

**ARGUMENTATION INVOLVING ACCOUNT-GIVING AND
SELF-PRESENTATION IN TANZANIAN
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES: A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL
PERSPECTIVE**

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the actual argumentative reality in the resolution of differences of opinion involving account-giving and self-presentation in Tanzanian parliamentary debates in Kiswahili. The research data that are analysed in this study come from the Hansard transcripts of the official proceedings of the annual ministerial budget debates which were collected in their original form from the website of the Tanzania's *Bunge* (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list). The study concentrates on three annual parliamentary debates from the last three years of President Kikwete's second term of presidency. Following a systematic reconstruction of the selected data, the analysis focuses on the debates on the constitutional review process in Tanzania, the 'controversial issues' of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and the annual budget speech in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children. In the analysis of the selected debates, the study employs the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation as the main theory and an account-giving model as a complementary theory. The findings of the study indicate that the first three stages of the (critical) discussions in all the three debates exemplify, to a greater or lesser degree, the proposed pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. However, the concluding stage in all the three debates is not materialised in the manner proposed by the theory. As regards the code of conduct, while there are cases where the rules are observed in all the three debates (e.g. the freedom rule), instances of rule violation (e.g. the relevance rule) are also found. The findings further suggest that MPs employ various modes of strategic manoeuvring from all the three aspects of topical potential, audience demand, and presentational devices. For instance, MPs' presentational devices include the strategic use of accusation of inconsistency, evasion, metaphors (and other figurative expressions), narratives, personal attacks, quotations, and rhetorical questions. Concerning the prototypical argumentative patterns, the ministers' prescriptive standpoints are, at the first level of defence, justified by either pragmatic argumentation in coordinative argumentation or pragmatic argumentation and symptomatic argumentation in coordinative or multiple argumentation. In the next levels of defence, pragmatic and symptomatic argumentation are justified by various (sub)types of argumentation, including authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), argumentation from example, and causal argumentation. In regard to the argumentative style, the ministers' argumentative style seems to exemplify a strategic combination of detached and engaged styles and the argumentative style by the opposition's spokespersons and other MPs exemplifies an engaged style. Moreover, all the four account-giving strategies (plus silence) are manifested in the ministers' accounts of failure events as the ministers accept, deny, or evade responsibility.

OPSOMMING

Hierdie studie ondersoek die werklike argumentasie realiteit in die resoluë van meningsverskille en self-presentasie in parlementêre debatte gevoer in Kiswahili in Tanzanië. Die navorsingsdata wat ontleed word vir die studie is onttrek vanuit die Hansard transkripsies van die amptelike verrigtinge van die jaarlikse ministeriële begrotingsdebatte wat in die oorspronklike vorm daarvan versamel is vanaf die webwerf van die Tanzaniese *Bunge* (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list). Die studie fokus op drie jaarlikse parlementêre debatte van die laaste drie jaar van President Kikwete se tweede termyn van sy presidensie. In opvolging van 'n sistematiese rekonstruksie van die geselekteerde data, fokus die analise op die debatte van die Tanzaniese konstitusionele hersieningsproses, die kontroversiële vraagsukke van die Unie van Tanganjika en Zanzibar, die Ministerie en die jaarlikse begrotingstoeppraak in die Ministerie van Gemeenskapontwikkeling, Geslag, en Kinders. In die analise van die geselekteerde toesprake, maak die studie gebruik van die Pragma-dialektiese teorie van argumentasie as die hoofteorie, en 'n verntwoordingdoeningsmodel as ondersteunende teorie. Die bevindings van die studie dui daarop dat die eerste drie fases van 'n kritiese bespreking (die konfrontasie, opening, en argumentasie fases) gemanifesteer word in al drie debatte. Die konklusie fase in al drie debatte word egter nie gemanifesteer op die wyse voorgestel in die teorie nie. Rakende die gedragskode, dui die studie daarop dat, terwyl die reëls (bv. Die vryheidsreël) nagekom word in al drie debatte, word gevalle ook gevind van die oortreding van die reëls (bv. Die relevansiëreël). Voorts word gevind dat die lede van die parlement 'n verskeidenheid wyses van strategiese manuevrering inspan van al drie aspekte van onderwerpspotensiaal, gehooreise, en presentasiemeganismes. Lede van die parlement se presentasiemeganismes sluit byvoorbeeld in die strategiese gebruik van aantygings van inkonsekwentheid, ontwyking, metafore, (en ander beeldspraak), narratiewe, persoonlike aanvalle, aanhalings en retoriese vrae. Met betrekking tot die prototipiese patrone, word die ministers se preskriptiewe standpunte op die eerste vlak van verdediging, geregverdig deur ander sub-tipes van argumentasie, outoriteitsargumentasie vanuit statistieke, argumentasie vanuit voorbeeld, en kousale argumentasie. Wat betref argumentasiestyl, blyk dit dat die argumentasiestyl van ministers 'n strategiese kombinasie vertoon van onbetrokke en betrokke argumentasiestyle. Al vier die verantwoordingsstrategieë (asook stilte) word gemanifesteer in ministers se verantwoording van mislukte gebeure soos hulle verantwoordelikheid aanvaar, ontken of vermy.

IKISIRI

Utafiti huu unachunguza ujenzi halisi wa hoja katika utatuzi wa tofauti za kimaoni ukijumuisha utoaji wa maelezo ya utetezi na kujiwasilisha kwenye mijadala ya Bunge la Tanzania katika lugha ya Kiswahili. Data zinazochambuliwa katika utafiti huu zinatoka kwenye kumbukumbu rasmi za bunge za mijadala ya bajeti za wizara za kila mwaka zilizokusanywa kutoka kwenye tovuti ya Bunge la Tanzania (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list). Utafiti huu unachambua mijadala ya bunge ya kila mwaka katika miaka mitatu ya mwisho ya muhula wa pili wa serikali ya Rais Kikwete. Kufuatia uchakataji makini wa data zilizochaguliwa, uchambuzi unajikita kwenye mijadala kuhusu mchakato wa mabadiliko ya katiba nchini Tanzania, ‘masuala tata’ yanayohusu Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar, na hotuba ya bajeti ya mwaka ya Wizara ya Maendeleo ya Jamii, Jinsia na Watoto. Katika uchambuzi wa mijadala iliyochaguliwa, utafiti huu unatumia nadharia changanuzi ya kipragmatiki kama nadharia kuu na nadharia ya utoaji maelezo (ya utetezi) kama nadharia kamilishi. Matokeo ya uchambuzi yanaonesha kuwa hatua tatu za awali za majadiliano (ya kidadisi) katika mijadala yote mitatu zinajidhihirisha, kwa kiasi kikubwa au kwa kiasi fulani, kama inavyopendekezwa na nadharia iliyotumika. Lakini hatua ya hitimisho ya majadiliano hayo katika mijadala yote mitatu haijitokezi kama inavyopendekezwa na nadharia hiyo. Kuhusu kanuni za maadili, pamoja na kuwepo kwa mifano inayoonesha kanuni kuzingatiwa (mf. kanuni ya uhuru), mifano inayoonesha kanuni kuvunjwa (mf. kanuni ya uhalisia) pia inajitokeza. Aidha, wabunge wanatumia mbinu mbalimbali za kujinadi kimkakati kutoka kwenye vipengele vyote vitatu, yaani uchaguzi wa mada, matakwa ya hadhira, na mbinu za uwasilishaji. Kwa mfano, mbinu za uwasilishaji zinajumuisha matumizi ya kimkakati ya tuhuma za kujikanganya, ukwepaji hoja, sitiari, masimulizi, kumshambulia (mtu kwa maneno), kunukuu, na maswali yasiyohitaji majibu. Kuhusu mipangilio halisi ya hoja, misimamo elekezi ya mawaziri katika ngazi ya kwanza ya utetezi inahalalishwa kwa kutumia hoja ya kipragmatiki katika muundo wa hoja pacha au hoja ya kipragmatiki ikiambatana na hoja dalili katika muundo wa hoja nyingi au hoja pacha. Katika ngazi zinazofuata za utetezi, hoja ya kipragmatiki na hoja dalili zinatetewa kwa kutumia aina mbalimbali za hoja, kama vile hoja (mamlaka za) takwimu, hoja mifano, na hoja sababishi. Kuhusu mtindo wa kujenga hoja, mawaziri wanaonesha kutumia mtindo wa kujitenga ukiambatana kimkakati na mtindo wa kujihusisha. Mtindo wa kujenga hoja wa wasemaji wa upinzani na wabunge wengine unadhihirisha mtindo wa kujihusisha. Aidha, aina zote nne za mikakati ya kutoa maelezo ya kujitetea (pamoja na ukimya) zinajidhihirisha kwenye maelezo ya mawaziri kuhusu matukio ya kushindwa huku wakikubali, wakikataa, au wakikwepa uwajibikaji.

DEDICATION

To my father
Phares Hezron Msagalla
(1956-1992)
Your memory lives on

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AG	Attorney General
AU	African Union
BoT	Bank of Tanzania
BRELA	Business Registrations and Licensing Agency
BRN	Big Results Now
CA	Constituent Assembly
CCBRT	Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Tanzania
CCM	<i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</i>
CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CDCF	Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund
CDF	Chief of Defence Forces
CDP	Community development practitioner/professional
CDS	Critical discourse studies
CDTI	Community Development Training Institute
Chadema	<i>Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</i>
CRC	Constitutional Review Commission
CUF	Civic United Front
DC	District Commissioner
DCF	District constitutional fora
EAC	East African Community
EACB	East African Currency Board
FDC	Folk Development College
GBS	General Budget Support
GBV	Gender-based violence
Govt	Government
Hon.	Honourable
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGP	Inspector General of Police
JFC	Joint Finance Commission
JKT	<i>Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa</i>
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KCMC	<i>Kilimanjaro</i> Christian Medical Centre
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MEO	<i>Mtaa</i> Executive Officer
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
MTZ	Mainland Tanzania
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NBC	National Bank of Commerce
NEC	National Executive Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPACP	National Plan of Action for Child Participation
PAYE	Pay-As-You-Earn

PDA	Political discourse analysis
RGZ	Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
RITA	Registration, Insolvency and Trusteeship Agency
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Co-Operative Society
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
TBC	Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation
TCAA	Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority
TCDTI	Tengeru Community Development Training Institute
TCRA	Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority
TCU	Tanzania Commission for Universities
TICD	Tengeru Institute of Community Development
TPDF	Tanzania People's Defence Force(s)
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority
TZS	Tanzanian Shilling(s)
TWB	Tanzania Women's Bank
Ukawa	<i>Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi</i>
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
VEO	Village Executive Officer
VETA	Vocational Education Training Authority
VICOBA	Village Community Banks
WAMA	<i>Wanawake na Maendeleo</i>
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WDF	Women Development Fund
WEE	Women's Economic Empowerment
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This study examines the argumentative reality in the management of differences of opinion involving account-giving and self-presentation in Tanzanian parliamentary debates in Kiswahili. The study employs the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren, 2018; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) to investigate the empirical argumentative reality in the resolution process and account-giving strategies (Mokapela, 2008; Schönbach, 1980, 1990) with regard to responsibility depiction (Solin & Östman, 2016) in the selected annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament¹. This introductory chapter presents a background to the study (1.2), problem statement (1.3), objectives of the study and research questions (1.4), theoretical points of departure (1.5), research design and methods (1.6), significance of the study (1.7), and organisation of the study (1.8). The concluding remarks of this chapter are given in section 1.9.

1.2 Background to the study

Parliamentary discourse analysis has become a prominent linguistic field over the past two decades with respect to research on the institutional discourse in different parliaments in the world. As observed by Jakaza (2013) and Nyanda (2016), a number of studies employing different theoretical perspectives, including argumentation theory, have been conducted to investigate parliamentary discourse in European, American, and Middle Eastern parliaments. These studies include Andone (2016), Bayley (2004), Bayley, Bevitori, & Zoni (2004), Bevitori (2004), Dibattista (2004), Garssen (2013), Ihnen Jory (2010), Ilie (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e), Miller (2004), Mohammed (2008, 2010), Ornatowski (2010), Pekonen (2012), Tonnard (2010, 2011), van Dijk (2004, 2010), Vasta (2004), and Zafiu (2012), among others. However, despite the increasing importance of investigating parliamentary discourse, the linguistic properties of argumentative discourse in African parliaments, from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, are still under-researched. In light of the growing prominence of parliamentary discourse analysis as a subfield in the wider field of political discourse analysis, the need to investigate argumentative discourse in African parliaments is of crucial importance.

¹ The “Tanzanian parliament” in this study refers to the National Assembly of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Some of the recent studies on African parliamentary discourse have focused on ‘appraisal and evaluation’ of the discourse and its representation in ‘news reporting’ (Jakaza, 2013), ‘argument quality and strategic manoeuvring’ (Nyanda, 2016), the ‘linguistic features of persuasion’ (Rutechura, 2018), and *ad hominem* attacks in argumentation (Amakali, Kangira, & Ekanjume-Ilongo, 2019). Jakaza (2013), for one, integrated the appraisal framework, the extended pragma-dialectical approach, and the ‘controversy analysis’ to examine the linguistic properties in Zimbabwean parliamentary discourse and their representation in news reporting, using both a corpus of debates and speeches for the 2009 and 2010 period and a corpus of newspaper reports on the debates and speeches in the same period. According to the author, the findings on the attitudinal values of affect, judgement, and appreciation indicate a variation in density, nature, and the way these values manifest depending on the debate, speech, or newspaper article. Further findings reveal that, apart from the tendency that the debates were found to be ‘dichotomised’ either across ‘party lines’ or ‘committee basis’, the dichotomisation was also observed in the representation of the debates in newspaper articles (Jakaza, 2013). In addition, the researcher gives evidence of variation in the use of ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ evaluation both in parliamentary discourse and in its representation in newspaper articles (Jakaza, 2013). The present study similarly and significantly adopts the pragma-dialectical theory but it also builds on the account-giving model in the context of Tanzanian parliamentary discourse to investigate argumentation involving account-giving and self-presentation with the purpose of determining the theoretical properties of argumentation involving these dimensions. The study further examines how the acceptance or non-acceptance of responsibility is depicted in the ministers’ political accounts in Tanzanian parliamentary debates.

Employing the pragma-dialectical theory to analyse two ‘annual budget speeches’ and the related debates in the 2011/2012 fiscal year in the Tanzanian parliament, Nyanda (2016) focused on the manifestation of three (sub)types of argumentation – authority argumentation, argumentation from example, and argumentation from cause and effect – as well as strategic manoeuvring. He observed that the three (sub)types of argumentation varied in the extent to which they were used by the ministers and (other) members of parliament (henceforth MPs). While authority argumentation and argumentation from example were not widely employed, argumentation from cause and effect was frequently utilised. The findings further indicate that ministers and MPs framed their arguments in a way that would convince their target audience to accept them. While Nyanda’s study sheds some light on the use of the three (sub)types of argumentation and strategic manoeuvring by ministers and MPs in the Tanzanian parliament,

the present study extends the scope of research in the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse by examining the extent to which the resolution process in the parliamentary debates exemplifies the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion and identifying the prototypical argumentative patterns as well as argumentative style in the annual ministerial budget debates. This study further explores how Tanzanian cabinet ministers employ linguistic resources to accept or deny responsibility as they give accounts of failure events in the selected parliamentary debates. These debates are selected from the last three fiscal years of the second term of President Kikwete's presidency, a period of government which constitutes a holistically delimitable government period, just prior to the 2015 general elections. In addition, in contrast to Nyanda's (2016) study, this study adopts a framework that integrates the pragma-dialectical theory and the account-giving model in order to provide a more detailed account of both the resolution process and account-giving strategies in relation to acceptance or non-acceptance of responsibility.

In his study, Rutechura (2018) employed Fairclough's model of critical discourse analysis to examine parliamentary debates involving members from two 'opposing camps' on the structure of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in the 2014 Constituent Assembly in Tanzania with the purpose of ascertaining the ways through which 'linguistic features of persuasion' were employed to frame politicians' argumentative moves in favour of the in-group opinions with respect to the out-group views of the Union structure and the possible socio-political effects of the linguistic features on the public. According to the author, the findings of this study demonstrate that in-group parliamentarians negatively described out-group opinions and used ethos to positively describe their own views regarding the structure of the Union. While linguistic features of persuasion can be discussed as devices of strategic manoeuvring from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, it is unclear whether the parliamentarians maintained a delicate balance or 'crossed the boundaries' of strategic manoeuvring. In contrast with Rutechura's (2018) study, the current research examines the use of these argumentative theoretical devices with regard to derailments of strategic manoeuvring, account-giving, self-presentation, and responsibility depiction.

Furthermore, using the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation as (part of) their theoretical framework, Amakali et al. (2019) investigated the manifestation of five forms of *ad hominem* or personal attacks in the Namibian parliamentary discourse. The five forms which were considered to realise personal attacks are antithesis, insults (or invectives), provocation, rhetorical questions, as well as sarcasm. The authors show that MPs in the Namibian parliament

tend to use such *ad hominem* forms to get their opponents (or fellow debaters) as well as their (indirect) audience (the media and members of the public) to accept their arguments, thus win the discussions in the parliamentary debates. Although the authors do not seem to favour the term *strategic manoeuvring* in their study, their analysis seems to show how MPs attempt to manoeuvre strategically in order to win the (critical) discussions to their advantage. Based on their analysis, it cannot be clearly established whether the MPs successfully combined the rhetorical aim with the dialectical goal through their ‘strategic’ use of the *ad hominem* forms. In the present study, *ad hominem* or personal attacks are examined as presentational devices of strategic manoeuvring. Therefore, the present study attempts to establish the extent to which MPs in Tanzanian parliamentary debates achieve both the rhetorical effectiveness and the normative standards of reasonableness in their use of personal attacks. Other studies on African parliamentary discourse are briefly discussed in chapter two (see section 2.8).

It is generally clear from the previous studies that research on African parliamentary discourse has given little attention to the argumentative reality involving account-giving and self-presentation within the framework of argumentation theory. An in-depth study on argumentation involving account-giving and self-presentation in African parliamentary discourse is therefore required to understand how the linguistic properties in African languages, particularly Kiswahili, are skilfully and strategically employed to manage differences of opinion, account for failure events, and accept or deny responsibility when cabinet ministers and MPs make argumentative moves in support of or against the standpoints put forward or called into question in parliamentary debates.

1.3 Statement of the research problem

With the purpose of exploring the linguistic insights from the actual argumentative discourse involving account-giving and self-presentation in African parliaments, this study examines the extent to which the empirical argumentative reality in the management of differences of opinion in Tanzanian parliamentary debates in Kiswahili exemplifies the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion. The study further investigates the manner in which Tanzanian cabinet ministers account for failure events, with respect to acceptance or non-acceptance of responsibility, in parliamentary debates. To this end, the present study utilizes a framework comprising the pragma-dialectical theory and account-giving model in order to provide a more in-depth account of the argumentative reality in the resolution of differences of opinion and the employment of modes of strategic manoeuvring, including self-presentation strategies, when ministers and MPs advance argumentation relating to political accounts.

1.4 Objectives of the study and research questions

This section presents both research objectives and research questions of the study.

1.4.1 Research objectives

The aim of this study is to investigate the empirical argumentative reality in the management of differences of opinion in the selected annual ministerial debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

To achieve this goal, the study has set six specific research objectives as follows:

- (i) To examine the extent to which the resolution of differences of opinion in the selected annual ministerial budget debates exemplifies the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion and its various rules
- (ii) To establish the extent to which the strategic manoeuvrings of topical potential, audience adaptation, and presentational choices are successfully realised in the MPs' argumentative moves within the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament
- (iii) To identify the prototypical argumentative patterns that come into being as a result of realising the institutional point in the selected annual ministerial budget debates
- (iv) To investigate the manner in which the *detached* and *engaged* argumentative styles are realised in the selected annual ministerial budget debates
- (v) To identify the account-giving strategies in the ministers' accounts of failure events
- (vi) To explain how the responsibility for a failure event (or the failure event itself) is accepted, denied, or evaded in the ministers' accounts of failure events.

1.4.2 Research questions

Based on the specific research objectives, this study addresses the following specific research questions:

- (i) To what extent does the resolution of differences of opinion in the selected annual ministerial budget debates exemplify the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion and its various rules?
- (ii) To what extent are the strategic manoeuvrings of topical potential, audience adaptation, and presentational devices successfully realised in the MPs' argumentative moves within the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament?
- (iii) What prototypical argumentative patterns come into being as a result of realising the institutional point in the selected annual ministerial budget debates?

- (iv) How are the *detached* and *engaged* argumentative styles realised in the selected annual ministerial budget debates?
- (v) Which account-giving strategies are realised in the ministers' accounts of failure events?
- (vi) How is the responsibility for a failure event (or the failure event itself) accepted, denied, or evaded in the ministers' accounts of failure events?

1.5 Theoretical points of departure

The theoretical framework adopted for this study is two-fold. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is employed to investigate the empirical argumentative reality in resolving differences of opinion and the account-giving model is used to examine the ministers' accounts of failure events with respect to acceptance and non-acceptance of responsibility.

In the pragma-dialectical theory, argumentation is viewed as a means of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits by testing the acceptability of the standpoints expressed by one party against the other party's criticisms through a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003). The critical discussion in pragma-dialectics is realised through four pragma-dialectical stages before the result of the discussion is reached. In the *confrontation stage*, a difference of opinion manifests itself through an opposition between a party's standpoints and non-acceptance of the expressed standpoints by the other party. In the *opening stage*, the participating parties assume the discussion roles of *protagonist* and *antagonist* and establish the material and procedural starting points of the critical discussion. However, these discussion roles may be exchanged in the argumentation stage depending on the nature of the critical discussion. In the *argumentation stage*, the protagonist effectively and reasonably tries to convince the antagonist of the acceptability of their standpoints and the antagonist reacts critically to the protagonist's standpoints and supporting argumentation. The result of the critical discussion is established by both parties in the *concluding stage* (van Eemeren, 2018; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). As arguers attempt to resolve a difference of opinion through the four discussion stages, they are expected to observe certain rules of the code of conduct, as discussed in chapter three (see section 3.4.3). Any 'argumentative' move that violates any of these rules at any discussion stage is in this theory deemed to be fallacious (van Eemeren et al., 2014). Apart from the discussion stages and the rules for critical discussion, this theory has several other variables that can be investigated in argumentative discourse. However, the present study pays attention to a few relevant components as discussed in chapter

three. These components include argumentation structure, argumentation schemes, strategic manoeuvring, prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style.

To provide a detailed account of the argumentative reality in the resolution of differences of opinion in relation to the ministers' political accounts during the annual parliamentary debates, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is complemented by the account-giving model. The account-giving model refers to the process and strategies of giving accounts of failure events in various communicative contexts. The process of giving an account involves an episode consisting of four phases. The first phase is the existence of a *failure event*. In this phase, the protagonist may be accused of incomplete attainment of specific goals, inconsistency, or incompetence. The second phase is *reproach*, where the antagonist asks the protagonist to account for the failure event of which they are accused. The third phase is *account*, where the protagonist offers explanation for the failure event. In the last phase, *evaluation*, the antagonist examines whether the protagonist's account of the failure event is acceptable. The four account-giving phases can be compared (but do not necessarily correspond) to the four pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. It is, however, not the purpose of this study to examine how the four phases of an account episode are realised in the actual argumentative discourse in parliamentary debates. Instead, the study examines the ministers' deployment of *account-giving strategies* in their argumentative moves. The account-giving model proposes at least four strategies that can be employed by the protagonist to account for a failure event. These account-giving strategies are *excuses*, *concessions*, *justifications*, and *refusals* (or *denials*) (Schönbach, 1980, 1990). Other scholars have also classified *silence* as the fifth account-giving strategy after the previous four (McLaughlin, Cody, & O'Hair, 1983). These strategies are of particular interest in the presented study because, as ministers (or MPs) attempt to defend or attack a certain standpoint, they may be expected to employ (some of) these strategies. In this study, the account-giving model is employed in conjunction with the notion of responsibility in political discourse, as is further discussed in chapter two (see section 2.7).

1.6 Research design and methods

This section focuses on the data collection procedure, nature of the selected data, and data analysis as reconstruction.

1.6.1 Data collection procedure

The Hansard transcripts of the official proceedings of Tanzanian parliamentary debates in their original form are publicly available on the Tanzanian parliament's website (Bwenge, 2010; Nyanda, 2016). Thus, research data for the present study were collected from the publicly published parliamentary Hansard transcripts in Kiswahili. Specifically, I retrieved the annual budget debates from the Tanzanian parliament's website (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list) in August 2018 and selected the annual ministerial budget debates from the last three fiscal years of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete's second term of presidency (2013-2015). I then studied all the annual budget debates available in each of the three years and selected for analysis only three annual parliamentary debates that could provide rich data on argumentation, political accounts, responsibility depiction, and self-presentation in each of the three fiscal years. The selected debates are the debate on the budget speech by the Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs in the 2013/14 fiscal year, the debate on the budget speech by the Minister of State – Vice President's Office (Union) in the 2014/15 fiscal year, and the debate on the budget speech by the Minister for Community, Gender and Children in the 2015/16 fiscal year. Since this study focuses on the last three years of President Kikwete's second term of presidency, I consider the selection of the three annual ministerial budget debates significant because a single debate covers a single fiscal year. The selected research data were later translated into English for analysis and evaluation.

1.6.2 Nature of the selected data

It is not uncommon for politicians to be involved in political scandals (Smith, Powers, & Suarez, 2005) or to be accused of failure events, including incomplete execution of ministerial objectives and plans, failure to fulfil election pledges, and accusations of inconsistency or incompetence. If this happens and politicians fail to employ effective political accounts to explain the failure events and restore their public image or that of their party, it may negatively affect their prospects for re-election (Smith et al., 2005), especially when elections are close. I consider the selected debates in the last three years of President Kikwete's second term of presidency to most likely be rich in argumentation, political accounts, and self-presentation for the reason that members of the ruling party are likely to make attempts to explain failure events and restore the image of the ruling party as they seek re-election while members of the opposition attempt to tarnish the ruling party's image as they seek to replace the party in power. For instance, the debate on the budget speech by the Minister of Constitution and Legal Affairs in the 2013/14 fiscal year focuses on the constitutional review process in Tanzania which

resulted in a heated debate over the manner in which the process was coordinated by the ministry through the Constitutional Review Commission of Tanzania. The debate on the budget speech by the Minister of State (Union) in the 2014/15 fiscal year realises various controversies and disagreements over the (structure of the) Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the coordination of the Union matters. Moreover, the annual parliamentary debate in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children in the 2015/16 fiscal year raises various disagreements between the responsible ministers and MPs over the performance of the ministry in the last fiscal year and its objectives or plans for the next year. In this debate, the government is accused by the opposition of having failed to fulfil its election pledges, including the promise to improve people's living conditions under the famous slogan *Maisha bora kwa kila Mtanzania* (Better life for every Tanzanian). Thus, with regard to the constitutional review process, the (structure of the) Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the status of community development, and the political situation in Tanzania during the last three years of President Kikwete's last term of presidency, the investigation of argumentative reality, account-giving strategies, and self-presentation in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament for this period is highly significant.

1.6.3 Data analysis as reconstruction

Based on the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse, in the analysis of the research data, only parts of the selected debates that lead to the resolution of a difference of opinion are analysed. Attention is also given to the parts of the debates that manifest account-giving strategies, (non-)acceptance of responsibility, as well as self-presentation strategies.

The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation offers four analytic operations in reconstructing argumentative discourse in various communicative activity types including parliamentary debates. These analytic transformations are *addition*, *deletion*, *permutation*, and *substitution* (van Eemeren et al., 2014). These operations are applicable to the reconstruction of the argumentative discourse that accommodates the management of differences of opinion in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

Starting with *addition*, which functions as a process of completion, the selected argumentative discourse is supplemented with all relevant elements that are left implicit. These elements include unexpressed premises, unexpressed standpoints, presuppositions, and some other ellipted structures. Argumentation structure and argumentation schemes are also reconstructed based on this analytic operation. Applying the operation of *deletion*, all parts of the debates

that do not constitute the resolution process are left out of consideration. These parts include, but not limited to, unnecessary repetitions and interruptions. Relying on *permutation*, the order of elements in the selected discourse are re-arranged to make them appear in the order that best suits the resolution process. This include, but not limited to, putting argumentative elements in their relevant discussion stage. *Substitution* is also employed to ensure that all elements are relevant for the resolution process. Thus, ambiguous or vague constructions are replaced with clear, unambiguous formulations (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). The four analytic operations in the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse are also discussed in chapter three (see section 3.5.1).

As a result of applying these operations, the analysed argumentative discourse in this study may slightly (or even considerably) differ from the selected annual ministerial budget debates as they appear in the *Bunge's* website (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list). For instance, in the first debate in the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs, the analysis of argumentative discourse focuses on the heated debate over the coordination of the constitutional review process in Tanzania, as discussed in chapter four. In the second debate on the speech by the Minister of State (Union and environment), I concentrate on the argumentative discourse on the 'controversial issues' of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. In the last annual parliamentary debate in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children, I focus on only those elements which are instrumental in the resolution process.

1.7 Significance of the study

This study is significant for developing research interests in the analysis of the empirical argumentative discourse in African parliaments from the perspective of pragma-dialectics (and other theoretical perspectives). With a focus on the Tanzania's *Bunge* and other parliaments in Africa, scholars interested in argumentation theory can conduct research to investigate various aspects of argumentation and deliberation in African parliamentary discourse. Some areas for further research, in the context of Tanzanian parliamentary discourse, are recommended in chapter seven (see section 7.4).

Furthermore, the analysis of prototypical argumentative patterns and argumentative styles as the pragma-dialectical facets of argumentation in context in the selected debates in the Tanzanian parliament provides original contribution to both research on argumentative discourse in African parliaments and research in the wider field of argumentation theory and the subfield of pragma-dialectics.

Moreover, the findings of the present study, as captured in chapter seven, consolidate the established research knowledge in the analysis of Tanzanian political discourse in recent years, following studies by Nyanda (2016), Keya (2018), Rutechura (2018), Mwombeki (2019), and Mathayo (2020), to mention a few but most recent ones.

1.8 Organisation of the study

This dissertation is organised in seven chapters. Chapter one presents a background to the study, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study and research questions, a brief description of the theoretical grounding, data collection procedure, data analysis as reconstruction, significance of the study, organisation of the study, and the concluding remarks of the chapter.

Chapter two provides a review of both theoretical and empirical literature in the field of political discourse analysis and the subfield of parliamentary discourse analysis, account-giving, and responsibility depiction. Chapter three explains a two-fold theoretical framework. Specifically, this chapter discusses the key dimensions, principles, and properties of pragma-dialectics and the manner they are employed in the present study.

The next three chapters (four, five, and six) present the analyses of the selected annual ministerial budget debates. Specifically, chapter four analyses the reconstructed debate on the constitutional review process in Tanzania. Chapter five discusses the reconstructed debate on the speech by the Minister of State – Vice President’s Office (Union), and chapter six focuses on the annual budget debate in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children. In each of these chapters, I analyse the argumentation structures, argumentation schemes, critical discussion stages, violations of the code of conduct, modes of strategic manoeuvring and self-presentation strategies, prototypical argumentative patterns, argumentative style, as well as account-giving strategies and (non-)acceptance of responsibility.

The findings of this study in relation to the research questions and objectives of the study are presented in chapter seven. This chapter also presents a summary of the study, scope of the study, areas for further research, and the conclusions to be drawn.

1.9 Conclusion

I have argued in the introduction that this study examines the empirical argumentative reality in the management of differences of opinion in the Tanzanian parliamentary debates. In the background to the study, I have reviewed a few specific studies on African parliamentary

discourse. This review was followed by the statement of the research problem. I then presented the objectives of the study and the research questions this study attempts to answer. Next, I briefly demonstrated the theoretical framework of the study, in which the pragma-dialectical theory is employed together with the account-giving model in the analysis of the selected data. Furthermore, I indicated that the research data for the presented study were collected in their original form from the website of the Tanzania's *Bunge* and are analysed through the four analytic operations of the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse (addition, deletion, permutation, and substitution). This was followed by a brief description of the significance of the study. I then described how this dissertation is organised. The next chapter focuses on the key issues and perspectives on parliamentary discourse as a broad genre of political discourse.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ON PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews key issues and perspectives from previous research on parliamentary discourse. Since parliamentary discourse is a genre of political discourse, the chapter begins with a brief discussion of political discourse as presented in section 2.2. This section focuses on a brief review of political discourse analysis, perspectives on political discourse, the nature of political discourse, and (sub)genres of political discourse. Section 2.3 discusses parliamentary discourse and describes parliamentary debates and parliamentary speeches. Section 2.4 explores four perspectives on parliamentary discourse, namely parliamentary discourse as institutional discourse, as deliberative discourse, as public discourse, and parliamentary discourse as political dialogue, in which both cooperative and conflictive nature of parliamentary dialogues are discussed. Section 2.5 focuses on a review of argumentation in parliamentary discourse and section 2.6 discusses the argumentative (or rhetorical) strategies that can be employed by politicians in parliamentary debates, including the use of definitions, narratives, evasion, and metaphors. Section 2.7 discusses aspects of account-giving and responsibility depiction in parliamentary discourse. A few studies on African parliamentary discourse are briefly reviewed in section 2.8. Finally, conclusions of the chapter are drawn in section 2.9.

2.2 Political discourse

Political discourse is one of the major domains of research in (critical) discourse studies and argumentation theory. This section presents an overview of political discourse analysis, perspectives on political discourse, the nature of political discourse, and various (sub)genres of political discourse.

2.2.1 Political discourse analysis

Political discourse analysis and political communication research have gained a considerable amount of attention from a wide range of scholars from different fields, including communication studies, (critical) discourse studies, legal studies, linguistics, media studies, philosophy, political science, pragmatics, psychology, and sociology (Fairclough, 2006; Fetzer, 2013; Wodak & Forchtner, 2018). In critical discourse studies (henceforth CDS) and linguistics in general, studies on political discourse and the complex link between language

and politics include Chilton (2004), Joseph (2004), Wodak (2009), Reyes (2011), Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), Cap & Okulska (2013), Wilson (2015), and Filardo-Llamas & Boyd (2018), to name a few studies. More recently, following van Eemeren's (2002) study on democracy and argumentation, several pragma-dialecticians, and argumentation theorists in general, have also shown interest in analysing argumentation in various argumentative practices of political discourse, including parliamentary debates. Pragma-dialectical studies on political discourse are discussed in chapter three.

The notion of *political discourse analysis* (henceforward PDA) has been described as 'ambiguous' (van Dijk, 1997), in the sense that it may have more than one interpretation. Van Dijk (1997) further offers at least two interpretations of the notion. First, in the simplest terms, PDA is concerned with the analysis of political discourse. Second, especially in the contemporary CDS, it is understood "as a political approach to discourse and discourse analysis" (van Dijk, 1997, p. 11). On the basis of these two interpretations, PDA is not only concerned with political discourse but it also incorporates a critical dimension (van Dijk, 1997). Apart from having different interpretations of PDA, another ambiguity in the notion of PDA lies on the interpretation of the term *political discourse*. However, according to Fairclough (2006), a "relatively broad view" of political discourse concentrates on how politics is conducted in the political sphere "as distinct and partially institutionalised area of social life, and therefore excludes household politics and the politics of particular organizations, such as schools or workplaces" (p. 33). From this viewpoint, analysing political discourse means examining how politicians in different political positions use language (or some other semiotic systems) to make decisions about the right thing to do through political deliberation or imposition (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012; van Eemeren, 2013; Wodak & Forchtner, 2018). Furthermore, the analysis and classification of political discourse depends on the specific political contexts. Fetzer (2013) describes three ways in which political discourse can be analysed or classified. First, political discourse can be analysed as institutional discourse. As a type of institutional discourse, political discourse differs from day-to-day conversation in the sense that it is usually practised in institutional settings (e.g. in parliament) and is thus preconditioned by institutional requirements (including topic selection and turn-taking system). Second, political discourse can be categorised as media discourse and is thus subject to the media's contextual requirements (as in the case of broadcast political interviews). Third, political discourse can be described as public discourse "with a public conversational record differing from private-domain-anchored discourse with its less constrained contextual

requirements” (p. 1). However, this classification is by no means clear-cut. For instance, as an institutional discourse, a broadcast parliamentary debate can be described both as media discourse and as public discourse.

In the new approach to PDA, drawing on both critical discourse analysis (hereafter CDA) and argumentation theory as developed by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), political discourse is viewed primarily as a form of argumentation which involves practical argumentation or practical reasoning in support of (or against) a particular action, decision, or plan (Fairclough, 2018; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Neagu, 2013). In pragma-dialectics, practical argumentation is manifested by a subtype of causal argumentation known as pragmatic argumentation and by (complex) problem-solving argumentation. Apart from pragmatic argumentation and problem-solution argumentation, other (sub)types of argumentation which prototypically occur in political discourse include, but not limited to, argumentation from example, argumentation by analogy, authority argumentation, and majority argumentation (Andone, 2016; Brambilla, 2020; Garssen, 2016, 2017; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2010). With the use of practical argumentation, the goal of political discourse is therefore to reinforce specific actions or decisions through argumentative means, rather than merely describing events in the world (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). Thus, in order to contribute to “the constitution of a new reality”, PDA should interpret specific events in the world and formulate understandings (Okulska & Cap, 2010, p. 4). After the construction of a new reality or value system, political discourse is aimed at engaging “the people in reconsidering their attitudes, interests, and beliefs with a view to changing their perspective over the future” (Neagu, 2013, p. 3). Reyes (2011, p. 2) adds that ruling political leaders “have the ‘opportunity’ to shape, construe or challenge the ideologies shared within the audiences”. Thus, this study sets out to examine how this is achieved through (political) argumentation in Tanzanian parliamentary debates. To this end, PDA is thus understood in this study as a critical analysis of political dialogue involving practical argumentation and/or other (sub)types of argumentation between (two) opposing parties or political groups as they attempt to resolve a difference of opinion or reach a deliberation in a specific political platform, such as a parliamentary debate. Although this interpretation is most relevant for the present study, other interpretations of PDA cannot be ignored as they offer further insights in understanding the nature of argumentation in political discourse.

Since language is a powerful means of political communication and “becomes more powerful when it is used by powerful people” (Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018, p. 315), such as cabinet

ministers and MPs, PDA is also viewed as the analysis of language use in specific political contexts. Language plays a central role in understanding and shaping power relations in the world (Okulska & Cap, 2010) and is strategically employed by politicians in various political practices to achieve their specific political goals. Politicians usually exploit specific linguistic devices to convince their (direct and indirect) audience of the acceptability of their political actions, decisions, and plans (Neagu, 2013). Thus, PDA involves primarily the examination of politicians' choices of linguistic resources when they make specific deliberations or advance argumentation for such deliberations. Since language is the most (and probably the only) powerful tool of political argumentation and persuasion, linguists have always been interested in examining why politicians prefer specific linguistic forms to others (Álvarez-Benito & Íñigo-Mora, 2009). This is based on the fact that political actions, decisions, and plans are primarily communicated through the use of language. For this reason, language and politics are closely connected and affect each other in the sense that language shapes politics and is, at the same time, shaped by politics. Although some other semiotic systems of communication may be involved, political activity cannot be practised without the use of language. Therefore, language constitutes political discourse (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012; Chilton & Schäffner, 2002; Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018). Berlin & Fetzer (2012) further argue that “[b]oth macro and micropolitics require language as a means of communication in order to exercise governmental control and to communicate felicitously in the political arena” (p. 5). Political language can be used by politicians and other political actors, such as journalists and concerned citizens. According to Fetzer (2013), while politicians use language to practise politics, other political actors (the media and ordinary citizens) use language to discuss politics and political actions. Since political argumentation in parliamentary debates is also communicated through the use of language, the present study examines the use of language by Tanzanian MPs in advancing argumentation in support of or against a particular standpoint in the annual parliamentary debates.

2.2.2 Perspectives on political discourse

Understanding different perspectives on political practices is instrumental in understanding how politics is practised in parliament. The practice of politics can be viewed from three – often overlapping – perspectives (Fetzer, 2013). In the first place, political discourse is conceptualised as discourse from above. From this perspective, the practice of politics (and its analysis) is linked to “the professional management of politics in society” as realised by “professional politics” and “leading professional politicians and their managerial support

systems” (Fetzer, 2013, p. 9). Fetzer (2013) further maintains that parliamentary discourse, including parliamentary debates, is the best example of political discourse from above. In a similar vein, Fairclough (2006) argues that this perspective is associated with the political system, which includes parliaments, political parties, elections, and political communication structures.

In the second perspective, political discourse is seen as mediated discourse and politics is thus considered to have a “thoroughly mediatised character” (Fairclough, 2006, p. 34). This perspective generally refers to the practice of politics in the media as an important platform for the general public to experience politics (Lauerbach & Fetzer, 2007). Fetzer (2013) adds that, in mediated discourse, the transmission of political content is facilitated through ‘dialogue-based’ genres of political discourse, for instance, parliamentary question time, political interviews, and TV talk shows.

Lastly, political discourse is viewed as discourse from below or, in Fairclough’s (2006, p. 33) terms, “grassroots or social movement politics”. For instance, through interviews with government and influential politicians about specific political decisions, the media can initiate ‘a political discourse from below’ by asking ordinary citizens to provide their opinions about such decisions and how they will affect ordinary people at the grassroots level. Political discourse from below has been facilitated by the recent technological developments in media communication which allow for more public participation in political discussions. The general public can now easily and immediately access political discourse and react to it (Fetzer, 2013; Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018). From this perspective, ordinary citizens and voters participate in politics not only as “recipients of political communication” (Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018, p. 313) but also as important political actors who can represent the voices of the people at the grassroots level who have limited or no access to the traditional or new media. Additionally, ordinary citizens can evaluate the decisions made by politicians and express their agreement or disagreement with political actions. They can discuss political actions and decisions in different places (at home, school, or work), and they can even express their reactions through demonstrations on streets (Bolívar, 2018).

As pointed out earlier, these three perspectives on political discourse can overlap. For instance, broadcast parliamentary debates share features of media discourse. In turn, a televised political interview between a government official (e.g. a cabinet minister) and a journalist can be described both as political discourse from above and as political discourse in the media. From

these perspectives, the current study analyses political discourse from above or the political discourse associated with the political system (the parliament), and it focuses on the decision-making processes through argumentation by cabinet ministers and MPs during the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

Similarly, since the study of political discourse is an interdisciplinary one, there are different approaches to PDA (Fairclough, 2006). Wodak & Forchtner (2018) describe four different types of approaches to PDA. 'Source-centred' approaches concentrate on information sources by paying attention to the strategic actions by powerful political leaders (McNair, 2004; Wodak & Forchtner, 2018). According to Wodak & Forchtner (2018), approaches to the analysis of political communication in media studies can be referred to as the 'mediation of politics', focusing on how politics is practised in (and transmitted through) the media. They add that approaches which examine the ordinary people's participation in (and influence on) political communication are 'reception-centred' ones. In linguistics and its subfields, approaches to PDA have been described as 'discourse-centred'. These approaches focus on the investigation of politicians' use of linguistic resources in various political contexts. The investigation may concentrate on the politicians' use of (conceptual) metaphors, political argumentation, and rhetoric (Wodak & Forchtner, 2018, pp. 5–6).

Discourse-centred approaches are many. In CDS alone, political discourse can be studied from dialectical-relational approach, socio-cognitive approach, discourse-historical approach, multi-modal approach, and positive discourse analysis (Flowerdew & Richardson, 2018), to name the most prominent approaches. Political discourse can also be analysed from the pragma-rhetorical or pragma-linguistic perspective (Ilie, 2009b, 2018). Moreover, there are different approaches to PDA from argumentation theory. One of them, and which is applied in the present study, is the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Unlike CDS approaches, which place a greater or lesser degree of emphasis on power relations as manifested in actual political discourse (Okulska & Cap, 2010), the pragma-dialectical approach focuses on the deliberation process (van Eemeren, 2002) and the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits in specific communicative activity types (van Eemeren, 2018), such as parliamentary debates. Thus, the present study employs the extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation in analysing the argumentative reality in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament in order to find out how deliberation in the parliament is reached and/or how differences of opinion are resolved through argumentative means.

2.2.3 The nature of political discourse

The nature of political discourse is both argumentative and deliberative. In other words, it involves both practical argumentation and deliberative genre. Since the primary activity of political discourse is action-oriented argumentation, political discourse is argumentative in nature in the sense that it involves primarily practical argumentation (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Neagu, 2013). Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) describe practical argumentation as “argumentation about what to do in response to practical problems (and practical arguments are often problem-solution arguments)”. From this description, the conclusion of a practical argument is then “a practical claim or judgement about what we should do, what it would be good to do, or what the right course of action is” (p. 14). These authors add that, viewed as ‘means-ends’ argumentation, the claim or conclusion in practical argumentation (‘we should do A’) is regarded as “judgement about what means” should be employed to achieve the end (goal) (p. 4). This claim or conclusion is in pragma-dialectics called *standpoint* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).

In political discourse, contesting groups of politicians (usually the ruling party and the opposition) with opposing political goals, interests, and viewpoints compete to ensure that their own specific choices of actions, decisions, policies, and strategies are accepted or promoted based primarily on argumentative means (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). To achieve this, politicians are expected to criticise effectively (and reasonably) the opposing choices of their adversaries and “delegitimise their policies” or proposals. To convince their direct and indirect audience of the acceptability of their political decisions and viewpoints and/or “their own credibility and sincerity”, politicians, more often than not, attempt to employ sound argumentation (Tsakona & Popa, 2011, p. 6). Politicians are thus expected to advance sound argumentation as to why they support (or attack) a specific political action, plan, or proposal (Neagu, 2013). It is for this reason that the current study examines what types or subtypes of sound argumentation are prototypically employed by Tanzanian MPs to support or attack ministers’ standpoints in the annual ministerial budget debates.

The deliberative nature of political communication suggests that political discourse involves a genre of deliberation. Deliberation is a primary argumentative genre of political discourse which is dominantly characterised by practical argumentation. It is further suggested that deliberation involves considering not only counter-arguments but also “other courses of actions and reasons for and against them, and weighing all these considerations together in order to arrive at a judgement on balance” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 11). Fairclough &

Fairclough (2012) maintain that, in political discourse, politicians, even when deliberating alone, weigh considerations for or against a certain proposed action or decision. This balancing of (reasonable) alternatives in practical argumentation is a manifestation of deliberation in political discourse (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). This is particularly relevant to the Tanzanian parliamentary debates, where MPs weigh considerations for or against the proposed annual ministerial budgets or requests for funds before deciding whether to approve or reject them. However, not all examples of deliberation are true manifestations of political deliberation (Fairclough, 2018; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). As Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) further put it, political deliberation “often falls short of normative standards” and this genre of political domain is then determined by power considerations and politicians’ self-interests (p. 14). Similarly, Berlin & Fetzer (2012) argue that political decisions may realise politicians’ self-serving political goals. Whether the strength of reasonable argumentation or “unreasonable power considerations” prevail in political deliberation, “decision-making processes are argumentative in nature” and this type of deliberation is still a political deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 14). In this study, political deliberation in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament is approached by examining whether Tanzanian MPs maintain the perfect balance between normative reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness when deliberating on the ministers’ proposed budgets.

The nature of political discourse has also been described as interactive and cooperative. In political discourse, political actors in general and politicians in particular engage in a discussion which involves “a relative degree of exchange” between themselves or between them and the media or the public (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012, p. 10). The cooperative nature of political discourse is emphasized by the notion of cooperative group action. Generally, politicians, within the same political group and beyond, collectively make plans for a specific cooperative group action (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012; Chilton, 2004). However, political discourse also has a conflictual character which manifests a struggle for power (Fairclough, 2006). The cooperative and conflictive nature of political discourse is made manifest in televised parliamentary debates, such as annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. These two features of political discourse (conflict and cooperation) are further discussed in section 2.4.4.

2.2.4 Genres of political discourse

The linguistic data analysed in political discourse research can come from various political contexts, including cabinet meetings, election campaigns, international treaties, online discussion platforms, parliaments, peace negotiations, policy documents, political interviews,

political propaganda and slogans, political speeches, presidential debates, public debates, as well as press conferences and releases (Álvarez-Benito & Íñigo-Mora, 2009; Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018; Lewiński, 2013; Neagu, 2013; van Dijk, 1997, 2002). On the basis of these contexts, several (sub)genres of political discourse can be distinguished, ranging from traditional to modern forms of political deliberation and interaction. According to Fairclough (2006), political genres in the first category are linked to the political system. These (sub)genres include parliamentary debates, political parties' manifestos, conferences, and programmes, political speeches, and political documents. Mediated political genres constitute the second category and include political interviews, political chat shows, political news reports, as well as parties' political broadcasts and advertisements. Genres in the last category are those which are conducted in the political public sphere, such as public debates and meetings, social movement campaigns, political forums, and focus group discussions (Fairclough, 2006, pp. 33–34). Other political genres are presidential election debates and online political discussions. This study, however, focuses on the (sub)genres of political discourse that are associated with the political system by analysing argumentation in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. Thus, the next section discusses parliamentary discourse as a genre of political discourse.

2.3 Parliamentary discourse

Research on parliamentary discourse has received a considerable interdisciplinary attention from the field of linguistics and its subfields, including (critical) discourse studies, cognitive linguistics, pragmatics, rhetoric, and systemic functional linguistics (Bayley, 2004; Fairclough, 2006; Ilie, 2010b; Ionescu-Ruxandoiu, 2012). Scholars who have examined parliamentary discourse by applying different approaches from CDS, linguistics, and pragmatics include Ilie (2000, 2001, 2003, 2013), Miller (2004), Ornatowski (2010), Rasiah (2010), Georgalidou (2011), Tsakona (2012), and Hoinarescu (2018), among others. Other scholars, such as Fairclough (2018), have combined a CDA approach and an argumentation theory approach in parliamentary discourse analysis. In addition, in recent years, research on parliamentary discourse from the viewpoints of argumentation theory and pragma-dialectics has also expanded considerably. Pragma-dialectical studies on parliamentary discourse include Andone (2016), Garssen (2016), Ihnen Jory (2010), Mohammed (2009a, 2009b), and Tonnard (2009, 2010). A discussion on the pragma-dialectical empirical studies on parliamentary discourse is provided in chapter three (see section 3.7).

Most of these studies have analysed parliamentary discourse as an institutionalised and ritualised genre of political discourse characterised by specific rules and conventions. Because “parliaments are institutions that vary according to constitutional frameworks, their function within the political system as a whole, representativity and political culture”, there are no universal features of parliamentary discourse (Bayley, 2004, p. 6). Rather, parliaments do share certain features. Most of the linguistic features of parliamentary discourse are not exclusive features for parliamentary discourse as they can be found in other registers as well (Bayley, 2004). Although the features of parliamentary discourse may vary from one parliament to another, parliamentary discourse is generally preconditioned and regulated by specific institutional goals and contextual requirements of a particular parliament.

As regards the types of parliamentary discourse, various representative subgenres of parliamentary discourse have been distinguished in the literature. According to Ilie (2010b, 2018), based on Westminster system parliaments, the main subgenres of parliamentary discourse that can be identified in the proceedings of different parliaments are interpellations, oral and written ministerial statements, oral and written parliamentary questions, parliamentary debates, parliamentary speeches, and Prime Minister’s question time. This study, however, focuses on two subgenres of parliamentary discourse, namely parliamentary debates and parliamentary speeches, as further discussed in section 2.3.1 and section 2.3.2 respectively.

2.3.1 Parliamentary debates

As a subgenre of parliamentary discourse, a parliamentary debate refers to a formal and regulated institutional dialogue about a specific subject, which is usually moderated by a President or Speaker of the house (Fetzer, 2013; Ilie, 2010b). It is a platform where parliamentarians engage in a political discussion which usually involves confrontational exchanges of viewpoints before making informed collective decisions on the issues under discussion (Fairclough, 2018; Ilie, 2018). Thus, in parliamentary debates, MPs advance arguments in support of or against a standpoint as they attempt to arrive at a particular decision for a specific political action. Through annual parliamentary debates, government officials, such as cabinet ministers, are held accountable and are required to provide clarifications or specific explanation about the performance of the government in the previous fiscal year and plans for the next year, as is the case in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

Different institutional rules may govern the discussions during parliamentary debates in different parliaments. According to Ilie (2010b, p. 10), in the U.K. parliament, for instance, parliamentary debates have been traditionally conducted on the basis of ‘cut-and-thrust’; MPs listen to other MPs’ speeches and intervene in these speeches as they spontaneously react to the opponent’s opinions. MPs speak in turns on the issue under discussion. However, the nature of confrontational interaction may vary from one parliament to another. In addition, through parliamentary debates, MPs aim to “achieve a number of institutionally specific purposes, namely position-claiming, persuading, negotiating, agenda-setting and opinion-building, usually along ideological or party lines” (Ilie, 2018, p. 312).

Several parliaments in commonwealth countries, including Tanzania, have been classified as debate parliaments. These parliaments usually “favour the parliament’s close political connection with the government, and function largely as an arena for lively adversarial debate and display of [argumentative and] rhetorical skills” (Ilie, 2018, p. 309). Ilie (2018) further maintains that, in parliamentary governments, parliamentary debates “constitute institutionally ratified practices of multi-party-political deliberation through pro and con dialogue between democratically elected representatives of the citizens” and “parliamentary debates are prototypical instantiations” of parliamentary government systems (p. 310).

In democratic parliaments, parliamentary debates are not conducted behind closed doors. The deliberation process in parliamentary debates can be covered by the media and directly viewed by TV viewers (or listened to by radio listeners), and the parliamentary proceedings can later be accessed by the general public, including ordinary citizens, in the form of Hansard transcripts. In this context, a broadcast parliamentary debate is both media discourse and public discourse (Fetzer, 2013; Ilie, 2018). When broadcast and/or when members of the public have access to the parliamentary proceedings, parliamentary debates become even more effective (Ilie, 2018). The effectiveness of broadcast parliamentary debates is closely linked to the audience types. To this end, broadcast parliamentary debates can be described as “audience-oriented in that they are enacted by fellow parliamentarians before a wide (present and virtual) audience that is comprised of not only parliamentarians but also of members of the electorate, the general public and the media” (Ilie, 2018, p. 311). Thus, although, according to the institutional rules in various parliaments, speaking MPs should directly address the moderator (i.e. the Speaker in the case of the Tanzanian parliament), in the actual debates, speaking MPs do not only address the Speaker but they also address, at least indirectly, multi-audiences in the parliament (fellow MPs, the press, and parliamentary guests) as well as radio listeners and

TV viewers or simply members of the public (Ilie, 2018). This is particularly instrumental in the analysis of MPs' adaptation to audience demand as they (attempt to) manoeuvre strategically. In broadcast parliamentary debates, MPs are aware that they are talking to, and for the interests of, a multi-layered audience. In this sense, MPs perform most part of their parliamentary role in the public eyes. They communicate to various types of people, including fellow MPs, other politicians, the media, and ordinary people on the street. Thus, in these debates, parliamentarians also strive to promote or restore their own images or that of their parties through self-presentation and personal marketing (Dosev, 2012; Ilie, 2018).

This study focuses on the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament as a communicative activity type. According to Andone (2010), communicative activity types “refer to more or less institutionalised argumentative practices in empirical reality shaped by specific goals and a set of rules and conventions that contribute to the achievement of the specific goals” (p. 74). She further observes that, in these communicative practices, arguers are expected to observe certain rules and regulations found in each of these practices. An annual ministerial budget debate in the Tanzanian parliament is governed by several institutional rules and follows a specific order as described in chapter three (see section 3.8).

2.3.2 Parliamentary speeches

Parliamentary speeches are considered to be “traditional forms of political discourse” (Ilie, 2010b, p. 9) and they are generally addressed to “the presiding officer, who is most commonly called the speaker in unicameral parliaments, or in the lower house of bicameral parliaments, and president in the upper house or second chamber” (Ilie, 2018, pp. 312–313). Ilie (2018) adds that the first speech which initiates an annual parliamentary session is referred to as the opening speech and is usually provided by the head of the government or state and is followed by annual parliamentary debates for specific departments or ministries. In the Tanzanian parliament, the opening speech of a parliamentary budget session is usually given by the Prime Minister, before the annual ministerial budget debates commence (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013).

There is also an opening speech which introduces an annual budget debate in each ministry and is provided by the minister of a relevant ministry. In this speech, the minister usually explains why their proposed budget should be adopted or approved. Apart from providing facts and events, parliamentary speeches also display both *self-presentation* and *other-presentation* (van Dijk, 1997). While in self-presentation the ministers usually give a positive evaluation of their own views or political actions and those of their political group, in the other-presentation they

usually provide a negative evaluation of the other-group and their views (Ilie, 2010b; van Dijk, 2002).

This is similar to the situation in the Tanzanian parliament, where annual ministerial budget debates are initiated by the minister's annual speech indicating the performance of their ministry in the last fiscal year and ministerial plans for the coming year. Because these budgets need to be approved by the parliament, and because a minister anticipates criticisms, especially from members of the opposition, it is expected that, in their opening speech, the minister will attempt to advance argumentation to convince the MPs to adopt the proposed budget or approve the minister's request for funds. In the Tanzanian parliament, a minister's speech is usually followed by two other speeches: a speech by a chairperson of a relevant parliamentary committee and a speech by the opposition (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). Of particular interest with regard to the adversarial nature of parliamentary discourse is the speech by the opposition. This speech is usually given by the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson for a relevant ministry. In this speech, the shadow minister implicitly explains why the minister's proposed budget should not be adopted or indicates failure or poor performance of the ministry or the government in the previous fiscal year. The shadow minister can also argue that the proposed budget can only be authorised on certain conditions. According to the Standing Orders of the parliament, these speeches are addressed to the Speaker of the parliament (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). For the purposes of this study, the annual budget speech by minister and the follow-up speech by the opposition are taken to constitute an annual ministerial budget debate, as is further discussed in chapter three (see section 3.8).

2.4 Perspectives on parliamentary discourse

Based on various studies on political discourse in general and parliamentary discourse in particular, four perspectives on parliamentary discourse can be distinguished. These perspectives are of relevance to the present study. Thus, in what follows, I discuss the four perspectives on parliamentary discourse, namely parliamentary discourse as institutional discourse, parliamentary discourse as deliberative discourse, parliamentary discourse as public discourse, and parliamentary discourse as political dialogue.

2.4.1 Parliamentary discourse as institutional discourse

The institutional nature of parliamentary discourse becomes manifest in various definitions of this genre of political discourse. Bayley (2004), for one, refers to parliamentary discourse as the most formal and institutionalised genre of political discourse which can take place in

different contexts, including a full sitting in the parliament. Similarly, but more precisely, Ilie (2010b) describes parliamentary discourse as:

a particular genre of political discourse characterised by a norm-regulated interaction which takes place among politically elected representatives for deliberation and decision-making purposes in a specific political institutional setting (the parliament) and which displays recurrent institutionalised communication patterns (p. 8).

Generally, parliamentary discourse is highly formal and institutional, and the nature of parliamentary discourse is determined by the rules and conventions of a specific parliament, political culture, and history of the parliament (Bayley, 2004). Being an institutionalised political discourse, parliamentary discourse is subject to the institutional point, conventions, procedures, and rules of the parliament (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012; Fetzer, 2013; van Eemeren, 2016). Thus, argumentation in parliamentary discourse, including the MPs' use of modes of strategic manoeuvring, is preconditioned by the institutional purposes and restrictions. Argumentation, which involves political accounts and self-presentation, in Tanzanian parliamentary debates is then analysed on the basis of the institutional conventions, requirements, and rules of the parliament.

Institutional discourse has been considerably studied from the perspectives of ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and CDA, as the (main) discourse analytical approaches to institutional discourse research (Mayr, 2015). The present study, therefore, extends the scope of approaches to institutional discourse by examining the African institutional discourse in Tanzanian parliamentary debates from the perspective of pragma-dialectics.

2.4.2 Parliamentary discourse as deliberative discourse

Political actions can be achieved through imposition (a party recognises them as legitimate) or by a means of deliberation (the involved parties collectively decide on their legitimacy) (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012; Wodak & Forchtner, 2018). However, in most democratic societies, political decisions about the legitimacy of political actions are reached primarily by a means of deliberation. According to Ilie (2016) "deliberation is generally considered necessary in decision-making across a broad and diverse political spectrum whenever there are reasons for deciding on one course of action but also equally compelling reasons for choosing another (p. 133). Fairclough (2018) further maintains that deliberation is an argumentative genre of political discourse characterised mainly by practical argumentation in favour of or against a particular political action, and it is thus an inherent feature of political discourse. As a genre of

political discourse, “deliberation coexists with negotiation, adjudication and mediation” and, through deliberation, politicians make “choices and collective decisions about what action to take in response to a situation” (Fairclough, 2018, p. 243). Thus, parliamentary discourse is deliberative discourse in nature. In other words, a parliamentary debate is the best instantiation of deliberative discourse. According to Ilie (2018), in order to reach a certain degree of agreement and make decisions about specific political actions in parliamentary debates, MPs engage in negotiations about these political actions, and the results of the political deliberations affect people’s daily lives.

According to Wodak & Forchtner (2018, p. 4), in the ideal deliberative discourse, “legitimate power is exercised collectively” or at least expected to be so. Since the decisions reached may affect one group of politicians, decision-making processes should be more or less free and must involve equal contributions from the parties involved. However, this does not make deliberation processes free from conflicts and disagreements (Wodak & Forchtner, 2018). In the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament, decision-making processes are, in most cases, not without conflicts and disagreements usually between members of the ruling party and members of the opposition or between a government minister and MPs. To resolve these conflicts and disagreements, argumentation should (or is at least expected to) play a central role.

As observed by Fairclough (2018), although deliberative discourse has been widely studied by political theorists, the genre of deliberation has not received pertinent attention from discourse analysts and argumentation theorists. Furthermore, little attention has been paid to African deliberative discourse. The present study, therefore, examines the deliberative discourse in African parliaments using annual ministerial budget debates in Kiswahili from the Tanzanian parliament as a case in point.

2.4.3 Parliamentary discourse as public discourse

Although parliamentary discourse is generally classified as ‘political discourse from above’, it nevertheless shares certain features with ‘political discourse in the media’ (Fetzer, 2013; Fetzer & Weizman, 2006) and is, for this reason, a form of public discourse. According to Fetzer & Weizman (2006), parliamentary discourse meets contextual requirements of the media communication in terms of transmission means, audience types, and the roles that media participants play. As further observed by Fetzer & Weizman (2006), in democratic societies, parliamentary debates, parliamentary questioning, and Prime Minister’s question time, as the

common communicative activity types in parliaments, are usually broadcast to reach a wider audience. The audience of parliamentary discourse includes members and supporters of a political party, opponents of the ruling or opposition parties, a “politically unbiased audience” (Fetzer & Weizman, 2006, p. 144), people following parliamentary debates on social media, as well as ordinary people (at home, at work, or on the streets) listening to a radio or watching parliamentary debates on television. Thus, as media discourse, parliamentary discourse is “on-the-record” discourse and is therefore accessible to the general public (Fetzer, 2013, p. 12). Although the general public, as non-ratified participants, cannot participate in the actual parliamentary debates and directly affect the deliberation process in parliamentary dialogues, they can still react indirectly to the negotiation process and how the discussion was conducted by making comments on several issues in parliamentary discourse and discuss parliamentary deliberations with one another. Furthermore, with easy access to the media, ordinary citizens have the opportunity to listen or watch, evaluate, and interpret parliamentary discourse (Fetzer & Weizman, 2006).

Parliamentary discourse is, however, not fully regulated by the media’s contextual rules as broadcast political interviews and debates. Some of the media requirements, such as topic selection and turn-taking system, do not work in the same way in parliamentary debates as in political interviews in the media. As has been argued in the previous sections, parliamentary debates are regulated by the parliamentary institutional rules and conventions. Although it is not fully regulated by the media constraints, parliamentary discourse is still a form of media discourse because it carries a mediated quality and is thus public discourse. This perspective is instrumental in analysing argumentative discourse in broadcast annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament because MPs are very much aware that they are talking to multi-audiences, including their potential voters, who can judge and evaluate their contributions in the debates, and this may affect their prospects for the next elections.

2.4.4 Parliamentary discourse as political dialogue

Apart from the previous three perspectives, this study adopts the view that political discourse is a form of dialogue, and this view is not narrowly restricted to the micro contextual limits of a dialogic situation (in terms of specific space, time, and participants) but broadly covers both micro and macro dimensions of a dialogic context. This is to say a political dialogue involves both micro and macro dimensions of communicative exchanges (Bolívar, 2018). To this end, parliamentary discourse, as a genre of political discourse, can be analysed as a form of political dialogue and politics in parliaments can be practised beyond the specific contextual limits of

the micro dialogic dimension. Parliamentary dialogues are controlled by the institutional and society's socio-cultural restrictions (Ilie, 2018). However, the degree of dialogicity in parliamentary debates may differ from one parliament to another or from one dialogue to another. Additionally, as a form of political dialogue, parliamentary discourse involves a certain degree of interactivity and is both cooperative and conflictive in nature, as discussed in the following subsections.

2.4.4.1 Interaction in parliamentary dialogues

In democratic societies, “where governance is shared to a greater or lesser degree” (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012, p. 4), the nature of political discourse can be described as interactive. As pointed out in section 2.2.1, the interactive nature of political discourse is made manifest in parliamentary debates. Bayley (2004) holds that, textually, a parliamentary debate comprises a series of monologues about the same issue or topic. In these monologues, parliamentarians react not only to what other parliamentarians previously said in the parliament but also to the views raised elsewhere. Thus, although it consists of a sequence of monologues, the nature of parliamentary discourse is dialogic and interactive; parliamentarians are usually engaged in friendly or unfriendly dialogues with one another (Bayley, 2004). From this viewpoint, parliamentary discourse involves a form of interaction through discussions about various issues. Parliamentarians do not only directly interact with one another, in a more or less friendly manner, but they also indirectly interact with the general public (including members of the electorate) as part of their multi-layered audience. In broadcast parliamentary debates, for instance, MPs do not only converse with the Speaker (or President) of the house and fellow MPs but they also talk to the listening/watching audience (members of the public). They talk to parents sitting in a living room watching TV, workers in workplaces, students in schools and universities, as well as street vendors or *machingas* in the context of Tanzania. The audience can participate in a televised parliamentary debate by evaluating the quality of decisions made and argumentation advanced by the MPs for these decisions (Berlin & Fetzer, 2012). This feature is relevant to the argumentative discourse from the broadcast annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament where the protagonists and the antagonists interact, more or less directly, with one another as they attempt to resolve the differences of opinion in one's favour.

2.4.4.2 The cooperative nature of parliamentary dialogues

As a form of political dialogue (Bolívar, 2018), parliamentary discourse has also been described as cooperative. The cooperative nature of parliamentary discourse becomes manifest

in “joint decision-making and cross-party problem-solving processes in order to reach commonly acceptable goals regarding suitable lines of action at a national level” (Ilie, 2018, p. 311). Generally, in parliamentary debates, parliamentarians can cooperate with one another and make collective decisions about political actions, plans, or proposals. However, the degree of cooperativeness in parliamentary dialogues may vary from one parliamentary debate to another with regard to the topic on the table. For instance, in the Tanzanian parliament, debates about matters of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (including the structure of the Union) and the constitutional review process in Tanzania seem to be less cooperative across party lines, as shown in chapter four and chapter five.

2.4.4.3 The conflictive nature of parliamentary dialogues

Although parliamentary discourse can also be described as cooperative, it is nonetheless conflictive in nature. The conflictive nature of parliamentary discourse is realised by confrontation, disagreement, and controversy in parliamentary debates (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2008; Wodak & Forchtner, 2018). To this end, political dialogues in parliamentary debates can be described as adversarial as they involve “position-claiming, opponent-challenging acts, and polarising argumentation” (Ilie, 2018, p. 311).

Parliamentary debates usually involve confrontational dialogues based on the differences of opinion among MPs and the adversarial nature of parliamentary discourse. In most parliaments, there are two conflictive sides with opposing roles. The role of the ruling party, on one hand, is to defend the decisions, actions, plans or policies of the government. “The obvious task of any Opposition party”, on the other hand, “is to attack the policies of the Government” (Ilie, 2000, p. 69). To achieve this, members of the opposition effectively (and reasonably) criticise or discredit the government’s political actions or decisions by systematically calling ministers’ standpoints into question. In turn, members of the ruling party usually assume the position of the government by advancing argumentation in support of the government or minister’s standpoints (Ilie, 2000).

This is particularly relevant to the Tanzanian annual parliamentary debates where members of the opposition usually attack the minister’s standpoints and members of the ruling party generally advance arguments in favour of the minister’s position. The confrontation and disagreement in parliamentary debates can be resolved through argumentation. Thus, taking Tanzanian parliamentary discourse as a political dialogue with both conflictive and cooperative

nature, this study examines how differences of opinion in annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament are resolved by the means of sound argumentation.

2.5 An overview of argumentation in parliamentary discourse

The four perspectives on parliamentary discourse, as discussed in section 2.4, are instrumental in analysing argumentation in parliamentary discourse. In order to achieve an in-depth examination of argumentation involving account-giving and self-presentation in Tanzanian parliamentary debates, parliamentary discourse is in this study analysed by considering all these perspectives, rather than narrowly focusing on only one perspective.

As an institutional discourse, Tanzanian parliamentary discourse is regulated by the institutional rules of the Tanzanian parliament as stipulated in the *Standing Orders* of the parliament (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). As I shall explain in the next chapter (see section 3.8), these rules constitute the parliamentary institutional preconditions which regulate the conduct of argumentation in the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament, including topic selection, turn-taking system, and general speaking behaviours. It goes without saying that, in expressing standpoints and advancing argumentation for or against these standpoints, parliamentarians are required to observe the institutional preconditions. This can limit, at least to a certain extent, the MPs' modes of strategic manoeuvring. At the same time, the institutional preconditions may create certain opportunities for strategic manoeuvring and shape the resulting prototypical argumentative patterns and arguers' argumentative styles (van Eemeren, 2018, 2019). From this perspective, argumentation in parliamentary discourse differs from other genres of political argumentation, such as political speeches, which seem to be less regulated (Zarefsky, 2008).

As deliberative discourse, Tanzanian parliamentary discourse involves a genre of deliberation or decision-making process. This perspective is complemented by the perspective that parliamentary discourse is a form of political dialogue, as discussed in section 2.4.4. As a political dialogue, parliamentary discourse involves not only cooperation and interaction but also confrontation and controversy (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2008). Since parliamentary discourse involves a deliberation process and is considered a political dialogue, argumentation in parliamentary discourse is adversarial in nature. The adversariality of parliamentary discourse is caused by two conflicting groups of politicians (the ruling party and the opposition parties) who hold opposing perspectives. Yet, in this situation, as regards the institutional point of the parliament, parliamentarians are expected to make 'collective' decisions as to whether a

specific action, plan, or proposal under discussion should be adopted. Since there are “fundamental differences of interests, purposes and values, and different ways of interpreting the situation, making collective decisions is almost invariably an adversarial process in which participants will advocate conflicting lines of action” (Fairclough, 2018, p. 243). As further observed by Fairclough (2018), in this context, there are obviously two opposing sides. On one side, there are members of the ruling party, who fight to remain in power. On the other side, there are members of the opposition, who try hard to win the public support and replace the ruling party. This adversarial nature is made manifest in Tanzanian parliamentary discourse as confrontational argumentation in Tanzanian parliamentary debates is fuelled by the adversarial nature between members of the government and members of the opposition.

Lastly, as public discourse, parliamentary discourse in democratic societies is usually made available or accessible to the public. Members of the public can follow the broadcast parliamentary debates through the media, and they can have access to the Hansard transcripts of the official parliamentary proceedings in their original form from the parliament’s website. This was also the practice during the period covered in this research, i.e. the last three years of President Kikwete’s second term of presidency. Moreover, in broadcast parliamentary debates, parliamentarians discuss issues that arouse public interests. Because this study focuses on the broadcast annual parliamentary debates which are also available on the *Bunge*’s website, this perspective is relevant to the analysis of the MPs’ modes of strategic manoeuvring as they advance argumentation to convince the parliament and the public of the acceptability of their standpoints and non-acceptability of the opposite standpoints.

2.6 Argumentative strategies in parliamentary discourse

To win deliberative discussions in their favour, MPs are expected to employ different argumentative or rhetorical strategies to support their standpoints and attack those of their adversaries in the most effective manner. Parliamentarians may also attempt to achieve a balance between rhetorical effectiveness and dialectical reasonableness through the argumentative moves they make. However, not all the strategies used by MPs may be considered instrumental in resolving differences of opinion on the merits. Some strategies employed by MPs in parliamentary discourse may be deemed fallacious as they violate rules for critical discussion, or they may be regarded as derailments of strategic manoeuvring. Whether considered reasonable argumentative strategies or fallacious argumentative moves, these strategies generally shape the arguer’s strategic manoeuvring and argumentative style.

Different scholars have identified several argumentative or rhetorical strategies that can be used by arguers in various communicative practices, including parliamentary debates. In what follows, I discuss some of these strategies and indicate how they can be employed by politicians in political discourse in general and in parliamentary discourse in particular. The strategies include definitions, narrations, quotations, evasion or avoidance (equivocation), political humour, political metaphors, personal attacks, as well as rhetorical questions, to name the most common ones.

2.6.1 Definitions, narrations, and quotations

Definitions, narratives, and quotations can be employed by politicians, including MPs, to reinforce their standpoints or argumentation and attack the opponent's ones. In this section, I discuss these three strategies and explain how they can be exploited by politicians in various political contexts, including parliamentary debates.

2.6.1.1 Definitions

Persuasive definitions can be employed by politicians in various political practices. However, to resolve a difference of opinion reasonably, persuasive definitions should also have a dialectical effect. Considering that MPs in parliamentary debates attempt to convince their direct and indirect audiences of the acceptability of their standpoints (and even manipulate them), they can be expected to employ (persuasive) definitions to support their standpoints or criticise those of their debating partners.

Since Stevenson's (1938) study on persuasive definitions, a number of studies have been conducted to examine the use of persuasive and argumentative definitions in different social practices (e.g. Hoinarescu, 2018; Macagno & Walton, 2008a, 2008b; van Rees, 2006, 2009; Walton, 2001; Zarefsky, 2006). In her study on refutation strategies by definition in Emmeline Pankhurst's public speech, Ilie (2009b) identifies five different types of definitions, which can be used by politicians. These types of definitions are definition by negation (one party's assumption about a specific issue is directly criticised and the claim associated with this assumption is denied), definition by explanation (a party expresses an opposite standpoint and advances argumentation in favour of the counter-claim), figurative definition (a party makes implicit evaluations which resort to "unexpected comparisons and less plausible parallels" in identifying the most noticeable features of the subject matter under discussion), definition by analogy (a party highlights and contrasts the other party's arguments "by correlating them with similar or comparable facts or phenomena"), and rhetorical dissociation (a party dissociates

themselves from a term that does not accommodate their position and associates themselves with a term that favours a specific line of reasoning) (Ilie, 2009b, p. 50).

Moreover, examining the use of argumentative definitions in the British and Romanian parliaments, Hoinarescu (2018) reports that dissociative definitions can be used as an argumentative strategy in parliamentary discourse. According to this author, some of the concepts or words raised in a discussion may have pejorative implications which a party may not wish to be associated with. To clarify their position or reinforce their argumentation, this arguer may employ dissociative definitions and distance themselves from the pejorative terms. These definitions can be supported by authority argumentation, which can be achieved by quoting an influential or respected (former) public figure who shares the same or similar view. In this case, a definition then functions as an authoritative and quotational argument. Furthermore, dissociative definitions “may be used to reject criticism by redefining a situation from a standpoint” that supports the arguer’s position (Hoinarescu, 2018, p. 225). Hoinarescu’s (2018) dissociative definition is more or less similar to Ilie’s (2009b) rhetorical dissociation. As has been maintained by van Rees (2006), dissociative definitions (and dissociative distinctions) may enhance both the dialectical and rhetorical aims. A dissociation satisfies the standards of reasonableness if it offers some clarifications with respect to the position of the speaker in relation to the terms under discussion. It is rhetorically effective when a party presents a specific definition or distinction that favours their interests (van Rees, 2006, 2009). Considering the use of these definitions in parliamentary discourse, I investigate whether (and to what extent) Tanzanian MPs exploit argumentative definitions to support their standpoints or attack those of their fellow debaters and whether, in doing this, they maintain a balance between rhetorical and dialectical aims. To resolve a difference of opinion on the merits, definitions should be both persuasive and reasonable.

2.6.1.2 Narratives

Like definitions, narratives can be employed to support politicians’ argumentation for choosing certain actions or decisions over others and thus influence the political decision-making process. This study examines the use of spoken (or written) narratives in Tanzanian parliamentary debates by paying particular attention to their argumentative function in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits.

Narratives have been widely studied in discourse analysis and text typology (Hoffmann, 2010). Recently, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of narratives in argumentative and

institutional discourse (Fairclough, 2018; Hoffmann, 2010). Narratives in argumentative discourse are regarded as components of (practical) argumentation which provide premises for the defence of a conclusion (i.e. standpoint) in a practical argument (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) or function as arguments by themselves (Olmos, 2017). Thus, in political discourse, “arguments coexist with narratives, descriptions and explanations” (Fairclough, 2018, p. 243). Narratives and small stories may also be employed by politicians as persuasion strategies (Duranti, 2006; Fetzer, 2010). Narratives can be analysed in various contextualised argumentative practices (including parliamentary debates) and they can be fictive or non-fictive (Olmos, 2017; Toker, 2017). Narratives can turn out to be humorous and can at the same time be used for argumentative purposes (Archakis & Tsakona, 2011). In their study on humorous narratives in Greek parliamentary debates, Archakis & Tsakona (2011) observe that humorous narratives can be used as argumentative means in parliamentary debates.

Furthermore, a distinction is made between narrative arguments and narrating arguments or ‘arguments that narrate’ (Frenay & Carel, 2017). Whether considered narrative arguments or arguments that narrate, for narratives to be acceptable and to argumentatively affect political decision-making processes in parliaments, they must be both rhetorically effective and dialectically reasonable. Unlike discourse analysis, which has placed more emphasis on “the discursive and socio-linguistic scope of storytelling [...]” (Hoffmann, 2010), in argumentation theory, the strength of narratives is determined by their argumentative effect. Thus, the study sets out to find out how effective and reasonable the MPs’ narratives are in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits during the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

2.6.1.3 Quotations

Similarly, as an argumentative strategy, quotations can be employed by one party to support their position or attack the other party’s position in a critical discussion. In their study on quotations and presumptions, Walton & Macagno (2011) indicate that a party in a dialogue usually exploits a quotation from the opponent to criticise the other party and accuse them of inconsistency by referring to their past assertions or commitments and emphasising the inconsistency between their current position and that of the past. These scholars add that quotations are frequently employed by a party as a reminder of another party’s past position and how this position is in conflict with the other party’s present position. However, the use of quotations usually gives a room for the accused or quoted party to deny the accusation. This means that quotations of this kind shift the burden of proof from the quoting party to the quoted

one. Although Walton & Macagno (2011) also talk about authoritative quotations (and quotations from expert opinion), they generally focus their analysis on quotations by the opposing party in order to attack the other party's position or argument, especially in legal dialogues.

Quotations can also be used to reinforce politicians' viewpoints or standpoints and strengthen political adversariality in various argumentative practices, including parliamentary debates. According to Reyes (2011), politicians may "evoke different voices to achieve their political goals" (p. 2). Politicians can achieve this not only by quoting the messages or views of national historical figures but also citing specific verses from the holy books (the Bible or Quran) or directly quoting Jesus Christ or Prophet Mohammed to reinforce their political perspectives (Reyes, 2011). This is very much common in the Tanzanian parliament. Although, according to the parliamentary Standing Orders, contributing MPs are not allowed to read their contributions word-for-word during parliamentary debates, they are at the same time allowed to read occasionally from their prepared notes or outline (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). The MPs may use this opportunity to quote (former) national political figures, especially Mwalimu Nyerere (Tanzania's Father of Nation), to support their standpoints or argumentation. Citing the Bible/Quran or quoting Jesus Christ/Prophet Mohammed is also not uncommon.

As observed by Walton & Macagno (2011), although quotations may be considered an effective and powerful means of political argumentation and persuasion, they are, more often than not, manipulative and fallacious, as they usually involve deceptions and misquotations. For instance, through quotations (or rather misquotations), one party may capitalise on only one detail of the other party's quotation, especially the one that supports this arguer's position, and completely ignore other (important) details which are not favourable to the speaker's position. In addition, quotations may be used out of context for political gain. Taking into consideration the manipulative nature of quotations and the possibilities for misquotations, in examining strategic manoeuvring in the annual parliamentary debates, this study sets out to find out how Tanzanian MPs effectively employ quotations as an argumentative strategy by observing the norms of reasonableness.

2.6.2. Evasion

Relevance (including its closest cousins cooperativeness and appropriateness) is a central concept in the analysis of communicative evasion or avoidance (equivocation) manoeuvres, especially when a party responds to a question asked or request made by another party in a

critical discussion (Berlin, 2007). To understand evasive response or avoidance strategies better, Galasinski (1996) distinguishes two types of relevance: pragmatic relevance and semantic relevance. According to Galasinski (1996), while pragmatic relevance refers to the relation of two conversational speech acts which satisfies the utterance goals, semantic relevance refers to the “relation between the propositional contents” of the conversational utterances (p. 5). From this distinction, an evasive utterance is associated with semantic irrelevance. Thus, an evasive response can be generally defined as “an intentionally semantically irrelevant response to a question” or request for verbal action (Galasinski, 1996, p. 1). An evasive utterance is intentional in the sense that the speaker or writer is (and should be) aware that they are giving a semantically irrelevant response to a question or verbal request for specific explanation or argumentation.

Galasinski (1996) further distinguishes two types of evasion with respect to the arguers’ cooperativeness in the interaction: overt and covert evasion. Overt evasion refers to a party’s uncooperative behaviour towards another party’s question or request (Berlin, 2007). Thus, when a party in a discussion indicates clearly that they are not willing to cooperate with the other party in terms of the question asked or request made, this kind of evasion is overt. In this context, a party may pragmatically talk about an issue that is the same as (or similar to) the other party’s question or request but refuses to cooperate. This party may do this by challenging the question (or questioner) or employing an implicature. In covert evasion or avoidance, a party manipulates the focus of the question by answering a question different from the one asked by the other party (in other words, answering a question the other party never asked), changing the focus of the question, or “changing both the focus (argument) and the state of affairs” to which the question is directed (Galasinski, 1996, p. 16).

Politicians, including parliamentarians, can strategically use evasion or avoidance as an argumentative strategy. In his study on cooperative conflict and evasive language, Berlin (2007) examined politicians’ use of communicative evasion in the 9-11 commission hearings and found that politicians employ different evasive response ‘tactics’ in the form of answers or non-answers. According to Berlin (2007), these politicians try to “maintain the appearance of cooperation within the conflict by answering questions through changing the direction of the question, mitigating the force of the imposition, and deflecting responsibility from an action that could prove politically embarrassing or damaging” (p. 167). Similarly, Rasiah (2010) observes recurrent cases of evasion in the Australian parliament where MPs refrain from answering questions with evasive response techniques. The author also analysed the MPs’

evasions by determining whether they are covert or overt as well as the shifts of agenda in the question-answer adjacency pairs.

As argued by Krappmann (2014), evasion or avoidance usually becomes manifest in defensive argumentation when a party in a critical discussion is confronted with an offensive argumentation from the other debating partner and this evasion can be presented implicitly or explicitly through linguistic forms. A party in a critical discussion can exploit avoidance strategies in their attempt to evade the other party's actual question or request for explanation by questioning the content of the question or request, questioning the questioner, or disqualifying themselves from answering the question or providing the required explanation. In this way, the respondent evades from directly responding to the question or argumentative reaction. An arguer may decide to answer only part of the question and ignore the main part of it or provide inadequate explanation that does not satisfy the other party's intent. According to Krappmann (2014), all these are instantiations of avoidance strategies. She adds that, in most cases, a party uses these types of evasive response manoeuvres when they avoid committing themselves or revealing a specific fact or giving confirmation to the other part's assumption or supporting their standpoint. Through avoidance manoeuvres, an arguer may deny a standpoint or an argument and even both but without advancing a sound argumentation for the denial. Moreover, strategic topic selection is another example of evasion or avoidance. An arguer may only select a topic they are familiar with and in which they think they can win the discussion in their favour, and will usually avoid topics that they think they are not (very) 'good' at or that they can't 'handle'. Generally, a debating partner employs avoidance manoeuvres to completely or partially block the other partner's further (offensive) argumentative strategies "which would have been unpleasant" for them (Krappmann, 2014, p. 209).

Although argumentative discourse in parliamentary debates may not necessarily appear in question-response sequence, to win a critical discussion, arguers must respond effectively and reasonably to the protagonist's defence or antagonist's critical reactions. As arguers attempt to manoeuvre strategically and win the discussion in their favour, they may be expected to employ different evasive response strategies. In parliamentary debates, evasion is usually used by politicians to evade the burden of proof or responsibility for a failure event. However, evasion, particularly covert evasion, may result in deception and manipulation (Galasinski, 1996) and can thus violate the rules for critical discussion and derail strategic manoeuvring. With this in mind, in analysing parliamentary debates in the Tanzanian parliament, this study examines the

MPs' use of evasion in the resolution process and determines the extent to which they can be deceptive and fallacious.

2.6.3 Humour, irony, and satire

Defined as “a communicative resource” which notices, emphasises, and attacks “incongruities originating in political discourse and action”, political humour is produced and used by politicians to criticise “political status quo” or reinforce “dominant values and views on politics” (Tsakona & Popa, 2011, pp. 2, 6). Since politicians usually express political criticism and praise through argumentation, humour in political discourse can be considered an argumentative strategy. Although it is often not taken seriously, political humour is considered to be a powerful and serious means of political criticism (Tsakona & Popa, 2011). Political humour can help politicians who share certain political opinions to demonstrate their solidarity. Politicians can employ humour in various (informal and institutionalised) political practices and genres. A parliamentary debate is one of the political settings where political humour prototypically occurs (Tsakona & Popa, 2011). Although parliamentary discourse is a highly institutionalised genre of political discourse (Bayley, 2004; Ilie, 2018) and MPs are thus expected to employ a formal (or detached) mode of communication (van Dijk, 1997), MPs often tend to use “a more conversational, informal, and personalised style” (Archakis & Tsakona, 2011, p. 62), which can be realised by humorous expressions.

Political humour is closely linked to irony (or sarcasm) and satire. According to Partington (2006), “[i]rony occurs when there is a mismatch, a radical difference, between the evaluation expressed in what is actually written or said [...] and the evaluation which is really intended [...]” (p. 94). Through the use of irony in politics, a politician may say one thing but mean quite the opposite in a more or less humorous way. The term *irony* is sometimes used interchangeably with the term *sarcasm*. However, sarcasm is viewed as the victim's evaluation of the speaker's or writer's irony or its intended implication (Partington, 2006). What the speaker sees as irony is actually viewed as sarcasm by the ‘targeted victim’ or a third party. Ilie (2001) maintains that jokes and irony may be used either to reinforce group cohesion or “to highlight and dedramatize the seriousness of the conflictual relation between political adversaries [...]” and she adds that abusive humour and irony “are meant to disguise the speaker's underlying aggressive attitude” (p. 255). Similarly, satire is regarded as one of the features of political humour. Satire can refer to a party's humorous use of criticism or ridicule against another party's untoward behaviour or state of affairs as one attempts to convince an audience of the need for change. Satire is usually targeted to influential or powerful people

with authority in a society (Partington, 2006). In parliamentary debates, the targets of satire can be the Prime Minister, (other) cabinet ministers, or even the leader of the opposition and the opposition's shadow ministers.

Taking into account the institutional restrictions imposed on MPs' linguistic choices and behaviours (Tsakona & Popa, 2011; van Eemeren, 2016) in parliamentary debates, this study examines the extent to which Tanzanian parliamentarians use political humour, irony, and satire as presentational devices of strategic manoeuvring to criticise the standpoints and argumentation of their adversaries or reinforce their own, and how (much) the use of political humour, irony, and satire by these politicians is constrained by the institutional preconditions. The study also investigates whether (and to what extent) the MPs' use of political humour, including irony and satire, can strengthen or weaken their standpoints or argumentation as regards the dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness.

2.6.4 Metaphors

Metaphors have been widely studied from various perspectives in public discourse (e.g. Kövecses, 1986, 2000, 2015; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Musolff, 2004, 2007, 2016; Neagu, 2013; Oswald & Rihs, 2014; Santibáñez, 2010). In the present study, however, metaphors are analysed from the pragma-dialectical perspective. According to Scheithauer (2007), metaphors are “a popular means of simplifying complex concepts” (p. 75). While Kövecses (2017) proposes a ‘multi-level view’ in the analysis of (conceptual) metaphors, metaphors are basically conceptualised on the cognitive level and linguistically realised on the communication or surface level in terms of the target domain and the source domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Scheithauer, 2007), as in *Maganga is a lion*, where *Maganga* is the target domain and *lion* in the source domain. From the constructivist perspective, metaphors are viewed as cognitive devices which constitute reality (Scheithauer, 2007). Moreover, metaphors can be used as argumentative means not only in pragmatic analysis (Musolff, 2010) but also in the pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse. Metaphors in political argumentation can be viewed both as argumentation by definition and as argumentation by analogy (Musolff, 2010; Neagu, 2013). When employing metaphors, politicians may give a short definition of a concept (argumentation by definition) but at the same time compare one concept to another (argumentation by analogy) (Neagu, 2013). Taken as premises of practical argumentation, (conceptual) metaphors can “steer the argument towards a particular conclusion and proposal for action” and are thus “persuasive definitions that should be treated as defensible arguments by definition or by analogy [...]” (Neagu, 2013, pp. 4–5). From the

perspective of pragma-dialectics, metaphors can have both a dialectical and rhetorical effect and can thus function as presentational devices of strategic manoeuvring (Neagu, 2013; van Eemeren, 2010).

As efficient linguistic resources and “powerful rhetorical tools” (Scheithauer, 2007, pp. 78–79), (political) metaphors can be employed by MPs to strengthen their argumentative moves in parliamentary debates. Taking Tanzanian parliamentary debates as argumentative practices, the present research investigates the Tanzanian MPs’ use of political metaphors as a type of presentational devices of strategic manoeuvring to criticise the standpoints or argumentation advanced by the ministers or other MPs or reinforce their own line of defence. The study also examines whether these MPs observe the norms of dialectical reasonableness as they manoeuvre strategically to win critical discussions in their favour.

2.6.5 Personal attacks, insults, and accusations (of inconsistency)

According to van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels (2012, p. 347), a personal attack or *argumentum ad hominem* has generally been described as a “fallacy of attacking the person who made the assertion instead of trying to disprove the truth or acceptability of what has been asserted”. The authors further distinguish three variants of personal attacks that can be employed in various argumentative practices, including parliamentary debates. In the case of abusive *ad hominem* or direct personal attack, one party directly attacks the other party by associating them with negative qualities. These negative qualities may be attributed to a party’s character, personality, or even appearance (Drury & Herbeck, 2019; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2019). In the circumstantial variant of personal attacks, a party discredits the other party indirectly by being suspicious of their motives. Additionally, through circumstantial *ad hominem*, a claim of inconsistency between a party’s past position (over the issue under discussion) and the present one is made the basis of the argument by another party. The last variant is known as *tu quoque ad hominem*. In this subtype, one party raises a contradiction between the other party’s actions and their words (van Eemeren et al., 2012; Walton & Macagno, 2011). This variant of *ad hominem* or personal attack is sometimes referred to as provocation (Amakali et al., 2019).

These strategies can realise both reasonable argumentative moves (if judged to be non-fallacious) or fallacious argumentative moves (if proved to be unreasonable). While in the standard treatment of fallacies, they have generally been described as fallacious moves, personal attacks are, in pragma-dialectics, regarded fallacious only if they violate a rule of a

critical discussion or constitute a derailment of strategic manoeuvring. As modes of strategic manoeuvring, for personal attacks to be non-fallacious argumentative strategies, they must be dialectically reasonable and function as legitimate critical reactions to the argumentation scheme (e.g. authority argumentation) employed by the opposing party. In these cases, they are regarded as reasonable *argumentum ad hominem*. When personal attacks, especially direct personal attacks, lack dialectical reasonableness, they are regarded as unreasonable abusive *ad hominem* (van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009; van Eemeren et al., 2012).

Ad hominem arguments may be employed in parliamentary debates as modes of strategic manoeuvring. Plug (2010a) investigated the use of direct personal attacks in the Dutch parliament and the European Parliament with respect to strategic manoeuvring in an institutional context. His goal was to establish whether the institutional preconditions in the two houses affect the use of this variant of *ad hominem* attacks by Dutch MPs and Members of the European parliament (henceforth MEPs). His study reveals that, since the institutional rules in the Dutch parliament make it possible for direct personal attacks to be immediately brought into light by the President or the attacked MP, MPs are expected to make effort to present them as reasonable argumentative moves. Similarly, although, according to the institutional rules in the European Parliament, *ad hominem* arguments can be revealed or responded to only at the end of a debate, MEPs may still attempt to present them as reasonable argumentative moves. He also concludes that the identification and judgement of the reasonableness of direct personal attacks in both parliaments may be complicated due to the institutional procedures for parliamentary debates, which provide the debating partners with a rationale for strategic manoeuvring when using an *ad hominem* argument (Plug, 2010a, pp. 325–326).

However, in their comprehensive empirical investigation on ordinary arguers' judgement of the reasonableness of personal attacks, van Eemeren et al. (2009) conclude that fallacious discussion moves from the perspective of pragma-dialectics were judged as unreasonable moves by ordinary language users and non-fallacious moves were regarded as reasonable. Specifically, abusive *ad hominem* attacks were judged as very unreasonable, although in actual argumentative practices the unreasonableness of direct personal attacks remains unnoticed. In their other two experiments, van Eemeren et al. (2012) tested the hypothesis that abusive personal attacks are judged as less unreasonable when presented as if they are critical reactions to authority argumentation compared to when they are clear cases of violations of discussion rules. According to the authors, the disguised abusive personal attacks were regarded as less unreasonable than the clear cases of rule violations. The results of the two experiments led to

the general conclusion that “abusive *ad hominem* attacks look more reasonable when they are presented as if they are used to criticise authority argumentation” (p. 363).

As observed by van Eemeren *et al.* (2012), it is hard for arguers, including politicians in parliament, to distinguish between abusive *ad hominem* attacks and reasonable critical reactions to an argumentation scheme. Thus, the present study investigates the extent to which personal attacks can be regarded as reasonable argumentative strategies in Tanzanian parliamentary debates. Additionally, in this study, personal attacks are analysed as modes of strategic manoeuvring (presentational choices). Therefore, to resolve the difference of opinion on the merits, an *argumentum ad hominem* should achieve both the rhetorical aim, as it usually does, and the dialectical goal.

Insults and various types of accusations, including accusations of inconsistency, can all relate to personal attacks as they are usually used to attack an opponent rather than the propositional content of the opponent’s standpoint or argumentation. They can thus be referred to as different forms in which personal attacks can manifest. However, various scholars have examined these presentational techniques separately as argumentative or rhetorical strategies in various political practices, including parliamentary debates, political interviews, and Prime Minister’s question time.

According to Ilie (2001, p. 259), parliamentary insults can be viewed as “subversive transgressions of the institutional boundaries of parliamentary language use and practices”. In her study on insulting behaviours in the British and Swedish parliaments, Ilie (2004) argues that insults can be used by politicians “to minimise cognitive differences within one’s own political group and to maximise cognitive differences between this group and adversarial groups” (p. 81). With respect to parliamentary polarisation, she observes that “British insulting acts are particularly based on pathos-oriented logos, whereas Swedish insulting acts are particularly based on ethos-oriented logos” (p. 82). She further observes that MPs from both parliaments resort to three mitigation strategies as they attempt to avoid being accused of or sanctioned by the parliamentary rules for using what she calls ‘unparliamentary language’. She identifies these strategies as juxtaposition of the opposite notion (e.g. contempt vs. respect), formulating insults as questions, and attributing transfer movement. However, following the assumption that insults are in most cases based on fallacious moves, she posits that, when used as argumentative strategies, insults can indeed turn out to be fallacious in parliamentary debates in both houses.

Ilie (2004) approached parliamentary insulting behaviours from the rhetorical viewpoint. This study approaches the use of insults in parliamentary debates from the perspective of pragma-dialectics where both the rhetorical and dialectical effects of insults are examined through the ideal model of strategic manoeuvring. While parliamentary insults can be rhetorically effective in political deliberation, it is questionable whether they can constitute a non-fallacious argumentative move in a critical discussion and resolve differences of opinions on the merits in Tanzanian parliamentary debates.

In regard to accusations, Andone (2009) and Mohammed (2010) have examined accusations of inconsistency in political interviews and Prime Minister's question time respectively. According to Andone (2009), an accusation of inconsistency can refer to a charge raised against an addressee for holding two contradicting positions or making two statements that contradict each other "in an attempt to challenge the addressee to provide a response that answers the charge" (p. 155). According to van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2007), in pragma-dialectics, accusations of inconsistency must be reconstructed as part of the confrontation or argumentation stage of one and the same critical discussion. Andone (2009) maintains that accusations of inconsistency can manifest in at least two forms in argumentative discourse. In the first form, it appears as a charge against a discrepancy between a party's past position or statement and the present one. This relates to the second variant of *ad hominem* attacks (circumstantial variant). In the second form, it appears as a charge against an incompatibility between a party's own words and their deeds (Andone, 2009). This relates to the third variant of personal attacks (*tu quoque* variant). Andone (2009) observes that accusations of inconsistency can be employed by an antagonist in a political interview as a way of manoeuvring strategically at the confrontation stage, and this can restrict or create opportunities for the protagonist "to respond to the accusation by achieving the consecutive consequence of retraction" (p. 166). Moreover, examining accusations of inconsistency in the Prime Minister's Question Time in the British House of Commons, Mohammed (2010) concludes that an accusation of inconsistency is "argumentatively advantageous" as it has the potential to reasonably eliminate an initial disagreement (p. 70). Expected responses to accusations (of inconsistency) may include admission of guilt, denial, or justifications (Andone, 2009; Kauffeld, 1998). From the perspective of account-giving model, the three expected responses correspond closely to three strategies – concessions, refusals, and justifications – which can be employed when a party gives an account of a failure event, including accusations of inconsistency.

2.6.6 Rhetorical questions

According to Snoeck Henkemans (2009), as an argumentative strategy, a rhetorical question can play a vital role in reconciling the arguer's dialectical aim with their rhetorical goal as the protagonist and antagonist attempt to manoeuvre strategically. Rhetorical questions can be used to express a standpoint, advance argumentation for a standpoint, or make a proposition for a common starting point. Generally, a rhetorical question is a strategy that can be used by a proponent as an attempt to get the opponent to accept a standpoint/argumentation or attack the opponent's standpoint or argumentation (Snoeck Henkemans, 2009). Snoeck Henkemans (2009) further suggests that, although a rhetorical question can play a vital role in enhancing the dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, especially in the opening and argumentation stages, the use of rhetorical questions may sometimes result in the violation of discussion rules and derailment of strategic manoeuvring. A party may employ a rhetorical question as a strategic attempt to shift the burden of proof to the other party. This device of strategic manoeuvring may also result in begging the question fallacy (Snoeck Henkemans, 2009). As a mode of strategic manoeuvring, a rhetorical question "may derail if the arguer ascribes unwarranted commitments to the opponent and tries to prevent this opponent from putting forward criticisms, either with respect to the propositional content or to the justificatory potential of the argument" (Snoeck Henkemans, 2009, p. 22). Unless a party perfectly balances reasonableness with persuasiveness, a rhetorical question in Tanzanian parliamentary debates can be treated both as a violation of a critical discussion rule and as a derailment of strategic manoeuvring.

