How the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct
South Africa as a nation

by
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Declaration

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ABSTRACT

The ‘nation’ is a powerful social construct. How it is understood has significant consequences for a society and its people. Actors compete for the ability to define the ‘nation’ as a means to spread their views and influence. Consequently, the conceptualisation of the nation remains subject to discursive contest and susceptible to change.

South Africa is no stranger to the nation being redefined. Pre-1994 South Africa was shaped by segregationist policies. During apartheid, race determined national identity and the relationship among racial groups. The different ethnic nations co-existed in the South African territory, but they did not do so as equals. Non-white populations were oppressed and exploited and this provoked a struggle, which culminated in the country’s liberation in the 1990s with a negotiated settlement.

The 1994 election symbolically marked the beginning of post-apartheid South Africa. It was also used as an opportunity to promote a reinvented South African nation. This ‘new’ national identity was to be based on inclusivity, equality and diversity. Archbishop coined the term ‘rainbow nation’ to reflect this vision for post-apartheid South Africa.

The socio-political context in which South Africa as a nation is constructed has changed since 1994. Political parties have started to strategically focus on difference in order to win or maintain political support (Sarakinsky, 2001). This led to the research question of how three important political parties in South Africa, namely the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), construct South Africa as a nation.

Bacchi’s (2004) concept ‘problem representation’ was applied to official political party documents and political parties’ social media to examine their respective constructions of the nation. Bacchi (2004) argues that by using problem representations one can identify certain underlying assumptions that are implicitly being promoted by the construction of the problem. The concept ‘problem representation’ was used to identify what assumptions underpin their construction of the South African nation by analysing constructions of public policy problems and by looking at what these political parties find problematic about the notion of a Rainbow Nation.

The ANC and the DA share a commitment to the ‘rainbow nation’. Both parties see unity, diversity and equality as desirable and as the foundation of South African national identity. In contrast, the EFF rejects the 1994 national narrative. They do not regard it as a reimagination
of South African national identity and dispute the premise that the ‘new’ South Africa is based on the principles of equality, unity and diversity. According to the EFF, the nation remains ethnically, or racially, defined and black people remains subjugated. Support for the EFF indicates that political parties can benefit from promoting an alternative construction of the nation. However, discarding an inclusive, civic national identity can come at the cost of developing a more socially cohesive South Africa in the long run.
Die begrip ‘nasie’ is ‘n kragtige sosiale konstruksie. Die verstaan hiervan het beduidende gevolge vir die samelewing en sy mense. Die begrip word gebruik om beleid te formuleer en speel daarom ‘n groot rol in die vorming van standpunt en uitbreiding van invloed in die samelewing. Gevolglik bly die konseptualisering van die ‘nasie’ onderhewig aan diskursiewe geskille en vatbaar vir verandering.

Om ‘n nasie so te herdefinieer is natuurlik nie vreemd aan Suid-Afrika nie. Voor 1994 was Suid-Afrika immers gevorm deur segregasie politiek. Gedurende apartheid het ras, en die verhouding tussen verskillende rasse, die nasionale identiteit bepaal. Die verskillende etniese groepe het so as aparte groepe van mekaar bestaan - nie as gelykes van mekaar nie. Nie-wit gemeenskappe is onderdruk en uitgebuit. Dit het gely tot die bevrydingstryd wat uitgeloop het op die onderhandelde skikking in die 1990’s.


Die sosiale konteks waarin Suid-Afrika as ‘n nasie gevorm is, het egter sedert 1994 verander. Politieke partye het strategies al meer gefokus op verskille in ‘n poging om politieke steun te behou of te werf (Sarakinsky, 2001). Dit het gely tot hierdie navorsing waarin die vraag beantwoord word oor hoe drie belangrike politieke partye in Suid-Afrika, naamlik die African National Congress (ANC), die Demokratiese Alliansie (DA) en die Ekonomiese Vryheidsvegters (EFF) Suid-Afrika as a nasie definieer.

Bacchi (2004) se konsep van ‘probleemvoorstelling’ is aangewend in die bestudering van amptelige dokumente en sosiale media van die verskillende politieke partye, om die verskille in die verstaan van ‘n ‘nasie’ uit te wys. Bacci (2004) voer aan dat deur die konsep van ‘probleemvoorstelling’ onderliggende vertrekpunkte reeds eksplisiet bevorder word. Die konsep van ‘probleemvoorstelling’ is gebruik om te identifiseer watter aannames gebruik word in die konstruksië van die Suid-Afrikaanse nasie. Dit is gedoen deur openbare beleidsprobleme te ontleed en agter te kom wat hierdie politieke partye as problematies ervaar in die idee van ‘n Reënboognasie.
Die ANC en die DA deel ‘n verbintenis tot die konsep van ‘n ‘reënboognasie’. Albei partye sien eenheid, diversiteit en gelykheid as wenslik en as die grondslag in hul konstruksie van ‘n nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse nasie. In teenstelling hiermee verwerp die EFF hierdie nasionale narratief van 1994. Hulle beskou dit nie as ‘n herkenning van Suid-Afrikaanse nasionale identiteit nie en betwis die veronderstelling dat die ‘nuwe' Suid-Afrika gebaseer is op die beginsels van gelykheid, eenheid en diversiteit. Volgens die EFF bly die nasie etnies of rassisties gedefinieer en swartmense bly onderdruk. Ondersteuning vir die EFF dui daarop dat politieke partye wel voordeel kan trek uit die bevordering van ‘n alternatiewe konstruksie van die nasie. Die wegdoen van ‘n inklusiewe, burgerlike nasionale identiteit kan egter op die lange duur ten koste wees van ‘n groter eenheid (kohesie) tussen alle Suid-Afrikaners.
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I would like to thank my parents, whose support has only ever been matched by their love. None of this would have been possible without them, nor without the Lord we share. Consider this completed thesis dedicated to you as a token of my sincere gratitude.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCYL</td>
<td>African National Congress Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFF</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Fighters</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Progressive Reform Party</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction and background

South Africa may have existed as a unified territory since 1910, but it was not a nation. Instead, the land was shared by several ethnic nations, which existed in competition with one another. Segregationist policies had a significant role in creating this political, social and economic landscape. They rigidly classified people and ethnic groups according to race. The legislation discarded ethnic diversity within racial categories and so established ‘racial’ nations in South Africa. These legislated racial identities in turn determined the rights and freedoms people would be afforded, or denied, in South Africa. Given that segregation was heavily influenced by white supremacy, the white nation was invariably benefitted by these policies and usually at the cost of the non-white nations.

Against expectations, this legislated system of racial oppression and exploitation was concluded relatively peacefully. Apartheid was brought to an end through a negotiated settlement and the 1994 election symbolically marked South Africa’s transition to a multi-racial democracy. Post-apartheid South Africa was meant to be decidedly different to its predecessor. This included how the ‘nation’ should be viewed in South Africa. An express attempt was made to create a unified national identity. All South Africans would share in this collective identity, regardless of race or ethnicity. In terms of the nation, South Africa’s transition can be interpreted as a shift from an ethnic understanding of the nation to a civic one.

Below the research provides a description of the nation as an ‘imagined community’. It gives an overview of what distinguishes such an ‘imagined community’ as an ethnic nation and as a civic nation. This brief outline also considers the possible implications an ethnic and a civic understanding view of the nation respectively have on the social capital. Neither version of the nation, however, is viewed as existing in perpetuity. A description of the nation, as a social construct, illustrates how the nation remains subject to change. Following this is a closer examination of the ‘nation’ in South Africa. The research shows how South Africa hosted several legislated communities that formed racial nations under apartheid. It then describes how a civic national identity was pursued in the wake of apartheid. The ‘rainbow nation’ represented this vision for post-apartheid South Africa and the research shows how the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution) supports this construction of the nation.
However, this chapter observes that South Africa has undergone several changes since 1994. One of these changes is the growing challenge to the rainbow nation. This led to the research question: how do the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) construct South Africa as a nation? The rationale behind this question is described where it is supposed that there is a movement away from the interdependence promoted. A sentiment that seems to be supported by the EFF’s rejection for the rainbow nation and their growing support. Following this is the methodology section, which explains how Bacchi’s (2004) concept of ‘problem representation’ is used to guide the research and analysis. Chapter one concludes with a chapter outline.

1.1.1. The nation: ethnic and civic

The ‘nation’ has been notoriously difficult to define and multiple attempts have been made over time (Anderson, 1983: 12; Visvanathan, 2006: 533). For the purpose of this research, Anderson’s (1983: 15) definition of the nation is used. According to this definition, the nation is “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983: 15).

Anderson (1983: 15-16) explains his understanding of the nation as follows. Firstly, the nation is imagined given that its members consider themselves connected even though they have realistically never met, or even heard of, most of their fellow members (Anderson, 1983: 15). Secondly, the nation is limited (Anderson, 1983: 16). It has finite, if elastic boundaries, outside of which other nations exist. No nation is seen as coterminous with humanity (Anderson, 1983: 16). Anderson (1983: 16) also characterises the nation as sovereign on the basis that it emerged during the Enlightenment and rejected the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm (Anderson, 1983: 16). Lastly, the nation is characterised as a community where a deep, horizontal comradeship exists among the members of the nation (Anderson, 1983: 16).

This research is specifically interested in the implications of characterising the nation as limited, as imagined and as a community. These characteristics denote how the ‘nation’ separates people. As an ‘imagined community’, the nation creates an in-group in that it is used to denote a ‘unique people’ (Visvanathan, 2006: 533). As ‘insiders’, individuals can derive a form of identity from being members of a nation (Visvanathan, 2006: 533). The limited nature of the nation means that membership is not freely available to everyone. There are always people who are excluded from the nation and are part of the outgroup. What delineates the
distinction between who belongs and who does not, varies from nation to nation (Blaser, 2004: 180).

The characteristics used to define a nation’s borders, are influenced by whether said nation can be defined as ‘ethnic’ or as ‘civic’. Ethnic nations consist of people who are ‘ethnically bounded’ (Mukherji, 2010:2). Their common membership is determined by culture or ethnicity, which can be traced through common descent, shared historical experience and so on (Mukherji, 2010:2). These commonalities are not so much about choices people made, as it about the circumstances of birth.

In contrast, civic nations are based on territory. Membership is extended to everyone who has a historic attachment to said territory (Lakoff, 2001; Kotze, 2012: 95). What connects the people to one another in this territory is a “central, national identity imposed on all citizens regardless of their cultural background” (Kotze, 2012: 95). These citizens gain the same obligations, rights and entitlements by virtue of their membership to the civic nation (Kotze, 2012: 95).

Ethic and civic nations show different ways in which a relationship is created among members of the same nation. This comradery is important and society can arguably not function without some sort of ‘fellow-feeling’ (Ariely, 2014: 573). Putnam (2007) uses social capital as a way to examine the relationship people have with others in their society. Social capital refers to the “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness” (Putnam, 2007: 137). It is frequently seen as an important dimension of social cohesion and these two concepts are regularly treated as synonymous (Ariely, 2014: 575).

A high level of social capital is seen as essential to the maintenance of a prosperous society (Ariely, 2014: 574). According to Putnam (2007: 137), there is significant amount of evidence, which indicates that where levels of social capital are higher people live longer and happier lives. Children also grow up healthier, safer and better educated in these environments (Putnam, 2007: 138). Additionally, higher levels of social capital positively impact the economy and democracy (Putnam, 2007: 138). In terms of the latter, higher levels of social capital are seen as beneficial for democracy because it facilitates “peaceful collective action, inclusiveness, tolerance, confidence in institutions and political participation” (Ariely, 2014: 573). Diversity, however, has the ability to adversely impact social capital.

Most countries, especially post-colonial states, have heterogenous populations where a territory is shared by several ethnicities (Mukherji, 2010; Ramutsindela, 2007). Greater ethnic diversity
is associated with lower social capital (Putnam, 2007). Putnam (2007: 159) relates this to social identity, people’s sense of who they are. Social distance is less in cases where people share a common social identity and people are consequently likelier to trust and cooperate with one another.

In contrast, where people are confronted with others who are too ‘unlike’ them, social distance is greater and it is more challenging for them to trust one another and to work together (Putnam, 2007: 159). Putnam (2007) postulates that ethnic diversity triggers a ‘hunkering down’ response, which negatively effects social capital. Where people feel that ethnic diversity is threatening their collective identity, they respond by ‘hunkering down’ (Putnam, 2007; Ariely, 2014: 573). They tend to withdraw from collective life and become less trusting (Putnam, 2007: 150-151).

‘Hunkering down’ is then not presented as the inevitable reaction to diversity but as people’s reaction when they feel as though their collective identity is being threatened by said differences. In this way, national identity, as a form of collective identity, can have a significant impact on social capital. The nature of this national identity, ethnic or civic, should also be considered given that they relate differently to ethnic or cultural diversity.

According to Mukherji (2010: 17), the relevance of ethnic differences is determined by how significant and socially pertinent society considers them to be. They do not automatically result in increased social distance. In an ethnic nation, however, these attributes have been internalised to the extent that members use it to distinguish themselves from other groups (Mukherji, 2010: 17). Cultural differences are at the core of their collective identity and this identity is likelier to be seen as under threat in the face of diversity. Although ethnic nations are not inherently conflictual, Lackoff (2001), Kotze (2012) and Visvanathan (2006) believe that they should be treated with caution exactly because it fosters rigid ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories.

Where there is a civic national identity, social capital is less likely to be negatively influenced by diversity. In civic nations, national identity crosses cultural distinctions such as race, religion, ethnicity and language (Lakoff, 2001). They are united by a commitment to a shared set of values that are seen as necessary for the common good (Mukherji, 2010:18). There is still ethnic diversity but in a civic nation there is the expectation that people are able transcend their differences to share in a united national identity (Mukherji, 2010:18-19). Hence, ethnicity may retain its personal importance but its social salience is reduced. This shared national
identity allows diverse people to act as a united community. It fosters a poignant sense of belonging and unity within the territory (Kotze, 2012:95). It is therefore less likely that people when confronted by diversity respond by ‘hunkering down’.

This is in line with Putnam’s (2007: 165) argument that the best way to minimise the adverse effects of diversity is by “creating a new, more capacious sense of ‘we’, a reconstruction of diversity that does not bleach out ethnic specificities”. National identity creates that ‘we’ in civic nations. It provides the conditions that let society to redraw social lines in a manner that transcends ancestry, which will allow societies to be both diverse and socially cohesive (Putnam, 2007: 161). While he accepts that it will take time and effort to deconstruct divisive ethnic identities, he believes that it is nevertheless possible and will be well worth the effort in the long run (Putnam, 2007: 165).

1.1.2. The nation as a social construct

According to Putnam (2007: 159), this shift in identity is possible because identity is socially constructed and can therefore be deconstructed and reconstructed. Anderson (1983: 13-14) regards the nation similarly where he argues that the only meaning that nations have is that which has been assigned to them by humans and these meanings can change over time. It is evident that Putnam (2007) and Anderson (1983) shares an ontological orientation, which is social constructionism.

Social constructionism “the belief that social phenomena are in a constant state of change because they are totally reliant on social interactions as they take place” (Walliman, 2006: 4). This research is similarly orientated and this section looks at how the nation can be viewed as a social construct and consequently remains subject to change.

The creation and existence of a social construct is dependent on social actors (Bryman, 2012: 33; O’Leary, 2007: 251). In terms of the nation, this means that the nation only exists because people believe that it exists. As stated by Anderson (1983: 13-14), it is people who create the nation by assigning meaning to it. People create and promote ways of understanding the world through discourse (Burr, 1995: 250). ‘Discourse’ refers to the language actors use in association with a social phenomenon (Burr, 1995:250). These actors are embedded in their respective social realities and are consequently always influenced by their context (Punch, 2005: 222). Given variation in context and beliefs that impact actors, there is no universal discourse. Instead, people produce several overlapping, challenging or competing discourses (Punch, 2005: 222; Burr, 1995: 285).
This is true in regards to the nation as well. Sutherland (2005) argues that the nation should not be taken for granted as people frequently do. What is understood as the ‘nation’ is not reflective of an ‘eternal’ truth but reflects one way in which it is understood at the time. Similarly, Strum (2007: 104) contends that nationalist events and symbols project the nation as consensual and timeless whereas in reality the nation is an ongoing site for contestation. The nation, as a social construct, is dynamic. Social constructs are constantly in a state of revision where they adapt and change according to the social context (Bryman, 2012: 33; Sutherland, 2005: 185; Walter, 2011: 15; O’Leary, 2007: 252). This is in line with Anderson’s (1983:13-14) argument that to study the nation, a person must consider how people’s understanding of the nation as changed over time.

Language plays a significant part in the creation of social constructs and is powerful in itself. According to Punch (2005: 222), language is a form of action. The way actors construct a specific discourse partly accomplishes an action with its ability to determine the nature of said action. Discourses have the ability to:

“frame and constrain given courses of actions, some of which are promoted as sensible, moral and legitimate, thus commanding wide levels of support, whilst others are discouraged as stupid, immoral and illegitimate” (Burr, 1995: 250).

Resultantly, discourse is a way to exert social regulation in a way that appears natural (Walter, 2011: 146). This has become central to modern politics where politics can be interpreted as actors trying to control the dominant political language (Burr, 1995: 253; Sutherland, 2005: 194).

Political elites fight for the ability to define the nation given that powerful consequences follow the construction of the nation (Maxwell, 2006; Blaser, 2004; Visvanathan, 2006; Moodley & Adam, 2000; Kotze, 2012). For example, nationhood creates common sympathies amongst people that would not otherwise exist (Lackoff, 2001; Anderson, 1983: 15-16). This comradery motivates people to make immense sacrifices for the sake of the nation, such as being willing to kill or die for the nation (Anderson, 1983: 16). It also makes it easier to reaffirm people’s loyalties to the group and enforcing collective decisions (Kotze, 2012: 90). Additionally, there is greater recognition, rights and privileges that accompanies being a ‘nation’ versus a ‘community’ (Maxwell, 2005: 405). The ‘nation’ has been found to be a powerful polemic tool (Maxwell, 2005: 385). The significance of how the nation is understood, places elites’ on-going interest in how the nation is defined into perspective (Sturm, 2007: 104).
However, the ability to control the dominant discourse is a reflection of power (Mengel, 2009: 344). The most powerful in society dominate language and discourse and they are therefore in the ideal position to articulate social reality in a manner best suited to their interests (Burr, 1995: 251; Punch, 2005: 221). Consequently, discourses can be seen as existing in a hierarchy that reflects the power dynamics among actors (Punch, 2005: 222).

At the apex of this hierarchy is the ‘banal’ discourse, which is articulated by the current most influential elites. This refers to a discourse that is so widely accepted that it has become common sense (Parkes & Unterhalter, 2009: 382; Sutherland, 2005: 194). Even these discourses, however, are fallible (Burr, 1995: 254, 258). New discourses can disrupt ‘common sense’ ideas (Parkes & Unterhalter, 2009: 382). They can challenge, undermine and even replace the hegemonic discourse over time as old elites are replaced with the new (Burr, 1995: 258). According to Sutherland (2005: 194), the nation can be seen as a dominant national construct. Nationalist movements attempt to undermine the dominance of the national construct, which is at that time part of the status quo. They disrupt the common understanding of the nation as a way to promote an identity crisis. Such a crisis provides them with the opportunity to mobilise support for their construction of the nation and rearticulate social reality in favour of their position.

1.1.3. The changing idea of the nation in South Africa

In South Africa, the way the nation has been understood has changed over time. Under apartheid, nations were treated as ethnically bound (Blaser, 2004:181-182). Segregationist policies, however, added a caveat to how ethnic nations existed in South Africa. These policies were first and foremost centred around race and divided the South African population into four racial categories: black, white, coloured and Asian. These groups were heterogenous and each contained several ethnic and linguistic subgroups but apartheid collapsed such intra-racial distinctions (Gibson, 2015: 42).

