different people are differently endowed with the gifts and talents of nature, there is still much room where individual (ir)responsibility determines one’s life chances, and it is morally justifiable that individual effort be duly rewarded. However, what an ubuntu education calls for is an acknowledgement that there are diverse psychosocial determinants that affect individual achievement. At times, these are beyond the control of the individual learner (Rawls, 1999). Ubuntu requires thoughtful responses to the following questions: What does society do with those who have failed to attain the prestigious mark? How should those that have attained academic success relate with those who have failed to do so? Ubuntu will still require that teachers and education systems endeavour harmony and an interconnectedness among people irrespective of their academic attainment or lack thereof. This does not mean that all learners be rewarded in exactly the same manner. Rather, it is a call for those that have achieved academic attainment to bear in mind that their identity lies beyond their ‘distinctiveness’ in academic attainment. They share a common humanness with the others for whom they and the community must provide due care support. This way, ubuntu would call for care of others in how the ‘achiever’ relates with those who have not achieved. On the other hand, ubuntu would expect teachers and education systems to caringly help the ‘non-achievers’ actualise themselves and explore their other abilities.

The challenge with the prevailing largely prestige-pursuing education order is that the educated elite become alienated from the low-quality life of the ‘uneducated’. Nyerere (1968: 56) holds that the ‘achievers’ come to regard their educational achievement as meaning that as an educated person they have now graduated and are detached from the hard life and struggles which characterise the life of the low social classes where the majority of the population belong in most communities. This way the interconnectedness of human beings as one community, where each ought to care about not only one’s own opportunities, but also of the other, is broken. In other words, the education insulates the educated from the wider people, attributing the low status of the ‘non-achievers’ to choice-making and a lack of self-discipline. This alienation has potential to disable the elite’s capacity to identify with and care for the struggles of the ‘uneducated’ communities in one’s capacity as an individual, citizen, or one with influence in public policy (Pais & Costa, 2017: 2). Only the epistemic languages of the educated elites are intelligible to the educated person such that he or she “will be more at home in the world of the educated than he [she] is among his [her] own [uneducated] parents” and community (Nyerere, 1968: 56). Thus, the alienation only escalates.
*Ubuntu*-inspired education would ensure that the curriculum does not prize individual achievement only, but rather individual achievement in the context of other people’s challenges and aspirations. To foster a sense of togetherness, such elements such as classroom sitting plan would have to be structured in a mode that also values caring for and connection with the other (Etieyibo, 2017: 321). In the school, *ubuntu* can aid achievement of intellectual virtues such as “open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, curiosity, and confidence in reason” through pedagogical experiences that are grounded in imaginative and creative thinking that is by and large collaborative and deliberative (Etieyibo, 2017: 313).

As highlighted earlier, that *ubuntu* ethics derives from bantu-speaking African communities’ cultures does not reduce it to ethno-philosophy, hence restricting its relevance to Africa only. My submission is that *ubuntu* is an ethic that has potential to contribute towards improving the dominant modern global ethics that is evidently deficient in some respects. Some critics (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 202) further argue that, “the success of *ubuntu* largely depends on undifferentiated, small and tight-knit communities that are relatively underdeveloped” and that such communities are hostile and intolerant of outsiders as well as divergence of thought, as such the *ubuntu* concept is incompatible with modern life. Matolini and Kwindingwi (2013: 298) therefore argue, “[u]buntu as a conceived ethical solution lacks both the capacity and context to be an ethical inspiration or code of ethics in the present context”. For such critics, the recent calls for *ubuntu* recognition are essentially a project of black elites garbed in restorative justice and a “so-called black identity” (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013: 197).

*Ubuntu* ideals are necessary and relevant not only to African contexts, but also to the global order that is largely market-oriented (Metz, 2014: 69; Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). The principles of humanness and harmony of *ubuntu* are crucial for the modern global economy, where market forces and economic returns largely determine acceptability of public and global policies (Ramose, 2014). Designing public and global policies on the model of market forces is problematic in that market forces are understood as given and are therefore left untouched and unregulated on the basis of how the effects of these market forces profoundly affect humanness (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). In global trade, for instance, what has escalated global iniquities is that nations and multinational corporations can establish trade agreements that are consensual or globally binding, yet they hurt the people in poor nations most (Oxfam, 2002; Benhabib, 2011: 104).
In the prevailing global order, which is in principle operating on and aspiring towards a neo-liberal conception of freedom realised through the paramountcy and exclusiveness of individual-centrism (Olssen et al., 2004: 136–137; Pais & Costa, 2017: 2), a deficit of ideals of the ubuntu type is glaring. The challenges of the modern world, as is being constantly revealed through political conflicts, tensions and unjust economic policies, have overwhelmed the individual-centric model whose ethical frameworks are inadequate to resolve the modern challenges.

The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organization (Yamabhai & Smith, 2012: 1–2; Hashim, 2013: 657–658) is a demonstration of the inadequacy of rights approaches to human relations. The TRIPS agreement was meant to incentivise scientific research and reward researchers by retaining the intellectual property rights over the knowledge and products of the researchers, thus preventing other producers from using the knowledge or products for a given period of time until the manufacturers have recovered the production costs and profit (Collste, 2015: 165). In the case of HIV antiretroviral drugs, this proved very expensive for developing nations who were severely hit by HIV-related deaths, but could not afford the non-generic drugs manufactured by international pharmaceutical corporations who held the intellectual property rights, yet were generic drugs to be produced by other manufacturers, the market value would be drastically lower and affordable (Sundaram, 2015: 247). The neoliberal order should therefore not be construed as given, but normatively as inherently problematic as it is devoid of care for the other who is marginalised and diminishing. In as far as a rights and individual-centric model is concerned, the primary interest of the pharmaceutical corporations are their economic interests. Once the economic interest of the corporation agent are legitimately satisfied, any other commitments are discretionary.

The neoliberal order is thriving on, and is very consistent with, individual-centric ethics. The global order remains the inevitable outcome of radical individual-centric ethics in so far as such individual-centric ethics places mere instrumental value on human relations, ignoring care commitments, leading to the marginalisation of the communities’ concreteness across the globe and ultimately alienating the individuals constituting them. Ubuntu moral theorisation challenges the exclusion of the value of human relations as manifested in concrete communal interests. Ubuntu would therefore challenge the marginalisation of cultures, languages and ways of life around the world on account of their inability to attract financial returns. On the flipside, it would question the justifiability of some global cultures
and languages dominating literature, art and entertainment in the world because of their monetary force that subjugates those that lack financial potency. The *ubuntu* framework “has important implications for changing the prevailing market-driven ethos of education into one that is more moralistic, emancipatory, cultured and relevant to the needs and aspirations of the people” (Oviawe, 2016: 9).

