Struggle(s) for Self-determination: Afrikaner Aspirations in the Twenty-first Century

By

Riaan Visagie

Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Political Science) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Dr Nicola de Jager

Co-supervisor: Prof Pieter Fourie

March 2018

Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: March 2018

i

Abstract

The question of self-determination is not a new one. Struggles for autonomy have drawn interest both from within and outside academia, and as a phenomena is not confined solely to history. Contemporary examples abound, including the recent decision of British voters to support a negotiated exit from the European Union – known as Brexit – and the uncertainty caused by calls for Catalonian and Kurdish independence. Clearly this phenomena holds valid and real consequences for the global state system. Moreover, very few scholarly studies touch upon Afrikaner self-determination, not to mention provide an in-depth analysis of just what this concept entails. It is into this deficit that this study ventures, through an analysis of historical and contemporary Afrikaner self-determination aspirations and the conditions under which it exist.

The research question this study investigates is whether the phenomenon of national self-determination can be identified in historical and contemporary *Afrikanerdom*, and what the broad trends and developments in Afrikaner self-determination aspirations are, as represented by key Afrikaner activists and organisations. In order to begin addressing this research problem it is first and foremost necessary to understand what national self-determination is, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline. As will be shown, national self-determination is a chameleonic right that seeks to establish an independent domain of political control – in various forms. On the factors conducive towards the phenomenon's emergence and/or decline, this analysis points toward discontent within deeply divided societies under democratic forms of governance that may accentuate these divides instead of bridging them – most notably majoritarianism – while other forms of democratic systems – such as consociationalism – may induce the opposite.

Secondly, it is necessary to establish what, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context. As will be made clear, the phenomenon of self-determination runs like a golden thread throughout Afrikaner history, from the anti-imperial and republican Afrikaner self-determination efforts of the nineteenth century to those in the twentieth century that mobilised Afrikaner Nationalism and the policy of apartheid to protect Afrikaner autonomy by denying others the same right. Thirdly, and closely linked with the former, a review of the broad manifestations of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action as presented by key self-determination activists and organisations was undertaken, in conjunction with the factors which contribute to action in this regard. Here it was shown that Afrikaner self-determination is alive and well in South Africa, with Afrikaner centric organisations seeking the establishment of greater internal self-determination while not denying the possibility of grand self-determination – or the consideration of Afrikaner independence – in the future.

Moreover, this analysis proposes that deep rifts within South African society – further worsened by the non-accommodation of majoritarianism and the resultant sense of political impotency – creates the conditions necessary to further Afrikaner action in this regard. Yet this need not be so. Indeed, there are alternatives to the attainment of Afrikaner self-determination on a grand scale, and none appear more promising than the group accommodation sought by consociationalist forms of democratic governance.

Opsomming

Die selfbeskikking vraagstuk is nie 'n nuwe een nie. Stryde vir outonomie lok belangstelling van binne en buite die akademie, en as 'n verskynsel is dit nie net beperk tot die geskiedenis nie. Hedendaagse voorbeelde bestaan in oorvloed, insluitend die onlangse besluit van Britse kiesers om 'n uittrede uit die Europese Unie – bekend as Brexit – te onderhandel, en die onsekerheid wat veroorsaak word deur oproepe vir Kataloniese en Koerdiese onafhanklikheid. Dit is duidelik dat hierdie verskynsel verreikende gevolge vir die globale staatstelsel inhou. Daarbenewens raak baie min studies aan die kwessie van Afrikaner selfbeskikking, om nie te praat van 'n omvattende analise van presies wat hierdie konsep behels nie. Dit is in die navorsingsgaping wat hierdie studie onderneem word deur middel van 'n analise van historiese en kontemporêre Afrikaner selfbeskikking aspirasies, en die omstandighede waaronder dit bestaan.

Die primêre navorsingsvraag wat hierdie studie ondersoek is of die verskynsel van nasionale selfbeskikking geïdentifiseer kan word in historiese en kontemporêre Afrikanerdom, en wat die breë tendense en ontwikkelings in Afrikaner selfbeskikking aspirasies is, soos verteenwoordig deur belangrike Afrikaner-aktiviste en organisasies. Om hierdie navorsingsprobleem aan te spreek is dit eerstens nodig om te verstaan wat nasionale selfbeskikking is, en watter faktore bevorderlik is vir die opkoms en/of agteruitgang daarvan. Soos gewys word, nasionale selfbeskikking is 'n chameleoniese reg wat daarop gemik is om 'n onafhanklike terrein van politieke beheer te vestig – in verskillende vorme. Op die faktore wat die verskynsel se opkoms en/of agteruitgang bevorder, dui hierdie ontleding op ontevredenheid binne 'n diep verdeelde samelewing onder demokratiese bestuursvorme wat hierdie skeidings kan beklemtoon – veral met betrekking tot meerderheidsregering – terwyl ander vorme van demokratiese stelsels – soos konsosialisme – moontlik die skeidings kan oorbrug.

Tweedens is dit nodig om vas te stel wat – indien enige – die breë tendense en ontwikkelings van Afrikaners se selfbeskikkingspogings in 'n historiese konteks is. Soos duidelik gemaak word, loop die verskynsel van selfbeskikking soos 'n goue draad dwarsdeur Afrikanergeskiedenis, van die anti-imperiale en republikeinse Afrikaner-selfbeskikkingspogings van die negentiende eeu tot dié van die twintigste eeu wat Afrikaner-nasionalisme gemobiliseer het, insluitend die beleid van apartheid wat Afrikaner outonomie beskerm en bevorder het deur ander dieselfde reg te ontken. Derdens, en in noue verband met die voormalige, is 'n oorsig van die breë manifestasies van kontemporêre Afrikaner-selfbeskikkingsdiskoers en aksie onderneem – soos aangebied deur sleutelbeskiktingsaktiviste en organisasies – tesame met die faktore wat bydra tot aksie in hierdie verband. Hier word getoon dat Afrikaner-selfbeskikking in Suid-Afrika floreer, met Afrikaner-

sentriese organisasies wat die vestiging van interne selfbeskikking propageer, terwyl hulle nie die moontlikheid van volkome selfbeskikking in die toekoms ontken nie.

Daarbenewens stel hierdie analise voor dat diep verskeurings binne die Suid-Afrikaanse samelewing – verder versleg deur die nie-akkommodasie van meerderheidsregering, en die gevolglike sin van politieke impotensie – die voorwaardes skep wat nodig is vir verdere Afrikaneraksies in hierdie verband. Tog hoef dit nie so te wees nie. Inderdaad, daar is alternatiewe tot die bereiking van Afrikaner-selfbeskikking op groot skaal, en geeneen lyk meer belowend as die groep akkommodasie wat deur konsosialistiese vorme van demokratiese regering nagestreef word nie.

Acknowledgments

To my single parent mother, Eurika de Wet, my first word of everlasting thanks. Were it not for your constant financial and emotional support I know I would not have had the privilege of attending university, much less the chance to pursue a postgraduate degree. You did not flinch when – at the ripe old age of 27 – your son chose to walk away from a dead-end career and into the halls of academia, the first in our family with this honour. The personal sacrifices you endured on behalf of your adopted son are forever etched into my heart and memory, and it is a debt which I know I can never repay – regardless of you referring to me as your "wee retirement annuity".

Secondly, to my academic supervisors, Dr Nicola de Jager and Prof Pieter Fourie, my undying gratitude for your patience, guiding hands, and never ceasing wisdom over the roughly three years it took to complete this study. The unexpected – yet wholly welcome – awarding of a Commonwealth Scholarship for postgraduate study in the United Kingdom meant that this study had to be temporarily shelved, with only the occasional tinkering here and there. This of course meant that my name stayed on your whiteboards – and my chapters in your inboxes – much longer than anticipated, and you would have been forgiven for the faintest hint of impatience. Yet the grace and professionalism that accompanied each encounter over the course of three years stands as a testament to the calibre of Stellenbosch University's exceptional staff.

A final word of appreciation to Mr Carel Boshoff IV, President of the Orania Movement, Dr Pieter Mulder, former leader of the Freedom Front Plus, and Mr Flip Buys, the Chief Executive Officer of the Solidarity Movement. This study would have been immensely poorer were it not for your voluntary research participation, and the insights gained therefrom proved enriching to an enquiring mind and the study's findings alike. This study is dedicated to all the men and women 'at the forefront of true local democracy', from Barcelona to Erbil, and beyond.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

AA   Affirmative Action

ABW   Anglo Boer War

ANC   African National Congress

AU   African Union

AWB   *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (Afrikaner Resistance Movement)

BKA   *Boere Krisis Aksie* (Boer Crisis Action)

CoE   Council of Europe

CSVR   Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation

DA   Democratic Alliance

EFF   Economic Freedom Fighters

EU   European Union

FAK   *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations)

FCNM   Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

FF+   Freedom Front Plus

FN   Front National

FSI   Fragile State Index

HSRC   Human Sciences Research Council

IJR   Institute for Justice and Reconciliation

ICCPR   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

IR   International Relations

IS   Islamic State

ME   Middle East

NP   National Party

OAU   Organization of African Unity

OB   *Ossewabrandwag* (Ox Wagon Sentinel)

OSCE   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RSD	Right to Self-Determination
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SAP	South African Party
TAU	Transvaal Agricultural Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDMR	UN Declaration on Minorities Rights
UNDRIP	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOC	*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Dutch East India Company)
VVK	*Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie* (People's Council Electoral Commission)
WWI	World War 1
WWII	World War 2

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter I – Study Introduction

1.1 Background and Rationale

The question of self-determination is not a new one. Struggles for autonomy have drawn interest both from within and outside academia since the advent of the Westphalian state system. In this context self-determination – as well as autonomy – refers to an "independent domain of political control" (Buchanan, 2004:333). Historical examples of such struggles include the American War of Independence, anticolonial struggles, and the struggles for statehood in the wake of the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, self-determination as a phenomena is not one confined solely to history. Contemporary examples abound. Within the Middle East (ME), for example, the fight against the Islamic State (IS) has highlighted the role of not only steadfast Kurdish resistance through its Peshmerga forces, but also of calls for the creation of an independent Kurdish homeland.

In Europe the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum culminated in a failed attempt by the "Yes Scotland" campaigners to espouse the benefits an independent Scotland would bring. On the European mainland the Scottish referendum has renewed interest in secessionist movements. These include, but are by no means limited to, Basque and Catalonian separatists in Spain, and a strong secessionist sentiment in Belgium and northern Italy. Further afield this secessionist sentiment can be observed in Chechnya, Tibet, Québec, as well as in the embers of the horrific breakup of Yugoslavia (Lehning, 2005:1). In Africa the anticolonial struggles for self-determination have given way to contemporary autonomous movements in the horn of Africa, while on the southernmost tip of the continent discontent after the fall of apartheid has sustained calls for Afrikaner self-determination (Webb & Kriel, 2000:24; Vestergaard, 2001:37; Davies, 2007:363).

Coupled with the unresolved issues of Northern Ireland, Palestinian, Somaliland, and Taiwanese statehood, it would be a mistake to confine self-determination movements to the footnotes of history. Moreover, beyond explicit self-determination movements there are those seeking to strengthen their independent domains of political control. The recent decision of British voters to support a negotiated exit from the European Union (EU) – known as Brexit – is a case in point. Clearly this phenomena holds valid and real consequences for the global state system. These consequences are perhaps nowhere more tangible than in the knowledge that in 2008 there were about 30 armed conflicts with self-determination at its gravitas, with a further 50 or more self-determination campaigns underway that have the potential to turn violent if left unaddressed (Weller & Metzger, 2008:xi; Weller, 2008:13). It is the potential value of informed policy responses to these vexing conflicts that makes this is an area worthy of critical study.

Within the fields of Political Science, International Relations (IR), and law, the question of self-determination is one often linked with nationalism, identity politics, constitutionalism, political legitimacy, ethnicity, conflict resolution, justice, and minority as well as human rights, amongst many more. This linkage is evident in studies of the effects of ethnonationalism and globalisation on self-determination struggles (Weiss, 2006:247), on constitutionalism as buttressing the right to self-determination (Bhandari, 2014:131), the legitimacy of European integration in the face of substantial separatist resistance (Laible, 2008:1), the role of complex power-sharing mechanisms within conflict resolution when settling self-determination disputes (Weller & Metzger, 2008:xvii), the effects of self-determination movements on the state as the primary medium of justice (Moltchanova, 2009:197), and the connection between self-determination, minorities, and minority rights (Barten, 2015:281), to name but a few.

While this study does not scrutinise the interaction between nationalism and self-determination it is however necessary to acknowledge their relationship. Nationalism has been described as "the elephant in the room whose huge presence has been consistently overlooked, unaccounted for, and downplayed by the major social theories of the modern period" (Gat, 2013:2). As a consequence observers "in general are repeatedly surprised when its movements shake and often shatter the room" (Gat, 2013:2). Emerson defined nationalism as the product of "a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future" (quoted in Johnston, Knight & Kofman, 2014:1). An example could include the role of Greek nationalism and its effects on the breakup of the Ottoman Empire (Katsikas, 2013:61).

Emerson also illustrated the linkage between nationalism and self-determination. Emerson explains that the right to self-determination is often seen as "the foundation on which all other rights rest; self-determination denied, no other right can be secure" (1960:3). When people then understand nationalism in relation to the right of self-determination – and often in conjunction with attaining statehood – they do so by "assuming that the remaining goods they seek will flow from its attainment" (Emerson, 1960:3). Studies concerned with the linkage between nationalism(s) and self-determination are plentiful, including how nationalist movements drive self-determination efforts (Canuel, 1997:87), and the remedial effect of self-determination on cultural nationalism and its impact on human rights (Saul, 2000:321), to name but a few.

Studies focusing on the theoretical aspects of self-determination are however more scant, even though closely related concepts such as secession theory help fill these gaps. However, it should be noted that while the two concepts of self-determination and secession are closely related, they are

2

not the same. While the latter can be argued to be the 'means', the former entails the 'end'. Secession involves the "formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state" (Bartkus, 2004:3). Furthermore, secession can be said to be the "most dramatic form assertions of self-determination can take" (Buchanan, 2004:333). To illustrate, in order to fulfil their self-determination aspirations in 1967 the people of Biafra engaged in a disastrous and vain attempt to secede from Nigeria (Lata, 2004:132).

Theories of secession, or scholarly approaches to the subject, can be divided into three types. The first approach *explains* secession, while the second approach focuses on *justifying* secession. The third approach relates to the *legal* aspect of secession and is grounded in a variety of national and international legal documents (Pavković & Radan, 2007:171). For scholars such as Buchanan the second and third (normative and legal) approaches to secession can be wedded in order to produce a theoretical framework that morally justifies pro or anti secessionist arguments while congruently being conducive to implementing "more humane and effective international responses to secessionist conflicts" (1997:60). In contrast, self-determination theory as a school of thought – and one concerned more with political science than law – remains largely confined to a select few ideational frameworks.

Before reviewing one such Political Science related framework it is necessary to briefly discuss a largely justice-based theory of self-determination. Returning to the work of Buchanan it can be understood that by narrowly focusing on secession a risk develops that theory can be misleading and progress hindered when dealing with issues of self-determination (2004:332). This is due to the goal of secession (the creation of a new sovereign state), which "is in many cases the least feasible or appropriate exercise of self-determination" (Buchanan, 2004:332). In its stead Buchanan proposes a primarily normative theoretical framework that not only explains the right to secede but also serves to evaluate and respond to self-determination contestations. For Buchanan a final characteristic of this framework has to be its utility in recognising that independent statehood is neither a natural goal nor an "inevitable culmination of aspirations for self-determination" (2004:332). As a substitute, for example, intrastate autonomy or a consociational form of governance may suffice.

While Buchanan goes to great lengths to extrapolate on what he terms a "Remedial Right Only Theory of the right of unilateral secession" (2004:400) it is outside of the bounds of this study to do his point of view any justice. However, his argument about the nature of an effective legal-based theory of self-determination is important to note due to the dichotomy it creates between self-determination and secession. This separation neatly encapsulates both the difference and

relationship between these two concepts. To illustrate, while there is a clear difference between the act of secession (e.g. the creation of a new state) and assertions of self-determination (e.g. greater intrastate autonomy) there is nevertheless a common thread that can and do bind these concepts intimately together, even though this is not always the case.

Furthermore Buchanan's (2004:332) description of the nature of his theoretical framework also stresses the difference and relationship between secession theory on the one hand, and self-determination theory on the other. Whereas a traditional approach to secession theory can include the erroneous assumption that secession is the only feasible and appropriate exercise of self-determination, self-determination theory in contrast should recognise that the goal of independent statehood is neither natural nor inevitable. In continuing with self-determination theory – and separating it from a chiefly legal perspective – the field of inquiry shrinks considerably to one essentially confined to the normative school. Within Political Science texts for example the concept of self-determination is often expanded upon without a comprehensive descriptive or typological foundation (Beran, 2005:33; Caney, 2005:149; Kapitan, 2008:16).

These foundational elements are essential in aiding clarification in order to facilitate effective conflict responses. In the self-determination studies mentioned (that is, those that link self-determination with nationalism, constitutionalism, political legitimacy, ethnicity, conflict resolution, justice, and minority as well as human rights) none attempt to typify the milieu within which the struggle for self-determination is carried out (or rather the types of forms such struggles can take). However, as has been shown, this statement (while relevant to Political Science literature) certainly does not ring true for those concerned with legal matters (as found in justice-based theories of secession for example). Yet there are theoretical frameworks that seek to broaden this discussion, and in so doing enriching the field of inquiry with typologies that can be drawn upon to understand the intricacies involved in struggles for self-determination.

One such theoretical framework, developed by Benyamin Neuberger, is useful in clarifying "many inter-ethnic conflicts, border disputes, secessions, and wars", with a caveat that it is by no means a "substitute for a thorough empirical study of each conflict" (2001:415). In essence this typological framework unpacks the conceptual difficulties related to national self-determination, and will be discussed at greater length within the theoretical framework section of this chapter. Moreover, while the above typology is applied to a variety of national groups – both historical and contemporary – it has not been used to analyse Afrikaner efforts at self-determination. In fact, very few scholarly studies even touch upon Afrikaner self-determination (Webb & Kriel, 2000:24; Vestergaard, 2001:37; Davies, 2007:363), not to mention provide an in-depth analysis of just what

4

this concept entails. It is into this deficit that this study ventures, through extrapolating on the dynamics related to self-determination and applying the above typological framework to elucidate on the phenomenon of Afrikaner national self-determination. Furthermore, while the typology mentioned above serves as a foundation undergirding the subsequent analysis, it is only useful insofar as it provides an exploratory framework.

To derive any significance from the data it is necessary to understand the interdisciplinary approaches to pluralism, and here an understanding of the dynamics of majoritarian and consociational democracy within deeply divided societies is key. Indeed, the phenomenon of national self-determination does not exist in a vacuum, and it is possible to identify factors conducive towards both its emergence and decline. As will be shown, majoritarian democracies can by their very nature endear the danger of unchecked majority power and a tendency towards the marginalisation of minorities and their democratic rights (Mbazira, 2009:33). In stark contrast, consociational democracies tend to enact less visible constraints on their various constituent groups and are as such generally perceived to be a more fair democratic system (Öberg & Strøm, 2008:13). These propositions will be discussed in greater length in the 'Theoretical Framework' section.

Continuing with the concept of Afrikaner self-determination it is first and foremost necessary to explain just what this concept entails. Writing in 1990 – while the pillars of apartheid were tumbling down – a BBC correspondent, Graham Leach, asked: "Who are today's Afrikaners – these stubborn and often infuriating people who defy the world?" (1990:xv). Referring to the Great Trek, Leach remarked that "one hundred and fifty years after they mounted their journey in search of liberation, the Afrikaners are still in many ways a homeless people – still seeking that elusive final and secure resting place" (1990:xv). Leach may have penned these thoughts over two decades ago, but as will be shown, his statement neatly encapsulates the *Weltanschauung* – or worldview – of many within contemporary *Afrikanerdom*.

Yet classifying the term 'Afrikaner' (and as such *Afrikanerdom*) can by no means be a homogeneous undertaking. A politically sterile and broad approach to delineating the term 'Afrikaner' would include a reference to those descendants of the Dutch, German, and French Huguenots that settled the area now known as South Africa beginning in 1652, intermixed with British settlers from 1806 onwards (Haynes, 1951:128; Preller, 1925:18). On the other hand a less sterile delineation of 'Afrikaners' as a group of people refers to the majority of the White population in South Africa, whom are predominantly Afrikaans-speaking (a language developed from a mixture of Dutch, German, French, and even Malay), whom share common Christian

(Protestant) cultural and historic roots, and perhaps a group more "infamously associated with the apartheid regime" (Todd, 2011:114).

Furthermore, the concept of Afrikaner self-determination is by no means ubiquitous or a universal aspiration within *Afrikanerdom*. After the end of apartheid and White minority rule Afrikaners "quickly lost what remained of their political unity" – typified by the once dominant Afrikaner-led National Party (NP) – "and by 1999 constituted one of the most electorally fragmented population groups in South Africa" (Lemon, 2003:144). As such the image (and arguable myth) of the "monolithic and invincible 'white tribe of Africa'" (Lemon, 2003:150) has been shattered. This pulling asunder of *Afrikanerdom* mirrors the gulf between those that oppose, support, or remain neutral on the issue of self-determination. To illustrate, while right-wing Afrikaner groups mobilise to further the idea of a self-determining *Volkstaat* (or people's state), moderates advocate for greater internal self-determination, and others for greater assimilation (Ramutsindela, 1998:179; Boersema, 2012:419). These differences are discussed at greater length within the following sections.

1.2 Problem Statement and Research Question(s)

With many armed conflicts driven by struggles for self-determination (rhetorically at least), and with many more self-determination disputes that could potentially escalate into violence, informed policy responses to these complex conflicts are essential. It is evident that while secession theory offers a wealth of perspectives on the 'means' of self-determination, Political Science orientated frameworks that address the latter remain few in number. As such the general goal of this research is to advance an understanding of the phenomenon of self-determination and of the dynamics surrounding those who seek to obtain it. This is accomplished through utilising two main research avenues that ultimately direct this study: an analytical review of theoretical and relevant literature connected to the conceptualisation, typology, and possible sources of Afrikaner self-determination aspirations, and the consideration of related empirical case study material (details which are expanded upon in the 'Research Design and Methodology' section). More specifically, the focal point of this study is an analysis of historical and contemporary Afrikaner self-determination aspirations and the conditions under which it exists. In sum, the research question this study investigates is as follows:

Can the phenomenon of national self-determination be identified in historical and contemporary *Afrikanerdom*, and what are the broad trends and developments in Afrikaner self-determination aspirations as represented by key Afrikaner activists and organisations?

Furthermore, four sub-questions compliment this primary research question:

(1) What is national self-determination, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline?

(2) What, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context?

(3) What are the broad manifestations of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action as presented by key self-determination activists and organisations, and what factors contribute to action in this regard?

(4) What possible significance can be derived from the study's findings, and what policy recommendations can be formulated to address this phenomenon?

In order to achieve these various research aims the following important objectives have been identified:

- Clarification of what the concept of national self-determination entails, as well as possible factors conducive towards its emergence and decline.

- Historical outline of past Afrikaner self-determination attempts.

- Exploration of key contemporary Afrikaner self-determination activists and organisations through three relevant case studies.

- Relevant recommendations to the epistemic and policy-making communities concerning the conclusions drawn from this exploration

1.3 Theoretical Framework

To recapitulate, it has been established that scholarly work focusing on the theoretical aspects of self-determination within the Political Science discipline specifically remain few in number (primarily where typologies are concerned). In contrast, justice-based approaches to secession theory comprises a larger body of work that can be seen as complementary to self-determination theory up to a certain point – or at least insofar as the 'means' can correspond to the 'end'. As has also been stated, the analytical model within which the research is undertaken is an examination of the typological framework of national self-determination and the possible conditions relating to its emergence and decline. The typological framework was chosen due to it originating from the Political Sciences and its purported ability to clarify the muddied waters of self-determination disputes, albeit with a caution that it is by no means a "substitute for a thorough empirical study of each conflict" (Neuberger, 2001:415).

Moreover, Neuberger's (2001:391) examination of national self-determination provides a typological foundation which serves as fertile ground for its application to a more focused analysis. According to Babbie a typology is "the classification (typically nominal) of observations in terms of their attributes on two or more variables" – or more succinctly put – as "a set of categories or types" (2010:184). To illustrate, when analysing governments a researcher can choose to classify them into various ideological camps, such as socialist, liberal, conservative, or right-wing. In doing so the researcher creates a typology of government ideological orientation. This typology can then be utilised to scrutinise any given number of governments. According to Mouton the utility of the typological approach is to be found in the fact that it creates cognisance "of certain distinctions that are helpful in identifying and understanding different kinds of studies in social research" (1996:103).

In essence the typological framework explores the conceptual and theoretical contestations related to national self-determination and sheds light on the (moral and political) *principle* of national self-determination versus the (legal) *right* of peoples to national self-determination. Even the idea of a single principle of national self-determination belies the fact that there are principles of national self-determination found in contrasting situations, being external self-determination, or "the right of every people to choose the sovereignty under which they live", and internal self-determination, or "the right of every people to select its own form of government" (Neuberger, 2001:392).

Furthermore, external self-determination can be found in two varieties, being "[1] internationally recognized independence for a people and [2] true independence for an already existing state" (Neuberger, 2001:392). In contrast internal self-determination can be found in three varieties, being "[1] democracy in a homogeneous state; [2] autonomy or federalism for a distinct people within a democratic state…; or [3] autonomy/federalism for a distinct group within a non-democratic system" (Neuberger, 2001:392). Yet one cannot rule out an overlap of external and internal self-determination, a fact alluded to by Neuberger (2001:392). These concepts in turn can be subdivided into economic, political, and cultural self-determination, which may fall into either external and/or internal self-determination. Ultimately all these distinctions can be simplified by creating a dichotomy between 'grand self-determination' and 'small self-determination', which entails the object of "true internationally recognized sovereignty" and "the internal structure and politics of the state" (Neuberger, 2001:393), respectively.

Even though reality is always far more complex, it can be argued that grand self-determination is usually "more external, political or secessionist, while small self-determination is more internal, economic and cultural" (Neuberger, 2001:394). Finally, apart from offering dichotomous

8

delineations of self-determination according to the democratic and national schools, the typology utilised also aids in clarifying (1) the identity of the 'self' in self-determination, (2) both the goals and means of determination, (3) the correlation between the right of self-determination and the right of secession, (4) questions regarding the optimal size of a viable state, (5) whether the process of self-determination can be reversed, and (6) the conflict between self-determination and other international principles (Neuberger, 2001:415).

Ultimately however the relative 'worth' of a theory can be found in its utility, and a comprehensive theory of self-determination should enable academics, policymakers, and activists to better "understand the nature of their action, the obstacles to it and the positions of their adversaries" (Rootes, 1990:15). In order to derive any meaningful analytical significance from the typological approach discussed above it is necessary to understand the possible sources of the phenomenon of national self-determination. Indeed, as with any social science analysis it should be possible to explore the factors conducive towards both the emergence and decline of national self-determination.

In understanding these linkages it becomes possible to explain what has happened, to make realistic predictions about what may yet happen, and to try and affect how it happens in the future. And as briefly stated previously – insofar as national self-determination is concerned – an understanding of democracy in plural societies is key. More specifically however, the dichotomy between majoritarian and consociational democracies warrants further scrutiny. This distinction, popularised by Arend Lijphart in the late 1960s, "derives its theoretical significance from the relationship it establishes between political culture and social structure on the one hand and political stability on the other hand" (1969:207). In other words, on the possible linkages between a democratic state's political attitudes and beliefs, its social character, and ultimately, on their impact on the polity's relative political stability.

As will be shown, particular forms of democratic governance are more suited to certain societies than they are to others. Simply put, there can be no 'one size fits all' approach to the choice of which democratic systems suit which societies better. Each form of democratic governance brings with it its own unique set of challenges and opportunities. Within majoritarian systems the onus rests on "undiluted majority rule", while consociational systems exhibit "a broader diffusion of power" (Dowty, 1999:173). Both of these systems have a direct bearing on the rights of minorities, and as such, on their behaviour. It is at this critical junction that the interplay between political culture and social structure *vis-à-vis* political stability occur. All of these propositions will be analysed in much greater detail within the following chapter.

1.4 Research Design and Methodology

The research design – or how the topical data was collected and analysed – features a qualitative strategy through an exploratory study. Within an exploratory study the generation of new insights into a given phenomenon (in this case Afrikaner self-determination) and the explication of central constructs and concepts (such as self-determination) are both key aims (Mouton & Marais, 1996:43). Furthermore, according to Mouton and Marais three methods often utilised when conducting exploratory research include (1) a pertinent literature review, (2) an assessment of individuals or subjects with practical experience of the problem to be studied, and (3) an exploration of "'insight-stimulating' examples" (1996:43). Thus for Mouton and Marais the primary research design considerations include the necessity of a flexible and open research strategy, and the use of methods including "literature reviews, interviews, [and] case studies…, which may lead to insight and comprehension" (1996:43).

All three of these methodological elements – being the literature review, case study, and interviews – are incorporated into this exploratory analysis. However, a cautionary note to the undertaking of an exploratory study relates to the influence of preconceived assumptions in determining the direction of the study. As the generation of new insights drives exploratory studies, predetermined ideas on the topic should be avoided, which can be accomplished by "the researcher's willingness to examine new ideas and suggestions and to be open to new stimuli" (Mouton & Marais, 1996:43). Continuing with the research design, this analysis is based on interpretations of secondary academic sources and primary data collection through the use of key informant interviews. While secondary data collection facilitates ease of "accessibility, convenience, and reduced costs in time, money, and inconvenience to participants" (Vartanian, 2011:17), there is however a greater lack of control in framing the research wording. As such questions pertinent to the study being undertaken (using secondary data) are often not available within the sources (Vartanian, 2011:15).

Nevertheless, another benefit of utilising secondary sources relates to its ability to facilitate the rapid analysis of current issues, a major strength in so far as this study is concerned. Furthermore, the research design will be a case study of Afrikaner self-determination in South Africa, that is, limited to Afrikaners within South Africa supporting various proxies whom are intimately linked to self-determination aspirations in one guise or another. However, as a proxy for Afrikaners concerned with self-determination three predominantly Afrikaner organisations have been identified and scrutinised through the use of the case study on Afrikaner self-determination efforts. As will be shown all of these organisations strive for self-determination in one form or another. These organisations include the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), the Orania Movement, and finally the

Solidarity Movement. The use of the case study method is warranted due to the detailed knowledge required on the topic of Afrikaner self-determination. According to Hofstee (2006:123) however certain risks are inherent when utilising the case study method. These include subjectivity, the generalisability of results, and the risk of retrogressing the study's focus. In response Hofstee (2006:123) proposes combining the case study design with other approaches. As such this research is complemented by a gathering of primary data to strengthen the study conclusions.

The gathering of primary data was accomplished by key-informant interviews. The subjects identified for interviews are drawn from the organisations mentioned above. They are Carel Boshoff IV, President of the Orania Movement, Dr Pieter Mulder, the former leader of the FF+, and Flip Buys, the Chief Executive Officer of Solidarity South Africa and the *force de jour* within contemporary Afrikaner civil organisations. All of the research participants have agreed to have their identities disclosed. Moreover, it was necessary to formulate an interview schedule (based on the study findings) that would facilitate a semi-structured, in-depth, open-ended, and one-on-one interview. To avoid any possible errors in utilising this methodology it was crucial that the interview schedule be articulated in such a way that the questions were neutral, inoffensive and unintimidating to the chosen subjects (Hofstee, 2006:135). In failing to formulate neutral, inoffensive and unintimidating questions the interviewer runs the risk of interviewees being defensive, not talkative, or dismissive of the interview as a whole. These questions are attached at the end of this study, and can be found in the Interview Schedule (see Addendum A).

Another consideration regards the 'leading' of the research subject, where the subject is guided to certain answers by the interviewer. This process is not academically sound, and can be avoided by asking for elaboration (when required) in a neutral manner (Hofstee, 2006:136). The study also has delimitations. Even though the main focus of this study centres on the post-apartheid period the discussion would be incomplete without being tied to its historical context. One cannot for example gain a complete understanding of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts shorn from the phenomenon's deep historical roots. As a result both the literature review and case study sections have segments dedicated to topical historical development. Moreover, it should be noted that this study has limitations beyond the control of the author. These include time, funding, and logistical limitations. As a result the key-informants identified whom are not situated within the Western Cape were interviewed telephonically as opposed to in-person, and the number of key-informant interviews was limited to the three previously mentioned.

1.5 Ethical Considerations

Ethical situations in social science analyses are not uncommon, even though they are less dramatic than those found in medical science for example (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013:81). As this study was conducted at Stellenbosch University it falls under the scope of the institution's *Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research at Stellenbosch University* (2009). More specifically, as this study involves a human element (through key-informant in-depth individual interviews) the framework policy's basic principles and values of integrity, respect, beneficence and non-maleficence, responsibility, scientific validity and peer review, justice, academic freedom and the dissemination of research results will be upheld. Accordingly, this study has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee (REC): Humanities, under the project number SU-HSD-000614. Furthermore, and in line with the *Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research at Stellenbosch University*, research participants were "well informed on the purpose of the research and how the research results will be disseminated and have consented to participate" (2009:5). This was accomplished through the signing of written consent forms which the participants were provided with. The participants were not remunerated for their participation in the study, and these (as well as all other) sources of information are acknowledged through proper referencing. And finally, as mentioned previously, all research participants have agreed – in writing – to have their identities disclosed.

1.6 Study Outline

With the conclusion of the study background and rationale as outlined above, it is now necessary to turn to a brief summary of the following chapters and to show how these chapters buttress the research question and goals. The analysis within Chapter 2 is in essence concerned with the question of delineating national self-determination, as well as of the exploration of factors which are conducive towards the phenomenon's emergence and/or decline. In order to answer the first research sub-question, Chapter 2 will provide an analytical review of the theoretical and relevant literature connected to the conceptualisation and typology of self-determination, in conjunction with the exploration of contemporary approaches to pluralism in deeply divided societies.

With the theoretical groundwork laid for an analysis of Afrikaner self-determination in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will examine the research sub-question of identifying the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in a historic context. The subsequent analysis will build on the notion that national self-determination is not only a historical phenomenon, but must also be analysed within a historical context. As will be shown, contemporary Afrikaner self-determination aspirations are in one way or another merely the continuation of an age old phenomenon, albeit a

chameleonic one. With the historic groundwork laid, Chapter 4 in turn will examine the research sub-question of identifying the broad trends and developments in contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action. In order to answer the above, Chapter 4 will examine key Afrikaner self-determination activists and organisations through the three case studies mentioned previously. Here the study will temporarily move away from the perspective of the researcher and epistemic literature to one where the research subjects identified previously will be given a space to air their views on the topic at hand. As will be shown, the incorporation of key informant interviews provided for some interesting results, results which were neither clear nor touched upon during the preceding sections.

Chapter 5 will examine the sub-question of whether it is possible to derive any significance from the study's findings, and what recommendations can be formulated to address the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-determination. The first part of this sub-question will be answered by employing the typology and factors conducive towards the emergence and decline of self-determination – discussed in Chapter 2 – to better understand contemporary Afrikaner efforts in this regard. This chapter will conclude with a succinct segment on the pros and cons of Afrikaner self-determination when viewed against the larger backdrop of this study, in conjunction with the provision of a set of recommendations to the epistemic and policymaking communities. And finally, Chapter 6 will conclude the study by providing a brief summation of the key findings, contributions, suggestions for further research, and a brief mention of the study's challenges.

Chapter II – The Many Faces of Self-determination

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter it was stated that the primary research question is concerned with the phenomenon of national self-determination, its identification in historical and contemporary *Afrikanerdom*, and on the dynamics and causes of self-determination aspirations as represented by key Afrikaner actors. In order to begin answering this research problem, this chapter will analyse the first research sub-question, being what is national self-determination, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline? In this chapter then an analytical review of theoretical literature connected to the conceptualisation, typology, and causes of self-determination will be undertaken to answer the aforesaid question. The first half of this chapter will examine the historical development of self-determination, highlighting its metamorphosis from a principle towards a right of all peoples. After reviewing current debates on self-determination this chapter will proceed to a typology of national self-determination and an overview of the phenomenon's sources. In doing so a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of self-determination will be established while also providing the ideational framework necessary to explore Afrikaner self-determination in the following chapters.

Self-determination is a complex ideational concept, be it a philosophical, historical, legal, or political one. From a philosophical vantage point self-determination refers to the "affirmation of the human drive to translate aspiration into reality, coupled with postulates of inherent human equality" (Anaya, 1996:75). From a historical perspective the religious freedom and sovereignty fought for and bought by the Treaty of Westphalia, and the "precepts of freedom and equality" made manifest during the American War of Independence and the French Revolution, serve as "progenitors of the modern concept of self-determination" (Anaya, 1996:76). While this chapter will approach the concept's topical development through an East-West spatial divide it is nevertheless necessary to stress that Western political thought is not the only conduit to have attempted to understand the phenomenon of self-determination.

To be sure, a concept to which many have turned in times of 'national angst' and still identify with regardless of their spatial particulars only shows that it is a concept that cuts across religious, geographic, and ethnic divides. Conversely it is also one that seeks to reaffirm these divides and give new meaning to them. It should also be noted that while a large body of the work to be discussed within this chapter originated primarily in the West, by far the largest number of people whom have benefited from self-determination reside in the former colonial periphery, that is, Africa

and Asia. To illustrate, on the issue of Namibian independence an International Court of Justice judge spoke of equality and self-determination as a product of:

> Two streams of thought [...] established on the two opposite shores of the Mediterranean, a Graeco-Roman stream represented by Epictetus, Lucan, Cicero and Marcus Aurelius; and an Asian and African stream, comprising the monks of Sinai and Saint John Climac, Alexandria with Plotinus and Philo the Jew, [and] Carthage to which Saint Augustine gave new lustre (quoted in Anaya, 1996:76).

This vibrant history of self-determination will for reasons of brevity have to be put aside, and in the pages to follow only the proverbial surface of the concept's development and current form will be discussed. As the title of this chapter suggests, an overly simplified approach to self-determination would obscure much more than it could possibly illuminate. Self-determination indeed has many more 'faces'.

2.2 The Historical Development of Self-determination

For some scholars the principle of national self-determination has a history arching back to World War One (WWI), while others prefer an approach that traces the origins of this idea back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Kapitan, 2008:16; Barten, 2015:214). To make the statement that the concept of self-determination was not unknown when popularised by then United States (US) President Woodrow Wilson during his Fourteen Points address in 1918 would be permissible. For many the very idea of self-determination was one intimately tied to notions of sovereignty. Indeed, "[w]e believe", President Wilson declared in the build-up to his Fourteen Points address, "that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live" (quoted in Manela, 2007:22). A claim to self-determination can thus be based on – and seen as inseparable from – a claim to sovereignty (Nawaz, 1965:84).

2.2.1   A Principle, then a Right, in the Making

Adopting the latter Westphalian approach proves more beneficial when considering the impact the Peace of Westphalia had not only on the concept of sovereignty, but also on the very foundation of international relations (Linklater, 2004:8). Europe before the treaty was a continent in disarray, and beholden to the devastating effects the Thirty Years' War had wrought. At its very heart the Thirty Years' War was a battle for self-determination (Philpott, 2003:89). Its belligerents were imperial (e.g. the Spanish and Holy Roman empires), royal (e.g. France, England, Sweden and Poland), and republican (e.g. the Netherlands), composed of families (e.g. the Habsburgs) and individuals (e.g. the Ottoman Sultan, Osman II), princes (e.g. Duke Maximilian of Bavaria) and kings (e.g. Christian IV of Denmark), the religious (e.g. Protestant and Catholic) and the fanatical (e.g. the Jesuits)

(Whaley, 2012:566-568). Evidently there were few corners in Europe untouched by the flames of war.

Also clear from the above was that the conflict involved far more than just sovereignty, and had as much to do with the politics of dynasty, expansion, religion, and self-determination, to name but a few. Yet when a measure of amity was finally established it was done with the Peace of Westphalia. The treaty itself composed two separate units, being the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. A major outcome of these treaties was the assurances it provided to individual religious liberty (Weinert, 2007:13). The right of every individual to define his or her religious affiliation is seen as a milestone in "the expansion and consolidation of human rights and more specifically of the right of each individual to live self-determined" (Barten, 2015:214). For Barten this right – along with others – leads to the "right to determine the political system or the structure one lives in" (2015:214), or the right of self-determination.

Yet dissenting opinions exist, especially when considering the use of Westphalia as a source for an examination of self-determination. For those scholars critical of the *status quo* the Treaty of Westphalia point toward the birth of a Western-dominated international order, and not one with a universally applicable concept of sovereignty. For such critical scholars the "morally deficient" modern law of nations was formulated by a Eurocentric clique, "not as the ethical basis of a universal order, but as a means to hegemony" (Grovogui, 1996:43). Furthermore, even the very idea of a contemporary Westphalian state-system and its universal applicability has been challenged, primarily at the sub-state and supra-state levels. Here ethnocultural groups in Somaliland, Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia for example are developing "substate political communities" (Valadez, 2001:248) which do not conform to any Westphalian notion of the nation-state. In contrast organisations such as the European Union (EU) highlight the emergence of "supra-state layers of authority" (Nauclér, 2005:85) that also challenge the traditional Westphalian state-system conceptualisation. In response to these challenges calls for the Westphalian paradigm to be updated are becoming more vocal (Packer, 2005:250).

Nevertheless, another linkage with sovereignty is to be found in the ideational cauldron of the French Revolution in 1789. The fall of the *ancien régime* was ultimately brought about by three separate yet interwoven revolutions, one democratic republican (associated with Thomas Paine), another moderate constitutional monarchist (Marquis de Lafayette), and finally an authoritarian populist revolution (Maximilien Robespierre) (Israel, 2014:695). According to Israel it was the Radical Enlightenment cause driving the democratic republican impulse that "politically, philosophically, and logically … inspired and equipped the leadership" of the revolution with

16

"values sufficiently universal, secular, and egalitarian to set in motion the forces of […] emancipation based on reason, freedom of thought, and democracy" (2014:708).

These egalitarian, secular, and universal values based on democracy, freedom of thought, and reason are central tenets of the history of popular sovereignty, which in turn is bound up with the history of self-determination. Government had to flow from the will of the people and not a monarch, and those dissatisfied with their government should be able to organise themselves as they deem fit (Brilmayer, 1991:180). In effect this meant that the onus placed on the territorial unit and its feudal predominance shifted and was supplanted by one on the individual unit, who "were not to be any more a mere appurtenance of the land" (Brilmayer, 1991:180).

During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries the principle of self-determination was kept alive by various national groups as a result of developing nationalism(s). As the Russian, German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires for example propagated assimilationist policies it often resulted in a backlash with their raucous imperial subjects demanding greater autonomy, local self-government, or even total independence (Hannum, 1990:27). However, it was not until the beginning of the end of WWI that the principle of self-determination came to resemble a form recognisable to contemporary scholars.

2.2.2 The Wilsonian Principle of Self-determination

Humphrey observed that the proposition of self-determination is one "of which poets have sung and for which patriots have been ready to lay down their lives" (1984:193). Yet to reach a more nuanced understanding of the principle of self-determination it is important to discuss its conceptual (and less romanticised) development since the dawn of the Twentieth century. No discussion on the concept of self-determination can be complete without acknowledging its most ardent advocate and unyielding champion, US president Woodrow Wilson. That is not to say that Wilson was a lone voice, indeed, there were many other guardians of self-determination. Nevertheless, and before embarking on such a discussion, a cautionary note is provided by Hannum, who warns that the right of all peoples to self-determination – being a well-established and widely supported contemporary norm of international law – is an ambiguous one, considering that the "meaning and content of that right remain as vague and imprecise as when they were enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles" (1990:27). It is on the road to Versailles – and the laying of the foundation of the right to self-determination – that this thesis now turns.

For those scholars familiar with historical intricacies the correlates between WWI and the Second World War (WWII) mirror more a continuum than two separate bloody chapters from early to mid-

Twentieth century history. Indeed, for scholars such as the German political theorist Sigmund Neumann (1946:8) the period between 1914 and 1945 could be described as a second Thirty Years' War. And just as the Thirty Years' War had a significant impact on the *concept* of self-determination so too would the 'war to end all wars' have on the *principle* of self-determination. Yet before a new type of idealism could grab hold of the imaginations of those peoples shackled to old political orders, another war would have to be fought.

Between July 28 and August 4, 1914, as one after the other European power delivered its declarations of war, President Wilson in comparison advocated US neutrality based "on his [own] long-standing notions of civilized behaviour" (Manela, 2007:16). However, Wilson's civilised notions and his ''Peace without Victory'' (Manela, 2007:16) plan could not withstand the onslaught of the sinking of the British steamship *Lusitania* (with 128 American lives lost, amongst others), and the further public outcry following news of the famous Zimmermann Telegram (in which Germany proposed to Mexico that it invade the US). On April 2, 1917, Wilson appeared before the US Congress to request a formal declaration of war on Germany. In doing so the president "hoped to ensure that he would have a dominant position in the eventual peace conference, a position that would allow him to implement his vision for the postwar restructuring of international relations" (Manela, 2007:16).

Wilson's vision for a post-war global order was made manifest in his Fourteen Points speech, delivered before Congress on January 8, 1918. In it the President propagated various pillars that would ultimately buttress peace in war-torn Europe (Clymer, 1995:3). Even though Wilson did not mention the term 'self-determination', point V of his Fourteen Points called for:

> A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined (quoted in Nawaz, 1965:84).

A further five of the Fourteen Points are understood as implicitly addressing the concept of self-determination. These include points IX to XIII, and address issues ranging from the revision of frontiers along lines of nationality, the autonomous development of peoples under foreign rule, and the formation of a new Polish state (Raič, 2002:181). It would however be just over a month after the delivery of his Fourteen Points that Wilson would again address the American leadership, and this time do so by specifically citing 'self-determination'. On 11 February 1918 Wilson addressed a joint session of the two Houses of Congress and stated that:

> National aspirations must be accepted; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of

action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril" (quoted in Van der Vyver, 2011:5).