Apartheid treated race as though it reflected ethnically homogenous groups and granted, or denied, rights accordingly. For example, the white population contained descendants of Dutch, English, French, German, Jewish, and other European settlers. They were further divided by language and a history of hostility and warfare (Gibson, 2015: 42). Apartheid made no such distinctions and all whites enjoyed the rights and privileges of belonging to the favoured racial category. Similarly, all black people were grouped together and denied political and civil rights regardless of their ethnic or linguistic affiliation. In effect, the collapse of these ethnic
difference created ‘racial’ nations in South Africa. In cognisance of this, the research uses racial labels, rather than ethnicity, to identify different nations in South Africa, such as the ‘white nation’ and the ‘black nation’.

Race was kept socially salient throughout apartheid. Legislated racial identities meant that race was at the centre of collective identity under apartheid. Additionally, it became the source of significant social distance among racial groups in South Africa. This was an intended consequence of apartheid, which, as the name suggests, was meant to minimise inter-racial contact. Moreover, white supremacy was an inherent part of apartheid and the result was “a closed, all-embracing system of racist colonialism and racial capitalism” (Saul, 2014: 64). Hence, where members of different races came into contact, it was not as equals.

These legislated racial identities, however, ended with apartheid (Moodley, 2000: 51). Their termination gave South Africa the opportunity to re-invent collective identity in South Africa (Hartley, 2014: 8). It was not an uncontested issue but at the first round of the CODESA talks majority political parties “declared for an undivided South Africa with one nation” (Ramutsindela, 2001: 31). This became the dominant construction of the nation given that it was incorporated in South Africa’s supreme law, the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution). The Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) envisages post-apartheid South Africa as “[belonging] to all who live in it, united in [their] diversity”.

This construction is in line with a civic view of the nation. Ethnic differences retain their personal importance as diversity is embraced and celebrated. Moreover, sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution guarantees individuals and communities the right to practice the language and culture of their choice (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The social salience of these and other distinctions such as race, however, is reduced. The Constitution inhibits unfair discrimination and so limits the significance of ethnic and racial diversity in the public sphere.

There is also the expectation that South Africans would be able to transcend their differences and that they would be united in their diversity (Moodley, 2000: 51; Ramutsindela, 2001: 34; Villa-Vicencio & Soko, 2012: 16; Republic of South Africa, 1996). They will be united by a new shared South African identity (Hartley, 2014: 8; Ramutsindela, 2001: 31). One that was inclusive of “all who comprise the South African polity as it is [and would be] commonly shared by every South African, regardless of race, gender, religion, and ethnicity” (Kotze, 2012: 105).

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Non-racialism would be at the core of this collective South African identity and be the shared ideology behind which all South Africans could unite (Kotze, 2012:91; Blaser, 2004:185). Non-racialism was meant to create non-racial citizens who co-existed peacefully in an integrated setting (Kotze, 2012:94). It also means that race, which defined the previous era, would be reduced to irrelevance in the public sphere (Moodley, 2000: 51; Ramutsindela, 2001: 32). This is reinforced by the Constitution’s equality clause that prohibits unfair discrimination based on, amongst other grounds, race (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The South African national identity can then be seen as a balancing act between the multiculturalism that is promoted by diversity and the non-racialism that is presented as the core of South Africa’s collective identity.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu coined the term ‘rainbow nation’ to describe this vision of post-apartheid South Africa, where its people would be united in their diversity (Buqa, 2015: 1; Gibson, 2015: 42). This thesis uses the term to denote this vision of South Africa as a civic nation as described above.

1.1.4. Is the rainbow nation a fading ideal?

Many people believed that only a civil war would end the apartheid state (Gibson, 2015: 41). Against expectations though, South Africa made a mostly peaceful transition from a racist authoritarian state to a multiracial democracy (Gibson, 2015: 41). According to Hartley (2014: 30), this would not have been possible without the idea of the rainbow nation. Its inclusive, non-discriminative vision played a crucial role in winning over a large portion of terrified whites who feared retribution (Hartley, 2014: 57; Newman, 2014: 37). This in turn had the effect of isolating and marginalising right-wing organisations that supported pre-1994 rhetoric and were seen as inviting retribution (Maxwell, 2005: 32; 2014: 58).

Additionally, the rainbow nation has the ability to impact South African democracy in the long run. It is more difficult to develop a democratic state in heterogeneous countries (Gibson, 2015: 41). This is because it is a greater challenge to foster social cohesion in countries that are racially and ethnically diverse (Gibson, 2015: 41; Putnam, 2007). Moreover, the more diverse the country is, the more social cohesion is needed to sustain a well-functioning society (Kotze, 2012: 95). According to Kotze (2012), a democracy cannot function without social cohesion.

One of the challenges in post-apartheid South Africa is building social capital. Not only is South Africa a very diverse country, inter-racial tensions fostered under apartheid would need to be addressed. Gibson (2015: 41) argues that South Africa’s multi-racial democracy will not
survive unless antagonism among its race and ethnic groups is reduced. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began to address this tension by laying the foundation for a new South Africa where different races could live together without a sense of mutual threat (Edwards, 2009: 47). This symbolic unity was an important attempt to evoke feelings of belonging (Blaser, 2004: 186).

The rainbow nation represents a more long-term solution. It is a broad and inclusive collective identity and can be used to create new forms of social solidarity in diverse nations (Putnam, 2007). Putnam (2007), however, makes the point that this is not easily done. He argues that “deconstructing divisive racial and ethnic identities will not be so quick and simple” (Putnam, 2007: 159). Moreover, the benefits of this more capacious sense of ‘we’, such as an increase in social capital, will not be felt immediately (Putnam, 2007: 164). For the social capital benefits to be realised in the long-run, the rainbow nation must first survive more immediate challenges.

According to Hartley (2014: 7), there are many difficult questions and circumstances that are preventing the rainbow nation narrative from maintaining its momentum in post-apartheid South Africa. This ‘new’ South Africa cannot only exist at abstract levels but needs to be reinforced by real change (Hartley, 2014: 7). For many people, post-apartheid South Africa and its government have failed to live up to expectations (Valji, 2003; Du Preez, 2013; Ford, 2011; Gobodo-Madikizela, 2009; Park 2011).

South Africa is still faced with numerous social and economic challenges that have not been addressed (Gibson, 2015: 41). This includes the slow pace at which racial relations are improving (Gibson, 2015). There are those who argue that the opposite is in fact happening and that people are moving away from and not towards non-racialism (Vincent & Howell, 2014: 89). These persisting socio-economic challenges have led to South Africa to a second interregnum where the notion of the rainbow nation is specifically being challenged (Ford, 2011).

The rationale of this research is that if there is widespread challenge to the rainbow nation, political parties may be motivated to pursue alternative constructions of the South African nation. A shared civic national identity may benefit societies in the long run, political parties are orientated around a more immediate future. Political parties, which host the political elite in South Africa, gain power from elections. These elections are held every few years and therefore political parties may be tempted to pursue strategies with short term gain. If people are becoming increasingly sceptical of the rainbow nation, political parties may benefit by
doing the same. They can gain people’s support by providing an alternative construction of the South African nation.

This led to the research question: how do the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation. What South Africa stands to gain or lose if the Rainbow Nation should be displaced, depends on what are offered as alternatives. The approach used to examine these constructions falls under discourse analysis.

1.2 Methodology
Discourse analysis is a qualitative method used to study social constructs (Punch, 2005: 224). According to Punch (2005: 222), the basis of all discourse analysis is the assumptions of construction, variability and action. Firstly, it builds on the premise that “reality is socially constructed by people, who give meaning and significance to objects in the material world” (Burr, 1995: 250). Hence, discourse analysis is inherently constructionist (Bryman, 2012: 529). It also gives special consideration to the role language plays in shaping these constructs (Punch, 2005: 222).

Secondly, discourse analysis assumes that discourses are infinitely varied, as actors construct their discourses out of a range of styles, linguistic resources and rhetorical devices (Punch, 2005: 222). Actors specifically create discourses in a way that is reflective of their specific interests and assumptions. These interests and assumptions can vary significantly. Consequently, multiple discourses develop and compete with, overlap and challenge one another (Punch, 2005: 222; Burr, 1995: 258). Discourse analysis is interested in uncovering these assumptions and interests (Punch, 2005: 224; Burr, 1995: 250).

Lastly, discourse analysis considers discourse to be a form of action (Bryman, 2012: 530). According to Punch (2005: 222), “people perform actions of different kinds through their talk and their writing and they accomplish the nature of these actions through constructing their [specific] discourse”. An example, in terms of the nation would be, of how the language used to construct the nation leads to the exclusion or inclusion of certain people.

These are the common themes that unite diverse bodies of theory, method and practice as ‘discourse analysis’. Bacchi (2004) falls under this scope with her concept of problem representations. ‘Problem representations’ is part of Bacchi’s (1999: 21) What’s the problem? Approach and “argues that every postulated ‘solution’ has built into it a particular representation of what the problem is, and it is these representations, and their implications that

Problems, according to Bacchi (2004), are always constructed and do not exist outside of their representation. Inherent in these problem representations are frameworks of meaning and assumptions that are automatically promoted due to how the problem is constructed (Bacchi, 2004: 134). These meanings and assumptions are implicit in both the problem representation and what are considered as viable and acceptable solutions.

Bacchi’s (2004) concept of ‘problem representation’ was used to identify what assumptions underpin the ANC’s, the DA’s and the EFF’s respective constructions of the South African nation. This was done by looking at what these parties consider to be ‘problematic’ about the rainbow nation. What they identify as problematic, indicates what they respectively find undesirable about the construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation. What is left as ‘unproblematic’ is similarly significant given that it indicates what the parties’ approve of in terms of the South African national identity. Additionally, the concept of problem representation was used to identify the parties’ underlying assumptions about their construction of the nation by analysing their constructions of public policy problems. It is presumed that these problem constructions are also be indicative of how the parties construct the nation. Moreover, given that the parties do not explicitly use these representations of policy issues to promote a national identity, they may provide a different perspective of how the parties each construct the nation in contrast to their explicit discussion of the South African nation.

1.2.1 Data collection

Relevant political party documents and social media were used to analyse how South Africa’s three biggest political parties, namely the ANC, the DA and the EFF, construct the South African nation. Sources were considered if they fell within the time frame from 26 July 2013 to 3 August 2016. This time frame takes into account the existence of all three parties given that the EFF did not exist until 26 July 2013 and concludes with the 2016 local elections.

Sources had to concern the construction of the South African national identity. This included explicit descriptions of South African nationhood as well as the characteristics the parties’ associate with it. The characteristics of ethnic and civic nations were specifically kept in mind. Alternatively, material was considered relevant where it referred to the construction of policy issues which contains underlying assumptions the respective party has of the nation.
1.2.1.1 Documents

The core party documents, their constitutions and founding manifestos, were considered where appropriate. These documents were chosen even if they were not written during the stated time frame, for their significance within the party. They set out the rules, aims and guidelines of their party. Theoretically, they are the foundational basis of all the parties’ ideas, actions and behaviour. Consequently, views about the nation that these documents contain should be the basis of their construction. It should inform how they construct the nation in other sources.

For a political party to control the dominant discourse, it must promote said discourse to the public. Hence, the parties’ speeches and election manifestos were examined. Speeches provide a political party with the opportunity to advance their discourse amongst the public. Only the speeches made by Jacob Zuma, Helen Zille, Mmusi Maimane and Julius Malema were considered given their positions as party leaders. During this period Zuma was president of the ANC. Their constitution sets out that the duties and functions of this position are to present the views and attitude of the organisation and orient and direct the activities of the ANC (ANC, 2012). Zille was leader of the DA until she was succeeded by Maimane. As leader, they were respectively obligated to be the “spokesperson of the Party at home and abroad” (DA, 2015: 52). Malema as the president and commander in chief is the political head and spokesperson of the EFF (EFF, 2014).

Election manifestos are similarly a platform where parties explicitly express their values and priorities to the people. They fight for political power on the basis of the content of their manifestos. Their media statements similarly provide an opportunity for the party to provide their interpretations of issues and consequently promote their discourse. Hence, both sources play a significant role in establishing the parties’ respective discourses amongst the public.

1.2.1.2 Social media

The Internet has played a significant role in confronting obstacles to communication (Merry, 2015: 374). Messages on the Internet can spread to a great many people with relatively little effort regardless of distance. This social media has become increasingly prominent in politics (Merry, 2015: 373). Politicians are increasingly using social media to frame issues, which is an essential part of politics (Merry, 2015: 373, 375). It is evident that social media have played an increasing role in creating and contesting discourses. Hence, the political parties’ use Twitter and YouTube to construct the South African nation was considered.
According to Merry (2015: 374-375), Twitter is especially useful in influencing narratives given its rapid speed and its large potential audiences. The character limitation creates brief and simple messages. This allows for information to be rapidly diffused. The limitation also means that the party has to carefully prioritise what it wants to say. Moreover, Twitter is quick and easy to use. Consequently, it is a platform that political parties can use to easily and frequently communicate with the public. Hence, tweets were used to fill the gaps between the documents, which are published or altered less often. Twitter feeds only reflect tweets dating back a few months prior at most. To view the tweets from years prior the advanced Twitter search was used.

YouTube videos are not as frequently used. However, like Twitter, it shows how discourses can be promoted using multi-media. Videos are not limited to text. They contain a visual and an auditory component as well. This allows discourses to be promoted implicitly and explicitly in a different manner. Supporting visuals can, for example, implicitly establish connections that text cannot. Videos and images can also be tweeted. Therefore, these sources were examined to complement construction of the nation via text.

1.2.2 Data analysis

Bacchi (2004) directed this study of South Africa as a nation. It was once desirable to define South Africa as the rainbow nation. It was examined whether or not this is the contemporary position of the ANC, the DA and the EFF respectively. Bacchi (2004: 131) argues that problem representations are underpinned by assumptions, which influences the consequences that follow. What is left as unproblematic is also significant (Bacchi, 2004: 131). It is an indication of what actors do not feel the need to scrutinise. According to Bacchi (2004: 131), this indicates what is likely to change and what is likely to stay the same.

This concept was applied to the political parties’ views of the South African nation. What they see as problematic is seen as being opposed to the parties’ respective constructions of the nation and therefore something that they would prefer to change. Characteristics of the rainbow nation that they do not see as problematic, are presumed to be part of their views of the nation. How they relate to reconciliation and Nelson Mandela was also considered. Both of these have symbolic value regarding South Africa as the rainbow nation. Reconciliation was seen as a necessary requirement for the ‘new’ nation to be established. Nelson Mandela is frequently seen as the symbolic figurehead of this ‘new’ South Africa (Buqa, 2015:1).
Additionally, the parties’ problem representations of policy issues were researched. While these policy issues are not directly about the nation, the parties’ respective assumptions about the nation can still influence their construction of the problem. These assumptions are underlying. Bacchi (2004) contends that they are revealed by how the problem is framed as well as by looking at what are postulated as ‘solutions’ (Bacchi, 2004: 131). These implicit assumptions provide an additional perspective to how the parties each view South African national identity.

1.3 Chapter Outline

In this chapter the ‘nation’ was defined as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983: 15). The distinction between the ethnic nation and the civic nation was explored as well as how each, as a collective identity, can influence social capital in a diverse society. These identities are not set and this chapter regarded how the meaning of the nation can change by examining it as a social construct.

This chapter illustrated the South African shift from ethnic national identities under apartheid to a civic national identity in the form of the rainbow nation. The latter construction of the nation, however, is under pressure in post-apartheid South Africa. This has led to the question of how South Africa’s three biggest political parties construct South Africa as a nation, which is rationalised in this chapter on the basis that increased discontent with the notion of the rainbow nation may motivate political parties to pursue alternative constructions of the nation. Chapter one is concluded with description how Bacchi’s (2004) concept of ‘problem representations’ was applied to research the political parties’ respective constructions of the nation.

The literature review follows in chapter two. It begins with an examination of how academic works have regarded the ‘nation’ as a social construct. South Africa is not alluded to in this section but the perspective of the rainbow nation as a social construct is implicit in the descriptive accounts of its creation. Literature regarding post-apartheid South Africa has a different focus. These works illustrate how the rainbow nation is struggling to maintain momentum in post-apartheid South Africa. The literature indicates that nation-building is an uncompleted project in South Africa and how post-apartheid South Africa has failed to live up to the ideal of the rainbow nation. The literature review also illustrates different approaches that have been used when studying the nation and how Bacchi (2004) has previously been used.
Given that social constructs are dependent on social actors and their context, chapter three provides a brief overview of the ANC, the DA and the EFF as political parties. This chapter briefly describes the parties’ respective histories, ideology and political positions in contemporary South African politics. Chapter four looks at how these parties construct South Africa as a nation. The ANC and the DA construct South Africa along the lines of the rainbow nation. The EFF does not and they regard race as the defining feature of national identity in post-apartheid South Africa.

These findings are discussed in chapter five and the thesis concluded. While the ANC and the DA are positioned as political opponents in South Africa, they both commit to the construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation. They are not competing for the opportunity to re-articulate national identity in South Africa, but are in contest with one to be seen as the main proponent for the rainbow nation. Their support has kept the rainbow nation salient and relevant in post-apartheid South Africa. However, this thesis is limited in that it does not consider how their actions are aligned with their verbal support. For the benefits of a collective South African identity to be realised in the long run, the ANC and the DA must be steadfast in their support even at the cost of immediate political gain. These parties could benefit from abandoning the civic national identity as is illustrated by the EFF’s rejection of the rainbow nation and rapid growth. However, this will come at the cost of developing a more socially cohesive South Africa.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how the nation as been studied as a social construct and illustrates how the nation can be viewed as constructed, mostly by political elites, and subject to contestation. These works do not specifically look at how this applies to the South African nation. However, descriptive accounts of the rainbow nation’s creation implicitly treat the South African nation as a social construct. There is also an acknowledgement in the literature that the rainbow nation is subject to re-articulation. This is made evident in academic works, which argue that South Africa is moving away from the ideals of the rainbow nation. Additionally, the literature indicates how the reality of post-apartheid South Africa has not lived up to the expectations of the ‘new’ South Africa.

Additionally, this chapter contains an overview of different methods that have been used when studying the nation as a construct, such as by examining the role signs and social capital respectively have on the way the nation is understood. This chapter also indicates the different ways in which Bacchi (2004) has been used in the academics.

2.2 The nation as a hegemonic social construct

Several works regard the nation and as a dominant social construct. These works concur that elites play a significant role creation of national identity and compete for the ability to do so in an attempt to further their interests. Sutherland (2005) explains this in terms of ‘discourse theory’. According to her, political actors have a significant interest in controlling discourses given that dominant discourses can be used to legitimise the status quo. These elites then “perpetuate power through the knowledge (and ‘truth’) contained in the predominant discourse” (Sutherland, 2005: 189). By propagating and consolidating it, political actors can manufacture the consent needed for them to exercise their authority (Sutherland, 2005: 189). Additionally, the national discourse can be used as a means to mobilise people (Sutherland, 2005: 186).

Similarly, Sturm (2007: 104) shows elite groups as being “constantly engaged in a vital and ongoing intellectual debate concerning how the nation should be presented”. This creates a process where the nation is continuously created and re-created by elites to revitalise its appeal.
to the majority of national citizens (Sturm, 2007: 104). Sturm (2007: 104) argues that this active reinvention is essential to the survival of the nation.

Maxwell (2006: 385) likewise depicts the nation as a rhetorical device, one which has become a popular polemical tool. He illustrates how political actors have used the ‘nation’ to make political arguments (Maxwell, 2006). Visvanathan (2006: 536) also emphasises how political actors tend to use the ‘nation’ to further their interests. Blaser (2004: 181) and Moodley and Adam (2000: 54) support this view, stating that national discourses have less to do with authentic interests and more with political contest.