*Ubuntu* places a premium on the virtues of care and empathy (Ramose, 2003: 387). In global citizenship, *ubuntu* would demand engagement with the concreteness of a global other and not relate with him or her only on generalised otherness terms. Related *ubuntu* values of cooperation and togetherness are central in confronting modern-day global challenges that are largely perpetuated by a generalised conception of otherness. In education, this entails teaching learners that citizenship in the modern world is about much more than mere conformity to certain schedules of negative duties or rights or, living and letting live. Rather it is about mutuality and the necessity to always learn how one’s actions in the world are influencing the chances and opportunities of others. In other words, it is for learners to realise that personhood can be achieved or fail to be achieved if one is excessively self-centred, insulates oneself from and ignores to care for global others, learn of and from the interests of global others. Personhood always ought to be with respect to humanness not only in yourself but also in terms of that which you share with others in such mutually intricate ways that the lack of flourishing in another individual adversely affects me although each one of us is an autonomous individual.

In the contractarian theories of society legitimacy that dominate modern democracies, the exclusive prioritization of private property ownership is prominent in conceptualisations of justice (Ramose, 2010: 292). By and large, whatever duties individuals owe each other, are generally centred on private property such that one can contend that for thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, property ownership and human dignity are each other’s flipsides. Ramose (2010: 293) criticises this centrality of private property in defining and determining social relations. He calls such a conceptualisation of society, a ‘timocracy’ because it is, unlike a democracy, a kind of political power distribution whose nature and extent are determined by wealth ownership (Ramose, 2010: 293). Ramose (2010) holds that wealth acquisition in the quest of meeting the necessities of life has become primary in social justice theorisation and practice. As a result, education is generally conceived as primarily aimed at achieving personal happiness derived from private wealth accumulation (Pais & Costa, 2017: 10). Mostly, this leaves out the moral imperative that such individual pursuits must be prized
in the same measure as relations with others, such that ultimately education no longer values its link with social morality (Ramose, 2010: 296).

The nature of neoliberal competition that the schools also replicate and advance among learners in such exclusive pursuits of personal happiness is hostile to meaningful relations with others. Today, the ontological conception of competition is adversarial, aimed at domineering and ultimately excluding the other and his or her interests in the pursuits of individual projects (Ramose, 2010: 297). However, according to Ramose (2010: 297), ideal competition entails that the people involved are in common pursuit of a common goal. This entails connection and cooperation among the pursuers (Ramose, 2010: 297) and generally an even playing field without arbitrary advantage over others (Rawls, 1999). Thus, in ideal competition, one “embraces the ‘other’ as a cooperative pursuer of a common goal” (Ramose, 2010: 297). Such aspects of ideal competition are thus compatible with ubuntu values. Fixing education today would therefore greatly benefit from ubuntu ideals.

Oviawe (2016: 5–6) contends that since the industrial revolution,

[C]apitalist values have become embedded in education such that the humanistic values of education have been replaced by market-driven, mechanistic and commercialist benchmarks for measuring educational success. As a result, education is seen as an investment that must yield economic returns.

Redeeming education from such a perilous mire, cannot happen without challenging the obsessive individualism that embeds modern education that reduces all collective relations and responsibility, to market value. One may suggest that this would be corrected by moderating individualism. However, that would only be temporal, as soon there would be a relapse. What is indispensable in correcting this is to bring to the centre of education discourse, the ubuntu values of connectedness, humanness, care and responsibility. It may not be the solution, but nevertheless an indispensable component of the ideal solution. Establishing social cooperation only in excessive individual-centric terms and rights paradigms, denying the normativity of a relational rationality undermines the interconnection of humanness.

Primacy and prioritisation of capitalist interests characterise political and economic systems globally. Modern democracies understand the human subject in capitalist terms, and the subsequent human relations he or she necessarily must be in, as market relations (Thomas, 2008: 42). Constitutions of states as well as their economic and public policies are also largely inspired by such a philosophy that manifests itself through minimum government, a
liberalised market, deregulation and privatisation of institutions providing public services (Thomas, 2008: 50). Such tendencies are said to be consistent with respecting individual rights such as individual economic rights and private property ownership where the state is ostensibly not justified to arbitrarily make determination of and partly appropriate the due property of an individual so as to redistribute to disadvantaged others (Olssen et al., 2004: 138).

Neoliberalism has subtly succeeded to be the ideology that also determines citizen–state relations (Olssen et al., 2004: 136–137). This has happened because the constitutions of most democracies conceptualise schedules and categorisation of human rights capable of being claimed from the state through a court of law in neoliberal frames (Thomas, 2008). Mostly, democratic states today “take a minimalist (as opposed to a maximalist) stance in the realization of [strategic] rights” (Thomas, 2008: 50) which if justiciable, can ensure an equitable access to opportunities, thus concretising the ubuntu core principle of humanness. For instance, Thomas (2008: 50) holds that in developing the new democratic constitution for South Africa to transition from the inequalities era of apartheid, a human right that is consistent with ubuntu, such as a right to decent housing, was not deemed worth including into the Constitution as a fundamental right whose obligation is incumbent upon the state, such that citizens can hold the state liable through the courts for failing to fulfil its obligation over securing the right. According to Thomas, (2008: 50) the understanding then among the constitutional developers was that hopefully, if not inevitably, embracing a minimal government would guarantee individual right to property, serving the demands of equity as each citizen would utmost be accorded an enabling environment to work and afford dignifying housing without state intervention or support. However, Thomas (2008: 50) argues that such minimalist commitment has only resulted in less compulsion on and lack of prioritisation by the state to ensure that all South Africans have decent housing, since such rights are not liable to claim from the government by citizens through the courts owing to how they have been rendered in the Constitution as non-absolute rights. Thomas (2008: 53) however, argues that the “constitutionalisation and justiciability of socioeconomic rights” in South Africa, if governed by ubuntu ideals, would go further to demand that they be conceived in maximalist terms.