In his address before the joint session of the two Houses of Congress Wilson elaborated on his Fourteen Points by introducing what has become known as the Four Principles, being:

> [I] That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring peace that will be permanent; [II] That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that [III] Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and [IV] That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world (quoted in Raič, 2002:182).

In response to his Fourteen Points address and subsequent statements it is argued that the "Wilsonian concept of self-determination" is one that consists "of the notion of self-government of peoples" (Nawaz, 1965:84). This concept entails "ethnically identifiable peoples or nations" (Raič, 2002:178) being able to assert their right to a democratic government of their own choosing. In reality however this would entail a "multiplicity of small States", a fact accepted by Wilson and evident in his acknowledgement of the "need for the creation of an international organization [...] which would have as its task to ensure the territorial integrity of these small States against external aggression" (Raič, 2002:184). For many this multiplicity of small states remain a major stumbling block on the road to national self-determination.

In 1919 the victors would gather at the Paris Peace Conference to decide the fate of the vanquished. At the insistence of Wilson the principle of self-determination was accepted, and while its affirmation aimed at the reconfiguration of Europe it also "directly undermined the moral authority of colonialism and imperialism" (Furedi, 2014:31). Furthermore, the litmus test for Wilson's self-determination crusade was evident in the Treaty of Versailles. Described as the "first determined effort by a Western leader […] to impose a pattern of humanitarian idealism on world affairs" (Hurd, 2001:7) the treaty resulted in the creation of the League of Nations and the independence of the Baltic States, to name but a few (Medijainen, 2004:114).

It should however be noted that there was no universal agreement on the feasibility of self-determination, and that many of Wilson's contemporaries believed his stance on self-determination was idealistic at best, and near impossible to achieve at worst. Amongst Wilson's detractors was his own secretary of state, Robert Lansing. Lansing wrote that "The phrase [self-determination] is loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes, which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands

of lives" (quoted in Thomas, 2003:45). One could argue that Lansing's words had an unfortunate prophetic quality to them, with the wars of national liberation being just one example (see De Bragança & Wallerstein, 1983:26). Furthermore, in retrospect it has also been argued that Wilson made major mistakes in his self-determination efforts.

Firstly, while the centre (Europe) enjoyed the main peace-building thrust the periphery (non-European) remained largely ignored. In stark contrast to Wilson's wartime speeches colonial peoples were denied a voice as fully-fledged members of international society, unless that voice echoed the strategic interests of the victorious powers (Manela, 2007:224; Hannum, 1990:28). Secondly, in constructing self-determination in such a universalist fashion Wilson "misjudged the force and effect of his words" (Raič, 2002:184), endearing hope in places it could not possibly be sustained. Thirdly, self-determination as a panacea for war proved an erroneous idea, with the redrawing of national boundaries proving just as bloody an undertaking as the wars that preceded them. Within these new boundaries dominant ethnic groups suppressed minorities – such as the Turks against the Armenians and the Poles against the Ukrainians – and resulting in the death of well over a million (Steiner, 2001:25).

In sum, while the Wilsonian concept of self-determination had an undoubtable democratic 'ring' to it, it nevertheless proved overambitious in its reach. Yet Wilson's bearing upon the principle of self-determination is one of an unassailable nature. To be sure, Wilson's impact on the aspirations of countless peoples across the globe on the question of self-determination is acknowledged by some as momentous, including H.G. Wells (1936:82), whom wrote that:

> For a brief interval, Wilson stood alone for mankind. Or at least he seemed to stand for mankind. And in that brief interval there was a very extraordinary and significant wave of response to him throughout the earth. So eager was the situation that all humanity leapt to accept and glorify Wilson—for a phrase, for a gesture. It seized upon him as its symbol. He was transfigured in the eyes of men. He ceased to be a common statesman; he became a Messiah. Millions believed him as the bringer of untold blessings; thousands would gladly have died for him. That response was one of the most illuminating events in the early twentieth century. Manifestly the World-State had been conceived then, and now it stirred in the womb. It was alive. And then for some anxious decades it ceased to stir.

2.2.3   The Leninist Principle of Self-determination

Wilson was not however the only statesman to prickle the hopes and dreams of millions on the subject of self-determination. For there was another on the opposite side of both the ideological and geographical divide who believed just as strongly in the concept of self-determination; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) premier Vladimir Lenin. Lenin led the Bolshevik party that overthrew the Romanov Czarist regime on 7 November 1917 during the Russian Revolution, and in

so doing heralded the birth of the first socialist state (Chandra, 1989:290). In the period between the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 both Wilson and Lenin almost simultaneously declared the principle of national self-determination as the answer to Europe's many dilemmas (Medijainen, 2004:114; Armitage, 2007:137; Lino, 2010:845).

However, Lenin was no stranger to the principle of self-determination. Even before the October Revolution Lenin advocated this principle in his *January-February 1916 Theses* and his *26 October 1917 Decree on Peace* (Cassese, 2008:92). Furthermore, Lenin was against coercive assimilation. He believed that oppressed national groups would in due time foster a sense of grievance, one that had to be addressed (Kymlicka, 2003:211). Yet this was only a transitory measure. In addressing their grievances Lenin believed he could curtail their recourse to nationalism and ultimately channel them voluntarily into assimilation (Kymlicka, 2003:211). As such the Soviet elite embraced three interpretations of the principle of self-determination. Firstly, it was understood as a principle which "deals with territories of sovereign States in instances of political or military conflicts"; secondly it was "proclaimed as an anti-colonialist postulate"; and thirdly it was a principle "according to which ethnic or national groups can legitimately and freely determine their destiny" (Cassese, 2008:93).

To clarify, in the first instance the principle (in theory) prohibited territorial annexations that were in variance with the will of the peoples concerned (Cassese, 2008:93). The Chinese Communists for example added the right of secession to their 1931 Constitution in an effort to placate annexed territories like Tibet. When power was consolidated in the party's hands the right of secession was scrapped (Kreptul, 2003:70). In the second instance the principle entailed the right of colonially subjected peoples to gain independence (Cassese, 2008:93). Colonised peoples were encouraged to "throw off alien (and, not coincidentally, capitalist) domination" (Brilmayer, 1991:181). In the third instance it was believed that 'peoples' should have a choice in matters of secession and autonomous identity (Cassese, 2008:93). Lenin for example constitutionalised secession in order to lure the Ukraine into federation (Kreptul, 2003:69).

However, the great divergence between the Wilsonian principle of self-determination versus its Leninist 'other' regarded its outcome. Wilson believed that the self-determination of peoples would result in free nation states buttressing global peace (Kreijen, 2004:117). Lenin on the other hand utilised self-determination as a "tool, a vehicle or a strategic concept for the realization of the integration of all nations, that is, a universal socialist community" (Raič, 2002:186). On the road to such a universal socialist community nation-states would be a necessary albeit temporal anomaly, one that would ultimately transition into a worldwide classless society (Bhandari, 2014:136; Raič, 2002:186). Indeed, Lenin himself declared that "mankind can proceed towards the inevitable fusion

21

of nations only through a transitional period of the complete freedom of all oppressed nations" (quoted in George, 2009:30).

The Leninist principle of self-determination was clearly utilised as a strategic instrument. The Soviet leadership received support for their revolution in return for promises of autonomy, in large part due to the tsars having extended Russia's reach over a multitude of nationalities. That they later reneged on such promises is well documented (Brilmayer, 1991:181). Moreover, the Soviet right of secession had no practical effect due to the highly centralised USSR being governed as a *de facto* unitary state. Organs such as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet could overrule any Soviet republic's autonomy. This has prompted arguments that the Leninist principle of self-determination and its status as a right within the various Soviet constitutions "was never intended to be exercisable" (Kreptul, 2003:70). Indeed, if any Soviet republic managed to successfully claim self-determination the revolution would be derailed, as it was "in conflict with the Soviet imperative to internationalize communism" (Kreptul, 2003:70).

Nonetheless, the Leninist doctrine of self-determination would prevail through the existence of the Soviet empire. During *perestroika* (Russian for 'listen') this constitutional right was reaffirmed while perversely making it a much more byzantine procedure to engage in (Akhmadov & Lanskoy, 2010:236). Thus to talk of an undeniable Leninist right of self-determination would be dishonest. It would not be until the emergence of the United Nations (UN) in the post WWII period that the *principle* of self-determination would be supplanted through the institutionalisation and codification of the *right* of self-determination.

2.2.4 The Right of Self-determination from WWII to the End of the Cold War

A major outcome of Wilson's self-determination drive was the establishment of the League of Nations after the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson truly believed that the League would be able to mete out effective economic sanctions and offer collective security (Hurd, 2001:10). However, while minor successes were achieved the League could not withstand the Germans, Italians, and Japanese calling its bluff in the 1930s (Hurd, 2001:11). Furthermore, the extreme war reparations placed upon German shoulders would ultimately prove too heavy to bear and result in a fascist whiplash from which the League would not recover. Not that such a possibility was unforeseen. Indeed, founding members of the League such as the South African General Jan Smuts described the Treaty as "a poisonous spirit of revenge, which may yet scorch the fair face – not of a corner of France, but of Europe" (quoted in Sharp, 2001:39).

Arguably the failure of the League was nowhere more evident than in the shot that echoed through its chamber on July 3, 1936. In mid-1936 a tense international atmosphere was made even more so when fascist Italy annexed Ethiopia, barely four years after the Japanese Empire annexed Manchuria with impunity (Sargent, 2001:188). These failures underscored the ghost of *Realpolitik* and the shadow of impotence it cast over international efforts at collective security. As a result a Jewish journalist, Stefan Lux, felt that the only way to draw attention to Nazi Germany's persecution of Jews and impeding sense of war would be to shoot himself in front of the League's bewildered delegates. After one of these delegates finished his prepared speech Lux jumped up, shouted "This is the last blow!" (quoted in Sargent, 2001:190), and shot himself through the chest. A letter was found in his briefcase after his death, where he described himself as one "unknown soldier of life", and called upon Sir Anthony Eden to "coerce the criminals [the Nazi elite] still today, for they, like all criminals, are cowardly and retreat in the face of decisive energy and strong willpower" (quoted in Sargent, 2001:196).

Sadly Lux and his farsighted letter would be forgotten within days. It was too easy to dismiss him as a "deranged refugee" and an "idiot", as international press reports and the Nazi press corps referred to him, respectively (Sargent, 2001:191). The war that Lux saw on the horizon broke out in 1939, and if his act of monk-like self-sacrifice was a warning of the League's impeding demise WWII would be its final blow. This was due – in large part – to a central tenet of the Covenant of the League of Nations being the prevention of war. The League went the way of the Concert of Europe and the Hague peace conferences that preceded it, and in its stead another rose to "take the torch of conflict prevention forward" (Ramcharan, 2008:14).

In the aftermath of WWII the UN would be the main institution for transmuting the *principle* of self-determination into a codified *right* of self-determination. This metamorphosis into a Right to Self-Determination (RSD) would be codified through various international treaties, including the UN Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as regional treaties, including the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the Language Charter, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) (Barten, 2015:34-36). Furthermore, various UN General Assembly declarations – such as 1515 (XV) of 1960, 1803 (XVII) of 1962, and 2625 of 1970 – have legitimised the RSD within the context of anti-colonialism (Bhandari, 2014:137). Additionally the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the UN Declaration on Minority Rights (UNDMR) also contains elements of the RSD (Bhandari, 2014:138-142).

This list is by no means exhaustive, yet accentuates the RSD in the context of anti-colonialism and minority rights. Within the UN Charter Article 1 includes the provision that the UN is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace" (United Nations, 1945:3). According to Barten (2015:34) this inclusion of self-determination into the UN Charter highlights not only its importance within the UN system, but also its utility in maintaining peaceful relations within the global system. However, it should be noted that self-determination here is used in a statist sense, and not in regards to a 'people'. Nevertheless, once the concept of self-determination was incorporated into the UN Charter it "became a right for peoples everywhere" (Barten, 2015:34).

The UN Charter further elaborates on self-determination within Articles 55, 56, 73, and 76(b). Within Chapter IX the question of international economic and social cooperation is dealt with in Article 55, which states that "[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (United Nations, 1945:11) the UN will undertake to promote various initiatives conducive to fostering the above. Furthermore, Article 56 obligates UN member states to implement the previous article (Barten, 2015:34). Article 73 – within Chapter XI and the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories – does not explicitly mention self-determination but it does however promote "self-government" for colonies (United Nations, 1945:14; Barten, 2015:34).

A final point of interest within the UN Charter is Article 76(b). Found in Chapter XII – concerning the international trusteeship system – Article 76(b) states that the UN will "promote the […] advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government *or* [emphasis added] independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned" (United Nations, 1945:15). For Barten the use of 'or' indicates that "independence was never meant to be the only way of exercising self-determination" (2015:34), a concept discussed in Chapter 1 where internal self-determination was propagated as an alternative. Clearly self-determination is not referred to as a right within the UN Charter, however, the RSD does make its appearance in the ICCPR and ICESCR.

Both of these international covenants share the same right in its opening chapter, stating that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (United Nations,

1976:173; United Nations, 1966:49). The pre-eminence of the RSD in both the ICCPR and ICESCR undergirds the notion that the RSD is the "first human right as it is the prerequisite for all other rights to be enjoyed" (Barten, 2015:34-35). Furthermore, both of these covenants refer to "all people" (United Nations, 1976:173; 1966:49), and not to 'colonial', 'trusteeship', or 'non-self-governing' peoples. As such, it is argued, the RSD is one "meant to have universal applicability" (Barten, 2015:35).

This does not however exempt those instances where the RSD is applicable to a colonial context. Here UN General Assembly declarations – including 1514 (XV) of 1960, 1803 (XVII) of 1962, and 2625 of 1970 – have legitimised the RSD as a "right against colonialism" (Bhandari, 2014:137). For example, Article 1 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (xv) states that "[t]he subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation" (United Nations, 1960:67). Rather interestingly, Article 2 of the same resolution repeats verbatim article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR as quoted above (United Nations, 1960:67). Yet again the RSD is one conferred to "all people" (United Nations, 1976:173; 1966:49; 1960:67), even though the previous article singled out 'peoples' under 'alien subjugation'. These instances serve to suggest that the RSD is not only applicable to subjugated peoples (Buchanan, 2004:16).

The UNDRIP in turn deals with the RSD in the context of indigenous peoples. Article 3 prescribes that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (United Nations, 2008:4). Yet again full independence is circumvented as the only viable manifestation for the RSD. In its stead Article 4 proclaims that "[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions" (United Nations, 2008:4-5). While the UNDRIP goes on to extrapolate on these rights, it can also be compared to the UNDMR.

In Article 2 the UNDMR – also known as the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities – enshrines the rights of minorities in self-determining their "own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination" (United Nations, 2012:9). For scholars such as Bhandari (2014:143) the UNDRIP prescribes a specific institutional, political, and legal mechanism for self-government. The UNDMR on the other

hand "endorses a politically unified non-fragmented legal and institutional mechanism to ensure minorities' rights" (Bhandari, 2014:143). Both of these documents advance the RSD, albeit through different 'lenses', such as 'indigenous' or 'minority', or self-government *vis-à-vis* self-determining one's culture, religion, and language.

The RSD can also be found within 'pieces' of regional governance. On the European level treaties such as the European Charter of Local Self-Government allow "territorially limited minorities" the right to "at least co-determination if not self-determination in local matters" (Barten, 2015:35). Spheres such as legislation are accordingly omitted. Another instance of the enmeshing of the RSD and minority rights can be found in the Language Charter and the FCNM. Both of these treaties utilise a territorial approach to self-determination, having been established on the sound principle that "territorial autonomy [or internal self-determination] is one of several good ways to ensure the protection of national minorities" (Barten, 2015:36).

The African Union (AU) offers minority protection mainly through 'inherited' treaties established under its forebear, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights were established to codify both human, communal, and anti-colonial rights (Murithi, 2005:300). Here minorities fall under the term 'communal groups', and Article 20 of the charter notes that "All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination", and that the 'people' "shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen" (Organisation of African Unity, 1986:3). The similarity between the above and Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR is self-evident, though the same cannot be said for its implementation. As with many other regional organisations the above "rhetoric was not upheld in reality" (Murithi, 2005:300), and some African governments not only failed to uphold the charter but also actively defied it.

Nevertheless, the linkage of anti-colonialism, minority rights, and the RSD has been a thread running through the preceding paragraphs. Regarding the former, the role of the RSD in anti-colonial struggles is plain. In this instance the RSD "facilitated the emergence to independence of formerly colonised 'peoples'" (Maguire, 2013:238), and as such it is maintained that the RSD and its utility within the anti-colonial struggle has run its course. Perhaps unknown to some is that there are 17 colonies remaining with 2 million inhabitants between them. The UN however refers to these as "Non-Self-Governing Territories" (United Nations, 2015), and not the more unpalatable term

'colonies'. There may yet be a role for the RSD to play in these theatres of foreign rule ranging from Europe, Africa, the Pacific, and Atlantic to the Caribbean.

The linkage between minority rights and the RSD is conceivably less clear at first. Undoubtedly one of the axes on which international law rests is on the defence of the rights of minorities (Castellino, 2005:60). A more confined discussion however centres on the "twinning of the agenda of minority rights" (Castellino, 2005:61) with that of the RSD. One such argument contends that in affording autonomy to a minority group a state would fulfil its obligation to protect the RSD for all its peoples, with autonomy counterbalancing those rights already enjoyed by the majority (Wright, 1999:605). Another concerns minorities resorting to minority rights in order to advance autonomous claims. To illustrate, aggrieved minority groups within a self-determination movement can and have often found sanctuary within minority rights, often also affording them international support and attention (Weller & Wolff, 2005:9). One (minority rights) could thus be utilised to promote the other (RSD), and *vice versa*.

However, there are points of contestation regarding the wording of these treaties that undergird international law, especially concerning those promulgated under the auspices of the UN. For example, while many of these agreements speak of the 'self-determination of peoples' none of them adequately delineates who qualify as a 'people'. Here the role of the RSD within anti-colonialism again comes to the fore, with most legal experts arguing that 'people' refers to those whom are found in the UN Charter's colonial categorisation of non-self-governing and trust territories (Knop, 2004:51). A subsequent contemporary debate on this matter has however examined whether 'people' can be interpreted as something other than the colonised in this specific historical sense. While Knop (2004:53-54) is of the opinion that the general answer to this question is 'no', she does however acknowledge that there are expansions of the concept beyond its colonial foundation.

There are also limits placed on the RSD. One such limit on the RSD include a proviso not to "engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms of others" (Kuwali, 2015:25). Another restriction on the RSD relates to the international legal norm of *uti possidetis juris* (Latin for 'as you possess under law'). In this instance the territorial boundaries of a state at the time of independence are seen as sacrosanct and inviolable (Kuwali, 2015:25). Furthermore, when considering the external application of the RSD another limitation relates to the prohibition of an action that would "dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states" (Kuwali, 2015:25). A final limit on the RSD can be found in instances of competing or overlapping claims. These and

other contestations will be discussed in greater detail within the last section of this chapter when a typology of the self-determination of 'peoples' is examined.

2.2.5   Self-determination in the Contemporary World

Before exploring such a typology it is necessary to situate this debate in a current setting. Most of the content of the preceding section occurred in the background of the Cold War. A chain of events starting in 1989 in Hungary and Poland and then spilling over into East Germany and the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall showcased the unravelling of the "evil empire" (Carey, 2008:179). In a 1991 speech on his resignation as president and the dissolution of the USSR, Gorbachev declared that the "nations and peoples of this country gained real freedom to choose the way of their self-determination" (quoted in Darraj, 2010:103). The Soviet Empire had gone the way of its Czarist predecessor it had so ruthlessly crushed.

Moreover, the breakup of the USSR refocused attention on the RSD. In the Balkans for example "Yugoslavia was 'dismembered' through a selective and prejudicial international recognition policy of its internal 'republics'" (Thomas, 2003:3) – reads one scathing interpretation of this event and its horrific consequences. As early as 1971 the RSD was claimed by Yugoslav groups such as the Croats whose nationalists declared that Croatia is "the sovereign national state of the Croatian nation", which possesses "sovereignty based on the right to self-determination, including the right to secession" (quoted in Thomas, 2003:12). After the fall of the USSR a conflict ridden Yugoslavia would be declared "an artificial state" (Thomas, 2003:15) and the RSD was granted to its various 'peoples'.

Since the breakup of Yugoslavia, self-determination aspirations and efforts would culminate in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both formed in 1993), Eritrea (1993), Palau (1994), East Timor (2002), Montenegro and Serbia (both formed in 2006), Kosovo (2008), and finally South Sudan (2011) all taking their seats at the table of nations. In some instances these transitions to statehood were peaceful, such as the Czech and Slovakian "velvet revolution" (Glenn, 1999:187). In others the self-determination birth pains were much more pronounced, with South Sudan for example coming into existence only after a prolonged period of bloody civil war (Christopher, 2011:125). These are all expressions of the RSD in its external sense. Cases of the RSD applied internally can include autonomy for Scotland and Catalonia within the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain respectively (Greer, 2007:2).

The importance of self-determination in the contemporary world can also be understood through the effects of globalisation. As Valadez (2001:235) explains, globalisation has markedly impacted the

lives of people the world over as decisions are increasingly being made by external actors. The end result is that those most affected by these decisions have no hand or say in making them. Valadez proposes that ethnocultural groups should bring these regional and global processes under their control in order to curtail the loss of "the efficacy of political communities to determine their own affairs" (2001:235). As a remedy a democratic framework needs to be established where self-governing ethnocultural groups are provided with local and regional autonomy, and one that "enables these groups to subject the regional and global forces affecting their lives to democratic standards of representation, public accountability, legitimacy, and reasoned public deliberation" (Valadez, 2001:235).

The emergence of the principle of self-determination and its institutionalisation and codification into the RSD has been described as "one of the most dramatic normative developments in this century" (Falk, 2002:64). For Falk the affirmation of the RSD during the decolonisation period onwards "seemed fully in step with the march of history" (2002:64). Not only did this affirmation free hundreds of millions from colonial oppression, it also "extended sovereignty and statehood to all corners of the planet for the first time and built the UN into a genuinely universal body representing virtually the whole of humanity" (Falk, 2002:64). With such remarkable results it would seem foolish to relegate the RSD to the footnotes of history. Yet that is exactly what is done when segments of the epistemic, legal, political, and diplomatic communities contend that the applicability of the RSD "was framed to apply only in the classical and narrowly defined circumstances of salt-water colonialism" (Weller, 2008:16).

Within any contemporary debate on self-determination there is thus a clear and present contradiction between the RSD's ideational force pulling one way and its implementation pulling in another. As Van Dyke duly noted, self-determination has become "a shibboleth that all pronounce to identify themselves with the virtuous" (1969:223). Since Van Dyke's (1969:223) statement both the UN and a majority of states recognise only a severely curtailed RSD to "freedom from a former colonial power" (or external self-determination) and "independence of the whole state's population from foreign intervention or influence" (or internal self-determination) (Hannum, 1990:49). Yet despite this statist and limited contemporary definition Hannum believes "the *principle* of self-determination will continue to be a major political force both internationally and domestically" (1990:49).

Based on the content of the chapter up to this point it is clear that self-determination has many faces. From its inception as a concept linked to sovereignty from the Thirty Years War and the French Revolution, to its primacy as a principle near the end of WWI, and to its emergence as a

right after WWII and during the Cold War, the concept, principle, and right of self-determination remains a contested and ambiguous norm. Indeed, Hannum's aforementioned assertion that the "meaning and content of that right remain as vague and imprecise" (1990:27) as when first acknowledged by Wilson is not without grounds. Certainly many other scholars on the subject agree with Hannum's (1990:27) claim (see Neuberger, 1995:297; 2001:391; Biskupski, 2013:406; Roberts, 2013:514). To illustrate, before delving into her study of the correlates between the RSD, minorities, and minority rights, Barten (2015:3) adequately encapsulates the 'vague and imprecise' nature of self-determination when she cautions that:

> Self-determination is a global phenomenon and continues to be claimed by groups around the world. This is so despite the indeterminacy of the concept. It is not clear what amounts to self-determination, how it is achieved and who can claim it under what circumstances. Yet, self-determination was responsible for the restructuring of the world map during the era of decolonization and still today conflicts are fought on the basis of self-determination.

What is disconcerting is that while self-determination remains 'vague and imprecise', it is nevertheless a well-established and widely supported contemporary norm of international law. The tension between these statements are tangible, and while it proves an enticement to further study this review will alternatively clear the muddied waters of self-determination through a typological approach. This method is essential in bridging the divide between this discussion of self-determination and its application to South Africa's Afrikaner minority and their self-determination aspirations in the following chapter.

2.3 A Typology of National Self-determination

In the previous chapter it was acknowledged that while there are many scholarly approaches to self-determination these primarily originate from legal texts (see Grovogui, 1996:1; Knop, 2004:1; Raič, 2002:1), legal-political theory (see Buchanan, 2004:v), and legal-philosophical rights issues (see Moltchanova, 2009:ix), to name but a few. As this chapter has shown this is hardly surprising, given the prominence of the RSD within global governance. There is also a substantial body of scholarly work that broadly focuses on self-determination, albeit with nuanced anthropological-philosophical undercurrents (see Barker, 2005:1; Beck, 2005:ix; Hodgins & Cannon, 1995:1; Hendrix, 2008:1). Within the broader field of Political Science studies, self-determination can be found within Peace and Conflict Studies (see Weller & Metzger, 2008:xi; Weller & Wolff, 2005:1), Global Political Economy (see Cameron, Ranis & Zinn, 2006:1), critical-political scholarship (see San Juan, 2009:xi; Gannon, 2008:1), and political theory (see Moore, 1998:1), to name but a few.

Yet none of these studies unpacks the conceptual difficulties related to self-determination. Such a discussion would enrich the field of inquiry with typologies that can be drawn upon to better

30

understand its complex nature. As the title of this section suggests the typological approach employed here should not be considered the only or even the most effective one. However, as an advantage the typology of self-determination advanced by Neuberger in *National Self-determination: A Theoretical Discussion* (2001:391) aids in identifying the many faces of self-determination. This in turn is conducive towards an analysis and subsequent understanding of Afrikaner self-determination, one somewhat distanced from the 'vague and imprecise' approach to self-determination observed during the preceding literature overview.

Disagreement clearly exists when delineating self-determination. Neuberger (2001:394) and others (see Singh, 2001:xxi; Welch, 1995:108) agree, noting that national self-determination entails for some national government, for others democratic self-determination, and still for others a combination of the two. Indeed, "[n]ational government need not be democratic […], while democratic government need not be national" (2001:394). To illustrate the former Neuberger (2001:394) utilises Ceausescu's Romania as an example, and the latter the example of (democratic) Czechoslovakia and its control of the (nationally German) Sudetenland. In order to examine the intricacies of self-determination it is possible to employ the 'lenses' of the democratic and national schools, as well as 'a third way' which combines "the aspects of democracy, rejection of foreign rule and national independence" (2001:396).

Within the democratic school national self-determination is defined as "government by consent of the governed and not as national government per se" (Neuberger, 2001:394). This is because the nation is not understood as being the culmination of various ethnocultural criteria, but rather as arising from a given territory. As such self-determination is seen as a principle that allows "people of a given *territory* [italics added] to determine their own government" (Neuberger, 2001:394). To illustrate, one theory holds that post-WWI Europe came about as a misunderstanding between the democratic variety of self-determination propagated by Wilson and another more 'national' stressing variety favoured by East Europeans. As a result the former parts of Austria–Hungary that became independent did so due to the advancement of democratisation more than the desire to establish nation-states (Neuberger, 2001:394).

On the other hand the national school "defines the achievement of independence as the goal of *national* self-determination" (Neuberger, 2001:394). As long as those within the national school are governed by their 'kith and kin' national self-determination will be attained (Neuberger, 2001:394). Through divorcing national self-determination from its democratic nature a willingness to accept "less autonomy with more flag" (Neuberger, 2001:394) underscores the onus being switched from national freedom to freedom from foreign rule. As a result autocratic forms of governance are

permissible in certain instances, "as long as it is national" (Neuberger, 2001:394). To illustrate it is possible to yet again utilise the example of the Sudeten Germans who willingly divorced from democratic Czechoslovakia in order to (re)join autocratic Nazi Germany. The 'third way' combines the two schools, such as those whom have historically fought for both national independence and democracy. Table 2.1 below provides a summary of these approaches as well as additional illustrative examples.

Table 2.1 Approaches to Self-determination (Adapted from Neuberger, 2001:394-396)				
	School of Thought	**Definition of Self-determination**	**The Nation**	**Example**
1	The Democratic School	Government by consent of the governed, and not necessarily national in character.	Bound to a specific territory.	The establishment of a government by the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) after Namibian independence, for all Namibia's 'peoples'.
2	The National School	The achievement of national independence, coupled with freedom from foreign rule.	'Kith and kin'	The proposed formation of an independent Kurdish homeland within the borders of Iraq.
3	The 'Third Way'	A combination of aspects of democracy, rejection of foreign rule, and national independence.	Case dependant	Poland in the late 1980's combined the democratic and national schools, as they fought for both independence from foreign rule and for democracy.

2.3.1 The Principle(s) of Self-determination

A first point of departure on the principle of self-determination is to recognise that there are in fact *principles* of self-determination. A differentiation should be made between external and internal self-determination, or "the right of every people to choose [the] sovereignty under which they live" and "the right of every people to select its own form of government" (Neuberger, 2001:392), respectively. External self-determination can include the "right of a nominally independent state to [gain] true independence" (Neuberger, 2001:392). To illustrate utilising an earlier example, the 'Yes' campaigners of the 2014 Independence Referendum sought external self-determination (or true independence) for Scotland (an autonomous region within the UK). Internal self-determination on the other hand can refer to "minority regimes, regional autonomy schemes, or federalism within

an established state" (Neuberger, 2001:392). With regards to internal self-determination Scotland can again serve as a prime example. In the run-up to the referendum the UK's main political parties all pledged an increase in the devolution of powers from Westminster to Holyrood – which would result in the latter attaining greater internal self-determination (Armstrong & Ebell, 2014:4).

Two further varieties of external self-determination can be identified. These are "[1] internationally recognized independence for a people and [2] true independence for an already existing state" (Neuberger, 2001:392). In the first instance an example could include the Québécois and their self-determination efforts in seceding from Canada during their high watermark of separatism in the 1990s (Turpel-Lafond, 1995:44). In the second instance separatists within Puerto Rico agitating for full independence serves as an apt example, with the island nation officially classified as an "associated free state", and a "non-incorporated territory belonging to but not a part of the United States" (Santana, 2005:219).

On the other hand three varieties of internal self-determination can be identified. These are "[1] democracy in a homogeneous state", "[2] autonomy or federalism for a distinct people within a democratic state", and "[3] autonomy/federalism for a distinct group within a non-democratic system" (Neuberger, 2001:392). To demonstrate, firstly, native Japanese already enjoy internal self-determination and democracy in a fairly homogeneous state, even though minority and ethnic divisions within Japan can include the Burakumin, Ainu and those with Korean ancestry (Tsunemoto, 2001:119). It should however be noted that there are scholars calling the idea of Japanese homogeneity (e.g. culturally, ethnically) a "cardinal axiom" (Lie, 2001:45) and "myth" (Creighton, 2003:121). Secondly, at independence the Georgian state contained five minorities with three of these (e.g. Abkhazia) enjoying autonomy (Cornell, 2002:248). Thirdly, a contemporary example could include ethnic Tibetans within the Tibet Autonomous Region, an annexed territory of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Halper & Halper, 2014:1).

Figure 2.1 below illustrates the binaries of self-determination in a nutshell. Based on Figure 2.1 it is also clear that there is a possibility of overlap between external and internal self-determination. To illustrate utilising a hypothetical example, if China were to rescind the autonomous status (internal self-determination) of Hong Kong the latter could have significant recourse to total independence (external self-determination) (Kaikobad, 2011:144). Another notable dichotomy within the principle of self-determination relates to the nation and state. Here 'nation' can be seen as shorthand for "peoples, nationalities, ethnic groups or any other distinct population" (Neuberger, 2001:392). While there are thousands of nations globally there are fewer than 200 states, and out of these 200 in only about 15 the "state and nation completely overlap" (Neuberger, 2001:392). Depending on

the conceptualisation of self-determination taken all of these thousands of nations are prospective candidates for either "external sovereignty or internal autonomy" (Neuberger, 2001:392).

Figure 2.1 Self-determination in a Nutshell (Adapted from Neuberger, 2001:392)

[1] Democracy in a homogeneous state

[2] Autonomy or federalism for a distinct people within a democratic state

[3] Autonomy/federalism for a distinct group within a non-democratic system

Self-determination

Internal Self-determination

External Self-determination

[1] Internationally recognized independence for a people

[2] True independence for an already existing state

Overlap

Apart from political self-determination discussed above one could also differentiate between economic, cultural, colonial, and secessionist self-determination. In the case of economic self-determination the internal/external binary is similarly relevant. To illustrate, socialists advance internal economic self-determination, or "the emancipation of the working class from exploitation by the capitalist owners of the means of production" (Neuberger, 2001:392). On the other hand nationalists propagate external economic self-determination, or "economic independence and freedom from exploitation" (Neuberger, 2001:392) by 'foreign' actors. In both instances the USSR could be utilised as an example. Up until the mid-1950s the USSR pursued a policy of self-sufficiency (internal economic self-determination) from world markets that insured domestic supplies while avoiding dependence on international imports (external economic self-determination) from what it perceived as a hostile world (Brainard, 1983:681).

Cultural self-determination can refer to a host of interrelated goals. These can include, but is by no means limited to, those rights contained in article 2 of the UNDMR in conjunction with the resistance against cultural assimilation by a dominant foreign power (Neuberger, 2001:393). Yet again the internal/external binary is relevant. To illustrate, nationalists within Ireland have previously called for "De-Anglicising the Irish Nation" (Duffy, 1904:117). If Ireland was to "become what it was of yore", one nationalist proclaimed, it could not remain "tied to the apron-strings of another race and another island, waiting for it to move before it will venture to take any step itself" (Duffy, 1904:161). This should be seen as cultural self-determination aspirations directed against a foreign power, while it also highlights how these calls can be interpreted

34

externally (affecting Ireland as a region in its entirety) or internally "as a demand for personal–cultural self-determination" (Neuberger, 2001:393).

A final distinction between types of self-determination relates to colonial *vis-à-vis* secessionist self-determination, especially relevant within Twentieth century developing states. Regarding the former – as has already been touched upon – this process entailed an anti-colonial struggle by Asian and African peoples in order to gain self-determination from colonising powers (see Dersso, 2012:121). In the latter instance secessionist self-determination represented "a people's aspiration to break out of the postcolonial state and achieve liberation for one Afro-Asian people from rule by another Afro-Asian people" (Neuberger, 2001:393). Here the external self-determination gained by the (mainly Christian and animist) South Sudanese from their northern (primarily Muslim) neighbours serves as a good example (Lin, 2011:6).

To rationalise these distinctions it is possible to utilise the umbrella terms of 'grand' and 'small' self-determination. Grand self-determination has as its goal true internationally recognised sovereignty, and as such is more "external, political or secessionist" (Neuberger, 2001:393) in nature. In contrast small self-determination is concerned with the internal political structure of the state, and as such it is more "internal, economic and cultural" (Neuberger, 2001:393) in form. As with many dichotomies overlap is possible. A self-determination struggle could include both "internal political self-determination and external economic self-determination" (Neuberger, 2001:394). Now that the principle of self-determination has been examined it is necessary to identify the 'self' in self-determination - as none of the international treaties discussed within this review adequately identifying the national self.

2.3.2   Approaches to Determining the 'Self'

The question of what determines a 'people' has been one fraught with disagreement, and often violently so. While the Confederate states of the American south saw themselves as a separate 'nation' Lincoln in contrast safeguarded the integrity of the union – "one nation indivisible" (Naylor, 2008:81). The Irish fighting for independence did so on the basis of them being a separate people, while the British that opposed them "recognized only one British national self" (Neuberger, 2001:396). Somewhat questionable attempts have even been made to disguise the existence of a national self. The Turkish government refers to Kurds within their territory as "Mountain Turks", and members of the Israeli right refer to Palestinians as "Arabs of the Land of Israel" (Neuberger, 2001:397). In so doing a dominant power can deny the RSD to those whom are entitled to it, as the minority 'self' is co-opted into the majority 'self' – as in the case of Turkey. On the other hand the

Israeli right's denial of the existence of a Palestinian people also nullifies any recourse to the RSD (Neuberger, 2001:397).

There are however approaches that seek to answer the question of the national self (see Asch, 2001:205). In one such approach, "[t]he emergence of a national self occurs, at least in the formative stages, through a process of differentiation from an opposing group" (Neuberger, 2001:397). This definition is closely linked with the "struggle against foreign rule" (Neuberger, 2001:397). The idea of an American nation in opposition to a British nation (see Wharton, 1889:667-668), or a Pakistani nation in opposition to an Indian nation (see Menon, 2013:5), serves as prime examples. In essence, through a process of 'othering' the 'self' emerges. This method of defining the self can be labelled the **difference approach**.

A **decolonisation approach** on the other hand – and one especially applicable to Afro-Asian peoples – sees the national self as emerging from the former colony and within its former borders (Neuberger, 2001:397). Here the national self is sanctified in conjunction with the territorial integrity of a post-colonial state and its colonially imposed borders. In other words, in these newly independent states (and the territorial framework bequeathed by colonialism) "their populations were not in any objective sense 'nations'", yet these states identified themselves as such while also attempting "to conform to the expectations that this definition raised" (Kratoska, 2011:47). During the decolonisation era (circa 1945 to 1990) international consensus enabled only those colonial peripheries (or the colonised) "separated by salt water" (Neuberger, 2001:397) from the colonial core (or the colonisers) to exercise their RSD. Virtually no exceptions to this salt water rule were allowed – with only Bangladesh effectively seceding from a post-colonial state (Pakistan) during this time (Neuberger, 2001:397).

A **post-decolonisation approach** emerged at the end of the Cold War as the West failed to implement a colonial approach to self-determination in Eastern Europe. With no salt water separating the 'colonies' of the collapsed USSR, the West was initially reluctant to endorse their recourse to the RSD (Neuberger, 2001:398). The wave of self-determination in those areas was however unstoppable, and the post-decolonisation approach readjusted self-determination within international law and relations (Neuberger, 2001:398). Through this new approach "only federal units […] that had a legitimate political–administrative status" (Neuberger, 2001:398) enjoyed exercising their RSD. For such peoples their internal borders were recognised as international borders (e.g. Croatia, Ukraine), while the aforementioned principle of *uti possidetis* denied any other ethnocultural minorities within those territories equal rights. For some observers the post-decolonisation approach "may have dire consequences for the future of multi-national and multi-

ethnic states", due to the fact that "it establishes a disincentive to devise federal solutions to the 'national problem' within states" (Neuberger, 2001:399).

An **ethnocultural approach** to the question of the national self would not leave distinct minorities without recourse to the RSD. Yet defining what an ethnocultural group may be is problematic. To open an avenue towards understanding what an ethnocultural group may be the classical Greek distinction of *polis* (or *demos*) and *ethnos* warrants closer scrutiny (Neuberger, 2001:399; 1995:304). Succinctly put, *demos* can be understood as a "political nation" brought together through "consent, [or] the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life" (Knop, 2004:55). While *demos* then is a political community, *ethnos* is a "social community" (Keman, 2005:ix). More broadly put, *ethnos* is "a pre-political community integrated on the basis of descent, a shared tradition or a common language" (Lehning, 2005:9). To illustrate, a person that identifies as British (*demos*) can also ethnoculturally identify as Welsh (*ethnos*), and it can be argued that instances of overlap should not be uncommon.

Ethnocultural groups possess a set of interesting traits regarding self-determination. One such trait relates to integrative (*demos*) and separatist (*ethnos*) nationalism. Regarding the former, self-determination can be realised through the amalgamation of "different ethno-cultural selves within an existing state", while the latter attains self-determination "for pre-existing ethnocultural selves" (Neuberger, 2001:399). An example in the first instance could include any multicultural state (e.g. the US, see Giroux, 1998:178), while in the last instance North Korea remains one of a handful of monocultural states (see French, 2014:346). Yet not all ethnocultural groups will develop nationalism(s) that strive for self-determination, with assimilation and integration remaining viable alternatives (Neuberger, 2001:399).

In contrast other ethnocultural groups may be drawn towards the opposite. As long as ethnocultural groups exist so too will "they have the potential to switch from integrative nationalism to separatist nationalism" (Neuberger, 2001:399). In such an instance the ethnocultural group's nationalism – or "nationalism with nation" – can more readily utilise popular sentiment than a state deprived of ethnocultural content – or "nationalism without nation" (Neuberger, 2001:399). An argument that the majority principle should curtail any challenges to the state arising from self-determination seeking ethnocultural groups is only a half-truth. As Arend Lijphart observed, "majority rule works well […] when there is considerable consensus and majority and minority are not far apart" (quoted in Neuberger, 2001:400). It can be argued that as long as there is one distinct ethnocultural majority and another ethnocultural minority – and as long as the former has no incentive to accommodate the

latter's grievances – the "minority will be disillusioned with a principle which condemns it to permanent exclusion from the levers of power and influence" (Neuberger, 2001:400).

Furthermore, other than alleviating conflict within pluralist societies, the majoritarian principle can in contrast "even contribute to conflict exacerbation rather than facilitate conflict regulation" (Neuberger, 2001:400). This is especially true for societies that lack even a modicum of national consensus, with this deficiency nullifying the preconditions for majority democracy (Neuberger, 2001:400). Another method of identifying the self is the **communal approach**. Within this process communal self-determination is "the aspiration of a communal group to determine the sovereignty of an area which contains other communal groups without absorbing them within the national self" (Neuberger, 2001:400). This process then advocates recognition (or lack thereof) of being a "part of the ethno-cultural self appropriate for self-determination" (Neuberger, 2001:400). To illustrate, ethnic Russians in post-Soviet states are seen as settlers 'deposited' there by the Soviet Empire. In the Ukraine these ethnic Russians account for about 22 per cent of the total ('non-communal') population (Fritz, 2007:114).

The **historical approach** on the other hand sees the national self – "whether real or mythical" (Neuberger, 2001:400) – as capable of demanding self-determination. Here the 'people' is understood as a "traditional–historical community" (Neuberger, 2001:400). While traditional nationalists understand the nation as a "historical personality linking past, present, and future generations", conservative nationalists think of the nation as "characterized by institutions and customs which represented the accumulated historical wisdom and experience of past generations" (Neuberger, 2001:401). Liberal nationalists on the other hand sees the nation as a "historical community, as a community which has 'done great things together' and has had 'common memories, sacrifices, glories, afflictions and regrets'" (Neuberger, 2001:401).

Yet all nationalists, no matter their position on the political spectrum, understand the need of a *Heimat* in securing a sense of union. Not only the nationalists, but also non-nationalists like Acton , Hegel, and Marx understood that "you cannot instill in a people a sense of kinship and brotherhood without attaching them to a place they feel is theirs, a homeland that is theirs by the right of history" (Neuberger, 2001:401). To illustrate, in the period leading up to the breakup of Yugoslavia a potent component of Slovene nationalism was the "distinctness of the Slovene nation" (Pavković, 2000:91) – or the Slovenian historic self – which could be utilised to aid in the quest for Slovenian statehood. The historic self can also be a relatively recent phenomenon. To illustrate, just after the fall of the USSR Russian nationalists sought to restore to the Russian Federation its 'historical' boundaries, being either those of the Soviet or Czarist Empires (Neuberger, 2001:401). '*Novaya'*

Russia's current foray into the Ukraine may be just another (aggressively covert) expression of its historical self (Gershman, 2015:52).

A further method to delineate the national self can be found in the **geographical approach**. Here territory plays a central role in the "crystallization of a national identity" (Neuberger, 2001:401), regardless of what type of natural frontier is under consideration. Even geographic distance facilitates the formation of a national self, evident in the "differentiation in culture, life-style, ideology, and economic interests" (Neuberger, 2001:401) between the US and Australia for example.

The final method in determining the national self can be described as the **mixed approach**, a label that explains any combination of the aforementioned approaches. To illustrate, the Chechen identity can be seen as a historical, geographical, and ethnocultural 'product' (Neuberger, 2001:401). The mixed approach also serves invaluable in highlighting the conflict inherent in determining the national self. To demonstrate, the mixed approach highlights that within the Russo-Chechen struggle the "historical Russian self is in conflict with the historical and ethnocultural Chechen self" (Neuberger, 2001:402).

A point of contestation regards the permanence of the national self. While nationalists regard the nation as "something permanent and indivisible" the historical–empirical reality on the other hand shows that "nations come and go, and national identity may expand, contract or disappear" (Neuberger, 2001:402). In contrast another popular argument holds that a nation – unvarnished with myth – is nothing more than an abstract construct. According to Benedict Anderson the nation is "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (2006:6). For Anderson nations are imagined because individuals within "even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (2006:6). While Anderson's (2006:6) theory enjoys popular scholarly and lay attention it nevertheless does not translate into reality for those fighting and dying in the name of nations, even if perhaps that is exactly what Anderson wanted to prevent in the first place.

Nonetheless, a final and significant point of contestation relates to the natives and settlers divide. Here the "problem of the legitimacy of recent settlers to be part of the national-self" (Neuberger, 2001:402) remains a pressing concern. In surmounting this obstacle a 'critical date' is necessary to determine whom qualifies as what, yet no agreement on any such time exists (Neuberger, 2001:402). While for example Gibraltarians after 250 years are still considered settlers by the UN, "the much more recently settled Fiji Indians are accepted as part of the Fiji self" (Neuberger,

2001:402). These contestations remain as yet unresolved. The eight approaches to determining the national self above are summarised in Table 2.2 below, in conjunction with additional illustrative cases.

