THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECLINE OF SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE CAPABILITY

by

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Date: December 2021
ABSTRACT

The decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities is a well-documented and politically acknowledged situation that inspired the review of the South African defence policy since 2010. The Defence Review 2015 was promulgated with a detailed strategic approach to restore the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF) credible military capacity to fulfil South Africa’s defence ambition. The Defence Review 2015 process continued for five years with a deliberate focus to achieve consensus on South Africa’s defence ambition. The implementation of this policy is yet to be financed by the South African government. This inspired a critical look at the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities through the contemporary lenses of the concepts of military security and strategy.

A contemporary theoretical discussion of the concepts of military security and strategy in the post-Cold War era demonstrated that military security and the role of militaries in nations’ and regions’ security requirements remain a central concern for polities, yet within a broader and wider security discourse academically and as security policy advice. The concept of strategic context provided the study with a framework to discuss and analyse literature related to South Africa’s declining defence capabilities with the purpose to understand this reality in a strategic context and what it means for South Africa’s military security. A qualitative, interpretive, and thematic approach extracted thematic insights into South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in a strategic context to obtain a deep understanding of the reality since 1994.

An analysis of government directives for defence since 1994, using contemporary understanding of military security and strategy, demonstrated that defence directives and policy thinking in South Africa continue to reflect enduring and developing military security and strategic thinking for the military establishment. South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, in a strategic contextual discussion and analysis, however showed significant contestation in the South African defence debate since 1994. The study ascribes the lion’s share of responsibility for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities to a deliberate political and bureaucratic demilitarisation of South Africa through disinvestment and defunding of the defence function, with a commensurate growing decline in political and academic interest in South Africa’s military. Politics leads in the approach of demilitarisation due to its prominent and dominant position to decide and fund. An idealistic academic perspective fuelled the process from a trusted position of advice. With
non-offensive defence (NOD) principles coded in the Constitution of 1996 and all subsequent government legal and policy provisions, the scene was set to implement the deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa.

The disconnect between the NOD military approach, which holds human security as the most appropriate approach to national security, and the strategic truth that a nation utilises its military to maintain the monopoly on force (organised violence) for defence against coercive threats should after two and a half decades of the existence of the SANDF be put to bed. The South African polity must honestly ask the question: What has South Africa gained from its broad and wide security approach of human security?

**Keywords:** Military-strategic; military security; South Africa’s defence ambition; South Africa’s declining defence capabilities; demilitarisation; Defence Review 2015.
OPSOMMING

Die agteruitgang van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsvermoëns is goed gedokumenteer en 'n politiek-erkende situasie wat die proses geïnspireer het om die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid sedert 2010 te hersien. Die hersiende Verdedigingsbeleid 2015 is gepromulgeer met 'n strategiese benadering om die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) se geloofwaardige militêre vermoë te herstel om Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsambisie te vervul. Die Verdedigingsbeleid 2015 proses het vyf jaar geduur met 'n fokus om konsensus te bereik ronde die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsambisie. Die implementering van die beleid moet nog deur die Suid-Afrikaanse regering befinde word. Dit het 'n kritiese studie geïnspireer, deur die hedendaagse lense van die konsepte van militêre veiligheid en strategie van die agteruitgang van die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsvermoëns.

'N Hedendaagse teoretiële bespreking van die konsepte van militêre veiligheid en strategie het getoon dat militêre veiligheid en die rol van militêre organisasies steeds 'n prominente rol speel in die veiligheidsbelange van lande en streke. Dit word egter hedendaags gesien in 'n meer omvattende begrip van veiligheid, beide as 'n akademiiese debat en beleidsadvies. Die konsep van strategiese konteks het aan die studie 'n raamwerk verskaf om literatuur met betrekking tot die agteruitgang van die verdedigingsvermoëns in Suid-Afrika te bespreek en te ontleed met die doel om die strategiese konteks van dié werklighheid te verstaan, asook wat dit vir die militêre veiligheid van Suid-Afrika beteken. 'N Kwalitatiewe, interpretatiewe, en tematiese studie van die strategiese konteks van die agteruitgang van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsvermoëns sedert 1994 bied 'n omvattende begrip van dié werklighheid vir Suid-Afrika.

Met behulp van 'n hedendaagse teoretiële begrip van militêre veiligheid en strategie is die rigtinggewende regeringspublikasies vir verdediging sedert 1994 ontleed. Die studie bevind dat 'n gesonde blywende en hedendaagse begrip van militêre veiligheid en strategie gehandhaaf is in die daarstelling van die Suid-Afrikaanse militêre instansie. Die bespreking en ontleeding van die strategiese konteks van die agteruitgang van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsvermoëns toon egter beduidende verskille in die Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsdebat sedert 1994. Die studie skryf die agteruitgang van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsvermoëns grotendeels toe aan doelbewuste politieke en burokratiese demilitarisering van Suid-Afrika deur middel van gebreklike belegging in, en onderbefondsing van die verdedigingsfunksie, met 'n gepaardgaande agteruitgang van politieke en akademiese belangstelling in die Suid-Afrikaanse weermag. Die politieke
bestel in Suid-Afrika het die belangrikste rol gespeel in die demilitarisering van Suid-Afrika weens die pertinente posisie wat politiek beklee in besluitneming en befondsing van staatsfunksies. ’n Idealistiese akademiese perspektief het die proses aangevuur vanuit ’n vetrouensposisie van advies. Met nie-offensiewe verdedigings (“NOD”)-beginsels wat in die Grondwet van 1996 en in alle verdedigingsbeleide sedert 1994 ingesluit is, is die weg gebaan vir die implementering van die doelbewuste demilitarisering van Suid-Afrika.

Die opponerende benaderings van ’n “NOD”-verdedigingsbenadering, wat menslike veiligheid as die geskikste benadering tot nasionale veiligheid beskou, en die strategiese waarheid dat ’n nasie sy weermag skep en onderhou om ’n monopolie van militêre mag te handhaaf vir verdediging teen nasionale bedreigings, moet ná twee en ’n half dekades van die bestaan van die SANW ter syde gestel word. Die Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap moet eerlik die vraag stel: Wat het Suid-Afrika uit sy breë en wye sekuriteitsbenadering van menslike veiligheid gebaat?

**Sleutelwoorde:** Militêr-strategies; militêre veiligheid, Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsambisie; Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsvermoënsagteruitgang; demilitarisering; Verdedigingsbeleid 2015.

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1 “Non-offensive defence”.
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I want to express my sincere gratitude to the Department of Defence, particularly the South African National Defence College and the South African Military Academy, for affording me the opportunity to embark on this master’s study as part of my professional development. It is a life-changing event that broadened my professional outlook as a senior military officer.

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To Susan, my wife, I give my utter appreciation for your patience and support during long and tedious times of research and report writing. You allowed and contributed to an environment of success for me to complete the task that was set before me.

To the Creator of heaven and earth, I ascribe the honour and praise. I am because Thou art.
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<td>Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azanian People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
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<td>DoD&amp;MV</td>
<td>Department of Defence and Military Veterans</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intervention Brigade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<td>JIIM</td>
<td>Joint, Integrated, Inter Departmental and Multinational</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>uMkhonto we Sizwe</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NOD</td>
<td>Non-offensive defence</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and development</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SA Army</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
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<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<td>SAPS</td>
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<td>SDA</td>
<td>Strategic defence acquisition</td>
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<td>SDP</td>
<td>Special Defence Packages</td>
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<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-based [goals]</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities is a concern to the South African defence fraternity since 2009. It inspired the initiation of review of the South Africa’s defence policy that started in 2010 and concluded in approval by Cabinet and Parliament in 2015. The Defence Review 2015 described South Africa’s declining defence capabilities as a state of force imbalance, block obsolescence and the unaffordability of many of its main operating systems; the inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility (Department of Defence [DoD], 2015:vii). It argued that there should either be an increase in defence spending, or a downscaling of ambition and commitment to align with prevailing budget allocations. The decision is between two budget approaches. The budget must be determined by policy, or the budget must inform what policy must be followed. The policy is widely consulted and it codifies South Africa’s political expression of its military security policy objectives as adopted and approved by both the parliament and cabinet. It, however, significantly broadened the scope of defence in South Africa.

The Defence Review 2015 went beyond only defining the political objectives of military security. It broadened the role and functions beyond the scope of military security. It considered the military as a multifaceted tool for political objectives, both externally and internally. As a higher-order government policy from which strategy is to be derived, it provided strategic direction and expressed the resourcing requirements to see the policy to be realised (DoD, 2015). The continued reduction of the defence budget since the promulgation of the Defence Review in 2015 places the strategists of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans (DoD&MV) in a predicament. The implementation of the policy seems to be difficult and almost impossible. No new military strategy has been

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2 Force imbalance refers to the ratio of funding spent on personnel costs, operating costs, and capability renewal cost. The generally accepted ratio is 60% personnel costs, 40% operating costs, and 40% capability renewal costs.

3 A policy-driven budget approach allows the formulation of the required outcomes for a policy without initial financial considerations. The costing of the policy is done after the policy outcomes and processes have been defined. A budget-driven approach considers the available financial resources in the process to formulate policy outcomes in order to manage feasible implementation from the onset.
promulgated that provides a broad framework to connect the stipulated political ends with the allocated means. The policy is widely critiqued as unaffordable for South Africa.

The Defence Review 2015 makes use of defence expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) to argue the case for an increase in defence spending for South Africa. The policy indicates that such a measurement is an indicator of national will. This measurement indicates how seriously the South African government views the country’s security, its commitments to regional defence and security arrangements, and its willingness to face unexpected threats (DoD, 2015:vii). Deliberate and consistent defence spending reductions indicate that the South African government views its defence commitments as a lesser priority in view of the state’s developmental priorities.

The defence budget declined since 2015 to 0.95% of the GDP in 2019 (the Defence Review 2015 requires a gradual increase to approximately 2.4% of the GDP). National Treasury made two significant statements in the defence budget allocation. The first was: “Cabinet has approved budget reductions of R183.2 million in 2019/20, R174.2 million in 2020/21 and R5 billion in 2021/22” (National Treasury, 2019). The second statement acknowledged that the implementation of the Defence Review 2015 reforms will require budgetary increases of R18.2 billion in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The Defence Budget Vote stated: “The cost of implementing the review’s proposals is over and above the current allocation and is not yet provided for in the department’s baseline over the medium term” (National Treasury, 2018). National Treasury reviewed this statement in the 2019 Defence Budget Vote by indicating that the implementation of the review in the MTEF will follow an incremental approach with funding from United Nations (UN) reimbursement (National Treasury, 2019). Strategic history, however, points to the centrality of military security in national security.

Colin Gray⁴, in his book on strategic history, demonstrated that military strategy⁵ has manifested as a central theme in security for the last 200 years (Gray, 2013:280).

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⁴ Colin S. Gray (December 29, 1943 – February 27, 2020) was a British-American writer on geopolitics and a professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, where he was the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies. In addition, he was a senior associate at the National Institute for Public Policy. He worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute, before founding the National Institute for Public Policy in Washington, D.C. He also served as a defence advisor to both the British and American governments. He taught at various universities and published 30 books on military history and strategic studies, as well as numerous articles. He is an
 acknowledged authority in the fields of defence, strategy, and strategic history, who takes care to take into consideration a holistic view of the scholarly approaches from Western and Eastern perspectives.

5 “Military strategy refers to the use made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy” (Gray, 2013:1).
The aim of the study is to analyse the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and its impact on South Africa’s military security. This will be achieved by answering the following research questions:

- The primary research question is: What is the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities?
- The secondary research question is: What are the military security implications of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities?

From the research questions posed, the primary research objective is to critically analyse the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The secondary research objective is to argue how South Africa’s declining defence capabilities will impact on South Africa's military security.

1.2 DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH

This study set out to examine the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities since 1994. It therefore focused on the period 1994 to 2020. Any social changes before 1994 and during or after 2020 were not included in the study.

The study was limited in time due to its learning programme nature and as such followed a simplified methodological approach to allow for the study to be completed within the time limits set for its completion.

The research involved information in and about the defence domain of South Africa and was conducted as part of a learning programme of the DoD. The thesis will form part of the public domain when concluded. As part of ethical considerations for the research project, only government literature in the public domain was used in the process of data collection.
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

South Africa’s “deliberate, predictable underfunding of defence function [is] a threat to democracy and economic growth” (Hamilton, 2020). Hamilton’s outcry after the budget speech on 26 February 2020 is just one of many since 2009 when the Portfolio on Defence warned of the critical downward spiral of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) (Heitman, 2014:2). South Africa’s declining defence capabilities is a reality articulated in the South African Defence Review 2015. The approved Defence Review 2015 argued for funding models that require an increase in defence spending to arrest the decline and improve the position of the SANDF to fulfil its constitutional role and functions (DoD, 2015). The increase of South Africa’s defence spending since 2015 does not seem desirable, or not possible. The strategic implications of the continued decline in defence capabilities provided a good reason for South African security sector stakeholders to investigate the situation urgently. An important focus is on the impact of the once-thriving defence industry, one of few in the world.

BusinessTech (2017) reported that the Defence Industry Strategy document detailed a “R12 billion drop in turnover from 1990, and a drop from 130,000 employees to just 15,000 from 1990 to 2017”. Defence Force acquisition decreased from R26.2 billion to R7 billion in 2017. Research and development (R&D) funding decreased from R6.1 billion to R850 million. The report highlighted that a continuation of the trend of underfunding and operational overstretch, resulting in lack of acquisition and R&D funding, will put the Defence Force into “unplanned, unstructured, uncontrolled and accelerating downward spiral, shedding capabilities and jobs” (BusinessTech, 2017). Strategically, South Africa can lose its defence industry. The concerns of the defence industry are broadly shared by the South African defence fraternity and in particular the SANDF’s strategic leadership.

Mitchley (2018) reported: “It’s not a funky chicken jive out there – SA Army chief slams budget cuts as ‘dangerous’.” Mitchley (2018) quoted General Lindile Yam, warning South Africa of danger coming that no one seems to see. General Yam expressed his concerns regarding the continued budget cuts. This results in the SANDF not being in a position to

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6 Simphiwe Hamilton is a Nelson Mandela Scholar, former South African Air Force officer, and a serving reservist. At the time of writing this thesis, he was the executive director of the South African Aerospace, Maritime & Defence Industries Association.

7 General Lindile Yam was the chief of the South African Army (SA Army) at the time of the news article.
fulfil its constitutional mandate to fully protect the country. General Yam explained that underfunding is the reason for inadequate training and equipping of the SANDF. The impact is beyond the ability to fulfil its primary function of defence. The military cannot address new potential threats. In General Yam’s own words:

I am telling you, with a 1.9%, we could keep up and say we are somehow going to keep [the] credibility of a potential war force that also takes [its] responsibilities in the defence of the Constitution of the country … I’m sorry, South Africans think again. This is how far we have gone and this is how far you have put your military (General Yam quoted by Mitchley, 2018).

General Yam’s expressions are an indication of how seriously the military community views the current situation. The promulgation of the Defence Review 2015 created expectations among the defence stakeholders in South Africa.

Heitman’s (2014) articulation of the Defence Review 2015 was to “begin the ‘arresting the decline’ by 2015, ‘rebalancing’ the SANDF by 2018 then ‘capacitating’ it by 2023 to handle current missions without damaging itself in the process, to develop the capability by 2028 to respond to new challenges”. This would require budget increases from “utterly inadequate 1,1% of GDP to 1,6%, 2% and then 2,4%” (Heitman, 2014). Since the promulgation of Defence Review 2015, the defence budget decreased to 0.95% of the GDP in 2019 (National Treasury, 2019). Understanding South Africa’s government behaviour to continue to reduce defence spending after approving the revised defence policy requires a deeper understanding of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

The abovementioned public accounts of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities are just a few examples of the interest in and importance of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities for South Africa’s defence fraternity. It highlights a growing defence fraternity perception that the continued disinvestment in the South African defence function threatens democracy and economic growth. The Defence Review 2015 provides important insight into the reasons for the critical decline and contains policy and operational considerations to correct the situation. Various scholars also provide insights into various aspects that impact on the critical decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities, as seen in
the analysis of this study. This study followed on these works with the manifested reality that the required budgetary increase argued for in the Defence Review 2015 did not realise. This study set out to analyse the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities to obtain a deeper understanding of the reality. The deeper understanding of the reality is expected to lay a foundation to argue what the implications are for South Africa’s military security. The knowledge will contribute to existing scholarly literature by bringing focus to the neglected military security dimension of national security. It provides another perspective to the existing reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

1.4 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

This study sought to understand South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in their strategic context and what it means for South Africa’s military security. Key concepts to be used in the study are therefore defined as a departure point from where the study will conduct its reasoning. The study is founded in two academic fields that are closely related. Strategic studies have various narrower and broader views on the understanding of what strategy entails. It is thus important that these different interpretations are considered for the understanding of strategy that also accommodates the South African context. From the understanding of strategy, the study adopted the concept of strategic context as a framework of analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The broad understanding of the concept of strategic context is thus also an important departure point for the study. The second academic field is security studies. Here the study specifically focused on military security as a component of national security as the selected central (overarching) theme of the study. The reason for such a restrictive focus is that military security is viewed as a neglected concept in the South African defence debate in the last two and a half decades. The study expects that South Africa’s declining defence capabilities have specific implications for South Africa’s military security. It is thus a pertinent requirement that the concept of military security is particularly interrogated to arrive at a contemporary understanding of what it is theoretically.
1.4.1 Military security

Military security was selected as a central (overarching) theme for this study. The selection of the concept is important in two ways for this study. The first is the specific departure from the prominence of military security when the new democratically elected African National Congress (ANC) government adopted human security as its approach to national security in 1994. This change in the national security outlook by the ANC government had specific implications for South Africa’s military security and as such resulted in the neglect of the concept in both practice and scholarly debate. The second reason is that military security also lost its prominence in the security debate when the security debate shifted to a wider and deeper consideration in the concept of human security.

The study considered the definitions of military security from various angles to arrive at an adopted definition that would allow a meaningful analysis for the South African context. The concept is approached to provide contemporary insights into the theoretical understanding of the concept. A detailed discussion of the concept of military security follows in Chapter 2. The scholarly discussions provided are predominantly from a Western perspective, yet provide contemporary insight into the concept of military security in a post-Cold War context. The various scholarly views provide sound theoretical considerations that can be applied in the South African context since the advent of democracy in 1994. From these descriptions, a working understanding of military security is adopted as the following: It is a concept that deals with the security of societies (nations). It is a condition created by a military force at large for a society to realise its social and development policy objectives. Military security requires the execution of force or the threat of such force to achieve policy objectives. This requires the skilful application of military strategy to achieve the required condition of military security as part of higher-order national security. Security is not an end in itself but an enabling condition.

1.4.2 Strategy

The understanding of military strategy developed from narrow definitions of classical thinkers such as Von Clausewitz (1780 – 1831), Liddell Hart (1895 –1970) and Beaufre (1902 – 1975), who focused on the use of war and warfare to achieve political ends through the use or threat of force, to more modern thinking by Wylie, Murray, Grimslay,
Osgood, and Freedman who considered strategy as an ongoing and constantly changing process to create and wield power through a careful balance of power apparatuses in national, regional, and global politics (Baylis, Wirtz & Gray, 2019:5). This makes the theoretical utility of the concept of military strategy applicable at various levels and for various reasons. Drew and Snow (2006:13) concluded practically that “the reality of strategy in its most fundamental sense is nothing more than a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve an objective”. Although the study acknowledges that militaries the world over are utilised for more than coercive purposes, the primary reason that a polity uses its military is vested in the need to employ organised violence.

Military strategy finds itself within a larger construct of national strategy. It can be described as a bridge between political ends (objectives) that require the application or the threat of force to achieve the required political results (Baylis et al., 2019:5). The strategist at any level is tasked to determine what means are required to achieve the required political ends and how the available means must be organised and employed to achieve the required political ends (Gray, 2013:281). The military strategist is therefore responsible to determine what means are required to achieve the required political ends for force and the threat of force and how the available means are to be organised and employed to achieve required political ends assigned to the use and threat of force. This study accepts that for its theoretical essence, “military strategy refers to the use made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy” (Gray, 2013:1). This definition provides the clearest measurement for analysis in relation to military security as the central theme of the study. It also links military security to the monopoly that the state must have on force and the threat of force to achieve political control of its sovereign space.

1.4.3 Strategic context

South Africa’s declining defence capabilities are a social reality that can be analysed using the theoretical concepts of military strategy and military security. The study required a manageable framework for analysis to understand the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities within their theoretical setting. The scholarly explanation of “strategic context” provided the study with a framework that fits in the theoretical setting of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and it includes “the political; the socio-cultural; the economic; the technological; the military-strategic; the geographical; and the historical
contexts” (Gray, 2013:10). Ångström and Widén (2015:36-43) also discussed six of the listed contexts but only drew attention to what Gray (2013) referred to as military-strategic as the strategic culture. The concept of strategic context was used in this study’s methodology to structure the collection of qualitative data for analysis to achieve the study’s research objectives. A key concept that emerged from the analysis is demilitarisation.

1.4.4 Demilitarisation

The impact of the demilitarisation process on the defence capabilities decline, two decades down the strategic timeline requires a conceptual understanding of the political agenda that was purposefully included in the new defence policy for South Africa after democratisation. Guy Lamb (1999) review the concept of demilitarisation and articulate the definitions as:

In broad terms, demilitarisation is a multidimensional process that involves the reversal of militarisation through the sustained reduction in the size and influence of the military sector in state and society and the reallocation of military resources to civilian purposes. However, as militarisation is a contested concept, so is demilitarisation. A process of demilitarisation is said to exist when there is an observable combination of the following processes: increasing civilian control over the armed forces; a decline in the size of the armed forces; disarmament; reduction in military expenditure and conversion of the arms industries (Lamb, 1999).

Susan Willett (1998) describes demilitarisation to include disarmament as part of cost saving and arms control but argue that it is an all-encompassing concept that include the deconstruction of ideological and institutional structures of militarism and ensure civil control over state organs like the military. Willett continues the argument by broadening the understanding of demilitarisation to include in the process a new normative framework for conceptualising and implementing security at a national and regional context (Willett, 1998). Willett continues to discuss the advancement of demilitarisation of South Africa in the establishment of Civil Control over the SANDF, the increased openness and transparency in defence and security decision making, the broadening of the security
agenda and the significant reduction of defence spending. The following section will discuss the research methodology followed in this study.

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.5.1 A qualitative research paradigm

This study was approached as qualitative research. The qualitative approach afforded the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the contextual setting for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities by analysing the thoughts and perceptions of policy writers and scholars as articulated in various governmental publications and scholarly works. South Africa’s declining defence capabilities are experienced in the social setting of their political, socio-cultural, economic, technological, military-strategic, geographical, and historical context. A qualitative approach to the research was preferred because the study sought to understand South Africa’s declining defence capabilities through an analysis of the social experiences of law makers, policy drafters, strategists, and scholars with the theoretical concepts of strategy, strategic context, and military security. The study sought a deeper understanding of the prevailing thoughts and experiences as articulated in legislation, defence policy, and scholarly literature. The analysis of these thoughts and experiences provided this study with the opportunity to discuss and describe decisions and behaviour that impacted on and resulted in the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

An in-depth content analysis was conducted to obtain insights into the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. This allowed the study to interrogate contemporary defence debates and discussions related to the theoretical concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context and South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The analysis was conducted by summarising, categorising, and interpreting the collected qualitative data within the framework of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The analysis highlighted themes that allowed the study to discuss and describe South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The purpose is to understand South Africa’s declining defence capabilities better and to argue what it means for South Africa’s military security (Streefkerk, 2019). The qualitative data provided the opportunity to interpret the
information in relation to the theoretical concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context and the identified themes during analysis and synthesis.

1.5.2 Interpretative social science

An interpretive approach was used because the study did not consider the theoretical concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context as correct or incorrect. The study discussed these concepts and used them to frame the collection and analysis of data related to the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. It provided a deeper understanding of an important social reality for South Africa’s defence and it gave the opportunity to argue what it means in relation to South Africa’s military security (Thomas, 2010:295). In view of the limitation that time had on the study, a content analysis would provide the required data for the study.

An in-depth content analysis of the latest South African defence policy, persistent defence stakeholder expressions, and growing scholarly literature on South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, as discussed earlier, are an indication of the importance of the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. For these reasons, this study set out to perform a critical content analysis of the strategic context of South Africa’s defence capabilities to gain an in-depth understanding of the reality and what it means for South Africa’s military security (Stemler, 2000). The interpretation of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities highlighted important themes of the social reality within a structured framework of analysis. Data were collected from primary and secondary sources about South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and the data were interpreted through inference and judgement to create deeper understanding (Thomas, 2010:296). Data were collected from selected government sources, academic sources and public accounts related to the research problem and question.

1.5.3 Data collection

Qualitative data collection focused on obtaining relevant and contextual information from people’s interpretation and experiences of social reality. The source of data was people’s account of reality (Streefkerk, 2019). The study framed the data collection by discussing and describing the theoretical concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context
from contemporary scholarly works. These insights provided theoretical conceptual tools to analyse the South African Constitution, defence law, and defence policies that have governed the defence function since 1994. The description of the concept of strategic context was used as a framework to collect data from government publications, scholarly works, and other written works related to South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The collected data provided a comprehensive set of thoughts, discussions, and descriptions within the ordered framework of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. This process of data collection also highlighted themes for analysis and discussion of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Due to the limited time available to complete the study, data collection was limited to a content analysis of the SA Government policies and laws that direct and regulate the role and functions of the military, academic literature related to the performance and decline of the SANDF over the last two and half decades and public opinions as reflected in opinion pieces and media debates on the SANDF decline and performance as the basis for thematic analysis. Identifying and selection of data followed a process.