All this demonstrates how conceptualisation of the institutions of democracy, through its instruments of the state and its systems of distribution, are inherently overcome by the neoliberal ideology. Human relationality, which is in principle feeling with and for the other,
is rendered as morally arbitrary and insignificant under the neoliberal ideology. The pervasiveness of the neoliberal ideology in democracies worldwide, makes urgent the integration of *ubuntu* humanness in conceptualisations of personal freedom and individual success. Individual flourishing ought to be connected with the well-being of others one is in relation with.

It is therefore imperative that education worldwide must help learners re-cultivate social values since the obsessive individual-centrism prevailing globally has prized individual survival as the ultimate goal for human existence and self-interest as its cardinal enabler (Ramose, 2010: 297). *Ubuntu* education would call for the transcendence of humanness over wealth possession in configurations and enactment of theories of justice and social relations (Ramose, 2010: 301).

6.4. **Implementing *ubuntu* in the school**

In this section, I discuss some of the practical ways in which *ubuntu* would contribute towards education for democratic and global citizenship. I explore how *ubuntu* would relate to the school curriculum, pedagogy and environmental education, so as to cultivate citizenship that is conscious of humanness, interconnectedness, care and the responsibilities that accrue from these.

Because *ubuntu* is an ethics of becoming (Le Grange, 2012: 334), one can argue that *ubuntu* cannot fail to achieve cosmopolitan or global citizenship. It is relevant for both global and local democratic citizenship. As previously highlighted (see section 6.3.1), some *ubuntu* critics (see Enslin and Horsthemke, 2004; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013) contend that the enabling social environment of *ubuntu* for communal life, they claim is traditionalist Africa, is long gone leading to the loss of the relevance of *ubuntu* ethics in modern life. However, what such a criticism ignores is that there are enduring related closely-knit communities today in the form of schools. The moment we consider the school as a community of diverse learners, teachers, public officials, parents and the community, one realises the indispensability of *ubuntu* in the education for citizenship for the modern industrialised Africa and world. Even if the so-called extinct traditional communalistic communities still persisted today, the learner in such communities would still spend much of his or her active time in the school than in the home. Therefore, presence or absence of communalistic communities does not alter the relevance of *ubuntu* in the school, given the community nature of the school. The learners need *ubuntu* because they are a community, but also because the school is the seedbed for citizenship development.
The next section looks at the role of achieving *ubuntu* citizenship through the curriculum and pedagogical experiences in the school.

### 6.4.1. Ubuntu citizenship through curriculum and pedagogy

In the school, development of *ubuntu* virtues in learners can be achieved through curriculum content, school practices and the nature of pedagogical experiences employed. *Ubuntu* values connectedness of humanness. This has an implication for education. Education must not be detached from the lived experiences of the learners (Waghid, 2004). More significantly, through pedagogy or curriculum development, education must confront the debilitating challenges of its communities. One challenge of the individualistic conceptualisation of education is that, although it recognises social challenges resulting from a society’s crisis of values, it largely steers clear of engaging issues of the good life, ostensibly out of fear of indoctrinating the learners and making learners embrace certain moral values they have to choose personally when they become adults. However, if learners can be engaged in the challenges that face their communities and they attempt to explore possible solutions to the challenges, there will be no detachment among and between learners and the actual community in which they exist.

Because of the fundamentalism of connectedness of humanness, one can hold that by implication an *ubuntu* education for democratic citizenship would revolve on deliberation and engaging the other, to see the world from their perspective. Through practical group projects that probe social practice and social structuring, for instance, learners will develop responsibility, empathy and caring attitudes that concretise the humanness human beings’ share not as a mere metaphysical trait, but in concrete terms, as a learner engages with an other learner and teachers too engaging with an other learner. This way, learners would self-criticise their attitudes towards the other. They will also be able to examine and evaluate the structure of their community and how it promotes or suffocates humanness not only in them, but equally importantly, in the other, including the non-human other. Educational planners, upon considering *ubuntu* ideals, would be mindful that education should aim at cultivating in learners the necessity of achieving harmony with humanness as one of the fundamental aims of education and not only to satisfy individual economic, national economic and political needs (Venter, 2004: 158).

*Ubuntu* ethics would require that curriculum content about human rights should not be anchored in an individual-centric model alone. Human rights must also include a relational framework which also emphasises the other’s entitlements in my exercising of agency.
Mkabela (2014: 288–289) holds that much of human rights education in South Africa is based on the entitlements of the individual and the community is basically de-emphasised. The instrumentalist conception of the community in most individualistic conceptualisations of human rights is what results in the concern that learners have more knowledge about their own entitlements than they do about that of others (Olssen et al., 2004: 138). One gleans that this is mainly because duties to the other or community are mostly assumed to be automatically fulfilled only by desisting from certain actions against the other. Rights under the prevailing model only understand the other in terms of what one must refrain from doing to the other and scarcely about what one should do towards the other as a concrete other.

*Ubuntu* emphasises the virtues of care, responsibility and empathy in exercising individual agency, because it understands the moral grounding of human rights to be relational, other than merely individualistic (Radebe & Phooko, 2017: 241). Owing to its interconnectedness heritage, an *ubuntu* conception of rights also places emphasis on the obligation of care the individual owes the other and not only to emphasise one’s entitlements as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 2015) currently does (Murithi, 2007: 284). Thus, an *ubuntu* rights education would also emphasise the virtues of forgiveness and reconciliation without necessarily promoting impunity.

An *ubuntu*-inspired education curriculum would also restore as a crucial ingredient in learners’ moral reflection, hitherto undermined communal interests that concretise all embedded autonomous beings. As highlighted earlier, one main challenge facing education today, which is owed to neoliberalism, is the role of the academic institution in knowledge production (Divala, 2016: 100). Should knowledge be produced for “local consumption [or] for global competitiveness?” (Divala, 2016: 100). In the prevailing education practice, the global domain is perceived to be the validating sphere for all education and has promises of financial returns for both the learner and education provider (Oviawe, 2016: 5–6). Consequently, institutions of learning are detached from their local communities’ needs in the quest of being recognised as globally relevant on global scales. University researchers aspire to earn the endorsement and praise of global scholarly and ranking communities which have special interests in a particular kind of research that necessarily does not usually prioritise the community interests of the locality of the university (Divala, 2016: 100). Education planners and curriculum developers (inspired by such globalist research) through their curriculum and pedagogy recommendations are thus committed to realising a globalist learner and citizen (Pais & Costa, 2017: 4). All such practices alienate the individual learner from his or her
local context. This disconnect is not only about curriculum content and practices. Since the alienation has almost attained an ideological status, it influences the learner’s moral intellect, as there is a clear disconnection between educational experiences and the concrete lived experiences of the community. Education no longer emphasises relations with and among people in the community. Interconnectedness gets lost. The higher one moves up the educational ladder the more isolated and alienated from the concrete needs of the community does one become. Being educated becomes synonymous with alienation (Nyerere, 1968: 56).

