The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvres and strategic resource management of Latin American, southern African and Asian countries.

This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capitã selecta of case studies and dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance – indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times.
National Security in Complex Times
The South African military dimension

Shadrack Ramokgadi, Tobie Beukes and Ian Liebenberg

Abstract

Having returned to the international gallery of nations in 1996 after its apartheid pariah status was lifted, South Africa had to adjust its defence posture, defence diplomacy, and general national security framework to new conditions. The Cold War was over, interstate wars in the region were unlikely, and if undertaken at all, military deployment was to participate in peacekeeping operations. With the apartheid garrison state mentality a thing of the past, a new national security strategy became a necessity. This chapter discusses the need and guidelines for a national security strategy suited to a democracy and a developmental state aware of current and future socio-economic challenges, and its role in the region and on the African continent.

Introduction

In South Africa, an official National Security Strategy (NSS) is prepared and reviewed periodically by the executive authorities, who are required to outline national security priorities, and suggest policy responses. Post-1994, the NSS process began with the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (1996), followed by the Defence Review 1998, and Defence Review 2015. The latest NSS is currently being developed, but it faces challenges. This chapter exclusively uses publicly available sources as it attempts a fresh look at a future NSS, highlighting lessons from the national security strategies of other countries, and providing some comparative insights.

Methodology

The methodology used here is qualitative and involved an extensive literature study of open source documents. While the goal was to gain insights on a possible security strategy for post-apartheid South Africa, we limited our country comparisons, choosing not to focus on core aggressive states, self-perceived ‘world policemen’, or societies that see themselves as beleaguered by a hostile world, such as the US. The authors assume that regional and international cooperation remain important tools, and that multipolarity in the future is a given.
National security in a new democracy

This contribution will do the following:

- Define the concept of national security;
- Describe current and future challenges to national security;
- Discuss the mandate of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF);
- Provide an outline of the role and functions of the military in national security;
- Discuss the SANDF Military Strategy;
- Discuss security as a concept and its links with perceived national values;
- Discuss regional challenges; and
- Indicate the threats that face the population of South Africa.

Defining the concept of ‘National Security’

The challenges experienced by states have changed since the end of the Cold War and the temporary lessening of the East-West divide. Increased globalisation and hyper-capitalism brought with them intensive international integration, yet simultaneously increased social alienation, fragmentation, and the rich-poor divide (Giddens, 1993). These have also led to new tensions and (armed) conflicts between multiple stakeholders (including non-state actors), often expanding into hybrid conflicts.

‘National security’ has no single definition (D’Anieri, 2014:69), but a broad description of a national security strategy, focusing on a diverse array of global threats including political, social, economic, health and environment, is relevant for the purposes of this chapter. The South African White Paper on Defence (1996: chapter 2) described national security as follows:

In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It … broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters … Security [became] an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being … At national level the objectives of security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. At international level the objectives of security policy include the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa.
The above implies a move away from restrictive threat analysis to what may be described as a *new and broader security realism*, where the future safety of people is linked not only to armed threats, but also to threats to human life and life quality within communities and regions.

**Current and likely future challenges to national security**

In the current context, the threats and risks to the state and society encompass the military, economic, political-cultural and resource-environmental sectors (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 2017:29ff.; De Wet & Liebenberg, 2018; Mandrup, 2018:136ff.). However, economic, social and political dynamics also offer opportunities and challenges to enhance the interests of South Africa. The South African approach to national security, we argue, should be based on an agreement between state and organised civil society (or civil community) on the protection of social liberties and human security, and the readiness for managing threats and risks in the regional environment. Thus, economic, political-cultural and resource-environmental security must be clearly identified in terms of both traditional and non-traditional threats and risks, as well as the positive challenges and opportunities that can enhance the interests of South Africa, the region, and the continent.

Current and likely future challenges to national security for South Africa include, but are not limited to:

- Regional instability (i.e. deterioration of quality of life and increasing poverty);
- Climate change and disasters;
- Energy supply and water/food sustainability;
- Internal (violent) reactions related to service delivery, xenophobia, crime;
- Possible intervention by states outside the continent; and
- Possible cyber-attacks and terrorism.

**The military and the Constitution**


a. The defence force is the only lawful military force in the Republic;

b. The defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force;

c. The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force;
d. The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, and must appoint the Military Command of the force; and

e. Command of the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Minister of Defence under the authority of the President.

**South African National Defence Force functions**

According to the Defence Act, Act 42 of 2002 (Section 18 (1) (d)), the SANDF may, subject to the Constitution, be employed:

a. For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;

b. For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;

c. For service in the preservation of life, health or property;

d. For service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;

e. For service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own;

f. For service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment; and

g. To effect national border control.

Along with this, according to the Constitution (1996, Schedule 6, section 24):


(3) The employment for service, training, organisation and deployment of the South African National Defence Force shall be effected in accordance with the requirements of subsection (2).

**The role of the military**

Development requires stability, and stability requires sound state and social structures which are seen and experienced as legitimate by the citizenry (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 2017). Thus, a well-trained and equipped military which holds legitimacy in the eyes
National Security in Complex Times

of civil society is imperative. The military provides security for both internal crises (in cooperation with the South African Police Service [SAPS]) and external aggression or threats to peace, making it a potential tool to ensure regional and international security. After 1994, the new government replaced the militarist security project of the apartheid government with a more holistic approach, using the lessons learnt through negative experiences and the flaws in civil-military relations under apartheid. Currently, the primary threat to security is not military and cannot be dealt with by purely military means. Along with this, in a constitutional state civil-military relations and safe communities hold more value than the ability to suppress with force, and the military is bound to accept civil control. This has an influence on the role of the military, whether internal or external, and also impacts the national security strategy.

This new approach arose from the success of the country’s negotiated settlement and the leadership preference for persuasion and negotiation. Force has been viewed as a limited mechanism, applicable only in exceptional situations, and rather than projecting military force, South Africa’s aim is to project diplomacy and enhance cooperation and peace, meaning that all other options should be exhausted before the use of force.