	Table 2.2 Approaches to Determining the 'Self' (Adapted from Neuberger, 2001:396-403)		
	Approach	**The National Self**	**Example**
1	The Difference Approach	The emergence of the national self occurs through a process of differentiation from an opposing group.	The idea of a Japanese self as opposed to an Ainu self.
2	The Decolonisation Approach	The national self corresponds to the area of the former colony, and is sanctified in conjunction with its imposed borders and territorial integrity.	A Namibian nation of various ethnic groups, including the Ovambo.
3	The Post-Decolonisation Approach	Applied to those peoples of the former Soviet Union whom enjoyed legitimate political-administrative status before the union's dissolution. Their internal boundaries are recognised as if they were international boundaries.	Lithuania regained its independence in 1990, having had legitimate political-administrative status before annexation.
4	The Ethnocultural Approach	The ethnocultural self originates from a shared language, religion, racial differences, or even more vague concepts such as culture and tradition.	The British people are a multi-ethnic and multicultural group.
5	The Communal Approach	The aim of a communal group to determine the sovereignty of a given area, which contains other communal groups, without absorbing them into the national self.	The Sudeten Germans were not regarded as part of the surrounding Czechoslovak nation.
6	The Historical Approach	The national self – whether real or imagined – is seen as capable of living self-determined, and the people are understood as a traditional-historical community.	The historic self served as a potent ingredient of Italian nationalism in the Nineteenth century.
7	The Geographical Approach	Territory and the crystallisation of national identity are understood as inseparable, regardless of the type of natural frontier under consideration.	The Druze of the Jebel Druze, or the Maronites of Mount Lebanon.
8	The Mixed Approach	The national self can often be a mixed self, based on any combination of the preceding approaches.	The Kurdish self, a product of many of the above approaches.

2.3.3   The 'Goals and Means' of National Self-Determination

Before examining self-determination from 'above' and 'below' it is necessary to make a distinction between self-determination and independence. In the past UN resolutions relating to the "possible and legitimate" goals of national self-determination have made reference to "independence, free association, and integration" (Neuberger, 2001:403). Yet even the UN has mistakenly accepted that self-determination and independence are synonymous. While national self-determination can lead to independence "it has sometimes led to different patterns and formulae" (Neuberger, 2001:403). In a colony, for example, self-determination can be achieved through independence (e.g. the US), in unifying with another territory, other forms of association (e.g. Puerto Rico), integration with the colonising state (e.g. Hawaii), and in some instances even maintaining the colonial *status quo* (e.g. the Falklands) (Neuberger, 2001:403). As a result it is possible to conclude that "any political status freely determined by the people constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination" (Neuberger, 2001:403).

This conclusion in turn focuses attention on how the political status is determined. These methods include plebiscites and representative institutions (or those claiming to be), and a differentiation can be made between self-determination "from below" and "self-determination from above" (Neuberger, 2001:403). In the first instance "elections, plebiscites or mass-based guerrilla movements" can be employed, and in the second instance "rulers, oligarchies, non-representative parliaments, and elitist movements" (Neuberger, 2001:403) serve as driving forces. Overlap occurs for instance when an elitist movement (from above) within a guerrilla war grows to include popular support (from below) (see De Bragança & Wallerstein, 1983:10).

On the topic of movements for self-determination liberation movements particularly stand out with issues regarding representation and the means of self-determination (see Tanca, 1993:103). Even though liberation movements are frequently acknowledged as "legitimate representatives of the 'national self'" they "are never elected to do so in any formal sense" (Neuberger, 2001:404). In its stead these movements prove their representation of 'the people' "through waging an efficient political and military campaign" (Neuberger, 2001:404), and as such it is vital to stress that their legitimacy rests on an armed struggle, and not on elections or plebiscites. In other words, the 'democracy' that these liberation movements seek to ultimately establish "is constituted during the process of national liberation" (Younis, 2000:22). An example could include the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria (see Le Sueur, 2010:2).

A final point of consideration regarding representation rests on the question of a 'true' reflection of the national will. In other words, how many people it takes supporting a self-determination

movement before concluding that the movement can "be considered true representatives of the popular will" (Neuberger, 2001:404). Yet again there is no pre-existing answer to draw from, and as a result "[d]emands for national self-determination may often be countered by arguing that the proponents of self-determination are an unrepresentative minority" (Neuberger, 2001:404). To be sure, all governments wrestling with self-determination disputes have argued in such a way (Neuberger, 2001:404). For states their sovereignty remains a fiercely guarded principle (see Kalmo & Skinner, 2010:1).

2.3.4 On the Right to Secession

Another noteworthy area of investigation centres on the question of whether the RSD also includes a right to secession. As was shown earlier in this chapter Lenin would have almost certainly agreed that in theory it does. While Wilson appeared to have endorsed such an idea some scholars argue that his principles opposed separatist self-determination and that he only intended to advance democratisation while also hindering territorial exchanges without the consent of the peoples involved (Neuberger, 2010:68). Citing published work on the 1945 San Francisco Conference, Neuberger (2001:405) sheds light on the guiding hands that worked on the UN Charter and reveals that those that drafted the charter (signalling the right of all peoples to self-determination) actually opposed secession (for a tie-in with US secessionism see Livingston, 1998:1). Within the UN Charter the RSD is understood "only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession" (Neuberger, 2001:405).

Many other UN linked principles conform to this view. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and its reference to the RSD underscores its incompatibility with the UN Charter insofar as opposing "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country" (Neuberger, 2001:405). A decade later the Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States holds that "the territorial integrity and political independence of every state is indivisible", and that it would be unacceptable "to dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent states" (Neuberger, 2001:405). Contemporary legal scholars are thus of the opinion that (barring cases of extreme brutality) secession is only permissible when a recognised government and the seceding party mutually agree on the matter (Norman, 2006:172). Yet tensions within the academic debate remain marked and divisive.

These tensions are typified in the maximalist and minimalist divide. Firstly maximalist self-determination upholds the linkage between the RSD and secession, while it is opposed by the latter whom argue that it undermines "international order and stability by legitimizing revisionism in

international politics" (Neuberger, 2001:405). Furthermore, an automatic recourse to secession can create what is known as "trapped minorities" and "stranded majorities" (Neuberger, 2001:406). Trapped minorities come into existence when ethnocultural groups are confined within the borders of a newly created nation state, and stranded majorities arise when a seceding territory is vital to the continued existence of the original state (Heraclides, 1991:28; Neuberger, 2001:406). Examples of trapped minorities include Francophones in Flanders or Anglophones in Quebec (Mancini, 2012:496). An example of a stranded majority could include Spanish citizens if ever the key economic region of Catalonia was to secede, or Italians if the *Lega Nord* managed to do the same in the affluent northern parts of Italy (see Greer, 2007:117; Huysseune, 2003:27).

There is thus a delicate balance between the rights of states and the rights of peoples. Yet an argument can be made that the democratic values inherent in the RSD "contain the right of a people to withdraw from a state if they wish to do so" (Neuberger, 2001:406), especially if the former agonised under the oppression and/or discrimination of the latter. According to Lijphart, "in plural societies where assimilation is resisted and elite cooperation (consociationalism) is impossible because of historical enmity, partition or separation become the only viable alternatives" (quoted in Neuberger, 2001:406). To be sure, it is exceptionally difficult to venture any other outcome in cases of historical grievance and contemporary (often violent) re-manifestation – such as in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (see Coppieters, 2003:187).

In such an instance the right of secession is seen in the guise of the right of self-defence. Here those opposing an oppressive state "can convincingly mobilize traditional democratic principles like the social contract", and "the consent of the governed and the right of rebellion" (Neuberger, 2001:406). Any opposition to the enforcement of the social contract in situations such as these, some argue, underscores how sovereign legitimism defends the sacrosanct boundaries of a state at the cost of the lives of oppressed peoples (Neuberger, 2001:406). Conceding that not all 'candidates' for secession should secede is commonplace, yet that in itself does not mean that all secessionist self-determination groups should be opposed. As a result each and every secessionist 'candidate' should have the merits of their case judged and secession supported as and where compelling reasons for it exists (Neuberger, 2001:406).

2.3.5   A Clash of Principles

The final 'face' of self-determination to be examined in this chapter relates to how this principle clashes with other prevailing norms within international relations and politics. These contestations include (1) the rights of peoples versus the rights of states, (2) the principle of non-interference, (3) the requirements of international peace and stability, (4) principles of non-violence, (5) *pacta sunt*

servanda (Latin for 'agreements must be kept', or in this case, international agreements), and finally the question of (6) double standards. Firstly, in those UN and AU treaties briefly examined the principle of self-determination constantly clashes with the right of states to their territorial integrity. When the RSD then is invoked opponents counter with the argument that it would "dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states" (Kuwali, 2015:25). As Neuberger remarks, "this basic contradiction between states and peoples remains a fundamental problem of the international community" (2001:411). There are unfortunately no simple answers to this question, and yet again the merits of each case should be weighed with care.

Secondly, the norm of non-interference also flows from the rights of states. In many instances those self-determination struggles that enjoy noteworthy external support are unable to sustain themselves on the road to autonomy. This then necessitates either military intervention or international diplomatic recognition, as the case of Yugoslavia for instance prove (Neuberger, 2001:412; Thomas, 2003:vii). Yet the principle of non-interference in another sovereign state is a questionable one, one of "doubtful morality" (Neuberger, 2001:412). A large body of contemporary scholarly and diplomatic debate focuses on this question through the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Kassim, 2014:2). As a result some have called for the principle of non-interference to fall to the wayside when extermination for instance threaten a people, and ultimately their RSD (Neuberger, 2001:412).

Thirdly, the requirements of international peace and stability have often overruled the RSD. After WWII for example the USSR blocked any debate on self-determination of the Baltic States, as these states were of key strategic value to the latter. Conversely, Hitler justified his annexation of territories with German minorities in order to advance their self-determination (Neuberger, 2001:412). Fourthly, the principle of non-violence is not observed in the majority of secessionist cases. In nearly every one of these the separatists have resorted to violence to pursue their RSD (Neuberger, 2001:412). The Tamil secessionists in Sri Lanka and the Muslim Malays in the Philippines serve as but two examples (Bandarage, 2009:93; Walter, 2009:168).

Fifthly, as the rebels challenge the *status quo* they are also acting as a revisionist force. As these forces are seeking to change "the legal order, including laws, constitutions and international conventions", it "has to run counter to the *pacta sunt servanda* principle of international law" (Neuberger, 2001:413). After the secession of the Province of Buenos Aires from the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata in 1852 it re-joined the Argentine Republic in 1859, and as a result it was not considered as bound by international treaties ratified by the republic before 1859 (Pfirter &

Napolitano, 2006:405). Sixthly, and on the question of double standards, the RSD can be described as a "chameleonic right" (Neuberger, 2001:413). In situations of self-determination at its core different criteria have often been applied when equal treatment was necessary. To illustrate, while the European community were eager to recognise Croatian and Slovenian statehood in the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic remains unrecognised by the same community (Philpott, 2003:88; Krüger, 2010:xii).

Neuberger (2001:408) further problematizes self-determination by elaborating on the viability of a proposed nation-state, the irreversibility of self-determination, and the domino theory of secession. The question of how 'big' or 'small' a state needs to be in order to be effective pits supporters of the 'bigger is better' approach against those who see large states as generating estrangement and bureaucratization, while their smaller counterparts are conducive towards participation and true self-government (Kimminich, 1993:96; Neuberger, 2001:409). While the idea of large states being more viable seems putative, microstates such as Luxembourg, Malta, Liechtenstein, and Monaco can hardly be described as unfeasible (see Eccardt, 2005:1).

On the topic of the reversibility of self-determination a plethora of questions can be identified, while any concrete answers remain elusive. If for example a right of reversibility is granted it could possibly bring about continuous changes to the global system through "an unending chain of border adjustments" (Neuberger, 2001:410). It may even hinder the creation of a stable and peaceful global order. If no reversibility is allowed then self-determination for this generation may very well deny self-determination to those that come after it (Neuberger, 2001:410). Nevertheless, the image of one after the other Balkan state claiming self-determination has given rise to the domino theory. In essence the theory holds that "one secession will necessarily lead to an endless chain of secessions" (Neuberger, 2001:410). Yet by citing examples of secessions like Norway, Ireland, and Iceland, it is possible to ascertain that in not one of the above cases did secession set "a precedent for additional secessions; there was no chain reaction of falling dominoes" (Neuberger, 2001:410).

2.3.6   On the Utility of Typologies

Finally it is necessary to briefly acknowledge those voices not convinced by Neuberger's (2001:415) claims. As was stated in the first chapter, Neuberger upholds that his framework on national self-determination is beneficial for clarifying "many inter-ethnic conflicts, border disputes, secessions, and wars" (2001:415). One dissenting opinion however stresses that such an assertion "seems to be misleading, at best" (Tindigarukayo, 1987:569). To be fair, Tindigarukayo's (1987:569) critique is direct against a duplicate claim Neuberger (1986:119) made in his book, *National Self-determination in Postcolonial Africa*. In this analysis Neuberger stated that his

theorising on self-determination "clarifies many of Africa's postcolonial interethnic conflicts, border disputes, secessions, and irredentist wars" (1986:119). The claims made by Neuberger (1986:119; 2001:415) are clearly near identical.

What concerned the reviewer was a lack of acknowledgement of the historical and cultural variables contained in the premise. According to Tindigarukayo (1987:569) Neuberger's (1986:119) analysis on self-determination within Africa is founded on a historical vacuum. As Tindigarukayo rightly asserts, "national self-determination is not only a historical phenomenon, but it also must be analyzed within a historical context" (1987:569). In the work of Neuberger (2001:391) examined within this chapter – especially pertaining to his descriptive examples – it would appear that Tindigarukayo's (1987:569) critique is not without foundation. To illustrate, when Neuberger employed the 'lenses' of the democratic and national schools – as well as 'a third way' – in order to conceptualise self-determination he did so by citing historical examples (e.g. Austria–Hungary) without accounting for the historical context of the cases. While democratisation may indeed have played a key role in the break-up of Austria–Hungary a more focused approach examining its unique historical context could reveal that Austria was a "form of political structure *sui generis* with an inherent dynamic that leads, over time, to its decline and disappearance" (Wank, 1997:45).

While the example above illustrates the 'historical vacuum' critique it is also necessary to acknowledge the other, being cultural factors. Tindigarukayo (1987:570) contends that not all regions whom are engaged in self-determination struggles are culturally homogenous. One of the three varieties of internal self-determination Neuberger mentioned included "democracy in a homogeneous state" (2001:392). The concept of a culturally homogeneous state – as well as a homogenous nation – is problematic. To illustrate, Neuberger (2001:394-395) utilises the example of Czechoslovakia in a number of his demonstrative cases.

Apart from the obvious Czech/Slovak dichotomy there was also 'difference' amongst the Czech 'people'. Commenting on the "myth of the Czech nation as a homogeneous and endogamous community", Iveta Jusová asserts that there were indeed "inequities and differences" (2005:63). Yet these were hidden by the Czech nationalist whom worked feverishly to establish a sense of unity – one that would ultimately culminate in 1918 with Czechoslovakian statehood. For this to happen "the Czechs needed to first 'imagine their nation'" (Jusová, 2005:63). These are but two examples of how various factors (e.g. historic or cultural) need to be taken into consideration when examining any phenomenon. Indeed, as Tindigarukayo affirms, "[w]e are left asking whether or not variables other than national self-determination are more relevant in explaining and/or clarifying" (1987:570) those conflicts that Neuberger (2001:415) purports it does.

However, it should not be forgotten that Neuberger warned that his theoretical framework is not a "substitute for a thorough empirical study of each conflict" (2001:415). Furthermore – as one commentator on Neuberger's (1986:119) semantic clarification of self-determination remarked – "Self-determination has the virtue of ambiguity; efforts to dissect its meaning will always run into the barrier of multiple significations" (Welch, 1987:464). Clearly then this section – seen as a "roster of interrogations" – demonstrates the ambiguities entrenched in the "apparently self-evident postulate" (Young, 1991:322) that is national self-determination. In this the concept of self-determination is not unlike other key concepts within Political Science where their delineation is often hotly contested. While it is necessary to acknowledge that such ambiguities exist, they should however not be allowed to hinder fruitful analyses.

2.4 On the Factors Conducive towards Self-determination Aspirations

In the previous chapter it was mentioned how the relative 'worth' of a theory can be found in its utility, and that in order to derive any analytical significance from the typological approach discussed above it will be necessary to understand the possible causes of national self-determination. In other words, to better understand the factors conducive towards both the emergence and decline of the phenomenon of national self-determination. Without understanding such linkages it becomes less possible to explain what happened, to postulate what may yet happen, or to try and affect how a phenomenon happens in the future. For the purposes of this analysis it is necessary to briefly turn to the forms of democracies in plural societies, as popularised by Lijphart (1969:207).

2.4.1   Archetypes of Governance

In 1956 Gabriel Almond comparatively explored the "major types of political systems" (1956:391) evident within the world around him then. Almond (1956:392) argued that four models of governance could be broadly discerned, being (1) Anglo-American (e.g. Canada), (2) Continental European (e.g. France), (3) pre-or partially industrial (e.g. India), and (4) totalitarian political systems (e.g. the USSR). However, there were then – and remains to this day – more forms of governance than the four described above. Yet these types were – and remain – dominant today, in form if not in name. Nevertheless, writing on the topic a decade later, Lijphart (1969:207) sought to expand upon Almond's hypotheses insofar as *democratic* forms of governance were concerned. That is, those types found in the (1) Anglo-American, (2) Continental European, and a third unrefined category of Almond's relating to the (3) Scandinavian and Low Countries, one which "combine some of the features of the Continental European and the Anglo-American" systems (Almond, 1956:391).

As stated in the previous chapter, the significance of each of these archetypes of governance relates to the empirical relationships it fosters amongst social structure and political culture on the one hand, and political stability on the other. To illustrate utilising Almond's (1956:392) positing, (1) Anglo-American democracies tend towards homogeneity and a secular political culture, and a highly differentiated role structure where the autonomous yet interdependent political establishment (e.g. from government to political parties and the media) enjoy specialised functions. In stark contrast (2) Continental European democracies tend towards fragmentation through varying political subcultures, with a role structure subservient to – and embedded within – these subcultures, and ultimately, the inurement of a bipartisan-like role structure (Almond, 1956:407).

For Lijphart (1969:208) the empirical linkage between social structure and political culture *vis-à-vis* political stability was self-evident. As Lijphart (1969:208) remarked, Anglo-American democracies tend to demonstrate high degrees of both stability and effectiveness, while their Continental European counterparts tend more towards instability as a result of political immobilism. This immobilism, Lijphart (1969:208) argues, is directly attributable to the fragmented condition of the Continental European political culture, one prone to "Caesaristic' breakthrough" and a "lapse into totalitarianism" as a result of the apparent political immobility. To illustrate, during the Great Depression the Anglo-American democracies remained relatively stable, whereas many of their Continental European counterparts resorted to tyranny.

According to Lijphart (1969:208), the key in understanding Almond's (1956:392) propositions can be found in the concepts of 'overlapping memberships' and 'crosscutting cleavages', an understanding of which explains the relationship between social structure and political culture *vis-à-vis* political stability. Regarding the former, group theorists such as Arthur Bentley and David Truman posit that overlapping memberships ultimately determine the political process (see O'Toole, 2006:4). In similar vein Seymour Lipset sees these relationships through the lens of crosscutting cleavages, and stresses the importance of overlapping cleavages in encouraging forceful political action (Clark & Lipset, 2001:81). As Lijphart (1969:208) summarises:

> These propositions state that the psychological cross-pressures resulting from membership in different groups with diverse interests and outlooks lead to moderate attitudes. These groups may be formally organized groups or merely unorganized, categoric, and, in Truman's terminology, "potential" groups. Cross-pressures operate not only at the mass but also at the elite level: the leaders of social groups with heterogeneous and overlapping memberships will tend to find it necessary to adopt moderate positions. When, on the other hand, a society is divided by sharp cleavages with no or very few overlapping memberships and loyalties— in other words, when the political culture is deeply fragmented—the pressures toward moderate middle-of-the-road attitudes are absent. Political stability depends on moderation and, therefore, also on overlapping memberships.

48

To illustrate, it can be argued that in culturally homogenous Japan such overlapping memberships could include liberal/economical *vis-à-vis* conservative/nationalist. For those nationalists a strong economy may buttress their notion of a strong nation, and as such lead to relatively moderate attitudes. In contrast, in societies where such overlapping memberships are absent or weak, instability may become pronounced. Indeed, as Truman argued, "in the long run a complex society may experience revolution, degeneration, and decay", yet if "it maintains its stability […] it may do so in large measure because of the fact of multiple memberships" (1951:508). Regarding the former, an example of a complex society experiencing such a breakdown in moderate attitudes and cooperation could include a reference to the deep divides prevalent within Rwanda and relating to the Hutu/Tutsi identity divide. The culmination of this breakdown in moderation and cooperation due to rigid memberships was of course the Rwandan genocide of 1994.

However, as with other social science theories there are those not wholly convinced by the arguments of group theorists such as Bentley and Truman. To illustrate, while these theorists accentuate the pressures between competing economic groups, they conversely fail to acknowledge that "large economic groups working for their economic interests are absolutely fundamental in the political process" (Olson, 1971:125). On the other hand – and again turning to the Rwandan example – there arguably were such large multi-ethnic groups working in unison to further their economic self-interest. Yet as in Rwanda this field of nominal cooperation could not withstand the onslaught of a greater opposing force, in this case resultant from virulent and irrational identity politics.

Nevertheless, while it is necessary to acknowledge such topical critique, it does not detract from the fundamental premise of the group theorists. Indeed, as this analysis will show, the heuristic importance of the relationships defined by these theorists are vital in understanding the linkage between political membership and attitudes within the South African context. However, these relationships are not set into stone, and the type of governance structures under which they function are of equal importance in either minimising or accentuating the impact of overlapping memberships and crosscutting cleavages. In this instance the types of governance system employed could act as a type of valve which aids in regulating and stabilising the pressures resultant from opposing memberships. And in this regard the dynamics of two specific types of governance systems within plural societies need to be briefly touched upon, being majoritarian versus consociational democracies.

2.4.2   Majoritarian Democracies

Majoritarian forms of governance are common throughout the world, and could include the frequently cited example of the United Kingdom (UK). Broadly speaking, majoritarian democracies will exhibit five key features, being (1) the concentration of executive power within a single political actor (e.g. the main political party), (2) the dominance of the executive branch over the legislature, (3) a two-party system, (4) a majoritarian electoral system, and a (5) pluralist system of interest intermediation (Magone, 2017:4). Within these types of democracies the will of the majority (often referred to as the 'ins') prevails over that of minorities (sometimes referred to as the 'outs'), for it is the majority that elects their representatives to a state's highest offices.

While this mode of democratic governance functions well in homogenous societies, it conversely can foster conflict in deeply divided societies where the 'ins' and 'outs' are far apart. For such a fractured society the democratic process becomes a zero-sum game, where one party may continuously be re-elected into power and thus leaving the opposition unable to respond with the entrenchment of adequate checks and balances (Norris, 2004:73). The potential dangers of this zero-sum game – especially within transitional democracies and deeply divided plural societies – includes an indifference towards minority rights, political corruption due to weak checks and balances, unfairness towards minor political actors, public disillusionment if voters perceive indifference to their needs, and an "elective dictatorship", to name but a few (Norris, 2004:73). Indeed, as the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict found (quoted in Luckham, Goetz & Kaldor, 2003:43):

> In societies with deep ethnic divisions and little experience with democratic government and the rule of law, strict majoritarian democracy can be self-defeating. Where ethnic identities are strong and national identity weak, populations may vote largely on ethnic lines. Domination by one ethnic group can lead to a tyranny of the majority.

Moreover, the relationship stretching from group membership to forms of governance and political behaviour have found its way into conflict theory. At the state-level of theorising for instance, majoritarian rule has often been identified as a possible predictor of civil war within divided societies. Such societies are deemed divided when "group identity has become politicised and/or polarised, making identification across groups difficult" (Lounsbery & Pearson, 2009:67). Furthermore, when minority rights are violated or found lacking, and when minorities perceive their own personal or economic security as under threat, civil war becomes a possibility due to the perceived struggle for survival. The likelihood of such conflict increases when the state in question has in the past been subjected to "divide-and-conquer colonial administration and/or minority rule" (Lounsbery & Pearson, 2009:67).

2.4.3   Consociational Democracies

Insofar as minorities are concerned, majoritarian democracies are not an effective governance system to aid in regulating and stabilising the pressures resultant from opposing memberships and/or political attitudes. However, there are alternative forms of governance more suited towards societies of a fractured nature, however benign such fissures may be. For many scholars, including Lijphart, the answer to the zero-sum nature of unbridled majoritarianism can be found in consociational democratic governance. These types of democracies have four defining characteristics, being (1) government by a grand coalition (one incorporating "all significant segments of the plural society"), (2) the "concurrent majority" rule (or mutual veto "which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests"), (3) proportionality (the "principle standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds"), and (4) a "high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs" (Lijphart, 1977:25). An example of such a democracy could include the Netherlands, to name but one amongst many within the world today.

As stated previously, consociational democracies are the embodiment of the acknowledgement that simple majoritarian democracy is not suited to societies that are marked by deep divisions. That is not to say that consociationalism remain without its detractors. Indeed, for some scholars at least the very act of solidifying identity through separate representation runs the risk of cementing these differences within social conscience, and as a result, hindering the potential emergence of a tolerant multicultural society (Robertson, 2002:114). Yet it could be countered that, for some societies at least, the historic fissures between 'us' and 'them' (or the 'ins' and the 'outs') are too deep to be plastered over by the construct of a new and ambiguous identity, especially if the fissures are deeply rooted in the past and linked to contemporary experience. This proposition will be explored at greater length within the chapters to come.

2.4.4   National Self-determination: A Rejoinder

This brief section on governance structures within deeply divided societies sought to show the interplay between factors conducive towards both the emergence and decline of the phenomenon of self-determination. If national self-determination is the sum of actions undertaken for the establishment of an "independent domain of political control" (Buchanan, 2004:333), there should also be existing identifiable conditions that prove conducive towards the emergence of action in this pursuit. Conversely, it should furthermore be possible to identify conditions that contribute towards a decline of action in this regard. As will become more evident within the sections to come, this analysis posits that the linkage between a fragmented political culture on the one hand, and

unbridled majoritarianism on the other, are factors conducive towards the emergence of Afrikaner self-determination. In contrast, consociationalism has the potential to decline action in regards to self-determination, insofar as it fosters consensus and minority protection.

Indeed – as stated previously – when a state's political culture is deeply fragmented, the pressures towards crosscutting membership accommodation and consensus are mostly lacking. Within a majoritarian democracy specifically, these cleavages can be accentuated and non-accommodation can prevail at the opportunity cost of consensus. As Lijphart observed, "majority rule works well […] when there is considerable consensus and majority and minority are not far apart" (quoted in Neuberger, 2001:400). One the other hand, Lijphart argued, "in plural societies where assimilation is resisted and elite cooperation (consociationalism) is impossible because of historical enmity, partition or separation become the only viable alternatives" (quoted in Neuberger, 2001:406).

2.5 Concluding Remarks

Within the previous chapter the main goal of this research was stated to be the advancement of an understanding of national self-determination, its identification in historical and contemporary *Afrikanerdom*, and on the dynamics and causes of self-determination aspirations as represented by key Afrikaner activists and organisations. The first step in pursuing this goal was to answer the first research sub-question, being, what is national self-determination, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline? Within this chapter an analytical review of theoretical and relevant literature connected to the conceptualisation of self-determination highlighted its historical metamorphosis from a principle towards a chameleonic right of all peoples.

In seeking to overcome this vague hallmark of the RSD, a typology accentuating the dynamic nature of national self-determination was examined. Here more faces of self-determination were revealed, including the goals and means of those seeking to obtain it, and of the various guises in which self-determination can be made manifest. Finally, an overview of the underlying complexities surrounding the question of national self-determination showed the interplay between factors conducive towards both the emergence and decline of the phenomenon. More succinctly put, of the importance of the linkage between a fragmented political culture on the one hand, and unbridled majoritarianism on the other. In contrast, consociationalism has the potential to side-line self-determination aspirations, insofar as it fosters consensus and minority protection. In the following chapter this research will shift its focus from the concept of self-determination to a broad historic overview of South Africa's Afrikaner minority, having now established the ideational framework necessary to explore Afrikaner self-determination in the following chapters.

Chapter III - Afrikaner Self-Determination: An Historical Overview

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter the theoretical groundwork was laid for an analysis of Afrikaner self-determination. Yet in order to understand contemporary Afrikaner self-determination currents, it is first and foremost necessary to be cognisant of its historic fount. In doing so, this chapter will be answering the second research sub-question, that is, what, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context? Moreover, recalling the typological critique briefly touched upon in the previous chapter, it was explained how an analysis of self-determination within a historical vacuum leaves the said analysis vulnerable to criticism. Indeed, for national self-determination is not only a historical phenomenon, but must also be analysed within a historical context. As will be shown, contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts are the continuation of an age old phenomenon.

However, while this phenomenon is a defining hallmark of Afrikaner history, it is by no means static and resistant to change. Quite the contrary, a uniquely Afrikaner self-determination streak runs like a golden thread through the *Volk's* historic tapestry, in patterns as diverse as the time in which it was woven. This chapter will focus on the shifting nature of Afrikaner self-determination in its historic form, and will be accomplished by examining Afrikaner self-determination attempts against the background of broader South African history. This historical overview commences in the Colonial Era (1652 to 1836), through to the Republican Era (1836 to 1902), the Union Era (1902 to 1948), and finally into the Nationalist Era (1948 to 1994). The Majoritarian Era (1994 to -) will be scrutinised within the following chapter, where a contemporary analysis of Afrikaner self-determination efforts will be built upon the basis of this historical foundation.

3.2 The Crooked Timber of Humanity

A cautionary note on the confluence of ideology and historiography has to be addressed before delving into the Afrikaner historic self. These two topics refer to both the "political and cognitive dimensions of our historical mind" (Schmidt-Glintzer, Mittag & Rüsen, 2005:xii). Linking these two concepts is another more ambiguous one, "the question of historical truth" (Schmidt-Glintzer et al., 2005:xii). This question of 'truth' is at the very epicentre of historical writing, and logically so. Without it the border between fact and fiction would be obscure. Furthermore, to be ignorant of historical truth one risks being "less able to understand the multifaceted relationship between the political and cognitive dimensions of historical consciousness" (Schmidt-Glintzer et al., 2005:xii). When ideology and historiography intermingle – as they too often do – "purposeful distortions, and

opinionated and biased views" (Schmidt-Glintzer et al., 2005:xiv) will regrettably come to be accepted as historical truth.

The oft quoted dictum that 'history is written by the victors' should cause critical pause for any scholar casting their net of inquiry back in time. To illustrate, in the foreword of his influential *A History of South Africa*, Leonard Thompson (2000:xv) writes about the (clearly ideologically infused) roots of South African historiography that:

> [W]hen British imperialism was reaching its apogee, Afrikaners were laying the foundations of an exclusive, nationalist historiography. In the segregation and apartheid years, the white regime authorized textbooks and favored other publications in the settler and Afrikaner nationalist traditions of the previous century. Today, those traditions are becoming obsolete […] Because historians now live in a post-Cold War and postapartheid context, we may expect new departures in South African historiography. Historians with strong commitments to the African nationalist movement may be expected to write from that perspective, which may lead to partisan works resembling a mirror-image of Afrikaner nationalist writings. Meanwhile, scholars and bureaucrats are working to create and authorize school textbooks that reflect the democratic *ideology* [emphasis added] of the new government, in place of the old textbooks, which emphasized the achievements of White [*sic*] and denigrated Blacks.

Based on the above it would appear that the role of ideology in historiography has been accepted as a *fait accompli*, regardless of whether it is imperialist, nationalist, or democratic in nature – or indeed of any other hue. As Thompson (2000:xvi) rightly observes contemporary South African history supplanted its 'obsolete' predecessor. In this 'new' historiography Europeans had – like the hordes of Attila and Genghis Khan – "swept across the globe from the late fifteenth century onward seeking new sources of wealth and power" (Berger, 2009:xi). In their wake lay the ruins of "ancient culture hearths" (Oppong, 2006:29). In South Africa this European expansionism culminated in a crescendo of "oppression, enslavement, and racial inequality combined with intense exploitation of natural resources" (Berger, 2009:xi).

While finally acknowledging those subjects of South African history the nationalists ignored at best – or demonised at worst – a strong case can be made that the new democratically infused historiography of South Africa has indeed gone the way of its predecessor, emphasising the achievements of one while denigrating the other. Some may argue that such a step is necessary in order to redress the imbalances of the past. Others may counter that in so doing those very same iniquities will be given new life, purpose and form. Nevertheless, in an effort to break from any ideologically linked historiographical portrait of *Afrikanerdom* this analysis will attempt to provide information 'sanitised' (as far as possible) from dogma, whether 'old' or *en vogue*. Such a 'sanitised' historic overview however runs the obvious risk of being dull, bereft as it were of the drama only a 'victim' and 'villain' dichotomy can provide. To be sure, Thompson's role allocation

between his "Africans" versus "white invaders" (2000:31) protagonists on the South African stage has the makings of an attention-grabbing and readable account. Yet human history – unlike ideology – cannot be reduced to such an overly simplistic black and white divide.

3.2.1   Afrikaner Origins: The Colonial Era (1652 to 1836)

The period from the arrival of the first emigres at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, to the time that many of their descendants embarked on what would become known as The Great Trek in 1836, numbers almost two centuries. For those early Afrikaners that left the British-ruled Cape Colony *their* colonial period had ended, and their departure ushered in *their* republican era. It would be nonsensical to broadly describe the chronological period of those staying behind in the Cape during The Great Trek as 'the republican period'. For the inhabitants of the Cape Colony *their* colonial era would be of much greater duration. As such it should be noted that these broadly defined period labels are utilised only for those Afrikaner subjects in question, and does not relate to any of the other inhabitants of South Africa directly.

Immanuel Kant once wrote that "[o]ut of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing can ever be made" (quoted in Vail, 1989:1). This quote from Kant prosaically summarises *Afrikanerdom*'s origins, structure, and – on a meta-level perhaps – their *volksgeist* (or 'spirit of the people'). Segments of *Afrikanerdom* have at various stages in their history been referred to as Dutch, Cape Dutch, *Trekboers* (Dutch for frontier farmers, and descendants of the Dutch), *Voortrekkers* (pioneers, descendants of the *Trekboers*), and then as *Boers* (farmers, descendants of the *Voortrekkers*) (Fairweather, 2006:xv). The term 'Afikaner' is a much later invention and should be viewed as an umbrella term incorporating all of the above.

Even referring to the 'Dutch' belies the fact that early *Afrikanerdom* consisted out of an amalgamation of different western, northern, and central European 'peoples'. Starting in 1652 the world's then largest trading company, the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC) – or the Dutch East India Company – settled the area of Table Bay in order to provide their vast merchant navy with supplies on route to the East (Cottrell, 2005:14). This period is frequently described as the "Golden Age of the Dutch Republic", with the VOC being a *de facto* "state outside the state" (Thompson, 2000:33). At the Cape the VOC encountered and traded with the native Khoisan, being the pastoralist Khoikhoi and the San. As the replenishment station grew the VOC increasingly encroached on Khoisan territory, with the inevitable result a clash of "guns, germs, and steel" (Diamond, 1999:85). The stage for future encounters between these (and other) different 'peoples' were set.

As the needs of the VOC station and fort at the Cape of Good Hope grew it sought to expand its operations by settling increasingly large tracts of arable land. Furthermore, the VOC brought in slaves from its commercial holdings in the East to bolster its manpower, while also enticing more Dutch Calvinists and their German cousins to settle the Cape peninsula through free passage and land grants (Cottrell, 2005:14). Former employees (also known as free burghers) of the VOC whom wished to stay on at the Cape after their contracts had expired were also allotted land to farm, and following religious upheaval in Western Europe French Huguenots together with Scandinavians and Belgians made the journey south to further bolster the settlement's growing European population (Cottrell, 2005:14; February, 1991:8-14).

The seeds of a new 'people' were being sown. The settlement was beginning to outgrow its originally intended purpose, as the replenishment station began to resemble a colony more than it did a 'tavern of the seas'. In 1707 the first recorded instance of a European identifying as an Afrikaner was found in the person of Hendrik Biebouw. Biebouw – a man of somewhat dubious standing – declared to a Stellenbosch magistrate that "'k ben een Africaander" (Dutch for 'I am an Afrikaner') (quoted in Giliomee, 2001:9). Whether this defiant statement to a Dutch civil servant was made as a result of unrest over the commercial monopolies of the VOC elite threatening the free burghers' livelihoods, or whether it was done in a drunken stupor remains unclear (Giliomee, 2001:9). One could certainly have given rise to the other. Only some 90 years later would the European population of the Cape begin to refer to themselves more generally as 'Afrikaners', in conjunction with other identifiers such as (protestant) 'Christians' and 'burghers' (Giliomee, 2001:9).

The eighteenth century European exodus to the 'new' world(s) continued. The settlers spread out from the greater Cape Town region and aided in the sustained expansion of the settlement's frontiers. The VOC in turn aided in the assimilation of these diverse communities through the sanctioned use of Dutch in all spheres of life (Berger, 2009:28). On the very fringes of this burgeoning enterprise were the *Trekboers*, a group of "fiercely independent farmers" (Farmer, 2015:77). As with many of the new world enterprises there was within the settler community a great inequality in both status and wealth (Worden, 2012:12). While some of the settler farmers had sufficient capital to slot into the Cape economy others were "forced into pastoralism by economic necessity" (Worden, 2012:12). The *Trekboers* were seminomadic farmers, *de facto* expanding the borders of the Cape settlement as they moved ever onwards in search of new hunting and grazing grounds (see Deumert, 2004:27).

The *Trekboers* were changing not only the very land their cattle grazed on, but also themselves. The further the *Trekboers* moved into the vast interior of the country the "more their European material comforts and culture became diluted" (Thompson, 2000:47). Indeed, according to one scholar at least they "also grew increasingly like the Khoekhoe [Khoisan] in their social and cultural practices" (Berger, 2009:30). Yet this process of flux, transformation, and expansion did not proceed unchecked. During the 1770s the *Trekboers* were hemmed in from all directions. To the south and west of them was a colony bereft of available grazing lands, to the north severe aridity, and in the northeast hostile Khoisan (Thompson, 2000:46). The *Trekboers* eastward movement clashed with Bantu-speaking (Xhosa) mixed farmers who were themselves moving westward, with both parties overpowering the Khoisan original inhabitants (Stapleton, 2010:3; Buchanan, 1991:111).

During this time of frontier wars the burghers also launched an ultimately abortive attempt at self-determination. It was the twilight years of VOC rule, and burghers around the towns of Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet declared an independent republic in order to break with "restrictive VOC economic controls and demanded firmer action against the Xhosa" (Worden, 2012:14). For the first time an Afrikaner republican impulse stirred in Africa, and as history shows it would certainly not be the last. Yet the golden era of the Dutch republic was a thing of the past, and as its star dimmed those formerly lurking in its shadow were eager to assume its prime of place. That one of the progenitors of this change was *le petit caporal* from Corsica makes this change all the more colourful. In 1795 the British violently seized the Cape in order to keep it (and the important sea route to India) out of Napoleon Bonaparte's hands (Stapleton, 2010:5).

The annexation was not undisputed. As the VOC's regular troops fled, the British only encountered armed resistance by settler, mixed race, and Khoisan volunteers whom conducted (somewhat successful) guerrilla operations until British reinforcements arrived (Stapleton, 2010:5). Faced with overwhelming odds the Dutch surrendered. The British initially held the colony on behalf of the expelled Dutch monarchy in the person of the Prince of Orange (Cottrell, 2005:19). In 1803 the Treaty of Amiens restored Dutch rule, however the Napoleonic Wars saw Britain reasserting her control over the colony in 1806. Yet again imperial soldiers were dispatched to the Cape. At Blaauwberg Mountain some 5,400 British troops faced a 2,000 man colonial army that consisted out of "French marines, German, and Hungarian mercenaries, Javanese artillerymen, and Khoisan soldiers and led by Governor Jan Willem Janssens" (Stapleton, 2010:7). With further French aid only a distant possibility the Governor surrendered and the Dutch formally ceded the territory to Britain in 1814 (Cottrell, 2005:20).

The first major phase of European settlement at the southernmost tip of Africa had ended. Britain conquered a territory where life at the core (Cape Town and surrounds) was relatively peaceful, while the periphery and its frontiers were marked by "a century of conflict - no less than nine separate wars" (Knight & Embleton, 1996:3) between the *Trekboers*, Xhosa, and Khoisan. In 1820 another major injection of Europeans into the interior of the country was undertaken by the British when roughly 5,000 British citizens were relocated from their homeland to inhabit farmland along the Fish River (Evans, 1999:7). Events started moving decisively against the *Trekboers* as the British presence increased, actions which would result in a "tragic climax to implacable enmity" (Castle, 1976:5) between these early Afrikaners and their British overlords through yet another (near) century of conflict.

3.2.2   Self-determination Won and Lost: The Republican Era (1836 to 1902)

Various factors would culminate and serve as an impetus for the flux and transformation of the 'peoples' under British domination. British nationality became compulsory for the *Trekboers*, now imperial subjects (Castle, 1976:5). In the colony Britain also enacted a liberal policy of Anglicization (in schools, courts, and government offices), slave emancipation, and recognition of civil status for the indigenes (Comaroff, 1985:25; Thompson, 2000:68). The *Trekboers* were incensed, while being imperial subjects they nevertheless lacked representative government (Worden, 2012:16). For these nineteenth century frontiersmen and women the social implications of emancipation and recognition of equal civil status for all 'peoples' "on an equal footing with Christians, [was] contrary to the laws of God" (Worden, 2012:16).

Apart from the perceived "subversion of the social order by the colonial government" (Worden, 2012:16), the *Trekboers* were further impacted by economic impoverishment. While many of their Cape Dutch cousins and the new British settlers were forming a prospering gentry they were indebted to the point of being unable to purchase their own land – a fact further compounded by the recent devaluation of their local currency, the rixdollar (Worden, 2012:16). Starting in 1835 *Trekboer* communities reconnoitred the area beyond the colonial border for new settlement areas and distance from Britain's reach (Knight & Embleton, 1996:4). And when such opportunities were identified – like a kettle building up too much steam – an outlet was forced through the Great Trek, an event described as the "birth struggle of the Afrikaner nation" (Latakgomo, 1994:168). This seminal event in Afrikaner history would also remain at the centre of claims for Afrikaner national self-determination (Davies, 2009:22).

The trek was in essence a mass migration of about 15,000 *Trekboers* – now referred to as *Voortrekkers* – that began in 1836 into the interior 'wilderness' beyond British control, and ended in

1840. This 'wilderness' would later be known as Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. Just before the main thrust of the trek got underway a rare glimpse was afforded to those 'outsiders' not joining the wagon trail through letters of trek leaders published in local newspapers. In the (rather contradictory) spirit of self-determination one of the leaders of these *Voortrekker* groups, Piet Retief (quoted in Cottrell, 2005:28), declared in one such letter that the Great Trek was necessary to:

> [A]llow us to govern ourselves without … interference in future […] We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the just principles of liberty; but, whilst we will take care that no one shall be held in a state of slavery, it is our determination to maintain such regulations as may suppress crime, and preserve proper relations between master and servant.

This statement by one of the originators of the Great Trek stands in stark contrast to contemporary claims. At least one scholar argues that far "from making a bid for independence the trekkers thought of themselves as loyal [British] subjects", and that they "were only depicted as Afrikaner patriots later in the century when Afrikaner nationalism began to emerge" (Worden, 2012:16). However, a majority of the works this chapter is drawn from directly acknowledge dissatisfaction with British dominion as a main cause for the exodus (Heywood, 2004:22; Stapleton, 2010:27; Frueh, 2003:40; Cottrell, 2005:25; Thompson, 2000:87). Nevertheless, the Voortrekker groups – composed out of mainly familial units – loaded what possessions they could into their ox wagons and together with their livestock and servants moved over the north-eastern frontier and into the vast interior. Here the trekkers found – instead of a vast emptiness – a land brought to heel through the 'Crushing'.

The *Mfecane* (in Nguni) – or *Difaqane* (in Sotho) – was the process through which the Zulu and Matabele kingdoms sought to solidify their own imperial ambitions. Around the dawn of the Nineteenth century a "fratricidal civil war" (Heywood, 2004:2) broke out between these kingdoms and smaller (Nguni and Sotho) communities. The Zulu and Matabele massacres of these smaller communities "exposed the land to armed incursions by white missionaries and farmers after the 1820s" (Heywood, 2004:2). Just how 'armed' the 'incursionary' missionaries were remains unclear. Nevertheless, the widespread and violent depopulation of this part of the interior undoubtedly facilitated Afrikaner settlement of the area (Fairweather, 2006:56). For late nineteenth-century European scholars the *Mfecane* "lent legitimacy to the Boers [*Voortrekkers*] occupying the land", with the *Voortrekkers* having "been in South Africa longer than the black newcomers who had invaded from the north" (Kuitenbrouwer, 2012:93). However, in contemporary South Africa the *Mfecane* is surrounded by controversy and remains a challenged historiography (Wenzel, 2009:266; Horwitz, 2001:66; Worden, 2012:19).

Into this malaise the *Voortrekkers* and their heavy-laden wagons moved in search of their 'promised land'. At Thaba 'Nchu the *Voortrekker* party was treated generously by the Barolong community, whereas the Ndebele under their king Mzilikatzi further north attacked the Voortrekkers and looted their livestock (Comaroff, 1985:25). The Voortrekkers assembled an alliance of the Barolong, Griqua, and Korana peoples, and succeeded in routing the Ndebele who withdrew a great distance to their present-day habitat, Zimbabwe (Comaroff, 1985:25). The victory was followed by a self-determination exercise through the creation of the first trekker republic at Thaba 'Nchu (Cottrell, 2005:29). As time progressed other sizeable parties joined the growing trekker community, including those led by Gert Maritz, Pieter Uys, and Andries Pretorius. However, as sectarianism arose the main thrust of the Voortrekkers would split between two large groups. One party – under Andries Potgieter – decided to move in a northerly direction to reach the high grasslands beyond the Vaal River (Stapleton, 2010:27).