Literature that views the nation as constructed also agree that the nation is never finalised. According to the literature, the elite can at best establish their discourse as hegemonic. Sutherland (2005) gives special consideration to the concept of hegemony in her discussion of nationalism. She argues that hegemony may result in a period of stability, but that discourses, regardless of dominance, remain unstable (Sutherland, 2005: 187, 195).

She explains that hegemonic discourses are unstable because their dominance is indicative of relations of power and resistance (Sutherland, 2005: 187). It changes because the power that allowed for its articulation is precarious and subject to resistance and change. When the nation is viewed in terms of hegemony, Sutherland (2005: 185, 195) shows that the political actors compete to define the national ‘nodal point’. This gives them the opportunity to articulate their common-sense idea, which determines the identity of the different groups (Sutherland, 2005: 191), giving them the ability to define the ‘Other’ in the nation-state (Sutherland, 2005: 190).

Sturm (2007) agrees with Sutherland (2005) that the constructions of the nations are consistently being challenged. He argues that nationalist symbols and events intend to present a unique and united nation. However, in reality nations are not exemplars of consensus but “the result of ongoing contestation” (Sturm, 2007: 104). Visvanathan (2006) holds a similar stance even though he does not specifically consider the concept of hegemony. He notes how rapidly signs can be reversed once a new understanding of the nation emerges (Visvanathan, 2006: 537).

Even though the literature shows national constructs in contest with one another, there is the view that these constructs are not automatically exclusionary. Sturm (2007: 105) argues that nations can both co-exist and compete with one another. He and Maxwell (2006) both look at how people can commit to multiple nations at the same time. Maxwell (2006) illustrates how
Slovaks saw their membership of the Slavic nations as compatible with membership of the Hungarian civic nation (Maxwell, 2006: 400).

These works indicate how understanding of the nation is dynamic and that political elites have a vested interest in this process. Political elites are depicted as interested in controlling the discourse because it is a means to promote their values and further their interests. While these works do not refer to South Africa specifically, descriptive accounts regarding the construction of the rainbow nation illustrate how the South African nation can be viewed through this lens.

2.2 The ‘rainbow nation’ as a dominant national construct

There are several works dedicated to South Africa’s transition and the establishment of the rainbow nation. These works, implicitly or explicitly, regard the rainbow nation as a social construct. This is evident in the way that it is treated as constructed and the role of political elites in creating this construction is emphasised. Furthermore, this national identity is regarded as variable given that it is depicted as an option that the political pursued. This construction of the nation was pursued according to the literature as a means to promote political and economic stability as well as a means to foster social capital in South Africa.

Kotze (2012), Blaser (2004) and Rajput (2011) explicitly identify national identity as being constructed in South African. This is depicted as true for national identities both before and after 1994. Valji (2003: 24) similarly reveals a constructionist orientation. He describes the new South Africa as an imagined community based on the foundational myth known as the ‘rainbow nation’ (Valji, 2003: 24). Ramutsindela (2001), Johnson (2009) and Leon (2008: 235) describe the rainbow nation as a constructed political product. Hence, they also support the social constructionist perspective of the rainbow nation, albeit implicitly.

According to Hartley (2014: 4), the rainbow nation was a “vast social pact engineered in the backrooms of negotiations by those who had put aside conflict in favour of a political settlement”. This is indicative not only of a constructionist orientation, but also acknowledges the role the political elite had in its construction. This influences Hartley’s (2014: 1) critique of South Africa’s transition being depicted as a “miracle”. He argues that while the label effectively captures the magnitude of events, it glosses over the invested effort that made it possible (2014: 1). To him it does not sufficiently acknowledge that the rainbow nation exists because of “hard work and difficult compromises by political leaders across a wide spectrum” (Hartley, 2014: 1). Likewise, Ramutsindela (2001), Johnson (2009) and Leon (2008: 235)
emphasise the actions of the political actors that made the pursuit of an inclusive South African identity possible. These descriptive accounts implicitly depict political elites as responsible for the creation of the national construct.

According to Rajput (2011), Kotze (2012) and Blaser (2004), the South African elite as responsible for nation-building. Rajput (2011: 3) states that after 1994, “nation building became a national governmental preoccupation”. Kotze (2012) similarly argues that the creation of the nation was the elite’s responsibility. Blaser (2004) acknowledges that the political elite has had a significant role in creating the post-apartheid South African nation. He, however, is more hesitant to attribute sole responsibility for the creation of a national identity to political elites.

Moreover, the political elite are depicted as pursuing the specifically rainbow nation for specific outcomes where this national identity was pursued for the implications it would have on South Africa. According to Kotze (2012), non-racialism was pursued as the basis for the new South Africa to serve as the ideological ‘glue’ to create a sense of South African nationhood in a post-apartheid context. Additionally, it was pursued to explicitly break from the ethnic and exclusionary nationalism that defined South Africa previously (Kotze, 2012). Moodley and Adam (2000) and Blaser (2004) concur that it was a means to lay a non-racial foundation for the new South African nation. This would move South Africa from the racial antagonisms that previously defined it and it would create a civic nation that would be inclusive and promote equality.

The creation of a ‘new’ shared South Africa, can also be viewed in terms of social capital. Putnam (2007: 137) refers to social capital as the “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness”. He distinguishes between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital. The former refers to ties to people that are similar to one another in an important way (Putnam, 2007: 143). ‘Binding’ social capital connects people who are unlike one another in a significant manner (Putnam, 2007: 143). A shared and inclusive identity can be used to increase the both forms of social capital of a diverse population. The nature of apartheid restrained interracial ties among people and the rainbow nation can be interpreted as an attempt by the political elite to facilitate the creation of social capital in the ‘new’ South Africa.

This is supported by both Ramutsindela (2001) and Valji, (2003) who describe the rainbow nation as a nation-building attempt, one that was centred on the establishment of the civic nation. Valji (2003: 18, 25-26) states that the intention of this particular nation-building project
was to establish a common identity that would be inclusive of all South Africans, regardless of their differences. Similarly, Ramutsindela (2001:34) argues that the Rainbow Nation was a way for the ANC to promote their vision of a “non-racial society in which race and ethnicity cannot be used as building blocks for a new South Africanism” (Ramutsindela, 2001: 32). Ford (2011: 267-268) also associates these features with the nationalism promoted by Mandela, one which she describes as where the “attachment to one’s own does not preclude fellowship with the other”. The description of the rainbow nation alludes to the characteristics associated with a civic nation.

Additionally, the literature depicts how the Rainbow Nation was pursued as a means to guard South Africa’s economy and democratic stability. According to Newman and De Lannoy (2014: 37), Johnson (2009: 6-7) and Du Preez (2013: 12-13), this national identity was a way to appease the white minority and the business community. Its focus on inclusivity and equality consequently helped to prevent the destruction of the South African economy. In terms of stability, Hartley (2014:30) believes that “South Africa might not have become a stable democracy of the late 1990s without Mandela’s emphasis on inclusivity”. Hartley, (2014) along with Du Preez (2013) argue that the inclusive nature of the Rainbow Nation not only won over a large portion of terrified whites but also managed to marginalize and isolate political organisations that continued with their pre-1994 rhetoric. Blaser (2004), for all his critique of the rainbow nation, agrees that the creation of a symbolically united nation played an essential part in advancing stability, especially during the transition years.

The literature also shows that political elites were invested in establishing South Africa as the rainbow nation. Blaser (2004: 179) specifically describes it as being established as the dominant rhetoric. What is evident in the literature is that its prevalence was not a given. An inclusive South African identity is depicted as an option that the political elites had and chose to pursue. According to the literature, South Africa could have taken an alternative path and this would have significantly impacted South Africa as a country and as a nation (Du Preez, 2013: 33; Cronje, 2014: 2; Valji, 2003: 18; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 152). These works argue that if the Rainbow Nation was not pursued, there would have been continued violence. Additionally, the country and the economy would have been plunged into instability. Du Preez (2013: 33) and Valji (2003: 18) also emphasise that the rainbow nation was an option as argues that people needed to be persuaded to pursue this discourse.
Moreover, Ramutsindela (2001), Hartley (2014) and Du Preez (2013) depict the rainbow nation of only ever having a delicate dominance. The political elite are depicted as promoting the Rainbow Nation even at personal cost. According to Hartley (2014: 51), they did so because “the country had made a pact, and to disturb it would undo a decade of compromise”.

Moreover, the literature indicates how the elites took steps to enforce the Rainbow Nation as the dominant national construct. For example, its underlying values of inclusivity and equality were enshrined in South Africa’s supreme law, the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Ramutsindela, 2001: 3, Hartley, 2014: 51). The TRC is also depicted as being established to create the foundation of the so-called Rainbow Nation (Moodley & Adam, 2000: 51; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 224; Johnson, 2009: 272; Klein, 2009: 113; Edwards, 2009: 47). These efforts were undertaken to promote the rainbow nation in newly multi-racial and democratic South Africa. Efforts to advance this discourse have since then been lessened.

2.3 National identity following 1994

There is a consensus in the literature that nation-building remain a concern in post-apartheid South Africa. According to Ramutsindela (2001: 4), “the realization of [the Rainbow Nation] hinges very much on post-apartheid national strategies and their outcomes”. Ramutsindela (2001) and Cronje (2014) both argue that nation-building needs to be seen as an on-going process, particularly as South Africa’s internal space has not yet successfully been rearranged to reflect the Rainbow Nation ideal. Kotze (2012: 95) argues that significant effort needs to be invested in South African nation-building given that South Africa is very diverse and requires greater cohesion for its society to be sustained. Moodley and Adam (2000) share this sentiment. They state that “a South African nation has yet to be born. South Africa at present constitutes an economic and political entity, but not an emotional one” (Moodley & Adam, 2000: 67).

Yet Du Preez (2013) notes that the nation-building project has been largely abandoned after the Mandela presidency. The literature indicates that instead of the rainbow nation being advanced in post-apartheid South Africa, South Africans are moving away from this construction of the nation, especially in terms of race. Vincent and Howell (2014: 89) argue that “far from a slow progression towards the ideals of a deepening non-racialism, then, the post-apartheid period has witnessed a process of re-racialisation in which the terms of racial discourse have altered”. Moodley and Adam (2000: 54) and Blaser (2004) agree that South African nationalism has not entrenched non-racialism.
On the contrary, ethno-racial consciousness is shown as having increased since 1994. According to Moodley and Adam (2000: 54), the end of legalised racism has ironically increased racial assertiveness. Blaser (2004: 179) argues that under the Mbeki presidency the nation-building project moved away from non-racialism to black nationalism. Furthermore, he believes that this “renewed ethno-racial consciousness’, may indeed mean ‘the demise of the non-racial dream’” (Blaser, 2004: 186).

According to Ford (2011), South Africa has entered a second interregnum where the notion of the rainbow nation is specifically being challenged. She believes politicians are pursuing alternative constructions of the nation because they stand to gain politically from challenging the 1994 narrative. Ramutsindela (2001: 24), Hartley (2014: 57) and Van Onselen (2015: 6) all agree that control over the national identity can be a source of political power for South African politicians. Successive South African governments have manipulated the identities of the different South African population groups to suit their needs in the past (Ramutsindela, 2001: 24). This is depicted as an on-going trend in South Africa.

According to Sarakinsky (2001:150), politicians have abandoned the carefully constructed image of interdependence that was advanced since the transition. They have done so in the “belief that stressing the differences between groups and parties is the only successful way to win and hold popular support” (Sarakinsky, 2001: 150). Hartley (2014: 25) agrees and argues that it is easier to mobilise support and to promote internal party coherence when old fault lines are made to create an external enemy. Du Preez (2013), Maré (2011) and Johnson (2009) agree that race is purposely kept salient because it has been a useful political tool, despite the contradiction with the official discourse.

Nevertheless, literature regarding the post-apartheid period is limited. Van Onselen (2015) notes this gap. He argues that South Africa is treated as being almost apolitical after its transition, even if South Africa has been an inclusive democracy long enough “for a range of new influences to manifest themselves, distinct from our past, even if informed by it” (Van Onselen, 2015: 11). The literature shows that the rainbow nation is struggling to gain traction in post-apartheid South Africa. It, however, only gives a cursory examination to contesting discourses. This thesis examines how this has affected current construction of the South African nation and how said constructions relate to the notion of the Rainbow Nation or not.
2.4 The ‘rainbow nation’ as an unattained ideal

Beyond its construction, the rainbow nation is frequently treated as a set of expectations regarding post-apartheid South Africa that have not been met as opposed to a construction of national identity. Progress is measured against these expectations and the literature frequently observes how post-1994 South Africa has been found lacking. Valji (2003: 25-26), Maré (2011: 63), Vincent and Howell (2014: 75) Du Preez (2013: 40, 15), Ford (2011: 234), Gobodo-Madikizela (2009: 151) and Park (2011: 122) note that there is an enduring gulf between the official rainbow nation doctrine and people’s lived realities. They then proceed to talk about unmet expectations and not national identity. The recurrent theme is how the legacies of apartheid have persisted under the new regime. The two most enduring legacies have been seen as the enduring influence of apartheid constructed socio-political identities and persisting socio-economic inequalities.

2.4.1 South Africa as racially divided under a doctrine of non-racialism

Non-racialism was meant to be an ideology that unites South Africans. The literature, however indicates that this has not been fully realised. Poplak (2014: 92) and Du Preez (2013: 253) both emphasise the necessity of South Africans redefining themselves and their communities. This view is shared by Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Van Onselen (2015) who depict South Africans as being in the midst of an on-going identity crisis. Moreover, race is shown as remaining at the centre of these identity crises. Du Preez (2013) argues that this is because South Africans are still conditioned to think race matters.

Racial consciousness is not racism in itself (Moodley and Adam, 2000: 55). The literature is nevertheless critical of rising ethno-racial consciousness. Moodley and Adam (2000), Kotze (2012: 90), Pressly (2013: 4), Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Ford (2011) consider it to be divisive in South Africa. They argue that this salience of race and ethnicity balkanizes the South African people to the extent of compromising the vision of a united South African nation. For example, Newman and De Lannoy (2014) state that many older white South Africans “want little to do with the ‘new South Africa’”. Similarly, Ford (2011: 140) argues that many black South Africans are resentful that they “couldn’t terminate this war with a bullet and put the whites down by stamping our boots on their throats”.

These groups may be seen as radical. However, in a discussion regarding racism in South Africa, Cronje (2014: 125) points out that, a third of South African adults support these radical – often racist – views of extremist political leaders. This indicates that race has yet to lose its
social salience, regardless of South Africa’s ‘unifying’ national identity that have been promoted since 1994.

There are numerous works which indicate the on-going tension amongst racial groups. Many attributes the on-going tension to the TRC. They argue that, despite its intention, the TRC insufficiently addressed the trauma cause by the apartheid regime (Du Preez, 2013: 15; Foster, 2009: 170; & Green, 2009: 75). Of all the racial groups, black South Africans have the lowest level of interracial trust (Gibson, 2015: 43). They also express significant more intergroup prejudice against other South Africans (Gibson, 2015: 43). Gibson (2015: 43) argues that this is undoubtable due to their experience of apartheid.

According to Brock (2009: xv) and Volkan (2009), this has caused the trauma to be absorbed by the South African society and to become part of people’s group identities. The literature depicts this trauma as undermining South Africa. According to Volkan (2009: 16), in times of crisis political leaders can intuitively rekindle recollections of such trauma in order to consolidate the group emotionally and ideologically. Ford (2011), Du Preez (2013: 14-15) and Poplak (2014: 34) all agree that this on-going tension is leading to rising radical sentiment.

This is worsened by perceptions of white South Africans not acknowledging the trauma. Johnson (2009: 59) and Du Preez (2013: 26) agree that whites have been lulled into a false sense of complacency under the Mandela years thinking that ‘race’ was now in the past. Vincent and Howell (2014) concur that white South Africans want a ‘post racial’ society. That this need, however, stems from the need to “minimize the injustices of racism and immediately erase the question of responsibility and ownership for the crimes of the past and the injustices of the present” (Vincent & Howell, 2014: 89). This sentiment seems to be shared by many blacks who meet this eagerness to move away from race with derision and anger, viewing the movement of the erasure of race as a way to protect and advance white interests (Vincent & Howell, 2014; Ford, 2011).

The socio-economic legacy of apartheid is also depicted as contributing to racial tension. Kotze (2012), Blaser (2004), Johnson (2009: 11) and Ramutsindela (2001: 6) agree that nation-building will only be successful if it be reinforced by concrete change. Similarly, Newman and De Lannoy (2014), Johnson (2009) and Van Onselen (2015) argue that South Africans consider the abstract ideals of the rainbow nation less important than problems regarding their lived realities. The majority of people remain trapped in economic subjugation and domination that defined the pre-1994 period (Shivambu, 2014: 1; Du Preez, 2013: 13). Until this change, the
equality promised by the rainbow nation narrative is presented as a luxury given to those who are already successful (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 62).

Furthermore, the untransformed socio-economic environment contributes to racial tension in South Africa. The current environment has produced two groups: a small minority of citizens with good qualification and middle-income lifestyle; and the majority citizens who are impoverished, poorly educated and dependent on welfare (Cronje, 2014: 61). As a consequence of apartheid, the division is racialized with whites mostly belonging to the former group and blacks to the latter. Whites constitute approximately 8% of South Africans whereas about 80% of South Africans are black. The relative wealth of whites rankles poor blacks who have not found their fortunes improved post-apartheid (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 206; Shivambu, 2014). Ford (2011), Cronje (2014: 114) and Du Preez & Rossouw (2013: 28) argue that this has produced a breeding ground for radical sentiment.

The government has pursued redress to address this legacy. According to Newman and De Lannoy (2014: 165), many people accept redress as necessary but reject the process. This is true for Maré (2011), Leon (2008), Park (2011) and Du Preez (2013) who are critical of the narrow focus on race. The literature shows how this has been interpreted as re-racialising the country and in contradiction of the Rainbow Nation ideals (Ramutsindela, 2001: 33; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 163-164; Maré, 2011; Vincent & Howell, 2014: 78, 88; Sarakinsky, 2001). Park (2011) and Du Preez (2013) caution that the racialised discourse will further entrench racial or other stereotypes even if its intention is to promote equality. This sentiment is supported by Blaser (2004), Kotze (2012) and Moodley and Adam (2000) who argue that, while redress is needed for nation-building, national unity will still be undermined if it cannot suitably balance recognition of race for redress with the discourse of non-racialism.

However, Pressly (2013), Ramutsindela (2001) and Vincent and Howell (2014) point out that others see race as necessary to de-racialise South Africa, where supporters of racial redress argue that one cannot re-racialise what has never been de-racialised (Moodley & Adam, 2000: 56). Hence, the response to redress is also divisive. Opinions tend to differ along racial lines with white people arguing for non-racialism to be prioritised and black people believing that race remains an essential consideration.

Nonetheless, these tensions do not unambiguously manifest as radical thoughts. The literature does indicate that there are areas where non-racial identities have been pursued with varying levels of success. For example, reconstruction of racial relations has been identified as a
priority for young Afrikaners. Newman and De Lannoy (2014), Mulder (2012) and Walker (2005) talk about how there have been attempts within the Afrikaans community to reinvigorate the Afrikaans culture within the ambit of a non-racial South Africa. According to Newman and De Lannoy (2014: 171) they are “looking for a way of differentiating themselves from the racial animosity that was the hallmark of ‘their people’ in the past”. Blaser (2004) concurs and refers to how, despite attempts, Afrikaners have resisted ethnic mobilization.

Moreover, Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Pressly (2013) argue that race is becoming less relevant amongst certain sections of South Africans. This is specifically associated with individuals who have received a good education, who do not live in abject poverty and whose schooling environment promoted inter-racial contact. Amongst these individuals he glimpses the realization of the Rainbow Nation narrative where the individuals are racially aware but do not rely on it as their primary identity marker. Nor is race seen as divisive but the diversity is appreciated (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; Pressly, 2013).