Strategic national security functions of the South African government and SANDF

Security in all forms is seen as a core function, and the armed forces and other state organs are required by government to contribute to this. The SANDF, as an arm of the state, is required to respond to both internal and external security issues, as guided by national and international regulatory frameworks, and this provides the foundation for a comprehensive approach to national security. Arguably, the main role of the SANDF is the use of military capabilities to achieve identified policy objectives. One approach suggests that the security-creating role of the government can fall into six strategic functions: China after a period of relative disruptive Western Colonial intervention returned to what perhaps can be called the geographical space of a perceived “greater” China as many ages before. While China became a republic, it was to experience a wide-ranging and destructive Japanese invasion before World War II and a civil war between communists and nationalists that was to end with the defeated nationalists establishing a nationalist government in exile in 1949 on the island of Taiwan (the latter seen by the Chinese government as an errant province). In a sense then the European imposed model of nationalism (or in cases a paradigm widely accepted in current discourse) had long-term consequences, some of which we still see today: (1) Anticipation; (2) prevention; (3) deterrence; (4) protection; (5) intervention; and (6) stabilisation (Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review, 1998).
Anticipation

As a representative of a community of citizens, the government is to prepare for foreseen and unforeseen contingencies, including incidents that may threaten the interests of South Africa or international rule of law. The role of the SANDF is to prepare forces which can respond to any foreseeable circumstances for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and if needed, secondary roles of various forms (Constitution, 1996: Chapter 11, Section 201(2)).

Prevention

The SANDF is required to proactively prevent possible future threats to the country or region. The Constitution (1996: Chapter 11, Section 2019(c)) provides for the deployment of the SANDF for services in compliance with the international obligations of the country, in line with international bodies and other member states. The most common obligation is the duty to protect people from any harm through prevention. Given the South African context and historical experience, the principle of ‘self-defence’ demands the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means (White Paper on Defence, 1996: Chapter 4).

Deterrence

The South African government is expected to discourage any actions that are in conflict with the interests of the state or the international rule of law (White Paper on Defence, 1996:Chapter 4), including protection outside the geographical confines of the country and its inhabitants.. In effecting this, the government of SA states that the prevention of conflict and war is a primary course of action (Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 2). This includes self-defence, requiring a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to deter potential aggressors (Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 2). The credibility of the core force capability must therefore be maintained at all times, as per the core-force approach (Ministry of Defence, 2010). The Constitution prescribes the mobilisation of the SANDF for service in upholding law and order within the country in cooperation with the SAPS, under circumstances where the police services are unable to do so alone (1996: Section 201(2)(a)). Such cooperative arrangements require an awareness of the limitations of the armed forces for deployment within a civilian environment and should be treated with care in terms of ‘deterrence’.

Civilian control over the military remains paramount. The deployment of the SANDF in cooperation with the SAPS should only be carried out with the awareness that military solutions to political problems are inherently limited. The Constitution (1996) prescribes that the president is the Commander-in-Chief of the defence force and appoints the Chief of the Defence Force. The White Paper on Defence, the Public Service Act, and
the Public Finance Management Act provide for the Secretary for Defence (a civilian), who shall exercise their functions and powers as Head of Department and Accounting Officer (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Along with this, the Constitution established a Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister of Defence with functions related to issuing of orders, directives, and commands, and the execution of budgetary programmes, as well as oversight, in close cooperation with parliament and defence-related committees.

**Protection**

South Africa views itself as a member of the international community, and the SANDF is therefore expected to participate in international peace operations. For the purposes of the protection of the people, peace support operations are characterised by military operations other than war (MOOTW). Participation in MOOTW is founded on the understanding that regional peace and security is important to SA, as any spill-over from neighbouring countries will impact on its territorial integrity and national security (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998).

One has to note that international peace support operations are not limited to the deployment of troops, and can include providing equipment, medical personnel and facilities, logistical support, engineering services, communication systems, and staff (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998).

**Intervention**

A function of the state is to carry out offensive operations to enforce change in the behaviour of actors or alliances that threaten the interests of the state, the region or, where applicable, international rule of law (Ministry of Defence, 2010). This can include peace support operations, which for the purposes of intervention are characterised by peace enforcement entailing the application or threat of coercion (Ministry of Defence, 2010). The application of such force should aim to promote international peace and abide by international resolution (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998; Ministry of Defence, 2010).

**Stabilisation**

In terms of the above the South African security forces may be requested to assist in re-establishing security in any of the affected countries in the region. Thus, stabilisation refers to common security, regional defence cooperation, and confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998; Ministry of Defence, 2010). In this context, the SA government is to be committed to political, economic and military cooperation with neighbouring states.
The Constitution (1996) also states that the SANDF may be employed in other roles in addition to self-defence, deployment in cooperation with the SAPS, and international peace support operations. These activities include disaster relief, the provision and maintenance of essential services, search and rescue, evacuation of South African citizens from high-threat areas, protection of maritime resources, and regional defence cooperation (Constitution, 1996).

Figure 7.1, compiled by the authors (see below), represents a summary of the proposed strategic functions of the South African government and the SANDF. Government is responsible for national security; the SANDF for activities to attain such goals, keeping in mind civilian control over the military.

**FIGURE 7.1  Strategic functions of the SANDF in pursuit of the National Security Agenda**

**SANDF and national security frameworks**

At present, the South African Defence Review (2015) is the only national policy framework that guides the development of the NSS into an implementation and funding model in South Africa. Thus, the operational activities of the SANDF should be aligned with the prescripts of the Defence Review. For example, the alignment of the military’s operational activities with the agenda for sustainable development within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is important, along with military intervention in promoting international peace and security. While the Defence Review 2015 remains the only official statement that defines security concerns and prescribes the nature of
acceptable policy responses, the White Paper on National Defence is the cornerstone in providing comprehensive and long-range planning on matters related to defence doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 1).