Under the stewardship of Potgieter various (mostly short-lived) republics would be created, including the republic of Winburg, the republic of Potchefstroom, and eventually the (more potent) Transvaal (Cottrell, 2005:29). For "loyal [British] subjects" (Worden, 2012:16) the trekkers had an unquestionably strong anti-crown and pro-republican impulse. Nevertheless, the other party – under Piet Retief – decided to trek over the Drakensberg Mountains and into present-day KwaZulu-Natal (Stapleton, 2010:27). The Retief party was faced by a much more formidable foe than the Ndebele, for beyond the Drakensberg lay the marshal Zulu empire. It was also beyond the Drakensberg that a tragedy of noteworthy proportions lay in wait.

In 1837 the Retief trekkers negotiated a treaty with the Zulu king Dingane. In return for settling the area around Port Natal a trekker commando had to undertake a punitive raid against one of Dingane's foes whom made off with some of the king's cattle (Thompson, 2000:90). The ease with which the trekkers recaptured the king's cattle left his advisors concerned over a force which could turn on them, and as such a pre-emptive strike was planned against the unsuspecting commando (Thompson, 2000:91). Precipitating the signing of the treaty large groups of trekkers left the relative safety of their defensive laagers (a type of mobile fort consisting out of a formation of wagons lashed together) to scout for prospective farms. In February 1838 while this dispersal was underway the Retief commando returned the king's cattle and was invited to a Zulu ritual of beer drinking (Thompson, 2000:91).

Unarmed – as required – the Retief commando was a paper tiger. At the king's command to "kill the wizards" (quoted in Leach, 1990:3) his Zulu warriors leapt at the naive trekkers and clubbed them all, including Retief, to death (Thompson, 2000:91). Filled with a sense of invulnerability the

impis (Zulu warriors) left the royal kraal, UmGungundlovu, and attacked the now dispersed and vulnerable trekkers along a broad front. In the wake of this bloodletting lay the bodies of approximately 100 trekkers (men and women), 200 of their children and 200 coloured servants – with thousands of their livestock looted (Cottrell, 2005:30; Thompson, 2000:91). In contemporary South Africa towns with names such as Weenen (Afrikaans for 'weeping') bears witness to these events and their impact on the Afrikaner psyche. However, Zulu hubris – especially in the face of trekker technology – could not stand *ad infinitum*.

Voortrekker vengeance was (although not swift) utterly decisive. Over the course of the following months the trekkers regrouped and – under the guidance of Pretorius – a 500 man punitive commando was formed (Thompson, 2000:91). In the days leading up to the clash the trekkers took a public vow that if God granted them victory they would honour Him through the construction of a church and hallowing the day as an annual Sabbath (Stapleton, 2010:30). Trekking with almost 60 wagons the commando formed a laager at the *Ncome* River, where it faced off against a (roughly) ten thousand strong Zulu army on 16 December 1838. Wave after wave of Zulu warriors were beaten back through trekker marksmanship and the effective use of 2 small canons, forcing the Zulus to retreat and leaving nearly 3,000 of their fallen behind (Cottrell, 2005:31; Thompson, 2000:91). The trekkers miraculously suffered no fatalities in what would become known in Afrikaans as the *Slag van Bloedrivier*, in English as the Battle of Blood River, and in Zulu as *iMpi yaseNcome*. The Zulus were routed and as a result their kingdom fractured between Dingane and his brother, Mpande (Thompson, 2000:91). Figure 3.1 illustrates this mass migration, as well as the confrontations along and beyond its route(s).

For a brief interval in history it appeared that the trekkers were on course in securing their sovereignty. Mpande aligned himself with the trekkers and with their military aid in 1839 managed to defeat his brother's armies, and ultimately Dingane himself (Cottrell, 2005:31). With the Port of Natal secure the trekkers were hardly idle, establishing their farms and in due course by 1842 they constituted the Republic of Natalia (Natal). To buttress their newly won independence they also created a *Volksraad* (or 'peoples' council') with judicial, legislative, and executive powers (Thompson, 2000:92). All their efforts combined it was, as one scholar noted, "a master-stroke fraught with promise for the future of their independence" (De Kiewiet, 1942:62). Yet the trekkers' ubiquitous bugbear – that is Her Britannic Majesty's colonial bureaucracy – was never far behind. Britain proved sensitive to threats (whether real or perceived) to her maritime empire and its vast sea-lanes (including the Cape), and she could "not complacently watch the establishment in Natal of a body of men who denied their British allegiance" (De Kiewiet, 1942:62).

Figure 3.1 The Great Trek of 1836 (Thompson, 2000:89)

It appeared that the trekkers did not trek far enough. Britain annexed Natal in 1843, officially as a result of the "wave of humanitarian outrage at reports of trekker use of slaves" (Worden, 2012:20). Unofficially this strategic move secured Britain's economic monopoly, while also curbing Nguni migration south towards the atrophied Cape frontier (Worden, 2012:20). A large number of the *Voortrekkers*, true to name and nature, trekked on. In hindsight their attempts at escaping 'the empire on which the sun never sets' seems both admirable and near futile. Nevertheless, those trekkers that settled in the area between the Vaal and Orange Rivers would only live self-determined for 5 years. In 1848 the British unilaterally annexed this territory, thenceforth known as the Orange River Sovereignty (Stapleton, 2010:31). While the trekkers fought British encroachment their resistance was in vain, albeit temporarily.

For these two groups were not the only warring parties in question. To this explosive mix were added a host of other 'peoples', with fighting over territory seeing the establishment of various alliances of convenience (even between the trekkers and the British). These 'peoples' included the Khoisan, Griqua, Xhosa, Thembu, and Sotho, to name a few (Stapleton, 2010:31-41). A near permanent state of conflict between these groups lasted almost 5 years, after which the British withdrew. With the trekkers the British concluded the Sand River Convention of 1852 – which recognised the independence of the trekkers in the Transvaal – and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 – which saw the Orange River Sovereignty revert back to the trekkers in the form of the Orange Free State (Stapleton, 2010:41).

What Figure 3.1 does not show however is the sheer proliferation of early-Afrikaner republics, either before, during, or after the Great Trek. Apart from the republics of Winburg, Potchefstroom, Natalia, the Transvaal, and Orange Free State already mentioned, further republics such as Gordonia, Upingtonia, Utrecht, Stellaland, and Goshen (amongst many more) also existed, albeit briefly (Grovogui, 1996:90; Webster, 2003:22). While some of these states have a reputation as the "liveliest republics ever formed" (Webster, 2003:22), for reasons of conciseness only the two most prominent ones will be briefly discussed. As the vast majority of *Voortrekkers* settled down in the new republics it became common to refer to them as Boers. Still, within the next century 'new' *Voortrekkers* would continue sating their *wanderlust* by settling in areas ranging from the Kalahari (in modern-day Botswana) to Patagonia (Russell & Russell, 1979:7; Brebbia, 2006:161).

Nevertheless, the Transvaal, formerly known as the *Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek* (or South African Republic), and the *Oranje-Vrijstaat* (or Orange Free State) were the jewels in the trekkers self-determination crown. That they were 'rough' or 'uncut' cannot be disputed. The Boers in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State had their self-determination buttressed by Britain in exchange

for their support of free trade and British monopoly over the ports on which they depended for essential goods (Giliomee, 1989:24). In so doing Britain managed to keep the Boer republics in its own "imperial orbit" (Giliomee, 1989:24), that is, while not controlling the republics *de jure* their economic dependence on the empire roughly achieved the same purpose. Yet again it proved near futile to attempt escaping the empire's reach.

Further hampering a united front against British encroachment were the divisions within Boer society. These cleavages were plentiful, found in language (e.g. Afrikaans versus English), class conflict (e.g. the landed 'patriarchs' versus *bywoners*, or landless Afrikaners), and religion (e.g. Dutch Reformed versus Reformed Churches), to name but a few (Giliomee, 1989:24-26). Republican consolidation was likewise hampered by near constant conflict between themselves and with local tribes (Evans, 1999:7; Knight & Embleton, 1996:15-24). Nevertheless, in the Orange Free State (and later in the Transvaal) a constitution was drafted and resulted in the establishment of a unicameral *Volksraad*, led by a chief executive (through the office of the president), and to be elected by adult white males whom were registered for military service (Cottrell, 2005:40). Furthermore, the Orange Free State constitution also enshrined press freedom and equality before the law (Cottrell, 2005:40). The republics came close to unification in 1860 when Martinus Wessel Pretorius ascended to the presidency of both republics simultaneously, yet Boer separatism ultimately prevailed (Cottrell, 2005:41).

While a modicum of normality appeared on the horizon the Mineral Revolution would ultimately provide a deathblow to the twin republics. The discovery of diamonds between 1867 and 1871 in the disputed region of Kimberly in the Northern Cape saw the "passing of the old order of things in South Africa" (Fairbridge, 1918:250). With the discovery foreign investment in the region became attractive, which in turn heralded the age of modern capitalism (and an unprecedented demand for labour) in South Africa (Butler, 2009:12). The process which saw Britain's hasty exit from the interior in the early-1850s was abandoned, and the empire yet again looked north. In the Transvaal a bitter and ultimately futile struggle against the Pedi created an opportunity for the British to annex the republic in 1877 – and in so doing flouting the Sand River Convention. Fuelled by whispers of shimmering gold veins in the Witwatersrand Britain moved swiftly to pre-empt any challenges to her control of the key mineral that was the gold standard (Worden, 2012:27).

While the republican Boers resisted the annexation it was welcomed by others. Indeed, the republic's émigré miners, bankers, and merchants, all recognised the profit potential only a confederated South Africa could bring (Worden, 2012:27). The schisms within Boer society temporarily migrated to the background, and a common enemy created a common cause. And as so

many times in global history the imposition of a specifically British tax on her colonial subjects would result in armed rebellion. The Transvaal's Boers were up to the annexation exempt from any taxes, and Britain's attempts at capturing those Boers guilty of evading payments to the crown led to armed mutiny in 1880 (Stapleton, 2010:75). In Afrikaner history this conflict is often referred to as the *Eerste Vryheidsoorlog* (or First War of Independence), as well as the First Anglo-Boer War.

The conflict was an unpopular one, both in South Africa and Britain. Troubles in Ireland and British losses in the Transvaal meant that there was little fervour in Britain for continuing the war, while the Cape Dutch reacted with a marked increase in nationalistic sympathy towards their northern kith and kin (Stapleton, 2010:77). Even the relatively peaceful Orange Free State was moving towards belligerent status as her population likewise agitated on behalf of their northerly neighbours (Stapleton, 2010:77). While peace feelers were being extended from both the Transvaal and Britain, events in early 1881 would ultimately decide the outcome. A crushing British defeat at Laing's Nek in January 1881 was swiftly followed by another the following month when the republican forces triumphed atop Majuba Hill (Van Hartesveldt, 2000:2). Britain's ruling liberals – for both ideological and fiscal concerns – sued for peace and the Treaty of Pretoria was signed in April of the same year (Van Hartesveldt, 2000:2).

Yet the currents of the Mineral Revolution would soon become an unstoppable torrent, one that would finally erode the sovereign Boer republics. The discovery of gold in 1886 beneath the Transvaal made the Boers the richest nation in the entire region. While this in itself was a challenge to British hegemony and the balance of power, there were fears that this wealth could be utilised to completely secure South Africa solely for the Boers (Farmer, 2015:78). To British paranoia even the Cape Dutch came to resemble a fifth column in such a scenario, a far cry from the loyal subjects of yesteryear (Farmer, 2015:78). Added to this dangerous mix was uncertainty over the Treaty of Pretoria which concluded the "only consistently unsuccessful campaign waged by the British army during the Victorian era" (Knight & Embleton, 1996:39). Furthermore, European imperial expansion, and the likes of Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit (of the De Beers Mining Corporation and Barnato Diamond Mining respectively) were creating new threats which would ultimately have to be addressed (Van Hartesveldt, 2000:3).

The Treaty of Pretoria – while securing the sovereignty of the Transvaal – nevertheless bestowed upon Britain undefined suzerainty over the territory. While the Boers were delighted with their apparent victory against the empire their English-speaking neighbours in the Transvaal were incensed. They were fully committed to the British cause, and Britain's subsequent suing for peace and retaining of an undefined sovereignty over the Transvaal soured Boer and Brit relations for

decades to come (Knight & Embleton, 1996:39). After the Berlin Conference of 1884 European expansion into the region further complicated matters, with fears that imperial Germany specifically could foster closer ties with the Boers and in so doing check British manoeuvre (Evans, 1999:8). As if confirming British suspicions, President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal closed the Vaal railway crossing linking the Cape Colony and his republic, relying instead on the railway line being constructed between the Transvaal and the Portuguese port at Delagoa Bay (Evans, 1999:8).

The sons of the empire would have none of it. Rhodes himself drummed up colonial support and managed to call Kruger's bluff by successfully threatening the republic. Furthermore, with his vision of empire stretching from Cape to Cairo Rhodes needed to ferment a rebellion that would finally rid him of his Boer adversaries (Evans, 1999:9). This was an opportune time for Rhodes to champion the rights of the *Uitlanders* (or foreigners). These were the masses of miners, magnates, and workers whom flocked to the Boer republic after the discovery of gold. While being harshly taxed by Pretoria the *Uitlanders* were nevertheless denied civic rights and political representation (Castle, 1976:6). While championing their cause Rhodes decided on a "classic piece of naïve adventurism" (Thompson, 2000:115) to alter the South African reality.

The Jameson Raid – as history came to know it – was yet another ignominious failure in Britain's otherwise astonishing military record. In 1895 Rhodes (who would become prime minister of the Cape Colony 5 years later) enlisted his friend Leander Starr Jameson to spearhead a small invasion force into the Transvaal, while the *Uitlanders* within Johannesburg and surrounds were encouraged to take up arms and help overthrow the republic (Berger, 2009:80; Cottrell, 2005:53). When Rhodes realised that the *Uitlanders* were too busy fighting amongst themselves instead of against the Boers he decided to call off the campaign, but it was too late. Jameson and his men had already crossed into the Transvaal, where they (and indeed the *Uitlanders* too) were successfully routed through coolheaded republican manoeuvring (Cottrell, 2005:54). The failure of Rhodes and his nascent mining lobby (also known as the Randlords) to topple a democratically elected government severely worsened already strained regional tensions (Worden, 2012:33). However, in the greater scheme of things the Jameson Raid was merely a temporary setback. The rand was a prize too grand to abandon.

The Anglo-Boer War, also known in Afrikaner history as the *Tweede Vryheidsoorlog* (or Second War of Independence), broke out on 11 October 1899. Apart from the persistent *Uitlander* question – and the Transvaal's vast mineral wealth – various theories exist about why these two 'peoples' would meet on the field of battle. Regarding the *Uitlander* and gold arguments the "'two level' 'proconsular interlock' model" (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:38) offers noteworthy insights into the fog

66

of this South African War. In the first instance, the wealth created by the burgeoning mining industry stimulated pressures for both political and economic change – the Kruger government was seen as a hindrance to greater control of the gold and the *Uitlander's* rights cause could be utilised to abolish Boer government (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:38-39). English settlers could then move into the newly created vacuum and enable the creation of a "larger British dominion of South Africa" (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:39).

The wealth of Johannesburg's mines were remarkable enough to peak interest in London. In the second instance London feared that Pretoria could utilise her newfound wealth to dominate South Africa both economically and politically, and as such threaten Britain's regional ascendancy (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:39). To be sure, as the Transvaal edged closer to total independence from Britain through the completion of the Delagoa Bay rail route, "it was clear to [Sir Alfred] Milner and the Colonial Office that early intervention on the issue of British settler rights was the only effective means of asserting control over the Transvaal" (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:39). Milner himself played a key role in this war, largely due to his influence as the "British government's proconsular 'man on the spot'" (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:38).

Milner also served as an enabler where the interests of the mining sector and those of the decision makers in London could overlap. In the third instance the model holds that both of these parties yearned for the total political transformation of the Transvaal, and that this aim could best be achieved through *Uitlander* enfranchisement – a view encouraged by Milner (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:39). Indeed, Milner could skilfully utilise his position "at the point of interlock between the centre [Colonisers] and the periphery [Colonised]" where he "was able to build up the *Uitlander* issue and shape events in a way that made war almost inevitable" (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:39). However, not all scholars are convinced that *Uitlander* rights and mineral envy are useful concepts in understanding the *casus belli* at the heart of this unfortunate close to the Nineteenth Century.

One dissenting view stresses the importance of the Cape sea route to Britain's global strategic policy. To be sure, the British Empire would be dealt a neck blow had she been severed from Australia, Singapore, Ceylon, Mauritius, and 'the jewel in the crown', India. For scholars such as Leopold Scholtz (2005:1-6) the primacy and securitisation of the Cape is evident in all of Britain's South African machinations since her seizure of the colony in 1795 to the aftermath of war in 1902. While India then was the *primus inter pares* of Britain's colonial possessions the Cape was described as "the lynch-pin of the British Empire" (Scholtz, 2005:5). More succinctly put, in order to safeguard India the Cape sea route had to be secured, which in turn was dependent upon British supremacy in southern Africa – the Boer republics had to be eliminated (Scholtz, 2005:5).

For the Boers however the war was fought for entirely different reasons, with self-determination being primary. According to Scholtz the republican's only aim was "the retention of their sovereignty […]. They merely wanted to preserve their independence" (2005:6). An analysis of the Boers' war plans has revealed that territorial expansion played no role in republican decision making, merely the retention of their *status quo* (Scholtz, 2005:6). It was then with this in mind that President Kruger declared war in 1899 through a pre-emptive strike on British forces, with the two Boer republics marshalling roughly 70,000 commandos (later to be joined by 13,000 Cape Dutch and Natal volunteers) under the leadership of generals such as Jan Smuts, Koos de la Rey, Christiaan de Wet, and Louis Botha (Evans, 1999:10; Stapleton, 2010:89-92). The Boers would initially at least not have to fight alone. Through a "devotion to the cause of freedom" – and no doubt a "distaste for Britain" (Evans, 1999:13) – the republican forces were joined by Jewish, German, Dutch, Irish, Russian, Greek, Italian, French, and American volunteers, numbering roughly 2,000 (Stapleton, 2010:89).

During the initial stages of the conflict Britain's victory appeared all but secure. The process of marshalling the full force of her vast empire was still underway, even though most commentators declared that the war would be "over by Christmas" (Castle, 1976:7). Under the Commander-in-Chief of South Africa, General Sir Redvers 'Reverse' Buller, Britain's early progress during the war could best be summed up by her misfortunes during Black Week. British forces faced defeat after defeat, with republican victories at Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso. As a result Buller was swiftly replaced by Lord Frederick Roberts, whom would successfully reorganise the British war effort in South Africa (Knight & Embleton, 1996:34). By February 1900 the British juggernaut's failures were reversed and the war entered a new phase, with the capital of the Orange Free State (Bloemfontein) falling in March and the Capital of the Transvaal (Pretoria) in June (Knight & Embleton, 1996:36-37). The republican cause appeared yet again a hopeless one.

To counter these reversals the Boers embarked on a guerrilla campaign, the consequences of which would cost the republicans dearly. At this stage of the conflict many burghers had given up the fight, and estimates put the numbers of republican guerrillas at about 25,000 (Fremont-Barnes, 2003:60). Boer guerrilla tactics soon proved successful, with the British countering by proclamation that in those operational areas where Boer forces destroyed infrastructure British forces would retaliate by destroying Boer houses and farms through torching (Fremont-Barnes, 2003:60). This form of retaliation would be utilised as legal precedent one year later when Lord Herbert Kitchener made the scorched earth policy official, in conjunction with internment and containment (Fremont-Barnes, 2003:62). The vagaries of war would now be equally distributed throughout the entire republican sphere, and not just burdened upon her fighting men.

The destruction of Boer property (e.g. houses, farms, livestock, and belongings) through the scorched earth policy created a refugee crisis. The British tried to remedy this situation not by halting their targeting of civilian property, but by the creation of numerous concentration camps throughout South Africa. Into these camps poured primarily Boer (or sympathiser) women and children, as well as large numbers of Black and Coloured Africans. With the camps being mismanaged, "insanitary and disease ridden" (Wilkinson-Latham, 1977:13) – as a source sympathetic to the British cause describes it – Boer fatalities would eventually number "27 927, of whom 26 251 were women and children under the age of sixteen" (Scholtz, 2005:124). Estimates of Black or Coloured fatalities hovers around 13,315 in total, even though this figure is harder to ascertain due to few or no records being kept (Scholtz, 2005:124). By 1902 even the Boer *bittereinders* (irreconcilables) realised that further resistance was suicidal.

The Treaty of Vereeniging was signed on 31 May 1902, and with it the republics were no more. The suppression of Boer self-determination was achieved at a heavy price, one paid disproportionally by the vanquished. The Boers, having "fought for ideology-nationalism and freedom (though not necessarily freedom for all)" during the "Last of the Gentlemen's Wars" (Van Hartesveldt, 2000:31), could be forgiven for thinking that there was nothing gentlemanly about the war's final and most destructive phase. The Boers lost roughly 14,000 men, 30,000 farms, with 40 towns completely obliterated and a further 15 all but destroyed, while livestock losses appeared to be innumerable (Scholtz, 2005:123). During a six-month period in 1901 alone a single district in the northern Orange Free State lost "some 714 300 head of cattle, 1,000 bags of meal and 184 400 lbs of grain [which] were destroyed or confiscated" (Scholtz, 2005:123).

Britain's victory came to an equally heavy price, even though she was spared the destruction of national property that was ruthlessly meted out against the Boer republics. British imperial deaths numbered some 22,000, with 335,000 horses dead in conjunction with untold numbers of donkeys and mules (Fremont-Barnes, 2003:86). In sum the war cost Britain well over £200 million, a staggering amount at the time (Fremont-Barnes, 2003:86). The Anglo-Boer War also had repercussions beyond southern Africa. In Britain victory nevertheless brought about a "palpable sense of loss of moral authority" (Furedi, 2014:215), largely due to the tactics the British employed. Rather ironically 44 years later during the Nuremburg trials British judges and prosecutors helped convict Nazi war criminals in part for their use of concentration camps (Ehrenfreund, 2007:70). Nevertheless, with the war won it was necessary to secure the peace.

3.2.3   Nation(s) Building, Part I: The Union Era (1902 to 1948)

The Second War of Independence had fundamentally altered the entire landscape of South Africa. While it was clear to the Boers that their republican era had ended it was less obvious that plans were already in motion for the unification of the (white) peoples and territories comprising the region of South Africa – for that is all that South Africa was then, a patchwork of peoples and their spaces. Spearheading post-war reconstruction Milner intensified colonial control of the newly acquired Boer territories while also enacting a policy of social engineering, one designed in the sole service of the region's embryonic capitalist economy (Worden, 2012:35). The post-war era would be one of unification, though not without resistance.

While it was officially hoped that British immigration to the newly acquired crown colonies would be sufficient enough to dwarf Boer demographics this proved to be a pipedream. The British authorities set about returning Boer families to their ruined farms through land resettlement schemes, the main purpose of which was the "reconstruction of agriculture to provide food for the urban areas and ensure a profitable and stable local economy" (Worden, 2012:36). Consequently the Milner administration provided the Boers with the agricultural training and capital earmarked for the English settlers that never came, in conjunction with £3 million for Boer losses suffered and promises that the native suffrage question would only be answered when the territories acquired self-government (Worden, 2012:36; Cottrell, 2005:57). The issue around native suffrage was not a new one, and by not acting on it the British wished to show the Boers the benefits white unity and cooperation could bring (Worden, 2012:37).

Whereas the Boers were theoretically beaten the demographic reality in the two new colonies meant that where the republicans had failed on the veldt they could make up for through the ballot. As such the "outcome of the war was by no means decisive" (Worden, 2012:36). This point is illustrated through the 1907 electoral victories of the Boer dominated *Het Volk* and *Orangia Unie* parties in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony respectively, barely 5 years after the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:69; Klotz, 2013:126). It should however be stated outright that the British did not anticipate a Boer electoral victory in the new colonies. The British planned the electoral system in such a way as to assure a minor British majority, and when the election results were announced a stunned Milner is purported to have murmured that the British establishment has "given South Africa back to the Boers" (quoted in Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:69).

The seeds of a future South Africanism were being sown, yet it would be roughly eight decades before this social engineering project would include those not classified as White. Leading Cape politicians such as the infamous Dr Jameson and his Cape Dutch counterpart, Jan Hofmeyr, were

both actively agitating for South African unionism as far back as 1906 (Fairbridge, 1918:307). As the idea spread and became popular the four colonies proved fertile for dreams of union. After various conferences a unity of purpose arose, one amongst former enemies in a 'country' still very much divided. Leading Boer figures including Smuts, de la Rey, de Wet, and Botha joined their English counterparts such as Sir Henry (afterwards Baron) de Villiers and Dr Jameson and together agreed that union was preferable (Fairbridge, 1918:311). A draft constitution was enacted in 1909 that unified the colonies under a single government and assigning various functions to each of the former capitols (Fairbridge, 1918:311).

The Union of South Africa was formally established in 1910. It comprised the former colonies of the Cape and Natal, the former republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, as well as the remaining indigenous African kingdoms that had thus far successfully resisted imperial or republican encroachment (Younis, 2000:39). The wish of Rhodes had been fulfilled, eight years after his death (Marks, 2011:174). However, this reconciling act was only a mere semblance, deep-seated divisions within South African society remained (e.g. Boer/Brit, Black/White, Poor/Rich etc.). Boer women for instance, as the British politician Ramsay Macdonald described, "had forgotten nothing and forgiven nothing" (quoted in Marks, 2011:174). The scars of war run deep, yet not too deep to hinder possible advantage. Perhaps none better than Smuts could describe this sudden about face when he said that Boer and Brit were "two white Christian peoples' surrounded by 'barbarians' who had to be kept in their place" (quoted in Marks, 2011:175). With union then came protection, both equally pale.

From the start the Union was unlike any of the other British unitary dominions – largely due to "serious 'non-British' republican elements" (Lowry, 2000:168) – and as such one more akin to the Irish Free State than Australia (see Kornprobst, 2008:149). Indeed, as one scholar described (Lowry, 2000:188), during later years the Union and the Irish Free State were the odd couple in an otherwise carbon copy dominion:

> Apart from the memory of the Irish pro-Boer movement in Irish nationalism in 1899–1902, this relationship was based on the realisation that South Africa was the only other dominion which was dominated by former republican guerrilla 'generals' who had experienced near-annihilation, whose state had originated in what many nationalists regarded as an ignominious treaty, and who appeared to share an Irish love of land, language, faith (even if somewhat different), and republican patriotism. Not surprisingly, the state visit to Dublin in 1930 of the South African Prime Minister, General Hertzog, was the largest such ceremony of the interwar years.

The emergence of the Union set the blueprint for a future South Africa. According to Pierre du Toit and Hennie Kotzé (2011:36) two features of this union would prove key to the future state. Firstly,

the manner in which the disillusioned republicans had lost the war (e.g. scorched earth, concentration camps, etc.) fuelled their need for a sense of control over their political destiny, and the emergence of the apartheid state some years later "eventually became *the* instrument in securing this goal" (du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:37). Secondly, modelled along the lines of European imperialism the Union served as a conduit through which forms of state building were anchored in notions of cultural and racial superiority (du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:37). As such a future South Africa would necessarily be "a competitive oligarchy, with access to public participation determined by racial criteria" (du Toit & Kotzé, 2011:37), a "pigmentocracy" or "pigmentatorship", as Neville Alexander (2011:318) eloquently styles it.

The term 'Boer' was also undergoing transformation. After Union an ideal began to consolidate of *ware* (true) Afrikaners. This republican ideal gained traction after the 1912 split of the South African Party (SAP), led by Smuts and Botha, which in turn led to the creation of the NP under General Hertzog (Swart, 2006:855). These 'True Afrikaners' ostensibly enjoyed a Boer War record, were of Calvinist persuasion and spoke Afrikaans, even though many 'True Afrikaners' could not possibly live up to all these requirements (Swart, 2006:855). It would not be until the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 that the republican impulse to self-determination would again be stirred into action by the 'True Afrikaners'. The war would also be a litmus test for the newly constituted Union, an arena to prove where her loyalties lay. As one scholar remarked, "South Africa does not go to war easily. Of all the Dominions, she is the tardiest to respond to the call" (Calpin, 1951:417).

Smuts and Botha were eager to prove their imperial commitment, and perhaps even engage in a bout of territorial expansion. Nations are made and lost in the crucible of war, and it was hoped that a common South Africanism would unite the (white) Union in the face of a common external enemy (Bonner, 2011:270). South Africanism, like the majority of Political Science concepts, is not easily defined. However, for the purposes of this analysis South Africanism can be said to refer to the "patriotic colonial or dominion nationalisms" (Dubow, 2006:vi) that were common throughout the British empire in the twentieth century. It was the preeminent "expression of a developing settler society" and as such it "marginalized or denied the rights of indigenous" peoples (Dubow, 2006:vi). Furthermore, South Africanism's main aim was its "commitment to ameliorating tensions between Afrikaners and English-speakers by stressing common bonds of patriotism" (Dubow, 2006:vi), mainly through a focus on the Union's relationship with the empire. Based on this definition it is clear that Smuts and Botha were South Africanists at heart, a marked change from their republican persuasion a decade before.

However, few would have been able to predict that as South Africa entered WWI on the side of Britain, Afrikaner nationalism – as opposed to South Africanism – would be consolidated as a political force (Bonner, 2011:271). In any event, South Africa undertook the imperial task of wresting South-West Africa (SWA) from German control. A century of Afrikaner enmity towards Britain found new meaning, as a large segment of the Afrikaner population still remembered German sympathy during the Boer War with gratitude (Stapleton, 2010:116). Afrikaner nationalists, including many an NP member, were at the forefront of the brewing uprising, with prominent individuals such as De Wet and De la Rey envisioning a restoration of the republics (Bonner, 2011:272).

The 1914 Rebellion, as it would come to be known, was doomed from the start. The sudden and unexpected death of General De la Rey (amidst a host of conspiracy theories) caused the movement to lose considerable momentum, and swift action taken by Smuts and Botha against the rebels saw even the NP sympathising with the rebels instead of providing outright support (Stapleton, 2010:116). A force of 11,500 rebels was raised under Generals De Wet, Byers and Kemp, but they were no match for Botha's loyalist force of 32,000 men, who routed the rebels through a series of engagements (Stapleton, 2010:116). While some rebels did manage to join German forces across the SWA border (forming the Afrikaner Free Corps), these forces were just as swiftly beaten. With the rebels defeated, the Botha administration changed its position from one of hostility towards one of conciliation (Stapleton, 2010:118).

The 1914 Rebellion, though decisively quashed, was still able to provide a distinct advantage. The NP's sympathy with the rebel cause translated into 20 additional seats for the party after the 1915 election, an event preceded by a 7,000-strong Afrikaner women's march to the Union Buildings (in Pretoria) to demand a blanket amnesty for the rebels (Stapleton, 2010:118). Furthermore, the rebels were faced with crippling fines and civil damages claims. Nationalist sympathy yet again rallied to their cause, this time in the form of fund-raising drives to help alleviate the rebel burden (Giliomee, 2008:769). In 1917 these drives – which had manifested as *Helpmekaar* (Mutual Aid) associations – were able to fully dispose of all rebel debt, while more importantly aiding in the "development of an enormous sense of [Afrikaner] self-empowerment and achievement" (Giliomee, 2008:769). Afrikaner capital could now be mustered and utilised in great quantities, and was directed primarily towards serving Afrikaner interests (Giliomee, 2008:769). The 1914 Rebellion – while it failed on the battlefield – was nevertheless successful in other spheres, most notably in the "mobilisation of an impressive social force" (Verhoef, 2008:709). Here the parallels with the Boer War is striking, at least insofar as military defeat was swiftly followed up with political victory.

There were also currents of Afrikaner consolidation less visible, though equally important. In 1918 Afrikaner nationalism migrated from the farms and countryside to urban areas, when a group in Johannesburg formed the Afrikaner *Broederbond* (brotherhood) (Marx, 2011:138). After a rocky start after which the organisation decided to go underground, it would in time grow to become "increasingly influential as the guiding force of Afrikaans cultural nationalism" (Marx, 2011:138). Although it would not be for some time that this secretive organisation rose to the commanding heights that it later did, it is nevertheless necessary to note their emergence during this period in Afrikaner history.

Afrikaner self-determination in its new nationalist garb (as opposed to republican trappings) was now merely in its teens, so to speak. The distinction between these dichotomous ideational frameworks is vital, and one often overlooked by scholars. Indeed, a variety of published work appears to confuse the nationalist and republican Afrikaner 'philosophies' for being one and the same when they are not (for examples of such erroneous linkages see Anderson, 2006:75; Scholtz, 2005:74; Thompson, 2000:145; Horwitz, 2001:27). Nationalism, as described by Emerson, should be seen as the product of "a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future" (quoted in Johnston *et al.*, 2014:1). It is thus the ethos emanating from a defined group and utilised to reinforce national goals or provide vision, or both.

Republicanism, on the other hand, is much more concerned with the relationship between the individual and freedom. In essence, republicanism points "toward a distinctive theory of *citizenship* organized around the ideal of *non-domination*" (Laborde & Maynor, 2008:2). Boer republicanism – as advocated by former President Kruger – was seen as vital in counteracting British imperialism, and it emphasised a "passion for freedom" (Giliomee, 2003:234) exercised through proactive Boer citizenship in the politics of the two former republics. That this participation was limited to white males remains well documented. Republicanism, then, was the Boer's answer to British imperialism, or the extension of Britian's dominion over peoples and territories in the name of civilisation (see Matikkala, 2011:1). Between (circa) 1836 and 1902 republicanism and imperialism would be the dominant ideational battleground between South Africa's primarily white communities, even though none of the region's peoples would be spared its effects.

Only after the republics were defeated and the Union declared did this ideational battleground undergo flux and transformation into one featuring South Africanism and Nationalism, lasting from roughly 1910 to 1948, a fact reflected by the political realities of the day (e.g. SAP versus NP). The republican ideal could, however, be readily incorporated into nationalist rhetoric, a type of

ideational piggybacking. To illustrate, nationalists readily invoked the image of republican Boer women and their dying children in concentration camps to buttress whatever message they wished to popularise (see Krebs, 2003:78; Piombo, 2009:51). As the growth of Afrikaner nationalism intensified, so too would such republican co-opting, while Boer republicanism (or a wish to restore the two republics) almost entirely faded out of the South African political landscape.

During the interwar years then Afrikaner self-determination efforts would be driven primarily by the nationalist clique. The loss of the republics and the political realities it created meant that these self-determination efforts were more concerned with the Afrikaner's ability to self-determine (to the greatest possible extent) their political future than outright independence. Just as South Africa's ideational battleground underwent flux and transformation so too was this reality reflected in the political landscape. The SAP-NP rift temporarily disappeared in 1934 when the two parties merged into the United South African National Party under the leadership of Smuts and Hertzog, yet reasserted itself through the emergence of the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party* (Purified National Party) under D.F. Malan later the same year (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:20). Through his fusion with Smuts Hertzog embodied the "rejection of Afrikaner separatism" in favour of forming "an alliance with British capital interests" (Worden, 2012:99).

However, Malan's Purified National Party was imbued with noteworthy support through the mobilisation of key Afrikaner organisations. These include the *Broederbond*, the *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* (FAK, or the Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations), and the *Nasionale Pers* (National Publishing) group (Worden, 2012:99). Their efforts would be focused on the "political mobilization of Afrikaner ethnicity" through the deployment of Afrikaner capital, the entrenchment of Afrikaner culture, and the idea of the "need for *volkseenheid* (unity of the volk)" (Worden, 2012:99) across societal or class divides. The fruits of these efforts would be borne in the aftermath of WWII, more than a decade away. Figure 3 illustrates the flux and transformation of the Afrikaner body politic from just after the fall of the republics through to the end of apartheid.

Nevertheless, the single largest obstacle during this period related to Afrikaner poverty, a fact compounded by rapid urbanisation, increasing labour market competition from fellow South Africans, and the Great Depression from 1930 onwards. By 1904 only a mere 6 per cent of *Afrikanerdom* lived in towns, by 1960 that figure would rocket up to 76 per cent (Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:22). With poverty-stricken Afrikaners migrating to the towns *en masse* job competition (whether real or imagined) with their English-speaking and Black counterparts increased, with the former dominating the South African economic sphere (see Welsh, 2015:30; Butler, 2009:14). The contrast between the well-to-do English-speaking Whites and their Afrikaner

counterparts were striking. In 1932 the Carnegie Commission concluded that out of roughly "300 000 poor whites, the majority were Afrikaans speakers" (Davies, 2009:24). The problem of White (read Afrikaner) poverty would become a central organising principle for those concerned with the *volk*, or with the ballots this large group could cast.

The thirties would be *the* preeminent period of Afrikaner nationalist ascendancy, one best described through the seminal event of the 1938 *Eeufees* (or Great Trek Centenary). In commemoration of their *Voortrekker* ancestors Afrikaner organisations organised a Great Trek re-enactment that set out from Cape Town and journeyed through the South African hinterland towards their final destination at the newly built *Voortrekker* monument in Pretoria (Bonner, 2011:307). Here a crowd of one hundred thousand would be gathered to greet the incoming trek. The response from grassroots *Afrikanerdom* was "phenomenal", with the event "penetrating the popular imagination" through connecting Afrikaners to a "Christian-national interpretation of Afrikaner-saved history [which] became the most widely accepted version of civil theology" (Bonner, 2011:307). As the wagons moved ever northwards streets were renamed, '*Die Stem*' became a *de facto* national anthem, Afrikaner literature flourished, and Afrikaner city-dwellers even made the *Voortrekker* practice of open fire cooking (*braai*) fashionable once more (Heywood, 2004:23; Bonner, 2011:307).

The centenary celebrations stirred Afrikaner subconsciousness into action, and as with many such historic moments those who stood ready to direct this action were able to shape the future – to a large extent. Nationalist leaders were eager to explain the similarities between Afrikaner history then and the political realities of their day. These messages usually contained references to Afrikaners being a "people united by a common historical, racial, language, and spiritual bond", while also being "oppressed by British colonialism from above and threatened by Africans from below" (Horwitz, 2001:31). The republican defeat "made the Afrikaners second-class citizens of South Africa", with the loss of political self-determination also making Afrikaners "terrified that blacks would do what the British had done: render them a subject minority in the land of their birth" (Knox & Quirk, 2000:144).

These were powerful fears, and would in the near future serve as the driving force behind apartheid. Perversely then this policy would inflict on one which the other sought protection from. Nevertheless, an Afrikaner nationalist future was still at this late stage anything but assured. The clouds of war were yet again gathering on the horizon, and with it the uncertainties that largescale and violent conflict brings. In the period leading up to WWII many Afrikaners fell victim to the fascist message, not unlike their contemporaries in the fascist movements of states such as Britain, America, Brazil, and Sweden, to name but a few (see Griffin, 2011:108). In South Africa the

relatively small yet vocal band of fascists gathered under the banners of the *Ossewabrandwag* (OB, Ox-wagon Sentinel), *Nuwe Orde* (New Order), and the Greyshirts (Freund, 2011:232).

As the West mobilised for another war against Germany Afrikaners were yet again questioning their required participation and allegiance. This is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the parliamentary vote over participation in the war, with a vote of 80–67 in favour of active involvement on the side of the "imperial parent" (Stapleton, 2010:137). The vote also saw the pro-British Smuts return as prime minister of the Union, having then to fend off not only the Axis powers but also those Afrikaners either hostile to the war or wholly sympathetic to Germany's cause (Stapleton, 2010:137). Like their non-fascist forebears during the 1914 Rebellion these new Afrikaner rebels would fight an ultimately futile military campaign, and follow up their military defeat with significant political gains. The main extra-parliamentary and paramilitary opposition were to be found in OB ranks, while those within the political mainstream yet opposed to the Union's participation on the side of Britain gathered around the nationalist banner.

The OB, true to paramilitary form, chose to rebel through actions of sabotage. A subgroup within the OB, the Stormtroopers, "blew up power lines, post offices, shops, and banks, and beat up Jews and soldiers" (Berger, 2009:111). With its roots in the 1938 Centenary the OB was able to draw mostly poor, urban Afrikaners through its vision of a future South Africa, described as "a simple racist, totalitarian mode based on the German … fascist model" (Cottrell, 2005:77). As the prospects of a German victory dimmed the rank and file (some of whom were incarcerated under the Smuts government) of the OB fragmented and many returned to the nationalist fold (Freund, 2011:233). While there were initial linkages between the two organisations, Malan's NP nevertheless "fought an intense struggle for its very political survival" (wa Muiu, 2008:56) against the OB. Even after having rejected fascism as unchristian, "it was unclear which of the two—Malan's Christian nationalists or the OB—would emerge victorious" (wa Muiu, 2008:56).

History is clear over the victor, though arguably less so over the extent to which the two had fused. It should be noted however that to Malan, then at the NP helm, "radicalism of any sort was foreign to his nature" (Freund, 2011:233). Nevertheless, the NP continued to grow and included those whom had followed Hertzog into the failed fusion of the United National South African Party, with Hertzog now left out in the political wilderness (Thompson, 2000:184). In the election of 1943 the NP became the official opposition in a parliament dominated by the South Africanist United, Labour and Dominion parties, and with the help of the secretive *Broederbond* and a cornucopia of Afrikaner organisations the NP was set towards continued growth well into the post-WWII era (Thompson, 2000:184). Figure 3.2 below illustrates this evolution of Afrikaner political parties.

Figure 3.2 The Evolution of Afrikaner Political Parties (Adapted from Hyam & Henshaw, 2003:20)

3.2.4   Nation(s) Building, Interrupted: The Nationalist Era (1948 to 1994)

The Union period could best be described as one wherein competing visions over whom 'the people' are were contested in the midst of a process of nation building. In the republican period before that the answer was simple, primarily (republican) Boer in opposition to (imperial) Brit, and secondarily Black Africans. In the Union era this distinction shifted towards primarily (nationalist) Afrikaners in opposition to (South Africanist) Whites in general (both Afrikaners and English-speaking whites), and secondarily Black Africans. In the following era – a distinctly nationalist one – the process of nation building would undergo an *interregnum*. Smuts' vision of a united White South African nation appeared unable to withstand the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. The South Africanist ideal was lost to the nationalists in the midst of Afrikaner poverty (as opposed to English-speaking prosperity), and *swart gevaar* (black peril).

The rise of the NP was everything but meteoric. When it emerged as the official opposition in the 1943 election, it did so not on the shoulders of "far-right organizations, but from an alliance of voters who saw their own position threatened by the economic and social changes within South Africa of the war period and its aftermath" (Worden, 2012:101). As this "rather fragile alliance" of voters grew so too did the prospects of a nationalist victory at the polls five years later, even though an NP victory "was by no means pre-ordained" (Worden, 2012:102). Afrikaner nationalist growth during the 1940s was matched by liberal and African nationalist hopes, but in 1948 the nationalists (under Malan) – campaigning on a ticket of separate development – managed to defeat the South Africanists (under Smuts) by a slim majority. However, as Table 3.1 shows this was a majority of seats, and not votes – a distorted consequence of the then single-member constituency first-past-the-post electoral system. These distortions meant that the UP needed an astonishing 9,124 votes to win each seat, whereas the NP-AP needed a mere 5,683 votes for each of their seats (Welsh, 2015:33).

Table 3.1 The 1948 National Election Results (Adapted from Welsh, 2015:32)				
Party/Coalition	Leader	Seats	Votes	% of Total Votes Cast
Herenigde National Party	Dr. D.F. Malan	70	401,834	37,70%
Afrikaner Party	Nicolaas Havenga	9	41,885	3,93%
HNP-AP Total		**79**	**443,719**	**41,63%**
United Party	Jan Smuts	65	524,230	49,18%
South African Labour Party	John Christie	6	27,360	2,57%
UP-SALP Total		**71**	**551,590**	**51,75%**
Independents	Various	3	70,662	6,63%
Grand Total		**153**	**1,065,971**	**100%**

Had the electoral system placed a higher value on actual votes cast South African history may have been dramatically different. Indeed, a debate amongst some academics have focused on how racial discrimination was less poisonous before 1948, and how a UP re-election during this watershed year may have contributed towards racial accommodation – through social welfare and voting rights, for example (Giliomee, 2012:15). Nevertheless – with wishful thinking aside – Thompson (2000:186) describes the NP election victory and Malan's euphoria thus:

> On June 1, 1948, Malan arrived in Pretoria by train to receive a tumultuous welcome. "In the past," he said, "we felt like strangers in our own country, but today South Africa belongs to us once more. For the first time since Union, South Africa is our own. May God grant that it always remains our own".

Posterity would record the following half-century of NP rule as the apartheid era. While this analysis is not concerned with apartheid *per se*, it is nevertheless necessary to situate this malignant set of segregationist legislation into a self-determination perspective (for a comprehensive analysis of apartheid see Seekings & Nattrass, 2005:49; Dubow, 2014:1; Clark & Worger, 2013:10; Guelke, 2005:1). For as Giliomee (2012:15) explains, the real challenge is to be able to explain apartheid in the context of the period wherein it was propagated and enforced. This period should ultimately be seen as one of competing nationalisms (Afrikaner and African), both of whose ultimate goal relates to self-determination. While one (Afrikaner) nationalism sought to safeguard its national self-determination the other (African) sought to obtain it. Indeed, as far back as the Versailles peace conference have deputations from Afrikaner nationalists and the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) – renamed the African National Congress (ANC) in 1923 – agitated for national self-determination (Clark & Worger, 2013:25-28).

While both nationalisms shared a penultimate goal there were also distinct differences between its Afrikaner and African variants. A popular account of the apartheid struggle highlights how the African nationalists understood 'the people' as being a "voluntaristic" notion, where "citizenship should be admitted regardless of origin, race, or creed" (Adam & Moodley, 1987:28). In contrast the same account stresses Afrikaner nationalism as "objective", due to its belief in South Africa being "made up of many cultures and nations" (Adam & Moodley, 1987:28). One is thus born into 'the people', with membership closed to those not considered 'kith and kin'. Furthermore, the NP considered the self-determination of these objectively defined groups as "sacred, independently of the group members' perception of themselves" (Adam & Moodley, 1987:28). Apartheid thus imposed nationhood from above.

