

**THE COMMODIFICATION AND  
COMMERCIALISATION OF PEACE OPERATIONS  
AND SECURITY CO-OPERATIONS:  
A CASE STUDY OF OPERATION RACHEL**

**by**

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**Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) at the  
University of Stellenbosch**



**Supervisor: Prof. Pierre du Toit**


**APRIL 2005**

## DECLARATION

I, Jenny Theron, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature: .....

Date: .....



## ABSTRACT

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Peace operations and security co-operations are expensive. Even though there are a variety of factors that influences peace agents when they consider approving a new, expanding an existing, or closing down a peace operation or security co-operation, one of these factors is the cost factor. If we were to isolate the cost factor it would follow that a reduction in the cost of peace operations and security co-operations, are likely to contribute to peace agents being more willing to approve new, expand existing or to give existing missions more time to consolidate before closing them down.

There are a variety of ways how the cost of peace operations or security co-operations can be lowered. This thesis suggests an alliance with the private sector in the form of corporate sponsorships. In short, that peace operations and security co-operations be commodified and commercialised. This would entail introducing corporate sponsorship of some of the commodities that are used in peace operations and security co-operations, followed by the corporate sponsor using their involvement in the peace operation or security co-operation to their commercial advantage. The commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations should result in the relevant operations and co-operations benefiting in a cost-effective as well as practical effectiveness sense, whereas the private sponsor should benefit in either or both a financial (profit) or an image-making sense.

The psychological theory supporting such an argument is that of social identity theory. This theory explains how positive connotations made with peacemaking in warlike conditions will motivate industries to use this opportunity to show that their products can succeed in such demanding circumstances. Accordingly, social identity theory provides us with evidence as to how the commercialisation and commodification of peace operations and security co-operations can succeed. We also support our argument by providing a case study, Operation Rachel, which serves as a successful example of an operation that was (partially) commodified and commercialised. Operation Rachel, which can be seen as either or both a peace operation and security co-operation, shows that in the case of security co-operations, these operations should be presented as peace operations during the commodification and commercialisation processes.

## OPSOMMING

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Vredesoperasies en veiligheidsamewerkings is duur. Een faktor wat vredes agente beingvloed wanneer hulle moet besluit om goedkeuring te gee vir nuwe operasies, of om huidige operasies uit te brei, of stop te sit, is die koste element. Indien die kostes verbonde aan vredesoperasies en veiligheidsamewerkings verlaag kan word, sal dit 'n direkte bydrae maak dat vredes agente meer gewillig sal wees om goedkeuring te gee vir nuwe operasies, of om huidige operasies uit te brei, of meer tyd te gee om te konsolideer, voordat hulle beindig word.

Daar is verskeie maniere hoe die kostes verbonde aan vredesoperasies en veiligheidsamewerkings verminder kan word. Hierdie tesis stel voor dat daar 'n alliansie gevorm word tussen vredes agente en die privaat sektor. In kort, dat vredesoperasies and veiligheidsamewerkings gekommodifiseer and gekommersialiseer word. Dit sal behels dat borgskappe deur maatskappye aangebied word vir van die kommoditeite wat gebruik word in vredesoperasies en veiligheidsamewerkings, gevolg daar deur dat die borg hulle betrokkenheid in die relevante vredesoperasie of veiligheidsamewerking gebruik tot die maatskappy se kommersiële voordeel. Die kommodifisering and kommersialisering van vredesoperasies en veiligheidsamewerkings behoort tot gevolg te hê dat die relevante operasies voordeel trek in 'n koste effektiewe, sowel as praktiese effektiewe sin, terwyl die relevante maatskappy voordeel trek in beide of 'n finansiële sin en in die skeep van 'n positiewe beeld.

Die sielkundige teorie wat hierdie argument ondersteun is die sosiale identiteits teorie. Hierdie teorie verklaar hoe positiewe assosiasies wat met vredemaking in oorlogvoerende omstandighede gemaak word, industrieë kan motiveer om van hierdie geleentheid gebruik te maak om te wys hulle produkte kan floreer in sulke veeleisende omstandighede. Gevolglik bied sosiale identiteits teorie die argument vir hoe die kommodifisering en kommersialisering van vredesoperasies en veiligheidsamewerkings kan slaag.

Ons ondersteun ook ons argument deur die bespreking van 'n gevalle studie, Operasie Rachel, wat dien as 'n suksesvolle voorbeeld waar 'n operasie [gedeeltelik]

gekommodifiseer en gekommersialiseer is. Operasie Rachel, wat as 'n vredesoperasie en/of 'n veiligheidsamewerking gesien kan word, dui daarop dat in die geval van 'n veiligheidsamewerking moet die relevante operasie voorgestel word as 'n vredesoperasie gedurende die kommodifiserings en kommersialiserings prosesse.



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**Dedicated to my parents, Andries and Karin Theron**  
Their love and support has made this possible

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


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- **Our Heavenly Father**, who watched over me.




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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<b>ACCORD:</b>	<b>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</b>
<b>AUSA:</b>	<b>Association of United States Army</b>
<b>CSIS:</b>	<b>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</b>
<b>DMC:</b>	<b>Delta Motors Corporation</b>
<b>DRC:</b>	<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>
<b>GMSA:</b>	<b>General Motors South Africa</b>
<b>GPS:</b>	<b>Global Position System</b>
<b>GPR:</b>	<b>General Purpose Revenue</b>
<b>IDP:</b>	<b>Internally Displaced Person</b>
<b>ISS:</b>	<b>Institute for Security Studies</b>
<b>JICA:</b>	<b>Japan International Cooperation Agency</b>
<b>LASW:</b>	<b>Light Arms and Small Weapons</b>
<b>NCPS:</b>	<b>National Crime Prevention Strategy</b>
<b>ONUMOZ:</b>	<b>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</b>
<b>PRM:</b>	<b>Police of the Republic of Mozambique</b>
<b>SAIIA:</b>	<b>Southern African Institute for International Affairs</b>
<b>SC:</b>	<b>(UN) Security Council</b>
<b>SAPS:</b>	<b>South African Police Service</b>
<b>UN:</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNESCO:</b>	<b>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</b>
<b>UNICEF:</b>	<b>United Nations Children’s Fund</b>
<b>US:</b>	<b>United States (of America)</b>

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# CHAPTER 1:

## INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

### 1.1 Research Problem

According to Brown and Rosecrance (1999: 1-2), one of the most important obstacles to the establishment of peace operations in the conflict prevention stage (as well as in other stages) of a peace process is the lack of motivation of outside powers to take action. Even though international powers often received early warning of looming trouble, as was the case in Rwanda (1994), they are often reluctant to act due to the issue of cost. This lack of will to act often leads to the greatest loss of all, namely the loss of human life, as was seen in the case of the Rwandan Genocide, when more than 800 000 people were murdered.

In general peace operations are expensive. United Nations (UN) peace operations for the year 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 cost \$2674,5 million (United Nations General Assembly, 2003:2). Peace operations undertaken by other actors, as well as other operations such as security co-operations share the same high expense. This can be illustrated by the costs of our case study, Operation Rachel<sup>1</sup>. Operation Rachel III cost R600 452, just R266 000 less than the cost of Operation Rachel I and II combined. Operation Rachel IV cost R1 120 144, almost twice the amount of Operation III<sup>2</sup>. This example shows an increase in the cost of the operation. An escalation of the cost of these operations naturally increases the pressure on the financial resources (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 37-39).

Accordingly, even though there are a variety of factors that influence the relevant peace agent when it considers approving a new, expanding an existing, or closing down a peace operation or security co-operation, one of these factors is the cost factor. Even though we would like to believe that “well-meaning people around the world will be motivated to act when human suffering is intense, when important moral principles are being trampled, and when crimes against humanity are being committed”, unfortunately this is not always the case (Brown and Rosecrance, 1999: 1; 2). If we were to isolate the cost factor it would follow that a reduction in the cost of peace operations and security co-operations, are likely to contribute to peace agents

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<sup>1</sup> Operation Rachel can be seen as both a security co-operation and a peace operation. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.

<sup>2</sup> The increase in the cost of Operation Rachel will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four

being more willing to approve new, expand existing or to give existing missions more time to consolidate before closing them down.

There are a variety of ways how the cost of peace operations or security co-operations can be lowered. The size of the operation can be decreased, or the scope of the operation can be limited through for example authorising observer missions rather than military missions. Neither of these options will prove viable since by reducing the size, or limiting the scope of the operation or co-operation, it will become less effective. It might not be able to address the needs of the specific situation. Another option concerns a peace agent alliance with the private sector, which can provide private funding in the form of donations (McDermott, 2001: 173; 174). This thesis rather suggests an alliance with the private sector in the form of corporate sponsorships. In short, that peace operations and security co-operations be commodified and commercialised. This would entail introducing corporate sponsorship of some of the commodities that are used in peace operations and security co-operations, followed by the corporate sponsor using their involvement in the peace operation or security co-operation to their commercial advantage.

If corporate sponsorships are feasible, and if they can reduce the overall cost of peace operations and security co-operations, then such sponsorships would be making a direct contribution to the likelihood that new missions will be approved, existing missions be expanded if necessary, or that they be maintained until the peace processes they are intended to support has been consolidated, or until the security issue they are addressing has been resolved.

## **1.2 Research Objectives**

The objective of this thesis is to look at the possibility of commercialising and commodifying peace operations and security co-operations as a means of lowering the costs associated with such missions. Accordingly the objective of this thesis is to analyse the commercialisation and commodification aspects of our case study, Operation Rachel. Primary data comprises an analysis of the advertising material relevant to this operation.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The questions that will be addressed are:

- How can peace operations and security co-operations be commodified and commercialised?
- What do the end results entail for the relevant parties?
- What is the social psychological theory supporting such a suggestion?
- What can the ingredients of a marketing strategy for providing sponsorships for such operations be?

### **1.4 Hypothesis**

The hypothesis of this thesis is that the cost of peace operations and security co-operations can be decreased through commodification and commercialisation.

### **1.5 Research Design**

#### **1.5.1 Case Study**

This thesis will make use of a case study, specifically the project *Operation Rachel*. After 20 years of single-party rule by *Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique* (Frelimo), multiparty elections were held in Mozambique in October 1994, marking the beginning of democracy for this country. At the same time that political violence was subsiding in Mozambique, South Africa was also undergoing similar political transitions as well as preparing for its first democratic elections. The decline of political violence in Mozambique and South Africa at the same time resulted in a surplus of weapons in the two countries. Soon these weapons were drawn into the illegal cross-border trade between Mozambique and South Africa, resulting in an inexpensive supply of firearms for criminals (Hennop, 2001; Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 9 – 11).


The free availability of weapons in 1995 resulted in, for example, AK47 rifles being obtained quite easily for just R100, while a single round for this assault rifle cost only 30 cents (DMCa, 2003). This negative situation has since been turned around to such an extent that by 2003 cost of an AK47 escalated to more or less R3000, while a single round for this weapon cost R35 (DMCa, 2003). This turn-around of events is mostly due to Operation Rachel. Operation Rachel is an ongoing bilateral joint operation on arms destruction that was started in 1995 between the South African

Police Service (SAPS) and its Mozambique counterpart, the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), with constant support from Isuzu (Delta Motor Corporation/General Motors South Africa) since 2000 (DMCa, 2003; Hennop, 2001).

The above case study was carefully selected, since we believe that examining how its parts are configured will illustrate whether this project can serve as a successful example of how the cost of peace operations and security co-operations can be lowered by commercialisation and commodification. Through describing and analysing this case study, it should become clear how the relevant parties did go about commercialising and commodifying Operation Rachel, as well as to what extent their example can serve as a model for peace operations and security co-operations.

### **1.5.2 Descriptive and Explanatory Study**

This thesis will take the form of descriptive and explanatory research. The aim of descriptive research is to “present a picture of the specific details of a situation, social setting, or relationship” (Neuman, 2003: 30). This picture is presented through asking “how” and “who” questions. In this case we will focus on ‘how’ Operational Rachel was commercialised and commodified, as well as on ‘who’ the different parties were involved in this process.



The second element of this thesis takes the form of explanatory research. Explanatory research builds on descriptive research and goes on to identify the reason that something occurs. The focus here is not only on describing a specific topic, but also goes beyond that to look for causes and reasons through asking “why” questions (Neuman, 2003: 31). Therefore this study will not only describe Operation Rachel, but will also go beyond and firstly determine the reasons that Operational Rachel was to a certain extent commercialised and commodified. Secondly, we will look at what the reasons are for the commercialisation and commodification of Operation Rachel to be considered a success story as well as to determine whether this success story can be applied to future peace operations and security co-operations.

Therefore this thesis will look at, describe and analyse the commodification and commercialisation of Operation Rachel in relation to the costs of peace operations and security co-operations.

### **1.5.3 Data Sources**

The data sources used in this thesis consist of literature reviews from journal articles, press releases, mostly academic Internet resources and books. Important information was also gathered through interviews done with **John Elford**, Manager Product Communications: General Motors South Africa; **Clive Evans**, Strategic Planning: Network BBDO; as well as **Superintendent Renco Roland** from the South African Police Service, who was at the time of writing involved with the practical aspects of Operational Rachel. More than one interview was held with each person during November 2004. Primary data comprises an analysis of the advertising material used by Isuzu to commercialise their involvement in Operation Rachel. Mr Clive Evans, Strategic Planning: Network BBDO, provided the relevant advertising material. Therefore the data gathered are mostly qualitative in the form of written text or interviews.