As shown in the previous chapter (see section 5.5), language of instruction policies in the school too need to be guided by ubuntu considerations. Currently, education is associated with the prestigious global social-marking languages (Matiki, 2006). As a corollary, local languages are never associated with academic progress and rising on the social ladder (Probyn, 2005). However, this undermines the reality that the local languages are the languages of interconnectedness and togetherness among learners and with their community. One can deduce that such a stark intentional exclusion and absence of the local language is alienating the learner from his or her community. Upon being detached from her community, the learner is effectively compelled to consider his or her interests in the learning process, in the construction, value and use of knowledge only in the conceptual categories underlying the school language.

The learner is also alienated from effectively engaging with subject content as there is a linguistic barrier (Bunyi, 2005: 133; Probyn, 2005: 166). Ubuntu education would therefore demand, among others, as Brock-Utne (2016: 34) argues, the adoption of education policies that are grounded in “translanguaging frameworks which recognise alternation of languages … [to] help reorient multilingual and bilingual education towards the African value of Ubuntu” (Brock-Utne, 2016: 34). Calling for the embracing of ubuntu ideals does not entail jettisoning the moral and cultural attributes obtained from other cultures and moral outlooks, because there is no pristine culture (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1198). Furthermore, the translanguaging, unlike foreign monolingualism, is necessary because the lived experiences of actual embodied persons draw from diverse moral traditions and not exclusively one.

Demanding that the curriculum be Africanised essentially entails blending “African-based paradigms” with “other knowledge paradigms” so that the curriculum has fair measures of each intellectual tradition (Etieyibo, 2016: 406). For instance, “language is not a neutral instrument of expression. It is a means through which a group expresses its worldview and history, its perceived role, and social relations” (Assie’-Lumumba, 2016: 22). Despite there
being universal moral truths, there are, however, diverse ways in which such truths are conceptualised and actualised.

This position of variations in actualisations of universalism is not necessarily about ethical relativism originating from differences in cultural practices and outlooks. Rather, the position is that even at the philosophical and ethical levels, a fundamental ideal such as human dignity can be actualised in either an individualist ethic or a commmunalistic one. Cultures as people’s practice of the ethical ideals are in part significantly shaped by the people’s dominant philosophy. As Assié-Lumumba (2016: 22–23) argues, a people’s language sometimes embeds the philosophical ideals that drive their society.

6.4.2. Ubuntu and assessment
It is worth noting and emphasising that education for democratic and global citizenship is not the preserve of subjects whose content is essentially about civic values and life. Almost every subject, teacher, practice, tradition, pedagogy and experience in the school significantly contributes towards citizenship construction (Hansen, 2011: 117). Assessment practice is one such domain in the school that shapes citizenship and must therefore embrace ubuntu ideals. Beets and Le Grange (2005: 1200) argue, “assessment of/for/as learning should crucially be informed by the socio-cultural backgrounds of learners” and hence call for consideration of ubuntu values as an alternative perspective to the ontological condition of the learner, in order to depart from the predominantly and exclusively individualistic one (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1200). Questions of what should be the purpose of assessment and what mode of assessment to adopt need incessant engagement in order to achieve more authentic and meaningful ways of assessing (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1199).

Beets and Le Grange (2005: 1200) contend:

[In] Western(ised) countries assessment of learning (summative assessment) has dominated assessment practices. Such an approach separates assessment activities from teaching and learning activities and as a consequence produces relationships between teachers/lecturers and learners that are aloof. Summative assessments tend to present results in the form of quantitative indices reducing learner’s abilities/potential to mere numbers and more disturbingly learners who do not attain required pass marks are labelled failures – the effects of summative assessment could be described as inhumane.

Summative assessment is therefore essentially hierarchical in that it ranks individuals in terms of their abilities. The position one has on the score rankings is arguably proportional to the prospects for success one has in the mainstream society. One would argue that in a way,
summative assessment is meant to profile learners in terms of their ability and employability for structured absorption into the labour market, which has become the ultimate and exclusive aim for education. Usually, those whose performance is deemed low or below the pass mark are regarded as ‘failures’ in the school, and most probably or inevitably, in general life. In principle, such a ‘failing’ learner is understood as being of less value or utility to the economic society as it were, and as such he or she does not command more attention from the teacher, school, the market, as well as the general community. This undermines their humanness. The point is not that there should be no aspects of summative assessment in the school. Rather, formative assessments should not exclusively monopolise, assessment practices in the school because in principle, they marginalise and indict those who are ‘failures’.

An ubuntu awareness, as Beets and Le Grange (2005) argue, develops room for a relation (connectedness) between the teacher, and their learners. Alternative forms of assessment ought to supplement summative assessment so that such exploring and enriching relationships between the learner and teacher develop. As Beets and Le Grange (2005: 1200) further observe, there is generally a consensus among thinkers for the need for models of assessment that involve cultivation and sustenance of a teacher–learner relationship, thus acknowledging that –

[Assessment is not only about making a judgement (in an aloof manner), but rather about being with the learner every step of the way and being prepared to recognise learning difficulties in a respectful and dignified way [through] genuine sharing of acquired knowledge and skills with compassion to the achievement of the intended outcomes.

In so far as competition and obsessive individualism typify education, it is difficult to humanise assessment (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1200). It is here where ubuntu ideals would help redeem the situation. Through its moral virtues of connectedness, care, responsibility and empathy, ubuntu would ensure that learners experience assessment in a positive, constructive way since “the teacher/lecturer who guides the learning process, is a humane and caring person who is fully aware of [learners’] fears and difficulties” (Beets & Le Grange, 2005: 1202). Ubuntu would demand of the teacher to understand assessment as a means for giving feedback to the learners about the learning, as well as the teaching processes. The ultimate value of assessment rests on a caring and empathetic relationship with learners who have performed below minimal expectations, trying to discover the causative forces behind the performance and reflecting together on how to overcome them. In other words,
assessment ought to be more than fulfilling positivist duties aimed at having data for making valuation of learners’ performance and ability. It should be governed by care and empathy.