The process of identifying and selection of data sources was guided by the contemporary theoretical understanding of military security and strategy as important yet neglected conceptual components of the national security academic and policy debate in South Africa since the inception of democracy. The discussions on the concepts of military security and strategy highlighted the contextual framework to be used in the study to collect data from academic literature and public opinion as reflected in opinion pieces and articles. The theoretical description of contemporary military security in the study identified two key themes in the establishment and maintenance of militaries all over the world across the continuum of historic time. These themes were used to analyse to what extend the South African policy and law regulating military security maintained the enduring purpose, roles, and functions of a military in a democratic political setting. From this thematic approach for analysis the South African Government Policy and Laws governing and directing the defence function and the establishment and maintenance of a credible military as part of the South African National Security were used for the content analysis using the enduring themes as identify in the theoretical literature analysis. In the study, these government sources served as primary sources. Secondary sources were identified through a process of collection of literature by framing them according to the theoretical
context of warfare adapted to reflect the Strategic Context of the South African Defence Decline.

Secondary sources were collected according to the description of the South African defence capabilities decline strategic context as the political-, socio-cultural-, economic-, technological-, military-strategic-, geographical-, and historical context of the South African Defence Capabilities Decline. Here the prioritisation of sources were to source reputable academic sources from university databases and reputable academic journals and online databases. The academic insights were further augmented with public accounts of the social reality of the South African defence capabilities decline from media reports and lectures pertaining to the reality. The data collection thus followed a three-step process.

The first step in data collection was a comprehensive literature review on the concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context of war to set the study in a reliable theoretical setting to conduct a structured collection of data reflective of the South African defence capabilities decline reality. The second step was to identify the government sources that regulate and direct the defence function in South Africa. An in-depth content analysis of these primary sources would reveal the contemporary thinking that prevailed in debate and formulation of the military security of South Africa since the process of democracy started in South Africa. Here the focus (limited as it may be) was to use the promulgated defence policies and laws from 1993 to 2020. The exclusion of the data represented in the defence debates in portfolio on defence debates and parliamentarian debates is accepted in the restricted time available for the study. The promulgated sources are considered the culmination of debates and the accepted and approved position of government on the policy and law on defence in South Africa. The third step of data collection was to collect from the available databases as reflected in relevant scholarly and public sources within the framework selected as the strategic context of the South African defence capabilities decline. The study is done within a growing academic debate on the South African defence capabilities decline and an in-depth content analysis of these scholarly sources' add a rich insight from various views into the reality of South Africa’s defence capabilities decline. All data collection was shaped to identify prominent themes from the text to conduct a thematic analysis of the data to create a deeper understanding of the reality of South Africa’s defence capabilities decline.
1.5.4 Approach to analysis

A thematic analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities was conducted with the purpose of gaining a deeper understanding of the reality and what it means for South Africa’s military security. A thematic analysis examines data in depth to identify themes and patterns that create an understanding of the social reality under discussion (Streefkerk, 2019). Thematic analysis is a good approach to understand views, opinions, knowledge, experiences, and values from a qualitative dataset such as literature, interview transcripts, social media profiles, or survey responses. It allows flexibility in the interpretation of data. It is useful to deal with large datasets by sorting them into broad themes. The approach is, however, at risk of missing distinctions in data. It is subjective and relies on the researcher’s judgement (Caulfield, 2019).

Military security was selected as the overarching theoretical theme for this study. The concept of military security was described from an analysis of contemporary scholarly works, which resulted in a working understanding of the concept for the study. From the discussion, the theme of specification of security emerged, which was then used in a thematic analysis of the Defence Review 2015 as the latest defence policy for South Africa to determine to what extent the policy serves as a specification of South Africa’s military security as a comparable and value-laden political objective for the SANDF to establish and maintain South Africa’s military security. The discussion of strategy illuminated the theme of force and/or threat of force to achieve political ends as the key purpose for establishing and maintaining military capabilities. This theme was used to analyse the South African Constitution of 1996, the Defence Act (No. 42 of 2002), and the various defence policies promulgated from 1994 to 2020 to establish to what extent the South African government considered the use of force, and/or the threat of such force, as a key motive for the establishment and maintenance of the SANDF to achieve political objectives. The conclusions from these two sets of analyses provide an understanding of South African policy thinking within contemporary theoretical understanding of military security and strategy. This allowed the study to focus on the primary objective of the study from a contemporary theoretical base of reasoning.

The theoretical concept of strategic context was used to frame the collection of data from government publications, scholarly works, and other written works related to South Africa’s
declining defence capabilities. Discussions from these various sources were grouped into South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and political, socio-cultural, economic, technological, military-strategic, geographical, and historical contexts. An in-depth analysis of these datasets led to prominent themes to discuss South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. These themes allowed thematic analysis that discussed and analysed the data to create a deeper understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. The identified themes are:

- the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa;
- a strategically misaligned defence mandate with strategic security requirements;
- socioeconomic realities in South Africa and military security;
- defence spending and military technology as drivers of military security;
- South Africa’s military-strategic context (military-strategic culture) and South Africa’s military security;
- capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and vital interests; and
- the disconnect between the military-strategic defence paradigm and non-offensive political perspectives.

The thematic analysis created a deep understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities along prominent themes, which allowed the study in its concluding chapter to describe South Africa’s declining defence capabilities from a broad and deep understanding of the social reality. It also allowed a discussion of what South Africa’s declining defence capabilities mean for South Africa’s military security and provided the opportunity to identify approaches to address the reality with a futuristic and pragmatic outlook.

Throughout the study, following the interpretive approach, a process of inductive reasoning was applied with one adjustment. The overarching theme of military security allowed the analysis to examine the data with a preconceived expectation to find the concept of military security embedded in the various texts. A deductive reasoning process interrogates data with some preconceived themes that are expected to be found based on
theory or existing knowledge (Caulfield, 2019). This study is founded on military security as a key political objective for the military to achieve as a subset of national security. It was further expected that military security would be a central theme in the strategic context of the defence of South Africa. In doing so, the inquiry followed a latent approach that sought to understand the subtext and assumptions of the data to determine what it would reveal about the assumptions and strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities (Caulfield, 2019). In summary, the conceptual framework for the study is depicted in Figure 1.1.

The Military-Strategic Implications of the Decline of South Africa’s Defence Capabilities

![Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework of the study](https://scholar.sun.ac.za)
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the research. Background is provided on the social reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and why it is important to have an in-depth understanding of this reality in relation to the neglected theoretical concept of military security. A problem statement, research questions, and research objectives were articulated to cast the study in a scientifically reliable structure of inquiry. The study’s research methodology is located in a quantitative paradigm that followed an interpretive approach to conduct a thematic analysis of data collected within the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The chapter concludes with a broad layout of the thesis.

Chapter 2 provides an in-depth theoretical review of the concept of military security, strategy, and strategic context to establish the study of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in the appropriate scholarly body of knowledge. South Africa’s declining defence capabilities are discussed within the framework of their strategic context. It serves as a qualitative dataset from where themes are identified to conduct a thematic analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 discusses South Africa’s military security specification by means of an in-depth analysis of the Defence Review 2015 as South Africa’s latest approved policy on defence. The discussion then focuses on an analysis of South Africa’s Constitution and legal and policy mandates for the SANDF with the theme of force and the threat of force as the military’s primary function as part of state power. The discussion then turns to a thematic analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities derived from the realities and strategic context to identify the impact on and implications for South Africa’s military security.

In Chapter 4, the discussion returns to the research problem to understand South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. A summary of the findings of the study is articulated with emphasis on what the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities means for South Africa’s military security. A deep understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security is used to discuss approaches to deal with the social reality of defence for South Africa.
CHAPTER 2:
SOUTH AFRICA’S DECLINING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES: A LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The South African government in 1994 was faced with multiple political realities that needed to be balanced as a developmental state to establish the democratic society as a prosperous, influential, and thriving polity in Africa and the world. For various reasons, the new South African government adopted the security approach of human security as its national security approach, with a non-offensive defence (NOD) military approach to national and regional security and stability. The scholarly and policy debates after the end of the Cold War widened and deepened the scope of security understanding with a distinct change in security priorities away from military security. Two and a half decades later, the prudence of such a shift in focus is questionable. South Africa is faced with the reality that its defence capabilities are set in a downward spiral of decline. The question arises: what does this mean for South Africa’s military security?

This study set out to attain a deep understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. The concept of military security is viewed as a neglected theoretical approach in the South African defence debate since 1994. The study focused on re-invigorating understanding of the concept of military security from a contemporary scholarly viewpoint. The concept of military security is intrinsically linked to the theoretical concept of strategy in the defence domain. It is thus paramount that the study also provides a contemporary view of the importance of strategy to achieve military security within its broader context of national security. The discussion of strategy affords the study the opportunity to frame the analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in a theoretical concept of strategic context of a structured understanding of the manifested reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

The chapter starts by identifying and analysing the theoretical concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context to establish the study in a theoretical foundation and framework for analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The chapter then discusses South Africa’s declining defence capabilities within the South African strategic context from 1994 to 2020. The last section consolidates the chapter with a summary of
themes to analyse South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security.

2.2 MILITARY SECURITY AS A CONCEPT

Security means different things to different nations in different regions of the world. The security debate evolved from traditional security approaches with the state as the referent object and its military as the key instrument to secure its existence and interests to the new security approach, which argued for a wider and deeper understanding of the concept. The new security approach originated in Europe with the Helsinki Agreement in the 1970s to argue for a more inclusive approach to security for Europe. The new security development progressed along two fields of conceptualisation. A scholarly development of the new security approach progressed to security studies as an academic field of scientific knowledge. The new security approach also developed in political and policy discussions and articulation for implementation with the hypothesis as security as development (Seegers, 2010).

The new security approach impacted policy at a global level. At the end of the Cold War, the UN emphasised the need to widen and deepen the understanding of security for policy formulation (United Nations Development Programme, 1994:3). Two key security views underpin the understanding of human security; namely “living free from fear and living free from want” (UN, 2001:44,69). State security, on the other hand, emphasises the sovereign existence of society as its focus. The state represents the society it governs (UN, 2001:9). It is important to note that the UN did not see the new approach of human security as excluding state security. Rather, the two concepts were considered mutually reliant. It is observed that the impetus for a focus on humans was aimed at an existing and growing security reality of the impact of intrastate conflict and other emergencies that resulted in humanitarian crises. The social, regional, and global impact of these humanitarian disasters increasingly required complex global responses with multi-disciplinary role players involved. The concept of human security became the dominant debate in the post-Cold War era and it particularly influenced and informed discussions in South Africa’s security debates since 1994. The human security debate recently attracted growing critique in that it broadened and widened the military’s roles and tasks in developmental tasks – for which it is ill-equipped and unprepared (Seegers, 2010).
The broadening and widening of security as a development debate introduced a range of competing actors that sought to include their specific agendas in the security debate for prominence and recognition. It also complicated and expanded the military involvement in development, which was not traditionally a primary focus of the military in society. Baldwin\(^8\) (1997:24) argued that security as a concept has not been sufficiently explained. Opposing views that security is a contested concept, Baldwin (1997:24) argued that the concept requires specification to understand it clearly. This study agrees that explanations of the different facets of security within the scope of national security are needed to prioritise different security aspects in a particular timeframe. In doing so, the policymaker or strategist must take the complexity of different security aspects into account when they are compared for prominence and priority.

Security as a policy objective competes with other policy goals for scarce resources and as such needs to be clearly defined and understood. The relative importance of security needs to be open and specified and not defined within the context of vital interests or core values. The specification of security became even more important after the Cold War. The policy debate often focuses on how to reallocate resources from one policy objective to other policy objectives. This emphasises the importance thereof that the concept of security is comparable in its value with other policy objectives (Baldwin, 1997:24). This understanding of security in the South African context is relevant, as can be seen from the security developments in South Africa since 1994. The broadened security outlook by the new democratic government in 1994 was not sufficiently explained and specified to provide a clear understanding of the extended role players in the security policy debate and agenda. The resource debate in relation to other developmental and foreign policy political objectives only favoured the demilitarisation of the South African society through disinvestment in the defence functions. The lack of specification in the early years of democracy to a detailed specification of South Africa’s security in the Defence Review 2015 supports the argument that security requires specification to be a value-laden and comparable policy objective that competes for government resources. The practice of specification can also assist in prioritisation and decision making at the national level. This, however, is not a guarantee that logical reasoning will inform political and bureaucratic decision making.

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\(^8\) David A. Baldwin is senior political scientist in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and a professor emeritus of Political Science at Columbia University. Baldwin’s views provide a comprehensive account of Western security development after the Cold War.
behaviour. The argument for specification highlights the theme of the need for specification of security to be a comparable and value-laden policy objective. This theme is examined later in the study to analyse to what extent the latest defence policy for South Africa provides a comprehensive specification of military security as a comparable and value-laden policy objective. The concept of military security, however, requires more theoretical description to be useful for analysis and policy discussion.

Szpyra⁹ (2014:63) defined security in social sciences as follows:

Security is a state (condition) variable in time that determines the ability to meet the social needs of existence and development of the subject despite the presence of real or potential threats. It also includes the awareness of the condition in question as well as all activities aimed at achieving the desired level of security (emphasis added by researcher).

From this departure point, Szpyra (2014) defined national security as

a state (condition) variable in time that determines the ability to meet the social needs of existence and development of the nation despite the presence of real or potential threats. It also includes the awareness of the condition in question as well as all activities aimed at achieving the desired level of security (emphasis added by researcher).

These two definitions are useful for further analysis of the concept of military security as part of national security.

Szpyra (2014) made the point that military security relates mainly to the state (country) as its subject. In achieving military security, Szpyra (2014) argued that three conditions need to be achieved. The first is a state (security condition) in time that determines the ability to meet the social needs of existence and the development of the nation despite the presence of real or potential military threats. The second condition is the awareness of the

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⁹ Ryszard Szpyra is professor of social sciences and director of doctoral studies at the National Defence University of Poland. He has occupied a range of positions as a researcher and teacher at the National Defence University. From 2010 to 2015, he was a member of the Academic Council of the European Security and Defence College and he has been a member of the Council of the International Society of Military Sciences since 2012. He has been dealing, both as a researcher and teacher, with various aspects of security and defence for around 30 years. As an academic from a former East Bloc country that transitioned from communist rule to democracy and integrating into a regional security bloc (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), his insights into military matters provide valuable opportunities for consideration in the South African context.
state (security condition) in time that determines the ability to meet social needs of existence and the development of the nation despite the presence of real or potential military threats. The third condition is all activities (military and other) to achieve the desired level of security (Szpyra, 2014). This approach to security argues for a condition to be created and maintained for other activities to take place.

From Szpyra’s (2014) model of military security, it is argued that the military creates the acceptable security conditions for a nation to exist sovereignly and to meet their social needs, which allow the nation to develop. The military achieves the military security condition through activities that create awareness of the prevailing and/or potential security conditions of a military threat, and activities to neutralise existing or potential military threats. These functions of the military relate to its main reason for existence. Society utilises its military to have the monopoly on organised violence for its defence. The South African context, however, requires a broader consideration of the concept.

Mandel¹⁰ (1994:48) adopted a working definition of military security as “the extent to which a nation’s armed forces are capable of protecting the government and its citizenry from coercive threats”. Although the discussion is about military security, the definition involves more than the military and is broader than military threats. Generally, armed forces include the police and other paramilitary forces that are responsible for internal security and stability. Coercive threats are also a broader category of threats than military threats. Mandel (1994:50) confirmed that the primary concerns of military security are war and the instruments of force. The focus is to prevent war and to attain victory when warfare is required. However, military security concerns a broader scope of challenges in the post-Cold War era.

The instruments of force broadened in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of military weapons brought more role players into the arena of military security. States also apply more non-military options in the process of influence on the global stage (Mandel, 1994:52). Sheehan (2013:158) agreed that with the expansion of the concept of security after the Cold War, the focus moved away from military security. Sheenan (2013:158)

₁₀ Robert Mandel is professor of international affairs at Lewis & Clark College. His book, The Changing Face of National Security: A Conceptual Analysis, contains a probing and comprehensive theoretical analysis of the emerging notion of national security in light of the dramatic post-Cold War transformation of the international system. It gives the study a contemporary scholarly view of the changes that military security experienced in the last three decades.
acknowledged that military security remains a central concern in security as a whole. The expansion of non-military coercive threats is also true for South Africa’s military security. Cross-border crime, rhino poaching, increasing violent internal unrest, and demonstrations brought about an increased requirement to employ the SANDF to participate in government actions to deal with these situations. The broader scope of coercive threats and the collateral utility of the military to participate in a broader security agenda influenced thinking pertaining to the military’s role and functions as part of the national security debate. In practice, the fulfilment of roles such as support to the police and other government departments is funded from the in-year defence operating budget. It raises the question of whether the SANDF should be structured and equipped to deal with the broader scope of roles and functions and which should enjoy priority when limited resources are allocated.

The post-Cold War reasoning about military security, as described by Mandel (1994) and Sheenan (2013), is typical in the South African defence policy debate since 1994 with the understanding that force will be the last resort after all non-military means were exhausted to prevent armed conflict. This approach proved to be largely successful since 1994 with the low probability of conventional military threats since 1994. South Africa was, however, required to intervene militarily in Lesotho in 1998 and again in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. South Africa also assumed more offensive roles in peace missions with military offensive operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). The essence of deterrence is based on the availability of credible military capabilities. The CAR intervention highlighted the dangers of committing insufficient military capabilities to military threats. South Africa’s offensive military engagements in 1998, 2013, and the current FIB indicate the continued requirement for balanced Joint, Integrated, Inter Departmental and Multinational (JIIM) military capabilities with the ability to operate in complex and difficult terrain. The lack of focus on military security in the South African Defence debate require clarity.

Chuter (2011:24) argued that “the primary function of the military is to underpin the domestic and foreign policies of a state with force or the threat of force”. He discussed the most basic function of the military as retaining the monopoly on the use of force. Chuter (2011) observed that with all states, the existence of the military shows the state’s resolve to retain the monopoly on the use of force. The military’s role is to control the terrain of the nation. This is to be achieved through fighting, occupying, and domination of the
geographical space (inclusive of sea space and airspace). The essence of the military’s role in the control of terrain is more prominent in the threat of violence than in actual fighting. This makes achieving political objectives easier. Chuter\(^{11}\) (2011) pointed out that the mere presence of the military is not enough. The military must be able to intimidate and achieve military victory when required to do so (Chuter, 2011:25). The control of terrain (including sea space and airspace) is important even in times of peace. A government’s inability to protect against piracy, large-scale smuggling, theft of natural resources, violent protests, and the forming of private armies or militias undermines its legitimacy (Chuter, 2011:26).

The theoretical discussions of military security highlight that governments utilise military forces to maintain their monopoly on force in defence of their sovereign territory and their national interests. National militaries exist to create and maintain a national and regional state of stability and security for other functions of existence and development to happen. The discussion highlights that the complexity of military security expands in an increasingly multipolar world order and globalisation, where the military struggles to maintain its hold on military functions. This study argues that the multifaceted and diverse understanding of modern military security increases the requirements for military capabilities that can deal with increasingly complex and difficult military tasks.

Military security is a concept that deals with the security of societies (nations). It is a condition created by a military force at large for a society to realise its social and development policy objectives. Military security requires force or the threat of such force to achieve policy objectives. This requires the skilful application of military strategy to achieve the required condition of military security as part of higher-order national security. Security is not an end in itself but an enabling condition.

\(^{11}\) David Chuter worked for more than 30 years for the British government, including spells in international organisations, think tanks, and at the French Ministry of Defence in Paris. An acknowledged expert on the management of the security sector around the world, Dr Chuter is the author of a number of books and articles. He has been involved with the South African security sector since before the 1994 election, and still teaches regularly in the country. The use of the Institute for Security Studies-sponsored book, *Governing & Managing the Defence Sector*, in this study provided a pragmatic approach to security- and defence-related discussions with a strong South African and African influence and focus.
2.3 THE THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Strategy as an academic field of study had its origins in war and warfare. The term is widely acknowledged as originating from the Greek term for “generalship”, yet its meaning expanded over time; from fairly narrow definitions of classical thinkers such as Von Clausewitz, Little Hard, and Beaufre, who focused on the use of war and warfare to achieve political ends, through the use or threat of force to more modern thinking by Wylie, Murray, Grimslay, Osgood, and Freedman considering strategy as an ongoing and constantly changing process to create and wield power through a careful balance of power apparatuses in national, regional, and global politics. It is power applied to defend and expand national interests as political policy ends (Baylis et al., 2019:5). It is obvious that strategy will involve a nation’s ability to create and apply power to achieve political ends both domestically and in its foreign relations context. This includes its military establishment with the purpose of creating and using force (organised violence) to achieve political ends.

Drew and Snow (2006) argued in a reductionist view that the concept of strategy is often wrapped in mystery, yet in reality, strategy, in its most fundamental sense, “is nothing more than a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve an objective” (Drew & Snow, 2006:13). Drew and Snow (2006) further explained that confusion exists that strategy pertains to only the highest level of importance from the Greek root of the word “strategic” as of “great importance” or the “highest level”. The scholars explained that in modern days, strategy is more accurately described as “a complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (national objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends” (Drew & Snow, 2006:14). The decision-making process is described as five interconnected and sequential decisions that define strategy at each level of authority. The five levels of strategic decision making are described from national objectives, grand strategy (national security strategy), military strategy, operational strategy, and battlefield tactics. Strategy in a modern context is defined and decided by different people at various levels of authority, often with different perspectives on what can and should be done (Drew & Snow, 2006:13). This, Drew and Snow (2006) argued, needs to be understood at two levels.

Strategy at the first level is concerned with a broad view of long-term strategic issues that transcend current events. This view on strategy stems from national objectives and how such objectives are to be prepared for and achieved over protracted time and in a
continuum of time. The second level of strategy is concerned with time-sensitive "contingencies" or objectives. These are more urgent strategic concerns that most probably will have to be faced with what the polity has (Drew & Snow, 2006:14). Drew and Snow (2006) noted the identification of national security objectives at both the macro and micro levels as the first and arguably the most crucial step in the strategy process. Devising a successful plan for national security is not possible without clear objectives. This is to be followed with a strategic process of a "grand strategy" where it must be determined which instruments of national power are necessary to achieve the defined objectives and how these powers will be used (Drew & Snow, 2006:14-17). Drew and Snow (2006:17) defined a grand strategy as "the art of coordinating the development and use of the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives".

The study observed from the description of strategy as an interconnected, complex decision-making process at the five levels of the security system to achieve national objectives that the most important step in the process is to get the national objective(s) right. The other levels of decision making must collectively work towards the same national objective(s). It is important to note that up to the level of grand strategy (national level), the military is a component of state power to be considered as a viable instrument of national power to achieve or to contribute to the achievement of national security objectives. The question then is, what does the military bring to national power?

Drew and Snow (2006:19) defined military strategy as "the art and science of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives". Baylis et al. (2019:5) described military strategy as a bridge between political ends (objectives) that required the application or the threat of force to achieve the required political results. The strategist at any level is tasked to determine what means are required to achieve the required political ends and how the available means are to be organised and employed to achieve the required political ends (Gray, 2013:281). The military strategist is therefore responsible to determine what means are required to achieve the required political ends, when force and/or the threat of force is needed and how available means are to be organised and employed to achieve the required political ends assigned to the use and threat of force. The threat and use of force are linked to a society’s national security and national interests through the military. Military forces can do much more than apply violence and is subsequently used for far more than this purpose. It stands to be disproved that a polity first and foremost utilises its military establishment to
create, maintain, and employ force (organised violence) as a threat or in actual use to achieve political objectives.

From the discussion, the theme of force and/or the threat of force to achieve political ends is a key consideration for a polity to create and maintain a credible military as part of its state power. The military is responsible for establishing and maintaining the monopoly on force (organised violence). It would be prudent in this study to consider how the South African government utilises its military to create and maintain the capacity to apply force and/or the threat of force to achieve political objectives. The strategic requirement of force and/or the threat of force as the existential purpose of the military cannot be understood only from a theoretical perspective. The use of force and/or the threat of force as a policy instrument has context. The study therefore turns to the concept of strategic context as a theoretical framework to analyse South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

Gray’s (2013:10) explanation of the context of war was adopted for this study as the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and includes “the political; the socio-cultural; the economic; the technological; the military-strategic; the geographical; and the historical”. Ångström and Widén (2015:36-43) discussed six of the listed contexts but only drew attention to what Gray (2013) referred to as military-strategic context as the strategic culture. The next section discusses these contexts as a framework for analysis of the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities.

2.3.1 The political context

The political context is by far the most influential in strategic thinking and strategy formulation. Since military strategy means to apply the threat, or execution, of force to achieve political objectives, militaries should serve the government of the day. It is a political decision to fight or not (Gray, 2013:10). Militaries are not only instruments of policies, but are part of the societies that they protect. Ångström and Widén (2015:42) highlighted that the political ends (objectives) for the application of force are formed by the political system. Ångström and Widén (2015:42) further discussed two aspects of importance. The first is that the type of political system influences the state in its stance on the application of force to achieve political objectives. The second is that the norms of a political system influence its application of military force in achieving political ends.
2.3.2 Socio-cultural context

States and their societies deal with strategic issues and use their militaries according to their values and beliefs (Gray, 2013:10). Values and beliefs evolve and they influence how policies and strategy are made. Societies can have a real impact on when a military is employed and when a military should not be utilised. Ångström and Widén (2015) discussed this context as the ideology context. Ångström and Widén (2015:39) discussed that decision makers’ and society’s belief of reality influences their decisions consciously and unconsciously. Such beliefs can be religious and secular and it can generate fear and threats that can bring about reasoning for the use of force.