2.6.7 Some other strategies

The discussed strategies are not the only but commonly used strategies by politicians in political practices, including parliamentary debates. Other strategies that can be used by politicians include clichés, parentheticals, and interruptions (Ilie, 2000, 2009a). It should also be noted at this point that, in most cases, argumentative strategies co-exist and complement one another. For instance, quotations (or misquotations) and personal attacks are closely connected. A quotation can be used as a strategy for circumstantial *ad hominem* or personal attack (Walton & Macagno, 2011). Furthermore, in some studies (e.g. Amakali et al., 2019), insults and rhetorical questions are analysed as forms of *ad hominem* attack.

2.7 Account-giving and the notion of responsibility in parliamentary discourse

Studies on account-giving can be traced back to Scott and Lyman's (1968) analysis of 'accounts'. Scott and Lyman (1968) define an account as:

a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behaviour – whether that behaviour is his own or that of others, and whether the proximate cause for the statement arises from the actor himself or from someone else (p. 46).

The authors further classify accounts into two types: excuses and justifications. While in *excuses* the account-giver admits the pejorative quality of the action, decision, or statement but denies being (fully) responsible for it, in *justifications* the account-giver accepts responsibility for the action, decision, or statement in question but rejects the undesired quality linked to it (Scott & Lyman, 1968).

In his efforts to extend Scott & Lyman's (1968) analysis and classification of accounts, Schönbach (1980) suggests four phases of account episodes (failure event, reproach, account, and evaluation) with an addition of two other account-giving strategies (concessions and refusals) and some modification of the Scott and Lyman's excuses and justifications. For him, an account episode involves a failure event (past conduct), a reproach (where the account-holder asks the account-giver to account for the failure event), an account (the account-giver now accounts for the failure event), and an evaluation (the account-holder evaluates whether the given account can be accepted or rejected). According to Schönbach (1980), apart from excuses or justifications, the account-giver can also give an account in terms of concessions or refusals. In *concessions*, the account-giver explicitly admits being guilty or responsible for the failure event, abstains from excuses and justifications, regrets that the failure event occurred, or makes restitution. In *refusals*, the account-giver may, for instance, claim that the failure event never happened, explicitly refuse to confess being guilty, or unrestrictedly attribute guilt to others. Additionally, the account-giver can deny the account-holder the right to reproach the failure event, or they can evade or mystify it (Schönbach, 1980, pp. 196–197).

Accounts can be offered in different contexts, including political domain. This view is shared by Andone (2015), who considers a “typical case of political accountability” to be one in which someone in a certain political position accounts for their past political conduct to another representative organ or person (p. 2). Thus, the term *account* is linked to both the term *political accountability* (Andone, 2014) and the notion of responsibility (Solin & Östman, 2016) in political discourse. The accounts that are offered in the political domain by politicians are known as *political accounts* (Mokapela, 2008). As observed by Andone (2014), politicians are usually required to give an account of their political conduct when they are held accountable for their past actions. If their political accounts do not live up to the criticisms, these politicians may be sanctioned (e.g. forced to resign from a particular political post, taken to court, etc.)

(Andone, 2014). Additionally, in giving political accounts, politicians may accept or deny responsibility (Solin & Östman, 2016).

Political accounts may be accepted or rejected depending on the background expectations of a particular society. These background expectations are shaped by culture, history, and experiences of the community (Scott & Lyman, 1968). For instance, politicians, especially ministers and MPs, are expected by fellow MPs and members of the electorate to behave reasonably and make decisions that will benefit the public greatly. If this is not the case, these politicians are held to account for their actions, decisions, or statements.

Although the term *political account* is usually used when politicians account for their past actions, decisions, or statements (retrospective political accountability), it can also be used to refer to the political account for future actions (prospective political accountability) (Andone, 2015). In Tanzanian parliamentary debates, MPs evaluate both ministry's performance in the previous year and ministerial plans for the coming year. Thus, both types of political accountability may be relevant to this study. However, although MPs in Tanzanian parliamentary debates may also question ministers' future plans, policies, or decisions for the coming year, they, more often than not, challenge ministers to account for the failed ones in the previous year and other failure events they think ministers should be accountable for. In analysing political accounts in Tanzanian parliamentary debates, the present study attempts to establish which account-giving strategies are prototypically employed by cabinet ministers in their political accounts of failure events and how this can be linked to argumentation schemes.

2.8 Studies on African parliamentary discourse

Although there has recently been a growing interest in the analysis of argumentative and deliberative discourse in African parliaments, research on African parliamentary discourse is still limited, compared to other parliaments in the world, such as European parliaments. Hence it is somewhat difficult to establish specific cross-linguistic and extra-linguistic features of parliamentary discourse in all African parliaments. However, on the basis of a few studies that have been carried out to investigate parliamentary discourse in Cameroon, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (e.g. Amakali et al., 2019; Atanga, 2012; Chikara & Sabao, 2019; Jakaza, 2013; Mwiine, 2018; Nyanda, 2016), a few things can be pointed out about African parliamentary discourse and African parliaments in general.

Many features that can be observed in African parliaments are not necessarily unique features of African parliamentary discourse as they can as well be found in other parliaments in the

world, especially in European or Westminster parliaments. In fact, most of these features, including the use of English as the official language, originate from Westminster parliaments. It is fair to posit that this is a legacy of British (or European) colonialism. For instance, the recently introduced Prime Minister's question time in the Tanzanian parliament – widely known as *Maswali kwa Waziri Mkuu* (Questions to the Prime Minister) – is more or less similar to the Prime Minister's Question Time in the British House of Commons. Chikara & Sabao (2019) further observe that South African and Zimbabwean parliamentary systems are based on the Westminster parliamentary system. The authors maintain that, like the Zimbabwean parliamentary model which has “two houses of Assembly”, the South African parliamentary system is also bicameral, with the “National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces” (pp. 64-65). Although *Bunge la Tanzania* may be said to resemble the Westminster system parliament in terms of, for instance, “the existence of many competing political parties” (Tambila, 2004, p. 49), the Tanzanian parliamentary setup seems, at the same time, to be slightly different from other African parliaments. According to the national constitution of Tanzania, the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania consists of the President and the (unicameral) National Assembly, which has legislative powers relating to all Union matters and the non-Union matters of Mainland Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika). Parliamentary seats in this assembly are occupied by MPs from both Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. This does not rule out the fact that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, as the only subgovernment in the Union and part of the United Republic of Tanzania, also has a (unicameral) assembly, i.e. the Zanzibar House of Representatives (famously known, in Kiswahili, as *Baraza la Wawakilishi*), with legislative powers relating to all non-Union matters of Zanzibar (URT, 2005).

As regards the language of the daily business in African parliaments, the official language for the daily business of the Tanzanian parliament is Kiswahili. However, English is also allowed (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013), but in most cases it is used only for convenience in parliamentary debates. The use of Kiswahili in parliamentary debates and in other proceedings of the Tanzanian parliament is believed to have not only “made it possible for more Tanzanians who may have otherwise been inhibited by their weak command of the English language to aspire to be parliamentarians but also “brought parliament closer to the people [...]” (Mukandala, 2004, pp. 1–2). Unlike the Tanzanian parliament which uses an African language in parliamentary debates, many other African parliaments use English (or French) as the official language, while allowing or restricting the use of indigenous African languages. The

Zimbabwean parliament, for instance, uses English as the official language for parliamentary debates. However, parliamentarians can also express themselves in Shona (Jakaza, 2013). Similarly, English is used as the official language in the Namibian parliament, although other languages may also be used for convenience (Amakali et al., 2019; Iipingwe, Makamani, & Ashikuti, 2019). In regard to the cooperative and conflictive nature, African parliamentary discourse, like in other parliaments in Europe or America, can be described as both cooperative and conflictive but the degree of cooperativeness or conflictiveness may differ from one African parliament to another or from one parliamentary dialogue to another in the same parliament. As further observed by Chikara & Sabao (2019), although African parliamentary discourse is usually characterised by party solidarity as well as ideological or political confrontation and disagreement along party lines (especially between the ruling party and the opposition), cross-party problem-solving or cooperation is also not uncommon.

Furthermore, in many African countries, parliamentary discourse can be described as public discourse as parliamentary proceedings are usually broadcast to reach a wider audience and the official records of the parliamentary proceedings are publicly accessible in the form of Hansards (Bwenge, 2010; Chikara & Sabao, 2019). It can thus be maintained that MPs in many African parliaments perform most of their parliamentary activities in the public eyes. Needless to say, like in many other parliaments, debates in African parliaments are moderated by the Speaker (or Chairperson) of the house and African parliamentary discourse is regulated by the rules and conventions of the specific parliament in the name of *standing orders*. Thus, another feature that may be said to characterise African parliamentary discourse is the deliberate or subconscious violation of the standing orders (Chikara & Sabao, 2019). Moreover, Chikara & Sabao (2019) maintain that debaters in African parliamentary debates include both “semi-literate” and “highly educated” MPs (p. 60), who are expected to be aware of the institutional rules and are required to observe them. Regarding the occupation of parliamentary seats among political groups, most parliamentary seats in African parliaments are occupied by members of the ruling parties and tend to be ‘male-dominated’ (Atanga, 2012). However, the number of opposition and female MPs seems to have recently increased. Similarly, Mukandala (2004) maintains that the number of special seats for women in the Tanzanian parliament has also continued to increase.

With respect to the research themes in African parliamentary discourse, while Bwenge (2010) has analysed the Swahili-English code-mixing discourse in the Tanzanian parliament, Iipingwe et al. (2019) have analysed the code-switching patterns in the Namibian parliament. Other

studies have focused on gender (equality) discourse, particularly the construction of a ‘model Cameroonian woman’ in the Cameroonian parliament (Atanga, 2012) and the promotion of gender equality by male MPs in the parliament of Uganda (Mwiine, 2018). Furthermore, Rutechura (2018) has examined the persuasiveness of parliamentarians’ linguistic forms in the Constituent Assembly (CA) in Tanzania. Studies by Atanga (2012) and Rutechura (2018) have generally approached African parliamentary discourse from a CDA perspective. Specifically, while Atanga (2012) employs Wodak’s discourse-historical approach to study Cameroonian parliamentary discourse, Rutechura (2018) uses Fairclough’s dialectical-relational approach in his study on the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse in the CA. Moreover, Chikara & Sabao (2019) concentrate on the violation of the institutional rules as an ‘argumentation strategy’ in the South African and Zimbabwean parliaments.

Research on argumentative reality in African parliamentary debates from a pragma-dialectical perspective has not received a considerable attention. As I have pointed out in chapter one (see section 1.2), a few studies that have been conducted to investigate the actual argumentative discourse in African parliaments from the perspective of pragma-dialectics have focused on argument quality and strategic manoeuvring in Tanzanian parliamentary speeches and debates (Nyanda, 2016), appraisal, evaluation, and intersubjective stance in Zimbabwean parliamentary discourse (Jakaza, 2013, 2019), and *ad hominem* arguments in Namibian parliamentary discourse (Amakali et al., 2019), among others. Therefore, this study extends the scope of research on African parliamentary discourse from the perspective of pragma-dialectics by examining not only the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring in an institutional context but also the prototypical argumentative patterns that come into being as a result of realising the institutional point of the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament, as well as arguers’ argumentative style. The study further investigates the ministers’ accounts of failure events, including (non)acceptance of responsibility, and self-presentation strategies, which are in this study taken to constitute forms of strategic manoeuvring (audience adaptation).

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the key issues and perspectives from the previous research on political discourse, focusing on its nature and genres. I paid particular attention to the analysis of parliamentary discourse, which the current research examines. I discussed both parliamentary debates and parliamentary speeches as subgenres of parliamentary discourse and indicated that, in this study, parliamentary speeches are analysed as constituents of parliamentary debates. I also discussed four perspectives on parliamentary discourse which are

instrumental in analysing argumentation in parliamentary debates. I next concentrated on the common argumentative (or rhetorical) strategies that can be employed by MPs in parliamentary debates. I then showed how argumentative discourse is linked to both account-giving and the notion of responsibility. Moreover, I provided a brief analysis of African parliamentary discourse, taking examples from Cameroon, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. In the following chapter, I discuss the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation and explain how it is utilised as a theoretical framework in the current study.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION

3.1 Introduction

In order to provide an in-depth account and analysis of the actual argumentative discourse in the Tanzanian parliament within and beyond the resolution process, this study employs a two-fold theoretical framework which combines the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, as the main theory, with the account-giving model, as a complementary theory. This chapter, however, presents the main principles and properties of the pragma-dialectical theory and discusses the manner they are employed in analysing the selected annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has a range of dimensions that can be investigated in argumentative discourse. However, the present chapter explores a few important dimensions of the theory which are relevant to the study.

This chapter is organised as follows. This introductory section is followed by section 3.2, which focuses on key elements in the origin and development of the pragma-dialectical theory. Section 3.3 presents the meta-theoretical starting points for the emergence of the theory, and section 3.4 discusses the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion, with particular attention to the critical discussion stages, the speech acts performed in each stage, as well as the rules for critical discussion and violations of the code of conduct. In section 3.5, the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse is presented with a focus on the analytic transformations, argumentation structure, and argumentation schemes. The pragma-dialectical properties of contextualised argumentative practices are discussed in section 3.6. These properties include strategic manoeuvring as an important extension of the theory, prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style. Section 3.7 presents the empirical pragma-dialectical research programme in the political domain, focusing on a few studies on parliamentary discourse. The characterisation of the Tanzanian parliament's annual ministerial budget debate as a communicative activity type is presented in section 3.8. Finally, the chapter's concluding remarks are given in section 3.9.

3.2 Origin and development of the theory

Initiated at the University of Amsterdam by Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst in the 1970s and developed over the next four decades by F. H. van Eemeren and colleagues, the pragma-dialectical theory is a theoretical framework in which argumentation is characteristically “viewed from a perspective that combines a communicative angle inspired

by pragmatic insights from speech act theory and discourse analysis with a critical angle inspired by dialectical insights from critical rationalism and formal dialectical approaches” (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 518). Thus, the theory has developed from both the study of language in use (pragmatics) and the study of regimented dialogues (dialectics). Apart from combining pragmatic insights with dialectical insights, it also builds on insights from different fields, such as linguistics, philosophy, communication studies, discourse analysis, speech act theory, and psychology (van Eemeren et al., 2014). The theory is centrally concerned with the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits through argumentative means. Passing through four stages of a critical discussion, the parties involved in a disagreement attempt to establish in a reasonable way whether the protagonist’s standpoints are tenable against the antagonist’s critical reactions (van Eemeren, 2012).

According to van Eemeren & Peng (2017), there are, so far, six vital stages in the development of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. These stages, which often overlap, are the conceptualization stage, the validation stage, the externalization stage, the empiricalization stage, the instrumentalization stage, and the contextualization stage, which “is still being processed but is nearing its completion” (p. 1). Based on a differentiation of the six stages by van Eemeren & Peng (2017, pp. 1–4), each of these stages can be briefly described as follows.

The *conceptualization* stage of pragma-dialectics was developed by Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst from the 1970s to the early 1980s by laying the philosophical and theoretical foundations of the theory and shaping the pragma-dialectical research programme (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, 2004; van Eemeren & Peng, 2017). Then, the pragma-dialectical standard theory was given its complete shape in the *validation* stage, which began from the early 1980s to the late 1980s. In this stage, the pragma-dialectical treatment of fallacies was established. It was then tested whether, after incorporating a systematic treatment of fallacies in dealing with the subject matter of argumentation in the theorizing, the rules for critical discussion were capable of helping to detect fallacious moves in argumentative discourse (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren & Peng, 2017).

In the *externalization* stage, which started in the late 1980s and ended in the early 1990s, the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse in the actual context was also established with an inclusion of the concept of analytic overview. For the analysis of an argumentative discourse to be done adequately, an analytic overview is needed of those, and only those, implicit and explicit elements instrumental in the resolution process. This means

that the parties' differences of opinion, standpoints, argumentation structures, and argumentation schemes must all be reconstructed in the actual argumentative discourse. The next stage is the *empiricalization* one. Extending from the late 1980s to the 2000s, this stage is based on "various series of empirical experiments aimed at determining the empirical basis of some major pragma-dialectical theoretical procedures and constructs, such as the identification of argumentative moves by means of textual and contextual indicators" (van Eemeren & Peng, 2017, pp. 1–2) through qualitative empirical research and the standards of dialectical reasonableness (van Eemeren et al., 2009; van Eemeren, Houtlosser, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007; van Eemeren & Peng, 2017).

According to van Eemeren & Peng (2017), the *instrumentalization* stage was initiated in the late 1990s and arrived at its full fruition in 2010. Generally, this stage dates back to van Eemeren & Houtlosser's (1999) introduction of strategic manoeuvring to account for the requirement to maintain a delicate balance between arguers' dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness. Through the introduction of strategic manoeuvring in the theorizing, the classical interrelationship between the dialectical and rhetorical perspectives on argumentation has been significantly strengthened (van Eemeren, 2010; van Eemeren & Peng, 2017). As the most recent one, the *contextualization* stage began around 2005 and it is about to be provisionally completed. In this stage, the pragma-dialectical research programme has concentrated on the detection of prototypical argumentative patterns which result from realizing the institutional point within the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in the contextualised argumentative practices (van Eemeren, 2015a; van Eemeren & Peng, 2017). The last two stages, to which the current study pays particular attention, are further discussed in section 3.6. Another important extension in the development of pragma-dialectics is the introduction of the notion of 'argumentative style' (van Eemeren, 2019), which is also discussed in section 3.6.

3.3 Meta-theoretical starting points

According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2014), in the pragma-dialectical research programme, the descriptive pragmatics and the normative dialectics in the study of argumentation have to be systematically linked together. To connect the two dimensions, argumentation is approached with four meta-theoretical premises which serve as methodological principles in the study of argumentation (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). These meta-theoretical starting points are "pointers to the way in which the integration of the pragmatic and the dialectical dimension aimed for in pragma-dialectics can be achieved" (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 523). For the

purpose of achieving the desired results of integrating the descriptive pragmatic dimension with the normative dialectical dimension, the subject matter under scrutiny in the study of argumentation has to be functionalized, socialized, externalized, and dialectified (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

To start with *functionalization*, in order to make sure that the fundamental function of argumentation in resolving a difference of opinion is not neglected, van Eemeren et al. (2014) argue that the theorizing about argumentation should focus on the specific functions performed by speech acts in the resolution of a difference of opinion. Thus, for the purpose of dealing with the subject matter of argumentation, this meta-theoretical premise is required (van Eemeren et al., 2014). Van Eemeren et al. (2014) maintain that “functionalization concentrates on making explicit how language (or another semiotic system) is used for realizing certain specific communicative and interactional purposes” (p. 524). Once the functions of the arguers’ speech acts have been identified, the arguers’ standpoints, argumentation, and argumentative moves can also be specified (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

The second meta-theoretical premise is *socialization*. According to van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984), argumentation has to be viewed as part of a bilateral process in which the subject matter under scrutiny is treated communicatively and interactionally. This social process involves two parties that assume two conflicting communicative roles. One party assumes the role of protagonist of a standpoint and the other takes the interactional role of antagonist to this standpoint. Through argumentative means, the protagonist has to convince the antagonist to accept their standpoint and the antagonist in their turn reacts critically to the argumentation advanced by the protagonist. This process goes on until a resolution is jointly reached (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). These social communicative and interactional roles of protagonist and antagonist can be exchanged, depending on the nature of a difference of opinion. However, what expresses the social nature of argumentation more clearly is not the mere fact that a critical discussion involves two interlocutors who exchange communicative roles but the kind of commitment both parties make to defend or attack the standpoint through the argumentative moves they make and how these moves relate to one another (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984).

In regard to *externalization*, van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984) put much emphasis on the verbal communication of the subject matter under investigation in the study of argumentation. Thus, according to van Eemeren et al. (2014), the theorizing about argumentation should

therefore focus on “explicating” what the protagonist and antagonist can be “held accountable for” due to what they have expressed in a particular context and against a “certain informational background” in the discourse (p. 526). This means that the pragma-dialectical theorist must start from what the protagonist and antagonist communicate verbally and must concentrate on the speech acts they explicitly or implicitly perform (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). “Rather than speculating about the psychological dispositions of the people involved in argumentation”, the theorizing about argumentation should be directed to the arguers’ commitments “as externalized in, or externalizable from”, the manner they have expressed themselves in a “certain context” and to the consequences these commitments have in argumentation (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015, p. 153).

The fourth meta-theoretical starting point is *dialectification*. For argumentation to be appropriate for resolving a difference of opinion, it must be capable of accommodating the relevant critical reactions of the antagonist (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). Thus, the theorizing about argumentation should not only concentrate on the argumentation advanced by the protagonist in defence of the standpoint at the centre of a discussion but also on the critical reactions to this standpoint by the antagonist (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). Van Eemeren et al. (2014) further maintain that “[d]ialectification means that argumentation is put in the perspective of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits and subjected to rules incorporating the standards of reasonableness that need to be observed for achieving that purpose” (p. 527). These four meta-theoretical premises are instrumental in analysing argumentation in Tanzanian parliamentary debates.

3.4 The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion

The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is a “theoretically motivated system” aimed at providing arguers with a “vital guidance” for resolving their differences of opinion on the merits by the means of argumentative moves (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015, p. 155). Apart from specifying several stages distinguishable in the resolution process, the ideal model of critical discussion also specifies the speech acts which constitute “the argumentative moves instrumental in resolution process” in each of the four stages. This model is regarded as a “point of reference” both in the analysis and assessment of argumentative discourse and in the reflection on the production of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren et al., 2014). Moreover, the model can be “a standard for guiding the methodical improvement of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015, p. 155).

In resolving their difference of opinion, the two parties involved in a critical discussion attempt to establish whether the protagonist's standpoints are defensible against the antagonist's critical reactions, given the mutually accepted starting points (van Eemeren et al., 2014). For the resolution to be reasonably reached, van Eemeren et al. (2014, p. 528) propose that the dialectical procedure for a regimented critical discussion should not only concentrate on "the inference relations between premises and conclusion but cover all speech acts that play a part" in deciding whether the standpoints are acceptable. The resolution of a difference of opinion means that either the antagonist is convinced that the protagonist's standpoint is reasonably acceptable or the protagonist has withdrawn the standpoint after realizing that their argumentation in defence of the standpoint cannot stand up to the antagonist's critical reactions (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is achieved through all the four stages of the resolution process and the various types of speech acts performed in all these stages in an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits. Section 3.4.1 and section 3.4.2 discuss the critical discussion stages and the speech acts performed in each stage respectively. The pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion and the violations of this code of conduct are discussed in section 3.4.3.

3.4.1 The pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion

The pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion incorporates four stages which correspond to the different phases that a critical discussion must go through for a successful completion of the resolution process. The four stages of a critical discussion are the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage. In the actual argumentative reality, however, these stages may not necessarily occur explicitly and/or in this order (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

In pragma-dialectics, the critical discussion begins with the *confrontation stage*. It is in this stage where a difference of opinion manifests itself through an opposition between the protagonist's standpoint and non-acceptance of this standpoint by the antagonist. In the argumentative reality, parts that realise this stage are those which indicate clearly that one party's standpoint is coincided with another party's (real or projected) doubt or contradiction, so that a (potential) difference of opinion arises (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015) succinctly argue that "if there is no confrontation of views, then there is no need for critical discussion" (p. 156).

At the *opening stage*, both material and procedural commitments of the participants in the entire discussion are identified and a decision is made on the division of the discussion roles of protagonist and antagonist. While the protagonist assumes the obligation to defend the standpoint, the antagonist undertakes the obligation to react critically to the protagonist's standpoint and defence. In the argumentative reality, the opening stage is realised by those parts of the discourse in which the participants begin to manifest themselves as such and establish sufficient common ground for their exchange of views. Having a critical discussion will make no sense if there is no such opening for an exchange of opinions (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

It is in the *argumentation stage* where the protagonist advances argumentation to defend their standpoint methodically against the antagonist's critical reactions, as an attempt to reasonably convince the antagonist to accept this standpoint. If the antagonist is not entirely convinced by the protagonist's argumentation, further argumentation is then elicited by the antagonist's critical responses. This can continue until the resolution is reasonably reached. As the protagonist advances further argumentation, their argumentation structure may become extremely complex, depending on the antagonist's critical reactions. The argumentation stage is made manifest in those parts of the discourse in which the protagonist advances argumentation in defence of a standpoint and the antagonist responds critically to this argumentation. A resolution process will not come to fruition unless there is the protagonist's argumentation and the antagonist's critical appraisal of this argumentation (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015)

According to van Eemeren et al. (2014), in the *concluding stage*, the parties establish the result of the resolution process by determining whether the protagonist's standpoint has been reasonably defended against the antagonist's critical reactions. The resolution process can be resolved in favour of either the antagonist or the protagonist. It is resolved in favour of the antagonist if the protagonist, at the end of a critical discussion, withdraws the standpoint, because the argumentation advanced in defence of the standpoint cannot stand up to the antagonist's critical reactions. It is resolved in favour of the protagonist if the antagonist's criticisms or doubts have to be retracted. No successful completion of the critical discussion has been reached if the two parties fail to draw a conclusion about the result of the resolution process. However, a successful completion of a resolution process does not necessarily mean that the same parties cannot embark on a new discussion. If the same parties start another discussion with themselves or with other participants on the same or different difference of

opinion with the same or different discussion roles, the new discussion must, as a rule, pass through the same four stages (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

3.4.2 Distribution of speech acts in a critical discussion

Several types of speech acts can contribute to the resolution of a difference of opinion in various stages of a critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). Because many speech acts in the resolution process can be performed “implicitly or indirectly”, a certain role in a critical discussion may be realized by different types of speech acts (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015, p. 158). In this section, I first discuss the five basic types of speech acts and then analyse how these speech acts can be performed in a critical discussion in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits.

Based on Searle's (1979) classification of speech acts, five basic types of speech acts can be distinguished (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). According to van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015), the first category of speech acts is comprised of the assertives, whose prototype is “an assertion by which the speaker or writer guarantees the truth” (p. 158) of the expressed proposition, as implied in the first utterance in *Example 3.1* (own example). However, as van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015) maintain, the assertives can also relate to the acceptability of the proposition being expressed in a more wider sense, as suggested by the second utterance in the following example.

Example 3.1

- (1) *I assert that Tundu Lissu and Zitto Kabwe never met.*
- (2) *Ally Kiba is the best Tanzanian musician.*

Apart from assertions, other assertives include assuring, claiming, conceding, denying, opining, stating, and supposing. In this type of speech acts, the commitment to the proposition being expressed may vary from very strong, as in assertions and statements, to quite weak, as in suppositions. In the resolution process, all kinds of the assertives can occur (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

The second type of speech acts consists of the directives. A prototypical directive is an act of ordering. This prototype requires a special position of the speaker or writer in relation to the listener or reader (van Eemeren et al., 2014). According to van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015), *Come to my room*, for instance, can only be interpreted as an order if the speaker is in position of authority in relation to the listener. Otherwise, it is either a request or an invitation. A question is regarded as “a special form of request”; a request for a verbal act – the answer.

Apart from the act of ordering, other directives include begging, challenging, forbidding, and recommending. Not all directives contribute to the resolution process. Prohibitions and unilateral orders, for instance, play no role in a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015: 158).

The commissives constitute the third type of speech acts. In this type of speech acts, the speaker or writer ‘commits’ themselves to doing (or not doing) something (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). A ‘promise’, as in the first utterance in *Example 3.2*, is a prototypical commissive. In addition to the act of promising, other commissives are accepting, agreeing, rejecting, and undertaking. Sometimes the listener or reader may be less enthusiastic about the commitments that the speaker or the writer undertakes, as indicated in the second utterance in *Example 3.2*. The commissives play a great role in a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015: 158). The following instances of commissives are provided by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015, p. 158).

Example 3.2

- (1) *I promise you I won't tell your father.*
- (2) *I guarantee that if you walk out now you will never set foot in this house again.*

The fourth type of speech acts is made of the expressives. These are the speech acts by the means of which speakers or writers express their sentiments or attitudes (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). As van Eemeren et al. (2014) further maintain, ‘joy’, for instance, can be expressed as indicated in the first utterance in *Example 3.3* (as provided by the authors) and ‘hope’ is realised in the second.

Example 3.3

- (1) *I'm glad to see you're quite well again.*
- (2) *I wish I could find such a nice girl friend.*

There is no single prototype of expressives but examples of this category of speech acts include commiserating, condoling, congratulating, greeting, regretting, and thanking. Expressives do not play a “constitutive role” in a critical discussion but they can indirectly affect the course of the resolution process (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 532).

The last type of speech acts consists of the declaratives. The declaratives are the type of speech acts by the means of which a speaker or writer brings about a change in reality (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984). For instance, if addressed to an employee by their employer, the first utterance in *Example 3.4* (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015) does not only describe a state of

affairs but it actually makes a reality. Thus, these speech acts are usually determined by “a specific institutionalized context in which certain people are qualified to perform a certain declarative” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015, p. 159). For instance, the second utterance in the following example can only be regarded as a declarative if the person saying this is (or acts as) the chairperson of the meeting.

Example 3.4

- (1) *You're fired.*
- (2) *I open the meeting.*

However, *usage declaratives* do not require any form of institutionalized relationship between interlocutors. As a special subtype of the declaratives, usage declaratives function to regulate linguistic usage with the purpose of improving listener's or reader's interpretation of the speech acts performed. Examples of this subtype of the declaratives include amplification, definitions, explications, and precizations (van Eemeren et al., 2014). Van Eemeren *et al.* (2014) further observe that, “[w]ith the exception of the usage declaratives, declaratives do not play a role in the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits” (p. 533).

After this brief discussion of the five basic types of speech acts, in what follows, I discuss how these speech acts (with the exception of the declaratives and expressives) can be performed in various stages of a critical discussion. According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2014), in the resolution process, these speech acts may be performed or requested at any stage. At the confrontation stage, the assertive can be performed by the protagonist by expressing their standpoint. The commissive can be performed through acceptance or non-acceptance of a standpoint, or by upholding non-acceptance of a standpoint. Both parties can perform the directive by requesting usage declaratives. These usage declaratives may be offered by the means of definitions or specifications as an attempt to ‘unmask a spurious dispute’ (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

At the opening stage of a critical discussion, the antagonist performs the directive by challenging the protagonist to defend the standpoint (expressed in the confrontation stage). Once challenged to defend their standpoint, the protagonist then performs the commissive by accepting the challenge to defend the standpoint. Both parties collectively perform the commissive by agreeing on the premises and discussion rules and by deciding to start a discussion. The two parties can also perform the directive by requesting a usage declarative and by offering the usage declarative through explanations (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

Four types of speech acts can be performed at the argumentation stage: the assertives, commissives, directives, and usage declaratives. The directive is performed by an arguer who assumes the role of antagonist by requesting argumentation from the discussant who plays the role of protagonist. Once requested to provide argumentation, the protagonist can accept this request and perform the assertive by advancing argumentation. Once the argumentation is offered, the antagonist can then perform the commissive by accepting (or not accepting) the protagonist's argumentation in defence of the standpoint. The discussion participants can also perform both the directive by requesting a usage declarative or the usage declarative by offering some explanation (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

In the concluding stage, the antagonist can perform the commissive by accepting or not accepting the protagonist's standpoint. Performing the assertive in this stage, the protagonist can either uphold their standpoint if it has been reasonably maintained that the antagonist's criticisms cannot refute the standpoint or retract it if their argumentation in defence of the standpoint cannot stand up to the antagonist's critical reactions. Moreover, these parties collectively perform the assertive by establishing the result of the critical discussion. As is the case in the previous stages, the discussants can also perform both the directive by requesting a usage declarative and the usage declarative by offering definitions, specifications, clarifications, etc. (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

In examining the argumentative reality in the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse, particular attention is given to the speech acts performed by the ministers and (other) MPs in all the four stages of a critical discussion, regardless of which party plays the role of protagonist and which one plays the role of antagonist.

3.4.3 Rules for critical discussion and fallacies as violations of the code of conduct

According to van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015), in order to make explicit the discourse requirements that arguers must observe, that is, the dialectical standards of reasonableness, the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion proposes a set of ten rules for critical discussion, which guide the resolution process in all stages. Any violation of any of these rules is in this theory treated as a fallacy, because it impedes the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits (van Eemeren et al., 2014). The present study examines the extent to which the argumentative discourse relating to the resolution process in the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse exemplifies the properties of this model and whether (and how much) the violations of these rules represent prototypical patterns of the argumentative discourse in the Tanzanian

parliament. Based on van Eemeren & Houtlosser's (2015, pp. 166–168) study, the ten rules of the code of conduct that should be observed by participants in a critical discussion are presented in *Table 3.1* below.

Table 3.1 Ten rules of the code of conduct in a critical discussion

No.	Rule	Prescription
1	Freedom rule	Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.
2	Obligation-to-defend rule	Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.
3	Standpoint rule	Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party.
4	Relevance rule	Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint.
5	Unexpressed premise rule	Discussants may not falsely attribute unexpressed premises to the other party, nor disown responsibility for their own unexpressed premises
6	Starting point rule	Discussants may not falsely present something as an accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point.
7	Validity rule	Reasoning that in an argumentation is presented in an explicit and complete way may not be invalid in a logical sense.
8	Argument(ation) scheme rule	Standpoints may not be regarded conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of appropriate argument(ation) schemes that are applied correctly
9	Concluding rule	Inconclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to maintaining these standpoints and conclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints.
10	(General) language use rule	Discussants may not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately misinterpret the other party's formulations.

All these rules are designed to ensure that a resolution of a difference of opinion is reasonably reached. For instance, according to van Eemeren *et al.* (2014), the first rule of the code of conduct is designed to make sure that “standpoints and doubt regarding standpoints can be freely advanced” (p. 542). If a protagonist is denied the freedom to advance a standpoint or an antagonist is prevented from calling this standpoint into question, no critical discussion can occur.

These rules may be violated in various ways at any stage of a critical discussion. In pragma-dialectics, any move which constitutes an infringement of any of these rules at any stage is deemed to be fallacious, since it hinders the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits. Thus, a fallacy, in this theory, is defined as “a discussion move that violates in some specific way a rule for critical discussion applying to a particular discussion stage” (van Eemeren &

Houtlosser, 2015, p. 169). Based on an overview of violations of these rules (van Eemeren et al., 2014) and van Eemeren & Houtlosser's (2015) *Violations of the code of conduct for critical discussion* (p. 169-173), in what follows, I discuss the various ways in which the rules for critical discussion may be violated by both parties at any discussion stage.

At the confrontation stage, both parties may violate the *freedom rule*. While the antagonist can violate the first rule by denying the protagonist the right to advance a standpoint, the protagonist can violate the same rule by restricting the antagonist's freedom to call the standpoint into question. The discussants can achieve this in different ways. For instance, they can place limits on standpoints or criticisms by declaring standpoints sacrosanct or taboo. Additionally, the parties can restrict each other's freedom of action by one party threatening the other party with sanctions (*argumentum ad baculum*), by appealing to emotions (*argumentum ad misericordiam*), or by attacking the other party's personality (*argumentum ad hominem*).

At the opening stage, the protagonist can violate the *obligation-to-defend rule* by evading the burden of proof or by shifting it to the antagonist. The protagonist can evade the burden of proof by presenting the standpoint as self-evident, providing a personal guarantee of the rightness of the standpoint, or by 'immunizing' the standpoint against criticism or doubt. The protagonist can shift the burden of proof to the other party by challenging the antagonist to show that the protagonist's standpoint is wrong (especially in a non-mixed difference of opinion), or forcing the other party to defend their standpoint, especially in a mixed difference of opinion.

At least five rules of the code of conduct may be violated in the argumentation stage: the relevance rule (4), the unexpressed premise rule (5), the starting point rule (6), the validity rule (7), and the argument scheme rule (8). The *relevance rule* can be violated by the protagonist by providing argumentation irrelevant to the standpoint expressed in the confrontation stage (*ignoratio elenchi*) or putting forward non-argumentation means of persuasion in defence of a standpoint (ethical/pathetic fallacies). The *unexpressed premise rule* can be violated by the protagonist by denying a correctly reconstructed unexpressed premise or by the antagonist by distorting the protagonist's unexpressed premise (reconstructing an unexpressed premise that goes beyond the *pragmatic optimum*). While the antagonist can violate the *starting point rule* by denying an accepted starting point, the protagonist can violate this rule by falsely presenting something as an accepted starting point. The *validity rule* can be violated by the protagonist in

at least two ways: by advancing an argument in which a sufficient condition is taken as a necessary condition (affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent) or by providing an argument in which the properties of parts and wholes are confused, i.e. fallacies of composition and division (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2009). Finally, the protagonist can violate the *argumentation scheme rule* by incorrectly applying an argumentation scheme (fallacies of authority, false analogy, slippery slope, etc.) or by using inappropriate argumentation scheme, which can constitute an *argumentum ad populum* or *argumentum ad consequentiam* (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

In the concluding stage, the *concluding rule* (9) can be violated by the protagonist by refusing to withdraw a standpoint that has not been conclusively defended or by concluding that a standpoint is right just because it has been defended successfully. The antagonist can also violate this rule by refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been reasonably defended or by concluding that their standpoint is true just because the opposite standpoint has not been defended successfully (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

The other two rules for critical discussion – the standpoint rule (3) and the language use rule (10) – can be violated in all stages. The *standpoint rule* can be violated by both parties in a critical discussion. This rule is violated when one party attributes a fictitious standpoint to the other party by wrongly presenting one’s own standpoint as the opposite standpoint or referring to the views of the group to which the other party belongs. This can also be done by creating a fictitious opponent. All these are instances of the fallacy of the straw man. The discussants can also violate this rule by misrepresenting the other party’s standpoint (taking utterances out of context or through oversimplification/exaggeration). These, too, are manifestations of the fallacy of the straw man. The *(general) language use rule* can be violated by the protagonist or antagonist by misusing unclarity (fallacy of unclarity) or taking undue advantage of ambiguity (fallacy of ambiguity, amphiboly, equivocation). The parties commit the unclarity fallacy if they take undue advantage of unclarity resulting from the way a text is structured (implicitness, indefiniteness, unfamiliarity, vagueness). The ambiguity fallacy is closely related to the unclarity fallacy; “it can occur on its own but also in combination with other fallacies” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015, p. 172).

From this analysis, it can be maintained that, as argued by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015), the pragma-dialectical model for critical discussion offers a more systematic treatment of fallacies in which all fallacies fall under one or more critical discussion rules, and each fallacy,

with exception of the standpoint rule and the language use rule, is committed at a particular stage. Additionally, while four rules can be violated by only the protagonist of a standpoint (rules 2, 4, 7, and 8), the rest can be violated by both the protagonist and antagonist (rules 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10). The pragma-dialectical treatment of fallacies also provides a broad overview of fallacies by recognizing (and distinguishing) both traditional (or ‘old’) fallacies (*argumentum ad hominem*, *argumentum ad populum*, or *argumentum ad verecundiam*) and unnamed “new” fallacies (denying an accepted starting point, evading the burden of proof, or falsely presenting a premise as self-evident) (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

3.5 The pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse

The pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse begins with the idea that resolving a difference of opinion reasonably requires not only passing through the four discussion stages analytically distinguished in the model but also performing the relevant types of speech acts in each of these stages. Thus, as a heuristic and analytic tool, in reconstructing argumentative discourse, the model of critical discussion serves as “a point of reference for the analysis and ensures that the discourse is interpreted in terms of argumentative moves relevant to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits” (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 535). The pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse is therefore aimed at achieving ‘an analytic overview’ which highlights all those, and only those, elements which play a potential role in bringing a difference of opinion to an end (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). Because these elements may not be represented explicitly in the argumentative discourse, or in the order required by the model, and may even be hidden in other non-argumentative elements, they must be systematically reconstructed and included in the analytic overview. Thus, to ensure that these elements are in agreement with the argumentative reality, the analytic overview must attend to (1) the standpoints at issue in the difference(s) of opinion; (2) the positions the parties adopt and their starting points; (3) the arguments explicitly or implicitly advanced by the parties; (4) the structure of the argumentation advanced in defence of a standpoint; (5) the argumentation schemes employed to justify a standpoint; and (6) the result of the discussion claimed by any of the parties. All these elements are “immediately relevant to the evaluation of argumentative discourse” because there is no way we can establish whether the difference of opinion has been reasonably resolved if these elements are not taken into consideration (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2014: 536; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015: 161). The argumentation structure and argumentation schemes

that are in agreement with the argumentative reality as proposed by the model are discussed in section 3.5.2 and section 3.5.3 respectively. Section 3.5.1 discusses four analytic operations in reconstructing argumentative discourse (see also section 1.6.3 of chapter one).

3.5.1 Analytic transformations

To ensure that all elements relevant to the resolution process are systematically and reasonably reconstructed in an argumentative discourse and are dealt with in an appropriate way, the pragma-dialectical analysis incorporates four specific analytic operations. Each of these reconstruction transformations “represents a particular way of reconstructing some part of the discourse in terms of a critical discussion” (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 535). The four analytic transformations distinguished in the model are deletion, addition, permutation, and substitution. The argumentative discourse resulting from these transformations may slightly or considerably differ from the discourse as it was written or spoken (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

The transformation of *deletion*, according to van Eemeren *et al.* (2014), “amounts to identifying in the analysis and leaving subsequently out of consideration all elements in the discourse” that are not instrumental in the resolution process (p. 535). These elements include immaterial interruptions, sidelines, and unnecessary repetitions (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). According to van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015), the transformation of *addition* entails “a process of completion” (p. 162). This transformation supplements the argumentative discourse with all elements that were left implicit (elliptical structures, presuppositions, unexpressed premises, etc.) (van Eemeren et al., 2014). The transformation of *permutation* involves re-arranging the order of the elements in the discourse and making these elements appear in the order that best reflects the resolution process. Elements that should belong to a particular stage in argumentative reality but are found in a different stage are readjusted and “overlaps between different discussion stages are redressed” (van Eemeren et al., 2014, pp. 535–536). In the transformation of *substitution*, ambiguous or vague phrases are replaced with clear and unambiguous formulations which fulfil the same function. This is done to ensure that all elements relevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion are presented clearly and explicitly (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

Since the argumentative discourse resulting from the application of some reconstruction operations may require and justify the execution of further transformations, in reconstructing an actual argumentative discourse, the four analytic transformations are, as a principle, carried

out together in a cyclic process. This means that, for instance, the reconstruction of a non-assertive speech act as an indirect standpoint can be completed by recursively carrying out the transformation of substitution and that of addition (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015).

3.5.2 Argumentation structure

An argumentation structure is one of the important components of an analytic overview that needs to be reconstructed in argumentative discourse for a difference of opinion to be successfully resolved. As observed by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2015), if the argumentation structure in support of a standpoint is not revealed, it cannot be decided whether the arguments advanced in defence of the standpoint “constitute a coherent and proper whole” (p. 161). However, the term *argumentation structure* should be employed in the manner in which it is defined and treated in the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 2014). Following van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans (2002) and van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans (2017), two main types of argumentation structure are distinguished in pragma-dialectics: single argumentation and complex argumentation. These types are further discussed in section 3.5.2.1 and section 3.5.2.2 respectively.

3.5.2.1 Single argumentation

The simplest structure of argumentation consists of just one single argument. A single argument structure is one which in its fully explicit form consists of two and only two premises as its defence. “Usually, one of these is unexpressed, so that the single argument appears to consist of only one premise” (van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 64). However, as van Eemeren *et al.* (2002) maintain, in order to have a more complete picture for the evaluation of a single argument, analysts may find it helpful to make the unexpressed premise explicit, as demonstrated in *Example 3.5* as provided by the authors.

Example 3.5

Petrewsky has earned the gift, because he has worked hard for it.

According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2002), the implicit premise in the example above is something like *hard work should be rewarded*. Based on van Eemeren *et al.* (2002), this single argument structure can be clearly and concisely presented using a schematic diagram as shown in Figure 3.1 below.




Figure 3.1 Simple argumentation

Alternatively, a single argument structure can be presented as shown in **Table 3.2** below (see also van Eemeren et al., 2002).

Table 3.2 Single argumentation

No.	Description
1	Petrewsky has earned the gift
1.1	Petrewsky has worked hard for it
(1.1')	(Hard work should be rewarded)

3.5.2.2 Complex argumentation

Depending on the nature of the difference of opinion (single or mixed) and the critical reactions that need to be addressed or are anticipated by a party, an argumentation structure can become more complex in various ways. Complex argumentation can be divided into three subtypes: multiple, coordinative, and subordinative argumentation. Multiple argumentation consists of alternative defences of the same standpoint, presented one after another (van Eemeren et al., 2002; van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans, 2017). Van Eemeren (2015b) further maintains that, in principle, each defence in this argumentation can stand on its own as it is considered sufficient to defend a standpoint. One of the reasons for advancing multiple defences of the same standpoint is that the arguer anticipates that a single defence may not be accepted by everyone. The following example demonstrates a multiple argumentation structure (van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans, 2017, p. 58):

Example 3.6

You can't possibly have met my mother in Marks & Spencer's in Sheringham last week, because Sheringham doesn't have a Marks & Spencer's, and as a matter of fact she died two years ago.

This argumentation can be presented in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 3.2 below.




Figure 3.2 Multiple argumentation

Alternatively, a multiple argumentation structure can be presented as shown in **Table 3.3** below.

Table 3.3 Multiple argumentation

S/N	Description
2	You can't possibly have met my mother at Marks & Spencer's last week
2.1	Sheringham doesn't have a Marks & Spencer's
2.2	My mother died two years ago

Another subtype of complex argumentation is coordinative argumentation. According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2002), in coordinative argumentation, the arguments put forward to defend a standpoint do not form a series of alternative defences as in multiple argumentation. Rather, a coordinative argumentation is regarded as “one single attempt at defending the standpoint that consists of a combination of arguments that must be taken together to constitute a conclusive defence” (p. 65). In this type of argumentation, the authors maintain, the arguments put forward in defence of a standpoint depend on each other in different ways. In the case of *cumulative* coordinative argumentation, for instance, each argument by itself may be considered too weak to conclusively defend a standpoint, as illustrated in *Example 3.7* below (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002, p. 65).

Example 3.7

The dinner was organized perfectly, for the room was exactly the right size for the number of guests, the arrangement of the table was well thought out, and the service was excellent

In the case of *complementary* coordinative argumentation, one argument reinforces another by ruling out possible objections to it (van Eemeren, 2015b; van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002). An example of a complementary coordinative argumentation is presented in *Example 3.8* below (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002, p. 65).

Example 3.8

We had to go out to eat, because there was nothing to eat at home and all the stores were closed.

According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2002), in the example above, the two single arguments, *there was nothing to eat at home* and *all the stores were closed*, are taken together to conclusively defend the standpoint “*we had to go out to eat*”. The authors further suggest that the first argument can be objected by arguing that food could have been bought at a store. Thus, the second argument rules out this objection.

In presenting coordinative argumentation in a schematic diagram, the single arguments, taken as a single defence of a standpoint, are combined together with a brace. Then, one single arrow links a combination of these arguments to the standpoint. To emphasize the relatedness of the arguments, horizontal lines are used to link them and assign them all the same number, followed by a letter (1.1a, 1.1b, 1.1c, etc.) (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002), as illustrated in Figure 3.3 below (see also van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002).




Figure 3.3 Coordinative argumentation

Alternatively, coordinative argumentation can be presented as shown in **Table 3.4** below.

Table 3.4 Coordinative argumentation

S/N	Description
3	We had to go out to eat
3.1a	There was nothing to eat at home
3.1b	All the stores were closed

The third pattern of complex argumentation is subordinative argumentation, in which arguments are advanced for arguments. The defence of the initial standpoint is constructed layer after layer, as it were. This goes on until the arguer is satisfied that the defence will be accepted as conclusive (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002), as illustrated in *Example 3.9* below (see van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002: 65-66).

Example 3.9

I can't help you paint your room next week, because I have no time next week, because I have to study for an exam, because otherwise I will lose my scholarship, because I'm not making good progress in my studies, because I've already been at it for more than five years

Speakers employ subordinative argumentation because they think that some parts of the argumentation need to be further defended. In subordinative argumentation, the part that needs further defence is called *substandpoint* and its defence is called *subargumentation*. This *subargumentation* then becomes *subsubstandpoint* and it is defended by *subsubargumentation*. This pattern of argumentation may continue until the defence is considered conclusive. Considered as a chain of reasoning, the weakest link in this argumentation determines the strength of the entire argumentation, regardless of the strength of the other links (van Eemeren et al., 2002).

According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2002), decimal points can be used to present subordinative argumentation in a schematic overview. An argument that has only one point (1.1 or 1.1a or 1.1') is not yet subordinative. In subordinative argumentation, subarguments have two points (1.1.1 or 1.1.1a or 1.1.1'); subsubarguments are marked with three points (1.1.1.1), and so forth. This chain of arguments which depend on each other is emphasized by presenting the arguments as a series of 'vertically connected' arguments, linked with arrows (van Eemeren et al., 2002), as in Figure 3.4 below.




Figure 3.4 Subordinative argumentation

A subordinative argumentation structure can alternatively be presented as shown in **Table 3.5** below.

Table 3.5 Subordinative argumentation

S/N	Description
4	I can't help you paint your room next week
4.1	I have no time next week
4.1.1	I have to study for an exam
4.1.1.1	Otherwise I'll lose my scholarship
4.1.1.1.1	I'm not making good progress in my studies
4.1.1.1.1.1	I've already been at it for more than five years

In actual argumentative practice, subordinative argumentation can be combined with multiple and coordinative argumentation and the structure of argumentation may become even more complex (van Eemeren et al., 2002), as illustrated in Figure 3.5 below (see also van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 72).




Figure 3.5 Complex argumentation

This complex argumentation can alternatively be presented as shown in **Table 3.6** below.

Table 3.6 Complex argumentation

S/N	Description
5	I can't attend the big peace demonstration

5.1	I have problems with my feet
5.1.1a	I spent time in a concentration camp
5.1.1b	I was beaten
5.2	I'll be out of country that day
5.2.1	My sister in London is getting married
5.3a	I don't entirely agree with the slogan they are using
5.3a.1	The slogan is biased
5.3a.1.1a	They make it sound like world peace is being threatened from only one side
5.3a.1.1b	World peace is threatened from many sides
5.3b	The slogan should be such that everyone agrees

3.5.3 Argumentation schemes

Another important component of an analytic overview that should be systematically reconstructed in argumentative discourse is an argumentation scheme². Like other important elements in argumentative discourse, an argumentation scheme is pertinent to the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits. If the types of argumentation schemes employed in support of a standpoint or substandpoints are not exposed, it will be difficult to determine whether the way the protagonist links the premises to the standpoint can stand up to the antagonist's critical reactions (van Eemeren et al., 2014).

According to Walton, Reed & Macagno (2008), "argumentation schemes are forms of argument (structure of inference) that represent structures of common types of arguments used in everyday discourse, as well as in special context like those of legal argumentation and scientific argumentation" (p. 1). From the perspective of pragma-dialectics, argumentation schemes are viewed as "schematic representations of justificatory relationships between reasons advanced in support of a standpoint and the standpoint defended that are instrumental in legitimizing a transfer of acceptability from these reasons to the standpoint concerned" (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020a, p. 2). In argumentative discourse, an argumentation structure can demonstrate various types of argumentation schemes. However, in pragma-dialectics, three main categories of argumentation schemes are distinguished. These categories characterise three main types of argumentation, namely symptomatic (or sign) argumentation, causal (or consequence) argumentation, and comparison (or resemblance) argumentation, which is also known as argumentation by analogy (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b; van Eemeren et al., 2002).

² Although in pragma-dialectics preference is given to the term *argument scheme* (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b), other scholars of argumentation theory (e.g. Walton et al., 2008) seem to favour the term *argumentation scheme*, which is also preferred in the presented study.

3.5.3.1 Symptomatic argumentation

According to van Eemeren & Garssen (2020b), symptomatic (or sign) argumentation is a type of argumentation in which an arguer appeals to an argumentation scheme “that is based on the pragmatic principle of something being symptomatic of something else” or, in other words, one thing is considered “a token or sign of the other” (p. 15). In this type of argumentation, there is generally a relation of concomitance between the arguer’s argumentation and what is claimed in the standpoint, and this standpoint is thus accepted on the grounds of this concomitance (van Eemeren, 2019; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren et al., 2002), as the following example illustrates.

Example 3.10

Tundu Lissu is a brilliant lawyer, because he has never lost a court case. (And never losing a court case is characteristic of brilliant lawyers)

This argument can be presented as shown in **Table 3.7** below.

Table 3.7 Symptomatic argumentation

S/N	Description
6	Tundu Lissu is a brilliant lawyer
6.1	He has never lost a court case
(6.1')	(Never losing a court case is characteristic of brilliant lawyers)

The argumentation scheme in this example is based on a symptomatic relation; Tundu Lissu’s never losing a case is taken as a sign that he is really a brilliant lawyer. This relation of concomitance between the argumentation and the standpoint is made clear by the implicit premise *never losing a court case is characteristic of brilliant lawyers*.

According to van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans (2017), the general argumentation scheme for symptomatic argumentation can be presented as shown in **Table 3.8** (see also Mwombeki, 2019).

Table 3.8 Argumentation scheme for symptomatic argumentation

	Y is true of X
because	Z is true of X
Therefore	Z is symptomatic of Y

The basic critical question to be answered for this argumentation scheme to be considered reasonable is whether what is claimed in the standpoint is indeed symptomatic of what is stated in the argument or whether what is indicated in the argument is really a token of what is

suggested in the standpoint (van Eemeren, 2019; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b). Van Eemeren *et al.* (2002) maintain that, for a defence of a standpoint to be conclusive based on this general argumentation scheme, the following critical questions must also be satisfactorily answered.

Example 3.11

- (1) *Aren't there also other non-Ys which have the characteristic of Z?*
- (2) *Aren't there also other Ys which do not have the characteristic of Z?*

In our example about Tundu Lissu's brilliance as a lawyer on the basis of the claim that he has never lost a court case, one may ask the following questions:

Example 3.12

- (1) *Aren't there other non-brilliant lawyers who have never lost a court case?*
- (2) *Aren't there other brilliant lawyers who have lost court cases?*

There are several subcategories of symptomatic argumentation (van Eemeren, 2015b). For instance, something done by someone can be taken as typical of their character. A phenomenon can also be presented as a sign or symptom of something more general (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002, p. 98). Another subcategory of symptomatic argumentation is argumentation from example. In this subcategory, a generalization is made, or a rule is introduced, by presenting a number of separate cases as indicative of something more general (van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans, 2017). To evaluate whether argumentation from example has been applied reasonably, there are at least two critical questions that must be satisfactorily answered to justify the generalization (van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002). While the first question determines whether the example cited is indeed representative in a specific context, the second question establishes whether the example is sufficient to justify the generalization (Plug, 2010b; van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002). Unless both questions are satisfactorily answered, argumentation from example may result in "the fallacy of hasty generalization (*secundum quid*)" (Plug, 2010b, p. 46). In the other subcategory of symptomatic argumentation; authority argumentation, a person's expertise (authority argumentation from expert opinion) or special position is presented as a sign that the proposition ascribed to them is acceptable (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Walton *et al.*, 2008).

3.5.3.2 Causal argumentation

Van Eemeren & Garssen (2020b) describe causal (or consequence) argumentation as a type of argumentation where an arguer applies an argumentation scheme "that is based on the

pragmatic principle of something being” a cause or consequence of something else or, in other words, one thing is considered “instrumental to or leading to the other” (p. 15). Thus, in this type of argumentation, the standpoint is accepted on the basis of “a relation of instrumentality or consequentiality between the reason advanced and the standpoint defended” (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b, p. 15), regardless of whether the reason is presented as a cause of the effect in the standpoint, as a means to an end, or as an action with some effect (van Eemeren et al., 2002). In the following example, *reading in poor light* is taken as the cause of the claim that *Lydia has weak eyes* (van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans, 2017, p. 88).

Example 3.13

Lydia must have weak eyes because she is always reading in poor light. (And reading in poor light gives you weak eyes)

To make clear that the relation between the speaker’s argumentation and the standpoint is a causal one, the unexpressed premise is reconstructed and made explicit, as **Table 3.9** illustrates (see van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002: 100-101).

Table 3.9 Causal argumentation

S/N	Description
7	Lydia must have weak eyes
7.1	She is always reading in poor light
(7.1’)	(Reading in poor light gives people weak eyes)

The basic critical question for evaluating the reasonableness of causal argumentation is whether what is indicated in the arguer’s argumentation does indeed lead to what is claimed in the standpoint or whether what the arguer claims in the standpoint indeed results from what is suggested in the arguer’s argumentation (van Eemeren, 2018, 2019; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b). For instance, according to van Eemeren *et al.* (2002), to evaluate whether the standpoint in **Table 3.9** has been conclusively defended, the analysis must verify whether *reading in poor light* indeed always results in *weak eyes*. Probably, as the authors maintain, the two things are unrelated, or under certain conditions the predicted result does not hold. Perhaps, Lydia’s eyes are so strong that reading in poor light does not have any effect on them. The authors further stress that the general argumentation scheme for a causal relation can be presented as shown in **Table 3.10** (see also Mwombeki, 2019).

Table 3.10 Argumentation scheme for causal argumentation

	Y is true of X
because	Z is true of X
Therefore	Z leads to Y

There are different subcategories of argumentation based on a causal link or relation. One of them is pragmatic argumentation, where a standpoint recommends a certain course of action and the argumentation consists of summing up the favourable consequences of adopting that course of action (van Eemeren et al., 2002), as illustrated in *Table 3.11* below (see also van Eemeren et al., 2002, pp. 101–102).

Table 3.11 Pragmatic argumentation

S/N	Description
8	Doctors should go back to wearing white jackets
8.1	Wearing white jackets will create distance
(8.1')	(It is a good thing to have a certain distance between the doctor and the patient)

There are *positive* and *negative* versions of pragmatic argumentation. In defence of a prescriptive standpoint (especially in parliamentary or policy debates), the positive version suggests that an action should be carried out because it leads to “a certain desirable result”, while the negative version suggests that the action “should *not* be carried out” because it leads to “a certain *undesirable* result” (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b, p. 17). Van Eemeren & Garssen (2020b, p. 17) further specify the argumentation scheme for (the positive version of) pragmatic argumentation as shown in *Table 3.12*.

Table 3.12 Argumentation scheme for (a positive) pragmatic argumentation

No.	Description
9	Action X should be carried out
9.1	Action X leads to desirable result Y
(9.1')	(If action X leads to a desirable result such as Y, [then] X must be carried out)

Van Eemeren *et al.* (2002) maintain that, in addition to answering the critical questions for causal argumentation in general, the assessment of (a positive) pragmatic argumentation should also determine whether the consequences presented to defend the standpoint are indeed favourable, as the case may be. Generally, van Eemeren & Garssen (2020b, pp. 17–18) suggest six relevant critical questions to evaluate the soundness of (a positive) pragmatic argumentation depending on the standpoint expressed in a specific context. These questions are presented in *Example 3.14*.

Example 3.14

- (1) *Does action X indeed lead to result Y?*
- (2) *Must actions that lead to a desirable result Y always be carried out?*
- (3) *Is result Y indeed desirable?*
- (4) *Would another result not be even more desirable than Y?*
- (5) *Does action X not have unavoidable undesirable side-effects?*
- (6) *Could result Y not be achieved more easily or more economically by other actions?*

Apart from pragmatic argumentation, which is considered a ‘prominent’ subcategory of causal argumentation, other subtypes of causal argumentation include (but not limited to) argumentation from cause to effect, argumentation from effect to cause, as well as argumentation from means to goal (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b). Additionally, *problem-solving* argumentation and complex *problem-solving* argumentation (Garssen, 2016) may be regarded as different realizations of pragmatic argumentation.

3.5.3.3 Comparison Argumentation

Comparison argumentation (or argumentation by analogy) is a type of argumentation in which an arguer relies on an argumentation scheme “that is based on the pragmatic principle of something being comparable to something else” or, in other words, one thing is considered to resemble or to be similar to the other (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b, p. 15). Similarly, Walton et al (2008, p. 55) maintain that the argumentation scheme for argumentation by analogy is based on “the principle that two cases can be judged to be similar to each other”. This type of argumentation involves a ‘relation of comparability’ between the argumentation advanced and the standpoint that is being justified, and the standpoint is thus accepted on the basis of these comparability or similarity grounds (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b; van Eemeren et al., 2002). The defence of a standpoint in **Table 3.13** is based on a relation of analogy (see also van Eemeren *et al.*, 2002, pp. 102-103).

Table 3.13 Comparison argumentation

S/N	Description
10	The movement toward democracy of the 1960s was bound to fail
10.1	The French revolution also failed
(10.1’)	(The movement towards democracy of the 1960s is like the French revolution)

Van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans (2017) posit that the general argument scheme for the argumentation based on a relation of analogy can be presented as shown in **Table 3.14** below (see also Mwombeki, 2019).

Table 3.14 Argumentation scheme for comparison argumentation

	Y is true of X
because	Y is true of Z
And	Z is comparable to X

According to van Eemeren *et al.* (2002) and Walton *et al.* (2008), to assess the soundness of the argumentation for the standpoint based on a relation of analogy, several critical questions must be answered. The basic critical question, however, is whether what is claimed in the standpoint is indeed comparable to what is indicated in the argumentation advanced (van

Eemeren, 2019) or whether what is suggested in the argumentation “is indeed similar to what is claimed in the standpoint [...]” (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2020b, p. 16).

Garssen (2009) further distinguishes two subtypes of comparison argumentation. The first subtype is *comparison argumentation as extrapolation of characteristics*. According to this author, in this variant of argumentation by analogy, two items (things, people, situations, etc.) belonging to the same category are said to be comparable on the basis of the extrapolation of their “shared properties” (p. 135), as shown in the following example as provided by the author.

Example 3.15

Camera surveillance in the centre of Amsterdam will prove to be very effective, because in London, camera surveillance proved to be highly effective before.

In *Example 3.15* above, London (as a city) is compared to Amsterdam (which is also a city). In the argumentation advanced for the relevant standpoint, the similarities being referred to usually remain implicit but are made explicit in the critical testing procedure for comparison argumentation. The basic critical question for examining the soundness of this subtype of comparison argumentation is whether the items that are compared in the argumentation are indeed comparable. Other relevant critical questions may follow depending on the nature of the supposed similarities and the protagonist’s further defence (Garssen, 2009).

The second subtype is *comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency*. According to Garssen (2009), this subtype involves, for instance, the general rule of justice that people, institutions, or groups belonging to the same class should behave consistently or “should be treated in a similar way” in similar situations, as the following example illustrates (Garssen, 2009, p. 136).

Example 3.16

The European committee should [grant] Belgium higher agricultural subsidies because it granted Italy higher subsidies as well.

On the basis of *Example 3.16* above, Garssen (2009) suggests that, in this argumentation, the relevant institution (i.e. the European committee) is prompted to do X (grant Belgium higher agricultural subsidies) because it also did X in a similar situation (it also granted higher subsidies to Italy). Unlike like the first variant, which involves an extrapolation of properties, the central concern in the second subtype (or the basic critical question for examining the soundness of this variant) is whether the two items that are compared “really belong to the same category and whether this category is really relevant to the claim in the standpoint” (p.

136). According to Garssen (2009), this subtype also differs from the first one in the sense that, while in the first subtype both the standpoint and premise(s) are typically descriptive, in this subtype the standpoint tends to be normative in nature. Apart from these two variants of comparison argumentation, in some other approaches, figurative analogy is (also) considered a special subtype of argumentation by analogy. However, Garssen (2009) categorically maintains that, from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, figurative analogy “should not be seen as [a variant of] comparison argumentation, but instead as a special presentational device that is used to put forward other (symptomatic or causal) types of argumentation” (p. 134).

In this study, all the three types of argumentation schemes are given particular attention. While considering the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in the Tanzanian parliament, the present study aims to establish which argumentation schemes are prototypically employed by parliamentarians when advancing argumentation in defence of a standpoint or when reacting critically to the argumentation advanced by the other party in the selected annual ministerial budget debates.

3.5.4 The presentation of argumentation structure and argumentation schemes

In this study, arguers’ arguments are presented in a table format where the unexpressed premises are reconstructed. The arguers’ argumentation schemes are also identified and analysed. The argumentation structure for each of the minister’s and opposition’s standpoints and related argumentation is then summarised in a schematic overview where the unexpressed premises are not presented but they can be referred to in the relevant tables. This is followed by a summary of the argumentation schemes that constitute the minister’s and opposition’s argumentative patterns in the relevant parliamentary debates.

3.6 The pragma-dialectical facets of argumentation in context

Three pragma-dialectical properties of the contextualised argumentative discourse in various communicative practices can be distinguished in the literature. These are the arguers’ modes of strategic manoeuvring (in relation to the institutional preconditions), prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style, as discussed in the following sections.

3.6.1 Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse

Strategic manoeuvring is an important extension to the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation which is concerned with investigating rhetorical effectiveness in conjunction with dialectical reasonableness in the contextualised argumentative practices. The extended pragma-dialectical theory focuses on how arguers achieve the effect of acceptance in the

audience they want to reach through the argumentative moves they make within the dialectical standards of reasonableness as established by the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion. Thus, in resolving a difference of opinion by the means of a critical discussion, the arguers' desire to be rhetorically effective must be reconciled with the requirement to be dialectically reasonable (van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, 2002, 2015). According to van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2002), this 'delicate balance' must be maintained in all stages of a critical discussion. Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2002, pp. 134–143) further specify the dialectical requirements and the rhetorical aims both parties attempt to achieve in each of these stages, as follows.

According to these scholars, at the confrontational stage, the parties are dialectically required to be clear about "the specific issues that are at stake" in the difference of opinion and the positions they take (p. 138). The parties' rhetorical aim is to direct the confrontation in the way that will benefit their positions greatly. To achieve this, each party will attempt to define the disagreement in a way that will accommodate the issues each party wants to be discussed and favour the position each of them assumes.

In the opening stage, arguers are dialectically expected to establish a clear point of departure. In this point of departure, the parties agree on material and procedural starting points and a decision is made on the division of the burden of proof. Rhetorically, arguers desire to arrive at a point of departure that best serves their own interests. To ensure that the established starting points and the allocation of the burden of proof work in their favour, each party is expected to manoeuvre strategically.

The dialectical aim of the argumentation stage is to test the acceptability of the standpoints expressed in the confrontation stage, "starting from the point of departure established in the opening stage". The rhetorical objective of the parties is "to make the strongest case and to launch the most effective attack" (p. 139).

The parties' dialectical aim in the concluding stage is to establish the result of the critical discussion and decide whether the standpoints advanced by the protagonist in the confrontation stage have been reasonably defended against the antagonist's critical reactions or whether the antagonist's doubt can be maintained. "Viewed rhetorically, each party will attempt to claim victory and their strategic manoeuvring will be designed accordingly" (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 139).

Because both parties want to realise both aims to their best advantage, they can be expected to make strategic argumentative moves that favour their own perspective and position. This can be manifested in the choice of the topical potential from a set of options available, in selecting a responsive adaptation to audience demand, and in the exploitation of presentational devices with regard to the linguistic resources (van Eemeren, 2010; van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, 2015). The parties can employ each of these aspects to influence the result of the critical discussion for their own interests (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002). Based on van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2002: 139–141), these aspects can be further discussed as follows.

The topical potential at a particular stage of a critical discussion constitutes a set of relevant options available in the relevant critical discussion stage. At the confrontation stage, the parties attempt to select the most effective choice from the potential issues to be discussed and influence the definition of the difference of opinion in their favour. In the opening stage, each party attempts to strategically influence the other party to accept the starting points that favour their position. In the argumentation stage, the parties attempt to select, from the available means of defence, a strategic means of defence that best serves their interests. In the concluding stage, the parties will make all attempts to achieve the desired result of the discussion based on their choice of topic and means of defence.

In regard to the audience adaptation, in each stage of a critical discussion, each party attempts to make strategic argumentative moves which “comply with the listeners’ or readership’s good sense or preferences”. Arguers generally make efforts to create the required empathy or ‘communion’ in each stage. An attempt to avoid unnecessary or unresolvable contradictions in the confrontation stage is a manifestation of the parties’ adaptation to audience demand. In the opening stage, each party attempts to base their arguments on the starting points that appeal to the emotions and feelings of the audience. In argumentation stage, the parties aim to achieve this by advancing arguments which can be accepted by the listeners or readers or by “referring to argumentative principles they adhere to” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 140).

To achieve the desired rhetorical effect, the parties attempt to employ the most effective presentational choices. In argumentative discourse, the selected presentational devices may include rhetorical figures (simile, proverbs, rhetorical questions, etc.), strategic quotations, persuasive definitions and narratives, as well as stylistic framing of the argumentative moves. As in the first two aspects, these devices can be exploited in each stage of a critical discussion.

As van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2002) propose, distinguishing these aspects analytically does not imply that each of them works independently in argumentative discourse. In the actual argumentative discourse, the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring work together and complement each other. In fact, “a fully-fledged ‘argumentative strategy’ is being followed only if the speaker’s or writer’s strategic manoeuvrings in the discourse converge with respect to choosing from the topical potential, adapting to audience demand, and the exploitation of presentational devices” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 141).

However, as van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2002) further prescribe, the exploitation of each of these aspects should not go beyond the boundaries of the ideal strategic manoeuvring as defined in the theory. In pragma-dialectics, the ideal strategic manoeuvring is based on the arguers’ attempts to achieve both the dialectical aim and the rhetorical effect. Thus, as the parties manoeuvre strategically, they should ensure that there is a ‘perfect balance’ between their desire for rhetorical effectiveness and the required dialectical reasonableness. In the actual argumentative discourse, maintaining this delicate balance is a goal that arguers may fail to achieve. The parties may either ignore the optimal rhetorical effect for the fear of not being reasonable or neglect the dialectical objective and commit themselves to the rhetorical aim in order to win the discussion in their favour. In this theory, when a party ignores the effect of their rhetorical persuasiveness and sticks to reasonableness, this argumentative strategy is not considered fallacious because it harms not the adversary in the critical discussion but the party that does this, and it may be regarded as just a bad strategy. Fallacious is an argumentative strategy in which the rhetorical effect overrules the dialectical objective. It is fallacious because it derails the ideal strategic manoeuvring and violates the rules of the code of conduct. “All derailments of strategic manoeuvring are fallacious and all fallacies can be regarded as derailments of strategic manoeuvring” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002, p. 142). In the analysis of the actual argumentative discourse in Tanzanian parliamentary debates, the study investigates how MPs’ rhetorical effectiveness is reconciled with the standards of dialectical reasonableness in all the four stages of a critical discussion. Additionally, as I have indicated in chapter two (see section 2.8), self-presentation and other-presentation strategies are in this study examined as modes of strategic manoeuvring as they are taken to constitute part of audience adaptation.

3.6.2 Prototypical argumentative patterns

After the extension of the pragma-dialectical theory following the introduction of strategic manoeuvring, the focal point of research on argumentation in context has moved on to the

investigation of the contextual dimension of communicative activity types in the actual argumentative discourse. Focusing on the contextual dimension, the current pragma-dialectical research programme is “aimed at detecting the argumentative patterns of constellations of argumentative moves that [...] characteristically come into being in the various kinds of argumentative practices” (van Eemeren, 2015a, p. 14). The inclusion of this dimension in the theorizing about argumentation is the recent extension to the development of pragma-dialectics after the introduction of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, 2017a).

The investigation of the contextual dimension of communicative activity types can be traced back to the mid-1980s when Frans H. van Eemeren and research associates started to link the pragma-dialectical standard theory with the argumentative reality by conducting experimental quantitative empirical research. This was in the 1990s followed by the efforts to consolidate the connection between the ideal pragma-dialectical theory and the argumentative reality by introducing the notion of strategic manoeuvring in the theorizing about argumentation (van Eemeren, 2017a). Following the inclusion of strategic manoeuvring in the theory, the pragma-dialectical standard theory became ‘the extended pragma-dialectical theory’ of argumentation (van Eemeren, 2010; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002). The incorporation of the contextual dimension of communicative activity types is therefore a further extension to the extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation which is generally aimed at identifying both the “institutional preconditions” which determine the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring in specific communicative activity types and the “prototypical argumentative patterns resulting from realizing the institutional point of a specific communicative type in accordance with its institutional preconditions” (van Eemeren, 2017a, p. 16).

To accommodate this extension in the analysis of the contextualised argumentative discourse, the current pragma-dialectical research programme integrates the conventionalization of a specific communicative activity type, the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, and the institutional point that arguers’ argumentative moves need to realize. The institutional preconditions and conventions may affect the conduct of argumentative discourse in the contextualized communicative activity types, including the use of the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring (topical potential, adaptation to audience demand, and presentational devices). This is manifested in all the four stages of a critical discussion, characterized by the initial situation (the confrontation stage), the starting points (opening stage), argumentative means and criticism (argumentation stage), and the possible outcome (concluding stage) (Mohammed, 2008; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2010). For instance, only certain modes of strategic

manoeuvring can be considered suitable for realizing the institutional point in a specific communicative activity type. However, this may vary from one argumentative activity type to another. Some modes of strategic manoeuvring may be regarded as appropriate in one communicative activity type but not in another (van Eemeren, 2012). Thus, while the institutional constraints may impose certain limitations on the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring in one argumentative activity type, they may, at the same time, create specific opportunities for strategic manoeuvring in another (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2010). The institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring and the requirement to realize the institutional point then result in the creation of certain argumentative patterns (van Eemeren, 2015a, 2017a). According to van Eemeren (2017a, pp. 19–20):

[An argumentative pattern] is characterized by a constellation of argumentative moves in which, in order to deal with a particular kind of a difference of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint a particular argument scheme or combination of argument schemes is used in a particular kind of argumentation structure.

Prototypical argumentative patterns, on the other hand, are characterized by “the way in which argumentative discourse is generally conducted” in a specific argumentative practice (van Eemeren, 2015a, p. 20). For instance, in parliamentary policy debates, prescriptive standpoints are generally justified by pragmatic argumentation which may be prototypically supported by argumentation from example, authority argumentation, or argumentation by analogy (Garssen, 2016, 2017; van Eemeren, 2015a, 2017a). The prototypical argumentative patterns are contingent on both the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring pertaining to a specific argumentative activity type and the critical questions to be answered by a particular argumentation scheme (van Eemeren, 2015a, 2017a). Moreover, the prototypical argumentative patterns can be distinguished from stereotypical argumentative patterns; the frequently used argumentative patterns in a specific communicative activity type (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2014).

3.6.3 Argumentative style

Most recently, Frans H. van Eemeren has introduced the concept of “argumentative style” in spoken and written argumentative discourse. As a complex notion, argumentative style is associated with the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring and is manifested in the argumentative moves instrumental in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, in the dialectical route chosen, as well as in the other strategic considerations (van Eemeren, 2019).

According to van Eemeren (2019), argumentative moves constitute the first property in which an arguer's argumentative style can manifest itself through the strategic use of the argumentative moves performed as the arguer attempts to win the critical discussion in their favour. He maintains that the second property of an arguer's argumentative style is the dialectical route chosen. In the dialectical route chosen, standpoints may be justified by various (sub)types of argumentation schemes through association and dissociation. Strategic considerations constitute the last property of argumentative style (van Eemeren, 2019).

Van Eemeren (2019) further distinguishes between what he calls *detached* argumentative style and *engaged* argumentative style. These two styles can be manifested differently in all the four stages of a critical discussion. Based on van Eemeren (2019, no page number), the two argumentative styles can be described as follows. Starting with the *detached* argumentative style, the topical potential in the initial situation of the confrontation stage can be realised by 'a business-like statement of what is to be discussed'. In parliamentary debates, for instance, the topic potential is restricted to the institutional topic on the table. In the audience adaptation, objectivity is said to be quasi-neutrally preserved. The party's presentational devices will be realised by formulations which intend to show the 'facts of the matter'. In the opening stage, the topical potential will consist of verifiable starting points which are based on facts. The audience adaptation can be materialised by undisputable starting points which are likely to be accepted by the audience. Straight-forward overviews and numerical or statistical data are the presentational devices which shape the arguer's starting points. In the argumentation stage, this style is manifested by the topical choices of pragmatic argumentation which emphasizes the positive effect of a certain course of action. In the audience adaptation, the party may argue quasi-neutrally that the proposed course of action has a desired effect to the audience. The presentation devices of the detached style may be manifested by what van Eemeren (2019) describes as 'the formalistic expert language'. In the concluding stage, the result of the discussion may involve the shaping of the divergent topical choices, and a non-subjective conclusion may be formally reached. In the audience adaptation, the party may attempt to clearly maintain to the audience that the outcome of the discussion is a logical consequence of the established starting points. Lastly, the presentational devices may be shaped by framing the outcome of the discussion that is arrived at in 'a reporting non-confrontational way' (van Eemeren, 2019).

According to van Eemeren (2019), in the *engaged* argumentative style, the topical potential in the initial situation of the confrontation stage is realised by the selection of topics which show

how the party is closely involved in the subject matter under discussion. In the audience adaptation, this party will attempt to strongly express their views and connect them to the interests of the audience. The party's presentational devices will be realised by strategic phrasings. In the opening stage, the topical potential is manifested by evaluative starting points indicating how the party is involved in the subject matter under scrutiny. In the audience adaptation, the party will select starting points which demonstrate the premises which are close to the centre of the audience. The party's starting points in terms of presentational devices may be marked by rhetorical questions and other linguistic features which show how the party is personally involved in the subject matter under discussion. In the argumentation stage, the party's topical choice may be realised by the selection of comparison argumentation which compares some previous accepted state of affairs with the present one, which is yet to be accepted. In the audience adaptation, the party may compare the proposed course of action to a situation that is already acceptable to the audience. The presentational devices of the engaged style may be realised by a personal language which shows the party's involvement in the subject under discussion. In the concluding stage, in terms of topical potential, the result of the discussion that is emphatically reached tends to be preferred. In the audience adaptation, the party will attempt to convince the audience to accept that the outcome of the discussion is reached on the basis of the argumentative exchange between the two parties. Lastly, the presentational devices of an engaged style may be shaped by a captivating metaphor that suggests a reasonably-reached conclusion (van Eemeren, 2019).

3.7 The pragma-dialectical research programme in the political domain

According to van Eemeren (2017a), the current empirical research on the contextualized argumentative discourse has so far focused on legal domain, medical domain, and political domain. Initiated by van Eemeren's (2002) study on democracy and argumentation, the current pragma-dialectical research in the political domain, as van Eemeren (2017a) further observes, has concentrated on examining the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring and the resulting prototypical argumentative patterns in parliamentary discourse (e.g. Andone, 2016; Garssen, 2013, 2016, 2017; Ihnen Jory, 2010; Mohammed, 2008, 2009b, 2009a, 2010; Tonnard, 2010, 2011, 2009; van Eemeren & Garssen, 2012), political interviews (e.g. Andone, 2009, 2010, 2012), activist discourse (e.g. Brambilla, 2019), and online political deliberations (e.g. Lewiński, 2013). Since this study focuses on parliamentary discourse, in what follows, I pay attention to a few pragma-dialectical empirical studies that have been conducted to examine both the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring and the prototypical

argumentative patterns that are brought into reality as a consequence of realising the institutional points in parliamentary debates, Prime Minister's Question Time, and European parliamentary reports.

As regards the strategic manoeuvring in an institutional context, Mohammed (2008, 2009a) examined the systematic integration of the institutional insights in the pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative discourse in a specific contextualised argumentative practice, such as the Prime Minister's Question Time in the British House of Commons. She further investigated the contribution of the pragma-dialectical tools of strategic manoeuvring, argumentative activity types, and dialectical profiles to this integration. She argues that the knowledge of the institutional insights plays a significant role in analysing arguers' modes of strategic manoeuvring in a specific contextualised argumentative practice as the institutional rules and conventions may restrict (or allow for) arguers' strategic choices from the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring (Mohammed, 2008, 2009a).

Furthermore, Tonnard (2009) examined the instrumentality of the presentational devices of strategic manoeuvring with respect to shifting the topic in the Dutch parliament. She observes that an MP can employ specific presentational choices, such as rhetorical questions and a figure of speech, to strategically shift a topic within the parliamentary institutional context. With the use of these choices, this MP can successfully achieve both their rhetorical aim and the institutional dialectical requirement. Similarly, Plug (2010b) indicates that MEPs can successfully combine their rhetorical aim and the institutional dialectical purpose in their strategic use of argumentation from example within the institutional context of the European Parliament. This can be achieved through their multi-layered roles (topical potential), utilizing the presence of a multiple-heterogeneous audience (audience demand), and the use of specific linguistic markers to emphasize the quality of examples provided (presentational devices) (Plug, 2010b). Considering the parliamentary institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, the present study examines the extent to which the MPs' argumentative moves can successfully realise modes of strategic manoeuvring within the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament.

Other studies have focused on the investigation of prototypical argumentative patterns in the European parliamentary discourse. According to van Eemeren (2017c), the 'argumentative patterns project' started in 2012. The first stage of the project focused on the employment of one and the same type of argumentation in the main argumentation for a prescriptive standpoint

in three communicative domains: legal domain, medical domain, and political domain (van Eemeren, 2017b). In the political domain, Garssen (2016) investigated the prototypical argumentative patterns in the argumentation by the rapporteur and MEPs in European parliamentary plenary debates and observed that pragmatic argumentation (*problem-solving* pragmatic argumentation and complex *problem-solving* argumentation) is prototypically employed by proponents of a proposal at the first level of defence of the main standpoint that a certain proposal should be adopted. At the second level of defence, argumentation by example, causal argumentation, and authority argumentation can be employed to support the problem claim. Moreover, argumentation by example can be used to support a general causal claim (the proposed action solves the problem) and symptomatic argumentation to support a particular one. Opponents of a proposal would most likely advance argumentation which stresses on the ineffectiveness or negative side-effects of the proposal (Garssen, 2016; van Eemeren, 2017b). The use of pragmatic argumentation in parliamentary debates has also been observed by Ihnen Jory (2010) in the British House of Commons.

Similarly, concentrating on political accountability in the European parliamentary committees of inquiry, Andone (2016) indicates that, at the first level of defence, pragmatic argumentation (in which the arguer suggests a certain course of action) can be prototypically used in coordinative argumentation together with majority argumentation (in which the arguer appeals to the views of the majority) to support the main prescriptive standpoint. It is further maintained that combining majority argumentation with pragmatic argumentation can strengthen the legitimacy of what is claimed in the standpoint (Andone, 2016; van Eemeren, 2017b).

In the second stage of the argumentative patterns project, Garssen (2017) focused on the role of argumentation from example in the legislative debates in the European Parliament and observed that, when statistical data are lacking, proponents of a new legislation are more likely to advance argumentation by example to support the claim that there is a problem that needs to be solved. When argumentation by example is used for this purpose, it is as a rule more appropriate to mention more than one example. However, a single example can suffice if one wishes to reinforce the undesirability of the existence of the problem (Garssen, 2017; van Eemeren, 2017c).

Although Nyanda (2016) has observed the use of causal argumentation, authority argumentation, and argumentation from example in the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse, it is still unclear which types of argumentation can be prototypically advanced in favour of or

against the ministers' prescriptive standpoints relating to the proposed budget or request for funds as well as other descriptive or evaluative standpoints in the annual ministerial budget debates. Thus, this research is aimed at identifying the kinds of prototypical argumentative patterns that are brought into reality as a result of realising the institutional point.

3.8 Annual ministerial budget debate as a communicative activity type

According to the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, one of the functions of the Tanzania parliament is to “debate the performance of each Ministry during the annual budget session of the National Assembly” (URT, 2005, p. 42). Thus, in this study, I characterize an annual ministerial budget debate in the Tanzanian parliament in terms of pragma-dialectics as a communicative activity type. In this argumentative practice, MPs, as ‘rational’ decision-makers, carefully scrutinise the minister’s budget motion and decide whether the proposed ministerial budget or request for funds for the next financial year should be approved. The institutional point of this communicative practice is therefore to arrive at a well-thought decision on whether the minister’s proposed annual budget or request for funds for a relevant ministry or government office in the next fiscal year should be approved, based on the performance of the ministry in relation to the execution of the budget objectives in the last fiscal year as well as estimated expenditure and ministerial plans for the next year.

Although the general practice in the annual ministerial budget debates is to approve the minister’s proposed budget or request for funds (with or without amendments), this, in the majority of the cases, is not achieved without involving rigorous argumentation. As observed by Nyanda (2016), in the opening speech, the minister has to convince the MPs to authorise their proposed budget or request for funds based on the performance of the ministry in the previous fiscal year and the ministerial plans for the next year. The minister must therefore advance various convincing arguments that can be accepted by the MPs. However, the minister’s standpoints or argumentation for these standpoints are generally challenged by the MPs, especially those from the opposition. Thus, the minister must also respond effectively and reasonably to the MPs’ critical reactions or opposite standpoints before the proposed budget or request for funds is approved. After characterizing an annual ministerial budget debate in the Tanzanian parliament as a communicative activity type, in the following sections I analyse the discussion stages, the institutional rules, and the general order of this argumentative practice.

3.8.1 The discussion stages in annual ministerial budget debates

The annual ministerial budget debate in the Tanzanian parliament can further be characterized in terms of the four stages of a critical discussion as follows. In these debates, critical discussions are initiated by a confrontation stage in which differences of opinion manifest themselves in the opposition between the ministers' standpoints and non-acceptance of these standpoints by the opposition's spokespersons and other MPs. Based on the confrontation stage, the main difference of opinion in the initial situation of an annual ministerial budget debate can be characterized as single mixed or single non-mixed, depending on the opposition's critical reactions or the MPs' related contributions. There are usually other differences of opinion relating to the evaluation of the performance of the relevant ministry or government office in the execution of the ministerial objectives based on the authorised budget in the previous fiscal year. Most of these differences of opinion can also be characterised as single mixed or single non-mixed.

The main difference of opinion usually relates to the proposition that the proposed annual ministerial budget or request for funds should be approved. In regard to this proposition, the minister is obliged by the parliamentary institutional rules and the institutional point to adopt a positive standpoint. Although the minister's main standpoint is a positive prescriptive standpoint (*the proposed annual ministerial budget or request for funds should be approved*), the minister will usually express other (positive) evaluative or descriptive (sub)standpoints suggesting good performance of the ministry in order to ensure that the proposed budget of the relevant ministry or government office is authorised. In their turn, the opposition's spokespersons usually express, at least implicitly, a negative prescriptive standpoint relating to the proposition that the proposed budget or request for funds should be approved and/or commit themselves to other (negative) evaluative or descriptive (sub)standpoints suggesting poor performance of the ministry or government. Other contributing MPs can either raise criticisms and doubts to the minister's or the opposition's standpoints or they may go as far as to express their own standpoints which contradict the minister's or the opposition's standpoints.

In the opening stage, the material and procedural starting points are well established by the parliamentary Standing Orders whose knowledge is shared among the MPs. It is made clear by the Standing Orders that in an annual ministerial budget debate the ministers shall first present a budget speech as they request the parliament to approve the proposed budget or request for funds. In so doing, the ministers will express their standpoints and advance argumentation in defence of the expressed standpoints. The opposition's spokespersons are also allowed to

present their speech and challenge the minister's standpoints (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). As regards the discussion roles, the cabinet minister automatically acts both as the main protagonist of the minister's standpoints and as the main antagonist to the opposition's standpoints, if the difference of opinion is mixed. In turn, the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson assumes the role of the main antagonist to the minister's standpoints and the main protagonist of the opposition's standpoints. With respect to the discussion roles assumed by the MPs other than the minister and shadow minister, Nyanda (2016, p. 78) divides them into three categories. The first category is composed of MPs who act as protagonists (of the minister's standpoints) together with the minister, but the minister remains the main protagonist. The second category comprises MPs who assume the role of protagonist (of the minister's standpoints) only in certain standpoints and the role of antagonist in others. The last category consists of MPs who perform the role of antagonist (to the minister's standpoints) throughout the discussion.

However, Nyanda's description of MPs' discussion roles in annual budget debates works well in a non-mixed difference of opinion, where only the minister expresses standpoints. In mixed differences of opinion, where both the minister and the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson express opposing standpoints, members of the ruling party are most likely to act both as protagonists of the minister's standpoints and as antagonists to the opposition's standpoints together with the minister throughout the critical discussion. Similarly, members of the opposition are very likely to assume the role of antagonist to the minister's standpoints and the role of protagonist of the opposition's standpoints together with the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson throughout the critical discussion. This does not mean, however, that members of the ruling party cannot challenge the minister's standpoints. Because they are representatives of the electorate, both members of the ruling party and members of the opposition can play the role of antagonist to certain standpoints by the minister when they think that certain issues of the electorate in their constituencies have not been well addressed or have been completely neglected.

In the argumentation stage, the minister and some other members of the ruling party advance argumentation in support of the minister's standpoints, while the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson and other MPs, especially from the opposition, raise further critical reactions to the minister's standpoints or advance argumentation to support the opposition's standpoints. As observed by Nyanda (2016), the resolution of this critical discussion is not reached in the manner proposed by the theory in the concluding stage. Generally, the exchanges of

argumentative means and critical reactions by the minister and MPs are largely regulated by the Standing Orders of the Tanzanian parliament. The result of the critical discussion in the concluding stage is also based on these institutional rules and conventions. Thus, in the following section, I briefly discuss a few institutional rules of the Tanzanian parliament that are relevant to the annual ministerial budget debates. These institutional rules (i.e. the Standing Orders) function as the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring and may shape the resulting prototypical argumentative patterns in Tanzanian parliamentary debates.

3.8.2 The institutional rules for annual ministerial budget debates

The manner in which (critical) discussions in annual ministerial budget debates are conducted is largely determined by a set of institutional rules explicitly laid down in the *Standing Orders* of the Tanzanian parliament. These rules are many. However, in this section, I discuss a few rules (i.e. sections or subsections of the Standing Orders) that are relevant to the present study.

While sections 99(7) and 99(2) of the Standing Orders afford a minister an opportunity to express their standpoints and advance initial argumentation for these standpoints as they request the parliament to discuss and approve the proposed budget or request for funds for a relevant ministry, section 99(9) gives room for the opposition to present their speech and challenge the minister's standpoints as they provide the views of the opposition on the minister's budget motion (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). These rules are instrumental in establishing the differences of opinion in the confrontation stage as well as the starting points and discussion roles of the minister (protagonist) and the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson (antagonist) in the opening stage.

Other rules concern time limit and turn allocation of the speaking MPs. For instance, sections 99(8), 99(9), and 99(12) stipulate that the minister shall be given 60 minutes to present the budget speech, the opposition's spokesperson has 30 minutes to present the views of the opposition, and each speaking MP shall make their contributions for no longer than 10 minutes. Additionally, according to section 99(13), the minister is also given another 60 minutes to respond to the MPs' critical reactions (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). Based on this allocation of speaking time, the speaking time for the opposition's spokesperson and individual MPs is strictly limited and may not allow them to critically react to *all* issues discussed by the minister. They thus have to make a *strategic* choice of which issues to raise or comment on during the debate. This may help to explain the MPs' *topical potential* when making contributions to the minister's budget motion. However, MPs have a second chance to react to the minister's

standpoints or request argumentation and explanation (usage declarative) from the minister during the expenditure committee (Nyanda, 2016), although they can do this for only five minutes. Sections 101(2,5) and 103(1-4) afford them such an opportunity. According to section 103(6), the minister is required to respond satisfactorily to the queries raised by the MPs during the expenditure committee. Moreover, other MPs can only contribute to the minister's budget motion once the minister and the opposition's shadow minister have presented their speeches (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013) This means that MPs have the opportunity to decide whether they should support the minister's position or the opposition's one. These rules relate to the confrontation and argumentation stages.

Another general rule is prescribed in section 60(1-2). According to this rule, speaking MPs should address the Speaker, not fellow MPs or members of the public. However, this rule is usually violated. As I have indicated in chapter two, speaking MPs do not only address the Speaker; they also talk to their fellow MPs and the general public, and this may form part of adaptation to audience demand. It is further stated that listening MPs cannot interrupt speaking MPs unless the interruption is institutionally allowed by the Speaker (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). Furthermore, although, in accordance with section 60(8), speaking MPs are not allowed to read their contributions word-for-word, they are at the same time allowed to occasionally read from their written notes or other written or published documents for the purpose of 'strengthening their explanation' (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013). It is unclear what *strengthening one's explanation* actually means. However, in argumentative discourse, it could mean 'increasing the argumentative force' (Norén, 2012) of one's contribution to the debate. As MPs occasionally read from their notes or documents, they may be expected to quote certain words or phrases produced by influential people to support their position or attack contradicting statements made by their opponents. Thus, this rule creates possibilities for the use of quotation as a presentational device of strategic manoeuvring. While section 60(8) provides some room for the use of presentational devices, section 60(9) limits the possibilities for topical potential, particularly topic shifts. According to this rule, MPs are not allowed to discuss a topic that is not on the table. However, as I shall demonstrate in chapter six, this rule can be violated. Additionally, in accordance with section 64(1), the use of abusive *ad hominem*, insults, and other 'unparliamentary' language forms is strictly prohibited (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013).

As regards the use of argumentation schemes, there are no specific explicit rules allowing or restricting the type of argumentation that can be employed. However, the possibilities for the use of quotation may help to explain the employment of authority argumentation (by quotation)

in the debates. Lastly, sections 79(1-5), 101(1), and 104(4) establish how the ‘resolution’ of a (critical) discussion during the annual ministerial budget debates shall be reached in the Tanzanian parliament. According to these rules, the result of a critical discussion is reached based on a simple majority of ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ votes of the MPs, who participated in a particular debate. Apart from these rules, MPs belonging to the same political group also share other implicit starting points, such as group solidarity, adversarial positioning, and ideologies.

3.8.3 The general order of annual ministerial budget debates

Annual parliamentary debates have a fixed order. The general order of an annual ministerial budget debate in the Tanzanian parliament can be presented as follows: (1) the minister’s opening speech, (2) the relevant parliamentary committee’s speech, (3) the opposition’s speech, (4) MPs’ contributions, (5) the minister’s responses, (6) the sitting of the expenditure committee, and (7) the minister’s closing statement and the vote. However, for the purposes of the present study, the parliamentary committee’s speech is not included in the analysis of the actual argumentative discourse for at least three reasons. First, based on its ‘neutrality’ nature, the speech of the committee may not accommodate conflicting individual views of its members who come from both the ruling party and the opposition parties. Thus, it is hard to determine the real positions of these members in the committee. For instance, one of the members of the parliamentary committee on constitution, legal affairs, and administration is the opposition’s Shadow Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs, Mr Tundu Lissu, who presented the opposition’s speech the same day when both the Minister of Constitution and Legal Affairs and the spokesperson of the committee presented theirs. Second, it is rather difficult to establish the role of the committee in the critical discussion. What the committee usually does is provide recommendations to the ministry without necessarily calling the minister’s standpoints into question or defending the government. Third, this speech is, for the most part, less argumentative and does not contribute to the resolution process. Based on the pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse, the discourse elements which play no role in the resolution of a difference of opinion on merits should be left out of consideration in analysing argumentative discourse. However, it should be noted that, although the committee’s speech is not included in the analysis, it might be referred to by the MPs when advancing argumentation or expressing standpoints.

For the purposes of this study, the general order of an annual ministerial budget debate in the Tanzanian parliament is therefore realised as follows: (1) the minister’s opening speech, (2) the opposition’s speech, (3) MPs’ related contributions, (4) the minister’s responses, (5) the

expenditure committee segment, and (6) the minister's closing statement and the vote. Ideally, the speeches by the minister and the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson constitute both the confrontation stage and the opening stage. The last three debate segments constitute both the argumentation stage and the concluding stage. MPs' related contributions may either constitute the first two stages or the first three ones depending on the nature of the debate. Thus, the argumentation stage may consist of (MPs' contributions), minister's responses and the argumentative discourse in the expenditure committee. The last part of the expenditure committee as well as the minister's closing statement and the vote constitute the concluding stage, although not in the manner proposed by the theory.

This general order of the debate can be briefly described as follows. An annual ministerial budget debate begins with an opening speech by the minister responsible for a specific ministry or government office under discussion. In this speech, the minister discusses the performance of the ministry in the previous financial year and ministerial plans for the coming year. The minister usually expresses the main prescriptive standpoint (*the ministry's proposed budget or request for funds should be approved*) and other evaluative or descriptive (sub)standpoints suggesting good performance of the relevant ministry. In the opposition's speech, the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson reacts critically to the minister's standpoints. The opposition's critical reactions are considered to be the initial argumentation for the negative prescriptive standpoint (*the ministry's proposed budget or request for funds should NOT be approved*) and/or other evaluative or descriptive (sub)standpoints suggesting poor performance of the relevant ministry. Then, other MPs are given turns to contribute to both speeches. Next, the minister is given the floor to respond to the MPs' comments or queries. The minister does so by defending their standpoints and attacking the opposite ones, especially those from the opposition. After this, the parliament sits as an expenditure committee to go through all sections of the proposed budget before deciding to authorise it. In the sitting of the expenditure committee, the Speaker of the parliament plays the role of the Chairperson of the committee and MPs act as members of the committee. In this sitting, the minister has to respond satisfactorily to the comments or queries raised by members of the committee as a condition to approve the request for funds. Once members of the committee have finished going through all the sections of the budget, the parliament resumes, and the minister informs the Speaker that the expenditure committee has finished going through each and every section of the budget and requests the parliament to approve the budget. The report of the expenditure committee is then put to the vote. The Speaker asks the MPs who support the motion to say 'Yes' and those who

are against it to say ‘No’ before announcing the winners, who are, almost always, those who say ‘Yes’, and this marks the end of an annual ministerial budget debate in the parliament (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013).

3.9 Conclusion

Based on the argumentative nature of annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament, the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is appropriate for examining this argumentative practice as it provides an appropriate framework for the researcher to provide a more detailed account and analysis of the argumentative reality in the management of differences of opinion on the merits. In this study, this theory is employed together with the account-giving model in order to examine the account-giving strategies deployed by the ministers when accounting for failure events (Schönbach, 1980, 1990) and explain how the ministers accept, deny, or evade responsibility for failure events. After the description of the theoretical framework, the next three chapters present analyses of the debates on the constitutional review process in Tanzania (chapter four), ‘controversial issues’ of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (chapter five), and annual budget speech by the Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children (chapter six). It should be noted that, for the purposes of the present study, I consider each of these three debates as the main critical discussion consisting of more than one difference of opinion and which has other subdiscussions. As already pointed out in section 3.8, the main difference of opinion in each of these debates relates to whether the proposed budget or request for funds for a specific ministry or government office should be approved.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW PROCESS IN TANZANIA

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses a systematically reconstructed parliamentary debate on the constitutional review process in Tanzania. This debate is based on the annual budget speech of the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs for the 2013/14 fiscal year, as presented in the Tanzanian parliament on 3rd May 2013 by then Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs, Mr Mathias Chikawe. The parliamentary Hansard transcripts on the constitutional review process are presented in the form of extracts (e.g. *Extract 4.1*) with subextracts labelled using letters (e.g. *a*, *b*, and *c*). For ease of in-text reference, the subextracts appear in numbered sentences/phrases at the beginning of a relevant sentence/phrase in both Swahili and English versions (e.g. [1], [2], and [3]). This style of data presentation is also applied in the next two chapters. As pointed out in chapter one (see section 1.6.1), the online Hansard transcripts of the official parliamentary proceedings from which this debate and the next two debates are reconstructed were retrieved from the website of the Tanzanian parliament (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list) in August 2018.