### **1.5.4 Theoretical Perspective**

Social identity theory will be used in explaining how positive connotations made with peacemaking and peacekeeping in warlike conditions will motivate industries to use this opportunity to show that their products can succeed in such demanding circumstances. This thesis will make use of the 1979 formulation of the social identity theory offered by Tajfel and Turner. “The theory was originally developed to understand the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination. Tajfel et al (1971) attempted to identify the *minimal* conditions that would lead members of one group to discriminate in favour of the in-group to which they belonged and against another out-group” (TCW, 2004). This theory will provide us with a framework for interpreting how the commercialisation and commodification of peace operations and security co-operations can succeed. Peace operations<sup>3</sup> can be seen as having two positive connotations. First of all, these operations have positive moral connotations. Conflict is seen as negative and ‘evil’, whereas the peace process is seen as the destroyer of such ‘evil’.

Secondly, peace operations are seen as a test of both the calibre of people and the quality of commodities in really difficult warlike conditions. These operations can

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<sup>3</sup> We only refer to peace operations, since as we will discuss in more detail later on, the commercialisation and commodification of security co-operations will entail that the relevant co-operation is presented as a peace operation by the stakeholders.



therefore be described as honourable. Since human beings in general want to feel worthy, through association with peace operations the individual will feel that his/her worthiness is increasing. Similarly, if a commodity succeeds in these demanding warlike conditions, its value will increase, since this commodity now also has positive connotations, individuals will also want to be associated with the commodity. Because of these two elements peace operations can be described as admirable.

### **1.5.5 Concepts**

In order to ensure that the reader fully grasps the meaning of important concepts used in this thesis, as well as to give these concepts their appropriate connotations in this context, we shall define the concepts of **commodification, commercialisation, peace process, peace operation and security co-operation.**

The concept of **commodification** is derived from the word 'commodity'. A commodity is a tangible good or service resulting from the process of production. Commodities are bought and sold, but are not necessarily physically exchanged (Bannock *et al.*, 2003). Commodification of a peace operation or security co-operation therefore entails that the operation or co-operation is conceptually broken down into individual components that can be seen separately as commodities. In a practical sense these might include equipment such as clothes worn by personnel or vehicles needed to move around. These commodities are considered to be necessities for peace operations and security co-operations.

**Commercialisation** can be defined as the act of commercialising something, usually in connection with profit and not quality or morality (*Economic Dictionary*, 2004). In the context of this thesis commercialisation therefore entails that the relevant company uses (or exploits) its association with a peace operation or a security co-operation for maximum profit. After deciding to become a stakeholder in a peace operation or security co-operation through, for example, supplying the equipment needed in this operation or co-operation, the company will then commercialise their actions and products in order to ensure maximum profits.

In the context of this thesis the term **peace process** comprise various phases. These are the phases of **conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.** Firstly, **conflict prevention**, also known as preventive action, refers

to “measures to prevent disputes from arising, to resolve them before they escalate into conflicts or to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur”. In particular, preventive diplomacy may take the form of mediation, conciliation or negotiation (United Nations (a), 2004).

Secondly, **peace-making** can be seen as the diplomatic process of bringing an end to conflict, mainly through mediation and negotiation. According to the United Nations, peace-making excludes the use of forces against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities. Such activities are referred to as peace enforcement (United Nations (b), 2004).

Thirdly, **peacekeeping** includes three broad categories. These are: 1) assist in maintenance of ceasefires; 2) implementation of comprehensive settlements; and 3) protection of humanitarian operations (United Nations (c), 2004). Peacekeeping therefore entails the prevention or ending of violence within or between states, through the intervention of an outside third party. Whereas peace-making involves negotiating a resolution to the issue in conflict, peacekeeping aims at preventing further violence (Conflict Research Consortium, 2004).

Lastly, **peacebuilding** refers to “all external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transition from war to peace, and include all activities and programmes designed to support and strengthen these transitions” (United Nations (b), 2004). In order for peacebuilding to be effective, it requires corresponding and integrated action on a variety of fronts such as the military, diplomatic, political, economic, social and humanitarian, as well as addressing the many “imponderables” that are needed to make up a coherent and stable social fabric (United Nations (b), 2004).

In the above context **peace operations** refer to the practical operations or missions that takes place within the peace process during the various phases discussed above. Even though in reality each peace operation has its unique mandated tasks, one can identify common aims. These are, “to alleviate human suffering, and create conditions and build institutions for self-sustaining peace” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2005).

**Security co-operation** falls under the wide definition of security thinking. According to this definition, security includes military-, political-, societal-, economic-, environmental-, (Buzan (b), 1991: 368; 369) and human security (Booth and Vale, 1995: 293). Security co-operations are operations that focus on one or more of the above security concerns. These security concerns are seen as being linked in that activities in one sector will have a consequential effect in one or more of the other sectors (Buzan (a), 1991: 433; Buzan (b), 1991: 368; Booth, 1991). Security co-operation can therefore be defined as a co-operation between two or more parties to address a security issue within the definition of security provided above.

### **1.5.6 Limitations and Delimitations**

In Chapter Two we will show how our case study, Operation Rachel can be viewed as either or both a security co-operation, and a peace operation. This issue is however not the focus of this study. Accordingly we will not take sides as to whether Operation Rachel should be viewed as a security co-operation and/or a peace operation.

This thesis will also focus only on Operation Rachel as an example of where a security co-operation/peace operation has been commodified and commercialised; this means that comparison with similar security co-operations/peace operations will not be included. Note, though, that in generalising conclusions made from Operation Rachel, one should be extremely careful and should take into account unique aspects of this case study. Still, even though in Chapter Three the arrangements between Delta Motor Corporation (later General Motors South Africa) and the SAPS, as well as consequences for both parties will be looked at in depth, we will not go into great detail about the functioning of Operation Rachel as well as the agreements between the SAPS and its Mozambique counterpart.

The primary research focus of this thesis lies with the commodification and commercialisation aspects of Operation Rachel. We will therefore provide a general discussion on Operation Rachel, after which we will mostly concentrate on information regarding Operation Rachel that is relevant to the aspects of commodification and commercialisation.

## **1.6 Thesis outline**

Following this chapter, the outline is as follow:

### **Chapter Two: Peace Operations and Security co-operations: Contrasting or Complimentary Analytical Perspectives?**

This chapter will show how Operation Rachel fits into the new security thinking perspective, as well as how Operation Rachel can be viewed as either or both a security co-operation, and a peace operation. Even though we do not take sides as to whether Operation Rachel should be viewed as a security co-operation or a peace operation, we do believe that this issue becomes important when the relevant operation or co-operation is commodified and commercialised. Accordingly Chapter Two presents the argument for both sides.

### **Chapter Three: Case Study: Operation Rachel**

Chapter Three will consist of an analysis of our case study, Operation Rachel. After providing the reader with the history and general functioning of Operation Rachel, we will describe and analyse the commercialisation and commodification arrangements between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Delta Motor Corporation (later General Motors South Africa). After describing the agreement between the two parties, we shall look at the benefits the relationship holds for both parties, followed by an analysis of why this relationship is so successful.


### **Chapter Four: The Value of Peace Operations**

This chapter will make use of social identity theory to determine whether positive connotations can be linked with peace operations in order for the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations to be successful. Through using this theory we will examine the relationship between positive connotations with peace operations and commodification as well as commercialisation of peace operations in warlike conditions.

### **Chapter Five: Future Implications of Commercialising and Commodifying Peace Operations**

Our final chapter, Chapter Five, summarises the evidence in order to determine how the commercialisation and commodification of peace operations and security co-operations will impact on the future of such operations and co-operations. This

chapter will also explain what the ingredients of a marketing strategy to obtain sponsorships for these operations and co-operations are, as well as what the ingredients of a marketing strategy for commercialising the company's involvement in the relevant peace operation or security co-operation are.



## **CHAPTER 2:**

### **PEACE OPERATIONS AND SECURITY CO - OPERATIONS: CONTRASTING OR COMPLIMENTARY ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES?**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This Chapter will provide the reader with a discussion of how our case study, Operation Rachel, fits into the old- and new security thinking perspective, as well as how Operation Rachel can be viewed as either or both a security co-operation, and a peace operation. Very importantly, the focus of this thesis is not whether or not Operation Rachel should be viewed as a security co-operation, or peace operation. This distinction does however become not only relevant but also extremely important when a peace/security (co-) operation is commodified and commercialised. More specifically when a corporate sponsor needs to be found and convinced to become a stakeholder in the relevant operation or co-operation, as well as when the sponsor uses its association with the relevant peace operation/security co-operation to its advantage. Accordingly, we will show how Operation Rachel can be viewed as either or both a peace operation and a security co-operation.

#### **2.2 Operation Rachel: A Security Co-operation**

In the Southern African region the circulation of small arms has caused crime to increase dramatically in the respective countries, Mozambique and South Africa being no exceptions. This circulation of small arms can be divided into two categories: 1) intrastate and 2) interstate movements. While the intrastate movement of small arms refers to the way “in which weapons change hands from legal to illegal possession, on the one hand, and among illegal owners, on the other hand”, the interstate movement of small arms refers to “the cross-border movement of arms, which takes place legally and/or illegally,” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 8). In this context Mozambique and South Africa experienced great amounts of intrastate and interstate movements of small arms in the early 1990s, leading to an agreement between the two countries in 1995 to work together to destroy arms caches in Mozambique. This agreement gave birth to the first Operation Rachel, followed by many more similar operations.

In short, Operation Rachel is an ongoing bilateral joint operation on arms destruction that was started in 1995 between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and its Mozambique counterpart the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM), with constant support from Isuzu since 2000 (DCMa, 2003; Hennop, 2001). Operation Rachel can therefore be classified as a security co-operation between the SAPS and the PRM, with support from Isuzu as corporate sponsor.

### **2.3 Old and New Security Thinking**

According to **old security thinking** international security is dominated by military security (Buzan (a), 1991: 433). This predominantly military centred paradigm makes use of the realist approach and focus almost exclusively on states and military concerns (Booth, 1994: 3). This perspective also focuses almost exclusively on national security. Ian Bellamy (in Booth (b), 1991: 16), defines security as “a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur”. Giacomo Luciani (in Booth (b), 1991: 16), defines national security “as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad”.

One of the aims of Operation Rachel is that of stopping illegal trade in light arms and small weapons (LASW). Accordingly Operation Rachel can fit into this perspective when viewed from a military security point of view, since it concerns arms control. But, Operation Rachel also has a human security element. Accordingly we turn our attention to the new security thinking perspective, which offers a broader definition of security.

**New security thinking** has a variety of proponents that differ from each other, just as they all differ from the old security thinking. However, all proponents criticise the old security thinking for it being a military centred paradigm that is inappropriate for the challenges of the new millennium (Solomon, 1998). Rather than focussing on the traditional military threats to security, new security thinking focuses on non-traditional threats such as “ethnic conflict, religious fundamentalism, small arms proliferation, mass migration, environmental degradation, and narco-trafficking” (Solomon, 1998). New security thinking also does not focus on the security of the state alone, but also on the security of individuals within the state (Van Aardt, 1998). With regards to Southern Africa, the “scarcity of food and water, poverty,

unemployment, drug and arms trafficking, corruption, migration etc have become the central threat to individual security” (Booth & Vale, 1995: 296; 297).

New security thinking calls for a broad interpretation of security. Where as old security thinking only focussed on military security, new security thinking focus on military, political, societal, economic, environmental (Buzan<sup>4</sup> (b), 1991: 368; 369), and human security (Booth and Vale, 1995: 293). According to this perspective, “[s]ome sense can be made of individual, national and international security, and of military, political, societal, economic and environmental security, as ideas in their own right. But a full understanding of each can only be gained if it is related to the others. Attempts to treat security as if it was confined to any single level or any single sector invite serious distortions of understanding” (Buzan (b), 1991: 363). The military, political, societal, economic and environmental sectors are linked, since activities in one sector have a consequential effect in one or more of the other sectors (Buzan (a), 1991: 433; Buzan (b), 1991: 368; Booth, 1991).

From the new security thinking perspective Operation Rachel will not only be seen as a security co-operation, with the aim of destroying small arms and the proliferation thereof, but also as an operation with the aim of ensuring human security, through conflict and crime prevention. As mentioned above, where as old security thinking view states as the primary object of security considerations, new security thinking puts human security as the focus of the state’s function (Booth and Vale, 1995: 293). According to Jakkie Cilliers (2004, 4), one of the issues of human security in Africa concerns the control of small arms and light weapons, including landmines. It is also not national governments but “various components of civil society at all levels – from grassroots organisations to policy think tanks, from churches to the private sector” (Cilliers, 2004:5), that have an important role to play in Africa in order to ensure human security. With regards to our case study, Isuzu, representing the private sector, plays a role in Operation Rachel, through providing sponsorships. The old security thinking perspective viewed the military as the prime agents of security (Van Aardt, 1998). One of the priorities in Africa with regards to human security concerns

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<sup>4</sup> Barry Buzan, as a structuralist or neo-realist, is a strong advocate for the new security thinking perspective (Naidoo, 2001). In the early 1990s, publications by Buzan provided a “convincing [broader] new approach to an altered concept of security” (Debiel, 2004: 2)



“strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution” (Cilliers, 2004: 6).

Consequently, the national governments of South African and Mozambique decided to establish Operation Rachel not to protect the states of South Africa and Mozambique, but to lower crime through the destruction of arms caches which in turn limits the circulation of small arms in and between South African and Mozambique. Through destroying the illegal trade of small arms proliferation, individuals in both countries are also forced to move into the legal trade of goods and services. Clearly the human security element of Operation Rachel is visible since it prevents crime and destroys the illegal small arms and light weapons, including landmines that presents a threat to individuals in both countries.