6.4.3. Ubuntu and environmentalism

The idea of ubuntu connection includes both humans and nature (Kayira, 2015: 123). Ubuntu emphasises the moral virtues of responsibility, reciprocity and care towards human and non-human others (Kayira, 2015: 110) making its perspectives relevant in the pursuit of meaningful environmentalism in education for citizenship. Largely, modern education has departed from emphasising holistic thinking about relationships and interdependences within and among communities and how they relate with the ecology, to “a more positivist and segmented worldview that essentially separates humans from nature” (Oviawe, 2016: 5). Furthermore –

[T]he global capitalist system which has influenced how education is conceptualised, designed and delivered around the world is often linear and mechanistic as opposed to organic and circular. As a result, communities, institutions and schools reflect silos that are reinforced with different levels of specialisation and credentialing (Oviawe, 2016: 5).

In environmental education for instance, it is necessary that the curriculum and pedagogy should in fair measures consider both conventional scientific, as well as the local communities’ indigenous modes of comprehending nature (Kayira, 2015: 118). The implication here is that there is an intersection between Eurocentric science and the local knowledge, which is informed by the idea of ubuntu connectedness. As such “students, teachers, curriculum developers and community Elders [ought to] collaborate in the co-construction of new hybrid meaning and interpretations of science” (Kayira, 2015: 118). One can draw that since the ubuntu idea of interconnectedness also extends to the non-human animal world as well as the biosphere, the environment is therefore not for individual, unmoderated exploitation, neither should it be used to the exclusion of the other.

Whilst acknowledging that there are ambivalent attitudes in African ethnophilosophy towards the natural environment (Taringa, 2006; Ben & Woll, 2012), the ubuntu ethic still has potentiality to achieve sustainable environmental education. At the heart of achieving a sustainable environment is the problem of economics (Martin, 2013: 101). As already shown, the prevailing global neoliberal economic order is unsustainable with respect to the ecology. There is an urgency to humanise this obsessive individual-centric economics and this requires confronting the understanding of the essentialist rational self-interest nature of the human being and the implications such an essentialist nature has on the value of his or her
relationships with others including the non-human world. This is a gap that the interconnectedness, care and responsibility of ubuntu would greatly help to fill. The ubuntu principle of interconnectedness is not restricted to human beings only, but to the whole cosmos: among humans, as well as between humans and the biosphere (Le Grange, 2012: 334). Ubuntu is therefore both “a condition of being and the state of becoming, or openness or ceaseless unfolding” hence crucial in global environmental management (Ramose, 2009, cited in Le Grange, 2012: 334).

The global environmental crisis humanity is now experiencing is largely due to excessive and unsustainable pollution of the environment resulting from individual and national pursuits of economic aspirations in a fiercely competitive manner. As a consequence, there has been neglect of the reality that humanity is also connected through the biosphere. As such, in relating with the biosphere, wider and more stringent interests of the distant economically weak other of the globe need to be considered at the individual or national levels. There ought to be harmony among the three moral ecologies of the self, the social (or global sphere) and nature, the implication being that a broken environment will cause disharmony among these three ecologies (Le Grange, 2012: 334). Thus, the human being is neither isolated from nor apart from nature as an entity, which he or she may overcome and exploit without breaking the harmony. Ubuntu would therefore call for responsible utilisation of the environment that is governed primarily by the humanness you share with others such that the paramountcy of economic self-interest will be downgraded, regulated and moderated by the higher principles of humanness and interconnectedness. Learners would among other things be requested to explore how, as individuals and communities, they are faring in relation to sustenance of harmony among these three moral ecologies of self, community and nature.

Ubuntu environmentalism does not entail teaching learners about myths and a distant romanticised past. Rather, it aspires to show learners in concrete terms how, not only they have an obligation to achieve harmony with global humanity, but that such harmony extends to and also depends on harmony with nature. As such, learners would be involved in projects or engaging local experiences about how mismanagement of the environment in their immediate communities leads to disharmony among humans, the self and others, ultimately threatening human existence.

6.5. Conclusion
The main challenge facing strong cosmopolitanism is its exclusion of the community in moral configurations of citizenship, regarding the community as inherently morally arbitrary.
However, the relational rationality of *ubuntu* ethics demonstrates that the community has moral value worth factoring into the moral theorisation of citizenship.

The major *ubuntu* values of humanness, interconnectedness and harmony would help address the glaring gaps in the prevalent individual-centric conceptions of citizenship and education. These ideals further show that contrary to strong cosmopolitanism, the community interest is not at odds with universalism, equality and individuality.

Furthermore, an *ubuntu* conception of citizenship, on account of its commitment to deliberation aimed at consensus-building, care and empathy, is compatible with the difference-grounded deliberative universalism that is lacking in the prevailing dominant global citizenship theories. In other words, *ubuntu* relational ethics is compatible with the concrete otherness of the world’s diverse people as Benhabib (1992: 153) argues.

An *ubuntu*-inspired education for democratic and global citizenship, owing to its regard for humanness and interconnectedness, is also best suited to confront and challenge the prevalent monetarisation of education. This is because the thriving of the monetarisation of education is largely anchored in excessively individual-centric conceptualisations of education and society such as of the strong cosmopolitan type, ultimately prizing competition, and individual attainment only, at the expense of caring for common humanity.

An *ubuntu* education for democratic citizenship can be realised through, among others, having a curriculum of which the content is in tandem with the people’s lived experiences, an assessment that is sensitive to our common humanness, rather than over-emphasising academic attainment-based stratification. Lastly, the interconnectedness of *ubuntu* among the moral ecologies of self, society and nature would ensure the sustainable use of the environment, as *ubuntu* conceives nature not as an object to be exploited for unbridled self-interest.

It is therefore evident that the exclusive claim of the individual-centric universalism of strong cosmopolitanism, that categorically dismisses relational being as subjective hence unfit for global citizenship conceptualisation is problematic. Ultimately, nationality which hosts such relational concreteness is indispensable in global citizenship conceptualisation.
Chapter 7: Concluding Reflections: Towards a New Cosmopolitanism

7.1. Research summary

Malawian primary education removed Malawian History (which is also absent at the secondary school level) from its curriculum. Malawi has also just removed mother tongue instruction from the first four years of primary education, replacing it with English. The ultimate underlying motivation for these educational policy changes is the pursuit of cosmopolitan citizenship, where education should produce individuals whose scope of interests, obligations, and competetiveness extends beyond the nation-state.