Perversely, the responses to these pockets of non-racialism is telling in itself. According to Newman and De Lannoy (2014), Pressly (2013) and McKaiser (2014), black South Africans risk being shunned by their communities for not being ‘black’ enough. Additionally, Newman and De Lannoy (2014) and Walker (2005) remark that the many traditional Afrikaner communities remain unmotivated to adapt to post-apartheid South Africa.

The rainbow nation was meant to promote a new and inclusive ‘we’ for post-apartheid South Africa. The literature, however, indicates that race remains socially relevant and salient in South Africa. While there has been some progress in racial relationships, the literature illustrates that this has had limited effect on South Africa as a whole. In general, there is still a great social distance among racial groups. South Africa’s traumatic past and enduring socio-economic inequalities have made it difficult to foster social capital in South Africa. This means that the benefits of a collective South African identity still need be realised on a larger scale.

2.4.2. Sentiments of who belongs in South Africa

Non-racialism was also promoted as a way to make South Africa inclusive. The Rainbow Nation was meant to make South Africa a ‘home’ to all who lived in it. Race, however, is still influencing feelings of national belonging in South Africa even if in a different manner than under apartheid. Kotze (2012) and Blaser (2004) both note that a sense of belonging and togetherness is essential for a nation and argue that South Africans still feel excluded from the South African nation.
Moodley and Adam (2000: 55) argue that racial minorities feel alienated by the renewed emphasis on African values and the African-first attitude. They argue that it has left many minorities feeling excluded because they do not fit the definition of ‘authentic’ African (Moodley & Adam, 2000: 55). According to Du Preez (2013), the problem is that ‘African’ is being conflated with ‘black’. While he expresses empathy with the need of black Africans to guard their identity, he argues that this should not be treated as the only conceptualisation of ‘African’. Moreover, there are understandings of ‘African’ that are not restricted to race. Park (2011) shares this sentiment. He makes the case that this narrow conceptualisation is resulting in continued racial exclusion. This is illustrated by the ambiguous, confused, in-between position of the Chinese South Africans. He considers the debate regarding the link between blackness and being South African to be at the core of this and other racial tension in South Africa (Park, 2011: 126).

Furthermore, Thompson (2006) and Newman and De Lannoy (2014) illustrate how Afrikaans communities also feel alienated because of their race. Thompson (2006) describes how Afrikaners consider Africa their home but feel like secondary citizens because of their skin colour. Newman and De Lannoy (2014) agree that many whites consider South Africa their home. However, they also feel threatened by the black majority which have left them in a position where they love the country but still feel alienated within it. The issues of redress being attached to this issue of identity further escalates the tension regarding who is African (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; Thompson, 2006; Park, 2011).

However, as noted by Valji (2003: 1) “discriminatory attitudes and practices continue to manifest themselves, not just in historically familiar divisions but also in new forms of identity-based violence”. Park (2011: 117) similarly points out how increased migration between regions and across national boundaries are further complicating notions of race, ethnicity, citizenship, identity and belonging in Africa. Hence, questions of belonging are not only in regards to race as the violent outbreaks of xenophobia demonstrate.

The literature indicates how foreigners are increasingly alienated in South Africa. Many of them are unable to return to the country from which they came and are forced to live in a country in which they are unwelcome (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; Valji, 2003). Newman and De Lannoy (2014) attribute this to competition for resources. Valji (2003: 20, 21), however, argues that xenophobia is actually based on the nation-building project. The argument is that “in order to legitimize the fast-paced nature of the transition as well as to deal with issues
of reconciliation, global reintegration, and the stability of the future democracy, analysts argued that a national identity and affiliation needed to be forged amongst all South Africans” (Valji, 2003: 7). The end result was focusing the national identity on forging a shared history and on defining more pronouncedly what or who was excluded from the nation (Valji, 2003: 20).

Xenophobia in South Africa is described as having a racial overtone, which further shows how race continues to influence belonging in South Africa. Blacks are targeted for being a foreigner or appearing to be one. The criteria for being targeted is not based on legal status as much as not speaking a South African language or being ‘too dark’ (Valji, 2003: 5). The most violent attacks are also carried out by black South Africans. The latter’s intolerance has been attributed to apartheid (Valji, 2003: 4; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 185). The rationale is that apartheid has installed thinking along racialized and hierarchal lines. In this regard, the xenophobic outbreaks are examples of the ‘us versus them’ sentiment that remains even if the target has shifted.

Additionally, Spurlin (1999) discusses the status of homosexuality in South Africa. It receives little attention in South Africa in comparison to race. However, he makes the point that “despite juridical changes in the ‘new’ South Africa, the status of homosexuality remains a highly contested and contradictory question, and homophobia continues to function as significant vectors of domination” (Spurlin, 1999: 221). This, along with the works regarding xenophobia, illustrate the increasing complexity of nationhood in South Africa. The South African nation is meant to ‘belong to all who live in it’ but these questions of identity indicate that South Africa is still in the process of redrawing social lines to create an inclusive national identity.

2.6 Approaches to the study of the ‘nation’

There is an array of approaches that have been applied to study the concept of ‘nation’. Sutherland (2005) uses discourse theory to study nationalism. She specifically looks at the ‘syntax of hegemony’ (Sutherland, 2005: 186) where she gives centrality to the role of words and meaning as indicators of power relations. She argues that the nation as informative and persuasive expression of ideology can be gleaned from the style, form and content of the language employed (Sutherland, 2005: 197). As a way to include the concept of hegemony in an empirical study of nationalism, she looks at dominance in discursive spaces. She views dominance to be reflected where central actors “are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse… and this is reflected in the institutional practices of that
political domain; that is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given discourse” (Sutherland, 2005: 196).

Therefore, she looks at the nation via rhetorical analysis of texts (Sutherland, 2005) where all texts may be evaluated on the basis of how well they convince and convert. Hence, “the rhetorical skill displayed becomes worthy of study (Sutherland, 2005: 197). She identifies four main rhetorical features of a text. Firstly, the use of tropes and, secondly, the deployment of persuasive techniques excluding the ‘straight’ logical argument. The third feature is the unity of style and content. Lastly, she considers how the author’s or speaker’s reference to the real world filters through their imagined one. She argues that these features can be seen as ‘cues’. Readers use these cues to assign a particular meaning to the text.

Sutherland (2005) shows how relevant language is in the construction of the nation and that a variety of texts can be examined as all texts can be instruments of persuasion. Sturm (2007) also looks at how signs can be used to promote a national construct. The signs he looks at are public monuments and not texts. He has an ethno-symbolist approach (Sturm, 2007). He argues that an analysis of nationalism should look into perceptions of the nation in different historical periods and the way in which members of a given nation develop their national sentiments. He shows a particular interest in how myriad groups interpret the same set of symbols, myths and traditions at various times (Sturm, 2007: 105).

Both Sutherland’s (2005) and Sturm’s approaches (2007) indicate how the elites can influence the construction of the nation, as do the works of Moodley and Adam (2000) and Kotze (2012), even though they have different theoretical orientations namely modernisation and democratic consolidation, respectively.

A different approach is used by this thesis to study the construction of the nation. This approach is based on Bacchi (2004). It is a beneficial approach given that Bacchi (2004) takes into consideration how a construct is both explicitly and implicitly formed. It also does not consider only how discourses are purposefully challenged. It can be used to demonstrate how political actors may inadvertently undermine the discourse that they are trying to promote, thus going beyond the focus of how political actors compete with one another, as well as taking into account how the construction of the nation may not always be what they intended.

Putnam (2007) does not focus on the elites in society, but the connections people have to their fellow countrymen in the form of social capital. He specifically researches how social capital is affected by the increase in diversity, which most advanced societies are experiencing.
Diversity, Putnam (2007) found, has adverse effects on social capital. This is true in terms of both ‘bonding’ social capital (ties people have to others who are like them) and ‘binding’ social capital (ties people have to others who are unlike them). As a result, both in-group and out-group solidarity is reduced and he finds that inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life and less likely to trust others (Putnam, 2007: 150-151).

His work, however, also makes the argument that these negative effects can be reduced in the long run by re-constructing collective social identities. He supposes that by diverse societies can “create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities” (Putnam, 2007: 138). This paper shares this premise that a shared collective identity can be used to unify a diverse people. While he looks at the experience of increasing diversity, caused by immigration, has on advanced, his work can nevertheless be applied to the South African context where the end of segregationist policies meant that more South Africans are confronted with the ‘other’ and the social distance between member of the different races needs to be addressed.

2.7 Sources which have made use of Bacchi


Other sources acknowledge Bacchi (2004) as a theoretical influence. Andersson and Listedav’s (2016) theoretical understanding was impacted by Bacchi’s argument that affirmative action policies can be counter-intuitive if their designs stigmatize the target group as ‘disadvantaged’ while maintaining the political and social status quo. This is the case with Freidenvall and Hallonsten (2013) and Lewis (2006) whose thinking was influenced by Bacchi’s perspective that policy meanings determine policy priorities. De Beer (2015) is influenced by her
presentation of policy as a discourse which she considers to be apt theoretical underpinnings for her methodological approach. Her work is less frequently used in terms of methodology. Nousiainen and Pylkkänen (2013) consider Bacchi (2004) a methodological influence. They do a close-reading of specific policy documents and use Bacchi (2004) to support their approach of reading the texts as political.

Bacchi (2004) influences Skilling (2010) more extensively. Skilling’s (2010) work also shares a number of similarities with mine. Both look at the political construction of national identity in pursuit of a specific vision. Skilling (2010: 175) describes his work as exploring the “paradox at the heart of national identity”. A country’s citizenship is not homogenous yet a shared national identity may be imposed by the government (Skilling 2010: 176). The establishment of a national identity is identified as the need to manage internal difference for the sake of ‘the nation’ as well as promoting political legitimacy and economic advantage. Internal diversity is acceptable as long as it falls within the ambit of the construction of the nation. South Africa has similarly endeavoured to pursue these goals through the establishment of a shared South African identity.

Like this work, Skilling (2010) adopts Bacchi’s (2004) rationale that these constructs promote underlying assumptions and values. My work, however, diverges in terms of methodology. Skilling (2010) looks at “how [the governing party] used a construction of national identity to define and defend a putatively shared national purpose, naturalizing thereby certain definitions of policy problems and solutions” (Skilling, 2010: 175). He applies Bacchi (2004) to show that the national identity is constructed in a way that makes certain policies appear more desirable or necessary. This research looks at how problem representations influence the construction of the nation. What the ANC, the DA and the EFF respectively find ‘problematic’ about the rainbow nation was examined as well as what view of the nation they each implicitly promote through their distinct constructions of policy issues. It also takes into account a greater variety of sources.

2.8 Conclusion

The literature indicates how the South African nation can be viewed as a social construct but how the rainbow nation is not treated as construction of the nation beyond its creation. The rainbow nation is treated as an ideal against which to measure post-apartheid South Africa, not as a construction of the nation. These accounts illustrate that many South Africans are disappointed in post-1994 South Africa.
What these descriptions also indicate is that the benefits of a shared national identity have not yet been realised on a large scale in South Africa. To an extent this is not surprising. Putnam (2007) cautions that the benefits a collective identity have in terms of social capital, are only realised in the long run. It takes time for social lines to be shifted as to construct a new capacious ‘we’. The literature indicates that South Africa is still in the process of reconstructing divisive identities in South Africa. There has been limited success in addressing interracial tensions, which is worsened by enduring socio-economic inequalities. Moreover, the literature suggests that this slow process and the lack of nation-building in undermining the rainbow nation narrative is post-apartheid South Africa.

Despite the acknowledged fragility of this civic national identity, there is not an in-depth consideration of current discourses regarding South Africa as a nation, which stand to challenge the status quo. This despite the political elite’s illustrated interest in the matter. This thesis uses Bacchi (2004) to examine current constructions of the nation. The literature review includes an overview of approaches that have been used to study the nation as a social construct and how Bacchi (2004) has been used by scholars. Using Bacchi (2004) to research constructions of the nation, is not a commonly done. the following chapter provides descriptions of the ANC, the DA and the EFF as political parties.
Chapter 3. Descriptions of the ANC, the DA and the EFF as political parties

3.1. Introduction

South Africa has a party system, which means that political parties are part of the political elite. They compete for political power and are invested in the controlling dominant discourses. Who they are as a political party impacts the social constructs that they create. Hence, this chapter provides a brief description of the ANC, the DA and the EFF.

The chapter provides an overview of the parties’ respective histories, ideologies and positions in contemporary South Africa politics. It begins with the ANC, illustrating its history as South Africa’s liberation movement, its hybrid ideology and its post-apartheid position as the governing party. Secondly, the DA is discussed. The DA served as parliamentary opposition to the National Party, its liberal ideology and its current role as the official opposition. Lastly, this chapter describes the EFF, its beginning from within the ANC, its unique ideological combination of Marxism, Leninism and Fanonism and how it has invigorated South African politics with its populist style of politics.

3.2. ANC

3.2.1 South Africa’s national liberation movement

The ANC was founded in 1912 making it Africa’s oldest liberation movement (De Jager, 2013: 149). Its creation took place in the wake of the unification of South Africa (Twala, 2014: 1989; Brief history of the ANC, n.d; & Saunders, 2012: 434). Africans were excluded from this political process and only the rights of white people were acknowledged (Twala, 2014: 1989; Brief history of the ANC, n.d). It follows that Africans lost their lands and cattle with the formation of the Union of South Africa (Brief history of the ANC, n.d). They were left with little chance for recourse with limited options. In the past separate chiefdoms have tried to confront the coloniser but this facilitated Africans military defeat (Suttner, 2012: 720). Africans thus had to find new ways to fight for their rights and freedoms (Brief history of the ANC, n.d; Twala, 2014: 1989). It was argued that the best way to do so would be to unite and fight together (Suttner, 2012: 720; Welsh, 2011).In response to their political exclusion, traditional and religious leaders, professionals, people’s representatives and other prominent individuals gathered in Bloemfontein (Twala, 2014: 1989; De Jager, 2013: 149; Brief history of the ANC, n.d). Their intention was to unite a “range of scattered opposition movements to better contest
colonial hegemony” (Twala, 2014: 1989). Consequently, the ANC was formed to unite Africans and spearhead the struggle for fundamental political, social and economic change (What ANC, n.d).

The ANC led the struggle and the fight against oppression in the following decades (What ANC, n.d). This included the organisation of mass resistance, the mobilization of the international community and taking up the armed struggle against apartheid (What ANC, n.d). The ANC is conventionally viewed as the vanguard of the struggle (Saunders, 2012: 434; Dubow, 2000: xiv). When the struggle moved towards negotiating a peaceful transition, they were one of the leading players (Ramutsindela, 2001: 3-4; Saunders, 2012: 434). With Mandela at the helm, the ANC became the representatives of the ‘miracle nation’ following the successful transition of power (Johnson, 2009: 4).

3.2.2 An organisation with an amalgam of political ideologies

The ANC has developed into an ideological hybrid (Rohanlall, 2014: 9). It has, throughout its long history, been influenced by different ideologies (Twala, 2014: 1989). As a result, the movement has been imbued with opposing principles and ideologies (Twala, 2014: 1989). One of the ANC’s greatest challenges has been balancing these internal ideological differences. In 1955, Chief Luthuli warned that the “ANC should not dissipate its energies by indulging in internal ideological feuds; a fight of ‘isms’” (Twala, 2014: 1988). This has arguably become more difficult post-1994 without the unifying effect of the liberation struggle (De Jager, 2013: 149).

One of the ANC’s ideological influences is Africanism (De Jager, 2013: 149). According to Twala (2014: 1989), Africanism dominated from the ANC’s establishment to the 1950s. Membership was exclusively black throughout this period (Twala, 2014: 1989). It was argued that the Union represented the interests of whites and the participation of whites in the ANC’s struggle was limited. One of its founding ideological missions was to “unite all Africans in South Africa in order to challenge the racially divisive attempts by the then ruling party” (Twala, 2014: 1989). The focus was not to establish an inclusive democracy per se. Rather, it was about self-determination for the African people (Twala, 2014: 1990). Southall (2003: 255-272) argues that the ANC fought for equality, but equality of nations rather than amongst individuals. Although Africanism as an ideology has varied in strength within the organisation, its influence has persisted. Post-1994 it has closely been associated with Thabo Mbeki and his presidency.
However, not everyone agreed with the multi-racial approach implicit in African nationalism. Its critics interpreted multi-racialism as implying that there were basic insuperable differences between the various national groups. Moreover, it supposed that these differences were so great that it would be best if these groups were kept separate in a type of democratic apartheid (Twala, 2014: 1991). Hence, they critiqued multi-racialism for attempting to “manage the relations among the different race groups in South Africa through what became known as constructive segregation” (Twala, 2014: 1990). In contrast, they promoted non-racialism. They argued that it will only be through the adoption of non-racialism that South African politics will cease to be framed in racial terms and so allow for meaningful social change and greater equality (Twala, 2014: 1990). Hence, the policy of non-racialism was adopted within the ANC (Twala, 2014:1990).

This adoption, though, did result in ideological tension within the liberation movement. Its position was especially contentious with the growth of the more radical Africanist position that emerged in the 1940s (Twala, 2014: 1990). However, in the following decades it was non-racialism that rose to prominence within the ANC. The Congress Alliance and the adoption of the Freedom Charter significantly promoted the non-racial agenda of the ANC (Twala, 2014: 1990). The Freedom Charter emphasised cross-racial political cooperation (Twala, 2014: 1990). Its adoption in 1955 was a pivotal moment in the narrative of the struggle exactly for its emphasis on non-racialism (Twala, 2014: 1990). A number of ANC members broke away as a result, which led to the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress.

The Freedom Charter became one of the ANC’s official documents and played a significant role in the development of the ANC’s non-racial politics (Twala, 2014: 1990). Non-racialism has since then become deeply entrenched within the ANC. Membership of the ANC is open to all South Africans above the age of 18 “irrespective of race, colour and creed” (What ANC, n.d). Moreover, the ANC defines its key objective as the “creation of a united, non-racial, non-sexist, and democratic society” (What ANC, n.d). The rise of non-racialism, however, has not erased concerns about race within the ANC. The liberation of Africans in particular, and blacks in general from political and economic bondage is seen as a perquisite for a non-racial society (What ANC, n.d; Rohanlall, 2014: 84).

Communism has also been one of the ANC’s major ideological influences (De Jager, 2013: 149). The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was founded in 1921. Initially, it was distinct from the ANC. However, the Communist International’s interest in colonial people,
the ANC’s increased worker organisation and the rising ethos of non-racialism prompted the ANC and the CPSA to establish closer relations (Musson, 1989) to the extent that when it became evident that the National Party, elected into government in 1948, intended to criminalise communism, the CPSA willingly dissolved itself. The majority of the party felt that they could continue the struggle from within the ANC. Therefore, by 1950, “the parallel histories of nationalism and socialism had come together: the class struggle […] had merged with the movement for national liberation” (Saunders, 2012: 435).

The Left’s influence on the ANC is evident in the latter’s endeavour to create a democracy with social content as is evident in their insistence that the South African constitution would include a guarantee for socio-economic rights and its initial pursuit of the collectivist-orientated Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was also indicative of its socialist democratic orientation (Twala, 2014: 1991-1992). However, the ANC has been criticised for ‘talking left but walking right’ (Rohanlall, 2014: 9). According to Rohanlall (2014: 9), the ANC may have maintained a communist vocabulary, but in practice it adheres to liberal and capitalist trends. It has been criticised as neo-liberal and for its apparent alienation from workers (Twala, 2014:1991).