Buzan (1991: 369; 370), also argues that an “increase in global capabilities makes it difficult for any state or society or individual to escape from the increasingly large consequences of actions taken by others. And it becomes increasingly difficult to act without co-ordinating with others”. Operation Rachel is the consequence of both the South African government and the Mozambique government realising that their individual efforts are ineffective since their security or crime problems are linked. As a result thereof they decided to co-ordinate their efforts, which led to this successful security co-operation, which supports the new security thinking claim that co-ordinated efforts prove more successful than individual ones.

Operation Rachel therefore can clearly be viewed out of a new security thinking perspective as a security co-operation. Yet, Operation Rachel can also be viewed as a peace operation, as will be shown below.

#### **2.4 Operation Rachel: A Peace Operation**

Even though the UN peace process in Mozambique had come to an end when Operation Rachel was established, it can still be viewed as a peace operation in the peacebuilding phase of the Mozambique peace process. “Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid relapse into violent conflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. It requires a coherent and co-ordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of role-players, including government,

civil society, the private sector and international agencies. These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society, collectively and cumulatively address both the causes and consequences of the conflict, and, in the long term, establish the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development” (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2004: 11). The term peacebuilding was first defined by the former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992). A number of dimensions that are common to most peacebuilding operations can be identified (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2004: 12), these will be summarised in the table below.




**Table 1: Generic Peacebuilding Dimensions and Sectors**

<b>SECURITY</b>	Providing a Safe and Secure Environment
	Security Sector Governance, Reform and Transformation
	Disarmament and Demobilisation
<b>POLITICAL, GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION</b>	Supporting the Peace Process and Overseeing the Political Transition
	Democratisation and Participation
	Elections: Assistance, Capacity Building and Monitoring
	Governance: Capacity Building, Strengthening the Civil Service, Good Governance, Policy Development
	Conflict Prevention and Dispute Resolution
<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC</b>	Humanitarian Assistance: Food, Water and Sanitation, Shelter, Health & Refugees/International Displaced Persons
	Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction
	Physical Infrastructure: Roads, Ports, Airports, Electricity, Telecommunications
	Social Services: Health, Education, Social Welfare, Population Registration, Civil Society
	Economy: Employment, Agriculture, Micro-lending, etc.
	Free Press: Policy Development, Capacity Building, Public Information (Radio, TV, Print)
<b>HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION</b>	Truth and Reconciliation Commission Processes
	National Dialogue, Nation Building and Confidence Building
	Human Rights
	Justice Sector Reform/Rule of Law: Police, Corrections & the Judiciary

(Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2004: 12 & 13)

Operation Rachel fits into two of the sectors provided by the table above. The first is the security sector, and the second the political, governance and participation sector. Two dimensions of the security sector is “providing a safe and secure environment”, and “disarmament and demobilisation”. Operation Rachel fits into these dimensions since by destroying illegal arms caches it contributes to providing a safe and secure environment directly in Mozambique, and indirectly in South Africa, since it prevents illegal weapons from finding their way into South Africa.

The destruction of illegal arms caches can also be viewed as the disarmament of not only ex combatants but also the disarmament of society as a whole, since it is often not only ex-combatants that are aware of the location of illegal arms caches, but also women and children. According to the U.S. Army and Centre for Strategic and International Studies (2002, 4), part of a peace operation in the peacebuilding phase, is disarmament. Disarmament is viewed as the collection and destruction of weapons, the reduction of the availability of unauthorised weapons and the collaboration with neighbouring countries on weapons flows, including the apprehension of illegal arms dealers. Finally, in order to foster sustainability there is the need to secure, store and dispose of weapons, as well as to develop indigenous arms control capacity. Operation Rachel clearly functions within this definition of disarmament activities.




This disarmament of the Mozambique society in turn helps to prevent crime in both Mozambique and South Africa. According to Virginia Gamba, the former director of the Arms Management Programme of the South African Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (in Fleshman, 2001: 1), the availability of inexpensive small arms “may escalate conflicts, undermine peace agreements, intensify [the] violence and impact on crime, impede economic and social development and hinder the development of social stability, democracy and good governance”. Stemmet (2001: 91), also suggests that there is a “linkage between armed conflict...and the trafficking in small arms and light weapons”. Accordingly, Operation Rachel prevents crime and conflict, putting it into the political, governance and participation sector, under the dimension of conflict prevention and participation. Clearly Operation Rachel helps to inhibit the participation in crime and conflict, as well as contribute to the prevention of crime and conflict in both countries.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

Operation Rachel can be viewed as either or both a security co-operation and a peace operation. This thesis will not take sides, as this issue is not the focus of this study. As mentioned before, this issue does however become important when approaching corporate sponsors, since corporate sponsors can be expected to react more positively to the concept of a peace operation than to that of a security co-operation. As mentioned above, whether or not Operation Rachel should in effect be viewed as a security co-operation or a peace operation is not important, but what is important is that Isuzu's advertising campaign, or more specific commercial television and cinema material, portrayed Operation Rachel as a peace operation rather than a security co-operation. Why this is so will be analysed in length in Chapter Four.

Consequently this thesis will consider whether peace operations and also security co-operations should be portrayed as peace operations when approaching corporate sponsorships, as well as when commercialising the sponsorship. This issue will also be discussed in more detail in the Chapter Four. However, in order to show that this thesis is not taking sides, from here on we shall refer to Operation Rachel as a peace/security operation.



## CHAPTER 3

### CASE STUDY: OPERATION RACHEL

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter will provide the reader with an analysis of Operation Rachel. We will not only offer a general discussion on the functioning of the operation, but will also specifically turn our attention to Isuzu's (Delta Motor Corporation/General Motors South Africa) involvement in Operation Rachel. We will look at the agreement between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Delta Motor Corporation/General Motors South Africa to give us a greater understanding of how this peace/security operation was commodified and commercialised. Then we will discuss Isuzu's successful advertising campaign that made use of their involvement in Operation Rachel. In order to demonstrate the necessity for, and importance of, Operational Rachel we will start our discussion by looking at events preceding the existence of Operational Rachel.

#### **3.2 History**

South Africa and Mozambique saw the old African smuggling routes for prohibited goods being strengthened by the human relationships that were formed through large numbers of refugees crossing borders into neighbouring countries during the civil war in Mozambique and the political conflict in South Africa. Since refugees often stayed in host countries for more than five years, relationships were established with the local population, allowing them to gain valuable knowledge of the society as a whole. These relationships allowed the refugees, once they were back in their home country, to "use their networks and knowledge for both legal and illegal deals... To this end the traditional supply networks of prohibited goods [were] 'resurrected'" (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 9). Accordingly, after the political conflict in South African and the civil war in Mozambique came to an end in the early nineties, these traditional networks were used for small arms trafficking. But what created the need for the trafficking of small arms?

As a result of peace agreements being reached in both countries, their strategic and security environments were altered to such an extent that it led to demobilisation, rationalisation and disarmament. The ordinary soldier was demobilised and his weapon became redundant. This situation became problematic when the

demobilisation and reintegration processes offered for these soldiers (as well as for rebel movements and security agents of colonial and minority regimes), were often not very effective. A lack of effectiveness led to many of these people becoming involved in arms smuggling operations for commercial and criminal purposes<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, one saw an increase in the availability of weapons in South African and Mozambique<sup>6</sup>. This availability of weapons posed a long-term threat to stability in the sense that it created and maintained a culture of violence among rural and urban communities in the relevant countries (Cornwell and Potgieter, 1998: 7; Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 10; 11). This is a crucial factor to take into consideration, especially at this specific point in history when the respective new governments, whose aim was peace and development, were trying to create a new atmosphere of security and tolerance.

According to Chachiu and Gamba (1999:11), “an increase in availability of unregulated and uncontrolled light weapons...can change the value systems of individuals and societies, making them *more – not less - insecure*, as well as more violent...the negative impact of their [illegal weapons] presence in societies will continue to produce intolerance, abuse and death”. A feeling of uncertainty and insecurity marked the democratic transition periods in both Mozambique and South Africa. This lack of security in turn threatened to put at risk much-needed development, without which political progress remained superficial and fragile. Consequently, the transition processes in both South Africa and Mozambique were accompanied by:

- “increased small arms proliferation;
- a shift in the use of weapons from war to crime;
- an increase in violent crime;
- an expansion of the illegal arms market within and between the countries;
- a lack of state capacity to provide security for the public; and
- ultimately, the potential for general social instability” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 20; 21).

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<sup>5</sup> Networks smuggling small arms from Mozambique into South Africa included, for example, former South African Defence Force officers, ANC cadres, demobilised RENAMO guerrillas, FRELIMO soldiers as well as former refugees (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 10)

<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that it was not only a surfeit of weapons as well as redundant soldiers that led to an increase in the availability of small arms, but also other important factors such as poverty,

This situation led to both the South African and Mozambique governments deciding, “to prioritise policies related to the control of crime, violence and weapons availability in their own national strategies” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 12; 14). Before providing the reader with a discussion on unilateral initiatives taken by each country, we will provide more detail on the extent to which these countries were influenced by the illegal small arms trafficking across their borders.

### 3.2.1 South Africa

Following the April 1994 elections, South Africa saw a decrease in political violence, but an increase in violent crime. According to the **Nedcor/ISS Crime Index** (1998: 1-5), even though levels of crime had stabilised, figures for the most violent crimes remained considerably high when compared to the period preceding 1994. An important factor in this high level of crime was weapons; 39,8% of all reported murders during January 1995 to June 1995 were committed by firearms. This same period also saw 33 441 robberies being reported, of which 26 563 (79,4%) were firearms related (Oosthuizen, 1996: 11). Furthermore, before 1990 weapons predominantly used in KwaZulu-Natal were *kwasha* (home-made weapons), while the period after 1994 saw political activists and criminals increasingly acquiring AK47s, R4s and G3s. As mentioned before, these weapons entered the market as a result of the ineffective disarmament and demobilisation processes in both Mozambique and South Africa (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 16).

The sources of weapons found in South Africa were considered to lie in the domestic defence industry, the remains of the political conflict, as well as arms smuggled from Mozambique. In 1995 South Africa was losing R31, 3 billion (5,6%) of its gross domestic product to crime, while rough estimates indicated that between 400 000 and eight million illegal small arms were circulating in, through and out of South Africa in 1996 (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 16; 21).

South Africa tried to address these issues through a variety of domestic initiatives including prevention, confiscation, amnesty and buy-back initiatives, as well as heavy penalties for offenders. One example is the tightening of the **South African Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969** in 1993, 1994 and 1998, with the aim of controlling

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environmental degradation and widespread epidemics which resulted in people becoming desperate for survival money (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 14).



and tightening the legal acquisition of arms (Gamba, 1998: 3-8). The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the SAPS also jointly undertook measures to prevent rising criminality in South Africa (Batchelor, 1997: 109). Another initiative taken was the formulation of the **National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)** in 1996. The aim of the NCPS is to focus on law enforcement and long-term prevention. Lastly, the South African government actively improved controls over land borders and reduced the number of international airports in the country as well as improved the inspection and clearance of goods at sea ports (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 18).

### **3.2.2 Mozambique**

The end of the war in Mozambique saw the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) undertake a disarmament peace process. Unfortunately, this operation was not very effective due to an extremely large difference in numbers between the quantity of weapons thought to be in the country and the number of weapons collected at the end of this operation. Consequently, large numbers of redundant weapons were left in the hands of demobilised soldiers and civilians, as well as in caches hidden in the bush. This situation was worsened by the country's weak economy (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 8). "The social and economic reintegration of former combatants and persons returning from exile became a nightmare" (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 16). A lack of formal employment as well as the inability of the small-scale agricultural sector to guarantee the survival of rural families, forced farmer combatants to look for alternative income through the "informal commerce of urban centres" (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 17).

The setting these ex-combatants now found themselves in meant they were vulnerable to crime, not only because the products offered in the informal economy were stolen, but also since the temptation to use anything, including weapons, to ensure survival was so high. In 1994 alone 12 000 weapons were reported stolen in Mozambique (Oosthuizen, 1996; 51), while Mozambique's insecure environment prevented investors from making [much needed] investments in the country. Mozambique's health authorities also suffered greatly under the pressure of tending to firearms-related casualties in hospitals (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 22). The last problematic element found at the time of transition in Mozambique concerns the weak state institutions that were unable to maintain law and order in the country. Even though crime rates were clearly escalating rapidly, the police were unable to prevent this

escalation (Vines, 1996). Consequently, Mozambique saw “weapons move from war to crime with impunity, threatening to transform Mozambique into a society where only the logic of the powerful prevailed” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 17).

Mozambique saw the problem of small arms proliferation as a security challenge (Vines, 1996). They tried to address this issue through a national master plan (beginning 1995) with the aim of curbing illegal weapons circulating in the country. Anti-arms campaigns such as the *Arms into Heroes* were also launched to create more awareness among civil society. The Mozambique police service also took the initiative of deploying a special police unit, *Lightning Battalion*, as a response to the ambushes and armed attacks along the highway between Mozambique and South Africa (Vines, 1998; Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 20).

### **3.2.3 Finding Common Ground**

Even though both South African and Mozambique made domestic attempts to improve the situation, it soon became clear that the “increased demand for weapons in South Africa was easily fulfilled through the already existing arms pipelines linking the two countries”, and that none of their unilateral efforts would be enough to control and reduce the problem (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 18-20). It seemed that South Africa and Mozambique were facing a common destiny. “Given the porousness of the countries’ borders, the existing supply networks and routes, and the interconnection between illicit arms and other cross-border crimes, such as vehicle theft and drug trafficking, any unilateral progress in either country clearly became insufficient” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 20).