The aim in designing the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review 1998 was to achieve national consensus on defence matters, subjected to consultation with multiple stakeholders and other interest groups (Defence Review, 1998). Defence reviews present proposals on themes such as defence posture and doctrine, force design options, and civil military relations, and act as an attempt to determine the appropriate size, structure, force design and posture of an armed force.

**Defence posture and doctrine**

In terms of defence posture, the SANDF should abide by the government’s primary chosen course, which is the prevention and deterrence of conflict and war, and the government should go to war only when non-violent strategies and deterrence on all available levels have failed (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 2). Thus, this needs to find expression in the NSS, keeping in mind political, economic, social and cultural rights, and primary needs of South Africa’s citizens; the commitment to goals of arms control and disarmament at national, regional and international levels; and the country’s vision to pursue peaceful relations with other states, including through military cooperation (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 2).

In protecting the state and its people against external threats, the SANDF is to employ the following NSS guidelines (Defence Review, 1998): (1) Military cooperation with other states in pursuit of common security; (2) prevention, management, and resolution of conflict through non-violent means, such as diplomacy, mediation and arbitration; and (3) force employment, as the very last option. Similarly, the Constitution requires that the deterrent capability be established in line with international law on armed conflict, and related international humanitarian law (1996: Chapter 11, Section 200 (2)). For example, the show of force through joint multinational military exercises should also respect international environmental rules and regulations.

South Africa’s defence doctrine is derived from its defence posture and the related policy frameworks, and encompasses the main principles and concepts that guide the conduct of military operations in support of national objectives. The SANDF doctrine is also founded on the Constitution’s commitment to international rule of law governing aggression, and provides for military capability that is able to halt, contain and reverse the effects of offensive actions at operational level of conflict, although this approach does not rule out offensive operations as the last instance (Constitution, 1996).
Force design options

The SANDF is required to plan and prepare force structure elements (e.g. land, sea, air, and cyber defence; and health support) that are ready at all times to act in defence of South Africa and to respond to other defence contingencies (Defence Review, 1998). Force design is based on readiness to execute the primary functions of the SANDF, namely defence of the state, its people and its territorial integrity against military aggression (Defence Review, 1998). Force design options are also influenced by the required level of defence, the approved defence posture, and the defence budget. For the latter, a funding model remains a challenge to be addressed.

Given economic and political-constitutional constraints, political judgment and military expertise are at play throughout the process, implying the development of various scenarios, policy responses or conceived courses of action. Needless to say, the approval of a specific option is primarily determined by the maintenance of the specified capabilities at the approximate level (Defence Review, 1998). Force design is a multidimensional system and should be open for review and innovation, enabling flexible responses to various security challenges or threats. Affordability is dependent on the long-term sustainability of the design, while upgrading and replacement of equipment is dictated by the lifespan of the capability itself, both man and material (Defence Review, 1998). Thus, force design process should translate into manageable options, and strategic gaps and related risks need to be consistently considered (Defence Review, 1998).

Civil military relations

The democratic transition in South Africa is relevant here, despite conceivable shortcomings since 1996 (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Civilian control over the military is the assumed cornerstone of democratic practices in South Africa. Civilian control relates to constitutional and legal transformation, oversight mechanisms, normative and cultural transformation, and future organisational restructuring (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). The SANDF is required to remain subordinate to the elected government and should retain ultimate respect for the principle of civil supremacy. This view should be reinforced through training and development programmes in the SANDF, with emphasis placed on the respect for civil control, as entrenched in the SANDF code of conduct for uniformed members (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). In this regard, continuous rejuvenation, persistent education of personnel, and the creation of a tertiary-educated officer corps is of utmost importance, and currently in need of urgent attention.

The Constitution (1996) prescribes that the president is the Commander-in-Chief of the defence force and appoints the Chief of the Defence Force. The White Paper on Defence, the Public Service Act, and the Public Finance Management Act provide for the
Secretary for Defence (a civilian), who shall exercise their functions and powers as Head of Department and Accounting Officer (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Along with this, the Constitution established a Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister of Defence with functions related to issuing of orders, directives, and commands and the execution of budgetary programmes, as well as oversight, in close cooperation with parliament and defence-related committees.

The SANDF Military Strategy (SANDFMS) and envisioned national values

The SANDFMS (2002) plans for eventualities in the military environment and attempts to provide answers to military challenges in the foreseeable future. The strategy hierarchy stems from the Constitution, the Defence Act, White Paper, Defence Review, and other statutory prescripts, and is fed by national values. In turn, the Department of Defence (DOD) Military Strategy provides and employs force strategies inclusive of support strategies (SANDFMS, 2002). Military strategy documents provide the strategic profile through the DOD’s Vision of Effective defence for a democratic South Africa, as a constitutional democratic state (SANDFMS, 2002).

The SANDFMS closely relates to the constitutional values of the country, and reflects on the use of the military outside its borders, seeking peace, and preventing or resolving conflict rather than acting belatedly and in a heavy-handed manner see in this regards the chapter by Liebenberg and Fonseca on South Africa’s defence diplomacy. In the case of South Africa, these values are to be underpinned by the notions of democratisation of state and society, the constitutional state-principle, and unity in social diversity.

South Africa is a diverse community (Zegeye, Liebenberg & Houston, 2000; Van der Heyden, 2018), and one of the constitutional norms is unity in diversity. The SANDF should therefore reflect the values of diversity, tolerance, service to the community, representivity on all levels, and accountability for its actions (Polley, 1988; Corder, 1989; Van Zyl-Slabbert, 1992; Duncan & Seleoane, 1998; Seleoane, 2001; Houston, Liebenberg & Humphries, 2001). These national values need to be reflected within the SANDF and its deployment in the region, and should be seen to be part of practice and attitude wherever defence force members may find themselves. Other terms that crop up in the national discourse and that have a bearing on the SANDF are a non-racialist approach, respect for personal freedom and community safety, social cohesion, and a strong sense of service delivery. On a critical note, the interaction between civil society and the military should remain favourable, although a growing civil-military gap can be observed in South Africa, which needs urgent attention.
SANDEF Military Strategy

At the core of SANDFMS are the military strategic objectives and military strategic capabilities, contained in the Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (DOD, 2011). The SANDF Military Strategic Objectives are to be aligned to a corresponding NSS, and are intended to highlight (1) the enhancement and maintenance of comprehensive defence capability; (2) promotion of peace, security and stability in the region and continent; and (3) providing support to the people of the Republic of South Africa (DOD, 2011).