3.2.3 The ANC as governing party
The ANC’s liberation credentials swept them into office in 1994 where they have stayed. The ANC has won every national election since then and has become South Africa’s political hegemon. They also dominate the polity and policy-making processes as a result of their electoral dominance (De Jager, 2013: 149). The ANC has maintained a large majority ever since the 1994 elections. As is evident in the table below, the ANC’s electoral support in national elections have always been over 60 per cent.

Table 3.2.3. ANC national election results

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<tr>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>62.2</td>
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(Results rounded up to one decimal place. Source: Election Resources, n.d.)

Its liberation credentials, however, are a wasting asset (Johnson, 2009: 623). Increasingly, the ANC is being evaluated in terms of their current performance, not their struggle history. In terms of the former, the ANC is falling short. Leading up to the 2014 elections the media frequently portrayed South Africa as a nation in crisis (Poplak, 2014: ix). Reasons for this
portrayal include the many corruption scandals, service delivery protests, the unpopular e-toll system, Nkandla and Marikana (Poplak, 2014: ix; Butler, 2012: 12). Yung (2014: 141) cites the rise of service delivery protests and police brutality as the weakening bond between the people and the ANC.

Moreover, the ANC has had difficulty with delivering its election promises (Twala, 2014: 1991). Butler (2014) also criticises them for their failure to advance coherent and credible economic and development policies. These and other issues are leading to mass re-alignment away from the ANC (Poplak, 2014: ix).

Additionally, citizens are increasingly critical of the ANC because they feel that the ANC has changed (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014; McKaiser, 2014). The ANC’s political success invited a whole new class of patrons “anxious to befriended and subsidise ANC leaders” (Johnson, 2009: 13). As a result, the ANC has become torn between the values of its founders and those who seek political power to serve political interests (De Jager, 2013: 149). In his book, McKaiser (2014) firstly lauds the ANC for its successes and their ideals that he feels resonates with him. However, he goes on to say that he, like many other South Africans, feel like they can no longer support the ANC - not with its endemic corruption, its lack of performance and the growing distance between the party and their ideals (McKaiser, 2014: 5-7). The ‘new’ ANC is also characterised by periods of rebellion against the leadership, and debilitating succession battles (Butler, 2012: 12-13).

Furthermore, it has become distanced from its electorate. The ANC, as a mass party, has had a longstanding connection with the people that has been a key source of its strength and identity (Yung, 2014: 141). Its self-assurance that the ANC will not lose, however, has weakened this bond (Butler, 2014: 4-7; Yung, 2014: 141). This decline in the ANC’s hegemony and the rise of viable opposition has led Butler (2014: 1) to conclude that the ANC now faces unprecedented political challenges. A sentiment that is reinforced by Booyse (2015: 7) who argues that decline and decay is evident in the ANC, no matter how you look at it.

### 3.3 DA

#### 3.3.1 History as the parliamentary opposition

According to Leon (2008: x), “there was always a group of white South Africans who opposed the system of racial supremacy and tyranny of its oppression and held fast for a more just and humane political and economic order”. They, however, fought apartheid from within the
system as parliamentary opposition to the National Party. In 1959 the Progressive Party was formed by a faction of the United Party. These members broke away when the United Party voted against returning land to the black majority (Why the DA, n.d). The party was opposed to apartheid and sought constitutional reform. In 1961, the party won only one seat in the elections. This seat was held by Helen Suzman who continued to stand against racial discrimination and remains known as a prominent anti-apartheid activist (Why the DA, n.d).

In 1974 the Progressive Party merged with the Reform Party to establish the Progressive Reform Party. In 1977, the PRF combined with the Committee for a United Opposition to form the Progressive Federal Party and became the official opposition (Why the DA, n.d). When the tricameral constitution was introduced, the PRF strongly opposed it given its exclusion of black people (Why the DA, n.d). In 1989, the Independent Party, the National Democratic Movement and Progressive Federal Party joined to form the Democratic Party, which is the predecessor of the DA (Why the DA, n.d; De Jager, 2013: 165). Hence, the DA considers itself the result of several movements and parties that united over the year under the vision of a liberal democracy (Why the DA, n.d).

Fighting within the system of apartheid, however, meant that up to 1994 none of their black members could become public representatives. This has contributed to the DA’s reputation of being a ‘white’ party (De Jager, 2013: 165). The DA’s opposition frequently use raced arsenals to undermine the credibility of this historically white party with its roots in apartheid parliamentary politics (Villa-Vicencio & Soko, 2012: 77). Deserved or not, the DA carries apartheid baggage (Pressly, 2013: 162). In response, the ‘Know Your DA’ campaign was launched to highlight its liberal roots and its anti-apartheid activists (Pressly, 2013; McKaiser, 2014). It has, nevertheless, retained its stigma as a white party.

3.3.2 The DA’s liberal ideology

The DA is and has always been a liberal party. As with other liberal parties, the DA’s priority is the individual (Leon, 2008:623). They envision a society where a person’s success is determined by their efforts and not by accident of birth (DA, 2016: 10; Leon, 2008: 276). Hence, it cannot be a society based on unfair discrimination. All individuals must enjoy equal rights and access to opportunities irrespective of gender, ethnicity or race (DA, 2014: 8). Their freedom must also be protected. They believe in constitutional supremacy on the basis that “the state has no right to tell people how to think and what they may or may not say” (DA, 2014: 8).
According to the DA (2014: 8), individuals should be free to do what they want as long as they do not infringe on the rights of others (DA, 2014: 8).

Therefore, the DA believes in limited state intervention. Ideally the state’s role is to create an opportunity society “where every individual has the power to live a life he or she values” (DA, 2014: 8). The state must provide these opportunities by growing the economy and stimulating job growth to lift people out of poverty (DA, 2014: 8). However, they should also provide a social safety net to protect vulnerable citizens (DA, 2014: 8). According to James (2013), “never has liberalism’s balance between individual freedom and the power of the state to champion social responsibility and opportunity through taxation, welfare and public services been so widely understood as it is in today’s complex world”.

One of the complexities that South African liberalism has had to adapt to was the legacy of apartheid. James (2013) explains that South Africa is a broken society with numerous contradictions. As a result, it has been challenging at times to translate liberal theory into practice. For example, the DA has had to question how to balance a policy of non-racialism with strategic interventions to counter apartheid’s legacy (James, 2013).

Liberals are divided about the extent of the role of the state in the economy (James, 2013). Nevertheless, the DA has come to the conclusion that action must be taken to “achieve genuine redress for the social and economic legacy of Apartheid” (DA, 2014: 8). According to the DA (2016: 10), an equal and fair society will only be possible if the large-scale inequality left in apartheid’s wake is addressed. A level playing field must be created for all South Africans (DA, 2016: 10). Hence, the DA is committed to both restorative and distributive justice (James, 2013). Their resultant policies are not being guided by race per se but by the need to benefit the least advantaged the most (James, 2013).

3.3.3 The DA as the official opposition

The DA has since then grown significantly and consistently. In the table below, this increase in their share of the national vote can be tracked. It has grown from 1.7 per cent in the 1994 election, to 22.2 per cent in the 2014 national election.
Table 3.3.3. DA national election results

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<tr>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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(Results rounded up to one decimal place. Sources: Election Resources, n.d.)

Part of their growth can be attributed to the rise in anti-ANC sentiment. Descendants of the struggle generation have less of an emotional attachment to the ANC (Pressly, 2013: 10; Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 205). They attribute less to the struggle and focus on the contemporary situation like the significant backlog in service delivery, the corruption and unanswered hopes (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 205). These critiques against the ANC have led many to believe that for the dominant party’s power to be constrained, they need to face credible opposition (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014:211). This has provided the DA with the opportunity to present themselves as a viable alternative (McKaiser, 2014: 13; Pressly, 2013: 32).

The DA has capitalised on this opportunity. They use anti-ANC sentiment to rally people of all races to their cause (Newman & De Lannoy, 2014: 203). According to the DA (2016: 1), people can continue to support the ANC and support the status quo of ‘corruption, empty and broken promises, poor service delivery and high unemployment’. Or they can vote for the DA and consequently bring about radical change in government (DA, 2016: 1). The DA depicts themselves as the “only viable alternative to the ANC” (Why the DA, n.d).

According to McKaiser (2014: 9-12), the DA is the obvious choice, at least on a superficial level, for an alternative given their good governance and service delivery. The DA’s apparent strategy has been to “win local, govern well and aim for national” (De Jager, 2013: 165). It has been relatively successful where it governs which has allowed the DA to style themselves as the government that delivers (De Jager, 2013: 165; Why the DA, n.d). Regardless, McKaiser (2014) argues that the DA will go no further unless they diversify their support base, especially amongst the black poor. Hence, Zille’s willingness to step back and Maimane’s ascendency.

3.3 EFF

3.3.1 The on-going struggle against racialised capitalism

The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) was founded in July 2013. However, they see their struggle as originating from the arrival of Jan van Riebeck (Shivambu, 2014: iix; EFF, 2013:
According to the EFF (2013: 1), his arrival begun the racist colonial and imperialist, political, economic and social domination of the Khoi and San people of South Africa. This domination sparked the resistance of which the EFF considers itself a part (EFF, 2013: 1). While the EFF (2013: 1) acknowledges that Africans had their temporary victories, they conclude that they were ultimately defeated, humiliated and enslaved by colonial settlers (EFF, 2013: 1).

A key victory in the resistance was the political freedoms symbolically gained in 1994 (EFF, 2013: 2; Shivambu, 2014: 1). This, at least, marked the end of the legalistic form of “colonial-apartheid domination” (EFF, 2013: 2). However, the EFF (2013: 2) argues that the post-1994 government was given the “overwhelming mandate to turn political power into total economic emancipation”. Political power in itself was never enough. It would only ever be meaningful where it was backed by economic freedom (EFF, 2013: 6; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a). They argue that the new political freedoms have not been translated into economic emancipation (EFF, 2013: 2, 3; Shivambu, 2014: 106). Consequently, the black majority remains conquered and powerless (EFF, 2013: 2; Shivambu, 2014: 1).

Therefore, the EFF sees themselves as continuing the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and racism (Shivambu, 2014: 1). They initially pursued the struggle from within the ANC. The founder and commander in chief of the EFF, Malema, gained his national political reputation as president of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). Malema rose rapidly within the ANC ranks. However, a rift formed between Malema’s faction and the ANC’s mother-body.

According to Shivambu (2014), this rift was formed because of Malema and his allies’ insistent push for nationalisation. He argues that the ANC turned on them because Malema’s faction had realized that the ANC government was directionless and that their faction had vowed to stand against corruption, money laundering and fraud and rejected Jacob Zuma who was at the head of what they saw as a failing state (Shivambu, 2014: 21). This, despite Malema’s role in installing Zuma as leader of the ANC (Ford, 2011).

Ford (2011) provides a different interpretation for this rift. According to Ford (2011), ANC leaders lost patience for Malema’s outrageous tactics. She also adds that his rapid rise within the ranks of the ANC alarmed several older cadres. Senior ANC members who have been working their way up within the ANC, felt threatened (Ford, 2011). Either way, disciplinary action was brought against Malema. This culminated in his eventual expulsion from the ANC.
In response Malema and his allies called for a people’s conference. They sent for delegates from across the country to gather in Soweto on 26 and 27 June. They gathered as:

“Economic Freedom Fighters, representing non-government organizations, youth, workers, traditional leaders, Activists, Movements, Non-Profit organisations, political parties, churches, intellectuals, academics, Students, Traditional Chiefs, Headmen and Kings, Independent Councillors, Internationalists and many others who have responded to the clarion call” (EFF, 2013a).

The purpose of the conference was to resolve the question of ‘what is to be done’ (EFF, 2013a). According to the Economic Freedom Fighters (2015), the question became necessary because the former liberation movement had failed to deliver on their ideological, political and historical mandate “to totally emancipate South Africa from starvation, unemployment, poverty, inequalities, hopelessness and potential social instability”.

Moreover, the EFF does not believe that the ANC can still carry out this mandate (EFF, 2013: 2; Mbete, 2014: 39). Its members have become too corrupted by power and the related sins of the incumbency (EFF, 2013: 2). As a result, they have lost the capacity to understand the aspirations of the people. The EFF point to the deepening neglect and violence against the people, which ranges from the brazen abuse of power to the sheer disregard of the people’s voice (EFF, 2013: 2). They (the ANC) are turning South Africa into a kleptocracy with those connected to political leaders becoming richer and more corrupt (EFF, 2013: 6).

Additionally, the EFF came to the conclusion that there was no-one available to pursue the mandate of economic freedom. According to the EFF (2013: 5), progressive forces within the ANC and the youth movement have been suppressed. Nor is there any real ideological opposition to the ANC. They argue that opposition political parties ultimately share the ANC’s neo-liberal, capitalist and free-market programme (EFF, 2013: 5). These parties oppose the incumbent government only on superficial issues. Furthermore, they consider the left-wing formations aligned with the ANC and the trade union movement to have also been swallowed by reform politics (EFF, 2013: 5). Consequently, these organisations cannot be relied on to challenge the ANC’s ideology (EFF, 2013: 5).

Hence, the EFF has taken it upon themselves to provide an alternative to the so-called current neo-colonial system (EFF, 2013a). They considered three options regarding how they should proceed with their resistance (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a). They could act within the ANC to advocate for radical change with the hope that they will eventually self-correct to save
society from starvation and the declining living conditions of the people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a). Or they could act as a movement advocating for economic freedom while remaining unaligned to an electoral political party and not contest elections (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a). Or, finally, they could become a political party and so compete against the ANC (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b).

Given the importance of elections in South Africa, the EFF styled themselves as a political party to compete in them (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b). Their intention is to pursue economic emancipation through political power (EFF, 2013: 7; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d). They became what they consider to be is South Africa’s only political party actively pursuing socialism (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b).

If so, the EFF presents a unique brand of socialism. They are controversially rich socialists (Ford, 2011). Poplak (2014: 40) consequently finds the EFF’s attacks on commercialism and capitalism to be ironic given how ‘well-versed’ they are in those benefits. Ford (2011) argues that Malema and his like has always been concerned with material benefits despite their pro-poor rhetoric. Malema has defended his extravagant lifestyle by arguing that he wants to show blacks that they too are worthy of wealth (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009)

3.3.2 A unique ideological combination of Marxism, Leninism and Fanonism

The EFF looks at the past and present with a unique ideological lens (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b). They draw inspiration from the broad Marxist-Leninist tradition and Fanonist schools of thought (EFF, 2013: 6; Shivambu, 2014:77-80). They view capitalism through a Marxist-Leninist lens and agree that its inevitable result is a class struggle (Shivambu, 2014:77). Moreover, they see capitalism as the core of South Africa’s problems and stalwartly define themselves as anti-capitalist (Shivambu, 2014: 95; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; EFF, 2013a). They are very critical of the government’s commitment to neoliberalism (EFF, 2013: 3). According to them, the current economic policies empower a few corporations and individuals at the cost of communities (EFF, 2013: 3). It has also contributed to poor service delivery, the draining of state resources and South Africa remaining a consumer of finished goods and services (EFF, 2013: 3).

While the EFF defines themselves as socialists, they are critical of the Eurocentrism and the Western arrogance they see defining socialism and the world. To counter-act this bias the EFF gives equal credence to the work of Fanon (Shivambu, 2014: 78). They draw on Fanon’s
argument that the economic substructure is also a superstructure in former colonies (Shivambu, 2014: 78). In these instances: “the cause is the consequence; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you rich” (Shivambu, 2014: 78). This perspective, however, does not explain wealthy black individuals. Black billionaires like Patrice Motsepe and Cyril Ramaphosa are discarded on the basis of being white ‘agents’ (Poplak, 2014: 43).

According to the EFF (2013: 2), this has been and remains the status quo in South Africa. Capitalism in South Africa has always been underlined by racism, segregation and sexism (EFF, 2013: 2). Shivambu (2014: 91) argues that under apartheid racial and class exploitation were inseparable. It resulted in a racialised capitalism that places the black majority, particularly Africans, at the lower end of society (EFF, 2013: 22). Moreover, South Africa’s current system of accumulation has retained its colonial nature (Shivambu, 2014: 88).

Therefore, the EFF has responded by creating a racialised socialism. They style themselves as the vanguard of the working-class revolution (Shivambu, 2014: 11). Their struggle is beyond any single political party and inclusive of anyone who identifies with it (Shivambu, 2014: 5). Additionally, they make the case for intra-racial equality and do not exclude whites from the dream of economic emancipation (Shivambu, 2014: 4). However, the EFF remembers that blacks were previously oppressed and whites turned a blind eye to that (Shivambu, 2014: 8-9). This in turn has justified its prioritisation of the black people in the post-apartheid era.

3.3.3. Adhering to a controversial style of politics

Despite their youth, the EFF rapidly ensnared the public imagination (Mbete, 2014: 35). This is reflected in their electoral success. The EFF gained 6.4% of the national vote in 2014 despite having only been launched in 2013 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, n.d). Making it the third largest political party in South Africa a year after its formation. Their popularity can be attributed to their ability to excite and invigorate the political scene (Poplak, 2014: 166). This is attributed to the EFF’s populist political style, which is characterised by its appeal to the people, its use of crisis, breakdown and threat and by its bad manners (Mbete, 2014).

Populist movements depict themselves as defending ‘the pure people’ against ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mbete, 2014: 38). According to the EFF, the ‘people’ refers to “the poor, marginalised masses of South Africa” (Mbete, 2014: 38). The EFF in turn defends them from those who hold political power (Mbete, 2014: 38). White people and the ANC are invariably described as antagonists to the people (Ford, 2011; Mbete, 2014: 38; Poplak, 2014: 40, 43).
Secondly, populist politics use crisis, break down and threat as driving forces (Mbete, 2014: 38). Incidents are framed as emergencies, which will allow immediate and decisive action that is favoured by populists (Mbete, 2014: 38). According to Mbete (2014: 38), the EFF was formed out of a crisis. Its existence due to the expulsion of Malema and Floyd Shivambu from the ANC (Ford, 2011; Mbete, 2014: 38). They also frame incidents in a manner that depict them, and through them the poor, as being under attack. For example, the tax evasion case against Malema was depicted as an attempt of the ANC to remove Malema as a political opponent (Poplak, 2014: 39-40; Ford, 2011).

Lastly, the EFF’s political style is characterised as populist by its ‘bad manners’. Mbete (2014: 38) states that populist discourse is course and marked by their disregard for what is appropriate. In challenging the rules and conventions of politics and political institutions, populists distance themselves from the elite. This is evident in the ‘revolutionary’ dress code of the EFF, which they use as a way to show their solidarity with the people (Mbete, 2014: 39; Poplak, 2014: 25). The EFF’s ‘bad manners’ are also evident in their blatant disdain for parliamentary rules and their more unconventional forms of politicking such as protests (Mbete, 2014: 43). Poplak (2014: 89) describes their tactics as a combination of “standard gangster activities – drugs, maiming, leaning against cars – with political campaigning”.

It is exactly this ‘hooliganism’ that makes the EFF appeals to some people (Ford, 2011; Du Preez & Rossouw (2009: 28). For black youths “[he] has become a much-admired hero [with] his arrogant, crude defiance of their fears, resentments and aspirations” (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009: 6). He has put into words the racial and social anger that continues to bubble beneath the surface of society and he hits raw nerves and earns kudos for it in many quarters (Ford, 2011: 15). According to Ford (2011: ix), Malema

“fills the gaps of disappointment and failure at a time when the promise of liberation had become privatized and the ideal of reciprocity and mutuality enshrined in the Constitution are struggling to find political and cultural platforms”.

Hence, there are many people who relate to his, and the EFF’s, style of politics; even as others hate him for upsetting the status quo. He challenged the notion of the Rainbow Nation and reminded them that the struggle was not over yet (Ford, 2011). Many people resented him for it. People from all sides were concerned that he was provoking a conflict that “could erupt in bloodshed similar to that of the years before the 1994 election” (Du Preez & Rossouw, 2009: }
16). This has led Malema to be both one of the most influential and ridiculed politicians in South Africa (Du Preez, 2013: 5).