South Africa and Mozambique both came to realise that, since neither of them was making much progress, and since both of the countries were part of the same problem, it would be wise to co-operate. Accordingly, the destruction of the arms caches in Mozambique formed the basis for the “bilateral political willingness [of South Africa and Mozambique] to co-operate”. The Presidents of the two countries, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and Nelson Mandela of South Africa met in March 1995 to sign a co-operation agreement, **In Respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating** that led to the establishment of Operation Rachel (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 21; 22).

Unfortunately the Agreement became an operational nightmare due to historical and structural differences between the different security institutions of the countries. Still, it was up to these institutions to ensure that a sound implementation strategy was worked out in order to ensure that the goals of the Agreement were reached. “Whereas other regional arrangements had started off as *ad hoc* measures that were eventually institutionalised, Operation Rachel became the opposite – an institutionalised arrangement providing an umbrella for *ad hoc* co-operation” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 23; 24).

### **3.3 The Functioning of Operation Rachel**

#### **3.3.1 A General Look at Operational Rachel**

As mentioned before, the South African and Mozambique governments found common ground, which led to the establishment of Operation Rachel. It is still relevant to note that each government maintained its individual reasons for taking part in this operation. The government of Mozambique wanted to prevent the security threat caused by the illegal flow of firearms into South Africa and the potential of existing arms caches to disrupt rural safety in the country. Accordingly, the main aim of the Mozambique government was to ensure rural safety, to eradicate violence as well as the general disarmament of its people, especially in rural areas. South Africa, on the other hand, wanted to identify arms caches and destroy illegal weapons “to prevent them from being smuggled into its territory where they fuelled violent crime” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 23).

Since Mozambique lacked the financial resources as well as the expertise to destroy arms caches, it was decided that South Africa would provide the majority of financial resources, landmine-resistant vehicles, other specialised equipment as well as highly trained senior police officers, while Mozambique would use its knowledge of the local conditions to facilitate contacts with local communities in order to gain intelligence about arms caches (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 25; 26). In general each operation would include about 20 people from the SAPS Task Force, including a pilot and flight engineer to provide the necessary air support with a helicopter, as well as about 15 to 20 people from the Mozambique police force (DMCa, 2003). They decided to use a unique approach, in that individuals disclosing arms caches would be rewarded rather

than prosecuted, therefore putting in place a buy-back component<sup>7</sup>. One of the reasons this approach was decided on was the belief that most of the informers knew about more than one cache (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 25; 26; Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004).

Informers normally guided the police teams to the caches where, “[d]epending on the assessment made by the experts of the quantity of arms found, the accessibility of the location and the security of the people in the vicinity, the weapons were destroyed in the original location or moved to a more appropriate place” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 26). When possible, public destruction sessions were held with the aim of raising public awareness<sup>8</sup>. The South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Mozambique police force would also together plot the caches on a Global Position System (GPS) map. The first Operation Rachel was launched on 11 August 1995 (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 25 – 27; Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004). At the time of writing, new Operation Rachels were constantly being organised.

### 3.3.2 Obstacles and Solutions

From the beginning Operation Rachel experienced both structural obstacles as well as obstacles of a contingency nature. Structural problems were related to resources and the general context of the operation. South African police officers were not used to the working conditions in Mozambique, which often included a lack of basic infrastructure and poor general living conditions. Other structural problems were the language differences between the two police teams, the differences in operational skills and the lack of resources among the Mozambique officers, who in 1995 had a budget of only R15 000 a month, with no vehicle available (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 27; 28).

Problems of a contingency nature included “personality-related conflicts, cultural differences, and perceptions evolving from the prevailing prejudices” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 28), leading to a feeling of distrust. These perceptions were understandable, since these police forces were previously seen as enemies and now

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<sup>7</sup> At a later stage an increased role was played by women and children, which led to new incentives being used (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 36), for example, sweets.

had to work together. Naturally there was scepticism regarding each others' motives (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 27; 28).

A variety of efforts were made to overcome these obstacles. A one-week training course was undertaken aimed at the improvement of skills as well as at team building. In order to sort out personality clashes some officers were removed from the police task force team both from the South African as well as Mozambique side. The emphasis of the operation was also moved from finding the origin of the weapons to destroying the weapons. Through simplifying the bureaucratic process the relationship between the two teams improved dramatically. A sense of unity was also created through the establishment of a common uniform and insignia in both English and Portuguese. For the sake of team cohesion, they decided that the same officers would be used for each operation, unless circumstances demanded a different approach. The changes made resulted in a shift from functional partnership to amicable friendship among police officers (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 30 – 34; Vines, 1998). These efforts eliminated unnecessary obstacles to the operation, but still the final and one of the most severe obstacles to Operation Rachel was the increase in cost.

### **3.3.3 Increase in Cost**

An increase in cost from one operation to the next was clearly evident. Operation Rachel III cost R600 452, just R266 000 less than the cost of Operation Rachel I and II combined. Operation Rachel IV cost R1 120 144, almost twice the amount of Operation III. This increase in cost was due to the expansion of the operation towards the northern parts of Mozambique. Most of the costs incurred were directly proportional to distance. Another element concerns the lack of accessibility in the northern parts of Mozambique. “[T]he further north one ventures, the worse roads become and the more difficult to gain access to remote areas”, which increased the demand to use helicopters (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 37 – 39; Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004), which in turn raised costs.


The cost of the operation also escalated since the longer the operation took, the more aware informers became that they can gain material and financial benefits from their knowledge. This realisation that there is a demand for their services led to an increase

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<sup>8</sup> Addendum A, page 69, shows how weapons retrieved during Operation Rachel 2003 are being destroyed.

in their prices<sup>9</sup> (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 37-39). Naturally an escalation of the cost of these operations increased the pressure on the financial sources. One way they decided to deal with this problem was through the inclusion of private sponsorships, meaning the partial commodification of Operation Rachel. As defined in Chapter One, the commodification of a peace operation or security co-operation entails that the operation or co-operation is conceptually broken down into individual components that can be seen separately as commodities. These commodities are considered to be necessities for peace operations and security co-operations. A general equipment list for such an operation includes: vehicles, a helicopter<sup>10</sup>, petrol, explosives, GPS, mine detectors, camping equipment and satellite phones (Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004). These can all be seen as commodities.

Two commodities that are considered to be necessary for as well as sponsored for Operation Rachel are 4 x 4 vehicles (*bakkies*), sponsored by Isuzu, General Motors South Africa [previously Delta Motors Corporation] and petrol sponsored, by Shell South Africa (DMCa, 2004). Due to limited time and space, this thesis will focus on the former to provide the reader with a discussion on the agreement of the sponsorship of this commodity as well as how Isuzu went about to commercialise their involvement in this operation.



### **3.4 Delta Motor Corporation/General Motors South Africa's involvement in Operation Rachel**

When Operation Rachel commenced, “the job of the task force was further complicated by the wide distribution of minefields, making the use of mine-protected vehicles essential”, according to Director Mike Fryer, head of the SAPS Task Force in charge of Operation Rachel in 2003 (DMCa, 2003). Since then great strides have been made in mine clearing, leading to Operation Rachel in 1999 deciding to adopt a new approach, where a helicopter as well as single and double 4 x 4 vehicles would be used in its execution (Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004).

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<sup>9</sup> What is important to note, though, is the context of poverty that these informers found themselves in. Human needs and socio-economic development became essential elements to take into consideration, once again supporting the argument that security problems cannot be dealt with effectively without addressing general socio-economic development issues (Cock, 1996: 4-22; Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 37 and 38).

<sup>10</sup> Addendum A, page 70, provides us with photos taken at Operation Rachel 2003 of an Isuzu vehicle and an SAPS helicopter. These photos illustrate the co-operation between the SAPS and Isuzu.



Accordingly, in 1999 the SAPS took the initiative of approaching Isuzu (Delta Motor Corporation<sup>11</sup>) to sponsor vehicles for use during operations (Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004). According to John Elford, Manager Product Communications, General Motors South Africa (GMSA) (Personal Communication, November 2004), Isuzu decided to get involved in Operation Rachel because they considered it to be a “worthwhile exercise that affected all South Africans, and would help cut down crime in South Africa”. Director Mike Fryer (in DMCA, 2003) indicated that “[They] operate in some of the toughest terrain in Africa in rural Mozambique and quite frankly [they] would have a very difficult task without [their] fleet of Isuzu KB 4 x 4s. They [the 4 x 4s] have proved extremely capable and reliable...Without this valuable assistance we would have to draw vehicles from our own fleet for the duration of each operation. Aside from the cost this would seriously impact on the normal effectiveness of the Task Force in combating serious crime for as much as two months of the year.” Consequently Isuzu’s sponsorship straight away helped to enlarge the capacity of Operation Rachel, as well as to lower costs.

In short, the arrangement between the two parties entails that Isuzu provides 14 brand new 4 x 4 vehicles for each operation. After the operations the vehicles are returned to Isuzu, where they are checked and any necessary repairs made before they are sold off to Isuzu’s dealer network as used vehicles. Before each new operation a new contract is signed (Personal Communication, John Elford: November 2004).

### **3.4.1 The Agreement<sup>12</sup>**

Since 1999 DMC/GMSA and the SAPS have been using the same contract every year<sup>13</sup> (Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004). This agreement was entered into by “The Government of the Republic of South Africa in its Department of Safety and Security: The South African Police Service” and “Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd”(DMC) at first and now by General Motors South Africa. In the preamble DMC states that it “*wishes to loan 14 vehicles to the SAPS*

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<sup>11</sup> At a later stage General Motors South Africa took over Isuzu from Delta Motors Corporation. This change over did not affect their relationship with Operation Rachel.

<sup>12</sup> This Agreement was obtained from Superintendent Renco Roland, who was at the time of writing involved in the practical aspects of Operation Rachel (Personal Communication, Renco Roland: November 2004).

<sup>13</sup> The only change that has been made to the contract is to change the name Delta Motor Corporation to General Motors South Africa (Personal Communication: Renco Roland, 2004).

*for a period determined in this agreement”, after which “the SAPS wishes to accept the proposed loan”.*

#### 3.4.1.1 Limits on the Use of the Relevant Vehicles

In the Agreement one finds certain limits as to by whom, where and for how long the loaned vehicles are allowed to be used. In clause 1.3 one finds *“the period that this agreement will remain in force and effect ... calculated as the period ... to...”*, normally for more or less three weeks. Clause 10.2 stipulates that *“Should the SAPS fail to return the vehicle within 24 hours of termination of the agreement, DMC shall be entitled to claim actual damages suffered by it.”* The Agreement also limits the drivers of the vehicles in that the *“vehicle may only be used by the SAPS members carrying out Operation Rachel”*, according to clause 2.1.2, and *“the use of the vehicle by any driver not in possession of a valid drivers license and the necessary training”* is prohibited by clause 3.1.2. Other limits put on the use of the vehicles include clause 3.1.3, which indicates that *“the use of the vehicle for any unlawful purpose”* is prohibited, and clause 3.1.1, which *“requires its drivers to use the vehicle with reasonable care and diligence taking cognizance of the SAPS work and working conditions”*.

#### 3.4.1.2 Ownership of and Responsibility for the Relevant Vehicles

As mentioned above, the vehicles are loaned to the SAPS and not given permanently. Clause 4.1 ensures clarity in that it suggests, *“Ownership of any vehicle in terms of this agreement shall at all times remain vested in DMC. The SAPS shall not be entitled to acquire ownership of the vehicle either during the term of the agreement or after expiry of the agreement. The SAPS’s rights in and to the vehicle are limited to the use and possession thereof in accordance with this agreement.”* Since the ownership of the vehicles remains with DMC or GMSA, the greatest responsibility for the vehicles also remains with them.

According to clause 5.1, *“All risk of loss, damage or destruction in and to the vehicle shall remain with DMC even after delivery of the vehicle to the SAPS”*, followed by clause 5.2, which states that *“DMC will be responsible for its own accident risk policy with regard to all loss or damage caused by theft, fire, accident (whether as a consequence of collision or otherwise), civil commotion, riot, political*



*or labour disturbance or uprising, ammunition and/or explosives, vis major and such other events as the parties may agree upon.”.*

DMC or GMSA is not only responsible for the insurance of the vehicles, but also for their maintenance and servicing. Even though clause 7.1 states that “***The SAPS shall be responsible for all consumables during operation of the vehicles.***”, clause 7.2 indicates that “***The SAPS shall not be responsible for any servicing, maintenance or repair after termination of this agreement.***” Consequently SAPS is responsible for their own petrol, but DMC/GMSA is responsible for servicing, maintaining and repairing the vehicles.

#### 3.4.1.3 Indemnity

Added to the Agreement is Annexure A, which stipulates that “***The SAPS indemnifies and holds Delta Motor Corporation harmless from and against any liability, claims, demands or expenses (including attorney’s and other professional fees) for damages to the property of, or injuries (including health) to the SAPS, its employees or any other person arising from or in connection with the SAPS’s use of Delta Motor Corporation’s property.***” Up until the time of writing no one has been injured in one of the operations. Even though there has been damage to the vehicles, Isuzu has always been able to repair it (Personal Communication, John Elford: November 2004). According to John Elford, “On one operation the vehicles can do a total of 150 000 km” (Personal Communication, November 2004). As can be expected, 150 000 kilometres can be quite challenging in the rough terrain that these vehicles have to perform in. Accordingly, GMSA ensures that all its vehicles are insured.

#### **3.4.2 Benefits<sup>14</sup>**

Since 1999 a long-term relationship has developed between SAPS and Isuzu. Isuzu has since provided brand new vehicles for each Operation Rachel executed. Their relationship is so successful because it is mutually beneficial for both parties, as will be discussed below.


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<sup>14</sup> No negative outcomes or consequences were foreseen by any of the parties involved in this operation (Personal Communications, Renco Roland and John Elford: November 2004).