The Military Strategic Missions are to be founded on a mission-based approach, using peace and war-time time missions to direct the strategy for force preparation and force structure (DOD, 2011), and accommodating both primary and secondary functions of the SANDF. The missions are to be aligned to a mandate-driven approach set out by parliament, and are to be implemented in non-conventional tasks, health support duties, peace support operations, special operations, defence diplomacy, support to other government departments, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, presidential tasks, and conventional operations. The Military Strategic Concepts (Mission Based Approach) are guidelines on how to accomplish the Military Strategic Objectives. Specific concepts are mission-essential training, mission trained force, selective engagement and strategic positioning.

National values and interests; security arrangements regional and continental

South Africa changed from a society based on racial segregation to a constitutional state through an extended process of transition (1990-1996). New values and legal frameworks had to be negotiated in tenuous circumstances, a process which has yet to be completed. Some core values which entered the discourse during the transition are principled non-racialism and an ethos of service to the community. Along with this, various religious, linguistic and cultural entities exist in South Africa, and the Constitution requires that the public sector, which includes the military and broader security community, enact tolerance of differences, as well as equality between peoples of different communities. The South African socio-political vocabulary was extended with terms such as equity, service delivery (batho pele), ubuntu, accountability, development, sustainable growth, and knowledge transfer.

These terms outline national values to be achieved, and future national values to be nurtured, and these should also be reflected within the SANDF in terms of internal and external interaction with other communities and the evolving security community in Southern Africa. South African’s national values share a link with the broader security community.
In terms of regional involvement, South Africa abides by regional structures as well as the protocols of the African Union (AU), and also adheres to international agreements and the protocols of the United Nations (UN). In cases of intervention, diplomatic or military (i.e. peacekeeping or peace enforcement), South Africa is bound by its Constitution and by international agreements, and adherence to the role of a constitutional state and a facilitator of peacemaking on the continent should be the focus. However, values and interpretation of reality remain complex, and the country may also find itself in a situation where the push of powerful states will clash with South Africa’s role as peacemaker. South Africa’s NSS will therefore have to decide on how to deal with similar future challenges.

Regional challenges

Observers pointed out that South Africa has to move from a diplomacy of a dominant power in the region to one of engagement in diplomatic, political and military activities such as peacekeeping (Malan & Cilliers, 1997).

The expectations for the NSS are high, but the authors have important limitations to consider. There are massive economic differences between states in Southern Africa even while South Africa holds a lion’s part of the collective GDP in the region. Because of this other member states may expect much from South Africa in terms of a financial contribution to the region and the continent. In reality, the South African defence budget has not increased significantly over the past five years and is unlikely to experience large increases soon (see Appendix below). In terms of maintenance, the replacement and modernisation of equipment and manpower/human resource expenses limit the SANDF’s capacity, and this must be kept in mind, both in defence diplomacy and in conceptualising an NSS.

Since the Declaration and Treaty of the SADC (1992) and the launch of the Organ for Peace, Defence and Security (OPDS) (1996), South Africa has been woven into the regional security architecture. In recognition of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, southern African states agreed on the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, which confirms respect for sovereignty, equality, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in the affairs of other states. The achievement of solidarity, peace and security, and the recognition of cooperation in political, defence and security measures both form part of this understanding. Add to this the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and the full picture becomes challenging in a region where there are large-scale economic disparities and occasional differences of opinion. The objectives of the protocol relate to curbing cross-border crime and promoting communities based on domestic security, as well as enhancing and nurturing regional capacity in terms of disaster management and international humanitarian assistance.
Against this background, South Africa is expected to play a role in both the region and the AU. Future security thinking will revolve around economic interdependence, closer cooperation, integration (without worsening social marginalisation) and awareness of outside influences and pressures. While positive growth rates are being experienced in the majority of countries in the region, these often do not translate into an abundance of funding for military and peacekeeping purposes. Interdependence is likely to remain in southern Africa for many years to come, and people will look towards South Africa for its contribution. Under current conditions, the expectations on what South Africa can do are unrealistically high. A consistent balance needs to be struck here when an NSS is framed.

**Threats that face the population of South Africa**

Traditionally, the concept of security has been interpreted in militarist terms, namely the simple military defence of the state or the offensive use of military power. However, since the 1994 Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the concept of security has included human security, which implies a condition of freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or their lives. It is seen as an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment that is not detrimental to their health and well-being.

Within the human security paradigm, the South African population face some potential and real threats, and an NSS should reflect an awareness of these potential threats and contingencies. Examples are health (including HIV/AIDS), lack of social services at all levels of government, social insecurity (high levels of poverty and crime), and corruption (syphoning money from social upliftment and economic growth). Within this broad architecture, the roles and duties of the military should be outlined to ensure that military action in a secondary role remains within the set parameters, yet will be functional, effective and professionally available when the need arises.

By 2004, it was reported that South Africa had the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, with 20% of the adult population (roughly five million people) being HIV positive (Nattrass, 2004). Although the health budget has increased and antiretroviral treatment has been rolled out, the situation is still not satisfactory. In 2001, there were 4.1 million people living with HIV in South Africa (9.4% of the total population), and this increased to 5.24 million by 2010, representing 10.5% of South Africans (SAIRR, 2010:52). The highest rates were recorded in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Free State, with the Western Cape having the lowest prevalence rate of 6% (SAIRR, 2010:55). According to the SAIRR’s future demographic projections, the situation is likely to worsen substantially from 2020 to 2040 (SAIRR, 2010:56).
AIDS impacts heavily on existing human capital, infecting mainly young adults, and affecting people’s health and productivity, resulting in them becoming a burden on the state. It destroys a section of people capable of contributing to the economic and social life of the community, while care for the frail and sick demands financial resources from the state, the taxpayer, and the private sector. More worrying is the social dislocation caused by the loss of fathers, mothers, caregivers, guardians or children, which damages the social fabric of society. The disease has the potential to disrupt economic growth, the maintenance of a labour force and human/intellectual capital and contribute to greater inequality. The latter can in turn act as a trigger for internal conflict.