This debate is analysed in terms of the four pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. These stages are discussed in section 4.2 (the confrontation stage), section 4.3 (the opening stage), section 4.4 (the argumentation stage), and section 4.5 (the concluding stage). Section 4.6 analyses the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion. Taking the parliamentary institutional rules into account, section 4.7 discusses the arguers' modes of strategic manoeuvring and self-presentation strategies and identifies the prototypical argumentative patterns and argumentative style(s) realised in this debate. Section 4.8 evaluates account-giving strategies and responsibility depiction. The conclusion of the chapter is then presented in section 4.9.

4.2 The confrontation stage

As pointed out in chapter three (see section 3.9), I consider this debate as the (main) critical discussion about, at least, two differences of opinion. While the main difference of opinion relates to whether the proposed budget for the Constitutional Review Commission in the next fiscal year should be approved, the second difference of opinion relates to the coordination of the constitutional review process in the last fiscal year. These differences of opinion manifest themselves through the opposition between Mr Mathias Chikawe's standpoints and non-

acceptance of these standpoints by the opposition's Shadow Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs, Mr Tundu Lissu, and other members of the opposition. As I shall demonstrate in section 4.2.2.5 and section 4.2.2.6, there is also another difference of opinion which relates to the proposition that the constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail. In the analysis of this debate, the speeches by the minister and the shadow minister constitute the confrontation stage, as the minister's standpoints receive critical reactions from the shadow minister. The minister's standpoints are presented in section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.2 analyses the opposition's critical reactions to the minister's standpoints. Moreover, the minister's standpoints are also challenged by other members of the opposition, as indicated in section 4.2.3.

4.2.1 The minister's standpoints and initial argumentation

As regards the constitutional review process, two standpoints can be reconstructed from the minister's speech. The first standpoint (and its related argumentation) is discussed in section 4.2.1.1 and summarised in section 4.2.1.2. While section 4.2.1.3 discusses the minister's second standpoint and its related argumentation, section 4.2.1.4 summarises this standpoint and its related argumentation.

4.2.1.1 The minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

In regard to the proposition that the minister's request for funds for the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) should be approved, the minister adopts a positive prescriptive standpoint. This standpoint and its related argumentation can be reconstructed from *Extract 4.1* below.

Extract 4.1

- (a) [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Wizara yangu itaendelea kuratibu jambo kubwa na la kihistoria nchini mwetu ambalo ni mchakato wa mabadiliko ya Katiba. [...] [2] Kwa kuzingatia muda ambao Sheria imeelekeza, Tume imeweka malengo ya kuwezesha kupatikana kwa Katiba Mpya ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ifikapo April 26, 2014. [...] [3] Aidha, katika Mwaka wa Fedha wa 2013/2014, Wizara yangu kupitia Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, inategemea kufanya mambo yafuatayo ili kukamilisha mchakato huu wa mabadiliko ya Katiba: - [4] Kusimamia Mikutano ya Mabaraza ya Katiba. [5] Kuchambua maoni yatakayotolewa na Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba. [6] Kuchapisha Ripoti na Rasimu ya Katiba. [7] Kuwasilisha Rasimu ya Katiba katika Bunge Maalum la Katiba. [8] Kutoa elimu na kuhamashisha Wananchi kushiriki katika Kura ya Maoni. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [...] [1] *Honourable speaker, my ministry will continue to coordinate a great and historic event in our country, which is the constitutional review process. [...] [2] Taking into consideration the time which has been stipulated by the [Constitutional Review] Act, the Commission has set the goal of enabling the attainment of the new constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania by April 26, 2014. [...] [3] Moreover, in order to finalise the constitutional review process, in the 2013/2014 fiscal year, my ministry, through the Constitutional Review Commission, is planning to execute the following activities: - [4] to supervise the meetings of the constitutional fora, [5] to analyse the opinions provided by members of the constitutional fora, [6] to publish*

a report and a draft constitution, [7] to present the draft constitution to the Constituent Assembly, [8] to provide [civic] education and advocacy for people to participate in the referendum.

- (b) [1] Ili kutekeleza majukumu yaliyopangwa kwa Mwaka wa Fedha wa 2013/2014. [2] Wizara yangu inaomba kuidhinishiwa kiasi cha Sh. 230,687,333,000 [...] [3] Mchanganuo wa matumizi kwa mafungu ya Wizara ni kama ifuatavyo: - [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, Fungu 8 – Tume ya Mabadailiko ya Katiba: Matumizi Mengineyo Sh. 33,944,588,000. [...] (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] *In order to fulfil the objectives/responsibilities that have been set for the 2013/2014 fiscal year, [2] my ministry requests the approval of TZS 230,687,333,000/= [...] [3] The analysis of the expenditure in terms of the ministerial budget sections can be presented as follows:- [4] Honourable Speaker, Section 8 – the Constitutional Review Commission: Miscellaneous expenditure TZS 33,944,588,000/=.* [...]

From *Extract 4.1*, the minister's first standpoint can be reconstructed as *1 the CRC's proposed budget of TZS 33.944 billion should be approved*. Although this standpoint is not expressed explicitly, it is implied in subextract (b). At the first level of defence, this prescriptive standpoint is defended by pragmatic argumentation. This argumentation realises coordinative argumentation, with two arguments. The first argument is expressed in (a) [1], where the minister argues that his ministry, through the CRC, will in the next fiscal year continue to coordinate the 'great and historic event', i.e. the constitutional review process. This argument is marked as argument *(1.)Ia*. He further suggests in the unexpressed premise that the proposed budget for the CRC will enable the ministry to achieve this goal, and if the proposed budget will enable the ministry to achieve the goal, the proposed budget should be approved. In this argument, the minister attempts to increase the argumentative force of his pragmatic argumentation through the use of the postmodifier *kubwa na la kihistoria* (great and historic) in the Swahili noun phrase *jambo kubwa na la kihistoria* (great and historic event) as a presentational device of strategic manoeuvring. With the use of this postmodifier, the minister implies that the constitutional review process is a very important event for the country, and the proposed budget should thus be approved so that this 'great and historic' event is finalised. The second argument is presented in (a) [2], where the minister suggests that *(1.)Ib the CRC is committed to finalising the constitutional review process by 26th April 2014*. The unexpressed premise in this argument implies that the CRC's proposed budget will enable the ministry to finalise the process by the date that has been set, and if the proposed budget will enable the CRC to finalise the process, it should be approved.

Argument *(1.)Ib* is defended by another pragmatic argumentation which is combined with authority argumentation in multiple argumentation. First, as shown in (a) [3], the minister maintains that, in order to finalise the process, the ministry, through the CRC, will execute

various activities in the next fiscal year. It is implied in the unexpressed premise that the CRC's proposed budget will enable the ministry to successfully execute these activities. These activities are listed in (a) [4-8] and they include supervising the constitutional fora, analysing the opinions by members of the constitutional fora, issuing a report and a draft constitution, presenting the draft constitution to the Constituent Assembly (CA), and providing civic education and advocacy for people to participate in the referendum. Second, in (a) [1], the minister suggests that finalising the constitutional review process is the requirement of the Tanzania's Constitutional Review Act. This argument demonstrates argumentation from legal authority. Based on this description, the minister's first standpoint (and its related arguments) is presented in *Table 4.1* below.

Table 4.1 The minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
(1)	(The CRC's proposed budget of TZ 33.944 billion should be approved)
(1.)1a	The ministry will continue to coordinate the great and historic event, i.e. the constitutional review process, through the CRC
(1.1a')	(The proposed budget will enable the ministry to achieve this goal)
(1.1a'.1')	(If the budget will enable the ministry to achieve the goal, it should be approved)
(1.)1b	The CRC is committed to finalising the constitutional review process by 26/4/2014
(1.1b')	(The budget will enable the CRC to finalise the process by the date that has been set)
(1.1b'.1')	(If the budget will enable the CRC to finalise the process, it should be approved)
(1.)1b.1	It will execute various activities to finalise the process
(1.1b.1')	(The proposed budget will enable the CRC to effectively execute these activities)
(1.1b.1'.1')	(If it will enable the CRC to do so, the proposed budget should be approved)
(1.)1b.1.1	It will supervise the constitutional fora
(1.)1b.1.2	It will analyse the opinions by members of the constitutional fora
(1.)1b.1.3	It will issue a report and a draft constitution
(1.)1b.1.4	It will present the draft constitution to the CA
(1.)1b.1.5	It will provide education and advocacy for people to participate in the referendum
(1.)1b.2	Finalising the process in 2013/14 is the requirement of the Constitutional Review Act

One of the critical questions that can be raised before the minister's pragmatic argumentation is considered conclusive is whether the CRC's proposed budget will indeed enable the ministry through the CRC to successfully execute its objectives and finalise the process as required by the Constitutional Review Act. Regarding the speech acts performed, the minister performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing argumentation in defence of his standpoint.

4.2.1.2 Summary of the minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's first standpoint (and its related argumentation) is summarised in Figure 4.1. For the purposes of this summary, and all other summaries of the MPs' argumentation in this study,

unexpressed premises are not included in the summary. However, the unexpressed premises for this argumentation have been reconstructed in *Table 4.1*.




Figure 4.1 Summary of the minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

With regard to the argumentation schemes, the minister's prescriptive standpoint is defended by pragmatic argumentation (in a coordinative argumentation structure) at the first level of defence. At the second level of defence, pragmatic argumentation in (1.)1b is defended by pragmatic argumentation in (1.)1b.1 and argumentation from legal authority in (1.)1b.2. Supporting arguments for (1.)1b.1 also demonstrate pragmatic argumentation.

4.2.1.3 The minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

Following a widespread call for a new constitution that will be based on the wishes of the people and how they want (the country) to be governed, on 6th April 2012 the then President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, instigated the process to write a new constitution by forming the Constitutional Review Commission for the purpose of coordinating and supervising the constitution-making process in Tanzania. The Commission³ was chaired by Justice Joseph Sindi Warioba (Rutechura, 2018).

Apart from collecting and analysing public opinions on the constitutional review, the Commission was also tasked to provide guidelines for the conduct of fora⁴. According to the Constitutional Review Act, through the meetings organised by the Commission, members of

³ "The Commission" means the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) of Tanzania.

⁴ The term *fora* refers to the district constitutional fora (DCF) or to other fora formed by groups of people with common interests during the constitutional review process in Tanzania.

fora were required to provide opinions on the first draft of the new constitution after the collection of public opinions before the second draft was issued. The second draft (the Commission's report) was to be submitted to the President⁵ and the President of Zanzibar. The President was later required to publish the draft constitution in the Gazette⁶ and other local newspapers. After the publication of the report in the Gazette, the President was then required to direct the chairperson of the Commission to present the draft constitution to the Constituent Assembly for the enactment of the proposed constitution. The final stage of the process was the validation of the proposed constitution in the referendum (URT, 2012).

When the Commission completed the tasks of providing civic education, collecting and analysing public opinions, providing the guidelines for the conduct of fora, and unveiling the first draft of the new constitution, the political opposition, activists, civil society organizations, and concerned citizens argued that the Commission did not use appropriate and reasonable methodologies in the performance of its functions. According to these groups, this was against the Act⁷ and it was done deliberately to favour the ruling party and its political allies. Thus, in his second standpoint, the minister defends the manner in which the constitutional review process was coordinated and supervised by the ministry through the Commission. This standpoint is reconstructed from *Extract 4.2*.

Extract 4.2

- (a) Mheshimiwa Spika, Utaratibu wa Mchakato wa Mabadiliko ya Katiba; [1] katika Mwaka wa Fedha 2012/2013 Wizara yangu imeendelea kuratibu Mchakato wa Mabadiliko ya Katiba. [2] Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba imeanza kazi rasmi tarehe 1 Mei 2012. [3] Madhumuni ya kuanzishwa kwa Tume ni kuratibu, kukusanya, kuchambua na kutathmini maoni ya wananchi kuhusu mabadiliko ya Katiba. [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, katika kipindi cha Mwaka wa Fedha 2012/2013, Tume ilitekeleza shughuli zake kama ifuatavyo: - (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013).

Honourable Speaker, the coordination of the constitutional review process; [1] in the 2012/2013 fiscal year, my ministry continued to coordinate the constitutional review process. [2] The Constitutional Review Commission started its activities officially on 1st May 2012. [3] The goals of forming this Commission are to coordinate, collect, analyse, and examine public opinions on the new constitution. [4] Honourable Speaker, during the 2012/2013 fiscal year, the Commission executed the following activities: -

- (b) [1] Kutoa elimu kwa umma na kuhamasisha wananchi kushiriki katika hatua zote za mchakato wa mabadiliko ya katiba kupitia vyombo vya habari (Redio, Luninga, Magazeti, Tovuti), machapisho mbalimbali na katika mikutano; [2] Kuandaa na kusambaza nakala 1,700,000 za Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano ya Tanzania, nakala 400,000 za Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba Sura ya 83, Katiba ya Zanzibar nakala 19,000, vipeperushi 800,000 vinavyoeleza

⁵ "The President" refers to the President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

⁶ "The Gazette" refers to the official newspaper of the government of the United Republic of Tanzania.

⁷ "The Act" refers to the Tanzania's Constitutional Review Act, Chapter 83 of the Laws (Principal legislation), Revised edition of 2012.

majukumu ya Tume, vipeperushi 670,000 vyenye maswali yanayoulizwa mara kwa mara na majibu yake, nakala 588,600 za Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania na Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba sura ya 83 kwa lugha nyepesi; [3] Kuandaa mifumo/njia mbalimbali ya ukusanyaji wa maoni ya wananchi kama vile mikutano ya hadhara katika Wilaya zote nchini, mikutano ya Makundi Maalumu, tovuti na mitandao ya kijamii, barua kwa njia ya posta, barua pepe, nukushi, ujumbe wa simu, Makala, kujaza fomu maalum za Tume pamoja na magazeti; [4] Kukusanya maoni ya wananchi kuhusu Mabadiliko ya Katiba katika Wilaya zote nchini na kuyachambua maoni hayo; (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] It provided [civic] education and advocacy for citizens to participate in all stages of the constitutional review process through mass media (radio, television, newspaper, website) various publications and public meetings; [2] prepared and disseminated 1,700,000 copies of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 400,000 copies of the Constitutional Review Act, Chapter 83, 19,000 copies of the Constitution of Zanzibar, 800,000 copies of the leaflets giving information about the functions of the Commission, 670,000 copies of the leaflets containing the frequently asked questions and their answers, and 588,600 copies of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Constitutional Review Act, Chapter 83 in plain language; [3] prepared various systems/methods for collecting public opinions, such as public meetings in all districts in the country, special group meetings, website and social networks, sending letters by post, e-mails, fax, short message service (SMS), articles, filling in the special forms from the Commission, and newspapers; [4] collected public opinions on the constitutional review from all districts across the country and analysed them;

- (c) [1] Kuandaa, kuchapisha na kusambaza nakala 50,000 za Mwongozo kuhusu Muundo na Utaratibu wa kuwapata Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya (Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mitaa); [2] Kutoa elimu kwa umma kuhusu utaratibu wa uundwaji wa Mabaraza ya Katiba, majukumu ya Mabaraza hayo na kuandaa ratiba ya uchaguzi wa Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba (Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mitaa); [3] Kuunda Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya (Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mitaa); [4] Kusimamia uchaguzi wa Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya (Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mtaa); [5] Kuandaa Mwongozo wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Asasi, Taasisi na Makundi ya Watu; na [6] Kuandaa Ripoti ya Awali na Rasimu ya Katiba. [...] [7] Hadi sasa Tume imeweza kuwapata Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba katika Ngazi ya Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mitaa kupitia chaguzi na taratibu mbalimbali ambapo jumla ya Wajumbe 10,932 wamepatikana katika Mikoa 17. [8] Katika kufanikisha kupatikana kwa Wajumbe, Tume ilitumia Mfumo wa Serikali za Mitaa zilizopo sasa (Vijiji, mitaa na kata). [9] Utaratibu huu ndio ulioainishwa kwenye Sheria zinazosimamia Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mitaa. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] prepared, published and disseminated 50,000 copies of the guidelines on the conduct/selection of members of the district constitutional fora (Local Government Authority); [2] provided [civic] education for the conduct of the constitutional fora, the responsibilities of the fora, and prepared the schedule for the election of members of the [district] constitutional fora (Local Government Authority); [3] formed the district constitutional fora (Local Government Authority); [4] supervised the election of members of the district constitutional fora (Local Government Authority); [5] prepared the guidelines for the conduct of the constitutional fora of civil societies, institutions/organizations, and [other] groups of people [with common interests]; and [6] prepared a preliminary report and the draft constitution. [...] [7] So far, the Commission has managed to get members of the [district] constitutional fora at the level of the local government authority through elections and different methodologies, where a total of 10, 932 members have been selected in 17 regions. [8] To achieve this, the Commission used the [electoral] system of the existing local government authority. [9] This procedure is the one that has been stipulated in the by-laws governing local government authority.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa mujibu wa Kifungu cha 10 cha Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, Sura ya 83, Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba inayo mamlaka na uhuru katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake. [2] Aidha, Tume imekuwa na utaratibu wa kutoa taarifa kuhusu jambo lolote

linalopangwa kutekelezwa na kutoa taarifa baada ya utekelezaji wake kupitia mikutano na vyombo vya habari, magazeti, majadiliano katika redio, luninga na majarida ya kijamii. [...] [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, kutokana na umuhimu wa mchakato huu wa mabadiliko ya Katiba, kupitia kwenu Waheshimiwa Wabunge, ninaomba muwahamasisha wananchi wa Majimbo yenu ili waweze kujitokeza kwa wingi katika kutoa mawazo kuhusu Rasimu ya Katiba kupitia kwa Wajumbe wanaounda Mabaraza ya Katiba. [4] Nawahamasisha na kuziomba Taasisi, Asasi za Kiraia, Jumuiia za Kidini, Vyama vya Siasa na Makundi mengine yote, kuunda Mabaraza ya Katiba. [5] Aidha, ninawaomba Wajumbe wa Mabaraza kutoa mawazo yao kwa uwazi, uhuru na bila ya hofu yoyote. [6] Pia nipende kuwahakikishia Wananchi kuwa, Tume inafanya kazi zake kwa uhuru na uwazi na kwamba, maoni yote yaliyotolewa na yatakayotolewa na Wananchi, Taasisi, Asasi za Kiraia na Makundi mengine, yanaheshimiwa na kufanyiwa kazi ipasavyo. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] *Honourable Speaker, in accordance with section 10 of the Constitutional Review Act, Chapter 83, the Constitutional Review Commission enjoys autonomy and independence in the performance of its functions. [2] In addition, the Commission has been informing the public of any matter which is planned to be implemented and giving information after its implementation through press conferences, newspapers, discussions on radio, television, and social magazines.[...] [3] Honourable Speaker, due to the importance of the constitutional review process, through you, Honourable MPs, I ask you to motivate citizens from your constituencies to come in large numbers and provide their opinions on the draft constitution through members of the constitutional fora. [4] I ask and urge institutions, civil society organizations, faith-based institutions/organizations, political parties, and other groups to form constitutional fora. [5] I also ask members of fora to give out their views openly, freely, and without any fear. [6] Moreover, I would like to assure the public that the Commission performs its functions independently and transparently and that all opinions which have been provided and those which will be provided later by the citizens, institutions, civil society organizations and other groups [of people] will be respected and considered accordingly.*

As regards whether the Commission is coordinating the constitutional review process effectively, the minister, in *Extract 4.2*, adopts a positive standpoint, which can be reconstructed as (2) *the constitutional review process is coordinated effectively by Commission*. This unexpressed standpoint is implied in (a) [1-3] and is defended by two main arguments at the first level of defence. These arguments realise multiple argumentation. The first argument is indicated from (a) to (c). In this argument, as indicated in (a) [4], the minister implicitly suggests that (2.1) *the Commission performed its functions effectively in 2012/13*. This argument demonstrates symptomatic argumentation. The Commission's effective performance of its activities or functions in the previous fiscal year is considered a sign of the ministry's effective coordination of the process. This argument is defended by four points of argumentation at the second level of defence. First, the minister suggests that (2.1.)1 *the Commission provided civic education and advocacy for people to participate in all stages of the constitutional review process*. This argument is further defended by two other arguments. In (b) [1], the minister suggests that (2.1.)1.1 *the provision of civic education and advocacy was achieved through the media, various publications, and public meetings*. In the unexpressed premise, the minister's statement suggests that the Commission used various communication

channels to achieve the goal of educating the public (causal argumentation – means to goal). To further support this argument, the minister argues that the media platforms included radio, TV, newspapers, and websites (argumentation from example). In (b) [2], the minister maintains that the Commission prepared and disseminated to the public 1,700,000 copies of the national constitution, 400,000 copies of the Act, 19,000 copies of the national constitution of Zanzibar, 800,000 copies of information-giving leaflets, 670,000 copies of the frequently asked questions and their answers, as well as 588,600 copies of the national constitution and the Act in plain language (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). Another argument for (2.1.)1 is presented in subextract (c). This argument realises coordinative argumentation, as indicated in (c) [2]. While the first premise of the coordinative argumentation suggests that (2.1.)1.2a *the Commission provided civic education on the conduct of the district constitutional fora (henceforth DCF) and their functions*, the second premise, as expressed in (c) [5], suggests that (2.1.)1.2b *the Commission prepared the guidelines for the conduct of the constitutional fora for civil societies, institutions/organizations, and other groups of people with common interests*. In favour of (2.1.)1.2a, the minister advances two other arguments. In (c) [1], he argues that (2.1.)1.2a.1 *the Commission prepared and disseminated 50,000 copies of the guidelines for the conduct of DCF* (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation), and in (c) [2] he maintains that (2.1.)1.2a.2 *the Commission prepared a schedule for the election of DCF members*. The minister's (rhetorical) aim in the use of authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation (and argumentation from example) with regard to the provision of civic education is to create an impression, especially to those who questioned the Commission's methodologies, that the Commission's civic education reached as many people as possible.

Second, in (b) [3-4], the minister maintains that (2.1.)2a *the Commission prepared various methods/systems for collecting public opinions* (causal argumentation – means to goal), including public meetings, special groups meetings, websites, social networks, letters, e-mails, fax, SMS, and newspapers (argumentation from example), and then (2.1.)2b *collected and analysed public opinions*. This argument realises coordinative argumentation (see **Table 4.2**). Like the first point of argumentation, the minister's use of multiple examples is intended to suggest that the Commission collected public opinions from as many people as possible. Third, in (c) [3-4], he suggests that (2.1.)3a *the Commission successfully formed DCF* and (2.1.)3b *supervised the election of DCF members*. He also argues that the Commission managed to get 10,932 members from 17 regions (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical

argumentation), as shown in (c) [7]. In (c) [8-9], he maintains that, in the election of DCF members, the Commission relied on the local government system which is stipulated in the local government by-laws (argumentation from legal authority). This subtype of authority argumentation is used to justify the manner in which DCF members were selected. Lastly, in (c) [6], Mr Chikawe argues that the Commission prepared a preliminary report and the draft constitution. The minister's first argument in defence of the second standpoint is summarised in *Table 4.2* below.

Table 4.2 The first argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
(2.1)	(The Commission performed its functions effectively in 2012/13)
(2.1.)1	It provided civic education and advocacy for people to participate in the process
(2.1.)1.1	This was achieved through the media, various publications, and public meetings
(2.1.)1.1.1	The media platforms included radio, TV, newspapers, and websites
(2.1.)1.1.2	It prepared and disseminated 1,700,000 copies of the national constitution, 400,000 copies of the Act, 19,000 copies of the constitution of Zanzibar, 800,000 copies of information-giving leaflets, 670,000 copies of the frequently asked questions and their answers, as well as 588,600 copies of the national constitution and the Act (Chapter 83) in plain language
(2.1.)1.2a	It provided civic education on the conduct of the district constitutional fora and their functions/responsibilities
(2.1.)1.2a.1	It prepared and disseminated 50,000 copies of the guidelines for the conduct of DCF
(2.1.)1.2a.2	It prepared the schedule for the election of DCF members
(2.1.)1.2b	It prepared the guidelines for the conduct of the constitutional fora for civil societies, institutions/organizations, and groups of people with common interests
(2.1.)2a	It prepared various methods/systems for collecting public opinions
(2.1.)2a')	(The methods/systems enabled the Commission to achieve its goal)
(2.1.)2a.1	The methods/systems included public meetings, special groups meetings, website, social networks, letters, e-mails, fax, SMS, and newspapers
(2.1.)2b	It collected and analysed public opinions
(2.1.)3a	It successfully formed DCF
(2.1.)3b	It supervised the election of DCF members
(2.1.)3b.1	It managed to get 10,932 members in 17 regions
(2.1.3b.1')	(These statistics suggest that the Commission's methodology was appropriate)
(2.1.)3b.1.1a	It used the local government system to get the members
(2.1.)3b.1.1b	This procedure is stipulated in the local government by-laws
(2.1.3b.1.1b')	(This methodology was reasonable)
(2.1.)4	It issued a preliminary report and a constitution draft

The minister's appeal to authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation) and argumentation from example seems to be very effective. Since he anticipates critical doubts from the opposition who think that the Commission did not use an appropriate methodology in the provision of civic education and collection of public opinions, the minister, through the use of authority argumentation from statistics and argumentation from example, suggests that the Commission educated and collected opinions from as many people as possible. However, these

subtypes of symptomatic argumentation and other types of argumentation may be put in a critical testing by the opposition in their critical reactions.

In his second argument, the minister maintains that (2.2) *the Commission is autonomous and performs its functions independently and transparently*, and because the Commission is autonomous and works independently and transparently, it is a sign that the process is coordinated effectively (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is implicitly suggested in subextract (d). In the first level of defence, this argument is defended by four points of argumentation. First, (d) [1], the minister argues that, in accordance with the Act, (2.2.)1 *the Commission enjoys autonomy and independence in the performance of its functions* (argumentation from legal authority). In the unexpressed premise, it is implied that the Commission cannot be interfered by any person or authority, as section 10 of the Act further stipulates. Second, in (d) [2], the minister argues that (2.2.)2 *the Commission has been informing the public about its activities and plans*, which is further supported by the argument that (2.2.)2.1 *this is achieved through press conferences, newspapers, discussions on radio/TV, as well as social magazines*. The unexpressed premise for (2.2.)2.1 implies that the Commission has been using various channels to achieve the goal of informing the public about its plans and activities (causal argumentation – means to goal). The third argument is also reconstructed from subextract (d), where the minister suggests that (2.2.)3 *the fora are managed independently and transparently*. To support this argument, in (d) [3], the minister suggests that (2.2.)3.1a *citizens are free to provide their opinions through members of fora*. In (d) [5], argument (2.2.)3.1a is coordinatively combined with the argument that (2.2.)3.1b *members of fora can provide their opinions freely, openly, and fearlessly*. With this argument, the minister seems to imply that the Commission, the ministry, and the government at large are willing to accommodate all public opinions, even those which do not favour the position of the ruling party (adaptation to audience demand). In the second argument for (2.2.)3, as indicated in (d) [4], he maintains that (2.2.)3.2 *different groups of people with common interests are free to form constitutional fora*, which is considered a sign that the fora are managed independently and transparently (symptomatic argumentation). According to the minister, (2.2.)3.2.1 *these groups include faith-based institutions/organizations and political parties* (argumentation from example). The last argument in support of (2.2) is indicated in (d) [6], where Mr Chikawe appeals to his position as the minister (authority argumentation) to assure the MPs and members of the public (adaptation to audience demand) that the Commission works autonomously and transparently and that all opinions will be respected and considered

accordingly. In this argument, the minister seems to give a personal guarantee of the rightness of argument (2.2). If the minister intends to evade the burden of proof with this personal guarantee, his argumentative move may constitute a violation of the obligation-to-defend rule. The second argument for the minister's second standpoint is summarised in **Table 4.3** below.

Table 4.3 The second argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
(2.2)	The Commission is autonomous and performs its functions independently and transparently
(2.2')	(Because the Commission is autonomous and works independently and transparently, this is a sign that the process is coordinated effectively)
(2.2.)1	According to the Act, the Commission shall enjoy autonomy and independence in the performance of its functions
(2.2.1')	(The Commission cannot be interfered by any person or authority)
(2.2.)2	It has been informing the public about its activities and plans
(2.2.)2.1	This is achieved through press conferences, newspapers, and discussions on radio/TV
(2.2.2.1')	(It has been using various platforms to inform the public about its activities and plans)
(2.2.)3	The constitutional fora are managed independently and transparently
(2.2.)3.1a	Citizens are free to give their opinions through members of fora
(2.2.)3.1b	Members of fora can give their views freely, openly, and fearlessly
(2.2.)3.2	Different groups of people are free to form constitutional fora
(2.2.)3.2.1	These groups include faith-based organizations, political parties, etc.
(2.2.)4a	I can assure you that the Commission works independently and transparently
(2.2.)4b	Public opinions will be respected and considered accordingly

Like the first argument, the minister's second argument for the second standpoint demonstrates various (sub)types of argumentation (causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation, and argumentation from example), which may be put into a critical testing by the opposition. Regarding the speech acts performed, the minister performs the assertive by expressing the second standpoint and advancing argumentation for this standpoint.

4.2.1.4 Summary of the minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's second standpoint and its related argumentation can be summarised as shown in Figure 4.2 below.




Figure 4.2 Summary of the minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

With respect to the argumentation schemes, the minister's evaluative standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation in multiple argumentation at the first level of defence. At the second level of defence, symptomatic argumentation in (2.1) is supported by symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation in multiple argumentation. The symptomatic argumentation in (2.2) is defended at the second level by authority argumentation and symptomatic argumentation. Symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation are also realised at the third level of defence of the standpoint.

4.2.2 The opposition's critical reactions

The minister's standpoints receive critical reactions from the opposition's shadow minister or spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu. In his speech, Mr Lissu puts forward three standpoints in response to the minister's standpoints. The opposition's first standpoint is analysed in section 4.2.2.1 and summarised in section 4.2.2.2. The second standpoint is discussed in section 4.2.2.3 and summarised in section 4.2.2.4. Section 4.2.2.5 focuses on the opposition's third standpoint, which is summarised in section 4.2.2.6.

4.2.2.1 The opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's first standpoint relates to the Commission's proposed budget or the minister's request for funds for the Commission. This standpoint seems to contradict Mr Chikawe's first standpoint. The opposition's first standpoint is reconstructed from *Extract 4.3*.

Extract 4.3

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, katika Maoni yetu ya mwaka jana, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni ililalamikia kile ilichokiita "... matumizi yasiyoelezeka na yasiyokubalika ya fedha za umma hasa katika mazingira ambayo Wananchi wanahubiriwa na Watawala kwamba miradi ya maendeleo yao ya kiuchumi na kijamii haitekelezeki kwa sababu ya ufinyu wa Bajeti ya Serikali." [2] Aidha, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni ilidai kwamba, shilingi bilioni 14.633 zilizotengwa kwa ajili ya kuwalipa Wajumbe na Watendaji wa Tume posho mbalimbali, zilikuwa zinatishia kuigeuza heshima ya kutumikia waliyopewa Wajumbe wa Tume kuwa hongo ya Serikali. [3] Madai ya Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni kuitaka Serikali ilieleze Bunge hili Tukufu gharama zote za kila Mjumbe wa Tume, Sekretarieti na Watumishi wengine wote wa Tume ili Wabunge na Wananchi wa Tanzania wafahamu kodi wanazolipa zinavyotumika katika mchakato wa Katiba Mpya, yalikataliwa na Serikali kwa hoja kwamba taarifa hizo ni siri kati ya mwajiri na mwajiriwa. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, in our last year's opinions, the opposition camp condemned what it referred to as the inexplicable and inappropriate use of public funds especially at the time when the rulers are preaching to the citizens that projects for their own economic and social development can't be implemented because the government budget can't afford them. [2] The opposition camp also claimed that a sum of TZS 14.633 billion allocated for paying different types of allowance to members of the Commission and Secretariat was threatening to change the honour of serving granted to members of the Commission into a government bribe. [3] The opposition camp's demand that the government should explain to this esteemed parliament the cost incurred for each member of the Commission and Secretariat, and all other workers of the Commission so that members of parliament and Tanzanian citizens may know how the taxes they pay are used in the constitutional review process was discarded by the government with the reason that this information is confidential [it is only shared] between the employer and the employee.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Bunge lako Tukufu linaombwa kuidhinisha shilingi bilioni 33.944, kiasi kilekile kilichoidhinishwa mwaka jana, kwa ajili ya matumizi ya Tume kwa Mwaka wa Fedha wa 2013/14. [2] Kiasi hiki ni pamoja na shilingi bilioni 12.193 kwa ajili ya kulipia posho za vikao kwa Wajumbe wa Tume 34 na Sekretarieti 160; shilingi bilioni 1.728 ambazo zitalipia posho ya kujikimu kwa ajili ya Wajumbe na Sekretarieti wanaposafiri ndani ya nchi kikazi; na shilingi bilioni 1.650 kwa ajili ya kulipa gharama za nyumba za Wajumbe na Sekretarieti wanaotoka nje ya Dar es Salaam. [3] Aidha, kuna shilingi milioni 18 zinazoombwa kwa ajili

ya kugharamia chakula kwa Wajumbe wa Tume na Sekretarieti watakaokuwa wamepata maambukizi ya UKIMWI; [...]. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, your august/esteemed parliament is requested to approve TZS 33.944 billion, the same amount that was approved last year, for the Commission's expenditure for the 2013/14 fiscal year. [2] This amount includes TZS 12.193 billion as sitting allowance for 34 members of the Commission and 160 members of the Secretariat; TZS 1.728 billion as travel allowance for members of the Commission and Secretariat travelling locally on official duty; and TZS 1.650 billion for house rent for members of the Commission and Secretariat from outside Dar es Salaam. [3] There is also a sum of TZS 18 million requested for food for members of the Commission and Secretariat who could be infected with HIV [...]

- (c) [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa ujumla, Bunge lako Tukufu linaombwa kuidhinisha jumla ya shilingi bilioni 19.039 kwa ajili ya posho za aina mbalimbali na malipo mengine yanayowahusu Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume kwa Mwaka wa Fedha wa 2013/14. [2] Hii ni zaidi ya asilimia 56 ya bajeti yote inayoombwa kwa ajili ya Tume. [3] Kwa ulinganisho, posho na malipo mengine yanayowahusu Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume yalikuwa shilingi bilioni 14.633 au asilimia 43 ya bajeti yote ya Mwaka wa Fedha uliopita. [4] Hii ina maana kwamba, gharama za moja kwa moja za Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume zitaongezeka kwa zaidi ya shilingi bilioni 4.406 au zaidi ya asilimia 30 ya gharama za mwaka jana kama Bunge lako Tukufu litaidhinisha maombi haya! [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, maombi haya ya mabilioni ya fedha za Wananchi yanatoa uvundo na harufu mbaya ya ufisadi na hayaelezeki na wala kukubalika kwa misingi ya kisheria na kwa rekodi ya utendaji kazi wa Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[...] [1] Honourable Speaker, generally, your august/esteemed parliament is requested to approve a sum of TZS 19.039 billion for various types of allowance and other payments for members of the Commission and Secretariat for the 2013/14 fiscal year. [2] This is more than 56 percent of the entire budget requested for the Commission. [3] In comparison, the allowance and other payments for members of the Commission and Secretariat were TZS 14.633 billion or 43 percent of the last year's entire budget. [4] This means direct costs for the members of the Commission and Secretariat will increase by more than TZS 4.406 billion or more than 30 percent of the last year's budget if your august/esteemed parliament approves this request [for funds]. [5] Honourable Speaker, this request for billions of public funds is stinky and smells of corruption and is inexplicable and unacceptable on legal grounds and performance record of the Constitutional Review Commission.

- (d) [1] Kwanza kabisa, kwa mujibu wa Kifungu cha 7(1) cha Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, Tume ina Wajumbe wasiozidi thelathini pamoja na Mwenyekiti na Makamu Mwenyekiti wake. [2] Kwa maana hiyo, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua uhalali wa maombi ya shilingi bilioni 12.193 kwa ajili ya posho za vikao kwa Wajumbe 34 wa Tume wanaotajwa katika kijifungu 210321 cha kasma 210300 kwenye randama ya Fungu 08 linalohusu Tume. [3] Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua Wajumbe hawa wanne wa ziada ni kina nani na wameteuliwa lini kuwa Wajumbe wa Tume? [4] Aidha, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kuelezwa, inakuwaje Tume iwe na Wajumbe 34 wakati Sheria iliyoiunda inataka Tume yenye Wajumbe wasiozidi thelathini? (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] First of all, in accordance with section 7(1) of the Constitutional Review Act, the Commission consists of not more than thirty members including the chairperson and deputy chairperson. [2] For this reason, the opposition camp wants to know the justification for requesting TZS 12.193 billion as sitting allowance for 34 members of the Commission mentioned in subvote 210321 of vote 210300 in Section 08 regarding the Commission. [3] The official opposition camp wants to know; who are these four additional members and when were they appointed as Commission members? [4] Also, the official opposition camp wants to know why the Commission has 34 members while the Constitutional Review Act stipulates that the Commission shall have not more than thirty members!

- (e) [1] Pili, kwa mujibu wa kazi za Tume kama zilivyoainishwa katika kifungu cha 9 cha Sheria; na kwa mujibu wa utaratibu wa utendaji kazi wa Tume kama ulivyofafanuliwa katika Sehemu ya Nne ya Sheria; na kwa kuzingatia masharti ya kifungu cha 22(1) cha Sheria hiyo, Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume siyo Wajumbe wa Bunge Maalum la Katiba. [2] Badala yake, uhusiano pekee wa kisheria uliopo kati ya Tume na Bunge Maalum ni ule uliotajwa katika Vifungu vya 20(3), 20(4) na 25(2) vya Sheria vinavyomruhusu Mwenyekiti wa Tume kuwasilisha Rasimu ya Katiba Mpya kwenye Bunge Maalum na kuwaruhusu Mwenyekiti na Wajumbe kutoa ufafanuzi utakaohitajika wakati wa majadiliano katika Bunge Maalum. [3] Hii ina maana kwamba, mara baada ya kuwasilisha Rasimu ya Katiba Mpya, Mwenyekiti wa Tume anakuwa *functus officio*, yaani hana kazi nyingine yoyote ya kufanya kwenye Bunge Maalum. [4] Aidha, Mwenyekiti na Wajumbe wa Tume hawana kazi nyingine yoyote ya kufanya katika Bunge Maalum hadi hapo watakapohitajika na Bunge Maalum kwa ajili ya kutoa ufafanuzi wa jambo lolote linalohusu Rasimu ya Katiba Mpya. [5] Wakishatoa ufafanuzi utakaohitajika walioitiwa, nao pia wanakuwa *functus officio*. [6] Kwa sababu hizi, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua uhalali wa shilingi bilioni 1.055 ambazo Bunge lako Tukufu linaombwa kuziidhinisha kwa ajili ya posho, chakula na viburudisho na usafiri wakati wa Vikao vya Bunge Maalum la Katiba. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Second, according to the functions of the Commission as listed in section 9 of the Act; and according to the mode of operation of the Commission as stipulated in Part IV of the Act; and in accordance with the provision of section 22(1) of the very Act, members of the Commission and Secretariat are not members of the Constituent Assembly. [2] Instead, the only legal relationship that exists between the Commission and the Constituent Assembly is the one mentioned in the sections 20(3), 20(4), and 25(2) of the Act, which allow the chairperson of the Commission to present the draft constitution to the Constituent Assembly and allow the chairperson and members of the Commission to provide the clarifications which may be required in the debates of the Constituent Assembly. [3] This means, immediately after presenting the draft constitution, the chairperson becomes functus officio, meaning that he has no other function to perform in the Constituent Assembly. [4] Also, the chairperson and members of the Commission do not have any function to perform in the Constituent Assembly until needed by the Assembly to offer clarifications of anything relating to the draft constitution. [5] After offering the required clarifications, they also become functus officio. [6] For these reasons, the official opposition camp in the parliament wants to know the justification for requesting TZS 1.55 billion to be approved by your august/esteemed parliament for allowance, meals and refreshments, as well as bus and taxi transport for members of the Commission and Secretariat during the conduct of the Constituent Assembly.

- (f) [1] Tatu, kwa mujibu wa Kifungu cha 33(2) cha Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, jukumu pekee la Tume katika hatua ya uhalalishaji wa Katiba Mpya ni kutoa elimu ya uraia na uhamasishaji juu ya Katiba inayopendekezwa kwa muda usiozidi siku thelathini kuanzia siku ya kuchapishwa katika Gazeti la Serikali. [2] Kwa kazi ya mwezi mmoja tu, Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume wanaombewa shilingi bilioni 1.307 kwa ajili ya posho za kujikimu. [3] Kwa mahesabu hayo, kila Mjumbe wa Tume, Katibu na Naibu Katibu pamoja na Wakuu wa Vitengo saba vya Tume na madereva wa kila mmoja wao, watalipwa wastani wa shilingi milioni 16.756 kwa mwezi mmoja au shilingi 558,547 kama posho ya kujikimu kwa kila siku moja. [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, katika nchi ambayo Wauguzi katika hospitali za umma wanalipwa mshahara wa kuanzia wa takriban shilingi 360,000 kwa mwezi na Walimu wa shule za msingi wanaanzia shilingi 250,000 na wale wa sekondari shilingi 325,000 kwa mwezi, malipo haya kwa Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba yana uvundo na harufu mbaya ya rushwa kwa Wajumbe wa Tume. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, hivyo basi, kwa vile kifungu cha 14(2) cha Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba kinatamka kwamba Wajumbe wa Tume na Sekretarieti “watalipwa kwa mujibu wa Sheria na Kanuni za nchi”, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inaitaka Serikali hii ya CCM iliambie Bunge lako Tukufu ni Sheria na Kanuni zipi za nchi yetu ambazo zimetumika kuhalalisha malipo haya makubwa kwa Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] *Third, in accordance with the section 33(2) of the Constitutional Review Act, the only function of the Commission in the validation of the proposed constitution is the provision of civic education and advocacy on the proposed constitution for no longer than thirty days from the publication of the proposed constitution in the Gazette. [2] For working for just a month, a total of TZS 1.307 billion is requested to pay subsistence allowance to members of the Commission and Secretariat. [3] On basis of this amount, each member of the Commission, secretary and deputy secretary, as well as heads of seven units of the Commission and drivers of each of these will receive an average of TZS 16.756 million for working for just one month or TZS 558,547 as subsistence allowance per day. [4] Honourable Speaker, in a country where nurses in public hospitals receive a minimum salary of about TZS 360,000 per month, and primary school teachers and secondary school teachers receive a minimum salary of TZS 250,000 and TZS 325,000 respectively per month, this payment to the Constitutional Review Commission is stinky and smells of corruption for members of the Commission. (Applause) [5] Honourable Speaker, therefore, because section 14(2) of the Constitutional Review Act stipulates that members of the Commission and Secretariat “shall be paid subject to the relevant laws and regulations”, the official opposition camp in the parliament is asking this CCM government to state before your august/esteemed parliament which of our national laws and regulations have been used to justify this huge spending for members of the Commission and Secretariat. (Applause)*

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, aidha, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inaitaka Serikali hii ya CCM itoe kauli rasmi mbele ya Bunge lako Tukufu kama kuna uhalali wowote wa kutumia fedha za wananchi wa Tanzania ili kununua ‘chakula maalum’ (special foods) kwa ajili ya Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume watakaopata UKIMWI kwa sababu ya kuendelea ngono zembe na starehe zao binafsi wakati wanatakiwa wafanye kazi ya Tume. [2] Vinginevyo, Bunge lako Tukufu lielezwe kwa ufasaha ni kwa namna gani mchakato huu wa Katiba Mpya unatazamiwa kusababisha maambukizi ya UKIMWI kwa Wajumbe na Sekretarieti ya Tume. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa Serikali kijificha nyuma ya pazia la ‘siri ya mwajiri na mwajiriwa’ hakutoshi tena, [4] kwani ni kulizuia Bunge lako Tukufu kutekeleza wajibu wake kikatiba wa kuisimamia Serikali chini ya Ibara ya 63(2) ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, Sura ya 2 ya Sheria za Tanzania. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] *Honourable Speaker, furthermore, the official opposition camp is asking this CCM government to issue an official statement before your august/esteemed parliament if there is any justification for using public funds to buy special foods for members of the Commission and Secretariat who could be infected with HIV for prioritizing unprotected sex and personal luxuries while they should be doing the work of the Commission. [2] Otherwise, it should be clearly clarified to your august/esteemed parliament how the new constitution process is expected to cause HIV infections to members of the Commission and Secretariat”. (Applause) [3] Honourable Speaker, the government can no longer hide behind the curtain of ‘confidentiality between the employer and the employee’, [4] because it limits the constitutional powers of your august/esteemed parliament to supervise the government under section 63(2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, Chapter 2 of the Laws of Tanzania.*

- (h) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua shilingi milioni 218 kwa ajili ya ununuzi wa mafuta ya magari ya Tume zitatumikaje ndani ya kipindi cha siku thelathini za uhamasishaji na kuelimisha wananchi kupiga kura ya maoni kwa Katiba Mpya. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, hii ina maana kwamba hata kama kila Mjumbe wa Tume, Katibu, Naibu Katibu na wakuu wa vitengo saba vya Tume watapewa gari moja kwa kila mmoja wao kwa kipindi hicho, kila gari itatumia wastani wa shilingi 186,325 kwa siku kwa ajili ya mafuta tu! [3] Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inataka kujua ni safari zipi hizo za Tume ambazo zitalazimu matumizi ya full tank ya mafuta kila siku kwa mwezi mzima? [4] Huu, kama Baba wa Taifa Mwalimu Nyerere alivyowahi kusema, ni ‘wizi mtupu’! (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] *Honourable Speaker, the official opposition camp in the parliament wants to know how TZS 218 million set for buying fuel for the Commission’s vehicles will be used within a period*

of thirty days of advocacy and provision of civic education on the new constitution referendum. (Applause) [2] Honourable Speaker, this means even if each member of the Commission, Secretary, deputy secretary and [each] head of seven units of the Commission takes one car for that period, each vehicle will consume an average of TZS 186,325 for fuel per day! [3] The official opposition camp in the parliament wants to know which are those trips of the Commission which will require a 'full tank' consumption of fuel every day for a month! [4] This, as Mwalimu Nyerere, Father of the nation, once said, is 'nothing but theft'! (Applause)

From *Extract 4.3*, Mr Lissu implicitly adopts a negative standpoint relating to the proposition that the Commission's proposed budget should be approved, which can be reconstructed as (1) *the Commission's proposed budget should not be approved*. This unexpressed standpoint is implied from the first three subextracts and suggested in the rest of the extract. The opposition's first standpoint is defended by two main arguments which realise multiple argumentation at the first level of defence. The first argument is indicated in (a) and (b) [1]. In (a) [1], Mr Lissu argues that (1.)*Ia the opposition complained about the inexplicable and unacceptable use of public funds in the last fiscal year*, which presupposes that the requested amount of money for the Commission in the last fiscal year was inexplicable and unacceptable. In (b) [1], this argument is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that (1.)*Ib the parliament is requested to approve the same amount of money as last year*. In the unexpressed premise, this argument implies that, because the requested amount of money for the Commission in the last fiscal year was inexplicable and unacceptable, and because the parliament is requested to approve the same amount as last year, the requested amount of money for the Commission for the coming fiscal year is also inexplicable and unacceptable. This argument realises comparison argumentation (or argumentation by analogy) as the last year's situation is compared to the current situation and conclusion is reached based on this analogy. In support of (1.)*Ia*, in (a) [1], Mr Lissu further suggests that the requested amount of public funds for the Commission is inexplicable and unacceptable because, according to the 'rulers', (1.)*Ia.1 people's economic and social development projects cannot be implemented due to the limited budget*. In the unexpressed premise, Mr Lissu's argument implies that the requested amount of 'public funds' would rather be used to implement these projects. This argument demonstrates authority argumentation by quotation. Mr Lissu strategically quotes the words of the government 'rulers' in order to criticise them. The strategic choice of the word *watawala* (rulers), which may be associated with a negative interpretation, instead of the word *viongozi* (leaders) further strengthens Mr Lissu's rhetorical effect in his argumentation. Another argument in support of (1.)*Ia* is indicated in (a) [2], where Mr Lissu argues that, according to the opposition, (1.)*Ia.2 TZS 14.633 billion requested for various types of allowance for the Commission in the last fiscal year was threatening to change the*

Commission's honour of serving into a government bribe. In defence of (1.)1a.2, Mr Lissu argues that (1.)1a.2.1a *the government refused to disclose the direct cost for every member of the Commission and other workers*, implying in the unexpressed premise that refusing to disclose the cost is a sign that the requested amount was a government bribe to the Commission (symptomatic argumentation). Argument (1.)1a.2.1a is combined with the argument that (1.)1a.2.1b *exposing the requested information would help MPs and members of the public to know how the taxes they pay are spent by the government* (causal argumentation), as suggested in (a) [3]. To defend argument (1.)1a.2.1a, in (a) [3], Mr Lissu argues that the government stated that the requested information is confidentially shared only between the employer (the government) and the employee (the Commission). The first argument in defence of the opposition's first standpoint is summarised in **Table 4.4** below.

Table 4.4 The first argument for the opposition's first standpoint

No.	Description
(1.)1a	Last year the opposition complained about the inexplicable and unacceptable use of public funds in the Commission's budget
(1.1a')	(The requested fund for the Commission was inexplicable and unacceptable)
(1.)1a.1	According to the rulers, people's economic and social development projects cannot be implemented due to the limited budget
(1.1a.1')	(The requested amount of money would rather be used to implement the projects)
(1.)1a.2	TZS 14.633 billion allocated for paying various types of allowance was threatening to change the honour of serving into a government bribe
(1.1a.2')	(It was a sign of bribery/corruption)
(1.)1a.2.1a	The government refused to disclose the direct cost for every member of the Commission and other workers
(1.1a.2.1a')	(Refusing to disclose this information was a sign of bribery/corruption)
(1.)1a.2.1a.1	The government argued that the requested information is confidentially shared only between the employer and the employee
(1.)1.1.2.1b	Disclosing/exposing the information would help the MPs and Tanzanians to know how the taxes they pay are used
(1.)1b	The parliament is requested to approve the same amount for the Commission as last year
(1.1b')	(Because the requested amount of money for the Commission in the last year was inexplicable and unacceptable, and because the minister requests the same amount this year, the requested amount is also inexplicable and unacceptable)

The second argument for the opposition's first standpoint is reconstructed from (c) to (h). This argument begins in (c) [1-2], where Mr Lissu argues that (1.)2a *more than 56% of the requested budget is allocated for various types of allowance and payment to the Commission* (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation) This is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that, if the parliament approves this request for funds, (1.)2b *the Commission's direct costs will increase by 30%*. In the unexpressed premise, Mr Lissu suggests that the budget will not achieve a desirable effect and, because it will not achieve a

desirable effect (i.e. it will lead to an increase in the direct costs), it should not be approved. In this argument, Mr Lissu seems to further imply that the constitutional review process can be effectively or efficiently coordinated (by the Commission) without increasing the Commission's direct costs as an increase in the costs is not something that can be considered desirable. This argument, which manifests a negative version of pragmatic argumentation, is supported by the argument that only 43% of the last year's proposed budget was allocated for various types of allowance and other payments to the Commission, as indicated in (c) [3-4]. Argument (1.)2a is defended by symptomatic argumentation and authority argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation. In (c) [5], Mr Lissu argues that (1.)2a.1a *this request for billions of TZS 'smells of corruption' and is inexplicable*, and that (1.)2a.1b *it is unacceptable based on legal grounds and the Commission's performance record*, implying that it is against the law and performance record of the Commission. Mr Lissu further advances five subarguments to defend argument (1.)2a.1a. These arguments demonstrate symptomatic argumentation as he demands the justification for various types of allowance for the Commission. The unexpressed premise in each of these arguments suggests that lack of justification for a relevant type of allowance or payment is a sign of bribery or corruption.

The first argument in support of (1.)2a.1a is reconstructed from subextract (d). In (d) [2], Mr Lissu suggests that the government should justify the legitimacy of requesting TZS 12.193 billion as sitting allowance for 34 members of the Commission. In (d) [1], he maintains that this request is questionable because, in accordance with the Act, the number of members of the Commission does not exceed 30 (argumentation from legal authority), but the minister is requesting an amount of money for 34 members. Thus, in (d) [3-4], he states that the opposition wants to know who the four additional members are and when they were appointed as members of the Commission, and that the opposition wants to know why the Commission has 34 members, instead of '30'.

In the second argument, as reconstructed from subextract (e), Mr Lissu questions the justification for allocating TZS 1.055 billion for various types of payment to the Commission during the convening of the Constituent Assembly (henceforward CA), as indicated in (e) [6]. In (e) [1], Mr Lissu suggests that this request for funds during the CA is questionable because, in accordance with the Act, members of the Commission are not CA members, implying that only CA members should be paid during the convening of the CA (argumentation from legal authority). In (e) [2], he further maintains that, in accordance with the Act, the chairperson of

the Commission is only allowed to present the draft constitution to the CA, and he adds in (e) [4] that members of the Commission do not have any other functions to perform in the CA until required to provide (necessary) clarifications. In (e) [3] and (e) [5], he argues that after presenting the draft constitution and providing the required clarifications, the chairperson and other members of the Commission become *functus officio* (do not have any other functions to perform). These supporting arguments also realise argumentation from legal authority. In his argumentation, Mr Lissu questions why people who, according to him, do not have ‘any other functions to perform’ in the CA should be paid during the convening of the CA.

The third argument for (1.)2a.1a is reconstructed from subextract (f). In (f) [2], Mr Lissu argues that (1.)2a.1a.3 *TZS 1.307 billion is requested to pay members of the Commission and Secretariat for working for just one month*. This argument is further defended by argumentation from legal authority coordinatively combined with causal argumentation. In (f) [1], he maintains that the Act stipulates that, during the validation stage of the proposed constitution, (1.)2a.1a.3.1a *the Commission shall provide civic education and advocacy for no longer than 30 days*. This is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that (1.)2a.1a.3.1b *each member of the Commission and Secretariat will be paid TZS 16.756 million for working for only a month or TZS 558,547 per day*, if the request for funds is approved, as indicated in (f) [3]. He implies in the unexpressed premise that approving the proposed budget will *cause* this to happen. In favour of (1.)2a.1a.3.1b, in (f) [4-5], Mr Lissu argues that (1.)2a.1a.3.1b.1 *this payment ‘smells of corruption’*. This is further defended by argumentation from legal authority with three premises which appear in coordinative argumentation. In the first premise, as indicated in (f) [5], he argues that, in accordance with the Act, (1.)2a.1a.3.1.1a *members of the Commission and Secretariat shall be paid subject to the relevant national laws and regulations*. The second argument is not expressed implicitly but implied in (f) [4]. In this argument, he suggests that (1.2a.1a.3.1b.1.1b) *other public servants are paid less money than members of the Commission per month*, and this payment is subject to the relevant national laws and regulations (legal authority). To further defend this argument, Mr Lissu seems to appeal to argumentation from example in (f) [4]. He argues that nurses in public hospitals are paid a minimum salary of TZS 360,000 per month. Additionally, primary school teachers and secondary school teachers are paid a minimum salary of TZS 250,000 and TZS 325,000 respectively per month. Because the Act stipulates that members of the Commission and Secretariat shall be remunerated subject to the relevant laws and regulations, and because other public servants are paid less money per month, in (f) [5], Mr Lissu maintains that

(1.)2a.1a.3.1b.1.1c *the government should explain to the parliament which laws and regulations have been used to justify the payment*, implying that there are no laws and regulations that can be used to justify such huge spending for the Commission. However, Mr Lissu's examples of public servants who are paid less per month than members of the Commission may not be considered representative. The environment in which nurses in public hospitals and teachers in public schools work for the government does not represent the environment in which members of the Commission work for the government. For instance, while (other) public servants are usually employed on permanent and pensionable terms and are paid salaries on a monthly basis, members of the Commission were appointed by the President to perform a specific task (i.e. to coordinate and supervise the constitutional review process) for a specified period of time. Thus, the amount of money and how (other) public servants are paid may not represent the amount of money and how members of the Commission should be paid. Although these examples may not be representative, Mr Lissu uses them to emphasise that members of the Commission are paid 'too much' money for working for just a month (rhetorical aim).

In the fourth argument, Mr Lissu maintains that (1.)2a.1a.4 *the government should explain to the parliament whether there is any justification for using public funds to buy special foods for members of the Commission and Secretariat who could be infected with HIV*, as shown in (g) [1]. In this argument, Mr Lissu refers to the TZS 18 million allocated for buying 'special foods' for members of the Commission and Secretariat who are (or could be) HIV-positive, as indicated in (b) [3]. Mr Lissu further advances causal argumentation in support of argument (1.)2a.1a.4. This argument realises coordinative argumentation. As described in (g) [1], he argues that, if members of the Commission and Secretariat will be infected with HIV (or are already HIV positive), it means that (1.)2a.1a.4.1a *they 'prioritise' unprotected or unsafe sex and personal luxuries over the Commission's work*, implying that HIV infections are *caused* by (prioritizing) unprotected sex and personal luxuries (causal argumentation). This argumentative move can be conceptualised as an insult to the targeted agents (i.e. members of the Commission). To strengthen the causal link, this argument is coordinatively combined with the argument that, if that is not the case, (1.)2a.1a.4.1b *the government should explain clearly how the new constitution process is likely to cause HIV infections to members of the Commission and Secretariat*, as indicated in (g) [2], which is further supported by the argument that (1.)2a.1a.4.1b.1 *the government can no longer hide itself behind 'the curtain of confidentiality between the employer and the employee'*, as indicated in (g) [3]. To strengthen

this argument, Mr Lissu strategically deploys the metaphor *kujificha nyuma ya pazia la siri ya mwajiri na mwajiriwa* (hiding behind the curtain of confidentiality between the employer and employee). With this presentational device, he emphatically suggests that it is high time the government explained various types of allowance and payment for the Commission to the parliament. It is further suggested in (g) [4] that ‘hiding behind the curtain of confidentiality between the government and members of the Commission’ constrains the institutional powers of the parliament to supervise the government (causal argumentation), which is combined with the argument that, in accordance with section 62(2) of the national constitution, powers are vested in the parliament to supervise the government or, in other words, to hold it accountable (argumentation from legal authority).

In the fifth argument in favour of (1)2a.1a, Mr Lissu raises doubts regarding the amount of money allocated for fuel consumption for the Commission’s vehicles. In (h) [1], he suggests that the government should explain how TZS 218 million allocated for buying fuel will be used within 30 days. This is further defended by the argument that, even if every member of the Commission and Secretariat uses one vehicle, each one will spend TZS 186,325 for fuel per day, as indicated in (h) [2]. Thus, in (h) [3], he states that the opposition wants to know which trips of the Commission will require a ‘full tank’ consumption of fuel every day in a month. He concludes his argument by asserting that, this request for the fund, as Mwalimu Nyerere once said, is nothing but theft (authority argumentation). The second argument for the opposition’s first standpoint is summarised in *Table 4.5*.

Table 4.5 The second argument for the opposition’s first standpoint

No.	Description
(1.)2a	More than 56% (TZS 19.03 billion) of the requested amount is allocated for various types of allowance and other payments to the Commission
(1.)2b	Direct cost for members of the Commission and Secretariat will increase by 30%
(1.2b’)	(If the proposed budget will increase the direct costs by 30%, it should not be approved)
(1.2b’.1’)	(An increase in the costs by 30% is undesirable effect)
(1.)2b.1	Only 43% (TZS 14.6 billion) of the last year’s budget was allocated for various types of allowance and other payments to the Commission
(1.)2a.1a	This request of billions of public funds ‘smells of corruption’ and is inexplicable
(1.)2b.1b	It is unacceptable on legal grounds and the performance record of the Commission
(1.2b.1b’)	(It is against the law and performance record of the Commission)
(1.)2a.1a.1	The legitimacy of requesting 12.193 billion as sitting allowance for 34 members of the Commission should be explained
(1.2a.1a.1’)	(There is no justification for this request, and this is a sign of corruption)

(1.)2a.1a.1.1	The Act stipulates that the Commission shall have not more than 30 members
(1.)2a.1a.1.1.1	The government should explain who the four additional members are and when they were appointed as members of the Commission
(1.)2a.1a.1.1.2	The government should explain why the Commission has 34 members
(1.)2a.1a.2	The legitimacy of requesting TZS 1.055 billion to pay the Commission during the sitting of the CA should be explained
(1.2a.1a.2')	(There is no justification for this request, and this is a sign of corruption)
(1.)2a.1a.2.1	Members of the Commission are not members of the CA
(1.2a.1a.2.1')	(They should not be paid during the sitting of the CA)
(1.)2a.1a.2.1.1	According to the Act, the chairperson of the Commission is only allowed to present the draft constitution to the CA
(1.)2a.1a.2.1.1.1	After presenting the draft constitution, he becomes <i>functus officio</i>
(1.)2a.1a.2.1.2	Members of the Commission do not have any other functions to perform in the CA unless required to provide [necessary] clarifications
(1.)2a.1a.2.1.2.1	After providing the needed clarifications, they also become <i>functus officio</i>
(1.)2a.1a.3	TZS 1.307 billion is requested to pay members of the Commission and Secretariat for working for only 30 days in the validation stage of the proposed constitution
(1.2a.1a.3')	(This is a sign of bribery/corruption)
(1.)2a.1a.3.1a	The Act stipulates that the Commission shall provide civil education and advocacy for no longer than 30 days
(1.)2a.1a.3.1b	Each member of the Commission and Secretariat will be paid an average of TZS 16.756 million for one month or TZS 558,547 per day
(1.)2a.1a.3.1b.1	This type of payment to the Commission 'smells of corruption'
(1.)2a.1a.3.1b.1.1a	The Act stipulates that members of the Commission and Secretariat shall be remunerated subject to the national laws and regulations
(1.2a.1a.3.1b.1.1b)	(Other public servants are paid less money than them per month)
(1.2a.1a.3.1b.1.1b')	(This payment is subject to the relevant national laws and regulations)
(1.2a.1a.3.1b.1.1b.)1	Nurses in public hospitals receive a minimum salary of TZS 360,000 per month
(1.2a.1a.3.1b.1.1b.)2	Primary school teachers and secondary school teachers receive a minimum salary of TZS 250,000 and TZS 325,000 respectively per month
(1.)2a.1a.3.1b.1.1c.	The government should explain which laws and regulations are used to justify this huge spending for members of the Commission and Secretariat
(1.)2a.1a.4	The use of public funds to buy special foods for the members of the Commission and Secretariat who could be infected with HIV should be explained
(1.2a.1a.4')	(The payment of this money to the Commission is a sign of corruption)
(1.)2a.1a.4.1a	If they are infected with HIV, it suggests that members of Commission and Secretariat 'prioritise' unprotected/unsafe sex' over the Commission's responsibilities
(1.)2a.1a.4.1b	Otherwise, the government should explain clearly how the new constitution process is likely to cause HIV infections to them
(1.2a.1a.4.1b')	(HIV infections are caused by unprotected/unsafe sex)
(1.)2a.1a.4.1b.1	The government can no longer hide behind the curtain of confidentiality between the employer and the employee
(1.)2a.1a.5	The use of TZS 218 million for buying fuel for the Commission's vehicles should be explained
(1.2a.1a.5')	(The payment of this money to the Commission smells of corruption)
(1.)2a.1a.5.1	Even if every member of the Commission and Secretariat uses one car, each one will spend TZS 186,325 for fuel per day

(1.)2a.1a.5.1.1	The government should explain which of Commission's trips will require 'full tank' consumption of fuel every day for 30 days
(1.2a.1a.5.1.1')	(No trips will require a 'full tank' consumption of fuel every day for 30 days)
(1.)2a.1a.5.1.1.1	As Mwalimu Nyerere once said, this is nothing but theft

In terms of the speech acts performed, three types of speech acts are performed by Mr Lissu in the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation. First, he implicitly performs the commissive by not accepting the minister's first standpoint. Second, he performs the assertive by implicitly expressing the opposition's first standpoint and advancing argumentation for this standpoint. The last speech act performed, which is also considered to be performed in the opening stage, is the directive. Mr Lissu requests usage declaratives or argumentation from the minister.

4.2.2.2 Summary of the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of the argumentation structure, the opposition's first standpoint and its related argumentation can be summarised as shown in Figure 4.3 below.




Figure 4.3 Summary of the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

As regards the (sub)types of argumentation employed, the opposition's first standpoint is at the first level of defence justified by symptomatic argumentation which is combined in coordinative argumentation with comparison argumentation and authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation) combined in coordinative argumentation with a negative version of pragmatic argumentation. At the second level, the negative prescriptive standpoint is defended by authority argumentation by quotation and symptomatic argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation with authority argumentation. At the third level, the standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation, which is at the fourth level of defence justified by argumentation from legal authority.

4.2.2.3 The opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

In his second standpoint, Mr Lissu suggests that the constitutional review process has been 'hijacked' by CCM for their own interests. This standpoint (and its related argumentation) is reconstructed from *Extract 4.4* below.

Extract 4.4

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, amlipaye mpiga zumari ndiye achaguaye wimbo. Baada ya Tume kulipwa mabilioni yote tuliyoyapigia kelele kwenye Maoni yetu ya Mwaka jana, kuna Ushahidi kwamba Tume imekuwa inacheza wimbo uliochaguliwa na CCM na Serikali yake. (Makofi). [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, mwezi Februari ya mwaka huu, Tume ilichapisha Mwongozo Kuhusu Muundo, Utaratibu wa Kuwapata Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya (Mamlaka za Serikali za Mitaa) na Uendeshaji Wake. [3] Ingawa Tume imedai kwamba Mwongozo huo ulitolewa kwa kuzingatia matakwa ya Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inaamini kwamba Mwongozo ulitolewa kinyume na matakwa ya Sheria hiyo na kwa lengo la kuinufaisha CCM na washirika wake. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, kifungu cha 17(8) cha Sheria kinailazimu Tume kubuni "... utaratibu unaofanana ambao utatumika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano katika ukusanyaji na uchambuzi wa maoni ya wananchi, uendeshaji wa Mabaraza na uandaaji wa ripoti." (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] *Honourable Speaker, he who pays the flautist chooses a song. After being paid all these billions of shillings which we complained about in our last year's opinions, there is evidence that the Commission has been playing the song chosen by CCM and its government. (Applause)* [2] *Honourable Speaker, in February this year, the Commission published a set of guidelines for the conduct of district constitutional fora (local government authority).* [3] *Although the Commission has claimed that the guidelines were issued in accordance with the Constitutional Review Act, the official opposition camp believes that the guidelines were issued without adhering to the Act and with the intention of benefiting CCM and its allies. (Applause)* [4] *Honourable Speaker, section 17(8) of the Act requires the Commission to devise "...uniform methodologies that would be applicable in each part of the United Republic in the collection and analysis of public opinions, the conduct of fora and writing of the report".*
- (b) [1] Katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake, Tume inatakiwa kufuata msingi huu mkuu "isipokuwa kama mazingira yatahitaji vinginevyo...". [2] Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inatambua kwamba, kwa kiasi kikubwa, Tume iliweka utaratibu unaofanana ambao ulitumika katika hatua ya ukusanyaji wa maoni ya wananchi katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano. [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwanza, Tume haikuweka utaratibu wowote wa maana wa kutoa elimu kwa wananchi juu ya masuala yote yanayohusu Katiba Mpya ili kuwaandaa wananchi kuchangia maoni yao kwa Tume wakiwa na uelewa wa kutosha. [4] Badala yake, wakati wa mikutano ya Tume ya kupokea maoni ya wananchi, wajumbe wa Tume walipewa jukumu la kuwaeleza wananchi juu ya Katiba Mpya kwa muda usiozidi nusu saa. [5] Hii ilifanyika katika mikutano yote ya Tume katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano. [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, pili, muda uliowekwa na Tume wa kukusanya maoni ya wananchi ulikuwa mdogo sana ukilinganisha na ukubwa wa nchi yetu na wingi wa Watanzania. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] *In the performance of its functions, the Commission is required to adhere to this main provision "except where circumstances require otherwise..."* [2] *The official opposition camp understands that, generally, the Commission devised uniform methodologies in the collection of public opinions in each part of the United Republic.* [3] *Honourable Speaker, first, the Commission did not have any reasonable plan for the provision of civic education on all matters of the constitutional review in order to prepare citizens to provide their opinions to the Commission with a thorough understanding of the subject.* [4] *Instead, during the public meetings convened [by the Commission] to collect public opinions, members of the Commission gave some clarifications to the people about the new constitution process for no longer than*

half an hour. [5] This was done in all meetings of the Commission in each part of the United Republic. [6] Honourable Speaker, second, the time allocated by the Commission for the collection of public opinions was very limited compared to the vast areas of our country and large population of Tanzanians.

- (c) [1] Katika Majimbo karibu yote ya uchaguzi, Tume iliendesha wastani wa mikutano saba kwa kila Jimbo kwa lengo la kukusanya maoni ya wananchi lakini huu ni wastani tu, katika Majimbo mengi, Tume ilifanya mikutano minne au mitano tu. [2] Hili pia lilifanyika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano. [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, tatu, katika mikutano yote ya ukusanyaji maoni, wananchi walitakiwa kutoa maoni yao kuhusu Katiba Mpya kwa muda wa dakika tano kila mmoja na mikutano yenyewe ilichukua muda wa masaa matatu ikiwa ni pamoja na muda wa kutambulisha wajumbe wa Tume na mambo mengine yaliyo nje ya kuchukua maoni ya wananchi. [4] Hii ilifanyika hata kwa Wabunge wakati Tume ilipokuja kuchukua maoni ya Wabunge hapa Dodoma. [5] Utaratibu huu ulitumika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano. [6] Aidha, utaratibu unaofanana katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano ulitumika kukusanya maoni ya makundi maalum kama vile vyama vya siasa, taasisi zisizokuwa za kiserikali, mashirika ya kidini n ahata taasisi za kiserikali na viongozi wake, wa sasa na waliostaafu. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] In almost all constituencies, the Commission convened about seven meetings in each constituency in order to collect public opinions, but this is just an average; in many constituencies, the Commission convened only four or five meetings. [2] This was also done in both parts of the United Republic [of Tanzania]. [3] Honourable Speaker, third, in all public meetings convened to collect public opinions, citizens were asked to provide their opinions on the new constitution for five minutes each and the meetings were held for three hours, which included the time for introducing members of the Commission and other unrelated issues. [4] This was also done for members of parliament when the Commission came to collect opinions from members of parliament here in Dodoma. [5] This methodology was used in both parts of the United Republic [of Tanzania]. [6] Also, similar methodologies in both parts of the United Republic were used for collecting opinions from special groups such as political parties, non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations and even government institutions and their current and retired leaders.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, wakati Tume iliweka utaratibu unaofanana katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano wakati wa zoezi la kukusanya maoni ya wananchi, Tume hiyohiyo iliweka utaratibu tofauti na wa kibaguzi katika hatua ya kuunda Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya. [2] Kwanza, Tume iliweka ngazi mbili za uchaguzi wa wajumbe wa Mabaraza kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara wakati kwa upande wa Zanzibar Tume iliweka ngazi moja tu ya uchaguzi. [3] Hivyo, kwa mfano, aya ya 6.1.4 ya Mwongozo wa Tume imeweka Mkutano Mkuu Maalum wa Kijiji au Mtaa “ambao utakuwa na agenda moja tu ya kuwapendekeza kwa kuwapigia kura watu wane ambao majina yao yatawasilishwa kwenye Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata.” [4] Hii ni ngazi ya kwanza ya uchaguzi wa wajumbe wa Mabaraza kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara na kazi yake ni kupendekeza tu. [5] Baada ya hapo, majina ya watu walioshinda katika uchaguzi wa ngazi ya Kijiji au Mtaa yatawasilishwa kwa Afisa Mtendaji wa Kata “ambaye ataitisha Kikao Maalum cha Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata, ambacho ... kitachagua majina manne...” ya wajumbe wa Baraza la Katiba la Wilaya. (aya ya 6.1.8, 6.1.9 na 6.1.10). (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, while the Commission set similar methodologies for collecting public opinions in both parts of the United Republic, the same Commission applied different and discriminatory methodologies in the conduct of district constitutional fora. [2] First, the Commission set two stages in the election of members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania, while in Zanzibar the Commission had only one election stage. [3] Therefore, for example, paragraph 6.1.4 of the guidelines of the Commission has put in place one special general meeting at the village or Mtaa “which shall have only one [item of the] agenda – to nominate, by voting, four people whose names will be presented to the Ward Development Committee. [4] This is the first stage in the election of members of [the district

constitutional] fora in Mainland Tanzania, and its function is just to nominate. [5] After that, names of those who won the village or Mtaa elections are presented to the Ward Executive Officer “who will call a special meeting of the Ward Development Committee which will select four names...” of members of the district constitutional fora (paragraph 6.1.8, 6.1.9, and 6.1.10).

- (e) [1] Hii ni ngazi ya pili na ndio inayoamua nani awe mjumbe wa Baraza la Katiba la Wilaya kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara na nani asiwe. [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa upande wa Zanzibar, ngazi ya uchaguzi ni moja tu, Mkutano wa Shehia ambao, kwa mujibu wa aya 6.3.4 ya Mwongozo wa Tume, “... utakuwa na agenda moja tu ya kuwapigia kura ya siri watu watatu... [...]”. [3] Kwa utaratibu huu, wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara wamechaguliwa na watu wane au watano tu ambao ni wajumbe wa WDC wakati wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya hayo kwa upande wa Zanzibar wamechaguliwa na watu wote walioshiriki katika Mkutano wa Shehia. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya kwa upande wa Zanzibar wana uhalali wa kisiasa kwa sababu wanawakilisha matakwa ya wananchi waliowachagua moja kwa moja bila mchujo, wakati wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara hawana uhalali wowote wa kisiasa kwa sababu wanawakilisha maslahi ya CCM ambayo ndiyo inayotawala asilimia zaidi ya themanini ya WDC zote ambazo ndio zilizowachuja wajumbe hao. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] This is the second stage and it is the one that decides who should and who should not be a member of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania! [2] Honourable Speaker, in Zanzibar, the election stage is only one, a Shehia meeting which, as per paragraph 6.3.4 of the Commission’s guidelines, “...shall have only one [item of the] agenda – to elect three people through a secret ballot, [...]”. [3] With this methodology, members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania were selected by only four or five people who are WDC members, while members of the [district constitutional] fora in Zanzibar were elected by all people at the Shehia meeting. (Applause) [4] Honourable Speaker, members of the district constitutional fora in Zanzibar have political legitimacy because they represent the wishes of the people who elected them directly without screening, while members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania do not have any political legitimacy because they represent the interests/wishes of CCM, which dominates more than eighty percent of all WDCs which screened the members. (Applause)

- (f) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, eneo la pili linalothibitisha kwamba utaratibu wa Tume ni wa kibaguzi ni katika uendeshaji wa mikutano ya uchaguzi wa wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya. [2] Kwa mujibu wa aya ya 6.1.4 ya Mwongozo wa Tume, kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara Mkutano Maalum wa Kijiji au Mtaa “... utaendeshwa na Mwenyekiti wa Kijiji au Mtaa, ambapo Afisa Mtendaji wa Kijiji au Mtaa atakuwa Katibu wa Mkutano na ndiye atakayewasilisha majina ya wananchi walioomba kuingia kwenye Baraza la Katiba la Wilaya.” [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, hata hivyo, kwa upande wa Zanzibar kwa mujibu wa aya ya 6.3.5 ya Mwongozo wa Tume, “Mkutano wa Shehia utachagua Mwenyekiti na Katibu wa Mkutano huo kutoka miongoni mwa wananchi waliohudhuria Mkutano. [4] Katibu ndiye atakayewasilisha kwenye Mkutano majina ya wananchi wote walioomba kuwa wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya...” [5] Karibu Maafisa Watendaji wa Vijiji na Mitaa wote wa Tanzania Bara ni wanachama na makada wa CCM, ilhali zaidi ya 90% ya Wenyeviti wa Vijiji na Mitaa wote ni wanachama na makada wa chama hicho. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, the second area which proves that the Commission’s methodologies were discriminatory is the conduct of the election meetings convened to elect members of the district constitutional fora. [2] As per paragraph 6.1.4 of the Commission’s guidelines, in Mainland Tanzania, a special village or Mtaa meeting “...shall be chaired by the village or Mtaa chairperson where a Village or Mtaa Executive Officer shall be the secretary of the meeting, who shall present names of the people requesting to be members of the district constitutional fora.” [3] Honourable Speaker, for Zanzibar, however, in accordance with paragraph 6.3.5 of the Commission’s guidelines, “the Shehia meeting shall elect a chairperson

and secretary of the meeting from among the members who attended the meeting. [4] It is the secretary who shall present to the meeting names of all people who applied to become members of the district constitutional fora...” [5] Almost all Village and Mtaa Executive Officers in Mainland Tanzania are CCM members and cadres, while more than 90% of village/Mtaa chairpersons are also members and cadres of the same party.

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa maana hiyo, mikutano ya uchaguzi wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara imeendeshwa na makada wa CCM wakati kwa upande wa Zanzibar mikutano imeendeshwa na viongozi waliochaguliwa na wananchi walioshiriki katika mikutano hiyo bila kujali itikadi au uanachama wao katika vyama vya siasa. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, ndio maana, karibu nchi nzima ukiacha Zanzibar, kwa mujibu wa taarifa ilizonazo Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni, wananchi wengi wasiokuwa wananchama wa CCM ambao walipata kura nyingi katika kura za mikutano ya uchaguzi ya Vijiji na Mitaa walienguliwa kwenye michujo iliyofanyika katika Kamati za Maendeleo za Kata zilizowekwa kwa mujibu wa Mwongozo wa Tume. [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, hata mahali ambapo wananchi wasiokuwa wana CCM walifanikiwa kupenya katika chekecheke la mchujo wa WDC, wamefanyiwa mizengwe na wana CCM ili waondolewe katika orodha ya wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, mfano mzuri ni yaliyomkuta Bwana Beatus Kipeya aliyechaguliwa mjumbe wa Baraza la Katiba la Wilaya ya Arusha Mjini kwa kupitia Kata ya Sombetini. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, for that matter, the election meetings of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania were convened by CCM cadres while in Zanzibar the meetings were convened by the persons elected by the people who attended the meetings regardless of their political affiliations”. (Applause) [2] Honourable Speaker, that’s why almost throughout the country, with exception of Zanzibar, according to the information that the opposition camp has [received], many non-CCM citizens who were overwhelmingly voted for during the village/Mtaa election meetings were removed [from the list of members] through the screening by the Ward Development Committees (WDCs), which have been put in place by the Commission’s guidelines. (Applause) [3] Honourable Speaker, even in places where non-CCM citizens passed the sifter of screening by WDCs, CCM members played tricks to remove them from the list of members of the district constitutional fora. (Applause) [4] Honourable Speaker, a good example is what happened to Mr Beatus Kipeya who was elected as a member of Arusha Urban district constitutional fora through Sombetini ward.

- (h) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni ina ushahidi unaonyesha kwamba njama za kuhakikisha kwamba wanaCCM pekee ndio watakaochaguliwa kuwa wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara zilipangwa katika ngazi za juu kabisa za CCM. [2] Mnamo tarehe 3 Machi, 2013, siku mbili tu baada ya Mwongozo wa Tume kuanza kutumika, Katibu wa NEC ya CCM, Uhusiano wa Kimataifa Dkt. Asha-Rose Migiro alituma barua pepe kwa wajumbe na watendaji wa Sekretarieti ya NEC ya CCM yenye kichwa cha habari: ‘MUHIMU!! MABARAZA YA KATIBA YA WILAYA. (Makofi). [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, barua pepe ya Dkt. Asha-Rose Migiro inasema: “Naandika kuhimiza kazi ya kuwatia hamasa Makatibu wa Mikoa wasimamie kikamilifu mchakato wa kuundwa kwa Mabaraza ya Wilaya ya Katiba. [4] Kama mnavyofahamu Tume ya Katiba imeshatoa taarifa rasmi kwenye vyombo vya habari... kuhusu zoezi hili muhimu. [5] Sambamba na hatua za awali tulizochukua baada ya kupata rasimu ya mwanzo ya Mwongozo wa Tume, hivi sasa tunatakiwa tuongeze juhudi za ushiriki wetu na kutayarisha makundi husika kama tulivyokwishaongea.” [...] [6] Dkt. Asha-Rose Migiro alimalizia barua yake kwa maneno yafuatayo: “Tafadhali wanakiliwa msisite kutoa maoni, ushauri na mbinu bora zaidi za kutimiza azma yetu katika suala hili muhimu.” (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, the official opposition camp in the parliament has evidence which shows that the plot to ensure that only CCM members are elected as members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania was masterminded by CCM’s top leaders. [2] On 3rd March 2013 just two days after the Commission’s guidelines were effective, the CCM’s NEC secretary – International relations, Dr Asha-Rose Migiro, sent an email to the members and

executive officers of the NEC Secretariat with the subject: 'IMPORTANT!! DISTRICT CONSTITUTIONAL FORA. (Applause) [3] Honourable Speaker, Dr Asha-Rose Migiro's email says: "I'm writing to insist on the task of encouraging Regional Secretaries to effectively monitor the conduct of the district constitutional fora. [4] As you may be aware, the Constitutional Review Commission has already given official information in the media about this important exercise. [5] In line with the initial actions we took, after receiving the first draft of the Commission's guidelines, we now have to work harder in our participation and prepare relevant groups as we already talked about." [...] [6] Dr Asha-Rose Migiro concluded her letter with the following words: "Please, leaders copied in on this email, do not hesitate to give us your opinions, advice and better techniques for achieving our aim on this important matter."

- (i) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, wanakiliwa wa barua pepe ya Dkt. Asha-Rose Migiro ni pamoja na Mheshimiwa Mwigulu Nchemba, Mheshimiwa Zakhia Meghji, Mheshimiwa Muhamed Seif Khatib na Bwana Nape Nnauye, Katibu Mwenezi wa NEC ya CCM. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, siku moja baadaye, Bwana Nape Nnauye aliwaandikia 'wanakiliwa' wenzake kama ifuatavyo: "nashauri ikiwezekana kwa sababu ya unyeti wa swala hili tupate taarifa kila siku/au walau siku tatu ya hali halisi inavyoendelea katika kila Mkoa, ni vizuri idara ikaandaa checklist ya mambo muhimu ya kupima kama mchakato unakwenda vizuri au la! Mfano... idadi ya walioandaliwa kugombea katika kila eneo, idadi ya waliohamasishwa kuhudhuria na kupiga kura, n.k." (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, njama za CCM kuteka nyara mchakato wa Katiba Mpya zinahusu pia mchakato wa uhalalishaji wa Katiba Mpya kwenye kura ya maoni. [4] Mnamo tarehe 18 Desemba mwaka jana, Katibu wa Sekretarieti ya Halmashauri Kuu ya Taifa ya CCM, Francis K. Mwonga, aliwaandikia barua Makatibu wote wa CCM wa Mikoa kuwapa 'Maelezo ya Kikao cha Sekretarieti ya Halmashauri Kuu ya Taifa na Makatibu wa CCM wa Mikoa Kilichofanyika Dar es Salaam Tarehe 10/12/2012.' (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, the leaders copied in on Dr Asha-Rose's email include Honourable Mwigulu Nchemba, Honourable Zakhia Meghji, Honourable Mohamed Seif Khatib and Mr Nape Nnauye, the Publicity Secretary of the CCM's NEC. (Applause) [2] Honourable Speaker, a day later, Mr Nape Nnauye wrote to the fellow leaders 'copied' in on the email as follows: "I suggest that, if possible, bearing in mind the importance of this issue, we receive a day-to-day report or at least a three-day report on the ongoing situation in every region; it is good if the department prepares a checklist of important issues to evaluate whether the process is on the right track, for example, the number of candidates prepared to contest for the positions in every area, the number of those encouraged to attend and vote, etc." (Applause) [3] Honourable Speaker, the CCM's plot to hijack the new constitution process also include the validation of the proposed constitution in the referendum. [4] On 18th December last year, the Secretary of the CCM's National Executive Council Secretariat, Mr Francis K. Mwonga, wrote to all CCM Regional Secretaries to give them instructions from the National Executive Council meeting with CCM Regional Secretaries held in Dar es Salaam on 10/12/2012.' (Applause)

- (j) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, sehemu ya Maelekezo hayo inasema: "Wakati wa kupiga kura ya maoni kuhusu Katiba Mpya ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania mawasiliano yafanywe na wahusika ili vituo vya kupigia kura visiwe mbali sana na wananchi." [2] Maneno haya yameandikwa hata kabla Tume haijamaliza zoezi la kukusanya maoni ya wananchi na tayari Sekretarieti ya Halmashauri Kuu ya CCM inawaelekeza makada wake mikoani kufanya mawasiliano na 'wahusika' juu ya namna ya kupanga vituo vya kupigiwa kura. (Makofi) [...] [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, mawasiliano haya ya viongozi wa ngazi za juu za CCM yanathibitisha kwamba mchakato wa Katiba Mpya umeingiliwa na kuhujumiwa kwa kiasi kikubwa na CCM. [...] [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, nyaraka za CCM ambazo tumezielezea hapa zinaonyesha dhahiri kwamba CCM imeingilia uhuru na mamlaka ya Tume. [...] [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, baada ya ushahidi wote huu, hakuwezi kuwa na ubishi kwamba utaratibu mzima wa kuundwa kwa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya ni haramu. [6] Hakuwezi kuwa na ubishi tena kwamba uharamu huu una lengo moja tu: kuhakikisha kwamba Katiba Mpya itakayopatikana kwa mchakato huu haramu "... itakuwa ni Katiba Mpya kwa jina tu, mambo mengine ya msingi yatabaki vilevile

(yalivyo katika Katiba ya sasa). [7] Kwa maneno mengine, itakuwa ni Katiba ile ile, ya watu wale wale, wa chama kile kile. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] *Honourable Speaker, part of the instructions says: "During the referendum for the proposed constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, communication should be made with the persons in charge [of the referendum] so that polling stations are not far from the citizens' places."* [2] *These words are written even before the Commission has finished the exercise of collecting public opinions and already the Secretariat of the CCM's National Executive Council instructs its cadres in the regions to communicate with the 'persons in charge' [of the referendum] on how to arrange polling stations. (Applause) [...]* [3] *Honourable Speaker, this communication among CCM's top officials proves that the new constitution process has been largely interfered and sabotaged by CCM. [...]* [4] *Honourable Speaker, the CCM documents which we have explained here show clearly that CCM has interfered in the autonomy and independence of the Commission. [...]* [5] *Honourable speaker, after all this evidence, there is no doubt that the whole process for the conduct of the district constitutional fora is null and void. [6] There's also no doubt that this illegality of the process has only one intention: to ensure that the new constitution that will be written through this illegal process will be a new constitution only by its name, but all other basic issues will remain the same (as they are in the current constitution). [7] In other words, it will be the same constitution of the same people from the same party.*

The opposition's second standpoint, as reconstructed from *Extract 4.4*, relates to a slightly different proposition compared to the minister's second standpoint. This standpoint suggests that *2 the constitutional review process has been hijacked by CCM*, as indicated in (i) [3] and suggested in the rest of *Extract 4.4*. Although the opposition's second standpoint does not relate to the same proposition as the minister's second standpoint, this 'new' standpoint raises critical doubts to the acceptability of the minister's second standpoint. With this standpoint, Mr Lissu implicitly attempts to shift the topic of discussion in the argumentation stage from the proposition that the process has been effectively coordinated by the Commission to the proposition that the process has been hijacked by CCM; an attempt which was successful. This topic shift does not violate the institutional rules because the 'new' standpoint still relates to the topic on the table or is strategically framed to make it look like it relates to the topic on the table.

At the first level of defence, the opposition's second standpoint is defended by two main arguments; both arguments realise coordinative argumentation. The first argument, which demonstrates causal argumentation, is indicated in (a) [1], where Mr Lissu argues that, after being paid billions of Tanzanian shillings (hereafter TZS) by the ruling party in the last fiscal year, *2.1a the Commission is now 'playing the song' chosen by CCM and its government*. In the other argument in this coordinative argumentation, Mr Lissu argues that *2.1b he who pays the flautist chooses a song*. In this causal argumentation, Mr Lissu suggests that the manner in which the Commission coordinates the process is the consequence of (or results from) being paid too much money (bribery) by the CCM government. This causal argumentation is based

on a metaphorical expression in which Mr Lissu compares the Commission to *mpiga zumari* (a flautist) and the CCM government to someone who pays the flautist to play the song the payer has chosen (the payer). This metaphor is reinforced by the Swahili figurative expression which suggests that *amlipaye mpiga zumari ndiye achaguaye wimbo* (he who pays the flautist chooses a song). After being paid too much money in the last fiscal year, ‘the flautist’ (the Commission) is now, to use Mr Lissu’s own words, ‘playing the song chosen by CCM and its government’ or, in other words, the Commission is dancing to the CCM’s tune. With these presentational devices of strategic manoeuvring, Mr Lissu suggests that the Commission does what CCM and its government want to be done for their own benefits.

As proof of argument 2.1a, in (b) [2], Mr Lissu suggests that 2.1a.1 *the Commission devised a uniform but inappropriate methodology for collection of public opinions in each part of the Union*. Argument 2.1a.1, which exhibits symptomatic argumentation (a sign that the Commission is dancing to the CCM’s tune), is defended by three arguments, which realise multiple argumentation. First, in (b) [3], Mr Lissu argues that 2.1a.1.1 *the Commission did not have any reasonable plan for the provision of civic education on the new constitution*, in order to prepare members of the public to provide their opinions with a thorough understanding of the subject. Implicitly, this argument presupposes that people gave opinions without having thorough understanding of the subject and it is a sign that the methodology was inappropriate (symptomatic argumentation). As proof of 2.1a.1.1, in (a) [4-5], Mr Lissu maintains that, in the Commission’s meetings, 2.1a.1.1.1 *members of the Commission provided civic education for no longer than 30 minutes*, implying that the time was not enough for people to understand the subject well, which is also considered a sign that the methodology was inappropriate (symptomatic argumentation). Second, in (b) [6], Mr Lissu maintains that 2.1a.1.2 *the time allocated for collection of public opinions was very limited* (symptomatic argumentation). To support argument 2.1a.1.2, in (b) [6], he suggests that 2.1a.1.2.1 *Tanzania has a large area and a huge population*, implying that, as a result of what is claimed in the argument, many places could not be reached to afford people an opportunity to provide their opinions (causal argumentation). In the other argument in support of 2.1a.1.2, Mr Lissu maintains in (c) [1-2] that, in almost all constituencies, 2.1a.1.2.2a *the Commission convened an average of 7 meetings in each constituency* (statistical argumentation) and that, in reality, 2.1a.1.2.2b *it held only four or five meetings in many constituencies* (statistical argumentation). Third, in (c) [3] and (c) [5], he maintains that, in all the meetings in each part of the URT, 2.1a.1.3a *citizens were required to provide opinions for only 5 minutes each*, implying that five minutes are not

enough for a citizen to provide detailed opinions. In (c) [4], he adds that this method was used to collect opinions from the MPs in Dodoma (argumentation from example). In (c) [6], argument 2.1a.1.3a is combined with the argument that 2.1a.1.3b *a similar method was used to collect opinions from various groups of people with common interests*, including political parties, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), faith-based institutions/organizations, and public institutions and their current and retired leaders. The opposition's first subargument in defence of argument (2.)1a is summarised in **Table 4.6** below.

Table 4.6 The first subargument for argument (2.)1a

No.	Description
2.1a.1	It devised a uniform but inappropriate methodology for collection of public opinions in each part of the Union
2.1a.1.1	It did not have any reasonable plan for the provision of civic education on the constitutional review in order to prepare citizens to provide opinions with a thorough understanding of the subject
2.1a.1.1')	(This presupposes that people gave opinions without having thorough understanding of the subject and it is a sign that the methodology was inappropriate)
2.1a.1.1.1	In the Commission's meetings, members of the Commission provided civic education for only 30 minutes
(2.1a.1.1.1')	(The time was not enough for people to understand the subject)
2.1a.1.2	The time allocated for the collection of public opinions was not enough
(2.1a.1.2')	(This denied people the right to provide opinions)
2.1a.1.2.1	Tanzania has a large area and a huge population
(2.1a.1.2.1')	(Many areas could not be reached, and many people could not provide opinions)
2.1a.1.2.2a	In almost all constituencies, the Commission convened an average of seven meetings in each constituency
2.1a.1.2.2b	In reality, in many constituencies, it held four or five meetings
2.1a.1.3a	In the Commission's meetings, each person was required to provide opinions for only 5 minutes
(2.1a.1.3a')	(Five minutes are not enough for someone to provide detailed opinions)
2.1a.1.3a.1	This method was used to collect opinions from the MPs in Dodoma
2.1a.1.3b	A similar method was used to collect opinions from special groups
2.1a.1.3b.1	These groups include political parties, NGOs, as well as faith-based and public institutions/organizations

In the second argument in support of argument (2.)1a, Mr Lissu criticises the Commission's guidelines for the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF), especially the election of DCF members. In (a) [2-3], he argues that 2.1a.2a *the guidelines are against the Act* (argumentation from legal authority) and 2.1a.2b *they benefit CCM and its allies*. Argument 2.1a.2b exhibits causal argumentation from means to goal. With this argument, Mr Lissu suggests that the guidelines were devised as a means to achieve the goal of benefiting CCM and its allies. Argument 2.1a.2a is further defended by argumentation from legal authority, which realises coordinative argumentation with two arguments. The first argument, as

indicated in (a) [4], suggests that *2.1a.2a.1a the Act requires the Commission to devise a uniform methodology in the conduct of fora*, in each part of the United Republic of Tanzania (henceforth URT). This is combined with the argument that, in accordance with the Act, *2.1a.2a.1b the Commission is required to adhere to this provision unless the circumstances require otherwise*, as shown in (b) [1]. As proof of argument *2.1a.2a.1a*, in (d) [1], Mr Lissu further suggests that, while the Commission used a uniform methodology in the collection of public opinions in each part of the URT, *2.1a.2a.1a.1 the Commission's methodology in the conduct of DCF in Mainland Tanzania was different and discriminatory*, implying that this was done with the purpose of benefiting the ruling party in the election of DCF members. This argument realises causal argumentation from means to goal, which suggests that the 'discriminatory' methodology was devised as a means to achieve the goal of ensuring that only CCM members are elected or appointed as DCF members. As evidence of the 'discrimination' (and difference) in the methodology used by the Commission for selecting DCF members in Mainland Tanzania, Mr Lissu advances two further arguments, both of them realising coordinative argumentation (see **Table 4.7**). In (d) [2], Mr Lissu argues that *2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a the Commission put two election stages in Mainland Tanzania but 2.1a.2a.1a.1.1b it put only one stage in Zanzibar*. In the first stage in Mainland Tanzania, citizens in each village or Mtaa nominated four people by voting, whose names were presented to the Ward Development Committees (henceforward WDCs). In the second stage, the WDCs selected four people from the list of nominees presented to them. This is indicated in (d) [3-5]. In (e) [1], he maintains that it is the second stage which decides who should or should not be a DCF member. In (e) [4], he further suggests that 80% of the WDCs are dominated by CCM, implying that it was difficult or impossible for non-CCM members to be elected or appointed as DCF members (causal argumentation). According to this member of the opposition, in Zanzibar, citizens who attended a Shehia meeting elected three people through a secret ballot, as shown in (e) [2]. Based on this comparison between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, in (e) [3], Mr Lissu maintains that DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were selected by four or five people who form WDCs while those in Zanzibar were elected by all citizens who attended the Shehia meeting. In (e) [4], he further maintains that DCF members in Zanzibar have political legitimacy because they represent the wishes of people who elected them (causal argumentation) while those from the Mainland lack political legitimacy because they represent the CCM's interests (causal argumentation).

The second argument in support of 2.1a.2a.1a.1 also realises coordinative argumentation. In (f) [2], Mr Lissu argues that in Mainland Tanzania the chairpersons of the election meetings were the village/Mtaa chairpersons, and the secretaries of the meetings were the Village Executive Officers (VEOs) or Mtaa Executive Officers (MEO). In **Table 4.7**, this argument is marked as argument 2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a. However, as indicated in (f) [3], he maintains that in Zanzibar the chairpersons and secretaries of the election meetings were elected by people who attended the relevant meetings. This is argument 2.1a.2a.1a.1.2b. To support argument 2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a, in (f) [5], Mr Lissu argues that almost all VEOs/MEOs and more than 90% of village/Mtaa chairpersons in Mainland Tanzania are CCM members. Based on this authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), in (g) [1-2], Mr Lissu suggests that the election meetings in Mainland Tanzania were supervised by CCM cadres while those in Zanzibar were supervised by people who were elected by the citizens regardless of their political affiliations, and, according to him, that is why in many areas non-CCM members who were overwhelmingly voted for in the first stage in Mainland Tanzania were ‘screened out’ by the WDCs in the second stage (causal argumentation). In (g) [3-4], Mr Lissu goes a step further to claim that CCM leaders made attempts to remove from the list of DCF members even a few non-CCM members who passed the screening stage, and a good example of these people, according to this member of the opposition, is Mr Beatus Kipeya (argumentation from example). The opposition’s second subargument for argument (2.)1a is summarised in **Table 4.7** below.