#### 3.4.2.1 SAPS/Operation Rachel

According to Superintendent Renco Roland of the SAPS, Operational Rachel benefits from their relationship with Isuzu in both a **cost-effective** as well as **practical effectiveness** sense. In a cost-effective sense the vehicles provided by Isuzu are not only in excellent condition, but there are no financial constraints upon the SAPS and other financial resources of the operation, concerning these vehicles. For each operation GMSA puts a mechanic on standby to tend to operation services as well as any breakdowns that might occur. When necessary, General Motors will also fly in the necessary vehicle parts (Personal Communication, November 2004). As pointed out in the Agreement, GMSA is responsible for the servicing, maintenance and repairs of the vehicles during and after the duration of the agreement between the two parties.

In a practical effectiveness sense one can compare Isuzu's 4 x 4 vehicles to the landmine-resistant vehicles at the disposal of SAPS. The heavy landmine-resistant vehicles are cumbersome because of their weight and size when they need to move from one arms cache to the next, as well as being difficult to operate in muddy terrains. These are often the conditions that Operation Rachel is executed in due to the floods and heavy rains during the annual rainy season in Mozambique (Personal Communication, Renco Roland, November 2004).



#### 3.4.2.2 Isuzu /General Motors South Africa

Isuzu (GMSA) can be seen as benefiting from their involvement in four ways:

1. According to Superintendent Roland, Isuzu benefits from their involvement in Operation Rachel since they help “to clean and clear the region of weapons and munitions and to make Southern Africa a safer place” (Personal Communication, November 2004);
2. Superintendent Roland believes they also benefit because, not only did they use their involvement to their advantage in making an advertisement about it, but they also won an international award in advertising (Personal Communication, November 2004);
3. According to John Elford from GMSA, their involvement “certainly positively affected the Isuzu brand in SA” (Personal Communication, November 2004).
4. Elford (in DMCb, 2003), also suggests that “There has also been the invaluable opportunity to demonstrate the ruggedness, reliability and fuel

efficiency of Isuzu products under extremely demanding conditions, often while carrying very heavy loads<sup>15</sup> over punishing off-road terrain.”

The key feature that ensures Isuzu is in a mutually beneficial relationship seems to be their successful advertising campaign. Isuzu’s advertising campaign can be seen as their way of commercialising their involvement in Operation Rachel. As defined in Chapter One of this thesis, **commercialisation** entails that the relevant company (in this case Isuzu (GMSA)) uses their association with the peace/security operation (in this case Operation Rachel) for maximum profit. After deciding to become a stakeholder in Operation Rachel through supplying the 4 x 4 vehicles needed for this operation, Isuzu then commercialised their involvement and product in order to ensure maximum profits and a positive image.

### **3.4.3 Isuzu’s Advertising Campaign**

#### 3.4.3.1 The Original Idea

When Isuzu approached the advertising company Network BBDO in 2001 to produce a new advertisement for them, they had had the same vehicle model for four years, and their new model was expected to come out only in April 2004. Consequently, in making an advertisement they had no new product ‘news’ to sell, as opposed to Toyota and Nissan, who had just launched new line-ups. Isuzu’s competitors at that stage were all doing “fun stuff” in their advertising campaigns, for example a Toyota being chased by a bull. Network BBDO and Isuzu decided to differentiate Isuzu from the competitors in that they would make a serious, documentary type of advertisement that would serve as testimony of Isuzu’s involvement in Operation Rachel (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004).

This advertisement formed part of Isuzu’s decision to use public relations and advertisements to inform the public about Operation Rachel (Personal Communication, John Elford, November 2004). It was shown on television as well as in cinemas for five weeks on and off for the duration of eighteen months.

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<sup>15</sup> Addendum A, page 68, provides us with actual photos taken at Operation Rachel 2003, which show some of the heavy loads that the Isuzu vehicles had to carry.

### 3.4.3.2 The Dialogue and Messages sent to Consumers

Below we provide the reader with the dialogue in the television advertisement, followed by a discussion of the advertisement:

**“Hello hello (little girl’s voice)... (Little girl shows a gun). Welcome to Mozambique my friend. (Narrator speaking in English with Portuguese accent.) The war is long over. The illegal arms caches are still here. It is tough enough finding them with the help of the people, then you still have the roads to negotiate. If these weapons are not found they will end up across our borders and in the wrong hands. You have to be able to get in there, track down, collect them and destroy them. This is Operation Rachel: A co-operation between South African Police, the Mozambique police... and Isuzu. Isuzu Obrigado”.**

When looking at the visual effect as well as the dialogue of the advertisement, one can see various messages being communicated to the viewer. According to Clive Evans, Strategic Planning – Network BBDO, they tried to:

1. get the message across that Isuzu is a good vehicle to drive since it was associated with a positive peace operation<sup>16</sup>;
2. as well as the message that Isuzu’s vehicles is of a good quality since it could succeed in demanding warlike conditions (Personal Communication, November 2004).

With regards to message one: even though all of the competition claimed their vehicles are tough, Isuzu added emotion (“heart and soul”). Their advertisement did not only serve as a testimony or demonstration of hard-working dependability, but what set them apart from their competition is that, whereas the competitive brands relied on humour and fun in their communication, Isuzu’s advertisement was topical and serious. Isuzu’s advertisement also had an element of social responsibility that the other brands did not have in their communication, as well as substance allowing for an emotional connection (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004), since crime in South Africa at the time was clearly evident. Most viewers in South Africa either had experienced crime first hand, or were at least made aware of the situation in South Africa through the media. The captured frames below can demonstrate the real

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<sup>16</sup> Giving Isuzu a good positive image in South Africa is considered important by Isuzu (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004).

and serious elements of the advertisement. These frames were taken from the actual advertising clip.



These frames indicate how serious the situation in Mozambique really is. We are shown not only how men gain access to guns, but that women and children are also involved in the illegal arms trade. While in normal circumstances children are expected to be attending school as well as playing, in Mozambique children have access to guns and are trying to sell them. The frames below also show how a civilian woman (informer) takes the police to where she has hidden hand grenades in a food bowl. This action indicates how these weapons penetrate the everyday workings of civilian lives. A bowl that was meant for food is being used for hiding hand grenades.





Throughout the advertisement we are also shown various faces representing the civilian people of Mozambique as well as various types of weapons, as can be seen below. These images combined provide the viewer with a realistic picture of the situation in Mozambique where Operation Rachel is being implemented.





Lastly, the advertisement was shown in both English and Afrikaans, since it was released in South Africa, but the dialogue of the advertisement ends with Portuguese text: “Isuzu Obrigado”, which means “Thank you Isuzu”. The decision to put Portuguese into the text resulted from Network BBDO’s and Isuzu’s decision to “keep it real”, since Operation Rachel is being carried out in Mozambique, where Portuguese is an official language (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004). In summary, these images and dialogue combined all help to create a positive image for Isuzu, since there is a link drawn between Isuzu and Operation Rachel, which represents an improvement in the situation in Mozambique as well as the prevention of illegal weapons coming into South Africa. Accordingly, Isuzu generates the image of being a peacemaker.



With regards to message two: throughout the advertisement Isuzu’s vehicles are seen performing in the demanding conditions of Mozambique, for example, on uneven areas and muddy roads, as can be seen in the frames below.





These real images showing Isuzu vehicles perform clearly create a sense of good quality. Not only are these vehicles performing in demanding conditions, but they are also performing in warlike conditions. As mentioned above, and illustrated below, the war element is seen throughout the advertisement in the sense that different weapons as well as army uniforms are seen throughout the clip. Throughout most of the advertisement the viewer is also aware of the constant military green colour that forms part of the images, creating once again the feeling of war.

The dialogue of the advertisement also refers to the war, more specifically the illegal arms caches that are in Mozambique as a result of the civil war. Therefore both the visual demonstration and the dialogue of the advertisement present viewers with a picture of war *versus* peace, rather than with a picture of a security situation. Accordingly, whether or not Operation Rachel should be viewed as a peace operation or a security co-operation is not important, but what is important is that Isuzu's advertising campaign portrayed Operation Rachel as a peace operation, and as a result Isuzu as a peacemaker. This researcher holds the view that the reason Operation Rachel was portrayed as a peace operation rather than a security co-operation is that peace operations, more so than security co-operations, can be seen as having universal positive connotations. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.





In showing Isuzu vehicles perform in these demanding warlike conditions, the advertisement broke the first rule in car advertising, namely to present viewers with a clean, shiny car. Throughout the Isuzu advertisement viewers are not once presented with a clean vehicle. Secondly, where normal car advertisements would definitely not bring guns into their advertisements since guns are associated with carjackings, Isuzu went ahead and produced an advertisement filled with guns (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004). Accordingly to Clive Evans, Strategic Planning: Network BBDO, they took the Isuzu advertisement out of *advertising land* and put it in the real world (Personal Communication, November 2004). As a result the Isuzu advertisement successfully creates a positive image as well as an image of good quality for Isuzu. The success of Isuzu's advertising campaign is clearly demonstrated by the response it received.

### 3.4.3.3 The Success of the Campaign

Isuzu’s advertising campaign was incredibly successful as can be seen when taking the **Awareness levels** and **Noting levels** provided by Millward Brown<sup>17</sup> Adtrack into consideration. These levels were measured through interviews with the general public. In these interviews consumers would be asked if they have noted the advertisements used by the competitive brands below, as well as whether they could establish a connection between the advertisements and the products. For example, if a consumer noted the Isuzu advertisement, was the consumer aware that it was an **Isuzu** advertisement or was the consumer only aware of the advertisement but not the product or brand. Figure 1 below provides the reader with a visual demonstration of how Isuzu’s as well as its competitors’ advertisements affected the level of awareness amongst consumers.

**FIGURE 1:**  
**BRAND AWARENESS FOR BAKKIES**  
**Period October 2001 to December 2001**  
 Spontaneous 1<sup>st</sup> Mentions All Adults  
**AWARENESS LEVELS**




Figure 1 indicates how the awareness levels amongst consumers either increased or decreased during the period indicated with regards to each brand. While the awareness levels of Toyota, Nissan, Mazda as well as Colt decreased, the awareness levels of

<sup>17</sup> Millward Brown is a market research agency that specializes in helping companies maximize their brand equity, performance and brand health, as well as helping companies to optimize their media, advertising, PR and other communications.

Isuzu and the Ford range increased. Accordingly, apart from the Ford Range (indicated with an orange line), Isuzu (indicated with a black line) is the only brand whose level of awareness increased. When compared to the Ford range, it is also quite clear that Isuzu’s awareness level increased substantially more than that of the Ford range. Not only was Isuzu’s awareness level quite high during this period but also their noting level, as indicated by Figure 2 below.

**FIGURE 2:**  
**BRAND AWARENESS FOR BAKKIES**  
**Period October 2001 to December 2001**  
 Spontaneous 1<sup>st</sup> Mentions All Adults  
**NOTING LEVELS**

<b>Brand</b>	<b>GPR</b>	<b>NOTING</b>
Toyota	334	20
Mazda	321	11
Nissan	233	13
Ford	220	13
<b>Isuzu</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>45</b>

Source: Millward Brown Adtrack

In Figure 2 one can see that Isuzu is the brand with the lowest GPR. GPR represents the airtime that was bought by the specific brand. Yet when looking at the noting levels one can see that, even though Isuzu bought the least amount of GPRs (airtime), they still received a noting level of more than double that of their closest competitor (Toyota), who bought considerable more GPRs than Isuzu did. The fact that Isuzu spent less money but received a higher noting level than its competitors clearly indicates the effectiveness of Isuzu’s advertisement. It is important to add that this advertisement would not have been possible if it were not for Isuzu’s involvement in Operation Rachel.

### **3.5 Secrets to Success**

#### **3.5.1 In General**

In general there are two factors that indicate Operation Rachel as extremely successful. First is the enormous number of weapons already retrieved and destroyed by Operation Rachel, as shown in Table 2, and second is the **Gold Impumelelo Award** for peace operations that was awarded to Operation Rachel in 2003 (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004).

What makes this operation even more noteworthy is the fact that it “managed creatively to forge a sound working relationship between two police forces that: had never worked together in any meaningful way before; regarded each other as enemies; had uneven operational capabilities; and had an unequal endowment of resources” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 42). But what are the elements that contributed to their success?

In summary we can identify ten key elements. These are:

1. “a reiterated political commitment;
2. [an] appropriate philosophy on which the operation was build[intelligence driven];
3. [a] flexible and *ad hoc* implementation strategy, aimed at confidence-building;
4. a sound working relationship between members of the joint team [team building];
5. [the creation of] mutual responsiveness and a sense of common interest;
6. improved skills and methods of arms collection among police officers;
7. identify[ing] all stakeholders[local communities included];
8. an improved understanding of and support by the community; and
9. an ever sensible civil society” (Chachiu and Gamba, 1999: 36 and 42 - 44).
10. Lastly, one of the most important elements of success is the private sponsorship offered by Isuzu, for Operation Rachel.