2.3.3 Economic context

“There is always an economic context to the record of war, peace and order” (Gray, 2013:11). Optimistic peace theorists argue that modern economies and their financing are so internationally interdependent that war has become impractical and unaffordable. Gray (2013) argued that this stance was proven wrong. War is expensive, yet governments have even funded their wars through credit. The economic context repeatedly proved key to strategic decisions – both in the preparation of military forces and the conduct of war. Ångström and Widén (2015:39) added to the discussion the importance of a state’s raw resources, and the industrial capability to process them to produce military equipment, fuel, and food. This emphasises the strategic importance of an industry that can equip, support, and sustain military efforts. This is important in establishing and maintaining military capability and in the execution of force to achieve political objectives.

2.3.4 Technological context

“War is waged with the products of technology” (Gray, 2013:11). At any time in the last two centuries, militaries had to execute force with legacy equipment and equipment still under development. Times of conflict also played an important role in the need for and development of new technologies or adaptations. At times, new technologies developed created the opportunity for military applications. This context is dynamic and it interfaces with economy and geography. Ångström and Widén (2015:40) argued that modern-day technology impacted substantially on military applications, as well as on the strategies that states will follow to execute force. Ångström and Widén (2015:40) also pointed to the
economic aspect of new technologies that substantially increases the cost of military activity.

2.3.5 Military-strategic context (strategic culture)

The military-strategic context to policy decisions may have consequences for war and peace (Gray, 2013:11). The argument presumes that the availability of military choices, in particular offensive capabilities, can provide political decision makers with reasons to use it for political advantage. Some theorists have argued that such an approach is a negative view of peace. Ångström and Widén (2015) discussed the context as strategic culture and indicated that political and military leadership is influenced by the various contexts to lead to a strategic culture. This strategic culture influences the decision making in the use, or not, of force (Ångström & Widén, 2015:42).

2.3.6 Geographical context

The geographical context can be observed as the political meaning of special relationships between the polity, its geographical environment, and other polities (Gray, 2013:12). This provides a stable context for strategic, and thus military security, considerations. The strategic profile of neighbours, the location of a country, and the control of natural resources (especially sea space) all provide important context when military security is considered. Indeed, technology advancement in some instances lowered the military significance of some geographic features. Ångström and Widén (2015) argued that geography significantly influences political and strategic thinking. It can impact on a state’s exposure to threats and it can suggest a strategic opportunity. Aspects such as location and size of territory can influence strategic posture. Mineral wealth can inspire foreign strategic ambition.

2.3.7 Historical context

The historical context considers people in the times they lived, the societies they were part of, and the ideas (thoughts) that were fashionable and authoritative at different times (Gray, 2013:12). It provides background understanding of political and strategic considerations of the time. It also provides insights into how people, societies, nations, states, and their decision makers deal with potential threats to national and military security. Ångström and Widén (2015:38) stated that “historical experiences are another
factor that shapes a state’s perceptions of threat and by extension its military strategy”. Ångström and Widén (2015:38) explained that experiences of war, terror, hunger, poverty, injustice, and oppression create expectations and preconceptions about real and potential threats. Such experiences can generate tensions and impact on strategic thinking.

2.4 SOUTH AFRICA’S DECLINING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES: STRATEGIC CONTEXT SINCE 1994

The discussion of strategic context generates the opportunity to frame the collection and analysis of qualitative data related to South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The departure point is the political acknowledgement of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and the need to arrest the decline. The next section discusses government publications, scholarly works, and other written sources that relate to and provide insights into the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

2.4.1 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities: Political context

The ANC government inherited a country where the white minority of South Africa was militarised during the era before democracy and instituted violence was entrenched in the black communities through the arms struggle for independence (Esterhuyse, 2016:38). The new ANC government was faced with the sensitive and difficult task to form a national Defence Force through the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces that are firmly under civil control. It also had the task to transform the new SANDF and police services to be representative of the demographics of the democratic society. This process posed ample opportunity for internal security risks to be managed. The new government had the advantage that an immediate external threat ceased to exist as South Africa’s neighbours were the new democratic government’s allies in the struggle for freedom. The sensitive internal security conditions and the absence of an external threat allowed the ANC government to adopt an emerging security approach of human security as its national security approach.

The ANC adopted the concept of human security as its approach to national security and, as such, its national security priorities would reflect this new approach. This is evident in the various strategic documents guiding the Defence Force since 1994. Esterhuyse (2016) discussed two fundamental approaches of the ANC government. An internal focus emphasised that South Africa’s national security was no longer a predominantly police and
military problem. National security was broadened to include political, economic, social, and environmental matters (Esterhuyse, 2016:38). The second was an outward focus to pursue peaceful relations through political, economic, and military co-operation. The SANDF was to be primarily defensive in its orientation and posture. Esterhuyse (2016) argued that the White Paper on Defence of 1996 deliberately played down the need for warfighting capacity in the SANDF. The policy emphasised NOD and non-threatening defence (Esterhuyse, 2016:38). However, the primary role and function of the SANDF remained to defend the state, its territory, and its people.

Jordaan (2004:22-24) discussed the political landscape during the early defence policy debates and processes as a plural approach allowing widespread influence on the formulation of defence policy. The concept of NOD was propagated by the advisors to the ANC government, who argued for downsizing the SANDF to equivalent levels of neighbouring states and decommissioning of offensive capabilities such as tanks, offensive aircraft, and submarines. The SANDF argued for a strong military based on constitutional mandates and the uncertain and volatile regional security situation. Jordaan (2004) argued that the idealistic influences were stronger than the realistic views of the SANDF. The policy documents and the new Defence Act (No. 42 of 2002) had clear compromises yet with the dominant theme of NOD (Jordaan, 2004:26).

The ANC foreign policy required that the military doctrine had to change from an offensive approach to a defensive approach. The ANC wanted to promote regional security and the security dilemma had to be avoided. The driving factor for defence transformation was to prevent the military from being a threat to democracy. Within ANC circles, the need for the military was questioned. This was a clear indication that a very strong sentiment existed politically that South Africa no longer needed a military. With the conclusion of the Defence Review process in 1998, the force design options based on NOD proved to be more expensive than other options and a compromise was reached to approve a core growth conventional Defence Force design in favour of reduced defence spending (Jordaan, 2004:89). The demilitarisation argument was more deliberate within the academic advisors to the ANC in the defence policy debate.

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12 The security dilemma refers to a realistic approach to military security where a strong military neighbour promotes a reactive response in states to improve their military security by strengthening their military capacity.
Laurie Nathan was part of the academic advisory committee to the ANC on National Security and Defence Policy. He discussed the demilitarisation of South Africa as part of a national security agenda articulated in the White Paper on Defence 1996. He argue clearly that demilitarisation of South Africa was a decided political agenda that was purposefully incorporated in the White Paper on Defence 1996 (Nathan, 1998). The demilitarisation of South Africa was planned comprehensively including the decreasing of the military size, the redirecting of security funding away from the defence function, the transformation of the defence industry to more privatised industrial activity with strict controls on military systems production for international exports. An important observation for this study is the acclaimed political agenda to demilitarise South Africa, reducing the militaries significance and influence as was experienced during the apartheid era. Academic advise to the defence policy process clearly promoted demilitarisation in a comprehensive approach. From Nathan’s description of the demilitarisation process of South African defence transformation, the demilitarisation of South Africa did not only include the process of demobilisation of excess personnel after integration. It included the doctrinal shift in policy to minimise the opportunity to consider military force as a political instrument in foreign policy. The impact of the demilitarisation process on the defence capabilities decline two decades down the strategic timeline requires a conceptual understanding of the political agenda that was purposefully included in the new defence policy for South Africa after democratisation.

Guy Lamb (1999) review the concept of demilitarisation and articulate the definitions as:

> In broad terms, demilitarisation is a multidimensional process that involves the reversal of militarisation through the sustained reduction in the size and influence of the military sector in state and society and the reallocation of military resources to civilian purposes. However, as militarisation is a contested concept, so is demilitarisation. A process of demilitarisation is said to exist when there is an observable combination of the following processes: increasing civilian control over the armed forces; a decline in the size of the armed forces; disarmament; reduction in military expenditure and conversion of the arms industries (Lamb, 1999).

Susan Willett (1998) describes demilitarisation to include disarmament as part of cost saving and arms control but argue that it is an all-encompassing concept that include the deconstruction of ideological and institutional structures of militarism and ensure civil
control over state organs like the military. Willett continue the argument by broadening the understanding of demilitarisation to include in the process a new normative framework for conceptualising and implementing security at a national and regional context (Willett, 1998). Willett continues to discuss the advancement of demilitarisation of South Africa in the establishment of civil control over the SANDF, the increased openness and transparency in defence and security decision making, the broadening of the security agenda and the significant reduction of defence spending. Willett cautions that the Southern African region lacked the strong vertical and horizontal legitimacy and have significant potential for a breakdown in the internal security community. It is imperative for understanding in this study that demilitarisation is described from the academic advice to the ANC defence policy makers views.

The demilitarisation of South Africa would be achieved through a broad approach that included the broadening of the security debate to minimise the prominence of military security. The deliberate defunding of the defence function to levels where the political choice of military force is insignificant. The transformation of the defence industry had to include a shift to more private used commodities for use by the broader society and strict controls on defence exports. Whilst a level of demilitarisation after integration of the statutory and non-statutory forces in 1994 is consistent with the required scaling down of military activity after times of conflict, the continuation of this process ultimately will result in the hollowing of the SANDF, rendering it incapable to fulfil its constitutional mandate. This is considered strategically irresponsible. The findings of this study proofs that the deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa constitutes a key theme in the analysis of the South African defence capabilities decline. It was a deliberate political agenda of the ANC government since 1994.

The South African government implemented a constant and deliberate political and bureaucratic approach to minimise the military’s influence on national security. An idealistic view from the South African government since 1994 considers conventional threats from neighbouring countries as unlikely since a mutual defence pact was signed between Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. Preparedness for external conventional threats by world powers was considered impossible and global security was considered through unilateral and multilateral agreements. The new military establishment posed a perceived threat to the new democracy, which led to deliberate political erosion of South Africa’s military influence and impact on South African society.
through a deliberate and consistent reduction in defence spending. The political and bureaucratic stance towards the SANDF was expanded with a business-like claim for more value for money by employing the military in a broadened scope of roles, functions, and tasks it was not resourced for. This resulted in the overall decline of the South African defence capabilities. The deliberate political and bureaucratic approach to minimise the military’s influence on national security is analysed in depth in Chapter 3.

Heinecken (2019:175) discussed South Africa’s changed security context as a key consideration for the changed security and mission priorities and the mandated primary role and functions of the SANDF to constitute a key reason for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. Heinecken (2019:175) echoed other scholars (Esterhuyse, 2017) (Esterhuyse & Louw, 2018) (Esterhuyse, 2020) (Jordaan, 2004) who argued that the narrow conventional core growth approach to the design, preparation, and training of the SANDF did not prioritise the prevailing security realities that the SANDF would be required to address as part of the new security approach and outlook for South Africa. This debate questions the constitutional mandate of the SANDF that prioritises the military role and function of territorial defence against external aggression. The Interim Constitution of 1993 and the Constitution of 1996 provided for broader roles and functions for the military, but clearly articulated these as secondary to the primary role of territorial defence.

This study argues that appropriate resourcing of defence policies (according to global norms for developmental states) since 1994 would have enabled the SANDF to fulfil its primary and secondary tasks. The Defence Review 1998 specifically promulgated a commitment from the government to fund only a core growth conventional design that could operationalise limited military contingencies to reduce defence spending in favour of human development policy objectives (DoD, 1998). The policy articulated a commitment to fund secondary commitments additionally to the defence budget. It is argued that through constant defence budget reductions, defence spending was channelled away from the core growth conventional role and functions to immediate operational requirements such as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). This is true for force training as well, where JIBM exercises focused on the SANDF’s participation in peace missions and regional interventions. Conventional exercising of forces and leadership eroded to simulation and limited formal training exercises at the Combat Training Centre. Scholarly views, however, differ from this point of view.
Heinecken (2019) questioned defence priorities where conventional warfare is not required anymore since conventional threats pose a very low probability and are considered to remain a low probability for a considerable time into the future. According to this argument, the structuring, equipping, and training for conventional warfare detract resources from the new priority missions to address contemporary security realities. The divided focus resulted in ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and ill-maintained systems for use during the changed security requirement deployments, which placed particular emphasis on the human terrain and cultural education of soldiers for this new environment. Force and formal training that emphasise conventional warfighting detracted from preparing SANDF contingents to be effective in the new priority missions (Heinecken, 2019:50-54).

The argument for reprioritisation of resources toward contemporary security tasks by the SANDF is only valid within the declining defence budget reality. An increase in the employment of the SANDF in its secondary roles and functions with a constitutional mandate to defend South Africa territorially without subsequent additional resources required strategic reprioritisation away from the promulgated defence policy design and mandate. An increased focus on education and training on complex environmental factors such as human terrain would require more time and resources that constantly and gradually decrease. Formal courses increased in length, with the result of more expensive formal training. Training institutions and force training requirements were confronted with the balance between foundational warfighting knowledge, skills, and attitudes and the significantly more expanded and more complex knowledge, skills, and attitudes required for OOTW. This indicates that a debate exists about a strategically misaligned defence mandate with South Africa’s strategic security requirements.

The ANC government started to experience pressure from a concerned defence fraternity when interest groups started to put pressure on the government to acknowledge the strategic impact of its security approach to defence and the decline of its defence capabilities since 2009 (Heitman, 2014). This prompted the Defence Review 2015, which followed a consultative process to achieve consensus on the defence ambitions.

Regional and domestic security focuses remained at the centre of the defence ambition. The policy argues in detail the defence capability requirements to fulfil its foreign policy objectives in Africa and the SADC sub-region. It argues for the capability requirements to support internal security through border security operations and operations in support of the South African Police Service (SAPS) where and when the police fail to maintain
internal stability and security. The Defence Review 2015 argued for an increase in defence spending to achieve a progressive level of effectiveness in the assigned defence functions and tasks with an international comparative level of defence spending (DoD, 2015). The newest defence policy, since its approval in 2015, has not been not fully funded. The political context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities highlights the approach to national security policy as human security and the NOD policy approach as articulated in government-published directives since 1994. The incorporated principles of NOD in these strategic directives continue to drive government decisions on defence spending in comparison to other government policy priorities. The idealistic views that influenced defence policy thinking still prevail in defence spending thinking. This explains the continued reduction in defence spending since the adoption and approval of the newest defence policy. However, it does not explain the unrealistic policy ambition for its military power base.

2.4.2 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities since 1994: Socio-cultural context

The ANC government in 1994 had a clear understanding of South Africa’s divided, unequal, unemployed, and poor society. This reality was reflected throughout government policy and programmes. Since 1994, the South African government and the South African society at large committed to development programmes such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which later changed to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework. The programmes delivered less-than-expected results even though some successes were achieved in housing, freshwater supplies, etc. The persistent challenges continue to be poverty, inequality, and unemployment (Chibba & Luiz, 2011). A key contributor to the failure and low success of the programmes to achieve the required results is below-expected economic growth. The focus on socioeconomic development was clearly articulated in the ANC government’s human security approach and it would directly affect the new military establishment in South Africa.

South Africa’s military conducted a demobilisation and reintegration process after completion of the integration process from 1994 to 2002. Heinecken (2019:97-116) discussed the economic and social difficulties that members from all former forces and new SANDF members experienced to reintegrate into civilian life in South Africa under the prevailing economic and social conditions in South Africa. The rationalisation and
rightsizing of the SANDF from 1994 to 2002 contributed to unemployment and internal insecurity. The majority of soldiers and police that exited the armed forces were highly trained and skilled white personnel. Many of these soldiers and police could not find or adjust to civilian employment and ended up in security-related careers in South Africa and abroad. This in itself created security concerns with the government promulgating legislation to outlaw military security involvement abroad under mercenary concerns. The reintegration of uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) also did not go smoothly, with substantial negative sentiments of the military veterans toward the government with feelings and realities of neglect.

Heinecken (2019:135-150) also discussed the impact of HIV and AIDS on the SANDF since 1994, which resulted in 25% of the SANDF workforce being undeployable in internal and external operations since 1994. This stems from a national imperative to not discriminate against people with HIV and AIDS and to rather deal with the sickness through healthcare initiatives in the military health system. Critiques of this approach argue that the SANDF became a welfare organisation to employ unhealthy and undeployable personnel. The impact of health on the SANDF is real and the reality places strain on the SANDF to effectively address all its operational requirements. Rationalising personnel who are unhealthy might create the opportunity to replace these personnel with new, healthy people. The perception that this will ease military financial constraints is disagreed with. Exiting approximately 20 000 defence employees with health problems will still place a substantial burden on the military health system and the national health system as these members will be added to the military veterans. In addition to such costs, the exit mechanism will have to include an economic sustainment package to prevent the new military veterans from falling into economic destitution. At least part of the numbers that are reduced will have to be replaced if the SANDF is expected to continue with its operational obligations. A deliberate rationalisation of defence personnel will most probably not have the straight-line reduction in costs that is envisaged with such an approach. It most probably will partly shift the economic burden to other government domains and retain substantial responsibility with the DoD&MV.

The anticipated and unavoidable reduction in personnel numbers for the DoD stands against an articulated requirement for an increase of personnel numbers (DoD, 2015:9-16–9-28). A reduction in personnel will arguably free personnel funding to fund operations and equipment renewal. This approach is not yet comprehensively appreciated, and it
does not validate the assumption that fewer personnel can (although better equipped and resourced for operations) fulfil political ambitions. The Defence Review 2015 argued for an increase in personnel numbers. The personnel debate for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities validates a comprehensive appreciation of the staffing options of the stated policy ambitions. Consideration of a larger part-time component that would arguably be less costly and more flexible is attractive and worth investigating. It is also doubtful that the reduction in personnel costs will sufficiently address the force imbalance and the systemic challenges experienced to implement the stated defence ambition with the commensurate defence industry capacity to sustain and maintain military-specific requirements.

The high unemployment rate in South Africa and the militarisation of society through rationalisation of the SANDF are important considerations for the SANDF leadership in a decision to reduce SANDF personnel to correct the force imbalance. The DoD was already required to reduce its personnel since integration in 1994 from 135 927 to less than 80 000 (Van der Waag, 2015:295; DoD, 2018:154). Like other state departments, the DoD & MV contributed to social upliftment through employment. In contrast to the reduction of personnel in the DoD, the SAPS experienced an increase in personnel numbers from 1994. Police personnel in 2019 stood at 192 277, with plans to employ 14 000 more in the next three years (South African Government, 2020).

The presumably unavoidable reduction of personnel for the DoD is prone to create further internal instability and human insecurity. It will also arguably not contribute to a more effective defence response to the defence policy ambitions. The defence policy ambitions will require rethinking as to what the defence priorities are. More importantly, the debate must consider what level of military security is required for present and future national security. The socio-cultural context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities emphasises an ongoing debate of socioeconomic realities in South Africa and military security.

### 2.4.3 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities since 1994: Economic context

The Defence Review 2015 used defence spending as a percentage of the GDP as a universal indicator of national will toward the nation’s security (DoD, 2015). Defence spending in South Africa declined from 3% of the GDP in 1992 to 0.95% of the GDP in 2019 (Trade Economics, 2020a). With the discussed political and socio-cultural contexts, the refocus of national security to human security and the defence policy focus on NOD, it
is evident that the South African government attached less priority to defence in relation to its developmental agenda. One must, however, look at this in perspective as to real defence expenditure. South Africa’s defence spending in real terms remains the largest in Africa (Trade Economics, 2020c; DoD, 2015:2-23). This must be viewed in relation to South Africa’s economic performance since 1994.

The South African economy grew on average with just over 2% since 1995. Peak growth of approximately 7% was experienced around 1996/1997 and again in 2006/2007, with a steep decline of growth in 2008/2009 due to a world recession. Economic growth recovered in 2010 to just over 4%. The average growth in the last three years was less than 1%, with a forecast of less than 2% by 2022 (Trade Economics, 2020b). The government’s development targets for reducing unemployment, poverty, and inequality require sustainable economic growth of approximately 6% of the GDP. It is thus a logical deduction that reprioritisation of government spending will favour the developmental agenda and other security concerns in the framework of its national human security approach.

An economic indicator, related to the human dimension of the socio-cultural context, that will impact on the decline of South African defence capabilities is government spending. Two observations are noteworthy. At large, government spending continues to grow unsustainably, except for its defence budget. The defence budget consistently declined since 1994 in real terms. The second observation is that the government expressed intent to decrease the government wage bill in the medium-term financial timeframe. The government is to reduce its wage bill by R160 billion (National Treasury, 2020:3,25). The DoD is due to be affected by this government spending decision, as can be seen in the Defence Budget Vote in 2019, where the defence budget was reduced by R5 billion for 2021/2022 (National Treasury, 2019).

The economic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities indicates a continuous shift of the South African government’s priority from military security as a mandate for its Defence Force to a defence policy of non-offensive threat and limited offensive use. Coupled with less-than-required economic growth and a very bleak outlook, a defence policy that stipulates increased defence spending seems unlikely in the medium term. In real terms, this indicates a further decline in South Africa’s defence capabilities. The economic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, in conjunction with the technological context, highlights an important theme for analysis and discussion to
deepen the understanding of this reality. This study includes a section that analyses and discusses South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security in Chapter 3, using the theme of defence spending and military technology as drivers of military security.

2.4.4 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities since 1994: Technological context

The SANDF inherited relatively modern military technology with acquisition and equipment technology projects to stay abreast of conventional renewal. Two services, however, required some new equipment to replace ageing capabilities. This led to the strategic defence acquisition (SDA) of a new fighter and fighter trainer air capabilities and new frigates and submarines for naval capabilities. The acquisition was plagued by controversy, with claims of corruption and pressure group resistance to the acquisitions (South African History Online, 2019). At the time of the SDA, the guns versus butter debate indicated a clear divide in perspectives about South Africa’s military needs. The SDA and other capability acquisition and development projects were at the time a compromise between the SANDF leadership and the South African government based on the constitutional mandate and negotiated agreement that South Africa needed a modern and technologically advanced military. The government security priorities and defence policy direction pointed to a future reality of declining defence capabilities.

Ängström and Widén (2015:40) pointed out the fact that new technologies increase the cost of military activity. The continued reduction of defence spending by the South African government and the socioeconomic reality of unemployment and increasing labour costs in South Africa resulted in a gradual decline in spending on capability maintenance and renewal. The impact on technology renewal and maintenance is best observed in the defence industry since 1994. Defence Force acquisition decreased from R26.2 billion to R7 billion in 2017. R&D funding decreased from R6.1 billion to R850 million. The defence industry experienced a decline in personnel from “130 000 employees to just 15 000 from 1990 to 2017” (BusinessTech, 2017). South Africa is systematically losing its ability to maintain its technologically advanced conventional capabilities.

The technology context of South Africa’s defence capabilities is not all doom. The industry continues to generate income for South Africa’s economy and if strategically supported by the South African government can serve the strategic importance of South Africa’s military
security. The South African defence industry must be carefully guided while steering the South African defence policy toward a win-win situation.

The technology context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities highlights a legacy focus on conventional defence capabilities, informed by a modern conventional warfare history. The defence spending focus aligned with the NOD defence policy approach points clearly to a misaligned strategic outlook for South Africa’s military security, where the existing technology-advanced capabilities would no longer be maintained at a point in the future. This reality ironically contributes to the pressure on South Africa’s human security focus, namely reduction of unemployment, poverty, and inequity. The defence industry lost 105 000 jobs until 2017 (BusinessTech, 2017) and the SANDF shed close to 43 000 jobs between 1994 and 2002. (Van der Waag, 2015:295; DoD, 2018:154). The defence industry provides strategic opportunities but it needs to be carefully guided to benefit South Africa both economically and strategically. The technological context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities is closely linked with the economic context and is included in Chapter 3 in the analysis and discussion of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. This is discussed under the theme defence spending and military technology as drivers of military security.

2.4.5 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities since 1994: Military-strategic context (strategic culture)

Understanding South Africa’s military-strategic (strategic culture) context starts with the formation of the SANDF as a national Defence Force by integrating statutory and non-statutory forces who were former enemies. The previous South African Defence Force (SADF) formed the majority of the new SANDF and its military-strategic leadership dominated the first decade of the SANDF’s existence. The relations between the political and civilian components of the new Defence Force were one of suspicion. This is illustrated by the Defence Ministry that contacted trusted advisors to participate in the formulation of the defence policy. The SANDF leadership would participate in, but not dictate, the process. The result is more of a compromise between the SANDF’s realistic position and the ANC’s idealistic defence policy direction of NOD (Jordaan, 2004:79).

Louw and Esterhuyse (2014:27) discussed the SANDF’s strategic culture as “a dichotomous strategic culture" that reinforced the weakness of the SANDF’s strategic management model. It hindered its organisational responsiveness, maximised
organisational entropy, and encouraged the Defence Force’s systemic decline. Louw and Esterhuysen (2014:27) argued that the prevailing ineffective military-strategic culture emanated from the continuation of two dominant strategic culture paradigms from past experiences. The existence of two strategic paradigms with their worldviews and value systems prohibited the SANDF from formulating a strategy from the political defence guidance to realise military effectiveness in its execution (Louw & Esterhuysen, 2014:27). These scholarly descriptions provide valuable insights into the internal dimensions of the SANDF’s military-strategic performance and how it impacted on military security for South Africa. It, however, assigns more responsibility to the military leadership for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities than what is reasonable. The most important weakness of the argument is the lack of acknowledgement that politics drives policy. It is important to note that the constitutional mandate for defence is set and changed by a majority constitutional political process that the SANDF has no control over.

Heinecken’s (2019) discussion of South Africa’s civil-military relations highlights an increasing and fundamental civil-military gap that developed since 1994. At large, the polity and the political role players became disinterested in military matters and the military in South Africa was set on a path to become marginalised and faceless in the polity (Heinecken, 2019:73-77). Heinecken (2019:74) expressed it as follows:

Unlike during the apartheid era, it [the South African military] has become marginal in terms of its status and relevance, as reflected by the lack of investment in defence and the decline in the defence budget and size of the military. Massive cutbacks in the defence budget have led to what Luckham calls the ‘demilitarisation by default’, as the defence budget and investment in the armaments industry declines, hereby removing the footprint of the military from society.