According to Mbete (2014: 36), the context created by socio-economic hardships makes the EFF’s style of politics particularly appealing to people even if it can be seen as lacking in content. Poplak (2014: 38) comes to a similar conclusion. He argues that it would be foolish to disregard the EFF as a serious threat to the ANC and DA, especially in downtrodden communities.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter described the respective histories, ideologies and political positions of the ANC, the DA and the EFF. These parties have different ideological orientations that are reflective of their different origins. The ANC as a mass-movement has incorporated various ideological influences over time. Consequently, it has a hybrid ideology that contains features of Africanism, non-racialism and communism. In contrast, the DA is a liberal party. It traces its history through a number of parties and movements that were centred on the liberal vision of a non-racial constitutional democracy with limited state responsibility to the individual. The EFF is one of South Africa’s youngest political parties but considers itself as part of the struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racialism. They use their Marxist-Leninist-Fanonist ideology to explain how South Africa has retained its colonial characteristics. The expectation would be that these differences would be reflected in any discourse that they promote.

Moreover, the parties’ positions in current South African politics were described. The ANC has been South Africa’s political hegemon since 1994. However, its electoral dominance has been in decline. Citizens have become increasingly critical of the ANC. As a result, South African politics are becoming increasingly competitive. The DA has been growing steadily as the official opposition, while the EFF’s rapid rise in popularity belies its young age. The decline in the ANC’s hegemony is providing the EFF and the DA with greater access to discursive spaces. In the following chapter, the constructions of the nations that the parties respectively promote are examined.
Chapter 4: Political parties’ constructions of South Africa as a nation

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines ANC’s, the DA’s and the EFF’s respective constructions of South Africa as nation. The point of departure is how the parties respectively relate to the Rainbow Nation. This will be evident in how they regard the symbols of the nations. For example, how they respond to the ‘rainbow nation’ term. Whether or not the party supports the characteristics of inclusivity, diversity and equality which is characterises this view of the nation. Also, how they regard reconciliation and Mandela respectively. Reconciliation because it has been interpreted as essential for the rainbow nation. That this vision of the nation can only be realised if races can resolve the animosity between them and come together. While Archbishop Tutu is the one who coined the term, it was furthered by Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president of South Africa (Buqa, 2015: 1). Hence, he is frequently as the symbolic figurehead of post-apartheid South Africa, including the view of South Africa as the rainbow nation.

Additionally, the respective parties depict policy issues as problems are considered. These problem representations are researched by regarding what is presented as the problem and viewed as a solution. This is done as a means to investigate what assumptions are contained within these constructions of problems. These assumptions also reflect how the parties respectively view the South African nation. Moreover, how this underlying assumption relates to its more explicit view of the rainbow nation.

4.2. ANC

4.2.1 Continued commitment to the rainbow nation

The ANC does not consider the rainbow nation as problematic. On the contrary, they still apply the moniker to the contemporary South African nation (ANC, 2013-2016). They also regard Mandela as the ‘father’ of the nation (ANC, 2013-2016). They also explicitly ascribe the values of non-discrimination and reconciliation to him (ANC, 2013-2016).

Moreover, the ANC describes an on-going commitment to these values. They emphasise the relationship between Mandela and the ANC. On the one hand, they dedicate themselves to the values associated with Mandela. They argue that his values have been inculcated in the
organisation (ANC, 2013-2016). They repeatedly vow to take forward his legacy (ANC, 2013-2016). On the other hand, they go to lengths to illustrate the influence the ANC had on Mandela. They argue that, while he became representative of the ‘new’ South Africa, he was nevertheless acting as a member of the ANC (ANC, 2013-2016) and that in his actions and beliefs he was adhering to the party’s doctrine. He is described as the product of the ANC (ANC, 2013-2016). Consequently, they are therefore critical of parties who try to ‘appropriate’ Mandela (ANC, 2013-2016).

Their language use also indicates that they do not believe that they have wavered from the ideals Mandela promoted in 1994. They talk about how Nelson Mandela “remains [their] symbol of a flagship bearer of a better society” (ANC, 2013-2016). That he continues to be their inspiration and that they will continue building the South African society that he envisioned (ANC, 2013-2016). They are not committing to his values; they are recommitting to them (Kodwa, 2015; ANC, 2013-2016). Hence, they present the ANC as being consistently committed to the values which informed the creation of the Rainbow Nation in 1994.

The ANC implicitly show their support for South Africa as a civic nation through its positive endorsement of its symbols. For example, the moniker ‘Rainbow Nation’ which is associated with the 1994 national identity as well as Mandela. Given that he has become symbolic of that national identity, which is reinforced by their view that ‘his’ values are non-discrimination and reconciliation. Both of these are related to South Africa as a civic nation.

Moreover, the political party show their support for the characteristics that the Rainbow Nation was supposed to promote as civic nation. They argue for a single, united South African nation (ANC, 2013-2016). This nation, they argue, should go across divisions (My ANC, 2014e; ANC, 2012: 5). They set this out in their party constitution where they describe the establishment of a nation built on common patriotism and loyalty that will unite people of all types as one of the party’s aims (ANC, 2012:5). This is a vision that is re-affirmed in both their national and local election manifestos (ANC, 2014: 50; ANC, 2016: 5), as well as on YouTube, where they argue that the ANC is “building a common identity [which] embrace[s] our diversity’, a common nation that is not defined by ‘colour, race, class, or creed” (My ANC, 2014c). They do not see South Africa’s heterogeneity as obstructive to national identity. Instead, they regard the South African nation as being stronger for its diversity (ANC, 2013-2016; My ANC, 2014c; My ANC, 2013e).
Clearly the ANC sees the South African nation as inclusive. It is a stance that is supported by their recurrent statement that “South Africa belongs to all who live in it” (ANC, 2013-2016; ANC, 2012: 30; ANC, 2016: 5; Mthembu, 2013; Zuma, 2015b). Similarly, they argue that “if SA is indeed to move forward, all South Africans, regardless of language or background, need to work together as equal citizens”. This is illustrative of another key characteristic that the Rainbow Nation intended to promote as part the South African national identity: equality.

One of the ways in which the Rainbow Nation tried to establish equality as a new basis for the South African nation was through reconciliation. Reconciliation was seen as a way to address the racial tensions that resulted from apartheid’s system of competing nationalisms. It endeavoured to put these tensions to rest in favour of a united South African nation. The ANC maintains this stance. It argues for the continued necessity and value of reconciliation (Zuma, 2014f; Zuma, 2013g; ANC, 2013-2016). The political party lauds “SA's remarkable ability to put centuries of racial hatred behind it in favour of reconciliation” (ANC, 2013-2016).

They reinforce this stance by showing the ANC as embracing white people in the new South Africa. It was the white race that caused the oppression the ANC fought to overthrow. Yet the ANC shows that they will nevertheless be equal citizens in post-apartheid South Africa. This is evident in Zuma’s (ANC, 2013-2016) rejection that they wish to expel Afrikaners from South Africa. It is also implicitly supported in their electoral videos where they depict South Africans as being members of all races, including whites, and co-existing in harmony under the ‘new’ South Africa (My ANC, 2016c; My ANC, 2016b; My ANC, 2014a). Similarly, they use Twitter to tweet images of white South Africans as part of their support base (ANC, 2013-2016).

Moreover, the ANC supports non-racialism as a South African ideal. They see it as an essential characteristic of post-apartheid South Africa (ANC, 2013-2016). One of the ANC’s fundamental goals is the construction of a “united, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society in South Africa” (ANC, 2012: 2, 5; Mthembu, 2013; Zuma, 2013b; Zuma, 2015c; Zuma, 2015d). They envision a South Africa where all citizens will be measured by their humanity regardless of race (ANC, 2013-2016).

According to the ANC, they have been unwavering in their commitment to non-racialism. They see their stance as preceding the ‘new’ South Africa (Zuma, 2016b; ANC, 2013-2016). Moreover, they describe non-racialism and unity being the cornerstone of the ANC even before its formal establishment in 1912 (ANC, 2013-2016). Their language use also indicates that they have been consistently committed to non-racialism. They talk about how they will continue
working to bring about a non-racial South Africa (ANC, 2013-2016). Similarly, the commitments made to non-racialism are about reaffirming their stance (ANC, 2013-2016). It should, however, be noted that this view does not take the ANC’s history of ideological heterogeneity into account, as illustrated in chapter four.

Moreover, their promotion of non-racialism is complemented by their rejection of racism. Under apartheid racism was entrenched and was the basis of unfair discrimination. It also contributed to antagonistic relationships among South Africa’s racial nations. Thus, racism is a specific obstacle to South Africa as an inclusive and egalitarian nation. Its rejection, therefore, is essential in the pursuit of civic nationalism. The ANC is fervent in their condemnation of racism. It is described as ‘unpalatable’ (ANC, 2013-2016) as well as a foul and undesirable feature that dehumanises both victim and practitioner (ANC, 2013-2016). Hence, they mobilise South Africans to band together and mobilise against racism (ANC, 2013-2016). According to Zuma (2015a; 2016b), the ANC rejects racism and all related intolerances.

The ANC specifically tries to distance racism from post-apartheid South Africa. They describe the post-apartheid nation as a place where races work together in solidarity with one another (Kodwa, 2016b; ANC, 2013-2016). They explicitly state that “[there is] No place [for] racism and ethnicity in this country” (ANC, 2013-2016). They call upon South Africans to act as a nation to reject racism to make way for a non-racial South Africa (ANC, 2013-2016). Where incidents of racism are discussed, their descriptions make it evident that these are not the actions of South Africans. They isolate racism to a ‘tiny minority’ or individuals whose attitudes should not be seen as a reflection of the views of the majority of South Africans (ANC, 2013-2016; Kodwa, 2016a). Hence, the ANC argues that while there are racists in South Africa, South Africa as nation is not racist (ANC, 2013-2016; Kodwa, 2016a). This further illustrates how the ANC continues to view South Africa as the Rainbow Nation.

4.1.2 South Africa as two racial nations

According to the ANC, radical economic transformation is one of the political party’s top priorities. In the 2014 national elections it was considered as the ‘central question’ (ANC, 2014: 3; ANC, 2013-2016). Mthembu (2014), Kodwa (2014b; 2014d; 2014p) and Mantashe (2014) all affirm that the ANC considers transformation as essential for South Africa. Moreover, they frequently tweet statements indicating the ANC’s continued dedication to the pursuit of economic transformation (ANC, 2013-2016).
The ANC pursues economic transformation because they believe that it is the solution to South Africa’s socio-economic challenges. According to Zuma (2014a), the “ANC must now implement radical socio-economic transformation to meaningfully address this triple challenge”. Similarly, their national election manifesto states that “Our struggle has now reached the second, in which we will implement radical socio-economic transformation to meaningfully address poverty, unemployment and inequality” (ANC, 2014: 3). Mantashe also considers that “the pace of socio-economic transformation will determine the pace of solving the poverty & unemployment related conflict” (ANC, 2013-2016).

Their call for ‘radical economic transformation’ indicates that they believe that the economy has not undergone sufficient changes. While South Africa may have experienced a political transition, these differences have not been reflected in the structure of the economy. They do not explicitly express it as such given that they do not conceptualise ‘radical economic transformation’. It can, however, be deduced from the policies they promote. These policies indicate how they are practically pursuing economic transformation via inclusive growth and affirmative action.

Inclusive growth and affirmative action are linked to the goal of radical economic transformation. The ANC argues that inclusive growth is needed to “substantially reduce poverty and unemployment, and place the economy on a qualitatively different growth path” (ANC, 2014: 18). It is seen as a way to address South Africa’s triple challenge (My ANC, 2015v). The shared goals implicitly link it to the ANC’s overall pursuit of economic transformation. This connection is made explicit where the ANC describes inclusive growth as being at the core of the political party’s economic mandate, which is to transform the economy (ANC, 2013-2016). Black economic empowerment is also described as a means to address South Africa’s triple economic challenge (Zuma, 2014c). Zuma (2014f) also directly depicts broad-based BEE as a means to transform the structure of the economy.

The ANC’s proposed solutions suggest that South Africa’s economic challenges should not only be addressed, but that they should also be solved in a way that empowers black people. Inclusive growth is described as a means to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are equitably shared amongst all South Africans (ANC, 2013-2016). According to Ramaphosa, this will also entail greater diversity in the economy “both in terms of what we produce and in terms of who owns, manages & work in it” (ANC, 2013-2016). Zuma (2014a, 2014b) also argues that an inclusive economy would be more reflective of the country’s demographics as
it would “change the ownership, control and management of the economy” (Zuma, 2014b). These elaborations do not directly refer to the need to include black people. However, given that they consider the economy as ‘untransformed’, the orientation around black peoples are tacitly included.

The intention of inclusive growth is to ensure the economic participation and ownership of black South Africans is also explicitly expressed. In terms of inclusive growth, the ANC argues that there is a “need to undo the deliberate exclusion of black people… from meaningful participation in the mainstream of the economy” (ANC, 2013-2016). Similarly, Zuma (2013b) argues that the economy should be grown in such a manner as to “[empower] the historically oppressed Africans and the working class in particular”. The argument that the ANC makes is that the economy will only transformed once black people, Africans in particular, play a larger role in the economy (My ANC, 2014e; My ANC, 2015a). Moreover, the conceptualisation of affirmative action as BEE illustrates a similar intention as regards to the policy. BEE is specifically meant to economically empower black people.

Thus, the ANC’s solutions indicate that the political party considers South Africa’s economic challenges to be problematic specifically in terms of race. This is reinforced in how they frame South Africa’s triple challenge in terms of race. For example, Zuma (2013d) measures the state of the economy in terms of the gap between white and black people. Similarly, unemployment is framed as a problem in the sense that it has a greater effect on black people than on the white population (ANC, 2013-2016). Ownership in the economy is also criticised in terms of the ongoing racial discrepancy (ANC, 2013-2016).

Hence, the ANC sets out to correct the racial patterns in the economy when they talk about radical economic transformation. The racial pattern of the economy is at the core of the ANC’s problem representation. They specifically find it problematic that they are similar to how they were under apartheid. According to Zuma (2015d), “it cannot be correct that, twenty-one years after democracy, the apartheid ownership patterns continue unabated”. The ANC wants to change the ownership of the South African economy (My ANC, 2016a; My ANC, 2015b; ANC, 2013-2016). Mantashe (2015) argues that it is expected of them to take race into account when dealing with poverty, inequality and unemployment. Additionally, they explicitly state that they need to ‘de-racialise’ the economy (Zuma, 2015e; My ANC, 2016a; Kodwa, 2014a; ANC, 2013-2016).
The ANC, however, does not consider itself as motivated by ethnic nationalism, regardless of their racial framing. Their intention is to address the socio-economic legacy of apartheid. Zuma (2016a) argues that without transforming the economy, the inequality created by apartheid will be reproduced and further entrench racial divisions. South Africa’s triple challenge is described as part of apartheid’s legacy (My ANC, 2016a; My ANC, 2015c; My ANC, 2014d; My ANC 2014b; ANC, 2012:2, 5; ANC, 2014: 13; Kodwa, 2014b; Mthembu, 2014; ANC, 2013-2016). Hence, their redress is racial where they describe their motivation as the need to ‘unshackle’ black South Africans from their past of economic exclusion and exploitation (Zuma, 2016a; ANC, 2014:3). If they do not, they see the transition from apartheid as incomplete (Zuma, 2014b; 2014f). Hence, their problem representation comes from the need to rectify the past by ensuring the economic inclusion of those who have been historically excluded and oppressed such as black people (ANC, 2014: 3; Zuma, 2013a; 2014d).

However, they see themselves as acting in favour of the civic nation. Despite their racial presentation of the problem and solution, they are not motivated by ethnic nationalism per se. They work from the assumption that racism is structural and that the untransformed economy remains racist (ANC, 2013-2016). According to Zuma (2014c), equality will only be realised once the structure of the society which was designed to favour the minority, is transformed.

Their structural view of racism means that they consider it imperative that blacks are economically empowered otherwise a civic nation in South Africa will not be possible. Hence, affirmative action is not to benefit black people, but to benefit the South African nation. It is not a reflection of who is included or excluded from the nation, but a pragmatic consideration. They therefore consider it the duties of South Africans to support this endeavour regardless of race (ANC, 2013-2016; Mkhize, 2014). It is not meant to continue racial antagonisms but soothe them. According to Zuma (2014d),

“[the ANC’s] bias towards the Indian, African and Coloured people all of whom are black is not meant to polarize society but is the most decisive intervention towards redress and social cohesion. White compatriots must never feel excluded in this important project of building a non-racial, non-sexist, prosperous and democratic South Africa”.

Furthermore, the ANC presents their racial redress as a requirement of the rainbow nation by connecting it to reconciliation, social cohesion and nation-building. They argue that reconciliation will only succeed if those who suffered the most under apartheid experience a
material improvement in their quality of life (Zuma, 2013h; ANC, 2013-2016). Moreover, redress, even if racial, consequently aids national building and promotes social cohesion (ANC, 2013-2016). According to the ANC, the rainbow nation will not be possible while the economy retains its racial inequalities. Therefore, they see themselves as motivated by their pursuit of the rainbow nation. This reconciles the racialised understanding of the nation implicit in ‘radical economic transformation’ with their supposed dedication to a non-racial South Africa.

Alternatively, one should not attempt to reconcile these two views of the nation but treat it as the contradiction that it appears to be. In which case the question would be as to why they differ. It may be because of the internal nature of the ANC. As I have mentioned in chapter four, the ANC consists of different if not contradictory ideologies. The different views of the nation may be a reflection of this. Where the support for the rainbow nation can be associated with the non-racialism strand within the ANC. Whereas the call to transform the prospects of the black nation stem from the faction that prioritises Africanism.

There is another explanation for these seemingly contradictory constructions of the nation. It may be that the ANC is committed to the idea of the rainbow nation but is willing to use race where it is politically convenient. ‘Radical economic transformation’ shifts the blame for South Africa’s continued socio-economic problems away from them. It frames apartheid as still being as the problem. Omitted from this problem representation is the effect of poor governance. In which case a racial narrative has more to do with political convenience and scapegoating than national identity.

‘Radical economic transformation’, regardless of what specifically motivated its construction, can inadvertently undermine the rainbow nation narrative. This is because of how it is perceived. In the literature review, an overview was provided of how some people believe racial redress to be contradictory to the ideals of the ‘new’ South Africa. Moreover, racial minorities feel alienated by it. Zuma (2014d) takes cognisance of this to an extent with his statement that their actions should not be seen as excluding people from the nation. However, as people feel as if it does, their sense of national belonging will be affected.
4.2. DA

4.2.1 South Africa as a civic nation

The DA does not reject the national identity created in 1994. It is the ethnic nation of apartheid that they consider to be problematic. Maimane (2015f) argues that colour has no place in defining nationhood. According to the DA, the racial divisions upon which ethnic nations are constructed are completely artificial (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o). Once people look beyond race, they will realise that they want the same things in life (Maimane, 2015e). Moreover, ‘colour’ should be rejected as the basis of power (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o).

They are very critical of politics that they interpret as ethnic mobilisation (Zille, 2015a). According to the DA, the key to the ‘new’ South Africa is to keep racial nationalism of any kind out of South African politics (Zille, 2015b; Maimane, 2015f). They emphasise that South Africa is now in an era where its people must move away from its historical divisions (DA, 2014: 64; Maimane, 2015b; Maimane, 2015h; DA, 2013-2016). They repeatedly vow to prevent South Africa from ever returning to such divisive politics (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015h; Maimane, 2016e; Maimane, 2015g; DA, 2013-2016; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014i). According to Maimane (2015j; 2016i), South Africa will never move forward as a nation if it pursues ethnic mobilisation. The DA dedicates itself to leading South Africa away from a racially polarised state and to uniting people across fault lines (Zille, 2014a; Maimane, 2015c; DA, 2013-2016). Its rejection of ethnically bound nations is a reflection of its implicit support for the civic nation.