**TABLE 2: OPERATION RACHEL  
STATISTICS**

TYPE	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	TOTAL
HANDGUNS	8	13	79	353	453	18	372	375	43	160	<b>1874</b>
SUB-MACHINE GUNS	91	68	980	735	1874	126	467	562	231	69	<b>5203</b>
RIFLES	981	355	4345	3183	8864	2205	2943	3768	1334	419	<b>28397</b>
LIGHT/HEAVY MACHINE GUNS	47	52	279	467	845	66	148	225	29	1	<b>2159</b>
MORTARS	15	44	35	21	115	70	32	17	0	0	<b>349</b>
LAUNCHERS	36	37	60	72	205	55	57	64	4	0	<b>590</b>
CANNONS/GUNS	6	5	9	1	21	8	2	65	0	0	<b>117</b>
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION	23153	136639	3000000	155314	3315106	83276	486000	11004018	2200001	100037	<b>20503544</b>
CANNON/GUN AMMUNITION	1	209	1457	847	2514	17233	139	11	13	0	<b>22424</b>
MORTAR BOMBS	178	48	2693	2557	5476	185	1060	321	115	1	<b>12634</b>
PROJECTILES/ROCKETS/MISSILES	197	49	797	5039	6082	422	37	508	43	26	<b>13200</b>
BOOSTERS/ROCKET MOTORS	17	17	90	923	1047	39	58	201	22	0	<b>2414</b>
INITIATORS/FUZES	416	589	1186	555	2746	522	398	278	106	0	<b>6796</b>
GRENADES	438	66	492	5201	6197	496	537	103	26	4	<b>13560</b>
PERSONNEL MINES	95	577	362	410	1444	129	96	49	10	0	<b>3172</b>
DEMOLITION MINE/CHARGE	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	<b>3</b>
VEHICLE MINES	3	4	4	77	88	3	0	8	12	0	<b>199</b>
EXPLOSIVES (Kg)	35.75	55	15	65	170.75	36.9	12	87	270	0	<b>747.4</b>
FUSE and CORD, (m)	700	100		500	1300	7733		0	0	0	<b>10333</b>
DETONATORS		230	604	58	892	40	244	1479	50	0	<b>3597</b>
MAGAZINES	401	636	3674	1317	6028	1290	558	14991	2000	1000	<b>31895</b>

\* Unfortunately the latest statistics for 2004 were not available at the time of writing.

Source: Superintendent Renco Roland (SAPS)

### **3.5.2 The Relationship between SAPS and Isuzu**

The relationship between SAPS and Isuzu can no doubt be described as successful. As mentioned before, not only did SAPS/Operational Rachel benefit in a cost-effective as well as practical effectiveness sense, but Isuzu also benefited greatly when taking into consideration the noting and awareness levels of Isuzu's advertising campaign as well as the Grand Prix Award in the cinema category that was awarded to the Isuzu advertisement at the 2002 Loerie Awards (Personal Communication, Clive Evans: November 2004).

According to Superintendent Roland, this relationship between SAPS and GMSA is successful because: "[t]here is personal contact between the group involved and they constantly communicate between themselves. During each operation members from General Motors, SAPS, Mozambique Police and Press are invited for 3 days to spend time with the members involved in the operation where a destruction of weapons and munitions as well as a press release is given" (Personal Communication, November 2004). Another reason given by Superintendent Roland is that Isuzu shares SAPS's and PRM's motivation to clean the region of illegal weapons and arms (Personal Communication, November 2004).


### **3.6 Conclusion**

It is expected that the successful example set by Operation Rachel will be followed by future regional initiatives that might be developed in Southern Africa, as well as in the rest of Africa. A similar operation is at the time of writing being planned for execution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the near future. Already the DRC police members are being trained in the techniques and procedures used in the execution of these operations (Personal Communication, Renco Roland, November 2004).

Most importantly, as was shown through the example of Operation Rachel the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations is not only possible, but can be extremely successful. In the case of Operation Rachel Superintendent Roland suggested that other commodities that could be corporately sponsored include, for example, explosives as well as a helicopter. Such sponsorships would benefit the operation and its resources tremendously (Personal Communication, November 2004).

The example of Operation Rachel also indicates that security co-operations should be portrayed as peace operations when the company commercialises their involvement in the relevant security co-operation. Accordingly, this element will have to form part of the relevant company's marketing strategy. This thesis also suggests that when a potential corporate sponsor is approached by those in charge of a security co-operation, that the security co-operation is either portrayed as a peace operation, or that the potential of the security co-operation being portrayed as a peace operation in the commercialisation phase be presented to the potential sponsor. This argument will be elaborated on in Chapter Five.

Now that we have seen the practical success of commodifying and commercialising a peace/security operation, what is the social psychological theory supporting the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations? The answer to this question lies in **social identity theory**. Social identity theory will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.





## CHAPTER 4:

### THE VALUE FOR PRIVATE COMPANIES OF ASSOCIATING WITH PEACE OPERATIONS

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter will make use of social identity theory to explain how positive connotations made with peace-making and peacekeeping in warlike conditions can motivate industries to use this opportunity to show that their products can succeed in such demanding circumstances. Social identity theory will provide us with evidence as to how the commercialisation and commodification of peace operations and security co-operations can succeed, as we saw in the case of Operation Rachel. We will start off by providing the reader with a basic definition of identity, followed by a discussion of the fundamental premises of social identity theory. Then we will integrate this theory with our practical suggestion of commodifying and commercialising peace operations and security co-operations. Throughout this chapter we will only refer to peace operations, since as mentioned in Chapter Three, security co-operations should be presented as peace operations by the stakeholders. Accordingly it is the value of association with peace operations that are of importance for discussion in this chapter.

#### **4.2 Defining Identity**

In short, identity can be defined as the answer to the question “Who are you?” The problem is that people can be seen as having many identities. Depending on the situation, they will draw on a specific identity for guidance in directing their behaviour in making various choices (Burgess, 2002: 10; 11). In order to provide a definition of identity, one needs to look at the various identities that people can draw on. According to Burgess (2002: 11), people have three basic identities namely: **1) a personal identity, 2) a relational identity, and 3) a social identity**. These identities signify “different identification operations” and, depending on the social context, “any or all of these identity types may be activated”.

#### **Personal Identity**

Personal identity allows people to make use of personal preferences as well as to act in self-interest, taking into consideration what their personal value priorities, goals and traits are. Personal identity is formed through introspection and experience through asking questions concerning ‘what I sense’, ‘how I feel’ and ‘what I think’. Therefore, when being guided by your personal identity, you will be motivated by self-reward as well as compare yourself to others on a one-to-one basis (Burgess, 2002: 11).




### Relational Identity

In reality people do not always act in self-interest and frequently characterise themselves in relation to others. Therefore, when relational identity is activated, “people evaluate themselves in relation to responsibilities and social requirements that benefit others” (Burgess, 2002: 11).

### Social Identity

Social identity concerns concepts such as: ‘we’, ‘they’, ‘people like us’, and ‘people like them’. People often think of themselves as a person who represents a group of people, as well as evaluating their group against other groups. According to Burgess (2002: 12), “social identity is the part of her [his] identity derived from knowing that she [he] is a member of a social group or groups and the emotional significance she [he] attaches to that membership”.

Accordingly, when taking the above three types of identities into consideration, one comes to realise that there will be circumstances when people would prefer to act as individuals and other circumstances when they would prefer to act as members of groups. Very importantly in this regard, the self-perceptions of groups will have an impact on behaviour, including most probably consumption choices. This element will be discussed in more detail below, but for now we will broaden our understanding of social identity theory.



## **4.3 The Basic Premises of Social Identity Theory**

### **4.3.1 Defining Social Identity**

According to Tajfel and Turner (1979: 40), in order to define social identity it is necessary first to clarify certain concepts such as: **social categorisation, social groups and intergroup behaviour**. Social categorisations are described as “cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment, and thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action ... they also provide a system of orientation for *self-reference*” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40). In short, social categorisations create and define an individual’s place in society.

Social groups, on the other hand, supply their members with an identification of themselves in a social context. The individual as member of a group is identified as similar or different, better or worse than members of other groups. In order for a person

to be considered a group member, the individual must define him/herself as well as be defined by others as a member of the relevant group. A social group therefore will be a compilation of individuals “who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership of it” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40). Consequently intergroup behaviour is defined as “any behaviour displayed by one or more actors toward one or more others that is based on the actor’s identification of themselves and the others as belonging to different social categories” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40).

These considerations provide us with the context in which social identity is activated. Social identity is defined as “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40). As a result, individuals hold conceptualisations of the self on both individual and social levels. Social identity theory is concerned with the latter, dividing individuals into social groups.

#### **4.3.2 In-group/Out-group Comparisons**

Social identity theory argues that social groups will try to differentiate themselves from other groups since there is constant pressure to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons. This argument is supported by certain general assumptions and theoretical principles (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40; 41). These will be summarised in Table 2 below.

Table 3: General Assumptions and Theoretical Principles

	General Assumptions	Theoretical Principles
1	“Individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem: they strive for a positive self-concept.	Individuals strive to maintain positive social identity.
2	Social groups or categories and the membership of them are associated with positive or negative value connotations. Hence, social identity may be positive or negative according to the evaluations of those groups that contribute to an individual’s social identity.	Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favourable comparisons that can be made between in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups
3	The evaluation of one’s own group is determined with reference to specific other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics.	When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct.”

(Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 40)

There are three important aspects that will influence intergroup differentiation in actual social situations. The first element suggests that individuals must be subjectively identified with the relevant in-group. In order for this to happen, the individual him/herself “must have **internalised their group membership** as an aspect of their self-concept”. Secondly, the social context that they find themselves in must allow for **intergroup comparisons**. In order for this to take place, the differences between two or more groups must have evaluative significance. Lastly, the in-group must find a **relevant out-group for comparison**. The comparability of an in-group with an out-group can be measured through variables such as: similarity, proximity, and situational salience (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 41).

Accordingly, when applied to our case study, the social context (vehicle industry) that Isuzu found themselves in allowed for intergroup comparisons between competing brands in the industry. Relevant out-groups that Isuzu compared themselves to included

competitive brands such as Toyota, the Ford range, Mazda, etc. Lastly, Isuzu internalised their ‘group membership’ as peacemaker by becoming involved in Operation Rachel.

But what is the aim of differentiation? The answer is, briefly: ‘[T]o maintain or achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimensions’ (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 41). It is therefore clear that differentiation is inherently competitive. According to Du Toit (2004), competitive arenas provide the relevant groups with opportunities for comparative evaluations. The result normally contains “clear-cut, indisputable, unambiguous winners [success] and losers [failure]”. An individual perceived to be a member of a winning in-group will more easily achieve or maintain positive personal identity. Differentiation in this sense can be seen to reflect a group’s relative position on some evaluative dimensions of comparisons. The outcome of the evaluative dimensions of comparisons can be defined as **status**<sup>18</sup>. The higher a group’s subjective status is, the higher is the contribution it can make to positive social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43).

#### **4.3.3 Positive Personal Identity**

Social identity theory suggests that an individual can gain a positive personal identity if the group that he/she identifies with is perceived to be desirable and positive. An individual has to feel that he/she is associated with a group[s] that is perceived to be positively distinctive from other groups (Burgess, 2002: 15). In order for a person to gain positive personal identity this way, the person’s social identity has to be activated. Accordingly the appropriate conditions would entail that “individuals tend to relate to one another less on the basis of their individual characteristics, or personal relationships, but more on the basis of their affiliation and or membership to particular groups or social categories” (Du Toit, 2004). But what is positive personal identity?

According to Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski (in Du Toit, 2004), a positive identity helps the individual to cope with anxiety. Self-esteem is viewed by Du Toit (2004) as a key element of personal identity that helps an individual to cope with anxiety. Esteem can be described as entailing “the positive self-evaluation that a community can make on the basis of succeeding in living up to certain standards of value” (Du Toit, 2004). Greenberg (in Du Toit, 2004) defines self-esteem as “the feeling that one is an object of primary value in a meaningful universe. Individuals sustain self-esteem by

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<sup>18</sup> The competitive arena is where the contest between social groups over status takes place.

maintaining faith in a culturally derived conception of reality (the cultural worldview) and living up to the standards of value that are prescribed by that worldview”.

Other important elements of a positive personal identity include: a sense of self-efficacy (a sense of personal competence) and self-consistency (a sense of personal coherence). These three elements (self-esteem/self-efficacy/self-consistency) can be achieved by living up to standards of value that include: adhering to strict moral codes, acquiring material prosperity, and achieving competitive success (Du Toit, 2004). The extent to which these standards and elements are sought after as well as achieved by the individual will place the individual into a social category or group, once again bringing us to the individual’s social identity.

Some contemporary standards of value that can be applied in the South African context are:

<b>POSITIVE</b>	<b>NEGATIVE</b>
Historically disadvantaged	Historically privileged
Non-racist	Racist
Freedom fighter	Terrorist
Prisoner of War	Criminal
Victim	Perpetrator
Oppressed	Oppressor
Exploited	Exploiter
Indigenous	Foreign, imperialist, colonialist
Activist	Collaborator
Peacemaker	Warmonger, warlords, bandits

These binary categories represent **status rankings**, assigning or depriving groups of positive social identity. Our last example of ‘peacemaker’ versus ‘warmonger, warlord, and bandit’ is especially relevant to our case study, since Isuzu (as mentioned above) is associated with the image of peacemaker.

In general, when the individual’s group is perceived to be positively distinct, it is likely that the individual will also consider him/herself to compare positively to others. On the other hand, the lower a group’s subjective status is, the less is the contribution it can make to positive personal identity. Low group status can result in various reactions (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43). These will be discussed below.

#### **4.3.4 Social Change**

If the group that individuals find themselves in is perceived as having low status, an individual or group of individuals has various options available to change this situation. These are: 1) individual mobility, 2) social creativity, and 3) social competition (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43).

##### Individual Mobility

Individual Mobility entails that an individual “try to leave, or dissociate himself from, his erstwhile group... [he] attempts, on an individual basis, to achieve upward social mobility, to pass from a lower- to a higher-status group”<sup>19</sup> (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43). Individual mobility can be achieved when the individual physically relocates or emigrates, or socially by disassociating from the original group (Du Toit, 2004). It is important to note, though, that it is not the social status of the individual’s original group that changes, but rather the solution applies only to the individual.