Heinecken (2019:74) argued that the SANDF is partly responsible for the civil-military gap because it isolated itself from the polity by not using the media to ensure that the SANDF’s activities, role, and purpose are shared with the broader society. The isolationist behaviour is further experienced in the closed environment created for research where information remained classified and access to military sources remained difficult. This led to a steady decline of research on military aspects.

Heinecken’s (2019:71-73) discussion of South Africa’s civil-military relations further highlight a dangerous tendency of subjective control over the military instead of a healthy
balance of objective control and subjective control\textsuperscript{13}. An indication of subjective control is the appointment of executive military leaders who are aligned with the ruling political party. The criterion for such appointments is not military professionalism but political loyalty. This makes the military an organisation prone to political manipulation. Military leaders are reluctant to report on the real situation of military affairs due to fear about their career aspirations in contrast to professional accountability to the system of civil control. Misguided political direction is unlikely to be confronted under such subjective military control and the military can even be misused for functions and tasks that it is not prepared for or that it should not perform. The military’s legitimacy is eroded under such conditions of subjective control. This does not detract from the need for limited subjective control where the Chief of the Defence must have a healthy working and trust relationship with the Executive, in particular the Commander in Chief (the president). The growing subjective control over the SANDF is, however, not a good indicator of the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The indication rather remains that the political leadership and civil-military oversight continue to marginalise the SANDF and the defence fraternity at large through a deliberate and consistent reduction in defence spending. The latest expressions by senior generals in the media are a sign of the growing frustration within the Defence Force. Growing reports of concern by non-governmental organisations, military analysts, and the defence industry show growing discontent with the government’s defence policy approach.

An analysis of the military-strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities highlights a marked distrust between the military leadership and the political leadership in the early years of the SANDF. The distrust between the military leadership and political leadership changed to increasing subjective control through the appointment of military leadership aligned with the ruling political party. This did not translate favourably for defence; on the contrary, the political approach of NOD continued to drive the demilitarisation of South African society with a deliberate decrease in defence spending. A civil-military gap developed, with a breakdown of civil-military control that can threaten democracy in South Africa. The military leadership lost its impact on the government. Two

\textsuperscript{13} According to Huntington, objective civil control maximises military professionalism, making the military a tool of the state and guaranteeing its distinctive existence as a professional body. As a consequence, the political leadership should seek to maximise military professionalism. At the same time, the military leadership should not acquire political influence. Instead, they should respect the ‘realm of political autonomy’ (Schultz and Vile, 2019)
themes are identified for a deeper analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. The first is the disconnect between the military-strategic defence paradigm and non-offensive political perspectives. The second theme is a recognition from the military-strategic context discussion that the military-strategic context and the scholarly debate on its impact on South Africa’s military performance warrant a deeper analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities with the theme of South Africa’s military-strategic context (military-strategic culture) and South Africa’s military security.

2.4.6 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities since 1994: Geographical context

South Africa historically enjoyed significant strategic importance due to its geographical position at the southern point of Africa. This geographical significance, coupled with the discovery of precious minerals and diamonds in part, is the reason for its volatile conflict-ridden history as civilisations met and fought over South Africa’s territory and riches. The Defence Review 2015 discussed South Africa’s geographical importance predominantly from an economic security perspective (DoD, 2015:2-6–2-18). The policy links South Africa’s national interest to defence capabilities as the Defence Force would be required to maintain the capabilities to ensure the freedom of South Africa to trade, including the free use of land, air and sea routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs. Ensure the security, domestically and externally, of fundamental resources, such as minerals, energy and water, including the safe and secure delivery, processing and distribution thereof. Ensure the safety and security of domestic and external strategic installations. Ensure the safety and security of the South African people, both within the national territory and abroad (DoD, 2015:2-26).

These policy provisions to ensure freedom and control over land, air, and naval space and the protection of fundamental resources such as minerals, water, and energy to ensure South Africa’s economic and human securities are important. It places defence capabilities at the centre stage of South Africa’s national security.
The significance of South Africa at the southern point of Africa continues to have strategic importance as a global trade route. Combined with good infrastructure, the country provides important economic trade access to Southern Africa. South Africa’s natural resources in its fish stock are important to South Africa’s economic and human security. These same resources are lucrative to other global players, who exploit these resources in the absence of adequate capacity to control South Africa’s exclusive economic zones (DoD, 2015:6-3).

The geographic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities highlights important capability requirements for the SANDF to have for the protection of economic security and for South Africa’s national interest. It also highlights some indications of capability priorities going forward in discussing South Africa’s military security. Considering the description of the concepts of military security and strategy earlier in the study, the link that the Defence Review 2015 made between South Africa’s economic security and its ability to dominate its sovereign territory military through its defence capacity warrants a deeper analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security under the theme of capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and vital interest.

2.4.7 South Africa’s declining defence capabilities since 1994: Historical context

The SANDF inherited defence capabilities that were developed for a mobile offensive in the Southern African theatre. Due to its increasing isolation since the 1970s, South Africa established a defence industry capable of equipping and supporting its conventional capabilities. The new political era and dispensation, however, soon showed little use for its legacy conventional systems in border operations and external regional Peace Support Operations (PSOs). A continued fixation of the SADF leadership on possible external conventional threats kept the conventional agenda firmly in place in defence policy and its training of the SANDF (Jordaan, 2004:79).

The early years of the SANDF (1994 to 1998) comprised mostly of the process of integration and transformation. The SANDF was formed from the amalgamation of statutory and non-statutory forces (Wessels, 2010). The focus was on the primary function of the SANDF in the defence of South Africa against external threats. The ANC government wanted to consolidate its civil control over the SANDF and sought not to employ the SANDF in internal roles (Van der Waag, 2015). The SANDF leadership was
preoccupied with the challenges of integration. The conventional paradigm with the convenience of existing doctrine kept the SANDF leadership organising, training, and exercising the SANDF in conventional roles. The political leadership was busy transforming the SANDF and articulating its new defence policy direction.

International pressure required South Africa to become involved in peace missions in Africa. This refocused SANDF employment in support of its foreign policy objectives. The first action was already seen in 1998 with Operation Bolesas as an SADC-sanctioned intervention in Lesotho. Other PSOs followed, sanctioned by the African Union (AU) and the UN (Van der Waag, 2015:304-308). The SANDF was reluctant to accept the new external role of intervention and peacekeeping. The SANDF leadership knew that it did not organise, train, and exercise SANDF forces in the new defence roles of regional security and stability. The SANDF orientation was still offensive. The equipment of the SANDF was still predominantly the SADF’s conventional arsenal.

The Defence Act of 2002 ended the feature of commandos in the defence mandate, which led to the closing of all commando structures that were predominantly used in support of police services. Simultaneously, the SANDF’s involvement in border operations was also phased out. This decision was reversed in 2009, with the SANDF being required to re-establish the capabilities to perform this function in support of the SAPS (Boshoff, 2009). This timeframe also marked the increased employment of the SANDF in support of South Africa’s foreign policy under UN, AU, and SADC mandates. Deployment under unilateral agreements increased, such as in the CAR and other African countries for post-conflict reconstruction support and other military training initiatives.

The Portfolio on Defence warned of the already critical downward spiral of the SANDF in 2009 (Heitman, 2014). This marked the start of a process to review South Africa’s defence policy again in the new decade. The Defence Review Committee was appointed with the mandate to critically examine South Africa’s defence policy after various stakeholders highlighted the critical decline of the SANDF. The first draft was published for public consultation in 2012 and continued to follow a consultative process until its approval in 2015 (DoD, 2015). The promulgation of the Defence Review 2015 created an expectation of renewed focus to restore a credible defence capacity for South Africa. It, however, would require an increase in defence spending.
Defence spending has been on a downward trend with the MTEF outlook continuing downward (National Treasury, 2019). The employment of the SANDF and the budget allocation have arguably reached a point in history where SANDF strategists could no longer link military means with political ends. The SANDF’s conventional capabilities, inclusive of its industrial base in South Africa, are at crossroads of existence. The SANDF’s capacity to fulfil its constitutional mandate is questionable.

The historical context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities provides a holistic flow of defence events since 1994. It places the development of South Africa’s strategic history since 1994 when the security and strategic outlook in South Africa fundamentally changed. It allows this study to place important defence changes in perspective to the aim and objectives of the study.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the theoretical concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context to provide a contemporary understanding of the theoretical setting that South Africa’s declining defence capabilities are situated in. From the theoretical discussion, the study derived two pertinent theoretical themes that are important to consider in terms of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

The discussion of military security in its contemporary view highlighted the requirement to specify security as a comparable and value-laden policy objective. This became even more important in the post-Cold War era where the security debate broadened and deepened with a refocus of its referent object to the individual; away from the state as a collective interest for a polity. In view of South Africa’s national security approach of human security that deliberately took the focus away from military security to South Africa’s developmental agenda, the theme specification of security to make it a comparable and value-laden policy objective was used to analyse the Defence Review 2015 as South Africa’s latest defence policy. The study discusses to what extent the latest policy is a comparable and value-laden specification of South Africa’s military security policy objective as the key responsibility of the SANDF in Chapter 3.

A discussion of contemporary strategy as a theoretical concept highlighted two important aspects for this study. The first observation was the centrality that military strategy maintained in the security of polities in the last 200 years. This observation cast doubt on
the academic and policy focus that a wider and deeper approach to security brought as the dominant discussion since the end of the Cold War. The academic discourse also highlighted a prominent theme in strategy of why societies establish, utilise, and maintain their militaries. The use of force and/or the threat of such force to achieve political objectives continues to be a key purpose for a society to establish and maintain a military. Militaries throughout existence in history have always being used for more than the purpose of violence. Yet its purpose of existence is derived from the need to establish and maintain the capacity to apply force to achieve political ends. The theme of force and/or the threat of force to achieve political ends allows the study to analyse how South Africa maintains this enduring strategic requirement for the establishment and maintenance of the SANDF in government directives in Chapter 3.

From the discussion of the theoretical concept of strategy, the concept of strategic context was identified as a useful theoretical framework to collect qualitative data from government publications, scholarly works, and other works relevant to South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. A broad description of strategic context was followed by a discussion of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities framed in their strategic context. The discussion highlighted prominent themes for analysis to gain a deeper understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. These themes are:

- the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa;
- a strategically misaligned defence mandate with strategic security requirements;
- socioeconomic realities in South Africa and military security;
- defence spending and military technology as drivers of military security;
- South Africa’s military-strategic context (military-strategic culture) and South Africa’s military security;
- capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and vital interests; and
- the disconnect between the military-strategic defence paradigm and non-offensive political perspectives.

Figure 2.1 provides an illustrated summary of the theoretical structure of the study as described and discussed in Chapter 2. The next chapter considers the impact of South
Africa’s declining defence capabilities on South Africa’s military security through a thematic analysis.

Figure 2.1: Structure and summary of the theoretical concepts and identified themes for the study
CHAPTER 3: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S MILITARY SECURITY: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

A contemporary theoretical understanding of the concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context as discussed in Chapter 2 allows the study to conduct a thematic analysis of the articulated qualitative data as presented in Chapter 2. The aim is to extract a deep understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. Military security serves as an overarching theme throughout the analysis to focus the analysis on this neglected theoretical approach in South Africa’s defence policy debate since 1994. Two prominent themes from the discussion of military security and strategy allow an analysis of South Africa’s defence policy directives since 1994, within a contemporary theoretical understanding of these concepts. It is important for the study to understand these policy directives in the contemporary theoretical body of scientific knowledge and how these government directives and their implementation impact and describe South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

The first theme identified from the conceptual discussion of security is the need to specify security, more specifically military security to make it comparable and value-laden among various political policy considerations. In the first section of this chapter, an analysis of the Defence Review 2015, as the latest policy on defence for South Africa, is conducted to determine to what extent the policy provides a specification of South Africa’s military security policy objective. The second theme identified from the conceptual discussion of strategy is the enduring concept of the use of force and/or threat of force for political ends. The discussion of strategy in Chapter 2 highlighted that this theme has manifested throughout history as a key motive for societies to establish and maintain militaries as their functional establishment for the use of violence as a political tool. In the second section of the chapter, the theme of the use of force and/or threat of force for political ends is used to analyse to what extent South Africa’s Constitution, defence laws, and defence policies maintained this enduring purpose of establishing, mandating, structuring, and maintaining a credible military force since 1994.

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The study then turns to South Africa’s declining defence capabilities’ strategic context in the third section of the chapter by conducting a thematic analysis of articulated data to extract a deep understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. The insight obtained from the three sets of analyses will be considered in the description of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security in the last chapter. It serves as qualitative conceptual constructs for describing South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and the impact on South Africa’s military security as a neglected concept within South Africa’s national security in the last chapter of the study.

3.2 SPECIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S MILITARY SECURITY AS A POLICY OBJECTIVE

3.2.1 Military security as a foundation for specification of defence policy

Military security as a policy objective requires specification to make it a comparable and value-laden political objective among various political policy considerations. This study considers the Defence Review 2015 as a considerably detailed specification of South Africa’s defence ambition and a reflection of the required military security for South Africa to exist as a nation in a stable region. The theoretical review of military security and strategy clearly shows from various scholarly approaches that the military is charged with the policy requirements for the use and/or the threat of force to create and maintain a state of military security for other policies to be pursued. A broader utility of the military is an important collateral consideration for the efficient use of expensive state architecture in extended times of peace. The existential purpose of the military remains its requirement to create and maintain the capacity to use force (organised violence) to achieve political ends. It is an important focus when the design, structuring, and preparation of the military are considered. To what extent does the Defence Review 2015 serve as a detailed specification of South Africa’s military security linked to South Africa’s national security?

A basic search in the Defence Review 2015 document shows that the term “military security” appears only once under the chapter “Defence Industry Policy and Strategy” in the section on “Defence Intellectual Property”. The term “national security” appears 103 times in the policy document. The word “defence” appears 3 684 times in the document. The absence of the term “military security” demonstrates that the concept is not considered in the conceptualisation of security in the description of defence. This does not
mean that military security is not implied or even included in the policy on defence. It shows that it is not consciously used as a conceptual departure point as a policy objective directly attributed to the military. This then requires that the higher-order concept of national security be considered, as well as to what extent it primarily refers to military security or in part includes military security. The instances where military security are specifically excluded are also highlighted.

From the chairperson’s overview of the Defence Review 2015, the following statement is interesting to take note of:

Traditionally, Defence Forces have focused purely on the role that they play in the defence of the sovereignty of the nation-state. This Defence Review, however, discusses the broader role of the Defence Force within a developmental state. It does not purely focus on the ‘what the Defence Force is against’ but additionally provides the framework for the ‘what the Defence Force is for’ and consequently ‘what the Nation expects its Defence Force to do’. This includes the positive role it should play in support of nation-building, as an adjunct to its traditional roles and functions (DoD, 2015:iii).

The Defence Review Committee from the onset intended to describe the South African defence policy using a more comprehensive, coordinated, and collaborative approach. It would describe the primary and secondary roles and functions of the Defence Force (military). It would provide a holistic understanding of the Defence Force as a component of the government.

The introductory chapter of the Defence Review 2015 discussed the defence mandate and the hierarchical place of the Defence Review in the hierarchy of national policy (DoD, 2015:0-5). The introduction explained that the new defence policy was a requirement due to the growing regional and domestic responsibilities of South Africa’s defence establishment. As a defence policy, the Defence Review 2015 is part of public policy that guides defence objectives and functions for South Africa’s armed forces. The Defence Review 2015 stipulated that “[t]o this end, defence policy defines the defence or military scope of national security, the strategic posture, defence capabilities, defence alliances, and security institutions or mechanisms (both national and international) that govern the
utilisation of the Defence Force”¹⁴ (DoD, 2015:0-6). The policy equates defence to the military scope of national security; i.e. military security and the wider use of the military. One should thus read “defence” as military participation in national security.

The introductory discussion further linked the defence policy (military security) to possible threats to “national security and its society, economy, territory, environment and provides options to the government on how the Defence Force should deal with such threats” (DoD, 2015:0-6). This broadens the scope for defence (military) employment. The broadening and deepening of the security agenda expanded the threat perception approach to the extent that it became more complex and nearly impossible to cater for all possible threats.

The policy discussed the principles that the Defence Force needs to follow (DoD, 2015:0-7). Principle 3 aligns the Defence Force with its constitutionally mandated functions and the government’s national strategic goals and priorities. This principle places the Defence Force strategically in a defensive posture with operational offensive capabilities. Principle 4 requires of the Defence Force to “stand ready” to defend and protect South Africa, to safeguard South Africa and its people, to contribute to regional and continental security, and to provide support in times of crisis and disaster – both domestically and regionally, man-made or natural. These principles require the Defence Force to create and maintain a required state of military security for South Africa. It further links South Africa’s military security to regional stability in pursuit of foreign policy objectives and support to the SAPS and other government departments in the safeguarding of South Africa’s people and to respond to crises and disasters. The responsibility for military security is unmistakably articulated in these principles, while a broader role of employment of the Defence Force is implicit.

Principle 6 provides a clear expectation of the maintenance of a “balanced, modern and flexible force employing advanced technologies appropriate to operations in the African environment”. The description further states that “the Defence Force will be appropriately equipped, resourced and multi-role trained to execute successful operations across the spectrum of potential conflict with embedded balanced military capabilities to conduct these military operations”. Principle 7 states that “the Defence Force will be organised in military combat capabilities and formations”.

¹⁴ Emphasis to equate armed forces with military forces in the Defence Review 2015.
It is clear that the Defence Review 2015 required the Defence Force to first structure, equip, and prepare for military tasks to conduct military operations in the spectrum of conflict. The principles go beyond pure military tasks and functions to also involve the military in the safeguarding of South Africa’s people\(^{15}\) and to provide support in national and regional crises and disasters. Structuring and equipping of the Defence Force are clarified in the principle that the military must be organised in military combat capabilities and formations. The principle then expands to a concept of multi-role trained force to conduct military operations on the spectrum of conflict. Such multi-role employments such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction should also have additional equipping and preparation implications unique to such operations.

The discussion of South Africa’s “Strategic Environment” in Chapter 2 of the Defence Review 2015 described the security issues for South Africa from the government’s broad approach of human security. It concludes the discussion with a section on “Defence Implications” (DoD, 2015:2-25–2-29). The section starts with a confirmation that

> from a defence perspective, the core tenet of national security means freedom from attack or threat of attack, the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity, the maintenance of sovereignty, independence and physical survival. It is within this context that South Africa’s constitutional requirement for a Defence Force capable of responding to an external threat, is not only justifiable but also remains an imperative (DoD, 2015:2-25).

This policy statement captures the policy intent to establish and maintain the SANDF as the functional state agency to employ force to create and maintain military security for South Africa.

The discussion further confirmed that

> the defence of South Africa against any threat to its sovereignty, territory, national interest or peoples will remain the primary defence priority. All other defence responsibilities will be executed and managed according to priorities dictated by circumstance at the time. Defence of South Africa’s territorial integrity and

\(^{15}\) This is constitutionally the primary responsibility of the SAPS.
sovereignty would most likely be a response to external armed threats from either state or non-state actors (DoD, 2015:2-26).

The Defence Review 2015 maintained as the primary role of the SANDF the creation and maintenance of military security. It commits to the employment of the Defence Force in a wider scope of military operations as required in time and in accordance with priorities.

The discussion further described the Defence Force’s role to protect South Africa’s vital national interests. The policy described the requirement to maintain capabilities to ensure the freedom of South Africa to trade, including the free use of land, air and sea routes, good order at sea and in the airspace, and the safety and security of trade and transport hubs. To ensure the security, domestically and externally, of fundamental resources, such as minerals, energy and water, including the safe and secure delivery, processing and distribution thereof. To ensure the safety and security of domestic and external strategic installations and lastly to ensure the safety and security of the South African people, both within the national territory and abroad (DoD, 2015:2-26).

This discussion demonstrates that for other political objectives such as economic activity and development, social cohesion and development, and other functions of the government to continue, the Defence Force must create and maintain military security as an enabling condition, or state, for these key activities of society to exist and to function. The discussion puts military security and the existence and need for the military into perspective with other political objectives for society.

The policy described the Defence Force’s role in the protection of South Africa’s borders and it linked this task to the primary function of “preservation of the state’s territorial integrity”. The need for coordinated land border control and management, air control and management, and maritime control and management indicates specific collaborative involvement of the SANDF in these functions for military security purposes. The policy acknowledges fundamental shortages in key capabilities, which can result in national insecurity. The military’s involvement in the role and functions of border protection is important and even advocates for expanded military capabilities to deal with territorial roles and functions of control. Substantial ambiguity in the roles, functions, and responsibilities of various state departments with regard to border control and management exists. It requires clear guidelines on who is responsible to structure, equip, train, and execute
these functions. In essence, the military’s participation in border protection should be guided by the need to create a military security condition through activities that create awareness of the prevailing and/or potential security conditions, as well as activities to neutralise existing or potential military threats. The military provides the level of force or threat of force for other role players to perform their roles and functions effectively.

The discussion then turns to an environment that rapidly evolved in the information age to a key consideration in all spheres of life, namely cybersecurity. The policy stipulated that “the National Cyber-Security Policy Framework states that Defence has overall responsibility for the coordination, accountability and implementation of cyber defence measures in South Africa as an integral part of its National Defence mandate” (DoD, 2015:2-27).

The function of cyber defence as a component of national security is arguably the most important emerging and growing security concern within the broadening of the security agenda. It requires collaboration and coordination over a broad spectrum of government departments and civilian actors. It is indeed a fundamental concern to society at large. The leadership role placed on the Defence Force to take responsibility for the role and function of cyber defence in South Africa and the relative importance to the sovereign existence of South Africa as a society in the future arguably warrants a more comprehensive specification of the role and functions of defence in this regard in the policy. It also requires resourcing considerations as it requires the expansion and establishment of new capabilities for military cybersecurity.

The discussion then turns to “Promoting Continental and Regional Peace and Stability” (DoD, 2015:2-27). The continental and regional leadership role of South Africa to promote peace and security manifested a range of deployments for the Defence Force in PSOs, post-conflict reconstruction, and security sector reform missions, as well as other training missions. These engagements in support of South Africa’s foreign relations objectives account for substantial Defence Force commitments and are poised to continue. The role and functions that the Defence Force play in these missions require a range of traditional military capabilities and other more specialised capabilities. It places substantial pressure on the defence capabilities to reorganise, train, and prepare for these missions that fundamentally differ from warfare in its mandates and rules. It can be argued that the priority of defence employment in the foreseeable future will be in this domain.
The utilisation of the Defence Force in PSOs provides significant overlaps with the primary role and functions of defence, although it places specific requirements for expeditionary capacities such as strategic air and sea transport capabilities. The different environments\textsuperscript{16} that military operations are to be conducted in also generate requirements for equipment, organisation, and tactics that are different from one another and the prevailing environmental demands that the South African territorial defence requires. Restructuring, equipping, and preparation for the defence of South Africa and these expeditionary missions would arguably be the more prudent approach to achieve commonality in equipment for all utilities. This, however, is not an easy task and it requires substantial re-equipping of the Defence Force to comply with effective expeditionary requirements that can effectively deploy in these various environments. The Defence Review 2015 provided a significant specification of the role and functions for promoting continental and regional peace and stability. The description of this role and function takes on multi-role utility in defence of South Africa into account. It is, however, also clear that within the constraints of the African theatre, the expeditionary capabilities will be light capabilities that arguably will not provide sufficient military capacity to act against modern conventional military aggression if such an external threat develops. For that purpose, the Defence Review 2015 maintained the concept of a core growth conventional military capacity to maintain the ability, with early warning, to expand the total defence establishment into a limited war force.

The discussion in the section on defence implications of the strategic environment lastly turns to “Protecting South Africa’s People” (DoD, 2015:2-28). The discussion of defence involvement centres on support to other governmental departments. The emphasis is on the defence utility in social stability, which ranges from operations in support of the SAPS for tasks during civil unrest, to developmental tasks such as bridge building and water provision, assistance in the containment of health threat outbreaks, etc. The discussion then continues to organised and violent crime, acts of terror, and disasters. It is evident that all these roles, tasks, and functions reside with other government departments and the involvement of the Defence Force in principle should not require specific structuring and budgeting. The utility of the Defence Force in these tasks requires additional

\textsuperscript{16} The African theatre where interventions, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement operations are anticipated ranges in various terrains, which include forests, mountainous areas, deserts, complex built-up areas, etc.
considerations through interdepartmental arrangements and/or national emergency funding. It might require additional equipping and specialised training and preparations to re-role the military for a specific period to perform the tasks allocated to the Defence Force in specific events.

The introductory and strategic background of the Defence Review 2015 provided a clear indication that South Africa expects of its Defence Force to create and maintain military security as an enabling condition for other political, economic, and social development activities to take place. Military security utilises the Defence Force to structure, equip, prepare, and be ready to apply force and/or the threat of force as its first commitment. The Defence Review 2015 expands on its ambition for the Defence Force to organise, prepare, and, if necessary, equip for roles and functions according to priority in time. In these three key priorities are highlighted defence support to foreign policy objectives, border protection and control, and cyber defence of South Africa. It also describes the Defence Force employment in support of other state departments to participate in the development of South Africa and protection against non-military threats.

3.2.2 Defence and national security

The Defence Review 2015 dedicated an entire chapter (Chapter 3) to describe the defence (military) scope in national security as the larger construct of security for South Africa. In this section, the description of national security as articulated in Chapter 3 of the Defence Review 2015 is analysed to determine to what extent the policy specified military security as a comparable and value-laden policy objective among various political policy considerations within the military scope of national security.