Table 4.7 The second subargument for argument (2.)1a

No.	Description
2.1a.2a	The Commission’s guidelines for the conduct of DCF are against the Act
2.1a.2b	The guidelines are intended to benefit CCM and its allies
2.1a.2a.1a	The Act requires the Commission to devise uniform methodologies in the conduct of fora in each part of the Union
2.1a.2a.1b	The Commission is required to adhere to this provision unless the circumstances require otherwise
2.1a.2a.1a.1	The Commission’s methodology in the conduct of DCF in Mainland Tanzania was different and discriminatory
(2.1a.2a.1a.1’)	(It was intended to benefit CCM in the election of DCF members)
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a	It put two election/selection stages in Mainland Tanzania
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1a	The first stage involved all people but the second stage involved WDCs
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1b	DCF members were appointed/elected by WDCs at the second stage
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1b.1	DCF members in Mainland Tanzania don’t have any political legitimacy
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1b.1.1	They represent the interests/wishes of the ruling party
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1b.1.1.1	More than 80% of the WDCs which selected them are led by CCM
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1c	Four or five people decided who should or should not be a DCF member
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1a.1c.1	Most WDCs consist of four or five people
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1b	It put only one election stage in Zanzibar

2.1a.2a.1a.1.1b.1	DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by people
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1b.1.1	They have political legitimacy
2.1a.2a.1a.1.1b.1.1.1	They represent the wishes of the people
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a	In Mainland Tanzania, chairpersons and secretaries of the election meetings were the village/Mtaa chairpersons and VEOs/MEOs respectively
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a.1	More than 90% of the village/Mtaa chairpersons and almost all VEOs/MEOs are CCM members and cadres
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a.1.1	The election meetings were supervised by CCM leaders
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a.1.1.1	Non-CCM members who were overwhelmingly voted for at the first stage were 'screened out' by the WDCs at the second stage
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a.1.1.2	CCM leaders made attempts to remove from the list even a few non-CCM members who passed the screening stage by WDCs
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2a.1.1.2.1	This happened to Mr Beatus Kipeya
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2b	The chairpersons and secretaries of election meetings in Zanzibar were elected by citizens from among the people who attended the meetings
2.1a.2a.1a.1.2b.1	Election meetings were supervised by leaders who were elected by the people regardless of their political affiliations

The second argument in defence of the opposition's second standpoint is reconstructed from the last two subextracts in *Extract 4.4*. Like the first argument, this argument represents coordinative argumentation. In (j) [2] and (j) [4], Mr Lissu suggests that *2.2a there is evidence that CCM's top leaders have sabotaged the constitutional review process* (symptomatic argumentation), and he maintains that *2.2b CCM has interfered in the autonomy and independence of the Commission*, suggesting that, in accordance with the Act, the Commission shall not be interfered by any authority (argumentation from legal authority). In defence of *2.2a*, Mr Lissu advances two further arguments. The first argument realises coordinative argumentation, where argumentation from example is combined with causal argumentation. In (h) [1], Mr Lissu argues that there is evidence which shows that *2.2a.1a CCM's top leaders conspired to ensure that only CCM members are elected as DCF members in Mainland Tanzania*. This is regarded as an instance which proves that CCM have sabotaged the process (symptomatic argumentation). In (j) [5], he maintains that, with this evidence, *2.2a.1b there is no doubt that the whole procedure for the conduct of DCF was is invalid*, implying that this evidence makes the election process invalid (causal argumentation). At the third level of defence, argument *2.2a.1a* is supported by argumentation from narrative in coordinative argumentation. In (h) [2], Mr. Lissu narrates that, on 3rd March 2013, via email, *2.2a.1a.1a one of the CCM's top leaders, Dr Migiro, communicated to the fellow CCM's top leaders regarding DCF*. These other leaders are mentioned in (i) [1] and they include Mr Nchemba, Ms Meghji, Mr Khatib, and Mr Nnauye, who is the CCM's Publicity Secretary. The content of this communication is explained in (h) [3-6]. First, as described in (h) [3], Dr Asha-Rose Migiro instructed these leaders to encourage CCM's regional secretaries to closely monitor the conduct

of DCF. Second, as indicated in (h) [5], she asked them to increase their participation in the process and prepare ‘relevant groups’, as ‘already talked about’. It is not clear what groups are being referred to here. However, with this statement, Mr Lissu implicitly suggests that these are the groups of CCM members who are prepared to be DCF members. Third, as shown in (h) [6], he maintains that she urged these leaders to provide their opinions, advice, and better techniques for achieving ‘our aim’. Although Dr Migiro does not seem to explicitly disclose in her email what aim this is, Mr Lissu’s statement implies that this aim is to ensure that only CCM members are elected as DCF members. In line with argument 2.2a.1a.1a, in (i) [2], Mr Lissu maintains that one day after receiving Dr Migiro’s email, *2.2a.1a.1b Mr Nnauye communicated to the fellow CCM leaders (copied in on Dr Migiro’s email) about the conduct of DCF*. He advised that there should be a day-to-day or a three-day progress report in every region and that the ‘department’ should prepare a checklist of important things to determine whether the process is on the right track, including the number of people prepared to contest and the number of people who have been encouraged to attend and vote in the meetings.

Argument 2.2a.1b is also defended by the negative version of pragmatic argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation with two arguments. In (j) [6], he argues that, because the election of DCF members is invalid, *2.2a.1b.1a the new constitution will be a new constitution only by name*, suggesting that the constitutional review process will not achieve the desired effect, because *2.2a.1b.1a.1 many things in the new constitution will remain as they are in the current constitution*. In line with argument 2.2a.1b.1a, in (j) [7], he argues that *2.2a.2b.1b it will be the same constitution of the same people from the same party*, implying that nothing will change.

Second argument in support of argument 2.2a is indicated in (i) [3]. Mr Lissu suggests that *2.2a.2 the CCM’s plot to hijack the constitutional review process includes its interference in the validation of the proposed constitution in the referendum*, implicitly suggesting that CCM’s interference in the validation stage of the new constitution is another proof that CCM has hijacked the new constitutional process (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is defended by argumentation from narrative. In (i) [4], Mr Lissu argues that, on 18th December last year, the Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCM’s NEC, Mr Francis Mwonga, wrote a letter to the CCM’s regional secretaries to give them instructions from the Secretariat’s meeting with the regional secretaries. In (j) [1], Mr Lissu adds that this NEC secretary asked them to communicate with the returning officers in charge of the referendum to ensure that polling stations are not far from the people’s places, and he maintains that this was said even before

the Commission had completed the task of collecting public opinions. Generally, the second argument in defence of the opposition's second standpoint is summarised in *Table 4.8* below.

Table 4.8 The second argument for the opposition's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.2a.	There is evidence that CCM's top leaders have sabotaged the process
(2.2a')	(This is a proof that CCM have hijacked the process)
2.2b	CCM has interfered in the autonomy and independence of the Commission
(2.2b')	(According to the Act, the Commission's autonomy and independence shall not be interfered by any person or authority)
2.2a.1a	The evidence shows that CCM's top officials conspired to ensure that only CCM members are elected as DCF members
(2.2a.1a')	(This is a proof that CCM has sabotaged the process)
2.2a.1a.1a	One of the CCM's top leaders, Dr Migiro, communicated to fellow CCM's leaders regarding the DCF via email
2.2a.1a.1a.1a	CCM leaders copied in on the email are Mr Nchemba, Ms Meghji, Mr Khatib, and Mr Nnauye
2.2a.1a.1a.1b	She told them several issues about the conduct of DCF
2.2a.1a.1a.1b.1	She asked them to encourage regional secretaries to closely monitor the conduct of DCF
2.2a.1a.1a.1b.2	She asked them to increase the CCM's participation in the process and prepare 'respective groups as 'discussed earlier'
(2.2a.1a.1a.1b.2')	(These respective groups are groups of people who are prepared to be DCF members from CCM)
2.2a.1a.1a.1b.3	She urged them to give her opinions, advice, and better techniques for achieving 'their aim'
(2.2a.1a.1a.1b.3')	(This aim is to ensure that only CCM members are selected as DCF members)
2.2a.1a.1b	One day later, the CCM's publicity secretary, Mr Nnauye, communicated to other leaders copied in on Dr Migiro's email about DCF
2.2a.1a.1b.1	He advised that there should be a day-to-day or a three-day report on what is going on in every region
2.2a.1a.1b.2	He suggested that 'department' should prepare a checklist of important things
2.2a.1a.1b.2.1	These important things include the number of people prepared to contest and the number of people encouraged to attend and vote in the election meetings
2.2a.1b	There is no doubt that the conduct of DCF was invalid
2.2a.1b.1a	The new constitution will be the new constitution only by name
(2.2a.1b.1a')	(The constitutional review process will not achieve the desired effect)
2.2a.1b.1a.1	Many things will remain as they are in the current constitution
2.2a.1b.1b	It will be the same constitution of the same people from the same party
2.2a.2	The evidence suggests that the CCM's plot to hijack the process includes its interference in the validation of the proposed constitution in a referendum
(2.2a.2')	(The CCM's interference in the validation stage of the proposed constitution is another proof that CCM has hijacked the process)
2.2a.2.1a	Mr Mwonga gave instructions to CCM's regional secretaries about the referendum
2.2a.2.1b	Mr Mwonga is a secretary of the Secretariat of the CCM's NEC
2.2a.2.1a.1	He asked them to communicate with the returning officers in charge of the referendum to ensure that polling stations are not far from the voters' places
2.2a.2.1a.1.1	These instructions were given even before the Commission had completed the collection of public opinions

The speech acts performed in the opposition's second standpoint and its related argumentation include the assertive, commissive, and directive. As in the previous standpoint, Mr Lissu performs the commissive by implicitly not accepting the minister's second standpoint. He also performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing argumentation in defence of the standpoint. Finally, he performs the directive by requesting usage declaratives and/or argumentation from the minister.

4.3.2.4 Summary of the opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's second standpoint (and its related argumentation), as expressed by Mr Lissu, is summarised in Figure 4.4. As it can be observed from Figure 4.4, Mr Lissu's argumentation for the opposition's second standpoint demonstrates complex argumentation structure, realised by a combination of coordinative, multiple, and subordinative argumentation. In this figure, 'MTZ' refers to Mainland Tanzania.




Figure 4.4 Summary of the opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

With respect to the argumentation schemes, the opposition's descriptive standpoint is at the first level of defence justified by causal argumentation (in coordinative argumentation) and symptomatic argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation with argumentation from

legal authority. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by various (sub)types of argumentation, including argumentation from legal authority, causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, and argumentation from narrative. The frequent use of argumentation from legal authority can be attributed to the topic on the table (the constitutional review process), the Act, and Mr Lissu's legal experience as a lawyer.

4.2.2.5 The opposition's third standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's third standpoint relates to a 'new' proposition (the constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail). Thus, the standpoint does not relate to any proposition which the minister's standpoints relate to. This standpoint realises a different difference of opinion. However, the 'new' proposition is still relevant to the topic on the table. In this standpoint, the shadow minister cites some separate cases from Kenya and Zimbabwe to prove that the constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail. This standpoint (and its related argumentation) is reconstructed from *Extract 4.5* below.

Extract 4.5

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, nchi ya Kenya imepata Katiba Mpya mwezi Agosti 2010 baada ya mchakato uliochukua zaidi ya miaka kumi na moja. [2] Kwa mujibu wa Dkt. Patrice L. O. Lumumba (Kenya's Quest for a Constitution: The Postponed Promise, The Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, Nairobi, 2008) aliyekuwa Katibu wa Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba ya Kenya, kwanza Serikali ya KANU chini ya Rais Daniel Arap Moi na baadaye Serikali ya NARC chini ya Rais Mwai Kibaki, zilijaribu kuteka nyara mchakato wa Katiba Mpya ya Kenya kwa kuandaa Rasimu ya Katiba Mpya ambayo ilipopelekwa kwenye kura ya maoni ya mwaka 2005 ilikataliwa na wananchi wa Kenya. [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, kama inavyojulikana, baadaye Kenya ilifanya Uchaguzi Mkuu wa Desemba 2007 kwa mujibu wa Katiba ya zamani ya Kenya ya mwaka 1969. [4] Matokeo ya uchaguzi huo chini ya Katiba ya zamani yaliingiza Kenya katika machafuko makubwa ya kisiasa yaliyosababisha mauaji ya maelfu ya Wakenya. [5] Kwa sababu ya machafuko hayo, Kenya imeingia katika vitabu vya historia kuwa nchi ya pili katika Bara la Afrika, baada ya Hassan al-Bashir wa Sudan, yenye Rais na Naibu Rais walioko madaraka[ni] lakini wanakabiliwa na mashtaka ya uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu (crimes against humanity) katika Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] *Honourable Speaker, Kenya has attained a new constitution in August 2010 after the process that took over eleven years. [2] According to Dr Patrice L.O. Lumumba (Kenya's Quest for a Constitution: The Postponed Promise, The Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, Nairobi, 2008), who was the secretary of the Kenya's Constitutional Review Commission, first, the KANU government under President Daniel Arap Moi and later the NARC government under President Mwai Kibaki tried to hijack the Kenya's new constitution process by preparing the [proposed] new constitution which was rejected when it was presented to the people of Kenya in the 2005 referendum. [3] Honourable Speaker, as it is [well] known, later in December 2007 Kenya held general elections using the old constitution of 1969. [4] The results of the elections under the old constitution put Kenya into the worst political violence that led to deaths of thousands of Kenyans. [5] Because of the violence, Kenya has entered historical books as a second country in the continent of Africa, after Hassan al-Bashir's Sudan, where the President and Vice President who are currently in power are faced with charges of crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court.*

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Jamhuri ya Zimbabwe nayo imepata Katiba Mpya mwezi Februari ya mwaka huu baada ya mchakato uliochukua zaidi ya miaka kumi na sita. [2] Mwaka 2000, Chama Tawala cha ZANU PF cha Rais Robert Mugabe kiliwapelekea wananchi wa Zimbabwe Rasimu ya Katiba Mpya iliyotokana na mchakato uliotawaliwa na chama hicho kuanzia mwanzo hadi mwisho. [3] Katika kura ya maoni iliyofanyika mwaka huo, Rasimu hiyo ya Katiba Mpya ilikataliwa kwa kura nyingi na wananchi wa Zimbabwe. [4] Matokeo yake, Zimbabwe iliingia katika giza kuu la machafuko ya kisiasa na kijamii yaliyopelekea ukiukwaji wa kutisha wa haki za binadamu na hatimaye Zimbabwe kutengwa kimataifa kwa kufukuzwa katika Jumuiya ya Madola na kuwekewa vikwazo vya kiuchumi na kidiplomasia. [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, baadaye, ZANU PF iliyofikiria kwamba inaweza kutawala kwa mabavu ya kijeshi, ilipoteza wingi wake Bungeni na hatimaye ililazimika kufanya maridhiano na vyama vya upinzani na makundi mengine ya kijamii yaliyopelekea kusainiwa kwa Makubaliano Makuu ya Kisiasa (Global Political Agreement). (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, the Republic of Zimbabwe has also obtained a new constitution in February this year after the process that took over sixteen years. [2] In 2000 the ruling party ZANU-PF of President Robert Mugabe presented to the citizens of Zimbabwe a [proposed] new constitution which was achieved from the process that was entirely dominated by the party from the beginning to the end. [3] In the referendum that was held in the same year, the [proposed] constitution was rejected with majority votes by the people of Zimbabwe. [4] As the result, Zimbabwe suffered a worse socio-political violence that led to horrible human rights violations and eventually Zimbabwe was isolated by the international community by being dismissed from the commonwealth, and economic and diplomatic sanctions were imposed on the country. [5] Honourable Speaker, later ZANU-PF, which thought could rule using the military force, lost its majority in the parliament and eventually had to reconcile with political parties and other social groups, which led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement.

- (c) [1] Chini ya Makubaliano hayo, Bunge la Zimbabwe liliunda Kamati ya Katiba ya Bunge iliyokuwa na wajumbwe sawa kwa kila kimoja cha vyama vikuu vya kisiasa vya nchi hiyo. [2] Kamati hiyo ya Bunge, iliyokuwa na Wenyeviti Wenza Watatu, Makamu Wenyeviti Wenza Watatu na wajumbe tisa kwa kila chama, ndio iliyoandaa Rasimu ya Katiba Mpya ya Jamhuri ya Zimbabwe iliyopigia kura ya maoni na kupitishwa na wananchi wa Zimbabwe mwezi Februari ya mwaka huu. [3] Baadhi ya Wabunge wa Bunge lako Tukufu walishiriki katika kura ya maoni hiyo kama sehemu ya ujumbe wa waangalizi wa Chama cha Mabunge ya SADC. [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, mifano ya Kenya na Zimbabwe inatosha kuwaonyesha kwamba wanajidanganya wale wote wanaodhani kwamba kuwa chama tawala chenye Wabunge wengi na mabavu ya kijeshi inatosha kubaki madarakani hata kwa hila na uchakachujaji. [5] Saa ya mabadiliko inapogonga, hakuna mabavu ya kijeshi wala Usalama wa Taifa wala mapesa mengi wala ukatili wa aina yoyote unaoweza kuzuia wimbi la mabadiliko hayo! [6] Bunge lako Tukufu litafanya vema kujifunza kutokana na historia ya wenzetu. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Under the agreement, the Parliament of Zimbabwe formed a parliamentary constitutional committee which had equal number of members from each of the main political parties in the country. [2] The parliamentary committee, which had three co-chairpersons, three co-vice chairpersons, and nine members from each party, is the one that prepared the proposed new constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe which was voted for in the referendum and approved by the people of Zimbabwe in February this year. [3] Some members of your esteemed parliament participated in the referendum as part of the delegation of observers from the association of SADC parliaments. [4] Honourable Speaker, examples from Kenya and Zimbabwe are enough to show you that all those who think that to have a ruling party that has the majority and the military force is enough to remain in power even through deception and manipulation are lying to themselves. [5] When the time for change rings on, there is no military force, or national security intelligence or huge amounts of money or brutality of any kind that can stop the movement for change! [6] You esteemed parliament should learn from the history of our colleagues.

In *Extract 4.5*, Mr Lissu suggests, rather implicitly, that (3) *the constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail*. This unexpressed descriptive standpoint is defended by complex argumentation (see **Table 4.9**). At the first level of defence, this complex argumentation appears in coordinative argumentation. Mr Lissu implicitly suggests that ((3.)1a) *the constitutional review processes which are controlled by the ruling parties usually fail*. This argument is also expressed implicitly, and it demonstrates experience-based authority argumentation. Mr Lissu seems to appeal to his legal experience as both a professional lawyer and a politician. This authority argumentation is combined with argumentation from example, which can be reconstructed as (3.)1b *Examples from Kenya and Zimbabwe are enough to teach a lesson to Tanzania*, as indicated in (c) [6] and suggested in (c) [4]. In the unexpressed premise, Mr Lissu implies that these examples are such a proof that the constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail. Argument (3.)1b is defended by four points of argumentation which realise multiple argumentation. The first line of defence realises coordinative argumentation, where Mr Lissu provides a specific example from Kenya. In (a) [2], Mr Lissu argues that (3.)1b.1a *the Kenya's proposed constitution was rejected by Kenyans*, which is complemented by the argument that (3.)1b.1b *Kenya held the 2007 elections using the old constitution of 1969*, as indicated in (a) [3]. In support of (3.)1b.1a, in (a) [2], Mr Lissu argues that the Kenya's constitutional review process was hijacked by the KANU government under President Daniel Arap Moi and later by the NARC government under President Mwai Kibaki (causal argumentation), and maintains that this statement was made by Dr Patrice L. O. Lumumba⁸, who was secretary of the Kenya's constitutional review commission (authority argumentation by quotation). In support of (3.)1b.1b, Mr Lissu advances argumentation from narrative. In (a) [4], he argues that the 2007 election results put Kenya into a worse political violence which caused thousands of deaths. In (a) [5], he maintains that, as the result of the violence, the President of Kenya and his deputy faced charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In the second argument for (3.)1b, Mr Lissu offers another specific example from the Zimbabwe's constitutional review failure. He argues that the constitutional review process in Zimbabwe was controlled by the ruling party ZANU-PF from the get-go to the end and that, as a consequence of the ZANU-PF's control of the process (causal argumentation), the Zimbabwe's proposed constitution was rejected by Zimbabweans in a referendum that was

⁸ The then 'Dr' Patrice L. O. Lumumba is now 'Prof.' Patrice L. O. Lumumba.

held in 2000, as shown in (b) [2-3]. In the next levels of defence, this causal argumentation is defended by argumentation from narrative, where Mr Lissu further narrates the ‘story’ of the constitutional review failure in Zimbabwe. In (a) [4], Mr Lissu maintains that, as a result of the rejection of the proposed constitution, Zimbabwe experienced a worse socio-political violence which caused worse human rights violations. This argument is further defended by other three arguments in coordinative argumentation (see **Table 4.9**). The first argument suggests that Zimbabwe was isolated by the international community by being removed from the Commonwealth. This is complemented by two other arguments. Mr Lissu argues that economic and diplomatic sanctions were imposed on the country and that it was forced to have the Global Political Agreement with the opposition parties and other social groups. Regarding this agreement, in (c) [1], Mr Lissu further argues that the Zimbabwean parliament formed a parliamentary constitutional committee with equal number of representatives from the main political parties in the country. In (c) [2], he maintains that this committee consisted of three co-chairpersons, three co-vice chairpersons, and nine members from each of the main political parties. This committee prepared the proposed constitution which was approved by Zimbabweans in the referendum which was held in February 2014. To prove that his narrative is a true story, in (c) [3], Mr Lissu argues that some MPs from the Tanzanian parliament participated in the referendum as part of observers from the association of SADC parliaments.

In the third argument for (3.)1b, Mr Lissu suggests that the constitutional review processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe took more than 10 years because the process was controlled by the ruling parties (causal argumentation), as indicated in (a) [1] and (b) [1]. The last argument in support of (3.)1b is indicated in (c) [4-5]. Mr Lissu argues that having military powers and many MPs is not enough for the ruling party to stay in power even through deception and manipulation. He further maintains that, when the time for change rings on, no military powers, national intelligence agency, much money or any form of brutality can stop the movement for change. The opposition’s third standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented in **Table 4.9** below.

Table 4.9 The opposition’s third standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
(3)	(The constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail)
((3.)1a)	(The constitutional review processes which are controlled by the ruling parties usually fail)
(3.)1b	Examples from Kenya and Zimbabwe are enough to teach this lesson to Tanzania

(3.1b')	(These examples prove that the constitutional review processes controlled by the ruling parties usually fail)
(3.)1b.1a	The Kenya's proposed new constitution was rejected by Kenyans
(3.)1b.1a.1a	The constitutional review process was hijacked by the KANU govt under Moi and later by the NARC govt under Kibaki
(3.1b.1a.1a')	(This is the cause of the rejection)
(3.)1b.1a.1b	This statement was made by Dr Lumumba who was the secretary of the Kenya's constitutional review commission
(3.)1b.1b	Kenya held the 2007 elections using the old constitution of 1969
(3.)1b.1b.1	The 2007 election results put Kenya into a worse political violence which caused thousands of deaths
(3.)1b.1b.1.1	The President of Kenya and his deputy were charged with crimes against humanity at the ICC
(3.)1b.2	The Zimbabwe's constitutional review process was controlled by the ruling party from the get-go to the end
(3.)1b.2.1	The proposed constitution was rejected by Zimbabweans in the referendum
(3.1b.2.1')	(It was rejected because it was controlled by ZANU-PF)
(3.)1b.2.1.1	This put Zimbabwe into a worse socio-political violence which led to the worse human rights violations)
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1a	Zimbabwe was isolated by the international community
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1a.1	It was removed from the Commonwealth
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1b	Economic and diplomatic sanctions were imposed on the country
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1c	It was forced to have the Global Political Agreement with the main opposition parties
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1c.1a	The Zimbabwean parliament formed a parliamentary constitutional committee with equal number of representatives from the main political parties
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1c.1a.1	The committee prepared the proposed new constitution which was approved by Zimbabweans in the referendum that was held in February this year
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1c.1a.1.1	Some Tanzanian MPs participated in the referendum a part of the delegation of observers from the association of SADC parliaments
(3.)1b.2.1.1.1c.1b	The committee consisted of three co-chairpersons, three co-vice chairpersons, and nine members from each of the parties involved
(3.)1b.3	The constitutional review process in Kenya and Zimbabwe took many years
(3.1b.3')	(The cause of the delay was the ruling parties' control of the process)
(3)1b.3.1a	In Kenya, the process to write a new constitution took more than 11 years
(3.)1b.3.1b	In Zimbabwe, it took more than 16 years
(3.)1b.4	Having military powers and many MPs in not enough for the ruling party to remain in power even through deception and manipulation
(3.)1b.4.1	When the time for change rings on, no military powers, intelligence agency, much money or any form of brutality can stop the movement for change

In regard to the speech acts performed in the opposition's third standpoint and its related argumentation, Mr Lissu mainly performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing various (sub)types of argumentation in defence of the standpoint (argumentation from example, experience-based authority argumentation, causal argumentation, and argumentation from narrative).

4.2.2.6 Summary of the opposition’s third standpoint and related argumentation

Based on *Extract 4.5* and the analysis in section 4.3.2.5, the opposition’s third standpoint (and its related argumentation) is summarised in a schematic overview, as shown in Figure 4.5.




Figure 4.5 Summary of the opposition's third standpoint and related argumentation

With regard to the (sub)types of argumentation advanced, the opposition's descriptive standpoint is justified by experience-based authority argumentation which is coordinatively combined with argumentation from example at the first level of defence. At the second level of defence, argumentation from example is defended by argumentation from example and causal argumentation. Argumentation from example at the second level is defended by argumentation from narrative in the next levels of defence.

4.2.3 MPs' related contributions in the confrontation stage

Other members of the opposition also put the minister's standpoints into question in their contributions to the debate. *Extract 4.6* presents a few contributions that form part of the confrontation stage.

Extract 4.6

- (a) MHE. KOMBO KHAMIS KOMBO: [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Mwenyekiti wa Tume ya Kuratibu Maoni ya Wananchi amekuwa akitoa maelezo kupitia vyombo vya habari kwamba suala la mabadiliko ya Katibu ni jambo ambalo halitochukuliwa vile wanavyotaka watoaji wa maoni hayo. [2] Kauli hiyo ya Mwenyekiti haiashirii kuwepo kwa uadilifu na uaminifu juu ya uratibu huo wa maoni ya wananchi juu ya mabadiliko ya Katiba. [3] Wananchi walio wengi wanaona kwamba suala la utoaji wa maoni ni kama kiini macho tu, lakini Katiba iliyokusudiwa imeshatayarishwa zamani [...] [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, maelezo yaliyotolewa ni Waziri wa Katiba na Sheria yanakinzana kabisa na maelezo yanayotolewa na Mwenyekiti anayesimamia uratibu wa maoni ya wananchi juu ya mabadiliko ya Katiba. [5] Ni vyema basi Mheshimiwa Jaji Warioba akajikita katika maoni ya wananchi na siyo yale tu anayoona yeye kwamba yanafaa badala ya kuwasilisha maoni ya wananchi, jambo ambalo linaweza kuleta ufa mkubwa na vurugu zisizokwisha, ambapo baada ya kusonga mbele likaweza kuturejesha nyuma. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. KOMBO KHAMIS KOMBO: [1] Honourable Speaker, chairperson of the Commission coordinating public opinions has been reporting through the media that the constitutional review process is something that will not be coordinated the way people who give opinions want [it to be coordinated]. [2] The chairperson's statement implies lack of integrity and trust in the coordination of the public opinions on the constitutional review. [3] Many people feel that the collection of public opinions on constitutional review is just like a magic trick, as the intended constitution has already been prepared a long time ago [...]. [4] Honourable Speaker, the statement made by the Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs contradicts the statement provided by the chairperson coordinating the public opinions on the constitutional review. [5] Honourable Justice Warioba should consider the opinions of the people and not just what he considers to be appropriate, which can be a source of a serious problem and endless confusion, which may push [us] back instead of moving forward.

- (b) MHE. HALIMA J. MDEE: [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kuhusu mchakato wa Katiba, nitazungumzia mambo mawili:- [2] Kwanza, idadi ya wananchi waliochangia/toa maoni ya Katiba; wakati tukiwa katika mchakato muhimu wa Katiba kumekuwa na sintofahamu nyingi juu ya ushiriki wa wananchi. [3] Naomba Serikali iliambie Bunge hili Tukufu, mpaka sasa tukiwa tunaelekea katika mchakato wa Baraza, ambapo Tume itatoa Rasimu kwanza ya Katiba ili Mabaraza yajadili kama ilivyoelekezwa na kifungu 18 (2). [4] Pili, kuhusu Bunge la Katiba; kwa mujibu ya Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, sura 83, Toleo la mwaka 2012, kifungu namba

29 (1) gharama za Bunge maalum la Katiba zitalipwa kutokea Mfuko Mkuu wa hazina ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, taarifa ambazo zimewasilishwa mbele ya Bunge lako Tukufu, kupitia Kamati ya Katiba, Sheria na Utawala, ambayo ndio ina jukumu la kupitisha Bajeti ya Wizara ya Katiba na Sheria, ambayo pia fungu la Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba iko ndani yake, hazioneshi fedha hizo ziko wapi [6] na ni kiasi gani ambacho kimetengwa kwa mwaka huu wa fedha. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. HALIMA J. MDEE: Honourable Speaker, concerning the constitution-making process, I have two things to talk about. [2] The first thing is about the number of citizens who participated in the collection of public opinions on the new constitution; while we were in the crucial process of making a new constitution, there has been little understanding about the participation of the people. [3] I urge the government to tell this august/esteemed parliament, so far as we are heading to the conduct of fora, where the Commission will issue the draft constitution to the fora for discussion as contemplated in section 18 (2), [how many people have provided opinions]. [4] Second, regarding the Constituent Assembly, in accordance with section 29(1) of the Constitutional Review Act, Chapter 83, [revised] edition of 2012, the expenses incurred by the Constituent Assembly shall be charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Republic of Tanzania. [5] Honourable Speaker, the report presented to the esteemed parliament, through the [parliamentary] committee on constitution, legal affairs and administration, which has the responsibility of authorising the budget of the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs, in which the budget section of the Constitutional Review Commission is, does not indicate the expenses; [6] nor does it show how much has been allocated for [the Constituent Assembly] in this fiscal year.

- (c) MHE. MARYAM SALUM MSABAHA: [...] [1] Katiba ni suala la Watanzania wote, Katiba sio suala la Vyama vya Siasa [...]. [2] Suala la upatikanaji wa Katiba mpya bado halijakaa sawa. [3] Kuna malalamiko kwa makundi yaliyo pembezoni kwa mfano, walemavu, wanawake na hata Watanzania wasiojua kusoma na kuandika bado hawajaelimishwa kuhusu Katiba mpya. [4] Ni kwa nini Serikali isiongeze muda wa kutosha ili tupate Katiba iliyokuwa bora na ambayo imewashirikisha Watanzania wote? (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. MARYAM SALUM MSABAHA: [...] [1] The constitution is the concern of all Tanzanians; the constitution is not a matter of political parties [only]. [2] The new constitution-making process has not yet been okay. [3] There are complaints from marginalised groups such as people with disabilities, women, and even illiterate Tanzanians; they have not yet been educated adequately about the new constitution. [4] Why doesn't the government take enough time to get a better constitution that will involve all Tanzanians?

In this extract, other members of the opposition join Mr Lissu to challenge the minister's standpoints. In regard to the minister's first standpoint, in subextract (b), Ms Mdee raises a critical doubt as to whether the Commission's proposed budget should be approved. In (b) [4-5], she argues that the ministry has not allocated money for the conduct of Constituent Assembly (CA) in the Commission's proposed budget. This is further defended by authority argumentation. She maintains that, in accordance with section 29(1) of the Act, the expenses incurred by the CA shall be charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund of the URT. Ms Mdee's argument can be considered a critical doubt to the minister's pragmatic argumentation for his first standpoint. However, the cited provision of the Act does not necessarily suggest that the budget for the conduct of CA shall be included in the Commission's proposed budget.

With regard to the minister's second standpoint, the MPs' critical reactions seem to suggest that the process is not coordinated effectively. For instance, in (a) [1-2], Mr Kombo argues that there is a lack of integrity and trust in the collection of public opinions on the constitutional review. This is defended by authority argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation. First, he argues that the Commission's chairperson has said that the process will not be coordinated the way people who provide opinions want it to be coordinated, which is in (a) [5] defended by the argument that the Commission's chairperson should consider public opinions. Second, Mr Kombo accuses the minister and the Commission's chairperson of inconsistency, arguing in (a) [4] that the minister's statement contradicts the statement issued by chairperson of the Commission. The statement that he seems to refer to is the minister's statement that all public opinions will be considered. In (a) [3], Mr Kombo appeals to majority argumentation by arguing that many people feel that the collection of public opinions is just like a 'magic trick', since, as he claims, the proposed constitution has already been prepared.

In (b) [2], Ms Mdee argues that there has been a lot of confusion over the participation of people in the process, including the number of people who have given opinions on the new constitution. In (b) [3], she asks the government to inform the parliament of the number of people who have given opinions. Starting from the premise that the constitutional review process is a concern of all Tanzanians, as indicated in (c) [1], Ms Msabaha argues in (c) [2] that the constitution-making process has not yet been okay because there are complaints from marginalised groups, maintaining that these groups have not been well educated about the new constitution. In (c) [4], she ends her argument with a rhetorical question: why doesn't the government take enough time to get a better constitution that accommodate the opinions of all Tanzanians? This rhetorical question is strategically used to suggest that the government has not taken enough time to provide civic education on the constitutional review to (and collect public opinions from) as many people as possible, which challenges the minister's argument that civic education was effectively provided. As in the opposition's standpoints and related argumentation, these members of the opposition perform the commissive by implicitly not accepting the minister's standpoints, the assertive by advancing counterarguments against the minister's standpoints, and the directive by requesting usage declaratives/argumentation from the minister.

4.3 The opening stage

The opening stage of the critical discussion in this debate is generally realised rather implicitly. Starting with the starting points, most of the procedural (and material) starting points for the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament are institutionally imposed on the parties by the parliamentary Standing Orders, as discussed in chapter three (see section 3.8.2). However, another starting point that seems to be implicitly agreed upon at the beginning of this debate is the soundness criterion for authority argumentation on the basis of the Constitutional Review Act as the main legal authority since, through the Commission, the government or the ministry was required to coordinate the constitutional review process in accordance with the Act. Thus, to establish whether the authority argumentation (an appeal to the Act as the legal authority) advanced in defence of or against a standpoint is reasonable, the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Act should be the ‘ultimate judge’.

As regards the discussion roles in the critical discussion in this debate, the Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs, Mr Mathias Chikawe, acts as the main protagonist of the minister’s standpoints and the main antagonist to the opposition’s standpoints. The deputy minister, Attorney General, and other members of the ruling party also perform the role of protagonist of the minister’s standpoints and the role of antagonist to the opposition’s standpoints but Mr Chikawe remains the main protagonist and antagonist. In contrast, the opposition’s shadow minister or spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu, acts as the main antagonist to the minister’s standpoints and the main protagonist of the opposition’s standpoints. Other members of the opposition also play these roles, but Mr Lissu remains the main antagonist to the minister’s standpoints and the main protagonist of the opposition’s standpoints.

On the basis of the data presented from *Extract 4.1* to *Extract 4.6*, in the opening stage, Mr Lissu and other members of the opposition perform the commissive by challenging Mr Chikawe (and other members of the government) to defend the minister’s standpoints. The minister is required by the institutional rules and the institutional point to accept the challenge to defend his standpoints as he attempts to convince the parliament to approve the request for funds for his ministry. Both members of the opposition and the minister perform the commissive by implicitly agreeing on the starting points (the Standing Orders) and the discussion roles automatically assigned to them. Members of the opposition also perform the declarative by requesting various usage declaratives (or argumentation) from the minister, as already suggested in the previous stage.

4.4 The argumentation stage

The argumentation stage of the critical discussion in this debate begins with the MPs' related contributions, as analysed in section 4.4.1. This is followed by the minister's responses to the raised issues or queries by members of the opposition, as discussed in section 4.4.2. In section 4.4.3, the argumentation stage moves on to the expenditure committee, where further argumentation is advanced.

4.4.1 MPs' related contributions in the argumentation stage

In this section, some members of the ruling party, who assume the role of protagonist of the minister's standpoints together with the minister, advance argumentation to support the minister's standpoints, while criticising the opposition's standpoints. In *Extract 4.7*, Mr Jasson Rweikiza challenges the opposition's standpoints as he attempts to defend the minister's argumentation for his standpoints.

Extract 4.7

- (a) MHE. JASSON S. RWEIKIZA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, nimemsikia Msemaji wa Kambi Rasmi ya CHADEMA, [2] yeye anasema Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani, [3] mimi nasema siyo ya Upinzani ni ya CHADEMA. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, anazungumzia Mabaraza ya Katiba, Tume, [5] ninamshangaa sana ni kwa nini anapenda kupotosha. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, anapenda kupotosha umma kwa sababu wao walisema wakiingia madarakani siku 100 na Katiba Mpya, [7] wangeipata wapi? [8] Siku mpya wangeipata wapi Katiba? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. JASSON S. RWEIKIZA: [...] [1] Honourable Speaker, I heard the spokesperson of the official CHADEMA camp. [2] He calls it the official opposition camp, [3] [but] I say it is not an opposition [camp]; it is a CHADEMA [camp]. (Applause) [4] Honourable Speaker, he talks about the [district] constitutional fora, the Commission. [5] I am very surprised by him; why does he like to mislead [the public]? (Applause) [6] Honourable Speaker, he likes misleading the public because they [also] said, if they get into power, they will have the new constitution [completed] within the first 100 days. [7] Where would they get it from? [8] Where would they get the constitution from? (Applause)

- (b) [1] Tumeanzisha mchakato wa kutafuta Katiba Mpya [...]. [2] Siyo jambo dogo hili. [3] Tumepiga hatua kubwa sana kwenye mchakato huu. [4] Wananchi wote wametoa maoni yao, wote waliotaka kutoa maoni yao wametoa maoni yao. [5] Wamehudhuria vikao vile vilivyoandaliwa kwa uhuru na uwazi, wametoa maoni yao. [6] Tume imeundwa na inafanya kazi yake vizuri. [7] Wanategemea Tume waende kwa miguu nchi nzima? Wajumbe thelathini na wangapi sijui, wazunguke nchi nzima kwa miguu? [8] Ni lazima watumie magari, walale hotelini, wafanye kazi yao, [9] anatoa takwimu za uongo, sijui posho shilingi ngapi, za kubuni, si za kweli. (Makofi) [10] Mheshimiwa Spika, nataka tu kusema kwamba mchakato huu ni mkubwa, Mabaraza yameundwa, vilevile yamehusisha wananchi wote, kuanzia kwenye vijiji na mitaa, wananchi wote wamepiga kura kwa haki na uwazi kuchangua wajumbe wa Mabaraza haya. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] We have instigated the process of making a new constitution [...]. [2] It is not a small matter! [3] We have made a huge progress in this process. [4] All citizens have provided their opinions; all those who wanted to provide opinions have done so. [5] They have attended the meetings that were convened freely and transparently; they have given their opinions. [6] The Commission has been formed and is doing a great job. [7] Do they expect the Commission to

go all over the country on foot? Thirty-something members to go all over the country on foot! [8] They have got to use vehicles, sleep in hotels, [and] do their job. [9] He is providing false statistics, allowance is TZS so and so; it is guessing, it is not true. (Applause) [1] Honourable Speaker, I want to say that this process is paramount, the [constitutional] fora have been formed, and they have involved all the citizens from the villages and Mitaa; all the citizens voted fairly and transparently to elect members of [the district constitutional] fora.

- (c) [1] Hakuna upendeleo wala kufichaficha, kila mwananchi amehusika kwenye Mabaraza haya, [2] yatakaa yajadili Rasimu ya Katiba, tutakwenda hadi Bunge Maalum la Katiba, amelisema, [3] tutakwenda hadi kwenye kura ya maoni, kuna tatizo gani? [4] Wenyewe walitaka watoe Katiba ya kuweka tu Wabunge wao, Tundu Lissu Mwanasheria atunge Katiba aseme ndiyo Katiba ya nchi! [5] Katiba inatungwa na watu kwa ajili ya watu, lazima watu washiriki kuanzia mwanzo mpaka mwisho. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa hiyo, namshangaa sana anapolalamika kwamba sijui gharama gani, sasa alitegemea ifanyike namna gani, bila gharama? [7] Lazima mchakato huu uwe na gharama kubwa na gharama hizi tunatoa wananchi wenyewe katika kodi, ndivyo ilivyotegemewa na ndiyo ilivyo. [8] Kwa hiyo, si vizuri kusimama pale na kupotosha wananchi kwamba, mchakato huu umetekwa na CCM, ooh mchakato huu umekuwa sijui namna gani, siyo kweli. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] There is no favouritism or secrecy; every citizen is involved in these fora. [2] They will sit and discuss the draft constitution, [and] we shall move on to the Constituent Assembly, he said it, [3] we shall go to the referendum; what is the problem? [4] They wanted to make a constitution by involving only their MPs; Tundu Lissu the lawyer drafts the constitution and calls it the people's constitution! [5] The constitution is enacted by the people for the people; it is a must for people to participate from the get-go to the end. (Applause) [6] Honourable Speaker, therefore I am very much surprised by him when he complains about the costs; so how did he expect it to be done with no costs? [7] This process must have huge costs, and these costs are provided for by us, the citizens, from our taxes; it is how it was expected, and it is how it is. [8] Therefore, it is not okay to stand there and mislead the citizens that this process has been hijacked by CCM, or this process has become this and that..., it is not true. (Applause)

In *Extract 4.7*, Mr Rweikiza's (sub)standpoint can be reconstructed as *I Mr Lissu's statement that the process has been hijacked by CCM is misleading*, as indicated in (c) [8]. This descriptive standpoint is defended by four arguments at the first level of defence. First, in (a) [4-5], Mr Rweikiza argues that *1.1 Tundu Lissu is misleading the public about the constitutional fora and the Commission*. In favour of *1.1*, in (a) [6], Mr Rweikiza argues that *1.1.1 Mr Lissu likes to mislead the public*, because, as he maintains in (a) [6-8], 'they' (Chadema) also said that they would have the new constitution completed within the first 100 days (if elected), which he thinks is not possible. This argumentative move may constitute a fallacy of straw man as Mr Rweikiza attributes a fictitious statement to Mr Lissu by referring to the political party (Chadema) to which Mr Lissu belongs. He thus violates the standpoint rule by expressing his 'own standpoint' as the opposite standpoint. The opposite standpoint was not expressed by Mr Lissu in this critical discussion. Another point of argumentation in support of argument *1.1.1* is presented in (b) [9], where he states that Mr Lissu is providing false statistics about the expenses of the Commission. In the second argument for his (sub)standpoint, as reconstructed from (b) [1-3], he maintains that *1.2 we have made a huge*

progress in the constitutional review process. By *tu* (we) in *tumepiga hatua kubwa sana* ('we' have made a huge progress), Mr Rweikiza refers to the ruling party and its government. To further support argument 1.2, he states that the Commission has done a great job in coordinating the process because all citizens who wanted to provide opinions have done so and the formation of the district constitutional fora (DCF) was done freely and transparently, as the formation did not involve any favouritism or secrecy and all citizens were involved in the election of DCF members at the village/Mtaa level. This is indicated in (b) [4-6], [10], and (c) [1-3]. In the third argument, as reconstructed from (c) [7], he argues that 1.3a *the constitutional review process must involve huge costs*, which is in line with rhetorical question 1.3b *how can the process be coordinated without involving costs?* This is indicated in (c) [6]. However, this argument constitutes a violation of the unexpressed premise rule as claiming that the minister is requesting too much money for the Commission does not necessarily imply that the process should be coordinated without involving any costs. As proof of 1.3a, in (b) [8], Mr Rweikiza argues that, in order to do their job, members of the Commission must have vehicles and sleep in hotels. In (b) [7], this is further defended by the rhetorical question: *do they expect members the Commission to go to all places in the country on foot?* This argumentative move also violates the unexpressed premise rule. No argument by Mr Lissu could be interpreted as suggesting that members of the Commission should go to places on foot. In his last argument, as indicated in (c) [4], he argues that 1.4a *they wanted the process to involve only their MPs*, which is complemented by the argument that 1.4b *Tundu Lissu wanted to draft the constitution and call it the national constitution*. The expressed premises for 1.4a and 1.4b imply that people's constitution cannot be written by a certain group of politicians or a single politician. In (c) [5], he further maintains that (ordinary) people must be involved in the constitutional review process because the constitution is written by people for people. However, no unexpressed premise from Mr Lissu's arguments can be reasonably reconstructed within the pragmatic optimum as suggesting that the constitutional review process should involve only members of the opposition or Mr Lissu alone. Thus, Mr Rweikiza's argumentative move in his last argument could constitute a violation of the unexpressed premise rule. Generally, Mr Rweikiza's (sub)standpoint (and its supporting argumentation) is summarised in **Table 4.10** below.

Table 4.10 Mr Rweikiza's (sub)standpoint and related argumentation

1.	Mr Lissu's statement that the process has been hijacked by CCM is misleading
1.1.	Mr Lissu is misleading the public about the constitutional fora and the Commission
1.1.1.	Tundu Lissu likes to mislead the public
(1.1.1')	(Misleading the public is typical of him)

1.1.1.1.	His party also said they would have the new constitution within the first 100 days
1.1.1.1.1.	Where would they get the new constitution from within 100 days?
(1.1.1.1.1.1')	(It is impossible to complete the constitution review process within 100 days)
1.1.1.2	He provides false statistics about the expenses of the Commission
1.2	We have made a huge progress in the constitutional review process
1.2.1	The Commission has done a great job in coordinating the process
1.2.1.1	All citizens who wanted to give their opinions have done so
1.2.1.2	The formation of the constitutional fora was done fairly and transparently
1.2.1.2.1	All citizens were involved in the election of members of fora
1.2.1.2.2	The formation did not involve favouritism or secrecy
1.3a	The constitutional review process must involve huge costs
1.3a.1	In order to do their job, they need to have vehicles and sleep in hotels
1.3a.1.1	Do they expect the commissioners to go to all the places in the country on foot?
1.3b	How can the process be coordinated without costs?
	(It is impossible to coordinate the process without incurring costs)
1.4a	They wanted the process to involve only their MPs
(1.4a')	(The national constitution cannot be written by only a certain group of politicians)
1.4a.1	The new constitution process must involve [ordinary] people from the beginning to the end
1.4a.1.1	The constitution is written by people for people
1.4b	Mr Lissu wanted to draft a constitution and call it the national constitution
(1.4b')	(The constitution cannot be written by a single politician)

Mr Rweikiza's first argument for his standpoint realises a personal attack. Mr Rweikiza is accusing Mr Lissu of misleading the public and proving false statistics. However, at least one of his subarguments (*1.1.1.1*) is challenged by Ms Sabreena Sungura in *Extract 4.8* below.

Extract 4.8

MHE. SABREENA H. SUNGURA: [...] [1] Kwanza kabisa, napenda kuweka kumbukumbu sawa kwamba, mchangiaji wa kwanza amepotosha umma kwa kusema Chama cha CHADEMA kilisema kitakamilisha mchakato wa Katiba ndani ya siku 100. [2] Sivyoy, Ilani ya CHADEMA ilisema itanza mchakato wa marekebisho ya Katiba ndani ya siku 100. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. SABREENA H. SUNGURA: [...] [1] *First of all, I would like to put the records right; the first contributor has misled the public by saying that Chadema said it would complete the constitutional review process within [the first] 100 days. [2] That is not true; Chadema's manifesto stipulates that [Chadema] will start the constitutional review process within [the first] 100 days.*

In the extract above, Ms Sungura accuses Mr Rweikiza's of misquotation and manipulating the propositional content of Chadema's statement about how they would coordinate the constitutional review process if elected. She refutes Mr Rweikiza's statement that Chadema said they would complete the constitutional review process within the first 100 days since taking office. According the Chadema's election manifesto, she maintains, the party would *start* (not *complete*) the process within the first 100 days since taking office. This counterargument demonstrates authority argumentation. In fact, the Chadema's election manifesto stipulates that, as one of the measures which would be taken to strengthen good

governance and rule of law, “[...] Chadema within 90 days since being elected will immediately instigate the constitutional review process [...]” (Chadema, 2010, p. 50). Thus, Mr Rweikiza’s quotation is indeed a misquotation of Chadema’s statement about the new constitution in their election manifesto.

Another defence of the minister’s standpoint in the argumentation stage is reconstructed from Ms Pindi Chana’s contribution to the debate as presented in *Extract 4.9* below.

Extract 4.9

- (a) MHE. PINDI H. CHANA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, mimi nitajikita kwenye Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba. [2] Wakati sheria hii inapitishwa mimi nilikuwa ni Mwenyekiti na ninashukuru Mungu bado ni Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, napenda kuielezea. [3] Kwanza nianze na Bajeti ya Tume, Tume tumepitisha bajeti shilingi bilioni takribani 33. [4] Hela hizi kwa Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba ni ndogo na nitatoa sababu. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, walikuja mara ya kwanza, hii ni bajeti ya pili, walitomba shilingi bilioni 40 na kulikuwa na kazi nyingi za kufanya. [6] Kwenye Kamati tukasema baadhi ya kazi zipunguzwe, tukaenda shilingi bilioni 33 na sasa hivi wamepewa ceiling ya kipindi kilichopita shilingi bilioni 33. [7] Sasa wakati wa kujadili tulisema hawa wajumbe wa Tume walipwe posho au mishahara? [8] Tukachukua mifano ya nchi ambazo zimebadilisha Katiba mfano wa Ghana na Kenya. [9] Kenya walikuwa wanalipwa dollar na Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba ya Kenya walikuwa wanaruhusa donors kutia pesa kwenye Tume, [10] kwa hiyo, walikuwa na pesa za kutosha. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. PINDI H. CHANA: [...] [1] Honourable Speaker, I will focus on the Constitutional Review Act. [2] When this Act was enacted, I was the chairperson [of the parliamentary committee on constitution, legal Affairs, and administration] and I thank God that I am still the chairperson; so, I would like to explain it. [3] First, let me start with the Commission’s budget; we have allocated to the Commission a budget of almost TZS 33 billion. [4] This amount for the Commission for the constitutional review process is little and I will explain why. (Applause) [5] Honourable Speaker, [when] they came the first time, this is the second budget, they asked for [TZS] 40 billion, and there were a lot of activities to be done. [6] In the committee, we said some of the activities should be reduced, we went for [TZS] 33 billion and now they have been given a ceiling of the previous time; [TZS] 33 billion. [7] During the discussions we asked ourselves whether members of the Commission should be given allowance or paid salaries! [8] We took examples of the countries which have reformed their constitution, for example, Ghana and Kenya. [9] In Kenya, they were paid dollars and the Kenya’s constitutional review commission allowed donors to provide funds to the commission. [10] Therefore, they had enough money.

- (b) [1] Kwa hiyo, sisi tukasema hii ni call kwa ajili ya nchi, tunaomba mfanyeni kwa viwango na malipo wanayolipwa yamepitishwa na Standing Orders kwa utaratibu maalum. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, hatujaanza leo kuwa na hizi Tume, tumewahi kuwa na Tume ya Kucusanya Maoni kutoka Chama Kimoja kwenda Vyama Vingi, tumewahi kuwa na Tume ya ku-fast track East Africa Community kwenda kwenye Political Federation, [3] hebu tuangalie Tume mbalimbali zimekuwa zinalipwa shilingi ngapi halafu tuangalie Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba inalipwa shilingi ngapi? [4] Pale ndipo tuta-justify kama wanalipwa fedha nyingi ama hawalipwi lakini utaona wanajitolewa kwa maslahi ya nchi. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa hiyo, naomba Watanzania wajue kwamba posho wanayolipwa Wajumbe wa Tume kwa kweli ni kwa kujitolea. [6] Kwa sababu taarifa hizi zipo wazi wala siyo za kificho angalieni Tume mbalimbali zimekuwa zikilipwa kiasi gani ukilinganisha na Tume mbalimbali ambazo zimeshakuwepo hapa nchini. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] So, we said this is a call for the country; we are asking that you work in standards and the payments that are made have been approved by the Standing Orders on a special procedure. (Applause) [2] Honourable Speaker, we didn't start today having these commissions; we once had the [Presidential] Commission on Single-Party or Multi-Party system [in Tanzania], we had a commission on fast-tracking the East African Community into a political federation. [3] Let us see how much [these] different commissions were paid and then see how much the Constitutional Review Commission is being paid. [4] That is how we can justify whether they are paid a lot of money or not, but you will see that they are just volunteering for the benefit of the nation. (Applause) [5] Honourable Speaker, therefore I am asking Tanzanians to understand that the allowance members of the Commission are paid, honestly, it is [just] volunteering. [6] Because this information is accessible and not confidential; you can compare the amount paid to the Commission with the amount paid to various commissions which have existed in the country. (Applause)

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, niendeleo kusema kwamba Tume imekuwa inachukua maoni katika baadhi ya maeneo, inapofika kwenye Wilaya inachukua Kata kadhaa. [2] Ni kweli tungetamani iende kwenye Kata zote. [3] Kutokana na bajeti tuliyowapa, kwa kweli ni vigumu kufika katika Kata zote. [4] Aidha, katika kufanya tafiti au kukusanya maoni tunafanya sampling, kuna purposeful sampling, snow ball sampling, random sampling na kuna wasomi wengi hapa, [5] sasa leo tunataka Watanzania milioni 45 wote wakatoa maoni, sijui hiyo ripoti itakuwaje? [6] Kwa hiyo, maudhui ya Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba kwa kweli yapo sawasawa na sheria hii ililetwa Bungeni na tulijadili Wabunge wote 357. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] Honourable Speaker, let me continue by saying that the Commission has been collecting public opinions in some of the areas; when it arrives at a district, it picks a few wards. [2] It is true that we would have loved to see the Commission go to every ward. [3] Because of the budget we have given them, honestly, it is difficult to reach every ward. [4] Also, in conducting research or collection of [public] opinions, we [usually] do sampling; there is purposeful sampling, snowball sampling, random sampling, and there are a lot of educated people here. [5] Now today we want all 45 million Tanzanians to provide their opinions; I don't know how that report will look like. [6] Therefore, the themes of the Constitutional Review Commission are okay, and the Act was presented to the parliament [and] all 357 MPs discussed it. (Applause)
- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, suala la elimu, sisi Wabunge tukipitisha sheria hapa lazima tukawaelimishe watu wetu, tukawape feedback iwe bajeti, iwe sheria, ni jukumu letu. [2] Tulipopitisha hii sheria tena tukasema isije under certificate of urgency, tukaambiwa twende tukawape elimu watu wetu Majimboni. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Spika, utaratibu huu wa kutoa elimu ilikuwa ni jukumu la Wabunge, Taasisi za Kidini, NGO's na wadau mbalimbali ikiwa ni pamoja na Vyama vya Siasa. [4] Leo hii Dkt. Asha-Rose Migiro akiwasiliana na wanachama wa CCM au Nape anaambiwa kwa nini umewasiliana na wanachama wako, hiyo sijapata kuona. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, tumeruhusu Vyama visajiliwe, leo hii tuna vyama 18 vilivyosajiliwa, kila chama kina utaratibu wake. [6] Kwa hiyo, mimi ninasema big up Nape, big up Dkt. Asha-Rose Migiro muwasiliane na mkishindwa hiyo kazi, tutasema mtupishe wataingia wengine. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] Honourable Speaker, [concerning] the issue of [civic] education, we MPs when we enact acts/laws here, it is imperative for us to go and educate our people, to give them feedback, whether it is budget or act/law; it is our responsibility. [2] When we enacted this Act – and we said it should not come under the certificate of urgency – we were asked to go to the constituencies and provide [civic] education to our people. (Applause) [3] Honourable Speaker, the task of providing [civic] education was the responsibility of the MPs, religious institutions, NGOs, and several stakeholders including political parties. [4] Today, if Dr Asha-Rose Migiro communicates to CCM members or Nape, we are questioning why she is communicating to her members; I have never seen this [before]. (Applause) [5] Honourable Speaker, we allowed [political] parties to be registered, today we have 18 registered [political] parties; each party has its own procedure. [6] Therefore, I say 'big up' to Nape and Dr Asha-

Rose Migiro; communicate with each other, and if you fail to do so, we shall ask you to leave the offices for others.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, lipo suala wanalosema wadau kwamba Mabaraza yamechukuliwa wanaCCM. [2] Mimi sielewi, [3] Tanzania population ni milioni 45 [4] leo hii tukisema tufanye statistics wanaCCM ni wengi, haikwepeki na ndiyo maana humu Bungeni CCM ni wengi maana yake waliotupa ridhaa huko nje CCM ni wengi. [5] Sasa unashangaa nini kuona Mabaraza CCM ni wengi? (Makofi) [6] Leo kuna Vyama vinasajiliwa, tumeruhusu. [7] Sasa hivi kuna vyama 18 vilivyosajiliwa, Chama kitachokuwa kimesajiliwa leo, followers wake hawatafanana na Chama kilichosajiliwa miaka ya nyuma. (Makofi) [8] Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa hiyo, tuliposema wakachaguliwe wajumbe, wala hatukusema watokane na vyama, wanachaguliwa Watanzania wajumbe kwende kwenye Mabaraza na uchaguzi huo umefanyika wazi kabisa. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speakers, there is a concern raised by the stakeholders that the [district constitutional] fora are dominated by CCM members. [2] I don't understand. [3] The Tanzanian population has reached 45 million people. [4] If today we say we compile statistics, the CCM members are many; it is unavoidable, that is why in this parliament CCM MPs are many, which means that those who gave us permission out there are many. [5] So why are you surprised to see that many members of the [district constitutional] fora are CCM members? (Applause) [6] Today there are [political] parties which are registered; we have allowed that. [7] Now there are 18 [political] parties which are registered; the [number of] followers of a [political] party that has been registered today cannot be the same as [the number of followers of] the party which was registered some years back. (Applause) [8] Honourable Speaker, therefore, when we said members should be elected, we didn't say they should come from parties; they are elected as Tanzanians to go into the fora and the election was conducted fairly. (Applause)

In *Extract 4.9*, Ms Chana responds to various arguments advanced by Mr Lissu in the opposition's standpoints and related arguments. In (a) [1-2], she begins her argumentation with the reason why she talks about the Act. This argument realises authority argumentation as she states that, when the Act was being enacted, she was, and she still is, the chairperson of the parliamentary committee on constitution, legal affairs, and administration. Implicitly, this argumentative move suggests that, as the chairperson of the committee, she knows the Act better than Mr Tundu Lissu or some other members of the opposition, which may not necessarily be the case.

Generally, Ms Chana advances three counterarguments against the opposition's first standpoint as she attempts to defend the minister's first standpoint that the Commission's proposed budget should be approved. These arguments realise multiple argumentation. In (a) [3-4], she argues that, in fact, *(1.)1 the budget is too little*. This is a counterargument to Mr Lissu's claim that the ministry, or rather the government, is requesting 'too much money' to pay the Commission, which he thinks is a sign of corruption. Ms Chana's first argument is further defended by comparison argumentation (based on the principle of consistency), realising coordinative argumentation. In (a) [5-6], she states that, in the previous fiscal year, *(1.)1.1a the Commission requested TZS 40 billion*, but the money was reduced to TZS 33 billion, and this year *(1.)1.1b*

*the Commission has requested the same amount as the one approved last year. In the unexpressed premise, she seems to imply that, because the last year's budget was approved, and because this year's budget is the same as the last year's one, then the Commission's proposed budget for the current year should also be approved. The second argument for (1.)I exhibits argumentation from example. In (a) [7-10], she maintains that, before deciding whether to pay them allowance or salary, (1.)1.2 'we took examples from Kenya and Ghana', and observed that (1.)1.2.1 Kenya's constitutional review commission was paid enough money directly in terms of [US] dollars. In the unexpressed premise, she suggests that the Commission is paid less money than Kenya's constitutional review commission. In the second argument against the opposition's first standpoint, as indicated in (b) [1], she argues that (1.)2 the amount of money that the Commission receives has been approved by the parliamentary Standing Orders. This argument demonstrates argumentation from legal authority. In her last argument, as expressed in (b) [3-6], she argues that, with respect to the amount they receive, (1.)3a the members of the Commission are just volunteering, and that (1.)3b Tanzanians should know this. As proof of this argument, she states that the amount of money paid to the Commission can be compared to the amount of money paid to other commissions that have ever existed in the country, implicitly suggesting that the Commission is paid less money than other commissions. This is followed by argumentation from example, where she argues that these other commissions include the Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multi-Party System in Tanzania and the Commission on the Fast Tracking of the East African Federation, as indicated in (b) [2]. Ms Chana's argumentation against Mr Lissu's first standpoint or in defence of the minister's first standpoint is presented in **Table 4.11** below.*

Table 4.11 Ms Chana's argumentation against the opposition's first standpoint

(1)	(The Commission's proposed budget should be approved)
(1.1)	The budget is too little
(1.1')	(This is a sign that the proposed budget is not 'too much money' or corruption)
(1.)1.1a	Last year they requested TZS 40 billion
(1.)1.1a.1	The requested amount was reduced to TZS 33 billion before it was approved
(1.)1.1b	This year we have given them TZS 33 billion, the same amount approved last year
(1.)1.2	We took examples from Kenya and Ghana
(1.1.2)	(Examples from Kenya and Ghana is such a proof)
(1.)1.2.1	Kenya's commission was paid enough money directly in terms of [US] dollars
(1.1.2.1')	(The Tanzania's Commission is paid less than the Kenya's commission)
(1.)2	The amount of money the Commission receives has been approved by the Standing Orders
(1.)3a	Members of the Commission are simply volunteering
(1.)3a.1	The amount of money paid to the Commission can be compared to the amount of money paid to other commissions that have existed in the country
(1.3a.1')	(The Commission is paid less than the other commissions)

(1.)3a.1.1	These other commissions include the Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multi-Party System and the Commission on the Fast Tracking of the East African Federation
(1.)3b	Tanzanians should know this

Arguing against the opposition's second standpoint, she implicitly suggests that (2) *the constitutional review process has not been hijacked by CCM*. She advances three counterarguments as she attempts to defend this unexpressed standpoint. In (c) [6], she argues that (2.)1 *the Commission's methodology in the collection of public opinions was reasonable*. This is a counterargument to Mr Lissu's claim that the Commission's methodology was inappropriate and unreasonable, as indicated in Figure 4.4. She offers at least three reasons to support her position. In (c) [1-3] she states that (2.)1.1 *it was difficult for the Commission to collect public opinions from all wards*, because (2.)1.1.1 *they had a limited budget*. As a result, in the collection of public opinions, (2.)1.1.1.1 *the Commission was selecting a few wards in every district*. This line of defence realises causal argumentation; the limited budget has led to the Commission's selection of a few wards in the collection of public opinions. The second argument for (2.)1 is presented in (c) [4-5], where she maintains that in doing research (2.)1.2a *'we' do sampling*, (authority argumentation from expert opinion), (2.)1.2b *it can be purposeful sampling, snowball sampling, or random sampling* (argument from example), adding that (2.)1.2c *the parliament has many educated people*, suggesting that they should know this (authority argumentation from expert opinion). In support of (2.)1.2a, in (c) [5], she asks: (2.)1.2a.1 *how will the research report look like if all 45 million Tanzanians provide opinions?* With this rhetorical question, she implicitly suggests that it is impossible for all Tanzanians to participate in the collection of public opinions. This causal argumentation which is strategically presented in the form of a rhetorical question seems to be effective: the impossibility to include all Tanzanians in the collection of public opinions is the reason (*cause*) why they selected a sample. However, the opposition's spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu, did not explicitly claim that all Tanzanians should participate in the collection of public opinions. The last argument in support of (2.)1 is presented in (c) [6], where she further maintains that (2.)1.3 *the Act was presented to the parliament and discussed by all 357 MPs* (authority argumentation). It is implied in the unexpressed premise that it is the very Act that the parliament enacted that provides for the Commission's methodology in the collection of public opinions.

The second counterargument against the opposition's second standpoint is provided in subextract (d). In (d) [4], she suggests that (2.)2 *it is okay for Dr Migiro and Mr Nnauye to communicate with CCM members* (about the constitutional review process). This argument is

used to criticise Mr Lissu's authority argumentation that this communication is a breach of the Act. To support this argument, she adds in (d) [3] that, according to the Act, it was the responsibility of MPs, faith-based institutions/organizations, NGOs, and political parties to educate the public about the constitutional review process (authority argumentation). In (d) [1-2], she further maintains that MPs were also asked to provide civic education on the constitutional review process (authority argumentation) and this was done so that the Act is not presented in the parliament under the certificate of urgency (causal argumentation). In (d) [5], she argues that there are 18 political parties and every party has its way of communicating with the public, suggesting that other parties do the same in different ways (comparison argumentation). Lastly, in (d) [6], she argues that, if CCM leaders fail to communicate with one another, they will be replaced.

In the last counterargument, as expressed in (e) [1] and (e) [8], Ms Chana argues that *(2.)3 the appointment/election of DCF members is not based on political membership*. This argument is further defended by authority argumentation and causal argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation. In (2-4), she argues that, if we compile statistics, these statistics will confirm that *(2.)3.1a many Tanzanians are CCM followers/members* (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). This argument is coordinatively combined with causal argumentation with two arguments. In (e) [6-7], she argues that *(2.)3.1b other political parties do not have as many members as CCM has*, which is also combined with the argument that *(2.)3.1c it is not surprising for the DCF to have many CCM members*, as shown in (e) [5]. This argument is framed as a rhetorical question: *Why are you surprised to see many CCM members in the fora?* In the unexpressed premise, she seems to suggest that having many CCM members in the district constitutional fora (DCF) is a consequence of the fact that many Tanzanians are CCM members or followers (causal argumentation). This is against Mr Lissu's causal link. According to Mr Lissu, having many CCM members in the DCF is a consequence of the Commission's methodology for the conduct of DCF. Ms Chana further supports argument *(2.)3.1a* with argumentation from example. In (e) [4], she argues that even in the parliament many MPs are CCM members. Additionally, as a reason (cause) for *(2.)3.1b*, in (e) [7], she argues that the ruling party has existed for a long time (an old party); that is why it has many members compared to other parties (causal argumentation). Ms Pindi Chana's critical reaction to the opposition's second standpoint is summarised in **Table 4.12**. This argumentation is also considered to be further argumentation for the minister's second standpoint, as presented in Figure 4.2.

Table 4.12 Ms Chana’s argumentation against the opposition’s second standpoint

No.	Description
(2)	(The constitutional review process has not been hijacked by CCM)
(2)1	The Commission’s methodology in the collection of public opinions was okay
(2.)1.1	It was difficult for the Commission to collect public opinions in all wards in a district
(2.)1.1.1	It has a limited budget
(2.)1.1.1.1	As a result, they collected public opinions in a few wards in a district
(2.)1.2a	In conducting research, we do sampling
(2.)1.2a.1	How will the research report look like if all 45 million Tanzanians participated in providing opinions?
(2.1.2a.1’)	(It is impossible for all Tanzanians to participate in providing public opinions)
(2.)1.2b	It can be purposeful, snowball, or random sampling
(2.)1.2c	There are many educated people in the house [who know this]
(2.)1.3	The Act was presented in the parliament and discussed by all 357 MPs
(2.)1.3’)	It is the very Act we all discussed that provides for the Commission’s methodology in the collection of public opinions)
(2.)2	It is okay for Dr Migiro and Mr Nnauye to communicate with CCM members
(2.)2.1	It is the responsibility of MPs, faith-based institutions/organizations, NGOs, and political parties to provide civic education about the constitutional review process
(2.)2.1.1	MPs were also asked to educate the public about the process
(2.)2.1.1.1	This was done so that the Act is not presented in the parliament under the certificate of urgency
(2.)2.2	There are 18 political parties, and each has its way of communicating with the members
(2.2.2’)	(All political parties do the same thing in different ways)
(2.)2.3	If CCM leaders fail to communicate with one another, they will be replaced
(2.)3	The selection of DCF members is not based on political membership
(2.)3.1a	Many Tanzanians are CCM followers/members
(2.)3.1a.1	Even in the parliament, many MPs are CCM members
(2.)3.1b	Other parties don’t have as many followers/members as CCM has
(2.)3.1b.1	CCM is an old party
(2.)3.1c	It is not surprising for the DCF to have many CCM members
(2.3.1c’)	(Having many CCM members in the DCF is resulting from the fact that CCM has many followers and members than other political parties)

In *Extract 4.10*, Ms Anna Abdallah criticises Mr Lissu’s use of what could be described as ‘insulting’ or ‘unparliamentary’ language.

Extract 4.10

MHE. ANNA M. ABDALLAH: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, [...] naomba niseme, maelezo yaliyotolewa hasa kuhusu Tume hususan kumtaja binafsi Mheshimiwa Warioba, ninasema kwanza haikuwa haki na maneno yaliyotumiwa yalikuwa ni ya kumvunjia heshima [2] na vilevile kwa umri wake Mheshimiwa Jaji Warioba ukimlinganisha na umri wa Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu, nataka kusema Mheshimiwa Jaji Warioba anastahili heshima ya asili kutoka kwa Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu. [3] Kwa kweli nasema Bunge hili lisitumike kudharau watu, kunyanyasa watu, kusema maneno ya kashfa kwa ajili ya watu, tena hasa watu waliotuzidi umri [...]. [4] Kwa kweli si vyema kuvunjiana heshima tunapotaka kuweka pointi yoyote ieleweke. [5] Tunaweza tukaeleza maelezo yetu vizuri bila hata kumkashfu mtu na yakaeleweka [...]. [6] Hivi sasa mnawakimbiza watu ambao pengine walikuwa wanadhani kwamba Chama hiki ni kizuri sana lakini kwa maneno ya namna hii mnawakimbiza tu watu ambao wangependa kujiunga nacho. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

MHE. ANNA M. ABDALLAH: [...] [1] Honourable Speaker, [...] allow me to say that the explanation that was provided [by Mr Lissu] regarding the Commission, especially by mentioning Honourable Warioba personally, was not right and the words that were used are [a sign] of lack of respect. [2] Also, considering his age, if you compare Honourable Warioba's age to Honourable Tundu Lissu's age, I want to say Honourable Justice Warioba deserves natural respect from Honourable Tundu Lissu. [3] Honestly, this parliament should not be used to disrespect people, to abuse people, to say slanderous words to people especially the ones who are older than us [...]. (Applause) [4] Honestly, it is not good to disrespect one another when we want to make any point understandable. [5] We can give our explanation well without abusing anyone and still be understood. [6] Now you are chasing away people who were probably thinking that this party is very good but with these words you are chasing away people who would like to join the party. (Applause)

In *Extract 4.10*, Ms Abdallah accuses Mr Lissu of using ‘disrespectful’ words to describe the chairperson and other members of the Commission. She suggests that the use of disrespectful language is an abusive personal attack or an insult to the chairperson (and other members) of the Commission. Although she does not mention the words explicitly, one of the words that she finds abusive and insulting to the chairperson is *ulaji*. I will further explain this word in the next section. While Ms Abdallah accuses Mr Lissu of personal attack and insult, her criticism can in turn be regarded as a personal attack on Mr Lissu. Instead of addressing the propositional content of the opposition’s standpoints and related argumentation, Ms Abdallah chooses to address ‘how abusive their language is’, which may not help to resolve the difference of opinion on the merits.

4.4.2 The ministers’ responses

This section analyses the minister’s responses to the raised concerns or queries by members of the opposition. In *Extract 4.11*, the minister joins Ms Abdallah to accuse Mr Lissu of ‘abusive’ language use and lack of respect for the members of the Commission. However, unlike Ms Abdallah, the minister advances a counterargument against Mr Lissu’s claim that the requested amount of money for various types of payment to the Commission is a sign of bribery or corruption.

Extract 4.11

WAZIRI WA SHERIA NA KATIBA: [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, napenda kutoa maoni ya jumla tu hasa kuhusu hotuba ya Kambi ya Upinzani. [2] Siyo hotuba mbaya, isipokuwa tu, kwa ujumla, lugha iliyotumika, kidogo hairidhishi. [3] Unapodhani kwamba Tume ya Marekebisho ya Katiba ni sehemu ya ulaji na unawatazama Wana-Tume wale, unasema Mzee Warioba ndio mlaji, kweli unasema ah, labda angesema jambo jingine au lugha nyingine, kwani hawa wazee tunawaheshimu sana. [4] Ni wazee ambao wanafanya kazi hii kwa kujitolea tu. [5] Hawapati kitu chochote ukiondoa labda sifa itakayotokana na kazi nzuri ambayo watakuwa wamefanya mwisho, kwa Taifa letu. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, lakini nasema pengine Mheshimiwa alitumia lugha hii kwa kuteleza tu. [7] Sidhani kama alikusudia kuwafikiria wazee wale ni walaji. [8] Nina uhakika kabisa hilo halimo kichwani mwake. [9] Lakini nafikiri katika ujumla tu wa kudhani Serikali basi ni walaji, basi akadhania na Tume ni walaji. [10] Tume ile ni ya

watu makini sana, hawawezi kuruhusu aina yoyote ya ufisadi utokee ndani ya Tume ile. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

MINISTER FOR CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: [1] Honourable Speaker, I would like to talk in general about the speech by the opposition camp. [2] The speech is not bad, except that, in general, the language that has been used is 'unsatisfactory'. [3] If you think the Constitutional Review Commission is part of corruption and you look at the Commission members, you say Warioba himself is corrupt, or Salim Ahmed Salim is corrupt, you really get surprised; maybe he meant something else or would use a different language, because we respect these elders. [4] They are the elders who are doing this work as volunteers. [5] They don't get anything apart from the virtue that will result in the end from their good work for our nation. (Applause) [6] Honourable Speaker, but maybe it was just a sleep of the tongue. [7] I don't think he intended to label these elders corrupt. [8] I am absolutely sure that this was not in his mind. [9] But I think this is just a general thinking that, because they think the government is corrupt, then the Commission is also corrupt. [10] The Commission is very principled; they cannot allow any kind of corruption in the Commission. (Applause)

In *Extract 4.11*, the minister accuses Mr Lissu of abusive language use and personal attack, as indicated in [2-3]. He criticises the use of the word *ulaji* to refer to the Commission's expenses or the amount of money requested for the Commission. Taken literally, the Swahili word *ulaji* denotes 'eating (something)' or 'the eating of something', and even 'the manner/way of eating'. However, TUKI's (2014) Swahili-English dictionary offers other two equivalents of the word *ulaji*: 'corruption' and 'bribery'. It is suggested that, in this context, the word *ulaji* is usually followed by the word *rushwa*, which also means corruption. Here we get the compound noun *ulaji rushwa* to mean the same thing; 'corruption' or 'bribery'. The addition of the word *rushwa* makes the interpretation of the word *ulaji* more specific. The word *ulaji* can also be used alone, without necessarily being followed by *rushwa*, to mean 'corruption' or 'bribery', and this is the context in which it is used by Mr Lissu. In his speech, Mr Lissu also uses the two words *ulaji* and *rushwa* interchangeably to mean the same thing. Through the use of the word *ulaji* to describe various types of payment to the Commission, Mr Lissu implicitly suggests that both the government and the Commission are corrupt. Thus, although he does not explicitly deny the government being corrupt, the minister thinks that it is wrong to describe members of the Commission, especially the chairperson, as corrupt, because it is abusive and insulting to them.

Apart from accusing Mr Lissu of the use of insulting language and personal attack, the minister also suggests that the requested amount of money for the Commission is not a sign of corruption, as claimed by Mr Lissu in one of his arguments. To support this substandpoint, the minister advances two arguments. In the first argument, as presented in [4-5], he argues that members of the Commission are just volunteering because they do not get anything apart from the virtue that will result from their good work. So, he seems to suggest that this is not

corruption. In the second argument, as suggested in the rest of the extract, the minister argues that members of the Commission are not corrupt because they are very principled, and because of that (causal argumentation), they cannot allow any form of corruption in the Commission. This argumentation functions as the minister's first attempt in defence of his first standpoint.

In *Extract 4.12*, the minister responds to other arguments in support of the opposition's first standpoint as he attempts to further defend the minister's first standpoint.

Extract 4.12

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, uhalali wa maombi ya fedha za matumizi ya Shilingi bilioni 33.94 zilizoombwa kwa mwaka wa fedha 2013/2014. [2] Kama mtakumbuka na Mheshimiwa Pindi Chana ametukumbusha hapa, mwaka 2012 tulipoomba kwenye Kamati Shilingi bilioni 40, zikapunguzwa zikafika Shilingi bilioni 33. [3] Mwaka huu ukomo wa bajeti tuliopewa na watu wa Hazina na Mipango wakasema hizo hizo, na mtaumia nazo, hizo hizo. [4] Lakini sasa kwa kupewa hizi, kuna mambo yataathirika. [5] Kubwa ni haya Mabaraza ya Kata ya Katiba. Kwa sababu vichwani mwetu tulikuwa tunafikiria tufanye siku nne, lakini haiwezekani. [6] Kwa hiyo, tutafanya siku mbili badala yake, ili angalau kuwa ndani ya bajeti yetu hii ya Shilingi bilioni 33.9. [7] Mheshimiwa Spika, tuliomba zaidi, lakini tukaambiwa ukomo ni huo huo. [8] Kwa hiyo, sasa inabidi tuji-adjust. [9] Kwa hiyo, tunaathirika na tutaathirika kiasi kwa sababu hatuna pesa hizi tena za kuweza kufanya Mabaraza. [10] Tungeweza kufanya Mabaraza siku nne labda, lakini inaongeza pesa nyingi. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, [regarding] the justification for requesting an expenditure budget of TZS 33.94 billion for the 2013/14 fiscal year, [2] if you can recall – and Honourable Pindi Chana has reminded us – in 2012, when we requested for TZS 40 billion in the committee, it was reduced to TZS 33 billion. [3] The budget allocation limit issued by the Treasury and Planning office for this year is the same, and they said we will have to suffer for having the same budget. [4] But now, by being given this budget, there are things that will be affected. [5] The most affected ones are these ward/district constitutional fora, because in our minds we were planning to convene them for four days, but it is impossible. [6] Therefore, we will hold them for two days instead, in order to be at least within TZS 33.9 billion budget. [7] Honourable Speaker, we asked for more, but we were told that this is the limit. [8] So now we have to adjust ourselves. [9] Therefore, we are affected, and we will suffer much because we no longer have this money for the fora. [10] Otherwise, we would have four days for the fora, but this will increase the budget.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, hoja ya kwanza ilikuwa ni uhalali wa malipo ya Shilingi bilioni 12.1 kwa ajili ya posho ya vikao kwa ajili ya Wajumbe 34 wa Tume. [2] Wajumbe wa Tume hawapo 34, Wajumbe wa Tume wapo 32. [3] Wapo Wajumbe 30, halafu wana Mwenyekiti wao na Makamu wake. [4] Walioweka ngazi sawa na Wajumbe hawa, ni Katibu na Naibu wake, unapata watu 34. [5] Lakini Wajumbe wa Tume hawapo 34. [6] Kwa hiyo, kama ilitolewa picha hiyo, basi picha hiyo siyo sahihi ni picha potofu. [7] Wajumbe wenyewe pamoja na Mwenyekiti wao na Makamu ni 32, halafu wanaongezwa juu yao ambao wako katika level sawa, kwa maana ya kulipwa posho sawa, ni Katibu na Naibu wake. [8] Kwa hiyo wanakuwa watu 34 katika ngazi sawa. [9] Sasa kama waliitwa wote ni Makamishna, basi ni makosa kwa sababu wote siyo Makamishna, [10] ila sasa posho hizi ndiyo zile ambazo zimepangwa na kukubaliwa kimsingi, kwamba watalipwa posho hii. [11] Zimekubalika na Sheria za Fedha na sisi wenyewe tumepitisha bajeti ya kwanza hivyo hivyo, bajeti hii inaendelea tena, [12] sasa hata sijui, hazijaongezwa! [13] Ni posho zile zile tulizozikubali last year na ndiyo hizo hizo wanazopewa mwaka huu. [14] Sasa kinachogomba ni nini? (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, the first concern was the justification for paying TZS 12.1 billion to 34 members of the Commission as sitting allowance. [2] Members of the Commission are not

34; there are 32. [3] There are 30 members, then the chairperson, and the vice chairperson. [4] Those who are at the same level as members of the Commission are the secretary and the deputy secretary, making 34 members in total. [5] But members of Commission are not 34. [6] So, if that is what is portrayed, it is incorrect. [7] Members [of the Commission] themselves plus their chairperson and vice chairperson are 32, and in terms of being paid the same amount of allowance at the same level, there are the secretary and the deputy secretary. [8] So, they are 34 people who are at the same level. [9] Now, if they are all called commissioners, then it is wrong because not all of them are commissioners, [10] but this allowance is primarily in the approved budget, stipulating how much these people are supposed to be paid. [11] It is acceptable on the basis of the financial laws and we approved the first budget, [and] this budget is a continuation [of the same amount], [12] now I don't know, because [the allowance] has not been increased! [13] It is the same allowance we approved in the last year and [it is] the same [amount] that they will be given this year. [14] Now, what is the problem?

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kuhusu suala la uhalali wa matumizi ya fedha wakati wa Bunge Maalum la Katiba. [2] Kwa mujibu wa Sheria, mnafahamu kwamba Mwenyekiti wa Tume ndio atawasilisha Rasimu ya Katiba kwenye Bunge Maalum la Katiba. [3] Lakini Mwenyekiti wa Tume, anaweza kutoa ufafanuzi unaohitajika wakati wa majadiliano kwenye Bunge Maalum la Katiba. [4] Kwa kuzingatia matakwa ya Kifungu tajwa, Tume imetenga fedha hizo kwa ajili ya kuwalipa posho Wajumbe wa Tume na Sekretarieti wakati wa Bunge Maalum la Katiba, kuwezesha kuwasilisha Rasimu ya Katiba na kutoa ufafanuzi kuhusu rasimu hiyo. [5] Hivyo basi, siyo sahihi kusema kuwa Mwenyekiti akishawasilisha Rasimu ya Katiba, anakuwa hana kazi nyingine ya kufanya kwamba, yeye sasa ni *functus officio*. [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, process hii ya kuwasilisha, kweli anakwenda mle ndani, labda atakwenda peke yake, lakini anabebwa na wenzake. [7] Wakati wote hii Tume ndiyo inayomsapot. [8] Iko naye, itamwacha siku ile wakishaambiwa haya, sasa referendum imefanyika na Katiba imeshapatikana, hatahitajika tena. [9] Tutawafukuza siku hiyo hiyo kweli! [...] Hatuwezi kuwalipa kama hawaendi kufanya kazi. [10] Kama nilivyosema mwanzo, hii siyo Tume ya Ulaji, hii ni ya kufanya kazi. (Kicheko) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, regarding the justification for the financial expenditure during the Constituent Assembly, [2] I think you know that, in accordance with the Act, the chairperson of the Commission will present the draft constitution to the Constituent Assembly. [3] Moreover, the chairperson may be required to provide necessary clarifications during the discussions in the Constituent Assembly. [4] In light of the requirement of the provision mentioned, the Commission has allocated this fund for paying allowance to the members of the Commission and Secretariat during the Constituent Assembly to facilitate the presentation of the draft constitution and providing clarifications on the draft constitution if required to do so. [5] Therefore, it is not right to say that the chairperson has nothing else to do after presenting the draft constitution, and that he is now *functus officio*. [6] Honourable Speaker, in the process of presenting the draft constitution, the chairperson may go to the Constituent Assembly alone, but he always has the support of other staff. [7] It is the Commission that supports him all the time. [8] It will be with him until the day the referendum is held, after voting, then he will no longer be needed. [9] We will dissolve the Commission on the same day! [...] We cannot pay them if they don't have work to do. [10] As I said earlier, this Commission is not for earning money; it is for work. (Laughter)

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kuhusu uhalali wa matumizi ya fedha wakati wa kutoa elimu ya uraia kabla ya kura za maoni; kwa mujibu wa Kifungu 33 (2), Sheria ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba, Sura ya 83; Tume inawajibika kuhamasisha na kutoa elimu kwa wananchi kuhusu Katiba inayopendekezwa kabla ya kura ya maoni. [2] Kwa msingi huo, Wajumbe wa Tume na Sekretarieti wote watalazimika kuzunguka nchi nzima kutoa elimu katika kipindi hicho. [3] Fedha zilizotengwa ni hizo, sasa sijui hata kama zitatoa. [4] Wataizunguka nchi hii yote kujaribu kuwaeleza wananchi kwamba, jamani, Katiba ile ambayo tumezungukanayo sasa ni hiyo, itoleeni maamuzi; kama mnaitaka semeni ndiyo, kama hamuitaki semeni siyo. [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, lakini ni lazima wazunguke. [6] Watafanya kazi hiyo na yale matangazo

ya redio na magazeti na television na runinga, yataendelea. [...] [7] Sasa pesa hizi sina hata uhakika kama zitatosha, maana mwaka huu bajeti yenyewe imefinywa sana. [8] Uhalali upo kwa sababu kazi hii ni ya Tume. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, regarding the justification for the use of fund during the provision of civil education before the referendum, in accordance with section 33(2) of the Constitutional Review Act, Chapter 83, the Commission shall provide civic education and advocacy on the proposed constitution before the referendum. [2] On the basis of this [provision], members of the Commission and Secretariat will be obliged to travel throughout the country to provide civic education [and advocacy] during that period. [3] That is the amount of money that has been allocated, now I don't even know if it is enough. [4] They will go around this whole country trying to tell the people that this is the constitution that we made based on your opinions when we were moving around the country to collect [your opinions], now make a decision on it; if you want it, say yes, if you don't want it, say no. [5] Honourable Speaker, but they have to go around the country. [6] They will do this work, and the advertisements on radio, newspapers, and television will [also] continue. [...] [7] I am not sure if this amount of money is enough because the budget in this year has been reduced a great deal. [8] The use of the fund is justifiable because this is the responsibility of the Commission.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, uhalali wa matumizi ya fedha kwa ajili ya chakula maalum kwa Wajumbe wa Sekretarieti watakaokuwa wamepata UKIMWI, duh. Katika utungaji wa bajeti kuna cluster tano. [2] Cluster ya kwanza kabisa, inawekwa inasema kuhudumia watumishi ambao wana UKIMWI, maana hili ni suala mtambuka kwa jamii. [3] Sasa haina maana kwamba Wana-Tume wale wana UKIMWI au Sekretarieti, hatujui, mimi sijui. [4] Lakini tunaweka bajeti, endapo wapo, watatumia ili waweze kutufanyia kazi vizuri. [5] Kwenye Wizara yangu mimi wapo na tunayo hiyo bajeti na tunawahudumia ipasavyo kabisa. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa kila Wizara hapa ukiangalia, kila Wizara ina bajeti hiyo kwa sababi, ni cluster mojawapo katika zile cluster 5 za bajeti. [7] Ni lazima iwekwe. [8] Hawa ni watumishi, tunataka watuhudumie, lakini wanahitaji hudumja ya Serikali na Serikali inaweka. [9] Kwenye Tume, sijui kama wapo! Lakini bajeti tunaiweka, kama wapo watatumia. [10] Hatuwezi kuyatangaza haya mambo hadharani, hata kama wangukwepo, siwezi nikakwambia wapo watano au sita. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, [regarding] whether there is justification for spending money for special foods for members of the Secretariat who could be infected with HIV, in the budget composition, there are five clusters. [2] The first cluster says 'to take care of servants with HIV infections, because this is a cross-cutting issue in the society. [3] Now it doesn't mean that those members of the Commission or Secretariat have AIDS, we don't know, I don't know. [4] But we budget for it, if any, they will use it so that they can work well for us. [5] In my ministry, we have them and we have a budget cluster for them, and we serve them quite well. [6] Honourable Chairperson, now every ministry here, if you look at them, every ministry has a budget portion for them; it is a cluster out of the five budget clusters. [7] It must be allocated. [8] They are [our] employees, we want their services, but they also need the government's service and the government provides them with that service. [9] In the Commission, I don't know if we have them, but we allocate a budget for that, just in case. [10] We cannot declare this publicly, even if they were there, I cannot tell you if they are five or six.

To further defend his first standpoint, in *Extract 4.12*, Mr Chikawe advances five counterarguments to attack the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation. The first argument is presented in subextract (a). Specifically, in (a) [1], he implicitly suggests that (1.1) *the requested amount of TZS 33.94 billion for Commission is justifiable*. This argument functions as an attempt to refute the opposition's claim that there is no justification for the requested amount of money for the Commission. The supporting arguments for (1.1) seem to

realise coordinative argumentation with three arguments. First, in (a) [3], he argues that *(1.1.)1a the requested amount is the same amount that was provided last year*, implying that, because the same amount was provided last year, this amount should also be provided this year (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency). Second, in (a) [4] and (a) [9], he argues that, due to the amount they will be given, *(1.1.)1b some things will be affected*, suggesting that the Commission's proposed budget is not only justifiable, but it is also too little, as also suggested by Ms Chana. This further implies that providing this amount to the Commission is not a sign of corruption (negative version of symptomatic argumentation). This argument is further supported by argumentation from example in (a) [5] and (a) [9], where he argues that one of the things that will be affected is the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF) because it is no longer possible to hold them for four days as they previously planned. Instead, they will be conducted for just two days due to the limited budget, as indicated in (a) [6] and (a) [10]. Third, to further complement the argument that the budget is not only justifiable but it is also too little, in (a) [7-8], he argues that *(1.1.)1c we wanted more money but we were told that we would be given the same as last year*. In favour of *(1.1.)1c*, in (a) [2], he reinforces Ms Chana's argumentation that even last year they requested TZS 40 billion, but it was reduced to TZS 33 billion.

In subextract (b), Mr Chikawe responds the opposition's claim regarding the justification for the payment of TZS 12.1 billion to 34 members of the Commission. He begins his argumentation by offering a usage declarative, as indicated in (b) [2-9]. This usage declarative was requested by Mr Lissu in his first standpoint. The minister clarifies that members of the Commission are not 34 as claimed by the opposition, but they are only 32. This number includes 30 members, chairperson, and vice chairperson. The minister's clarification is in agreement with section 7(1) of the Act, which stipulates that "[t]he Commission shall consist of: (a) a Chairman; a Vice-Chairman; and not more than thirty and not less than twenty other members" (URT, 2012, p. 8). The interpretation of this provision is that members of the Commission shall be not more than 32 and not less than 22, including the chairperson and the vice chairperson. While Mr Lissu is wrong to claim that members of the Commission shall be 30 (including the chairperson and vice chairperson), the minister still needs to explain why they are planning to pay 34 'members of the Commission' instead of 32, as required by the Act. Thus, in (b) [4] and (b) [6-8], he offers a further explanation (usage declarative). He argues that there are two other people who are 'not commissioners' but have the same status as the commissioners in terms of remuneration. These are the secretary and the deputy secretary of

the Commission. In this usage declarative, the minister introduces the term *commissioners* to make a distinction between members of the Commission and members of the Secretariat. This argumentative move (usage declarative) constitutes argumentation from (dissociative) definition. Mr Chikawe provides a narrower definition of the term *members of Commission*. Implicitly, he defines members of Commission as *commissioners*. With this definition, the term *member of Commission* does not refer to members of the Secretariat (the secretary and deputy secretary), who are, according to this definition, not commissioners. Thus, in (b) [6] and (b) [9], he insists that it is wrong to refer to non-commissioners as members of the Commission. However, the Act does not explicitly stipulate whether the secretary and deputy secretary, as members of the Secretariat and not members of the Commission (according to the minister's definition), shall be paid the same amount of money as, to borrow the minister's word, the 'commissioners'. In accordance with section 14(2), the Act only provides that "members of the Commission and the Secretariat shall be remunerated subject to the relevant laws and regulations" (URT, 2012, p. 12). Therefore, it is still unclear at this point whether the two members of the Secretariat are supposed to receive the same amount of allowance as members of the Commission or 'commissioners'.

After offering the usage declarative, the minister provides a justification for the payment of TZS 12.1 billion as an allowance to 34 members of the Commission and Secretariat. In (b) [1] and (b) [10], he argues that (2.)2 *the requested amount of TZS 12.1 billion has been basically accepted*, implying that the requested amount of allowance is justifiable. In favour of (2.)2, two more arguments are advanced. First, in (b) [11], he argues that (2.)2.1 *the allowance is acceptable on the basis of the financial laws*. This argumentation from legal authority seems to be convincing, except that the minister does not say which financial laws were used to pay the Commission such an amount of money. Second, in (b) [13], he maintains that (2.)2.2 *the requested allowance is the same allowance that was approved last year*, suggesting that, if the parliament approved the same amount last year, the same amount should be approved by the parliament this year (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency). This comparison argumentation is not conclusive. Approving the same amount last year does not necessarily mean that the same amount should be approved this year. Things might have changed or probably the parliament was not critical enough last year. In support of (2.)2.2, the minister offers two other arguments as probably an attempt to pre-empt critical questions on his comparison argumentation. In (b) [12], he argues that the requested amount has not been increased, and in (b) [14] he concludes his argumentation with a rhetorical question: *what is*

the problem? This suggests that there is no problem requesting or approving such an amount as the allowance for the Commission, because of the reason provided in (2.)2.2.

In subextract (c), the minister responds to the opposition's critical reaction regarding the allocation of fund to the Commission during the Constituent Assembly (CA). The minister implies that (2.3) *it is reasonable to allocate fund for the Commission during the CA*, for at least two reasons. First, he argues in (c) [4] that (2.3.)1 *the allocated fund will enable the Commission to present the draft constitution to the CA and provide clarifications about the draft constitution*, if required to do so. The unexpressed premise suggests that, if the proposed budget will enable the Commission to do so, then the proposed budget should be approved. This pragmatic argumentation is defended by authority argumentation in (c) [2-3], where the minister argues that, according to the Act, (2.3.)1.1a *the chairperson of the Commission is required to present the draft constitution to the CA*. This is complemented by the argument that, in accordance with the Act, (2.3.)1.1b *the chairperson and members of the Commission may be required to provide clarifications about the draft constitution in the CA*. Second, in (c) [5-10], he suggests that (2.3.)2 *it is not true that the chairperson becomes functus officio after presenting the draft* because the chairperson and the members of the Commission will continue to work until the referendum is held and the new constitution is obtained. He further maintains that, after the constitution is obtained, the Commission will be dissolved because the ministry cannot pay members of the Commission if they do not have work to do, because the Commission is not the Commission for earning money but for doing work.

In subextract (d), the minister responds to the opposition's criticism regarding the justification for spending what Mr Lissu describes as 'too much money' for the Commission during the validation stage of the proposed constitution. In (d) [8], he argues that (2.4) *there is justification for paying the Commission the requested amount of allowance*, because (2.4.)1a *it is the responsibility of the Commission to provide civic education and advocacy on the referendum*. This argument is further defended by authority argumentation in (d) [1], where he argues that, in accordance with the Act, the Commission is required to provide civic education and advocacy on the referendum. In (d) [2] and (d) [4-6], he maintains that members of the Commission will go to all places in the country to do so and at the same time advertisements on radio, TV, and newspapers will continue. To complement argument (2.4.)1a, in (d) [7], he argues that (2.4.)1b *'I am not even sure if the amount of money allocated for this exercise is enough'*, since the budget is very limited. While Mr Lissu is of the opinion that the fund is too

much, the minister thinks that it is not even enough with regard to the responsibility the Commission has to execute.

In subextract (e), Mr Chikawe reacts to the opposition's criticism regarding the justification for allocating fund for members of the Commission who could be infected with HIV. The minister argues that, since AIDS is a cross-cutting issue, the allocation of fund for taking care of HIV-positive employees is the first cluster among the five budget clusters, as indicated in (e) [1-2]. This is supported by the argument that every ministry must allocate fund for HIV-positive people because it is the responsibility of the government to take care of them, as indicated in (e) [6-8]. In (e) [5] he gives an example of his own ministry, which allocates fund for HIV-positive employees and they take good care of them. To support the argument that AIDS is a cross-cutting issue, in (e) [3-4] and (e) [9-10], he argues that allocating fund for HIV-positive people in the Commission's budget does not necessarily mean that there are members of the Commission who are HIV-positive. Nevertheless, the budget for them should be allocated so that, in case they are there, they can be taken good care of. Mr Chikawe's further argumentation for his first standpoint is summarised in *Table 4.13* below.

Table 4.13 The minister's further argumentation for his first standpoint

No.	Description
(1)	(The Commission's proposed budget should be approved)
(1.1)	(The requested amount, i.e. TZS 33.94 billion, for the Commission is justifiable)
(1.1.)1a	It is the same amount that was provided last year
(1.1.1a')	(If the same amount was provided last year, the same amount should be provided this year)
(1.1.)1b	Due to this amount, some of the things in the process will be affected
(1.1.1b')	(The expenditure budget is not only justifiable but it is also too little and is not a sign of corruption)
(1.1.)1b.1	One of the things that will be affected is the conduct of fora
(1.1.)1b.1.1	It is no longer possible to conduct the fora for four days as we previously planned
(1.1.)1b.1.1.1	We don't have enough money to conduct them for four days
(1.1.)1b.1.1.1.1	For this reason, we will instead conduct them for only two days
(1.1.)1c	We wanted more money but we were told we shall be given the same amount
(1.1)1c.1	Even last year we requested TZS 40 billion but it was reduced to TZS 33 billion
(1.)2	The allowance of TZS 12.1 billion for the Commission has been basically accepted
(1.2')	(The requested allowance of TZS 12.1 billion for the Commission is justifiable)
(1.)2.1	The allowance is acceptable on the basis of financial laws
(1.)2.2	It is the same allowance we approved last year
(1.2.2')	(Because the same allowance was approved last year, the same amount should be approved this year)
(1.)2.2.1	What is the problem?
(1.2.2.1')	(There is no problem about authorising this allowance)
(1.3)	(It is reasonable to allocate fund to the Commission during the CA)
(1.3.)1	The allocated fund will enable the Commission to present the draft constitution to the CA and provide some clarifications about the draft constitution

(1.3.)1.1a	According to the Act, the chairperson is required to present the draft constitution to the CA
(1.3.)1.1b	According to the Act, members of the Commission may be required to provide clarifications about the draft constitution to the CA
(1.3.)2	It is not true that the chairperson becomes <i>functus officio</i> after presenting the draft constitution to the CA
(1.3.)2.1	The chairperson and members of the Commission will continue to work until the referendum is held and the new constitution is obtained
(1.3.)2.1.1	After that, the Commission will be dissolved
(1.3.)2.1.1.1	We cannot pay them if they don't have work to do
(1.3.)2.1.1.1.1	This is not the Commission for earning money but the Commission for work
(2.)4	There is a justification for paying the Commission the requested amount of money at the validation stage of the proposed constitution in the referendum
(2.)4.1a	It is the responsibility of the Commission to educate the public about the referendum
(2.)4.1a.1	According to the Act, the Commission is responsible for that
(2.)4.1a.1.1	They will go to all the places in the country to do this
(2.)4.1a.1.2	Ads on radio, TV, and newspapers will also continue
(2.)4.1b	I am not even sure if the allocated amount of money is enough
(2.)4.1b.1	The Commission budget is very limited

In *Extract 4.13*, the minister attacks various (sub)arguments for the opposition's second standpoint as he attempts to further defend his second standpoint.