After the nationalists managed to secure the state from their pro-union contemporaries in 1948 the policy of apartheid thereafter came about as an Afrikaner bulwark against African domination. The

obvious irony was of course that a system of racial domination was created in order to protect the *volk* from being subjected to the same. Yet the NP realised that African demands for self-determination had to be accommodated in one form or another. As a consequence the *Tuislande* (or homelands, also disparagingly known as the Bantustan) system was introduced

The NP administration was a type of laager government, that is, one whose penultimate goal was to protect Afrikaner self-determination. This statement is important to note in the light of the policies the administration pursued, including (but by no means limited to) apartheid. During this era the leaders of *Afrikanerdom* implicitly understood that apartheid was "never a goal in itself", but rather "an instrument of Afrikaner nationalism" (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989:212). As the former NP government minister, Administrator-General of SWA, and *Broederbond* chair, Gerrit Viljoen (quoted in Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989:212), stated:

> Our policy of separate development is, to my view, no ideology, dogma or principle; it is an instrument or method, a road whose future course displays a certain openness, but which will always have as its goal or future destination the maintenance of our national identity.

Apartheid then combined with other instruments available to the NP leadership, in effect creating an arsenal to protect Afrikaner self-determination. The other instruments available to the Afrikaners included the armed forces, and even the state itself. For it was *their* armed forces (see Boulter, 2000:437), and *their* state (see Cox, 2002:201), as Giliomee (2012:10) noted. The Afrikaners had nowhere else to turn to, nowhere else to go. Indeed, unlike the Southern Rhodesians or *Pieds-Noirs* in Algeria, Afrikaners did not have a Plan B which could entail a retreat into the relative safety of a mother country (e.g. Britain or France). Afrikaner's bonds with Western Europe were broken centuries ago, and the isolation apartheid would wrought upon Afrikaners would severely undermine the few bridges between them and the West.

Further compounding this inward turn, and satisfying Afrikaner self-determination efforts, was the constitution of South Africa as a republic in 1961. In 1940 Malan declared that: "First we obtained self-government, later dominion status, but the spirit of Paul Kruger cannot be satisfied with that. The nation will not be satisfied before South Africa has a free, independent republic" (Vatcher, 1965:169). After the NP narrowly won the republican referendum, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd also oversaw South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and ultimately, the conclusion of a prime nationalist goal (Vatcher, 1965:173).

With the republic firmly in Afrikaner hands, the onus would switch from self-determination to self-preservation. The Cold War served as a chilling background in which Afrikaner self-preservation rested on the pillars of apartheid, and as stated previously, the South African Defence Force

(SADF) and the state itself. While apartheid protected Afrikaner social gains, the SADF was deployed both externally and internally to protect the *volk* against the so-called "rooi/swart gevaar" (Baines, 2009:22), or the dual threats of communism and African nationalism respectively. In time White South African society would become almost completely militarised, a necessity ensuring that the regime in Pretoria survived its own policies. White South Africa appeared as a monolith, united in a "Total Strategy" to survive what it perceived as a "Total Onslaught" (Truesdell, 2009:108) from communist expansion and the antiapartheid movement. Like Philippe-Joseph Salazar's portrayal of Afrikaner nationalist era monuments, the republic itself "was Spartan, closed in on itself and deaf to the world, decidedly not Athenian" (2008:157).

Yet the myth of a monolithic *Afrikanerdom* is all too readily accepted as truth. Throughout the Afrikaners "long history of internal strife and shifting intragroup alliances" (Louw-Potgieter, 1988:1) a clear tradition of dissent can be discerned. This tradition of dissent was imbued with the emotional fallout of defining events, including the Sharpeville Massacre (see Frankel, 2001:4), the Border War (see Baines, 2014:1), and the growing international isolation of the pariahs in Pretoria largely due to the global antiapartheid movement (Thörn, 2006:29). Indeed, in time this schism would be most pronounced between *verligte* (enlightened) and *verkrampte* (intolerant) Afrikaners. While the former agitated for fundamental change, the latter harkened back to the more extreme nationalist views of yesteryear (Frankental & Sichone, 2005:183). Both were responding to the realisation that change was necessary, yet they fundamentally differed in their opinion as to what course was best.

Change was indeed coming, yet commentators were divided as to whether it would be outright racial civil war on one end, or a negotiated multiracial democracy on the other. The untenable situation created by isolation, sanctions, and internal rebellion (both from South African Blacks and disenfranchised Whites) served as a conduit through which Afrikaner opinion could be moulded and swung into a new direction. A *verligte*, F.W. de Klerk, rose to the leadership of the NP and as state president enacted various reconciliation and transformation policies. The ANC was unbanned, Nelson Mandela released from prison, and the formal presumption of talks aimed at the transformation of the South African state was begun in earnest (Weiss, 2000:130).

Afrikaners were on the threshold of surrendering their political self-determination in favour of majority rule and a unitary state. Through the policy of apartheid its architects selfishly showed that they "understood the right to self-determination", however, they also severely "miscalculated the political modalities of its attainment" (Altbeker & Steinberg, 1998:59). Under de Klerk the NP leadership abandoned territorial self-determination, "not because it misconstrued the ethico-political

82

principles of democracy, but, on the contrary, because it was too ambitious in the modalities of their implementation" (Altbeker & Steinberg, 1998:60). In other words, while separate states for individual peoples may be desirable at the level of political ethics, "due to an unfortunate twist of fate" (Altbeker & Steinberg, 1998:60) it is not always implementable. In the South African case, as the former minister of foreign affairs, Pik Botha, remarked, "it was just too expensive" (quoted in Wintrobe, 1998:163).

For the Afrikaners the final step on the road to yielding their political self-determination was the 1992 referendum. It would be the last whites-only vote in South African history, and it was meant to gauge support for the NP government's continued negotiations on a new constitution for the future democratic state (Johnston, 1994:177). Roughly 85 per cent of the white electorate cast their ballots, with 68 per cent of white voters backing the NP's negotiating mandate (Johnston, 1994:177). White South Africans had finally crossed the racial Rubicon on the road to universal suffrage. It would – within the space of barely two years – lead to the election of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela as South Africa's first black president in 1994 and the founding of what would be popularised as the South African 'Rainbow Nation' (Manzo, 1996:73).

3.3 Concluding Remarks

The goal of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive historical overview of the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-determination. In doing so the second research sub-question was addressed, that is, what, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context? This historical overview of Afrikaner self-determination will now serve as a pool from which the following chapter can draw from in contextualising Afrikaner self-determination in its contemporary form. Within this chapter it was shown how a two centuries old pattern of an Afrikaner struggle for self-determination emerges with its roots in the Colonial Era (1652 to 1836). This crucial period serves as the fount of contemporary *Afrikanerdom* and its centuries old struggle for self-determination. In the Republican Era (1836 to 1902) the bitter struggles wrought over the South African landscape included Afrikaner self-determination attempts, having been won and lost numerous times. Boer republicanism eventually resulted in two young republics, only to be scorched by the flames of British imperialism and the dawn of South Africanism.

This South Africanism typified the Union Era (1902 to 1948), with the dying embers of Boer republicanism and its strong connection to self-determination causing minor difficulties for those with a firm belief in a common white identity and the building of a new, South African, nation. However, this nation building project was interrupted with the dawn of the Nationalist Era (1948 to 1994) and the ascendancy of the Afrikaner nationalists. Unlike their republican forebears, the

Afrikaner nationalist idea of self-determination now blanketed South Africa as a whole, a far cry from the two landlocked Boer republics. The nationalists would go on to buttress their self-determination through the policy of apartheid, and in doing so ultimately rob others of the right they claimed for themselves. Yet apartheid could not stand, and the majority's right to self-determination was reaffirmed at the dawn of the Majoritarian Era (1994 to -). With the historical groundwork laid, the following chapter will examine the broader nature of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination, and the conditions under which it persists.

Chapter IV: Afrikaner Self-determination in the Twenty-first Century

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 examined the historical development of self-determination, and provided a typological framework which is drawn from to enrich the subsequent self-determination analysis. Chapter 3 in turn provided an overview of Afrikaner self-determination aspirations situated within its historical context. This chapter then will answer the third research sub-question of identifying the broad trends and developments in contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action, and highlighting the factors that contribute towards stirring the aspirations of Afrikaner self-determination. In order to answer this sub-question three case studies are examined, using secondary data. Moreover, this chapter will further explore these broad trends and developments through an analysis of primary data collected from three key informant interviews.

It is recognised that these broad trends and developments do not occur in a vacuum. In order to understand contemporary Afrikaner self-determination currents, it is first and foremost necessary to be cognisant of the issues around which it can coalesce. To be sure, if the whole of contemporary *Afrikanerdom* were satisfied with the status quo there would be little interest in sustaining self-determination aspirations. While all South Africans are adversely affected by unemployment, crime, poverty, the economy, HIV/AIDS, corruption, and the delivery of basic services, other concerns such as inequality and land reform prove especially pressing for Afrikaners and their intimate connection with the former apartheid state. Moreover, questions around the use of the Afrikaans language, pressures on Afrikaner cultural heritage, affirmative action policies, and farm murders are especially relevant to Afrikaners and those that claim to represent their interests. Thus factors conducive towards the emergence and decline of self-determination aspirations will be identified to better understand the context of contemporary Afrikaner efforts.

4.2 Nation(s) Building, Part II: Challenges in the Majoritarian Era (1994 to -)

Almost exactly two centuries after the British seized the Cape from the Dutch their Afrikaner descendants voted themselves out of power, perhaps in the hope of emancipation from a troubled past or perhaps to protect what gains they managed to secure during NP rule. Afrikaners whom were once the majority in White South Africa now became a minority in the new multiracial and majoritarian state. More than two decades later – and whether at the international or state level – various challenges remain as a stumbling block to the realisation of "a universal [South African] nation, based on political equality and belonging" (MacDonald, 2006:108). It is to the legion of challenges facing South Africa that this analysis now turns.

4.2.1 Challenges at a Comparative Level

Figure 4.1 Key South African Fragility Indicators (Adapted from The Fund for Peace, 2017:17)

Comparatively speaking, at the international level the South African state has been subjected to a rapid decline. As figure 4.1 shows, data from The Fund for Peace's (2017:17) Fragile State Index (FSI) highlights a marked increase in factors conducive towards the weakening of the South African state, including a worsening of state legitimacy (P1), group grievance (C3), and the resultant pressures on the country's security apparatus (C1). When measured against other global actors, the South African problem becomes even more pronounced.

Indeed, as Figure 4.2 shows, South Africa now ranks as the sixth most worsened country within the FSI for the period of 2007 to 2017. To contextualise just how serious this increase in state fragility is, and with the exception of Senegal, South Africa is the most worsened country on the FSI not engaged in overt conflict – or bloody civil war (The Fund for Peace, 2017:17). What then could account for South Africa's movement from relative stability in 2007 to the FSI's warning category in 2017? According to the FSI dataset, the answer is best understood when accounting for the country's "economic challenges, societal divisions, and fractured leadership", and "an underlying interest in preservation of the status quo and diversion of attention away from the actual drivers of the country's woes" (The Fund for Peace, 2017:17).

Moreover, this data is reinforced by ordinary South Africans whom echo this increase of a negative outlook. Data from the Pew Research Centre's (2017) Global Attitudes Survey shows that South African parents for example are lowering their expectations for the future wellbeing of their offspring. When asked "When children today in our country grow up, do you think they will be better off or worse off financially than their parents?", a mere 44% believed that their children would be better off as opposed to 49% who believed they would be worse off (Pew Research Centre, 2017). When measured with previous polls, this 2017 dataset appears to confirm a steady increase in negative views originating in 2014.

Figure 4.2 The Fragile States Index: Decade Trends 2007-2017 (Adapted from The Fund for Peace, 2017:38-39)

4.2.2   Challenges at the State Level

In continuing with the challenges around which Afrikaner self-determination efforts can coalesce, no present challenge is more contentious than that of 'state capture'. This phenomenon can best be described as the seizure of public institutions and processes in order to accumulate power, and ultimately, ever more private wealth (Leitner & Meissner, 2017:1). In order for such a virulent strain of state capture to endure various conditions must be present, including "weak state institutions, legal uncertainty, rampant corruption and the detrimental behaviour of ruling elites, fostering their own business interests" (Leitner & Meissner, 2017:1). In the South African case, state capture has merged with societal divisions and a political elite whom preys on these divisions in order to divert attention away from their looting of the fiscus.

Central to this plot is the South African President, Jacob Zuma, his family, fellow ANC cronies, members of the affluent Gupta family, and foreign spin-doctors. Under the so-called "Zuma-Gupta nexus" an "illicit economic empire" has been created through the deployment of key ANC cadres into positions of power over various state linked enterprises – including the electricity public utility, Eskom, and the rail and port company, Transnet – which then enabled public funds to be diverted to Gupta-linked companies (Myburgh, 2017:262). Moreover, a UK public relations firm, Bell Pottinger, was hired as Gupta spin-doctors and amongst many other questionable practices engaged in a campaign of vilifying "white monopoly capital" in order to divert attention away from their billionaire clients (Neate, 2017). Not surprisingly this campaign caused a furore in a country still very much grappling with latent racial tension.

Moreover, the legacy of apartheid continues to endure and further complicates efforts of the social construction of a new nation and their state. Chief among these are issues related to inequality and land restitution (Maddison, 2016:154). Additionally, the inability of the ruling party to adequately address issues relating to unemployment, crime, poverty, the economy, HIV/AIDS, housing, corruption, and the delivery of basic services, remain pressing causes of concern (Schulz Herzenberg, 2012:136). The dual questions of inequality and land restitution warrants – due to their prominence – closer attention, especially insofar as the Afrikaners are concerned. South Africa is regularly cited as one of the most unequal societies on earth, and it is frequently assumed that "inequality is very highly correlated with race; the racial dimension of inequality is persistent; and it is the main stumbling block to nation-building" (Johnston, 2014:25). While there is an element of truth contained in this statement, it should be noted that after more than 20 years of ANC rule, state-led redistributive efforts have begun addressing these disparities (Johnston, 2014:25). Yet not nearly enough has been done to tackle the question of inequality in South Africa, and the deprivation

underlying these statements breeds "despair, hope, resentment, apathy, futility, and fury" (Lester, Nel & Binns, 2000:233).

Afrikaners are frequently singled out as responsible for these gross inequalities. Indeed, global discourse locates the origin of the country's inequalities to apartheid, and in South Africa itself Afrikaners and apartheid are regularly blamed for the current state of affairs (Oyedemi, 2016:189). The reality is far more complex. To understand the inequalities in South Africa today would require taking into account not only pre-1994 racial capitalism and exploitation, but also how post-apartheid democratic capitalism and its neoliberal agenda have hampered efforts at the redistribution of wealth (Oyedemi, 2016:190). Moreover, with the protection afforded by apartheid no longer in effect there has been a marked increase in white poverty levels, and by extension, in levels of inequality (Davies, 2009:2). Yet that a large segment of *Afrikanerdom* "still commands a vast material and cultural capital accrued under the previous dispensation" (Davies, 2009:2) remains clear in post-apartheid South Africa.

Regarding the question of land redistribution the picture is similarly troubling. Wide consensus exists that the pace of land redistribution is too slow, with the target of 30 per cent of available land in the hands of Black South Africans by 2014 never having been met, let alone approached (Campbell, 2016:126). For some of South Africa's Black population "the failure to carry out meaningful agricultural land reform is the cause of their enduring poverty, even if they are urban township dwellers" (Campbell, 2016:126). This fact highlights how the snail-paced process of land redistribution has taken on a mystique-tinged legitimacy, being "symbolic of the post-apartheid state's failure to transform the conditions of the poor" (Campbell, 2016:126). Populist politicians, including Julius Malema, the leader of the revolutionary socialist political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), frequently capitalises on such feelings of discontent connected to the question of land reform. Moreover, Malema has labelled White South Africans as the "enemy within", with Afrikaners specifically being targeted with vitriolic public statements including "dubul'ibhunu" - part of a song sang by Malema and others that translates into "Shoot the Boer" (Nyamnjob, 2015:47).

Besides the pressing nature of inequality and land reform – and the long list of social, economic, and political ills bedevilling the post-apartheid state mentioned before – not only do these serious challenges inhibit the formation of a common South African identity based on social inclusion and human dignity, but also serve as points of contestation around which the issue of Afrikaner self-determination can coalesce. In this regard it is necessary to briefly touch upon four further points of contestation, being the use of the Afrikaans language, pressures on Afrikaner cultural heritage,

Affirmative Action (AA) policies, and farm murders. Firstly, Afrikaners have had to come to grips with the relegation of their language, Afrikaans, to secondary or lower status.

The protection afforded to the Afrikaans language during apartheid has all but evaporated, notwithstanding the safeguard afforded it by the 1996 South African constitution. Indeed, Chapter 1 Section 6 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa explicitly states that "all [11] official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equitably", with the provision that "the state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance" the "historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages" (Republic of South Africa, 1996:4). Questions of what qualifies as an indigenous language notwithstanding, the *algemene taaldebat* (or the general language debate) has been gathering momentum in the post-apartheid state as the perceived retreat of the Afrikaans language has been observed from university campuses to radio and television shows (Brink, 2006:61).

Indeed, few observers would be able to deny the marked decline of the Afrikaans language within the public sphere. For some the retreat of Afrikaans can be described through benign neglect, for others it is as a result of an anti-Afrikaans agenda (Brink, 2006:61). Whatever the driving force behind the retreat of Afrikaans, it has resulted in a type of "trench warfare, every inch of territory being fought for – only to be grudgingly conceded in the end" (Brink, 2006:61). And nowhere is this battle more apparent than on the campuses across South Africa's universities, especially those universities which can be described as historically Afrikaans orientated. For some Afrikaners these historically Afrikaans universities are the "ultimate repository of Afrikaner identity" (Davies, 2009:87), and as such warrant protection. For others the use of Afrikaans as a primary language of tuition excludes fellow South Africans whom are not native speakers, and as such alternatives should be considered due to the pressures of fostering inclusivity (Lubbe & du Plessis, 2010:101). Moreover, Afrikaans is still sadly seen in some quarters as the "language of the oppressors" (McCormick, 2002:109), thereby undermining its defence or promotion.

Equally problematic is the question of Afrikaner cultural heritage. Afrikaner history does by no stretch of the imagination start with apartheid, yet for all intents and purposes remains tainted by it. From the changing of Afrikaans place names (e.g. Pretoria into Tshwane) to the removal of Afrikaner cultural artefacts (e.g. the Totius statue at the North-West University), the politics of remembrance playing out in contemporary South Africa proves divisive. The vandalism of Afrikaner statues across South Africa illustrates this point, with the Paul Kruger statue in Church Square, Pretoria, defaced on numerous occasions and necessitating its protection with the erection

of temporary fencing and police protection. For some Afrikaners such emotive episodes conjure up images of "cultural genocide" (ENCA, 2015).

Further muddying the already troubled waters is dissatisfaction with the ruling party's Affirmative Action (AA) policies. From a general viewpoint criticism against the policy has included accusations that, while necessary to foster growth and inclusivity, it merely replaces one elite with another and as such is not equitable (Naidoo & Savage, 1998:83). Moreover – and in conjunction with the challenges previously listed – the curtailment of opportunities for non-Black South Africans stimulates "emigration, which squanders cultural capital and undermines economic growth", which "in turn, generates crime, which fuels capital flight and the emigration of skilled people" (Louw, 2004:199). This vicious cycle remains as yet unaddressed.

Figure 4.3 Violent Conflict on South African Farms (Adapted from Graphics24, 2017)

Lastly, farm murders is another controversial and fiercely emotive issue, and unlike certain historic examples (e.g. the brutal killing of European descended farmers in Kenya during the Mau Mau Uprising), remains distressingly under examined (Mano, 2015:18). *Plaasmoorde*, as farm murders are known in Afrikaans, can however be defined in terms of its general trends. These include the facts that most "victims are white; [and] most perpetrators are poor, young black males" (Jones, 2013:201). Based on data provided by the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU), Figure 4.3 above shows the marked increase in farm attacks during the period of 2011 to 2016. The data thus far collected in 2017 buttress the notion of an upward trend, with 47 murders and 246 attacks recorded for the year to July (Graphics24, 2017). When comparing this upward trend in both attacks and murders, it is however surprising that a worrying increase in attacks have not resulted in an equally marked increase in murders. When considering the lack of a concrete rural safety plan guiding the efforts of the SAP, the suppressed numbers of murdered victims could be due to the better organisation of farming communities in response to the violent conflict besetting the South African countryside.

91

The motives behind these attacks remain muddied and shrouded in political sensitivities. Allegations of official complicity in farm murders –alluding to "an orchestrated, government-sanctioned attempt to purge South Africa of White landowners, as has already happened in Zimbabwe" (Jones, 2013:201) – remain unproven. For others, factors such as "revenge, fuelled by racism and envy" are the primary causes of farm murders, evident in the "extreme violence, including rape, torture and physical mutilation" of victims of farm attacks, "including in cases where theft of property does not take place" (Jones, 2013:201).

It should be noted that the aforementioned challenges affect all South Africans, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or even social status. The effects of crime in South Africa for instance are as evident in its numerous impoverished townships as it is in the leafy suburbs, while farm murders touch not only the affected families but also the workers on those farms. Moreover, while Afrikaner self-determination *can* coalesce around the challenges briefly discussed herein it is by no means certain that it does so in every instance. The fact remains that not all Afrikaners support the idea of self-determination, in whatever guise, and that many remain unconvinced regarding the feasibility of any self-determination attempts. Yet there are those who advocate for self-determination in one form or another. It is to these drivers of Afrikaner self-determination that this analysis now turns.

4.3 Key Afrikaner Self-determination Activists and Organisations

The roots of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts can be traced back to the negotiating process in the run up to the 1994 election. The Afrikaner far-right agitated for the creation of a *Volkstaat* (or people's state), an Afrikaner homeland, where whites would be in the majority (Fessha, 2010:84). Some of the suggestions raised from this quarter included "financial incentives to induce blacks to leave the *Volkstaat* once its borders were laid out, *Volkstaat* constitutional provisions entrenching an Afrikaner majority in the *Volkstaat* legislature, and inducing more whites to move to the new *Volkstaat*" (Fessha, 2010:84). While not successful in their attempts, certain provisions were however secured.

This was due, in large part, to the potential power of the Afrikaner far-right at the time. Having already threatened the negotiations, it was feared that they could further destabilise South Africa and as a result accommodation was sought (Fessha, 2010:84). This accommodation translated into two provisions, being the creation of a *Volkstaat* Council and, eventually, the incorporation of a self-determination clause into the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Regarding the former, the *Volkstaat* Council was essentially a stopgap institution tasked with the preparing of recommendations on cultural self-determination, including on the constitutionality of a proposed Afrikaner homeland (Fessha, 2010:84). When they were eventually released the recommendations

included that a *Volkstaat* be created containing an Afrikaner majority, proposals on the creation of a national Afrikaner council, and on the creation of autonomous regional Afrikaner hubs (Spence & Welsh, 1997:93).

However, the *Volkstaat* Council's report evidently found no responsive parliamentary audience, and the body was unceremoniously disbanded in 1999. In retrospect – some academics argue – the whole episode was nothing more than a charade, one cunningly designed to "emasculate the white separatists", and that "once the ANC felt confident that the security forces were sufficiently transformed to rule out any danger of armed rebellion" (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003:31) the council could be done away with. The council was eventually replaced by the creation of the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, a body clearly shorn of any overt ethnic affiliations (Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003:32).

Regarding the latter, a more lasting product of the negotiations was the eventual inclusion of a self-determination clause in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Chapter 14 Section 235 (Republic of South Africa, 1996:141) states that:

> The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.

While Section 235 in theory provides the scope necessary to exercise self-determination for any of South Africa's peoples, this may not actually be the case. Section 235 alludes not to a right, but merely that a "recognition of the notion of the right to self-determination is not precluded" (Henrard, 2002:211). Moreover, Section 235 is also subject to national legislation, which in effect "amounts to another safety valve for the ANC government to prevent the actual realisation of a *Volkstaat*" (Henrard, 2002:211).

It should be little wonder then that the idea of outright Afrikaner independence remains confined to a niche within Afrikaner society. That it remains at all is remarkable, especially in light of the formidable obstacles strewn over its path. Yet its advocates persist, dogged in their pursuit for an ideal that may turn out to be a mere pipedream. From online 'keyboard warrior' groups to parliamentary politics, and from ethnic 'enclaves' to a robust civil society, aspirations for Afrikaner self-determination in one form or another remain a defining feature of contemporary *Afrikanerdom*. However, a clear distinction can be made between those on the fringes of the struggle for Afrikaner

self-determination, and those at its core. It is to the fringes of Afrikaner self-determination that this analysis now turns.

4.3.1   A Pantheon of Minor Actors

The fractured nature of contemporary Afrikaner socio-political movements is perhaps nowhere more clear than in the sheer number of divergent groups. From political parties to online interest groups, these movements remain largely confined to the (far) right of the political spectrum. Examples include, but are by no means limited to, the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (or Afrikaner Resistance Movement) (AWB), *Front Nasionaal* (or Front National) (FN), *Boere Krisis Aksie* (or Boer Crisis Action) (BKA), and the *Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad* (or Boer-Afrikaner People's Council). To these comparatively larger – yet still minor – actors can be included a host of much smaller groups, including the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (or Reconstituted National Party) (HNP), the *Afrikaner Volksparty* (or Afrikaner People's Party) (AVP), and the *Boerstaat Party* (or Boer State Party) (BSP), amongst many more (see Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2016).

For reasons of brevity a detailed discussion of all of the above will have to be forgone, regardless of the colourful and often checkered history of many of the above groups. Yet when considering the question of Afrikaner self-determination it is important to briefly touch upon the first four groups listed above, being the AWB, FN, BKA, and the *Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad*. While the AWB is noteworthy only insofar as it presents the more unsavoury element of Afrikaner self-determination, the FN on the other hand presents a more recent phenomenon of an Afrikaner organisation 'piggybacking' on the popularity of a more robust movement elsewhere. The BKA in turn presents an intriguing look into the realm of online social movements, whereas the *Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad* is somewhat of an enigma in its reach, if not its actual capability, in the quest for Afrikaner self-determination. Each of these groups will be succinctly examined before progressing onto more viable actors.

Far-right groups such as the AWB are more popular in alternate history literature than they are on the contemporary South African political stage (Turtledove, 1993:1; Bond, 1991:1). Nevertheless, the neo-Nazi group has long been an advocate of Afrikaner self-determination, and while not as powerful as during its apartheid heyday it nevertheless manages to play its role as the white-right bogeyman. This was perhaps nowhere clearer than in the aftermath of the brutal murder of its long-time leader, Eugène Ney Terre'Blanche, and the subsequent reconciliatory remarks of political heavyweights calling for "peace, calm and cool heads" (Holomisa, 2012:216). While membership estimates remain vague, reports indicate 5,000 active members, and while this may appear insignificant it should be remembered that at the height of the Irish Republican Army's activities it

never had more than a couple hundred active members (Mail & Guardian, 2008; Schönteich & Boshoff, 2003:7).

The FN on the other hand is a relative newcomer to the South African political scene. Bereft of the paramilitary nature of groups such as the AWB, the FN instead mimics its French counterpart insofar as the party's identity is concerned. Evident admiration for Marine Le Pen aside, the party agitates primarily around the issues of farm murders and Afrikaner self-determination (Front Nasionaal, 2014). The FN participated in the 2014 National Election and garnered zero seats with 5,138 votes, a total of 0,03 per cent of all votes cast (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014). Time will tell whether the party will go the way of other fringe Afrikaner political groups or whether the ideational piggybacking of its more robust French counterpart will prove fruitful in the long run.

Closely related to FN is BKA, a grassroots organisation with a significant online presence if nowhere else. Describing itself as a "political pressure group for self-determination and white interests in South Africa", the group utilises social media (primarily Facebook, with roughly 165,000 followers) to create awareness of issues affecting the Afrikaner community (Boere Krisis Aksie, 2016). Its value as a news source is apparent not only in terms of its online membership, but also in terms of its citation in mainstream news outlets where it is mentioned in relation to the dissemination of current information (ENCA, 2013(a); Daily Maverick, 2012; Independent Online, 2011). Moreover, the group also mobilises support for various initiatives, including Red October, that seeks to mobilise members of the Afrikaner community into protest over issues such as the protection of Afrikaner cultural artefacts, farm murders, and self-determination (Eyewitness News, 2015). While its support for political parties such as the FN has not proven fruitful it remains to be seen whether the BKA will have any noteworthy impact on the question of Afrikaner self-determination (see ENCA, 2013(b)).

A final minor actor to consider is the *Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad*. This group is composed of individuals elected to office through elections under the auspices of the *Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie* (or People's Council Electoral Commission) (VVK). The VVK was created in 2007 with the sole purpose of organising an independent election in which those Afrikaners concerned with self-determination could choose a representative body to advocate on their behalf (Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad, 2011). As a result of those elections the *Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad* came into being. While there is little to differentiate it from the plethora of similar peripheral Afrikaner self-determination groups, its most noteworthy achievement to date has been an official meeting between the group's leadership and the Deputy President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa (The

Citizen, 2014(a)). The meeting stemmed from a court application brought by the *Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad* on the matter of Afrikaner self-determination, and the government requested the meeting "to settle this issue through negotiations rather than litigation" (The Citizen, 2014(b)). While both parties agreed on negotiations the ANC government has as of yet not participated in any secondary round of talks (Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad, 2015). Time will tell whether these talks will bear any fruit, and while doubtful, the return of both parties to litigation could prove significant for the future of Afrikaner self-determination from a legal perspective.

As stated within the introduction, this chapter is primarily concerned with answering the third research sub-question of identifying the broad trends and developments in contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action, and highlighting the factors that contribute towards stirring the aspirations of Afrikaner self-determination. In order to answer this sub-question three case studies are examined, using secondary data. Moreover, the following three case studies will further explore these broad trends and developments through an analysis of primary data collected from three key informant interviews. The three case studies are built around the Orania Movement, The freedom Front Plus, and the Solidarity Movement, with key informant interviews from Carel Boshoff IV, President of the Orania Movement, Dr Pieter Mulder, the former leader of the FF+, and Flip Buys, the Chief Executive Officer of Solidarity South Africa.

4.3.2   Case Study I: The Orania Movement

For those Afrikaners seeking self-determination, the small town of Orania in the Northern Cape is their geographical expression. Founded upon the remnants of an abandoned housing site in 1990, Orania is a town like few others in South Africa. Orania is privately owned through a holding and shareholder company, and through the purchase of shares Afrikaners gain both living and usage rights to the properties owned (Schweitzer, 2015:37). The town currently has its own currency (the Ora), and a population of roughly 1,100 inhabitants, with a further 10,000 'outhabitants' (or partners not living on the premises itself). According to critics, of which the town has in abundance, the Afrikaner of Orania "advocates a retreat to the *laager* of survival and traditional Afrikaner values associated with modernisation", which clearly set them apart from their more liberally inclined kin whom are beckoned to "accept their African heritage and to harness it creatively in South African nation-building" (Kruger, 2000:133). Other criticisms include that it is a "strange little settlement", one with the "feel of an Israeli outpost in the Negev dessert" (Harrison, 2004:92) – or more dubiously – that it is a refuge for "racist Afrikaners […] determined to preserve their old ways and maintain apartheid" (Mwakikagile, 2008:91).

Such harsh accusations aside, the Oranians have presided over a series of small yet significant economic and political triumphs. These include the autonomous-inclined Oranians successfully having withstood official attempts at the incorporation of their town into a larger municipality, after founding refuge afforded in Article 235 of the South African Constitution (Cherry, 2012:49). Economically speaking Orania furthermore has the distinction as the biggest producer of pecan nuts in South Africa, in conjunction with local economic development activities which includes a variety of other commercial agricultural activities in a region that is largely economically marginalised (Schweitzer, 2015:37).

The Orania movement, as it is known, has even more ambitious plans. According to its 2016 Economic Development Plan, the group has earmarked funds for investment in infrastructure development, secondary and tertiary education, residential, commercial and industrial expansion, and information technology infrastructure expansion, with an eye on future investments that includes the establishment of an agricultural school, a local pension fund, and an import-substitution action plan (Orania, 2016:54-65). Whether or not the people of Orania achieve such remarkable goals remains to be seen, for it may well be the only viable territorial self-determination exercise in contemporary South Africa.

Firstly, as the President of the Orania Movement, Carel Boshoff IV was asked what he thought was the most significant milestone achieved by the Orania Movement on behalf of its Afrikaner supporters. Boshoff stated that he believed the symbolic and physical existence of the town itself stands as an achievement in this regard (Boshoff, 2017). As opposed to merely being a theoretical concept or static entity, Boshoff believes that Orania is the dynamic embodiment of Afrikaner self-determination built from the ground up. During this process to date, the town has withstood attempts at incorporating it into a neighbouring municipality, successfully implemented an ongoing process of development projects, growing its inhabitants from the low teens to almost 1,500, the maintenance of a high level of economic self-sufficiency, driven by a cooperative sense of community, and establishing what Boshoff referred to as the machinery of self-determination.

Secondly, according to critics – of which Orania has in abundance - the Orania Afrikaners are accused of propagating a flight back to the lagers of survival and traditional Afrikaner values. With a view to the future, Boshoff was asked how Orania helps in the modernisation of Afrikaners. He responded by explaining how the Orania experiment has made a break with the centuries old pattern of *Baasskap* (White lordship) and its relationship with Black labour, and how it revolutionised the notion of own (Afrikaner) labour, that is, Afrikaners doing the types of labour which the Black population have historically performed. Furthermore, Boshoff explained that Orania is not a

throwback to some supposed golden era, but rather the new foundation of a self-determining exercise with a firm focus on the future. That is not to say that there is no historical consciousness underpinning the movement, and Boshoff utilised a baggage metaphor explaining the movement's relationship with the past. People are frequently called upon to let go of their historical baggage. Yet very few people will ever travel without their baggage, Boshoff explained, for a very good reason; within that baggage they carry essential items necessary for their journey. And while necessary to keep that baggage in check – lest it become a hindrance – there are nevertheless essentials therein the traveller cannot do without. It is the same with the lager metaphor Boshoff explained, there are times during clear and present danger when the safety afforded by a lager necessitates its use, just as there are times when its protection is no longer necessary.

On the topic of Afrikaner modernisation, Boshoff remarked that the concept of a modern Afrikaner is not by itself an unqualified positive idea, as it cannot be divorced from the past injustices perpetrated by, and those suffered by, the Afrikaners. If modernity can be associated with large scale, centralist, and environmentally unfriendly ideas, Boshoff extrapolated, it becomes necessary to review our relationship with modernity and establish a new understanding thereof. In this respect Boshoff explained, Orania enables its supporters to establish just such a new understanding of modernity, one that is small scale and makes local economic development, self-reliance, food security, and environmentally friendly ideas and practises more appealing.

Thirdly, and staying on the topic of Orania's critics, Boshoff was asked to respond to the accusation that Orania is racist, and asked what the role of race plays within the Orania movement. He answered by stating that Orania stands in relation to South Africa as an entity which has not sufficiently dealt with the issue of race, and that those whom propagated the notion of non-racialism cannot be but disappointed at the course South Africa has undertaken in this regard. While old forms of Afrikaner racism are continuously being fed by the failures of the ANC government, whom Boshoff blames for a new racial dialectic which is directed towards Afrikaners as unwanted and unwelcome citizens in the new democratic state. Against this background the stereotyping of Afrikaners as racists should not come as a surprise. In regards to the role of race within Orania, Boshoff explained that Orania remains a culturally defined community, and not a racially one – a reality with strong constitutional links. Constitutionally and organisationally speaking, race can be no factor within Orania's framework, and all prospective residents are invited to spend some time in the town before committing to becoming inhabitants to see if they would be able to culturally acclimatise to the Orania environment, and no guarantees exist that fellow Afrikaners – or indeed any South Africans – will find either success or failure within this process. Because of Orania's focus on being a culturally focused movement, there are many whom would not feel culturally

inclined to be a part of such a specific movement, not because of the colour of their skin, Boshoff said.

Fourthly, Boshoff was asked what he believed to be the single biggest failure of the Orania movement. He responded by relating the question of failure to one of expectations and context. Within the context of the late 1980's to the early 1990's, Boshoff explained, the early leaders and associates of the movement favoured the idea of a territorial nationalist state, one smaller than South Africa but constructed along a similar pattern. The expectation of creating such "a chip off the old bloc" was a miscalculation, Boshoff believed, with the commitment of Afrikaners to the South African state regardless of its changing character or nature trumping their earlier considerations. As a result, Boshoff stated, it was necessary to construct a new self-determination movement from the ground up, one with a new political discourse, goals and aims, and divorced from its twentieth century nationalist roots. In effect, Boshoff believes, Afrikaners had changed, and so too would the Orania Movement if it were to continue safeguarding Afrikaner interests.

Moreover, Boshoff explained that, historically speaking, three types of Afrikaners can be identified. The first Afrikaners are those born of the Great Trek and the Boer Republics, a people with a self-conscious identification of being a *volk*, or a people. Their conditions for continued existence as one *volk* came to an end at the close of the Anglo-Boer War and the start of the new mineral based economy in South Africa. The second type of Afrikaners – or modern Afrikaner as Boshoff describes them – are those that came in the wake of these tribulations and whom rediscovered and redefined themselves in terms of urbanisation and the modern economy. Like the first Afrikaners, the second Afrikaners lost their identity when conditions yet again fundamentally changed, however, these Afrikaners were wedded to their South African state body and soul, and when their state disappeared so did their soul, Boshoff explained. Today a third type of Afrikaner is emerging from movements such as Solidarity and Orania, one who – while not knowing what his political future looks like – nevertheless wants greater self-determination. In regards to Orania's biggest failure, Boshoff explained that the movement focused too much attention on the second type of Afrikaner while not recognising that a third type has emerged. When asked how this realisation of a third type of Afrikaner has impacted on their overall strategy, Boshoff explained that it fundamentally altered their frame of reference, and made them realise that the hope placed on the second type of Afrikaner to understand the benefits of greater self-determination was misplaced and futile. New energy could now be focused on a smaller scale to symbolically and practically show these new Afrikaners of the benefits of greater self-determination, without the political and ideological baggage of their predecessors, Boshoff explained.

Finally, Boshoff was asked what he believed to be the single greatest threat – and greatest hope – of today's Afrikaners. He utilised the term of an existential threat, one intimately linked to the Afrikaner identity. Many Afrikaners chose to move to countries where their Afrikaner identity could not negatively impact on their lives, Boshoff stated, while a critical mass chose to stay in South Africa while congruently reaffirming their Afrikaner identity. As far as a critical threat goes, Boshoff utilised the example of Rwanda. While the mass-murdering of Tutsis was underway, the world was instead focused on the South African miracle. The lessons to be drawn from the Rwanda experience, Boshoff argues relates to the similarities between its Tutsi population and their Afrikaner counterparts elsewhere on the African continent. Both are minorities, both are geographically spread out over their respective regions, both were formerly politically dominant groups, and both are equally recognisable and identifiable groups.

These four shared characteristics, Boshoff stated, places both groups at risk. Their relatively small numbers, geographic dispersion, scorned because of previous political dominance, and ease of identification and thus 'nowhere to hide' if needed, are all factors conducive towards their risk profiles. Further complicating these factors is the visible difference between Afrikaners and the majority of their fellow countrymen. Afrikaners are mostly in a relative better economic position than their fellow South Africans, and this fact is constantly utilised as a signifier of the failure of the majority of South Africans to reach a similar level of affluence. Moreover, with the cessation of the commodities boom and the financial crisis of 2008, the increases in wealth and living standards experienced by many South Africans have come to an abrupt end, while their expectations have not similarly followed the downward curve. These high levels of expectations create tension between hopes and reality, Boshoff explained, and makes the White population stand in stark contrast to the majority of their black counterparts.

The increase in expectations with little hope to realise them – in conjunction with the four shared characteristics described above – creates a significant security risk insofar as the Afrikaners are concerned. In order to address this risk, Boshoff believes that it is necessary to adopt a strategy of concentration; both the concentration of interests and physical concentration. The only other option is retreat, Boshoff stated, with Afrikaners already in demographic retreat, and that this prospect does not endear hope. However, retreat becomes a viable strategy only when the prospect of regrouping is pursued. In this regard, Boshoff said, Orania can serve as a focal point of regrouping in order to safeguard Afrikaner interests. Insofar as hope is concerned, Boshoff identified the increasing awareness and enterprise of Afrikaners in this regard as a key factor, with Afrikaners no longer being mere victims of circumstance but rather opting to self-determine their lot in life.

The interview with Boshoff highlighted a plethora of interesting developments in Afrikaner self-determination. Most significantly, however, was Boshoff's explanation of the changing nature of the phenomenon and Afrikaners relationship thereto – typified by his classification of the three types of Afrikaners – and the realisation that contemporary self-determination efforts had to take this changing nature of *Afrikanerdom* into account. Moreover, while Boshoff's threat analysis of the similarities between Tutsis and Afrikaners prove discomforting at best, his alluding to the enterprising nature of Afrikaners and an increasing of awareness of their relationship to broader South African currents does indeed endear a sense of hope. Try as they may, Afrikaners have never stood apart from these broader currents, be they social, political, or economic, and Afrikaners will do well to remember that retreat – whether into the 'lager' or comfortable denial about the daunting challenges they and their fellow South Africans face – are not necessarily the only viable strategies for such challenging times.

4.3.3   Case Study II: The Freedom Front Plus

Of all the contemporary Afrikaner political parties discussed in this chapter the *Vryheidsfront Plus* (or Freedom Front Plus) (VF+) is the most significant. However, it should be remembered that Afrikaners are a minority in South Africa, comprising roughly 5,2 per cent of the total South African population with 2,710,461 individuals (Statistics South Africa, 2011). As such – when viewed against the broader political movements in South Africa – the VF+ pales in comparison to say, the ANC or Democratic Alliance (DA). Yet it remains as the only mainstream Afrikaner political party with parliamentary representation. The VF+ was born with the 1994 dispensation. Its founder, General Constand Viljoen (retired), broke ranks with his former colleagues in the *Volksfront* (People's Front) after the latter's decision to boycott the 1994 elections (Goodwin & Schiff, 1995:249). Viljoen represented the Afrikaner conservative element willing to engage with the new government in order to safeguard Afrikaner interests, and he is frequently commended for having stayed his hand when the prospect of a race war threatened to bring the transition to a screeching halt (News24, 2001).

Since its formation in 1994, the party has participated in all the major South African elections. Nationally speaking the VF+ received 424,555 (9 seats) in the 1994 general elections, 127,217 (3 seats) in 1999, 139,465 (4 seats) in 2004, 146,796 (4 seats) in 2009, and 165,715 (4 seats) in the last general election of 2014 (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 1994; 1999; 2004; 2009; 2014). The barely visible growth of total share of votes received since 2004 aside, the party appears to have plateaued in support under its former leader, Pieter Mulder, whom took over from Viljoen in

2001. Mulder also served in the ANC-led government as Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries from 2009 until 2014.

Moreover, the party officially stands as the champion for Afrikaner self-determination. The VF+ was instrumental in the inclusion of the self-determination clause into the new South African constitution, largely due to Viljoen's participation with the transitionary regime (Spence & Welsh, 1997:91). Moreover, the party's mission statement directly acknowledges the importance it attaches to self-determination by claiming that it (Freedom Front Plus, 2013):

> [I]s irrevocably committed to the realisation of communities', in particular the Afrikaner's, internationally regocnised [*sic*] right to self-determination, territorial or otherwise; the maintanance [*sic*], protection and promotion of their rights and interests, as well as the promotion of the right of self-determination of any other community, bound by a common language and cultural heritage in South Africa.

In this statement the VF+ echoes the South African Constitution insofar as its self-determination clause is concerned. Yet, according to Mulder (2014), self-determination "cannot be bought from the shelf and there are different self-determination phases that have to take place for the end-goal to be reached". While not directly elaborating on what these phases may be, it is possible to formulate the VF+'s approach through examining its 2014 Election Manifesto. In it the party proposes the creation of a National Afrikaner Council to oversee Provincial Afrikaner Councils – with membership to be determined through nationwide elections – while adhering to the principle of freedom of association insofar as Afrikaner membership and voter registration is concerned (Freedom Front Plus, 2014). Moreover, institutions, whether private or public, should be allowed to associate themselves with these councils "without subsidies being affected" (Freedom Front Plus, 2014). In doing so, the VF+ contends, these bodies will not be dissimilar in their nature to those such as the national and provincial houses of traditional leaders, themselves vested with authority acknowledged in the South African constitution (Freedom Front Plus, 2014). No such authority structure exists for Afrikaners, in contrast to other South African ethnic groups.

Firstly, Dr Mulder has in the past remarked that in order to ensure the Afrikaner's survival in his native country, it has become important for the FF+ to form a coalition with another political party or parties. Dr Mulder was asked why the FF+ has not yet launched such a broad coalition with other Afrikaner organizations, including for instance the Solidarity movement. Dr Mulder explained that while such a coalition does not officially exist there is indeed a longstanding relationship with many other organisations, including Solidarity, whose leadership corps cut their political teeth within the FF+ (Mulder, 2017). Moreover, Dr Mulder highlighted the necessity of a broad front of

organisations – from cultural and religious to political – in furthering the aims of their overlapping membership, much the same as the ANC and its sister organisations have done in the past.

Secondly, the FF+'s roots extend back to movements with a strong commitment to Afrikaner self-determination, and Dr Mulder was asked why it appears that the FF+ moved away from championing Afrikaner self-determination and apparently replaced it with a stronger focus on minority rights. Dr Mulder reaffirmed the party's commitment to self-determination, and explained that the toxicity of the concept of Afrikaner self-determination – which reached its high watermark in the pre-1994 period – had made continued use of the concept unpalatable. In switching from an overt focus on Afrikaner self-determination to the use of modern concepts such as minority rights, the process of attaining self-determination could start afresh. As Dr Mulder explained, the process of establishing self-determination resembles a ladder, with the first step being the securing of individual rights, followed by language and cultural rights, then collective rights which makes cultural self-determination viable. From this step onwards regional autonomy can be pursued and strengthened by regional governance, which then creates the conditions necessary for the attainment of full independence. This process takes time, Dr Mulder explained, as it does for supporters of the party in getting incrementally used to the idea of greater autonomy.