The DA views the current South African national identity to have been established in 1994 (DA, 2013-2016). This is tacit in how they relate to Mandela. They refer to him as the ‘father’ of the nation (DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016f). They argue that the values he represented of reconciliation and non-racialism are the values by which the majority of South Africans live (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b; Zille, 2015b; Maimane, 2016f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016g; Zille, 2014c; DA, 2013-2016). They emphasise that he left behind a legacy of an inclusive and commit themselves to taking it forward (DA, 2013-2016).

According to Maimane (2015e; 2015f; 2015a), the DA will work to establish his dream nation where colour is irrelevant. They consider themselves as the only party that maintains Mandela’s dream of a united, non-racial and prosperous South Africa (Maimane, 2015e; Maimane,
2016g). Consequently, they show themselves as now being the party responsible for furthering the rainbow nation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016i; DA, 2013-2016). This is the implicit message of one of their electoral videos. In their electoral video, there is a Mandela voice-over of him stating that ‘let there be justice for all, let there be peace, let there be bread for all’. Moreover, when this narration occurs, they purposely show the voter choosing to vote for the DA instead of the ANC (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016d).

The DA also indicates that they support the values of the civic nation which the Rainbow Nation was meant to contain. Firstly, South Africa can be a single united nation. They repeatedly call for South Africans to stand united as one nation (DA, 2013-2016; Zille, 2014c; DA, 2014:64). According to Maimane (2016c), creating this single nation despite its divided past remains imperative. The DA believes such a shared national identity is possible. People can rally around the same values and common humanity to create the ‘new’ South African nation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; Maimane, 2015b; Maimane, 2015f; Zille, 2014b). This reflects their belief in a civic nation given that it is based on shared values.

Additionally, they see one of the characteristics of the South African nation to be based on non-racialism. They argue that all South Africans should be invested in the establishment of a non-racial South Africa (DA, 2013-2016). According to Zille (2015a), non-racialism will be the rallying point of the ‘new’ majority. Moreover, the DA commits to pursuing non-racialism (Maimane, 2016i; DA, 2013-2016). They identify as non-racial and ‘for all people’ (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015c).

The DA considers the South African nation as inclusive and illustrates how they share this ideal. It is a point of pride for them that they represent South Africans of every race (Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a). They especially focus on their growing support amongst black South Africans, especially as they have been stigmatised as a ‘white’ party. They do however regard this as a stigma and not a reflection. According to Maimane, it is sheer nonsense that there are no black DA supporters (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a). Consequently, the DA calls for the need to break through this prejudice (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015h).

They do this by emphasising their growing support amongst black South Africans (Maimane, 2016b; Zille, 2014d). They especially do this implicitly through the use of visual material.
Several of their tweets show black South Africans in DA regalia (DA, 2013-2016). Moreover, in their electoral videos when they talk about fighting for the rights of South Africans, or state that they are representative of all races, these statements are accompanied by visual media showing black South Africans (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013a).

They have branded themselves as the party for South Africans from all walks of life (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Zille, 2014d; DA, 2013-2016; Zille, 2014f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Zille, 2014a), a point that they emphasise by promoting themselves as South Africa’s most diverse party (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015c; Zille, 2014a; Zille, 2014c; Maimane, 2015g; Maimane, 2016g; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; DA, 2013-2016). This is supported with visuals of members of different races and backgrounds united under the DA (DA, 2013-2016; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Maimane, 2016bi; Zille, 2015b; Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b). According to Maimane, the DA “reflects all the dynamics and diversities of South Africa” (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014b).

The DA considers diversity to be a feature of the new South Africa nation. They argue that its diversity of cultural practices, languages and histories is the nation’s defining feature post-apartheid (DA, 2014:64; DA, 2013-2016). They see it as something that should be safeguarded and celebrated (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016c; DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016a). Moreover, the call for diversity is not seen as divisive. It is seen as an essential part of a united South African nation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h). This view is implicitly supported in their electoral videos where they talk about South Africans in the voiceover while showing members of different races celebrating together (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h), or showing members of different races interacting with one another while draped in South African paraphilia (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h). In accordance with the expectations of a civic nation, they see South Africans as being able to transcend their differences and remain united.

While they call for diversity, they emphasise that this is not at the cost of equality. The new South African nation should be built on the foundations of mutual understanding and respect (DA, 2014: 64). The South Africa they envision will be egalitarian. According to Maimane
(2015g), “the war is no longer West vs East, Communism versus Capitalism, Black versus White. It is about a contestation for a better tomorrow and a future we can ALL have”. Similarly, when they talk about how to build a better South Africa for all, they explicitly state that this must be “better for all South Africans black and white, Indian or Coloured” (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014f). Hence, they see equality as an essential part of the ‘new’ South Africa. South Africa should be a country where all South Africans are equal (DA, 2013-2016).

Given South Africa’s racist history, this entails an explicit rejection of racism. The DA makes it clear that racism has no place within their party. Their constitution rejects unfair discrimination on any grounds (DA, 2015: 9). An act of unfair discrimination is considered as an act of misconduct (DA, 2015: 19). Moreover, they state that racists are not welcome in the DA (Maimane, 2015b; Maimane, 2015f; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; Zille, 2014b). Additionally, racism has no place in the ‘new’ South Africa. They call for South Africans to stand united against racism and racial mobilisation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; DA, 2013-2016). According to the DA, racists should receive no leeway (Zille, 2014b; DA, 2013-2016) and incidents of racism should be investigated and addressed (DA, 2013-2016). Racism is shown as contrary to the South African national identity, an attitude that is limited to a dwindling minority. Instead, there is the increasing preference of South Africans to associate along the lines of values and not race (Zille, 2014b).

Their stance is reinforced by their support for reconciliation. According to Zille (2015a), “given the tragedy of our past, building trust between South Africans is an essential foundation”. They do, however, believe that it is possible to move past this history and so establish a new future in a democratic South Africa (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014i). The DA urges South Africans to follow Mandela’s example of reconciliation (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016a; DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016a). They specifically call for former ‘nations’ to find common ground and unite (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b).

4.2.2. South Africa as one nation divided between economic insiders and outsiders

According to the DA, the ideal South African society, is an open opportunity society. There needs to be opportunities for all (DA, 2014:8; DA, 2015:5; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016z; Maimane, 2015a; DA, 2013-2016). They argue that by providing opportunities for all, the South African triple challenge will be addressed (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014e;
Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015a). It will resolve South Africa’s unequal playing field, which will allow every South African to pursue their best life (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2015:5). Their proposed solution consists of two separate yet related parts.

Firstly, the DA believes that ‘opportunities’ should be available. Their proposed solution is job creation. They explicitly link it to the aim of their envisioned opportunity society where job creation is seen as an essential means to improve people’s quality of life (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014l; DA, 2013-2016) as well as the key to social mobility, given that they represent possibilities that people can utilise to lift themselves out of poverty (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2014:8; Zille, 2014d).

According to the DA, the best way to ensure that there are sufficient opportunities is via job creation. They depict job creation as the DA’s priority (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2016:2; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015j; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015b; Zille, 2014c). Moreover, they argue that it should be the priority of the South African government as well (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n; Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014d; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014g; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014h; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014m; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016e; DA, 2013-2016). Practically, they see job creation as the result of policy decisions. Hence, they believe that parties with the best policies will be best at stimulating job creation (DA, 2013-2016). The state does not need to be a job creator but it needs to create an environment conducive to job creation.

Consequently, the DA views the problem of unemployment as the product of a lack of opportunities (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016e; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016i). They specifically attribute the blame to the government’s inability to stimulate sufficient job growth (Maimane, 2016b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014j; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016l; DA, 2013-2016). According to the DA, the rise in unemployment is the defining feature of the Zuma administration (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014m; DA, 2013-2016; Maimane, 2016f; Maimane, 2016d; DA, 2014:1, 4; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014e; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b; Zille, 2014g; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016h; DA, 2013-2016).
Secondly, the DA believes that opportunities should be available for all. This means creating a system where opportunities are unrestricted and outcomes are determined by effort. They acknowledge that apartheid had a lasting legacy, one that has kept the black majority excluded from opportunities. As a solution, the DA supports BEE (DA, 2013-2016). However, they argue that for BEE to be a viable solution, it must first be ‘fixed’ (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014k). This fix would entail the policies to be broad-based. They argue that BEE must benefit the many not only the few with political connections (DA, 2013-2016; Zille, 2015b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n).

As a standard, they will see whether or not BEE policies contribute to job creation (DA, 2013-2016). Where BEE creates jobs, the DA considers it as beneficial. They argue that BEE is then a means to ensure that all South Africans have equal access to opportunities (Maimane, 2015d; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014j; DA, 2014:5). Moreover, it will ensure that all those who were previously disadvantaged will benefit and so address racial inequality (DA, 2013-2016). Hence, they call for BEE that creates ‘jobs not billionaires’ (DA, 2014:18; DA, 2013-2016; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014c; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014k).

Thus, the DA considers it problematic that people have restricted access to opportunities. This is in part because of the current version of BEE. According to the DA, “[BEE] policies so far, while well-intended, haven’t created real, broad-based empowerment that’ll improve the lives of ordinary [South Africans]” (DA, 2013-2016). The DA argues that BEE as it is at the moment does not create a level playing field. On the contrary, it is shutting out those who lack political influence (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014o), including those it is meant to assist. They argue that BEE is problematic because the policies are not empowering the many but enriching the few (Maimane, 2015d; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b; DA, 2013-2016). Hence, they see them as failing as that they do not bridge the “divide between economic insiders and outsiders” (DA, 2013-2016).

The DA argues that this culture of insiders and outsiders extend beyond BEE policies. Maimane (2015ni) argues that it has developed into a culture where opportunities are reserved for insiders who have political connections (DA, 2013-2016; DA, 2014: 3; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b; Maimane, 2015h; Maimane, 2015i; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014g; Maimane, 2015ni). These are the select few. Most South Africans are locked out of opportunities as most South Africans are not politically connected (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014a; DA, 2013-2016). Hence, the DA indicates that they consider the problem to be
that “instead of opportunities for all, we only see opportunities for some” (DA, 2013-2016; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2013b; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2015h; Maimane, 2016zi; Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014n).

The DA’s problem representation of a closed crony society is based on their liberal ideology. They believe that individuals should have the ability to determine their quality of life by their efforts, not by their birth (DA, 2013-2016). This is only possible where opportunities are equally available to all and outcomes are the reflection of effort and ability (DA, 2013-2016). Currently, this is infringed upon by the lack of opportunities as well as an unequal playing field.

The DA takes cognisance that the apartheid legacy has restricted people’s access to opportunities so active measures are needed to address it. According to the DA, “people mustn't be held back by arbitrary criteria; gender, religion, or colour, or by prejudice of those in power” (DA, 2013-2016). Similarly, they consider it an evil of apartheid that South Africa has been divided into groups of haves and have-nots based on race (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2014i; DA, 2013-2016).

However, even as they support racial redress, the DA endeavours to minimise the extent their actions are seen as racial. Firstly, they consider race and disadvantage as distinct even if they believe that a significant correlation between race and disadvantage remains (DA, 2014: 18; DA, 2013-2016). Secondly, they emphasise that redress policies are considered as transient and subject to regular review (DA, 2014: 18). Lastly, their problem representation conceptualises people as insiders and outsiders. Hence, they show that their priorities remain providing opportunities for all. At the moment that would entail economically empowering people, taking race into consideration. Hence, they show that their redress policies are not about race per se but about individuals who have been denied access to opportunities on the basis of race.

Therefore, the DA does not consider people as being alienated by South African national identity. They are divided into those who are excluded from the economy and those who are not. In this regard, race is an influencing factor but not conclusive. Moreover, they do not see this a failure of South Africa as a nation, a sentiment that is reinforced by their statement that there is nothing wrong with the South African identity or people. The fault lies with its government (Democratic Alliance South Africa, 2016b). Consequently, they promote a narrative where South Africans remain included in the South African nation even if their government has failed to include them in the economy.
4.3. EFF

4.3.1 Rallying behind black nationalism

The EFF does consider the ‘Rainbow Nation’ a problem. It does not see it as the beginning of South Africa as a civic nation. Instead, they view it as a very unsatisfactory compromise, one that did not replace the previous system of racial oppression by the white nation but instead allowed for its continuation. They interpret reconciliation as a movement towards politics of class collaboration (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015c). They believe that attempting to reconcile interests of the workers and bosses is impossible. In their view, the ANC has become social partners with the bosses at the cost of the workers (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015c). The bosses are inevitably white and the workers inevitably black as a result of apartheid. Moreover, they have maintained this ‘false unity’ with white capital into the post-apartheid era (Ndlozi, 2014c).

Therefore, the EFF does not see the transition as creating a new South African identity. Instead, Ndlozi (2016a), argues that the ANC became co-opted into supporting the old one (Ndlozi, 2016a), an identity that was based on race and racism. They describe the nationalism that follows as one of ‘house niggers’ and cowards (Ndlozi, 2013a). The intention of their ‘toothless African nationalism’ is to suppress the black nation in protection of white interests (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2013a). They attribute this to the black elite’s self-hatred, which has informed their actions since the transition (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2013a). Hence, the black elite has internalised ideas of white supremacy. According to Ndlozi (2016a), they are conditioned like ‘house slaves’ to believe they will be doomed without their white masters, a stance they see reiterated in the current government’s all white legal council (Ndlozi, 2016b; Ndlozi, 2016d). They see the ANC as not only failing to transform South Africa but protectors of so-called white privilege (Ndlozi, 2016a; Ndlozi, 2016a).

The EFF does not see reconciliation as a means to an equal and inclusive nation. Instead they interpret it as the language of the bosses that they ‘trained’ the black elite to speak. Talk of peace and reconciliation is intended to keep the ‘black’ folk on its knees while distracting from the bosses continuing gains (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c). They consequently see the post-apartheid nationalism to be akin to the one before 1994 where nationalism promotes white supremacy while asking black people to accept the ‘scraps’ (Ndlozi, 2013a), instead of promoting black people to pursue a national discourse that is in their own interest (Ndlozi, 2013a).
Thus, the EFF views the 1990s peace process as a means to lull people into complacency while white supremacy continues (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015h; Malema, 2016b) where the ‘peaceful’ laws and reconciliation discourses have taken the place of explicit racist laws (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2013a). South Africans now have to “wake up from the long dogmatic sleep of peace and reconciliation and fearlessly pursue economic justice and freedom in our lifetime” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c).

They do not reject the possibility of a reconciled South Africa. However, they argue that reconciliation still needs to be earned (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d). According to the EFF, for there to be genuine reconciliation, South Africa must move away from the Mandela type reconciliation (EFF, 2013: 7, 8; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d; Malema, 2015; EFF, 2013-2016). Genuine reconciliation will only be possible if accompanied by economic reconciliation (Ndlozi, 2013c; Mokoena, 2015a; EFF, 2013-2016). Hence, they used Reconciliation Day 2015 to issue a warning that reconciliation has not yet occurred. Moreover, they argue that the reconciliation discourse is evil unless it is accompanied by radical economic changes (Ndlozi, 2015g); otherwise it asks blacks to keep enduring colonial conditions while the beneficiaries keep benefitting from the system (Ndlozi, 2013c; Mokoena, 2015a; Ndlozi, 2015g).

Their critique of the ‘post-liberation’ nation is also reflected in their stance towards Mandela. As a symbol of the ‘reconciled nation’, they are very critical of him, arguing that he “preached reconciliation at the expense of our people” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d; EFF, 2013-2016). Moreover, he and other leaders “usurped the leading role of the workers on the ground” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015c) in favour of the bosses, thus reaffirming their stance that the national identity was not changed with the political regime.

However, they also lauded him for the ‘political gift’ that he and his fellow fighters gave black South Africans (Ndlozi, 2013b; Ndlozi, 2014a; Ndlozi, 2014e; Ndlozi, 2015d). This more positive stance on Mandela comes from them reinterpreting their symbolic attachment to him, arguing that he understood the need for economic emancipation, which is why he pursued political freedom. They depict him as a ‘reputable Freedom Fighter’ whose commitment to Freedom in our Lifetime gained fruition (Ndlozi, 2013b). They now want to take his vision further by continuing the quest for economic freedom (Ndlozi, 2015d). They also challenge the connection between him and reconciliation. They argue that “Mandela was willing to lead an
armed revolution to restore a country where black people can live without fear, prejudice and as fully human” (Ndlozi, 2014e).

Moreover, the EFF depicts race and racism as still being the foundation of nationhood in South Africa. This is illustrated in how they claim that the racial nations are still in conflict with one another, where the black nation specifically is trying to overcome its continued oppression. This is evident in their demands to decolonise South African spaces. They call for all apartheid symbols and statues to be removed (EFF, 2013-2016; Ndlozi, 2015a; Ndlozi, 2015b; Ndlozi, 2015e; Ndlozi, 2015f; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; Ndlozi, 2016d) as well as the removal of ‘die Stem’ from the national anthem (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a; Ndlozi, 2015c; Ndlozi, 2015e). In addition, English must be used as the sole medium of instruction (Ndlozi, 2016c; Ndlozi, 2016d). Lastly, street names should be changed to stop exalting ‘apartheid agents’ (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They rationalise these demands on the basis that these are all symbols that perpetuate white supremacy or celebrate racists so they need to be removed. Until they are, Mokoena (2015a) argues, apartheid rules out of the grave.

They similarly see parliament as being a contest between the nations. They describe it as still being a place of the elite, colonisers and apartheid agents (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They also reject the celebration of the Union Buildings arguing that they are rooted in a ‘union’ that contributed to black dispossession and was given its name by white settler forces (Ndlozi, 2013c; EFF, 2013-2016). They argue too that the white minority hates the EFF’s behaviour in parliament specifically for undermining this colonialist legacy (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g).

They also show antagonism and oppression as still defining the relations between racial nations. According to Ndlozi (2016a), anti-black racism has been normalised in South Africa and whites comfortably display their continued belief in white supremacy in public (Ndlozi, 2016a). The EFF’s ideas are rejected solely because they are made by black people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They specifically also present black professionals on the basis of their ongoing subjugation in the workplace (EFF, 2013: 2; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). They argue that institutionalised racism remains alive (Ndlozi, 2016a). According to Ndlozi (2013h), the “EFF notes that the struggle to humanise black people…is far from complete”.

The EFF also argues that it will be impossible for white people to consider blacks with anything other than disgust and hate until there is a systematic change in the latter’s socio-economic conditions (Ndlozi, 2016i). The EFF has a structural view of racism. Malema argues that white
supremacy rests on socio-economic inequality (Malema, 2016b). This inequality has continued into the post-apartheid era during which the EFF argues most black people’s material conditions have not been changed (Ndlozi, 2015g). They are still subjugated by being kept as a source of cheap and disposable labour (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c; Ndlozi, 2016d; EFF, 2013-2016). This has been the intention of colonisation: to provide a way for a white minority to exist in a black majority community (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c). Until this changes, the EFF argues, South Africa’s colonial nature will persist (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013c). According to Malema (2016c), whites’ feelings of racial superiority specifically will go unchanged.

Moreover, the EFF unabashedly shows themselves as pursuing the promotion of the black bation. They describe themselves as representatives of the black majority (Ndlozi, 2016f; EFF, 2013: 7, 8). One of their aims is “to attain and defend the National and Liberation of the oppressed black majority” (EFF, 2014b). They also describe themselves as “fighting for the black nation in particular” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They depict the EFF as the product of the black nation, the political party that has been “formed and manned by blacks and will change the lives of black people” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). They are not advised or funded by any white man is a point of pride for them (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). Moreover, they call for a “municipality owned by black people that will prioritise the black community” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g).