Extract 4.13

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kulikuwa na suala kuhusu Tume kwmaba haikuweka utaratibu wowote wa maana wa kutoa elimu kwa wananchi juu ya masuala yote yanayohusu Katiba. [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, katika suala la kutoa elimu kwa umma kuhusu mchakato wa Katiba Mpya, Tume iliandaa programu mbalimbali za elimu na tulitumia vyombo vya habari kama radio, runinga na magazeti. [3] Tulitoa machapisho mbalimbali yakiwemo Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano yenyewe, kwa lugha nyepesi na kwa lugha yake ilivyo, Sheria yenyewe ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba kwa lugha nyepesi na kwa lugha yake ilivyokuwa, [...] hadidu za rejea za Tume, kazi za Tume, maswali yanayoulizwa mara kwa mara, yaani frequently asked questions, tulichapisha tukagawa. [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, machapisho hayo pamoja na Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania na ya Zanzibar, yalisambazwa nchi nzima kabla ya Tume haijafika kukusanya maoni ya wananchi. [5] Elimu kwa Umma ilikuwa inatolewa na Wajumbe wa Tume kila walipofika kwenda kukusanya maoni. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] *Honourable Speaker, there was a concern that the Commission didn't have any reasonable plan for providing [civic] education on all important issues relating to the constitution. [2] Honourable Speaker, in the provision of [civic] education about the constitutional review process, the Commission prepared various education programmes and we used the media such as radio, television, and newspapers. [3] We produced various publications including the [national] constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania in plain language and in its actual language, the Constitutional Review Act in plain language and in its actual language, the Commission's terms of reference, functions of the Commission, [and] the frequently asked questions; we produced and distributed them [to the people]. [4] Honourable Speaker, those publications and the [national] Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and that of Zanzibar were disseminated all over the country before the Commission went to collect public opinions. [5] Civic education was [also] provided by the members of the Commission whenever they went to collect public opinions.*

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, [...] wanasema muda uliotolewa pia haukutosha, watu walipewa dakika tano-tano tu kuzungumza. [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, lakini nasema, pamoja na hizo dakika tano, watu walipewa muda wa kuandika. [3] Hili la watu kusema sample ni ndogo, kwa kweli siyo sawa. [4] Hakuna sample kubwa iliyoweza kutumika kama hii ya kwetu, nitakwambia namna gani. [5] Pamoja na watu wale ambao mnasema walionekana wakipigwa picha, wakatoa; tulikuwa na makundi mbalimbali. [6] Chama cha Mapinduzi chenye Wanachama wasiopungua 6,000,000 kilitoa maoni kikiwakilisha wanachama wale 6,000,000. [7] Chama cha CHADEMA, kilikwenda kutoa maoni yake, sina uhakika wana wanachama wangapi waliowawakilisha kwenye maoni yale? [...] [8] Acha Vyama vingine, CUF, sitaki kuuliza, mna wanachama wangapi, lakini na ninyi mlitoa maoni kwa niaba ya wanachama wenu. [...]. [9] Sasa unaposema sample ni ndogo, ulitaka watu milioni 40 wote waweze kutoa? [10] Maana wengine ni watoto wadogo, hawawezi kutoa. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, [...] they also said that the time allocated was not enough; people were given five minutes each to give their opinions. [2] Honourable Speaker, note that, apart from the five minutes, they were also given time to write their opinions. [3] Saying that the sample was small is not true. [4] There is no sample bigger than ours that has ever been used; I will tell you how. [5] Apart from those people that people saw and took pictures, we also had various groups. [6] The CCM party, which has not less than 6,000,000 members, gave its opinions, representing its six million members. [7] Chadema gave opinions but I am not sure how many members the party represented in the opinions provided. [...] [8] Leave alone other political parties; CUF, I don't want to ask you how many members you have, but you also provided your opinions on behalf of the members of your party. [...] [9] So, if you say the sample was small, did you want all 40 million people to participate? [10] Some of them are children; they cannot provide [opinions]. (Applause)

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Tume iliweka utaratibu tofauti na wa kibaguzi katika hatua za kuunda Mabaraza. [...] [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, lakini niseme kwa mujibu wa Kifungu 17 (8), Tume imepewa mamlaka ya kubuni na kutumia taratibu tofauti katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake katika pande mbili za Muungano. [3] Siyo kweli kusema kwamba, wakati wa kukusanya maoni Tume ilikuwa na utaratibu unaofanana na pande zote za Muungano. [4] Kwa upande wa Mabaraza ya Katiba, kulikuwa na tofauti katika ngazi za uchaguzi wa Wajumbe wa Mabaraza hayo. [5] Kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara, ngazi ya msingi ilikuwa ni Kata, wakati kwa upande wa Zanzibar, ilikuwa ni Shehia. [6] Mheshimiwa Spika, katika chaguzi hizi, Tume ilikuwa inatumia mifumo iliyopo kisheria ya Uchaguzi katika ngazi za Mamlaka ya Serikali za Mitaa. [7] Kwa Zanzibar, hakuna mfumo wa kiuchaguzi katika ngazi ya Wadi, ambayo ndiyo inayofanana na Kata kwa Tanzania Bara. [8] Kwa Tanzania Bara, kuna mfumo wa uchaguzi katika ngazi ya Kijiji na ngazi ya Mtaa. [9] Pia Kamati za Maendeleo za Kata zimepewa mamlaka ya kufanya maamuzi mbalimbali ya kimaendeleo na chaguzi za Wajumbe wa Kamati mbalimbali katika ngazi ya Kata. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, [there is also a claim that] the Commission devised a different and discriminatory methodology in the conduct of [the district constitutional] fora [in Mainland Tanzania]. [2] Honourable Speaker, in accordance with section 17(8), the Commission has been given the mandate to devise and apply different methodologies in the performance of its functions in both parts of the Union. [3] It is not true that the Commission applied uniform methodologies in both parts of the Union in the collection of public opinions. [4] As for the [district] constitutional fora, there were differences during the election stage of members of the fora. [5] In Mainland Tanzania, the basic level was ward while in Zanzibar it was Shehia. [6] Honourable Speaker, in these elections, the Commission applied the legally existing systems based on the local government levels. [7] There is no electoral body at Wadi level in Zanzibar which is equivalent to ward in Mainland Tanzania. [8] In Mainland Tanzania, there are electoral bodies at the level of a village and Mtaa. [9] Also, the Ward Development Committees (WDCs) have the mandate to make various development decisions and supervise elections of members of various committees at ward level.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, tusingeweza kufanya uchaguzi katika ngazi ya Kata, haiwezekani! Kata ni kubwa mno! [2] Hakuna Kikao cha Uchaguzi wa Kata, lakini wa Kijiji kipo na ndiko tulikofanya. [3] Tusingeweza kufanya kwenye Kata, hata kidogo! Uchaguzi huo sijui ungekuwaje? [4] Wakazi wote wa Kata, isingewezekana. [5] Kwa hiyo, tukafanya kwenye Kijiji tukaja kwenye Kata. [6] Kwenye Kata, tukatumia mfumo tu uliokuwepo wa Serikali za Mitaa, wa kupata Wawakilishi wanne wa wananchi. [7] Najua zimetokea kasoro sehemu mbalimbali, zipo na hizo Tume wenyewe wanajua jinsi ya kufanya. [8] Mheshimiwa Spika, kuna Kata imetokea imepeleka watu wanne, bahati mbaya watu watatu katika wanne, wale wanatoka nyumba moja. Baba mwenyewe Diwani, mke wake na mwanawe. [9] Sasa Uwakilishi wa namna hiyo, Tume inajua. [10] Hamwezi mkapata watu kutoka kwenye vijiji vine, badala mnapata watu kutoka nyumba moja? [11] Kwa hiyo, yapo matatizo madogo madogo. [12] Lakini kimsingi utaratibu umekamilika na [...] tumekwishawapata Wajumbe wote katika Mikoa yote ambayo inahusika. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, we wouldn't have been able to hold elections at ward level; it is impossible, a ward is too large. [2] There is no election meeting at ward level, but there is one at village level where we held elections. [3] We wouldn't have done it at all! I cannot imagine the kind of election it would have been. [4] It wouldn't have been possible for all residents of a ward [to participate]. [5] So, we held [elections] at a village, then we went to the ward. [6] In the ward, we used the local government system to get four representatives of the people. [7] I understand that there were some irregularities in different areas, but the Commission knows what to do. [8] Honourable Speaker, one ward presented four names of representatives but later on it was discovered that three out of the four representatives came from the same household; the father is a councillor, but other representatives are his wife and son. [9] The Commission knows [how to deal with] this kind of representativeness. [10] It cannot be possible that, instead of getting four people from a village, you get [three] people from one family! [11] So, there are a few challenges, [12] but the elections have been completed [successfully] and [...], we have already got all representatives from all the regions involved.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, kuhusu Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya kutawaliwa na Wajumbe wengi kutoka CCM na kuondolewa Wajumbe ambao sio wa CCM, na hasa wa CHADEMA. Kama nilivyoeleza, jambo hili siyo kweli, [2] na misingi yake chaguzi hizi haikuwa Vyama. Uwakilishi katika Mabaraza haya, siyo wa Vyama. [...] [3] Misingi ya Mabaraza haya siyo Vyama, ni Wawakilishi wa wananchi wenyewe. [4] Wakitokea wote ni CCM, basi labda ni kwa sababu hapo mahali wengi ni CCM. [5] Wakitokea wote ni CHADEMA, basi labda hapo mahala wengi ni CHADEMA, [6] lakini hakuna mfumo uliotungwa eti wakachaguliwe wanachama fulani, hapana. [7] Chama siyo sifa mojawapo ya kuwa Mjumbe wa Mabaraza haya. [8] Hiyo ningependa ieleweke mapema na kwa hiyo, waliochaguliwa wamechaguliwa kwa sifa zao ambazo zimetajwa katika ule Mwongozo. [9] Uwakilishi wake ulikuwa mzee mmoja, mwanamke mmoja, kijana mmoja na mtu mwingine mmoja, basi. [10] Mheshimiwa Spika, sasa mambo ya Vyama haya ni uvurugaji. [11] Nami ninavionya, kama vyama vimeingilia mchakato huu, vinaharibu, viache. [12] Havihusiki na jambo hili! Siyo lao! [13] Hili ni jambo la Tume, Tume inatafuta maoni ya wananchi na maoni hayo hayategemei wewe unatoka Chama gani. [14] Ila wewe katika Kijiji, chako unawakilisha, watu wamekupenda kiasi gani, basi. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, concerning the claim that the district constitutional fora are full of CCM members and that non-CCM members, especially from Chadema, were removed from the list; as I explained, this allegation is not true, [2] and these elections were not [conducted] based on [the proportion of] political parties; representativeness in the fora is not based on [political] parties. [...] [3] [The selection of members of the fora is not based on [political] parties; [members of the district constitutional fora] are representatives of the citizens. [4] If it happens that most of them are CCM members, then perhaps most people in that area are CCM members. [5] If most people are Chadema members, then perhaps most people in that area are Chadema members, [6] but there is no methodology that has been devised for electing certain members, no. [7] Membership to a [political] party is not a criterion for being elected as a member of the [district constitutional] fora. [8] It should be understood that the elected

members were selected based on their qualifications as stipulated in the guidelines. [9] The representativeness criterion was one old person, one woman, one young person, and any other person; that is all. [10] Honourable Speaker, involvement of political parties is some kind of interference. [11] I warn them; if they have interfered in this process, [they should] stop that, [because] they ruin the process. [12] They are not concerned with this! [13] This is the responsibility of the Commission, which collects public opinions and these opinions have nothing to do with which [political] party those people come from. [14] As a member [of the district constitutional fora], you just represent people of your village, and what matters is how much people like you; that is all.

- (f) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, niseme [...] kwamba umetumika muda mwingi sana na kurasa nyingi katika hotuba ya Kambi ya Upinzani, [...] ulikuwa ukimzungumzia mtu anayeitwa Beatus Kipea kwamba ameunguliwa katika Orodha ya Wajumbe waliochaguliwa, kutoka Kata ya Sembetini na kwamba imefanywa hivyo kwa sababu yeye siyo mwana-CCM. [2] Kwanza niseme kwamba taarifa hii siyo sahihi. [3] Sitaki kusema ni ya uwongo, lakini nasema siyo sahihi. [4] Aliyempa taarifa hii au aliyeandika taarifa hii, hakumwambia ukweli, kwa hiyo, naye akafanya jambo ambalo siyo sahihi. [5] Bwana Beatus ni Mjumbe halali. [6] Hadi kufikia tarehe 25 Mwezi huu wa Mei (sic), taarifa nilizonazo mimi, Bwana huyu ni Mjumbe halali, na bado ni Mjumbe, na katika matangazo ya Wajumbe wote watakaokwenda kwenye Mabaraza ya Kata, jina lake limo na litatangazwa. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, let me say [...] that a lot of time and many pages in the opposition camp's speech [...] have been used to talk about someone called Beatus Kipea and it is claimed that he was removed from the list of the selected members [of the district constitutional fora] from Sembetini ward and that was done because he is not a CCM member. [2] Let me say that, first of all, this information is not correct; I don't want to say it is a lie, but I say it is not correct. [3] The one who gave him or wrote this information to him didn't want to tell him the truth, [and] he consequently did something which is wrong. [4] Mr Beatus is a valid member [of the district constitutional fora]. [5] Until the 25th of this month of May (sic), according to the information I have, this person is a valid member, and is still a member, and his name is on the list of all members who will go to the fora, his name is there and it will be announced.

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, nashangaa kuambiwa kwamba kafutwa, sijui kwa sababu gani. [2] Ndiyo maana nasema jambo hili siyo sahihi. [3] Taarifa zangu hizi nimeletewa leo. [4] Sina Kawaida ya Kuongea na Tume, lakini kwa hili nimeziomba. [5] Wakaniambia Mratibu wa Tume ameleta taarifa rasmi kwamba Bwana huyo yumo na katika majina yatakayotolewa atakuwemo. [6] Sasa inapoandikwa hapa zimetumika page 14, 15, 16, na 17 kuzungumzia jambo ambalo siyo sahihi. Mheshimiwa Spika, unataka kujiuliza ukurasa wa 1 – 30 umesema nini ambacho ni sahihi? [7] Maana page hizi tatu zote siyo sahihi. Hizi nyingine zimesema nini cha sahihi? [8] Lakini hili suala la Bwana Beatus siyo la kweli, ni la uwongo. [9] Wananchi mljue hivyo! [10] Bwana Beatus kama yupo mwenyewe anaweza kuthibitisha, maana hili limethibitishwa na Viongozi wa Tume, wanasema yumo katika majina ya wale watu wa Mabaraza na atatangazwa rasmi. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Speaker, I am surprised to be told that he has been removed, and I don't know why. [2] That is why I say this is wrong. [3] I received this information today. [4] It is rare for me to talk to the Commission, but because of this, I had to enquire this information. [5] They told me that the Commission coordinator brought the official information that this person is on the list that will be made public. [6] Now if pages 14, 15, 16, and 17 have been used to talk about something which is not correct, you ask yourself if there is anything that is correct from page 1 to page 30. [7] Three pages contain false information; how could the rest talk about something correct? [8] But the issue of Mr Beatus is not true, it is a lie. [9] [You] citizens should know this! [10] If Beatus himself was here, he could confirm this because this information has been confirmed by the leaders of the Commission; they say he is on the list of the prospective members of the [district constitutional] fora and the list will be officially announced. (Applause)

In *Extract 4.13*, the minister advances four counterarguments against the opposition's second standpoint. The minister does this in order to further defend his second standpoint regarding the 'effective' coordination of the constitutional review process by the Commission. In subextract (a), the minister implicitly suggests that *(2.1) the Commission's methodology in the provision of civic education was reasonable*. This is a counterargument against the opposition's argument that the Commission did not have any reasonable plan in the provision of civic education on the constitutional review. Mr Chikawe advances two other arguments to support his claim. In his first argument, as indicated in (a) [2], he argues that *(2.1.)1 the Commission used various methods/programmes to provide civic education* (maintaining causal argumentation from means to goal). He argues that the Commission used mass media such as radio, TV, and newspapers (argumentation from example) and it produced various publications which were disseminated to the people all over the country. These publications are mentioned in (a) [3-4] and they include the Constitution, the Act, the Commission's terms of reference and functions, as well as the frequently asked questions (argumentation from example). In his second argument, he states that *(2.1.)2 members of the Commission provided civic education whenever they visited a place* to collect public opinions, as indicated in (a) [5]. This is taken to constitute a sign that the Commission's methodology in the provision of civic education was reasonable (symptomatic argumentation).

In subextract (b), the minister responds to the opposition's claim that the Commission's methodology in the collection of public opinions was inappropriate and unreasonable. He suggests that *(2.2) the methodology was appropriate and reasonable*. He supports his claim with two arguments. In the first argument, as presented in (b) [2], he maintains that, apart from being given five minutes to give opinions, *(2.2.)1 citizens were also afforded an opportunity to provide opinions in writing*. The second argument is expressed in (b) [3], where he argues that *(2.2.)2 it is not true that the sample was small*. This is supported by the argument that *(2.2.)2.1 'this is the largest sample we have ever had in the country'*, as shown in (b) [4]. In favour of *(2.2.)2.1*, in (b) [5-8], he states that, apart from people who provided opinions in the Commission's meetings, different groups of people, including political parties, also provided opinions on behalf of their members, which is considered a sign that the methodology was appropriate and reasonable (symptomatic argumentation). For instance, CCM provided opinions on behalf of their 6 million members (argumentation from example with statistical data). Other political parties, such as Chadema and CUF did the same (argumentation from example). The second argument for *(2.2.)2.1*, as shown in (b) [9-10], is presented in the form

of a rhetorical question: *Do you want all 40 million Tanzanians to provide opinions?* This implies that it is impossible for all Tanzanians to provide opinions because some of them are children who cannot provide opinions (causal argumentation). However, the opposition's spokesperson did not claim, whether explicitly or implicitly, that all Tanzanians should provide opinions. Saying the sample is small does not necessarily suggest that all Tanzanians should provide opinions. For this reason, although the minister's use of a rhetorical question seems to be effective, the minister is responding to an argument that Mr Lissu never advanced. The minister's reconstructed unexpressed premise from the opposition's argument is thus beyond the *pragmatic optimum* and is deemed to be fallacious.

In subextract (c), the minister attacks the opposition's argument that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF) in Mainland Tanzania was different and discriminatory. Although he seems to accept that the methodology was different, he denies being discriminatory. The minister implies that (2.3) *the methodology was not discriminatory*. To defend this argument, in (c) [2], he argues that, in accordance with section 17(8) of the Act, (2.3.)1 *the Commission has the mandate to devise different methodologies in the performance of its functions in each part of the Union*. This is further defended by two arguments, which complement one another. In the first argument, as indicated in (c) [3], he argues that (2.3.)1.1a *it is not true that the Commission used uniform methodologies in the collection of public opinions in each part of the Union*, suggesting that the Commission devised non-uniform methodologies in the collection of public opinions in the two parts of the URT. In order to maintain that the Commission did not apply uniform methodologies in the performance of its functions, the minister thought that it was necessary to first deny the 'claim' that the Commission used uniform methodologies in the collection of public opinions. This helps to maintain consistency in the methodologies used by the Commission. With this argument, the minister suggests that the Commission did not strategically use a different methodology in the conduct of the DCF in Mainland Tanzania to favour CCM but 'that is how it was performing its functions'. Thus, in the second argument, as shown in (c) [6], Mr Chikawe argues that (2.3.)1.1b *the Commission applied the legally existing electoral systems of the local government authority*, which is further defended by causal argumentation. In (c) [4], he argues that, in the conduct of DCF, (2.3.)1.1b.1 *there were differences at the election stage of DCF members*, suggesting in the unexpressed premise that these differences are caused by the local government electoral systems. In (c) [5], he further argues that (2.3.)1.1b.1.1 *the basic level in Mainland Tanzania was ward while in Zanzibar it was Shehia*. This argument is supported by

another causal argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation. In (d) [1] and (d) [3-4], he maintains that (2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a *it was impossible to hold elections of DCF members at ward level*. Since it was impossible to hold elections at ward level, (2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1b *'we' instead used the local government system to get four people from every ward* and *'we' have already got all members from relevant regions*, as expressed in (d) [6] and [12]. The minister further offers two arguments in favour of (2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a. The first argument is expressed in (d) [1], where he argues that a ward is too large to hold elections of DCF members (it is impossible to involve all people in a ward). He then employs a rhetorical question to reinforce the impossibility of involving all people in a ward: *'how would the elections be if we involved all people'*? In this argument, the minister also employs an account-giving strategy of *justification*. He accepts the responsibility for failure event in the election of DCF members but denies the pejorative quality associated with it. He admits that there were *'a few problems'* but maintains that these minor problems will be solved by the Commission (the Commission knows what to do). In the second argument for (2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a, as expressed in (d) [2], he argues that there is no election meeting at ward level (the election meeting is at village/Mtaa level). Instead, as indicated in (c) [9], the WDCs have the legal mandate to make decisions on the elections of members of different committees at ward level, suggesting that they have the mandate to make decisions on the election of DCF members as well (argumentation from legal authority). Lastly, in the other argument in favour of (2.3.)1.1b.1.1, he argues that in Zanzibar there is no electoral system at Wadi level, which is equivalent to ward level in Mainland Tanzania and that there is an electoral system at village/Mtaa and ward levels in Mainland Tanzania, as expressed in (c) [7].

In subextract (e), Mr Chikawe responds to the opposition's criticism that DCF are dominated by CCM members and that non-CCM members were intentionally removed from the list of DCF members. In (e) [1], he argues that (2.)4 *it is not true that only CCM members were selected and non-CCM members were removed from the list*. In favour of (2.)4, he offers two supporting arguments. First, in (e) [2] and (e) [7], he argues that (2.)4.1 *membership to a political party is not a selection criterion*. This is because (2.)4.1.1a *DCF members were elected based on the criteria stipulated in the Commission's guidelines* (legal authority), as advanced in (e) [8], and that (2.)4.1.1b *the basis of the election was representativeness*, as expressed in (e) [3]. In support of (2.)4.1.1b, he further maintains that (2.)4.1.1b.1 *the Commission considered how much someone is accepted by people as their representative* (authority argumentation), as indicated in (e) [14], and that (2.)4.1.1b.2 *the representativeness*

criterion was one old person, one woman, one young person, and some other person (authority argumentation), as presented in (e) [9]. Another argument in favour of (2.)4.1 is advanced in (e) [6], where he argues that (2.)4.1.2 *there is no methodology that has been devised to ensure that only certain members are elected* (a negative version of causal argumentation from means to goal). This argumentation challenges the opposition's causal argumentation (from means to goal) that the Commission devised a discriminatory methodology as a *means* to ensure that only CCM members are elected as DCF members (*goal*). Argument (2.)4.1.2 is further defended by causal argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation. In (e) [4], he argues that (2.)4.1.2.1a *if in a certain ward all DCF members are CCM members, it probably means that in that area many people are CCM members*. In (e) [5], he maintains that (2.)4.1.2.1b *if they are Chadema members, it probably means that many people in that area are Chadema members*. The unexpressed premise for these two arguments in coordinative argumentation seems to suggest that the selection of many CCM members (in many areas) is caused by the fact that many people in those areas are CCM followers or members (causal argumentation). The last argument for (2.)4.1 is expressed in (e) [10-13]. Responding to the opposition's accusation that CCM has interfered in the process, he maintains that (2.)4.1.3 *if political parties have interfered in the process, they should stop it*, because the conduct of fora is not their responsibility but the Commission's responsibility. In this argument, the minister appeals to authority argumentation. In accordance with the Act, it is the Commission that has the legal mandate to provide for the conduct of fora.

Second, as indicated in (f) [2-4] and (g) [2,8], he argues that (2.)4.2 *it is not true that Mr Beatus Kipeya was removed from the list of DCF members*. In favour of (2.)4.2, he argues that Mr Beatus Kipeya is still a valid member of the district constitutional fora, as shown in (f) [5-6]. He also adapts to audience demand. He argues that Tanzanians should know that Mr Beatus Kipeya is still a valid member and should also know that Mr Lissu is providing false information. In (f) [10], he states that, if Mr Beatus Kipeya was around, he could confirm this information because this information has been confirmed by members of the Commission, as indicated in (g) [3-5] and [10]. However, the minister's argumentative move in (g) [6-7] may be considered a fallacy of hasty generalization. The minister argues that, because the opposition's spokesperson has used almost five pages (pages 14, 15, 16, 17) in the opposition's speech to provide what the minister considers to be false information or lies, he questions the truth of other issues raised by the opposition in the rest of the speech. It should be brought to light here that providing false information in one part of the opposition's speech does not

necessarily mean that Mr Lissu also provided false information in the rest of the speech. It may be true that the opposition's spokesperson provided false information in the specified pages of the opposition's speech but it is not necessarily true that he also provided false information in the rest of the speech.

The minister's further argumentation for his second standpoint is summarised in *Table 4.14* below.

Table 4.14 The minister's further argumentation for his second standpoint

(2.)	(The constitutional review process has been effectively coordinated)
(2.1)	(The methodology applied in the provision of civic education on the constitutional review was reasonable)
(2.1)1	The Commission used various methods/programmes to educate the public
(2.1)1.1	They used mass media such as radio, TV, and newspapers
(2.1)1.2	It prepared and disseminated various publications all over the country
(2.1)1.2.1	These include the national constitution in plain language, the Act in plain language, the Commission's functions and terms of reference, as well as the frequently asked questions
(2.1.)2	Members of the Commission provided civic education whenever they visited a place to collect public opinions
(2.2)	(The methodology in the collection of public opinions was appropriate and reasonable)
(2.2.)1	Apart from being given five minutes to give opinions, people were also afforded an opportunity to provide their opinions in writing
(2.2.)2	It is not true that the sample was too small
(2.2.)2.1	This is the largest sample we have ever had in this country
(2.2.)2.1.1	Apart from those who provided opinions in the Commission's meetings, different groups also provided opinions on behalf of their members
(2.2.)2.1.1.1	CCM provided opinions, representing not less than 6 million members
(2.2.)2.1.1.2	Other political parties also provided opinions, on behalf of their members
(2.2.)2.1.1.2.1	These include Chadema and CUF
(2.2.)2.1.2	Do you want all 40 million citizens to provide opinions?
(2.2.2.1.2')	(It is impossible for all Tanzanians to provide opinions)
(2.2.)2.1.2.1	Some of them are children
(2.2.)2.1.2.1.1	Children cannot provide opinions
(2.3)	(The methodology in the conduct of DCF was not discriminatory)
(2.3.)1	According to the Act, the Commission has the mandate to devise different methodologies in the performance of its functions in each part of the URT
(2.3.)1.1a	It is not true that Commission used uniform methodologies in the collection of public opinions in each part of the Union
(2.3.)1.1b	The Commission applied the legally existing electoral systems of the local government authority
(2.3.)1.1b.1	There were differences in the election/selection of DCF members
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1	The basic level in Mainland Tanzania was ward, while in Zanzibar it was Shehia
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a	It was impossible to hold elections of DCF members at ward level
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a.1	A ward is too large to hold elections of DCF members
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a.1.1	It was impossible to involve all people in a ward
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a.2a	There is no election meeting at ward level
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.1a.2a.1	The election meeting is at village level

(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.a.2b	WDCs have the mandate to make decisions on the elections of members of different committees at ward level
(2.3.1.1b.1.1.a.2b')	(They have the mandate to make decisions on the elections of DCF members)
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.b	We instead used the local government system to get 4 people in every ward
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.b.1	We have managed to get all members from all relevant regions
(2.3.)1.1b.1.1.2	In Zanzibar, there is no electoral system at Wadi, which is equivalent to ward in Mainland Tanzania
(2.)4	It is not true that DCF are full of CCM members and non-CCM members were removed
(2.)4.1	Membership to a political party is not a selection criterion
(2.)4.1.1a	DCF members were selected based on criteria stipulated in the Commission's guidelines
(2.)4.1.1b	The basis of the elections was people's representativeness
(2.)4.1.1b.1	They considered how much someone is acceptable by people as their representative
(2.)4.1.1b.2	The representativeness criterion was one old person, one woman, one young person, and some other person
(2.)4.1.2	There is no methodology that has been devised with the intention to ensure that only certain members are elected
(2.4.1.2')	(The Commission never intended to favour CCM)
(2.)4.1.2.1a	If all members are CCM, it probably means many people in that ward are CCM followers/members
(2.4.1.2.1a')	(The selection of many CCM members in many areas is caused by the fact that many people in those areas are CCM followers/members)
(2.)4.1.2.1b	If all of them are Chadema, it means many people in that ward are followers of Chadema
(2.)4.1.3	If political parties have interfered in the process, they should stop it
(2.)4.1.3')	(They violate the Act)
(2.)4.1.3.1a	This is not their responsibility
(2.)4.1.3.1b	It is the responsibility of the Commission
(2.4.1.3.1b')	(According to the Act, the Commission shall exercise this responsibility)
(2.)4.2	It is not true that Mr Beatus Kipeya was removed from the list of DCF members
(2.)4.2.1	He is still a valid DCF member
(2.)4.2.1.1	If he is around, he can confirm this information
(2.)4.2.1.1.1	This information has been confirmed by members of the Commission

4.4.3 Argumentation in the expenditure committee

Further argumentation against or in favour of the minister's second standpoint (and substandpoint) as well as the opposition's substandpoint in the argumentation stage is advanced in the expenditure committee. In *Extract 4.14*, the Leader of the Opposition in the parliament, Mr Freeman Mbowe, responds to the accusation of the use of insulting language and personal attack by the opposition's spokesperson, as raised by the minister and Ms Anna Abdallah.

Extract 4.14

MHE. FREEMAN A. MBOWE – KIONGOZI WA KAMBI YA UPINZANI BUNGENI: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] pamejitokeza mazingira ya kujaribu kuchonganisha na kumchonganisha Mheshimiwa Warioba, tunaacha ku-address issue, watu wanajaribu kujenga hoja kwamba, pengine sisi tukijenga hoja dhidi ya Tume tunajenga hoja dhidi ya Mheshimiwa

Warioba. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba niseme jambo moja la msingi kwamba, tunamheshimu Warioba, tunawaheshimu Maka[mi]shna wote na tunawaheshimu Watanzania wote katika hii process ya Katiba. [3] Ila tunapokuwa tuna-address issue ambayo ni ya msingi, tusiondoe ile issue ya msingi, tukarudisha kwenye personality. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, maana yake tumeona watu wengine wanasema, ooh tuna-question uwezo wa Warioba, hiyo si hoja! [5] Mheshimiwa Warioba tukimtaja hapa ambaye tunamheshimu sana ni kwamba, tunamtaja Mwenyekiti wa Tume na hatuwezi kumtaja Mwenyekiti mwingine kwa sababu Mheshimiwa Warioba ndiye ambaye ana-communicate na public. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. FREEMAN A. MBOWE – LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION CAMP IN THE PARLIAMENT: [1] Honourable Chairperson, [...] there have been circumstances of trying to create conflict between Honourable Warioba [and us]; we deviate from addressing issues, [and] people are trying to make an argument that perhaps, when we make an argument against the Commission, then we make an argument against Honourable Warioba. [2] Honourable Chairperson, let me say one important and fundamental issue; we respect Warioba, we respect all the Commissioners and we respect all Tanzanians with regard to the constitutional review process. [3] However, when we address an important issue, let us not ignore the important issue and shift our focus to personality. [4] Honourable Chairperson, some people argue that we question Warioba's integrity; that is not the point. [5] If we mention Honourable Warioba, whom we respect so much, it means we mention the Commission's chairperson and we cannot mention any other person because Honourable Warioba is the one who communicates with the public.

In *Extract 4.14*, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Freeman Mbowe, responds to what could be described as the government's counter personal attack on Mr Lissu based on his use of what the minister and Ms Abdallah have described as 'disrespectful' (or 'insulting') language in the opposition's speech. Mr Mbowe thinks that the minister and other members of the ruling party are attacking Mr Lissu personally instead of addressing the subject matter under discussion, as indicated in [1]. In [2-5], he argues that mentioning Justice Joseph Warioba personally is not a personal attack on him or lack of respect for him, but he should be mentioned because he is the chairperson of the Commission and there is no other chairperson but him. In this argumentative move, he also performs the directive, asking MPs to focus on 'issues' rather than personality. With this argumentative move, Mr Mbowe implies that, instead of attacking Mr Lissu personally, the minister and other members of the ruling party should advance sound argumentation to support the minister's standpoints or attack the opposition's ones.

In *Extract 4.15*, another member of the opposition, Mr John J. Mnyika, requests a usage declarative from the minister regarding the requested allowance of TZS 12.1 billion for the Commission.

Extract 4.15

- (a) MHE. JOHN J. MNYIKA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] kasma 210300 ambayo mwaka wa fedha uliopita ilikuwa Shilingi bilioni 10.2, mwaka huu Shilingi bilioni 10.1, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani inaomba ufafanuzi wa mgawanyo wa fedha hizi kwa maana ya viwango vya posho vya Wajumbe wa Tume ya mabadiliko ya Katiba. [2] Mheshimiwa Waziri katika majumuisho

hakutaja kabisa viwango vya posho vya Wajumbe, na Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani imeonyesha mashaka yake siyo mwaka huu tu, hata mwaka 2012 kuhusu viwango ambavyo Wajumbe wa Tume wanalipwa na kufikia hatua ya kuviona kama viwango hivyo ni ulaji. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ningependa kupata ufafanuzi kutoka kwa Mheshimiwa Waziri, kwa Shilingi hizi bilioni 12.1 zilizopo hapa, kiwango cha posho cha Mjumbe kwa kikao kimoja kwa siku wa Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba ni kiasi gani? (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. JOHN J. MNYIKA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, [...] [regarding] vote 210300 which was TZS 10.2 billion in the last fiscal year [and] this year it is TZS 10.1 billion, the official opposition camp demands clarification about the distribution of this amount of money in terms of the amount of money given as allowance to the members of the Constitutional Review Commission. [2] In his responses, Honourable Minister didn't mention at all the rates of the allowance for the members and the official opposition camp has shown its doubts, not only this year, even in 2012, concerning the rates of the allowance paid to the members of the Commission to an extent of seeing these rates as a form of bribery. [3] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to get clarification from Honourable Minister, for this TZS 12.1 billion which is [indicated] here; what is the rate of the allowance for each member of the Commission for a single meeting per day?

- (b) NAIBU WAZIRI WA KATIBA NA SHERIA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, napenda kujibia swali alilouliza Mheshimiwa Mnyika kuhusiana na kasma ya 210300 ambapo ametaka kujua mgawanyo wa fedha wanazolipwa Makamishna wa Tume. [2] Mheshimiwa Spika, tumekuwa tukirudia suala hili mara kwa mara. [3] Mwaka 2012 wakati tunapitisha bajeti ya Wizara ya Katiba na Sheria, lakini pia hata leo Mheshimiwa Waziri amelieleza hili, viwango vya posho anayolipwa Kamishna wa Tume ni stahili na siri ya Mjumbe mwenyewe wa Tume. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

DEPUTY MINISTER FOR CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: [1] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to respond to the question asked by Honourable Mnyika concerning vote 210300, where he wants to know the distribution of the fund paid to the commissioners of the Commission. [2] Honourable Speaker, we have been repeating this matter over and over again. [3] In 2012 when we were approving the budget for the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs, but even today, Honourable Minister has talked about this matter; the rate of the allowance paid to commissioners of the Commission is a reasonable amount and it is confidential to the members of the Commission themselves.

In (a) [1-2], Mr John Mnyika suggests that, because the opposition's spokesperson has raised doubts regarding the allowance of TZS 12.1 billion for the Commission, in order to establish whether the allowance is reasonable, in (a) [3], this member of the opposition wants to know how much each member of the Commission is paid as an allowance per day. However, in subextract (b), the deputy minister declines from offering the requested usage declarative. She insists that each member of the Commission is paid a reasonable amount of allowance but this amount is confidential. With this response, the deputy minister provides the same answer as last year. In terms of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion, this response can be regarded as a violation of the obligation-to-defend rule. Additionally, by stating that members of the Commission are paid a 'reasonable' amount without disclosing it, the deputy minister seems to persuade Mr Mnyika to accept the minister's first standpoint with non-argumentation, hence violation of the relevance rule, as the deputy minister's response does not help to resolve the difference of opinion on the merits.

In *Extract 4.16*, Mr Lissu continues to challenge the minister's argumentation regarding the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF).

Extract 4.16

- (a) MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba nijielekeze kwenye utaratibu mzima wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya. [2] Kama ambavyo tulisema katika maoni yetu ya Kambi, kumekuwa na utaratibu wa kibaguzi katika uteuzi, uchaguzi wa Baraza la Kikatiba, kati ya Tanzania Bara na Zanzibar. [3] Huku Bara, Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba wamechujwa na Kamati za Maendeleo za Kata, wakati Zanzibar Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba wamechaguliwa moja kwa moja na wananchi. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Bara Wenyeviti wa Vijiji na Watendaji wa Vijiji na Mitaa ndiyo walikuwa Wenyeviti wa mikutano ya uchaguzi wakati Zanzibar, Wenyeviti na Makatibu wa mikutano ya uchaguzi walichaguliwa na wale waliokuwa wanachagua. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa hoja imeletwa kwamba, haya Mabaraza ya Kata yaliyofanya mchujo kwa Tanzania Bara ni vyombo vya kisheria vinatumika kwenye mambo mengi, [6] lakini ni muhimu nieleze hapa, Mabaraza ya Kata siyo vyombo vya kisheria, these are not statutory bodies, hazina kazi zilizoandikwa kwenye sheria zetu za Halmashauri za Mitaa. [7] Hizi ni Kamati tu na hazina Mamlaka yoyote ya kisheria kwa mujibu wa sheria. [8] Kwa hiyo, hakukuwa na sababu yoyote ya kuzifanya kuwa Mamlaka za uchaguzi. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. TUNDU A.M. LISSU: [1] Honourable Chairperson, let me focus on the whole process [of the conduct] of the district constitutional fora. [2] As we said in the opposition's speech, there has been a discriminatory methodology in the appointment, the election of members of the [district] constitutional fora between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. [3] In Mainland Tanzania, members of the [district] constitutional fora have been screened by the Ward Development Committees whereas in Zanzibar members of the [district] constitutional fora have been elected directly by the citizens. (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, in Mainland Tanzania, the village chairpersons and the Village Executive Officers were the ones who were the chairpersons of the election meetings whereas in Zanzibar the chairperson and the secretaries of the election meetings were elected by those who participated in the elections. [5] Honourable Chairperson, now an argument has been advanced that these ward committees which screened out people in Mainland Tanzania are statutory bodies that are used in miscellaneous matters, [6] but it is important to note that these committees are not statutory bodies; they don't have functions that have been stipulated in our local government by-laws. [7] These are mere committees; they don't have any legal mandate in accordance with the law. [8] Therefore, there was no reason to make them electoral bodies.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, japo la pili kwenye suala hilo hilo, hata Zanzibar kuna Madiwani na kuna kwenye Ward, lakini Madiwani wa Zanzibar kwenye ngazi ya Ward hakukuwa na mchujo wa Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Kata, Mabaraza ya Wilaya, wamechagua moja kwa moja. [2] Sasa Waziri amesema kwamba ngazi ya Kata kwa Tanzania Bara siyo ngazi ya kiuchaguzi, vilevile hapa amekosea, ngazi ya Kata ni ngazi ya uchaguzi, Madiwani wanachaguliwa kwenye ngazi ya Kata. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, kama suala ni ngazi ya kiuchaguzi, hata kwenye Kata zetu kulikuwa na uwezekano wa kuwachagua moja kwa moja Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya badala ya kuweka watu wane au watano wao ndiyo waamue nani anayekwenda kwenye Mabaraza ya Wilaya. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, naomba ufafanuzi wa jambo hili na nitoe hoja kwamba, kama sitaridhika na ufafanuzi wa Waziri, nitatoa shilingi kwenye mshahara wa Waziri, ili jambo hili lijadiliwe kwa kirefu na Kamati hii ya Matumizi ya Bunge lako. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the second matter in the same issue [is that] Zanzibar also has councillors and wards, but in Zanzibar, the councillors at the ward level didn't do [any] screening of members of the ward [constitutional] fora, district [constitutional] fora; they have been elected directly [by the people]. [2] Now the minister says that in Mainland Tanzania the

ward level is not an electoral level; in this regard, he is wrong since the ward level is an electoral level, the councillors are elected at the ward level. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, if it is the matter of electoral levels, even in our wards, there was a possibility of electing members of the district constitutional fora directly instead of putting four or five people to decide who should go to the district constitutional fora. [4] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, I need clarification concerning this matter and I beg to move that, if I am not satisfied with the minister's explanation, I will withdraw a shilling from the minister's salary in order for this matter to be discussed in depth by this expenditure committee of your parliament.

In *Extract 4.16*, Mr Lissu begins his argumentation by referring to the argument he already advanced in his speech, as indicated in (a) [1-4]. Since he is not convinced by the minister's response to his argument, in (a) [2], he maintains that *1 the Commission's methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory*. In favour of this substandpoint, in (a) [3], he argues that, while DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by citizens, *1.1 in Mainland Tanzania they were screened by WDCs*. For him, as he already suggested in the opposition's second standpoint and its related argumentation, this was done with the intention of ensuring that only CCM members are selected as DCF members (causal argumentation from means to goal). In support of *1.1*, in (a) [8], he suggests that *1.1.1 it was unreasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies*. To further defend this argument, he offers two supporting arguments. In the first argument, as indicated in (a) [6-7], he argues that *1.1.1.1a WDCs are not statutory bodies* because they do not have any legal functions stipulated in the local government by-laws (argument from legal authority) and, for that reason, *1.1.1.1b they are 'mere committees'*, as they do not have the statutory mandate. In the second argument, as shown in (b) [3], Mr Lissu maintains that *1.1.1.2 it was possible to directly elect DCF members at ward level in Mainland Tanzania*, as it was done in Zanzibar. In the unexpressed premise, Mr Lissu's statement implies that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have similar electoral systems and it was thus possible to apply a uniform methodology in both parts of the Union (comparison argumentation based on extrapolation of features). This argument contradicts the minister's argument that it was impossible to do so in Mainland Tanzania. However, one of the critical questions to Mr Lissu's comparison argumentation is whether the systems are really comparable. Thus, in an attempt to pre-empt this question from being raised, Mr Lissu advances two arguments in support of *1.1.1.2*. In (b) [1], he argues that, just like Mainland Tanzania, Zanzibar also has councillors (extrapolation of a feature) but there was no screening of the members as people elected DCF members directly at Shehia. In (b) [2], he further argues that, contrary to what the minister claims, a ward is an electoral level because councillors are elected at ward level.

Although Mr Lissu has attempted to defend his comparison argumentation in 1.1.1.2, this argumentation is still challenged by the deputy minister in *Extract 4.17*. In (b) [4], Mr Lissu performs a directive by requesting a usage declarative from the minister(s). Generally, Mr Lissu's standpoint and its related argumentation in the argumentation stage can be summarised as shown in *Table 4.15* below.

Table 4.15 Mr Lissu's standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
1	The methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory
1.1	While DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by citizens at Shehia, DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were screened by WDCs
(1.1')	(This was done with the intention of ensuring that only CCM members are elected)
1.1.1	It was unreasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania
1.1.1.1a	WDCs are not statutory bodies
1.1.1.1a.1	They don't have any legal functions stipulated in the local government by-laws
1.1.1.1b	They are 'mere committees'
1.1.1.1b.1	They don't have any statutory mandate
1.1.1.2	It was possible to directly elect DCF members at ward level in Mainland Tanzania
(1.1.1.2')	(Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have similar electoral systems and it was thus possible to apply a uniform methodology in both parts of the Union)
1.1.1.2.1a	Zanzibar also has councillors
1.1.1.2.1b	There was no screening of DCF members in Zanzibar
1.1.1.2.1c	All citizens at a ward elected DCF members directly
1.1.1.2.2	A ward is an electoral level in Mainland Tanzania
1.1.1.2.2.1	Councillors are elected at ward level

In *Extract 4.17*, the Minister and Deputy Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs respond to Mr Lissu's argumentation against the methodology in the appointment or election of DCF members at ward level (in Mainland Tanzania) as an attempt to further defend the minister's second standpoint about 'effective' coordination of the constitutional review process. In their responses, they critically react to Mr Lissu's comparison argumentation in 1.1.1.2 and argumentation from legal authority in 1.1.1.1a and 1.1.1.1b.

Extract 4.17

- (a) NAIBU WAZIRI WA KATIBA NA SHERIA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, swali [...] la Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu, kuhusiana na utaratibu wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya na alituhumu kwamba katika uteuzi wa Wajumbe wa Mabaraza haya ya Katiba kulikuwa na ubaguzi. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, tumekuwa tukijibu mara kwa mara, lakini pia siku mbili zilizopita Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti wa Tume hii, Mheshimiwa Jaji Warioba, alilielezea hili kwa kina na endapo ana uthibitisho wa hayo, anaweza akaiwasilishia Tume waweze kuchukuliwa hatua stahiki. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini ameelezea pia wasiwasi wake [...] kwamba kumekuwa na double standard katika Tanzania Bara, hatua ya uchaguzi wa Wajumbe ilikuwa ni hatua mbili wakati Tanzania Zanzibar walikuwa na hatua moja tu. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ukiangalia mwongozo wa Tume, katika aya ya pili, unaeleza kabisa bayana kwamba utaratibu wa kuwapata Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya hautafanana kwa pande zote za Muungano. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hii inatokana na

sababu kwamba tuna tofauti ya mfumo wa utawala. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
DEPUTY MINISTER FOR CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: [1] [Regarding] [...] Honourable Tundu Lissu's question on the methodology for [the conduct of] the district constitutional fora, and he has accused [the government] of discrimination in the appointment of members of the district constitutional fora, Honourable Chairperson, we have been responding to this question several times, but also in the past two days, the chairperson of the Commission, Honourable Justice Warioba, explained it in depth and if he has evidence of those allegations he can present it to the Commission for them to take appropriate measures. [2] Honourable Chairperson, but he has also expressed his concern [...] that there has been a double standard; in Mainland Tanzania, there were two stages in the election of the members, whereas in Tanzania Zanzibar, there was only one stage. [3] Honourable Chairperson, if you look at the Commission's guidelines, in the second paragraph, it explains quite clearly that the methodology for getting members of the district constitutional fora will not be the same in each part of the Union. [4] Honourable Chairperson, this is due to the fact that we have different governing systems.

- (b) WAZIRI WA KATIBA NA SHERIA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini pia nisahihishe moja tu la Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu hapa, aliposema kwamba Kamati za Maendeleo za Kata ni Kamati tu. [2] Kamati hizi zimetungwa kisheria kwa mujibu wa sheria namba saba (7) na namba nane (8) za mwaka 1982 na Kamati hizi zinafanya maamuzi yake na maamuzi yake ni ya kisheria. [3] Ni Kamati za kisheria, huwezi ukasema ni Kamati tu, [...] [4] Mheshimiwa Lissu, soma vizuri sheria. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
THE MINISTER FOR CONSTITUTION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS: [...] Honourable Chairperson, let me make a correction on the issue raised by Honourable Tundu Lissu, who said that the Ward Development Committees are mere committees. [2] These committees have been legally established in accordance with the Act Number 7 and Number 8 of 1982 and these committees make their decisions and these decisions are made according to the law. [3] They are statutory committees; you cannot say they are mere committees [...]. [4] Honourable Lissu, please read the laws between lines. (Applause)

In *Extract 4.16*, the deputy minister responds to Mr Lissu's accusation of discrimination and double standard in the selection of DCF members. As regards the accusation of discrimination, although she strategically evades from offering further argumentation or a usage declarative with the reason that the 'failure event' has already been well accounted for by the minister and the chairperson of the Commission (*refusal*), the deputy minister's statements in (a) [1-2] suggest that (1) *the methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory because (1.1) there is no evidence of discrimination in the appointment/election*. Lack of evidence of discrimination is considered a sign that the methodology was not discriminatory (symptomatic argumentation). She further states that, if Mr Lissu has evidence of discrimination in the process, he can present it to the Commission. This implies that, if there was discrimination, people would have already presented evidence of such discrimination to the Commission. I consider argument (1.1) to be the first argument in favour of the ministers' standpoint (*the methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory*). With regard to the Commission's use of a different methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland

Tanzania, she argues that (1.)2 *this is caused by the existence of different governing systems between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar (causal argumentation), as indicated in (a) [3-5]. This causal argumentation is challenged by Mr Lissu in Extract 4.18.*

In subextract (b), Mr Chikawe's argumentative move implies that (1.3) *it was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies.* In favour of this argument, he challenges Mr Lissu's argument that WDCs are mere committees. In (b) [1-3], he maintains that WDCs are not mere committees because they have been legally established in accordance with the Local government Act No. 7 and No. 8 of 1982, and their decisions are legally acceptable. He concludes his argumentation with what Ilie (2001, 2004) could describe as an insult to Mr Lissu's intellectual capability. In (b) [4], he asks Mr Lissu to read the laws between lines. Being one of prominent lawyers in Tanzania, this can be seen as an insult to Mr Lissu's legal intelligence. Nevertheless, this argumentative move seems to strengthen the minister's appeal to legal authority in his argumentation. The ministers' substandpoint (and its related argumentation) is summarised in **Table 4.16** below.

Table 4.16 The ministers' substandpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
(1)	(The methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory)
(1.1)	(There is no evidence of discrimination in the appointment/election)
(1.1)1	If Mr Lissu has the evidence, he can present it to the Commission
(1.1.1')	(If there was evidence, it would have been already presented to the Commission)
(1.)2	The use of a different methodology in Mainland Tanzania is caused by the existing differences in the governing systems between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar
(1.3)	(It was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies)
(1.3.)1	WDCs are not mere committees
(1.3.1')	(WDCs are statutory bodies)
(1.3.)1.1a	They have been established according to the law
(1.3.)1.1b	The decisions they make are legally acceptable
(1.3.)1.2	Tundu Lissu should read the laws between lines
(1.3.1.2')	(He is not legally aware that WDCs are statutory bodies)

It seems Mr Lissu is still not convinced by the ministers' argumentation. In *Extract 4.18*, he continues to challenge the ministers' substandpoint and its related argumentation.

Extract 4.18

- (a) MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hoja yangu ni very specific, Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya yalivyochaguliwa. [2] Hoja ya Waziri ni kwamba, kuna taratibu tofauti za kiutawala kati ya Tanzania Bara na Zanzibar. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hii hoja si sahihi, kwani Tanzania Bara ngazi ya msingi ni Kijiji, lakini Zanzibar hakuna vijiji bali wanaita Shehia. [4] Baada ya Kijiji kwa Tanzania Bara, ngazi inayofuata ni Kata na kwa upande wa Zanzibar inaitwa Wadi. [5] Ni majina tu lakini ngazi ni zile zile. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa kwenye uchaguzi wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya upande wa Tanzania

Bara ngazi ya kwanza ya Kijiji imependekeza tu, wamepiga kura wote, wanakijiji wamehudhuria wote, lakini kura zao zote hazina maana, ni mapendekezo tu! [7] Wanaochagua ni wajumbe wa Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata. [8] Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata, nina Wajumbe wake ni Wenyeviti wa Vijiji na Diwani wa Kata, Kata nyingi zina vijiji vinne au vitano. [9] Kwa hiyo, ni watu watano au sita ndiyo waliochagua wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Kata za Tanzania Bara wakati Zanzibar wamechaguliwa na wananchi wote. [10] Kuna direct democracy Zanzibar, lakini kuna mchujo Bara [11] na ndiyo ubaguzi ninaouzungumzia. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. TUNDU A.M. LISSU: [1] Honourable Chairperson, my point is very specific; how [members of] district constitutional fora were elected. [2] The minister's argument is that there are different governing systems between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. [3] Honourable Chairperson, this is not correct since in Mainland Tanzania the basic level is the village whereas in Zanzibar, there are no villages, but they call this [level] Shehia. [4] In Mainland Tanzania, the next level after the village is 'kata' (ward) and in Zanzibar is called 'Wadi' (ward). [5] These are just [different] names, but they refer to the same level. [6] Honourable Chairperson, now in the election of members of district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania, the first stage at the village simply nominated the candidates; all [people] voted, all the villagers attended, but all their votes are meaningless, those are mere nominations! [7] The ones who selected the members are the members of the Ward Development Committees (WDCs). [8] Members of the WDCs are the village chairpersons and the ward councillor; many wards have four or five villages. [9] So, it is five or six people who selected the members of the ward/district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania whereas in Zanzibar they were elected by all citizens. [10] There is direct democracy in Zanzibar, but there is a screening process in Mainland Tanzania, [11] and this is the discrimination I am talking about.

- (b) [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, hoja ni hiyo kwamba, kwa nini wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Tanzania Bara wamechujwa na Kamati ya watu wanne au watano wakati wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya ya Zanzibar wamechaguliwa na wananchi wote. [2] Hiyo ndiyo hoja na naomba hoja hii ijadiliwe kwa sababu tunatengeneza Katiba, hatuwezi tukatengeneza Katiba ambayo wajumbe wake watakaokwenda kuizungumzia kwenye Wilaya ni watu waliopitishwa kwenye mchujo. [3] Kama nilivyosema ni kwamba Ward C za Tanzania Bara over 80% ni za CCM, ndiyo hali halisi! [4] Sasa kama ukitumia utaratibu huo maana yake ni kwamba waliopitishwa wote ni wana CCM. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti jambo la mwisho, kuhusiana na hoja hii ni kwamba, Sheria imesema wazi, katika kifungu cha 17 (8) kilisema Tume itabuni utaratibu unaofanana utakaotumika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano katika ukusanyaji na uchambuzi wa maoni, uendeshaji wa Mabaraza na uandaaji wa report. [6] Hii ndiyo mandate ya Tume, [7] Tume haikuambiwa itutengenezee utaratibu ambao watu wanakwenda kuchujwa na kikundi cha watu wanne au watano. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, that is the argument; why members of the [district] constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania were screened by a committee consisting of four or five people whereas members of the district constitutional fora in Zanzibar were elected by all citizens? [2] That is the point and I request that this issue be discussed because we are making the constitution, we cannot make the constitution whose members, who will go to talk about it at the district level, are the people who have been obtained through a screening [process]. [3] As I have said, more than 80% of the Ward Cs in Mainland Tanzania are dominated by the CCM, this is the reality! [4] Thus, if you use that system, it means all members who are selected are CCM members. [5] Honourable Chairperson, the last thing concerning this motion is that the Act has pointed out clearly in section 17(8); it says the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies which will be used in both parts of the United Republic [of Tanzania] in the collection and analysis of public opinions, the conduct of fora and writing of the report. [6] This is the Commission's mandate. [7] The Commission was not told to devise a methodology where people are screened by a group of four or five people.

In *Extract 4.18*, Mr Lissu continues to argue against the methodology for the election or appointment of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania, as indicated in (a) [1]. As suggested in (a) [11], he seems to maintain his substandpoint that *(1) the methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory*. In the first argument for the substandpoint, as expressed in (a) [2-5], he challenges the deputy minister's argument that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems. He argues that *(1.)1 it is not true that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems*, suggesting that the systems are just the same and what was done in Zanzibar could be done in Mainland Tanzania (comparison argumentation based on extrapolation of features). He maintains that *(1.)1.1 the basic level in Mainland Tanzania is village and the basic level in Zanzibar is Shehia*, implying that this is the same level because Shehia in Zanzibar is equivalent to village or Mtaa in Mainland Tanzania. He further maintains that *(1.)1.2a the next level in Mainland Tanzania is 'kata' (ward) and in Zanzibar it is Wadi (ward)*. In (a) [5], he argues that *(1.)1.2b this is the same level with different names*. In these subarguments for *(1.)1*, he seems to extrapolate characteristics which make the systems to be similar, and he thus maintains comparison argumentation based on extrapolation of features.

The second argument in favour of Mr Lissu's substandpoint realises coordinative argumentation with three premises. In (a) [9], he argues that *(1.)2a DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by people*, and for this reason, there was what he describes as 'direct democracy' in Zanzibar. In (a) [7-9], he insists that *(1.)2b DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were selected by 5 or 6 people who are WDC members at ward level*, because *(1.)2b.1 there was screening of DCF members by WDCs in Mainland Tanzania*, which suggests that there was no direct democracy, and for that reason, *(1.)2b.2 people's votes at village/Mtaa level did not mean anything*, as the election stage at village/Mtaa was merely a nomination stage, as indicated in (a) [6]. After comparing the methodology in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, in (a) [10], he maintains that *(1.)2c 'this is the discrimination I am talking about'*. As shown in (b) [1-2], a further argument in favour of *(1.)2c* is advanced in the form of a (rhetorical) question: *(1.)2c.1 why DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were selected by four or five people while those in Zanzibar were elected by all citizens?* In the unexpressed premise, Mr Lissu seems to reinforce the argument that it was unreasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies for two reasons. First, in (b) [3], he argues that 80% of WDCs are dominated by CCM, adding in (b) [4] that, if you use WDCs, all the selected members will be CCM members (causal argumentation). Second, in (b) [5-6], he maintains that section 17(8) of the Act clearly provides

that the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies that will be applicable in each part of the Union in the collection of public opinions, the conduct of fora, and writing of the report (argumentation from legal authority). He concludes his argumentation in (b) [7]. He argues that, in accordance with the Act, the Commission was not directed to devise a methodology where members of fora will be screened out by a group of four or five people. This argument suggests that what the Commission did is against the Act (argumentation from legal authority).

Although Mr Lissu provided the right quotation of the cited provision of the Act in the confrontation stage, this time he quotes only the detail of the subsection that supports his argumentation and ignores other important detail of the subsection which contradicts his position (presentational device). This quotation (or rather misquotation) can lead to misinterpretation of the referred provision of the Act. Section 17(8) of the Act provides that:

In the performance of its functions, the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies, *except where the circumstances require otherwise*, (italic; my emphasis) that would be applicable in each part of the United Republic in the collection and analysis of public opinions, the conduct of fora and writing of the report (URT, 2012, p. 15).

The italicized part of the subsection refers to the provision which Mr Lissu strategically omitted in his quotation. However, this provision is brought to light by the Attorney General in *Extract 4.23*. Mr Lissu's further argumentation for his substandpoint is summarised in **Table 4.17** below.

Table 4.17 Mr Lissu's further argumentation for his substandpoint

No.	Description
(1.)	(The methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory)
(1.)1	It is not true that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems
(1.1')	(The systems are basically similar)
(1.)1.1	The basic level in Mainland Tanzania is a village and the basic level in Zanzibar is Shehia
(1.1.1')	(Shehia in Zanzibar is similar to a village/Mtaa in Mainland Tanzania)
(1.)1.2a	The next level in Mainland Tanzania is 'kata' (ward) and in Zanzibar it is Wadi (ward)
(1.)1.2b	This is the same level with different names
(1.)2a	DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by all citizens at Shehia
(1.)2a.1	There was direct democracy
(1.)2b	DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were appointed by five or six people who are WDC members
(1.)2b.1	There was screening of DCF members by WDCs in Mainland Tanzania
(1.)2b.2	People's votes at village/Mtaa didn't mean anything
(1.)2b.2.1	The election stage at village/Mtaa was merely a nomination stage
(1.)2c	This is the discrimination I am talking about
(1.)2c.1	Why DCF members were appointed by four or five people on the WDCs?

(1.2c.1')	(It was unreasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies)
(1.)2c.1.1	80% of WDCs are dominated by CCM
(1.)2c.1.1.1	If you make them electoral bodies, the selected people will be CCM members
(1.)2c.1.2	The Act provides that the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies in the conduct of fora in each part of the Union
(1.)2c.1.2.1	The Commission was not directed to devise a methodology where people will be selected by four or five people

As regards the methodology in the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF) or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania, in *Extract 4.19*, the Deputy Minister for Energy and Minerals, Mr George Simbachawene, advances further argumentation to defend the ministers' substandpoint. However, this argumentation is challenged by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Freeman Mbowe.

Extract 4.19

- (a) NAIBU WAZIRI WA NISHATI NA MADINI (MHE. GEORGE B. SIMBACHAWENE): [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, napenda niseme tu kwamba, kwa kweli hoja ya mtoa hoja hata kwa formula yoyote ile utakayoifanya, kama msingi wake ni uwiano wa vyama, matokeo yatakuwa yale yale. [2] Lakini siamini kama msingi wa Mabaraza haya ni uwiano wa Vyama [3] na ukijaribu kui-transmute, ukaipeleka kwa aspect hiyo, kwa direction hiyo ya Vyama utapata matokeo yale yale. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mtoa hoja anasema kwamba 80% ya Mabaraza haya ya Kata kwa maana ya Ward C ni ya CCM, maana yake nini? [5] Viongozi waliochaguliwa na wananchi kule chini anakosema kwenye Kijiji, kwa maana ya vitongoji na vijiji hivyo, ndiyo waliamua iwe hivyo. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- DEPUTY MINISTER FOR ENERGY AND MINERALS (HON. GEORGE A. SIMBACHAWENE): [1] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to say that, to be honest, the motion of the motion mover by using any formula whatsoever, if its basis is the proportion of the parties, the results will just be the same. [2] But I don't believe that the basis of [the selection criterion in the conduct of] the [district constitutional] fora was the proportion of one [political] party to another, [3] and if you try to transmute it and capitalise on that aspect, in the direction of the proportion of the parties, you will get the same results. (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, the motion mover says that 80% of these Ward councils in the sense of Ward C belong to the CCM party, what does it mean? [5] It means the leaders who were elected by the citizens from the grass root level, to the village there, in the sense of the hamlets and those villages, those [citizens] are the ones who decided it to be so. (Applause)*
- (b) [1] Kwa hiyo, kwa vyovyote utakavyofanya hata ukienda kwenye kijiwe, uwiano huo kama ni ratio kwa maana yake kwa 80 na 20 maana yake ni nane kwa mbili, popote utakapokwenda nchi hii ukawakusanya hivi utapata uwiano huo huo hata ukienda kijiweni. [2] Sasa sina hakika kama mtoa hoja anataka ku-achieve nini, [3] lakini kama anataka ku-achieve uwiano wa uwakilishi katika Taifa hili huwezi ukaiweka pembeni CCM, huwezi kwa namna yoyote. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, niombe tu Mheshimiwa Mjumbe pamoja na mawazo mazuri na dhamira nzuri na mimi namheshimu sana, kwamba jambo hili alione katika mtazamo mpana. [5] Anaweza akawa ana-drive kitu anachotaka kukifikia, lakini si rahisi akakifikia hata kwa formular anayokuja nayo. [...] (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- [1] Therefore, in whatever way you do it, even if you go to people on streets, this proportion, if it is the ratio in the sense of 80% and 20%, means that it is eight to two, wherever you go in this country, and gather people this way you will get this proportion, even if you go to a small meeting place for the youth on street. [2] Thus, I am not sure what the motion mover wants to achieve! [3] But if he wants to achieve the representative proportion in this nation, you cannot put CCM aside, it is impossible, by whatever means! (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson,*

let me advise the Honourable Member [of Parliament] that, despite his good ideas and good intention, and I highly respect him, he should look at this matter from a broader perspective. [5] He might be driving something which he wants to achieve, but it is not easy to realise it even by using the formula that he proposes.

- (c) MHE. FREEMAN A. MBOWE – KIONGOZI WA KAMBI YA UPINZANI BUNGENI: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, anachokizungumza Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu, Mnadhimu wetu, anazungumzia kuchagua Wajumbe wa Mabaraza kutokana na uchaguzi wa wananchi na siyo uchaguzi wa Vyama vya Siasa. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, wote tunajua hapa ndani kwamba Vyama vyote vikichanganywa members wa Vyama vyote hatufiki milioni kumi, [3] lakini nchi hii wapiga kura wapo zaidi ya milioni 20. [4] Kwa nini tunaogopa na tunashindwa kuwapa wananchi fursa ya kuwachagua wawakilishi wao, [5] wakiwa wa CCM hewala, wakiwa wa CHADEMA hewala na wakiwa hawana Chama pia hewala! [6] Where is the problem? (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- HON. FREEMAN A. MBOWE – LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION IN THE PARLIAMENT: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, what Honourable Tundu Lissu, our chief whip, is talking about; he is talking about the election of members [of the district constitutional] fora on the basis of the election by people, not by the political parties. (Applause) [2] Honourable Chairperson, we all know that, if we combine all members of our parties, we won't have more than ten million members. [3] But this country has more than 20 million voters. [4] Why are we scared of affording citizens the opportunity to elect their representatives? [5] If they are CCM members, it is fine, if they are CHADEMA members, it is fine, and if they don't belong to any political party, it is also fine! [6] Where is the problem?*

In *Extract 4.19*, Mr Simbachawene seems to suggest that (1) *it was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies*. Causal argumentation is advanced to support this substandpoint. In (a) [1] and (b) [5], he argues that (1.) *I even if you use any other formula, the result will be the same*, implying that, even if the Commission applied a different methodology, the result would have been the same. A further argument for (1.) *I* begins with the premise that (1.) *I.1a I don't believe that the selection criterion was the proportion of one political party to another*, as expressed in (a) [2] and (b) [2]. In (a) [3], this premise is coordinatively combined with the argument that (1.) *I.1b but even if it was so, the results would still be the same*. In favour of (1.) *I.1b*, in (a) [4-5], he argues that, (1.) *I.1b.1a since 80% of WDCs are dominated by CCM, it means citizens who elect leaders at the grassroots level decided it to be so*, implying that 80% of people at the grassroots level are CCM supporters or members (symptomatic argumentation). To further defend this argument, in (b) [1], he argues that (1.) *I.1b.1b in every place you go in this country the ratio is 8 to 2 or 80 to 20*, implying that, in every 10 people, 8 people are CCM supporters or members (statistical argumentation). This argument is based on Mr Lissu's statement that 80% of WDCs are dominated by CCM members. The second argument in support of (1.) *I.1b* is expressed in (b) [3], where he argues that (1.) *I.1b.2 you cannot put CCM aside*, if the criterion of representativeness is the proportion of one party to another. Another argument for (1.) *I* is presented in (b) [4], where he suggests that (1.) *I.2 Mr Lissu should look at the matter from a broad perspective*, implying that he looks at the matter from a narrow perspective, which

could be interpreted as a personal attack on Mr Lissu. In **Table 4.18** below, I summarise Mr Simbachawene's argumentation. This argumentation seems to support the ministers' substandpoint that the Commission's methodology in the appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory.

Table 4.18 Mr Simbachawene's argumentation

No.	Description
(1.)	(It was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies)
(1.)1	Even if you use any other formula, the result will be the same
(1.1')	(Even if the Commission used a different methodology, they would achieve the same result)
(1.)1.1a	I don't believe that the selection criterion was the proportion of one political party to another
(1.)1.1b	But even if it was so, the result would still be same
(1.)1.1b.1a	Since 80% of WDCs are dominated by CCM, it means that citizens who elect leaders at the grassroot level decided it to be so
(1.1.1b.1a')	(It is a sign that 80% of people at the grassroot level are CCM followers or members)
(1.)1.1b.1b	In every place you go in this country the ratio is 8 to 2 or 80 to 20
(1.1.1b.1b')	(The statistics suggest that, in every ten people, eight people are CCM supporters)
(1.)1.1b.2	You cannot, in any way, put CCM aside when it comes to representativeness
(1.)1.2	Mr Lissu should look at this matter from a broad perspective
(1.1.2')	(He seems to look at this matter from a narrow perspective)

However, Mr Simbachawene's argumentation is challenged by Mr Mbowe in subextract (c). In this subextract, Mr Mbowe seems to suggest that, if the results would be the same even if the Commission used a different methodology, why did the WDCs screen out DCF members at ward level instead of electing them directly at the village level? This argument is presented in (c) [1], where he suggests that DCF members in Mainland Tanzania should be directly elected by citizens, as it was done in Zanzibar, implying that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have similar governing systems (maintaining Mr Lissu's comparison argumentation). In (c) [2-3], he attacks Mr Simbachawene's argument that many people in Tanzania are CCM members or supporters. He argues that members of all political parties in the country are less than 10 million people, but the country has more than 20 million voters. With this argumentative move, he implies that it is impossible to have 8 CCM members/supporters in every ten Tanzanians who are eligible to vote. In (c) [4], he wonders why the government is afraid and fails to afford people an opportunity to directly elect their representatives. In (c) [5], Mr Mbowe focuses his argumentation on the methodology for the selection. He suggests that, if the Commission applied a reasonable methodology, they would not bother whether the selected DCF members are CCM members or followers of other parties. In (c) [6], he concludes his argumentation with a rhetorical question: *where is the problem?* This suggests that there is no problem giving citizens the right to directly elect DCF members as their representatives.

In *Extract 4.20*, two other members of the ruling party also challenge the opposition's argumentation against the Commission's methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania, while supporting the ministers' substandpoint.

Extract 4.20

- (a) MHE. DEO K. SANGA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hawa Wajumbe ambao anawazungumzia Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu kwamba wamechaguliwa kutoka kwenye Kata, wajumbe wale waliochaguliwa kutoka kwenye Kata ni wale waliochaguliwa kutoka kila Kijiji katika Kata hiyo. [3] Kwa mfano, Kata ina Vijiji sita au saba, wametoka kila Kijiji wajumbe wanne wanne. [34] Wakaenda sasa kwenye Kata ambapo sasa wakachaguliwa wanne na Baraza la Kata ambalo sasa kwenye Kata pale wapo Wenyeviti wa Vijiji na wa Vitongoji na ndiyo waliowachagua wale waliochaguliwa na wananchi kule. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. DEO K. SANGA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, the members whom Honourable Tundu Lissu is talking about that have been selected at the ward are the same people who were elected from each village in the ward. [2] For instance, if the ward has six villages or seven, four members are elected from each village in the ward. [3] They then go to the ward level where four of them got elected by the Ward [Development] Committee, which is composed of the chairpersons of villages and the hamlets, and they are the ones who selected the members who were elected by the citizens there. (Applause)

- (b) MHE. CAPT. JOHN Z. CHILIGATI: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hoja kwamba Tume imefanya ubaguzi kwa kutumia mfumo tofauti Bara na Zanzibar, [2] Waziri ameeleza vizuri kwamba, mifumo yetu ni tofauti. [3] Kwa hiyo, utaratibu usingefanana katika hiyo mifumo tofauti na tofauti yenyewe iko hivi, [4] huku Bara tuna kikao cha Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata yaani Ward C, wajumbe wake wanatoka kwenye vijiji ndiyo wanakwenda kwenye Kata, kwenye Ward C na ndicho kikao ambacho kilichotumika cha uwakilishi wa vijiji hivyo. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa Zanzibar kikao kama hicho hakipo, Kamati ya Maendeleo ya Kata Zanzibar haipo. [6] Kwa hiyo, usingetegemea kitu ambacho hakipo Zanzibar kifanye kazi hiyo. [...] (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

HON. CAPT. JOHN Z. CHILIGATI: [1] Honourable Chairperson, [as regards] the argument that there was discrimination in the Commission's application of different methodologies in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, [2] the minister has explained it very well that our systems are different. [3] Thus, the methodologies couldn't be the same in the different systems and the difference is that, [4] in Mainland Tanzania, we have the meeting of the Ward Development Committee also known as Ward C, whose members come from the villages and then go to the ward level at the Ward C, and this is the meeting which was used to represent the villages. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in Zanzibar, there is no such a meeting, in Zanzibar, they don't have the Ward Development Committee. [6] Therefore, you wouldn't expect something that is non-existent in Zanzibar to be applicable.

In *Extract 4.20*, Mr Deo Sanga and Mr John Chiligati continue to suggest that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory, as implied in (b) [1]. They advance two arguments to support this substandpoint. First, as indicated in (a) [1], Mr Sanga argues that DCF members who were selected by Ward Development Committees (WDCs) at ward level in Mainland Tanzania are the same people who were elected by citizens at the village level,

implying that it was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies. In (a) [2], he further argues that, if a ward has 6 or 7 villages, people will elect 4 members from every village (argument from example). This argumentation from example is supported by argumentation from narrative, as he ‘narrates’ how the selection process was conducted. In, (a) [3], he argues that names of the elected people from every village were sent to the ward where the WDCs selected four people from the list of the people elected by the villagers of the relevant villages.

Second, in (b) [2-3], Mr Chiligati maintains that it was impossible to use uniform methodologies in different governing systems, suggesting that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems, as already explained by the deputy minister. In the rest of the subextract, he explains these differences in the governing systems between Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. He argues that Mainland Tanzania has WDCs or a WDC meeting, but Zanzibar does not have such WDCs or such a WDC meeting. For this reason, it was impossible for the Commission to use a system that does not exist in Zanzibar in the appointment/election of DCF members. In this argumentation, Mr Chiligati suggests that the Commission’s use of different methodologies in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar is caused by the differences in the governing systems between the two parts of the Union (causal argumentation). This causal argumentation is advanced to challenge Mr Lissu’s comparison argumentation. In his previous arguments, Mr Lissu suggests that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have similar governing systems.

One of the opposition’s claims that the government ministers and MPs have not addressed in their arguments is the claim that many people who were overwhelmingly voted for by citizens at village level were removed from the list and those who got fewer votes were selected. This is why Ms Halima Mdee raises this claim in *Extract 4.21*. She also talks about other criticisms and doubts that need further lines of defence from the ministers.

Extract 4.21

- (a) MHE. HALIMA J. MDEE: [...] [1] Kuna Ushahidi unaonesha kwamba wajumbe waliochaguliwa kwenye vijiji ama mitaa, wamepata kura nyingi na wamechaguliwa na wananchi wengi, wamekwenda kuchujwa na wamepewa uwakilishi watu waliopata kura chache, hiyo ni moja. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, la pili, kuna ushahidi wa dhahiri, sheria inakataza Vyama kuingilia kabla hatujafika hatua ya referendum baada ya Bunge la Katiba. [3] Kuna Ushahidi wa barua ya Asha-Rose Migiro, wameingilia mchakato kuelekeza viongozi wa Wilaya na Vijiji kwenda kuingilia mchakato na kuchagua machaguo ambayo siyo sahihi kisheria. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- HON. HALIMA J. MDEE: [...] [1] First, there is evidence that members [of the district constitutional fora] who were overwhelmingly voted for by many citizens at the village or Mtaa level were screened out and those who got fewer votes were selected as representatives.*

(Applause) [2] Honourable Chairperson, second, there is a clear evidence; the Act forbids the parties to interfere in the process before we reach the referendum stage after the Constituent Assembly. [4] There is evidence of the letter by Asha-Rose Migiro; they have interfered in the process by instructing district and village leaders to interfere in the process and make choices which are against the Act.

- (b) [1] Lakini Waziri amekiri kwamba, Diwani amejichagua yeye na familia yake, [2] huo ni mfano mmoja ambayo unaelezea mifano mipana. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mwenyekiti wa Tume amekiri kuna tatizo, anasema watu ambao hawajaridhika wakate rufaa. [4] Ukipitia mwongozo ambao wametoa, watueleze kuna mechanism ya kukata rufaa? [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, niungane na hoja ya Mheshimiwa Lissu kwamba, kuna tatizo, Waziri amekubali, Mwenyekiti wa Tume amekubali, turekebishe kwa manufaa ya nchi. [6] Hii Katiba ni zaidi ya CCM, ni zaidi ya CHADEMA, ni zaidi ya NCCR Mageuzi na hali kadhalika ni zaidi ya CUF. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] But the minister has admitted that a councillor has elected himself and his family [as representatives]. [2] That is [just] one instance that exemplifies more horrible cases. [3] Honourable Chairperson, the chairperson of the Commission has admitted that there is a problem; he says that the people who are not satisfied should appeal. [4] If you go through the guidelines that they have issued; is there a mechanism for appealing that they have explained there? [5] Honourable Chairperson, let me support Tundu Lissu's motion that there is a problem, the minister and the chairperson of the Commission have admitted that there is a problem, let us resolve it for the welfare of the nation. [6] This constitution is more important than CCM, it is more important than Chadema, it is more important than NCCR-Mageuzi, and it is also more important than CUF.

Based on *Extract 4.21*, Ms Mdee suggests that *(1) the methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory and problematic*. To defend this standpoint, she advances four arguments. In her first argument, she argues that *(1.)1 DCF members who were overwhelmingly voted for by citizens at village/Mtaa level were screened out by WDCs and those who got fewer votes were selected*, as indicated in (a) [1]. In the second argument, as expressed in (b) [1-2], she maintains that *(1.)2a [there is] a councillor who has appointed himself and his family members as representatives of the people* (argumentation from example) and that *(1.)2b the minister has admitted this* (authority argumentation). In support of *(1.)2a*, she further maintains that *(1.)2a.1 this is just a single instance which entails more horrible cases* (symptomatic argumentation). In the third argument, as indicated in (b) [3], she argues that *(1.)3 the chairperson of the Commission has admitted that there is a problem* (authority argumentation), and that he asks those who are not satisfied with the process to appeal but there is no mechanism for appeal in the Commission's guidelines. This is framed as a rhetorical question in (b) [4]. In her last argument, as presented in (a) [2-3], she suggests that *(1.)4 based on Dr Migiro's letter, it is evident that CCM has interfered in the process*, which is considered to be a sign that the methodology was discriminatory and problematic (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is defended by argumentation from legal authority. She suggests that this interference

is against the Act because the Act prohibits political parties from interfering in the process before the validation stage of the proposed constitution in the referendum. Based on these arguments, she supports Mr Lissu's argumentation regarding the conduct of DCF or the coordination of the constitutional review process and she asks minister to intervene for the interests of the nation because the constitution is more important than political parties (audience adaptation), as indicated in (b) [5-6]. In this argumentative move, she adapts to audience demand. She seems to suggest that she speaks for the interests of the people (the electorate), not for the interests of her party, as she attempts to get her substandpoint or argumentation accepted. I summarise Ms Mdee's argumentation in *Table 4.19* below.

Table 4.19 Ms Mdee's argumentation

No.	Description
(1)	(The methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory and problematic)
(1.)1	DCF members who were overwhelmingly voted for at village level were screened out by WDCs at ward level and those who got fewer votes were selected
(1.)2a	A councillor appointed himself and his family members as representatives of the people
(1.)2b	The minister has admitted this
(1.)2a.1	This is just one instance which entails more horrible cases
(1.)3	The chairperson of the Commission has admitted that there is a problem
(1.)3.1a	He asks those who are not satisfied with the process to appeal
(1.)3.1b	There is no mechanism for appeal in the Commission's guidelines
(1.)4	Based on Dr Migiro's letter, it is evident that CCM has interfered in the process
(1.)4.1	The Act prohibits political parties from interfering in the process before the validation stage

In *Extract 4.22*, the then Minister of State, Prime Minister's Office (Regional Administration and Local Government), Ms Hawa Ghasia, advances further argumentation to support the ministers' substandpoint.

Extract 4.22

- (a) WAZIRI WA NCHI, OFISI YA WAZIRI MKUU, TAWALA ZA MIKOA NA SERIKALI ZA MITAA (TAMISEMI): [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kama alivyosema Naibu Waziri kwamba, mifumo ya utawala ya Tanzania Zanzibar na Tanzania Bara inatofautiana, [2] wenzetu wametumia Shehia na sisi tumetumia Kata kwa sababu sisi Kata zetu nyingine zina vijiji mpaka nane na kila Kata inahitaji watu wanne. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika ngazi ya Kijiji wananchi wote walishirikishwa na walivyokuja katika ngazi ya Kata, wajumbe wa Baraza la Kata ni Wenyeviti wa Vijiji ambavyo vinaunda Kata au mitaa kwa mijini. [4] Hao Wenyeviti aidha wa mitaa kwa mijini au wa vijiji kwa maeneo ya Halmashauri wanatokana na vyama vyao. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

MINISTER OF STATE, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, as the deputy minister has said, the governing systems in Tanzania Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania are different. [2] Our colleagues have used Shehia and we have used wards because some wards are made up of eight villages and each ward needs four people. [3] Honourable Chairperson, at the village level, all citizens were involved and when they came to the ward level, members of the Ward

[Development] Committees are the chairpersons of the villages or Mitaa (in urban areas) forming the relevant ward. [4] The Mtaa chairpersons in urban areas or the village chairpersons in rural areas are members of [political] parties.

- (b) [1] Sasa kama Wilaya ambayo CHADEMA haina Kijiji hata kimoja wala haina Diwani hata mmoja nikichukulia Halmashauri ya Mtwara Vijijini, CHADEMA haina Diwani, Mwenyekiti hata mmoja wala Mwenyekiti wa Kitongoji hata mmoja. [2] Hivi unategemea kwenye Baraza la Kata huyo wa CHADEMA ataingiaje? [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, kwa maana ya wananchi wameshirikishwa katika ngazi ya Kata na Vijiji, lakini wanaotakiwa ni wanne na Kata zetu za Bara ni kubwa, huwezi kuwakutanisha wananchi zaidi ya 20,000 katika eneo moja, tofauti na Zanzibar ambapo Shehia zao zina watu kati ya 3,000 na 4,000. [4] Kwa hiyo, huwezi kuwa na mfumo mmoja wa uteuzi [...] (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

Now, if Chadema doesn't have even a single village or a single councillor within a district, for instance, Mtwara Rural District Council, in this district council, Chadema doesn't have a councillor; it doesn't have even a single village chairperson. [2] How could you expect to have a Chadema member in the Ward [Development] Committee in such kind of a situation? [3] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, for the case of citizens, they have been involved at the village or Mtaa level, but only four members are needed and our wards in Mainland Tanzania are too large, it is impossible to gather more than 20,000 citizens in one area, as opposed to Zanzibar where their wards have between 3,000 and 4,000 people. [4] Thus, we cannot have the same methodology of appointment [...]

From Extract 4.22, Ms Hawa Ghasia suggests in (b) [4] that *it was impossible to use uniform methodologies in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members*. To support this substandpoint, she reinforces the deputy minister's argumentation by arguing that *1.1 Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems*, as indicated in (a) [1]. She further suggests that, due to the existence of different governing systems, *1.1.1a Zanzibar used Shehia and Mainland Tanzania used wards to get DCF members* (causal argumentation). As suggested in (b) [3], this argument is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that *1.1.1b it was impossible to hold elections of DCF members at ward level in Mainland Tanzania*, implying that it was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies, for various reasons. First, in (b) [3], she argues that *1.1.1b.1 in Mainland Tanzania a ward has more than 20,000 people while a Shehia in Zanzibar has between 3,000 and 4,000 people*. These statistics implicitly suggest that it was possible for Zanzibar to hold elections due to a small number of people in a Shehia compared to the number of people in a ward in Mainland Tanzania (statistical argumentation). Second, *1.1.1b.2 some wards have up to 8 villages but only four members were needed* (statistical argumentation), as shown in (a) [2]. Third, in (a) [3], she maintains that *1.1.1b.3a WDC members are chairpersons of the villages which constitute a ward*. This is combined with the argument that *1.1.1b.3b these chairpersons are members of political parties*, as shown in (a) [4]. To further support this reason, in (b) [1], she argues that there are districts where Chadema does not have any village chairperson, including Mtwara Rural district (argumentation from example). For this reason, she suggests with a

rhetorical question in (b) [2] that it was impossible for Chadema to have a member in the WDCs (causal argumentation). However, the opposition's argument was not whether it was possible for Chadema to have a member in the WDCs but why the Commission used what Mr Lissu describes as a 'discriminatory' methodology which involves screening out of DCF members by WDCs. The last reason in support of *1.1.1b* is presented in (a) [3], where she argues that *1.1.1b.4 all people were involved in the elections at village/Mtaa level*, which is considered to be a sign that there was direct democracy in Mainland Tanzania as well (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is a counterargument against the opposition's claim that DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were not directly elected by people, hence there was no direct democracy. What the government MPs still need to address is the opposition's claim that the elections of DCF members by citizens at village/Mtaa level in Mainland Tanzania were mere nominations, which, according to the opposition, were meaningless because the elected members were later screened out by WDCs contrary to what happened in Zanzibar. Ms Ghasia's argumentation is summarised in the *Table 4.20* below.

Table 4.20 Ms Ghasia's argumentation

No.	Description
1	It was impossible to apply uniform methodologies in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members
1.1	Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems
(1.1')	(The existence of different governing systems led to the application of different methodologies in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar)
1.1.1a	While the Commission used Shehias in Zanzibar, they used wards in Mainland Tanzania
(1.1.1a')	(This is caused by the differences in the governing systems between the two)
1.1.1b	It was impossible to hold elections of DCF members at ward level
(1.1.1b')	(It was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania)
1.1.1b.1	A ward in Mainland Tanzania has more than 20,000 people while Shehia in Zanzibar has between 3,000 and 4,000 people
(1.1.1b.1')	(These statistics suggest that it was impossible to hold elections)
1.1.1b.2	Some wards have up to 8 villages but only four members were needed
1.1.1b.3a	WDC members are chairpersons of the respective villages
1.1.1b.3b	These village chairpersons are members of political parties
1.1.1b.3b.1	There are districts where Chadema doesn't have a single village chairperson
1.1.1b.3b.1.1	A good example is Mtwara Rural district
1.1.1b.3b.1.1.1	How could a Chadema member be a WDC member?
(1.1.1b.3b.1.1.1')	(As a consequence of this situation, it is impossible for a Chadema village chairperson to be a WDC member)
1.1.1b.3b.4	All people were involved in the elections at village/Mtaa level
(1.1.1b.3b.4')	(This is a sign that there was direct democracy in Mainland Tanzania as well)

On behalf of the government, in *Extract 4.23* the Attorney General (hereafter AG) makes the final attempt in defence of the ministers' substandpoint that the Commission's methodology in

the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory.

Extract 4.23

- (a) MWANASHERIA MKUU WA SERIKALI: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kifungu ambacho Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu amekielekeza kinachoipa mamlaka Tume kufanya haya, ni kifungu kidogo cha nane cha kifungu kikubwa cha kumi na saba na naomba nikisome kwa urefu kwa sababu Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu amekisoma kuanzia katikati. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, amesema hivi: “Isipokuwa kama mazingira yatahitaji vinginevyo katika utekelezaji wa majukumu yake, Tume itabuni utaratibu unaofanana ambao utatumika katika kila upande wa Jamhuri ya Muungano katika ukusanyaji na uchambuzi wa maoni ya wananchi, uendeshaji wa Mabaraza na uandaaji wa ripoti”. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, usianze kusoma katikati, mazingira yanayozungumzwa hapa ni yapi? [4] Kwa upande wa Zanzibar ngazi za mitaa kuanzia Shehia [...] ambapo ndipo Sheha ana mamlaka ya kuitisha mikutano. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the section which Honourable Tundu Lissu has focused on which gives the Commission the mandate to do all this is the subsection (8) of section (17) and allow me to read it at length since Honourable Tundu Lissu has read it starting from the middle. [2] Honourable Chairperson, it says that: “Unless the circumstances require otherwise, in the performance of its functions, the Commission shall devise uniform methodologies which will be applicable in each part of the United Republic [of Tanzania] in the collection and analysis of public opinions, in the conduct of fora and writing of the report”. [3] Honourable chairperson, therefore, a person shouldn’t start reading from the middle of the section; what kinds of circumstances are being referred to here?[4]In Zanzibar, the local government levels starts from Shehia [...] where a Sheha has the mandate to convene meetings.

- (b) [1] Ngazi ya Wadi au Ward ambayo ni sawa na Kata kwa Tanzania Bara haina mikutano ya kisheria kwa mujibu wa sheria namba moja ya Mamlaka ya Tawala za Mikoa ya Zanzibar ya mwaka 1998. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara, kwa busara za Tume, kuna utaratibu wa Kiserikali na huo ndiyo uliotumika. [3] Sasa hapa hoja ni hii kwamba, je, katika kufanya hivi Tume ilifanya makosa? [4] Jibu lenu ni kwamba ni ndiyo na ni kweli kwa sababu kila mtu ana kichwa na hapa tupo wengi. [5] Kama ungekuwa wewe ungefanya hivyo, lakini Tume siyo wewe, bali Tume imefanya vile ilivyofanya. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, naona kwamba, Tume haijafanya kosa lolote na imefanya kazi hizi kwa mujibu wa sheria. [7] Nafikiri tuache kutumia Bunge hili kama kituo cha malalamika, kwa sababu nimeona tunaanza kutumia Bunge hili kama kituo cha Polisi, malalamiko yanayohusu mambo ya hujuma yanaletwa hapa. (Kicheko/Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Wadi level which is equivalent to the ward level in Mainland Tanzania doesn’t have statutory meetings in accordance with the Zanzibar Regional Administration Authority Act No. 1 of 1998. (Applause) [2] Honourable Chairperson, in Mainland Tanzania, with the Commission’s sagacity, there is a governmental procedure and that is the one which was used. [3] Thus, here the issue is: did the Commission make a mistake in doing this? [4] You answer is yes and it is true because here everybody has a head and we are many here.[5] If it were you, you would do so, but the Commission is not you; the Commission has done what it has done. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, therefore, I see that the Commission has not made any mistake and it has performed its functions in accordance with the Act. [7] I think we should stop using this parliament as a centre for complaints because I have seen that we have started using this parliament as a police station, where the complaints pertaining to assault are brought here. (Laughter/Applause)

From *Extract 4.23*, the AG implies that (1) *the methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory*, because (1.)1 *the Commission used the governmental procedure*, as indicated in (b) [2]. As also suggested by other members of the government, the unexpressed premise for (1.)1 seems to suggest that (1.1') *it was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania*. The AG advances three arguments in favour of (1.1). Because he seems to speak from the legal point of view, it is not surprising that the first two arguments demonstrate argumentation from legal authority. In the first argument, as shown in (a) [1-2], he argues that (1.)1.1 *according to the Act, the Commission has the mandate to do so*. In this argument, he actually quotes section 17(8) of the Act and he accuses Mr Lissu of misquotation of the provision. It should be recalled that, in his argument, as presented *Extract 4.17*, Mr Lissu quoted only part of the subsection that supports his argumentation and strategically left out of consideration another important detail which contradicts his position. The part of the subsection that was strategically left is “except where the circumstances require otherwise”. Thus, the AG explains the circumstance which required the Commission to apply a different methodology in Mainland Tanzania. Based on this circumstance, the unexpressed premise for (1.)1.1 can be reconstructed as (1.1.1') *Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania have different governing systems*, as already suggested by the ministers and other members of the ruling party. Explaining the circumstance, as he defends argument (1.)1.1, the AG in (b) [1] argues that, according to the Zanzibar Regional Administration Authority Act No. 1 of 1998, (1.)1.1.1 *Zanzibar doesn't have statutory electoral meetings at Wadi level*, because (1.)1.1.1.a *statutory meetings are held at Shehia level*, where (1.)1.1.1.b *a Sheha has the mandate to convene these meetings*, as indicated in (a) [4]. The AG's second and third arguments for (1.)1 are presented in (b) [3-6]. In the second argument, he suggests that, although others may think that the Commission made a mistake, (1.)1.2 *the Commission didn't make any mistake in doing so*, because (1.)1.2.1 *the Commission has performed its functions in accordance with the Act*. In the third argument, the AG maintains that (1.)1.3 *the Commission's decision to use the governmental procedure is based on their wisdom*, implying that, because it is based on their wisdom, the Commission's decision was right in its own way. In this argument, he appeals to the Commission's sagacity as the authority. This authority argumentation is questioned by Mr Lissu in *Extract 4.24*. The AG's argumentation is also reinforced by a personal attack in (b) [7], where he accuses the opposition of making the parliament a “centre for complaints”. This personal attack is challenged by Mr Lissu in the last extract. I summarise the AG's argumentation in **Table 4.21** below.

Table 4.21 The AG's argumentation

No.	Description
(1)	(The methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was not discriminatory)
(1.1)	The Commission used the governmental procedure
(1.1')	(It was reasonable to make WDCs electoral bodies in Mainland Tanzania)
(1.)1.1	According to the Act, the Commission has the mandate to do so
(1.1.1')	(Zanzibar and MTZ have different governing systems)
(1.)1.1.1	According to the Zanzibar Regional Administration Act, Zanzibar doesn't have statutory meetings at Wadi level
(1.)1.1.1.1a	Statutory meetings are held at Shehia level
(1.)1.1.1.1b	A Sheha has the mandate to convene these meetings at Shehia
(1.)1.2	The Commission didn't make any mistake by doing so
(1.)1.2.1	The Commission performed its functions in accordance with the Act
(1.)1.3	The decision is based on the Commission's sagacity
(1.1.3')	(Based on their wisdom, the Commission's decision was right in its own way)

In *Extract 4.24*, Mr Lissu responds to various critical reactions against his substandpoint that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF) or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory.

Extract 4.24

- (a) MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hoja hapa siyo uwiano wa Vyama katika Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya. [2] Hoja ni je, Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba wanachaguliwa moja kwa moja na wananchi au wanapita kwenye chekecheke fulani? (Makofi) [3] Kwa upande wa Zanzibar, Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya za Zanzibar, wamechaguliwa moja kwa moja na wananchi bila kujali itikadi za Vyama vyao na bila kujali uchama. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa upande wa Tanzania Bara, Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya wamechaguliwa moja kwa moja na wananchi kwenye vijiji na mitaa, halafu wakapelekwa kwenye chekecheke fulani linaitwa Ward C. [5] hiki ni chombo cha waniasia, Mwenyekiti wake ni Diwani, Katibu wake ni Afisa Mtendaji wa Kata, Wajumbe wake ni Wenyeviti wa Vijiji au Mitaa. [6] Wote hawa ni wananchama wa Vyama vya Siasa. [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hili chekecheke kwa Tanzania Bara siyo chombo kilichoundwa na Sheria ya Halmashauri za Mitaa, [8] si chombo chenye mamlaka yaliyowekwa kwenye sheria, ni Kamati na ndiyo maana inaitwa Kamati. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)
- HON. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the point here is not the proportion of parties in the district constitutional fora. [2] The point is: are members of the fora directly elected by the citizens or they pass through a certain sifter? (Applause). [3] In Zanzibar, members of the district constitutional fora were directly elected by the citizens irrespective of their [political] ideologies and without taking their party membership into consideration.[4] Honourable Chairperson, in the Mainland Tanzania, members of the district constitutional fora were directly elected by the citizens at the village or Mtaa level and were then taken to a certain sifter called Ward C. [5] This is an instrument which belongs to the politicians, its chairperson is the councillor, its secretary is the Ward Executive Officer, and [other] members are the village or Mtaa chairpersons.[6] All these people are members of political parties. [7] Honourable Chairperson, this sifter, which was used in Mainland Tanzania, is not a body that has been established in accordance with the local government by-laws. [8] It is not an instrument with the mandate that has been put in place by the law; it is a [mere] committee, and that is why it is called a committee.*
- (b) [1] Lakini utaratibu wa kupata Wajumbe wa Mabaraza ya Katiba kwa kuwapitisha kwenye Kamati hii ya watu wanne au watano, wao ndiyo wanaoamua nani aende kwenye Baraza la

Katiba, nani asiende. Hiyo ndiyo hoja. (Makofi) [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hoja nyingine imetolewa kwamba mifumo iko tofauti. [3] Kama nilivyosema Zanzibar hawaiti Vijiji, wanaita Shehia. [4] Ndiyo ngazi ya msingi kama ilivyo Kijiji kwa Tanzania Bara. [5] Huku Bara ukitoka kwenye Kijiji unakwenda kwenye Kata, ukiwa Zanzibar unakwenda kwenye Wadi. [6] Wadi kuna Diwani na Kata kuna Diwani. Diwani wa Wadi wa Zanzibar anachaguliwa, Diwani wa Kata wa Tanzania Bara anachaguliwa. [7] Kwa hiyo, zinafanana. (Makofi) [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa hoja ni kwamba, kwa nini hizi ngazi ambazo zinafanana ziwe na utaratibu tofauti? [9] Kwenye mkutano wa Shehia Zanzibar, wale wote waliokusanyika kufanya uchaguzi jambo la kwanza wanachagua Mwenyekiti na Katibu wao. [10] Kwa hiyo, Mwenyekiti wa Mkutano wa Katiba, Zanzibar anachaguliwa na wananchi, anasimamia uchaguzi wa watu watakaokwenda moja kwa moja kwenye Baraza la Katiba la Wilaya. (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] But [my] point is [about] the methodology in the selection of members of the [district] constitutional fora by screening them through the committee made up of four or five people, who decide who should go to the [district] constitutional fora and who shouldn't. [2] Honourable Chairperson, another argument that has been advanced is that there are different systems [in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar]. [3] As I have said, in Zanzibar, they don't call it village, but they call it Shehia. [4] This is the basic level in Zanzibar as it is for a village in Mainland Tanzania. [5] In Mainland Tanzania, the next level after the village level is 'kata' (ward) and, if you are in Zanzibar, it is 'Wadi'. [6] In a Wadi, there is a councillor, the Wadi councillor in Zanzibar is elected and the ward councillor in Mainland Tanzania is also elected. [7] Thus, the systems are [basically] similar. (Applause) [8] Honourable Chairperson, thus the argument is that: why should these levels which are [basically] similar use different methodologies? [9] In the Shehia's meetings in Zanzibar, all those who were gathered for the election first elected the chairperson and the secretary [of the election meeting]. [10] Thus, the chairperson of the constitutional meeting in Zanzibar is the person who is elected by the citizens, s/he supervises the election of people who will go directly to the district constitutional fora.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, upande wa Bara, Mwenyekiti wa Kijiji au Mtaa hachaguliwi na ule mkutano pale, ni Mwenyekiti by virtue of sheria ya Serikali za Mitaa. [2] Kwa nini utaratibu upo tofauti kwenye ngazi zinazofanana? [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sababu ni moja, ukija Bara Ward C nyingi kama ambavyo tumesema mara nyingi, ni za CCM na [4] kwa hiyo Tume imetumia utaratibu wa Ward C ili kuhakikisha kwamba, wajumbe watakaokwenda kwenye Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya ni wana-CCM. [5] Ndivyo ambavyo imetokea na ndiyo maana ya hizo barua za Mwalimu wangu Dkt. Migiro na akina Nape Nauye na wengine humu ndani. [6] Utaratibu huu wa kibaguzi, ndiyo tunaoupigia kelele. (Makofi) [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni kweli Tume imetumia busara. [8] Nasita kusema busara za Tume hazikuwa sahihi. [9] Busara za Tume kwenye jambo hili si sahihi, kwa sababu Tume haiwezi ikatengeneza utaratibu wa kibaguzi unaokiuka makatazo ya ubaguzi kwenye Katiba yetu, halafu ikasema ina busara. [10] Hizi si busara sahihi. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in Mainland Tanzania, the village or Mtaa chairperson is not elected by [people] at the meeting there; s/he is a chairperson by virtue of the local government by-laws. [2] Why do we have different methodologies at the levels which are [basically] similar? [3] Honourable Chairperson, there is one reason; in Mainland [Tanzania], as we have already said, many Ward Cs belong to CCM. [4] Thus, the Commission used the Ward C procedure in order to ensure that those who will go to the district constitutional fora are CCM members. [5] This is what has happened, and this explains those letters from my teacher, Dr Migiro and Nape Nnauye and many more people who are here. [6] It is this discriminatory methodology that we are complaining about. (Applause) [7] Honourable Chairperson, it is true that the Commission used its wisdom. [8] I hesitate to say that the Commission's sagacity was incorrect. [9] The Commission's wisdom on this matter is not right, because the Commission cannot devise a discriminatory methodology which violates prohibitions against discrimination in our constitution and then claim to be wise. [10] This is not a correct wisdom. (Applause)

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, walipoleta rasimu ya mwongozo, tulipeleka maoni, haya tunayoyazungumza tumeyapigia kelele tangu mwezi wa Pili. [2] Tume imeziba masikio na imefumba macho. [3] Inatengeneza utaratibu ambao kama ambavyo imetokea Mabaraza ya Katiba ya Wilaya ni Mabaraza ya CCM. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa hoja ni kwamba, Bunge lako Tukufu siyo kituo cha malalamiko na sitaki kumbishia Mheshimiwa Mwanasheria Mkuu wa Serikali. [5] Bunge si mahali pa malalamiko, Bunge ni mahali pa kuisimamia Serikali na kuiwajibisha. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Bunge hili ni mahali pa kuisimamia Tume ya Katiba, ikikosea inatakiwa isemwe hapa kama ambavyo tumeisema. [7] Kwa hiyo, hatujageuza Bunge kuwa mahali pa kulalamika, [8] hili Bunge ni mahali pa kuisimamia Serikali na hili ni vema na haki kwa mujibu wa Katiba yetu. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013) [1] *Honourable Chairperson, when they brought the draft of the guidelines, we provided our opinions, we have been complaining about all these things that we are talking about today since February. [2] [But] the Commission has shut its ears and closed its eyes. [3] It has devised a methodology which, as it has happened, has made the district constitutional fora the CCM's fora. [4] Honourable Chairperson, now the argument is that your august/esteemed parliament is not a centre for complaints, and I don't want to disagree with Honourable Attorney General. [5] The parliament is not a place for complaints; the parliament is a platform for supervising the government and holding it to account for whatever it does. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, this parliament is a platform for supervising the Constitutional Review Commission, if it makes mistakes, it has to be warned here as we have tried to criticise it. [7] Therefore, we haven't turned the parliament to be a place for complaints, [8] this parliament is a platform for supervising the government and this is right and just according to our constitution. (Applause)*
- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Tume yenyewe imekubali kwamba, utaratibu ulikuwa mbovu, imekiri kulikuwa na rushwa, kulikuwa na misukumo ya kisiasa, siasa ambazo haizisemi, lakini misukumo ni siasa za CCM. [2] Barua zile za akina Asha Migiro, Mwalimu wangu, maelekezo ya akina Msome, Mkuu wa Wilaya ya Shinyanga, Katibu wa CCM wa Wilaya ya Arusha, Ndugu Kingazi. CCM imehujumu mchakato wa Mabaraza ya Katiba, ndicho tunachokilalamikia. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 3 May 2013) [1] *Honourable Chairperson, the Commission itself has admitted that the methodology was bad, it has admitted that there was corruption; there is political pressure, the political [pressure] which it doesn't specify clearly, but this is the political pressure from CCM. [2] Those letters from Asha Migiro my teacher, the instructions from Msome, the Shinyanga district commissioner, the Arusha district CCM secretary, Mr Kingazi [prove that] CCM has sabotaged the conduct of the [district] constitutional fora; this is what we are complaining about! (Applause)*

In *Extract 4.24*, Mr Lissu advances five arguments in favour of the substandpoint that (1) *the methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory*, as described in (c) [6]. Because he thinks that some members of the ruling party, such as Mr Simbachawene and Ms Ghasia, evade his main point by manipulating the propositional content of his argumentation, this time he begins his argumentation by offering a usage declarative to clarify his point. In (1-2), he argues that it is not the point that DCF members should be selected based on the proportion of one party to another but rather whether they are directly elected by people or they pass through a certain 'sifter'. With the use of the Swahili word *chekecheke* (sifter), Mr Lissu metaphorically

compares the WDCs with the sifter. In Kiswahili, the word *chekecheke* (or *chekeche*) refers to a container used for removing large pieces from flour. Using it to describe the WDCs, Mr Lissu implies that WDCs is a committee that was used intentionally to remove non-CCM members from the list of DCF members. This metaphor is used to effectively reinforce his argumentation for the substandpoint.