The discussion of South Africa’s national security starts with the confirmation of the Constitution’s declaration of human security as South Africa’s national security approach. The new national security approach broadens the security perspective by emphasising the wellbeing of the citizenry, extends by implication the political, economic, social and environmental security domains. The personal security of the individual extends to matters such as education, health, freedom of movement, protection of human rights, freedom from gender-based violations and individual, political, economic and democratic development. It further extends to the rights of political and cultural communities (DoD, 2015:3-1–3-2).
The policy, however, stipulated that

this understanding of security does not replace the security of the state with the security of the people. It sees these as mutually dependent. The state retains the obligation to facilitate, if not create, the necessary conditions and environment for the fulfilment of human security. Within this conceptualisation, Defence is but one of the elements of state power that promote and ensure national security. Although Defence contributes to human security, this should not distract the Defence Force from its mandated functions. The policy should rather express how the execution of mandated defence functions and other specific initiatives can in certain circumstances contribute to the development of South Africa's people (DoD, 2015:3-2).

It can thus be argued that the Constitution and government policy stipulate that the government as a whole is responsible to articulate, coordinate, and execute national security. It can also be argued that the Defence Review 2015 itself states that the Defence Force is primarily mandated by its constitutional mandate. The policy indicates that in the specification, the Defence Force should describe the execution of its mandate in a value-laden and collateral way to contribute to the development of South Africa’s people.

The policy description also articulated the provisions of the Constitution and legal frameworks for defence in South Africa’s national posture. The national posture as articulated demonstrates the strategic defensive posture that South Africa adopts toward its existence within the region and the world (DoD, 2015:3-3). It warrants the approach to maintain a defence establishment to defend South Africa’s sovereignty. From this, the core growth military capability approach can be argued and motivated as a responsible neighbour in the region. The military-strategic balance to be achieved is to ensure sufficient early warning and capacity to expand the military to be ready to defend against external and internal aggression to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa.

The discussion of the national posture further described South Africa’s peace and security reliance on the peace and stability of the African region: “... South Africa’s National Defence Policy must be cognisant of the role that the Defence Force must play in the promotion of regional security” (DoD, 2015:3-3). This description of South Africa’s participation in regional and continental peace and security points to military capabilities and stature that can contribute to initiatives that promote peace and security in Africa.
It requires the Defence Force to structure, equip, train, prepare, and execute military operations and OOTW as expeditionary capacity. It requires the Defence Force to consider a multi-role approach to capabilities in achieving military security in a broader context of regional peace and stability. The discussion indicates South Africa’s participation in regional and continental processes as requiring a variety of structural, human resource, financial, and capability commitments to the continental and regional initiatives for peace and security. It expresses the national intent to play a leadership role in Africa and the sub-region at large and a participating role in African and sub-regional levels at least. This is done from the premise that “South Africa has significant diplomatic, economic and military capabilities that position it to make a unique contribution to the resolution of many pressing African issues” (DoD, 2015:3-3).

The description of national security turned to national interests as an important consideration for national security. The discussion started by describing what national interests are. It confirms that it is a collective concept that evolves constantly. It cannot be stated as static statutes. However, it is “essential and indispensable to the sovereignty of a state. It must be noted that national interests may, in some instances, be counter-posed to the interests of other states, thus informing the development of foreign policy” (DoD, 2015:3-3). The discussion concluded on national interest as follows:

Those cardinal interests that, if threatened or removed, would compromise the sovereignty, independence, survival, continuance or liberty of the Republic and therefore are considered vital for the functioning of the state, the security and well-being of the people and the preservation of the South African way of life (DoD, 2015:3-4).

In view of the discussed link between South Africa’s national interests and the required defence capabilities (DoD, 2015:2-26), these policy provisions place defence capabilities (the military) at the centre stage of South Africa’s national security. It can be argued that military security is implicit in the defence and protection of South Africa’s national interests.

The policy made an important statement regarding the military security of South Africa, namely: “However, as a responsible government amongst the community of nations, South Africa reserves the right of self-defence against aggressors and will equally protect the state and its people from threats to its sovereignty, independence and interests” (DoD, 2015:3-4). The Constitution equates the maintenance of a credible military to a responsible
government among nations. This statement recognises that the condition of military security is time and context dependent. Friendly relations with neighbouring nations and other nations in the world can change at any time. South Africa’s national security approach remains one of a layered approach with the application of force or the threat of force retained as a last resort. Nonetheless, “the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, against external aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political and other interventions have been exhausted” (DoD, 2015:3-5).

The policy concluded with an important stipulation that

the adoption of an effects-based strategy approach allows for a threat-independent determination of capabilities required, based on government’s intended level of defence capability. This approach elucidates a clear and unambiguous understanding of South Africa’s defence mission, and identifies four strategic defence goals and thirteen strategic defence tasks (DoD, 2015:3-13).

It is observed that the Defence Review 2015 used a threat perception approach in the description of South Africa’s strategic environment and South Africa’s defence (military) scope in South Africa’s national security as the specification of the defence (military) ambition for South Africa. It, however, adopted an effects-based approach for defence planning to steer away from a threat-based capability determination. This approach is consistent with the scholarly writings of Chuter (2011) and Szpyra (2014), as discussed in Chapter 2.

3.2.3 Guiding the defence role and functions

Significant critique is levelled against the Defence Review 2015 for its voluminous content that arguably substantially stretches beyond the scope of government policy. The study already demonstrated that the policy in its first three chapters specified South Africa’s military security as a comparable and value-laden political objective. The aim of the study warrants a section on how the policy described its guidance for the implementation of the policy from the acknowledged position that the defence capabilities are in decline, with a political acknowledgement that the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities is an unwanted political and social reality that must be arrested and turned around. This section focuses on the defence strategic trajectory as a process over time to restore the SANDF as a credible military force capable to act as mandated.
The strategic trajectory for the Defence Force as articulated in Chapter 9 of the Defence Review 2015 provides for measurable military establishments to be able to deal with the defence ambition as articulated in Chapter 3 of the Defence Review 2015. The study accepted the premise that the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities is an acknowledged fact. The study does not endeavour to re-confirm the facts. Sufficient institutional insight exists to testify to the fact. An analysis of this section of the policy provides the opportunity to provide a more detailed description of the reality.

The description of the strategic trajectory starts with an analysis of defence spending and the impact of declining defence spending on defence capabilities. The policy discussed the declining defence spending as follows:

Between 1995 and the approval of the Defence Review in 1998, the defence budget was cut by 11.1% (R1,4 bn) in nominal terms, with the concurrent mismatch arising between policy intent and execution. The defence budget further decreased from 1.54% of GDP in 2004/05 and has levelled out in recent years at around 1.2% to 1.1% of GDP. The Defence Review 1998’s force design was consequently neither affordable nor sustainable, especially following the defence budget cuts in the late 1990s. South Africa at present spends less than 1.2% of GDP on defence, translating to less than five cents out of every rand of total budget being expended on defence. The Defence Force is effectively nearly 24% underfunded (in respect of its current size and shape) (DoD, 2015:9-2).

The defence policy argued that the source of the defence decline is situated in a mismatch between defence ambition and defence funding. The Defence Review Committee made it clear that South Africa’s government has one of two choices:

There must be either a greater budget allocation or a significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the current budget allocation. In short, there are two strategic options available for government: budget must be determined by policy or budget must drive policy. The reality will most probably lie somewhere in between. Nonetheless, the fundamental principle remains that the force design must match the level of commitment, without compromising the necessary ratio between personnel, operations and capital, and the balance between Regulars and Reserves (DoD, 2015:vii).
In comparison with the discussed reality in the economic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, the Defence Budget Vote in 2019 and the Budget Speech for 2020 continued with the reduction trend for defence spending (National Treasury, 2019; National Treasury, 2020:3,25).

The description of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities continues with the discussion of the increased domestic and international commitments for defence that are far more than the policy predictions of the late 1990s on which the defence spending trajectory was based when reductions of defence spending were effected. At the time of drafting and approval of the Defence Review 2015, the defence allocation equated to 1.1% of the GDP. With the level of defence spending, the maintenance of core growth prime mission equipment was already unsustainable. The standards of proficiency were already on the decline due to insufficient funding for training and force preparation. Combat readiness was already questionable and proven to be lacking through UN mission inspections due to poor serviceability of deployed equipment and aged ammunition stocks.

Even with the commissioning of the strategic defence capabilities, the medium- and long-term provisioning for adequate funding of these capabilities’ lifecycle cost and increased operational costs were not provided for. Significant risk was reported in all the major defence programmes, and inflation pressures, as well as increased operational employment, increased the rate of decline already experienced through defence spending reductions. The defence policy provided a significant description of the reasons for and implications of the declining defence capabilities and argued for a gradual increase in defence spending to restore the SANDF to a credible regional military capacity that can provide the specified military security for South Africa, to contribute to regional peace and stability as support to South Africa’s foreign policy objectives, and to support other government departments in maintaining safety and security in South Africa, as well as contributing to the developmental agenda.

The discussion continued with the much-debated matter of increasing personnel cost for the DoD to a universally accepted measure of cost distribution. The discussion started with the statement that

[i]n FY [Financial Year] 2010/11 the compensation of employees rose to 55% of the allocation, despite these employees being, at entry-level, the lowest paid of South Africa’s public servants. This leaves little for training and exercises or operations such as peacekeeping or the maintenance of public order. The 1998 Defence
Review pegged the defence personnel budget at 40% of the total budget with 30% to be spent on operating costs and the remaining 30% to be spent on capital costs (40:30:30 ratio) (DoD, 2015:9-6–9-8).

This statement follows a deliberate action from the DoD to correct the situation of unequal remuneration of DoD staff versus the rest of the public sector and specifically the security cluster.

The policy further discussed why the uneven distribution towards increased personnel costs is experienced. It attributed the increased personnel costs to six main causes:

1) “The increased level of tasks, such as regional peacekeeping and border safeguarding commitments, has brought about a higher personnel requirement.

2) The general phenomenon of growing labour costs in South Africa. Government’s employment imperative required all vacant posts in the public service to be filled, creating upward pressure on the defence personnel budget.

3) Government’s employment imperative required all vacant posts in the public service to be filled, creating upward pressure on the defence personnel budget.

4) Defence retains people who no longer fit their post profile or who cannot be economically employed.

5) Recent service improvements for defence personnel were introduced without commensurate budget augmentation from the National Treasury.

6) The defence budget was augmented each year accordingly for the Strategic Defence Packages. The tapering off of these additional capital funds means that in recent years the ratio of personnel, operating and capital has distorted the defence budget” (DoD, 2015:9-7).

The six main causes articulated in the policy mainly point to underfunding of the defence function at large. A point is made that the Defence Force did not exit members who no longer fit their post profile or who could not be economically employed. This argument is often explored by scholars like Esterhuyse and Louw (Esterhuyse, 2017) (Esterhuyse & Louw, 2018) who argue for a reduction in personnel to free funding for operational costs and renewal. The arguments are refuted by the personnel increases argued for by the policy. Medically unfit and aged personnel numbers indeed play a big part in the stresses experienced to deploy forces for operational commitments. It will serve the debate to recognise that the DoD faced legal action when it classified HIV-positive personnel as unfit
for military service (High Court North Gauteng Provincial Division [Pretoria], 2014). The Defence Force constantly faces the prevailing socioeconomic realities that South Africa experiences as a nation, which makes strategic decisions a matter of military-strategic significance. Decisions such as personnel reductions or retrenchments face socioeconomic opposition and have political ramifications. The overall policy argument for increased defence spending is primarily based on the requirement to achieve a political defence ambition.

The Defence Review 2015 summarised the decline of the South African defence capabilities as follows:

The Defence Force is in a critical state of decline, characterised by: force imbalance between capabilities; block obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems; a disproportionate tooth-to-tail ratio; the inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling (DoD, 2015:vii).

The analysis of the Defence Review 2015 as a specification of South Africa’s military security ambition demonstrates that the policy is a detailed specification of defence ambition with a significant overstretch of only military security as a policy objective. The specification of South Africa’s military security and defence ambition is also clearly argued in terms of the required defence spending commitment that it entails. The decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities is further described with evidence and arguments as to the causes. The continued reduction of defence spending after approval of the policy by parliament and cabinet can only be understood as a deliberate political and/or bureaucratic process of continued demilitarisation of South Africa.

3.3 THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS AS A KEY DRIVER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE’S (SANDF) EXISTENCE

This section of the analysis uses an enduring theme for the purpose of militaries across the world, namely the use of and/or threat of force for political ends. The political ambition for defence as articulated in the Constitution of 1996, the White Paper on Defence of 1996, the Defence Review 1998, and the Defence Review 2015 demonstrates the political
purpose of applying military means in regional peace and security contributions, the securing of South Africa’s militarily, support of the SAPS in maintaining safety and security of the South African populace, and to contribute to the development agenda of the government. All these political ambitions are expected against a business-like efficiency that will manifest as the most value for money practically manifested in a consistent process of budget reductions. This study argues that South African defence is not without rational political guidance. It is, however, completely under-resourced for what is expected. This poses the question: Is the South African military’s role and functions still considered from the enduring principle that it exists to maintain the state’s monopoly on organised violence; more specifically, the state’s ability to use force and/or the threat of force to achieve the policy objective of security? The discussion further analyses South Africa’s Constitution, defence law, and various policy documents with the theme of the use of force and/or threat of force to achieve policy objectives by the Defence Force.

3.3.1 Defence in the Constitution

South Africa’s Constitution provides governing principles for national security in Chapter 11, section 198. The national security approach is defined in the first principle that “[n]ational security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life” (South African Government, 1996c:1331(20)). This constitutes the concept of human security as South Africa’s national security approach. The Constitution further stipulates in section 199:

Establishment, structuring and conduct of security services - (1) The security services of the Republic consist of a single Defence Force, a single police service and any intelligence services established in term of the Constitution. (2) The Defence Force is the only lawful military force in the Republic (South African Government, 1996c:133(20)).

The principle’s existence as stipulated in the Constitution demonstrates that South African society utilises the SANDF as the only military in South Africa. It demonstrates the resolve to establish and maintain the monopoly on force (organised violence) within the sovereign space of South Africa.

The Constitution articulates matters of defence specifically in section 200 as follows:
200. Defence Force - (1) The Defence Force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force. (2) The primary object of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force (South African Government, 1996c:1331(21)).

The stipulation of the Constitution provides a clear purpose for the SANDF to be a military force that can defend and protect through force and/or the threat of force, regulated by the Constitution, and principles and laws for the use of force (organised violence). The key observation is that the constitutional purpose of the military is to maintain the monopoly on force and to direct the use and/or threat of force in three distinct fields of the policy ends, namely: “to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people”, “in cooperation with the police service ... for internal safety and security”, and “in fulfilment of an international obligation” (South African Government, 1996c:1331(21)). It can thus be argued that the principles for maintaining the monopoly on force by the state and the use of force and/or the threat of force for political ends were maintained within a national security approach to human security. The South African military would be created, maintained, and used to contribute to the national security of South Africa by providing military security.

3.3.2 Defence in South African law

The Defence Act of 2002 was promulgated on 20 February 2003 as a replacement for the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1954 as amended. The Act is aligned with and implements the stipulations on defence in the Constitution of 1996. As per constitutional stipulation, the functions of government require legal promulgation of each function of government to regulate the execution of functions. It is for this reason that defence law is considered as a legal provision for the execution of the defence function.

The Defence Act of 2002 articulates all regulatory provisions for the execution of defence and defence-related functions as stipulated in the Constitution. The Act starts its description after a section on definitions with the promulgation of principles for defence in South Africa. The Act articulates the principles for defence and emphasises that the formulation and execution of defence policy are subject to the authority of the parliament and the national executive, and that the primary object of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its people, and its territorial integrity. The Defence Force is to
perform its functions in accordance with the Constitution and international law regulating the use of force (South African Government, 2002:12-13). Analysis of the enacted principles reveals that the Defence Act upholds the constitutional provisions for defence. The principles maintain the primary object of the Defence Force to defend and protect the Republic, its people, and its territorial integrity and to perform defence functions in accordance with the Constitution and international law regulating the use of force. The Defence Act ascribes the functions of defence to the use of force.

The Defence Act’s description of the employment and use of the Defence Force expands the use of the Defence Force beyond its primary purpose. The Act confirms that the employment and use are in addition to the employment of the Defence Force for its primary objective. The employment of the Defence Force is categorised as follows:

[I]n order to (a) preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations; (b) ensure the provision of essential services; (c) support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic upliftment; and (d) effect national border control (South African Government, 2002:22).

Any employment of the Defence Force in the provisions as articulated in Chapter 3 of the Act requires parliament to be informed following the stipulations of the Act. The provisions of the Act for the employment of the Defence Force in addition to its primary object of defence arguably place these tasks as subordinate to the responsibility of the Defence Force to be established and maintained as a credible military force, capable of applying force (organised violence) as the only legal military force in South Africa.

The Act also stipulates structural provisions for the Defence Force (South African Government, 2002:18). The structural provisions by the Act provide for the establishment of the Defence Force to perform its primary objective and civil management functions in the form of the Secretariat for Defence. The Act provides for temporarily grouping existing Defence Force elements for the employment of additional tasks. The study argues that the management of the Defence Force will be based on its primary objective. Tasks in support of other state departments should be managed as additional tasks to the primary objective and as such should be resourced specifically from national reserves or the departments that the tasks are performed in support of. Indeed, such an argument would challenge the government’s bureaucratic planning processes. After all, government departments plan and budget within a medium-term budget and planning framework and all government
departments are required to perform their functions according to these plans. Departments would therefore not have the funding for defence commitments in support of such tasks due to their lack of capacity. The argument remains true. Adjustments of plans and reprioritisation of resources to fund the utilisation of defence capacity should not be the problem of the DoD, who is not allowed to plan and budget for its secondary roles and functions.

The analysis of the Defence Act with the theme of force and/or threat of force demonstrates that the enacted law considers the main object of the Defence Force as the only legal custodian of military force. It is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution on the defence function of the government. It also allows for the employment of the Defence Force in support of other government functions as a capacity provider to deal with national emergencies and the fruitful use of defence capacity in developmental tasks. The Defence Act does not express itself specifically on managerial matters such as budgets and resourcing of various tasks, except for the broad provisioning for structuring at a very conceptual level.

### 3.3.3 The use of force and/or threat of force and defence policy

The White Paper on Defence of 1996 took much of its lead from the Interim Constitution of 1993 to formulate defence policy as a priority by the new democratic government, which was faced with the task to consolidate its control over the military, which was formed as a result of democratic regime change. This government priority was a key success factor to prevent the new democratic society from falling into internal conflict. The White Paper on Defence of 1996 was subsequently developed simultaneously with the new Constitution and both documents were adopted and promulgated in 1996. Since the adoption of the White Paper on Defence of 1996, South Africa also had the Defence Review 1998 and the Defence Review 2015 to update defence policy to cater for changing strategic environments and to deal with prevailing defence complexities. This section of the study aims to analyse the defence policies under the theme of the use of force and/or the threat of force as an enduring principle for the creation and maintenance of a credible military.

The White Paper on Defence 1996 had to steer the new Defence Force, which was in a difficult process of transformation and integration. As previously alluded to, the policy process had to take its lead from the negotiated Interim Constitution of 1993 as the function of defence and establishing civil control over the military were priorities for the
new democratic government in 1994. The White Paper on Defence of 1996, like the Constitution of 1996, articulated the new approach to national security as a broader approach that was “no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people” (South African Government, 1996a:6).

The White Paper on Defence of 1996 clearly articulated the need to rationalise the Defence Force and to reduce defence spending to channel government spending to developmental priorities articulated in the RDP of the new government. The policy specified national security at two levels. Nationally, the security objective included

the consolidation of democracy, the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability. Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. At the international level, the objectives of security policy include the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa (South African Government, 1996a:6).

The White Paper on Defence of 1996 provides a clear demarcation of national security objectives as its specification for national security. It also articulates the priorities for the government as it “recognises that the greatest threats to the South African people are socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well as the high level of crime and violence” (South African Government, 1996a:6).

The policy stipulated that the new approach to security did not imply an expansion of the role for the armed forces. It further stated that in rationalising the SANDF and containing military spending, the country’s core defence capability in the short and long term should not be undermined. This statement is significant when the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities is contemplated in 2020. The White Paper on Defence of 1996 clearly distinguished between the Defence Force’s primary and secondary roles and articulated the priority as follows: “[T]he SANDF may be employed in a range of secondary roles as prescribed by law, but its primary and essential function is service in defence of
South Africa, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity" (South African Government, 1996a:6).

The White Paper on Defence of 1996 discussed important aspects that have a bearing on arguments in debates about declining South Africa’s defence capabilities and the unaffordability of defence policy that became evident in 1998. The first aspect that the study draws attention to is the provisions for military professionalism. The policy discussed what professionalism requires of members of the SANDF (South African Government, 1996a:13). From this discussion, the study observes and recognises the principle of the maintenance of skills and resources to enable the Defence Force to perform primary and secondary functions efficiently and effectively. A second important observation is the requirement of strict adherence to the Constitution, national legislation, and international law and treaties.

Another important provision in the White Paper on Defence of 1996 to draw attention to is the responsibility of the government towards the Defence Force. It explained the constitutional necessity to establish civilian control over the military because armed forces have substantial capacity for organised violence. It stipulates that “civil-military relations will only be stable if the requisite control is accompanied by the fulfilment of certain responsibilities towards the SANDF and its members” (South African Government, 1996a:14-15). The study draws attention to the following articulated responsibilities of the government toward the Defence Force:

- “The government will take account of the professional views of senior officers in the process of policy formulation and decision-making on defence. This input is assured through the Defence Staff Council, the Council on Defence and the structure of the DoD.”
- “The government will request from Parliament sufficient funds to enable the SANDF to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently. The government will seek to ensure that military personnel are adequately remunerated. It will also ensure that demobilised and rationalised soldiers, as well as veterans from the former statutory and non-statutory forces, are properly integrated into civilian society.”
- “The government will not endanger the lives of military personnel through improper deployment or the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons and equipment” (South African Government, 1996a:15-16).
This study drew important insights from the provisions of the White Paper on Defence of 1996 concerning an observation that is made that the persistent reduction in defence spending indicates the deliberate bureaucratic demilitarisation of South Africa. The constitutional, defence law, and initial policy provisions for defence in South Africa clearly articulated a specific purpose for the military in South Africa. The policy placed particular emphasis on the professional quality of the Defence Force, specifically on compliance with the Constitution and the law. The provisions for government responsibility in the social contract with the Defence Force illuminated reasonable expectations by the Defence Force to receive specific support from the government to enable the Defence Force to comply with the constitutional, legal, and policy expectations of defence. The responsibility of the government to “request from Parliament sufficient funds to enable the SANDF to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently” (South African Government, 1996a:16) and “government will not endanger the lives of military personnel through improper deployment or the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons and equipment” (South African Government, 1996a:16) reflects specifically on the reality of the declining South African defence capabilities to the point that it requires steps to arrest the decline.

Further analysis of the White Paper on Defence of 1996 shows a correlation with the Constitution of 1996 and the Defence Act of 2002 on the primary function of the SANDF to defend South Africa against external aggression (South African Government, 1996a:21). The policy expands this by stipulating that the size, design, structure, and budget of the SANDF will be determined primarily by its primary function but that provision will be made for special requirements of internal deployments and international PSOs. By deduction, the study argues that the function of force or/and the threat of force will be the primary design consideration. Force will, however, be regulated to comply with the constitutional requirements of human rights and international law provisions for the regulation of armed conflict. The White Paper on Defence of 1996 articulated clear intent by the government to maintain a credible and professional military force. The White Paper on Defence of 1996 articulated that “government’s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn to military means when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed” (South African Government, 1996a:22).
The White Paper on Defence of 1996 introduced an important concept of core defence capacity to the main function of the Defence Force to limit defence spending. The policy described that
deterrence requires the existence of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is, therefore, necessary to maintain a core defence capability (South African Government, 1996a:22).

The study recognises that the policy provided for reduced core military capability intended to maintain credible military force with an expectation that this capacity would be ready to act with force in a variety of contingencies. The study acknowledges that the regime at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1996 and the White Paper on Defence of 1996 made decisions on defence and provided proportionate defence spending and defence operational expectations. The Defence Force was withdrawn from internal operations and, in line with the policy provisions, from border protection operations as well.

The Defence Review 1998 followed only two years after the White Paper on Defence of 1996. The two processes can be viewed as one of reinforcing by providing a more detailed account of the previously articulated policy principles. The Defence Review 1998 is also analysed within the theme of force and/or the threat of force for political ends.

From the onset, an overview of the Defence Review 1998 is an attempt to expand on the White Paper of Defence of 1996 with more details on aspects articulated in the principle, yet not described to allow implementation (DoD, 1998:5-6). The study found that the stipulations in the Defence Review 1998 are aligned with the Constitution of 1996, the Defence Act of 2002, and the White Paper on Defence of 1996 as a policy that accepts the Defence Force as the agent for force and/or the threat of such force for the establishment and the maintenance of military security both within and external to South Africa. The policy described, in agreement with the mentioned government literature, the primary role and functions of the Defence Force to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Africa, its people, and its national interests (DoD, 1998:13).
The Defence Review 1998 articulated a much-criticised approach to defence. It stipulated that

[t]he government has adopted a narrow, conventional approach to defence. The primary function of the SANDF is defence against external aggression. The other functions are secondary. The Defence Review, therefore, sets a policy vision for the size, structure, weaponry, equipment and funding requirements of the SANDF, mainly based on its primary function. Where the self-defence capabilities are insufficient for certain secondary functions – such as peace support operations and internal deployment in co-operation with the SAPS – additional capabilities may be required (DoD, 1998:10).