Thirdly, with the ever-present spectre of apartheid in South African politics – and of the singling out of Afrikaners as a scapegoat in this regard – Dr Mulder was asked how Afrikaners could atone for their part in South Africa's troubled past. Dr Mulder described how during his tenure as minister within a predominantly ANC cabinet, he saw that the ANC was not a single cohesive unit with one overarching policy. Instead, the ANC is a whole made up out of various capitalist, socialist, communist, and religious factions, and the only thing that binds these groups into a whole is their shared experience of 'the struggle'. As such the ANC needs to keep the struggle alive – by doing so it remains united in a past shared experience. And this past is kept alive by ensuring the continued guilt is heaped on Afrikaner shoulders. And while he expressed his disbelief in the concept of collective guilt, Dr Mulder reaffirmed his belief that if South Africa was to flounder it would take all of her people down with her, and as such, that while he believes in safeguarding Afrikaner interests these cannot be divorced from the interests of the wider South African society.

Fourthly – and in a spirit of introspection – Dr Mulder was asked what he considered to be the single biggest failure of the FF+, as well as its greatest success. Regarding the former, Dr Mulder explained that it was a mistake believing that the realisation of Afrikaner self-determination would be a speedy process. Moreover, he believed that a failure to get more voters to support the party in this regard was equally disappointing, especially after the efforts of the party in the inclusion of

103

Section 235 in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Regarding the latter, Dr Mulder highlighted that the efforts of the FF+ culminating in legislation such as Section 235 was a success, especially when considering the climate of distrust surrounding anything that reeked of racialism or ethnicity. Moreover, Dr Mulder believes that the FF+ surviving 23 years after the 1994 elections is a further credit to the party, with older behemoths such as the NP having ceased to exist.

Finally, Dr Mulder was asked what it would take for more Afrikaners to support the party's self-determination efforts, what would serve as a trigger in this regard, and what the chances were for it to happen. He explained that as South Africa's democratic honeymoon comes to an end, increasing party support shows that people are realising that while they are all individuals, they also belong to groups, groups which – like the Afrikaners – are currently experiencing political pressures such as minority discrimination. However, that is not to say that an unforeseen crisis cannot further speed up this process, even though such a crisis would in all likelihood be harmful towards everyone involved. There is always the option of peaceful separation, such as between Malaysia and Singapore Dr Mulder explained, and the final step on the ladder towards self-determination is not necessarily one that has to be taken. For regions such as Quebec and Catalonia – who enjoy significant autonomy – there is the option of taking the final step towards full independence, but only after careful consideration over a period of time. The benefits of enjoying economic integration and regional autonomy may make taking the final step unnecessary and as such a balance can be struck between full independence and autonomy.

When considering the above, the most significant point raised during the Mulder interview relates to the party's continued support for the realisation of Afrikaner self-determination, in whatever form. At first sight this may appear as surprising, with the issue of self-determination not featuring prominently within its public discourse, while its focus on minority rights does. As Dr Mulder explained above, the logic behind a focus on minority rights and a muted deference towards Afrikaner self-determination can be found in the tainted nature of the *Volkstaat* concept – one intimately linked to the White far right. Having accepted this fact, it would appear that the FF+ leadership realised that a new self-determination strategy was necessary, and that its attainment would take considerable time. It remains to be seen whether Dr Mulder's vision will be carried forward by the party's new leadership, and where it may lead.

4.3.4   Case Study III: The Solidarity Movement

Of all the organisations examined in this chapter the Solidarity movement is by far the most complex. The organisation's roots lie in the white Mine Workers Union, and after having reinvented itself in the early 2000s the union moved away from "narrow shop-floor concerns" and embraced

the idea of safeguarding broader Afrikaner interests. In a broadening of the tradition of Christian trade unionism, these interests relate primarily to minority rights, civil liberties, and the fight against Afrikaner poverty (Sharp & van Wyk, 2015:127). In its current form the Solidarity Movement encompasses a myriad of divergent organisations, each one contributing to the overall goals as stipulated previously.

These include, but are not limited to, the Solidarity *Boufonds* (or building fund), *Akademia* (a private Afrikaans tertiary education institution), the Solidarity *Beleggingsmaatskappy* (or investment company), *Helpende Hand* (or helping hand, the union's charitable wing), the FAK (an umbrella organisation of cultural societies), the Solidarity *Navorsingsinstituut* (or research institute), Sol-Tech (a technical training college), AfriForum (a civil-rights organisation), Maroela Media (an online news and opinion site), Kraal *Uitgewers* (or publishers), and AfriForum Youth (the youth division of AfriForum) (Solidarity, 2016). While it is possible to identify more organisational links to other bodies, or to elucidate on all those already included, for the purposes of this analysis only two will be briefly examined.

Solidarity's *Helpende Hand* is not unlike other welfare programs launched by Afrikaners within the last century. It is an organisation primarily funded by Afrikaners that caters to those economically disadvantaged members of the same community, and does so with the help of roughly 36,000 members through 158 branches across South Africa (Helpende Hand, 2016). Some of its projects include the provision of school meals, looking after the elderly, as well as offering skill transfer programs and vocational training (Helpende Hand, 2016). These programs are especially important in light of the protection afforded to white workers during apartheid having evaporated, resulting in an increase in Afrikaners living in extreme poverty (Sharp & van Wyk, 2015:127). AfriForum on the other hand enjoys a much higher profile due to the successes of its various legal challenges primarily against the South African government. These include issues related to the renaming of Pretoria to Tshwane, the halting of a transfer of military hardware from South Africa to Zimbabwe, and having the 'song' "Shoot the Boer" declared hate speech and banned, amongst many more (Lubbe & du Plessis, 2010:54; Mehler, Melber & van Walraven, 2014:539; Habib, 2013:249).

With regards to Afrikaner self-determination the Solidarity Movement appears to be pragmatic. In 2015 the movement hosted a *Krisisberaad* (or crisis summit, with the theme 'we are here to stay!') in response to the seriousness of the political, economic, and social challenges affecting South Africa, the movement's members, and their communities (Krisisberaad, 2015). The summit primarily explored four points of interest, the growing danger of state decay, the growing signs that the South African government is increasingly ruling against Afrikaners, the introduction of an

interim action plan to combat the aforementioned, and the seeking of a mandate to form a task team from within the Solidarity Movement to formulate a comprehensive future strategy (Krisisberaad, 2015). A follow up summit, the *Toekomsberaad* (or future summit), was held later the same year to provide feedback around the plans formulated in the wake of the earlier summit.

The result of this summit could have significant consequences for the future of Afrikaner self-determination, in one form or another. The Solidarity Movement announced a staggering R3,5 billion (roughly $257 million) to finance its *Helpmekaar* (or 'help each other') 2020 5-year plan, which at its heart concerns the establishment of Afrikaner autonomy (Solidariteit, 2015:16). Indeed, as its report indicates, "the answer to state decay is the politics of the self" (Solidariteit, 2015:12). Yet it should be stated that the organisation believes that "Afrikaner independence was not practically achievable" (Thamm, 2015), and instead advocates for greater Afrikaner autonomy in education, safety, media, and heritage, to name but a few. While critics were quick to condemn the "strange blend of ethnic mobilisation and past rhetoric" (Thamm, 2015) of the summit, the onus on Afrikaner autonomy through 'self-help' organisations could be a boon for the Afrikaner minority's future in South Africa's majoritarian democracy.

Firstly, Buys was asked what South Africa would look like five years hence, and commented that South Africa is going to change significantly more in the next twenty years than it did in the previous two decades (Buys, 2015(a)). He identified two tendencies, one negative and one positive, with an increase in the rate of state decay and a corresponding increase and strengthening of community self-help initiatives. To illustrate Buys remarked how at the same time as public technical colleges were weakening those established by the organisation were becoming stronger.

As a follow-up Buys was asked how Afrikaners will fit into this changing South Africa. He stated that Afrikaners already move from [first world] 'island' to 'island'. In the mornings they leave the 'island' where they stay, get on the freeway, and travel to the 'island' where they work. As far as Afrikaners are concerned, the importance of this first world lifestyle cannot be overlooked, as its absence will encourage emigration. The goal of the Solidarity Movement then – as well as their mission and vision – is to create the circumstances wherein the Afrikaner can be free, safe, and prosperous within South Africa. That is the only way Afrikaners can make a contribution to South Africa and all its people. Secondly, Buys was reminded of having described self-determination as a "loaded word", and in the same article also spoke of "modern Afrikaners", and was asked how he defined "modern Afrikaners" (see Buys, 2015(b)).

Buys explained that modern Afrikaners are those found at the other side of apartheid, people who say the past is over and that they have to create a future for themselves, those who say they work for

a better future and not a better past. Returning to the loaded nature of self-determination, Buys explained that there are two different and competing conceptualisations of the term. The first is the ANC's conceptualisation of national self-determination, the second the White far-right's conception of ethnic self-determination. In the run-up to the 1994 elections the issue of self-determination became a political ballgame, and highly controversial. Those that advocated for reform (the ANC and NP) did not approve of the right's ethnic conceptualisation of self-determination, and this combined with the right's irresponsible use of the term created the negative connotations that exists to this day.

As a follow-up question Buys was asked what his thoughts were on the *Volkstaat* Council formed under former President Mandela to examine the question of Afrikaner self-determination. He replied that Afrikaners do not have their own 'Scotland' which enjoys de facto internal self-determination, through which it could move to external self-determination. As there is no area were Afrikaners form a clear majority the *Volkstaat* Council could not simply conjure one up in order to secure Afrikaners a homeland. Afrikaners would have to detach themselves from South Africa, and understandably many did not wish to do so. It would be difficult to find a people willing to leave behind that which they built up over time and move into the unknown.

Thirdly, Buys previously stated that "there are currently no opportunities for full autonomy (or independence) for Afrikaners" (see Buys, 2015(b)), and asked what opportunities are then required to bring about full self-determination for Afrikaners? He replied that the strategic choice to be made is between '*grondwet*' (the constitution) or '*grondgebied*' (geographic area). As far as Afrikaners are concerned, he stated, the "*grond vraag*" (or central question) is the "*grond vraag*" (or the land question). Ben Gurion once said that self-determination without a territorial base is groundless in every sense of the word. People used to think that if you had a constitution you did not need your own geographical area, because the constitution would protect your interests. Yet the idea of a timeless constitution is false, and its political lifespan is relatively short. As encroachments upon the South African constitution becomes more likely so too will the need for self-determination be realised by more and more people. Yet the prerequisites for self-determination is difficult to attain, and these will have to be secured before that right is claimed, Buys stated.

And in this regard, Buys continued, the most important objective is to create an area where Afrikaners form a majority which wishes to be a self-determining group. For practical reasons this will not be a *Volkstaat*, but rather a '*volkstadt*' (or people's city). The old method of drawing up maps and relying entirely on the government to approve of it is ridiculous, there will be no agreement as the prerequisites for agreement do not exist. These will have to be created *de facto* so

that it in turn can be politically and *de jure* recognised. Finally, Buys previously suggested that "a Western-style system be developed within an African state through the establishment of community organisations in key areas" (see Buys, 2015(b)). He described it as "a model of community driven or DIY cultural self-determination" (see Buys, 2015(b)).

At the end of the day – due to a lack of full self-determination – Buys was asked whether these 'community driven institutions' would not be subject to the vicissitudes of forces beyond the control of Afrikaners? In other words, how feasible would such islands of minority sovereignty be in a sea of majority hegemony? Buys replied that if these forms of community self-determination were the end goal it could not be sustainable, and that the road should not be seen as the final destination. Afrikaners support the Solidarity movement because of its stance on minority rights, and if their basic needs in relation to safety, municipal services, control over their children's education, and social services for the elderly for instance are met they will also support the bigger projects of the movement. And if in the long run the fulfilment of these basic needs are not anchored in external self-determination then it will always be subject to the tolerance of the majority. Moreover, the difficult political realities of the subject also had to be acknowledged. If Solidarity was to continuously make a noise over the end goal it could in turn make this goal more difficult to attain. Within the South African constitution there are 'federal spaces' within which the ANC could – if it wanted to – give greater self-determination to Afrikaners, in education for instance. If this were to happen calls for external self-determination would likely decrease. Yet this is unlikely, as the ANC's hegemony and ideology leaves little room for compromise.

In the interview with Buys some significant points were touched upon. The most important however is the suggestion – if not unmistakable indication – that the Solidarity Movement is set to become the main vehicle for Afrikaner self-determination. And – based on the above interview – it is also clear why Solidarity's leadership remain muted on the issue. Indeed, within the current South African political malaise the overt proclamation of such goals could potentially damage its attainment. As such a low key approach is taken, one that would provide the space necessary for the movement to lay the groundwork upon which the goal of Afrikaner self-determination can be realised. Clearly the conditions necessary to undergird Afrikaner external self-determination are nowhere yet wholly in existence, and the efforts of Solidarity to create these will in all likelihood take a considerable amount of time.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter on Afrikaner self-determination in the Twenty-first century sought to answer the third research sub-question, that is, what are the broad manifestations of contemporary Afrikaner self-

determination discourse and action as presented by key self-determination activists and organisations, and what factors contribute to action in this regard? As was shown, Afrikaners had given up their latest failed attempt at self-determination and became a minority in the new 'Rainbow Nation'. Flawed nation building attempts aside, the New South Africa presented a new set of challenges for all involved. The state – besieged by a host of problems – has failed to live up to the rainbow ideals, and apartheid's legacy lingers on. Questions around inequality and land reform are often connected to the Afrikaner *ancien régime*, and the vilification of this group remains a cause for concern. Growing discontent with the 'order of things' can also be discerned within Afrikaner ranks, and while by no means ubiquitous, fuels a contemporary Afrikaner self-determination drive.

The points of contestation around which the question of Afrikaner self-determination can coalesce include the use of the Afrikaans language, pressures on Afrikaner cultural heritage, AA policies, and farm murders. Into this gap a host of minor groups fills advocating self-determination, albeit with insufficient support. However, three key Afrikaner self-determination actors have emerged in the post-1994 dispensation. Together these three organisations constitute the most viable conduits to Afrikaner self-determination. The Orania Movement represents the most recent expression of Afrikaner regional autonomy, if not self-determination. And as Boshoff explained how the concept of Afrikaner self-determination has changed, this change necessitated a fundamental change in the strategy of those seeking to establish Afrikaner self-determination, in whatever form.

On the other hand – and from a political perspective – the FF+ is the only primarily Afrikaner party left within the South African legislature, one with a history connecting it and Afrikaner independence. Indeed, as the interview with Dr Mulder showed, the party remains committed to the realisation of Afrikaner self-determination. And finally, the Solidarity Movement with its onus on Afrikaner self-help programs in education and safety, and the importance of minority rights advocates for greater Afrikaner self-reliance. Apart from these short term goals, the Buys interview more importantly showed Solidarity's long term objectives as relating to the realisation of Afrikaner self-determination on a much larger scale.

Chapter V – On the Past, Present, and Future of Afrikaner Self-determination

5.1 Introduction

The penultimate chapter of this exploration of Afrikaner self-determination will answer the fourth and final research sub-question, being, what possible significance can be derived from the study's findings, and what policy recommendations can be formulated to address this phenomenon? In order to answer the concluding sub-question this chapter is divided into two broad sections, with the first part of the chapter returning to the typological approach undertaken in Chapter 2 and utilising it to better understand the past, present, and possible future trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts. After this broad analytical overview a brief application of the relationship between deeply divided societies and governance structures will be undertaken in a South African context, and show the interplay between factors conducive towards the emergence and possible decline of Afrikaner self-determination efforts. The final section of this chapter is dedicated to extending these findings into possible recommendations to the epistemic and policy-making communities on the question of Afrikaner self-determination from both a maximalist and minimalist point of view – a dichotomy of views also discussed in Chapter 2.

5.2 Afrikaner Self-Determination: A Broad Analytical Overview

A first point of departure within this analysis is to examine the different approaches to the concept of self-determination from an Afrikaner perspective. Within Chapter 2 a differentiation of approaches was explored between the democratic and national schools – in conjunction with the 'third way' – that sought to place the differences of self-determination conceptualisation into perspective. According to the democratic school national self-determination was defined as "government by consent of the governed and not as national government per se" (Neuberger, 2001:394). Within this approach the nation is divorced from any ethnocultural criteria, and instead arises from a given territory. Insofar as the Afrikaners can be included in such a delineation the Union Era saw a type of democratic self-determination, and while it did not come into being through Afrikaner consent, it nevertheless unified white South Africa for most of the following century. Interestingly, true democratic self-determination would only be established in South Africa in 1994 at the birth of a geographically defined nation.

In contrast, the national school "defines the achievement of independence as the goal of national self-determination" (Neuberger, 2001:394). In other words, as long as a 'people' is governed by their 'kith and kin' national self-determination will be attained (Neuberger, 2001:394). Freedom from foreign rule is what drove the *Voortrekkers* from the British controlled Cape colony, and

eventually, to the formation of the twin Boer republics. It was also the Boer *raison d'être* for fighting in both the Anglo-Boer wars, and would heavily influence Afrikaner's dogged defence of the national self during apartheid. Afrikaners then, depending on the view, lost – or gave up – their national self-determination in 1994.

When examining the principles of self-determination it is necessary to differentiate between its external and internal variants. External self-determination refers to "the right of every people to choose [the] sovereignty under which they live", while internal self-determination relates to "the right of every people to select its own form of government" (Neuberger, 2001:392). Yet again, for a brief period of time, the Boers enjoyed external self-determination until the loss of the Boer republics, while contemporary groups such as the Orania Movement advocate for greater internal self-determination. If the more complicated nature of external self-determination is considered it should be remembered that it comes in two varieties, "[1] internationally recognized independence for a people and [2] true independence for an already existing state" (Neuberger, 2001:392).

Yet again the Boer republics can be utilised as an example, with both the Transvaal and Orange Free State being externally self-determining as both were internationally recognised. On the other hand, during the 1914 Rebellion the Boer mutineers hoped to re-establish the external self-determination of the twin republics, to no avail. Next it is necessary to briefly consider the variants of internal self-determination, being "[1] democracy in a homogeneous state", "[2] autonomy or federalism for a distinct people within a democratic state", and "[3] autonomy/federalism for a distinct group within a non-democratic system" (Neuberger, 2001:392). Firstly, an example of internal self-determination through democracy in a homogenous state could include the *Volkstaat* idea proposed by the white right in the transitionary period, with Afrikaners living self-determined in a homogenous state. Secondly, if the ideal of an autonomous Orania as a *heimat* (or homeland) for Afrikaners is reached it will be an example of internal self-determination. In the third instance it would be difficult to find a contemporary South African example, as only the Bantustans of apartheid would conform to such a delineation.

Apart from the forms of political self-determination examined above it is also possible to differentiate between economic, cultural, colonial, and secessionist self-determination. When considering economic self-determination in the Afrikaner case examples are similarly scarce, yet when considering it in a broader South African sense it can be said that a majority of South Africa's citizens do not enjoy internal economic self-determination. Regarding cultural self-determination an Afrikaner example could include their historic resistance against cultural assimilation by Imperial Britain, or the cultural self-determination favoured by the Orania Movement. Insofar as colonial

self-determination is concerned the Boer's resistance against British colonial encroachment will serve as an apt example. And on the topic of secessionist self-determination the early 1990s conception of a *Volkstaat* conforms to such a model.

In Chapter 2 these distinctions were rationalised by utilising the umbrella terms of 'grand' and 'small' self-determination. Grand self-determination seeks internationally recognised sovereignty, and as such is more "external, political or secessionist" (Neuberger, 2001:393) in form. For those Afrikaners seeking a *Volkstaat* grand self-determination is the penultimate goal. On the other hand small self-determination relates to the internal political structure of the state, and is more "internal, economic and cultural" (Neuberger, 2001:393) in nature. In this case it can be said that the FF+ and the Orania and Solidarity movements are all currently seeking small self-determination for their Afrikaner 'clients', with grander aspirations hidden just below the surface.

5.2.1   Determining the Afrikaner 'Self'

At the heart of any self-determination discussion lies the question of the national self, that is, the question of what determines a 'people'. Within Chapter 2 eight approaches were identified to aid in answering what – or who – the 'self' entails. According to one such method, the difference approach, "[t]he emergence of a national self occurs, at least in the formative stages, through a process of differentiation from an opposing group" (Neuberger, 2001:397). The Afrikaner self then could be determined in opposition to a British, Xhosa, or Zulu self, to name but a few. In the British case the process of differentiation included resistance against the process of Anglicisation, and this process arguably reached its zenith during apartheid and the differentiation it sought to entrench *vis-à-vis* the various other (primarily Black) self's.

On the other hand a decolonisation approach underscores how the national self emerges from the former colony and within its former borders (Neuberger, 2001:397). Within this approach the national self is intimately bound with the territorial integrity of a post-colonial state and its colonially imposed borders. Such an approach would underscore the 'South Africaness' of Afrikaners – as well as the overlap or fluid nature of identity – with their inclusion in the unitary South African state after the Anglo-Boer War and into the Majoritarian Era with its dedication to the British imposed borders. Closely linked to this method is the post-decolonisation approach. This method of delineation only considers those internal borders of "federal units […] that had a legitimate political–administrative status" (Neuberger, 2001:398) during the Cold War Era as legitimate in the majority of their 'peoples' recourse to the RSD. In this instance it could be argued that an Afrikaner 'self' emerged after the Republic Referendum of 1960, and the subsequent break

away from imperial Great Britain and the declaration of the Afrikaner dominated Republic of South Africa in 1961 (Davenport & Saunders, 2000:416).

The ethnocultural approach to determining the self on the other hand proves far more enriching. According to this approach a distinction can be made between the *demos* – or a "political nation" brought together through "consent, [or] the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life" (Knop, 2004:55) – and *ethnos* – or "a pre-political community integrated on the basis of descent, a shared tradition or a common language" (Lehning, 2005:9). Within this analysis the South African identity conforms to this understanding of *demos*, while the Afrikaner identity largely conforms to its *ethnos* counterpart. However, a case could be made that the Afrikaner *ethnos* was once a *demos*, especially when considering the amalgamation of different 'self's' in early *Afrikanerdom*.

Nevertheless, the Afrikaner case also shows how *demos* and *ethnos* can be identified in a single state, group, or individual, and how some place a higher value on the *demos*, while others do the same on the *ethnos*. To illustrate, Afrikaners can claim a South African (or *demos*) identity in conjunction with their Afrikaner (or *ethnos*) identity, albeit with different values attached to each. Furthermore, insofar as *demos* are concerned, self-determination can be realised through the amalgamation of "different ethno-cultural selves within an existing state", while *ethnos* attains self-determination "for pre-existing ethnocultural selves" (Neuberger, 2001:399). However, it should be remembered that not all groups will develop nationalisms that strive for self-determination, and that assimilation and integration remain viable alternatives.

Nevertheless, in the case of a minority *ethnos* in a majority *demos*, majority rule is most sustainable "when there is considerable consensus and majority and minority are not far apart" (Neuberger, 2001:400). Neuberger explained that as long as there is one distinct ethnocultural majority and another ethnocultural minority – and as long as the former has no incentive to accommodate the latter's grievances – the "minority will be disillusioned with a principle which condemns it to permanent exclusion from the levers of power and influence" (2001:400). Indeed, as this analysis has shown, Afrikaners have grown increasingly aware of the effects of their minority status and the need to seek some form of protection because of it. For parties such as the FF+ the recourse to minority rights remains paramount.

In continuing, the communal approach closely mirrors the difference approach in that it too defines the self in relation to another. Here the self is recognised as being a "part of the ethno-cultural self appropriate for self-determination", which in turn results from "the aspiration of a communal group to determine the sovereignty of an area which contains other communal groups without absorbing them within the national self" (Neuberger, 2001:400). Insofar as Afrikaners are concerned there can

be no strict application of the communal approach, this could however change if groups such as the Orania Movement prove successful in obtaining external self-determination when Afrikaners could theoretically share a geographical area with other peoples. More applicable to the Afrikaner example is the historical approach. In this approach the self is understood as a "traditional–historical community" (Neuberger, 2001:400). Yet again this process closely mirrors another – with the ethnocultural approach's emphasis on *ethnos* being analogous – and as such not necessary to reapply to the Afrikaner example.

The geographical approach on the other hand underscores the importance of a territory in the "crystallization of a national identity" (Neuberger, 2001:401). The distance between once similar peoples can, in time, create a "differentiation in culture, life-style, ideology, and economic interests" (Neuberger, 2001:401). When measuring the Afrikaners against the Dutch for instance the latter may appear as more socially liberal, even though the latter heavily influenced the former's historic development. The final method in determining the self could be described as the mixed approach, a method of delineating that explains any combination of the aforementioned approaches. Clearly overlap is possible when considering identities, just as the historical and ethnocultural methods for instance show. Indeed, "identities are too complex to be captured by concepts that rely on national borders for reference" (Schultermandl & Toplu, 2010:11). As such these approaches to determining the self should be seen in a much broader context, one which acknowledges that identities cannot be indefinitely fixed.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the controversial natives and settlers' dichotomy. As was stated within Chapter 2, the "problem of the legitimacy of recent settlers to be part of the national-self" (Neuberger, 2001:402) remains a fiercely debated issue. In surmounting this obstacle, a 'critical date' is necessary to determine whom qualifies as either a native or a settler, even though no agreement on any such time exists. As far as Afrikaners are concerned this debate is especially relevant. While they were undoubtedly settlers during the VOC reign, they were less so by the time they themselves were forcibly attached to the British Empire as colonial subjects.

In contemporary South African political discourse the relevance of this debate can be seen in issues ranging from land rights to the 'first peoples' debate. Like apartheid has been labelled "colonialism of a special kind" (Scerri, 2009:81), so too perhaps could Afrikaners be described as settlers or natives of a special a kind. In the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War, Boer independence was snuffed out just as those of the nominally free Black kingdoms, with all being subjected to the victor's justice. That the Afrikaners were more favoured than any in this justice remains indisputable, all due to the colour of their skin. And just as 'natives' in Canada or Algeria had nowhere else to turn,

114

their Quebecois and Pied-Noir settler groups could find refuge in the French metropole. The bonds Afrikaners had with the respective nations that constituted contemporary *Afrikanerdom* evaporated centuries ago, and for the Afrikaners there is no other geographical home outside South Africa.

5.2.2   The Goals and Means of Afrikaner Self-determination

As far as contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts are concerned the goals of these could be described as autonomy seeking projects. As noted in Chapter 2 outright independence and self-determination are not necessarily the same. In other words, while national self-determination can lead to independence "it has sometimes led to different patterns and formulae" (Neuberger, 2001:403). For the three main Afrikaner self-determination drivers examined in this analysis this pattern or formulae relates to autonomy, at least in its current form. For the FF+ this entails their proposal of the formation of an Afrikaner Council to act as a means for Afrikaner concerns to be heard; for the Orania Movement this could entail protecting the autonomy it currently enjoys under the South African constitution while growing its core; and for the Solidarity Movement this entails the fostering of autonomous projects in basic services, security, and education, amongst many more.

Another question relates to the means of Afrikaner self-determination efforts. While the three organisations above rely on a mandate buttressed through votes (FF+), shareholders (the Orania Movement), or paying members (the Solidarity Movement), other attempts at determining the political status of Afrikaner self-determination could include plebiscites (or self-determination from below) and representative institutions (or self-determination from above). To a large extent the three Afrikaner organisations discussed herein can be described as representative institutions, even if only regarding their very specific membership and not Afrikaners as a whole. Moreover, apart from a few nominal polls gauging support for the idea of a *Volkstaat,* no other means of determining the Afrikaner's political status have been undertaken to date.

Yet the result of those public opinion surveys conducted did deliver interesting results. The first survey, conducted in 1993 by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), and the second, conducted in 1996 by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), similarly asked respondents "How do you feel about demarcating an area for Afrikaners and other white South Africans in which they may enjoy self-determination? Do you support the idea of a *Volkstaat*?" (Theissen, 1997:52). As Figure 5.1 shows two out of every three respondents of the CSVR survey indicated that they were not in favour of the idea, a significant increase from the HSRC survey three years previously (Theissen, 1997:52). This decline in support for the idea of a *Volkstaat* could be due to the post-1994 fears (e.g. chaos and bloodshed) of many Afrikaners not materialising (Theissen, 1997:52).

Fast forward another three years in the run-up to the 1999 elections and the sentiments contained in Figure 5.1 shows a modicum of flux and transformation. In the popular discourse surrounding the elections a debate

Figure 5.1 Reactions to the Idea of a *Volkstaat* (Adapted from Theissen, 1997:52)

concerning emigration was forming around minority discontent with the political *status quo*. In a subsequent survey respondents were asked about their future intentions concerning residence in South Africa. As Figure 5.2 shows, the majority of Afrikaners surveyed opted to stay in South Africa, yet over a quarter of them preferred to be somewhere else if circumstances allowed it (Johnson, 1999). While the analysis of the survey results describes this significant number due to a "state of denial", it is evident that a substantial proportion of Afrikaners "continue to hanker for an alternative outside the system" (Johnson, 1999), including by extension self-determination.

Just over a decade later another poll measured support for the idea of a *Volkstaat*. As Figure 5.3 shows, this poll was conducted by the major Afrikaans newspaper *Beeld* in 2010 and garnered a total of 11,019 respondents, with 56% (or 6,178) indicating that they "would move to a *Volkstaat* if it were created" (Davis, 2014), 17% (or 1,908) would consider it, and 27% (or 2,933) would not. A similar poll conducted in 2015 by the same media company – albeit hidden behind a paywall – asked whether its readers thought that Afrikaner self-determination was a good idea. The poll was

Figure 5.2 What are your plans concerning residence? (Adapted from Johnson, 1999)

held in response to the Solidarity Movement's *Krisisberaad* of the same year. Out of a total of 2,556 respondents, 94% (or 2,404) agreed that Afrikaner self-determination was a good idea, while 6%

116

(or 152) did not (Netwerk24, 2015; Polldaddy, 2015). On face value within Figure 5.3, there appears to have been a marked increase in support for the idea of a *Volkstaat*. Yet the most recent polls were of an informal nature,

Figure 5.3 The *Volkstaat* Idea, Revisited (Adapted from Theissen, 1997:52; Davis, 2014; Netwerk24, 2015; Polldaddy, 2015)

and as such lack the heuristic rigour applied to the more formal studies conducted in the mid-1990s.

These polls and opinion surveys undoubtedly touch upon questions surrounding the 'true' reflection of the national will. Here the importance of the amount of support enjoyed by those favouring Afrikaner self-determination warrants closer scrutiny in order to "be considered true representatives of the popular will", as "[d]emands for national self-determination may often be countered by arguing that the proponents of self-determination are an unrepresentative minority" (Neuberger, 2001:404). When considering the FF+ its support can be gauged according to the votes it received in the last election of 2014. As stated previously the party received 165,715 votes earning it 4 seats in the legislature (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2014). While this support is enough to secure Afrikaners a (faint) voice in the South African parliament, it is not enough to claim that a large percentage of Afrikaners support the FF+'s vision of Afrikaner self-determination.

In terms of individual support the Orania Movement fares much worse. Those supporting their vision of Afrikaner self-determination numbers roughly 1,100 inhabitants and 10,000 'outhabitants' (Orania, 2016). In terms of individual numbers of supporters the most promising vehicle for Afrikaner self-determination is the Solidarity Movement. Solidarity itself has roughly 140,000 members, and AfriForum – only one of its many affiliates – has over 170,000 and grows at roughly 300 new members a day (Retief, 2016). While these numbers are impressive they are nonetheless not sufficient to claim a majority of Afrikaner support. As stated in the previous chapter the last nation-wide census placed Afrikaner numbers in South Africa at approximately 2,710,461 individuals (Statistics South Africa, 2011). Of course this number represents all ages and the number of those Afrikaners eligible to vote will be significantly lower. Nevertheless, insofar as a true reflection of Afrikaner support for self-determination is concerned, these numbers show that

while there is significant support for types of Afrikaner self-determination it is not yet a majority undertaking.

5.2.3 On the Possibility of Afrikaner Secession

The question of Afrikaner secession warrants brief pause. As stated in Chapter 2, the pieces of global governance generally hold the view that "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country" (Neuberger, 2001:405) should be opposed. Contemporary opinion thus holds that secession is only permissible when a recognised government and the seceding party mutually agree on the matter, barring cases of extreme brutality (Norman, 2006:172). Afrikaners thus remain a trapped minority dispersed throughout South Africa, and nothing short of extreme hardship looks set to change their status.

However, those opposed to such a minimalist view of the RSD would contend that the rights of states cannot trump the rights of peoples, including in recourse to the RSD. As such it is possible to argue that the democratic values inherent in the RSD "contain the right of a people to withdraw from a state if they wish to do so" (Neuberger, 2001:406), even more so when such a people are oppressed and/or discriminated against. While claims of discrimination against the Afrikaner minority is not novel it is certainly not yet at levels severe enough to warrant their recourse to the RSD. Nevertheless, as Lijphart remarked, "in plural societies where assimilation is resisted and elite cooperation (consociationalism) is impossible because of historical enmity, partition or separation become the only viable alternatives" (quoted in Neuberger, 2001:406). This too can be considered in the Afrikaner case.

For historical reasons Afrikaner assimilation remains perhaps a bridge too far, and the old enmity between Afrikaners and those disadvantaged by apartheid was only briefly plastered over during the 'honeymoon' period of the elite-driven transition (Bond, 2000:1). And while infringements in the social contract between Afrikaners and the government remain moot, any overt increase on the government's side could impinge upon "the consent of the governed and the right of rebellion" (Neuberger, 2001:406). The current political climate in South Africa is far from favourable for the Afrikaner community, yet it is also far from outright hostility. If Afrikaners are ever to secede it will be after some as of yet unknown cataclysm, either through civil war, severe oppression, or discrimination of the apartheid kind. Yet even just a few years ago the prospect of civil war seemed absurd. Today South Africa's political elite regularly warns (or threatens) of its possibility, from the leader of the ANC Youth League to prominent political economists, the spectre of a (race) war looms large (Gqirana, 2016; ENCA, 2016).

Considering the brutality of South Africa's recent xenophobic attacks, civil unrest threatens to undo decades of progress. As one prominent South African journalist imagined (Eaton, 2016):

> Warlords, black and white, establish fiefdoms, and South Africa ceases to exist. In its place is hell, patrolled by young men armed with machetes and high on crystal meth, who divide their time between murder and recreational rape. In the end the only people who win are racists living far away, who point and say, "See? We told you blacks and whites can't live together. We told you it always ends like this in Africa."

Yet it certainly does not have to come to such extremes. Strong political leadership able to address the myriad of South Africa's challenges intermixed with goodwill and cooperation from South Africa's diverse peoples could see the country return from the brink and back onto the road that was envisaged during the 'miracle' transition. Sadly such leadership and goodwill appear lacking at present, to the detriment of all involved.

5.2.4   A Clash of Principles, Revisited

A final area to re-examine relates to how the principle of self-determination clashes with other prevailing norms within international relations and politics. Within Chapter 2 six areas of focus were identified in this regard, being (1) the rights of peoples versus the rights of states, (2) the principle of non-interference, (3) the requirements of international peace and stability, (4) principles of non-violence, (5) *pacta sunt servanda*, and finally the question of (6) double standards. As stated previously, the principle of self-determination clashes with the right of states to their territorial integrity, and "this basic contradiction between states and peoples remains a fundamental problem of the international community" (Neuberger, 2001:411). Those advocating for Afrikaner self-determination – especially when it comes to the external kind – need to be cognisant of this as yet unresolved question.

Secondly, the norm of non-interference is closely linked to the rights of states. In Africa the policy of non-interference has proven particularly problematic, with internal conflicts remaining closed off from outside intervention to the detriment of those needing it most (Engel & Porto, 2010:153). As a result some have called for the principle of non-interference to fall to the wayside when measured against other principles such as the Right to Protect (R2P). While this clash of principles currently does not affect Afrikaner self-determination in any remarkable way, it could prove detrimental if the previous section's scenario ever comes to fruition. Thirdly, the RSD has often been overruled by the requirements of peace and stability. States can and have blocked the self-determination efforts of aspirant actors by arguing that it would threaten peace and stability. In the Afrikaner case any future attempts at external self-determination could be blocked by the South African state for

instance by arguing the same, especially considering the regional destabilising nature of the previous Afrikaner state (Seidman, 1990:49).

Fourthly, the principle of non-violence often falls to the wayside when self-determination issues are at stake. In secessionist cases specifically the separatists have more often than not resorted to violence to pursue their RSD (Neuberger, 2001:412). Afrikaner self-determination attempts are not marked by violence, with the sole exception of the '*Boeremag*' (Boer Force) case. This ultimately futile attempt by a small group of far-right Afrikaners to violently overthrow the South African government highlights and warns how readily the principle of non-violence can be abandoned in pursuit of self-determination (see Purkitt & Burgess, 2005:203). It remains to be seen whether any similar criminal elements will coalesce around the issue of Afrikaner self-determination in the future.

Fifthly, the *pacta sunt servanda* principle of international law seeks to maintain the *status quo* and prevent revisionism. Efforts by those seeking to claim their RSD entails changing "the legal order, including laws, constitutions and international conventions" (Neuberger, 2001:413), and as such the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* could be invoked by those opposing the self-determination seekers in order to protect the *status quo*. This is yet another hurdle to be aware of in the quest for Afrikaner self-determination, however, in its current internal (or autonomy seeking) form as being propagated by the FF+, and the Orania and Solidarity movements there is little to no danger of infringing upon the *pacta sunt servanda* principle of international law. Sixthly, within Chapter 2 the RSD was described as a "chameleonic right" (Neuberger, 2001:413), due to different criteria having been applied in self-determination disputes when equal treatment was necessary. The rush of European powers to recognise the Croatian state for example was not reciprocated in the Nagorno-Karabakh case (Philpott, 2003:88; Krüger, 2010:xii). For Afrikaner self-determination efforts in its current guise there is yet again little to no impact.

Before examining the strengths and weaknesses of Neuberger's typology of self-determination it is necessary to briefly touch upon three final topics, being the viability of a proposed nation-state, the irreversibility of self-determination, and the domino theory of secession. As stated previously, the idea of large states being more viable appear at face value to be true. However, microstates such as Luxembourg, Malta, Liechtenstein, and Monaco can hardly be described as unfeasible (see Eccardt, 2005:1). For those advocating Afrikaner self-determination on a grand scale these examples surely proves alluring. Yet Orania – the closest example discussed in this analysis – has a long way to go before it can become a viable self-sufficient vehicle for Afrikaner self-determination. Perhaps the leaders of the Orania Movement acknowledged as much with the recent adoption of their economic

development plan and the marshalling of significant financial resources (R183,300,000.00) in order to accomplish it (Orania, 2016).

On the question of the irreversibility of self-determination this analysis will forego a discussion on a topic that as of yet enjoys no certain answers and instead focus on the domino theory of secession. As stated earlier the theory holds that "one secession will necessarily lead to an endless chain of secessions" (Neuberger, 2001:410). If this is applied to the South African case a question of other South African 'peoples' and their self-determination efforts comes to the fore. Could the attainment of Afrikaner self-determination then lead to similar aims by groups such as the Zulu or Khoisan? Of course such a discussion would be pure conjecture, it is however necessary to acknowledge its possibility – however remote.

5.2.5   Neuberger's Strengths and Weaknesses

As explained in Chapter 2, Neuberger's framework was employed to facilitate an examination of Afrikaner self-determination. In this regard Neuberger's framework provided ample topical vantage points from which to examine these efforts. From approaches to determining the 'self' in self-determination to the goals and means of self-determination, the topological nature of Neuberger's framework clearly provided the markers necessary to guide this analysis. While this is certainly a strength it does however have its drawbacks, most notable in the broad nature evident throughout this chapter and the preceding ones. In covering so many different angles of self-determination generally, and Afrikaner self-determination specifically, a more focused end result is foregone.

Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, criticisms of Neuberger's work included a lack of acknowledgement of the historical and cultural variables contained in the premises Neuberger examined (Tindigarukayo, 1987:569). In order to stress that contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts do not exist in a historical vacuum this analysis provided sufficient room to view and understand contemporary Afrikaner self-determination as merely the latest manifestation of a centuries old phenomenon. However, the biggest weakness of Neuberger's topical framework relates to the importance of an analysis based thereon. More succinctly put, the end reading of such an analysis begs the question; so what? While it helps to describe, identify and categorise the different types of self-determination, it does not serve as a framework to explain the rise, persistence or consequences of self-determination.

5.3 Factors Sustaining Afrikaner Self-determination Struggles

This penultimate section then will seek to address this shortcoming by returning to the work of Lijphart as first explored in Chapter 2. Within this chapter a host of challenges were discussed

121

within the context of factors that could potentially serve as issues around which the question of Afrikaner self-determination could coalesce. Indeed – and as stated previously – if national self-determination is the sum of efforts undertaken towards the establishment of an "independent domain of political control" (Buchanan, 2004:333), these efforts in turn should be driven by identifiable conditions which prove conducive towards either a decline or increase of action in this regard. When considering the Afrikaner case hitherto discussed, the nature of a deeply fragmented South African political culture – and exasperated by unbridled majoritarianism – are both critical conduits through which Afrikaner self-determination currents can flow. That is not to say that these currents are unalterable. Indeed, there are other types of democratic forms of governance that are remarkable for their suitability towards such deeply fragmented societies, most notably consociationalism.

5.3.1   South Africa's Societal Fissures

Within Chapter 2 the relationship between political culture and social structure *vis-à-vis* political stability was explained. As Lijphart (1969:208) noted – whether at the mass or elite level – the cross-pressures derived from overlapping group membership with dynamic interests and outlooks lead to moderate political attitudes. This statement is easily observed within recent South African history. To illustrate at the elite level, the advent of a fully democratic South Africa was due in large part to the moderating efforts of the political top bras of both the Afrikaner NP and their adversaries within the ANC. Through a negotiated settlement and transition these actors assured that the new South Africa would be born through elite consensus and not civil strife. Indeed, as one observer noted, "elites on both sides had embarked on a far more sober and pragmatic approach to South Africa's future, enabling them to meet on middle ground" (de Jager, 2015:86).

With regards to the overlapping group memberships that made such moderate attitudes possible, some scholars argue that it was due to the neoliberal elements within both parties that made consensus feasible (Bond, 2000:53). Conversely, it was also argued that societal fissures and few overlapping memberships could curtail such moderate attitudes. As Lijphart (1969:208) explained, in a deeply fragmented society with little or no overlapping memberships such moderate attitudes are absent. In South Africa these societal fault lines run deep, from race and ethnicity to nationality and culture. And while Lijphart (1985:123) was a fierce proponent of the viability of consociationalism in South Africa, even he had to acknowledge that South Africa's level of societal segmentation is significantly higher than the optimal level required for the favourable conditions necessary to establish a consociational order. Moreover, Lijphart believed that overarching loyalties

could counterbalance these societal divisions insofar as a "sense of belonging together" (1985:124) could be endeared to the South African population at large.

In order to bridge racial tensions and endear just such a sense of unity, the concept of the rainbow nation was incorporated into the ideological project of the ANC (Johnson, 2012:136). This new form of South Africanism propagated a concept of unity in diversity and a break from the country's segregationist past, "based on the idea that the ethnoracial, linguistic, cultural and religious groups coexisting in South Africa could be incorporated into a single state identity" (Lollini, 2011:22). Yet as the heady days of the new South Africa passed into memory the alluring light of the idea of a rainbow nation faded into myth. The differences within South African society were too deep-rooted and pronounced, so much so that no myth could plaster over them. Questions remain as to who can be considered a 'true' South African, with "race, nativity and indigeneity" and the "connection between 'whiteness' and 'Africanness'" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:150) remaining a hotly contested debate.

The continued importance of racial fissures are evident not only in those areas briefly touched upon earlier within this chapter, but also in others such as voting patterns. Indeed, South African elections have earned the dubious sobriquet of being "racial censuses", with Black voters by and large favouring one set of parties while their White compatriots favour others (Ferree, 2011:1). These racial fissures spill over into party politics along ethnic lines too, with a significant segment of the Zulu population for instance supporting the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), while a sizeable group of their Afrikaner countrymen likewise support the FF+. It remains unclear whether the recent spike in political killings can be attributed more towards intra-party and inter-party rivalries than ethnic identity (Bruce, 2013:21).

These societal fissures are arguably nowhere more clearly captured than in the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation's (IJR) Reconciliation Barometer. In the 2013 survey, the IRJ found "apartheid's long shadow" (Gibson, 2015:41) still lingering across *all* of South Africa's divergent groups. However, most noteworthy were the attitudes of South Africa's Black majority. Discussing the IRJ's findings, Gibson notes how Black South Africans seem "particularly unwilling to consider a multiracial political coalition", and that they "harbor more prejudice than other South Africans" (2015:44). Moreover, these sentiments are further echoed in the Reconciliation Barometer data insofar as contact across racial lines are concerned. Indeed, while Whites "professed the highest levels of satisfaction with the amount of contact they presently had", a significant proportion of their fellow Black South Africans in contrast "said that they would actually prefer to talk less often to those of the other races" (Gibson, 2015:46). And while the long shadow of apartheid clearly casts

doubt on the integrity of South African democracy, the IRJ did find "a good deal of progress in the racial views" (Gibson, 2015:44) of White, Coloured, and Asian South Africans.

Nevertheless, these fault lines stretch beyond an overly simplified Black/White binary and have found often violent expression in cases of extreme xenophobia. Starting in 2008 and erupting many times thereafter, this phenomenon has been blamed on attitudes of South African exceptionalism and Othering - especially in relation to the country's political leadership (Mabera, 2017:28). This destructive process of othering continues to remain a thorn deeply embedded into the South African psyche, one cementing difference rather than seeking to overcome it. That Africans from across the continent met their untimely demise at the hands of angry mobs should serve as a warning for those concerned with the political fissures and future of the South African state.