The first argument in support of the substandpoint demonstrates argumentation from narrative, framed in coordinative argumentation. He *narrates* how DCF members were elected or appointed in both parts of the Union. The first premise of the coordinative argumentation suggests that *1.1a DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by people at Shehia*, regardless of their political affiliations or membership, as indicated in (a) [3]. The unexpressed premise implies that there was no screening of the members by WDCs at *Wadi* level in Zanzibar. The second premise suggests that *1.1b DCF members in Mainland were selected by WDCs*. Argument *1.1b* is supported by another argument realising coordinative argumentation with three premises. The first premise, as presented in (a) [4], suggests that *1.1b.1a DCF members were first elected directly by people at village/Mtaa level*. The second premise suggests that *1.1b.1b [Names of] the elected members were then sent to the WDCs at ward level for screening*. In the last premise, as shown in (b) [1], he argues that *1.1b.1c Four or five members of WDCs decided who should or shouldn't go to the DCF*, implying in the unexpressed premise that this led to the selection of only CCM members (causal argumentation). In support of *1.1b.1c*, he argues that *1.1b.1c.1 WDCs are politicians' bodies*, because a WDC is composed of a councillor (chairperson), a Ward Executive Officer (WEO) as a secretary, and village/Mtaa chairpersons as members, and that the WDC members are members of political parties, as described in (a) [5-6]. By 'members of political parties', he actually means members of the ruling party (CCM), as he has already argued that 80% of WDCs are dominated by CCM and almost all village chairpersons are CCM members. In the second argument for *1.1b.1c*, he suggests that a WDC is not an organ established by the local government by-laws, and for that reason, it does not have the mandate (to appoint DCF members) and that is why it is called a committee, as indicated in (a) [7-8].

The second argument for the substandpoint also realises coordinative argumentation with two premises. In the first premise, as presented in (b) [9-10], he argues that *1.2a in Zanzibar people elected the chairperson and secretary of a Shehia election meeting* from among themselves. In the second premise, as shown in (c) [1], he argues that *1.2b in Mainland Tanzania the*

chairperson of the election meeting at village/Mtaa wasn't elected by people, because a village/Mtaa chairperson is automatically a chairperson of the election meeting by the virtue of the local government by-laws (argumentation from legal authority).

The third argument is a counterargument to the ministers' argument that Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have different governing systems, hence it was impossible to apply uniform methodologies in the conduct of fora in both parts of the Union. Mr Lissu is of the opinion that the systems are not different. Like the second argument, the third argument realises coordinative argumentation with two premises. As described in (a) [7], the first premise suggests that *1.3a the governing systems in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are basically similar*, which exhibits comparison argumentation (based on extrapolation of features). To further maintain his comparison argumentation, Mr Lissu seems to extrapolates a few properties which make the systems basically similar. In (b) [3-4], he argues that *1.3a.1a the basic level in Mainland Tanzania is village/Mtaa which is equivalent to Shehia in Zanzibar*. This is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that *1.3a.1b the next level in Mainland Tanzania is ward, which is equivalent to Wadi in Zanzibar*, as indicated in (b) [5]. In the other argument in support of *1.3a*, as presented in (b) [6], he argues that *1.3a.2 both Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have councillors who are elected at ward/Wadi*. Thus, in (b) [8] and (c) [2], he asks: *1.3b why did the Commission use different methodologies in the selection of DCF members at the levels that are basically similar?* With this rhetorical question, he suggests that it was unreasonable for the Commission to use different methodologies in the systems that are basically similar. To further support argument *1.3b*, he answers his rhetorical question in (c) [3-4], where he argues that *1.3b.1a the Commission used WDCs with the intention of ensuring that only CCM members go to the fora* (causal argumentation from means to goal) because WDCs are dominated by CCM. In (c) [5], this argument is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that *1.3b.1b Dr Migiro's letter to Mr Nnauye and other CCM leaders is such a proof that the methodology was discriminatory* (symptomatic argumentation).

In his fourth argument, Mr Lissu challenges one of the AG's arguments which suggests that the decision to make WDCs electoral organs was reasonable because it was based on the Commission's sagacity. In (c) [7-10], Mr Lissu argues that *1.4 the Commission's wisdom in making WDCs electoral bodies wasn't a right wisdom*. He further argues that *1.4.1 the Commission cannot design a discriminatory methodology and claim to be wise*. He also argues

that *1.4.2 the methodology violates prohibitions against discrimination*. This ‘personal attack’ seems to be a reasonable argumentative move against the AG’s authority argumentation because the ‘Commission’s wisdom’ to make WDCs electoral organs may not necessarily be a reasonable wisdom.

In the last argument, Mr Lissu argues that, because of the Commission’s methodology, *1.5 the district constitutional fora are now CCM’s fora*, as indicated in (d) [3]. Mr Lissu’s supporting argument for *1.5* seems to realise coordinative argumentation with two premises. The first premise suggests that *1.5.1a the Commission refused to listen to us*, implying that it is the result of the Commission’s reluctance to follow the opposition’s advice (causal argumentation). This is reinforced by the figurative expression ‘*Tume imeziba masikio na imefumba macho*’ (The Commission has shut its ears and closed its eyes), which suggests that the Commission refused to listen to the opposition. Argument *1.5.1a* is further supported by the claim that the opposition has been complaining about the Commission’s methodology since February 2013, as described in (d) [1-2]. In the second premise, as indicated in (e) [2], Mr Lissu argues that, since the Commission refused to listen to them, *1.5.1b CCM sabotaged the conduct of DCF*, which is further defended by the argument that *1.5.1b.1 Dr Migiro’s letter and other instructions from CCM leaders is such a proof* (symptomatic argumentation). As another proof for *1.5.1b*, in (e) [1], he argues that *1.5.1b.2 the Commission has admitted that the process involved corruption and political pressure* (authority argumentation). Although the chairperson of the Commission did not disclose where this political pressure came from, Mr Lissu suggests that this political pressure came from CCM (causal argumentation). Mr Lissu’s final argumentation for his standpoint is summarised in **Table 4.22** below.

Table 4.22 Mr Lissu’s final argumentation against the minister’s second standpoint

No.	Description
1	The methodology in the conduct of DCF or appointment/election of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory
1.1a	DCF members in Zanzibar were directly elected by the people at Shehia
(1.1a’)	(There was not screening of the members by WDCs at Wadi level)
1.1b	DCF members in Mainland Tanzania were appointed/selected by WDCs
1.1b.1a	These members were first elected directly by citizens at village/Mtaa level
1.1b.1b	Names of the elected members were then presented to the WDCs for screening
1.1b.1c	Four or five members of WDCs decided who should or shouldn’t be a DCF member
(1.1b.1c’)	(This led to the selection of only CCM members)
1.1b.1c.1	WDCs are politicians’ bodies
(1.1b.1c.1’)	(WDCs are dominated by CCM)
1.1b.1c.1.1a	WDCs are composed of a councillor (Chairperson), WEO (Secretary) and village/Mtaa chairpersons (members)
1.1b.1c.1.1b	All these are members of political parties

(1.1b.1c.1.1b')	(Because WDCs are dominated by CCM, WDC members are CCM members)
1.1b.1c.2	A WDC is not an organ established by the local government by-laws
1.1b.1c.2.1	It doesn't have the mandate to appoint DCF members
1.1b.1c.2.1.1	That is why it is called a committee
1.2a	In Zanzibar people elected the meeting chairperson from among themselves
1.2b	In Mainland Tanzania the chairperson of an election meeting isn't elected by people
1.2b.1	The village/Mtaa chairperson is automatically the chairperson of the meeting by virtue of the local government by-laws
1.3a	The governing systems in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are basically similar
1.3a.1a	The basic level in Mainland Tanzania is village/Mtaa which is equivalent to Shehia in Zanzibar
1.3a.1b	The next level in Mainland Tanzania is ward which is equivalent to Wadi in Zanzibar
1.3a.2	Both Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar have councillors who are elected at ward/Wadi level
1.3b	Why did the Commission apply different methodologies in the governing systems that are basically similar?
(1.3b')	(It was unreasonable and discriminatory to do so)
1.3b.1a	The Commission used WDCs with the intention of ensuring that only CCM members go to the fora
1.3b.1a.1	WDCs are dominated by CCM
1.3b.1b	Dr Migiro's letter to Mr Nnauye and other CCM leaders is such a proof
1.4	The Commission's wisdom in making WDCs electoral bodies wasn't a right wisdom
1.4.1	The Commission cannot devise a discriminatory methodology and claim to be wise
1.4.1.1	The methodology violates prohibitions against discrimination
1.5	The DCF are now CCM's fora
(1.5')	(This is the result of the Commission's discriminatory methodology)
1.5.1a	The Commission didn't listen to us
(1.5.1a')	(This is caused by the Commission's reluctance to listen to our advice)
1.5.1a.1	We have been complaining about the Commission's methodology since February
1.5.1b	CCM has sabotaged the conduct of DCF
1.5.1b.1	Dr Migiro's letter and other instructions from other CCM leaders are such a proof
1.5.1b.2	The Commission has admitted that there were corruption and political pressure
1.5.1b.2.1	This political pressure comes from CCM

In regard to the AG's claim that the opposition has turned the parliament into a centre for complaints, in (d) [4-8], Mr Lissu argues that the opposition has not turned the parliament into a centre for complaints but the parliament is a place to hold the government to account, and that is what they are doing, and it is right and just to do so according to the national constitution. In this argumentation, he seems to suggest that the Commission should account for its failure events. With this counterargument, Mr Lissu is performing the directive by requesting the ministers to reasonably respond to their criticisms rather trying to evade them. However, the proposal to continue discussing Mr Lissu's motion until the (sub)difference of opinion is reasonably resolved was rejected by the parliament through a simple majority of the MPs' votes.

With respect to the speech acts performed in the argumentation stage, apart from the directive and the usage declarative, which have been widely performed by both members of the opposition and members of the government, other speech acts performed include the assertive (by expressing the (sub)standpoints and advancing argumentation) and the commissive (by not accepting the (sub)standpoints expressed by the other party).

4.5 The concluding stage

From the perspective of pragma-dialectics, in the concluding stage the parties establish the result of a critical discussion based on argumentative means and critical reactions (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). However, as observed by Nyanda (2016), the resolution of differences of opinion in Tanzanian parliamentary debates is not reached on the basis of sound argumentation advanced by the parties but the institutional procedure of the parliament. Specifically, the result of the main (critical) discussion and subdiscussion(s) in this debate is decided by the Speaker/Chairperson, based on a simple majority of the MPs who participated in the debate. Hence the winner of the main (critical) discussion or subdiscussion(s) cannot be reasonably established. Thus, although Mr Mathias Chikawe seems to reasonably defend the minister's first standpoint relating to the proposition that the Commission's proposed budget (or request for funds) should be approved, the (sub)difference of opinion relating to the proposition that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of district constitutional fora or appointment/election of members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory remains unresolved. Furthermore, some 'unreasonable' arguments remain unchallenged and those which are challenged are not necessarily defended conclusively. Additionally, some arguments which could be considered 'reasonable' based on the line of defence advanced are not (explicitly) accepted by the other party. For instance, on the basis of the supporting argumentation he advances, Mr Lissu seems to convincingly argue that the governing systems in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are basically similar.

4.6 Evaluation of the rules for critical discussion

This section evaluates the extent to which the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion in the main (critical) discussion and subdiscussion(s) in this debate are adhered to. The freedom rule is largely observed. As pointed out in chapter three (see section 3.8), according to the institutional rules, the minister is afforded the 'freedom' to present his speech and express various standpoints. Based on the Standing Orders, the opposition's spokesperson is also afforded the 'opportunity' to provide the views of the opposition on the budget motion and express critical reactions or negative/opposite standpoints. The obligation-to-defend rule is also

widely observed except that there are instances where the deputy minister declines from offering a usage declarative (see the discussion following *Extract 4.15*). However, in *Extract 4.7*, Mr Rweikiza violates the standpoint rule by referring to the political group to which Mr Lissu belongs (straw man fallacy) as he suggests that the opposition's standpoints, as expressed by Mr Lissu, are misleading, and thus they should not be accepted. Additionally, as observed in *Extract 4.15*, by stating that members of the Commission are paid a reasonable amount without revealing the amount or advancing sound argumentation to support this claim, the deputy minister violates the relevance rule.

The unexpressed premise rule is also violated by Mr Chikawe by distorting Mr Lissu's unexpressed premise regarding the number of people who should have provided opinions on the constitutional review (see *Table 4.14*). There are other instances where Mr Rweikiza violates this rule in *Extract 4.7*. But the validity rule and the language use rule are largely observed in the discussions. However, Mr Lissu in *Extract 4.18* and the Attorney General in *Extract 4.23* violate the argumentation scheme rule by incorrectly applying authority argumentation. While Mr Lissu strategically leaves important detail of (sub)section 17(8) of the Act (which may lead to a wrong interpretation of the provision), the Attorney General incorrectly suggests that the Commission made a right decision to make WDCs electoral bodies simply because this decision is based on the Commission's sagacity or wisdom.

4.7 Evaluation of the properties of argumentation in context

This section summarises the three facets of argumentation in context in the pragma-dialectical theory, as realised in the main (critical) discussion and subdiscussion(s) in this debate. These properties are the (institutional preconditions for) strategic manoeuvring, prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style. This section also summarises the MPs' self-presentation strategies in relation to strategic manoeuvring (audience adaptation) in an institutional context.

4.7.1 Strategic manoeuvring and self-presentation

As regards the main (critical) discussion and subdiscussion(s) in this debate, the instantiations or derailments of (the three aspects of) strategic manoeuvring (topical potential, audience adaptation, and presentational devices) in the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament can be discussed as follows. Starting with the topical potential in the main difference of opinion, although the minister generally focuses on the topic on the table, in his first standpoint he seems to capitalise on the requirement to finalise the constitution-making process in order

to get the parliament to accept his standpoint. In his argumentation for this standpoint, the minister also appeals to the audience, both his fellow MPs and the listening/watching audience or members of the public (adaptation to audience demand). The minister is aware that members of the public want a new constitution. He thus suggests that the proposed budget will enable the Commission to finalise the writing of the new constitution that the majority of the electorate want to have. The minister also attempts to employ the most effective presentational devices. For instance, to get his first standpoint accepted, he describes the constitutional review process as *jambo kubwa na la kihistoria* (great and historic event). The use of the postmodifier *kubwa na la kihistoria* (great and historic) in the noun phrase *jambo kubwa na la kihistoria* suggests that the constitutional review process is a very important event for the nation, and it should thus be completed.

In the argumentation stage, in order to maintain that members of the Commission are 32 as required by the Act (and not 34 as claimed by Mr Lissu), Mr Chikawe appeals to (dissociative) definition. Because in the confrontation stage Mr Lissu demanded an explanation as to why the ministry requests fund to pay 34 members of the Commission, the minister defines *members of the Commission* as *commissioners*. With this definition, the minister's rhetorical aim is to make a distinction between the broad term *members of the Commission* and the specific term *commissioners*, suggesting that 'other members' in the Commission who are not commissioners cannot be regarded as *members of the Commission*. Thus, the minister insists that the ministry requests fund to pay 32 *commissioners* (i.e. members of the Commission) and other two members of the Secretariat, who are not members of the Commission, because they are not commissioners. The minister's modes of strategic manoeuvring in the confrontation and argumentation stages are within the institutional preconditions as no sections of the Standing Orders are violated.

While the minister capitalises on the requirement to complete the constitutional review process, in the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation, the opposition's spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu, capitalises on the amount of money requested by the minister to finalise the process (topical potential). With this 'topic', Mr Lissu attempts to create to the electorate an impression that the government is unnecessarily spending too much money on the process, which he thinks members of the public will not be happy with (adaptation to audience demand). This is reinforced by words such *ulaji* (bribery/corruption). With the use of the word *ulaji*, Mr Lissu suggests that the amount of money requested for the Commission is a sign of corruption. There is no specific rule which restricts the way the opposition can attack the minister

standpoints, except that MPs are prohibited from using insulting language or telling lies in the parliament, as pointed out in chapter three (see section 3.8.2). Thus, in the argumentation stage, Ms Anna Abdallah and Mr Mathias Chikawe perceive the use of the word *ulaji* as an insult to the chairperson (and other members) of the Commission, because it describes them as corrupt. However, according to Ilie (2001, 2004), insults are not necessarily offensive by themselves but are perceived as such by the target (the insulted person, a third party, or the audience). While Ms Abdallah and Mr Chikawe perceive the word *ulaji* as offensive, Mr Lissu was not required to withdraw the word by the Speaker of the parliament, which could suggest that the Speaker did not necessarily find it offensive. Additionally, to a large extent, quotations and rhetorical questions are employed effectively within the institutional context except that some instances of quotation can be viewed as derailments of strategic manoeuvring. For instance, in the confrontation stage, Mr Lissu suggests that, in accordance with the Act, members of the Commission are only 30. However, the correct interpretation of the cited provision suggests that members of the Commission can range from 22 to 32.

In his second standpoint (and related argumentation), the minister focuses on demonstrating how the constitutional review process has been ‘effectively’ coordinated by the Commission (topical potential). From the confrontation stage to the argumentation stage, the minister and other members of the government have attempted to convince the parliament and the electorate (audience demand) that the process is coordinated effectively by the Commission. One of the salient features in their argumentation is the strategic use of quotation, which has been applied as one of the most effective presentational devices. However, there are instances where quotation results in misquotation, hence derailment of strategic manoeuvring. One of them is indicated in *Extract 4.7* (and **Table 4.10**), where Mr Rweikiza suggests that the opposition’s standpoints (and related argumentation) are misleading and should not be accepted because Chadema once said, if they get into power, they would *complete* the constitutional review process within first 100 days. However, Chadema’s election manifesto (2010-2015) indicates that the party would *start* (not *complete*) the process within first 90 days since taking office. Thus, Mr Rweikiza’s quotation (or rather misquotation) constitutes a derailment of strategic manoeuvring.

The opposition’s second standpoint, as expressed by Mr Lissu, relates to a slightly different proposition (topical potential): *the constitutional review process has been hijacked by CCM*. With this standpoint, Mr Lissu intends to shift the topic of discussion in the argumentation stage from the proposition that the process is effectively coordinated (by the Commission) to

the proposition that the process has been hijacked by CCM (rhetorical aim), an attempt which was successful. Although the opposition's second standpoint does not relate to the same proposition as the minister's second standpoint, Mr Lissu cannot be accused of violating the institutional rules in his (attempt of) topic shift because the 'new' proposition is still within the scope of the topic on the table: *coordination of the constitutional review process*. Thus, in the argumentation stage, the minister advances argumentation against the opposition's 'new' standpoint as he attempts to further defend his second standpoint, as expressed in the confrontation stage.

Additionally, although in the confrontation stage Mr Lissu and other members of the opposition react to almost all issues relating to various stages of the constitutional review process, in the argumentation stage they strategically focus on the conduct of the district constitutional fora or selection of members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania in order to win the discussion or subdiscussion in their favour. From the confrontation stage to the argumentation stage, the opposition's spokesperson attempts to convince members of the electorate that, considering the manner in which the process has been conducted, the so-called 'new constitution' will not be the one that ordinary people want to have (audience demand) but the one that the ruling party wants to have, further suggesting in one of his arguments that it will be the same constitution of the same people from the same party. To achieve this rhetorical aim within the institutional context, the opposition's argumentation for the second standpoint realises strategic uses of quotation, metaphor, rhetorical questions (as already discussed), and other figurative expressions such as '*Tume imeziba masikio na imefumba macho*' (The Commission has shut its ears and closed its eyes), which is used to reinforce the opposition's claim that the Commission refused to listen to the opposition's views on how to effectively coordinate the process.

In relation to their strategic manoeuvring, the self-presentation strategies by members of the ruling party and members of the opposition seem to realise van Dijk's (1997, 2002) 'positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation'. The ministers and other members of the ruling party present a positive evaluation of themselves and their actions or views and present a negative evaluation of members of the opposition, their parties, and their views. For instance, the minister, deputy minister, and other members of the ruling party present themselves as people with the authentic facts, statistics, and truths but present the opposition as people who provide false information/statistics and who cannot be trusted. In fact, in *Extract 4.13*, the minister accuses Mr Lissu of lying to the parliament about the removal of a non-CCM member

from the list of members of the district constitutional fora. This is strategically done to achieve acceptance of the minister's standpoints from the audience they want to reach (MPs and importantly the electorate). Similarly, the opposition's spokesperson and other members of the opposition display a positive evaluation of themselves, their parties, and their views, and display a negative evaluation of the government, the ruling party, and their actions.

4.7.2 Prototypical argumentative patterns

There are, at least, three differences of opinion with regard to the debate on the constitutional review process in Tanzania. The first two are single mixed and the last one is single non-mixed. The first one relates to the proposition that the Commission's proposed budget of TZS 33.993 billion should be approved. With respect to this proposition, the minister adopts a positive prescriptive standpoint and the opposition's shadow minister has adopted a negative prescriptive one. Both standpoints are implicit. The initial argumentation for the minister's standpoint has three levels of defence. At the first level, the standpoint is defended by pragmatic argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation. At the second level of defence, the standpoint is justified by pragmatic argumentation combined with argumentation from legal authority in multiple argumentation. The minister's further argumentation for this standpoint in the argumentation stage is determined by the opposition's critical reactions and becomes even more complex. However, most arguments in the argumentation stage at different levels of defence exhibit argumentation from legal authority.

The initial argumentation for the opposition's first standpoint has various levels of defence. These levels of defence realise complex argumentation. At the first level, the standpoint is justified by comparison argumentation, realising coordinative argumentation, which is combined in multiple argumentation with both authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation) and causal argumentation, also realising coordinative argumentation. At the second level, the standpoint is defended by authority argumentation (by quotation), symptomatic argumentation, and authority argumentation from statistics. At the third level, the standpoint is defended by argumentation from example, causal argumentation, and symptomatic argumentation. In the next levels, it is defended by argumentation from legal authority, causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, and argumentation from example. In the argumentation stage, apart from requesting usage declaratives from the ministers, no further argumentation is advanced for this standpoint as the discussion is directed toward the conduct of the district constitutional fora.

The second difference of opinion relates to the proposition that the constitutional review process is coordinated effectively by the Commission. Implicitly, the minister adopts a positive evaluative standpoint. At the first level of defence, the standpoint is justified by symptomatic argumentation in multiple argumentation. At the second level, this standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation, and causal argumentation. In the next levels, the standpoint is defended by argumentation from example and causal argumentation. In the argumentation stage, further argumentation for the minister's standpoint is determined by the opposition's critical reactions, where the minister and other members of the government advance counterarguments against the opposition's (sub)standpoint and related argumentation. In fact, in order to defend the minister's second standpoint, the minister, deputy minister, and other members of the government act as antagonists to Mr Lissu's substandpoint that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of the district constitutional fora or selection of members of the district constitutional fora in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory, and in most cases, they appeal to legal authority at different levels of defence of their (unexpressed) negative substandpoint that the methodology was not discriminatory. Causal argumentation is also employed by members of the government.

As pointed out in section 4.7.1, with respect to the effective coordination of the constitutional review process, the opposition's second standpoint relates to a slightly different proposition, suggesting that the constitutional review process has been hijacked by CCM. However, this standpoint is considered a substandpoint for the opposition's negative implicit standpoint, which suggests that the constitutional review process is not effectively coordinated by the Commission. At the first level of defence, the opposition's second standpoint (the constitutional review process has been hijacked by CCM) is justified by causal argumentation (realising coordinative argumentation) which is combined in multiple argumentation with symptomatic argumentation and argumentation from legal authority (also realising coordinative argumentation). At the second level, the standpoint is defended by causal argumentation, argumentation from legal authority, and symptomatic argumentation. In the next levels, the standpoint is justified by argumentation from example, comparison argumentation, and argumentation from narrative. In the argumentation stage, the opposition's substandpoint that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of the district constitutional fora or election/appointment of members of the fora in Mainland Tanzania was discriminatory

is basically justified by argumentation from legal authority, causal argumentation, and comparison argumentation.

The last difference of opinion relates to the proposition that the constitutional review process in Tanzania is bound to fail. Unlike the previous two differences of opinion, in this proposition, it is the opposition's spokesperson who adopts a positive standpoint by anticipating doubts or rejections from the minister or other members of the government. The anticipated doubts or rejections were, however, not explicitly expressed by the antagonists. This descriptive standpoint is defended by experience-based authority argumentation which is combined in coordinative argumentation with argumentation from example at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, argumentation from example is defended by another argumentation from example, argumentation from narrative, as well as authority argumentation.

Generally, while pragmatic argumentation is prototypically employed in defence of the minister's main standpoint, argumentation from legal authority is frequently advanced to support both the minister's and the opposition's standpoints in the confrontation stage and substandpoints in the argumentation stage. Argumentation from legal authority may thus be considered a stereotypical argumentative pattern in this debate. The frequent use of argumentation from legal authority can be attributed to the fact that the constitutional review process was supposed to be coordinated in accordance with the Constitutional Review Act. Thus, while members of the government argue that the Commission has adhered to the Act, members of the opposition are of the view that the Commission did not adhere to the Act in the performance of its functions, especially in the conduct of the district constitutional fora. Apart from the subject matter under discussion, the frequent use of argumentation from legal authority is also attributed to the matters coordinated or supervised by the ministry. As its name suggests, the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs is responsible for coordinating and supervising all matters pertaining to the constitution and legal affairs. It is thus not unexpected for the MPs to appeal to legal authority.

4.7.3 Argumentative style

Based on van Eemeren's (2019) provisional distinction between detached argumentative style and engaged argumentative style as discussed in chapter three (see section 3.6.3), in what follows I discuss how the two styles are utilised by Mr Mathias Chikawe (the minister) and the opposition's spokesperson (or shadow minister), Mr Tundu Lissu, in the critical discussion stages. Starting with the initial situation in the confrontation stage, the minister's topical

potential is realised by the choice of the topic on the table; the coordination of the constitutional review process (detached), while Mr Lissu selects issues that show the opposition's close involvement in the process, such as how CCM has hijacked the process (engaged). The minister's initial argumentation for the first standpoint realises a topic choice of pragmatic argumentation, indicating how the proposed budget for the Commission will enable the Commission to complete the constitutional review process (detached). Mr Lissu appeals to comparison argumentation supported by authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation) and causal argumentation to show how the government is spending too much money on the process (engaged). In the adaptation to audience demand, both parties attempt to connect emphatically with the interests of the audience (engaged). However, while the minister does so by indicating how the process is coordinated effectively, Mr Lissu attempts to show how the process is not coordinated in the right manner. The minister's presentational devices are based on formulations that are intended to show 'facts of the matter' or 'the truth' (detached), while Mr Lissu's presentational devices are based on strategic phrasings in the forms of metaphor, quotations, rhetorical questions, and other figurative expressions (engaged).

As regards the empirical counterparts of the argumentation stage, the minister makes topical choices of pragmatic argumentation and argumentation from legal authority to emphasise that the proposed budget will achieve a positive effect, and that it is not a sign of bribery or corruption as suggested by the opposition in the confrontation stage. The ministers (and other members of the government) further apply argumentation from legal authority to show that the process has been coordinated in accordance with the Act and have applied causal argumentation to justify the use of different methodologies in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar in the conduct of the district constitutional fora (detached). Mr Lissu makes a topic choice of argumentation from legal authority to indicate that CCM has violated the Act by interfering in the autonomy and independence of the Commission (engaged). Mr Lissu also applies comparison argumentation and causal argumentation to show that the governing systems between the two parts of the Union are basically similar and that the Commission used a different methodology in Mainland Tanzania as a *means* to achieving the *goal* of favouring the ruling party. In the audience adaptation, the minister attempts to show that the requested amount of money will lead to a positive effect, and it is not a sign of corruption as suggested by the opposition (detached). Appealing to separate examples, which he thinks could be accepted by the audience, Mr Lissu, in his last standpoint, compares the constitutional review

process in Tanzania to the unsuccessful attempts to make a new constitution in Kenya and Zimbabwe and argues that the constitutional review process in Tanzania is (also) bound to fail (engaged). While the minister attempts to maintain a ‘formal parliamentary language’, Mr. Lissu’s presentational devices realise a personal language with the use of metaphors, quotations, rhetorical questions, and other figurative expressions.

Finally, although the arguers’ argumentative styles in the empirical counterparts of the opening stage (the starting points) and the concluding stage (the result of the resolution process) are largely determined by the institutional rules (the Standing Orders), Mr Chikawe and Mr Lissu also attempt to maintain their argumentative styles in the two stages. For instance, by suggesting that the constitutional review process has been hijacked by CCM, Mr Lissu seems to strengthen the adversarial nature based on the group solidarity between members of the opposition and members of the ruling party (engaged).

4.8 Account-giving and responsibility depiction

As captured in chapter two (see section 2.7), argumentative discourse may realise four basic types of account-giving strategies: concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals. In this debate, the argumentative discourse by the ministers and other members of the government demonstrates at least three types of accounts (excuses, justifications, and refusals). Starting with the accusation that the ruling party has interfered in the conduct of the district constitutional fora, the minister seems to appeal to *excuses*; he admits that it is wrong and against the Act for political parties to interfere in the conduct of fora (before the validation stage) but seems to evade being responsible for the interference as he seems to ‘distance himself from his party’ and he ‘warns’ political parties (including his own party) to stop interfering in the Commission’s autonomy and independence. As regards the accusation that the requested amount of money for the Commission is a sign of bribery or corruption, the minister attempts to *justify* different types of allowance or payment to the Commission (accepting responsibility) but suggests that the requested amount of money is not a sign of bribery/corruption (denying the pejorative quality). Concerning the accusation that the selection of members of the district constitutional fora was problematic, the minister’s account of this failure event also exhibits *justification*. The minister admits that there were ‘a few problems’ but suggests that the Commission will work on them (minimizing the effect). With this account-giving strategy, the minister accepts the responsibility for the failure event on behalf of the Commission but denies the pejorative quality associated with it. Another instance of justification is realised in Ms Pindi

Chana's argumentation against the opposition's second standpoint. First, she justifies the amount of money requested for the Commission. Second, she justifies the communication between CCM's top leaders or officials. In this case, she also accepts the responsibility but denies the pejorative quality associated with it. With respect to the accusation that the Commission's methodology in the conduct of the district constitutional fora (DCF) or election/appointment of DCF members was discriminatory, and it was devised as a means to favour the ruling party, the minister and other members of the government deny the failure event (*refusal*). They instead argue that the methodology was not discriminatory but the Commission had to devise non-uniform methodologies in the conduct of DCF or selection of DCF members in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar because the two parts of the United Republic of Tanzania have different governing systems; an account that is not accepted by members of the opposition, especially Mr Tundu Lissu.

4.9 Conclusion

The first three stages of the (critical) discussion in the reconstructed parliamentary debate on the coordination of the constitutional review process in Tanzania seem to exemplify, to a greater or lesser degree, the pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. However, the last stage – the concluding stage – deviates from the model as the result of the main (critical) discussion and subdiscussion(s) in this debate is determined by the MPs' votes. While there are various instances where the parliamentary rules provide some room for the MPs to observe the critical discussion rules, there are also instances where rules for critical discussion are violated. As regards the MPs' strategic manoeuvring, there are instances where MPs successfully manoeuvre within the institutional context, but some instances of strategic manoeuvring by MPs realise derailments of strategic manoeuvring. While the minister's main prescriptive standpoint is justified at the first level of defence by pragmatic argumentation, argumentation from legal authority is stereotypically applied at different levels of defence in almost every (sub)standpoint. It can further be concluded that the minister has attempted to maintain a detached style and the opposition's spokesperson seems to maintain an engaged style. Finally, excuses, justifications, and refusals are the three account-giving strategies that are employed in the ministers' (and MPs') accounts of various failure events.

CHAPTER FIVE

DEBATE ON THE ‘CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES’ OF THE UNION OF TANGANYIKA AND ZANZIBAR

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses a reconstructed parliamentary debate on the annual budget speech of the Vice President’s Office (Union) for the 2014/15 fiscal year as presented in the Tanzanian parliament on 12th May 2014 by the then Minister of State – Vice President’s Office (Union), Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan⁹. The Vice President’s Office coordinates matters pertaining to the Union¹⁰ and environment. However, based on a systematic pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative discourse, as captured in chapter three (see section 3.5), and nature of the (critical) discussion(s) in this debate, this chapter focuses on various ‘controversial issues’ of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar as discussed in the parliament. For the purpose of enhancing the understanding of the minister’s first standpoint and the opposition’s critical reactions to this standpoint, a speech segment from the Prime Minister’s opening speech of the 15th parliamentary budget session as presented in the parliament on 6th May 2014 is also included in the analysis (see *Extract 5.1*).

This debate is also analysed in terms of the four stages of a critical discussion from the perspective of pragma-dialectics. Specifically, section 5.2 analyses the confrontation stage. Section 5.3 discusses the opening stage. Section 5.4 and section 5.5 examine the argumentation stage and the concluding stage respectively. Section 5.6 concentrates on the evaluation of the rules for critical discussion. Section 5.7 explores the realisation of the pragma-dialectical facets of argumentation in context, i.e. the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, the prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style. Aspects of account-giving and the notion of responsibility are discussed in section 5.8. The concluding remarks of the chapter are given in section 5.9.

5.2 The confrontation stage

The structure of the Union and how Union matters are coordinated since the Union was founded became the subject of heated debate among politicians, activists, and members of the public during the constitutional review process in Tanzania. On the one hand, the ruling party and its

⁹ Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan is currently the Vice President of the United Republic of Tanzania.

¹⁰ “The Union” or “Union” refers to the Union of (the then Republic of) Tanganyika (now known as *Mainland Tanzania*) and (the People’s Republic of) Zanzibar, which led to the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania on April 26, 1964 (See also Masabo & Wanitzek, 2015).

government advocated for the current structure of the Union with two governments, i.e. the government of the United Republic of Tanzania or ‘the Union government’ and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. This political group argued that the current two-government structure of the Union is appropriate and historic and it should thus be protected, strengthened, and maintained. In their views, there was no need to reform the structure of the Union and the manner in which it operates. On the other hand, opposition parties, especially Chadema and CUF, and various (political) activists held the view that it was high time the current (structure of the) Union was reviewed and reformed. These political parties and activists attacked the current two-government structure of the Union and advocated for a change in the structure of the Union. They indicated how the structure of the Union is unfair to both parts of the Union. One of their arguments was that the current structure of the Union suggests that Zanzibar has lost all its important powers to Tanganyika and Tanganyika has just changed its name from the Republic of Tanganyika to the United Republic of Tanzania. They maintained that the Union government is not doing justice to Zanzibar and it is actually exploiting Zanzibar economically, politically, and socially. There were also complaints from Tanganyika about the challenges associated with the structure of the Union and how Union matters are handled. It was thus suggested that, to solve the challenges or ‘nuances’ of the Union, there was a need to have three (sub)governments within the Union, namely the Union government, the government of Tanganyika, and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.

In its report, after the conduct of the constitutional fora, the Constitutional Review Commission (henceforth the *Commission*) concluded that the majority of Tanzanians wanted a three-government structure of the Union. Thus, in the draft constitution by the Commission, the three-government structure was proposed (CRC, 2013; TUME, 2013). However, this was not the end of the debate on the structure of the Union. In accordance with the Act, after the publication of the Commission’s report in the Gazette, the chairperson of the Commission was later required to present the draft constitution to the Constituent Assembly (henceforward CA) for the enactment of the proposed constitution. In accordance with section 25(1) of the Act, based on the draft constitution tabled by the chairperson of the Commission, powers were vested in the CA to make further provisions for the proposed constitution. These provisions required passing by the CA “on the basis of support of two third majority of the total number of the members hailing from” each part of the Union (URT, 2012, p. 22). Thus, during the convening of the CA, members of the CA from the ruling party, who were the majority in the CA, criticised the three-government structure of the Union proposed by the Commission and

insisted that the two-government structure should be maintained (Rutechura, 2018). Out of disappointment, members of the opposition in the CA boycotted the CA session. However, this did not stop the remaining members of the CA to continue with the debates and make provisions to the draft constitution. Thus, in the proposed constitution by the CA, the two-government structure was eventually proposed (Bunge Maalum, 2014; Masabo & Wanitzek, 2015), rejecting the three-government structure, which was proposed by the majority of Tanzanians and advocated for by the opposition and some other (political) activists. It seems that, after boycotting the convening of the CA, members of the opposition wanted to air their views on the structure of the Union (and how Union matters are coordinated) in a different but common platform – the Tanzanian parliament. Thus, the debate on the budget speech by the Minister of State in the Vice President’s Office (Union) affords them such an opportunity.

The differences of opinion about the structure of the Union and the manner in which Union issues are managed can be characterised as controversies since they realise a more serious disagreement and the two opposing parties hold strong opinions about the structure of the Union and the coordination of the Union matters. This adversarial and controversial positioning about the Union is made manifest in the annual parliamentary debate on the proposed budget by the Minister of State – Vice President’s Office (Union) for the 2014/15 fiscal year. Thus, for the purposes of this study, I consider this debate as the (main) critical discussion about the differences of opinion relating to the structure of the Union and the manner in which Union matters are coordinated. These differences of opinion manifest themselves through the opposition between the standpoints by Minister Samia Suluhu Hassan (as well as Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda) and non-acceptance of these standpoints by the opposition’s spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu, and other members of the opposition. One of the differences of opinion, which is presented as the first difference of opinion in this debate, relates to the proposition that the (structure of the) Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained. With regard to the institutional point of the annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament (see also section 3.8 of chapter three), the main difference of opinion, however, relates to the proposition that the minister’s proposed budget (estimates of revenue and expenditure) or request for funds for the Vice President’s Office (Union) in the next fiscal year should be approved. On the basis of the differences of opinion in this critical discussion, the minister’s standpoints and initial argumentation are discussed in section 5.2.1 and the opposition’s standpoints and initial argumentation are discussed in section 5.2.2.

5.2.1 The minister's standpoints and initial argumentation

As regards the (structure of the) Union and the coordination of the Union matters, two standpoints and initial argumentation can be reconstructed from the speeches by the Minister of State (Union) and the Prime Minister as presented in the parliament. The minister's first standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 5.2.1.1 and summarised in section 5.2.1.2. The minister's second standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 5.2.1.3 and summarised in section 5.2.1.4.

5.2.1.1 The minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

In regard to the proposition that the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained, the ministers adopt a positive prescriptive standpoint. This standpoint and supporting argumentation can be reconstructed both from the speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Mizengo Pinda, and from the budget speech by the Minister of State (Vice President's Office-Union), Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan. The speech segments from which the minister's first standpoint and related arguments are reconstructed are presented in *Extract 5.1*.

Extract 5.1

- (a) WAZIRI MKUU: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, tarehe 26 Aprili, 2014 tumeanzimisha miaka 50 ya Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar. [2] Miaka 50 kwa lugha yoyote ile sio kipindi kifupi. [3] Tumeweza kufika hapa tulipo kutokana na misingi imara ya Muungano iliyowekwa na waasisi wetu na kuendelezwa na Viongozi walio[o]ngoza Taifa letu katika awamu zilizofuatia. [4] Tunajivunia kwamba Muungano wa Tanzania umejengeka kwenye historia ya muda mrefu ya ushirikiano wa watu wa pande hizi mbili. [5] Jamii zina uhusiano wa damu, kifikra na mapambano ya pamoja dhidi ya Wakoloni waliotawala kwa vipindi tofauti. [6] Walichofanya Waasisi wetu mwaka 1964 ni kurasimisha ushirikiano wetu kwa muda mrefu. (Hansard transcripts, 6 May 2014)

PRIME MINISTER [...] [1] Honourable Speaker, on 26th April 2014 we commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. [2] The [period of] 50 years is, in any language, not a short time. [3] We have reached here because of the solid foundation of the Union laid by the founders of our nations and developed by the leaders who took over in the next phases. [4] We are proud that the Union of Tanzania is built on a long history of cooperation between these two parts. [5] The communities are united by blood, thoughts, and the struggle against colonial rulers, who ruled in different periods. [6] What our founding fathers did in 1964 was just to formalise our cooperation for a long time.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, tumeadhimisha miaka 50 ya Muungano tukiwa na takwimu za Sensa ya Watu na Makazi ya Mwaka 2012. [2] Takwimu hizo zinaweka jambo moja wazi kwa Muungano wetu, kwamba zaidi ya asilimia 90 ya Watanzania wote wamezaliwa baada ya Muungano. [3] Hivyo, tuliozaliwa kabla ya Muungano ni chini ya asilimia 10. [4] Kwa mujibu wa Takwimu hizo, Tanzania nzima ina watu 44,926,923. [5] Kati yao, 40,640,425 sawa na asilimia 90.6 ni wa umri wa siku moja hadi miaka 50. [6] Takwimu hizo zina maana kwamba asilimia 90.6 ya watu wote wamezaliwa ndani ya Muungano na nchi wanayoifahamu ni Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [7] Sote tunawajibika kuwatendea haki watu hawa kwa kuulinda, kuimarisha na kuudumisha Muungano wetu. (Makofi) [8] Mheshimiwa Spika, tutaendelea kuulinda Muungano wetu kwa nguvu zote tukiwa na uelewa kwamba katika kipindi cha miaka 50 iliyopita Watanzania wameishi kwa amani na kufanya kazi zao za kujiletea maendeleo

wakiwa upande wowote wa Muungano. [9] Ni imani yangu kwamba Muungano huu utaendelea kudumu na watu watapata maendeleo makubwa [10] kwani Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ina fursa nyingi zinazoweza kutumika kwa manufaa ya wote. [11] Sote tukumbuke kuwa Utanzania wetu ni Muungano wetu; [12] hivyo, tuulinde tuimarisha na kuudumisha. [Makofi] (Hansard transcripts, 6 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Speaker, we have commemorated the 50th [anniversary] of the Union with the statistics of the 2012 Population and Housing Census. [2] These statistics make one thing clear about the Union; the statistics show that over 90% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was formed. [3] Thus, those of us who were born before the Union was founded are less than 10% of the population. [4] According to these statistics, Tanzania has 44,926,923 people. [5] Out of this, 40,640,425, which is equivalent to 90.6%, are between one day and 50 years old. [6] These statistics mean that 90.6% of Tanzanians were born within the Union and the country they know is the United Republic of Tanzania. [7] We are all responsible for doing justice to these people by protecting, strengthening, and maintaining our Union. (Applause). [8] Honourable Speaker, we will continue to protect our Union with all our efforts with an understanding that, within the past 50 years, Tanzanians have lived peacefully and engaged in their development activities in any part of the Union. [9] It is my belief that this Union will continue to exist, and people will achieve huge development [10] because the United Republic of Tanzania has a lot of opportunities which can be utilised for the benefits of all people. [11] We should all remember that our Tanzanian nationality is our Union; [12] therefore, we should protect, strengthen, and maintain it. (Applause)

- (c) [1] [T]umeadhimisha miaka 50 ya Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar kwa amani na utulivu. [2] Muungano huu ni wa kipekee na wa kupigiwa mfano duniani kote. [3] Aidha, ni kielelezo kamili cha umoja, mshikamano na upendo miongoni mwa wananchi, [4] jambo lililoweza kuwepo kwa amani na usalama, [5] Muungano umetuletea maendeleo makubwa katika miaka 50 ya uhai wake, [6] hivyo ni wajibu wetu kuuendeleza, kuenzi, kuulinda na kuudumisha Muungano huu kwa nguvu zetu zote. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 6 May 2014)
- [1] We have commemorated the 50th [anniversary] of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar peacefully. [2] This Union is unique and exemplary all over the world. [3] It is also a complete manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love among citizens. [4] This has paved a way for the existence of peace and security. [5] The Union has brought huge economic development within the 50 years of its existence. [6] It is therefore our responsibility to develop, cherish, protect, and maintain this Union with all our efforts. (Applause)*

- (d) WAZIRI WA NCHI, OFISI YA MAKAMU WA RAIS (MUUNGANO) [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, tarehe 26 Aprili, 2014 Muungano wetu umetimiza miaka 50 tangu kuasisiwa kwake. [2] Katika kipindi hicho sote tumeshuhudia wananchi ndani ya nchi yetu wakipata fursa ya kuishi kwa amani na kufanya shughuli za kimaendeleo popote katika Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [3] Hali hii inathibitisha kauli isemayo Utanzania wetu ni Muungano wetu, [4] hatuna budi, kuulinda, kuimarisha na kuudumisha. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER OF STATE, VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE (UNION) [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, on 26th April 2014 our Union marked 50 years of existence since it was founded. [2] During this period, we have all witnessed citizens in our country enjoying the opportunity of living peacefully and doing their economic development activities anywhere in the United Republic of Tanzania. [3] This proves the slogan/theme that 'Our Tanzanian nationality is our Union'; [4] we are obliged to protect, strength and maintain the Union. (Applause)

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kama nilivyoeleza hapo awali, mwaka huu tumeshuhudia Muungano wetu ukitimiza miaka 50 tangu kuasisiwa kwake. [2] Ni ukweli ulio wazi kuwa Muungano huu upo kwa sababu ya uamuzi makini na wa busara uliofanywa na viongozi waasisi wa Taifa letu, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere aliyekuwa Rais wa Jamhuri ya Tanganyika na Mzee Abeid Karume aliyekuwa Rais wa Jamhuri ya Watu wa Zanzibar. (Makofi) [3] Tunaposherehekea na kuadhimisha miaka 50 hatuna budi kutambua, kupongeza na kuthamini

uongozi wao, hasa kwa kuona mbali kuhusu umuhimu wa Muungano na mchango mkubwa walioutoa katika kuasisi na kujenga Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [...] (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, as I have pointed out earlier, this year we have witnessed the 50th anniversary of the Union since it was founded. [2] The fact remains that the Union exists because of a well-considered and wise decision of the founders of our nations; Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, who was the President of the Republic of Tanganyika, and Mzee Abeid Karume, who was the President of the People's Republic of Zanzibar. (Applause) [3] As we celebrate and commemorate the 50th anniversary, we must recognize, congratulate and appreciate their leadership, especially for envisioning the importance of the Union and for their valuable contribution to the establishment of the United Republic of Tanzania.

From *Extract 5.1*, the minister's first standpoint is expressed in (b) [12], (c) [6], and (d) [4], and it can be reconstructed as *I the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained*. I have reconstructed six arguments as collectively advanced by Mr Mizengo Pinda and Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan at the first level of defence of the standpoint. The first argument is expressed in (a) [1-2], (d) [1], and (e) [1], where the ministers argue that *1.1 the Union has marked 50 years of its existence*. In the unexpressed premise, the ministers imply that the existence of the Union for 50 years is a sign that the (structure of the) Union is appropriate and in order, and it should thus be protected, strengthened, and maintained. It is, however, questionable whether the mere existence of the Union for such years is indeed a sign that the (structure of the) Union is appropriate or ideal. In an attempt to pre-empt this objection, this symptomatic argumentation is at the second level of defence supported by causal argumentation in (c) [5], where Mr Pinda suggests that *1.1.1 the Union in the past 50 years has brought huge development in the country*, because people have lived peacefully and have engaged in development activities anywhere in each part of the United Republic, as indicated in (b) [8] and (d) [2]. Implicitly, this argument seems to suggest that the existing 'development' would not have existed without the Union (as it is now). The basic critical question that must be answered for this causal argumentation to be considered reasonable is whether the 'existing development' is indeed a consequence of the (structure of the) Union. A question can also be raised as to whether there are no possible causes of the existing development other than the Union. One could also question whether it is in effect the case that, without the Union, the existing development would not have existed. Another argument for *1.1* is presented in (a) [3], where Mr Pinda argues that *1.1.2 'we have reached here because of the solid foundation laid by the founders of the Union'*, and developed by the leaders who took over in the next phases, implying that the existence of the Union for 50 years is caused by the solid foundation laid by its founding fathers (causal argumentation).

In the second argument, as indicated in (b) [11] and (d) [3], the ministers suggest that 1.2 ‘*Our Tanzanian nationality is our Union*’, implying that the Tanzanian nationality is a consequence of the Union or, in other words, the Union has led to the existence of the Tanzanian nationality (“we are Tanzanians because of the Union”), and without the Union there are no Tanzanians. This means that citizens in both parts of the Union are regarded as *Tanzanians* because of the Union. Without the Union, there are Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris. This causal argumentation seems to be convincing and hard to challenge. However, it does not conclusively defend the standpoint. Being the *cause* or reason for the Tanzanian nationality does not necessarily make the Union or its structure appropriate or in order. The Union may be the cause of the Tanzanian nationality and still be inappropriate. In an attempt to further defend this causal link, in (c) [3], Mr Pinda argues that 1.2.1 *the Union is a complete manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love among citizens* from each part of the Union. This symptomatic argumentation is in (c) [4] defended by causal argumentation, where Mr Pinda argues that 1.2.1.1 *this has paved a way for the existence of peace and security*, implying that unity, solidarity, and love among people has led to the existence of peace and security in the country. Another argument for 1.2 is expressed in (a) [4], where the Prime Minister argues that 1.2.2 *the Union is built on the basis of a long history of cooperation between citizens from the two parts of the Union*, implying that the Union is a result of such a long history of cooperation (causal argumentation). In (a) [5], the Premier maintains that 1.2.2.1 *the two parts are united by blood, thoughts, and struggle against colonialism* (maintaining causal argumentation).

The third argument is reconstructed from (e) [2], where Ms Hassan suggests that 1.3 *the Union exists because of a well-considered and wise decision of the founding fathers of the Union; Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume*. Ms Hassan’s argument seems to suggest that the Union is appropriate and in order since it is based on the decision made by Mwalimu Nyerere and Sheikh Karume. Because the Union is based on the decision by its founding fathers, in (e) [3], the minister maintains that, as we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Union, we should recognize, congratulate, and cherish the founders of the Union for envisioning the importance of having the Union and for their great role in the establishment of the United Republic of Tanzania. In this argumentation, the minister appeals to the founding fathers of the Union as the authority (authority argumentation). One of the critical questions that can be raised is whether the mere fact that the existence of the Union is based on the decision by the founding leaders is sufficient to prove that the Union is appropriate and in order.

The fourth argument in defence of the minister's first standpoint is reconstructed from subextract (b). Specifically, in (b) [7] the Prime Minister suggests that *1.4 we are all responsible for doing justice to Tanzanians by protecting, strengthening, and maintaining the Union*, implying that protecting, strengthening, and maintaining the Union is doing justice to the majority of Tanzanians who were born after the Union was founded; in other words, it is a sign of justice. This symptomatic argumentation is defended by authority argumentation from statistics in (b) [1-6]. The Prime Minister states that, according to the statistics of the 2012 Population and Housing Census, *1.4.1a 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was founded*, and that *1.4.1b the country that they know is the United Republic of Tanzania*. In this argument, the Prime Minister appeals to the official statistics of the 2012 Population and Housing Census. However, one could question whether the fact that 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was established is necessarily a reasonable reason to protect, strengthen, and maintain the Union.

In the fifth argument, as indicated in (c) [2], Mr Pinda argues that *1.5 the (structure of the) Union is unique and exemplary*, implying that the 'fact' that the Union is unique and exemplary is a sign that it is appropriate, and it should be protected, strengthened, and maintained. This argument exhibits symptomatic argumentation. The claim that the (structure of the) Union is unique and exemplary is considered to be symptomatic of what is suggested in the standpoint. There are, however, at least two critical questions that should be satisfactorily addressed by the Prime Minister for this argument to be successful. First, a question can be raised as to whether the Union is really unique and exemplary as suggested by the Prime Minister. Second, a question can be raised as to whether being unique and exemplary is indeed a sign that the Union is in order and should be protected, strengthened, and maintained.

The last reconstructed argument at the first level of defence is expressed in (b) [9-10]. In (b) [9], the Prime Minister argues that *1.6 people will achieve huge development within the Union*. The unexpressed premise suggests that, if the Union continue to exist, it will bring huge development to the people. In pragmatic terms, the Prime Minister's argumentative move implies that the Union will achieve a desired effect (pragmatic argumentation), and if it will achieve a positive result, the (structure of) Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained. To further defend this argument, in (b) [10], Mr Pinda argues that *1.6.1 there are a lot of opportunities that can be utilised for the benefit of all people*, implying that the

utilisation of such opportunities will lead to a positive result (pragmatic argumentation). The ministers' arguments in support of the minister's first standpoint are summarised in *Table 5.1*.

Table 5.1 The minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
1	The Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained
1.1	The Union has marked 50 years of its existence
(1.1')	(The existence of the Union for 50 years is a sign that it is in order and it should thus be protected, strengthened, and maintained)
1.1.1	It has led to huge development
1.1.1.1a	People have lived peacefully anywhere in each part of the URT
1.1.1.1b	People have engaged in development activities anywhere in each part of the URT
1.1.2	We have reached here because of the solid foundation laid by the founders of the Union
(1.1.2')	(The existence of the Union for 50 years is caused by the solid foundation laid by its founders and, because of that, it should be protected, strengthened, and maintained)
1.2	Our Tanzanian nationality is our Union
(1.2')	(We are Tanzanians because of the Union; our nationality is a consequence of the Union)
1.2.1	Our Union is a manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love
1.2.1.1	This has paved the way for the existence of peace and security
1.2.2	The Union is built on the basis of a long history of cooperation between people from each part of the Union
(1.2.2')	(The Union is a result of such a long history of cooperation)
1.2.2.1	We are united by blood, thoughts, and struggle against colonialism
1.3	The Union is based on a well-considered and wise decision of the founding fathers of the nation, i.e. Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume
(1.3')	(Because it is based on the decision of the founding fathers of our nation, the Union is ideal and it should be protected, strengthened, and maintained)
1.3.1	We should recognise, congratulate, and appreciate them for envisioning the importance of having the Union and for their huge contribution to the establishment of the URT
(1.3.1')	(Protecting the Union is commemorating the founding fathers of the Union)
1.4	We should do justice for Tanzanians by protecting, strengthening, and maintaining the Union
(1.4')	(Protecting, strengthening, and maintaining the Union is doing justice for the majority of Tanzanians)
1.4.1a	The statistics of the 2012 Population and Housing Census show that 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was founded
1.4.1b	The country these Tanzanians know is the United Republic of Tanzania
1.5	The Union is unique and exemplary
(1.5')	(Because it is unique and exemplary, it is ideal and should be protected and maintained)
1.6	People will achieve huge development within the Union
(1.6')	(If the Union will bring huge development for the people, it should be protected, strengthened, and maintained)
1.6.1	The Union has various opportunities that can be utilised for the benefit of all people
(1.6.1')	(The utilisation of these opportunities will achieve a positive result)

With regard to the speech acts performed, both the Prime Minister, Mr Pinda, and the Minister of State (Union), Ms Hassan, perform the speech act of assertive by expressing the standpoint that the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained. The Prime Minister and the minister also perform the assertive by advancing six arguments to justify the standpoint.

5.2.1.2 Summary of the minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

Based on *Extract 5.1* and *Table 5.1*, I summarise the first four arguments in defence of the minister's first standpoint. This summary of the argumentation structure can be diagrammatically presented in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1 Summary of the minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

With respect to the argumentation schemes, the minister's first standpoint is at the first level of defence justified by symptomatic argumentation (1.1), causal argumentation (1.2), authority argumentation (1.3), symptomatic argumentation (1.4), symptomatic argumentation (1.5) and pragmatic argumentation (1.6), which constitute multiple argumentation. Symptomatic argumentation in 1.1 is at the second level defended by causal argumentation (1.1.1 and 1.1.2). Causal argumentation in 1.1.1 is at the third level of defence justified by another causal link (1.1.1.1a and 1.1.1.1b). Causal argumentation in 1.2 is at the second level defended by symptomatic argumentation (1.2.1) and causal argumentation (1.2.2). At the third level, both symptomatic argumentation in 1.2.1 and causal argumentation in 1.2.2 are defended by causal argumentation. Authority argumentation in 1.3 and pragmatic argumentation in 1.6 are defended by the same (sub)type of argumentation at the second level of defence. Furthermore,

symptomatic argumentation in 1.4 is at the second level of defence justified by authority argumentation from statistics (1.4.1a and 1.4.1b), realising coordinative argumentation.

5.2.1.3 The minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

As regards the proposition that the proposed budget (or request of funds) for the Vice President's Office for 2014/15 fiscal year should be approved, the minister adopts a positive prescriptive standpoint. This standpoint (and its related argumentation) is reconstructed from *Extract 5.2* below.

Extract 5.2

- (a) WAZIRI WA NCHI, OFISI YA MAKAMU WA RAIS (MUUNGANO): [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba kutoa hoja kwamba Bunge lako Tukufu sasa likubali kupokea, kujadili na kupitisha Makadirio ya Mapato na Matumizi ya fedha ya Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais kwa mwaka wa fedha 2014/2015. [...] [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kupitia hotuba ya bajeti ya mwaka wa fedha 2013/2014 Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais iliahidi mambo kadhaa ambayo utekelezaji wake ni kama ifuatavyo: - (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER OF STATE, VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE (UNION): [1] Honourable Chairperson, I beg to move that your august/esteemed parliament now accept to receive, debate, and approve the estimates of revenue and expenditure for the Vice President's Office in the 2014/2015 fiscal year. [...] [2] Honourable Chairperson, through the 2013/2014 budget speech, the Vice President's Office made various pledges whose fulfilment is highlighted as follows: -

- (b) [1] Kwanza, tuliagizwa kuratibu uboreshaji wa sheria na kanuni za fedha, zinazotawala ukusanyaji wa mapato chini ya Mamlaka ya Mapato (TRA) na ZRB ya Zanzibar kwa faida ya pande zote mbili za Muungano. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kulitekeleza hili Mawaziri wa Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania na wale wa Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar wamekubaliana kuwa kwa vile kodi ya mapato itokanayo na mishahara ya wafanyakazi (Pay as You Earn – PAYE) ni suala linalohusu mapato ya Muungano, dai la SMZ kupata fungu kutokana na mapato hayo kwa wafanyakazi wa taasisi za Muungano [wana]ofanya kazi Zanzibar litekelezwa[e]. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuanzia tarehe 1 Julai 2013 hadi Machi, 2014, jumla ya sh. 36,750,000,000/= zimepokelewa na SMZ. [4] Hata hivyo, marekebisho ya kisheria yanahitajika ili kuweka utaratibu wa wazi zaidi. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] First, we were directed to coordinate the reform of financial laws and regulations governing revenue collection under the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and Zanzibar Revenue Board (ZRB) for the benefits of both parts of the Union. [2] Honourable Chairperson, in fulfilling this order, ministers of the Union government and those from the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGZ) have agreed to remit to Zanzibar part of the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) taxes deducted from public employees working in the Union government in Zanzibar, because PAYE is a Union matter; the RGZ's claim to receive its dividend from PAYE has thus been settled. [3] Honourable Chairperson, from 1st July 2013 to March 2014, the RGZ has received a total of TZS 36,750,000,000/=. [4] However, further reforms of the laws are needed to make the process more transparent.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, tuliagizwa pia kuratibu Uboreshaji wa Sheria, za Ajira kwa Taasisi za Muungano ili kuwa na uwiano. [2] Ofisi imeratibu uboreshaji wa Sheria, Kanuni na Taratibu [za] ajira kwa taasisi za Muungano ili kuwa na uwiano katika nafasi za ajira. [3] Mwongozo wa ajira katika taasisi za Muungano umeandaliwa kupitishwa. [4] Mwongozo huo

unaendana na ibara ya 185 ya rasimu ya mapendekezo ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya Desemba, 2013 inayozungumzia uwiano wa ajira kwa washirika wa Muungano. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kutekeleza agizo la kuondoa vikwazo katika utekelezaji wa masuala ya Muungano, ofisi imeratibu utekelezaji wa masuala yanayoendelea kufuatilia ufumbuzi wake ambayo ni pamoja na hisa za SMZ katika Bodi ya Sarafu Afrika Mashariki na mgao wa faida ya Benki Kuu, mafuta na gesi, usajili wa vyombo vya moto na masuala ya kodi kwa wafanyabiashara kama yalivyoielezwa kwenye ibara ya 15 hadi 17 ya kitabu cha bajeti. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, we were also directed to reform the employment laws for the Union institutions/organizations so as to bring harmony in the employment process. [2] The office has coordinated the reforms of the laws, regulations, and procedures for employment in the Union institutions/organizations in order to bring harmony in job positions. [3] Employment guidelines for Union institutions/organizations have been prepared and approved. [4] The guidelines are pursuant to Article 185 of the draft constitution of December 2013, which addresses the harmonisation of employment posts for both parts of the Union. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in fulfilling the order to lift barriers in implementing Union matters, my office has coordinated the implementation of all matters pertaining to Union affairs, including shares of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar from the East African Currency Board and the dividend from the Bank of Tanzania, oil and gas, the registration of motor vehicles and tax issues for businesspeople as shown in paragraphs 15 to 17 of the budget [speech] book.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, tuliagizwa kufanya uratibu [w]a masuala ya kiuchumi, kijamii, kisheria na mambo yanayohusiana na Katiba katika Muungano. [2] Katika eneo hili ofisi imeendelea kuratibu gawio la asilimia 4.5 ya mapato ya Muungano kwenda Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar. [3] Gawio hilo linajumuisha misaada ya kibajeti yaani GBS, Fedha ya Mfuko wa Maendeleo ya Jimbo na Kodi ya Mshahara (PAYE). [4] Hadi kufikia mwezi Machi, 20[1]4 SMZ imepokea misaada wa kibajeti, sh. 27,190,502,190/= kati ya sh. 32,627,535,000/= zilizo dhinishwa na Bunge kwa mwaka wa fedha 2013/2014. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, aidha, katika kipindi cha kuanzia Julai, 2013 hadi Machi, 2014 SMZ imepokea PAYE ya sh. 15,750,000,000 na fedha za Mfuko wa Maendeleo ya Jimbo sh. 1,243,925,860/=. [6] Vile vile, SMT ilichangia sh. 600,000,000/= kwenda SMZ kwa ajili ya kufanikisha maadhimisho ya miaka 50 ya Mapinduzi. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, we were also directed to coordinate economic, social, legal, and constitutional issues in the Union. [2] On this aspect, the office has continued to coordinate [the provision of] the dividend of 4.5% from the Union revenues to the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGZ). [3] This dividend includes the General Budget Support (GBS), the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund, and Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE). [4] Until March 2014, the RGZ has received TZS 27,190,502,190/= as GBS out of TZS 32,627,535,000/= that was approved by the parliament for the 2013/14 fiscal year. [5] Honourable Chairperson, also from July 2013 to March 2014, the RGZ has received TZS 15,750,000,000/= of PAYE from the Union government, and TZS 1,243,925,860/= as [its dividend from] the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund. [6] Furthermore, the Union government contributed TZS 600,000,000/= to Zanzibar to facilitate the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, aidha, katika kipindi hiki masuala ya miradi ya miradi ya kijamii inayofadhiliwa na Serikali kwa kushirikiana na washirika wa maendeleo yameratibiwa. [2] Baadhi ya miradi hiyo ni mradi wa Mfuko wa Maendeleo ya Jamii (Tanzania Social Fund - TASAF) na Mradi wa Maendeleo ya Kilimo pamoja na Mradi wa Maendeleo ya Mifugo. [3] Pamoja na hiyo kulikuwa pia na mradi wa Mille[n]ium Challenge Account na Mfuko wa Maendeleo ya Jimbo. [4] Maelezo kamili ya jinsi miradi hiyo inavyotekelezwa yako kwenye ibara 18-22 ya kitabu cha hotuba ya bajeti. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuelimisha umma kuhusu Muungano, ili kuwe na jamii yenye uelewa [w]a masuala ya Muungano na yasiyo ya Muungano, [6] Ofisi iliandaa makongamano manane ya kutoa elimu kwa umma kuhusu

masuala ya Muungano. [7] Makongamano hayo yalifanyika katika Mikoa ya Da es Salaam, Tanga, Dodoma, Zanzibar, Mbeya na Iringa. [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ofisi pia iliandaa na kuchapisha nakala 2,000 za jarida la Muungano Wetu; nakala 7,000 za vipeperushi, nakala 5,000 za jarida maalum la miaka 50 ya Muungano wa Tanganyika na nakala 5,000 za Kitabu cha Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar, historia katika picha na kuzisambaza kwa wadau. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, during this time we have coordinated the community development projects financed by the government in partnership with the development partners. [2] Some of these projects include those implemented by Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) and the joint projects on agriculture and livestock development. [3] We also had projects financed by Millennium Challenge Account and the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund. [4] Further details about these projects can be found in paragraphs 18-22 of the budget speech book. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in the provision of [civic] education about the Union in order to have a community that is knowledgeable about the Union and non-Union issues, [6] the office organised eight symposiums to provide [civic] education on Union issues to the people. [7] Those symposiums were held in Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Dodoma, Mbeya, and Iringa regions, as well as in Zanzibar. [8] Honourable Chairperson, the office also published and distributed to stakeholders 2,000 copies of 'Muungano Wetu' newsletter; 7,000 copies of leaflets, 5,000 copies of a special-edition newsletter of the 50th anniversary of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and 5,000 copies of the book on the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, history in pictures.

- (f) Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, malengo ya mwaka 2014/2015. [1] Katika mwaka wa fedha 2015, ofisi itaendelea kutekeleza majukumu yake ya uratibu wa masuala ya Muungano na kudumisha ushirikiano katika Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania na Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar. [2] Katika kutekeleza hayo, shughuli za Kamati ya SMT na SMZ ya kushughulikia masuala ya Muungano pamoja na vikao vinavyohusika vitaratibiwa ili kurahisisha utekelezaji wa masuala hayo. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ofisi itaendelea kufanya ufuatiliaji wa miradi ya kijamii iliyopo na mipya inayotarajiwa kuja [...] ili kubaini manufaa na upungufu unaopatikana kwa kuwepo kwa miradi hiyo. [4] Vile vile ushirikiano baina ya Wizara na taasisi zisizo za Muungano zenye kazi zinazoshabihiana kati ya SMT na SMZ utaimarishwa. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, suala la elimu kwa umma litapewa msukumo wa kushirikiana na Kamati za Ushauri za Mikoa na Wilaya ili Watanzania wapate uelewa mkubwa zaidi wa historia ya Muungano na hali ilivyo kwa wakati huu. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa kuwa nchi yetu iko katika mchakato wa kuandika Katiba mpya ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, ofisi itatekeleza masuala yote yanayohusu Muungano yatakayotokana na mapendekezo au yatakayotokana na Katiba hiyo. [...] [7] Ili ofisi iweze kutekeleza malengo yaliyoelezwa katika hotuba hii, [8] naomba kutoa hoja kwamba Bunge lako liidhinishe maombi ya fedha kwa mwaka wa fedha 2014/2015 [...] [9] Fedha za matumizi ya kawaida zinajumuisha sh. 44,039,608,000/= fedha zitakazopelekwa Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar. [...] (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

Honourable Chairperson, in the 2014/2015 fiscal year, [1] the office will continue to coordinate Union matters and promote the cooperation between the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGZ). [2] To achieve this [objective], the activities of the committee of the URT and RGZ dealing with the Union matters and the relevant sessions will be coordinated in order to ease the implementation of the [Union] matters. [3] Honourable Chairperson, the office will continue to supervise the existing and prospective projects [...] in order to identify the benefits and shortcomings resulting from the existence of the projects. [4] Similarly, the cooperation of non-Union ministries and institutions/organizations with similar functions between the URT and RGZ will be strengthened. [5] Honourable Chairperson, the issue of public education will be prioritised in collaboration with Regional and District Consulting Committees for Tanzanians to have a better understanding of the Union's history and its present status. [6] Honourable Chairperson, since our country is in the process of making a new constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, the office will fulfil all Union-related issues based on the recommendations or

outcomes of the [new] constitution. [...] [7] To enable the office to execute the objectives stated in this speech, [8] I beg to move that your parliament resolve to approve the request for funds for the 2014/2015 fiscal year. [...] [9] The recurrent expenditure includes TZS 44,039,608,00/=, which the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar will receive. [...]

Based on *Extract 5.2* above, the minister's second standpoint is expressed in (f) [8] and (a) [1], and can be reconstructed as *2 the proposed budget of the Vice President's Office (Union) for 2014/15 fiscal year should be approved*. This standpoint is both positive and prescriptive. The main argumentation in the first level of defence of the standpoint is realised by multiple argumentation with two arguments. In the first argument, as indicated in (a) [2] and implied from (b) to (e), Ms Hassan implicitly suggests that *(2.1) the office has effectively coordinated Union matters in the 2013/14 fiscal year by fulfilling various pledges*. This argument also implies that the fulfilment of various pledges is symptomatic of the office's effective coordination of the Union matters in the previous fiscal year (symptomatic argumentation), and for this reason, the proposed budget for the 2014/15 fiscal year should be approved. Further subarguments in support of the first argument are reconstructed from (b) to (e).

The first subargument is reconstructed from (b) and (d). In (b) [1] and (d) [1], the minister argues that the Vice President's Office (Union) was directed to coordinate economic, social, legal, and constitutional issues of the Union and supervise revenue collections for the benefit of both Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. In (f) [2-3], the minister argues that, in executing this directive, *(2.1.)1 the URT gave Zanzibar its dividend of 4.5% from General Budget Support (GBS), Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF), and Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) taxes*, implying that this is what the regulation requires (argumentation from legal authority). To further defend this argument, in (d) [4-5], the minister argues that, by March 2014, *(2.1.)1.1 Zanzibar had received TSZ 27,190,502,190 (out of TZS 32 billion) of GBS, TZS 15,750,000,000 of PAYE, and 1,243,925,860 of CDCF*. This argument demonstrates authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation).

The second subargument in support of Ms Hassan's first argument begins with a premise that her office was directed to harmonise the employment laws and regulations. This is presented in (c) [1]. In (c) [2], the minister argues that *(2.1.)2 the office harmonised laws, regulations, and procedures for employment in the Union institutions/organizations*. This is further supported by another argument, realising coordinative argumentation. First, Ms Hassan argues that *(2.1.)2.1a new employment guidelines were prepared and approved*, as indicated in (c) [3]. Second, she argues that *(2.1.)2.1b the issued guidelines are pursuant to section 185 of the*

proposed draft constitution of 2013, as shown in (c) [4]. This coordinative argumentation exhibits argumentation from legal authority. The minister appeals to the provisions of the proposed draft constitution as the legal authority.

In the third subargument, as expressed in (e) [1], Ms Hassan states that *(2.1.)3 her office coordinated different development projects in both parts of the Union*. This argument realises symptomatic argumentation. ‘Successful’ coordination of the projects is taken to constitute a sign of the office’s effective coordination of the Union matters in the previous fiscal year. In (e) [2] and [3], this symptomatic argumentation is supported by argumentation from example, where the minister argues that these development projects include the ones financed by the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF).

The fourth subargument in defence of the first argument is reconstructed from subextract (c), starting with a premise that the office was directed to meet the challenges of the Union in order to have a smooth coordination of the Union matters. In this argument Ms Hassan argues that *(2.1.)4 the office made efforts to address the challenges of the Union*. For instance, the office worked (and is still working) on the Zanzibar’s shares from the East African Currency Board (EACB) to ensure that Zanzibar gets its shares back.

The last subargument in defence of the first argument is reconstructed from subextract (e). In (e) [5], the minister argues that *(2.1.)5 the office provided civic education to the public about the Union in order to improve people’s understanding of the Union*, including the understanding of its history and its current status. In (e) [6] and [7], Ms Hassan states that the office organised different symposiums which took place in Zanzibar and in different regions of Mainland Tanzania, including Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Dodoma, Mbeya, and Iringa. Another point of argumentation in support of this subargument is reconstructed from (e) [8]. The minister states that the office prepared and distributed to the stakeholders different publications to help the public to have a better understanding of the Union. These publications include 2,000 copies of *Muongano Wetu* newsletter, 7,000 copies of leaflets on the Union, and 5,000 copies of a special-edition newsletter of the 50 years of the Union (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). The minister’s first argument in defence of the second standpoint with five subarguments is summarised in **Table 5.2** below.

Table 5.2 The first argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
(2.1)	(The office has effectively coordinated Union matters in 2013/14 by fulfilling various pledges)
(2.1')	(Fulfilment of the pledges is a sign of the office's effective coordination of the Union matters)
(2.1.)1	The URT govt gave Zanzibar its 4.5% share of GBS, PAYE, and CDCF
(2.1.1')	(This is what the regulation requires)
(2.1.)1.1	RGZ received TZS 27.1 billion of GBS, 15.7 billion of PAYE, and 1.2 billion of CDCF
(2.1.)2	It has harmonised laws, regulations, and procedures for employment in the Union institutions/organizations
(2.1.)2.1a	New employment guidelines were prepared and approved
(2.1.)2.1b	The guidelines are pursuant to the proposed draft constitution of 2013
(2.1.)3	The office has successfully coordinated development projects in both parts of the Union
(2.1.3')	(Successful coordination of the projects is a sign of the office's effective fulfilment of the previous budget objectives)
(2.1.)3.1	The projects include those financed by TASAF, MCA, and CDCF
(2.1.)4	The office has made efforts to address the challenges of the Union
(2.1.4')	(The efforts made by the office are a sign of the office's good performance)
(2.1.)4.1	The office has been working on the issue of Zanzibar's shares from EACB
(2.1.)5	The office educated the public about the Union in order to improve people's understanding of the Union
(2.1.)5.1a	It organised various symposiums in both parts of the URT
(2.1.)5.1b	The symposiums took place in Zanzibar, Dar, Tanga, Dodoma, Mbeya, and Iringa
(2.1.)5.2a	It prepared and distributed to the public various publications about the Union
(2.1.)5.2b	The publications include 2000 copies of <i>Muongano Wetu</i> newsletter, 7000 copies of leaflets, and 5000 copies of a special-edition newsletter of the 50 th anniversary of the Union

In the second argument for the minister's second standpoint, as advanced in (f) [1] and (f) [7], Ms Hassan suggests that *2.2 the proposed budget will enable her office to coordinate Union matters and promote the cooperation between URT and RGZ in the 2014/15 fiscal year*. In the unexpressed premise, this argument seems to suggest that, if the proposed budget will enable the office to coordinate Union matters and promote cooperation between the two parts of the Union (which is considered to be a desired effect), the proposed budget should be approved. This pragmatic argumentation is at the second level of defence justified by six subarguments, realising multiple argumentation structure. Most of these arguments demonstrate pragmatic argumentation or causal argumentation from means to goal. In the first subargument, as expressed in (f) [2], the minister pledges that *2.2.1 the activities and meetings of the Union's joint committee responsible for handling Union matters will be coordinated*. The minister further suggests that the coordination of these activities and meetings will ease the coordination or implementation of the Union matters.

The second subargument for 2.2 is indicated in (f) [3], where the minister argues that *2.2.2 the office will continue to evaluate the existing and prospective development projects*. According

to the minister, this will enable the office to identify strengths and weaknesses of the projects, which is considered to be a desired effect. In the third argument, as described in (f) [9], the minister argues that *2.2.3 TZS 44 billion will be provided to the RGZ*, suggesting in the unexpressed premise that, if Zanzibar will be given this amount as required by the regulation, then the proposed budget should be approved. In the fourth argument, as presented in (f) [4], the minister suggests that *2.2.4 the cooperation between non-Union ministries and institutions/organizations from Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, with similar or related functions, will be strengthened*, which is also considered to be a desired effect.

Another subargument for 2.2 is expressed in (f) [5], where Ms Hassan pledges that, in collaboration with the regional and district consulting committees, *2.2.5 the office will put more emphasis on providing civic education on the Union*. She further argues that this will be done in order to broaden people's understanding of the history of the Union and its current status (causal argumentation from means to goal). Lastly, in (f) [6], the minister states that *2.2.6 the office will coordinate all Union matters based on the proposed draft constitution*. The minister's second argument in defence of the second standpoint is summarised in **Table 5.3** below.

Table 5.3 The second argument for the minister's second standpoint

2.2	The proposed budget will enable the office to coordinate Union matters and promote cooperation between URT and RGZ in 2014/15
(2.2')	(If the proposed budget will enable the office to coordinate Union matters and promote cooperation between the two parts of the Union, the proposed budget should be approved)
2.2.1	The activities and meetings of the Union's joint committee responsible for handling Union matters will be coordinated
2.2.1.1	This will ease the coordination/implementation of Union matters
2.2.2	The office will continue to make follow-ups on the existing and future development projects
2.2.2.1	This will enable the office to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the projects
2.2.1.3	TZS 44 billion will be provided to the RGZ
(2.2.1.3')	(If Zanzibar will be given this amount as required by the regulation, then the proposed budget should be approved)
2.2.4.	The cooperation between non-Union ministries and institutions/organizations from Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, performing similar or related functions, will be strengthened
2.2.4.1	Non-Union institutions will work together on non-Union matters
2.2.5	Civic education on the Union will be given more emphasis
2.2.5.1	This will be done in order to broaden people's understanding of the history of the Union and its current status
2.2.6	It will coordinate all Union matters based on the proposed draft constitution

Regarding the speech acts performed in the minister’s second standpoint and related argumentation, in subextract (a) the speech act of assertive is performed by expressing the minister’s second standpoint that the proposed budget should be approved. The assertive is also performed in the rest of the extract as the minister advances argumentation in defence of the standpoint.

5.3.1.4 Summary of the minister’s second standpoint and related argumentation

From *Extract 5.2* and the follow-up discussion, the minister’s second standpoint and its related argumentation can be diagrammatically presented in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 5.2. For the purposes of this summary, at the first level of defence both arguments are indicated (with exception of the unexpressed premises). At the second level, only the first three subarguments for each argument at the first level are presented. Other arguments and unexpressed premises can be referred to in *Table 5.2* and *Table 5.3*. What follows this summary is a brief description of the argumentation schemes appealed to in defence of the minister’s second standpoint.




Figure 5.2 Summary of the minister’s second standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's second standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation which is combined in multiple argumentation with pragmatic argumentation at the first level of defence. Symptomatic argumentation is at the next levels of defence justified by symptomatic argumentation and other subtypes of symptomatic argumentation, particularly argumentation from legal authority and authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation). Pragmatic argumentation is at the next levels of defence supported by mainly pragmatic argumentation and causal argumentation from means to goal.

5.2.2 The opposition's critical reactions

Two standpoints and initial argumentation can be reconstructed from the speech by the opposition's spokesperson or shadow minister for the Vice President's Office (Union), Mr Tundu Lissu. These standpoints (and their related argumentation) are considered to be the opposition's critical reactions to the minister's standpoints and related argumentation. The opposition's first standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 5.2.2.1 and summarised in section 5.2.2.2. The second standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 5.2.2.3 and summarised in section 5.2.2.4.

5.2.2.1 The opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's first standpoint and supporting arguments can be reconstructed from *Extract 5.3*.

Extract 5.3

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mwaka huu Jamhuri ya Muungano Tanzania imefikisha umri wa nusu karne tangu ilipozaliwa tarehe 26 Aprili, 1964. [2] Kama alivyosema Mheshimiwa Waziri [Mkuu] Mheshimiwa Mizengo Kayanza Peter Pinda, katika hotuba yake ya tarehe 7 Mei, 2014, kuhusu Mapitio na Mwelekeo wa kazi za Serikali na Makadirio ya Matumizi ya Fedha ya Ofisi ya Waziri Mkuu na Ofisi ya Bunge kwa mwaka 2014/2015, miaka 50 kwa lugha yoyote ile, siyo kipindi kifupi. [3] Waziri Mkuu, alitumia takwimu ya Sensa ya Watu na Makazi ya Mwaka 2012, zinazoonyesha kwamba asilimia 90.6 ya Watanzania wote wamezaliwa ndani ya Muungano na nchi wanayoifahamu ni Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [4] Kwa maneno ya Waziri Mkuu, sote tunawajibika kuwatendea haki watu hawa kwa kuulinda, kuuimarisha na kuudumisha Muungano wetu. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kama ilivyo kwa Watanzania wengine wengi na mimi pia nimezaliwa ndani ya Muungano. [6] Ninaamini kwamba ukweli huu unawahusu pia Waheshimiwa Wabunge wengi waliomo ndani ya Bunge hili Tukufu na sisi pia tunaomba kutendewa haki kuhusu Muungano huu. (Makofi). [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hata hivyo, haki tunayoomba kutendewa ni moja tu, kuambiwa ukweli juu ya Muungano huu na historia yake, hali yake ya sasa na mwelekeo wake wa baadae. [8] Haki tunayoomba kutendewa ni kwa watawala kuacha propaganda na uongo juu ya Muungano na kutuambia ukweli wote juu ya Muungano huu. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, this year, the United Republic of Tanzania has marked half a century since its birth on 26th April 1964. [2] As Honourable [Prime] Minister Mizengo Kayanza Peter Pinda said in his speech, on 7th (sic) May 2014, on the review and trends of the government's duties and the budget estimates of the Prime Minister's Office and the

Parliament's Office for the fiscal year 2014/2015, in any language, this is not a short time. [3] The Prime Minister referred to the 2012 Population and Housing Census, indicating that 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was founded and the country that they know is the United Republic of Tanzania. [4] In the words of the Prime Minister, we are all responsible for doing justice to these people by protecting, strengthening, and maintaining our Union. (Applause) [5] Honourable Chairperson, like many other Tanzanians, I was also born after the Union was founded. [6] I believe that this is also true of many members of your august/esteemed parliament and we equally need justice to be done to us on matters of the Union. (Applause) [7] Honourable Chairperson, however, the justice that we need is only one; to be told the truth about this Union, its history, its current status and its destiny. [8] The justice we want is for the rulers to stop peddling propaganda and lies about the Union and tell us the whole truth about it. (Applause)

- (b) [1] Bob Marley aliyekuwa Mwanamuziki mpigania uhuru wa watu weusi maarufu kutoka Jamaica, aliwahi kusema katika wimbo wake, "Get up, stand up; stand up for your rights." Yaani amkeni, simameni; simameni kwa haki zenu. Kwamba *you can fool some people sometime but you cannot fool all the people all the time*. Yaani unaweza kuwadanganya baadhi ya watu kwa muda fulani, lakini huwezi kuwadanganya watu wote kwa muda wote. (Makofi). [2] Baada ya nusu karne ya uongo na propaganda kuhusu Muungano huu, Watanzania wa kizazi hiki cha Muungano wanataka ukweli. [3] Watanzania hawa hawataulinda wala kuuimarisha au kuudumisha Muungano huu endapo wataendelea kudanganywa au kufichwa ukweli juu ya mambo mengi yanayouhusu. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, sisi kizazi cha Muungano tunahitaji kutendewa haki. [5] Acheni propaganda na uongo kuhusu Muungano huu, ndipo muweze kutuambia tuulinde, tuuimarishe na tuudumishe. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Bob Marley, a former legendary musician from Jamaica and freedom fighter for black people, once said, in his song 'Get up, stand up (stand up for your rights)', that "you can fool some people sometime but you cannot fool all the people all the time". (Applause) [2] After half a century of lies and propaganda about the Union, the Tanzanians who were born after the Union was founded want to know the truth [about the Union]. [3] These Tanzanians will not protect, strengthen, or maintain this Union if they will continue to be deceived or are not told the truth about many pending issues relating to the Union. (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, we [members of] the post-Union generation want justice to be done. [5] Stop peddling propaganda and lies about the Union before asking us to protect, strengthen, and maintain the Union. (Applause)

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Sherehe za miaka 50 ya Muungano ni mahali pazuri pa kuanzia kudai ukweli juu ya Muungano huu. [2] Mtu yeyote anayetembea sasa katika Barabara ya Nyerere kuanzia uwanja wa ndege wa Kimataifa wa Julius Nyerere hadi katikati ya Jiji la Dar es Salaam au barabara ya Ally Hassan Mwinyi kuanzia Morocco hadi katikati ya jiji, ataona kila mlingoti wa taa za barabarani umepambwa kwa picha za Waasisi rasmi wa Muungano, yaani Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere na Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume wakiwa katika matukio mbalimbali ya siku za mwanzo za Muungano. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hata hivyo, kwa upande wa Zanzibar, barabara zote kuu za Mji wa Zanzibar ikiwemo ile inayotoka Mji Mkongwe kupitia Ikulu ya Zanzibar hadi uwanja wa ndege wa Kimataifa wa Abeid Amani Karume, hakuna picha hata moja ya Waasisi wa Muungano katika matukio yanayoonyeshwa kwenye picha zilizopo Dar es Salaam. [4] Badala yake, barabara hizo zimepambwa kwa picha za Marais wa Zanzibar kutoka Mapinduzi ya mwaka 1964 hadi sasa. [5] Ni ndani ya eneo la wageni maarufu pekee ndiyo kuna picha moja ya Mwalimu Nyerere na Sheikh Karume. [6] Hii ni katika wiki ambayo Muungano huu umeadhimisha miaka 50 tangu kuzaliwa kwake. [7] Kwa jinsi ambavyo tangu mwaka huu uanze, Watanzania tumepigwa propaganda za kila aina juu ya Muungano na TBC na vyombo vingine vya habari vya Serikali na vya binafsi, kukosekana kwa dalili yoyote ya sherehe za Muungano kwa upande wa Zanzibar wakati wa kilele cha sherehe hizo, kunatilia shaka juu ya uimara wa misingi ya Muungano wenyewe. [8] Hii ndiyo kusema kwamba pengine kuna ukweli katika hitimisho la Tume ya Mabadiliko ya Katiba kwamba

Tanganyika ndiyo imevaa koti la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania [9] na pengine ndiyo maana Muungano huu haujawahi kuungwa mkono Zanzibar kwa kiasi ambacho wanaopenda kutuaminisha vinginevyo, wamekuwa wakidai. (Makofi). [10] Aidha, pengine ndiyo maana hata picha za kuchanganya udongo zinazooneshwa na TBC kila kukicha, zinamwonesha Mwalimu Nyerere akichanganya udongo peke yake, wakati Sheikh Karume haonekani kabisa. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the 50th anniversary of the Union is a good starting point for demanding the truth about this Union. [2] Anyone walking on Nyerere Road from Julius Nyerere International Airport to Dar es Salaam city centre or Ally Hassan Mwinyi Road from Morocco to the city centre will see posters displaying the images of the official founders of the Union, namely Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, at different events during the early days of the formation of the Union. [3] Honourable Chairperson, however, all the main roads of Zanzibar, including one from Mji Mkongwe through the State House of Zanzibar to the Abeid Aman Karume International Airport, display no single image of the founders of the Union as displayed in Dar es Salaam. [4] Instead, the roads in Zanzibar are decorated with pictures of the presidents of Zanzibar from the Revolution of 1964 to the present. [5] There is only one picture of Mwalimu Nyerere and Sheikh Karume in a designated area for VIPs. [6] This is happening in the celebration week of the 50th [anniversary] of the Union since its birth. [7] Considering the way, since the beginning of this year, Tanzanians have been fed with all kinds of propaganda about the Union by TBC and other public and private media entities, the absence of any sign of the Union's [50th anniversary] celebration in Zanzibar at the peak of the celebration raises doubts as to whether the foundation of the Union is solid enough. [8] This is to say that there is probably some truth in the conclusion by the Constitutional Review Commission that Tanganyika is "wearing the coat of the United Republic of Tanzania" [9] and that is why this Union has never been supported in Zanzibar as much as those who have been convincing us to believe otherwise have been claiming. (Applause) [10] Moreover, this is perhaps [the reason] why even the images of the founders of the Union mixing the soil shown by TBC every day display Mwalimu Nyerere mixing the soil alone, while Sheikh Karume is not seen. (Applause)

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuna jambo lingine linalofikirisha sana kuhusu picha hizi za Sherehe za Miaka 50 ya Muungano zilizopamba Mitaa ya Dar es Salaam. [2] Baadhi ya picha hizo zinawaonyesha watu wengine ambao wamefutwa kabisa katika historia rasmi wanayofundishwa Watoto wetu mashuleni na vyuoni. [3] Kwa mfano, katika picha maarufu ya Mwalimu Nyerere na Sheikh Karume wakisaini hati za makubaliano ya Muungano, wapo pia kwa upande wa Tanganyika, Oscar Kambona, Bhoke Munanka na Job Lusinde, wakati kwa upande wa Zanzibar wanaonekana kwenye picha hiyo ni Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla na Ally Mwinyigogo. [4] Aidha, kuna picha inayowaonyesha Mwalimu Nyerere, Sheikh Karume na Kassim Hanga wakitabasamu kwa furaha kubwa. [5] Katika kitabu chake "Kwaheri Ukoloni, Kwaheri Uhuru," Zanzibar na Mapinduzi ya AFRABIA kilichochapishwa mwaka 2010 Harith Gasan ameonyesha jinsi ambavyo Oscar Kambona, Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla na Saleh Saadala Akida walitoa mchango mkubwa katika kufanikisha Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar ya Januari 12, 1964 na baadaye kufanikisha Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar wa Aprili, 26 mwaka huo. [6] Katika kitabu chake "The Partnership; Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar Miaka 30 ya Dhoruba," Rais wa pili wa Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar Alhaji Aboud Jumbe ameeleza kwamba ni Kambona, Bhoke Munanka na Job Lusinde ndio waliompelekea Sheikh Karume nakala za hati za makubaliano kabla ya hati hizo kusainiwa tarehe 22 Aprili, 1964. [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, swali kuu sisi tuliozaliwa ndani ya Muungano tunataka lijibiwe kwa kweli kabisa, ni Waasisi hawa wengine wa Muungano, akina Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla na Salehe Saadala Akida kwa upande wa Zanzibar; na Oscar Kambona, Bhoke Munanka na Job Lusinde kwa upande wa Tanganyika walipotelea wapi na kwa nini hawatajwi katika historia rasmi ya Muungano na Waasisi wake? (Makofi) [8] Aidha, tunataka kuambiwa ukweli, kwa nini mchango wao katika kuzaliwa kwa Muungano umefichwa kwa muda wote wa nusu Karne ya Muungano huu? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, there is another thing that is worth reflecting in relation to these images of the Union's 50th [anniversary] celebration as displayed in Dar es Salaam. [2] Some of these pictures display some other people who have been completely removed from the official history (of the Union) taught to our children in schools and colleges. [3] For example, in the famous picture of Mwalimu Nyerere and Sheikh Karume signing the Articles of the Union, there are also Oscar Kambona, Bhoke Munanka and Job Lusinde from Tanganyika and Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla and Ally Mwinyigogo from Zanzibar. [4] There is also a picture displaying Mwalimu Nyerere, Sheikh Karume, Kassim Hanga smiling with great joy. [5] In his book "Kwaheri Ukoloni, Kwaheri Uhuru: Zanzibar na Mapinduzi ya Afrabia (Goodbye colonialism, goodbye freedom: Zanzibar and the Afrabia revolution), published in 2010, Harith Ghassany has shown how Oscar Kambona, Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla and Saleh Saadala Akida played a key role in the achievement of the Zanzibar Revolution of January 12, 1964 and later in the achievement of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar of April 26 the same year. [6] In his book "The Partnership: Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar: Miaka 30 ya Dhoruba" (The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: 30 years of Storm), the 2nd President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Alhaji Aboud Jumbe, explains that it was Kambona, Bhoke Munanka, and Job Lusinde who took the copies of the Articles of the Union to Sheikh Karume before the signing of the Articles on 22nd April 1964. [7] Honourable Chairperson, the basic question that we [members of] the post-Union generation want to be honestly answered is: Where did Abdallah Kassim Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla and Saleh Saadala Akida from Zanzibar and Oscar Kambona, Bhoke Munanka and Job Lusinde from Tanganyika go and why aren't they recognized in the official history of the Union as part of its founders? (Applause) [8] In addition, we want to be told the truth; why their contribution to the birth of the Union has been hidden throughout the whole half a century of the Union's existence?

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lingine ni kuhusu kutolewa kwa nyaraka za Muungano. [2] Katika maoni yake wakati wa Bunge la Bajeti la mwaka wa fedha 2012/2013 Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni ilipendekeza kwamba Serikali iweke wazi nyaraka mbalimbali zinazohusu historia ya Muungano wetu na mapito yake ili Watanzania waelewe masuala yote yaliyotokea na yanayohusu. [3] Hii ni muhimu zaidi kwa kuzingatia ukweli kwamba, Mataifa ya Magharibi kama vile Marekani na Uingereza yalikuwisha toa hadharani nyaraka za mashirika yao ya kijajusi pamoja na Balizi zao Tanzania zinazoonyesha jinsi ambavyo Serikali za Mataifa hayo zilikusika katika kuzaliwa kwa Muungano. [4] Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni ilifafanua kwamba kuanikwa kwa nyaraka zilizopo katika mamlaka mbalimbali za Serikali, kutasaidia kuthibitisha au kukanusha taarifa ambazo chanzo chake ni nyaraka za kidiplomasia na kijasusi za nchi hizo kwamba Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar ulitokana na njama za kibeberu za kudhibiti ushawishi wa siasa za kimapinduzi za Chama cha Umma na Viongozi wake ndani ya Baraza la Mapinduzi. [5] Aidha, nyaraka hizo zitatoa mwanga juu ya kilichowasibu Viongozi Waandamizi wa Chama hicho ambacho bila uwepo wao kutambuliwa rasmi, historia ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar na ya Muungano inabaki pungufu. [6] Aidha, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani bungeni ilisisitiza juu ya haja ya taifa letu kuambiwa ukweli juu ya Muungano huu. [7] Miaka karibu 50 ya Muungano ni umri wa kutosha kwa Taifa la Tanzania kuambiwa ukweli wote juu ya kuzaliwa kwake na mapito ambayo limepitia katika kipindi hicho. [8] Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni ilirudia wito wake huo wakati wa kuwasilisha maoni yake juu ya bajeti ya Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais ya mwaka 2013. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the other issue is the exposure of the Union documents. [2] In its speech during the 2012/2013 budget session, the official opposition camp in the parliament recommended that the government should make public various documents pertaining to the history of our Union and steps towards its formation so that Tanzanians could understand all the issues that happened. [3] This is particularly important in view of the fact that even the Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom have publicly exposed the documents of their intelligence agencies as well as their embassies in the country, indicating how their governments were involved in the birth of the Union. [4] The official opposition camp

in the parliament explained that exposing the documents from various government authorities would help to confirm or deny the information from diplomatic and intelligence documents of those countries that the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was influenced by the conspiracy of imperialists to control the influence of the revolutionary politics of the Umma Party and its leaders in the Revolutionary Council. [5] In addition, the documents would shed light on what happened to the senior leaders of the party because, without official recognition of these leaders, the history of the Zanzibar Revolution and the Union remains incomplete. [6] Furthermore, the official opposition camp insisted that there was a need for our nation to be told the truth about this Union. [7] 50 years of the Union are enough for Tanzanians to be told the whole truth about the birth of the Union and the trends that it has passed through during this period. [8] The official opposition camp in the parliament reiterated its call when presenting its views on the proposed budget of the Vice President's Office in 2013.