The detailed description of the Defence Review 1998 indeed followed a narrow approach in line with the approach to defence as it repeatedly stated that the force design, structure, equipping, and budget of the Defence Force are determined by its primary functions. Secondary functions will be performed with Defence Force capabilities with capacity that can be reorganised, multi-trained, and, if needed, be supplemented by structures and capabilities specifically required to augment the existing defence capacity. The study found that the Defence Review 1998 made fundamental errors in determining the real impact of cost. It, for instance, only made provision for fighting capacities as it articulated required personnel numbers. This is fundamentally flawed as support functions traditionally are required in a tooth-to-tail ratio of 1 to 2. In that, the Defence Review 1998 ignored this, which probably resulted in inaccurate defence policy advice as far as the real costs of the presented options were concerned.

The Defence Review 1998 was formulated on the constitutionally stipulated expanded approach to national security to reduce defence spending in favour of social development as at the time captured in the government’s RDP (DoD, 1998:12). Given the policy prioritisations away from defence to development as a security priority, the Defence Review 1998 stipulated that

the White Paper outlines the conflicting pressures on the national budget and the level of defence preparedness. It concludes that the maintenance of a core defence capability is a prudent and viable solution. The maintenance of this capability is, therefore, a priority task for the SANDF (DoD, 1998:19).
The reality turned out to be very different as can be realised from the declining South African defence capabilities. Instead, political priorities such as support to South Africa’s foreign ambitions in regional peace and security structures and employment of the SANDF in PSOs and peace interventions fitted clearly in the constitutional and legal provisions of employment. These commitments did not translate to specific budgetary provisions. In fact, the defence budget had to constantly pay for preparations and functional equipping of the SANDF to perform tasks in a very different environment than it was equipped for. Preparations also redirected defence funding to these secondary tasks. A consistent reduction trajectory of defence spending coupled with inflation impacts resulted in fewer resources spent on the core growth capacity of the SANDF. This situation was aggravated by the socioeconomic realities of South African society. An observation made at this point is that defence policy over the period 1994 to 1998 was characterised by a specific focus on the Defence Force to maintain the monopoly on force through a careful balance between military security and the broadened security agenda. The policy focus, however, was undermined by an employment focus on secondary tasks in support of government foreign policy and internal security without honouring the policy provisions that such tasks would be considered in addition to the primary function provisions. This set the core growth capabilities on a declining trajectory. A deliberate process of defence spending reduction, unfavourable socioeconomic and conditions in society, and a lack of political will to correct this situation resulted in the social reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. This is not only true for legacy SADF conventional systems, it is also true for the new strategic defence capabilities acquired after the adoption and approval of the Defence Review 1998.

A key feature of the recommended option for the new SANDF force design in the Defence Review 1998 is the approach of a small regular force component with a larger reserve force component (DoD, 1998:67). The envisaged personnel approach did not manifest as articulated in the policy. In fact, the reserve component of the SANDF has decreased since 1998. Several human resource policies were adopted since 1998 but the political and SANDF leadership were reluctant to implement a reduction of personnel provisions in the regular force. The socioeconomic realities of society, negative responses to the demobilisation after the completion of the integration process, and negative political implications resulted in a failure to implement a feeder system for the reserve forces. A personnel cost approach that only makes use of personnel on a part-time basis is arguably more cost effective, especially when the functions they must fulfil are not required on a
permanent basis. The existing and previous human resource contract approaches indeed did not successfully deal with Defence Force personnel requirements. Prevailing socioeconomic realities in South Africa will make harmful human resource practices a difficult strategic decision.

This study does not agree with scholarly arguments that the reduction of SANDF personnel to more economically sustainable levels is a key contributor to South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The study argues that SMART\textsuperscript{17} human resource policy approaches can contribute to a more efficient human resource budget that can enable the SANDF to achieve the required personnel numbers when they are needed. A completely new contractual system should be developed that will ensure that the Defence Force is served with the right human capital in the right posts at the right time for only the necessary period. An intelligent human resource policy can achieve financial efficiency, operational effectiveness, and contribute to the social upliftment of South African society. The study will elaborate on this observation in the concluding chapter to deal with an important component of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. This study supports the argument for more part-time employment of defence personnel.

The Defence Review 1998 consolidated the provisions for the South African defence function. It conceptualised the narrow focus on conventional defence in performing the constitutional mandate of the SANDF with an attempt to balance the role of defence in the broader South African approach to national security. This study observes that the enduring strategic role of the military to apply force and/or the threat of force to achieve the political aim of military deterrence by maintaining a core conventional defence capacity was consistently articulated in the Constitution of 1996, the Defence Act of 2002, the White Paper on Defence of 1996, and the Defence Review 1998. The timeframe proved to be a challenging period to achieve optimal military-strategic effectiveness. A key factor impacting on the declining South African defence capabilities since 1998 remains insufficient defence funding for increasing defence ambition. The analysis of the Defence Review 1998 highlighted some fault lines in defence advice where incomplete defence requirements led to incorrect funding considerations of the policy options. The personnel

\textsuperscript{17} SMART is an acronym for the five elements of specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-based goals.
cost debate will continue to complicate defence policy considerations and this dimension of defence capability considerations warrant a comprehensive research study on its own.

The Defence Review 2015 was analysed in depth in the section that dealt with the theme the need to specify security, and specifically military security. As the latest defence policy promulgated by the South African cabinet and parliament, and the fact that significant time has passed since the last formal government policy on defence, also warrants an analysis of this defence policy under the theme the use of force and/or the threat of force to achieve political ends. The next section analyses the Defence Review 2015 in terms of the extent to which the Defence Review 2015 maintained the enduring military-strategic concept of the use of force and/or the threat of force to achieve political ends.

The Defence Review 2015 maintained the constitutional mandate of “the defence of South Africa against any threat to its sovereignty, territory, national interest or peoples will remain the primary defence priority” (DoD, 2015:2-26). The policy steered away from the distinction between primary and secondary functions. It articulated that “other defence responsibilities will be executed and managed according to priorities dictated by circumstance at the time” (DoD, 2015:2-26). The policy described South Africa’s territorial and sovereignty defence as a response to external armed threats from states or defence against threats to constitutional order and/or insurgency. The impact of such threats is arguably very high for national security but its probability in the medium to long term (five to ten years) is relatively low. It can be argued that defence against aggression indeed is a long and extended long-term priority due to its high impact on national security. The relative peace and stability of the Southern African sub-region and South Africa’s geo-strategic position in the world make maintaining expensive military capabilities designed for warfare a difficult strategic choice. This is especially true because of existing military requirements where the use and/or threat of force is a collaborative policy choice in support of national security and regional stability objectives. The existing requirements for military support to other regional and national security and stability objectives arguably contribute to longer-term outcomes of regional and national development. However, military capabilities suitable for the existing OOTW are arguably inadequate to achieve military success against a modern warfighting force if such a force is equipped and trained with modern technologically advanced military capabilities. The priority approach is nonetheless a significant change from the primary and secondary functional approaches to defence in the previous defence policies.
The Defence Review 2015 described the various functions of the SANDF as variations in priority over time. The functions are articulated as follows:

For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity; b. For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states; c. For service in the preservation of life, health or property; d. For service in the provision or maintenance of essential services; e. For service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and f. For service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment (DoD, 2015:3-5).

It can thus be argued that the Defence Review 2015 contended that these functions will have different priorities over time as the strategic context changes. The priority approach indicates a deliberate consideration of military capacity employment where force and/or the threat of force is not necessarily a consideration. Nonetheless, the broader approach still includes a substantial requirement for military capabilities that can maintain the state’s monopoly on military force within the sovereign territory of South Africa and the employment of force and/or the threat of force in support of regional stability. The policy maintained a core growth approach to achieve military deterrence and capacity to establish limited war capacity with sufficient early warning.

An analysis of the Constitution of 1996, the Defence Act of 2002, and the defence policies approved in the White Paper on Defence of 1996, the Defence Review 1998, and the Defence Review 2015 shows that the use of force and/or the threat of force is consistently maintained as a military-strategic principle for maintaining a credible military. It is clear from the analysis that the use of force and/or the threat of force is consistently considered as the main purpose for maintaining a military in South Africa and that this is important for internal and external security considerations. The analysis also illuminates a social contract where the military will be subordinate to civil control and oversight and accept reduced priority in the scope of national security, with a commensurate reduction in defence spending. The political leadership from 1994 to 1998 also committed to policy and implementation of the government’s responsibility to adequately resource defence ambitions and the commitment not to commit the Defence Force to military tasks it was not
adequately equipped for. The mutual social contract between the military and the government, however, gradually deteriorated where defence spending was consistently reduced and employment of the military and the use of military resources were increased in support of other government policy objectives. The commitment as articulated in the defence policies to make special provisions for the commitment of the Defence Force to internal security and development tasks and foreign relation objectives such as PSOs was consistently not honoured under a bureaucratic refusal to fund these commitments by the Treasury. The next section focuses on the thematic analysis of the strategic context data of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

3.4 WHAT DOES SOUTH AFRICA’S DECLINING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES MEAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S MILITARY SECURITY?

The discussion of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in Chapter 2 highlighted themes for analysis to gain a deeper understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. These themes are as follows:

- The deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa;
- A strategically misaligned defence mandate with strategic security requirements;
- Socioeconomic realities in South Africa and military security;
- Defence spending and military technology as drivers of military security;
- South Africa’s military-strategic context (military-strategic culture) and South Africa’s military security;
- Capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and vital interests; and
- The disconnect between the military-strategic defence paradigm and non-offensive political perspectives.

This section of the study conducts thematic analysis of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and argues what it means for South Africa’s military security.
3.4.1 The deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa

The first round of discussions on the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities highlighted a deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa. This observed trend of demilitarisation continued at a bureaucratic level where military spending was deliberately reduced consistently yet progressively, while military employment in a broader range of tasks increased. Opposition to a credible military force in South Africa from the onset was ramped up through academic pressure groups to keep justifying the demilitarisation of South Africa. The opportunity that existed due to the distrust that existed between the SANDF leadership (mostly former SADF) and the new political leadership allowed for defence policy advice from trusted academics that resulted in the defence approach of NOD. The evidence indicates that the process of demilitarisation still continues.

The analysis of South African government literature indicates an initial collaborative political commitment to a broader security agenda and a decreased military agenda with a commensurate reduction in defence commitments. The first decade of democratic South Africa established a civil-military arrangement that emphasised a professional military, under civil control, that would willingly accept decreased military emphasis. The South African military at the time posed a significant risk for the political progress represented by the new democracy. The military leadership between 1994 and 1998 experienced a substantial reduction in defence spending. The integration process of the various military entities and the transformation of the SANDF to a representative government institution with rationalisation of the inflated personnel numbers to a core growth capacity must be acknowledged as military-strategic success.

The second decade of South Africa’s democratic defence development was characterised by an expansion of South Africa’s involvement in regional stability and security through multilateral and bilateral initiatives. This resulted in a steep increase in military deployments in PSOs, as well as the return of the SANDF to border protection operations. The increased employment of the SANDF in PSOs and border protection was not honoured by a commensurate increased defence budget as articulated in the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review 1998. This break from the policy provisions of special resource provisions of secondary tasks resulted in a shift of defence resources
to “secondary tasks”. This can be argued as the start of the defence ambition and defence resource gap.

The shift of defence focus to PSOs and border protection also happened in a timeframe where, in line with the narrow conventional approach of maintaining a core conventional military capacity, South Africa embarked on the acquisition of Special Defence Packages (SDP) to renew South Africa’s tactical offensive air and naval capabilities. The SDP soon exploded in controversy with claims of corruption reinforcing a persisting argument for reduced military spending. Insufficient provision in defence spending was made for the new SDP capabilities’ 30-year lifecycle where original procurement cost only accounted for 20% of the lifecycle cost. This resulted in a decline in operational availability of the new air and naval capabilities due to insufficient funding to maintain and operate these new capabilities.

The focus on the SDP also detracted from other defence capability requirements such as new expeditionary capacity for projecting and sustaining PSOs in Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC. The replacement and upgrading of South Africa’s transport aircraft fleet and a naval support vessel are only some examples where significant defence budget expenditure was channelled to chartered air services and commercial shipping to deploy and sustain PSO deployments. The army was not considered in the SDP. Most of the army capabilities in 1994 were modern, and given the reduced external conventional threat and a focus on core growth capacity, the initial understanding was that army capability renewal could be considered in the long term (ten years) to the extended long term (30 years). This approach to army capability renewal as articulated in the Defence Review 1998 did not consider the geographical impact that PSO deployment would demand of army capabilities. The conventional capabilities designed and developed for the Southern African theatre of operations were ill-suited for the desert, jungle, and complex urban theatres that PSOs entail. The existing army capabilities were also designed for strategic, operational, and tactical land movement. Many of the capabilities could not be deployed cost effectively as systems for the new PSO theatres of operations. No additional funding was available to equip the SA Army with capabilities with expeditionary characteristics suitable for desert, mountainous, jungle, and complex urban environments.

What does the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa mean for South Africa’s military security? The broad South African defence ambition can be described as a commitment to regional stability and security that requires a
balanced expeditionary joint interagency military capacity commensurate with South Africa’s ambition to act as a regional power and leader. It requires participation in multilateral initiatives in the SADC and the AU, commitment to the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (SADC, 2003) and the AU Standby Force Arrangement (AU, 2015), and a credible demonstrated commitment to regional stability with deployed PSO capabilities. A continuation of the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa will result in the decline of South Africa’s strategic capacity to be a leader in Africa’s developmental objective to silence the guns and create a stable and secure region. Diplomatic, economic, and socioeconomic development initiatives will be at risk of failure due to the decline of credible capacity to ensure stability and security through military capabilities. The SANDF significantly developed these capabilities over the last 26 years. It is doubtful whether the expected increase in commitments from the UN, AU, and SADC could be honoured in the next ten years. Strategically, Africa and the SADC region remain unstable with lasting radical insurgency, political instability, and lag in global economic growth and socioeconomic development. South Africa’s expeditionary military requirements necessitate a change in the political and bureaucratic demilitarisation of South Africa. If this approach is not reviewed, the result will be South Africa’s regional political insignificance. South Africa’s regional approach to achieve military security is diminishing.

South Africa’s broad defence ambition can also be described as a commitment to remain a developmental state that can exercise political, economic, informational, and military authority over its claimed sovereign territorial spaces. In this instance, South Africa has the existential responsibility to govern and control its sovereign territorial spaces. The Constitution of 1996, the White Paper on Defence of 1996, the Defence Review 1998, and the Defence Act of 2002 all articulated South Africa’s national security in a broader approach to human security. All these political policy directives confirmed that the primary function of the Defence Force remains defence against external aggression. The absence of external military threats to South Africa’s territorial sovereignty allowed the strategic approach of reduced defence spending by maintaining a credible core growth military capacity that could execute limited military contingencies. The Defence Review 2015 provided significant arguments that reduction in defence spending and an increase in defence ambition resulted in a critical decline of South Africa’s conventional joint capabilities. What does this mean for South Africa’s military security?
It is important to view the core growth conventional capacity of South Africa as a more interactive reality. The decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities is observed in its ability to conduct military contingencies (interventions) and its ability to upscale its military to limited war capacity should an external military threat develop. This requirement is clearly articulated in the political directives for the Defence Force as the need to maintain the military capacity as a responsible state. What constitutes such core growth military capacity is open for debate. The requirement to conduct military contingencies in an unstable regional context was specified in significant detail in the Defence Review 2015. The core growth conventional capacity is articulated as those joint conventional capabilities that would require an unacceptable warning period to establish if external threats to South Africa’s territorial sovereignty or national interests develop. The Defence Review 2015 described the core growth capabilities as tactical offensive air capability, an offensive surface naval capability, submarine capability, and an armoured brigade with core growth mobile combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The core growth conventional capacity would also include commensurate training capabilities and an industrial base to support the core growth and the expansion of these capabilities.

The study previously indicated that the Defence Review 1998 was based on incomplete defence cost in its policy considerations. The Defence Review 1998 followed a narrow conventional approach of a core growth military deterrence and with that justified the reduction of defence spending with R1.4 billion to 1.5% of the GDP (DoD, 2015:9-2). From an analysis point of view, this already would not be sufficient to maintain a core growth conventional capability. The Defence Review 2015 argued for an R88 billion (2014/2015 rand value) or 2.4% of the GDP defence allocation to satisfy the political ambitions for defence. The current reality is that the same defence ambitions are expected from R52 billion (2020/2021 rand value) or 0.95% of the GDP. The key strategic question is, can South Africa risk the absence of its core growth joint conventional capabilities? From an idealistic perspective, the SADC defence pact would muster some military deterrence and a perspective that South Africa would not face an external military threat from its neighbours. From a realist perspective, South Africa exists in an unstable, insecure sub-region with growing global power interests that undermine regional cohesion. This is aggravated by growing non-traditional security threats such as radical insurgency and piracy in the SADC region. In its current state and with a growing reality of losing its core growth conventional capabilities, South Africa is very much defenceless against any external threat. This is especially true if such a threat is backed by a global power.
3.4.2 A strategically misaligned defence mandate with strategic security requirements

Louw (2013:77-80) argued that the continuation of a traditional defence approach substantially undermines the real security requirements for defence as observed in an international shift of security thinking since the end of the Cold War and South Africa’s security realities. Louw (2013:77-80) further argued that neither the policy requirements of a modern professional military force nor the security realities could be satisfied by the observable military effectiveness for its primary or secondary roles and functions. This Louw (2013:77-80) ascribed primarily to an unresponsive military-strategic culture that is driven by unconceivable military philosophies of irregular war and modern conventional war. From the theoretical understanding that political entities utilise militaries to maintain a monopoly on force and to create militaries to maintain force or the threat of force for political ends, the constitutional and subsequent defence law and defence policy provisions to maintain a credible military for defence are argued to be reasonable by this study. In hindsight, one could argue that a narrow conventional approach to South Africa’s military security in 1998 was short-sighted because of the South African government’s regional leadership role to be played and developing security realities both internally and externally as already visible in this timeframe. The employment of the SANDF in the broader scope of the Defence Force was clearly articulated in the founding political directives for the military, yet with a commitment to fund such tasks over and above the allocation to defence.

The arguments for very different roles and functions for South Africa’s military were present from the onset in the negotiations leading up to the democratic elections in 1994, the scholarly debates from the end of the Cold War, and South Africa’s subsequent strategic changes from 1990 to 1998 and strategic planning in the same timeframe. Louw (2013) and Esterhuyse (2017) have articulated compelling arguments why South Africa’s military-strategic approach should be aligned with the development of contemporary security realities both internal and external to South Africa. Substantial theoretical support exists for this line of argument. Most of these arguments remain based on the development of a threat-based concept of security and more specifically military security.

The theoretical analysis of military security as articulated in this study recognises that militaries exist firstly to provide the role and function of force (organised violence) or the
threat of such force to achieve political ends. The literature recognise that militaries are utilised in a wider scope of tasks and increasingly so since the end of the Cold War. Gray (2013:280) concluded that the use of force and/or threat of force remained central to military strategy in the last 200 years. This study agrees that the defence of South Africa could be argued differently from defence against external aggression that follows a traditional state-centric approach. The study considers the Defence Review 2015 as providing a sufficient description of military security related to the national security of South Africa. The study observed that the defence policy developers in 2015 described South Africa’s defence ambitions better, with a clear understanding of what it would cost. South Africa’s current political and bureaucratic regime is clearly not willing to fund the political defence ambitions. No level of military-strategic responsive leadership will mitigate the risk that the level of underfunding of the Defence Force represents. It is not a reasonable expectation if compared with global, regional, and sub-regional defence spending. As Louw (2013:85) finally concluded: “With an insolvent defence policy lately appearing to coincide with financial bankruptcy, the SANDF may just be heading for a perfect storm.”

The study disagrees that South Africa is without reasonable defence policy direction, yet can agree with a worrying future. The study would rather say that with a marginalised Defence Force, South Africa is heading for the perfect storm.

What does an outdated defence mandate, role, and functions mean for South Africa’s military security? A review of the constitutional mandate and the subsequent review of the Defence Act and defence policy requires a political process that, especially in South Africa, will not be driven by the military. As Louw (2013:67-68) correctly articulated, little hope exists to follow a different strategic direction to deal with growing employment of the SANDF in ever-widening tasks if the mandate, role, and functions require a modern conventional war deterrence capacity. Louw (2013:67-68), however, blamed the military-strategic leadership who, in his observation, did not stay true to the mandate it received from the various political directives. Earlier discussions referenced Chuter (2011) arguing that the threat perception approach to security proved to be impractical in defence planning. A more honest approach would argue to what extent force is required to achieve the polity’s requited state (condition) of security. This needs significant debate, specification, and agreement from all stakeholders in the national security debate. This study argues and concludes that any attempt to review South Africa’s defence mandate should consider fundamental questions regarding having a credible military. To what extent does South Africa resolve to maintain its sovereign control over its claimed
territories? To what extent is South Africa willing to create and employ force (organised violence), and for what reasons? What is South Africa willing to sacrifice to achieve the specified level of military security? If the debate and arguments for or against a level of military security, and the subsequent structure, equipping, training, education, and organising, exclude the purpose of force and/or threat of force, South Africa will be militarily insecure and unable to create the required military security for its existential purposes.

3.4.3 Socioeconomic realities in South Africa and military security

South Africa’s socioeconomic realities continue to place the political objective of military security under pressure when these competing political objectives require financial resources. The contestation occurs at two fundamental levels. The first is that military security is not an absolute priority most of the time and probably will be required comparatively with other political requirements even in a state of war. As argued previously in this study, security at large and military security as one aspect of national security is not an end in itself. It is an enabling state (condition) under which a polity can pursue a way of life and labour towards an improved life (development). The level of security required is subject to various influences and as a national political objective requires agreement on to what extent security is needed to allow for other political objectives to be pursued. As previously articulated, the study agrees with Baldwin’s (1997) argument that military security needs to be specified as a comparable and value-laden political objective for comparison and prioritisation in time with other political objectives at the national level. The second level of contestation exists in the expectation of a military institution to contribute to society’s progress and development. The very nature of militaries makes it a significant economic contributor at the local and national level. Where bases are established, the military participates in local economic activity and impacts on the social structures of communities. Modern military equipment requires defence industry specialisation. The military employs people and the subsequent military activities also generate employment.

A compelling argument put forward by Esterhuyse (2017) is the strategic decision to correct the unfavourable force imbalance to a generally acceptable level of a 40:30:30 ratio between personnel, operating, and renewal costs. Esterhuyse (2017) argued that unpopular strategic decisions are required to reduce an unfit human component for
operational employment and an unbalanced structural design. As previously discussed, the SANDF experienced significant reduction of personnel after the integration process and the Defence Review 2015’s analysis of South Africa’s defence ambition as requiring an increase in personnel. The various arguments do not start from the same baseline of reasoning. Esterhuyse and Louw (2018) argued from a position that the Defence Force needs to strategically align itself with the fact that increased defence spending in the medium to long term is unlikely and that society demands value for money from the Defence Force (Esterhuyse & Louw, 2018:16). The drafters of the Defence Review 2015 argued from the basis of consensus on South Africa’s defence ambition. A dilemma exists where the military is expected to contribute to socioeconomic development through employment, healthcare, internal stability and security (border security), disaster relief, and other tasks, while strategic military effectiveness amid continued reduction in defence spending requires reducing personnel, which carries unwanted political implications.

The irony of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities is how the decline contributed to the socioeconomic dilemma. As articulated in the economic context, the decline in defence spending resulted in the loss of 105 000 jobs in the defence industry. If the demobilisation during the integration process and the problems experienced with this process are also considered, it is difficult to comprehend a further reduction of defence personnel given the high unemployment rate in South Africa.

As much as the human dimension of military capabilities, within the complex socioeconomic conditions, contributes to an unsustainable strategic reality in the absence of increased defence spending for the medium term to long term, it subsequently also holds part of the key to the strategic solution. A modification of the approach and model of personnel employment contracting, to reduce the full-time employment footprint and increase the part-time employment footprint, with a commensurate reduction in employment uncertainty that exists in the current part-time model, can contribute to rebalancing the force imbalance ratio. The defence personnel problem is also part of a larger unsustainable government employment bill. The Defence Force needs to be proactive and innovative to ensure that its increased personnel requirements are satisfied through a more cost-efficient personnel employment model. The reduction of its regular component needs to be done with care to prevent an increased risk of human insecurity and internal instability.
What do South Africa’s prevailing socioeconomic realities mean for South Africa’s military security? The reduction of Defence Force personnel will affect the Defence Force’s operational capabilities. The Defence Force requires renewal of its human capital to contribute to operational deployable capabilities, and reduction of personnel without renewal will affect the operational availability of capabilities. The Defence Force can strategically address the current unacceptable personnel situation through a SMART personnel employment policy that will position the SANDF with a more efficient yet increased personnel structure in the medium term. The study agrees that, operationally, undeployable personnel need to be redeployed and utilised in a sustainable part-time employment model that reduces the uncertainty of the current part-time employment model. Rationalisation of the regular force must be done responsibly by not contributing to existing socioeconomic and human security challenges in society.

3.4.4 Defence spending and military technology as drivers of military security

The Defence Review 2015 discussed and argued for an increase in defence spending to a 2.4% of the GDP to satisfy the articulated defence ambition and stipulated tasks in Milestone 4 in an incremental approach to arrest the decline and to position the SANDF as a credible military force (DoD, 2015:2-20–2-25,9-1–9-9). The study previously described the manifested reality that since the adoption of the Defence Review 2015, the required increase in defence spending did not take place. The Defence Budget Votes of 2018 and 2019 showed that cabinet approved reductions in defence spending while acknowledging that the implementation of the Defence Review 2015 would require an increase in defence spending. It was articulated from an analysis of the Defence Review 2015 that the policy document provided a detailed specification of South Africa’s defence ambition as a value-laden and comparable policy objective that allows it to be compared to other political objectives. One can argue that the adoption of the Defence Review 2015 by parliament and cabinet demonstrates consensus of the fact that it contains valid defence objectives for the government for the next 20 years.