What then of the impact of South Africa's divergent cultures? The difficulty of this question relates to the nature of culture and subculture, and its fluid nature. Many individuals can claim various cultures as their own, while others may feel more comfortable immersing themselves into one. However, in South Africa a distinction can be drawn between African and Western culture, even though overlap and amalgamation exists. In the South African case Western culture is represented mainly by the White population – though by no stretch of the imagination exclusively – while an African (or communal) culture is represented mainly by the Black population, yet again not exclusively (Macleod, 2002:9). Moreover, these different cultures are by no means incompatible, and can coexist quite comfortably without endearing conflict.

However, when the issue of intercultural conflict has come to the fore it is mainly centred on the perceived gulf between these two cultures. This gulf is the product of centuries of parallel development, and is best understood through the acknowledgement that African culture was historically denigrated while Western culture was idealised (Mafela & Ntuli, 2017:178). In contemporary South African political discourse this gulf is further mirrored through divergent approaches to challenges. To illustrate, on the topic of AIDS denialism traditional African culture can coalesce around the seemingly irrelevant issues of witchcraft and imperialist conspiracy. In said culture traditional healing is concerned with the origins of a disease, and if no plausible explanation exists traditional healers frequently blame specific members of their communities for the ills of said disease (Fourie & Meyer, 2010:191). For those within Western culture such an approach could appear archaic and strange, and further strengthen the cultural dichotomy and reinforce the process of othering.

Each of the fissures discussed above pose by themselves no great singular threat. Yet when viewed from the perspective of overlapping group membership they remain as fundamental challenges to

the notion of a common South African membership. That is not to say that such an overlapping membership does not exist, quite the contrary. However, the othering that these divergent group memberships cement and reinforces severely diminishes the chances for overlapping membership bringing South Africans of all colours and creeds together in middle-of-the-road attitudes. As stated previously, political stability depends on such moderate attitudes and overlapping memberships (Lijphart, 1969:208). The question of overlapping memberships and othering discussed above is further compounded by the type of governance structure within which it operates. While the pressures resultant from political instability can be regulated to some extent within certain types of democracies, not all are equally suited towards such forms of divergent group accommodation.

5.3.2   South Africa's Ethnic Majoritarianism

In Chapter 2 majoritarianism was explained in relation to its suitability towards homogenous societies, and conversely, how such a form of democratic governance can be ill-suited towards deeply divided societies. In this context the democratic process resembles a zero-sum game where the gains of the in group correspond to the losses of the out group (Norris, 2004:73). However, in order to better understand the South African form of majoritarianism it is first and foremost necessary to make a distinction between its inclusive and ethnic variants. It could be argued that inclusive majoritarianism remains true to an often overlooked yet fundamental principle of democracy, namely political equality (Macedo, 2010:1030). While allowing for "opportunities for majority rule voting and direct popular participation to play important roles in working democracies", this principle of political morality asserts "that legitimate democracies are those that respect minority rights and promote fair and inclusive deliberation" (Macedo, 2010:1030). If the gap between majority and minority is to be bridged this fundamental principle of affording each individual equal political importance in the democratic process cannot fall by the wayside.

In contrast, ethnic majoritarianism is by its very definition a choice of governance system where the most important and defining moniker rests on ethnic identity, and can as such be subjected to ethnic chauvinism. Examples of such ethnic democracies include Israel, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. In the South African case it can be argued that the state is starting to resemble an ethnic democracy, one where racial mobilisation and "ideological consolidation relies on targeting the "other" as the enemy" (Adam 1999:285). Given South Africa's long history of ethnic domination this is not surprising. Nevertheless, in contemporary South African political discourse this process of othering is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the vilification and popularisation of concepts such as 'white monopoly capital', of enemies as being 'white lackeys', of Afrikaners as being "Boer bullies", and the framing of South Africa's entire white population as "conquerors, colonists,

intellectual cannibals, cultural corruptives, oppressors and thieves" (Buthelezi, 2002:3; du Preez, 2017;Madlingozi, 2014:109).

What makes this process of othering even more disconcerting is that such language often originates from the South African political elite. It should be noted than in the recent past similar statements by notable leaders have according to some sources directly resulted in violent retribution, including remarks made by the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini kaBhekuzulu, and blamed for a violent increase in the 2015 xenophobic attacks previously mentioned (Moyo, Nshimbi & Gumbo, 2017:92). Clearly there remains cause for concern, democratic consolidation in South Africa cannot be attained while influential leaders and their populist narratives undermine the chances of fostering a truly inclusive majoritarian state. Indeed, such a course of action flies in the face of the country's negotiated constitution. As it boldly declares in its preamble, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity" (Republic of South Africa, 1996:1).

5.3.3   South African Consociationalism, Unrealised

That South Africa would eventually embark on such a majoritarian course was not always certain. South Africa has in the past had a few dalliances with consociationalism, however transitory. Indeed, this idea emerged from various academic and political circles where it was acknowledged that within an ethnically and culturally plural society like South Africa any new political dispensation had to allow for group representation (Ottaway, 1993:92). To be sure, the importance of these elites in being the primary drivers of consociationalism within plural societies cannot be overstated, with the "choice for coalescence instead of adversarial relations" (Bogaards, 1998:492) being a necessary condition for the successful establishment of a consociational order. In time this line of thinking would catch on with those NP politicians concerned with the future of the South African state, and was formalised in the foundation of a tricameral parliament in 1984. However, as the name suggests, the new parliament's three chambers were reserved for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians, while black South Africans were excluded on the premise that their interests were to be represented within their homeland constituencies (Lötter, 1997:50). Moreover, the tricameral system was rigged in favour of the white minority, and in no way could the white chamber be outvoted by the other two chambers, whom had to be content with limited decision-making powers over their own group affairs (Lötter, 1997:50).

In the following decade the consociational strand continued to be evident and relevant to South African politics. After the unbanning of the ANC and release of Mandela in 1990, the NP and their erstwhile adversaries embarked on a process of a negotiated transition to majority rule through a new constitutional framework with unmistakable consociational features (Taylor, 1992:1). These

126

multiparty efforts would culminate in a Transitional Executive Council "in which all parties participated on a completely equal footing", and the 1994 interim constitution, one described by Lijphart himself as "almost perfectly consociational" (1998:144). However, with the interim constitution making way for the previously discussed 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, some observers remarked on the perceived eclipse of consociationalism during the country's democratic transition (Connors, 1996:420). That the highpoint of South Africa's consociational experiment had come and gone is certain. What remains uncertain is whether South Africa will ever again return to the consociational path.

5.4 Afrikaner Self-determination: Pro et Contra

Within Chapter 2 the maximalist/minimalist separation on self-determination was briefly described. The maximalist approach "is adopted by many claimants and advocates a wide understanding of the right to self-determination" (Ghanea & Xanthaki, 2005:20). On the other hand the minimalist view "is adopted by most states and limits the scope and consequently the beneficiaries of the right" (Ghanea & Xanthaki, 2005:20). The following section will incorporate these divergent views into two sets of key recommendations, one for those in favour of grand Afrikaner self-determination and one against. At the end of each discussion – from both a maximalist and minimalist point of view – a brief set of recommendations will be provided for the benefit of the epistemic and policy-making communities.

5.4.1   Recommendations, Part I: A Maximalist View

For those maximalists in favour of the attainment of Afrikaner self-determination the three organisations examined in this analysis each offer a unique and possibly rewarding attribute that the others lack. The FF+ for instance is the only political party of note in the question of Afrikaner self-determination. Their presence in the national legislature – however small – provides a 'foot in the door' for those seeking Afrikaner self-determination. The party's idea of National and Provincial Afrikaner Councils – with membership to be determined through nationwide elections, while adhering to the principle of freedom of association insofar as Afrikaner membership and voter registration is concerned – is not unique (Freedom Front Plus, 2014). Such councils will conform to those that already exist for traditional leaders of South Africa's other ethnic communities. These councils could not only safeguard Afrikaner interests in the national and provincial houses of traditional leaders, but could also provide a democratically elected body to safeguard Afrikaner self-determination in any form.

The Orania Movement on the other hand – however nascent – is the only currently viable Afrikaner territorial self-determination exercise in contemporary South Africa. The town's image as a racist enclave notwithstanding, the recent launch of its Economic Development Plan and the provision of funds necessary to fulfil it indicate a seriousness and future vision absent from similar experiments, such as Kleinfontein near Pretoria (Sharp & van Wyk, 2015:123). Moreover, should Orania successfully implement their Economic Development Plan the town may outgrow its infancy and turn into an agricultural, commercial, and cultural hub (Orania, 2016:47). Time will tell whether Orania can accomplish these goals and grow its supporter base, whether they be in or 'outhabitants'. The Solidarity Movement in contrast not only has the capital and support base necessary to act as a key driver of Afrikaner self-determination, but is also its most ardent supporter. Yet the movement's aversion to party politics means that its actions are largely confined to civil society activism within the courts and the media, in effect severely limiting its reach.

If the goal of external Afrikaner self-determination is to be achieved the problems posed by Section 235 of the South African Constitution (further dependant on national legislation) and Afrikaner regional majorities needs to be addressed. Since an outright majority in parliament is necessary to amend the South African constitution, Afrikaner aspirations in this regard remain severely constrained. Baring acts of extreme aggression and/or discrimination, whatever Afrikaner self-determination actors wish to accomplish would have to happen within the confines of the constitution. However, that does not discount a uniquely Afrikaner political voice, quite the contrary. The ability of the Afrikaner minority to have their legitimate concerns aired in parliament is as important as it is for other minorities at risk worldwide. Controversially in this regard Afrikaners have been identified as an at risk and vilified minority in a 2012 report by Genocide Watch and the International Alliance to End Genocide (Stanton, 2012:68).

Moreover, the presence of Orania provides the nucleus around which a regional Afrikaner majority can form. Without such a majority claims to Afrikaner self-determination remain unlikely to enjoy any serious attention. While the Buys interview above acknowledges as much, the partition of the Afrikaner self-determination effort along three broad and distinctive lines appears inefficient. Each actor can only accomplish so much in their respective domains, be it political (FF+), regional (the Orania Movement), or civil-social (the Solidarity Movement). If the three organisations could join in partnership the question of Afrikaner self-determination would benefit from parliamentary representation, a regionally established nucleus, and the funds and organisation necessary to infuse the amalgamated movement with the necessary impetus and growth. In this regard such a movement would not be unlike Solidarity's European namesake. *Solidarność* (Polish for Solidarity) is a Polish trade union that managed to transform itself into a broad social movement and eventually

successfully agitated for Polish national self-determination and freedom from communist rule (Ash, 2002:11). The parallels with the Solidarity movement discussed within this analysis are striking, and perhaps intended.

Insofar as the epistemic community is concerned, further research forays into the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-determination should be undertaken from various vantage points, including on the topic's linkage with (a) minority rights, (b) actual current support for self-determination within *Afrikanerdom*, and (c) comparative studies linking Afrikaners with other self-determination seeking groups such as the Kurds and Catalans, to name but two. These research areas each warrant closer scrutiny, as they all could help formalise a body of scholarly work supporting the maximalist view through embedding it in the context of minority protection, popular support, and similarities with other groups whom have obtained, or are seeking to obtain, their self-determination goals.

When considering the question of (a) minority rights for example, the linkage with the RSD features prominently within a broad set of contemporary scholarly works. And while this analysis did not provide a much narrower focus on these links, the importance of recourse to minority rights and protection insofar as Afrikaners are concerned cannot be underestimated. On the question of (b) actual current support for self-determination within *Afrikanerdom*, this analysis identified a prominent research gap. Gauging support for efforts in this regard has been somewhat muted within mainstream media in general, and academic studies specifically, and new research into these ancillary dynamics seems promising. When considering (c) comparative studies linking Afrikaners with other self-determination seeking groups such as the Kurds and Catalans, comparative research could relocate the Afrikaner self-determination debate away from its contentious South African roots and into a global context were other similar movements are hailed as being "at the forefront of true local democracy" (Khanna, 2017).

For those policy-makers of the maximalist persuasion the primary obstacles to the attainment of Afrikaner self-determination can be found at the (a) global and (b) local levels. When considering the RSD from the (a) global perspective the challenges presented within Chapter 2 highlighted the chameleonic nature of the right. The ambiguities of the RSD as enshrined in various international charters and covenants will forever be a boon to those that oppose the maximalist view, and a bane for those that advocate for a wide understanding of the RSD. As a consequence, policy-makers at the (a) global level should examine the possibilities of changing these treaties and its current interpretation of the RSD to remove the ambiguous veil shrouding the right in its current form.

When examining challenges at the (b) local level, the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa remains as a possible hurdle to the prospects of those Afrikaners seeking to claim the RSD.

129

Within the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 235 states that (Republic of South Africa, 1996:136):

> The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.

While the constitution clearly allows for some form of self-determination exercise to be carried out within the borders of the republic, this exercise is pursuant to further national legislation. There are thus two routes open to policy-makers, either the constitution would have to be amended to remove the national legislation clause, or new national legislation would have to be enacted to allow for external or internal self-determination. There are thus significant challenges at both the (a) global and (b) local levels, and these are likely to remain with little to no incentives for states at the (a) global – or lawmakers at the (b) local level – to change these realities. And – as stated previously – since an outright majority in parliament is necessary to amend the constitution, Afrikaner aspirations in this regard remain for now highly unlikely. Only unforeseen circumstances could change this fact – such as acts of extreme aggression and/or discrimination against the Afrikaner minority – and whatever policy-makers wish to accomplish would have to happen within the confines of the constitution.

5.4.2   Recommendations, Part II: A Minimalist View

In contrast, to those favouring a minimalist approach to the RSD insofar as Afrikaner self-determination is concerned the challenges that fuel any such demands should be addressed. Within Chapter 3 a host of such challenges were briefly touched upon, including the inability of the ruling party to adequately address issues relating to unemployment, crime, poverty, the economy, HIV/AIDS, housing, corruption, and the delivery of basic services (Schulz Herzenberg, 2012:136). These are challenges that affect all South Africans, and the ability of the South African government to address these challenges in the short or medium term remains unlikely.

Moreover, the serious nature of the challenges posed by inequality and land restitution proves equally divisive. As long as these challenges remain the wounds of apartheid cannot heal, and the government's inability to address these issues in a timely manner has resulted in widespread dissatisfaction. So long as the goal of wealth creation is supplanted by the goal of wealth redistribution, the Afrikaners will likely remain as scapegoats for the failure of such policies. More importantly however the use of the Afrikaans language, pressures on Afrikaner cultural heritage, AA policies, and farm murders are immediate concerns that directly affect Afrikaner dissatisfaction

– and arguably – creates support for calls of self-determination, in whatever form. These are not impassable obstacles on the road to national reconciliation, and the protection and promotion of all languages (including Afrikaans), the safeguard of Afrikaner cultural heritage, a sunset clause to AA policies, the prioritisation of farm murders and the improvement of rural policing could diminish Afrikaner separatist sentiment insofar as these challenges are concerned.

However, it should be remembered that in the minds of many South Africans the Afrikaners are a historically advantaged minority whom benefited from a system that suppressed the black majority. Any official favour shown to Afrikaners is sure be unpopular within the more radical spheres of the ANC and populist black parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Within these domains reconciliation is seen through the lens of redress, and as long as no substantive progress is made in relation to redress, the question of reconciliation can be side-lined and trumped by the vilification of whites in general, and Afrikaners particularly. Indeed, the idea of 'white *gevaar*' (or white danger) is not novel, and is frequently invoked in issues relating to the perceived "white threat to the greater aims of reconciliation, justice and democracy" (Foster, 2006:85), or more succinctly put, the idea that "Black is good and White is bad" (Gibson, 2013).

As stated previously, such challenges would not appear as daunting if they were confronted by good governance - not unlike South Africa's first non-racial cabinet (see du Toit & de Jager, 2014:93). Yet the patronage politics of the current Zuma administration bodes unwell for South Africans in general, and Afrikaners in particular. The cleavages wrought by apartheid may have once been plastered over by the heady days of the Mandela presidency, but the rate of state decay and capture under the current regime is sure to continue to enflame the passions of the previously disadvantaged and the beneficiaries of the *ancien régime* in almost equal measure. The latter however is not as important insofar as a significant voter base is concerned, and their fears and trepidations – however legitimate – will likely continue to be subordinated to the interests of the majority of South Africa's citizens, in line with the principles of a majoritarian state as opposed to a consociational democracy.

For those members of the epistemic community and of the minimalist persuasion, research that focuses on Afrikaners and linked with topics such as (a) the question of social justice, (b) the potential benefits of consociationalism *vis-à-vis* majoritarianism in the South African context, and on (c) the potential dangers of South Africa's entrenchment of divisive identity politics, all have the potential to endear Afrikaner accommodation within a multi-ethnic state. While the body of scholarly work focusing on Afrikaner's role within South Africa's apartheid past remains sizeable, work that focuses on Afrikaners role within (a) the question of social justice in contrast remains marginal. If Afrikaners are to become South Africans in every sense of the word, if the stain of

apartheid is to be removed, what role should Afrikaners play in the process of social justice and nation building? Research of such a nature – while controversial – will move away from merely explaining the historic role of Afrikaners and Apartheid to providing a plausible narrative about their place in securing social justice for all those handicapped by the unjust *ancien regime*.

Research on (b) the potential benefits of consociationalism *vis-à-vis* majoritarianism in a South African context could equally endear Afrikaner accommodation within the post-apartheid state. South African politics is rapidly changing, those parties once considered hegemonic are now shedding electoral support while upstarts emerge from seemingly nowhere and often find themselves as kingmakers in new and emerging local government coalition-building efforts. If the trend of a fracturing of politics according to class, race, or ethnicity looks set to continue, then the question of the viability of other forms of democratic systems more suited towards divided societies warrants closer attention. Closely linked to this deepening of societal divides is (c) the potential dangers of South Africa's entrenchment of divisive identity politics. The increasing polarisation between South Africa's various groups should be a prime topic of current research, with the potential dangers of this process evident from Kigali to Kirkuk. That such research is currently being conducted almost solely by fringe groups – such as genocide prevention organisations – remains perplexing and troubling in equal measure.

For those policy-makers of the minimalist school legislation which targets the Afrikaner minority for exclusion in whatever form should be reviewed. As discussed previously, a sunset clause for AA policies, and those that threaten Afrikaner's cultural heritage – with regards to their language for instance – are areas where action should be focused if Afrikaner accommodation is to be sought. Yet as with all the policy recommendations discussed herein the likelihood of their successful implementation remain, as for now, highly unlikely. The political will and support necessary to accomplish these goals cannot be endeared within the confines of South Africa's current realities. Afrikaners are for all intents and purposes a problematic minority – their concerns, however legitimate, cannot be addressed while the majority of their countrymen still struggle with the same challenges they did under NP rule. Poverty, a lack of education, and unemployment, to name but a few – these are all concerns that are being grappled with by the South African state and society – and inadequately so. The sheer increase in frequency and violence of service delivery protests is symptomatic of this dilemma.

5.5 Afrikaner Self-determination: A Rejoinder

What then of the Afrikaners? While a significant many have emigrated – a fluctuating process termed "white flight" (Campbell, 2016:83) – the hump of *Afrikanerdom* still reside in those areas

132

that their forebears settled centuries ago. In that time they have faced many crises, from the hardships of volatile frontier life to wars that appeared to threaten their near extinction in the very republics they founded to escape foreign rule. This resistance to foreign influence found its first expression against the VOC, and in time would be pitted against the mighty British Empire in a dogged self-determination defence. Only in the aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War were these early Afrikaners brought to their knees, yet even then – after having lost home, hearth, and many a loved one – did they manage to blunt imperial aims and score a political victory in the first elections after the war, so soon after a crushing military defeat. From the ashes of the Anglo-Boer War the Afrikaners largely regained control of not only their erstwhile republics, but of the South African state as a whole. That these embers would again consume the South African state in yet another self-determination conflict shows just how limited humankind's capacity is to learn from its past mistakes.

With South Africa's Black majority having claimed their right to self-determination in 1994, the Afrikaner minority are yet again in political limbo, and at a historical crossroads. For many the shock corresponding to a loss of political power may appear as new and unique. Yet one only has to look back into relatively recent South African history to see that it is not so. Is the new South Africa the final liberation that Leach (1990:xv) spoke of? This analysis would answer in the negative, if only considering Afrikaner insecurity in the new democratic state. As stated previously, if Afrikaners were relatively satisfied with the status quo of their lot in the new South Africa there would be little to no support for those movements advocating for the establishment of an independent domain of political control – in whatever form.

Indeed, the support – in terms of membership and financial contributions – given to those organisations examined herein suggests otherwise. Moreover, with a long list of challenges faced by South Africans in general, and Afrikaners specifically, discontent with the status quo is likely to remain in an upwards trend. Twenty-three years after the first fully democratic elections South African society remains deeply fragmented. These societal fault lines and lack of overlapping memberships finds expression in the doubt over the longevity of a 'Rainbow Nation', and racial and ethnic othering at both the elite and mass levels. These fissures hinder overlapping memberships and middle-of-the-road attitudes, creating fertile ground for populist leaders wishing to deflect attention away from their failures and onto the White – and by extension, Afrikaner – other.

Further complicating the above is the ethnic nature of South Africa's majoritarian governance system. To be sure, majoritarianism need not be exclusionary and can foster political equality - a fundamental principle of democracy. However, South African majoritarianism has fallen victim to

those elected by millions of desperate individuals whom have seen little to no increase in their living standards compared to decades ago. These failures are being plastered over by blaming it on the other, further driving wedges into a society that can ill afford any additional fissures. That unbridled majoritarianism would be the norm was not always certain, as South Africa's brief – albeit noteworthy – liaison with consociationalism shows. Remnants of this connection include a proportional representation electoral system, one allowing a modicum of minority representation in South Africa's parliament. Moreover, a South African state with consociational values imbedded in its political core has the promise to radically alter the current 'us' and 'them' divide, providing political equality and building bridges instead of burning them down through populist rhetoric and national angst.

Afrikaners should be forgiven their anxiety in a society which views them and their historical and cultural selves as criminals at best, and violent oppressors at worst. History is replete with examples of how the downtrodden have dealt with their oppressors in the past. That Whites in general, and Afrikaners particularly, are no longer at the political helm matters little. Their perceived affluence in a sea of economic misery already arouses suspicion, if not contempt. It would take a cadre of leaders with great vision and determination to address these divergences, sadly the country largely remains saddled with their moral and intellectual inferiors. It is against this backdrop that Afrikaner self-determination currents should be understood, with these currents being fed into by the energies released through othering, estrangement, guilt, and victimisation, in conjunction with the long list of challenges described within this chapter. Caught between a severely divided society on the one hand, and unbridled majoritarianism on the other, the impetus towards finding a way out of the quagmire that is South African politics will likely remain – and quite possibly increase – at least for some within contemporary *Afrikanerdom*.

If nothing else, Afrikaner history demonstrates how an unlikely victory can often be snatched from the jaws of utter defeat. Conversely, it also serves as a dire warning to those blind to the plight of the "wretched of the earth" (Fanon, 2004:viii). Whether they are poor masses of post Anglo-Boer War Afrikaners who sowed the seeds of almost a century of Afrikaner racial domination, or those millions of their fellow Black countrymen whom are today sowing the seeds that will determine South Africa's future. Whatever the case may be, after centuries of racial and ethnic conflict one can but hope that all of South Africa's peoples will indeed one day find peace. Time will tell what kind of future the Afrikaners of today are self-determining, and for how long they will remain "a homeless people – still seeking that elusive final and secure resting place" (Leach, 1990:xv).

5.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter further explored the topic of Afrikaner self-determination through answering the fourth and final research sub-question, being, what possible significance can be derived from the study's findings, and what policy recommendations can be formulated to address this phenomenon? In answering this concluding sub-question this chapter utilised the typological approach examined in Chapter 2 to better understand the past, present, and possible future trends and developments within Afrikaner self-determination currents. After exploring the above broad analytical overview, a brief examination of the relationship between deeply divided societies and governance structures showed how a fractured South African society on the one hand, and unbridled ethnic majoritarianism on the other, potentially serve as factors conducive towards the sustainment of Afrikaner self-determination efforts. The final section of this chapter provided two vantage points from which to view the phenomenon of Afrikaner self-determination – one maximalist and one minimalist – and provided recommendations to the epistemic and policy-making communities which either supports grand self-determination or seek to accommodate Afrikaners within the post-apartheid state.

Chapter VI – Study Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

Within Chapter 1 the research problem was explained within the context of global – often violent – self-determination struggles, and the need for informed policy responses to the challenges these struggles bring. Moreover, it was also shown how theoretical frameworks exploring the question of self-determination remain few in number, and that the general goal of this research was to advance an understanding of historical and contemporary Afrikaner self-determination aspirations and the conditions under which it exists. More narrowly defined, the main research question guiding this analysis was whether the phenomenon of national self-determination can be identified in historical and contemporary *Afrikanerdom*, and whether it is possible to explain the dynamics and causes of self-determination aspirations as represented by key Afrikaner activists and organisations?

Furthermore, four research sub-questions buttressing this primary research was identified. The four sub-questions asked (1) what is national self-determination, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline; (2) what, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context; (3) what are the broad manifestations of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action as presented by key self-determination activists and organisations, and what factors contribute to action in this regard; and (4) what possible significance can be derived from the study's findings, and what policy recommendations can be formulated to address this phenomenon? Within this final chapter each of the study's constituent parts will be summarised and presented as a response to the research questions outlined above. Furthermore, this summary of findings will be preceded by a brief discussion on the research problem, suggestions for further research, and finally a brief overview of problems encountered in the final stages of this study and with a bearing on its method and findings.

6.2 Study Overview

Within Chapter 2 this analysis examined the first of four research sub-questions, being, what is national self-determination, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline? The first part of the chapter examined the historical development of self-determination, one highlighting its metamorphosis from a principle with its roots in the Treaty of Westphalia towards a chameleonic right of all peoples in the aftermath of two devastating world wars. Current debates on self-determination include those that touch upon the ambiguous nature of the RSD, a right that continues to be claimed irrespective of the uncertainties around what actually amounts to self-

determination, how it can be achieved, who is eligible for claiming the right, and under what specific circumstances this can be done.

Moreover – and regarding the second part of the chapter – the typological face(s) of self-determination were examined in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of self-determination while also providing the ideational framework necessary to explore Afrikaner self-determination in the subsequent chapters. The typology of self-determination advanced by Neuberger in *National Self-determination: A Theoretical Discussion* (2001:391) explored (1) the identity of the 'self' in self-determination, (2) both the goals and means of determination, (3) the correlation between the right of self-determination and the right of secession, (4) questions regarding the optimal size of a viable state, (5) whether the process of self-determination can be reversed, and (6) the conflict between self-determination and other international principles.

Yet a typological understanding of national self-determination by itself does little to explain under which conditions the phenomenon can flourish, or decline. In order to bridge this gap, the final section of Chapter 2 examined governance structures within deeply divided societies to show the interplay between factors conducive towards both the emergence and decline of the phenomenon of self-determination. In other words, if national self-determination is the result of actions undertaken for the establishment of an independent domain of political control, there should also be identifiable conditions that prove conducive towards the emergence and/or decline of action in this pursuit. As was shown, the linkage between a fragmented political culture on the one hand, and unbridled majoritarianism on the other, are factors conducive towards the emergence of Afrikaner self-determination. In contrast, consociationalism has the potential to decline action in this regard, at least insofar as it can foster consensus, political inclusion, and entrench minority protection.

With the theoretical groundwork laid in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 in turn proposed that in order to understand contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts it is first and foremost necessary to be cognisant of its historic fount. Indeed, contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts are in one way or another merely the continuation of an age old phenomenon. This chapter then answered the second research sub-question, that is, what, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context? This sub-question was explored against the background of broader South African history, from the Colonial Era (1652 to 1836), through to the Republican Era (1836 to 1902), the Union Era (1902 to 1948), and finally into the Nationalist Era (1948 to 1994). During these three and a half centuries the bitter struggles wrought over the South African landscape included multiple Afrikaner self-determination attempts, having been won and lost numerous times. Ultimately however the Afrikaners would buttress their self-

determination through the policy of apartheid, and in doing so rob others of the right they claimed for themselves. Yet apartheid could not stand, and the majority's right to self-determination was reaffirmed at the dawn of the Majoritarian Era (1994 to -).

Chapter 4 in turn answered the third research sub-question of identifying the broad trends and developments in contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action, and on what factors contribute to action in this regard. Apart from unemployment, crime, poverty, the economy, HIV/AIDS, housing, corruption, the delivery of basic services, and state capture and decay, other pressing issues around which Afrikaner self-determination attempts can coalesce included pressures on the Afrikaans language, Afrikaner cultural heritage, affirmative action policies, and farm murders which serve as noteworthy examples of issues affecting Afrikaner disenfranchisement within the post-apartheid state.

In returning to the topic of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination efforts, Chapter 4 further explored three contemporary organisations which constitute the most viable potential conduits for the realisation of Afrikaner self-determination, in one form or another. Firstly, the Orania Movement represents the most recent expression of Afrikaner autonomy in regional form. The Oranians have achieved a series of small yet significant economic and political triumphs, being a beacon of commercial agricultural activities in a region that is largely economically marginalised and successfully protecting their autonomous status in the face of government encroachment. Moreover, town management has earmarked significant capital reserves for investment and growth facilitated through their 2016 Economic Development Plan. The plan includes investment in key sectors including in infrastructure development, secondary and tertiary education, residential, commercial and industrial expansion, and information technology infrastructure expansion, amongst many more. However, it remains to be seen what impact the plan will have not only on Orania, but also on the future of Afrikaner self-determination in a territorial sense.

Secondly, while the small town of Orania is the geographical expression of Afrikaners seeking self-determination, the FF+ are their most significant political hope. The FF+ represents the sole remaining Afrikaner political party in the South African legislature. The party owes its very existence to the idea of Afrikaner self-determination and was of singular importance in the inclusion of Section 235 in the South African Constitution. The party remains committed to the idea of Afrikaner self-determination, territorial or otherwise.

Thirdly, the Solidarity Movement was identified as the most dynamic Afrikaner self-determination actor within this analysis. As a vehicle advocating minority rights, civil liberties, and the fight against Afrikaner poverty, the movement has grown to encompass a host of divergent institutions.

138

From tertiary educational institutions and cultural societies to a civil liberty lobby group, the movement has grown exponentially over the last decade and is robust both in membership and capital. Moreover, in response to the seriousness of the political, economic, and social challenges affecting South Africa, Solidarity hosted summits where its sister organisations and members could aid in formulating a response. This includes the commitment of R3,5 billion (approximately $257 million) to finance a 5-year plan to buttress Afrikaner autonomy in education, safety, media, and heritage, to name but a few.

Finally, Chapter 4 complemented the overall research project through a gathering and analysis of primary data to strengthen the study conclusions. In the first of three key informant interviews, Carel Boshoff IV, President of the Orania Movement, explained how the concept of Afrikaner self-determination has changed, and how this change within *Afrikanerdom* has brought about a fundamental change in the strategy of those seeking to establish Afrikaner self-determination, in whatever form. The most significant point raised during the Mulder interview relates to the party's continued support for the realisation of Afrikaner self-determination. Initially this may appear as surprising, with the question of self-determination having ostensibly faded into the background while the party remains vocal in its support for minority rights and protections. As Dr Mulder explained, the logic behind a focus on minority rights – and a muted deference towards Afrikaner self-determination – relates to the tainted nature of the *Volkstaat* concept – one intimately linked to the White far right. Having accepted this fact, it would appear that the FF+ leadership realised that a new self-determination strategy was necessary, and that its attainment would take considerable time.

Through an interview with the Chief Executive Officer of Solidarity South Africa, Flip Buys, several important points on the current and future state of Afrikaner self-determination were examined. Of primary importance in this regard was the suggestion that while Solidarity's short term goals include community self-determination projects, its more long term objectives relate to the possibility of Afrikaner self-determination on a much larger scale. The current volatile South African political malaise does not prove conducive to an oft maligned minority making political demands, and as such Solidarity's low key approach appears prudent. Moreover, such a low key approach would also provide the organisation the space and time necessary to lay the groundwork upon which the goal of Afrikaner self-determination – in whatever form – can be realised. This conforms to Buys' admission that the factors conducive towards the emergence of Afrikaner self-determination needs to be cultivated before it can be realised.

In response to the fourth and final research sub-question, being, what possible significance can be derived from the study's findings, and what policy recommendations can be formulated to address this phenomenon, Chapter 5 employed the broad typological markers provided by Neuberger and identified the dynamics related to past, present, and possible future Afrikaner self-determination efforts. From determining the Afrikaner 'self' to extrapolating on the goals and means of their self-determination actions, Neuberger's framework proved beneficial in explaining and understanding the nature of Afrikaner self-determination. However, the greatest weakness of utilising a purely typological framework relates to its limitations in explanatory power, or more succinctly put, in its failure to answer the 'so what' question. In order to address this shortcoming, an application of the questions of overlapping memberships and democratic forms of governance in divided societies shed new light on the topic of Afrikaner self-determination. Here the linkage between a deeply divided South African society on the on hand, and unbridled ethnic majoritarianism on the other, was posited to serve as factors conducive towards the sustainment of action in this regard.

To conclude Chapter 5 further examined the maximalist and minimalist divides in relation to claiming the RSD from an Afrikaner perspective, and utilised these perspectives to formulate recommendations to the epistemic and policy-making communities. Regarding the former the strengths of each organisation in its separate capacity was touched upon, in conjunction with the possibility of the amalgamation of the FF+ and the Orania and Solidarity movements as an alternative that could combine their respective lines of effort into a potentially potent vehicle for Afrikaner self-determination efforts. And insofar as the latter was concerned the factors conducive to the emergence and sustainment of Afrikaner disenfranchisement was discussed to show how questions around a fractured society and ethnic majoritarianism – and the challenges posed by the use of the Afrikaans language, pressures on Afrikaner cultural heritage, AA policies, and farm murders – combine to fuel possible Afrikaner alienation. Yet Afrikaners are a minority, and as the South African state struggles to provide even basic public goods for the majority of its citizens it remains uncertain how minority concerns can be alleviated, if at all. While there are avenues open to policy-makers in this regard, the likelihood of their successful implementation currently remains close to nil.

6.3 On the Research Problem

In returning to answering the research question it is first and foremost necessary to answer the four sub-questions buttressing the primary problem. Firstly, on the question of what national self-determination is, and what factors are conducive towards its emergence and/or decline, this analysis posits that that ultimately, national self-determination is a chameleonic right that seeks to establish

an independent domain of political control – in various guises. On the factors conducive towards the phenomenon's emergence and/or decline, this analysis points toward discontent within deeply divided societies under democratic forms of governance that may accentuate these divides instead of bridging them – most notably majoritarianism – while other forms of democratic systems – such as consociationalism – may induce the opposite.

Secondly, on the question of what, if any, are the broad trends and developments of Afrikaner self-determination efforts in an historical context, this analysis examined the anti-imperial and republican Afrikaner self-determination efforts of the nineteenth century to those in the twentieth century that mobilised Afrikaner Nationalism and the policy of apartheid to protect Afrikaner autonomy by denying others the same right. Thirdly, on the question of what the broad manifestations of contemporary Afrikaner self-determination discourse and action as presented by key self-determination activists and organisations are, and on what factors contribute to action in this regard, this examination linked the primarily autonomy seeking projects – such as those favoured by the FF+, and the Orania and Solidarity movements – to a host of challenges besetting the South African state. However, when considering the single largest contributing factors, this analysis posits that a deeply divided South African society on the on hand, and unbridled ethnic majoritarianism on the other, potentially serve as factors conducive towards the sustainment of action in this regard.

Fourthly, on what possible significance can be derived from the study's findings, and what policy recommendations can be formulated to address this phenomenon, this analysis provided two contrasting vantage points. In utilising the maximalist and minimalist approaches to the RSD it was possible to view the question of Afrikaner self-determination efforts from the vantage points of support and accommodation. From a maximalist perspective in favour of a broad application of the RSD, each of the three organisations discussed herein provide a unique trait that the others lack. However, if the three were to be integrated into one body representing the combined efforts of those seeking Afrikaner self-determination it would benefit from parliamentary representation, a regionally established nucleus, and the funds and organisation necessary to possibly achieve their hefty aims. In contrast, when examined from a minimalist perspective an alternative to Afrikaner self-determination has to take into consideration those factors conducive towards the phenomenon's emergence. However, even if only considering voter participation – and the absence of a consociational order – the importance of the Afrikaner minority within South African politics is negligible, and as such their concerns remain consigned largely to the background.

Finally, by answering these four sub-questions the main research problem can now be addressed, that is, can the phenomenon of national self-determination be identified in historical and contemporary *Afrikanerdom*, and is it possible to explain the dynamics and causes of self-determination aspirations as represented by key Afrikaner activists and organisations? This analysis replies in the affirmative, noting that Afrikaner self-determination is alive and well in South Africa, and that the phenomenon of self-determination runs like a golden thread throughout Afrikaner history, and indeed, well into contemporary Afrikaner discourse and action. That the nature of this phenomenon has not remained static is evident, even if only considering the variants of national self-determination sought during the close of the nineteenth century, or the type sought by contemporary Afrikaner actors.

To illustrate, it could be argued that external self-determination was the *raison d'être* of those republicans fighting in the Anglo-Boer War, while current Afrikaner centric organisations seek the establishment of greater internal self-determination, with the possibility of grand self-determination waiting on the horizon. And regarding the latter, this analysis proposes that deep rifts within South African society – further worsened by the non-accommodation of majoritarianism and the resultant sense of political impotency – creates the conditions necessary to further Afrikaner actions in this regard. Yet, as previously discussed, this need not be so. Indeed, there are alternatives to the attainment of Afrikaner self-determination on a grand scale, and none appear more promising than the group accommodation sought by consociationalist forms of democratic governance.

6.4 Avenues of Future Research

Based on the preceding chapters a host of avenues for future research can be identified. To illustrate, within Chapter 2 for instance the relative scarcity of Political Science orientated theoretical frameworks on self-determination was identified. The research possibilities in this regard include the empirical assessment of those frameworks found in legal theory and its applicability to the political sciences, or the formulation and testing of a new theory seeking to fill this gap. However, when considering Chapter 4 specifically one of the more glaring research gaps related to the gauging of support for Afrikaner self-determination. While various surveys and polls were touched upon, all the examples cited can be seen as insufficient for gauging current support for Afrikaner self-determination.

The surveys examined were conducted two decades ago, while the polls were confined to a specific newspaper and hidden behind an online paywall respectively. As such support may or may not have increased for Afrikaner self-determination in the two decades since, while the narrow focus of newspaper polls cannot accurately measure support for Afrikaner self-determination. A study

seeking to empirically gauge support for the idea of Afrikaner self-determination could prove rewarding not only in terms of its face value, but also in what factors prove more conducive towards the need or wish for self-determination. Such results would prove beneficial not only to those seeking to realise this goal, but also to those whom wish to keep Afrikaners within the broader South African fold.

6.5 A Brief Note on Challenges Encountered

At the end of a study it becomes possible to review the research process and comment on those challenges encountered that may cast a measure of doubt on the methods employed and the findings deduced. An example of a minor issue encountered during the early phases of the study included the use of Neuberger's (2001:415) typological framework of national self-determination without any subsequent addition as to those factors which may prove conducive towards the emergence of self-determination movements in the first place. If the study was not subsequently adapted a more focused end result would have to be foregone. Indeed, understanding what various forms a given phenomenon can take is certainly useful when seeking to comprehend it, yet an understanding of the conditions under which it can exist does more to explain the complexities of the phenomenon in the first place than do mere topical markers.

This statement leads to a final challenge encountered. While this analysis examined the possibility of deeply divided societies and non-accommodating governance systems as the fertile soil from which self-determination movements can spring, the study did not have a more narrow focus accounting for how this may happen, and whether this process can be observed in contemporary South Africa and specifically applied to its Afrikaner minority. More succinctly put, this qualitative study did not undertake the quantitative route of proving how X (e.g. deeply divided societies and majoritarian governance) can cause Y (e.g. the emergence of self-determination movements). And while this potential problem certainly does not render the study without merit, it should serve as an interesting point of departure for those quantitative social scientists whose research interests intersect at the points of causality and its linkages with contemporary self-determination movements.

Bibliography

Abulof, U. 2015. *The Mortality and Morality of Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Adam, H. 1999. Corporatism as Minority Veto under ANC Hegemony in South Africa, in Giliomee, H. and Simkins, C. (eds). *The Awkward Embrace: One-party Domination and Democracy*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Adam, H. and Moodley, K. 1987. *South Africa without Apartheid: Dismantling Racial Domination*. Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman.

Akhmadov, I. and Lanskoy, M. 2010. *The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Alexander, N. 2011. After Apartheid: The Language Question, in Shapiro, I. and Tebeau, K. (eds.). *After Apartheid: Reinventing South Africa?* Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Almond, G.A. 1956. Comparative Political Systems. *The Journal of Politics*, 18(3): 391-409.

Altbeker, A. and Steinberg, J. 1998. Race, Reason and Representation in National Party Discourse, 1990-1992, in Norval, A.J. and Howarth, D.R. (eds.). *South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Anaya, S.J. 1996. *Indigenous Peoples in International Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, B. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Armitage, D. 2007. *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Armstrong, A. and Ebell, M. 2014. Devolution within the UK. *National Institute Economic Review*, (230):F4-F5.

Asch, M. 2001. Indigenous Self-determination and Applied Anthropology in Canada: Finding a Place to Stand. *Anthropologica*, 43(2):201-208.

Ash, T.G. 2002. *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Babbie, E. 2010. *The Practice of Social Research*. Belmont: Wadsworth.

Baines, G. 2009. South Africa's Forgotten War. *History Today*, 59(4):22-24.

Baines, G. 2014. *South Africa's 'Border War': Contested Narratives and Conflicting Memories*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Bandarage, A. 2009. *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Barker, J. (ed.). 2005. *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-determination*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Barten, U. 2015. *Minorities, Minority Rights and Internal Self-Determination*. New York: Springer.

Bartkus, V.O. 2004. *The Dynamic of Secession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beck, D.R.M. 2005. *The Struggle for Self-Determination: History of the Menominee Indians since 1854*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Beran, H. 2005. A Democratic Theory of Political Self-determination for a New World Order, in Lehning, P.B. (ed.). *Theories of Secession*. London: Routledge.

Berger, I. 2009. *South Africa in World History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bhandari, S. 2014. *Self-Determination and Constitution Making in Nepal: Constituent Assembly, Inclusion, and Ethnic Federalism*. New York: Springer.

Biskupski, M.B.B. 2013. Wilson's Policies toward Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 1917–1919, in Kennedy, R.A. (ed.). *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad. 2011. Agtergrond [Online]. Available: http://volksraad.co.za/agtergrond/ [2016, September 30].

Boer-Afrikaner Volksraad. 2015. Mediaverklaring: 20 Januarie 2015 [Online]. Available: http://volksraad.co.za/mediaverklarings/ [2016, September 30].

Boere Krisis Aksie. 2016. Boere Krisis Aksie (B.K.A.) [Online]. Available: https://www.facebook.com/boerekrisisaksie/ [2016, September 30].

Boersema, J.R. 2012. Between Recognition and Resentment: An Afrikaner Trade Union's Brand of Post-Nationalism. *African Studies*, 71(3):408-425.

Bogaards, M. 1998. The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy: A Review. *European Journal of Political Research*, 33:475-496.

Bond, L. 1991. *Vortex*. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

145

Bond, P. 2000. *The Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press.

Bonner, P. 2011. South African Society and Culture, 1910-1948, in Ross, R., Mager, A.K., and Nasson, B. (eds.). *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, *Volume 2. 1885–1994*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boshoff, C. 2017. Interviewed by: Visagie, R. 5 October 2017.

Boulter, R.S. 2000. Afrikaner Nationalism in Action: F. C. Erasmus and South Africa's Defence Forces 1948- 1959. *Nations and Nationalism*, 6(3):437-459.

Brainard, L.J. 1983. Foreign Economic Constraints on Soviet Raw Material Development in the 1980s, in Jensen, R.G., Shabad, T. and Wright, A.W. (eds.). *Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brebbia, C.A. 2006. *Patagonia, a Forgotten Land: From Magellan to Perón*. Southampton: Wessex Institute of Technology Press.

Brilmayer, L. 1991. Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation. *Yale Journal of International Law*, 16(177):177-202.

Brink, C. 2006. *No Lesser Place: The Taaldebat at Stellenbosch*. Stellenbosch: SUN Press.

Bruce, D. 2013. A Provincial Concern? Political killings in South Africa. *South African Crime Quarterly*, 45:13-24.

Buchanan, A. 1991. *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Buchanan, A. 1997. Theories of Secession. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 26(1):31-61.

Buchanan, A. 2004. *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buthelezi, J. 2002. *Rolihlahla Dalibhunga Nelson Mandela: An Ecological Study*. Victoria: Trafford.

Butler, A. 2009. *Contemporary South Africa*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Buys, F. 2015(a). Interviewed by: Visagie, R. 31 August 2015.

Buys, F. 2015(b). Die Stand van Selfbeskikking in Suid Afrika [Online]. Available: http://maroelamedia.co.za/debat/meningsvormers/die-stand-van-selfbeskikking-in-suid-afrika/ [2016, October 12].

Calpin, G.H. 1951. South Africa in Afrikaner Hands. *Foreign Affairs*, 29(3):417-423.

Cameron, D.R., Ranis, G. and Zinn, A. (eds.). 2006. *Globalization and Self-determination: Is the Nation-state Under Siege?* London: Routledge.

Campbell, J. 2016. *Morning in South Africa*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Caney, S. 2005. National self-determination and National Secession: Individualist and communitarian approaches, in Lehning, P.B. (ed.). *Theories of Secession*. London: Routledge.

Canuel, E.T. 1997. Nationalism, Self-Determination, and Nationalist Movements: Exploring the Palestinian and Quebec Drives for Independence. *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 20(1):85-122.

Carey, H. 2008. Religion and the "Evil Empire". *Journal of Religious History*, 32(2):179-192.