##### Social Creativity

Social creativity entails that members of the group<sup>20</sup> “seek positive distinctiveness for the in-group by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43). Social creativity can include various strategies. The first strategy would be to compare the same in-group and out-group as previously on some new dimension. The second strategy entails the changing of values assigned to the attributes of the group, so that comparisons, which were previously perceived as negative, are now perceived as positive<sup>21</sup>. The third and final strategy entails that the out-group ceases to use high-status groups as a comparative frame of reference. Through avoiding comparisons with high-status groups, the feeling of inferiority experienced by low-status groups should decline, allowing the group’s self-esteem to recover (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43; 44).

##### Social Competition

Social Competition suggests that members of a specific group try to gain positive distinctiveness through direct competition with the out-group. “They may try to reverse

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<sup>19</sup> Various studies reported the existence of strong forces for upward social movement in status hierarchies (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43).

<sup>20</sup> Social creativity can be seen as a group strategy (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43).

<sup>21</sup> A classic example is ‘Black is Beautiful’. While the salient dimension (skin colour) remains the same, the prevailing value system is rejected and reversed (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 43).

the relative positions of the in-group and the out-group on salient dimensions” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 44).

Since social competition is likely to lead to conflict between subordinate and dominant groups insofar as it focuses on the distribution of scarce resources, one can come to the conclusion that individual mobility and some forms of social creativity are preferable options when wanting to reduce intergroup conflict (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 44).

#### **4.3.5 How Secure is Social Identity?**

The differences in status experienced between social groups in social contexts have various degrees of stratification. Social identity can be seen as secure where it is perceived to be a part of the “fixed order of things” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 45). Social identity becomes insecure when the “existing state of affairs begins to be questioned” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 45). One such instance would be if an individual or a group starts doubting his/her or their cultural worldview or standards of value, for example, because of the actions of competing groups. These doubts might lead to the questioning of the current hierarchy of status, possibly resulting in insecurity.

Accordingly, it is not only low-status groups that can experience insecure social identity, but dominant high-status groups can also experience insecurity. In such a situation the high-status groups can be expected to react the same way as low-status groups to insecurity in the sense that they will also search for enhanced group distinctiveness (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 45).

#### **4.4 Social Identity Theory and Peace Operations**

In Chapters One and Three we conceptualised commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations. In short, **commodification** of a peace operation or security co-operation, such as Operation Rachel, entails that the peace operation or security co-operation is conceptually broken down into individual components that can be seen separately as commodities – for example, vehicles, explosives and petrol. **Commercialisation** of peace operations or security co-operation entails that, after deciding to become a stakeholder in a peace operation or security co-operation (for example, Isuzu supplying the 4 x 4 vehicles needed for Operation Rachel), the company will then commercialise their actions and products, as Isuzu did through their advertising campaign, in order to ensure maximum profits and a positive image. Accordingly, the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and



security co-operations bring about that the commodities needed in a peace operation or security co-operation are commercially sponsored, after which the relevant company commercialises its actions and products to ensure maximum profit. One way to ensure maximum profit would be to follow Isuzu's lead to launch a successful advertising campaign.

#### **4.4.1 Commercial Advertising and Positive Social Identity**

The three identities presented by Burgess (2002: 11; 12) at the beginning of this chapter are important when looking at commercial advertising in general. An advertisement might activate a person's personal identity when the person watching the advertisement associates with it as an individual with unique characteristics. The advertisement can also activate a person's relational identity when it causes the individual to think about how his actions will influence others around him. Lastly, an advertisement can activate a person's social identity when he/she reflects on themselves not in an individual sense, but as a "depersonalised entity indicative of a class or type of individuals", for example women or men (Burgess, 2002: 14).

Personal, relational and social identity "may enhance or inhibit the information processing and persuasion of the advertisement". Whereas Burgess refers to three identities, as discussed above, social identity theory basically distinguishes two identities, namely that individuals hold conceptualisations of the self on an individual and a social level. Whereas personal identity refers to self-knowledge developed from the individual's unique qualities, the social identity refers to the individual's perception of what defines the "us" associated with group membership (Tajfel in Burgess, 2002: 14). From here on, we will only focus on the distinction between the individual level and social level.

Most important of these in this context is the social identity, since in general people have a universal desire to "achieve and maintain a sense of positive social identity" (Burgess, 2002: 14). Any aspect of an advertisement might cause a person to recognise aspects of social identity, causing him or her to identify with the advertisement and to hopefully be influenced by it positively<sup>22</sup> (Burgess, 2002: 14; 15). Social identity theory suggests that in order for a person to achieve and maintain a sense of positive social identity, this person has to belong to desirable social groups. Therefore an individual has to feel that he/she is associated with groups that are perceived to be positively distinctive from other


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<sup>22</sup> It seems that in order to obviate the advertisement from being incorrectly perceived, it is important that the message being communicated is clear and aimed at a specific identity.



groups. When the individual's group is perceived to be positively distinct, it is likely that the individual will also consider him/herself to compare positively to others.

In practice, people may use, or just associate with, or assess positively certain products "in their efforts to pursue a positive social identity or to avoid negatively distinctive groups" (Burgess, 2002: 15). Therefore, one way of explaining the high awareness and noting levels as well as positive image that Isuzu's advertisement triggered is they managed to create the image that through association with Isuzu as peacemaker; the individual can regard him/herself as belonging to a group that is positively distinct allowing the individual to maintain a sense of positive social identity, as demonstrated below. This need of the individual underlies the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations (and security co-operations).



According to Burgess (2002: 15), products and services offered may also have an influence when people find themselves "in undesirable social identity groups". As discussed above, social identity theory perceives such persons to have three options to change this undesirable situation. These are: 1) individual mobility, 2) social creativity strategies, and 3) social competition. As a result people have the ability to associate with a new product in order to once again differentiate themselves positively.

#### **4.4.2 Positive Moral Connotations**


As mentioned in Chapter One, peace operations can be seen as having two positive connotations. First of all, these operations have positive moral connotations. Conflict is seen as negative and 'evil', where as the peace operations are seen as the destroyers of such 'evil'. As discussed above, one way for someone to achieve a positive self-esteem would be to adhere to strict moral codes. Values in general provide a powerful basis for understanding the way that people choose products and services as well as behave like buyers and consumers (Burgess, 2002: 30). In this instance, moral values will determine how the consumer will behave. When looking, for example, at the Charter of United Nations (UN) one clearly sees the value that is associated with moral codes. Article 1 of the UN Charter states that the purpose of the UN is:

1. “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends” (Charter of the United Nations).

Consequently, peace operations are clearly seen as having positive moral connotations. The fact that most governments in the world, with few exceptions, consider it important to belong to the UN (Baehr and Gordenker, 1999: 163) indicates that these positive moral connotations can almost be considered to be universal. These operations can be described as honourable. Clearly an individual’s positive social identity will increase if this individual is associated with the social group that supports these positive peace operations. As mentioned before, peace operations are seen as being more inclusive and attractive to individuals since they have universal positive connotations that are not shared with security co-operations. Individuals can be expected to believe that their positive social identity will increase substantially more through association with a peace operation, than through association with a security co-operation.

One way of enhancing positive social identity would be to make use of or associate with products that support such operations. “Any range or kind of group may serve as a vehicle of positive collective esteem. Many commercial brand names, especially those in the competitive sporting arena, serve this function. If you are a fan and your team wins on the field, you share the victory, the sense of being a winner too, and can gain a sense of achievement from their prowess.” (Du Toit, 2004). The same counts for peace operations. If you associate with a product, such as Isuzu, which is seen as honourable as well as having positive moral connotations since it is associated with a peace/security operation

such as Operation Rachel, you will also have a sense of honour and a sense moral value. Once again we can visually illustrate this connection:



Clearly the winning team (or peacemaker) and its supporters can be considered to be the in-group, since they are positively distinct. According to social identity theory, one can expect bias toward the in-group, meaning that people treat in-groups more favourably than out-groups<sup>23</sup>. This element is also relevant to marketing, since it extends to things that people associate with the in-group, for example, products and brands (Burgess, 2002: 16). According to Burgess (2002: 16; 17), “[t]his may be because products designed for a particular social identity group fulfil their needs; it may also be because buying the product shows loyalty to the group”.

Very importantly, any observable characteristics that identify a group could be sufficient to bring about intergroup behaviour (Tajfel in Burgess, 2002: 17). For example, the peace sign, long hair, bell-bottom jeans, etc. of the hippie era served as observable characteristics for a group of people that held negative social attitudes towards war and positive social attitudes towards social equality (Burgess, 2002: 17). Consequently, a product’s (in this case Isuzu’s) involvement in a peace (security) operation can lead to the user of the product being associated with positive attitudes towards peace and negative attitudes towards conflict and war.

As a result, if an individual considers, or assesses positively for example an Isuzu vehicle, since Isuzu is associated with a positive peace (security) operation, the individual can gain a positive sense of moral value from Isuzu’s involvement in this operation. It would therefore be both beneficial for Isuzu to involve itself in these operations, as well as beneficial for the individual to buy or associate with Isuzu products due to the positive moral connotations of these peace/security operations.

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<sup>23</sup> Bias towards the in-group might lead to “some negative consequences of out-group formation, but it does not necessarily suggest an aggressive response to others who are different ... in-group-out-group bias is much more about favouring the in-group than disadvantaging the out-group” (Burgess, 2002: 17).

### **4.4.3 Material Prosperity and Competitive success**

As mentioned above, other ways to achieve a positive self-esteem would be to acquire material prosperity and to achieve competitive success. Competitive success in general can be considered to be a source of high self-esteem, whereas competitive failure is a threat to high self-esteem. As discussed above, self-esteem is part of positive identity. In Chapter One we suggested that through association with peace operations, the individual will feel that he/she is increasing his/her own worthiness. Peace operations are seen as a test of the calibre of people and the quality of commodities in really difficult warlike conditions. Clearly the relevant product, in the case of our example, Isuzu's 4 X 4s, can be seen as being tested in warlike conditions for an increase in its value. If the commodity survives and performs in these demanding conditions, as Isuzu did, it can be seen to be achieving competitive success, increasing its value<sup>24</sup>.

### **4.5 Conclusion**

Consequently the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations can have a persuasive effect. Peace operations do however have universal positive moral connotations that are not shared with security co-operations. When a security co-operation is commercialised, it should be portrayed as a peace operation in order to ensure maximum success.


Individuals can be expected to associate more positively with peace operations than security co-operations. Since the commercialisation of its involvement in a peace operation or security co-operation is the responsibility of the relevant corporate sponsor, it will be up to this sponsor to portray its involvement in the relevant security co-operation as that of a peace operation. As a result, the company will be presented as a peacemaker. This image is one that individuals associate with positively, since this image has universal positive connotations. As mentioned before, ingredients for a marketing strategy will be provided in Chapter Five.

Private sponsorships, if managed in the appropriate way, should improve the image of the relevant company as well as increase their sales. Since companies in general already spend large amounts on advertising and sponsorships, focusing these elements in the direction of peace operations and security co-operations will clearly have a beneficial impact not only on peace operations, but certainly on the relevant companies as well, as

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<sup>24</sup> Even though the competitive arena that Isuzu finds itself in is still the vehicle industry, through performing successfully in the demanding warlike conditions presented by Operation Rachel, their competitive capability increases.

was seen in the case of Operation Rachel. But what are the key elements for managing such arrangements in the appropriate way? Our final chapter will provide the reader with some recommendations on how to go about commodifying and commercialising peace operations.



## CHAPTER 5:

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

#### **5.1 Introduction**

In Chapter One we stated that the objective of this thesis is to look at the possibility of commercialising and commodifying peace operations and security co-operations as a means of bringing down the costs associated with such missions. We proposed to reach this objective through answering the following questions:

- How can peace operations and security co-operations be commodified and commercialised?
- What do the end results entail for the relevant parties?
- What is the social psychological theory supporting such a suggestion?
- What can the ingredients of a marketing strategy for providing sponsorships for such operations and co-operations be?

Accordingly, even though we have already indirectly provided the answers for the first three questions, we shall summarise the answers for these questions which indicate that the costs associated with peace operations and security co-operations can successfully be decreased through the commodification and commercialisation of such peace operations and security co-operations. We will also look at the ingredients of a marketing strategy to obtain sponsorships for peace operations and security co-operations, as well as what the ingredients of a marketing strategy for commercialising the company's involvement in the relevant peace operation or security co-operation are. Thereafter this thesis will conclude by taking a look at what the future may hold for peace operations and security co-operations.

#### **5.2 How Peace Operations and Security Co-operations can be Commodified and Commercialised**

Our case study, Operation Rachel, provided us with an example of how peace/security operation could be commodified and commercialised. Accordingly, peace operations and security co-operations could be commodified and commercialised through following five basic steps:

1. The peace operation or security co-operation must be conceptually broken down into individual components;
2. After the individual components or commodities have been identified, those in charge of the peace operation or security co-operation must approach the appropriate companies for private sponsorships of these commodities<sup>25</sup>;


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<sup>25</sup> In the case of security co-operations, the security co-operation should be presented as a peace operation.

3. After the company agrees to become involved in the specific operation or co-operation, an agreement must be established between those in charge of the operation or co-operation and the company;
4. The conclusion of an agreement would be followed by the agreement being put into practice;
5. Finally, after the private company has officially become involved with the peace operation or security co-operation, the final step would be for the company to commercialise their involvement in this operation to ensure maximum profit and a positive image<sup>26</sup>.

How these five steps fit together will be discussed in more detail below.

The **first step** in this process entails that the peace operation or security co-operation is conceptually broken down into individual components that can be seen separately as commodities. These commodities will all be considered necessities for this specific peace operation or security co-operation. The list of commodities for Operation Rachel included: vehicles, a helicopter, petrol, explosives, GPS, mine detectors, camping equipment and satellite phones, but each operation or co-operation will require its own list to be drawn up. These lists of commodities will more than likely differ depending on whether a peace operation is at the stage of conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping or peacebuilding, or in what security sector the security co-operation is being executed in.