The Defence Review 2015 articulated in sufficient detail the declining defence capabilities to accept its truth as validated. The policy followed a strategic approach to describe a trajectory for arresting the decline of the SANDF’s defence capabilities and to reposition it in a 20-year timeframe, which is a clear articulation of political acknowledgement of the undesirable reality. The consultation process as described in the Defence Review 2015 is
a demonstration of a deliberate effort to achieve consensus. The study acknowledges that any policy process is bound to balance conflicting views and requirements. It is, however, a very difficult point to understand that such a process will end in a different implementation reality where the very same levels of authority that adopt and approve the policy will not only fail to resource the policy for implementation, but will also reduce spending for the policy objective. The study previously argued that a deliberate process to demilitarise South Africa is continuing in 2020. The arguments that propound that South Africa’s socioeconomic realities and its slow economic growth are the reasons for decisions to further reduce defence spending and not allow reasonable defence spending increases deliberately fail to see that all political objectives are subjected to scrutiny for prioritisation. It deliberately prioritises military security as the lowest priority in full view of other political policy failures. It also fails to acknowledge that the very reason to place the military under civil control is the significant potential of military forces to exercise organised violence. South Africa deliberately surrendered its social need for military security to a central legal military force. Defence spending, like any other political objective, is a political decision and choice. Defence spending cannot only be viewed from a demand-for-resources point of view.

Defence activity, both internal to South Africa and in operations external to South Africa, also holds economic activity at local and national levels. The impact on socioeconomic realities in South Africa since 1994 was discussed previously. A national change of attitude toward the SANDF and its place in South African society will realise the economic potential that the military possesses if the SANDF and South Africa’s defence industry receive the necessary national support through policy and defence commitments. A continuation of reducing defence spending not only affects the SANDF’s ability to achieve the defence mandate and commitments, it also affects South African society and the South African economy. The scope of this study does not allow for an in-depth investigation into the impact of the consistent and deliberate decrease of defence spending on South Africa’s economy at local and national levels. Again, defence spending and financial performance require attention. The researcher assumes that much of the government’s poor financial performance can be found in national management policies and practices that are vested in the South African Treasury.

As alluded to at the start of this section of the discussion, the economic context and technological context are best considered together. The first round of discussions
referred Ångström and Widén’s (2015:40) point that new technologies increase the cost of military activity. An important observation to be made is that within any environment where technological advantage proved to be key to success, R&D must receive priority. South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, however, shows a diminishing focus on defence R&D, which is consistent with a national approach of demilitarisation. Both Gray (2013) and Ångström and Widén (2015) indicated that technology plays an important role in a nation’s strategies to deal with military security. Military R&D contributed significantly to technology advancements and adaptations in history. A lack of focus on R&D significantly impacts on South Africa’s ability to provide local technology solutions to current and future defence technology requirements.

What does South Africa’s defence spending and military technology as drivers of South Africa’s military security mean for South Africa’s military security going forward? The study found that the deliberate process to demilitarise South Africa was achieved through a consistent process of defunding of the Defence Force and the defence industry. The meaning for South Africa’s military security because of this process was articulated earlier. Some observations at this point from an economic, military technology, and military security point of view are that South Africa will lose its defence industrial base to maintain key military capabilities for its core force concept. South Africa’s opportunities to extract economic value from an international defence economy will significantly decline. South Africa will in the future increasingly depend on foreign military equipment and systems providers for military requirements and future defence developments. Losing the South African industrial base for its conventional capabilities will cost South Africa more in the long term and the extended long term. It is argued that South Africa is militarily insecure to a modern conventional threat at present and will remain vulnerable for the medium to long term. This indeed needs to be observed in the context that such military threats seem absent in South Africa’s regional context. The African region, however, is by no means peaceful and stable. South Africa at present is involved in offensive military operations as part of the FIB peace enforcement activities in the DRC. The developing insurgency in Mozambique points to counterinsurgency capability requirements if South Africa, as part of the SADC, is to become involved.
3.4.5 South Africa’s military-strategic context (military-strategic culture) and military-strategic security

There are specific trends that developed in the military-strategic culture that point to a breaking point in South Africa’s civil-military realities in the future. Four aspects emerged from the discussion. The first is the developing civil-military gap. The second aspect is the growing subjective political control over the South African military institution. The third aspect is a growing perception of marginalisation by the defence fraternity. Lastly is the growing scholarly debate that argues that an unresponsive military-strategic leadership reality hampers South Africa’s strategic defence requirements.

The deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa was not only applied through a deliberate and consistent decrease of defence spending, the disinvestment in defence was also commensurate with a decreasing political and bureaucratic focus on defence matters. The military presence from various regimes in 1994 was viewed by the new democratic government and its trusted academic advisors as a threat to the new democracy, internal stability, and security. The formation of the new SANDF and the transformation of the military establishment to a demographically representative SANDF took precedence. The second decade of SANDF developments saw a refocus of employment to support South Africa’s foreign policy initiatives. The government failed to fund the expanded employment of the SANDF and the defence budget had to be reprioritised away from its core growth conventional capabilities. This timeframe is also categorised by politically managed SDA framed in controversy. Defence discussions and debates were mostly channelled along what is wrong and what must be fixed. The present timeframe is characterised by an awakening awareness of the decline of the SANDF and its inability to fulfil its constitutional mandate and the manifestation of political disinterest in the SANDF. The South African military increasingly are isolated from the civil polity it serves. It is marginalised by the civil authorities. Heinecken (2019:74) describe this reality as a change of prestige of the South African Military in the apartheid era to marginalised after 1994 in that the SANDF became marginal in its status and relevance. This is visible in the lack of investment in defence and the decline of the defence budget and the size of the military. Heinecken quoted Luckham that called this change in status and importance as ‘demilitarisation by default’ through the reducing and the defence budget and investment in the armaments industry. This resulted in the removing of the footprint of the military from society.
The second military-strategic aspect is the increase in subjective control over the military institutions. The transformation of the SANDF not only resulted in a more demographically representative human component, it also translated into a predominantly non-statutory representation in the military-strategic leadership of the SANDF by the early 2000s. This reality continues to be maintained through a process of appointment of military-strategic leadership aligned with the ruling party and its political alliances. This poses specific challenges for the professional character of the SANDF because of its responsibility to uphold the Constitution versus political allegiance. It also makes the military-strategic leadership susceptible to indirect influence through the political allegiance to submit to the ongoing demilitarisation agenda. The civil control over South Africa’s military has translated into the lack of strategic military confrontation of the unhealthy continuation of the demilitarisation process when the social agreement to fund PSOs and internal deployment over and above the defence budget as articulated in the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and Defence Review 1998 was not honoured. Heinecken (2019) referred to a healthy balance between objective and subjective control over the military; implying that a good working relationship needs to exist between the military leaders and the appointed civilian authorities they are answerable to. The debate has not yet begun on what would constitute a more transparent approach to the appointment of military-strategic leadership in the South African model. One can argue that such appointments should be subjected to parliamentary adoption like the deployment of the SANDF in external and internal military tasks is. It is also quite egotistical to argue that the military-strategic leadership since 1994 to date has behaved unprofessionally. This is especially true when it is considered that the South African government repeatedly turns to the SANDF when a national crisis emerges.

The third aspect that emerged from the military-strategic context is a growing perception of marginalisation by the defence fraternity. By drawing attention to this observation, the study does not propose or support an unconstitutional approach to deal with the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. It considers the articulated dissatisfaction of the defence fraternity with the current military reality given what such dissatisfaction means for South Africa’s military security. When the study drew on observed articulated scholarly and media publications of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and the continued reduction of defence spending, it became clear that the SANDF, the defence veterans, and the defence industry increasingly grew dissatisfied with the marginalisation of the South African military. Esterhuyse (2020) accurately observed that society’s security
forces reflect the society it represents. Along with serious academic and political critique, dissatisfied soldiers protested about service conditions and marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria in 2009. This still has ramifications in 2020. As history revealed, military interference in the government is seldom facilitated by loyal military-strategic leadership. At the same time, the professional and subordinate behaviour of soldiers is affected by the respect and support the military experiences from its government and its polity. Hamilton’s outcry after the 2020 budget speech is an indication of how the prevailing deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa is experienced by the defence fraternity: “SA’s deliberate, predictable underfunding of defence function [is] a threat to democracy and economic growth” (Hamilton, 2020).

This section on the military-strategic context will not be complete without academic arguments on ineffective military-strategic leadership as articulated in the first round of discussions. To what extent should the SANDF leadership since 1994 take responsibility for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities? Esterhuyse and Louw (2018) argued that the SANDF’s strategic culture evolved from two valid yet incompatible military philosophies. The modern conventional military doctrine of offensive mobile operations carried by the SADF leadership into the new SANDF stood in contrast to the revolutionary war and insurgency that formed the basis of the MK and APLA leadership cultures. Esterhuyse and Louw (2014) concluded that the SANDF leadership learned to accommodate and allow the two cultures to co-exist rather than formulating a new military culture that would foster and drive military effectiveness. Louw (2013) argued that these two competing military cultures, combined with quite different policy views and provisions on required military-strategic processes, evolved into “a dichotomous strategic culture”. As articulated by Louw (2013), this impaired the SANDF’s organisational responsiveness, maximised organisational entropy, and encouraged the Defence Force’s systemic decline. The existence of two strategic paradigms with their worldviews and value systems prohibited the SANDF from formulating a strategy from the political defence guidance to realise military effectiveness in its execution (Louw & Esterhuyse, 2014:27).

The arguments that focus on effective military-strategic leadership carry weight in observation of the SANDF’s internal effectiveness. Louw (2013) discussed many of the SANDF’s internal organisational challenges and problems and how they have impacted on the SANDF’s strategic performance since 1994. The arguments, however, mostly disregarded the impact of the SANDF’s external influences in their conclusions and
considered ineffective military-strategic leadership and unresponsiveness as the key drivers of an ineffective and inefficient military that is unable to perform its constitutional mandate or deal with the real security demands of the time. This study acknowledges the validity of most of the articulated descriptions of the various academic works that propose a military-strategic leadership role for the SANDF’s internal ineffectiveness and inefficacies. The conclusions that these are the key drivers of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities are disputed. Accepting these concluding arguments disregard any of the SANDF’s achievements over the last two and a half decades. South Africa was hailed for its successful integration process of various military entities. Various UN reports have described South Africa’s success in UN PSOs. A holistic view of the SANDF over the past two and a half decades sees more operational and tactical successes than failures. Indeed, the SANDF experienced its fair share of problems and setbacks, yet it is hard-pressed to ascribe South Africa’s declining defence capabilities predominantly to unresponsive military-strategic leadership.

What does South Africa’s military-strategic context (military-strategic culture) mean for South Africa’s military-strategic security going forward? The civil-military gap spells nothing good for South Africa’s military security going forward. A growing isolated and marginalised South African military can behave in three ways. It can lose hope and allow the decline to continue until South Africa has only a military employment scheme, or it can resort to what it is trained for, namely organised violence, or a responsive and professional military leadership should confront the political and social reality of isolation and marginalisation free from fear and favour. The SANDF needs to confront the South African government with hard facts on the military security situation and the realisation that you can only get what you pay for.

The aspect of subjective political control over the military institution in South Africa is a matter for South African politics. The analysis previously pointed to a reviewed outlook of the appointment of military-strategic leadership. It can be argued that the political and military-strategic relations in South Africa have impacted on defence policy decisions and even military-strategic employment of the SANDF. The most criticised instance is South Africa’s intervention in the CAR. Without concrete evidence, the analysis depended on inference to argue that the subjective control over the SANDF in the last two decades increased and that it impacted on the professional duty of the SANDF to hold the South African government and the state accountable to honour its policy commitments to the
SANDF. In that sense, the study agrees that the SANDF’s strategic leadership should accept responsibility for its role in South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.

It is observed that the SANDF remained subordinate to the civil-military arrangements instituted since 1994. As correctly observed and articulated by various scholarly and military specialists over the last two and a half decades, the SANDF experienced significant internal challenges and acted with observed difficulties in its external environment. Professional military-strategic leadership and effective military-strategic processes can improve the SANDF’s responsiveness to military-strategic effectiveness and efficiency. Professional responsive military-strategic leadership will contribute to military security, yet in itself will not solve South Africa’s declining defence capabilities dilemma.

3.4.6 Capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and vital interests

The first round of discussions of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in the geographic strategic context highlighted a requirement stipulated in the Defence Review 2015 to protect South Africa’s ability to conduct economic activities domestically and internationally. The policy linked defence capabilities to South Africa’s ability to control its sovereign territories and to maintain free trade along land, sea, and air routes. In addition, the policy stipulated the need to protect fundamental resources such as minerals, water, and energy to ensure South Africa’s economic and human securities. At first glance, the stipulations are broad and involve much more of the government’s efforts than merely its military capacity. Much of these protective roles and functions are indeed ascribed to government departments such as the SAPS, the Department of Transport, and lately the development of the Border Management Agency. A term that is often used in the description of policies to articulate these functions is the all-of-government approach. The description of the all-of-government approach often is without clear demarcation of the roles and responsibilities that the different departments fulfil. The function of protection mostly falls at the lower spectrum of priorities and are mostly assumed to be the responsibility of the security sector.

An analysis of the policy requirements to protect South Africa’s economic security and national interests indicates a significant amount of capabilities to control South Africa’s airspace, land territories, naval space, and cyberspace. Any prudent approach would
consider that the capabilities required for such roles and functions should ideally also be available for other defence roles and purposes. One would consider the more intense requirements and then downscale for other roles and functions. As an example, South Africa’s airspace requires constant monitoring for legal and illegal use. The higher spectrum of illegal use of South Africa’s airspace would be a military contravention of the airspace that represents military air attack from external aggressors. It would be strategically important that the DoD, the Department of Transport, and the SAPS have a shared picture of South Africa’s airspace and coordinated capacity to act against any illegal use of South African airspace. Similar examples can be described for South Africa’s naval spaces and land territories. The discussion should include what is enough protection given the national security estimate and who is responsible for what. Then the decision can be made as to what capabilities are required to achieve the level of protection needed.

The discussion extends further than South Africa’s sovereign spaces. Economic security and South Africa’s national interests extend to the African region and beyond. The unanswered question in the last two and a half decades is, for what will South Africa be willing to use force in the protection of its national interests? Since South Africa’s economic security and national interest are situated within and outside South Africa, the capacity to control and protect must exist over its territorial and cyberspaces and it must have expeditionary capabilities commensurable with South Africa’s economic vulnerabilities and national interests.

What does South Africa’s defence capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and vital interests mean for South Africa’s military security? The described declining defence capabilities and the lack of resources to establish new capability priorities like cyber defence capability at a minimum imply that South Africa is increasingly more militarily insecure against military and other coercive threats to its economic security. It is doubtful that South Africa will be able to protect its regional economic interests when expeditionary military capacity is required to deal with threats to South Africa’s economic activities regionally and elsewhere in the world.

3.4.7 The disconnect between the military-strategic defence paradigm and non-offensive political perspectives

The 1994 situation pictured a largely modern conventional military establishment from the SADF that had recent conventional and counterinsurgency experience and a revolutionary
insurgency component that was required to meet and integrate into the new SANDF. Jordaan (2004) provided key insights into the lack of trust that existed between the new SANDF leadership and the new political regime. Louw (2013) described the conditions for agreement toward a conventional military approach as quite different between the realist SADF military leadership and the idealist political approach to military developments. More important is the breeding ground that the distrust created for advisors to the new political regime, which is a practice that has been observed throughout the two and a half decades of democracy. The SANDF’s leadership’s professional advice has a continuous counterweight. This practice is quite prudent. It, however, requires a careful balance between theory and practice. The most prominent issue is, who carries accountability for strategic decisions?

An uneasy management existence between the SANDF and the Secretariat of Defence in the last two decades demonstrates the strategic difficulty that exists and the limitations on military command when the command is responsible and accountable for operational effectiveness and the civilian bureaucracy exercises control as the departmental accounting authority. The civil control arrangements for the DoD significantly complicate strategic flexibility and accountability. To add to this complexity, one can observe that the civilian deployment in state bureaucracy carries more subjective political influence and is not particularly aligned with the defence function. It is already challenging to balance the requirements of defence management as part of state practices and the strategic requirements of military operational effectiveness. When these functions are directed from two heads, it becomes in itself a driver of ineffectiveness and inefficiency.

An important observation from the SANDF development process over the last two decades is the overarching political approach of NOD and the maintenance of a strategic defensive and operational offensive doctrine. The general perception is that South Africa will only use the military option as the last resort to prevent conflict but will maintain a credible offensive military when needed. This study agrees with scholars like Esterhuyse (2016; 2017) and Jordaan (2004) that such a divide in the national security approach and the military-strategic posture from the onset did not consider national security requirements holistically. The military security decisions from the political leadership (advised by trusted academics) and the military-strategic leaders were mostly the result of compromise rather than an honest intelligence estimate. A continuation of this two and a half decades later is, to say the least, perplexing.
The Defence Review 2015 process attempted to clarify the two strategic environments by describing South Africa’s defence policy not only as what defence is against, but also what defence is for. Scholarly critique questions the usefulness of an approach to conduct the policy review process without considering what can be afforded by the government. This is an intriguing point of view since the policy was subjected to the Parliament Portfolio Committee processes, parliament adoption, and cabinet approval. One would argue that the affordability of a policy that stipulates its financial requirements for success is a key discussion when considering adopting such a policy. The political leadership and the military-strategic leadership in 2020 require an urgent and honest discussion about what the SANDF is needed for, and the SANDF leadership needs to be regarded as the responsible authority for military security in South Africa, as it carries the functional responsibility to create the required military security conditions.

What does the disconnect between the military-strategic defence paradigm and non-offensive political perspective mean for South Africa’s military security? Concluding from the various insights obtained from the strategic context analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, the consensus between the political regime and the military-strategic leadership must be replaced by a collaborative approach to the SANDF’s participation in South Africa’s national security and the level of military security that South Africa needs domestically, regionally, and internationally.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter continued from a contemporary theoretical understanding of the concepts of military security, strategy, and strategic context as a framework for analysing the South African declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security. The first round of discussions of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities’ strategic context provided a qualitative dataset to conduct a thematic analysis in the quest to understand the social reality. From the theoretical discussion, two prominent themes emerged.

The concept of security has a wide scope of meaning and at any level considered requires enough specification that can lead to consensus before it can become an attainable political objective. The study confined itself to focusing on military security as the required outcome of South Africa’s only legally designated military force. Understanding South Africa’s declining defence capabilities requires a description of what such a decline means.
in respect of the political objective primarily ascribed to the military, as South Africa’s military security. The chapter started with an analysis of the Defence Review 2015 as a specification of South Africa’s military security requirements.

The second theme that emerged from the theoretical discussion is the central prominence that strategy (from its military origins) occupied in the last 200 years of human history. For clarity and focus, the emphasis was again on military strategy as the use of force (organised violence) to achieve political ends (political objectives or national policy objectives). The chapter used this enduring manifested purpose for establishing and maintaining credible military forces to analyse the political directives promulgated in the Constitution of 1996, the Defence Act of 2002, and the defence policy publications since 1994 in their purpose for the South African military establishment.

Lastly, the chapter turned to the qualitative dataset of the first round of discussions of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities’ strategic context. Using inference, thematic analysis of the data was undertaken to extract what the South African defence capabilities’ strategic context reveals and means for South Africa’s military security. Seven aspects emerged from the analysis. Each was discussed and they provided the study with a deep understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security.

What remains for the study is to conclude with a description of the obtained understanding and to discuss possible strategic approaches to deal with the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. This is done in the last chapter of the study.
CHAPTER 4:  
WHAT SOUTH AFRICA’S DECLINING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES MEAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S MILITARY SECURITY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The research problem posed in this study was to understand South Africa’s declining defence capabilities from an in-depth analysis of their strategic context. Two research questions guided this study, namely what is the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities (the primary research question), and what are the military security implications of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities? (the secondary research question). The primary research question was addressed by the discussion of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities’ strategic context in Chapter 2 and the thematic analysis conducted on the qualitative data of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in Chapter 3. The secondary research question was addressed in Chapter 3 with the thematic analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The contemporary understanding of military security as a theoretical concept and the use of the concept as the overarching theme in the study allowed thematic analysis with a deductive focus to argue how South Africa’s declining defence capabilities impact on South Africa’s military security. The study was set in a rich description of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and can conclude with a description of its findings.

The first section of this chapter discusses the observations from the theoretical discussions of the concepts of military security and strategy and how South Africa’s governmental directives align with a contemporary understanding of the theoretical discourse of South Africa’s military security and strategy as the approach to achieve such a policy objective. The second section discusses observations obtained from the thematic analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities’ strategic context to extract a deep understanding of the social reality. The third section focuses on probable strategic approaches derived from the study discussions to deal with the reality of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The chapter concludes with general remarks.
4.2 SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENCE DIRECTION: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF MILITARY SECURITY AND STRATEGY

An understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities starts with a contemporary understanding of the theoretical concepts of military security as part of the broader concepts of national security and strategy as they relate to the function of defence. The study considered the theoretical concept of military security for two reasons. The first is that the concept of military security is fundamentally linked to the purpose and existence of a polity’s military. The second reason is that military security is considered to be a neglected theoretical concept in South African defence scholarly and policy debates since 1994. The study found that contemporary thinking on military security within a broader conceptualisation of national security in South African government directives as human security was not explicitly considered to inform the defence debate and function since 1994. A detailed analysis, however, showed that military security is consciously implied in government publications related to the defence function.

The theoretical discussions in this study demonstrated that contemporary scholarly discourse still considers military security central to nations’ national security needs. The scope of security, however, broadened significantly after the end of the Cold War. This made the conceptualisation of military security as a scholarly and policy consideration significantly more complex. The discourse contains a substantial amount of disagreement on what is useful for scientific description and explanation, as well as for advisory usefulness for policy considerations and comparison. The literature, however, is uniform in its conclusion that security in all its dimensions is important, but is not an end in itself. It is an enabling condition for other policies to be pursued.

The discussion of military security in the study highlighted an important aspect within the broad and deep contemporary view of security. The study agrees with the scholarly view that security in all its forms is not a contested concept. It requires sufficient description and consensus among stakeholders to make it value-laden and comparable in its context to other policy objectives at the level of application. The need to specify military security allowed the study to analyse the latest South African defence policy against this theme to determine to what extent the Defence Review 2015 provided a specification of the level of military security that the South African government expected, given the national security context that the polity faces in the future. The study found that the Defence Review 2015 in
its descriptions of South Africa’s global, regional, and national security context provided a sufficient and honest reflection of the probable national and military security situations that South Africa can expect, with the exception of two important aspects.

The policy refrained from discussing the influences of global powers on South Africa’s regional and national contexts and how these influences could impact on South Africa’s national and military security. The policy did not sufficiently discuss and describe the emerging security matter of cyber defence that is ascribed to the Defence Force as a component of its primary role and function of defence against aggression. Other than these two aspects, the policy is viewed as a prudent account of the manageable uncertainty that South Africa’s defence ambition must manage in its continuum of South Africa’s strategic future.

The discussion of strategy in the study demonstrated the centrality of military security to national and even regional security. The need for governments to control their sovereign territories in times of peace and war and the need for governments to maintain their monopoly on force (organised violence) are key drivers of governments to maintain credible military forces. The theme of force (violence) and/or the threat of force as the founding reason to establish and maintain a credible military force was used to analyse to what extent South Africa’s Constitution, defence laws, and defence policies maintain this fundamental truth for establishing, mandating, structuring, and maintaining the SANDF as a credible military force; thus maintaining the monopoly on the force in the protection and defence of South Africa’s sovereign existence. The study concludes that in founding, enacting, and directing the defence function for South Africa since 1994, the political need of force and/or the threat of force is found to be evident to establishing and maintaining the SANDF as a professional military force. The government utilises the SANDF to maintain South Africa’s monopoly on force in its sovereign spaces. It is, however, from the onset in 1996 clear that the new government did not see its Defence Force as the first respondent to conflict in its domestic and international affairs. The policy utility of force is viewed as the last resort of policy action in dealing with a range of conflicts. Over and above the NOD approach to conflict, the Defence Force would be available to perform various tasks in support of the government’s developmental agenda.

This study argued that the adoption of a broader and deeper approach to national security as advised by trusted academics did not consider the approach holistically and inclusively. The evidence points to only one objective in this line of argument: to deliberately
demilitarise South Africa. The expressed non-military security threats to national security of poverty, unemployment, and inequality are not debated, discussed, and articulated from a national security approach. The new human security approach to national security is only articulated as an offset to state and military security to justify demilitarisation and disinvestment in the defence function in South Africa. This study holds the view that a review of the adopted approach to national security for South Africa is required by asking the question: How did South Africa benefit from adopting a wide and broad approach to national security?  

(Seegers, 2010).

4.3 UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S DECLINING DEFENCE CAPABILITY FROM ITS STRATEGIC CONTEXT

An initial discussion of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities in Chapter 2 of the study highlighted a disconnect between political vision and policy ends and the military-strategic perspective toward the defence requirements for South Africa since 1994. The analysis showed a constant and deliberate political and bureaucratic approach to minimise the military’s influence on national security. With no observed evidence to the contrary, the study deems that this political and bureaucratic (government and state) behaviour is expected to continue, with the consequence of the loss of most of South Africa’s core military capabilities. This includes the industrial capacities that underpin the existing capabilities. The study also indicates that prevailing socioeconomic and economic conditions in South Africa and the government fixation on demilitarisation of South Africa will lead to further decreases in defence spending and the loss of South Africa’s conventional military capacity and ability to scale up for limited war in the long and extended long term. Current defence spending reached levels where continuation with military commitments such as PSOs, military interventions in the SADC and Africa, and internal deployments in support of other government departments are unsustainable in the medium to extended long term.

The deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa is observed as a trend continued at a bureaucratic level where military spending was deliberately and consistently reduced while military employment in a broader range of

18 This idea is credited to Prof. Annet Seegers as adapted to a general question that she posed in seeking to determine if an issue belongs to the security debate. Can the issue be better described as a security issue or does it belong to another field of study?
tasks increased. Increased employment of the SANDF in PSOs and border protection was not honoured by a commensurate increased defence budget as articulated in the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review 1998. This break from the policy provisions of special funding provisions of secondary tasks resulted in a shift of defence funding to priority secondary tasks. This can be argued as the start of the defence ambition and defence resource gap. The study argued that a sufficiently adequate defence budget\textsuperscript{19} to fund the primary tasks as maintaining a core growth military capacity and the priority tasks since 1998 to deploy in PSOs and perform military interventions, deploy internally in support of the SAPS and in border protection operations, as well as assistance in disaster management since 1998 could have facilitated a different strategic reality than the manifested declining defence capabilities for South Africa in 2020.

A continuation of the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa is prone to result in the decline of South Africa’s strategic capacity to be a leader in Africa’s developmental objectives to silence the guns and create a stable and secure region. South Africa’s participation in diplomatic, economic, and socio-development initiatives could face increasing difficulty due to the decline of credible capacity to ensure stability and security through military ways. It is doubtful that the expected increase in commitments from the UN, AU, and SADC could be honoured in the next ten years at current and planned defence spending levels for South Africa. Strategically, Africa and the SADC region remain unstable with lasting radical insurgency, political instability, and sluggish socioeconomic development. If the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of demilitarisation of South Africa is not reviewed, the consequence will be South Africa’s regional political insignificance. South Africa’s regional approach to achieve military security is diminishing.

South Africa as a sovereign state has the existential responsibility to govern and control its sovereign territorial spaces. The absence of external military threats to South Africa’s territorial sovereignty allowed the strategic approach of reduced defence spending by maintaining a credible core growth military capacity that could execute limited military contingencies. This approach is a prudent provision for uncertainty in the future.

\textsuperscript{19} In comparison to internationally accepted levels of defence spending for developmental states, a 1.8\% to 2\% of GDP defence spending could allow for the strategies that the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review 1998 envisaged.
A continuation of the deliberate political and bureaucratic process of the demilitarisation of South Africa will, however, result in the loss of most of South Africa’s core growth military capabilities and with it will diminish South Africa’s warfare capacity. South Africa will be significantly less militarily secure against external and domestic military threats that are backed by global powers in the future. The study argued that the strategic outlook of the absence of external threats to South Africa’s sovereignty is optimistic and grounded in the present and immediate past of South Africa’s strategic continuum of time. This view lacks an honest analysis of South Africa’s strategic context in its global and regional exposure. Allowing the South African military core capacity to cease to exist is not only strategically unwise, it also lacks the vision of the importance that the South African military carries in South Africa’s economic freedom and its impact on the legitimacy of the South African state in the global community. Facing the strategic future without a credible military that can defend South Africa is not prudent and is strategically irresponsible. The continued deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa is perplexing.

In hindsight, one could argue that a narrow conventional approach to South Africa’s military security in 1998 was short-sighted because of the South African government’s regional leadership role to be played and developing security realities both internally and externally, as already visible in this timeframe. The scholarly arguments on why South Africa’s military-strategic approach should be aligned with the development of contemporary security realities both internal and external to South Africa are observed as a sensible continuation of what the strategic history of South Africa revealed in the last two decades. It is, however, not the only uncertainty that should be anticipated going forward. An important debate that needs to ensue is for what and to what extent South Africa is willing to use force and/or the threat of force as a polity. That should drive the understanding of core military capacity.

The analysis of the Defence Review 2015 revealed that the defence policy developers described South Africa’s defence ambitions better and more honestly than in the Defence Review 1998, with a clear understanding of what it will cost. South Africa’s current political and bureaucratic regime seems unwilling to fund the political defence ambition, as is observed from the budget provisions for the defence function since 2015. No level of

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20 The idea of a strategic time continuum is borrowed from the book Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty by Colin Gray.
military-strategic responsive leadership will mitigate the risk that the level of underfunding of the Defence Force represents. It is not a reasonable expectation if compared with global, African, and SADC defence spending. The study disagrees that South Africa is without reasonable defence policy direction, yet can agree with a worrying future.

The argument that South Africa’s socioeconomic realities and its slow economic growth are the reasons for decisions to further reduce defence spending and not allow reasonable defence spending increases deliberately fail to see that all political objectives are subjected to scrutiny for prioritisation. It deliberately prioritises military security as a low priority in full view of other political policy failures. It ignores the fact that a failure in military security has catastrophic implications for a polity’s existential sovereignty and way of life, even if such a probability was low since 1994 until 2020. It also fails to acknowledge that the very reason to place the military under civil control is the potential that the military exists to employ violence. South Africa’s polity surrenders its social need for military security to a central legal military force. Defence spending, like any other political objective, is a political decision and choice.

Defence spending cannot only be viewed from a demand-for-resources viewpoint. Defence activity both internal to South Africa and in operations external to South Africa represents economic activity at local and national levels. A national change of attitude towards the SANDF and its place in South African society will recognise the economic potential that the military possesses if the SANDF and South Africa’s defence industry receives the necessary national support through policy and defence commitments. A continuation of reducing defence spending not only affects the SANDF’s ability to achieve the defence mandate and commitments, it also affects South African society and the South African economy.

The study found that the deliberate process to demilitarise South Africa was achieved through a consistent process of defunding of the Defence Force and the defence industry. From economic, military technology, and military security points of view, South Africa will lose its defence industrial base to maintain key military capabilities for its core force concept. South Africa’s opportunities to extract economic value from an international defence economy will significantly decline. South Africa will in the future increasingly depend on foreign military equipment and systems providers for military equipment, which will make South Africa strategically vulnerable to global influences. Losing the South African industrial base for its military capabilities will cost South Africa more in the long
run. It can be argued that South Africa is militarily insecure to a modern military threat at present and will remain vulnerable for the medium to long term. An honest national security estimate, which includes the growing interests of global powers in Africa and the SADC, will probably conclude that such military threats seem largely absent in the immediate strategic future. The African region, however, is by no means peaceful and stable. South Africa at present is involved in offensive military operations as part of the FIB peace enforcement activities in the DRC. The developing insurgency in Mozambique points to the need for counterinsurgency capability if South Africa, as part of the SADC, is to become involved.

The deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa has not only been pursued through a deliberate and consistent decrease of defence spending, the disinvestment in defence was also commensurate with a diminishing political and bureaucratic focus on defence matters. Heinecken (2019) accurately defined the growing civil-military gap where she described the SANDF as faceless in the South African polity. The civil-military gap spells nothing good for South Africa’s military security going forward. An increasingly isolated and marginalised South African military can behave in three ways. It can lose hope and allow the decline to continue until South Africa has only a military employment scheme, or it can resort to what it is trained for, namely organised violence, or a responsive and professional military leadership should confront the political and social reality of isolation and marginalisation free from fear and favour. The SANDF needs to confront the South African government with hard facts on the military security situation and the realisation that you only get what you pay for.

Subjective political control over the military institution in South Africa is a matter for South African politics. The analysis pointed to the need for a reviewed outlook of the appointment of military-strategic leadership. It can be argued that the political and military-strategic relations in South Africa impacted on defence policy decisions and even the military-strategic employment of the SANDF. Without concrete evidence, the analysis depended on inference to argue that the subjective control over the SANDF in the last two decades increased and that it impacted on the professional duty of the SANDF to hold the South African government and the state accountable to honour its policy commitments to the SANDF. In that sense, the study agrees that the SANDF’s strategic leadership should accept responsibility for its role in South Africa’s declining defence capabilities.
The SANDF remained subordinate to the civil-military arrangements instituted since 1994. The SANDF experienced significant internal challenges and acted with observed difficulties in its external environment. Professional military-strategic leadership and effective military-strategic processes can improve the SANDF’s military-strategic effectiveness and efficiency. Professional and responsive military-strategic leadership will contribute to military security, yet in itself will not solve the dilemma of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The main cause of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities is the continuing political demilitarisation of South Africa. South Africa’s socioeconomic challenges are mostly only an excuse to justify the demilitarisation decision.

South Africa’s developmental challenges continue to place the political objective of military security under pressure when these competing political objectives require financial resources. The contestation occurs at two fundamental levels. The first is that military security is not an absolute priority most of the time and will probably be required comparatively with other political requirements even in a state of war. Security at large and military security as one aspect of national security is not an end in itself. It is an enabling state (condition) under which a polity can pursue a way of life and labour toward an improved life (development). The level of security required is subject to various influences and as a national political objective requires agreement to what extent security is needed to allow for other political objectives to be pursued. The second level of contestation exists in the expectation of a military institution to contribute to societal progress and development. The very nature of militaries makes it a significant economic contributor at local and national levels. Where bases are established, the military participates in local economic activity and influences the social structures of communities. Modern military equipment requires defence industry specialisation. The military employs people and the subsequent military activities also generate employment.

The argument to correct the unfavourable force imbalance by decreasing personnel in order to reduce personnel expenditure in favour of operating and renewal expenditure carries uncertainty regarding the depth of the argument. The study demonstrated that various arguments started from different baselines of reasoning. A dilemma exists where the military is expected to contribute to socioeconomic development through employment, healthcare, internal stability and security (border security), disaster relief, and other tasks while strategic military effectiveness amid continued reduction in defence spending...
requires reducing personnel, which carries unwanted socioeconomic and political implications. The irony of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities is how the decline contributes to the socioeconomic dilemma. The decline in defence spending resulted in the loss of 105 000 jobs in the defence industry (BusinessTech, 2017). If the demobilisation of almost 43 000 personnel (Van der Waag, 2015:295; DoD, 2018:154) during the integration process and the problems experienced with this process are also considered, it is difficult to comprehend a further reduction of defence personnel given the current high unemployment rate in South Africa. Yet, the analysis indicated that further personnel reductions seem unavoidable.

As much as the human dimension of military capabilities, within complex socioeconomic conditions, contributes to an unsustainable strategic reality in the absence of increased defence spending, it subsequently also holds part of the key to the strategic solution. A modification of the approach and model of personnel employment contracting, to reduce the full-time employment footprint and increase the part-time employment footprint, with a commensurate reduction in employment uncertainty that exists in the current part-time model, can contribute to rebalancing the force imbalance. The defence personnel problem is also part of a larger unsustainable government employment bill. The Defence Force needs to be proactive and innovative to ensure that its increased personnel requirements are satisfied through a more cost-efficient personnel employment model. The Defence Force requires renewal of its human capital to contribute to operationally deployable capabilities, and a reduction of personnel without renewal will affect the operational availability of capabilities. The Defence Force can strategically address the current unacceptable personnel situation through a personnel employment policy that will position the SANDF with a more efficient yet increased personnel structure in the medium term. The study agrees that operationally undeployable personnel need to be redeployed and utilised in a sustainable part-time employment model that reduces the uncertainty of the current part-time employment model. Rationalisation of the regular force must be done responsibly by not contributing to existing socioeconomic and human security challenges in society.

A discussion of capability requirements for the SANDF to protect South Africa’s economic security and national interests drawn from the Defence Review 2015 articulated requirements for defence capabilities to protect South Africa’s ability to conduct economic activity domestically and internationally. The policy linked defence capabilities to South
Africa’s ability to control its sovereign territories and to maintain free trade along land, sea, and air routes. In addition, the policy stipulated the need to protect fundamental resources such as minerals, water, and energy to ensure South Africa’s economic and human security. The stipulations are broad and involve much more of the government’s efforts than merely it’s military. Most of these protective roles and functions are indeed ascribed to government departments such as the SAPS, the Department of Transport, and lately the development of the Border Management Agency. A term that is often used in the description of policies to articulate these functions is the all-of-government approach. The description of the all-of-government approach often is without clear demarcation of the roles and responsibilities of the different departments. The function of protection mostly falls at the lower spectrum of priorities and are mostly assumed to be the responsibility of the security sector.

An analysis of the policy requirements to protect South Africa’s economic security and national interests indicated capabilities to control South Africa’s airspace, land territories, naval space, and cyberspace. The economic security and South Africa’s national interests extend to the African region and beyond. The unanswered question is for what South Africa will be willing to use force to protect its national interests. Since South Africa’s economic security and national interests are situated within and outside South Africa, the capacity to control and protect its territorial and cyberspaces must exist and it must have expeditionary capabilities commensurable with South Africa’s economic vulnerabilities and national interests. The described declining defence capabilities and the lack of resources to establish new capability priorities, such as cyber defence capability, at a minimum, imply that South Africa is increasingly more militarily insecure against military and other coercive threats to its economic security. It is doubtful that South Africa will be able to protect its regional economic interests when expeditionary military capacity is required to deal with threats to South Africa’s economic activities regionally and elsewhere in the world.

The study observed that a distinct distrust between political leaders and the strategic military leaders in 1994 resulted in a very plural approach to defence policymaking with a wide range of influences. The prevailing practice of trusted academic advisors and defence analysts is viewed as a prudent approach to defence policy formulation. The SANDF leadership’s professional advice has a continuous counterweight. It, however, requires a careful balance between theory and practice. The most prominent issue is, who carries accountability for strategic decisions? An uneasy management existence between
the SANDF and the Secretariat of Defence in the last two decades demonstrates the strategic difficulty that exists, as well as the limitations on military command when the command is responsible and accountable for operational effectiveness and the civilian bureaucracy exercises control as the departmental accounting authority. The civil control arrangements for the DoD significantly complicate strategic flexibility and accountability. It is already challenging to balance the requirements of defence management as part of state practices and the strategic requirements of military operational effectiveness. When these functions are directed from two heads, it becomes in itself a driver of ineffectiveness and inefficiency.

An important observation from the SANDF development process over the last two decades is the overarching political approach of NOD and the maintenance of a strategic defensive and operational offensive doctrine. This study agrees with scholars such as Esterhuyse (2016; 2017) and Jordaan (2004) that such a rift in the national security approach and the military-strategic posture from the onset did not consider the national security requirement holistically. The military security decisions of the political leadership (advised by trusted academics) and the military-strategic leaders were mostly the result of compromise rather than an honest intelligence estimate. A continuation of this two and a half decades later is, to say the least, perplexing.

The Defence Review 2015 process attempted to clarify the two strategic environments by describing South Africa’s defence policy not only as what defence is against but also what defence is for. Scholarly critique questioned the usefulness of an approach to conduct the policy review process without considering what can be afforded by the government. This is an intriguing point of view since the policy was subjected to the Parliament Portfolio Committee processes, parliament adoption, and cabinet approval. One would argue that the affordability of a policy that stipulates its financial requirements for success is a key discussion when considering adopting such a policy. The political leadership and the military-strategic leadership in 2020 require an urgent and honest discussion about what the SANDF is needed for, and the SANDF leadership needs to be regarded as the responsible authority for military security in South Africa, as they carry the functional responsibility to create the required military security conditions.

Concluding from the various insights obtained from the strategic context analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities, the consensus between the political regime and the military-strategic leadership must be replaced by a collaborative strategic approach to the
SANDF’s participation in South Africa’s national security and the level of military security that South Africa needs domestically, regionally, and internationally. The missing link in the debate is what the other role players’ functions, responsibilities, and performance in the national security agenda are.

4.4 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA GOING FORWARD

South Africa is not unique in its requirement to deal with national political requirements of national security and military security as a component of these political requirements. The study will endeavour to articulate some strategic considerations for South Africa. South Africa’s strategic future, like any other polity in Africa and in the world, is uncertain and cannot be accurately predicted. The articulated understanding of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and what it means for South Africa’s military security provides a valuable body of knowledge to consider how South Africa’s strategic future could be influenced to realise sufficient military security within its national security approach.

The first strategic approach prudent to South Africa’s strategic future is an honest and inclusive debate and discussion of South Africa’s national security. The disconnect between the NOD military approach, which holds human security as the most appropriate approach to national security, and the strategic truth that a nation utilises its military to maintain the monopoly on force for defence against coercive threats should, after two and a half decades of the existence of the SANDF, be put to bed. The South African polity must honestly ask what South Africa has gained from its broad and wide security approach to human security. Not everything that is important or even a priority in society is better described and explained as a security issue. The debate on national security should be approached as the formulation of a grand strategy for South Africa’s national security to ensure the articulation of who in government and civil society must do what to contribute to the components of national security. An important part of the debate must be what society is willing to pay to enjoy a specified level of national security, and for considering defence for military security.

The debate on national security must include for what and when South Africa is willing to employ coercive measures to achieve the political objectives of national security. The discussion of the use of force (organised violence) and the credible threat of force must define the debate on the need, structure, and required military capabilities for the SANDF as the only legal military force in South Africa. The SANDF remains principally responsible
for the creation and maintenance of military security that is underpinned by force and/or the threat of force. A continuation of the demilitarisation of South Africa is not only unwise, but is set to contribute to domestic and international instability and the insecurity of the South African polity and the African region.

The second strategic approach to a more prudent and flexible response to South Africa’s strategic future is to refocus the professionalisation of South Africa’s military-strategic establishment. Two important considerations emanated from the study’s analysis. The first is that those responsible to produce and manage the strategic responses to South Africa’s future strategic reality need to be prepared through a thorough education in strategic history and strategising. The argument that grave strategic mistakes are far more severe and more difficult to recover from than operational and tactical failures is a good motive to ensure that those who are responsible for the strategic bridge must be the best-suited candidates for this responsibility. The second consideration is to establish a South African model of a balanced objective and subjective civil-military control system for the appointment of military-strategic leaders which will ensure a productive yet professional relationship between the political and military entities in South Africa. The approach will indeed not be without political contestation within the South African context of civil-military relations. The constitutional mandate of the democratically elected president, and his/her appointed executive for defence, to appoint the relevant military-strategic leadership for the DoD is supposedly challenged by a more inclusive parliamentarian approach. The argument is that the Constitution and the law place such prominence on the regulation of the legal use of organised violence (force), by subjecting it to parliamentarian endorsement, that consideration of leadership that will preside over legal violence warrants the scrutiny and endorsement of parliament as the elected representatives of the South African polity. It is considered to strengthen the democratic status of South Africa as a constitutional democracy. This approach is not sufficiently interrogated scientifically and warrants a particular enquiry.

The third strategic approach to be considered is an urgent parliamentarian debate on the South African Defence Review 2015. The fact that the policy is not funded from the fiscus as required in the policy for five years of its existence requires that its validity and feasibility be reconsidered. The debate must include the critical decline of South Africa’s

21 Military-strategic leadership here refers to the appointment of military generals and civil servants of the same level.
defence capabilities as a key motive for the Defence Review 2015. The strategic significance of the South African declining defence capabilities and its imminent loss will only be ignored to the peril of the South African polity. How this matter is going to find its way and place to the political agenda for South Africa is an open question. It is this study’s submission that the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, the Chief of the SANDF, and the Secretary of Defence must shoulder the strategic responsibility to table the issue at the Portfolio Committee on Defence, in cabinet and in parliament. The DoD&MV’s strategic planners must be prudent in their approach to this debate to prepare validated options for a priority approach to the articulated defence ambition in the Defence Review 2015. The questions to answer are what tasks can be performed with the allocated defence budget in the medium term, and what are the strategic implications for those defence tasks that cannot be performed? In approaching prioritisation of the articulated defence tasks, the strategic planners must articulate the tasks in monetary terms from a capability perspective of POSTEDFIT.\textsuperscript{22} It must be clear where capabilities are considered in their collateral utility from their primary function.

A key observation from the analysis in this study is the prominence that the human component carries in the affordability debate of the SANDF. The study previously articulated that a reduction of defence personnel as envisaged from the analysis to correct the force imbalance is not considered to be a constructive approach. The Defence Review 2015 argued for increased personnel requirements and the negative socioeconomic and political implications that such decisions carry make such a decision contentious. A key strategic approach to be considered is the review and revision of the DOD’s employment model. Initial work studies clearly show the cost-efficiency advantages of a part-time employment approach in the current context of the SANDF. The Defence Review 1998 also argued for a more affordable ratio of employment between permanent and part-time employment. The challenges with the current part-time employment model are that it still carries the legacy that the system is not designed for employment but to use members from society for military service when required. The reality is that in a society plagued by unemployment, the Defence Force’s part-time employment can contribute to the livelihood of many South African homes. As such, it carries significant insecurity, as the part-time employment system of the Defence Force has little employment guarantees. The DoD

\textsuperscript{22} The acronym POSTEDFIT stands for an acknowledged framework for capability management as Personnel, Organisation, Sustainment, Training, Equipment, Doctrine, Facilities, Information, and Technology.
needs to take a fresh look at its human employment approach and model. A part-time human resource management model carries the potential for more efficient human employment by changing the human employment ratio from permanent employment to the bulk as part-time employment. Such an approach, if effectively designed, can address many of the human resource-related problems that impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the SANDF. It can also contribute to a more efficient human resource component of the SANDF’s capabilities. It can further contribute to the solution for the prevailing human insecurity dimension of South African society, which is unemployment.

4.5 CONCLUSION

The military-strategic implications of the decline of South Africa’s defence capabilities were critically extracted from government publications, scholarly works, and other written sources within the framework of the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities. The primary research objective (to critically analyse the strategic context of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities) and the secondary research objective (to argue how South Africa’s declining defence capabilities will impact on South Africa’s military security) were achieved through a qualitative social interpretive approach and a thematic analysis of South Africa’s defence directives and South Africa’s declining defence capabilities’ strategic context. This was achieved within a contemporary theoretical understanding of the concepts of military security and strategy as they relate to the defence function in society.

Conscious of the error of being too reductionist of a complex and comprehensive theoretical field, the study focused on military security as a neglected concept to provide an important yet not exclusive angle of view of South Africa’s national security. The study re-emphasised the centrality of force (organised violence) as the foundation for a polity’s need and motive to create and maintain it’s military. This said, the study acknowledged the strategic historic reality that the actual employment of a polity’s military in the execution of force is far less than the utility of the military institution in other roles. This reality, however, does not overrule the founding purpose of the existence and purpose of a polity’s military. It rather serves to extract more value from an expensive political endeavour in times and situations where the use of force is not required. The study agrees with the notion that to have peace, one must be prepared for war.
This research also considered the importance of the academic and functional scientific-related study of strategy and security in the quest for scientific knowledge and practice in national security strategic matters. Security studies and strategic studies are bound to dance with each other on the dancefloor of politics, domestically and internationally. In the analogy, the study viewed security as the reason to dance and strategy as the partner that steers the couple. Irrespective of the prominence of the two who dance in time, politics decides the music that will be danced to. Security matters give the science and policy communities (both not exclusive of the crowd) much to explore and describe, but it fails to give focus or direction to what is important and what needs to be done. Strategy provides the science and policy community much to explain and to consider regarding choices but on its own will dance aimlessly and hazardously through the continuum of strategic time. In the end, politics decides. The polity and its elected or imposed leadership choose the course it is willing to take and pay the wages of sin or prudence. A polity can achieve much with prudent and effective (sufficient) strategic focus for the future. It is, however, also true that a failure in strategy is difficult to recover from or even survive, as adequately displayed in strategic history.

The study made use of South Africa’s strategic context to frame a thematic analysis of South Africa’s declining defence capabilities and ascribed the lion’s share of responsibility for South Africa’s declining defence capabilities to a deliberate political and bureaucratic demilitarisation of South Africa through disinvestment and defunding of the defence function, with a commensurate growing decline of political and academic interest in South Africa’s military. Politics leads in the approach of demilitarisation due to its prominent and dominant position to decide and fund. An idealistic academic perspective fuelled the process from a trusted position of advice, exploiting the opportunity that distrust between the political and military-strategic leadership created at the inception of democracy for South Africa. With NOD principles and a wide and deep approach to the national security of human security coded in the Constitution of 1996 and all subsequent government legal and policy provisions, the scene was set to implement the deliberate demilitarisation of South Africa.

It would be injudicious to ignore the role of other contributing factors such as an inauspicious military-strategic culture that ensued from distrust between the political and military-strategic leadership at the start of democracy in 1994, to the growing subjective political control over the military through political allegiance, and the manifested political and academic disinterest in South Africa’s military affairs as fertile ground for conditions to
see the South African military establishment decline in its prominence. The government’s security focus on human security, which focuses on human development, also continues to put pressure on the defence spending debate after numerous policy disappointments to achieve less-than-required progress in alleviating poverty, unemployment, and inequality. One would lastly mention insufficient economic growth and too many political needs for a too small fiscus to justify required defence spending levels to pursue overambitious military security goals and objectives. The study considered these factors as valid participants in the declining South African defence capabilities but concluded that these play a contributing role only. Military-strategic leadership was bound to choose between priorities of prudent defence for the uncertain future and pressing security needs in the face of decreasing defence spending and disinvestment in South Africa’s defence. The new security focus and defence approach were not honestly and holistically developed as a national security agenda. It rather served as an argument to demilitarise South Africa. Insufficient economic growth does not explain the defence spending decline when the implementation of the defence spending decline is observed as a constant decrease in a percentage of the GDP.

The essence of the military’s role is the control of terrain. It is more prominent in the threat of violence than in actual fighting. This makes achieving political objectives easier. The mere presence of military force is not enough. The military must be able to intimidate and achieve military victory when required to do so. Control of terrain (including sea space and airspace) is important even in times of peace. The government’s inability to protect against piracy, large-scale smuggling, theft of natural resources, violent protests, and the forming of private armies or militias undermine its legitimacy (Chuter, 2011). The study argued that the multifaceted and diverse understanding of modern military security increases the requirements for military capabilities that can deal with increasingly complex and difficult military tasks. The imminent loss of South Africa’s core growth military capabilities will leave South Africa significantly more militarily insecure.
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