The necessity of cultivation of cosmopolitan values (as contrasted with only national citizenship values) through education for democratic citizenship in Malawi and across the globe is indisputable. Besides the normative imperativeness of cosmopolitan ideals, the demands of modern interconnectedness of all the people of the world in their everyday lives are inescapable. The interconnectedness also demands that the interests of the others of the world who are not co-nationals should be a priority in moral decision-making. The fundamentalism of the ideal of human equality and its consequent universal impartial duties (unrestrained by nationality) are thus non-negotiable.

However, despite this consensus, the question of what the form and substance of ideal cosmopolitanism should constitute, is still left open and unresolved. Examining the nature of education for democratic citizenship being practised in Malawian education, the question of the role of (national) particularism in (cosmopolitan) universalism comes to the fore. Is nationality inherently inimical to cosmopolitanism? Does ideal education for democratic citizenship necessarily demand exclusion of patriotic considerations such as teaching and learning of a national history? Is employment of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction only a matter of effectiveness and efficiency in teaching and learning, and not a valid normative matter? There is also the question of the implications on ideal human equality, of the exclusive impartiality orientations of strong cosmopolitan citizenship among the people in developing nations under the prevailing global order.

In response to these pertinent questions, this dissertation has argued that the citizenship that Malawi is pursuing through the removal of national history and mother tongue instruction in the first four years of primary education is normatively problematic, because it has adverse implications for human equality. Such policy expressions reveal the adoption and motivation
of strong cosmopolitanism. Ostensibly necessitated by the universalism duties of human equality, strong cosmopolitanism strips national particularity commitments of normative value, substituting them with and assigning value to the exclusive duties of impartiality only. This dissertation has argued that this brand of cosmopolitanism is problematic because it in principle undermines human equality.

The education for democratic citizenship that Malawi is pursuing demands the marginalisation of the local language and history, and is therefore asymmetrical with ideal cosmopolitan equality. Ideal cosmopolitanism is a unity of opposites: it is an aspiration for achieving the universal in the local. Supplanting the local for the universal is a heritage of neo-Kantian essentialism which regards the subjective as not rational, and hence unworthy of inclusion in normative conceptualisations of the universalism of human equality.

These policy changes reveal that for the Malawian government, the removal of mother tongue instruction in the context of globalist pressures is not regarded as a normative matter, but one only driven by convenience and efficiency. In other words, such positions do not either recognise the moral value of mother-tongue instruction, or when they do, such value is considered to be less weighty, normatively speaking, than the pragmatic utility of the global convenience derived from replacing the mother-tongue by English.

This dissertation has argued in Chapter Two that nationality has normative value in that it embodies and hosts the local sources of individual and collective concreteness which substantially constitute the people’s being in the world. The individual person achieves the autonomous capacity through an indispensable reliance on the ‘subjective’ relations and the care others non-reciprocally give him or her. The common sharing of language, history, shared public culture, and territory make possible and sustain such relations and institutions of care. Since it hosts individuals’ and communities’ sources of concreteness, the nation is the edifice upon which the political community builds, and continues with the national community’s aspirations and mode of cohesion. Thus, the national community, in significant measure constitutes both the end and means for the political community’s struggles for justice. The political community inherits the struggles, injustices, achievements, and aspirations of the national community such that the shape and justness of the present political community are largely responses to its historical past. Nationality is therefore indispensable in the sustenance of a civic patriotism. Civic patriotism cannot be decoupled from nationality.
Nationality also provides members with the languages for active and meaningful participation in democratic life, thus promoting self-determination. A member’s lack of the modes of expression, the informal terms of engagement, the community’s meaning-making frames, civic values, and common culture would impede his or her meaningful participation, as well as sustenance of the political community itself.

With respect to cosmopolitanism, this study has argued in Chapter Three that in both its ideal and historical origins cosmopolitanism is a dualistic ideal with the two faces of particularism and universalism enabling and regulating each other. Trying to take away one to remain with the other, only results in collapsing the very essence of cosmopolitanism.

The elevation of impartiality by strong cosmopolitanism as the sole primary determinant of normativity of human relations is an inheritance from the neo-Kantian essentialist orientation of human nature as consisting of the rational and affective categories only. Ultimately, only the ‘objective’ impartial human interests are accorded moral worth, leading to the idea of the detached atomistic individual as the ultimate and exclusive pre-occupation of normativity. However, universalism of human equality can be conceptualised in other frameworks that are non-atomistic, yet still acknowledge the value of both relational being and individual-centrism.

The strong cosmopolitanism demand for neutrality over the particularism of nationality on the grounds that nationality is inimical to cosmopolitan universalism, is informed by a wrong diagnosis of the underlying causes of global inequality. Global inequalities cannot be meaningfully understood without considering the role of responsibility over the causation of the inequalities. Unless such a causation establishes who is responsible, blaming national interests by placing stringent impartial duties that undermine the nation, does not address the core problem. What also makes the prevailing global order unjust is not necessarily the ostensibly inherent problematicism of nationality. Rather, it is that the inevitable representation of national interests at the global level, is skewed against many peoples in developing nations. The solution therefore lies in balancing nations’ interests and not removing them, for the consequent global order emerging after extinguishing nationality would undermine people’s self-determination and promote tyranny as the order would only pursue global homogeneity.

A meaningful cosmopolitanism, besides placing primacy on similarity among human beings, should also include difference, that which makes the people other, because in such otherness
reside individuation and the ultimate of being human. The inward dimension of patriotism would as such ensure that the patriarchy’s political community is consistent with higher normative ideals to ensure there is no oppression and marginalisation within it. On the other hand, the outward dimension of patriotism would ensure that the national community relates with other peoples’ collectives in a non-homogenising way which recognises both what makes other people other, as well as the generic impartial moral duties humanity owes each other irrespective of particularities. Cosmopolitan education should thus endeavour to achieve universalism through a dialogue regarding the people’s differences. Universalism should not be about making a choice between the particular and the universal, for none can singlehandedly serve human equality. Universalism ought to be about a difference-grounded dialogue that endeavours to realise the universal through the concreteness of the individuating otherness of the world’s peoples.