- (f) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mjadala juu ya nyaraka za Muungano huu ulichukua picha mpya wakati Wajumbe wa Bunge Maalum la Katiba walipohoji uwepo wa Hati ya Makubaliano ya Muungano na uhalali wa Muungano wenyewe wakati wa mjadala juu ya sura ya kwanza na ya sita ya Rasimu ya Katiba. [2] Baada ya walio wachache wa Kamati namba nne kuonyesha Ushahidi kwamba Serikali ya mapinduzi Zanzibar haijawahi kuwa na nakala ya hati hiyo na kwamba haijawahi kupelekwa na kusajiliwa katika Sekretarieti ya Umoja wa Mataifa, Serikali hii ya CCM ililazimika kutoa kile ilichokiita Nakala ya Hati ya Makubaliano ya Muungano. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hatuhitaji kuzungumzia tofauti kubwa ya sahihi ya Sheikh Karume iliyopo kwenye hati hiyo na sahihi ya Sheikh Karume iliyopo katika Sheria mbalimbali alizosaini kama Rais wa Zanzibar na wakati mwingine kama Kaimu Rais wa Jamhuri ya Muungano. [4] Cha muhimu ni kwamba mgogoro juu ya Hati ya Makubaliano ya Muungano unathibitisha ukweli kwamba matokeo ya utamaduni huu wa kufichaficha nyaraka muhimu za nchi, ni kwa wananchi kukosa Imani na Serikali iliyoko madarakani kwa kuwa wananchi wanajenga hisia kwamba nyaraka hizo zinafichwa kwa sababu zina Ushahidi wa maovu yaliyofanywa na serikali hiyo. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa sababu zote hizi, kwa mara nyingine tena Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inaitaka Serikali hii ya CCM kutoa nyaraka za Muungano huu hadharani ili Watanzania waweze kuelewa historia halisi ya Muungano badala ya kuendelea kulishwa propaganda na TBC na kwenye majukwaa ya kisiasa ya CCM na Serikali yake. [6] Vinginevyo, chochote kitakachosemwa na TBC na watawala katika majukwaa yao ya kisiasa kuhusu Muungano huu, hakitaaminika tena na wananchi wa Tanzania. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the debate on the Union documents took a new twist when members of the Constituent Assembly questioned the presence of the Articles of the Union and the legitimacy of the Union itself during the debate on the first and sixth chapters of the draft constitution. [2] After the minority in the committee number four testified that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar has never had a copy of the Articles and that the Articles have never been presented to and registered in the United Nations Secretariat, the CCM government was forced to issue what it called the copy of the Articles of the Union. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, we don't need to talk about the difference in Sheikh Karume's signatures in the CCM's document and in various acts he signed as President of Zanzibar and sometimes as Acting President of the United Republic [of Tanzania]. [4] The important thing is that the dispute over the Articles of the Union confirms the fact that the government's culture of hiding important documents of the country makes citizens lose confidence in the government because they believe that the government hides the documents because they contain evidence of the evils committed by the government. (Applause) [5] Honourable Chairperson, for all these reasons, once again the official opposition camp in the parliament demands the CCM government to make the documents public so that Tanzanians can understand the real history of the Union instead of being fed with propaganda by TBC and in the political platforms of CCM and its government. [6] Otherwise, whatever that will be said about the Union by TBC and the rulers through their political platforms will no longer be believed by Tanzanians. (Applause)

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika hotuba ya Waziri Mkuu, Bunge lako Tukufu limeambiwa kwamba Muungano huu ni wa kipekee na wa kupigiwa mfano duniani kote. [2] Aidha, ni kielelezo kamili cha umoja, mshikamano na upendo miongoni mwa wananchi. [3] Ni kweli kwamba Muungano huu ni wa kipekee kwa sababu haujawahi kuigwa na nchi nyingine zozote katika Afrika. [4] Kama Muungano huu ungekuwa wa kupigiwa mfano duniani kote kama inavyodaiwa na Waziri Mkuu, basi kungekewa na angalau nchi moja iliyoomba kujiunga na Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [5] Angalau kungekuwa na nchi zilizoiga mfano wa Muungano huu kwingineko Afrika na duniani kote. (Makofi) [6] Kwa kuwa, hakuna hata nchi moja iliyowahi kuomba kujiunga nasi na kwa kuwa hakuna nchi nyingine zilizoiga mfano wa Muungano huu, pengine huu ni muda muafaka wa kuhoji ukweli wa kauli kwamba Muungano huu ni kielelezo cha umoja, mshikamano na upendo miongoni mwa wananchi wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar. (Makofi) [7] Mzee Pius Msekwa, Mwenyekiti Mstaafu wa CCM na Spika Amertus wa Bunge hili Tukufu aliwahi kusema katika mada yake, hali ya Muungano, kwa Semina iliyofanyika Tanga miaka 20 iliyopita kwamba Muundo wa sasa wa Muungano huu umepelekea wengi kuamini kwamba Muungano huu ni kiinimacho tu. (Makofi) [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hii ni kwa sababu chini ya Muungano huu Zanzibar ilikabidhi sehemu muhimu ya mamlaka yake mahusiano ya nchi za nje, ulinzi na usalama, uraia, na kodi na ushuru, sarafu, nguvu kuu za kuendeshea uchumi na mengineyo kwa Tanganyika na kasha Tanganyika ikajigeuza jina na kujiita Jamhuri ya Muungano. [9] Spika, Amertus Msekwa aliongeza kwamba kwa jinsi mambo yalivyo sasa, Zanzibar inaonekana kama vile ni invited guest, yaani mgeni mwalikwa katika Muungano huu. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)
- [1] Honourable Chairperson, in the Prime Minister's speech, your august/esteemed parliament was told that this Union is unique and exemplary in the whole world. [2] In addition, it is a complete manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love among the people. [3] It is true that this Union is unique because it has never existed in any other countries in Africa. [4] If this Union was exemplary as it is claimed by the Prime Minister, then there would be at least one country that has [ever] requested to join the United Republic of Tanzania. [5] At least there would be countries in Africa and around the world that have formed a union like this. (Applause) [6] Because there is no country that has ever asked to join us and because no other countries have copied this Union, this is probably the right time to question the truth of the statement that this Union is a manifestation of unity, solidarity and love among the people of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. (Applause) [7] Mzee Pius Msekwa, a retired CCM Chairperson and Emeritus Speaker of this august/esteemed parliament, once made a statement about the state of affairs in the Union, during a seminar held in Tanga 20 years ago, that the current structure of this Union has made many to believe that this Union is just a 'magic trick'. (Applause) [8] Honourable Chairperson, this is so because, under the Union, Zanzibar handed over important parts of its sovereignty, including international relations, defence and security, citizenship, taxes and levies, currency, major drivers of the economy, to Tanganyika and then Tanganyika just changed its name and started calling itself the United Republic [of Tanzania]. [9] Emeritus Speaker Msekwa added that, with the current state of affairs, Zanzibar is like an invited guest in the Union.*
- (h) [...] [1] Naye msomi mashuhuri wa kiafrika, Professor Ally A. Mazrui katika Makala yake Imperialism After the Empire, Lessons from Uganda and Tanzania yaani Ubeberu baada ya himaya, funzo kutoka Uganda na Tanzania iliyochapishwa katika Gazeti la Kenya, the Sunday Nation la Mei 22, 1994, alisema:- “Kwa sababu ya Muungano, Zanzibar imepoteza kila kitu chake muhimu, [2] wakati Tanganyika imebadilika jina tu na kuwa Tanzania huku ikiwa na mamlaka zaidi, [3] lakini ikibaki na Rais wake, nembo yake ya Taifa, Wimbo wake wa Taifa na hata Kiti chake katika Umoja wa Mataifa. [4] Kama tunavyoonyeshwa katika maoni haya, gharama ya kuyapuuza maneno haya ya watu wazito imekuwa kubwa kweli kweli hasa kwa Zanzibar. [...] [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, baada ya nusu karne ya Muungano wa aina hii, wananchi wa Tanganyika na hasa Wazanzibar hawako tayari kuendelea na utaratibu huu wa kiunyonyaji na kikandamizi. [6] Wananchi wanataka mabadiliko ya msingi ya Muundo wa Muungano na uendeshaji wake. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[...] [1] Likewise, a prominent African scholar, Professor Ally A. Mazrui, in his article “Imperialism after the empire: Lessons from Uganda and Tanzania”, published in the Kenyan newspaper, *The Sunday Nation*, of May 22, 1994, said that, “because of the Union, Zanzibar has lost everything important, [2] while Tanganyika has just changed its name to become Tanzania with more power, [3] but it has also remained with its president, its national emblem, its national anthem and even its seat in the United Nations. [4] As it has been revealed by these views, the cost of ignoring these words of prominent people has been too high, especially for Zanzibar. [...] [5] Honourable Chairperson, after half a century of the Union of this kind, people of Tanganyika and especially Zanzibaris are not ready to continue with the Union which is exploitative and oppressive in nature. [6] They want fundamental reforms of the structure of the Union and how it operates. (Applause)

While the minister’s first standpoint suggests that the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained, the opposition’s first standpoint, as reconstructed from *Extract 5.3* above, seems to suggest that (1) *the Union should be reviewed and reformed*. This unexpressed prescriptive standpoint is suggested in (b) [2] and (h) [5-6] and implied in the rest of the extract. Unlike the minister’s first standpoint, this standpoint relates to a slightly different proposition. However, the arguments in defence of this standpoint are considered to be the opposition’s critical reactions to the minister’s first standpoint. In fact, in (b) [3], Mr Lissu argues that people will not protect, strengthen, or maintain the Union if they will not be told the ‘truth’ about the Union. He further suggests that, before asking people to protect, strengthen, and maintain the Union, this kind of union should first be reviewed and reformed. With this ‘new’ standpoint, Mr Lissu implicitly suggests that the Union should not be protected, strengthened, and maintained ‘unless it is reviewed and reformed’.

Specifically, the opposition’s first standpoint is defended by four main arguments at the first level of defence. These arguments are combined in multiple argumentation and exhibit different (sub)types of argumentation. The first argument is reconstructed from (a) [3, 7] and (b) [2, 4], where Mr Lissu argues that (1.)*Ia the justice that the Tanzanians who were born in the Union want to be done to them is to be told the truth about the Union* (its history, current status, and future). In the unexpressed premise, Mr Lissu implies that the majority of Tanzanians (90.6%) want justice to be done. This majority argumentation is combined in coordinative argumentation with authority argumentation by quotation in (a) [3], where Mr Lissu maintains that, according to the Prime Minister, citing the 2012 Population and Housing Census of Tanzania, (1.)*Ib 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was founded and the country they know is URT*. Further arguments are advanced in support of (1.)*Ia* and (1.)*Ib*. I will first concentrate on argumentation for (1.)*Ib*, and then turn back to (1.)*Ia*. In (a) [4], Mr Lissu maintains that, according to the Prime Minister, (1.)*Ib.1 we are all responsible for doing*

justice to these people by protecting, strengthening, and maintaining the Union. However, in (b) [3], Mr Lissu argues that *(1.)1b.1.1 these people will not protect, strengthen, or maintain the Union if they will not be told the truth about the Union.* This chain of subordinative argumentation is concluded in (b) [5], where Mr Lissu suggests that *(1.)1b.1.1.1 the government should first stop peddling lies and propaganda about the Union before asking people to protect, strengthen, and maintain the Union.*

In favour of *(1.)1a*, in (a) [8], Mr Lissu argues that *(1.)1a.1a rulers should stop peddling lies and propaganda about the Union.* To increase the argumentative force of this argument, Mr Lissu does not refer to the government as *viongozi* (leaders) but *watawala* (rulers), a term which may be associated with a pejorative quality (presentational device). This argument is combined in coordinative argumentation with authority argumentation by quotation. In (b) [1], citing some lyrics from the Reggae legend and freedom fighter, Bob Marley, in his song ‘Get Up, Stand Up’, Mr Lissu indicates that *(1.)1a.1b Bob Marley said that “You can fool some people sometime but you cannot fool all people all the time”*. Thus, based on Mr Lissu’s statements in (b) [1-2], the unexpressed premise for *(1.)1a.1a* can be reconstructed as the government has been fooling people about the Union with, to borrow Mr Lissu’s own words, ‘lies and propaganda’ and the time has come for the government to tell Tanzanians the whole truth about the Union.

Mr Lissu advances further argumentation to support argument *(1.)1a.1a*. First, he suggests that *(1.)1a.1a.1 the legitimacy of the Union is questionable*, as indicated in (f) [1]. In support of this argument, in (d) [2], he argues that *(1.)1a.1a.1.1 other founders of the Union have been completely removed from the official history of the Union*, which is considered a sign that the legitimacy of the Union is questionable (symptomatic argumentation). These other founders who are not hailed or mentioned are named in (d) [3], and they include Oscar Kambona, Bhoke Munanka, and Job Lusinde (from Tanganyika) and Abdallah Kassimu Hanga, Abdulaziz Twalla, Ally Mwinyigogo, and Salehe Saadala Akida (from Zanzibar). This argumentation from example is further supported by authority argumentation. In (d) [5] and [6], he argues that, according to Harith Ghassany (writer) and Alhaji About Jumbe (second president of Zanzibar), these people played a key role in the formation of the Union. To reinforce this argumentation, Mr Lissu performs a directive speech act in (d) [7-8], where he asks the government where these people are, why they are not mentioned in the official history of the Union, and why their role in the birth of the Union has been hidden for half a century of the

Union's life. In the other argument for (1.)1a.1a.1, as reconstructed from (f) [4-5], he argues that (1.)1a.1a.1.2a *the government has been hiding the Union agreement documents*, which is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b *the documents should be exposed*, implying that the documents have never been exposed by the government.

In support of (1.)1a.1a.1.2b, Mr Lissu advances five arguments. In the first argument, as indicated in (f) [2-3], Mr Lissu states that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.1 *the document that the CCM government presented to the CA is not authentic* because Sheikh Karume's signature in the document is different from his signature in different laws he signed as the President of Zanzibar and sometimes as Acting President of Tanzania (authority argumentation). In this argument, the 'authentic' Sheikh Karume's signature is used as an authority. In (e) [3], he argues that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.2 *Western countries have exposed the documents of their intelligence agencies and embassies*, indicating how their nations were involved in the birth of the Union. These Western countries are such as the UK and the US (argumentation from example). The unexpressed premise for (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.2 seems to suggest that, because Western nations such as the UK and the US have exposed their documents, Tanzania should also do the same (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency). In (f) [5-6], he argues that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.3a *exposing the documents will help people to know the 'real' history of the Union* instead of being fed with propaganda by TBC, CCM and its government, and it is a good thing for people to know the true history of the Union (pragmatic argumentation). Otherwise, he maintains, people will not believe anything said by TBC, CCM, and its government. The use of the word *halisi* (real/true) as a presentational device suggests that, in Mr Lissu's opinion, the existing history of the Union is not a 'complete or true history' of the Union. In (e) [2], argument (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.3a is combined with the argument that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.3b *exposing the documents will help Tanzanians to know all issues that happened and which concern the Union*, which is considered a desired effect (pragmatic argumentation). In (e) [4-5], he argues that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.4 *exposing the documents will help to confirm or deny the allegation of conspiracy*, which constitutes another instance of pragmatic argumentation (suggesting that it is a desired effect or a 'good thing' to confirm or deny the allegation). This is the allegation that the formation of the Union was influenced by the conspiracy of the imperialists to control the revolutionary politics of the Umma Party and its leaders in the revolutionary council. He further maintains that exposing the documents will shed light on what happened to the leaders of the party, because, without official recognition of the leaders, the history of the Union remains incomplete. Lastly, in (f) [4], he argues that (1.)1a.1a.1.2b.5 *hiding the documents*

makes people believe that the government is hiding the documents because they contain evidence of the evils committed by the government (causal argumentation).

Another argument in support of (1.)1a.1a is reconstructed from (c) [7], where Mr Lissu suggests that (1.)1a.1a.2 *it is doubtful whether the foundation of the Union is solid enough*, implying that the foundation of the Union is not necessarily solid enough. I consider this argument a counterargument to the Prime Minister's argument that the Union is built on a solid foundation laid by the founding fathers of the Union. In support of 1.1a.1a.2, in (c) [8], Mr Lissu argues that, according to the Commission, (1.)1a.1a.2.1 *Tanganyika is 'wearing the coat of the United Republic of Tanzania'*. This argument demonstrates authority argumentation by quotation and is reinforced by a metaphor (presentational device). The metaphor *Tanganyika imevaa koti la Jamhuri ya Muungano ya Tanzania* (literally, 'Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the United Republic of Tanzania') suggests that Tanganyika has taken control of the Union government or has more power in the Union than Zanzibar. In (c) [9], this authority argumentation is further defended by the argument that (1.)1a.1a.2.1.1 *the Union has never been supported in Zanzibar* as much as 'those who have been convincing us to believe otherwise have been claiming'. At least two reasons are offered to support this argument. First, as indicated in (c) [1-4] and (c) [7], Mr Lissu argues that, while there were signs of the Union's 50th anniversary celebration in Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam), (1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a *there were no signs of the celebration in Zanzibar*, and that (1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1b *lack of signs of celebration in Zanzibar raises doubts as to whether the foundation of the Union is solid enough*, implying that this is a sign that the foundation of the Union is not solid enough (symptomatic argumentation). In support of (1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a, Mr Lissu appeals to argumentation from narrative (of life experience). In (c) [3] and (c) [4], Mr Lissu asserts that, during the celebration week, Zanzibar's main roads were not decorated with the images of the founders of Union as it was the case in Dar es Salaam. Instead, Zanzibar's main roads were decorated with the images of the presidents of Zanzibar from the time of revolution to the present. These roads include the one from Mji Mkongwe to Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume International Airport via the State House. Second, in (c) [9], he argues that (1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.2a *the image displayed by TBC shows Mwalimu Nyerere mixing the soil alone*, and that (1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.2b *Sheikh Karume is not seen in the image*, implying that this is a sign that Zanzibar did not support the Union from the get-go. Generally, the first argument for the opposition's first standpoint is summarised in **Table 5.4** below.

Table 5.4 The first argument for the opposition's first standpoint

No.	Description
(1.)1a	The justice that Tanzanians who were born in the Union want to be done is to be told the truth about the Union, its history, current status, and future
(1.1a')	(The majority of Tanzanians want this justice to be done for them)
(1.)1a.1a	Rulers should stop peddling lies and propaganda about the Union
(1.1a.1a)	(Tanzanians no longer need lies and propaganda from rulers)
(1.)1a.1b	According to Bob Marley, you cannot fool all the people all the time
(1.1a.1b')	(The govt can no longer fool Tanzanians about the Union)
(1.)1a.1a.1	The legitimacy of the Union is questionable
(1.)1a.1a.1.1	Other founders of the Union have been completely removed from the official history of the Union
(1.1a.1a.1.1')	(This is a sign that the legitimacy of the Union is questionable)
(1.)1a.1a.1.1.1	These founders include Kambona, Munanka, Lusinde, Hanga, Twalla, and Akida
(1.)1a.1a.1.1.1.1	According to Ghassany and Jumbe, they played a key role in the Union's formation
(1.)1a.1a.1.1.1.1.1	Where are these people, why are they not mentioned in the official history of the Union, and why their role in the birth of the Union has been hidden for half a century of the Union's life?
(1.1a.1a.1.1.1.1.1')	(Hiding the truth about these people is a sign that the legitimacy of the Union is questionable)
(1.)1a.1a.1.2a	It has been hiding the Union agreement documents
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b	The hidden Union agreement documents should be exposed
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.1	The document that the CCM govt exposed in the CA is not authentic
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.1.1	Karume's signature in the document differs from his signature in the other documents he signed
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.2	Western countries have exposed their documents, indicating how their nations were involved in the birth of the Union
(1.1a.1a.1.2b.2')	(Because Western nations have exposed their documents, Tanzania should also do the same)
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.2.1	These Western countries are such as the UK and the US
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.3a	Exposing the documents will help people to know the 'real' history of the Union instead of being fed with propaganda by TBC, CCM and its government
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.3a.1	Otherwise, people will no longer believe anything that TBC, CCM and its government have been saying about the Union
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.3b	It will help people to know all issues that happened and that concern it
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.4	Exposing the documents will help to confirm or deny the allegation of conspiracy
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.4.1	This will help Tanzanians to know what happened to the leaders of the Umma Party
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.4.1.1	Without recognising these leaders, the history of the Union is incomplete
(1.)1a.1a.1.2b.5	Hiding the documents makes people believe that the documents contain evidence of the evils committed by the govt
(1.)1a.1a.2	It is doubtful whether the foundation of the Union is solid enough
(1.1a.1a.2')	(This is a sign that the foundation is not necessarily solid enough)
(1.)1a.1a.2.1	According to the Commission, Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the Union
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1	Zanzibar has never supported the Union as the leaders want us to believe
(1.1a.1a.2.1.1')	(This is caused by the fact that Tanganyika has taken control of the Union)
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a	There were no signs of celebration in Zanzibar during the celebration week
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a.1a	Zanzibar's main roads displayed no image of the founders of the Union

(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a.1a.1	These include the road from Mji Mkongwe to the Airport via the State House
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a.1b	The images of the Union's founders were only displayed in Dar es Salaam
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1a.1b.1	They were displayed in Nyerere and Ally Hassan Mwinyi Roads
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.1b	Lack of signs of celebration in Zanzibar raises doubts as to whether the foundation of the Union is solid enough
(1.1a.1a.2.1.1.1b')	(It is a sign that the foundation of the Union is not solid enough)
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.2a	The image displayed by TBC shows Mwalimu Nyerere mixing the soil alone
(1.)1a.1a.2.1.1.2b	Sheikh Karume is not seen in the image
(1.1a.1a.2.1.1.2b')	(It is a sign that Zanzibar didn't support the Union from the get-go)
(1.)1b	According to the Prime Minister, 90% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was founded, and the country they know is the URT
(1.)1b.1	According to the Prime Minister, we are all responsible for doing justice to these people by protecting, strengthening, and maintaining the Union
(1.)1b.1.1	These people will not protect, strengthen, or maintain the Union if they won't be told the truth about the Union
(1.)1b.1.1.1	The govt should first stop peddling lies and propaganda about the Union before asking people to protect, strengthen, and maintain the Union

The opposition's second argument in defence of the first standpoint is reconstructed from (g) [7], where Mr Lissu argues that, according to Mr Pius Msekwa (a former CCM chairperson and Emeritus Speaker of the Tanzanian parliament), *(1.)2 the current structure of the Union has made many to believe that the Union is just a 'magic trick'*, implicitly suggesting that, in Mr Msekwa's opinion, the structure of the Union is not appropriate or in order. Two subarguments are offered to further support the opposition's second argument. First, in (g) [8] and (h) [1], he argues that, according to Mr Msekwa and Professor Ali Mazrui (who is, in Mr Lissu's words, a prominent African scholar), because of the Union, *(1.)2.1a Zanzibar has lost important powers of its sovereignty to Tanganyika*, including international relations, defence and security, citizenship, taxes, and currency, but *(1.)2.1b Tanganyika has just changed its name to become Tanzania*. In support of *(1.)2.1b*, in (h) [2-3], Mr Lissu argues that, according to Prof. Mazrui, *(1.)2.1b.1 Tanganyika has become even more powerful* and that *(1.)2.1b.2 it has remained with its national anthem, national emblem, president, and its seat in the UN*. Second, in (g) [9], Mr Lissu argues that, according to Mr Msekwa, under the current (structure of the) Union, *(1.)2.2 Zanzibar is like an invited guest in the Union*. The second argument and supporting arguments for the opposition's first standpoint exhibit mainly authority argumentation by quotation, where Mr Lissu appeals to the views of one of the prominent political figures from CCM, Mr Msekwa, and one of the prominent African political scholars, Prof. Mazrui, to suggest that the structure of the Union is not ideal or in order. The second argument and subarguments for the opposition's first standpoint are summarised in **Table 5.5** below.

Table 5.5 The second argument for the opposition's first standpoint

(1.)2	According to Mr Msekwa, the current structure of the Union has made many to believe that the Union is just a 'magic trick'
(1.2')	(Mr Msekwa's statement suggests that the structure of the Union is not ideal or in order)
(1.)2.1a	Zanzibar has lost important powers of its sovereignty to Tanganyika
(1.)2.1a.1	These powers include international relations, defence and security, citizenship, taxes
(1.)2.1b	Tanganyika has just changed its name to become the United Republic of Tanzania
(1.)2.1b.1	It has become even more powerful
(1.)2.1b.2	It has remained with its national anthem, national emblem, president, and its seat in the UN
(1.)2.2	According to Mr Msekwa, under the current [structure of the] Union, Zanzibar is like an invited guest in the Union

The third argument in defence of the opposition's first standpoint is reconstructed from subextract (g). In (g) [1-2], this argument begins with a quotation from the Prime Minister's speech that the Union is unique and exemplary, and that it is a complete manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love among Tanzanians. Thus, this argument functions as a counterargument against the Prime Minister's symptomatic argumentation. In (g) [3-5], Mr Lissu performs a commissive by denying the Prime Minister's statement that the Union is exemplary or unique. Ironically, in (g) [3], Mr Lissu argues that *(1.)3a it is true that the Union is 'unique' because (1.)3a.1 it has never been copied by any other countries in Africa*. Argument *(1.)3a* is coordinatively combined with other two arguments. In (g) [4-5], Mr Lissu argues that, if they Union was really exemplary, as suggested by the Prime Minister, *(1.)3b there would be at least one country that has ever requested to join the URT and there would at least be countries that have copied this Union elsewhere in Africa or in the world*. In (g) [6], he further maintains that, because no other countries have ever formed a union of this kind, and because no country has ever asked to join the Union, *(1.)3c it is questionable whether this Union is indeed a manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love*, as suggested by the Prime Minister. At this point, it is clear that what remains implicit in *(1.)3a* is the premise that the Union is not unique as suggested by the Prime Minister or, in other words, it is only 'unique' in the sense that it is 'unusually bad'. The use of irony as a presentational device in this argument seems to be effective but does not necessarily make the argument conclusive.

In the fourth argument, as indicated in (h) [5-6], Mr Lissu argues that *(1.)4a Tanzanians are not ready to continue with this exploitative and oppressive type of a union*, which is combined with the argument that *(1.)4b they want fundamental reforms of the structure of the Union*. The unexpressed premise for *(1.)4b* suggests that, because Tanzanians want fundamental reforms of the structure of the Union, the current (structure of the) Union should be reviewed and

reformed. This point of argumentation exhibits authority argumentation from populist appeal, where Mr Lissu appeals to the views of members of the electorate or the public. The opposition's third and four arguments are summarised in *Table 5.6* below.

Table 5.6 The third and fourth arguments for the opposition's first standpoint

No.	Description
(1.)3a	It is true that the Union is 'unique' (irony)
(1.3a')	(The Union is not unique or it is only 'unique' in the sense that it is 'unusually bad')
(1.)3a.1	It has never been copied by any other countries in Africa
(1.)3b	If it was exemplary, there would be at least one country that has ever asked to join the Union and there would at least be countries that have copied this Union elsewhere in Africa or in the world
(1.)3c	Because no country has ever requested to join us and because no countries have ever copied this type of union, it is questionable whether the Union is indeed a manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love between Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris
(1.)4a	Tanzanians are not ready to continue with this exploitative and oppressive Union
(1.)4b	They want fundamental reforms of the structure of the Union
(1.4b')	(Because Tanzanians want fundamental reforms of the structure of the Union, the Union should be reviewed and reformed)

In terms of the speech acts performed, three types of speech acts are performed by Mr Lissu in the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation. First, he implicitly performs the commissive by not accepting the minister's first standpoint. Second, he performs the assertive by implicitly expressing the opposition's first standpoint and advancing four arguments in defence of the standpoint. Lastly, he performs the directive by requesting usage declaratives (or argumentation) from the minister.

5.3.2.2 Summary of the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

Mr Lissu's argumentation in defence of the first standpoint can be diagrammatically presented in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 5.3. This summary presents only the first two arguments (with the exception of the unexpressed premises). This is followed by a brief description of the argumentation schemes employed in defence of the standpoint.




Figure 5.3 Summary of the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

The argumentation schemes in the opposition's first standpoint and its related argumentation constitute majority argumentation and authority argumentation by quotation (1.1a and 1.1b, realising coordinative argumentation), authority argumentation by quotation (1.2), symptomatic argumentation (1.3a, 1.3b, 1.3c), and authority argumentation from populist appeal (1.4a and 1.4b) in the first level of defence. These four arguments realise multiple argumentation. Majority argumentation in (1.)1a is in the next levels defended by various (sub)types of argumentation, including symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation, and argumentation from example. Authority argumentation in (1.)1b is defended by still

another authority argumentation at the second level of defence. Authority argumentation by quotation in (1.)2 is maintained in the next levels of defence. Symptomatic argumentation in (1.)3a is also maintained in argument (1)3a.1.

5.2.2.3 The opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's second standpoint does not relate to the same proposition as the minister's second standpoint, and it thus realises a topic shift within the institutional preconditions. This standpoint relates to the proposition that the (structure of the) Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar by Tanganyika. The opposition's second standpoint and supporting arguments are reconstructed from *Extract 5.4* below.

Extract 5.4

- (a) Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuhusu misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti. [1] Ushahidi wa nyaraka ambazo zimewasilishwa kwenye Bunge lako Tukufu na Serikali hii ya CCM unaonyesha kwamba Muungano huu ni kielelezo cha unyonyaji na ukandamizaji mkubwa ambao nchi ndogo ya Zanzibar imefanyiwa na nchi kubwa ya Tanganyika. [2] Ni mfano wa jinsi ambavyo nchi moja kubwa ya kiasia inaweza kuigeuza nchi nyingine ndogo ya kiasia kuwa Koloni lake. [3] Kwa sababu maneno haya yanaweza kupotoshwa na wale ambao wamefaidika na uhusiano huu wa kikoloni katika ya Tanganyika na Zanzibar, naomba kutoa ufafanuzi kama ifuatavyo: - (Makofi) [4] Kwa miaka mingi Zanzibar imelalamika kwamba inapunjwa katika mgawanyo unaotokana na fedha zinazotolewa na nchi wafadhili na Taasisi za Kimataifa kwa Jamhuri ya Muungano. (Makofi) [5] Kwa sababu ya malalamika hayo, mwaka jana, 2013 Kamati ya Kudumu ya Bunge lako Tukufu ya Katiba, Sheria na Utawala iliagiza Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais kwamba utaratibu wa mgawanyo wa mapato yanayotokana na fedha zinazotoka kwa wafadhili, ni vema ukaangaliwa upya kwa Serikali zote mbili, yaani Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar na Serikali ya Muungano. (Makofi) [6] Aidha, Kamati ilishauri kwamba Serikali itolee uamuzi mapendekezo ya Tume ya Pamoja ya Fedha yaliyowasilishwa Serikalini tangu mwaka 2006 na kuwasilishwa tena mwaka 2010 kuhusu utaratibu wa mgawo wa fedha za Serikali zote mbili. [7] Serikali hii ya CCM imejibu maagizo haya ya Kamati kama ifuatavyo: (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

Honourable Chairperson, concerning General Budget Support; [1] evidence from the documents presented to your august/esteemed parliament by the CCM government indicates that this Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of a small country – Zanzibar – by a big country – Tanganyika. [2] It is an example of how one big African country can turn another country into its own colony. [3] Since these words can be misinterpreted by those who have benefited from this colonial relationship between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, let me clarify my point as follows: - (Applause) [4] For many years, Zanzibar has been complaining about unequal division of the funds provided by donors and international organizations to the United Republic [of Tanzania]. (Applause) [5] Due to these complaints, last year 2013 the standing Committee on Constitution, Legal Affairs, and Administration of your august/esteemed parliament directed the Vice President's Office to review the procedures for the division of the donors' funds for both governments, that is, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and the Union government. (Applause) [6] In addition, the Committee advised the government to implement the recommendations of the Joint Finance Commission submitted to the government in 2006 and re-submitted in 2010 on the procedures for sharing the funds between the two governments. [7] The CCM government has responded to the Committee's recommendations as follows: -

- (b) [1] “Serikali zetu mbili bado zinaendelea kushughulikia mapendekezo yaliyotolewa na Tume ya pamoja ya Fedha. [2] Aidha, kuhusu mgawanyo wa fedha zinazotoka kwa Wafadhili, upo

utaratibu wa mgawanyo wake ambao kwa upande wa misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti isiyokuwa na masharti maalum, Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar hupata gawio la 4.5%. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kauli hii ya Serikali ya CCM ni ya uongo. [4] Katika maelezo yake mbele ya Kamati ya Katiba, Sheria na Utawala, Waziri wa Nchi, Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais (Muungano) aliitaarifu Kamati kwamba kwa mwaka wa fedha 2013/2014 hadi kufikia mwezi Machi 2014 Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar ilipata gawio la misaada ya kibajeti la Shilingi bilioni 27.190 kati ya Shilingi bilioni 32.627 zilizoidhinishwa na Bunge hili. [5] Hii ndio kusema kwamba kati ya fedha zilizoidhinishwa na Bunge lako Tukufu kama gawio la misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti kwa Zanzibar, ni 83% ndizo zilizolipwa hadi kufikia robo ya tatu ya mwaka huu wa fedha. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hata hivyo, hili siyo tatizo, kwani kwa mwelekeo wa takwimu hizi hadi kufikia mwisho wa mwaka huu wa fedha gawio lililoidhinishwa na Bunge lako Tukufu linaweza kuwa limelipwa lote. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *“Our two governments are still working on the recommendations made by the Joint Finance Commission. [2] Furthermore, with regard to the division of the funds from the donors, there is a regulation for sharing the funds; the [Revolutionary] Government of Zanzibar receives 4.5% of the General Budget Support (GBS).” [3] Honourable Chairperson, this statement by the CCM government is a lie. [4] In her statement before the Committee on Constitution, Legal Affairs, and Administration, the Minister of State, the Vice President’s Office (Union) informed the Committee that, for the 2013/14 fiscal year, up to March 2014 the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar had received TZS 27.190 billion as its dividend from the General Budget Support out of TZS 32.627 billion that was approved by this parliament. [5] This is to say, out of the fund that was approved by the parliament as Zanzibar’s dividend of the General Budget Support, Zanzibar received only 83% until the third quarter of this fiscal year. [6] Honourable Chairperson, however, this is not a problem because it might happen that by the end of this fiscal year the total dividend approved by your august/esteemed parliament might have been paid.*

- (c) [1] Tatizo kubwa na la msingi ni kwamba gawio lililoidhinishwa na Bunge hili Tukufu siyo gawio halali kwa Zanzibar. [2] Hii ni kwa sababu kwa mujibu wa maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha, akiwasilisha mapendekezo ya mfumo wa mapato na matumizi ya Serikali kwa mwaka 2014/2015 kwa Wabunge wa Bunge la Jamhuri ya Muungano tarehe 30 Aprili, 2014 mapato halisi ya Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano yanayotokana na misaada na mikopo nafuu ya nje, ilikuwa Shilingi bilioni 1,163 au trilioni 1.163 kwa mwaka jana wa fedha. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kama Zanzibar ingepatiwa 4.5% ya mapato hayo kama inavyotakiwa kwa mujibu wa utaratibu uliowekwa na Serikali hii ya CCM, basi kwa mwaka 2013 peke yake gawio halali la Zanzibar la misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti lingekuwa Shilingi bilioni 52.335. [4] Badala ya kupatiwa Shilingi bilioni 52.335 ambazo ni fedha zake halali, Zanzibar iliidhinishwa Shilingi bilioni 32.627 au 52% ya fedha zake halali. [5] Fedha hizo ni sawa na 2.8% ya fedha zote za misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti kwa Jamhuri ya Muungano. [6] Fedha zilizobaki, yaani Shilingi trilioni 1.130 au 97.2% ya fedha zote za misaada ya kibajeti, zimetumika na zitatumika Tanganyika. [7] Kwa Ushahidi huu nyaraka za Serikali ya CCM, kwa sababu ya Muungano huu, kwa mwaka 2013 peke yake Zanzibar imeibiwa Shilingi bilioni 25.145 au 48% ya fedha zake halali za gawio la misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *The major and fundamental problem is that the dividend approved by this august/esteemed parliament is not the rightful dividend for Zanzibar. [2] This is because, in accordance with the statement of the Finance Minister, when presenting the proposal for the revenue collections and expenditure of the government for the 2014/15 fiscal year to the parliament of the United Republic [of Tanzania] on 30th April 2014, the actual government revenue generated from grants and soft/concession loans from foreign donors was TZS 1,163 or TZS 1.163 trillion in last [fiscal] year. [3] Honourable Chairperson, if Zanzibar was to receive 4.5% of the fund as required by the regulation set out by the CCM government, then, in 2013 alone, Zanzibar’s rightful dividend of the General Budget Support should have been TZS 52.335 billion. [4] Instead of receiving TZS 52.335 billion, Zanzibar received only TZS 32.627 billion or 52% of its rightful dividend. [5] This fund is equivalent to 2.8% of the total General Budget Support*

[provided] to the United Republic [of Tanzania]. [6] The remaining amount of money, that is, TZS 1.130 trillion or 97.2% of the General Budget Support was spent and will be spent in Tanganyika. [7] From this evidence from the CCM government's documents, because of this Union, Zanzibar in 2013 alone was deprived of TZS 25.145 billion or 48% of its rightful dividend from the General Budget Support.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa mapendekezo yaliyoletwa kwenye Bunge lako Tukufu na Serikali hii ya CCM, Zanzibar itaibiwa fedha nyingi zaidi kwa mwaka huu wa fedha 2014/2015. [2] Hii ni kwa sababu kwa mujibu wa maelezo ya Waziri wa Nchi, Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais Muungano kwa mwaka huu wa fedha, fedha zitakazokwenda Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar zinajumuisha Shilingi bilioni 21.639 mgawo wa misaada ya kibajeti. [3] Kwa upande mwingine, kwa mujibu wa maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha, misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti kwa mwaka huu wa fedha itakuwa Shilingi bilioni 992.170. [4] Hii ina maana kwamba kwa mwaka huu wa Fedha Zanzibar itapata 2.18% tu ya fedha za misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti. [5] Hii inaonyesha pia kwamba kwa mwaka huu, fedha za misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti ambazo zitabaki na kutumika Tanganyika, ni shilingi bilioni 970.531% au 97.82% ya fedha hizo. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, based on the proposed [budget] presented to your august/esteemed parliament by the CCM government, huge amount of money for Zanzibar will be stolen in the 2014/15 fiscal year. [2] This is because, according to the statement by the Minister of State, the Vice President's Office (Union), in this fiscal year, the amount of money that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar shall receive includes a dividend of TZS 21.639 billion of the General Budget Support. [3] Moreover, according to the statement by the Finance Minister, the total General Budget Support for this year will be 992.170 billion shillings. [4] This means that in this fiscal year Zanzibar will receive only 2.18% of the General Budget Support. [5] This also means that in this year the amount of General Budget Support that will remain and be used in Tanganyika amounts to 970.531 billion or 97.82% of the total fund.

- (e) [1] Kwa Serikali hii ya CCM, kama Serikali hii ya CCM ingeheshimu utaratibu wake wa 4.5% ya fedha hizo kwa Zanzibar, gawio halali la Zanzibar kutokana na fedha za misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti kwa mwaka ujao wa fedha lingekuwa Shilingi bilioni 44.647. [2] Kwa maana hiyo, Serikali hii ya CCM inapendekeza kuilipa Zanzibar asilimia 48.47 ya fedha zake halali. [3] Endapo Bunge lako Tukufu litapitisha mapendekezo kama haya kama inavyoombwa na Serikali hii ya CCM Zanzibar itaibiwa Shilingi bilioni 23 au 51.53% ya fedha zake halali kwa mwaka wake wa fedha. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inaitaka Serikali hii ya CCM ieleze Bunge lako Tukufu na iwaeleze Watanzania na hasa Wazanzibari, kwanini fedha halali za Zanzibar kutokana na misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti inayokuja kwa jina la Jamhuri ya Muungano hazijalipwa kwa mwaka jana wa fedha? [5] Aidha, Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni inaitaka Serikali hii ya CCM ilieleze Bunge lako Tukufu na iwaeleze Watanzania na hasa Wazanzibari kwanini inapendekeza kuipatia Zanzibar pungufu ya fedha zake halali kama gawio la misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti kwa mwaka huu wa fedha? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] With this CCM government, if it really respected the regulation of allocating 4.5% of the General Budget Support to Zanzibar, then Zanzibar's rightful dividend of the fund for the next financial year should have been TZS 44.647 billion. [2] For this reason, the CCM government proposes to pay Zanzibar only 48.47% of its rightful fund. [3] If this august/esteemed parliament approves such a proposal as requested by the CCM government, Zanzibar will lose TZS 23 billion or 51.53% of its rightful fund in the next fiscal year. (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, the official opposition camp in the parliament calls upon the CCM government to explain to your august/esteemed parliament and to all Tanzanians, especially to the Zanzibaris, why Zanzibar's rightful dividend of the General Budget Support secured under the name of the United Republic [of Tanzania] was not fully paid in the last fiscal year. [5] In addition, the official opposition camp in the parliament calls upon the CCM government to explain to your august/esteemed parliament and to the Tanzanians, especially the Zanzibaris,

why it proposes to pay Zanzibar less than it rightfully deserves from the General Budget Support in this fiscal year. (Applause)

- (f) [1] Mwenyekiti, lingine ni misaada na mikopo isiyokuwa ya kibajeti. [2] Misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti siyo eneo pekee ambapo Zanzibar inanyonywa na Tanganyika kwa sababu ya Muungano huu. [3] Ukweli ni kwamba hali ni mbaya zaidi kuhusiana na fedha za misaada na mikopo isiyokuwa ya kibajeti. [4] Hapa pia takwimu za Serikali hii ya CCM zinatisha na kusikitisha, hivyo [5] kwa mfano kwa mujibu wa maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha kwa mwaka wa fedha 2013/2014 fedha za nje kwa ajili ya miradi ya maendeleo zikijumuisha misaada na mikopo ya basket fund na misaada na mikopo ya miradi zilikuwa Shilingi trilioni 2.692 au Shilingi bilioni 2,692. [6] Fedha hizi zote zilitumika kwa ajili ya miradi ya maendeleo ya Tanganyika. [7] Hapa, Zanzibar haikupata kitu chochote (Makofi) [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha yanaonesha kwamba kwa mwaka wa fedha 2014/2015 misaada na mikopo isiyokuwa ya kibajeti kutoka nje inatazamiwa kuwa Shilingi bilioni 2019.43, au Shilingi trilioni 2.019. [9] Hizi zote ni fedha zitakazotumika kwa ajili ya miradi ya maendeleo ya Tanganyika. [10] Hapa pia, Zanzibar haitapata kitu chochote. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, another issue is about the non-budget support funds. [2] The General Budget Support is not the only area in which Zanzibar is exploited by Tanganyika because of this Union. [3] The fact is that the situation is even worse in terms of non-budget support funds. [4] Here, the statistics of the CCM government are terrifying. [5] For example, according to the statement by the Finance Minister, for the 2013/14 fiscal year, the amount of money from external sources for development projects, including basket funds as well as grants and loans for development projects, amounted to TZS 2.692 trillion or TZS 2,692 billion. [6] All this fund was used for development projects in Tanganyika. [7] Zanzibar did not get anything. (Applause) [8] Honourable Chairperson, the statement by the Finance Minister shows that for the 2014/15 fiscal year the [total] non-budget support is expected to be TZS 2019.43 billion or TZS 2.019 trillion. [9] All this fund will be used for Tanganyika's development projects. [10] Here, too, Zanzibar will not get anything.

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni muhimu kwa Bunge lako Tukufu kukumbuka kwamba, kwa sababu ya Muungano huu Zanzibar imenyang'anywa mamlaka ya kuomba mikopo au misaada kutoka nje bila kwanza kupata kibali cha Wizara ya Fedha ya Jamhuri ya Muungano ambayo kiuhalisia ni Wizara ya Fedha ya Tanganyika. (Makofi) [2] Sisi tuliozaliwa ndani ya Muungano tunataka kujua unyonyaji na wizi huu wa fedha za Wazanzibari utakomeshwa lini? [3] Aidha, sisi tulio kizazi cha Muungano huu tunataka kuambiwa kama mgawanyo wa aina hii wa mapato yanayokuja kwa jina la Jamhuri ya Muungano ndiyo kielelezo cha umoja, mshikamano na upendo miongoni mwa wananchi wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar, ulioletwa na Muungano. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sio tu kwamba Zanzibar haipati stahili yake ya mapato yanayopatikana kwa jina la Jamhuri ya Muungano kutoka vyanzo vya nje bali, pia fedha zinazopatikana kutokana na mambo ya Muungano zinatumika kwa mambo yasiyo ya Muungano ya Tanganyika. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa upande wa Akaunti ya Pamoja ya Fedha, leo ni mwaka wa 30 tangu Katiba kuelekeza akaunti hiyo kufunguliwa na bado haijafunguliwa. [6] Kutokana na kushindikana kufunguliwa huko kwa miaka yote hii, bajeti ya Muungano ndiyo bajeti ya Tanganyika kinyume na maelekezo ya Katiba. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, it is important to remember that, because of the Union, Zanzibar has been deprived of the mandate to apply for foreign loans or grants without first obtaining permission from the Ministry of Finance of the United Republic, which is, in practical terms, the Ministry of Finance of Tanganyika. (Applause) [2] We, who were born after the Union [was founded], want to know when this exploitation of Zanzibar will come to an end. [3] Moreover, we [members of] the post-Union generation want to be told if this kind of division of the revenue we get under the name of the United Republic (of Tanzania) is a manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love among the people of Tanganyika and Zanzibar brought by this Union. (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, not only that Zanzibar does not receive its rightful

revenue obtained from external sources under the name 'United Republic' [of Tanzania] but also the amount of money collected for the Union matters is spent on non-Union matters of Tanganyika. (Applause) [5] Honourable Chairperson, in regard to the Joint Finance Account, today we mark 30 years since the constitution stipulated that there should be a Joint Financial Account, but it has not yet been opened. [6] Due to the failure to open the Account for all these years, the Tanganyika's budget is considered to be the Union's budget, contrary to the requirements of the constitution. (Applause)

- (h) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mwaka 2006 Tume ya Pamoja ya Fedha iliajiri Watalaam waelekezi kutoka Kampuni ya Kimataifa ya Uhasibu ya Price Water House Coopers kuangalia suala la gharama na mgawanyo wa fedha za Muungano. [2] Taarifa ya uchambuzi ya Price Water House Coopers ilitolewa kama mapendekezo ya Tume kuhusu vigezo vya kugawana mapato na kuchangia gharama za Muungano ya mwezi Agosti, 2006. [3] Taarifa ya Tume ya Pamoja ya Fedha inaonesha hali ya kusikitisha kuhusu mapato na matumizi ya fedha za Muungano hasa kwa upande wa Tanganyika. [4] Ili kupata picha kamili ya hali halisi ilivyo, tunaomba kunukuu sehemu ya taarifa hiyo. [5] "Uchambuzi unaonesha kuwa mapato yanayotokana na vyanzo vya Muungano yanakidhi matakwa ya Muungano na kuwa na ziada ya kutosha. [6] Takwimu zinaonesha kuwa kiasi kidogo cha mapato hayo kimekuwa kinagharamia matumizi ya Muungano. [7] Uchambuzi unaonesha vilevile kuwa, kiasi kikubwa cha ziada ya mapato ya Muungano kimekuwa kinatumika kugharamia mambo yasiyo ya Muungano." (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in 2006 the Joint Finance Commission hired international consulting experts from Price Water House Coopers to investigate cost-sharing and distribution of the Union funds. [2] In August 2006, the Commission adopted the recommendations from the consultancy report of the Price Water House Coopers on revenue distribution and the Union's cost-sharing. [3] The Joint Finance Commission's report reveals a sad situation about the Union's revenue and expenditure, particularly in Tanganyika. [4] I would like to quote part of the report so as to get a real picture of the situation: [5] "The analysis shows that the revenue collected from Union sources satisfy the requirements of the Union and there is an adequate excess. [6] The statistics show that a small amount of the revenue is used to cover the cost of the Union matters. [7] The analysis also shows that a huge amount of the Union's excess revenue is used to cover non-Union matters."

- (i) [1] Takwimu za utafiti za Price Water House Coopers zinaonesha kwamba, kwa mwaka wa fedha 2003/2004 pekee, matumizi halisi kwa vifungu vya Muungano yalikuwa Shilingi bilioni 537 ambayo ni 20% tu ya bajeti yote ya Serikali ya Muungano kwa mwaka huo. [2] Mapato halisi ya vyanzo vya mapato vinavyotokana na mambo ya Muungano kwa mwaka huo yalikuwa Shilingi bilioni 1,030. [3] Kwa maana nyingine, mapato na matumizi ya fedha zinazotokana na vyanzo vya mambo ya Muungano yaliacha ziada ya Shilingi bilioni 493 kwa mwaka huo mmoja. [4] Ziada hii nje ya mapato yaliyotokana na misaada na mikopo kutoka nje na ilitumika kwa shughuli za maendeleo za Tanganyika zisizo za Muungano. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa sababu Tanganyika imekuwa inafaidika sana na utaratibu huu, Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano ambayo kiuhalisia ni Serikali ya Tanganyika iliyovaa joho la Muungano, imekataa kutekeleza mapendekezo ya Tume ya Pamoja ya Fedha kwamba uwepo utaratibu utakaowezesha kutenganisha mapato na matumizi ya Muungano na yasiyo ya Muungano. [6] Miaka nane tangu mapendekezo hayo yatolewe mwaka 2006, Serikali zetu mbili kwa maneno ya Mheshimiwa Samia Suluhu Hassan, bado zinaendelea kushughulikia mapendekezo yaliyotolewa na Tume ya Pamoja ya Fedha. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] The findings of the Price Water House Coopers indicate that, for the 2003/04 fiscal year, the actual expenditure for the Union matters was TZS 537 billion, which was only 20% of the whole budget of the Union government for that year. [2] The actual revenue from income sources for the Union matters for that year amounted to TZS 1,030 billion. [3] In other words, revenue and expenditure for the Union matters left an excess of TZS 493 billion in the same year. [4] This excess did not include grants and loans from external sources, and it was spent on non-Union development activities of Tanganyika. [5] Honourable Chairperson, because

Tanganyika has been benefiting from this procedure, the government of the United Republic [of Tanzania], which is practically the government of Tanganyika wearing the 'gown' of the Union, has refused to implement the recommendations of the Joint Finance Commission that there should be a mechanism to separate the revenue and expenditure for the Union matters from those for non-Union matters. [6] It has been eight years now since the recommendations were made in 2006 but our two governments, in the words of Honourable Samia Suluhu Hassan, are still working on the recommendations made by the Joint Finance Commission.

- (j) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kero nyingine kubwa ya Muungano huu na ambayo ina umri sawa na Muungano wenyewe inahusu hisa za Zanzibar zilizokuwa katika Bodi ya Sarafu ya Afrika Mashariki kabla ya Bodi hiyo kuvunjwa mwaka 1965 na Benki Kuu ya Tanzania kuanzishwa. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa vile fedha za Zanzibar katika Bodi ya Sarafu zilichukuliwa na Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano baada ya masuala ya fedha, sarafu na Benki Kuu kufanywa kuwa mambo ya Muungano mwaka 1965, sisi tuliozaliwa ndani ya Muungano tuna haki ya kuambiwa ukweli kwanini Serikali hii ya CCM imeshindwa kurudisha fedha hizo kwa Wazanzibari kwa takribani miaka 50 tangu fedha hizo zinyakuliwe na Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano ambayo ndiyo Serikali ya Tanganyika? [3] Tunahitaji kuelezwa Serikali hii ya CCM inahitaji muda wa miaka mingapi mingine ili iweze kurudisha fedha za watu na kuwaepusha Watanganyika na laana ya wizi wa fedha za Wazanzibar! (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, another major concern of the Union, which is almost as old as the Union itself, is Zanzibar's shares from the East African Currency Board (EACB) before the board was dissolved in 1965 and subsequently the Bank of Tanzania was formed. [2] Honourable Chairperson, since Zanzibar's shares in the EACB were taken by the government of the United Republic after making financial matters, currency and the central bank matters of the Union in 1965, we who were born after the Union was founded have the right to be told the truth as why the CCM government has failed to return the money to Zanzibar for about 50 years since the money was taken by the government of the United Republic, which is the government of Tanganyika. [3] We want the government to explain how many years the CCM government needs to repay the money so as to spare Tanganyikans from the curse of stealing Zanzibar's fund! (Applause)

Based on *Extract 5.4*, in what I have reconstructed as the opposition's second standpoint, as expressed in (a) [1], Mr Lissu suggests that *2 the Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar by Tanganyika*. It should be noted that this standpoint can also be analysed as another argument in defence of the opposition's first standpoint because it also relates to the structure of the Union. In fact, the shadow minister argues that this exploitation of Zanzibar by Tanganyika is resulting from the Union structure (causal argumentation). However, I analyse Mr Lissu's statement that the Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation of Zanzibar by Tanganyika as the opposition's second standpoint in this debate because it relates more closely to the performance of the government in coordinating Union matters, through the Vice President's Office (Union), than to the structure of the Union. Furthermore, I am of the view that, even if the Union structure was not ideal or in order, the URT government could still coordinate the Union matters in a way that benefits both parts of the Union, as it also seems to be implied by the shadow minister. For instance, the view of having a three-government structure need not correlate to giving Zanzibar its shares from the East African

Currency Board (see subextract (j)). Moreover, it does not need to change the structure of the Union to implement the parliamentary committee's recommendations on the coordination of the financial matters of the Union for the benefits of both parts of the Union.

From *Extract 5.4*, I have reconstructed five arguments in defence of the opposition's second standpoint. In the first argument, as expressed in (b) [2-3], Mr Lissu argues that *2.1 Ms Hassan's statement that Zanzibar receives 4.5% of General Budget Support is a lie*, implying that Zanzibar does not receive its rightful dividend of the General Budget Support (hereafter GBS) as required by the regulation, which is considered a sign that the (structure of the) Union is a manifestation of exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is supported by authority argumentation from statistics, which realises coordinative argumentation. In (c) [5] and (d) [4], Mr Lissu argues that, based on the statements by the Finance Minister, *2.1.1a Zanzibar received only 2.8% of GBS in 2013/14 fiscal year* and that *2.1.1b it is bound to receive only 2.18% of the GBS in 2014/15*. In favour of *2.1.1a*, in (b) [4], Mr Lissu suggests that *2.1.1a.1 only TZS 32.627 billion was allocated to Zanzibar in 2013/14 fiscal year*. In (c) [1], he maintains that *2.1.1a.1.1 the amount of money (TZS 32.627 billion) approved by the parliament in 2013/14 was not the rightful dividend of GBS for Zanzibar* because, as indicated in (c) [2], according to the Finance Minister, *2.1.1a.1.1.1 the actual GBS from donors in 2013/14 was TZS 1,163 billion*. In (c) [3], Mr Lissu further maintains that, if Zanzibar was to receive 4.5% of TZS 1,163 billion, then *2.1.1a.1.1.1.1 TZS 52.335 billion should have been allocated to Zanzibar but 2.1.1a.1.1.1.1 only 32.627 billion or 52% of its rightful dividend was approved*, as indicated in (c) [4]. This chain of subordinative argumentation is concluded with a directive speech act in (e) [4], where Mr Lissu asks: *why Zanzibar's rightful share of GBS was not fully paid in the last fiscal year?*

Argumentation in defence of *2.1.1b* begins with an assertive in (d) [1], where Mr Lissu asserts that, based on the proposed budget, even more fund for Zanzibar will be stolen in 2014/15. Thus, in favour of *2.1.1b*, Mr Lissu suggests that, according to the Minister of State (Union), *2.1.1b.1 Zanzibar will receive only 21.639 billion of GBS in 2014/15 fiscal year*, as shown in (d) [2]. To maintain this argument, in (d) [3], he argues that, according to the Finance Minister, *2.1.1b.1.1 the actual GBS for the 2014/15 fiscal year is expected to be TZS 992.170 billion*. In (e) [1], he clarifies that, if the CCM government respects the regulation to give Zanzibar 4.5% of GBS, *2.1.1b.1.1.1 it should have requested to give Zanzibar TZS 44.647 billion in 2014/15* but, as (e) [2] suggests, *2.1.1b.1.1.1.1 it requests to give Zanzibar only 48.47% of its rightful*

dividend. In (e) [3], he further maintains that, if ‘your august/esteemed parliament’ approves this request, *2.1.1b.1.1.1.1 Zanzibar will lose TZS 23 billion or 51.53% of its rightful dividend in the 2014/15 fiscal year*. Although the phrase *Bunge lako Tukufu* (your august/esteemed parliament) is a common phrase in Tanzanian parliamentary debates, Mr Lissu strategically uses it as a presentational device in order to convince the parliament not to approve such a request because an ‘august or esteemed parliament’ cannot approve such a request. Like the previous argument, this argument also ends with the directive in (e) [5], where Mr Lissu asks: *why the CCM government proposes to pay Zanzibar less than it rightfully deserves from GBS in the next fiscal year?* I have reconstructed the opposition’s first argument in defence of the second standpoint as shown in *Table 5.7* below.

Table 5.7 The first argument for the opposition’s second standpoint

No.	Description
2.1	It is not true that Zanzibar receives 4.5% of GBS
(2.1’)	(Zanzibar doesn’t receive its rightful dividend of GBS and this is a sign that the Union is a manifestation of exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar)
2.1.1a	Zanzibar received only 2.8% of GBS in the 2013/14 fiscal year
2.1.1a.1	According to the Minister of State, only TZS 32 billion was allocated to Zanzibar
2.1.1a.1.1	This amount is not the rightful dividend of GBS for Zanzibar
2.1.1a.1.1.1	According to the Finance Minister, the actual GBS was TZS 1,163 billion
2.1.1a.1.1.1.1	If Zanzibar was to receive 4.5% of TZS 1.163 billion as required by the regulation, Zanzibar’s rightful dividend should have been TZS 52 billion
2.1.1a.1.1.1.1.1	Instead of receiving TZS 52.335 billion, only TZS 32 billion or 52% of its rightful dividend was approved
2.1.1b	Zanzibar is bound to receive only 2.18% of GBS in the 2014/15 fiscal year
2.1.1b.1	According to the Minister of State, only TZS 21 billion is allocated for Zanzibar
2.1.1b.1.1	According to the Finance Minister, the actual GBS is expected to be TZS 992.170 billion
2.1.1b.1.1.1	If the CCM govt respects the regulation to give Zanzibar 4.5% of GBS, it should have requested to give Zanzibar TZS 44.647 billion
2.1.1b.1.1.1.1	Instead it requests to give Zanzibar only 48.47% of its rightful dividend
2.1.1b.1.1.1.1.1	If your august/esteemed parliament approves this request, Zanzibar will lose TZS 23 billion or 51.53% of its rightful dividend

The first argument for the opposition’s second standpoint exhibits mainly authority argumentation from statistics (supported with specific quotations from the ministers). Mr Lissu appeals both to the ministers and to the budget statistics of the government as presented in the parliament by the Minister of State – Vice President’s Office (Union) and the Finance Minister on different occasions. One of the critical questions to ask is whether these statistics are indeed the statistics presented by the ministers and/or have been interpreted correctly by Mr Lissu. Another critical question is whether these statistics really lead to the conclusion that Zanzibar has been receiving less than it rightfully deserves from GBS.

The opposition's second argument in support of the second standpoint is reconstructed from subextract (f). In this subextract, Mr Lissu talks about Zanzibar's exploitation by Tanganyika in terms of non-GBS. The main argument is 2.2 *Zanzibar receives nothing from non-GBS*. The unexpressed premise suggests that this is another proof that Zanzibar is exploited (and oppressed) in the Union (symptomatic argumentation). Like the first argument, the opposition's second argument is defended by authority argumentation from statistics (supported by specific quotations from the ministers). In defence of 2.2, in (f) [7] and (f) [10], he maintains that 2.2.1a *Zanzibar did not get anything from non-GBS in the 2013/14 fiscal year* and that 2.2.1b *it will not get anything in the 2014/15 fiscal year*. Both arguments in this coordinative argumentation are supported by budget statistics from the Finance Minister. In favour of 2.2.1a, in (f) [5], Mr Lissu argues that, according to the Finance Minister, 2.2.1b.1 *the total non-GBS in the 2013/14 fiscal year was TZS 2,692 billion* and maintains in (f) [6] that 2.2.1a.1.1 *all this fund was spent on the development projects in Tanganyika*. In support of 2.2.1b, in (f) [8], he argues that, according to the Finance Minister, 2.2.1b.1 *the total non-GBS from donors in the 2014/15 fiscal year is expected to be TZS 2019.43 billion*, maintaining in (f) [9] that 2.2.1b.1.1 *all this fund will be spent on the development projects in Tanganyika*. In (g) [4], Mr Lissu further suggests that, based on the budget statistics, Zanzibar's amount of money that the Union government receives from donors under the name 'the United Republic of Tanzania' is spent on non-Union matters of Tanganyika. In this argumentation, Mr Lissu performs a directive speech act by posing two questions to the government. First, in (g) [2], he asks the government to explain to those who were born in the Union when this 'exploitation and theft' of Zanzibar's fund by Tanganyika will come to an end. Second, in (h) [3], he maintains that those who were born after the Union was founded want to know if this kind of sharing the donors' funds (that come under the name 'the United Republic of Tanzania') is the manifestation of unity, solidarity, and love between Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris brought by the Union, as suggested by the Prime Minister. I have reconstructed the opposition's second argument in defence of the second standpoint as shown in **Table 5.8** below.

Table 5.8 The second argument for the opposition's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.2	Zanzibar receives nothing from non-GBS
(2.2')	(This is another proof that Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed in the Union)
2.2.1a	Zanzibar didn't get anything from non-GBS in the 2013/14 fiscal year
2.2.1a.1	According to the Finance Minister, the total non-GBS was TZS 2,692 billion
2.2.1a.1.1	All this fund was spent on the development projects in Tanganyika
2.2.1b	Zanzibar will not get anything from non-GBS in the 2014/15 fiscal year

2.2.1b.1	According to the Finance Minister, the total non-GBS is expected to be TZS 2019.43 billion in 2014/2015
2.2.1b.1.1	All this fund will be spent on the development projects in Tanganyika

Mr Lissu's second argument demonstrates symptomatic argumentation and authority argumentation based on the budget statistics as presented by the ministers. Mr Lissu's symptomatic argumentation suggests that the fact that Zanzibar receives nothing from non-GBS is a sign of exploitation of Zanzibar by Tanganyika. In his authority argumentation, Mr Lissu specifically appeals to the budget statistics indicating the allocation of non-GBS fund from donors. Based on these statistics, Mr Lissu suggests that Zanzibar has been receiving nothing from non-GBS and all this fund is spent on the development projects of Tanganyika. This subtype of symptomatic argumentation should address the same critical questions posed in the first argument.

In the third argument, as reconstructed from (g) [5-6], (h), and (i), Mr Lissu argues that *2.3 Zanzibar's fund (from the Union's internal sources of income) is spent by Tanganyika*. To further defend this argument, in (g) [6], he maintains that *2.3.1 URT's budget is practically the budget of Tanganyika*. He further maintains that, because *2.3.1.1a the government has not implemented the Committee's recommendations to address this challenge*, *2.3.1.1b the Union's excess fund (including Zanzibar's fund) is spent on non-Union matters of Tanganyika*. In defence of *2.3.1.1a*, in (i) [5], he argues that *2.3.1.1a.1a the government has been reluctant to separate Union's revenue and expenditure from non-Union revenue and expenditure*, as recommended by the Joint Finance Commission (JFC), further arguing that *2.3.1.1a.1a.1 the government was directed by JFC to separate the Union's revenue and expenditure from non-Union revenue and expenditure* (authority argumentation). In (g) [5], argument *2.3.1.1a.1a* is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that it has been 30 years since the government was required by the revised national constitution of Tanzania to open a Joint Finance Account but *2.3.1.1a.1b the government has not yet opened the Account*. It is further suggested that *2.3.1.1a.1b.1 opening the Joint Finance Account is the requirement of the constitution* (argumentation from legal authority). In (i) [1-4], argument *2.3.1.1b* is further defended by the argument that the statistics from the research report by the international consulting experts (Price Water House Coopers) indicate that, in 2003/2004 alone, only TZS 537 billion (20% of the entire budget of the URT in the relevant fiscal year) was spent on Union matters and there was an excess fund amounting to TZS 493 billion, because the actual revenue from the Union's internal sources of income was TZS 1,030 billion. It is further suggested that

the excess fund (i.e. TZS 493 billion) was spent on non-Union matters of Tanganyika, and this fund did not include grants and loans from external sources or foreign donors. This line of defence demonstrates authority argumentation from statistics based on the experts' research report (expert opinion). From this description, the opposition's third argument is summarised in *Table 5.9* below.

Table 5.9 The third argument for the opposition's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.3	Zanzibar's fund (from the Union's internal sources) is spent by Tanganyika
2.3.1	The budget of the URT is, in practical terms, the budget of Tanganyika
2.3.1.1a	The government hasn't implemented the Committee's recommendation to address this challenge
2.3.1.1a.1a	It has been reluctant to separate the Union's revenue and expenditure from non-Union revenue and expenditure
2.3.1.1a.1a.1	The government was directed by JFC to do so
2.3.1.1a.1b	The government hasn't [yet] opened a Joint Finance Account
2.3.1.1a.1b.1	Opening the Account is the requirement of the constitution
2.3.1.1b	The Union's excess fund (including Zanzibar's fund) is spent on non-Union matters of Tanganyika
2.3.1.1b.1	The statistics from the experts' research report indicate that, in the 2003/04 fiscal year alone, only TZS 537 billion out of 1,030 billion was spent on Union matters, and there was an excess fund amounting to TZS 493 billion
2.3.1.1b.1.1	The excess fund (i.e. TZS 493) billion was spent on matters of Tanganyika

In (g) [1], Mr Lissu argues in the fourth argument that, because of the Union, *2.4 Zanzibar has been deprived of the mandate to apply for foreign grants and loans without permission from the Ministry of Finance of Tanzania*, which implies that the Union has made Zanzibar lose the right to apply for such grants and loans (causal argumentation). This is further defended by the argument that *2.4.1 the ministry of Finance of the United Republic of Tanzania is practically the Ministry of Finance of Tanganyika*, which is considered to be a sign of exploitation and oppression (symptomatic argumentation).

In the last argument, Mr Lissu suggests that Zanzibar has not yet received its shares from the East African Currency Board (EACB). The shares were taken by Tanganyika in 1965. In Mr Lissu's view, taking someone's money and not returning it back to them is a sign of 'theft'. This means that Tanganyika has stolen Zanzibar's shares from the EACB. This argumentation is reconstructed from (j) (1-3) and is concluded with the directive in (j) [3], where Mr Lissu asks the government to explain how many years the CCM government needs to return the money to Zanzibar so as to spare Tanganyikans from what he calls the 'curse of stealing Zanzibar's money'. The opposition's fifth argument demonstrates causal argumentation and symptomatic argumentation. With regard to causal argumentation, it is implied that it is

because of the (structure of the) Union that Zanzibar's shares from EACB were taken by Tanganyika and it is because of the (structure of the) Union that Tanganyika has not returned the money back to Zanzibar. A critical question may be raised as to whether this is indeed caused by the (structure of the) Union. Demonstrating symptomatic argumentation, it is suggested that taking Zanzibar's shares and not returning them back to Zanzibar is symptomatic of theft. However, one could question the extent to which this case is indeed a sign of theft. The fourth and fifth arguments are summarised in *Table 5.10* below.

Table 5.10 The fourth and fifth arguments for the opposition's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.4	Zanzibar has been deprived of the right to apply for foreign grants or loans without permission from the Ministry of Finance of Tanzania
(2.4')	(The Union has caused Zanzibar to lose the right to apply for such grants and loans)
2.4.1	The Tanzania's Ministry of Finance is practically the Ministry of Finance of Tanganyika
(2.4.1')	(This is a sign of exploitation and oppression in the Union)
2.5	Tanganyika hasn't returned Zanzibar's shares from the East African Currency Board
(2.5')	(This is the result of the Union structure)
2.5.1	Tanganyika took the shares from the board in 1965 after the formation of BoT
2.5.1.1	Tanganyika has stolen Zanzibar's shares from the board
(2.5.1.1')	(Taking someone's money without returning it back to them is theft)

The speech acts performed in the opposition's second standpoint and its related argumentation include the assertive, commissive, and directive. As in the previous standpoint, Mr Lissu performs the commissive by implicitly not accepting the minister's second standpoint. He also performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing five arguments in defence of the standpoint. Finally, he performs the directive by requesting various usage declaratives (or argumentation) from the minister.

5.3.2.4 Summary of the opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

Based on *Extract 5.4*, the opposition's second standpoint (and its supporting argumentation) is summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 5.4. This schematic overview serves as a representation of the opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation in a single diagram. For this purpose, not all arguments in defence of the standpoint are presented.




Figure 5.4 Summary of the opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of the argumentation schemes, the opposition's second standpoint is at the first level of defence justified by symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation. In the next levels

of defence, the standpoint is defended by authority argumentation from statistics, authority argumentation based on expert opinion, argumentation from legal authority, and causal argumentation.

5.2.3 MPs' related contributions in the confrontation stage

Other related critical reactions against the minister's standpoints can be reconstructed from other MPs' contributions to the debate. In what follows, I discuss a few related contributions from other MPs that are instrumental in resolving the difference of opinion. In *Extract 5.5*, Mr Kombo puts the minister's first standpoint into question.

Extract 5.5

(a) MHE. KOMBO HAMISI KOMBO: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, matatizo yanayoukabili Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar si tu kwamba, yanachefua nafsi za Watanganyika na Zanzibar, bali umechukua nafasi kubwa ya kufanya Zanzibar kama si Nchi Washirika wa Muungano huu bali umeifanya Zanzibar kama koloni na siyo Mshirika wa Muungano. [2] Kwanza, mfumo wa kupatikana na kwa Rais wa Zanzibar, Wazanzibari hawana maamuzi ya kuchagua Rais wao bila ya kutolewa maamuzi na Tanganyika. [3] Pili, kauli iliyotolewa na Waziri Mkuu juu ya Kauli aliyoitumia kusema kuwa Zanzibar si nchi ni uthibitisho tosha wa kuonesha kuwa Zanzibar ni Koloni la Watanganyika. [4] Tatu, kutofunguliwa kwa Akaunti ya Pamoja ya Mfuko wa Muungano ni kielelezo na uthibitisho tosha kwamba, Zanzibar ni Koloni la Watanganyika. [5] Nne, Kauli iliyotolewa na Mheshimiwa Salmin Awadhi kwamba, Sera ya CCM ni Serikali Mbili kuelekea Moja, ni uthibitisho tosha kwamba, Tanganyika imekalia Zanzibar kama Koloni lake. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. KOMBO HAMISI KOMBO: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the problems facing the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar not only sicken the souls of Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris but have [also] greatly made Zanzibar like a colony [of Tanganyika] and not a Union partner. [2] First, [regarding] the process of getting a president of Zanzibar, the people of Zanzibar have no decision to choose their president; the decision is made by Tanganyika. [3] Second, the Prime Minister's remark on the statement that Zanzibar is not a country is enough proof to show that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyikans. [4] Third, the failure to open a Joint Finance Account of the Union is a manifestation and proof that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyikans. [5] Fourth, the statement by Mr Salmin Awadhi that the CCM policy [on the Union structure] is a two-government structure toward one-government structure is a clear manifestation that Tanganyika controls Zanzibar as its colony.

(b) [1] Tano, kauli ya kejeli na kebehi iliyotolewa na Mheshimiwa Dkt. Khamis Kigwangalla katika Mkutano wa Bunge Maalum kusema kwamba, Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar ni Local Government na hakutokea Kiongozi yeyote kukemea kauli hiyo, ni uthibitisho tosha kwamba Zanzibar ni Koloni la Tanganyika. [2] Sita, kauli iliyotolewa kanisani Machi, 2014 na Waziri wa Nchi, Ofisi ya Waziri Mkuu (Sera, Uratibu wa Bunge), akimwakilisha Waziri Mkuu kwamba, asilimia 95 ya Wazanzibari ni Waislam, tukiwaachia wataunda Serikali ya Kiislam; nani kamwambia hilo? [3] Aliendelea kusema pia hawawezi kuiachia Zanzibar hata siku moja na endapo Mfumo wa Serikali Tatu utapita, Jeshi litachukua madaraka, ni uthibitisho tosha kwamba Zanzibar ni Koloni la Tanganyika. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Fifth, the statement of mockery and ridicule by Honourable Dr Khamis Kigwangallah in the Constituent Assembly suggesting that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is a local government, and no leader condemned the statement, is a clear proof that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyika. [2] Sixth, the statement made in church in March 2014 by the Minister of State, Prime Minister's Office (Policy, Coordination and Parliamentary affairs), representing the Prime Minister, that 95% of Zanzibaris are Muslims, if we leave them they will form an Islamic state; who told you that? [3] He continued to say that they cannot leave Zanzibar at all and, if

the three-government structure is adopted, the army will take power; it is a proof that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyika.

- (c) [1] Saba, kauli iliyotolewa na Rais wa Jamhuri wa Tanzania, Mheshimiwa Jakaya Kikwete wakati akihutubia Bunge Maalum juu ya kupinga Rasimu ambayo aliweka saini yeye mwenyewe na kuthubutu kusema katika uhai wake Serikali Tatu haiwezekani na ikitokea Jeshi litachukua Serikali; [2] ni kwa nini basi Tume ya Jaji Warioba ilitumia zaidi ya bilioni sabini wakati Serikali ilikuwa haikubaliani na maoni hayo? [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni wazi kwamba, mambo ya msingi ambayo ni kero katika Muungano huu bado yanafichwa. [4] Hivi karibuni aliyekuwa Katibu wa Baraza la Mapinduzi 1964, alinukuliwa akisema Zanzibar haikuridhia Muungano huu bali kulitumika hila na ghiliba katika kuitawala Zanzibar. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sisi kama Wazanzibari tumeshachoka na Muungano ambao ni Jahanam kwa Wazanzibari na hauna faida wala tija, isipokuwa Ubunge tunaopata Wazanzibari. [6] Kwa mantiki hii, [...] ni wakati wa kuufikiria upya Muungano huu. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Seventh, the statement made by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency Jakaya Kikwete, when addressing the Constituent Assembly, against the draft constitution that he himself signed and dared to say that as long as he lives the three-government structure will not exist, if it happens [that it is adopted], the army will take control of the government; [2] so why did the Justice Warioba's Commission spend over TZS 70 billion if the government didn't agree with the public opinions? [3] Honourable Chairperson, it is clear that the basic issues which are nuances in the Union are still hidden. [4] Recently, the former secretary of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council of 1964 was quoted as saying that Zanzibar didn't agree to this Union, but deception and manipulation were used to control Zanzibar. [5] Honourable Chairperson, we Zanzibaris are tired of this Union which is hell for Zanzibaris and has no benefits [for us], apart from the parliamentary seats we get. [6] In this sense, [...] it is time to rethink this Union.

Based on *Extract 5.5*, Mr Kombo asserts that 'it is time to rethink the Union', as expressed in (c) [6]. This statement realises Mr Kombo's (prescriptive) standpoint, which can be reconstructed as *1 the Union should be rethought*. Like Mr Lissu's first standpoint, Mr Kombo's standpoint relates to a slightly different proposition compared to the minister's first standpoint. However, the argumentation in favour of this standpoint are regarded as Mr Kombo's critical reactions against the minister's first standpoint. Mr Kombo's standpoint is supported by three arguments at the first level of defence. The first argument is advanced in (a) [1], where he argues that, under the current Union, *1.1 Zanzibar is like a colony of Tanganyika*; not a Union partner, implicitly suggesting that the Union has made Zanzibar a colony of Tanganyika (causal argumentation). This argument is defended by seven supporting arguments combined in multiple argumentation. These arguments are considered to be 'proofs' that Zanzibar is like a colony of Tanganyika (symptomatic argumentation). The first 'proof' is advanced in (a) [2], where Mr Kombo argues that *1.1.1a the decision on who should be president of Zanzibar is made by Tanganyika*, which is complemented by the claim that *1.1.1b Zanzibaris have no choice over who should be their president*. This argument realises experience-based authority argumentation. Mr Kombo seems to suggest that, based on his

experience, that is how the decision on who should be Zanzibar's president is made. In 9a) [3], Mr Kombo suggests that *1.1.2 the Prime Minister's remark on the statement that Zanzibar is not a country is the second proof that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyika*. As shown in (a) [4], he further argues that *1.1.3 the failure to open a Joint Finance Account of the Union funds is a third proof that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyika*. According to him, *1.1.4 the fourth proof is Mr Awadhi's statement that the CCM policy on the structure of the Union is a two-government structure towards one*, as presented in (a) [5].

In (b) [1], Mr Kombo further argues that *1.1.5 the fifth proof is Dr Kigwangallah's statement of mockery and ridicule that the RGZ is a local government*, which is supported by the argument that *1.1.5.1 no leader condemned the statement*. Mr Kombo's statement seems to suggest that comparing RGZ with a local government implies that RGZ does not have the same status as Tanganyika in the Union and that it cannot make decisions without approval from Tanganyika. As argued in (b) [2-3], *1.1.6a the sixth proof is the statement made in church by the Minister of State (Prime Minister's Office) that 95% of Zanzibaris are Muslims*, which is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that, according to the minister, *1.1.6b if the three-government structure is adopted, the army will take power*. Argument *1.1.6a* is further supported by the argument that, according to the Minister, *1.1.6a.1 if they allow a three-government structure, Zanzibar will form an Islamic government*, implicitly suggesting that a three-government structure will *lead* to the formation of an Islamic government in Zanzibar (causal argumentation). Mr Kombo rejects this causal link. He instead suggests that it is not the case that, if a three-government structure is adopted, then Zanzibar will form an Islamic government. As advanced in (c) [1], *1.1.7a the last proof is President Kikwete's statement that he will never allow a three-government structure* and that *1.1.7.b if it is adopted, the army will take control of the government*. In (c) [2], he wonders why the Constitutional Review Commission spent more than TZS 70 billion to collect public opinions if the government was against the public opinions. This is presented in the form of a rhetorical question (presentational device). It should be recalled that, based on the public opinions collected by the Commission, the majority of Tanzanians proposed a three-government structure (CRC, 2013; TUME, 2013).

The second argument in defence of the standpoint is advanced in (c) [3], where he suggests that *1.2 the basic issues which are nuances in the Union are still hidden*, which is considered an indication that the Union should be rethought (symptomatic argumentation) so that these

issues are exposed and addressed. In (c) [4], this argument is supported by the claim that, according to the former secretary of the 1964 Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar, *1.2.1 Zanzibar never agreed to the Union but deception and manipulation were used to control Zanzibar*. The third argument is advanced in (c) [5], where Mr Kombo argues that *1.3 Zanzibaris are tired of the Union* (populist appeal) because *1.3.1 the current Union is hell to Zanzibaris* and *1.3.2 it has no benefits for them*, apart from the parliamentary seats they get. The use of the metaphor *Muungano ni Jahanam kwa Wazanzibari* (the Union is hell to the Zanzibaris) is intended to reinforce Mr Kombo's rhetorical effect in his argumentation. With this metaphor, he seems to suggest that Zanzibaris are 'suffering' in the Union. Mr Kombo's standpoint (and its related argumentation) is summarised in the table below.

Table 5.11 Mr Kombo's standpoint and related argumentation

1	The Union should be rethought
1.1	Under the current Union, Zanzibar is like a colony of Tanganyika
(1.1')	(The Union has made Zanzibar a colony of Tanganyika)
1.1.1a	The decision on who should be a president of Zanzibar is made by Tanganyika
1.1.1b	Zanzibaris have no choice over who should be their president
1.1.2	Prime Minister's remark on the statement that Zanzibar is not a country is the second proof that Zanzibar is a colony of Tanganyika
1.1.3	Failure to open a Joint Finance Account of the Union funds is a third proof
1.1.4	Mr Awadhi's statement that the CCM policy on the structure of the Union is a two-government structure towards one is such a proof
1.1.5	Another proof is Dr Kigwangallah's statement of mockery and ridicule that the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is a local government
1.1.5.1	No leader condemned the statement
1.1.6a	Minister of State made a statement that 95% of Zanzibaris are Muslims
1.1.6b	If the three-government structure is adopted, the army will take power
1.1.6a.1	If they allow a three-government structure, Zanzibar will form an Islamic government
1.1.7a	President Kikwete's statement that he will never allow a three-government structure is another proof
1.1.7b	He further said that, if it is adopted, the army will take control of the government
1.1.7a.1	Why did the Commission spend more than TZS 70 billion to collect public opinions if the government was against the public opinions?
1.2	The basic issues which are nuances in the Union are still hidden
(1.2')	(This is an indication that the Union should be rethought so that these issues are exposed and addressed)
1.2.1	Zanzibar never agreed to the Union but deception and manipulation were used to control Zanzibar
1.3	Zanzibaris are tired of the Union
1.3.1	The current Union is hell to Zanzibaris
1.3.2	It has no benefits for Zanzibaris, apart from the parliamentary seats

In terms of the argumentation schemes, Mr Kombo's prescriptive standpoint seems to be defended by causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation by

quotation, experience-based authority argumentation, and authority argumentation from populist appeal.

Further criticisms levelled at the minister's standpoints are advanced by Mr Ali Khamis Seif in the following extract.

Extract 5.6

- (a) MHE. ALI KHAMIS SEIF: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Serikali imejaribu kutatua baadhi ya kero lakini zipo nyingi hazijatatuliwa na baadhi ya kero nyingine zinasababishwa na muundo wenyewe wa Muungano. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, baadhi ya kero za Muungano zinazosababishwa na muundo wa Muungano ni Tanganyika kuvaa koti la Tanzania, utungaji wa sheria zinazohusiana na mambo ya Muungano kwa wingi wa kura ukitilia maanani Wabunge wa Zanzibar ni wachache na pia utaratibu wa Wabunge wa Zanzibar kuchangia mambo yasiyo ya Muungano wakati sisi ni Wabunge wa Muungano. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Tanganyika kuvaa koti la Muungano hufanya zile fursa za nchi (sovereign State) zote kuchukuliwa na kufaidika kwa Tanganyika. [4] Mawasiliano baina ya nchi nan chi ambayo ni rasmi, yanafanywa na Tanzania lakini Tanganyika imo humo humo. [5] Ni dhahiri kero hiyo itaendelea kama muundo wa Muungano utaendelea hivyo ulivyo. [6] Vinginevyo, Serikali naomba iniarifu, vipi Zanzibar itakuwa na hadhi sawa Kimataifa pamoja na Tanganyika ikiwa mshirika mwenzake wa Muungano? (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. ALI KHAMIS SEIF: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the government has tried to address some of the challenges [of the Union] but most of them have remained unresolved and some are caused by the structure of the Union. [2] Honourable Chairperson, some of the challenges of the Union caused by the structure of the Union are [the fact that] Tanganyika is wearing the coat of Tanzania, enactment of acts on the Union matters on the basis of the simple majority votes, regardless of the fact that Zanzibar has a small number of MPs, and the tendency for MPs from Zanzibar to discuss non-Union matters while we are the Union MPs. [3] Honourable Chairperson, the fact that Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the Union makes all opportunities of the sovereign state to be under Tanganyika. [4] Official communication between countries is made by Tanzania but Tanganyika is also part of it. [5] It is clear that this challenge will continue to exist if the Union structure continues to be the way it is. [6] Otherwise, I ask the government to tell me; how will Zanzibar have the same international status as Tanganyika as [an equal] Union partner?

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika utaratibu wa kawaida, sheria zinazohusiana na utungaji wa sheria za kuyatawala au kuyaendeleza mambo ya Muungano inakuwa kwa wingi wa kura (simple majority), kura ya theluthi tatu (2/3) inatumika kuongeza au kupunguza mambo ya Muungano. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Bunge la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania lina Wabunge 358. [3] Wabunge wa Zanzibar ni 77 na Wabunge kutoka Tanzania Bara (Tanganyika) ni 281. [4] Ni dhahiri Muswada wowote wa sheria kwa mgao wa Wabunge aina hiyo unaweza kupitishwa kwa kura za Tanzania Bara (Tanganyika) hata kama Wabunge wa Zanzibar hawakubaliani na sheria hiyo. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa muundo huu wa Muungano, kero hiyo haitaondoka. Nashauri kero hiyo iangaliwa kwa undani zaidi. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in normal circumstances, the laws that govern the enactment of the acts governing Union matters are based on the number of votes (simple majority); the two-thirds (2/3) majority is used to add or remove Union matters. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania has 358 MPs. [3] MPs from Zanzibar are [only] 77 and those from Mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) are 281. [4] It is obvious that, based on this distribution of votes among MPs, any bill can be approved by votes from Mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) even if MPs from Zanzibar are against it. [5] Honourable Chairperson,

with the current structure of the Union, this challenge will not be solved. [6] I suggest that this problem should be carefully addressed.

In this extract, Mr Seif states that, although the government has tried to address some challenges of the Union, other challenges have remained unresolved. This standpoint is expressed in (a) [1]. As proof of his standpoint, in (a) [2], he maintains that there are many other challenges that have remained unresolved and these challenges are caused by the structure of the Union (causal argumentation), and they include the fact that ‘Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the Union’, enactment of acts regarding Union matters on the basis of a two-thirds majority (while Zanzibar has a small number of MPs compared to Tanganyika), and the tendency for MPs from Zanzibar to discuss non-Union matters, while they are Union MPs. Concerning the claim that Tanganyika is ‘wearing the coat’ of the Union, in (a) [3], he argues that, as a consequence of this (causal argumentation), Tanganyika utilises and benefits from all the opportunities of a sovereign state, implying that Zanzibar gets nothing. For instance, his statement in (a) [4] suggests that Tanganyika makes official international communications as Tanzania. In (a) [5] he states that this challenge will continue to exist if the structure of the Union is not reviewed. His statement in (a) [6] suggests that, because Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the Union, it is questionable whether Zanzibar, as a Union partner, has the same international status as Tanganyika in the Union.

Regarding the enactment of acts on Union matters based on a two-thirds majority (or simple majority), he argues that any bill can be approved or made an act based on majority votes from Tanganyika even if MPs from Zanzibar are against the bill (causal argumentation) because Tanganyika has a large number of MPs (281) compared to Zanzibar (77) (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation), as indicated in (b) [1-4]. In (b) [5], he argues that, unless the structure of the Union is reviewed, this problem will continue to exist. This argumentation ends with the directive in (b) [6], where he suggests that this challenge should be addressed. In **Table 5.12**, I summarise Mr Seif’s argumentation for his standpoint.

Table 5.12 Mr Seif’s argumentation

No.	Description
1	Other challenges/nuances of the Union have remained unresolved
1.1a	The government has failed to address these challenges
1.1b	These challenges are caused by the structure of the Union
1.1a.1	Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the Union
1.1a.1.1	Tanganyika utilises and benefits from all opportunities of a sovereign state in the name of Tanzania
(1.1a.1.1’)	(This is a consequence of the structure of the Union)
1.1a.1.1.1	All official international communications are made by Tanganyika under the umbrella of Tanzania

1.1a.1.1.2	It is questionable whether Zanzibar has the same international status in the Union as Tanganyika has
1.1a.2a	Acts on Union matters are enacted based on a two-thirds or simple majority
1.1a.2b	This is a problem and should be addressed
1.1a.2b.1	As a result of this problem, any bill can be made an act based on majority votes from Tanganyika even if MPs from Zanzibar are against it
1.1a.2b.1.1	Zanzibar has a small number of MPs (77) compared to Tanganyika (281)
1.1a.3	MPs from Zanzibar discuss non-Union matters while they are Union MPs
(1.1a.3')	(MPs from Zanzibar should discuss only Union matters)

In *Extract 5.7*, Mr Mnyaa attacks the ministers' argumentation for the expressed standpoints.

Extract 5.7

- (a) MHE. ENG. MOHAMMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...], ni kweli Muungano wetu umeshatimiza miaka 50 na kuna 90.6% ya watu waliozaliwa wakati Muungano huu uko tayari kwa mujibu wa maneno ya Waziri Mkuu. [2] Hata hivyo, hilo bado halituzui katika Muungano wa dhuluma na katika Muungano wa namna hii, wa upande mmoja tu kuwa sisi tunyamaze kuwa miaka 50 ndiyo mingi kwa hiyo tena tunyamaze dhuluma za miaka yote hiyo. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014) [...]
- HON. ENG. MOHAMMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, [...] it is true that the Union has marked 50 years and 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was already founded, according to the Prime Minister. [2] However, that cannot stop us from complaining about the exploitation and imbalance in power in the Union for all these years, just because the Union has existed for 50 or many years.*
- (b) [1] Kwanza miaka 50 ni kidogo sana ukilinganisha na miungano mingine duniani [2] kwa mfano pale Uingereza tu wana miaka 300, ina miaka hiyo 50 inaingia mara sita na bado watu wa Scotland wanatetea Muungano ule na umeleta matatizo na wanapiga kura mwezi Septemba na wana miaka zaidi ya miaka (sic) tatu seuze miaka 50. [3] Kwa hiyo, hatuwezi kunyamaza kimya kwa kuona dhuluma hizi zinaendelea kwa Muungano wa upande mmoja tu. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, la tatu, katika kipindi cha muda mrefu, Wazanzibar wengi tuliamini kwamba Watanganyika ndiyo wanaotuletea matatizo na kudhulumu katika Muungano huu kumbe sivyo, [5] ni baadhi tu ya kikundi powerful, hiki kikundi kina nguvu cha watu wa CCM walioko madarakani, walioko Serikali ndiyo ambao wanaleta dhuluma na matatizo katika Muungano huu. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)
- [1] After all, the existence of the Union for 50 years is not a big deal compared to other unions in the world. [2] For example, the UK has been in the union for 300 years, which is six times 50 years of our Union, but still the Scottish are debating about that union; and they are holding a referendum in September, despite being in the union for 300 years. [3] So, we cannot keep quiet while exploitation continues in one part of the Union. (Applause). [4] Honourable Chairperson, third, for a long time, most Zanzibaris believed that Tanganyikans are the ones causing problems and exploitation in the Union, but it is not true. [5] There is only a small but powerful group of CCM members who are in power; they are the ones causing problems and exploitation in the Union.*
- (c) Baada ya kuona maoni ya Tume ya Jaji Warioba kumbe Watanganyika walio wengi wanataka haki itendeke na hawapendelei Muungano huu ambao una dhuluma wanataka Muungano wa haki. [2] Kwa hiyo, watusamehe wale wenzetu mwanzo tuliofikiria na wao wameungana kumbe ni kikundi kidogo lakini powerful. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kikundi hiki baadhi yao walithubutu kufanya uchochezi mkubwa Makanisani na mpaka leo wameachiwa wanadunda na hakuna hatua yoyote iliyochukuliwa na ni uchochezi mkubwa sana uliofanywa Makanisani [4] na walionesha dhahiri siri iliyojificha imefichuka kwamba wao kumbe nia ni kuidhibiti Zanzibar katika hali tofauti. [5] Sababu walizozitoa ni kwamba Zanzibar ina eneo kubwa la bahari haiwezi kujilinda, [6] siyo sahihi kwa sababu linalolinda toka hapo Muungano

ni Jeshi la Wananchi wa Tanzania na siyo Wazanzibar peke yao. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *After seeing the public opinions by the Justice Warioba's Commission, [I realised that] most Tanganyikans want justice to be done and they don't like this Union which is exploitative; they want a just union. [2] So, our fellow [Tanganyikans] should forgive us; we thought they also support this, but it is just a small but powerful group of people [who do all this]. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, some members of this group even tried to inculcate hate in churches but until today they are still free, and no legal actions have been taken against them for what they did in churches. [4] They revealed the secret which has been hidden that their intention is to control Zanzibar under different conditions. [5] One of the reasons provided is that Zanzibar has a large area covered by the ocean; [because of that] it cannot protect itself. [6] This is not true because it is the Tanzania People's Defence Force(s) which is(are) protecting [this area] since the formation of the Union; not Zanzibar alone.*

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Ndugu yetu hapa wa Kambi ya Upinzani alizungumzia maeneo mengi ambayo Zanzibar inadhulumwa kwa hali ya juu. [2] Alizungumzia mambo ya budget support, alizungumzia mambo ya misaada mingine lakini kwa kweli ile ni sehemu ndogo tu ya dhuluma inazofanyiwa Zanzibar. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni nani asiyejua kwamba kuna mashirika ya Muungano tena mengi lakini mashirika hayo yote hayana muundo wa Muungano kiuongozi na kiutawala. [4] Tunapohoji unaambiwa kuna Board Member mmoja, kuna Board Member wawili, [...] kuwa Mjumbe wa Bodi kuwa tena ndiyo Zanzibar imeshirikishwa. [5] Mashirika haya yako mengi, yako Mashirika kama TICRA (sic), Mamlaka ya Usafiri wa Anga, Vyuho Vikuu – TCU na kadhalika wala hauna haja ya kutafuta sehemu nyingi sana. [6] Yote haya kwa kiasi kikubwa Wazanzibar hawashirikishwi na hata mapato yake Zanzibar Government haiapati. [7] Baadhi ya mashirika yamebinafishwa na wakachukua fedha na Zanzibar haikupata chochote, [8] yako mengi tu yakiwemo hayo ya NBC. [9] Kwa hiyo, dhuluma hizi tunazofanyiwa haziko katika mambo ya misaada tu wala budget support tu dhuluma hizi ziko katika mambo mengi sana ambayo mpaka leo Zanzibar hawafaidiki. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *Honourable Chairperson, our colleague from the opposition camp talked about many areas in which Zanzibar is highly exploited. [2] He talked about the [General] Budget Support and other forms of support, but in fact, that is [only] a small part in which Zanzibar is exploited. [3] Honourable Chairperson, who doesn't know that there are many Union organizations which don't reflect the Union structure in terms of their leadership and management? [4] But when we question this, we are told that there is one board member or two [from Zanzibar]; having a board member [from Zanzibar] doesn't mean Zanzibar is represented. [5] These organizations are many, some of them are TCRA, Tanzania [Civil] Aviation Authority, [Tanzania Commission for] Universities – TCU, and so forth; you don't need to go any further. [6] To large extent, Zanzibar is not involved in any of these organizations and [the Revolutionary Government of] Zanzibar doesn't get any revenues from them. [7] Some organizations were privatized, and they took the money, but Zanzibar didn't get anything. [8] There are many of them, including NBC. [9] So, this exploitation is not just in terms of (General) Budget Support; it is also in many other areas in which Zanzibar doesn't get any benefits.*

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, wakati wa Kamati huko Bagamoyo, ambapo Kamati ya Uchumi, Biashara na Viwanda, nilimuuliza Naibu Katibu Mkuu, Wizara ya Fedha kuhusu ongezeko la deni la Taifa pamoja na Devaluation ya shilingi ya Tanzania, Zanzibar inafidiwa vipi wakati haya yote yanayosababishwa na upande mmoja tu? [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, jibu la Naibu Katibu Mkuu ni kwamba, Zanzibar inakopa kupitia Jamhuri ya Muungano na hawalipi madeni yao ambapo Jamhuri ya Muungano ndio inayolipa deni la Zanzibar. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ikiwa jibu hilo Naibu Katibu Mkuu alilionahi sahihi ndiyo njia ya kufidia Zanzibar, basi wakati sasa umefika ikipatikana Katiba mpya au laa basi hesabu zifanywe za miaka 50 kwa Mashirika yote ya Muungano ambapo Zanzibar haijapata faida au mgawo wowote, basi

hesabu zifungwe ili fedha ya mkopo iliyolipiwa Zanzibar na fedha yote Zanzibar ilistahili ilipwe kutoka Mashirika ya Muungano. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, during the meeting by the Committee on Economy, Trade and Industries in Bagamoyo, I asked the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance; how will Zanzibar be compensated due to the increase in the national debt and the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling since all this is caused by one part [of the Union]? [2] Honourable Chairperson, the answer of the Deputy Permanent Secretary is that Zanzibar gets loans through the United Republic [of Tanzania] and it doesn't pay its debt but the United Republic [of Tanzania] pays the debts for Zanzibar. [3] Honourable Chairperson, if the Deputy Permanent Secretary thinks that this is right and that this is the [best] way to compensate Zanzibar, then it is time we got a new constitution or we should calculate for the past 50 years to know the amount of money that was used to repay Zanzibar's loans and the total amount of money Zanzibar deserves to receive as its dividend from all the Union organizations.

Based on *Extract 5.7*, Mr Mnyaa, in (a) [1-2], challenges the Prime Minister's symptomatic argumentation and authority argumentation. It should be recalled that the first argument for the minister's first standpoint (See *Table 5.1*) suggests that the existence of the Union for 50 years is a sign that the Union is ideal and that it should thus be protected, strengthened, and maintained. The Prime Minister's authority argumentation from statistics also indicates that the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained because 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union was founded. Thus, in subextract (a) and in (b) [3], Mr Mnyaa challenges both arguments by suggesting that the existence of the Union for 50 years and the fact that 90.6% of Tanzanians were born after the Union had already been formed is not necessarily a sign that the Union (or the Union structure) is appropriate and ideal or that people should not complain about the exploitative nature of the Union. In (b) [1-2], he maintains that, in fact, the existence of the Union for 50 years is not a big deal compared to other unions which have existed for more than 50 years. For instance, he states that the UK has stayed in a union for 300 years but still people are debating about the union (argumentation from example). These counterarguments against the Prime Minister's symptomatic argumentation and authority argumentation from statistics raise doubts to the acceptance of the minister's first standpoint.

Furthermore, Mr Mnyaa suggests that Zanzibar is highly exploited in the current Union, as suggested in (d) [1]. This standpoint is more or less similar to Mr Lissu's standpoint that the current Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar by Tanganyika. To further support this standpoint, Mr Mnyaa appeals to majority argumentation and authority argumentation. In (c) [1], he argues that, according to the public opinions by the Commission, the majority of Tanzanians are against this exploitative and oppressive nature of the Union. In (b) [4-5], Mr Mnyaa's majority argumentation is complemented by the argument

that those who support this Union, which is exploitative in nature, and those who cause this exploitation in the Union are a small but powerful group of people from the ruling party. In (c) [2], he maintains that this group tried to inculcate hate in Tanzanians, but no legal action was taken against them. In (c) [3-4], he adds that this group of powerful people wants to control Zanzibar under different conditions, and their reasons for supporting this type of Union are baseless. According to him, they say that Zanzibar has a large area covered by the sea; so, it cannot protect itself. However, as he further maintains, it is the Tanzania People's Defence Force(s) (TPDF) that is(are) responsible for protecting the country; not Zanzibar alone, as indicated in (c) [5].

Another argument in support of his standpoint is advanced in subextract (d). In (d) [1-2] and (d) [9], he argues that, apart from the GBS and other forms of financial support, as explained by Mr Lissu, there are many other areas in which Zanzibar is highly exploited (by Tanganyika). In (d) [3] and (d) [6], he maintains that Zanzibar is not fully involved in the leadership and management of many Union organizations and that Zanzibar receives nothing from these organizations. In (d) [5] and (d) [8], he argues that these organizations include the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA), Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA), Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU), and National Bank of Commerce (NBC), which demonstrates argumentation from example. This argumentative move realises coordinative argumentation (see *Extract 5.13*). To further support the argument that Zanzibar is not fully involved in the Union organizations, he argues in (d) [4] that having a board member or two from Zanzibar does not mean that Zanzibar is fully involved. In defence of the argument that Zanzibar receives nothing from these organizations, in (d) [7-8], he argues that some of these organizations were privatized but Zanzibar received nothing, and that one of the privatized organizations is NBC (argumentation from example).

Other points of argumentation in defence of this standpoint are advanced in subextract (e). In (e) [1], he suggests that Zanzibar should be compensated for the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling because these two are caused by one part of the Union, i.e. Tanganyika (causal argumentation). In (e) [2-3], he argues that Zanzibar should be given its dividend or share from all Union organizations. Based on this description, Mr Mnyaa's standpoint (and its related argumentation) is summarised in **Table 5.13**.

Table 5.13 Mr Mnyaa's standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
1	Zanzibar is highly exploited and oppressed in the Union
1.1a	Zanzibar is not fully involved in the leadership and management of many Union organizations
1.1a.1a	They say there is a board member or two
1.1a.1b	Having a board member or two doesn't mean that Zanzibar is fully involved
1.1b	Zanzibar receives nothing from these organizations
1.1b.1	Some of them were privatised and Zanzibar received nothing
1.1b.1.1	One of them is NBC
1.1c	These organizations include TCAA, TCRA, TCU, and NBC
1.2	Zanzibar should be compensated for the rise of national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian currency
(1.2')	(Not compensating Zanzibar is a proof that Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed)
1.2.1	The rise of the national debt and depreciation of the currency are caused by Tanganyika
1.3	Zanzibar should receive its dividend/share from the Union organizations
(1.3')	(Zanzibar hasn't been paid its dividend/share from these organizations)

In Extract 5.8, Mr Abdallah continues to challenge the ministers' standpoints.