Cassese, A. 2008. *The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Castellino, J. 2005. Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-Determination, in Ghanea, N. and Xanthaki, A. (eds.). *Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Castle, H.G. 1976. *Spion Kop*. New Maiden: Almark Publishing.

Chandra, B. 1989. *India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*. London: Penguin Books.

Cherry, J. 2012. 'Their Vote is not Unconditional': Development, Devolution and Local-provincial Dynamics, in Booysen, S. (ed.). *Local Elections in South Africa: Parties, People, Politics*. Bloemfontein: Sun Press.

Christopher, A.J. 2011. Secession and South Sudan: An African Precedent for the Future? *South African Geographical Journal*, 93(2):125-132.

Clark, N.L. and Worger, W.H. 2013. *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Clark, T.N. and Lipset, S.M. 2001. *The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Clymer, K.J. 1995. *Quest for Freedom: The United States and India's Independence*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Comaroff, J. 1985. *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Connors, M.K. 1996. The Eclipse of Consociationalism in South Africa's Democratic Transition. *Democratization*, 3(4): 420-434.

Coppieters, B. 2003. War and Secession: A Moral Analysis of the Georgian–Abkhaz Conflict, in Coppieters, B. and Sakwa, R. (eds.). *Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cornell, S.E. 2002. Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective. *World Politics*, 54(2):245-276.

Cottrell, R.C. 2005. *South Africa: A State of Apartheid*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers.

Cox, K.R. 2002. *Political Geography: Territory, State, and Society*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Creighton, M. 2003. May the Saru River Flow: The Nibutani Dam and the Resurging Tide of the Ainu Identity Movement, in Edgington, D.W. (ed.). *Japan at the Millennium: Joining Past and Future*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Daily Maverick. 2012. Cape winelands: Whose protests are they anyway? [Online]. Available: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-11-20-cape-winelands-whose-protests-are-they-anyway/#.V-5rlPkrLIV [2016, September 30].

Darraj, S.M. 2010. *The Collapse of the Soviet Union*. New York: Chelsea House Publishers.

Davenport, T.R.H and Saunders, C. 2000. *South Africa: A Modern History*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Davies, R. 2007. Rebuilding the Future or Revisiting the Past? Post-Apartheid Afrikaner Politics. *Review of African Political Economy*, 34(112):353-370.

Davies, R. 2009. *Afrikaners in the New South Africa: Identity Politics in a Globalised Economy*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Davis, R. 2014. 'Winnie Mandela Province' and an independent Afrikaner state: The politics of exclusion in the 'new' South Africa [Online]. Available: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-07-25-winnie-mandela-province-and-an-independent-afrikaner-state-the-politics-of-exclusion-in-the-new-south-africa/#.V_e2V_krLIU [2016, October 7].

De Bragança A. and Wallerstein, I. (eds.). 1983. *The African Liberation Reader*. London: Zed Press.

De Jager, N. 2015. Apartheid to Democracy, in de Jager, N. (ed.) *South African Politics: An introduction*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

De Kiewiet, C.W. 1942. *A History of South Africa: Social and Economic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dersso, S.A. 2012. *Taking Ethno-Cultural Diversity Seriously in Constitutional Design: A Theory of Minority Rights for Addressing Africa's Multi-ethnic Challenge*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Deumert, A. 2004. *Language Standardization and Language Change: The dynamics of Cape Dutch*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Diamond, J. 1999. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Dowty, A. 1999. Consociationalism and Ethnic Democracy: Israeli Arabs in Comparative Perspective, in Levi-Faur, D., Sheffer, G. and Vogel, D. (eds.). *Israel: The Dynamics of Change and Continuity*. London: Frank Cass.

Du Preez, M. 2017. 'Boer bullies' will cost white people dearly [Online]. Available: http://www.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/boer-bullies-will-cost-white-people-dearly-20170926 [2017, September 26].

Du Toit, P. and de Jager, N. 2014. South Africa's Dominant-Party System in Comparative Perspective. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 10(2): 93-113.

Du Toit, P. and Kotzé, H. 2011. *Liberal Democracy and Peace in South Africa: The Pursuit of Freedom as Dignity*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dubow, S. 2006. *A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa 1820–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dubow, S. 2014. *Apartheid, 1948–1994*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Duffy, C.G. 1904. *The Revival of Irish Literature: Addresses by Sr Charles Gavan Duffy, KCMG, Dr. George Sigerson, and Dr Douglas Hyde*. London: T. Fisher Unwin.

Eaton, T. 2016. The Big Read: 'I don't need your civil war' [Online]. Available: http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2016/03/01/The-Big-Read-I-dont-need-your-civil-war [2016, October 8].

Eccardt, T.M. 2005. *Secrets of the Seven Smallest States of Europe: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City*. New York: Hippocrene Books.

Ehrenfreund, N. 2007. *The Nuremberg Legacy: How the Nazi War Crimes Trials Changed the Course of History*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 1994. 1994 National and Provincial Elections [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/uploadedfiles/NPE%201994.pdf [2016, October 1].

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 1999. National Elections 1999 [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/1/Detailed%20Results/National.pdf [2016, October 1].

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2004. 14 APR 2004 NATIONAL ELECTION [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/45/Detailed%20Results/National.pdf [2016, October 1].

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2009. 22 APR 2009 NATIONAL ELECTION [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/146/Detailed%20Results/National.pdf [2016, October 1].

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2014. 2014 National and Provincial Elections: National results [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/Elections/Results/2014-National-and-Provincial-Elections--National-results/ [2016, September 30].

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2014. 2014 NATIONAL ELECTION [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/NPEPublicReports/291/Results%20Report/National.pdf [2016, October 1].

Electoral Commission of South Africa. 2016. Political Party List [Online]. Available: http://www.elections.org.za/content/Parties/Political-party-list/ [2016, September 29].

Emmerson, R. 1960. Nationalism and Political Development. *The Journal of Politics*, 22(1):3-28.

ENCA. 2013(a). Missing Brakpan girl found raped, murdered [Online]. Available: https://www.enca.com/south-africa/missing-brakpan-girl-found-raped-murdered [2016, September 30].

ENCA. 2013(b). Kunene launches party, targets voters [Online]. Available: https://www.enca.com/south-africa/kunene%E2%80%99s-new-party-patriotic-alliance-set-contest-2014-elections [2016, September 30].

ENCA. 2015. Paul Kruger statue defaced again [Online]. Available: https://www.enca.com/south-africa/paul-kruger-statue-smeared-green-again [2016, September 27].

ENCA. 2016. Hidden civil war within ANC will boil to surface: Moeletsi Mbeki [Online]. Available: https://www.enca.com/south-africa/hidden-civil-war-within-anc-will-boil-to-surface-moeletsi-mbeki [2016, October 8].

Engel, U. and Porto, J.G. (eds.). 2010. *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalising Solutions*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Evans, M.M. 1999. *The Boer War: South Africa 1899-1902*. Oxford: Osprey.

Eyewitness News. 2015. Afrikaner groups protest near Jan van Riebeeck statue [Online]. Available: http://ewn.co.za/2015/04/08/Group-protests-against-Jan-van-Riebeeck-statues-removal [2016, September 30].

Fairbridge, D. 1918. *A History of South Africa*. London: Oxford University Press.

Fairweather, J.G. 2006. *A Common Hunger: Land Rights in Canada and South Africa*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Falk, R. 2002. Self-determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine versus the Incoherence of Experience, in Danspeckgruber, W.F. (ed.). *The Self-determination of Peoples: Community, Nation, and State in an Interdependent World*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Fanon, F. 2004. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove press.

Farmer, A. 2015. *The Experience of Warfare in Britain: Crimea, Boer and the First World War 1854–1929*. London: Hodder Education.

February, V. 1991. *The Afrikaners of South Africa*. London: Routledge.

Ferree, K.E. 2011. *Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial Census Elections*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fessha, Y.T. 2010. *Ethnic Diversity and Federalism: Constitution Making in South Africa and Ethiopia*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Foster, D. 2006. Healing, in Villa-Vicencio, C. and Du Toit, F. (eds.). *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years on*. Claremont: New Africa Books.

Fourie, P. and Meyer, M. 2010. *The Politics of AIDS Denialism: South Africa's Failure to Respond*. London: Routledge.

Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research at Stellenbosch University. 2009. [Online]. Available: http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/Arts/graduate_school/docs/Tab/SU%20Research%20Ethics%20Policy_Mar09.pdf [2015, March 11].

Frankel, P.H. 2001. *An Ordinary Atrocity: Sharpeville and Its Massacre*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Frankental, S. and Sichone, O.B. 2005. *South Africa's Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook*. Santa Barbara: ABC Clio.

Freedom Front Plus. 2013. Mission [Online]. Available: http://www.vfplus.org.za/mission [2016, October 1].

Freedom Front Plus. 2014. Manifesto of the FF Plus for the election of 2014 [Online]. Available: http://www.vfplus.org.za/content/manifesto-of-the-ff-plus-for-the-election-of-2014 [2016, October 1].

Fremont-Barnes, G. 2003. *The Boer War, 1899-1902*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.

French, P. 2014. *North Korea: State of Paranoia*. London: Zed Books.

Freund, B. 2011. South Africa: The Union Years, 1910–1948 – Political and Economic Foundations, in Ross, R., Mager, A.K., and Nasson, B. (eds.). *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, *Volume 2. 1885–1994*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fritz, V. 2007. *State-building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Front Nasionaal. 2014. Manifes [Online]. Available: http://frontnasionaal.com/?cat=42 [2016, September 30].

Frueh, J. 2003. *Political Identity and Social Change: The Remaking of the South African Social Order*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Furedi, F. 2014. *First World War – Still No End in Sight*. London: Bloomsbury.

Gannon, J. 2008. *Military Occupations in the Age of Self-determination: The History Neocons Neglected*. Westport: Praeger Security International.

Gat, A. 2013. *Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

George, J.A. 2009. *The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gershman, C. 2015. A Fight for Democracy: Why Ukraine Matters. *World Affairs*, 177(6):47-56.

Ghanea, N. and Xanthaki, A. (eds.). 2005. *Minorities, Peoples And Self-determination: Essays In Honour Of Patrick Thornberry*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Gibson, D. 2013. "Black good. White bad" [Online]. Available: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/black-good-white-bad [2016, October 17].

Gibson, J.L. 2015. Apartheid's Long Shadow: How Racial Divides Distort South Africa's Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 94:41-48.

Giliomee, H. 1989. The Beginnings of Afrikaner Ethnic Consciousness, 1850–1915, in Vail, L. (ed.). *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*. Berkeley: Currey University of California Press.

Giliomee, H. 2001. Voëlvlug van 'n Afrikanergeskiedenis van 350 jaar. *Historia*, 46(1):5-24.

Giliomee, H. 2003. *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Giliomee, H. 2008. Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915-1970. *South African Journal of Economics*, 76(4):765-788.

Giliomee, H. 2012. *Die Laaste Afrikaner-leiers: 'n Opperste Toets van Mag*. Kaapstad: Tafelberg.

Giliomee, H. and Schlemmer, L. 1989. *From Apartheid to Nation-building*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Giroux, H.A. 1998. The Politics of National Identity and the Pedagogy of Multiculturalism in the USA, in Bennett, D. (ed.). *Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity*. London: Routledge.

Glenn, J.K. 1999. Competing Challengers and Contested Outcomes to State Breakdown: The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. *Social Forces*, 78(1):187-211.

Goodwin, J. and Schiff, B. 1995. *Heart of Whiteness: Afrikaners Face Black Rule in the New South Africa*. New York: Scribner.

Gqirana, T. 2016. ANCYL leader's 'civil war' threats out of order – Mbete [Online]. Available: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ancyl-leaders-civil-war-threats-out-of-order-mbete-20160209 [2016, October 8].

Graphics24. 2017. Plaasmoorde Ontstel [Online]. Available: http://www.grafika24.com/plaasmoorde-ontstel/ [2017, August 9].

Greer, S.L. 2007. *Nationalism and Self-Government: The Politics of Autonomy in Scotland and Catalonia*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Griffin, R. 2011. Fascism and Culture: A Mosse-Centric Meta-Narrative (or how Fascist Studies Reinvented the Wheel), in Pinto, A.C. (ed.). *Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspectives*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grovogui, S.N. 1996. *Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Guelke, A. 2005. *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Habib, A. 2013. *South Africa's Suspended Revolution: Hopes and Prospects*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Halper, L.B. and Halper, S. 2014. *Tibet: An Unfinished Story*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hannum, H. 1990. *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Harrison, P. 2004. *Struggle*. Kenilworth: Spearhead.

Haynes, G.E. 1951. *Africa, Continent of the Future: Its people, Problems and Prospects*. New York: The Association Press.

Helpende Hand. 2016. Wie is ons? [Online]. Available: http://helpendehand.co.za/wie-is-ons/ [2016, October 2].

Hendrix, B.A. 2008. *Ownership, Authority, and Self-determination*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Henrard, K. 2002. *Minority Protection in Post-apartheid South Africa: Human Rights, Minority Rights, and Self-determination*. Westport: Praeger.

Heraclides, A. 1991. *The Self-determination of Minorities in International Politics*. Oxon: Routledge.

Heywood, C. 2004. *A History of South African Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodgins, B.W. and Cannon, K.A. (eds.). 1995. *On the Land: Confronting the Challenges to Aboriginal Self-determination in Northern Quebec and Labrador*. Toronto: Betelgeuse Books.

Hofstee, E. 2006. *Constructing a Good Dissertation: A Practical Guide to Finishing a Masters, MBA or PhD on Schedule*. Sandton: EPE.

Holomisa, N.P. 2012. *According to Tradition: A Cultural Perspective on Current Affairs*. Johannesburg: Real African Publishers.

Horwitz, R.B. 2001. *Communication and Democratic Reform in South Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Humphrey, J.P. 1984. Political and Related Rights, in Meron, T. (ed.). *Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hurd, the Rt Hon. Lord of Westwell. 2001. The Rise and Fall of Morality in Peace Making, in Dockrill, M. and Fisher, J. (eds.). *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* Hampshire: Palgrave.

Huysseune, M. 2003. A Nation Confronting a Secessionist Claim: Italy and the Lega Nord, in Coppieters, B. and Sakwa, R. (eds.). *Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hyam, R. and Henshaw, P. 2003. *The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Independent Online. 2011. ET murder scene pics on FB [Online]. Available: http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/et-murder-scene-pics-on-fb-1156877 [2016, September 30].

Israel, J. 2014. *Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from the Rights of Man to Robespierre*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Johnson, D. 2012. *Imagining the Cape Colony: History, Literature, and the South African Nation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Johnson, R.W. 1999. How to use that huge majority [Online]. Available: http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/focus/issue-16-fourth-quarter-1999/how-to-use-that-huge-majority [2016, October 7].

Johnston, A. 2014. *South Africa: Inventing the Nation*. London: Bloomsbury.

Johnston, D. 1994. The Churches and Apartheid in South Africa, in Johnston, D. and Sampson, C. (eds.). *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Johnston, R.J., Knight, D. and Kofman, E. (eds.). 2014. *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*. London: Routledge.

Jones, A. 2013. *The Scourge of Genocide: Essays and Reflections*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Jusová, I. 2005. Gabriela Preissová's Women-Centered Texts: Subverting the Myth of the Homogeneous Nation. *The Slavic and East European Journal*, 49(1):63-78.

Kaikobad, K.H. 2011. Autonomy, Kashmir and International Law, in Hofmann, R. and Caruso, U. (eds.). *Minority Rights in South Asia*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH.

Kalmo, H. and Skinner, Q. (eds.). 2010. *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kapitan, T. 2008. Self-Determination, in Halwani, R. and Kapitan, T. (eds.). *The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: Philosophical Essays on Self-Determination, Terrorism and the One-State Solution*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kassim, Y.R. 2014. *The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect*. New York: Springer.

Katsikas, S. 2013. Millet Legacies in a National Environment: Political Elites and Muslim Communities in Greece (1830s–1923), in Fortna, B.C., Katsikas, S., Kamouzis, D. and Konortas, P. (eds.). *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830–1945*. London: Routledge.

Kellstedt, P.M. and Whitten, G.D. 2013. *The Fundamentals of Political Science Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keman, H. 2005. Series Editor's preface, in Lehning, P.B. (ed.). *Theories of Secession*. London: Routledge. viii-x.

Khanna, P. 2017. Catalans and Kurds are at the Forefront of True Local Democracy [Online]. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/catalonia-kurdistan-referendum-democracy_us_59c916e0e4b01cc57ff3f069 [2017, September 27].

Kimminich, O. 1993. A "Federal" Right of Self-determination? in Tomuschat, C. (ed.). *Modern Law of Self-determination*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Klotz, A. 2013. *Migration and National Identity in South Africa, 1860–2010*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Knight, I. and Embleton, G. 1996. *The Boer Wars (1): 1836-1898*. London: Osprey.

Knop, K. 2004. *Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Knox, C. and Quirk, P. 2000. *Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Kornprobst, M. 2008. *Irredentism in European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kratoska, P.H. 2011. Elites and the Construction of the Nation in Southeast Asia, in Dülffer, J. and Frey, M. (eds.). *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Krebs, P.M. 2003. *Gender, Race, and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kreijen, G. 2004. *State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Kreptul, A. 2003. The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 17(4):39-100.

Kriel, M. 2010. *South African Language Rights Monitor 2007*. Bloemfontein: Sun Press.

Krisisberaad. 2015. Krisisberaad [Online]. Available: http://krisisberaad.co.za/krisisberaad/ [2016, October 3].

Kruger, D.P. 2000. Afrikaner Identity in Late Twentieth-Century South Africa: Struggle, Trek, and Rootedness, in Norwine, J. and Smith, J.M. (eds.). *Worldview Flux: Perplexed Values Among Postmodern Peoples*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Krüger, H. 2010. *The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Legal Analysis*. New York: Springer.

Kuitenbrouwer, V. 2012. *War of Words: Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War (1899-1902)*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Kuwali, D. 2015. Acquisition of Autonomy: Application of the Right of Self-determination in Africa, in Bereketeab, R. (ed.). *Self-Determination and Secession in Africa: The Post-Colonial State*. New York: Routledge.

Kymlicka, W. 2003. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laborde, C. and Maynor, J. (eds.). 2008. *Republicanism and Political Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Laible, J. 2008. *Separatism and Sovereignty in the New Europe: Party Politics and the Meanings of Statehood in a Supranational Context*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lata, L. 2004. *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland: The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization*. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Latakgomo, J. 1994. The Sociopolitical Prerequisites for Nation-building: Comment on Vilakazi's Chapter, in Rhoodie, N. and Liebenberg, I. (eds.). *Democratic Nation-building in South Africa*. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.

Le Sueur, J.D. 2010. *Algeria Since 1989: Between Terror and Democracy*. London: Zed Books.

Leach, G. 1990. *The Afrikaners: Their Last Great Trek*. London: Mandarin.

Lehning, P.B. (ed.). 2005. *Theories of Secession*. London: Routledge.

Leitner, J. and Meissner, H. (eds.). 2017. *State Capture, Political Risks and International Business: Cases from Black Sea Region Countries*. London: Routledge.

Lemon, A. 2003. The Rise and Fall of Afrikaner Ethnic Political Mobilisation, 1943-1999. *South African Geographical Journal*, 85(2):144-151.

Lester, A., Nel, E. and Binns, T. 2000. *South Africa, Past, Present and Future: Gold at the End of the Rainbow?* Abingdon: Routledge.

Lie, J. 2001. *Multiethnic Japan*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Lijphart, A. 1969. Consociational Democracy. *World Politics*, (21)2: 207-225.

Lijphart, A. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. 1985. *Power-sharing in South Africa*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

Lijphart, A. 1998. South African Democracy: Majoritarian or Consociational? *Democratization*, 5(4):144-150.

Lin, A. 2011. A Rough Road: Southern Sudan's Independence. *Harvard International Review*, 32(4):6-7.

Linklater, A. 2004. *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Lino, D. 2010. The Politics of Inclusion: The Right of Self-determination, Statutory Bills of Rights and Indigenous Peoples. *Melbourne University Law Review*, 34(3):839-869.

Livingston, D.W. 1998. The Secession Tradition in America, in Gordon, D. (ed.). *Secession, State and Liberty*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Lollini, A. 2011. *Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice in South Africa*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Lötter, H.P.P. 1997. *Injustice, Violence and Peace: The Case of South Africa*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Lounsbery, M.O. and Pearson, F. 2009. *Civil Wars: Internal Struggles, Global Consequences*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Louw, P.E. 2004. *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*. Westport: Praeger.

Louw-Potgieter, J. 1988. *Afrikaner Dissidents: A Social Psychological Study of Identity and Dissent*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd.

Lowry, D. 2000. New Ireland, Old Empire and the Outside World, 1922–49: The Strange Evolution of a 'Dictionary Republic', in Cronin, M. and Regan, J.M. (eds.). *Ireland: The Politics of Independence, 1922–49*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Lubbe, J. and du Plessis, T. (eds.). 2010. *Suid-Afrikaanse Taalregtemonitor, 2010*. Stellenbosch: Sun Press.

Luckham, R., Goetz, A.M. and Kaldor, M. 2003. Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics, in Bastian, S. and Luckham, R. (eds.). *Can Democracy be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies*. London: Zed Books.

Mabera, F. 2017. The impact of xenophobia and xenophobic violence on South Africa's developmental partnership agenda. *Africa Review*, 9(1): 28-42.

MacDonald, M. 2006. *Why Race Matters in South Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Macedo, S. 2010. Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design. *Boston University Law Review*, 90(2):1029-1042.

Macleod, D. 2002. *Cultural Considerations in South African Business*. Claremont: Spearhead.

Maddison, S. 2016. *Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation: Multi-level Challenges in Deeply Divided Societies*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Madlingozi, T. 2014. Post-Apartheid Social Movements and Legal Mobilisation, in Langford, M., Cousins, B., Dugard, J. and Madlingozi, T. eds. *Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance?* New York: Cambridge university Press.

Mafela, M.J. and Ntuli, C.D. 2017. Intercultural Conflict and Conflict Management in South Africa as Depicted in Indigenous African Literary Texts, in Xiaodong, D. and Guo-Ming, C. eds. *Conflict Management and Intercultural Communication: The Art of Intercultural Harmony*. London: Routledge.

Magone, J.M. 2017. *The Statecraft of Consensus Democracies in a Turbulent World: A Comparative Study of Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland*. London: Routledge.

Maguire, A. 2013. Contemporary Anti-Colonial Self-Determination Claims and the Decolonisation of International Law. *Griffith Law Review*, 22(1):238-268.

Mail and Guardian. 2008. Ek is wit en trots daarop [Online]. Available: http://mg.co.za/article/2008-10-12-ek-is-wit-en-trots-daarop [2016, September 30].

Mancini, S. 2012. Secession and Self-determination, in Rosenfeld, M. and Sajó, A. (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Manela, E. 2007. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mano, W. (ed.). 2015. *Racism, Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Mediating Conflict in the Twenty-first Century*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Manzo, K.A. 1996. *Creating Boundaries: The Politics of Race and Nation*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Marks, S. 2011. War and Union, 1899-1910, in Ross, R., Mager, A.K., and Nasson, B. (eds.). *The Cambridge History of South Africa*, *Volume 2. 1885–1994*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marx, C. 2011. Verwoerdian Apartheid and African Political Elites in South Africa, 1950–68, in Dülffer, J. and Frey, M. (eds.). *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Matikkala, M. 2011. *Empire and Imperial Ambition: Liberty, Englishness and Anti-Imperialism in Late-Victorian Britain*. London: I.B.Tauris and Co.

Mbazira, C. 2009. *Litigating Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice Between Corrective and Distributive Justice*. Cape Town: ABC Press.

McCormick, K. 2002. *Language in Cape Town's District Six*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Medijainen, E. 2004. Estonia and the World, in Subrenat, J. (ed.). *Estonia: Identity and Independence*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Mehler, A., Melber, H. and van Walraven, K. (eds.). 2014. *Africa Yearbook, Volume 10: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2013*. Leiden: Brill.

Menon, J. 2013. *The Performance of Nationalism: India, Pakistan, and the Memory of Partition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moltchanova, A. 2009. *National Self-Determination and Justice in Multinational States*. New York: Springer.

Moore, M. (ed.). 1998. *National Self-Determination and Secession*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mouton, J. 1996. *Understanding Social Research*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.

Mouton, J. and Marais, H.C. 1996. *Basic Concepts in the Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Pretoria: HSRC Publishers.

Moyo, I., Nshimbi, C.C. and Gumbo, T. 2017. Migration, Logics of Inclusion and Exclusion and Xenophobia: The Case of African Migrants in post-apartheid South Africa, in Magidimisha, H.H., Khalema, N.E., Chipungu, L., Chirimambowa, T.C. and Chimedza, T.L. eds. *Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa*. Cham: Springer.

Mulder, P. 2014. Minority rights, self-determination and Afrikaners in the current dispensation and political environment [Online]. Available: http://www.vfplus.org.za/media-releases/minority-rights-self-determination-and-afrikaners-in-the-current-dispensation-and-political-environment [2016, October 1].

Mulder, P. 2017. Interviewed by: Visagie, R. 4 October 2017.

Murithi, T. 2005. The African Union and the Prospects for Minority Protection, in Ghanea, N. and Xanthaki, A. (eds.). *Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Mwakikagile, G. 2008. *South Africa and Its People*. Pretoria: New Africa Press.

Myburgh, P. 2017. *The Republic of Gupta: A Story of State Capture*. Cape Town: Penguin Books.

Naidoo, P. and Savage, M. 1998. Science Education and the Politics of Equity: Part 1, Analysis and Praxis, in Cobern, W.W. (ed.). *Socio-Cultural Perspectives on Science Education: An International Dialogue*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Nauclér, E. 2005. Autonomy and Multilevel Governance: Experiences in Nordic and Continental European Cooperation, in Weller, M. and Wolff, S. (eds.). *Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in Divided Societies*. Oxon: Routledge.

Nawaz, M.K. 1965. The Meaning and Range of the Principle of Self-determination. *Duke Law Journal*, 14(1):82-101.

Naylor, T.H. 2008. *Secession: How Vermont and all the Other States can Save Themselves from the Empire*. Port Townsend: Feral House.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2013. *Coloniality of Power in Postcolonial Africa: Myths of Decolonization*. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Neate, R. 2017. Bell Pottinger faces sanction over claims it stirred racial tension in South Africa [Online]. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/aug/24/bell-pottinger-south-africa-claims-pr [2017, August 30].

Netwerk24. 2015. Peiling: Selfbeskikking vir Afrikaners? [Online]. Available: http://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Peiling-Selfbeskikking-vir-Afrikaners-20150506 [2016, October 7].

Neuberger, B. 1986. *National Self-determination in Postcolonial Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Neuberger, B. 1995. National Self-determination: Dilemmas of a Concept. *Nations and Nationalism*, 1(3):297-325.

Neuberger, B. 2001. National Self-determination: A Theoretical Discussion. *Nationalities Papers*, 29(3):391-418.

Neuberger, B. 2010. National Self-determination and Democracy, in Lecours, A. and Moreno, L. (eds.). *Nationalism and Democracy: Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Neumann, S. 1946. *The Future in Perspective*. New York: Putnam's Sons.

News24. 2001. Mbeki thanks Constand Viljoen [Online]. Available: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Mbeki-thanks-Constand-Viljoen-20010315 [2016, October 1].

Norman, W. 2006. *Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nyamnjob, F.B. 2015. Media and Belonging in Africa: Reflections on Exclusionary Articulation of Racial and Ethnic Identities in Cameroon and South Africa, in Mano, W. (ed.). *Racism, Ethnicity and the Media in Africa: Mediating Conflict in the Twenty-first Century*. London: I.B. Tauris.

O'Toole, B. 2006. *The Ideal of Public Service: Reflections on the Higher Civil Service in Britain*. London: Routledge.

Öberg, M. and Strøm, K. 2008. *Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Olson, M. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Oppong, J.R. 2006. *Africa South of the Sahara*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers.

Orania. 2016. Orania Ekonomiese Ontwikkelingsplan, 25 Mei 2016 [Online]. Available: http://www.orania.co.za/wp-content/uploads//2016/05/Orania-Dorpsraad-EOP-CD.pdf [2016, October 1].

Orania. 2016. Welcome to Orania [Online]. Available: http://www.orania.co.za/welcome-to-orania/ [2016, October 7].

Organisation of African Unity. 1986. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights [Online]. Available: http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf [2015, May 27].

Ottaway, M. 1993. *South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Oyedemi, T. 2016. From Racial Capitalism to Democratic Capitalism: Historical Perspectives of Inequalities and Communication Technologies in South Africa, in Servaes, J. and Oyedemi, T. (eds.). *Social Inequalities, Media, and Communication: Theory and Roots*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Packer, J. 2005. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Pyrometer, Prophylactic, Pyrosvestis, in Ghanea, N. and Xanthaki, A. (eds.). *Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination: Essays in Honour of Patrick Thornberry*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Pavković, A. 2000. *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pavković, A. and Radan, P. 2007. *Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession*. Hampshire: Ashgate.

Pew Research Centre. 2017. South Africa: Children's Financial Future [Online]. Available: http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/74/country/203/ [2017, August 29].

Pfirter, F.A. and Napolitano, S.G. 2006. Secession and International Law: Latin American Practice, in Kohen, M.G. (ed.). *Secession: International Law Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Philpott, D. 2003. Self-Determination in Practice, in Moore, M. (ed.). *National Self-Determination and Secession*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Piombo, J. 2009. *Institutions, Ethnicity, and Political Mobilization in South Africa*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Polldaddy. 2015. Dink jy selfbeskikking vir Afrikaners is 'n goeie idee? [Online]. Available: https://polldaddy.com/poll/8848349/?view=results [2016, October 7].

Preller, G.S. 1925. *Historiese Opstelle*. Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik.

Purkitt, H.E. and Burgess, S.F. 2005. *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Raič, D. 2002. *Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Ramcharan, B.G. 2008. *Preventive Diplomacy at the UN*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ramutsindela, M.F. 1998. Afrikaner Nationalism, Electioneering and the Politics of a *Volkstaat*. *Politics*, 18(3):179-188.

Republic of South Africa. 1996. *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*. Cape Town: Juta.

Retief, H. 2016. Hanlie Retief gesels met Kallie Kriel [Online]. Available: http://www.netwerk24.com/Stemme/Hanlie-Retief/hanlie-reteief-gesels-met-kallie-kriel-20160424 [2016, October 7].

Roberts, P. 2013. Wilson, Europe's Colonial Empires, and the Issue of Imperialism, in Kennedy, R.A. (ed.). *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons. 492-517.

Robertson, D. 2002. *A Dictionary of Modern Politics*. London: Europa Publications.

Rootes, C.A. 1990. Theory of Social Movements: Theory for Social Movements? *Philosophy and Social Action*, 16(4):5-17.

Russell, M. and Russell, M. 1979. *Afrikaners of the Kalahari: White Minority in a Black State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Salazar, P. 2008. *An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

San Juan, E. 2009. *Toward Filipino Self-Determination: Beyond Transnational Globalization*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Santana, D.B. 2005. Indigenous Identity and the Struggle for Independence in Puerto Rico, in Barker, J. (ed.). *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-determination*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Sargent, B. 2001. The Desperate Mission of Stefan Lux. *The Georgia Review*, 55(4):187-201.

Saul, B. 2000. Cultural Nationalism, Self-Determination and Human Rights in Bhutan. *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 12(3):321-353.

Scerri, M. 2009. *The Evolution of the South African System of Innovation since 1916*. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Schmidt-Glintzer, H., Mittag A. and Rüsen, J. (eds.). 2005. *Historical Truth, Historical Criticism, and Ideology: Chinese Historiography and Historical Culture From A New Comparative Perspective*. Leiden: Brill.

Scholtz, L. 2005. *Why the Boers Lost the War*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Schönteich, M. and Boshoff, H. 2003. *'Volk', Faith and Fatherland: The Security Threat Posed by the White Right*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Schultermandl, S. and Toplu, S. (eds.). 2010. *A Fluid Sense of Self: The Politics of Transnational Identity*. Wien: Lit.

Schulz Herzenberg, C. 2012. Managing Public Opinion During the 2009 South African Elections, in Thuynsma, H.A. (ed.). *Public Opinion and Interest Group Politics: South Africa's Missing Links?* Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.

Schweitzer, E. 2015. *The Making of Griqua, Inc.: Indigenous Struggles for Land and Autonomy in South Africa*. Wien: Lit.

Seekings, J. and Nattrass, N. 2005. *Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Seidman, A. 1990. *Apartheid, Militarism and the U.S. Southeast*. Trenton: Africa World Press.

Sharp, A. 2001. Holding up the Flag of Britain…with Sustained Vigour and Brilliance or 'Sowing the seeds of European Disaster'? Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris Peace Conference, in Dockrill, M. and Fisher, J. (eds.). *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* Hampshire: Palgrave.

Sharp, J. and van Wyk, S. 2015. Beyond the Market: White Workers in Pretoria, in Hart, K. (ed.). *Economy for and Against Democracy*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Singh, A.I. 2001. *Democracy, Ethnic Diversity, and Security in Post-communist Europe*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Solidariteit. 2015. Solidariteit Beweging Helpmekaarplan [Online]. Available: http://krisisberaad.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/verkorte-plan-uitleg.pdf [2016, October 3].

Solidarity. 2016. Who Are We [Online]. Available: https://solidariteit.co.za/en/who-are-we/ [2016, October 2].

Spence, J.E. and Welsh, D. 1997. Coping with Diversity: Sovereignty in a Divided Society, in Brace, L. and Hoffman, J. (eds.). *Reclaiming Sovereignty*. London: Pinter. 80-100.

Stanton, G.H. 2012. *Countries at Risk Report – 2012*. Washington, D.C.: Genocide Watch.

Stapleton, T.J. 2010. *A Military History of South Africa: From the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid*. Santa Barbara: Praeger.

Statistics South Africa. 2011. Census 2011: Census in Brief [Online]. Available: http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf [2016, October 1].

Steiner, Z. 2001. The Treaty of Versailles Revisited, in Dockrill, M. and Fisher, J. (eds.). *The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?* Hampshire: Palgrave.

Swart, S. 2006. The Construction of Eugène Marais as an Afrikaner Hero. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30(4):847-867.

Tanca, A. 1993. *Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Taylor, R. 1992. South Africa: A Consociational Path to Peace? *Transformation*, 17:1-11.

Thamm, M. 2015. Back to the future: Afrikaners unveil R3.5-billion plan to secure future autonomy [Online]. Available: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-12-back-to-the-future-afrikaners-unveil-r3.5-billion-plan-to-secure-future-autonomy/#.V_JeK_krLIU [2016, October 3].

The Citizen. 2014(a). Cyril Ramaphosa meets Boere-Afrikaner Volksraad [Online]. Available: http://citizen.co.za/235370/cyril-ramaphosa-meets-boere-afrikaner-volksraad/ [2016, September 30].

The Citizen. 2014(b). Afrikaners to hold talks for own state [Online]. Available: http://citizen.co.za/218739/afrikaners-hold-talks-state/ [2016, September 30].

The Fund for Peace. 2017. *Fragile States Index, 2017*. Washington, D.C.: The Cipher Brief.

Theissen, G. 1997. *Between Acknowledgement and Ignorance: How white South Africans have dealt with the Apartheid Past*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Thomas, R.G.C. 2003. *Yugoslavia Unravelled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Thompson, L. 2000. *A History of South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thörn, H. 2006. *Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tindigarukayo, J.K. 1987. Review: National Self-determination in Postcolonial Africa. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 20(3):569-570.

Todd, L.R. 2011. The Nation as a Scarce Resource: Reading a Contested Site of Sacrifice in Post-apartheid South Africa. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 17(1):113-129.

Truesdell, A. 2009. Achieving Political Objectives: South African Defense Priorities from the Apartheid to the Postapartheid Era. *African Studies Review*, 52(3):107-125.

Truman, D.B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.

Tsunemoto, T. 2001. Rights and Identifications of Ethnic Minorities in Japan: Indigenous Ainu and Resident Koreans. *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law*, 2(1):119-141.

Turpel-Lafond, M.E. 1995. Oui the People? Conflicting Visions of Self-determination in Quebec, in Hodgins, B.W. and Cannon, K.A. (eds.). *On the Land: Confronting the Challenges to Aboriginal Self-determination in Northern Quebec and Labrador*. Toronto: Betelgeuse Books.

Turtledove, H. 1993. *The Guns of the South*. New York: Del Rey.

United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice [Online]. Available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf [2015, May 11].

United Nations. 1960. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res.1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960 [Online]. Available: http://www.sfu.ca/~palys/UN-Resolution%201514.pdf [2015, May 26].

United Nations. 1966. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [Online]. Available: http://www.arabhumanrights.org/publications/cbased/ga/covenant-escr66e.pdf [2015, May 26].

United Nations. 1976. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [Online]. Available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/volume-999-I-14668-English.pdf [2015, May 26].

United Nations. 2008. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf [2015, May 26].

United Nations. 2012. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities [Online]. Available: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/Booklet_Minorities_English.pdf [2015, May 26].

United Nations. 2015. The United Nations and Decolonisation [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/index.shtml [2015, May 27].

Vail, L. (ed.). 1989. *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Valadez, J.M. 2001. *Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Self-Determination in Multicultural Societies*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Van der Vyver, J.D. 2011. The Right to Self-determination of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities in South Africa. *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, 14(4):2-28.

Van Dyke, V. 1969. Self-determination and Minority Rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 13(3):223-253.

Van Hartesveldt, F.R. 2000. *The Boer War: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Vartanian, T.P. 2011. *Secondary Data Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vatcher, W.H. 1965. *White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism*. London: Pall Mall Press.

Verhoef, G. 2008. Nationalism, Social Capital and Economic Empowerment: SANLAM and the Economic Upliftment of the Afrikaner people, 1918–1960. *Business History*, 50(6):695-713.

Vestergaard, M. 2001. Who's got the map? The Negotiation of Afrikaner Identities in Post-Apartheid South Africa. *Daedalus*, 130(1):19-44.

wa Muiu, M. 2008. *The Pitfalls of Liberal Democracy and Late Nationalism in South Africa*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Walter, B.F. 2009. *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are so Violent*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wank, S. 1997. The Habsburg Empire, in Barkey, K. and Von Hagen, M. (eds.). *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-building – The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Webb, V. and Kriel, M. 2000. Afrikaans and Afrikaner nationalism. *International Journal of The Sociology of Language*, 144(1):19-50.

Webster, R. 2003. *The Illustrated at the Fireside: True Southern African Stories*. Cape Town: New Africa Books.

Weinert, M.S. 2007. *Democratic Sovereignty: Authority, Legitimacy, and State in a Globalizing Age*. New York: UCL Press.

Weiss, M.L. 2006. Globalization and Ethnonationalist Movements: Evidence from Spain and India, in Cameron, D.R., Ranis, G. and Zinn, A. (eds.). *Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the nation-state under siege?* London: Routledge.

Weiss, R. 2000. *Peace in Their Time: War and Peace in Ireland and Southern Africa*. London: I.B. Taurus.

Welch, C.E. 1987. Review: National Self-determination in Postcolonial Africa. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 21(3):463-464.

Welch, C.E. 1995. *Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Nongovernmental Organizations*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Weller, M. 2008. *Escaping the Self-determination Trap*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Weller, M. and Metzger, B. (eds.). 2008. *Settling Self-determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Weller, M. and Wolff, S. (eds.). 2005. *Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in Divided Societies*. London: Routledge.

Wells, H.G. 1936. *The Shape of Things to Come*. New York: Macmillan.

Welsh, D. 2010. *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers.

Welsh, D. 2015. Apartheid and its Legacies, in de Jager, N. (ed.). *South African Politics: An Introduction*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Wenzel, J. 2009. *Bulletproof: Afterlives of Anticolonial Prophecy in South Africa and Beyond*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Whaley, J. 2012. *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume 1, from Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia 1493-1648*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wharton, F. (ed.). 1889. *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Volume II*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Wilkinson-Latham, C. 1977. *The Boer War*. London: Osprey Publishing.

Wintrobe, R. 1998. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Worden, N. 2012. *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

Wright, J. 1999. Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 19(4):605-629.

Young, C. 1991. Self-determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System, in Deng, F.M. and Zartman, I.W. (eds.). *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. Washington: The Brookings Institution Press. 320-346.

Younis, M. 2000. *Liberation and Democratization: The South African and Palestinian National Movements*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Addendum A – Key Informant Semi-structured Interview Schedule

Key Informant Interview 1: Carel Boshoff IV, President of the Orania Movement

1. What do you think was the most significant milestone ever achieved by the Orania Movement, on behalf of its Afrikaner supporters?

2. According to critics – of which Orania has in abundance - the Orania Afrikaners are accused of propagating a flight back to the lagers of survival and traditional Afrikaner values. With a view to the future, how does Orania help in the modernisation of Afrikaners?

3. As a follow-up on the topic of Orania's critics, how would you respond to the accusation that Orania is racist, and what role does race play within the Orania movement?

4. What do you believe to be the single biggest failure of the Orania Movement?

5. And finally, what do you believe to be the single greatest threat – and greatest hope – of today's Afrikaners?

Interview conducted on October 5, 2017.

Key Informant Interview 2: Dr Pieter Mulder, former leader of the FF+

1. You have in the past remarked that in order to ensure the Afrikaner's survival in his native country, it has become important for the FF+ to form a coalition with another political party or parties. Why has the FF+ not yet launched such a broad coalition with other Afrikaner organizations, including for instance the Solidarity movement?

2. Why does it appear that the FF+ have moved away from championing Afrikaner self-determination, and apparently replaced it with a stronger focus on minority rights?

3. How can Afrikaners atone for their part in South Africa's troubled past, if they should at all?

4. What do you consider to be the single biggest failure of the FF+, as well as its greatest success?

5. What would it take for more Afrikaners to support the party's self-determination efforts, what would serve as a trigger in this regard, and what are the chances for it to happen?

Interview conducted on October 4, 2017.

Key Informant Interview 3: Flip Buys, Chief Executive Officer of the Solidarity Movement

1. What does South Africa look like five years hence?

2. As a follow-up, how will Afrikaners fit into this changing South Africa?

3. In an article you authored you described self-determination as a "loaded word", and also spoke of "modern Afrikaners". What are your thoughts on the "loaded" nature of the word, and how do you define "modern Afrikaners"?

4. As a follow-up, what are your thoughts on the *Volkstaat* Council formed under former President Mandela to examine the question of Afrikaner self-determination?

5. You have previously stated that "there are currently no opportunities for full autonomy (or independence) for Afrikaners". What opportunities are then required to bring about full self-determination?

6. You have previously suggested that "a Western-style system be developed within an African state through the establishment of community organisations in key areas". You described it as "a model of community driven or DIY cultural self-determination". At the end of the day – due to a lack of full self-determination – wouldn't these 'community driven institutions' be subjected to the vicissitudes of forces beyond the control of Afrikaners? In other words, how feasible would such islands of minority sovereignty be in a sea of majority hegemony?

Interview conducted on August 31, 2015.

174

Addendum B – Research Ethics Committee: Approval Notice

UNIVERSITEIT·STELLENBOSCH·UNIVERSITY
jou kennisvennoot · your knowledge partner

Approval Notice
New Application

23-Nov-2015
Visagie, Riaan R

Proposal #: SU-HSD-000614
Title: Struggle(s) for Self-determination: Afrikaner Aspirations in the Twenty-first Century

Dear Mr Riaan Visagie,

Your **New Application** received on **09-Oct-2015**, was reviewed
Please note the following information about your approved research proposal:

Proposal Approval Period: 23-Nov-2015 -22-Nov-2016

Please take note of the general Investigator Responsibilities attached to this letter. You may commence with your research after complying fully with these guidelines.

Please remember to use your **proposal number** (SU-HSD-000614) on any documents or correspondence with the REC concerning your research proposal.

Please note that the REC has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

Also note that a progress report should be submitted to the Committee before the approval period has expired if a continuation is required. The Committee will then consider the continuation of the project for a further year (if necessary).

This committee abides by the ethical norms and principles for research, established by the Declaration of Helsinki and the Guidelines for Ethical Research: Principles Structures and Processes 2004 (Department of Health). Annually a number of projects may be selected randomly for an external audit.

National Health Research Ethics Committee (NHREC) registration number REC-050411-032.

We wish you the best as you conduct your research.

If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the REC office at 218089183.

Included Documents:
DESC Report - Cilliers, Jean
REC: Humanities New Application

Sincerely,

Clarissa Graham
REC Coordinator
Research Ethics Committee: Human Research (Humanities)

Addendum C – Research Ethics Committee: Progress Report

**UNIVERSITEIT
STELLENBOSCH
UNIVERSITY**

APPROVAL NOTICE
Progress Report

19 October 2017

Project number: SU-HSD-000614

Project title: Struggle(s) for Self-determination: Afrikaner Aspirations in the Twenty-first Century

Dear Riaan Visagie

Your progress report submitted on 22 August 2017 was reviewed and approved by the REC: Humanities.

Ethics approval period: 25 September 2017 – 24 September 2018

GENERAL COMMENTS:

Please take note of the General Investigator Responsibilities attached to this letter. You may commence with your research after complying fully with these guidelines.

If the researcher deviates in any way from the proposal approved by the REC: Humanities, the researcher must notify the REC of these changes.

Please use your SU project number (SU-HSD-000614) on any documents or correspondence with the REC concerning your project.

Please note that the REC has the prerogative and authority to ask further questions, seek additional information, require further modifications, or monitor the conduct of your research and the consent process.

FOR CONTINUATION OF PROJECTS AFTER REC APPROVAL PERIOD

Please note that a progress report should be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee: Humanities before the approval period has expired if a continuation of ethics approval is required. The Committee will then consider the continuation of the project for a further year (if necessary)

If you have any questions or need further help, please contact the REC office at cgraham@sun.ac.za.

Sincerely,

Clarissa Graham

National Health Research Ethics Committee (NHREC) registration number: REC-050411-032.
The Research Ethics Committee: Humanities complies with the SA National Health Act No.61 2003 as it pertains to health research. In addition, this committee abides by the ethical norms and principles for research established by the Declaration of Helsinki (2013) and the Department of Health Guidelines for Ethical Research: Principles Structures and Processes (2nd Ed.) 2015. Annually a number of projects may be selected randomly for an external audit.