In Chapter Four I have shown that one of the arguably central aims of education is that it must develop critical, authentic individuals. In as much as education is expected to sustain the social structure, it is not meant to reproduce it, but to be critical of it so as to make it as non-oppressive as possible. However, I have argued that in the pursuit of authenticity, an absolutist prioritisation and unconditional primacy of impartiality that supplants national particularity in education for citizenship over-exaggerates the comprehensiveness of the generality of the human being with respect to community life. The sharing of linguistic, historical, cultural, and territorial commonalities makes the political community one of shared fate. The fate of the members substantially revolves around the elements of nationality even though they may value them differently. Furthermore, strong cosmopolitanism’s ostensibly impartial education for citizenship in essence inures particularism and surreptitiously marginalises any other epistemologies on account of their being ‘subjective’. Education that is meaningful and just is that which is responsive to the learner’s lived experiences. An extensively impartial globalist education that mutes local particularism contravenes the fundamental requirement for meaningful education.

In Chapter Five I have shown that the model of education for democratic citizenship that Malawi is currently pursuing, is asymmetrical with ideal human equality, and only serves to alienate her epistemological, historical, and linguistic concreteness from the global order. I have argued that in Malawian political history, nationality has been initially an inspiring, later troubling, and now a troubled ideal. It was the motivation and means for colonial resistance. However, upon achievement of political independence it became the object for oppression,
boundedness, indoctrination, alienation, and human rights violation. Currently though, it is under trouble as it is being systematically marginalised as normatively empty in deference to a cosmopolitanism of exclusive impartiality. A lack of political will, and pressure from the neoliberalism underlying global interconnectedness preside over this marginalisation.

The consequence is that sources of Malawian concreteness and epistemologies, are being marginalised as incompatible with the detached individual and with the neoliberal interests of strong cosmopolitanism. The essentialist categorisation of the national local as subjective, following neo-Kantianism, effectively undermines the normative value of mother tongue instruction as well as the moral relevance of historicity to the Malawian community. Malawi, and indeed the world, need education for cosmopolitan citizenship that is inclusive of the subjectivity of national otherness. Other than being arbitrary, nationality embodies the frames of expression, epistemologies, and concreteness of the peoples of the world which can neither be substituted, nor rendered neutral, without undermining the otherness that makes the ‘invisible absent’ peoples of the world in developing nations both other and human. The essentialism of strong cosmopolitanism that generally regards the ‘subjective’ Other epistemologies and ethics as subaltern cannot achieve equality because the essentialism typically summarily marginalises them as inconsistent with the ‘objective’ standards. Only a re-imagination of cosmopolitanism achieved from and through the differences that indispensably constitute the global peoples’ being, making them the concrete human beings they are, can ensure cosmopolitan equality. Such a cosmopolitanism’s education recognises the normative value of both partiality and impartiality without sacrificing one for the other. Through vernacularisation, such cosmopolitanism regards a critical promotion of both as the necessary condition for achieving human equality.

Through exploration of ubuntu principles, I have argued in Chapter Six that it is possible to have a normatively valid relational, as opposed to an exclusively individual-centric conceptualisation of human nature, that is compatible with recognising the normativity of individual and community interests. An excessively individual-centric conception of personhood that side-lines relational belonging is not exhaustively definitive of ultimate human nature. Relational perspectives of human nature, although they are not compatible with the essentialism of individual-centrism, are nevertheless more capable of recognising the value of the distinctive concreteness across global peoples’ communities. The relational rationality of ubuntu is also thus capable of confronting the prevalent monetarisation of education that is due to the advancement, by modern education, of an exclusively agent-
centric impartial education. Without necessarily advocating relativism, the complexities of the modern world and the diversity of the heritage of global diversity demand going beyond the generality of human equality. There is a need to include and engage the otherness of the world. Citizenship founded on this model allows for room for the other to self-define and be recognised as an equal human being especially in terms of his or her subjectivities. From the perspective of global citizenship, such otherness is largely hosted in his or her shared language, history, common culture, and territory.

All in all, this dissertation acknowledges that education for democratic citizenship today can no longer be restricted to the nation only, because the interconnectedness of people makes urgent imagination and performance of moral duties that transcend to the rest of humanity. However, the nature, breath, and scope of such duties ought not in any way displace particularistic duties. The two domains of duties are interactive, yet distinct. National particularism is an indispensable catalytic collaborator of cosmopolitan universalism.

7.2. Contribution of the study

The thesis makes three major contributions to the theorization of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship education. The first key contribution of this study lies in its arguing that reconceptualising universalism under a difference-grounded moral standpoint reveals that the central postulates of strong cosmopolitan impartiality in principle undermine, particularly among the less powerful peoples of the world, the very human equality ideal that the cosmopolitanism seeks to achieve. The inherent essentialist dismissal of historical, linguistic and cultural particularism that is embedded in strong cosmopolitanism denies recognition of the normativity of subjectivity in the imagination of global citizenship, denying the situated peoples of the world the concreteness of their being. Not only does such marginalization of concrete being ultimately deny them equality as equal human beings, but rather the denial of recognition of their concreteness also sets them up for assimilation into the dominant mainstream culture and epistemology that underly global citizenship education. If global citizenship education is to be grounded in human equality then it must necessarily be responsive to the concreteness of global peoples. Global citizenship must centre difference other than marginalise it by focusing only on what is common among humankind. Unless cosmopolitanism theorisation centres difference, it in principle hides and perpetuates the forms of inequality that undermine the equality of the less powerful people of the world owing to the lack of economic power of their languages, epistemologies, shared culture, and histories.
Secondly this dissertation has shown that the disdain for subjectivity and difference that inheres and informs the strong cosmopolitanism Malawian primary education is pursuing renders the cosmopolitanism particularistic. Strong cosmopolitan universalism is grounded in a particularistic conceptualisation of human nature that privileges individual-centrism. Making such a (Kantian) individual-centric perspective that is particularistic to be the universalism benchmark for dismissing subjectivities of concrete situatedness of people across the globe makes the cosmopolitanism assimilationist as it unduly privileges one of the alternative valid philosophical conceptualisations of being human as the ultimate standard.