When considering an NSS, the military needs to make its contribution through educating its own personnel and their families, and the communities within which they are active, around diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The military health services should also be available to assist in problem areas, and with initiatives of government health services in a clearly defined and publicly acceptable secondary role, especially in rural areas.

Other threats, such as climate change and its conceivable negative spin-offs, also need to be factored in. The extent of such challenges (e.g. drought and floods followed by scarcity of resources) are not fully predictable, and the consideration of multidisciplinary task teams to act as early warning forums are necessary.

**Communities and social divisions**

Social conflict is multifaceted, and one of the main challenges to democratic consolidation in South Africa is the cultural divisions within the country. The country is divided across a variety of linguistic, ethnic, racial and religious lines, and there is a sharp rich-poor gap which creates tension and conflict through real or relative depravation. One of the worrying trends in South Africa is a growing class of people without access to any job or occupation – the *jobless class*. The existence of a jobless class can further tensions between those with jobs – even if only part-time or poorly paid – and those without access to jobs. The result of these tensions, confounded by suboptimal service delivery, may lead to active alienation from government or the state, and even active distrust of the state and the electoral process.

Another challenge is the inflow of migrants, both legal and illegal, which can trigger tensions and xenophobia, as the newcomers are seen as people who take jobs, and hence economic opportunities, from South Africans. In the past, this led to violent confrontations and tensions remain. The issue of national security is linked here with social tolerance and human security. While creating tolerance through education and with optimum immigration control, the military are also called upon to ensure the efficient patrolling of South Africa’s borders, which have become porous since 1998. Those aware of national security challenges need to factor this in too.
In case of violent conflict within communities, the military (including the medical support services) may be called upon to assist in a strictly secondary role, and the ability and capability of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to negotiate, manage and facilitate conflict is important here. In this regard, training should be offered to officers and NCOs where possible, and the same applies where the military may be called upon to assist in crime reduction.

The framework for an NSS should take cognisance of all of the above. One of the adverse consequences of divisions or perceived schisms in society is political intolerance, with the potential for social conflict. In deeply divided societies, people typically develop strong in-group identities, often leading to strong out-group animosity that can culminate in alienation and violent civil conflict. The protracted conflicts in the region, such as in Sudan, are attributed to attempts by one group to subjugate or impose its will on other groups. With its numerous ethnic and linguistic groups and deep social stratification, South Africa may face similar challenges. As a constitutional extension of the state, the military should be aware of this and contribute to tolerance, inter-group communication, and maintenance and nurturing of principled non-racialism and caregiving to smaller or marginalised groups and communities.

Like schools, religious groups, the media and sport organisations, the military is an agent of socialisation for their personnel, their families and peer groups. It is important that the values of life-long education, knowledge sharing, tolerance and accommodation are reflected actively into the organisation and into the community.

The Grim Reaper(s): Unemployment, inequality and poverty

The policy of separate development implemented by the apartheid regime created one of the most unequal societies in the world, and South Africa’s macro-economic policies since 1996 further contributed to inequalities. In 1996, 1,8 million South Africans were earning less than US$1 a day, but by 2005, the figure had risen to 4,2 million people (Johnson, 2010). The unique feature of this inequality is that, unlike in other countries, the disenfranchised group in South Africa is the numerical majority. This has left a large part of the society in a situation characterised by poverty and limited chances of emancipation. A further characteristic of inequality in South Africa is that inequalities within groups also deepened while, according to a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report, households originally living in poverty had sunk deeper into poverty (Schwabe, 2004). ‘In the past inequality in South Africa was largely defined along race lines. It has increasingly become defined by inequality within population groups as the gap between rich and poor within each group has increased’ (Schwabe, 2004).
Inequality has serious consequences, such as lack of social capital, lack of upward mobility, and social disorganisation, which frequently spill over into secondary problems such as crime, health threats, or intercommunity tensions. Despite the efforts of the new democratic government, couched in the National Development Plan, these challenges largely remained by 2018, and current inequality remains a serious challenge (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 2017:29ff.).

Along with this, unemployment in South Africa is very high, and rising. The country arguably has one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world, which in 2002 was 41% on a broad definition, and 30% on a narrow definition. Unemployment is especially high in rural areas and informal settlements. (Landman, Bhorat, Van der Berg & Van Aardt, 2003).

The economy is unable to productively absorb the current labour force, which is different from the patterns that exist in most developing countries, where scarcity of jobs in the formal sector translates into large informal sectors, rather than high levels of unemployment. Unemployment in South Africa remains a matter of serious concern due to its effects on economic welfare, production, human capital, social exclusion, crime and social instability. The level of unemployment and its rise is the most serious problem facing the country. Following the first democratic elections in 1994, the government’s efforts to eliminate poverty have been frustrated by the ongoing shedding of jobs from the formal economy, resulting in continued poverty for sections of the population. Landman et al. (2003) came to the conclusion that 40% of people in South Africa are living in poverty, with the poorest 15% in a desperate struggle to survive, and the authors suggested that the most challenges facing South Africa following transition to democracy is to break the grip of poverty. Despite short spurts of growth, unemployment remains a major social challenge (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 2017:29ff.).

People who perceive their poverty as permanent or increasing may ultimately be driven by hostile impulses, rather than rational pursuit of their interests. Thus, a high level of poverty can result in the breakdown of values, and other undesirable behaviours such as high levels of crime.