After the peace operation or security co-operation has been conceptually broken down into individual components, **step two** would entail that those in charge of the operation or co-operation approach appropriate companies for private sponsorships. (The ingredients for a marketing strategy will be discussed later in this chapter.) After the relevant company decides to become involved in the operation or co-operation through, for example, sponsoring vehicles or camping equipment, **step three** would entail that the agreement between the two parties is worked out.

As seen in Operation Rachel, in order to ensure that no misunderstandings arise, the agreement should provide the parties with complete clarity on every single aspect relevant to their agreement. Important aspects include, for example:

- The **term** of sponsorship (long-term/short-term; permanent or non-permanent basis);



- **Limits** as to where, when, how and by whom the relevant commodities may be used;
- Clarity on who is **responsible** for maintenance as well as repairs, during and afterwards, to the relevant commodities;
- Lastly, indemnity forms to ensure that the company providing the sponsorship is not sued during or after the agreement leading to a negative relationship, which in turn will result in the sponsorship being withdrawn in the future.

After the agreement has been worked out between the relevant parties, the **fourth step** would be to ensure that the agreement is put into practice, marking the stage when the company officially becomes involved in the peace operation or security co-operation. Once this is finalised, the **final step** would be for them to commercialise their involvement in this peace operation or security co-operation to ensure maximum profit and a positive image. One way of doing this would be to follow Isuzu's example of launching an advertising campaign presenting consumers with information regarding their involvement in a positive peace operation (or security co-operation). Our case study showed that Isuzu's advertisement successfully created a positive image as well as an image of good quality for Isuzu. This brings us to the next question, namely what do the end results for the relevant parties entail?

### **5.3 The end results for the relevant parties**

Our case study indicated that in general only positive results for both parties could be expected. Since the commodities sponsored are considered to be necessities for the peace operation or security co-operation, one can expect that the peace operation or security co-operation will benefit in a cost-effectiveness as well as practical effectiveness sense. Naturally not all peace operations and security co-operations are the same, meaning that negative results can be expected in certain situations. For example, if the product provided shows a lack of quality, this might lead to a decrease in practical as well as cost-effectiveness, which in turn might slow the operation or co-operation down. Accordingly, it is of the utmost importance that the sponsorship provided is of a good quality.

Apart from the benefits for the peace operation or security co-operation and its resources, our example also indicated that the private company could benefit in the sense that they can create a positive image for themselves, as well as increase their profits. Once again it

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<sup>26</sup> As discussed earlier on, in the case of a security co-operation, the private company should portray the security co-operation as a peace operation when commercialising their involvement in the co-operation.



is important to note that not all operations or co-operations are the same and that it is crucial for the company to realise that the benefits for the company will depend on the efforts made by the company itself to make the most of its involvement in the peace operation or security co-operation. Our case study serves as an example where the product provided was of a good quality ensuring practical as well as cost effectiveness. The relevant company, Isuzu, also made the most of its involvement in Operation Rachel through their advertising campaign. As discussed in Chapter Three, Isuzu's advertising campaign proved to be extremely successful, resulting in a positive image being created for Isuzu in South Africa. In summary, if no effort is made by the relevant company to inform consumers of their involvement, they can expect no real positive results.

Now that this thesis have determined how peace operations and security co-operations can be commodified and commercialised, as well as what the results for the relevant parties could entail, we can look at what the social psychological theory is that explains why Isuzu's advertising campaign was so successful, and accordingly how this supports the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations.

#### **5.4 The Social Psychological Theory**


The social psychological theory that we are referring to is the **social identity theory**. This theory provides two reasons as to why the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations should prove successful.

The **first** reason is that in general people have a universal desire to “achieve and maintain a sense of positive social identity” (Burgess, 2002: 14; 15). In order for a person to achieve and maintain a sense of positive social identity, this person has to belong to desirable social groups. Therefore an individual has to feel that he/she is associated with groups that are perceived to be positively distinctive from other groups. When the individual's group is perceived to be positively distinct, it is likely that the individual will also consider him/herself to compare positively to others. In practice, people may use or just associate with, or assess positively certain products “in their efforts to pursue a positive social identity or to avoid negatively distinctive groups” (Burgess, 2002: 15).

Products that are associated with peace operations can expect to be assessed positively since peace operations have positive moral connotations and can be described as honourable. As discussed in Chapter Four, one way for someone to achieve positive self-

esteem would be to adhere to strict moral codes. Values in general provide a powerful basis for understanding how people choose products and services as well as behave like buyers and consumers (Burgess, 2002: 30). In this instance, moral values will determine how the consumer will behave. If an individual associates with a product that is seen as honourable as well as having positive moral connotations, since it is associated with a positive peace operation, the individual is likely also to develop a sense of honour and moral value. Consequently, it would be beneficial for the company to become involved in a peace operation or security co-operation, as well as for the individual to buy or associate with its products.

**Secondly**, social identity theory suggests that another way for an individual to achieve positive self-esteem would be to acquire material prosperity, and to achieve competitive success. Competitive success in general can be considered to be a source of high self-esteem, whereas competitive failure is a threat to maintaining high self-esteem. As discussed in Chapter Four, self-esteem is part of positive identity. Through association with peace operations, the individual will feel that he/she is increasing his/her own worthiness, since peace operations are seen as a test of both the calibre of people and the quality of commodities in really difficult warlike conditions. The relevant product can be seen as being tested in warlike conditions for an increase in its value. If the commodity survives and performs in these demanding conditions, it can be seen as achieving competitive success, increasing its value.



In summary, the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations (if portrayed as a peace operations) are likely to succeed since:

- In general people have a universal desire to achieve and maintain a sense of positive social identity;
- In order for a person to achieve and maintain a sense of positive social identity, this person has to belong to desirable social groups;
- In practice, in order to belong to desirable social groups, people may use or just associate with, or assess positively certain products;
- Products associated with peace operations have positive connotations; since
- Peace operations have positive moral connotations and can be described as honourable; and
- Peace operations are seen as a test of both the strength of people and commodities in really difficult warlike conditions, if the relevant

product/commodity survives and performs in these demanding conditions it can be seen as achieving competitive success, increasing the value of it.

Consequently the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations are likely to prove successful. But what are the ingredients of a marketing strategy that will motivate companies to provide sponsorships?

### **5.5 The ingredients of a marketing strategy**

From the analysis above, it can be concluded that successful marketing strategies for obtaining sponsorships and for commercialising the company's involvement in the relevant peace operation or security co-operation should include four very important arguments:

1. The interests of peace operations and security co-operations can be aligned with the interests of the private sector;
2. The private company is provided with an opportunity to prove that its product[s] can succeed in extremely demanding [warlike] conditions;
3. It is time for the conventional book of rules to be thrown out of the window;
4. Ethical advertising works.

UNICEF's forthright Executive Director, Carol Bellamy, warns against a UN (and other peace agents') alliance with the private sector, since she believes the main goal of the private sector, namely profit, is not compatible with the United Nation's (and other peace agents') goals (McDermott, 2001: 173; 174). This thesis concludes that the fact that business and industry are profit driven can be used to the advantage of the UN and other peace agents. By becoming involved in a peace operation or security co-operation, a company that forms part of the private sector has the opportunity to prove their product can succeed in extremely demanding warlike conditions. If the company's product succeeds, it can use this situation in commercialising their involvement in the peace operation or security co-operation. The commercialisation of its involvement can lead to the specific company achieving its goal of profit, since **profit can be seen as the test of commercialising a commodity/product**. Accordingly, the potential sponsor should be convinced that through becoming involved in a peace operation or security co-operation and through commercialising its involvement in the relevant operation, the company should experience an increase in profits.

Our case study indicated that a company's involvement in a peace operation or security co-operation could help ensure that the commercialisation of its product is successful.

What is very important, though, is for the company to accept that it is time for **the conventional book of rules regarding advertising to be thrown out of the window**. As discussed in Chapter Three, Isuzu's advertising campaign broke the rules of vehicle advertising by presenting viewers with dirty vehicles and guns in a vehicle advertisement, while according to the book of rules viewers should always be presented with a clean vehicle and no guns should be shown in the advertisement, since guns are associated with carjackings.

Secondly, companies must realise that, as the successful example of Isuzu's advertisement also shows, you do not need *fantasy* advertising, since **ethical advertising** works, as was indicated by the response to the Isuzu advertisement. Our example proved that consumers do not just associate with or assess products positively with regards to, for example, their price, but they do associate with or assess products positively with regards to moral principles. This element is clearly illustrated by the high noting and awareness levels that Isuzu's advertisement attained compared to its competitors, who advertised according to the 'rulebook' and who did not make use of ethical advertising.

As mentioned before in the case of a security co-operation the relevant corporate sponsor should present the relevant security co-operation as a peace operation when commercialising their involvement in this co-operation. Since consumers associate with or assess products positively with regards to moral principles, presenting a security co-operation as a peace operation should result in the relevant product being associated with or assessed positively by consumers, since peace operations are seen as having universal positive moral connotations.

As a result, the marketing strategy for obtaining corporate sponsorships for a peace operation or security co-operation should first of all clarify that the profit goal of the private sector can be used to the advantage of peace operations and security co-operations, since through the commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations, these operations should become more cost effective as well as more practically effective. The private sector should be persuaded to become involved in peace operations and security co-operations in the form of private sponsorships through convincing them that their involvement in peace operations or security co-operations will provide them with the opportunity to prove their products can succeed in extremely demanding [warlike] conditions, which should in turn benefit them in a profit as well as image-making sense through the commercialisation of their involvement. The relevant

company's marketing strategy for commercialising their involvement in the relevant peace operation or security co-operation should take into consideration that it is time for the conventional book of rules to be thrown out of the window, as well as take into consideration that ethical advertising works, as the example of Isuzu's advertising campaign showed.

This thesis has shown how peace operations and security co-operations can be commodified and commercialised; what the end results would be for the relevant parties; what the social psychological theory supporting our argument is; as well as what the ingredients of a marketing strategy for providing peace operations and security co-operations with sponsorships are, as well as what the ingredients are for a marketing strategy when the relevant company commercialises their involvement in the relevant peace operation or security co-operation. The question we are left with is: what would the future implications be for commodifying and commercialising peace operations and security co-operations?

### **5.6 Conclusion: The Future**


This thesis proposes that the costs of peace operations and security co-operations should be reduced through the commodification and commercialisation of such operations. If this recommendation can be put into practice effectively, we expect peace agents to reap positive results. On the basis of the example of our case study, Operation Rachel, we believe that commodifying and commercialising peace operations and security co-operations should mean that these operations immediately become more cost effective as well as efficient.

It is important to note that care should be taken with regards to deciding which companies to approach for sponsorships. Even though, as shown above, the interests of peace agents and the interests of the private industry can be aligned, it is important to ensure that the underlying moral principles of the individual company are compatible with those of peace agents. For example, if a shoe company offers to provide a specific peace operation or security co-operation with the necessary hiking boots, but this specific company is associated with human rights violations since their staff is extremely underpaid or because they make use of child labour, it is clear that the moral principles of the company are not compatible with those of peace agents. Consequently it could do more harm than good to allow such a company to become involved in a peace operation

or security co-operation, since the positive moral connotations of peace agents are at stake.

It is also important for private companies to note that peace operations and security co-operations are often executed in unpredictable conditions. As a result, an operation can for example be terminated at any point when deemed necessary. Consequently, their involvement in a peace operation or security co-operation cannot guarantee positive results.

Since this thesis focused on only one example of a peace/security operation being commodified and commercialised, future studies might improve its recommended marketing strategies, provide us with a wider variety of positive and negative results, indicate what the implications will be if all peace operations and security co-operations were commodified and commercialised, as well as indicate what the implications will be for the private company if the specific peace operation or security co-operation is unsuccessful. As mentioned above, we do realise that our assertions are based on one case study executed in specific conditions. Consequently it would be necessary for future studies to differentiate between how various types of conflicts, the political economy of the area and the different stages of the peace operation or the different focus areas of security co-operations will influence the commodification and commercialisation aspects of the operation.



Yet, at the time of writing it is clear that it is necessary to decrease the costs of peace operations and security co-operations in order to ensure that peace agents are more willing to approve new, expand existing or to maintain existing missions until the peace process they are intended to support has been consolidated, or the security issues they are focussing on has been addressed. This can be done through the effective commodification and commercialisation of peace operations and security co-operations.



## ADDENDUM A:

The images below were obtained from a digital media pack that contains images and a press release covering the 2003 Operation Rachel Joint Crime Prevention Initiative. The digital media pack was provided by John Elford, Manager Product Communications, General Motors South Africa.



The photos above provide us with a visual image of the heavy and dangerous loads that the Isuzu vehicles often had to carry when participating in Operation Rachel 2003.





The photos above shows how weapons retrieved during Operation Rachel 2003 are being buried with explosives and then effectively destroyed.





These three photos not only show a helicopter and Isuzu KB 4 x 4 vehicles, but also have an underlying message demonstrating how the police (helicopter), representing the public sector, and Isuzu (4 x 4 vehicles), representing the private sector, are working together.

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
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## **INTERVIEWS:**

Interview done via phone on more than one occasion during November 2004, with **Clive Evans, Strategic Planning - Network BBDO.**

Interview done via email and phone on more than one occasion during November 2004, with **John Elford, Manager Product Communication for General Motors South Africa**

Interview done via email and phone on more than one occasion during November 2004, with **Superintendent Renco Roland of the South African Police Service.**