Thirdly, this dissertation has shown that ideal cosmopolitanism must necessarily presuppose an ideal global interconnectedness that is not characterised by inequality and hegemonic metaphysical conceptualisations of human nature. The global interconnectedness upon which strong cosmopolitanism depends has linguistic, cultural, metaphysical and epistemological hegemony, as it is inhered by Eurocentrism. Theories of cosmopolitanism that regard the cosmopolitanism-enabling global interconnectedness as pertaining only to non-ideal theory and not ideal theory are complicit in perpetuating the global inequalities that characterise globality. Ultimately, as long as the education for global citizenship is informed by such cosmopolitanism it will entrench epistemic, linguistic and cultural domination by selected worldviews over the rest of the world. Guarantees of ensuring equality in global citizenship greatly depends on demanding that cosmopolitan citizenship should be responsive to the concreteness of the peoples of the world. To be normatively justified, cosmopolitan citizenship conceptualisations must therefore necessarily center other than marginalise difference.

The implications of this thesis on education policy and practice is that it demands affirmation of locality as a necessary requirement of ideal cosmopolitanism. Matters of deciding the place of mother tongue instruction and the teaching of national history in the curriculum should not be determined in financial utility terms or in terms of global convenience only. Such matters must be understood as having a normative dimension. Education for democratic citizenship must thus be democratised to be consistent with people’s concreteness. The education must centre local concreteness as a normative necessity. Besides centring local epistemologies, the school must employ pedagogical experiences that are consistent with the concrete philosophical worldviews of the learners. The education in Malawi and much of Africa must therefore be decolonised to be democratic.
Towards affirmation of the local

As this dissertation has shown, individual and community concreteness as a core attribute of being, ought to contribute to the constitution of universalism. Such an inclusion neither negates, nor undermines the normative validity and relevance of the duties emanating from the generality of humanity i.e. the ‘objective’ duties of moral impartiality. Rather, these two moral standpoints ought to collaborate and one is insufficient and incomplete without the other. The implication of this for cosmopolitanism is that education for democratic citizenship should seek to cultivate universal ideals through democratic iterations where ideals will, upon being debated and deliberated, be vernacularised, thus be appropriated in the local frameworks of meaning-making. This means the essentialist classification of all subjectivity as being unfit to partly constitute the normativity of a cosmopolitan citizenship will no longer hold. Universalism will be a result of interaction between critical contestation of the local particular and vernacularisation of the universal. In education for democratic citizenship, this would, among others, entail as a normative requirement, teaching and learning in the mother tongue wherever feasible. It would also entail having learners critically assess the history of the nation, its practices, and values in terms of how the history affected and affects the moral entitlements of the people both within it and without. Requisite moral duties would thereafter be established, besides demanding care in how to relate with other nations in a non-homogenising way.

Such inclusion of the otherness dimension of localness will ensure that the autonomous individual on whom strong cosmopolitanism is fixated and who is also an integral part of morality, has his or her sources of care provision retained, for their collapse disables achievement of autonomy. This is because nationality hosts some of the institutions and networks on which development of individual autonomy irreplaceably depends.

It is also worth noting that cultivating cosmopolitanism does not pertain to curriculum content only, but pedagogical experiences too that involve encountering otherness. It is imperative for Malawi and Africa to actively develop their languages and epistemologies or else their people stand to be marginalised. With less than 1% of Malawians using English as their household language (National Statistics Office of Malawi, 1998), yet it is the official language and language of global opportunities, the marginalisation only escalates as they cannot realise their full potential and make appropriate contributions to the global order.
Their perspectives will continue to be missing in global education, knowledge, and scholarship, making very little profound and meaningful change to the African condition whose transformation rests largely on African initiatives.

7.4. Africa’s responsibility

This dissertation has shown that an impartiality ethic that builds on the prevailing global interconnectedness is problematic. Such an impartiality presupposes a global order that has equitable economic, epistemological, and cultural representation of the peoples of the world. Neglecting correction of global inequalities and merely building on its interconnection that is inhered by inequality, immediately renders absent and invisible the otherness of the majority of the economically weak nations of the world. Ultimately the absence of the other’s voices from the global order under the influence of neo-liberalism only compels them to integrate into the mainstream.

However, besides this iniquitous global order, what needs emphasis is the role of African nations themselves in at least averting a homogenising global citizenship and education. In as much as Africa’s efforts to make the global order representative and equitable are thwarted by neo-liberalism and an imbalanced global order, there is still so much of Africa’s own collusion in perpetrating and sustaining her own disadvantaged condition. Neo-colonial attitudes still prevail in much of African public policy-making. Marginalisation of African languages where they would easily be employed such as in courts, parliament, schools, internet and public media is exclusively a choice that rests with African nations themselves.

Affirmation of the value of the local substantially rests with African nations. Decolonisation of the curriculum in Africa cannot be effected by ‘impartial’ global forces. Africa must initiate it. Regional and continental organisations in Africa must pull together to affirm and develop their common languages and epistemologies. It is disempowering to observe that there is very little content in indigenous African languages on the internet, for instance, yet 1.2 billion of the 7.3 billion world population lives in Africa (United Nations Population Division, 2017) and the internet is unavoidably at the centre of modern life. My position is that taking restorative steps towards affirmation of Africa’s alternative perspectives in education and knowledge construction, is possible only if and when African political leadership so decides.
7.5. **Study limitations and further research**

This dissertation calls for the inclusion of nationality in conceptualisations of ideal citizenship. However, one of the realities of the modern world is that communities are increasingly becoming multi-cultural. The ideal national national response to such multiplicity is not simple, but it is also categorically not neutralism. Rather, there must be ways to establish what commonly binds the community as a community of shared fate without making others’ interests invisible. There is need for further research as to how the multi-cultural nation should ensure that it promotes a sense of legitimate unbounded patriotism, without side-lining and marginalising other groups within the community.

Furthermore, with respect to the challenges being uniquely faced by developing nations, the question of negotiating between an ideal cosmopolitan theory and what is practicable in ensuring recognition and representation of the sources of concreteness of the peoples of the world in the global order is a complex matter that requires further study. For instance, how meaningfully and sustainably to develop one language out of many others in a nation into a language of education, science, and trade requires more researching, because there are moral, political, and economic implications for achieving such an endeavour. If it is not achievable as idealised, there is need to establish at least the approximations of the ideal that will ensure service of the minimum particularistic interests.

Lastly, I am also cognisant of the fact that the substance constituting the nationality elements of history, common culture, language, and even territoriality is greatly contestable. There is need for further research into what should determine the content of patriotism in the curriculum without amounting to essentialism. The threat of bounded nationalism cannot be downplayed.
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