**Land**

One of the damaging legacies of colonial and apartheid history in South Africa is the inequitable distribution of land between race groups. In addition to being a source of social tension, the result is that impoverished communities have little opportunity for providing for themselves through subsistence and commodity production. Many rural people are essentially landless, and those who have land find it too small or poor for production. In addition, these families and communities lack financial support for training and productivity.
Land reform is an accepted necessity, but when land reform takes place in an unplanned and haphazard way, tensions are created. Simultaneously, weak planning of land reform can have dire consequences for the agricultural output of the country and its ability to produce enough food for use and export. There should be awareness of the sensitivity of the issue in South Africa, which must be factored into the national and community security architecture.

It has been pointed out that, in view of the expected increase of the South African population (natural growth, as well as incoming people) between now and 2025, South African agricultural outputs need to increase drastically, but the need for growth in agricultural output acts as a double challenge. Agricultural output has to be enhanced, yet it may be tempered by land reform if the latter is not managed well and implemented with care. One challenge relates to a concrete negative outcome, namely food insecurity, while another relates to possible dissatisfaction with the speed of land reform. These challenges cannot be neglected and future needs and wants will have to be balanced carefully (De Wet & Liebenberg, 2017).

**Crime**

Crime is one of the most difficult challenges facing SA, with a crime rate amongst the highest in the world, and all South Africans are vulnerable to its effects. In 2007, South Africans had to live with the reality of around 19,000 murders per year, roughly 200,000 robberies and aggravated robberies, 300,000 burglaries (some violent), 85,000 stolen cars and 55,000 rapes (Altbecker, 2007:37-38). Crime diverts resources to protection efforts, increases health costs, and generally creates an environment unconducive to productive activity, and the exodus of professionals and specialists is largely attributed to this factor. All of this has the potential to discourage investment and hinder long-term growth in the country.

Rising crime rates are often typical in countries undergoing transition, as democracy tends to compound crime by weakening the overbearing controls put in place by a previously oppressive government, and even relatively affluent citizens have an incentive to participate in crime when controls are weakened. The South African crime situation is aggravated by relatively easy access to illegal firearms and the existence of numerous crime syndicates. Surveys suggest that South Africans are particularly exposed to violent crime and murder, and while crime statistics over the past years have shown a slight improvement, there is no room for complacency. Crime causes feelings of insecurity and undermines confidence in democratic governance and government policies.

The military can set an example to society by maintaining a crimeless military community. However, the military cannot and should not act as a police force, although it will have
to be considered as an element to support the police in exceptional cases. Inwardly, the military as an institution should demonstrate that the military institution strives to be free of crime and corruption.

**Corruption**

The prevalence of corruption – or even the perception of corruption – can lead to deep discontent and loss of legitimacy for governments. To maintain legitimacy, governments should be able to prove that they are making positive changes to the negative experiences of citizens. The threat of criminalisation of state and society cannot be ignored. Not addressing it can invite social discontent and alienation. Post-apartheid South Africa saw many trials and tribulations, including high levels of corruption, especially under President Zuma’s rule. The current investigation into ‘state capture’ hopes to unveil the truth, and the commission will ideally propose concrete steps to prevent future corruption. To create a secure society, these challenges cannot be ignored when reflecting on and framing security in South Africa.

While the military is not a tool to be used for corruption prevention, its role as a socialisation agent and example setter should not be underestimated. Leading by example by stamping out corruption is important.

**Extremism and violence**

Since the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, the likelihood of extremist attacks has reduced substantially in South Africa. Some tensions remain, but the incorporation of most of the dominant white political parties has diminished the likelihood of right-wing extremism, although it must be mentioned that the majority of then white parties, with the exception of supporters of authoritarianism, in principle agreed with a parliamentary and representative system. There are also no left-wing groupings that advocate violent regime change, even if the rhetoric is fairly militant (i.e. the Economic Freedom Fighters or EFF); rather, the ‘left’ opposition generally work within the ambit of the democratic and labour structures available in South Africa. Some may argue that Muslim fundamentalists pose a danger to South African communities, but in terms of cultural and religious tolerance, the Muslim and Christian communities generally coexist peacefully in South Africa, and to a large extent are socially enmeshed/integrated.

Unfortunately, as a result of the US’s ‘war on terror’, Muslim people are frequently associated in foreign media with ‘terrorism’ or as ‘political Islamists’, and such labelling causes intolerance and alienation. However, it seems unlikely that the South African state can be labelled as an extension of those countries that are waging a war on terror, given its non-alliance stance and interactions with other states (Latin-America, Middle East, China, Europe, India, Russia, African peers). Close association with countries that have declared
a war on terror may be seen as guilt-by-association by their targets, but South Africa has so far steered clear of such associations in its multilateral relations and involvement on the continent.

Keeping a distance from states that habitually project military power outwards will benefit national security in South Africa and should be continuously on the agenda. Experience over the past two decades has shown that countries that uncritically associate themselves with the US’s war on terror can become targets as a result of guilt by association, and the bomb attacks in Spain are but one example. The US chose to project military power far outside its own borders against those perceived to be part of a ‘terrorist onslaught’, and such power projection frequently caused social dislocation, insecurity, alienation, and destruction in the targeted communities, deeper animosity, alienation, and the urge to retaliate. Close association with those that fight a war on terror may well cause discontent in other communities, and apartheid is an example of a case where a wide definition of terrorism was uncritically applied. Attempts to suppress ‘terrorism’ eventually had the opposite effect, galvanising communities against the apartheid state and its policies.

The vulnerability of African states to extremism is attributed partly to porous borders, weak authority in governance and public finance, seemingly irrepressible internal conflict over scarce resources, criminal groups attempting to gain access to scarce resources (diamond, ivory, etc.), the reluctance of long-serving leaders/governments to step down after losing legitimacy or national elections, and the easy availability of weapons. Extremism is frequently founded on a lack of economic perspectives, social deprivation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression, and a dysfunctional state. Like any country, South Africa is a possible target for extremist action, but government foreign policy, African policies, and the constitutional commitment to religious and economic equality play important roles in reducing such a risk.