The EFF is specifically in pursuit of the restoration of the dignity of black people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013a; Ndlozi, 2014d). They have consequently allied with Black Consciousness and Pan-Africanists who have similar goals (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). The EFF incorporates the teachings of Steve Biko who argued for the importance of black people to love themselves and not allow themselves to be subjugated (Ndlozi, 2013a; Ndlozi, 2014c; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g).

Hence, the EFF does not consider a South African nation to have been established. They believe that the nation is ethnically bound still. Where the black nation is identified by their skin colour but also by their shared experience of oppression.

4.3.2 The landless black nation in South Africa

According to the EFF the economy needs to be transformed (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d), meaning that it needs true transformation (EFF, 2014: 3; EFF, 2014b), indicating that they do not consider previous attempts as valid. According to the EFF, the economy needs to
be changed so that the country’s wealth is equally shared to the benefit of all South Africans (EFF, 2016: 4; EFF, 2016: 2). They note that Africans in particular must benefit from this change (EFF, 2014b). Their solution aims at addressing at the current deeply unequal distribution of wealth in South Africa (EFF, 2014: 7). For this to be addressed, the EFF argues that the land question needs to be resolved.

Land expropriation without compensation is non-negotiable to the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015b; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; EFF, 2014b; EFF, 2013: 7-8, Ndlozi, 2016f; EFF, 2013-2016). They believe that land should be expropriated for equal distribution (EFF, 2016: 9; Ndolzi, 2015l; Ndlozi, 2016d; EFF, 2013-2016). According to the EFF, this is the only solution to the racially skewed land ownership patterns in South Africa (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013b). Moreover, it is seen as necessary to restore the dignity of the people (Ndlozi, 2015e).

Practically their solution is to amend section 25 of the Constitution (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). To do so they are willing to support the ANC in parliament to form the necessary two-thirds needed to make constitutional changes (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; Malema, 2014a; Mngxitama, 2014; Tshabalala, 2014; Ndlozi, 2014b; EFF, 2013-2016), hence making way for legislation that will allow the state to expropriate land without compensation.

Their proposed solution indicates that they believe that the government should not have to spend money on land restitution. Their problem representation is that the ANC is ‘buying back stolen land’ (Malema, 2014a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013b; Mngxitama, 2014; Ndlozi, 2014b). According to Malema (2014a), “[the government] must be prepared to expropriate the land of our people, which was forcefully stolen from them”.

Their problem construction emphasises that land was illegally acquired during the colonial era and it is now in the hands of ‘colonial settlers’ and ‘land thieves’ (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). According to Malema (2014a), land is consequently owned by a “few white people who illegally got it through colonial dispossession” (Malema, 2014a). They do not see this as acceptable. Their emphasis on the illegality of the acquisition reinforces their view that the government should not be reduced to buying back stolen property (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013b). Hence, their call for the Constitution to be amended. The amendment would end the legal requirement that the government must pay for ‘stolen’ land.
They consider policies that suggests payment for land restitution to be problematic. For example, they reject restitution given that it is based on the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle (Ndlozi, 2014b). According to Ndlozi (2016p), they reject that any money should be spent on land redistribution given that it was acquired by the commitment of crime against humanity. They also attribute the low rate of land redistribution to the adherence to this principle (Malema, 2015b) arguing that it relies on ‘land thieves’ who are unwilling to sell (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). They also reject the Expropriation Bill which they see as another extension of this ethically unjustifiable logic (Ndlozi, 2016e). The only difference it introduces is that the government no longer needs to have a consent from those it wishes to expropriate land from for public use (Ndlozi, 2016e).

They reject that it addressed the colonial question of land. They critique that it has taken twenty years to distribute 7 per cent (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a). At this rate, it will take 100 years for the issue to be rectified (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015a; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a; Mngxitama, 2014). The result is that the land remains in the hands of imperialists following the pre-apartheid land theft (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d), with the result that the black majority is congested in less than 20 per cent of the land while the land remains owned by those who colonially took it through committing black genocide (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016a; Malema, 2016a).

Their solution and problem representation of the land issue are based on the assumption that the land belongs to all, more specifically, that it belongs to black people. This is implicit in their continued emphasis that current land ownership is the result of its illegal acquisition. Similarly, they state that the green African continent signifies that the land that must be restored to its people (EFF, 2014b). They also state that the black people are the original people of the land and that they must be respected as such (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016d). Hence, their call for land to be restored to their rightful owners (Ndlozi, 2015d), a call which is reiterated by statements such as the “[the land] belongs to us, all of it” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015d). Moreover, this is why the EFF does not see illegal occupation as illegal as they do not see the land as being legally owned (Ndlozi, 2014di).

According to Ndlozi (2014z), the current ownership is racist and anti-black and it is maintaining South Africa’s colonial structure (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015). This sentiment they reinforce by their terminology such as describing the owners as settlers. Moreover, they depict it as a racial issue where they argue that land redistribution has not yet
succeeded because the ANC is too invested in protecting white interests than they are in solving the issue (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013b; Ndlozi, 2014b). They argue that until it is addressed blacks will suffer the same oppression and racism from whites as they did under apartheid (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015).

Hence, it is evident that the EFF continues to see South Africa as being defined by competing ethnic nations. They are motivated by their desire to end the suppression of the black nation via the pursuit of black nationalism. Nevertheless, they reject that this should be seen as them wanting to oppress white people. They make the point that they hate white supremacy, not white people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2015e). They claim that “we want [whites] here” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g) and that land redistribution is not at the exclusion of white people (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; EFF, 2013: 9). Land redistribution will be pursued in a manner that promotes intra-racial as well as inter-racial equality (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g; EFF, 2013: 24; Shivambu, 2013; Economic Freedom Fighters, 2016g). This land redistribution “should apply to all South Africans, black and white” (EFF, 2013:9).

They argue as well that their actions are meant to promote the peace outcomes of 1994, not undermine them. According to them, the democratic aims of 1994 will be impossible until the black nation is freed and land redistribution is an essential ingredient of genuine reconciliation and consequently democracy. Ndlozi (2016o) argues that without land our democracy traps the whole society into a fast approaching time bomb. Social cohesion and democracy are currently being undermined by the historically oppressed suffering from poverty, indignity and unemployment while, in contrast, the beneficiaries of the murderous apartheid regime continue to thrive (Ndlozi, 2015g). Hence, the EFF does not consider their view of national identity as inevitably resulting in racial suppression one way or the other. Rather, these nations can harmoniously coincide but this is dependent on the black nation being established as the white one’s equal.

### 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter shows that the ANC, the DA and the EFF believe that the different racial groups can peacefully co-exist as equals in South Africa. They, however, come to that conclusion with very different views of the nation. Both the ANC and the DA show that they still regard South Africa as the Rainbow Nation. Where they both understand this to be a reflection of the civic nation. They agree that there is shared South African national identity. Additionally, that this
identity extends beyond cultural and other differences. That citizens can celebrate their diversity but that the national identity transcends these differences. As a result, diverse people remain united. They are united by shared values. The ANC and the DA both agree that non-racialism unites South Africans.

Both agree that too many South Africans are excluded from the economy. The ANC’s problem representation of these economic challenges emphasises their exclusion on the basis of race. This can be interpreted as them believing that it is necessary to apply racial categories to rectify the racialised legacy left by apartheid. Consequently, they argue for a racialised solution, which they argue is done in pursuit of the civic nation. However, this discrepancy can also be explained by the ANC’s ideological heterogeneity or as an attempt by the ANC to avoid being held responsible for poor governance.

The DA takes a similar stance regarding racial redress but attempts to distance itself from the racial narrative. They focus on how the government is failing the people by not providing them with the necessary opportunities. They argue that South Africa as a nation should not be adversely judged for the failure of its government.

The EFF believes in equality. They, however, believe in the equality of nations. They do not see the ‘Rainbow Nation’ as promoting inclusivity and equality. According to the EFF, national identity changed in 1994 only to the extent that the black elite were co-opted into the apartheid narrative. They see South Africa as still consisting of racially bound nations. They consider reconciliation and peace as possible but conditional. It is dependent on the end of the oppression of the black nation. The EFF argues that this is based in the landlessness of the black nation. Hence, reconciliation will only begin with the return of their land.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

This thesis looked at how the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation. It specifically kept in mind the features of ethnic and civic nations, given that in 1994 the South African nation was meant to be re-articulated as a civic nation as to distinguish the ‘new’ South Africa from its past. The ANC and the DA share an understanding of the nation even if their internal logic differs. In contrast, the EFF rejects the rainbow nation on the basis that they see it as another of oppressing the black nation.

What follows is a short summary of the thesis and then a discussion of the findings. The latter will illustrate that the rainbow nation remains a relevant construction of the nation in post-apartheid South Africa. This is in part because of the continued support that it continues to receives from South Africa’s two largest political parties. The EFF, however, attempts to challenge the status quo by re-interpreting the rainbow nation and by promoting an alternative construction of the nation in South Africa.

The ANC’s and the DA’s supposed commitment to the construction of South Africa as rainbow nation does not however guarantee its future. This is partly because this thesis is limited to what these political parties say. It is beyond the scope of this research to consider the actions of the political parties. The rainbow nation will not be viable unless it supported by deeds as well. Moreover, South Africans will not immediately benefit from this collective national identity. This means that the proponents of the rainbow nation must be dedicated to this ideal in the long run, even if there are immediate political costs.

5.2 The construction of South Africa as a nation

This thesis researched how the ANC, the DA and the EFF constructed South Africa as nation. It began by looking at how the nation is defined as at term. It specifically looked at what distinguishes the ethnic nation and the civic nation. The ethnic nation is based on exclusive identity defined by a cultural aspect. While it is not inherently conflictual, it has been associated with oppressive system and conflict where ethnic nations are set up to compete with one another. In contrast, civic nations are very inclusive. It extends to everyone with a historic connection with a territory. It creates a shared national identity that crosses cultural differences. The type of national identity can influence the how social capital is influenced by diversity.
Most modern countries contain heterogenous populations. This ethnic and racial diversity can, however, negatively impact social capital in that society. As a result, people become more withdrawn from collective life and less willing to trust one another. Putnam (2007), however, argues that this does not have to be the inevitable result that diversity has on a community. He argues that the creation of an overarching identity allows a society to balance diversity with social solidarity. This inclusive identity is then used to create new forms of social capital in the long run. His description of such a collective identity is similar to how a civic national identity is characterised. Hence, a civic national identity, more than an ethnic national identity, can be used to minimise the adverse effects that diversity has on social capital. Given that it takes time to rearticulate social identities, the benefits of this civic nation may not be felt in the short run.

Neither ethnic or civic nations are established in perpetuity. This thesis showed how the nation can be regarded as a social construct and therefore remains subject to change and challenge. South Africa used the transition from apartheid to a multi-racial democracy to re-articulate national identity in South Africa. Whereas national identity was defined by race under apartheid, a civic national identity would be created for post-apartheid South Africa. The latter referred to a nation where people would be united in their diversity and be inclusive of all who lived in South Africa. This was the vision of post-apartheid South Africa that was enshrined in the Constitution.

However, the rainbow nation has failed to retain its momentum in post-apartheid South Africa. A review of the literature illustrates that post-1994 South Africa has failed to live up to the expectations of its people. Moreover, the South African national identity has not yet begun to foster social capital in a significant manner in South Africa. Non-racialism has not united South Africans under a single national identity and interracial tensions have not been sufficiently addressed. The social distance among members of different races is worsened by socio-economic inequality and the lack of nation-building. As a result, the notion of the rainbow nation has been losing traction under post-apartheid South Africa.

Political parties can capitalise on this discontent by offering an alternative construction of the nation. A construction the South African nation that rejects the interdependence promoted by the civic national identity may benefit its proponent in the short run but will adversely affect social capital both in the short run and the long run. This led to the question of how the ANC, the DA and the EFF construct South Africa as a nation given that they, as organisations that
contain the political elite, may stand to gain from re-articulating the South African national identity.

Bacchi’s (2004) concept of problem representation was applied to official political party documents and their social media to research their respective constructions of the nation. This concept was applied to parties’ discussions of the nation. What they considered as ‘problematic’ was interpreted as being against their respective constructions of the nation. ‘Problem representations’ was also used to examine the underlying assumptions parties had about the nation, which were promoted by their respective constructions of policy issues.

Despite the critique levelled against it, the rainbow nation remains politically salient in South Africa. The ANC and the DA both commit themselves to the construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation, regardless of the parties being political opponents and very different in terms of history and ideology. Their interpretation of this national identity is also similar. Both political parties describe South African as being united nation based on inclusivity and equality where racism is isolated from the current national identity. Both emphasise the break from the previous era and highlight their adherence to this new vision. They respectively depict themselves as non-racial and celebrating a South Africa united in its diversity. Additionally, they both indirectly show their support for the rainbow nation as it was imagined in 1994 by lauding Nelson Mandela as father of the nation and by expressing their support for reconciliation.

The ANC and the DA do not only attempt to show their support for this construction of the nation, both political parties attempt to establish themselves as the proponent of the rainbow nation. The ANC tries to establish ownership over this discourse by emphasising their role in its establishment, as well as by the link between the ANC and Mandela as the figurehead of this ideal. Their language is also meant to illustrate them as never deviating from this ideal. This ignores the internal ideological tension between Africanism and non-racialism within the ANC, but is meant to uniquely position the political party as the heirs of the rainbow nation.

This position is challenged by the DA. The DA cannot dispute the ANC’s historical relation with this construction of the nation and all that it entails. They nevertheless try to usurp the ANC as the political representative of the rainbow nation by emphasising that the ‘ANC has changed’. According to the DA, the ANC is no longer organisation that it was under Mandela. The current leadership is depicted as having abandoned the values that have previously defined the organisation and are now only motivated by self-enrichment. As a result, the DA has
‘stepped forward’ to protect this construction of the nation. Their language use speaks of their commitment to the ideas of Mandela and how they, more than any other party, are now best suited to carry forward his ideas.

In contrast, the EFF rejects the construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation. According to the EFF, this construction of the nation is problematic because it does not constitute a re-articulation of collective identity in South Africa. According to the EFF, the nation is not understood differently to how it was seen under apartheid. Unlike the ANC and the DA, the EFF describes the current collective identity, to emphasise its similarities to pre-1994 identities. They do not distinguish the two because they believe that the biggest difference between the apartheid and the current era, is that the latter is being upheld by self-hating blacks. The narrative of the rainbow nation and reconciliation are therefore not seen as establishing a united South African identity but as another means of lulling black South Africans into accepting their oppression.

They do not see South Africans as sharing a national identity. According to their construction of the nation, South Africa is still a country that contains different ethnic nations, which are specifically grouped according to race. The relationship between these nations have remained antagonistic and oppressive, an issue they do not seek to resolve by establishing a civic nation, but by fighting for the equality of the black nation. The EFF has capitalised on the fragmentation within South Africa and provide a very ‘us versus them’ understanding of the nation.

Nevertheless, even as the EFF challenges the dominant national construct, they make use of it. They have retained some of the language associated with the Rainbow Nation but use it to promote their understanding of the nation. For example, reconciliation is beneficial for South Africa but genuine reconciliation is conditional and has not yet been attained. They laud Nelson Mandela not as a figurehead of the rainbow nation, but as a freedom fighter. Hence, they selectively find value in the 1994 national identity.

5.3 The future of the rainbow nation in South Africa

The construction of South Africa as the rainbow nation creates a shared national identity that transcends ethnic and racial differences in South Africa. This can help South Africa to balance its diversity with the need for social cohesion given that this national identity creates a new collective ‘we’ which South Africans can use to address the social distance apartheid created
among races left and to create new forms of social capital. South Africans will benefit from the increase of social capital given that where social capital is higher, people are healthier, happier and democracy is advanced.

The ANC and the DA are the two biggest parties in South Africa and their support for the rainbow nation should bode well for this construction of the South African nation. However, this construction of the nation is faced with obstacles, which makes its future a more contentious issue. Firstly, it takes effort to redefine social identities. Therefore, the creation of a sustainable South African identity requires more than lip-service. Action needs to be taken for the vision of the rainbow nation to be realised.

This is acknowledged by both the ANC and the DA who concur that a shared South African nation will not be possible unless it is accompanied by socio-economic change. Similarly, both parties agree that racism should be actively confronted. Both these actions will help to reduce the social distance among races. One of this thesis’s limitations, however, is that it does not consider the actions of the political parties. Therefore, it cannot be determined whether or not the ANC’s and the DA’s action corroborate their stated constructions of the rainbow nation.

Secondly, it takes time to create a new and inclusive identity and the benefits are not immediately felt. Hence, Putnam’s (2007) argument that a shared social identity will alleviate the adverse effects of diversity in the long run. Part of the critique against the rainbow nation stems from the fact that people are not yet feeling the benefits from this construction of the nation. According to Putnam (2007), greater diversity is expected to have negative implications on the community in the short run. It is only over time that a shared identity will alleviate these negative implications.

One of the problems with modern politics, however, is that it is geared towards the more immediate future. Political parties aim to win support through popular elections. National elections are held every five years and these are interspersed with local elections. This is not enough time to establish a civic national identity that will reduce the negative impact that diversity has on social capital. Therefore, there is limited political incentive for a political party to devote themselves to a construct of the nation whose benefits will only be realised. Nor is it guaranteed that these societal benefits will be translated into political gain. It could be argued that the ANC and the DA are competing for the ‘ownership’ of the rainbow nation in attempt to consolidate any resultant with their respective political party.

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However, where the construction is faced with widespread critique such as with the rainbow nation, it may cost its proponents like the ANC and the DA political support. The EFF rejected the interdependence promoted by the civic construction of the nation and has grown rapidly during its short existence. Thus, the party has benefited from highlighting ethnic and racial differences. This may be an easier way to gain political support in the short run but the promotion of racial ingroups and outgroups will be detrimental to South Africa in the long run.

The future of the rainbow nation will consequently be determined by exactly how dedicated its supporters are. They must be willing to support it even though it is not conducive to their immediate political goals. It must be consistently supported over a long period of time and cannot be abandoned once it becomes politically expedient to do.

This is unlikely to happen for the DA in the foreseeable future. The DA has been stigmatised as a ‘white’ party. It has, however, managed to largely overcome this stigma by presenting itself as a diverse party where everyone is welcome. This position has allowed it to grow among minorities groups. Its support among racial minorities has, however, been maxed out. For it to grow further it needs to be seen as an attractive to a larger proportion of the black population as well. To do so while maintaining its traditional support base, the party needs to promote a vision that reduces the salience of race in the public sphere. This is also in line with their liberal ideology, which argues that individual identity should be regarded as primary. Its liberal orientation and its diverse support base makes its unlikely that the DA will easily forsake the civic construction of the nation.

The ANC’s continued support for the rainbow nation is less certain. Unlike the DA, the ANC does not need to court different races because the vast majority of South Africans are black. Moreover, the ANC’s internal heterogeneity makes it challenging to predict a consistent party position. The ANC has several factions and numerous ideological influences, including Africanism. This internal diversity means that there can be multiple ways of viewing the nation within the party all at once. Future research should consider intraparty politics when exploring how the ANC constructs the South African nation. Additionally, the ANC’s position as political hegemon is under threat for the first time since they came into power in 1994. In light of greater political challenge, the political party may be tempted to follow the EFF’s example of pursuing political support via divisive politics.

Therefore, the future of South Africa as the rainbow nation is not guaranteed. It is dependent on its proponents’ ability to withstand the political expedience of divisive politics. There are
socio-economic problems that this construction of the nation will not be able to resolve. However, this does not mean that the value of a united and inclusive South African identity should be taken for granted or discarded. South Africa will lose much in terms of social capital, if the benefits of a civic national identity should be sacrificed for the political convenience of divisive politics.
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