However, the likelihood of local protest over dissatisfaction with service delivery and infrastructure is greater and needs to be kept in mind. It is also important not to label such instances as extremism, or as that of people intent on anarchy or ‘manipulated by dark forces’. The focus here should be on preventing and resolving such protest through awareness of the context, and by addressing the root of the problem, which is lack of services. It is of utmost importance that local discontent be solved through addressing the root causes, rather than forceful action and/or attaching negative labels to the discontented. The role of the military here can be educational or to lend a hand in community initiatives in order to improve perceptions and to demonstrate a willingness to assist, on the condition that such educational help is according to constitutional obligations and is non-partisan.
Nuclear weapons and national security

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the immediate risk of a nuclear war subsided. Despite the reality of mutually assured destruction (MAD), there was the possibility that a nuclear war could be triggered unintentionally or mistakenly. As a relatively small state (‘middle power’) under apartheid, South Africa, like Israel, was a nuclear-holding nation, projecting an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Since then, South Africa has signed the non-proliferation treaty and other relevant treaties, and is a non-nuclear power.

In reality, the mass holders of nuclear power are still in the West, while Russia also retains significant, if not competitive, numbers. Relative ‘newcomers’, such as India and China, do not seem inclined to use their nuclear power other than as a deterrent under serious provocation, and as a last resort. New ‘newcomers’, such as North Korea, do not have even vaguely competitive capacities, and if offensive nuclear capacity is reached, they will be unlikely to stockpile significant numbers. Thus, given the reality of limited arsenals and despite being labelled as ‘rogue states’, it remains highly unlikely that such a state will unleash a nuclear war, with the possible exception of Israel, which operates within a framework of ‘being besieged’ and threatened.

In short, the nuclear threat that new newcomers pose is overrated when measured against current stockpiles of nuclear arms. More likely, such attempts at building nuclear capacity are to boost confidence, as these countries are consistently criticised and threatened and may thus have developed the feeling of being besieged, which will have worsened the feelings of exclusion and isolation of their governments and significant chunks of their population. South Africa faces no nuclear threat in the short to medium term, as it is not geographically near to any of these powers, nor is it in competition with them. Realistically, the likelihood in the long-term is also limited. Any ‘hard’ military threat that may arise is likely to be from stronger powers in search of scarce resources, or who have strong ideological differences with South Africa or its leadership, and in this case the threat would be economic, rather than nuclear.

The vision, mission, structures and posture of South Africa’s defence should include both conventional and non-conventional capabilities. The military have responsibilities to participate in peacekeeping operations and carry out border security. The capabilities for this need to be retained and honed in a cost-effective way, and the defence policy and NSS should take heed of this. Added to this is the challenge of planning a policy of rejuvenation within the current defence budget, as an increase is highly unlikely in the short to medium term, and savings will have to be incurred through piecemeal methods such as salary cuts for top management, and natural attrition in higher age categories.
In terms of disaster management, the military, in cooperation with civilian institutions, should be prepared to assist in case of a nuclear disaster, both on and off our soil. South Africa has one nuclear reactor, and may add more given the current power crisis, and the reality is that having nuclear power goes with the possibility of a nuclear disaster. A nuclear disaster around our shores also cannot be ruled out, as various maritime vessels that pass along the sea routes of South Africa are nuclear-powered of which some are ageing fast.

**Armed intervention by core states**

The risk of direct invasion does not face South Africa. However, as both Kosovo and Libya have proven, the responsibility to protect (R2P) can be used as a rationale to intervene in other smaller states that are rich in resources. In the case of Iraq, the action was taken by core industrial states (US, UK) with others in alliance (‘the willing’) using the excuse of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In Libya’s case, it was an abuse of the R2P.

Given the shortage of certain resources on the globe, African and regional states should be aware of this threat. Any attack on an African state can have negative consequences in surrounding states, as the Libyan example now demonstrates. Preparedness for such interference and contingencies in this regard should be considered and planned for.

**Conclusion**

South Africa’s citizenry currently faces no direct threat from nuclear or conventional attack. Some countries on the continent may be vulnerable to armed intervention by core states, under pretences such as the war on terror or R2P, or simply because they hold scarce resources. However, South Africa faces numerous other socio-political and economic challenges. The country’s population currently does not face a conventional threat or reactionary violence and, given South Africa’s diplomatic stance and multiple relations on the globe, they are also not a priority for what is described as ‘terrorism’.

Being viewed as a regional powerhouse, South Africa can expect to be called upon within SADC and on the continent (AU) to provide mutual security, and to contribute to peace operations and/or disaster relief. Such requests are likely to increase rather than decrease.

South Africans face numerous human security challenges. An NSS should be aware of this and, as far as the SANDF is concerned, it is in these areas that it may need to be prepared to render services within prescribed parameters when called upon. In terms of its constitutional position and social responsibilities, the SANDF has a role to play in leading by example in terms of health, service delivery, accountability, corruption and crime-eradication, and community interaction.Projected inside the country, this example should also be seen to be visible both in the region and more broadly.
APPENDIX
SANDEF budgetary challenges

Introductory remarks

This appendix provides an overview of successive South African defence budgets and their effects on the SANDEF during the period 2008-2017. Defence underfunding and its effects constitute arguably the most significant military security development in post-Mandela South Africa, and analysing the defence policy and its outcomes without taking defence spending into account is less than useful.

Sustained underfunding and a shrinking budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP R trillion</th>
<th>Defence Budget R billion</th>
<th>Defence as GDP percentage</th>
<th>Inflation rate</th>
<th>Rand per US $1</th>
<th>Active service personnel</th>
<th>Reservist personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.28tr</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>62,082</td>
<td>15,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.08tr</td>
<td>32.0bn</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>62,082</td>
<td>15,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.68tr</td>
<td>30.7bn</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>62,082</td>
<td>15,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.95tr</td>
<td>30.4bn</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>62,082</td>
<td>15,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.2tr</td>
<td>37.9bn</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>5.64%</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>62,082</td>
<td>15,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.46tr</td>
<td>44.6bn</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>5.77%</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>15,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3.65tr</td>
<td>42.8bn</td>
<td>1.17%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>15,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4.03tr</td>
<td>44.6bn</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>15,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4.28tr</td>
<td>47.2bn</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>15.26</td>
<td>62,100</td>
<td>15,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>4.61tr</td>
<td>48.6bn</td>
<td>1.05%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>13.40</td>
<td>66,350</td>
<td>15,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: The Military Balance, 2009-2018

It is clear that the South African inflation rate over the past decade has neutralised the effects of any nominal growth in the defence budget. The table provides an indication of the extent to which the Rand (ZAR) declined in value against foreign currencies, and the increasingly unfavourable foreign exchange rate compounded the damaging effects of the inflation rate on South African defence spending. The currency exchange rate directly affects not only main equipment acquisition costs, but also the cost of refits, maintenance, training and other services provided by armament system suppliers.

Table 7.1 further demonstrates how the defence budget declined to about 1% of the South African GDP, although the current minister of defence (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) and her predecessor (Lindiwe Sisulu) both called for a defence budget amounting to at least 2% of the GDP. That percentage, if provided and sustained, would have enabled the SANDEF to rebuild itself over a period of about 20 years.
Sustained overstretch

Table 7.1 demonstrates that SANDF personnel numbers have changed little over the past decade. Amongst other things, growth in SANDF foreign deployments did not result in a significant growth of personnel numbers. Figure 7.2 below provides an indication of the annual number of SANDF members deployed on UN peacekeeping missions from 1999 to 2018.

Unchanging personnel numbers had a direct impact on any personnel shortages experienced by the SANDF during the past decade. For example, in 2008 the SAAF had only 38% of its target strength in fighter pilots and 60% in fighter aircraft technicians. It also had only 72% of its helicopter pilots and 68% of its helicopter technicians. The air transport force had 68% of its target pilot quota and 59% of its technicians. Persistent and significant personnel and budgeting shortages strain or overstretch a workforce, and the DOD Annual Report 2010/2011 mentioned overstretch specifically. The SA Army is referred to as ‘severely overstretched, especially in the infantry, engineer and support capabilities.’ The Air Force fared no better, while the SA Navy ‘continued to experience critical shortages of personnel within the technical, combat, diver, submariner and logistics domains’.

FIGURE 7.2  Number of SANDF members on UN peacekeeping missions, 1999-2018
SOURCE: De Carvalho, 2018
Any increase in personnel costs during the past decade cannot be attributed to a manpower increase, and this is especially interesting when one considers personnel costs as a percentage of the defence budget. Increasing percentages of the defence budget have been spent on personnel costs over the past 14 years. About 30% of the 2004 budget was allocated to personnel costs, while the percentage of the 2016 budget was 57% and 80% for the 2017 budget. During the course of 2017, the Defence Ministry announced plans to reduce the numbers of military personnel to 66,016 by 2019. If the funding allocation for personnel cannot be increased, the Minister of Defence has no choice but to reduce their numbers, or at least cut remuneration and/or staff at high-ranking levels.

**Defence policy implications**

In May 2018, the Minister of Defence reminded parliament that they had endorsed the 2015 Defence Review as the national policy on defence but that the Defence Review remained unfunded. The declining budgetary allocation has reached the stage where the SANDF is losing essential capabilities. Given the expected current and future tasks of the SANDF, such expectations cannot be executed. The defence policy implications of sustained underfunding are clear. Sustained underfunding will increasingly amount to a contradiction of the South African defence policy, as articulated in the 2015 Defence Review, and continued underfunding reduced the status of the 2015 Defence Review to a relatively toothless policy.

**Notes**

2. In terms of the collective regional GDP in 2003/2003, South Africa held 74.9%, Angola 4.2%, Zimbabwe 4.2%, and Tanzania 3.9%, while Mozambique stood at 1.6%, the DRC at 2.6%, Zambia 1.6%, Swaziland at 0.5%, and Lesotho at 0.4%.
3. South Africa’s Gini coefficient for the African population increased from 0.62 in 1991 to 0.72 in 2001 (HSRC, 2004). On the World Bank Gini Index, South Africa finds itself at 67%, ahead of Angola (59%), Bolivia (57%), the Central African Republic (56%), the Comoros (64%), Haiti (60%), Lesotho (53%), Zambia (51%) and Zimbabwe (50%). Within the region, only the Namibians were worse off at the time and rated 70% (Schwabe, 2004). In 2016, it was reported that the Gini coefficient increased from 0.61 (all population groups) in 1996 to 0.64 by 2014 (SAIRR, 2016:313ff.).

Ibid., p. 68.

Ibid., p. 74.


The following articles, published on defenceWeb (http://www.defenceweb.co.za), support the arguments made in the Appendix: ‘Alarming issues’ uncovered on border fact-finding mission (30 November 2018); ‘Critical maintenance events’ impact on SAAF maritime patrol capabilities (9 November 2018); Acknowledgement all is not well with the SANDF comes from the top (5 November 2018); Alternative funding, models needed for SA defence industry – Armscor (24 October 2018); Defence Legal Services will be impaired by lack of funds (11 April 2018); Defence Minister needs a hearts and mind campaign and a retrenchment plan (6 June 2018); Defence Review – no money, so no implementation (11 October 2018); Defence Review 2015 unlikely to ever be fully implemented (published on 29 November 2018); Navy Defence acknowledges it is in danger of sinking (5 June 2018); Navy deteriorating, Parliamentary Committee hears (26 November 2018); SA Navy funding and capacity need careful consideration – ISS (16 July 2018); SANDF suspensions cost millions (26 September 2018); Slow progress with DOD financial misconduct disciplinary proceedings (13 April 2018); Speech: Defence and Military Veterans Budget Vote 2018-19 (25 May 2018); Yam bemoans underfunded SANDF (18 October 2018).
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