Extract 5.8

- (a) MHE. RASHID ALI ABDALLAH: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hakuna kitu kizuri kama Muungano. [2] Muungano ndiyo wenye kuleta nguvu za kiuchumi lakini Muungano ndiyo wenye kuleta sauti ya umoja na mshikamano. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ukiangalia mjadala ambayo imepita katika Bunge la Katiba na ukiangalia mjadala ambayo imepita katika Bunge hili, inaonesha wazi kwamba Muungano tulio nao hauwafai Wazanzibar, Muungano tulio nao hauwafai Watanzania. [4] Muungano ambao sehemu moja ya nchi inakandamizwa, inadhulumiwa huo siyo Muungano. [5] Kwa maana hiyo, Wazanzibar sasa tuko macho, tuko macho kupambana na hali yoyote ya dhuluma dhidi ya Zanzibar. [6] Kwa hili hatuna mchezo kuhakikisha kwamba Zanzibar inapata haki zake kwa mujibu wa Sheria. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. RASHID ALI ABDALLAH: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, there is nothing better than [having] a union. [2] The union is the source of economic strength but it also brings a voice of unity and solidarity. [3] Honourable Chairperson, [but] if you refer back to the previous debates about the Union in the parliament and during the Constituent Assembly, it is evident that the type of the Union we have is not ideal for Zanzibaris as well as Tanzanians. [4] The Union in which one of its partners is oppressed and exploited is not a good type of union. [5] Therefore, we Zanzibaris are conscious against any form of exploitation of Zanzibar [by Tanganyika]. [6] We are very strict about ensuring that Zanzibar gets its rights in accordance with the law. (Applause)

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nizungumzie haki za kiutawala kwa Muungano. [2] Haki za kiutawala kwa Muungano hazijafanya haki hata kidogo. [3] Ukiangalia tokea mapinduzi ya mwaka 1964 hadi leo miaka 50 lakini Zanzibar imepata kuliongoza Taifa hili kwa muda wa miaka kumi tu. [4] Ukiangalia hata Bunge lako, Maspika wote ambao wote wapo, Manaibu Spika ambao wote wapo, hakuna Spika mmoja kutoka Zanzibar, huu ni Muungano wa aina gani? (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ukiangalia taasisi muhimu kwa mfano Wizara ya Mambo ya Nje, hakuna hata Mzanzibar mmoja ambaye amekuwa Waziri wa Mambo ya Nchi za Nje. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, let me talk about the administrative rights in the Union. [2] There is no justice in the administrative rights in the Union. [3] Since the 1964 Revolution, it has been 50 years, but Zanzibar has had [only] one chance to lead this nation for only ten years. [4] Even in your parliament, there has never been a Speaker or Deputy Speaker from Zanzibar; what kind of Union is this? (Applause) [5] Honourable Chairperson, if you look at the

important institutions/organizations, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; no Zanzibari has ever been a Minister for Foreign Affairs.

- (c) [1] Tunazungumzia kuhusu Kamati ambapo chini ya Kanuni 117 inatakiwa Kamati zote zifanye kazi aidha Dodoma, Dar es Salaam au Zanzibar, ni lini Kamati zako zilifanya kazi Zanzibar? [2] Hakuna hata siku moja tokea kuasisiwa kwa Bunge hili. [3] Huo siyo Muungano sahihi kabisa, unawadhulumu Wazanzibar na kuwakandamiza Wazanzibar. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ukija suala la Taasisi ya Kijeshi, hii ni Wizara ya Muungano, ni Mzanzibar gani aliwahi kuwa Mkuu wa Majeshi, [5] hakuna hata siku moja. [6] Ukienda IGP, hakuna hata siku moja IGP kutoka Zanzibar. [7] Haya si masuala ya Muungano, haiwezekani hata siku moja kwa miaka 50 ya Muungano taasisi muhimu kama hizi hakuna hata Mzanzibari mmoja ambaye ameingia. [8] Ukienda BOT hakuna hata siku moja Mzanzibari ameshikilia pale nafasi ya BOT. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014).

[1] Regarding the [meetings of the] committees, in accordance with section 117, all committees are required to work in Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, or Zanzibar; [but] when did your committees work in Zanzibar? [2] It has never been so since the inception of this parliament. [3] This is not a just Union because it exploits and oppresses Zanzibaris. [4] Honourable Chairperson, regarding the Ministry of Defence; this is a Union ministry; [but] when did a Zanzibari become Chief of the Defence Forces? [5] Not even a single day! [6] If you look at [the position of] IGP; there has never been an IGP from Zanzibar. [7] These are Union matters; but for 50 years of the Union, not a single Zanzibari has ever held any of the positions in these important institutions. [8] If you go to BoT; not even a single day a Zanzibari has ever held the [top] position at BoT.

In this extract, Mr Abdallah advances argumentation for the standpoint that the current Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar is not ideal for Zanzibaris in particular and Tanzanians in general, as expressed in (a) [1]. The main argument for this standpoint at the first level of defence realises coordinative argumentation (see **Table 5.14**). In (a) [2], Mr Abdallah suggests that Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed (by Tanganyika) in the Union. This is complemented by the argument that Zanzibaris are against this exploitation and oppression in the Union, as they want Zanzibar to get its rights in accordance with the law, as indicated in (a) [3-4]. He advances two arguments to defend the claim that Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed in the Union. First, in (a) [5-6], he argues that Zanzibar does not enjoy administrative rights in the Union. Second, in (b) [2-3], he maintains that no parliamentary committee has ever carried out its activities in Zanzibar, while section 117 of the Standing Orders stipulates that parliamentary committees shall carry out their activities in Dodoma, Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar (argumentation from legal authority).

The argument that Zanzibar does not enjoy administrative rights in the Union is supported by four further arguments. The first argument is advanced in (a) [7], where he argues that Zanzibar has had only one chance to lead the nation for ten years, implying that all other presidents came from Tanganyika. The second argument is advanced in (a) [8], where he maintains that the URT government has never had a Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the parliament from Zanzibar

and that all Speakers and Deputy Speakers are from Tanganyika, implying that this is a proof that Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed in the Union (symptomatic argumentation). In his third argument as indicated in (b) [1], he suggests that top positions of important institutions in the Union have never been held by a person from Zanzibar. For instance, he claims that no Zanzibari has ever been a Minister for Foreign Affairs. The fourth argument is presented in (b) [5-9]; where he suggests that top positions in (other) Union institutions have never been held by a person from Zanzibar. For instance, in (b) [5-6], he argues that no person from Zanzibar has ever been Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). Another example is indicated in (b) [7], where he argues that no Zanzibari has ever held the position of Inspector General of Police (IGP). In the last example as presented in (b) [9], he suggests that no person from Zanzibar has ever held the top position (i.e. Governor) of the Bank of Tanzania (BoT). These supporting arguments exhibit argumentation from example. Mr Abdallah's standpoint (and its related argumentation) is summarised in *Table 5.14* below.

Table 5.14 Mr Abdallah's argumentation against the minister's first standpoint

No.	Description
1	The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar is not ideal for Zanzibaris and Tanzanians
1.1a	Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed by Tanganyika
1.1a.1	Zanzibar doesn't enjoy administrative rights in the Union
1.1a.1.1	Zanzibar got only one chance to lead the nation for ten years
(1.1a.1.1')	(Only one former President of Tanzania came from Zanzibar)
1.1a.1.2a	URT has never had a Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Parliament from Zanzibar
(1.1a.1.2a')	(This is a proof that the Union is exploitive and oppressive in nature)
1.1a.1.2b	All Speakers and Deputy Speakers are from Tanganyika
1.1a.1.3	Top positions of important institutions in the Union have never been held by a Zanzibari
1.1a.1.3.1	No person from Zanzibar has ever been a Minister for Foreign Affairs
1.1a.1.4	Top positions of other Union institutions have never been held by a Zanzibari
1.1a.1.4.1	No Zanzibari has ever held the position of CDF in the TPDF
1.1a.1.4.2	No Zanzibari has ever held the position of IGP
1.1a.1.4.3	No Zanzibari has ever been a [Governor] of BoT
1.1a.2	No parliamentary committee has ever conducted its activities in Zanzibar
1.1a.2.1	Section 117 of the Standing Orders stipulates that parliamentary committees shall conduct their activities in Dodoma, Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar
1.1b	We are against this type of exploitation and oppression in the Union
1.1b.1	We want Zanzibar to get its rights according to the law

Mr Khatib Said Haji also puts the minister's standpoints into question in *Extract 5.9* below.

Extract 5.9

- (a) MHE. KHATIB SAID HAJI: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni dhahiri kwamba Muungano wetu umetimiza umri wa miaka 50. [2] Katika kipindi hiki cha uhai Muungano huu tumepitia katika misukosuko mingi iliyotishia uhai wa Muungano. [3] Jambo hili msingi wake mkuu ni malalamiko ya kila upande wa Muungano huo, mfano malalamiko mengi yanayotokea upande wa Zanzibar yanahusu mgawanyo wa mapato na uhuru wa Zanzibar kujiamulia mambo yake. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mfano katika suala la mgawanyo wa mapato yatokanayo na

misaada ya nje kuendelea kuigawia Zanzibar 4.5 ni jambo ambalo linafaa kuangaliwa upya. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, it is clear that our Union is now 50 years old. [2] In this period of its existence, the Union has gone through many agitations that threatened the life of the Union. [3] The core of these problems are the complaints from both parts of the Union; example, many complaints from Zanzibar are about the distribution of revenue and the Zanzibar's autonomy to make decisions on its own matters. [4] Honourable Chairperson, for example, on the matter of the distribution of revenue that comes from external donors, giving Zanzibar 4.5% is something that should be reviewed.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, suala la Balozi za Tanzania nje ya nchi: kumekuwa na malalamiko makubwa upande wa Zanzibar kuhusu uteuzi wa Mabalozizi na wafanyakazi wa Balozi zetu nje ya nchi. [2] Ni kweli kwamba katika Balozi zetu zaidi 50 duniani ni Balozi tatu tu ndizo zinawakilishwa na Wazanzibari, jambo ambalo halileti taswira nzuri ya uwakilishi wa Jamhuri yetu. [3] [H]ivyo naomba tuelezwe vigezo gani vinatumika katika jambo hili linalofanya Zanzibar kupata nafasi 3 kama ilivyo sasa, [4] pia ili kuondoa malalamiko haya, napendekeza angalau nafasi 15 ipewe Zanzibar. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the issue of Tanzanian embassies abroad; there have been a lot of complaints from Zanzibar on the appointment of ambassadors and other workers for our embassies abroad. [2] It is true that in our over 50 embassies in the world, only three embassies have representatives from Zanzibar, something that doesn't present a good image of our United Republic [of Tanzania]. [3] Therefore, I request explanation of the criteria that are used in this matter that bequeaths only three chances for Zanzibar as it is now. [4] Also, in order to address these complaints, I suggest that at least 15 positions be given to Zanzibar.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, pia suala la ushiriki wa Zanzibar katika Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki, kuna mambo kadhaa ambayo Serikali ya Muungano imewakilisha katika Jumuiya hiyo kwa kivuli cha Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, [2] lakini kosa kubwa ni kwamba Serikali ya Muungano imeshindwa kuiwakilisha Zanzibar kwa ukamilifu katika mambo ambayo siyo ya Muungano hivyo kuifanya Zanzibar kukosa uwakilishi katika jumuiya hiyo hali inayopelekea Zanzibar kupoteza fursa adhimu katika masuala kadhaa. [3] Mfano, Wizara ya Kilimo na Chakula ni Wizara isiyo ya Muungano, Wizara ya Biashara na Viwanda siyo ya Muungano na Wizara ya Maliasili na Utalii. [4] Hebu tujiulize linapokuja suala la Kilimo katika Jumuiya hiyo msemaji wake ni nani? [5] Linapokuja suala la utalii mtetezi wa Zanzibar ni nani? [6] Suala la Biashara Afrika Mashariki msemaji wake ni nani. [7] Hili ni tatizo na kasoro kubwa isiyovumilika katika Muungano huo. [8] Hivyo naomba majibu kwa Serikali kuhusu ushiriki wa Zanzibar katika Afrika ya Mashariki kwa masuala ambayo siyo ya Muungano. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, also, regarding the participation of Zanzibar in the East African Community, there are various issues that the URT government has presented in the Community under the umbrella of the United Republic of Tanzania [2] but a big mistake [that is made] is that the Union government has failed to fully represent Zanzibar in non-Union matters, depriving Zanzibar of its important opportunities in some issues. [3] For instance, the Ministry of Food Security, Agriculture and Cooperatives, Ministry of Trade and Industries, and the Ministry of Tourism are non-Union ministries. [4] Let us ask ourselves; when it comes to the issue of agriculture in the Community, who is a spokesperson for Zanzibar? [5] When it comes to tourism, who is an advocate for Zanzibar? [6] Who speaks for Zanzibar in the matters of trade in East Africa? [7] This is a problem and a big shortcoming that cannot be tolerated in this Union. [8] Therefore, I request answers from the government about the participation of Zanzibar in the East African [Community] in non-Union matters.

In this extract, Mr Haji argues that, although the Union has marked 50 years, it has gone through many challenges or problems that threatened the life of the Union, as shown in (a) [1-2]. This

argumentative move suggests that many challenges of the Union have remained unresolved, which raises doubts to the acceptability of the minister's first standpoint. In (a) [3], he argues that these problems include the complaints from Zanzibar regarding the distribution of the Union funds and Zanzibar's autonomy to make decisions about its own matters. As indicated in (a) [4], he suggests that the distribution of the Union's revenue between Tanganyika and Zanzibar is unfair and argues that giving Zanzibar only 4.5% of the Union funds is something that should be reviewed. Another challenge or complaint is about the appointment of ambassadors and other diplomats or workers for Tanzanian embassies abroad, as shown in (b) [1]. In (b) [2], he suggests that the appointment of ambassadors is not fair because, out of more than 50 embassies, Zanzibar represents only three embassies. In (b) [3-4], he wants to know why Zanzibar has only 3 positions and suggests that Zanzibar should be given at least 15 positions, implying giving Zanzibar 15 position will lead to a positive result (pragmatic argumentation). The other challenge is expressed in subextract (c). In (c) [1-2], he argues that Zanzibar is not fully represented in non-Union matters in the East African Community and this deprives it of various opportunities in the Community. In (c) [3-7], he provides examples of three non-Union ministries which represent the URT in the EAC; these are the Ministry of Food Security, Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Ministry of Trade and Industries, and the Ministry of Tourism (argumentation from example). Since these ministries are non-Union ministries, he questions who speaks for Zanzibar in the EAC when issues relating to these ministries are discussed. In (c) [8], he requests answers from the government regarding the participation of Zanzibar in the EAC.

5.3 The opening stage

As in the previous debate, most of the parts constituting the opening stage of the (critical) discussion in this debate are realised rather implicitly. Concerning the material and procedural starting points, both parties are required to abide to the institutional rules of the Tanzanian parliament (the Standing Orders) and democratic principles, as already pointed out in chapter three. Moreover, in this debate, both parties seem to implicitly agree that the Union should continue to exist. What they do not agree upon is the structure of the Union and the manner in which the Union operates, including the coordination of the Union matters by the Vice President's Office.

In regard to the distribution of the discussion roles, it is clear from the confrontation stage that Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan assumes the role of protagonist of the minister's standpoints and the

opposition's spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu, performs the role of antagonist to the minister's standpoints. However, these roles can be exchanged in the argumentation stage because both parties have standpoints to defend. Other members of the opposition also act as antagonists to the minister's standpoints, as observed in the confrontation stage. In the argumentation stage, MPs may take any of the two roles. However, as it is made clear in the next stage, (other) members of the ruling party assume both the role of protagonist of the minister's standpoints and the role of antagonist to the opposition's standpoints, together with the minister. Similarly, (other) members of the opposition perform both the role of antagonist to the minister's standpoints and the role of protagonist of the opposition's standpoints, together with the opposition's spokesperson.

On the basis of the data presented from *Extract 5.1* to *Extract 5.4*, in the opening stage, Mr Lissu and other members of the opposition perform the commissive by challenging Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan (and other members of the government) to defend the minister's standpoints. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the minister is required by the institutional rules to accept the challenge to defend her standpoints as she requests the parliament to approve the proposed budget of the office for the next fiscal year. Both members of the opposition and the minister perform the commissive by implicitly agreeing on the starting points (Standing Orders) and the discussion roles automatically assigned to them. Members of the opposition also perform the directive by requesting various usage declaratives (or argumentation) from the minister, as already suggested in the previous stage.

5.4 The argumentation stage

In this debate, the argumentation stage begins with a few contributions by other members of the ruling party. In these contributions, the MPs respond to various concerns or queries raised by Mr Lissu and other members of the opposition regarding the state of affairs in the current Union. The MPs' contributions to the debate in this stage are analysed in section 5.4.1. This is followed by Ms Hassan's responses as she advances further argumentation for the minister's standpoints, as discussed in section 5.4.2. This stage ends with still further argumentation in the expenditure committee, as analysed in section 5.4.3.

5.4.1 MPs' related contributions in the argumentation stage

Four members of the ruling party respond to the opposition's doubts and criticisms about the acceptability of the minister's standpoints. Two of these MPs are ministers. In *Extract 5.10*, Mr Sereweji attacks what can be described as 'the opposition's evasion' about the benefits of

the Union. He also advances counterarguments against the opposition's arguments as he attempts to defend the minister's first standpoint.

Extract 5.10

- (a) MHE. HAJI JUMA SEREWEJI: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mie huwa nashangazwa sana kwa sababu Kambi ya Upinzani kila wanapokaa hawayatoi mazuri na nashangazwa sana hasa na Wazanzibar hawajui mazuri. [2] Hakuna Mzanzibar hata mmoja katika Kambi ya Upinzani anayeshukuru jambo kubwa sa[n]a ulimwenguni na jambo hili ndilo linalotuletea maendeleo. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni jambo gani basi? [4] Ni umeme. Leo kila mmoja anasema kwamba Muungano hauna maana wakati umeme Zanzibar tunaupata Tanganyika [...]. [5] Kama si Tanganyika tungeshindwa kuchukua ma-generator kutoka Uingereza wala kokote, hayo hawayasemi. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, vilevile hawajataja BoT, jengo kubwa lililojengwa pale. [7] Lingine hawayasema wale vijana wetu wanaondoka Zanzibar kwenda JKT, wanalishwa, wanavishwa, wanapewa mazoezi, hawayasemi! [8] Kila wakikaa hapa wanalaumu tu, mnalaumu nini? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. HAJI JUMA SEREWEJI: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, I am very surprised because the opposition camp never appreciates good things and I am particularly very surprised by the Zanzibari for not knowing the good things [about the Union]. [2] Not a single member of the opposition from Zanzibar is grateful for something very important in the world and this is what brings us development. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, what is it then? [4] It is electricity. Today everyone says that the Union is not worthwhile while Zanzibar gets electricity from Tanganyika [...]. If not Tanganyika, we couldn't afford to get generators from the UK or anywhere [in the world]; they don't say this. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, they also didn't mention the huge BoT building that has been constructed out there. [7] They don't talk about our young people who leave Zanzibar for JKT, they are fed, dressed, and trained; they are not talking about that! [8] They are only complaining whenever they come here; what are you complaining about?

- (b) [1] Nakuja kwenye sherehe ya Muungano. [2] Sherehe hii ya Muungano uzinduzi ulifanyika Zanzibar kilele chake kikafanyika Dar-es-Salaam. [3] Maana ya kilele ni kwamba mambo yote yanapelekwa kunakofanyika kilele. [4] Viongozi wote wa Zanzibar wamekuja pale, viongozi wa Mikoa wamekwenda Dar-es-Salaam, [5] viongozi wa nje wamepitia Nyerere Airport kuja kwenye kiwanja, [6] sasa Zanzibar tupambe tunampambia nani? [7] Kwa hiyo, mkisema hapa msipotoshe wananchi. (Makofi) [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, jambo lingine akasema kwamba Muungano huu kama utakwenda hivi, hatuulindi, hatuudumishi, [9] wewe tunajua hulindi Muungano, hudumishi Muungano lakini wenyewe wapo hapa na majumbani kwetu na Majimboni kwetu, [10] tutaulinda, tutaumarisha kama kawaida, potelea mbali! (Makofi/Kicheko) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Let me talk about the Union's [50th anniversary] celebration. [2] The celebration of the Union was launched in Zanzibar and the climax of the celebration was held in Dar es Salaam. [3] The climax means that everything is brought to where the ceremony is taking place. [4] All leaders from Zanzibar, [and] leaders of regions went to Dar es Salaam. [5] Leaders from abroad also went to Dar es Salaam via the [JK] Nyerere [International] Airport. [6] Now, [you want] Zanzibar to decorate [the roads]; whom are we decorating [the roads] for? [7] So, when you talk here, don't mislead people. (Applause) [8] Honourable Chairperson, he also said that if the Union will continue to be like this, they will neither protect nor maintain it. [9] We know you neither protect nor maintain the Union, but the owners are here, at home and in our constituencies. [10] We will protect and strengthen it as usual, come what may! (Applause/Laughter)

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lingine akasema kwamba Afrika nzima hawajafanya Muungano kama huu, [2] Afrika wamefanya Muungano, [3] Senegal na Gambia walifanya Muungano

lakini wakashindwa [4] halafu Nyasaland na North Rhodesia wakafanya Muungano wakashindwa, [5] sisi leo tumefika miaka 50 tuna Muungano bado tunalalamika? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, he also said that Africa has never had a union like this. [2] Africa has had unions. [3] Senegal and Gambia formed a union, but they later failed. [4] Then, Nyasaland and North Rhodesia formed a union, but they eventually failed. [5] Today our union has marked 50 years and we are still complaining? (Applause)

In this extract, Mr Sereweji argues that members of the opposition have evaded good examples of the benefits of the Union. Specially, in (a) [1-2], he maintains that members of the opposition, especially those from Zanzibar, never appreciate the good things brought by the Union in Zanzibar. In (b) [9-10], Mr Sereweji suggests that the (ordinary) people in the constituencies will continue to protect and maintain or strengthen the Union. This statement is more or less similar to the minister's first standpoint that *1 the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained*, and it will thus be reconstructed as such. Mr Sereweji advances three arguments to support this standpoint.

First, his statements in (a) [1-2] suggest that *1.1 the current Union is good for Zanzibar*, implying that Zanzibar benefits from the existence of the Union in various ways. One of the ways in which Zanzibar benefits from the Union is that *1.1.1 it gets electricity from Tanganyika*, as shown in (a) [3-4], implicitly suggesting that it is because of the Union (*cause*) that Zanzibar gets electricity. In defence of this causal argumentation, in (a) [5], he maintains that, *1.1.1.1 without Tanganyika, Zanzibar couldn't afford to get generators from UK or elsewhere in the world*. In (a) [6], he further argues that *1.1.2 the construction of a huge BoT building in Zanzibar is a consequence of the existence of the Union* (causal argumentation). In (a) [7], he argues that, because of the Union (*cause*), *1.1.3 Zanzibar's youths who join JKT are fed, dressed, and trained* (causal argumentation).

Second, in subextract (b), Mr Sereweji challenges Mr Lissu's argument that there were no signs of celebration in Zanzibar during the week of the Union's 50th anniversary celebration because Zanzibar did not decorate the roads. As a counterargument, in (b) [6], he asks *1.2 whom should Zanzibar decorate (the roads) for?* This argument, which is expressed in a rhetorical question (presentational device), implies that there was no point in decorating the roads (with the images of Nyerere and Karume) because *1.2.1 the climax of the celebration took place in Dar es Salaam*, further implying that the climax of the celebration was not in Zanzibar, as indicated in (b) [2]. In favour of *1.2.1*, in (b) [3], he argues that *1.2.1.1 the climax of the celebration means that everything is brought to where the ceremony takes place*, implying that it was reasonable to decorate roads in Dar es Salaam, and not in Zanzibar. This is further defended by two

arguments. In (b) [4-5], he argues that *1.2.1.1.1 all leaders from Zanzibar and regional leaders went to Dar es salaam*, and that *1.2.1.1.2 all leaders from abroad went to Dar es Salaam*, not to Zanzibar.

Third, in subextract (c), he challenges Mr Lissu's argument that the Union is not ideal because no other countries in Africa have ever formed a union like this. In his counterargument, as expressed in (c) [2-4], Mr Sereweji suggests that *1.3a Africa has had unions which failed*, which is in (c) [5] combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that *1.3b our Union has marked 50 years and we are still complaining?* The implicit premise for *1.3b* suggests that, because other forms of union in Africa have proved failure and because 'our Union' has existed for 50 years, 'our Union' is ideal or in order. This is a typical case of symptomatic argumentation. Mr Sereweji suggests that the failure of other unions in Africa and the fact that the Union has existed for 50 years are the tokens that the Union is ideal and is in order. However, it should be stressed that the failure of other unions in Africa does not necessarily mean that the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar is ideal. Argument *1.3a* is further supported by argumentation from example. In (c) [3-4], he argues that *1.3a.1 Senegal and Gambia formed a union but failed*, and *1.3a.2 Nyasaland and North Rhodesia also formed a union but proved failure*. However, these examples may not be representative, in the sense that the structure of these unions may not necessarily represent the structure of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which is complained about. Mr Sereweji's argumentation in defence of the minister's first standpoint is summarised in **Table 5.15** below.

Table 5.15 Mr Sereweji's argumentation for the minister's first standpoint

No.	Description
1	The Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained
1.1	The Union is good for Zanzibar
(1.1')	(Zanzibar benefits from the Union in various ways)
1.1.1	It gets electricity from Tanganyika
(1.1.1')	(The Union has caused this to happen)
1.1.1.1	Without Tanganyika, Zanzibar couldn't afford to get generators from abroad
1.1.2	It is because of the Union that a huge BoT building was constructed in Zanzibar
(1.1.2')	(This is the result of the Union)
1.1.3	Zanzibar's youths who join JKT are fed, dressed, and trained
(1.1.3')	(This is caused by the Union)
1.2	Whom are we (Zanzibar) decorating the roads for?
(1.2')	(There was no point in decorating the roads with the images of Nyerere and Karume)
1.2.1	The climax of the celebration took place in Dar es Salaam
1.2.1.1	The climax means everything is brought to where the ceremony takes place
(1.2.1.1')	(It was reasonable to decorate roads in Dar es salaam, and not in Zanzibar)
1.2.1.1.1	All leaders from Zanzibar as well as regional leaders went to Dar es Salaam
1.2.1.1.2	All leaders from abroad also went to Dar es Salaam

1.3a	Africa has had unions which failed
1.3a.1	Senegal and Gambia formed a union but failed
1.3a.2	Nyasaland and North Rhodesia formed a union but proved failure
1.3b	Our Union has marked 50 years and we are still complaining?
(1.3b')	(The fact that our Union has existed for 50 years and other forms of union in Africa have failed is a token that our Union is ideal and in order and it should thus be protected)

Further argumentation in defence of the minister's first standpoint is provided in *Extract 5.11*, where another protagonist from Zanzibar suggests that the Union is legitimate and in order.

Extract 5.11

- (a) MHE. MAIDA HAMAD ABDALLAH: [...] [1] Muungano huu siyo kiini macho, [2] Muungano huu ni sahihi, Muungano huu ni halali na uliwekwa sahihi na viongozi wetu wawili na picha zipo, mikutano ipo, [3] hivyo tusipotoshe wananchi. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nathubutu kusema kwamba Muungano huu ni halali. [5] Katika hatua mbalimbali za kuangalia historia ya Muungano huu kwanza kuweka saina makubaliano ya Muungano mwaka 1964, kupitishwa rasmi katika Bunge la Tanganyika na Baraza la Mapinduzi, Hati ya Makubaliano ya Muungano ilipitishwa Karimjee, [6] kuchanganywa udo[n]go amesema Mzee Abeid Aman Karume hakuwepo, [7] angalieni nyuma alikuwepo, [8] picha ipo angalieni vizuri. (Makofi/Kicheko) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)
- HON. MAIDA HAMAD ABDALLAH: [...] [1] *This Union is not a 'magic trick'. [2] This Union is in order; this Union is legitimate, and it was signed by our two leaders, and pictures are available, and the meetings were held. [3] Let us not mislead people. [4] Honourable Chairperson, I dare to say that this Union is legitimate. [5] If you look at various stages in the history of the Union, first, the Articles of the Union were signed in 1964, and then they were officially approved by the parliament of Tanganyika and the Revolutionary Council [of Zanzibar]; the Articles of the Union were approved at Karimjee. [6] He said in the soil-mixing exercise Mzee Abeid Amani Karume was not there. [7] Take a [closer] look at the back [of the photo], he was there. [8] The picture is there; just look carefully at it. (Applause/Laughter)*
- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, walioshiriki katika kuchanganya udongo ule kwanza ni mwananchi kutoka Zanzibar na mwananchi kutoka Tanzania Bara na wale waliokamata chungu ni Tanzania Bara na Zanzibar. [2] Baada ya kuchanganya udongo ule kulifanyika sherehe rasmi ambapo mgeni rasmi alikuwa Mwalimu Nyerere na Mzee Abeid Karume siku hiyohiyo. [3] Walikuwa ni wageni rasmi na kuhudhuriwa na wananchi mbalimbali kutoka pande zote za Muungano. [4] Muungano huu siyo sahihi kweli? Hapana! (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, eti Muungano huu haujulikani kimataifa, hivi sisi ni nchi gani? [7] Kwa sababu kimataifa tunajulikana kama The United Republic of Tanzania, [8] kwa hiyo ni nchi gani [9] tupeni jina basi, [10] msipotoshe wananchi. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)
- [1] *Honourable Chairperson, those who participated in the soil-mixing exercise were a citizen from Mainland Tanzania and another one from Zanzibar, and those who held the pot are [also] from Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. [2] After mixing the soil, on the same day there was a formal ceremony where the guests of honour were Mwalimu Nyerere and Mzee Abeid Karume. [3] They were the guests of honour and the ceremony was attended by various people from both parts of the Union. [4] [And you say] this Union is not in order? [5] No way! (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, [he also says] that this Union is not recognized internationally; what is [the name of] our country? [7] Internationally, we are recognized as the United Republic of Tanzania. [8] So, what is the name of our country? [9] Give us a name then! [10] Don't mislead people. (Applause)*

In this extract, Ms Abdallah criticises both Mr Lissu's argument that the legitimacy of the Union is questionable and his argument that the Union is a 'magic trick'. She argues that the

Union is legitimate and in order. This is expressed in (a) [1-4]. Ms Abdallah advances two counterarguments against Mr Lissu's arguments as she attempts to support her substandpoint. In (a) [5], her statements suggest that both member states were fully involved at various stages in the formation of the Union. First, the Articles of the Union were signed in 1964 by both Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanganyika and Sheikh Karume of Zanzibar. Second, the Articles of the Union were approved by both the Parliament of Tanganyika and the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar. Third, she argues in (b) [1] that the soil-mixing exercise involved people from both Tanganyika and Zanzibar. In (a) [6-8], she adds that Sheikh Karume is also seen in the image taken during the soil-mixing exercise (as displayed by TBC). This argument is a counterargument against Mr Lissu's argument that Karume is not seen in the image displayed by TBC. Fourth, she argues in (b) [2-3] that the formal ceremony after the soil-mixing exercise was attended by people from both Tanganyika and Zanzibar, where Mwalimu Nyerere and Sheikh Karume were the guests of honour. This argument ends with a rhetorical question in (b) [4], where she asks whether it is indeed true this Union is not in order. With all these 'facts', she wonders how someone could question the legitimacy of the Union. It is implied in (b) [5] that the Union is indeed in order and legitimate. Another argument as proof of this substandpoint is advanced in (b) [6-10], where she maintains that Tanzania is recognized internationally as the United Republic of Tanzania. However, Mr Lissu did not question whether the country is recognized internationally as the 'United Republic of Tanzania' but whether this type of Union has ever existed elsewhere in Africa or around the globe. Thus, Ms Abdallah's argumentative move in this counterargument may constitute a (deliberate) misinterpretation or manipulation of the propositional content of Mr Lissu's original argument. In terms of the argumentation schemes, Ms Abdallah's arguments for her substandpoint exhibit mainly argumentation from narrative of life experience and as well as authority argumentation. Ms Abdallah's substandpoint, which is considered to be a further argumentation for the minister's first standpoint, is summarised in *Table 5.16* below.

Table 5.16 Ms Abdallah's argumentation for the minister's first standpoint

No.	Description
(1)	(The Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained)
(1.1)	The Union is legitimate and in order
(1.1.1)	Both member states were fully involved at various stages in the formation of the Union
(1.1.1.1)	The Articles of the Union were signed by both Nyerere and Karume in 1964
(1.1.1.2)	The Articles of the Union were approved by the Parliament of Tanganyika and the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar
(1.1.1.3)	The soil-mixing exercise involved people from both Tanganyika and Zanzibar
(1.1.1.4a)	The formal ceremony was attended by people from both Tanganyika and Zanzibar
(1.1.1.4b)	Nyerere and Karume attended the ceremony as the guests of honour

(1.)1.2	Tanzania is recognised internationally as the United Republic of Tanzania
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In *Extract 5.12*, the Deputy Finance Minister defends the minister's second standpoint by attacking the arguments raised by members of the opposition, particularly Mr Tundu Lissu and other members of the opposition from Zanzibar.

Extract 5.12

- (a) NAIBU WAZIRI WA FEDHA (MHE. MWIGULU L. N. MADELU): [...] Nianze tu kwa kusema kwamba mimi nimesimama kuweka kumbukumbu sawa. [2] Ni kwamba fedha ambazo Zanzibar wanastahili kupata miaka yote wamekuwa wakipata kama inavyostahili. [3] Kinachowachanganya watu ni kimoja na nilishasema mara nyingi sana jambo kama hulijui ni vema sana ukaulizia ili ulijue. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, zinapokuja fedha za misaada kwanza wafadhili huwa wanatoa commitment, huwa wanaahidi, wanapoahidi tunaweza tukatenga hesabu ya 4.5 kutokana na ahadi lakini fedha watakazozipata zitatokana na fedha tutakazozipata. [5] Kwa hiyo, utaratibu ni huo tu. [6] Sasa kama hivi ambavyo ilikuwa inasomwa hapa kwamba ilitakiwa ipatikane bilioni 32 na hazikupatikana, fedha ambayo ilishapatikana tumetafuta uwiano wa 4.5 ya fedha tulizopata ndiyo tukazipeleka Zanzibar. [7] Mimi nadhani ni vizuri sana kuwa na utaratibu wa kuwapa Wabunge takwimu hizi ili wawe wanazijua kwa sababu wanawapotosha sana wananchi ambao hawana muda wa kupata takwimu za aina hii. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FINANCE (HON. MWIGULU L. N. MADELU): [...] [1] Let me start by saying that I have stood up to put the records clear.[2] Zanzibar has been receiving all the funds that it deserves. [3] What confuses people is one thing, and I've said this many times; if you don't know something, you better ask so that you know it. [4] Honourable Chairperson, when it comes to General Budget Support, first of all, the donors normally give commitment and we allocate the 4.5% of the fund based on the donors' commitment, but the actual fund that they receive is determined by the amount of money we have received. [5] So, that is the procedure. [6] For instance, it was read that Zanzibar was supposed to get 32 billion shillings, but they did not; we calculated 4.5% of the actual fund we received and provided it to Zanzibar. [7] I think it is a good [thing] to give Honourable MPs these statistics because they mislead people who have no time to refer to the statistics of this kind. (Applause)

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini mambo mengine pia niwashauri ndugu zangu wa Zanzibar kuweni na muda basi wa kuuliza hata viongozi wenu, msiwe mnakuja kusemea hapa mambo yote. [2] Mna ofisi yenu ya Wizara ya Fedha kulekule, mambo yanayohusu uchumi ulizeni mjue kuliko kuja kupandikiza chuki hapa. [3] Gharama ya kupandikiza chuki hizi ni kubwa mno. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, jambo lingine niwaambie tu kwamba haya anayosema leo Lissu mnaweza mkadhania anawapenda kumbe hizi ni jitihada baada ya kuona chuki aliyokuwa anaipandikiza Tanzania Bara haijaweza kuwa na mashiko akaamua ahamie kwenu. (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mwaka jana Mheshimiwa Lissu alisema kero za Muungano si mali binafsi ya Wazanzibar. [6] Nasoma Hansard ukurasa wa 113, alisema kero za Muungano si mali binafsi ya Wazanzibar, Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar pekee na anasema hata Watanganyika wanakerwa na ubaguzi unaendeshwa dhidi yao na Wanzibar [...]. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to advise my fellow MPs from Zanzibar to take time to ask your leaders these questions; this is not the place to ask every question. [2] You have an office of the Ministry of Finance in Zanzibar; ask this ministry questions relating to economy instead of coming here to instil hate. [3] The cost of instilling this kind of hate in people is too high. [4] Honourable Chairperson, another thing that I would like to tell you is that Lissu doesn't say this because he loves you; these are his efforts [to divide us] after he failed to do the same thing in Mainland Tanzania, and now he decided to come to you. (Applause) [5] Honourable Chairperson, last year, Honourable Lissu said that the challenges of Union are

not the private properties of the Zanzibari. [6] I am reading the Hansard [transcripts], page 113; he said the challenges of the Union are not the private properties of the Zanzibaris, [or] the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, and he says that even Tanganyikans are irritated by the discrimination done against them by the Zanzibaris [...].

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, leo anasema Watanzania Bara hawahawa ndiyo wanawanyasya wale kule kwamba ndiyo wanawanyonya. [2] Kwa kweli wakati mwingine huwa naona aibu kweli kwamba na Lissu naye katokea Singida kulekule nilikotokea. (Kicheko) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, leo hii anakuja mtu yuleyule anasema Zanzibar imeibiwa kwa kipindi chote hiki anasema huu ni ukoloni uliofanywa [...]. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mimi niwaombe Watanzania tusije tukaingia kwenye uchochezi wa aina hii. [5] Sasa unaongelea tu kwamba Zanzibar inadai, Zanzibar inadai, hivi takwimu hizo kwanza wewe umezitoa wapi? [6] Hivi unajua kwenye mchango wa kuanzisha Benki Kuu Tanzania Bara imechangia kiasi gani na Zanzibar imechangia kiasi gani? [7] Hivi unajua Uwanja wa Ndege ule pale unaojengwa wa Zanzibar fedha za mikopo zilizokopwa kwa kofia ya Muungano na zinalipwa kwa kofia ya Muungano unajua ni kiasi gani? [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, niwaombe Watanzania changamoto mara zote Taifa linapokuwa hai zinakuwepo palepale ndiyo maana tunahangaika kuzishughulikia. [9] Mnahangaika na mambo yaliyopita, wenzenu tuliyo na dhamana tuliona tumeshapata fursa ya kutengeneza Katiba tuweze kuwa na jawabu la kudumu kwenye jambo hili. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, today he says that Tanganyikans are oppressing and exploiting [Zanzibaris]. [2] Sometimes I feel ashamed that Lissu also comes from Singida, the same place I come from. [3] Honourable Chairperson, today the same person says that [Tanganyika] has been stealing from Zanzibar for the whole period [of the Union] and says that this is colonialism. [4] Honourable Chairperson, I urge Tanzanians not to be manipulated by this kind of provocation/sedition. [5] Now you are just saying Zanzibar has claims, Zanzibar has claims, where did you get those statistics in the first place? [6] Do you know how much money Mainland Tanzania has contributed, and the amount of money contributed by Zanzibar, to the establishment of the Bank of Tanzania? [7] Do you know the amount of money that has been borrowed under the umbrella of the Union for the on-going construction of the Airport in Zanzibar? [8] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to tell Tanzanians that challenges will always be there as long as a nation exists; and that is why we are struggling to address them. [9] You are talking about things of the past but we who have the power saw that the constitution-making process was an opportunity for having a long-term solution to these problems.

- (d) [1] Tulishasema hivyo kwamba kama ni mkopo, kama ni misaada kila nchi ina GDP yake. [2] Kwa hiyo, kila mmoja atapiga hesabu ana kiwango gani anachoweza kukopa, atakopa na atalipa deni. [3] Wenzetu walipoona tunaanza kujadili mambo ya wananchi kwa sababu hawana hoja za wananchi wakatoka nje. [4] Leo mnakuja kwa kisirisiri tena kuturudisha kwenye mambo mengine ambayo sisi tulishapita. [5] Nyie wenzetu wa Zanzibar, mimi niwaambieni jambo la Muungano mnatakiwa muelewe vizuri sana [6] tena sijui niseme Kiingereza, you cannot eat the whole cake and have it. [7] Hauwezi ukawa na mamlaka kamili na ukawa na Muungano, hayaendi pamoja. [8] Mnakuja hapa mnaongea halafu tukitangaza Bunge linakuja hapa mnakuja kwa furaha, sasa Mnyaa unakuja kufanya nini hapa? (Makofi) [9] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hotuba iliyotolewa na Waziri na Waziri atajibu, ina mambo ya msingi inayofafanua lakini ina mipango mizuri ambayo itasaidia kuondokana na mambo haya ambayo yamedumu kwa muda mrefu [...]. [10] Ni vyema tukakaa mezani kwa fursa ambazo zinatolewa tukajadili mambo haya kwa sababu haya mnayoyasema nyie ni mambo ambayo hata hamjapata uhakika wake. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] We already said that, when it comes to loans or grants, each member state has its own GDP. [2] So, this will determine its capacity for requesting and repaying loans. [3] However, when our fellow MPs found that we were going to discuss issues that concern people, and since they don't have an agenda for the people, they ran away. [4] Today you secretly come back to take us back to where we have already passed. [5] Our fellow MPs from Zanzibar, let me tell

you that you need to understand the Union very well. [6] Maybe I should say this in English; you cannot eat the whole cake and have it. [7] You cannot have a sovereign state and still have the Union; they don't go together. [8] You come here and talk, but when the parliament starts, you happily come to attend; Mnyaa, what do you come to do here [if you want a sovereign state]? (Applause) [9] Honourable Chairperson, the speech presented by the Minister [of State], and the minister will respond to [the issues/queries raised], has a clear basis for good plans that will help to overcome these long-term issues [...]. [10] The best thing is to sit on the table for opportunities that are presented and discussed these things because you are talking about things of which you are not sure.

In this extract, the Deputy Finance Minister offers a usage declarative as he attempts to clarify how Zanzibar benefits from the Union in terms of GBS, as shown in (a) [1]. In (a) [2], he refutes Mr Lissu's argument that 'Zanzibar does not receive its rightful dividend of GBS', arguing that Zanzibar has been receiving the fund it deserves. In (a) [3], he accuses members of the opposition of insufficient knowledge and understanding of the amount of money that goes to Zanzibar. This realises an accusation of incompetence (or ignorance), which can also be perceived as an insult to someone's intellectual ability. He maintains that there is a difference between the amount of GBS that the donors commit themselves to provide and the amount of money that is actually provided. According to him, what goes to Zanzibar is 4.5% of the provided GBS, and not 4.5% of the GBS that donors promise to provide. This is advanced in (a) [4-5]. For instance, as indicated in (a) [6], Zanzibar was supposed to receive TZS 32 billion of the GBS but received less than that based on the fund that was released. In (a) [7], he advises that, because members (of the opposition) 'do not know these things very well', they should be given the statistics so that they have the correct information instead of misleading the public. He also advises MPs from Zanzibar to ask for the correct information from the office of the Ministry of Finance in Zanzibar instead of asking about everything in the parliament and instil hate among Tanzanians, because the cost of this hate speech is too high, as indicated in (b) [1-3].

In (b) [4-6] and in subextract (c), the deputy minister accuses Mr Lissu of an inconsistency as well as misleading and dividing Tanzanians. In (b) [4], Mr Madellu suggests that Mr Lissu does not say Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed by Tanganyika because he loves Zanzibaris; but he says that in order to divide the two parts of the Union. In (b) [5-6], he maintains that Mr Lissu is inconsistent because last year he said that Zanzibar is discriminating Tanganyikans and this was recorded in the Hansard (authority argumentation by quotation). In this argumentative move, Mr Madellu reminds Mr Lissu of how his past position regarding the subject matter is in conflict with his present one as an attempt to silence Mr Lissu or to shift the burden of proof from the minister to Mr Lissu. This argumentative move also realises a

circumstantial *ad hominem*. He further argues that this year the same person says that Tanganyika is exploiting and oppressing Zanzibar, implying that Mr Lissu is inconsistent and cannot be trusted, as indicated in (c) [1] and (c) [3]. As revealed in the expenditure committee, Mr Madellu's attempt to silence Mr Lissu with an accusation of inconsistency is unsuccessful.

In (c) [2], Mr Madellu states that he feels ashamed that Tundu Lissu and himself come from the same place. This exhibits direct personal attack. In (c) [4], Mr Madellu suggests that Mr Lissu's claim that Zanzibar is exploited (and oppressed) is not supported with authentic evidence and he wonders where Mr Lissu gets the statistics from. He doubts whether Mr Lissu has any clue regarding the contribution of Mainland Tanzania (compared to the contribution of Zanzibar) to the establishment of the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) and whether he knows that all the money for the construction of the airport in Zanzibar was borrowed and is repaid under the umbrella of the URT government, as presented in (c) [5-6].

In (c) [7], the deputy minister admits that there are (a few) challenges facing the Union but maintains that the government has been working hard to address them (justification). The opportunity to write a new constitution, according to this minister, is/was the best way to have a permanent solution to these challenges, as shown in (c) [8]. In (d) [1-2], Mr Madellu suggests that the proposed draft constitution stipulates that, based on its GDP, every member state will request and repay loans by considering its capacity to repay. However, as he further maintains, the opposition ran away from discussing people's issues and now they secretly want to take them back to the subject, as indicated in (d) [3-4]. In (d) [5-7], he suggests that members (of the opposition) from Zanzibar should understand the Union very well because 'they can't eat the whole cake and have it'. The English saying *you can't eat your cake and have it* is used as a presentational device to emphasise that Zanzibar cannot have full autonomy and still be in the Union, and it thus strengthens Mr Madellu's argumentation. In (d) [8], he accuses Zanzibar MPs of inconsistency; while they complain about being exploited and oppressed, they still attend the sessions of the Union parliament in Dodoma. In (d) [9-10], he argues that the Minister of State (Union) has better plans to address the challenges of the Union and urges MPs to sit down and discuss together how best to solve the challenges. Based on these argumentative moves, Mr Madellu's counter argumentation to the opposition's second standpoint is summarised in *Table 5.17*.

Table 5.17 Mr Madellu's argumentation against the opposition's second standpoint

No.	Description
(1)	(Zanzibar is not exploited or oppressed by Tanganyika)

(1.)1	It has been receiving its rightful dividend of GBS
(1.)1.1	It has been receiving 4.5% of the provided GBS
(1.)2	The information provided by Mr Lissu is incorrect and misleading
(1.)2.1	Mr Lissu is trying to divide Tanzanians
(1.)2.2	Mr Lissu is inconsistent in his remarks
(1.2.2')	(He cannot be trusted)
(1.)2.2.1a	Last year he said that Tanganyikans are discriminated by Zanzibari
(1.)2.2.1b	This year he says that Tanganyika is exploiting and oppressing Zanzibar
(1.)3a	There are [a few] challenges facing the Union
(1.3a')	(Having these challenges doesn't mean that Zanzibar is being exploited or oppressed)
(1.)3b	The government is working hard to address them
(1)3b.1	It has set good plans to meet the challenges
(1.)4	Zanzibar benefits from the Union
(1.)4.1	The money for the airport construction in Zanzibar was requested and is repaid under the umbrella of the Union

In *Extract 5.13*, the Finance Minister, Ms Saada Mkuya, also responds to the issues or queries raised by Mr Lissu.

Extract 5.13

- (a) WAZIRI WA FEDHA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mimi tu kwa kuendeleza nataka kutoa ufafanuzi wa taarifa hii ambayo imetolewa hapa na naweza kukiri kwamba kuna mambo mengi sana yamechanganywa bila kujua ukweli wake hasa ukoje. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kulikuwa kuna eneo ambalo Mheshimiwa Tundu Lissu aki-recall maelezo yangu ambayo nilikuwa nimeyatoa kupendekeza mfumo wa mapato na matumizi wa Serikali kwa mwaka 2014/2015 kwa Wabunge tarehe 30 Aprili. [3] Alini-quote nikisema kwamba mapato halisi ya Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano yanayotokana na misaada na mikopo nafuu ya nje, ilikuwa ni shilingi trilioni 1.16 Zanzibar yeye anavyoona ingepata asilimia 4.5 ya mapato hayo. [4] Vilevile ana-quote kuhusiana na issue ya misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwanza nataka kuweka sawa. [6] Misaada na mikopo nafuu ya nje (concession loans) ni tofauti na misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti. [7] Hizi ni concept mbili tofauti. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER FOR FINANCE: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, as a continuation [of the government's argumentation], I just want to explain the information that has been provided here and I can say that there are so many things that have been messed up without knowing the truth of the matter. [2] Honourable Chairperson, there was an area in which Honourable Tundu Lissu recalled the statement I made to the MPs on 30th April regarding the proposed government's revenue and expenditure for the 2014/15 [fiscal] year. [3] He quoted me as saying that the actual revenue of the United Republic of Tanzania from grants and concession loans from external [donors] was 1.16 trillion and he thinks that Zanzibar should have received 4.5% of the revenue. [4] He also quoted me talking about General Budget Support (GBS). [5] Honourable Chairperson, first of all, I would like to put things right.[6] Grants and concession loans are different from GBS. [7] These are two different concepts.

- (b) [1] Sasa ukija kwenye misaada na mikopo nafuu (concession loans) na siyo misaada ni concession loans, Zanzibar inaweza ku-access yenyewe. [2] Juzi tumesikia Waziri wa Fedha akitangaza bajeti ya bilioni 750 na almost asilimia 50 inatokana na vyanzo hivi vya nje, ni kwamba mle ndani mna misaada lakini vilevile mna mikopo ambayo Zanzibar imepata. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, upande wa Sheria, Zanzibar inaweza ika-access misaada asilimia 100, misaada ile ambayo inakwenda kwenye projects na [4] upande wa mikopo kinachotakiwa tu kwa Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ni kufanya ufafanuzi kwenye Kamati yetu ya madeni ambayo Zanzibar pia kuna member wake pale akiwemo Katibu Mkuu, Wizara ya Fedha

na Mhasibu Mkuu wa Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar na tunakuwepo wote pale, [5] tunachanganua na once ikishakuwa cleared, the whole amount ambayo Zanzibar ilikuwa ikihitaji inapelekwa. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, hiyo ni concept ya concession loans na haiingii kwenye asilimia 4.5, hapana! [7] Kuna miradi chungu nzima ambayo imepitia utaratibu huo, mwenzangu Naibu Waziri ameshaeleza. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *Regarding grants and concession loans, and they are not [called] grants but concession loans, Zanzibar can access these loans on its own. [2] We heard in the past few days the Finance Minister [of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar] presenting a proposed budget of 750 billion shillings and almost half of it comes from these external sources; in that budget, there are grants and loans that Zanzibar received. [3] Honourable Chairperson, according to the law, Zanzibar can access these grants 100%, grants which are directed to projects. [4] As for the loans, the United Republic [of Tanzania] is only required to explain this to the loans committee in which Zanzibar is represented by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and the Chief Accountant of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. [5] After evaluating the request, the whole amount requested by Zanzibar is provided. [6] Honourable Chairperson, this is the concept of concession loans which is not included in the 4.5%! [7] There are numerous projects which have been funded through this procedure as explained by the deputy minister.*

- (c) [1] EXIM Bank imepitia utaratibu huo, miradi ya barabara imepitia utaratibu huo [2] lakini kwa upande wa grant kwa pamoja tulifanya miradi ya MCC ambapo barabara tano za Pemba tumefungua juzi pamoja na underline cable ambayo imetoka Dar es Salaam kwenda Zanzibar zote tumepitia utaratibu huo. [3] Kwa hiyo, kwa upande wa misaada Zanzibar inaweza ika-access lakini kwa upande wa mikopo tunafanya kazi sote kwa pamoja. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini kwenye General Budget Support, upande wa General Budget Support kinachokwenda asilimia 4.5 kwa Zanzibar ni ile earmarked GBS [5] yaani hizi concept, [...] [6] tukae labda tuelezane kuliko kuwa tunatoa taarifa ambazo hazikufanyiwa uchunguzi. [7] Kinachokwenda Zanzibar kwenye General Budget Support ni an earmarked grant yaani ni misaada ambayo haiko kisekta lakini vilevile an earmarked loans na mikopo ambayo haijamaanishwa kwenye kisekta yaani general tu inakwenda 4.5. [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kinachogomba hapa pengine na ndiyo maana tunaweka basis ya taarifa zetu ni kwamba commitment ni tofauti na disbursement. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *EXIM Bank and road construction projects have been implemented through this procedure. [2] Regarding grants, we jointly implemented MCC projects, where we inaugurated five roads in Pemba as well as the underline cable from Dar es Salaam to Zanzibar. [3] Therefore, as for grants, Zanzibar can access them but for the loans we work together. (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, as for General Budget Support (GBS), the 4.5% [of GBS] which goes to Zanzibar is the [un] earmarked GBS. [5] These concepts [can be confusing]. [6] We should sit down and educate one another [on these concepts], instead of producing ungrounded information. [7] What goes to Zanzibar as GBS is the unearmarked grants, meaning non-sectorial grants and unearmarked loans which are non-sectorial, just general; 4.5% goes [to Zanzibar]. [8] Honourable Chairperson, the problem here, and that is why we put it as the basis of our report, is that commitment is different from [actual] disbursement.*

- (d) [1] Commitment akija donor akisema mimi mwaka huu natoa trilion 1, haimaanishi ile ndiyo 4.5 ndiyo itakwenda Zanzibar. Mpaka leo hivi tunavyozungumza kuna baadhi ya donors hawajatoa pesa zao. [3] Kuna wengine watatoa mwakani Julai. [4] Kwa hiyo, ikiwa portion ya Zanzibar tunahakikisha kwamba tunaisimamia, tunaipeleka. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, mimi sielewi kwa nini inachukuliwa hivi kijumla lakini pengine ni katika utaratibu mzima wa kisiasa kupotosha taarifa lakini taarifa zipo na tunazisimamia. [6] Ukweli wenyewe upo. (Makofi) [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, leo tukisema deni la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania maana yake ni pamoja na mikopo iliyochukuliwa kwa niaba ya Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar. [8] Kuna miradi chungu nzima pale. [9] Kuna miradi ambayo tunadaiwa *African Development Bank*. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] When donors come and commit themselves to provide TZS 1 trillion, it doesn't mean that the 4.5% that goes to Zanzibar comes from the TZS 1 trillion. [2] As we speak today, some donors haven't released their funds. [3] Some of them will release [the funds] next year in July. [4] So, if it is Zanzibar's portion, we make sure we send it to them. [5] Honourable Chairperson, so, I don't know why people wrongly generalise things; maybe it is a common practice of politicians to distort information, but we have the [correct] information and we work on it. [6] The truth is there. (Applause) [7] Honourable Chairperson, when we talk about the debt of the United Republic of Tanzania, it includes loans borrowed on behalf of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. [8] There are so many projects there. [9] There are projects for which we owe the African Development Bank.

(e) MBUNGE FULANI: [1] Figure!

WAZIRI WA FEDHA: [2] Figure ninazo siyo lazima, [3] nikianza kuzitaja hapa mwezi mzima tunaweza kumaliza lakini mimi ndiye ninayedhamini. [4] Zanzibar hawalipi, hakuna deni ambalo mpaka sasa Zanzibar imelipa. [5] Hiyo ukiambiwa 27 trillion au deni la external ambalo linafikia around 24 trillion ni pamoja na mikopo ambayo imechukuliwa kwa niaba ya Serikali ya Mapinduzi ya Zanzibar. [6] Leo deni lile ambalo tunajenga airport kutokana na mkopo wa EXIM Bank amount yote imekwenda Zanzibar. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

A CERTAIN MP: [1] Figure!

MINISTER FOR FINANCE: [2] I have the figures, but it is not necessary [to provide them here]. [3] If I start providing the figures, it can take a month to finish them; but I am the guarantor. [4] Zanzibar doesn't repay [the loans]; Zanzibar has never repaid a single loan. [5] So, when you are told that the debt is [TZS] 27 trillion, or the external one which is [TZS] 24 trillion, that includes loans taken on behalf of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. [6] The whole amount of the loans from EXIM Bank for the airport construction went to Zanzibar.

In this extract, the Finance Minister provides 'further clarification' (usage declarative) about GBS and other types of external grants and loans. In subextract (a), the minister accuses Mr Lissu of misquotation and misrepresentation (distortion) of the official information/statistics. Specifically, in (a) [3], she argues that Mr Lissu said that, according to her statement, the total government's revenue from external donors' grants and concession loans amounted to TZS 1.16 trillion in the previous fiscal year and, according to him, Zanzibar should have received 4.5% of this fund. Because the minister thinks that Mr Lissu is misrepresenting her statements on the budget statistics, she performs a usage declarative in (a) [6-7]. She argues that grants and concession loans are different from GBS and maintains that these are two different concepts.

Responding to Mr Lissu's claim that Zanzibar cannot access external grants and loans without the permission of the URT's Ministry of Finance (which he describes as the Tanganyika's Ministry of Finance), Ms Mkuya argues in (b) [1] that Zanzibar can actually access the grants and concession loans on its own. For instance, almost 50% of the Zanzibar's proposed budget of TZS 750 billion is from the external sources (authority argumentation from statistics), as indicated in (b) [2]. In (b) [3], she further maintains that Zanzibar can access grants for its projects by 100%. This is also indicated in (c) [3]. Regarding the concession loans requested

by Zanzibar from external donors, what the URT government does, she says, is only to ‘explain this request’ to the loans committee before it is approved. She further states that, once cleared, the whole amount of loans requested by Zanzibar is given to Zanzibar. This is advanced in (b) [5-6]. In this argumentative move, she seems to suggest that giving explanation of the requested loans by Zanzibar is not seeking permission from the URT government, as suggested by Mr Lissu. However, this can be considered as a proof that Zanzibar does not access the loans directly without ‘requesting for permission’ from the URT’s Ministry of Finance. The fact that URT government has to give explanation to the loans committee before Zanzibar’s request is processed does not necessarily refute Mr Lissu’s claim that Zanzibar cannot access the loans without permission from Tanganyika. In (b) [6], Ms Mkuya further suggests that Zanzibar does not receive 4.5% of the concession loans because it can access them on its own or by working together with the URT. In (b) [7] and (c) [1-2], she maintains that different projects in Zanzibar have been implemented through this procedure, including the Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) projects for the construction of roads in Zanzibar and the project for the underline cable from Dar es Salaam to Zanzibar. Although, in his argumentation, Mr Lissu does not claim that Zanzibar should receive 4.5% of the grants and concession loans from external donors, he claims that Zanzibar receives nothing from non-GBS fund. Therefore, Ms Mkuya’s argument is a counterargument against Mr Lissu’s claim; Ms Mkuya argues that Zanzibar does actually receive non-GBS fund on its own.

Regarding the Zanzibar’s dividend of GBS, she argues that what goes to Zanzibar is 4.5% of the unearmarked GBS, not the total amount of GBS, as indicated in (c) [4]-7]. To further attack Mr Lissu’s argumentation, in (c) [8], Ms Mkuya argues that donors’ commitment is different from actual disbursement. This argument was also advanced by her deputy minister. In (d) [1-4], she argues that Zanzibar receives its 4.5% dividend based on the disbursed GBS, not the amount of GBS that the donors commit themselves to provide. In (d) [5-6], she accuses the opposition of distorting the government’s information for political interests (personal attack).

Responding to the request for compensation of Zanzibar due to the national debt, as suggested by Mr Mnyaa, in (d) [7], Ms Mkuya argues that the national debt includes the loans requested by the URT government on behalf of Zanzibar, maintaining in (d) [8] that there are various projects financed through this procedure, and that the URT government still owes the African Development Bank (ADB). In (e) [1], an MP requests the figures of these loans and projects but in (e) [2] the minister evades providing such figures, arguing that it will take a lot of time to provide the figures (overt evasion) but she is the guarantor of these loans, as indicated in (e)

[3]. In this argumentative move, Ms Mkuya provides a personal guarantee of the rightness of her argument, appealing to her position as the Finance Minister (authority argumentation). In (e) [4], she insists that Zanzibar does not repay the loans but the debt of TZS 27 trillion or the national external debt of TZS 24 trillion includes the loans taken by the URT on behalf of RGZ for different projects in Zanzibar, such as the airport construction in Zanzibar, as described in (e) [5-6]. Ms Mkuya's argumentation against the opposition's second standpoint is summarised in *Table 5.18*.

Table 5.18 Ms Mkuya's argumentation against the opposition's second standpoint

No.	Description
(1.)	(Zanzibar is not exploited or oppressed by Tanganyika)
(1.)1	Zanzibar has been receiving its rightful dividend of GBS
(1.)1.1a	It receives 4.5% of the unearmarked GBS
(1.)1.1b	It receives 4.5% of the disbursed GBS
(1.)2	It can access external grants and concessions loans on its own
(1.)2.1	50% of its proposed budget of TZS 750 billion is from external sources
(1.)2.2	Zanzibar's projects are financed through the grants and loans requested by RGZ
(1.)2.2.1	Five roads were constructed in Pemba under MCC projects
(1.)2.2.2	The underline cable project was successfully implemented
(1.)2.2.3	The airport construction is financed by the loans from EXIM Bank
(1.)3	The opposition is distorting the information of the fund that Zanzibar deserves to receive
(1.)3.1	Zanzibar doesn't receive 4.5% of grants and concession loans
(1.)4a	The national debt includes the loans requested by URT on behalf of Zanzibar
(1.)4b	Zanzibar doesn't repay the national debt
(1.4b')	(There is no compensation for Zanzibar)

5.4.3 Responses by the Minister of State (Union)

In *Extract 5.14*, the Minister of State – Vice President's Office (Union), Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan, responds to various issues raised by members of the opposition, especially those that the Finance Ministers did not address.

Extract 5.14

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kabla sijaendelea labda niseme kwamba nilichowasilisha hapa ni utekelezaji wa bajeti ya mwaka 2013/2014 na maombi ya fedha ya kwaka 2014/2015. [2] Sikuwasilisha mjadala unaohusu Muungano au Katiba ya nchi. [3] Kwa hiyo yaliyofukuka, yaliyochimbuka inaonesha kwamba ni ile theory ya mjamzito anapoamua kula udongo au mkaa ni kwa sababu ana upungufu wa madini yanayopatikana kule na mwili unamtuambia afanye hivyo. [4] Kwa hiyo yaliyoibuka hapa inaonesha wazi kwamba Waheshimiwa Wabunge wana hamu ya mjadala wa aina hii. [5] Sasa mwezi wa nane Waheshimiwa hauko mbali, naomba wote tuwepo huko ili tuendelee na mjadala huu. (Applause) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba sasa niingie katika maoni na ushauri wa Msemaji wa Kambi ya Upinzani. [7] Lakini niseme kwamba yale yote ambayo yalihatiji majawabu na hasa yanayohusu mambo ya fedha, kiasi cha fedha kinachoingia Tanzania, mgawo wa Zanzibar, aina ya mgawo Zanzibar wanapata. [8] Niwashukuru sana Waziri wa Fedha na Naibu Waziri wa Fedha kwa kutoa majawabu hayo. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, before I continue, I would like to say that what I presented here is the implementation of the 2013/14 budget and request for funds for 2014/2015 fiscal year.

[2] *I didn't present anything about the Union or the national constitution. [3] So, what has been raised here is just like the theory of a pregnant woman; when she eats soil or charcoal, it is because she has deficiency of such kind of minerals found in such stuffs and because of that her body tells her to do that. [4] Therefore, what has been raised here indicates that Honourable MPs would like to have this kind of debate. [5] Now, August is not very far, you should all be there to continue this debate. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, I would now like to respond to the views and advice from the opposition's spokesperson. [7] However, regarding the financial matters, the amount of money Tanzania gets, Zanzibar's dividend, and the type of dividend that Zanzibar gets, [8] I would like to thank the Minister and Deputy Minister for Finance for responding to all the issues that required responses.*

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, haya mengine yaliyozungumzwa ni yale yale niliyosema kwamba yameletwa, yamezungumzwa, lakini si mahali pake. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kule kwetu Zanzibar kuna msanii anaitwa Ali Kuniki. [3] Ali Kuniki huchukua fulana ile pull neck anaivaa juu chini, chini juu ile mikono yeye ndiyo anatia miguu na katikati kukawa kuna tundu anatembea nayo. [4] Lakini ili ikae inabidi atafute Kamba afunge na ile fulani ifanye marinda ili iweze kukaa vizuri. [5] Sasa nimetoa mfano huu kwamba Ali Kuniki anafanya vile ili kuvutia kuongeza hamasa kwenye usanii wake, lakini pia anatomia kile kifaa alichopewa visivyo. [6] Sasa niseme tu kwamba haya mengine yote yaliyoandikwa kwenye Kambi ya Upinzani ni hiyo fulana ya Ali Kuniki kwamba yameletwa sipo lakini pia ni kutia bashasha katika usanii wa yale ambayo yalitakiwa kuelezwa. (Makofi/Kicheko) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] *As I said, other issues that have been talked about here are those which were brought up and discussed but this is not a relevant platform to discuss them. [2] Honourable Chairperson, in Zanzibar, we have an artist called Ali Kuniki. [3] Ali Kuniki wears a pullover upside down; he uses sleeves as trousers, which leave some kind of a hole in the middle and he walks around like that. [4] However, for it to fit him well, he uses a rope to tie it around, making it [look] like round waves. [5] I used that example to show that Ali Kuniki does that in order to attract people's attention by his artistic skills, but he also uses the pullover inappropriately. [6] So, all these other things written by the opposition camp are like the Kuniki's pullover because they have been presented in an inappropriate platform to colour what they wanted to say. (Applause/Laughter)*

- (c) [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mnyaa katika mchango wake wa maandishi ana points nzuri sana ambazo angesimama na kuzizungumza pengine angezifafanua vizuri, tungeweza kumuelewa na tukampatia majawabu, lakini aliposimama ametanguliza hamasa, kwa maandishi ametuandikia point nzuri, kwa hiyo tulishindwa kuzielewa. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini lingine Mheshimiwa Rashid yeye amesema kwamba Muungano ni mzuri, unaleta nguvu ya kiuchumi na mshikamano lakini kero zilizopo katika Muungano unaleta sura mbaya. [3] Nimhakikishie tu kwamba kero tutaziondosha, lakini zaidi wote tukikaa pamoja kuzijadili na kufikia pale tunapotaka kwenda [...] (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[...] [1] *Honourable Mnyaa's written contribution contains good points which could be well understood and responded to if he was here to present them orally and explain them; but when he stood up he started with persuasion and we couldn't understand his arguments, though the written ones seem sensible. [2] Honourable Chairperson, Honourable Rashid said that the Union is good, and it promotes development and unity, but its challenges create a bad image of the Union. [3] I would like to assure him that we will address these challenges, but it will be better if we sit together and discuss the challenges in order to reach where we want to be [...]*

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Ali Khamis Seif yeye amezungumzia kero za Muungano miaka hamsini haziishi tunajitahidi kuzifanyia kazi. [2] Lakini pia amesema mengine, Tanganyika kuvaa koti la Tanzania, utungaji wa sheria na theluthi mbili kwenye Bunge. [3] Haya yote naomba tuje tuyazungumze mwezi wa nane na siyo leo. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mheshimiwa Khatib Said Haji Mbunge wa Konde yeye amesema kwamba Muungano umetimiza miaka 50, lakini uhai wake umepita kwenye misukosuko mingi. [5] Ni kweli kuna malalamiko mengi kwa

upande wa Zanzibar, niseme siyo Zanzibar peke yake hata upande wa pili wana malalamiko yao. [6] Lakini alikuwa anauliza je, Zanzibar inashiriki vipi katika Afrika Mashariki? [7] Labda nimjibu tu kwamba katika vikao vyote vya Afrika Mashariki Zanzibar inawakilishwa na matakwa ya Zanzibar yanazungumzwa kwa sababu Mawaziri wa Zanzibar wa sekta zisizo za Muungano wanashiriki wenyewe na wanapata nafasi ya kuzungumza mambo yao. [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, alikuwa anaendelea kuuliza kwamba je, mbona Tanzania Bara wana miradi ambayo imepelekwa Afrika Mashariki, mbona Zanzibar hakuna? (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Ali Khamis Seif had a doubt that it has been fifty years now, but the challenges of the Union have not been addressed; we are making efforts to meet them. [2] He also talked about Tanganyika wearing the coat of Tanzania, the enactment of laws, and the two-thirds [majority] in the parliament. [3] We shall discuss all these in August but not today. [4] Honourable Chairperson, Honourable Khatib Said Haji, an MP for Konde [Constituency], said that the Union has marked fifty years of its existence, but it has gone through many hurdles. [5] It is true that there have been many complaints from Zanzibar, of course even people from the Mainland have their complaints as well. [6] He was also asking how Zanzibar participates in the East African [Community]. [7] I would like to respond to him that in all meetings involving East African countries Zanzibar is represented and the concerns of Zanzibar are discussed because Zanzibar ministers for non-Union matters participate and get opportunity to air their issues. [8] Honourable Chairperson, he also asked why the Mainland Tanzania has projects in East Africa while Zanzibar doesn't have any.

- (e) [1] Nimhakikishie tu kwamba kuna miradi minne ya Zanzibar iko kwenye hatua mbalimbali ndani ya Afrika Mashariki. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] pia [...] Mheshimiwa Khatib [...] ametaka kujua vipi Balozi zetu za Tanzania zilizoko nje na ajira yake Mabalozzi na Wafanyakazi mbona Zanzibar ina idadi ndogo! [3] Nataka kukubaliana naye ni kweli na Mabalozzi huwa idadi inakwenda inafika sita, inarudi inakuwa tatu kama sasa hivi. [4] Lakini makubaliano tuliyozungumza, ajira katika Taasisi za Muungano ziwe 79 kwa 21, 79 kwa Tanzania Bara na 21 kwa Zanzibar. [5] Kwa hiyo, pole pole formula hiyo itafanyiwa kazi na hasa kwa sababu suala la uwiano limeshawekwa kwenye mapendekezo ya Katiba kwa hiyo hakuna atakayeweza kukwepa, [6] tutalitungia sheria na polepole tatizo hili litakuwa linaondoka. [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nadhani nimejibu yote ambayo yameulizwa yanayohusiana na bajeti, [8] yale yanayohusiana na hadhi ya Muungano, Katiba, nini, naomba tuje tuyazungumze baadae kwenye kikao husika na siyo hapa. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] I want to assure him that there are four projects from Zanzibar which are at various stages [of implementation] in the East African [Community]. [2] Honourable Chairperson, Honourable Khatib also wanted to know why, in terms of employment in our embassies abroad, Zanzibar has a small number of ambassadors and other workers. [3] I agree with him; it is true that the number sometimes goes up to six then it decreases to three as it is now. [4] However, we have reached an agreement that the ratio of employment opportunities in the Union institutions shall be 79 to 21; 79 for Mainland Tanzania and 21 for Zanzibar. [5] Therefore, slowly the formula for this ratio will work out, especially because this issue of ratio has been incorporated in the proposed draft constitution; no one will avoid it. [6] We shall enact an act for it and slowly the problem will be solved. [7] Honourable Chairperson, I think I have responded to all the questions raised about the budget [motion]. [8] I suggest that the questions about the status of the Union, constitution, and so forth, should be discussed later in the relevant meetings, and not here.

In this extract, the Minister of State, Vice President's Office (Union) responds to what can be described as 'relevant' issues or queries raised as by members (of the opposition). In (a) and (b), she maintains that other reactions from the MPs are not relevant to this debate. This argumentation realises a good example of overt evasion in the minister's responses to the raised

issues by the MPs. The minister strategically evades some criticisms, doubts and objections and responds to only those she finds relevant. In (a) [1-2], she maintains that what she presented is the last year's budget implementation and request for funds for the next year, and that she did not present anything about the status of the Union or the national constitution. The minister's evasion is emphasized in (b) (1) and (e) [7-8] and is reinforced by metaphors and a narrative. In (a) [3], she argues that the 'irrelevant' issues which have been raised by the opposition realise a theory of pregnant woman who eats soil or charcoal because she has a deficiency of the minerals found in such stuffs. Applying this metaphor, she indicates in (a) [4] that what has been raised by the opposition suggests that they would like to have a debate on such issues. In (a) [5], she suggests that these MPs should wait for the Constituent Assembly (CA) in August, which is an appropriate platform to debate these issues. It should be pointed out at this juncture that members of the opposition (especially from Chadema) boycotted the convening of the CA, accusing CCM of determining to change public opinions on the proposed constitution. I thus consider this evasion to be the minister's strategy to get the opposition back to the CA. Another metaphor in support of the minister's evasion is expressed in (b) [2-6] in the form of narrative. In (b) [2-5], the minister talks about Ali Kuniki, an artist from Zanzibar who shows his artistic skills by wearing a pullover upside down in order to attract people's attention. The minister maintains that, although this artist does this to show his artistic skills, he wears the pullover inappropriately. In (b) [6], the minister metaphorically compares members of the opposition to this artist and what they have raised to the pullover which has been worn upside down. With this metaphor, the minister implies that members of the opposition have inappropriately raised these issues in a wrong platform because what they have raised should be discussed in the CA.

From (c) to (e), the minister responds to the 'relevant' issues or queries as raised by the MPs. Concerning Mr Mnyaa's question regarding the national debt and Zanzibar's dividend from the Union organizations, the minister performs a directive by requesting a usage declarative because she claims that she did not understand Mr Mnyaa's concern, as indicated in (c) [1]. In (c) [2-3] and (d) [1], Ms Hassan responds to the MPs' criticism that the government has failed to address the challenges of the Union. She argues that the government is working on the challenges and it will address the (remaining) challenges but maintains that it would be better if the government and the opposition sit together to address the challenges. Responding to Mr Seif's accusation that Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the Union, and his concern about the enactment of laws, and the decision-making process in the parliament based on the two-thirds

majority, Ms Hassan reinforces the use of evasion by arguing that all these issues should be discussed in the CA in August, because they are not relevant to the current debate, as indicated in (d) [2-3].

Regarding Mr Haji's concern about the existence of complaints from both sides of the Union, but especially from Zanzibar, in (d) [5], she admits that there has been a lot of complaints, but these complaints are not only from Zanzibar; even Tanganyika has its complaints. However, the minister evades explaining how the office will address these complaints. As shown in (d) [6], Mr Haji also wanted to know how Zanzibar is represented in the East African Community (EAC). In (d) [7], the minister argues that in all EAC meetings Zanzibar is represented and Zanzibar's concerns or matters are discussed because Zanzibar's ministers for non-Union matters attend these meetings and are given an opportunity to express the concerns of Zanzibar. Responding to his claim that Zanzibar does not have any projects in EAC, the minister argues that Zanzibar has four projects in EAC which are at various stages of implementation. This is indicated in (d) [8] and (e) [1]. Moreover, Mr Haji raised a concern about unfair appointment of ambassadors and other diplomats in the Tanzanian embassies between Zanzibar and Tanganyika. His main concern was that Zanzibar is given fewer positions than Tanganyika, as indicated in (e) [2]. Mr Haji suggested that Zanzibar should be given at least 15 positions. In (e) [3], the minister agrees with him that Zanzibar has a small number of ambassadors (and other diplomats) compared to Tanganyika but maintains in (e) [4] that, with the current agreement, the formula will be 79 positions for Tanganyika and 21 for Zanzibar. In (e) [5-6], she adds that, because this formula has been included in the proposed draft constitution, no one will avoid it and an act will be enacted to solve this problem. This argumentation demonstrates argumentation from legal authority and is supported by pragmatic or problem-solving argumentation (the agreement/act will produce desired effect or solve the problem). Regarding the financial matters, the minister argues in (a) [7-8] that the Minister and Deputy Minister for Finance have already responded successfully to the finance-related issues, a response which realises evasion.

5.4.3 Argumentation in the expenditure committee

Further subdiscussions between the cabinet ministers and members of the opposition about the acceptability of the minister's standpoints, especially the second standpoint, are reconstructed from the expenditure committee, where the parliament sits as a finance committee to go through the budget sections of the relevant government's ministry or office before approving the proposed budget or request for funds. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the

subdiscussions between Mr Lissu and the Finance Minister, on the one hand, and between Mr Mnyaa and the ministers (the Finance Minister and the Minister of State – Union), on the other.

In *Extract 5.15*, Mr Lissu, whose standpoints have been criticised by the ministers and other members of the ruling party, stands to challenge the ministers' argumentation as he attempts to justify the opposition's second standpoint.

Extract 5.15

- (a) MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, gawio la asilimia 4.5 la Zanzibar, naomba nifafanuliwe na ninaomba niseme yafuatayo ili nipewe ufafanuzi sawasawa: - [2] Hapa nilipo nina maelezo ya Waziri Samia Suluhu Hassan na nina maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha na Uchumi. [3] Waziri Samia Suluhu Hassan ameieleza Kamati, yeye aliileta kwenye Kamati kwamba, kuhusu mgawanyo wa fedha zinazotoka kwa wafadhili, upo utaratibu wa mgawanyo wake, ambapo kwa upande wa misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti, isiyokuwa na masharti maalum, Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar, hupata gaiwo la asilimia 4.5. [4] Haya ni maneno ya Waziri Samia Suluhu Hassan, siyo ya Tundu Lissu. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, na akasema kwenye maelezo yake kwamba kwa mwaka huu wa fedha, Zanzibar ilitengewa shilingi bilioni 32, imepata bilioni 27. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. TUNDU LISSU: [1] Honourable Chairperson, [regarding] the Zanzibar's dividend of 4.5%, I would like to ask for clarification and allow me to say the following in order to get a detailed clarification. [2] Here, I have Minister Samia Suluhu Hassan's statement and the statement by the Minister of Finance and Economy. [3] Minister Samia Suluhu Hassan told the committee, she brought it to the committee, that regarding the allocation of the funds from external donors, there is a regulation, where for the unearmarked General Budget Support, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar receives 4.5% of the money. [4] These are words by Minister Samia Suluhu Hassan, and not Tundu Lissu. [5] Honourable Chairperson, and she added in her statement that for this fiscal year TZS 32 billion was allocated for Zanzibar and it has received TZS 27 billion.

- (b) [1] Sasa ili tujue zimetokea wapi, zimekuwa calculated on what basis, kwa sababu maelezo ya Waziri, hayajasema jumla ya fedha zote za misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti, inabidi twende kwenye maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha na Uchumi. [2] Maelezo ya Waziri wa Fedha yapo kwenye ukurasa wa tatu wa Hotuba yake, inasema; misaada na mikopo nafuu ya kutoka nje, shilingi bilioni 1,163. [3] Hizi ndizo takwimu nilizotumia mimi, sijatumia zingine zozote. [4] Sasa uki-calculate gawio la asilimia 4.5, kwa mujibu wa maelezo haya ya Waziri, unakuta kilichotolewa mwaka huu wa fedha, shilingi bilioni 32, Zanzibar imepunjwa shilingi bilioni 20. [5] Zilizotolewa ni bilioni 27, ilitakiwa zitolewe bilioni 52.335. [6] [...] Zanzibar imepigwa bao shilingi bilioni 25 za mwaka huu peke yake. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)
- [1] Now, for us to know where this comes from, on what basis it was calculated, because the minister's statement is silent about the total amount of General Budget Support, we had to go to the statement by the Minister of Finance and Economy. [2] The Finance Minister's statement is on page three of her speech; it says grants and soft/concession loans from external donors amount to TZS 1,163 billion. [3] These are the statistics I used; I didn't use any other statistics. [4] Now, if you calculate a dividend of 4.5%, as per the minister's statement, you will find out that what was offered this fiscal year was TZS 32 billion; Zanzibar has been deprived of 20 billion. [5] It received TZS 27 billion; it deserved to receive 52.335 billion. [6] [...] Zanzibar lost 25 billion this year alone (Applause)*

In *Extract 5.15*, Mr Lissu requests detailed clarifications about the Zanzibar's dividend of GBS (request for usage declarative), as expressed in (a) [1]. In the rest of the extract, he insists that

he is not confusing the statistics indicating the amount of GBS that goes to Zanzibar. He argues that his argumentation is based to the same statistics provided by the ministers (authority argumentation from statistics), and according to these statistics, Zanzibar has lost to Tanganyika TZS 25 billion in the 2013/14 fiscal year alone, because it was supposed to receive TZS 52 billion but only TZS 32 billion was allocated for Zanzibar, and it has received only TZS 27 billion out of the allocated amount. With these argumentative moves, Mr Lissu attempts to maintain the opposition's standpoint that the Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar by Tanganyika.

In *Extract 5.16*, Ms Mkuya responds to Mr Lissu's argumentation.

Extract 5.16

- (a) MWENYEKITI: [1] Mheshimiwa Lissu, umejieleza vizuri na una hoja ya msingi, nakubaliana na wewe. [2] Mheshimiwa Waziri wa Fedha, tupe majibu kama kuna upungufu umepungua hesabu nini, warudishieni au kama hakuna majibu tuambieni. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

CHAIRPERSON: [1] Honourable Tundu Lissu, you have expressed yourself well, and you have a point, I agree with you. [2] Honourable Minister of Finance, give us answers, if there is a missing amount, return it to them or if there are no answers, tell us. (Applause)

- (b) WAZIRI WA FEDHA: [...] [1] Hakuna upungufu wa hesabu, nilitoa maelezo kwamba, wakati tunatoa maelezo kibajeti, tunasema misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti ambayo tunatarajia kuipata ni fedha kadhaa, general. [2] Tukumbuke kwamba, hii ni commitment ya donor, yaani donor anaji-commit, lakini most of the time inakuwa actual disbursement siyo sawasawa na ile commitment. [3] Kwa hiyo, hiyo kwanza tuone tofauti. [4] Tofauti nyingine, katika ile jumla ya commitment, kuna portion, yaani mikopo na misaada ambayo ina masharti maalum, tunasema earmarked, haiendi Zanzibar. [5] Kinachokwenda Zanzibar ni ile unearmarked; yaani katika ile list, kwa mfano, una 900, ndani yake unaondoa ile ambayo earmarked unaweka pembeni na ile total ya unearmarked ndiyo asilimia 4.5 inakwenda Zanzibar. [6] Kwa hiyo, hiyo ni hesabu sahihi, umechukua calculations, lakini umechanganya na mambo mengine. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER FOR FINANCE: [...] [1] *There is no miscalculation, I said that, when we give budget statements, we say that the General Budget Support (GBS) which we expect to get is a certain amount, general. [2] We should remember that this is the donors' commitment, meaning that the donors commit themselves but most of the time the disbursement is not the same as the commitment. [3] So, let us see this as the first difference. [4] Another difference [is that], from the total amount of the fund the donors commit themselves to provide, there is a portion, that is, grants and loans with specific conditions, we call this earmarked; they don't go to Zanzibar. [5] What goes to Zanzibar is the unearmarked [GBS], meaning that in the list, for instance, you have [TZS] 900 [of GBS], you put the earmarked one aside, and 4.5% of the total unearmarked [GBS] is what goes to Zanzibar. [6] So, that is the right calculation, you took the [correct] calculation, but you mixed it with other things.*

- (c) [1] Kuna jambo ambalo tunaita misaada na mikopo nafuu, hii inakuwa siyo ya kibajeti, ambayo hakuna utaratibu wa kupeleka 4.5 Zanzibar. [2] Isipokuwa kama kuna misaada na mikopo ambayo ipo inatekelezwa katika Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania, ndiyo ambayo inakwenda Zanzibar na hii inakwenda based on the needs, yaani na mahitaji. [3] Nimetoa mifano Miradi kama MIVAF, ndiyo ambayo based on the needs, ndiyo inakwenda Zanzibar. [4] Nadhani, nakuelewa, lakini kuna vitu viwili umevichanganya. [5] Kwa hiyo, kinachokwenda hapa ni

asilimia 4.5 ya general budget support ya unearmarked general budget support, nayo mpaka hivi tunapozungumza, kuna asilimia kubwa sana bado haijatolewa. [6] Once ikitolewa, kinachokwenda Zanzibar, kitakwenda Zanzibar. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] There is something we call grants and soft/concession loans, this is not part of GBS, and there is no regulation of giving Zanzibar 4.5% of this amount. [2] If there are grants and loans implemented in the United Republic of Tanzania, a certain amount of this will go to Zanzibar and it goes there based on the needs. [3] I have provided some examples; projects like MIVAF are implemented in Zanzibar based on the needs. [4] I think I understand your [point] but there are things you have confused. [5] So, what goes [to Zanzibar] is 4.5% of the unearmarked GBS, and as we speak now, there is a huge percent that has not been disbursed. [6] Once given, what deserves to go to Zanzibar will go.

Based on *Extract 5.16*, the chairperson suggests in (a) [1] that Mr Lissu has a point. In (a) [2], he asks the minister to respond to his concern and, if there is any miscalculation, she should inform the parliament. However, in (b) [1], the minister insists that there is no miscalculation regarding the amount of money that goes to Zanzibar. While this time the minister agrees with Tundu Lissu on the total amount of money from external donors, she maintains that Tundu Lissu is confusing Zanzibar's dividend of GBS with 'other things' (other funds), as indicated in (b) [6] and (c) [4]. There are two points that the minister clarifies (usage declarative). First, in (b) [2-3], she insists that donors' commitment is different from actual disbursement. She argues that what goes to Zanzibar is the disbursed GBS from donors, not the total amount of what the donors committed themselves to provide. However, the minister does not say the total amount of the disbursed GBS in the last fiscal so that MPs can determine whether Zanzibar indeed received 4.5% of the disbursed GBS. Thus, the offered usage declarative does not help to resolve the difference of opinion. Second, in (b) [4-5] and (c) [5], she suggests that GBS is divided into two: there is earmarked GBS, which refers to grants and loans with specific conditions, and unearmarked GBS, which refers to grants and loans with no specific conditions. She further maintains that what goes to Zanzibar is 4.5% of the unearmarked GBS, not 4.5% of the whole GBS. In (c) [5-6], she adds that a large percent of the unearmarked GBS is yet to be released but, once released, Zanzibar will receive its remaining fund. Again, the minister does not mention the total amount of unearmarked GBS for the MPs to calculate and find out whether Zanzibar received 4.5% of the 'unearmarked' GBS, and this violates the relevance rule. Mr Mkuya also violates the language use rule by taking advantage of the missing information (the total amount of disbursed or unearmarked GBS) to persuade MPs and members of the public that Zanzibar receives its rightful dividend of GBS.

Regarding concession loans and grants, in (c) [1] she maintains that Zanzibar does not receive 4.5% of this type of loans (and grants). As she pointed out in *Extract 5.14*, Zanzibar can access concession loans on its own. In (c) [2], she argues that Zanzibar can receive this type of loans

and grants only if there are projects that are implemented by the United Republic of Tanzania in both parts of the Union. One of these projects is MIVAF, which is implemented based on the needs, as shown in (c) [3]. With this argumentation, the minister maintains that Zanzibar receives its rightful dividend of GBS and is not exploited by Tanganyika.

It seems Ms Mkuya's argumentation or usage declarative is not convincing enough to Mr Lissu. Thus, in *Extract 5.17*, Mr Lissu continues to request further argumentation from the government as he attempts to further justify the opposition's second standpoint.

Extract 5.17

- (a) MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwanza, niseme nitatoa shilingi kwa sababu hizi ni porojo. [2] Kwenye maelezo ya Waziri Mkuya, kuna misaada na mikopo ya kibajeti, halafu kuna misaada na mikopo ya Miradi, kuna misaada ya mikopo ya basket fund, sijagusia huko. [3] Nazungumzia mikopo na misaada ya kibajeti, ambayo kwa maneno yake ni shilingi bilioni mia tisa ishirini na mbili, kwa mwaka ujao wa fedha. [4] Ambayo kwa maneno yake, kwa takwimu zake, kwa mwaka huu unaoisha tumeletewa, hajasema hii ni commitment, amesema hizi ni za mwaka huu ambazo zimekuja, bilioni 1,163. [5] Sasa anasema hapa kwamba, hii ni commitment; kama ni tofauti na actual disbursement, my point is, kama ni commitment, hiyo actual disbursement ni kiasi gani, ambayo hamjaionesha hapa, kwa sababu haipo hapa? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [1] Honourable Chairperson, first of all, let me say that I will withdraw a shilling because these are unfounded chit-chats. [2] In the Minister Mkuya's statement, there is General Budget Support (GBS), then there are grants and loans for projects, and there are basket fund grants and loans; I didn't talk about that. [3] I am talking about GBS, which according to her statement, is [TZS] 922 billion for the next fiscal year. [4] According to her statement, and according to her own statistics, for this year we received, she didn't say that this is a commitment, TZS 1,163 billion. [5] Now she says that this is a commitment, [6] and it is different from the actual disbursement. [7] My point is, if this is a commitment, how much is the actual disbursement, which you haven't exposed here? [8] [I am asking this] because it is not indicated here. (Applause)

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, la pili, kwenye hoja hii hii na ni very important, kama matazamio ya mwaka ujao ni bilioni 922, then matazamio ya gawio la Zanzibar liwe asilimia 4.5 ya hilo tazamio la the total sum. [2] Ukiangalia kwa utaratibu huo, asilimia 4.5 ya bilioni 922, ni bilioni 44, lakini maelezo ya Waziri Samia Suluhu anasema, mwaka ujao Zanzibar itapata bilioni 21! [3] Inatakiwa ipate on the basis ya asilimia 4.5 ya bilioni 922, inatakiwa ipate bilioni 44, haitapata hiyo. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hoja yangu ni kwamba, watuambie, hii ya mwaka huu unaoisha, actual disbursement iliyoletwa ni kiasi gani ili tujue kama Zanzibar imepata fedha yake halali? (Makofi) [5] La pili, kwa nini hawajaweka asilimia 4.5 kwa hii inayotazamiwa mwaka ujao wa fedha? [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nimesema naondoa shilingi. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the second thing in this argument, and this is very important, if the projection for the next year is TZS 922 billion, then the projection for the dividend of Zanzibar should be 4.5% of the total amount. [2] If you look at that arrangement, 4.5% of TZS 922 billion is TZS 44 billion, but Minister Samia Suluhu says that Zanzibar will get TZS 21 billion in the next year. [3] On the basis of 4.5 of TZS 922 billion, it was supposed to get TZS 44 billion, but it will not get that [amount]! (Applause) [4] Honourable Chairperson, my point is, let them tell us, for this year, how much is the actual disbursement offered in order to know whether Zanzibar got its rightful fund. (Applause) [5] Second, why haven't they allocated 4.5% of the expected amount [of GBS] in the next fiscal year? [6] Honourable Chairperson, I said I will withdraw a shilling.

In this extract, Mr Lissu refers to the minister's explanation as *porojo* (unfounded chit-chats/stories), as shown in (a) [1]. In (a) [2], he suggests that he understands the difference between GBS and other types of grants and loans. In (a) [3], he insists that he is talking about GBS, which according to the minister's own words, amounts to TZS 922 billion in the next fiscal year. Moreover, he argues that, according to the minister's statements and statistics, the donors provided to the country a total of TZS 1,163 billion in the current fiscal year, and he maintains that the minister did not say that this was a commitment, as indicated in (a) [4]. In (a) [5] and (b) [6], he further maintains that, if it was a commitment, then the minister should mention the total amount of the actual disbursed money. Regarding the amount of GBS that Zanzibar is expected to receive based on 4.5% of the total fund in the next fiscal year, in (b) [1-3], he argues that Zanzibar will not receive its rightful dividend (TZS 44 billion) because, according to the Minister of State (Union), only TZS 21 billion is allocated for Zanzibar. Performing the directive in (b) [5], he asks why the ministers have not allocated 4.5% of GBS for Zanzibar in the next fiscal year. In (b) [6], he insists that he is withdrawing a shilling. With this argumentative move, Mr Lissu continues to maintain his first argument for the second standpoint as he insists that Zanzibar does not receive its rightful dividend of GBS.

In *Extract 5.18*, the chairperson decides to 'conclude' this subdiscussion between Mr Lissu and Ms Mkuya.

Extract 5.18

- (a) MWENYEKITI: [1] Mheshimiwa Lissu, kama nilivyokwambia mwanzo, una hoja ya msingi, issue ya kuondoa shilingi hapa ni kupitisha bajeti, itakuwa haina tena presidency (sic) yoyote huko mbele. [2] Wewe una hoja ya msingi, cha msingi hoja yako Serikali imeisikia itaichukua, wewe kaa nao hakikisha hii kitu inapatikana. Kwa sababu tutapiga kura hapa, and then the end of it, hii siyo sahihi. [3] Una kitu cha msingi, kama kuna kitu ambacho kinapungua na labda upande wa Serikali wamepitiwa, umewaonesha jamani, kuna kitu hiki, bado hakijafanikiwa, kinatakiwa kiwe hivi na hivi! [4] Sasa hii haina sababu tusimame tuanze kujadili kitu, mimi nakuomba na mimi nina-guarantee kuwa nitazungumza na Kamati ya Bajeti, nitazungumza na Serikali, hoja yako ipokelewe, itazamwe upya, [5] and then, kama kuna pungufu ambayo ilikuwa haiendi Zanzibar, iende! [6] This is what is government is for! [7] Sawa umekubali? [8] Nakuruhusu, mrudishie Waziri akatumie fedha yake na mumewe. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

CHAIRPERSON: [1] Honourable Tundu Lissu, as it told you earlier on, you have a point, [but], [because we are] here to approve the proposed budget, withdrawing a shilling will have no precedent in the future. [2] You have a point, the most important thing is that the government has heard your point and will work on it, you just need to make a follow-up, make sure this is addressed; because we will just vote, and then that is the end of it, this is not right. [3] You have a point, if there is a missing piece and maybe the government has overlooked it, you have shown them; there is this thing that hasn't been successful, it should be handled this way. [4] There is no need to continue discussing this; I am begging you and I guarantee you that I will talk to the budget committee, I will talk to the government and your argument will be

considered, [and this will be] reviewed. [5] And then, if there is anything that was not going to Zanzibar, it should go. [6] This is what the government is for. [7] Okay, do you agree? [8] I allow you to return [the shilling] to the minister so that she can spend the money with her husband.

- (b) MHE. TUNDU A. M. LISSU: [...] Naomba nirudishe shilingi, lakini kama ambayo nimeomba kwenye maelezo yangu ya msingi na Waziri amesema, tunahitaji Bunge lako liletewe takwimu za fedha zote za budget support za Jamhuri ya Muungano na fedha zote ambazo zimepelekwa Zanzibar kwa kipindi cha miaka kumi, ili tujue kama hakujawa na wizi hapa. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. TUNDU A. M. LISSU [...] I would like to return the shilling, but as I requested in my basic explanation, and the minister has said, we need all financial statistics of the General Budget Support of the United Republic [of Tanzania] and all the money that was sent to Zanzibar in the last ten years so that we may know if there was no theft in this area.

In *Extract 5.18*, the subdiscussion between the Finance Minister, Ms Saada Mkuya, and the opposition's spokesperson, Mr Tundu Lissu, is institutionally 'concluded' by the Chairperson. In (a) [1], the Chairperson argues that there is no point in withdrawing a shilling because the purpose of the debate is to approve the proposed budget (institutional point), implicitly suggesting that withdrawing a shilling will constrain the achievement of the institutional point of the debate. In (a) [2], the Chairperson maintains that Mr Lissu has a point and the government has heard him. He only needs to follow up on that matter. He suggests that, if he continues to withdraw a shilling, this subdiscussion will be decided by the MPs' votes (or simple majority) and that will be the end of it, which, according to him, is not right. In (a) [3-7], the Chairperson insists that Mr Lissu has a point and the government will work on it because that is what the government is for. In (a) [8], he asks Mr Lissu to return the shilling so that this subdiscussion is 'concluded', and the expenditure committee moves to the next section of the budget. In subextract (b), Mr Lissu accepts to return a shilling but maintains that the minister should submit to the parliament detailed statistics of all GBS funds that Zanzibar has received in the past ten years in order for the parliament to establish whether Zanzibar has been receiving its rightful dividend of GBS.

The Chairperson's decision to institutionally 'conclude' the subdiscussion does not only constrain Mr Lissu's freedom to continue challenging the minister's second standpoint but it also constrains the ministers' obligation to continue defending the standpoint until the difference of opinion is reasonably resolved. Thus, although the Chairperson is not a party in this (critical) discussion, his decision is nonetheless regarded as a violation of both the freedom rule and the obligation-to-defend rule. As I shall explain in the concluding stage (see section 5.5), this manner of concluding a critical discussion does not reflect the pragma-dialectical resolution process because the difference of opinion remains unresolved. For instance, Mr

Lissu still has doubts as to whether Zanzibar has been receiving its rightful dividend of GBS, for two reasons. First, the minister has argued that what goes to Zanzibar is the disbursed GBS, not the amount of GBS that donors commit themselves to provide, but she never says how much was the total disbursed GBS in the last fiscal year. Second, the minister argues that what goes to Zanzibar is the unearmarked GBS, but she does not say the total amount of the unearmarked GBS for the MPs to determine whether Zanzibar does receive its rightful fund of the unearmarked GBS. Additionally, the minister seems to suggest that Zanzibar receives 4.5% of the disbursed unearmarked GBS but she does not mention the total amount of the disbursed unearmarked GBS in the last fiscal year. Lack of this information hinders the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits, and the minister's argumentative move is thus deemed to be fallacious.

Another subdiscussion which this chapter focuses on is the (critical) subdiscussion between Mr Mohamed Habib Juma Mnyaa and the two ministers (Ms Mkuya and Ms Hassan). In *Extract 5.19*, Mr Mnyaa continues to insist that Zanzibar should receive compensation from Tanganyika or URT for the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling.

Extract 5.19

- (a) MHE. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [1] [K]atika mchango wangu wa maandishi, ambapo Mheshimiwa Waziri alisema mzuri, lakini sikupata kufafanua. [2] Ni kwamba katika Kamati ya Uchumi, Biashara na Viwanda nilimuuliza swali Naibu Katibu Mkuu Wizara ya Fedha, ambalo linahusiana na deni la Taifa la trilioni 21 ambalo kila Mtanzania kabeba pamoja na sisi kule. [3] Halafu nikataka kujua thamani ya shilingi ya Tanzania inaposhuka, ambapo deni hili la Taifa na thamani ya shilingi ya Tanzania inaposhuka, inaathiri sana uchumi wa Zanzibar, sana kabisa kwa asilimia kubwa, na haya mambo yote yanasababishwa na upande huu wa Jamhuri ya Muungano siyo Zanzibar. [4] Nilitaka kujua tunafidiwa vipi Zanzibar katika masuala kama haya. [5] Jibu lake ananiambia Zanzibar mnakopa Serikali kupitia Jamhuri ya Muungano na madeni hamlipi tunalipa sisi Jamhuri ya Muungano. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa hapo ndipo nilipokuwa nataka ufafanuzi kwamba ikiwa jibu lake la mtu mzito kama huyu wa Wizara ya Fedha maana yake ni kama hisani tu tunafanyiwa Zanzibar, si haki yetu. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [...] [1] [I]n my written contribution, which the minister said was good, but I didn't clarify, [2] I said that, in the [meeting] of the [parliamentary] Committee on Economy, Trade and Industries, I asked a question to the Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, which was about the national debt of [TZS] 21 trillion, which is carried by every Tanzanian including us [Zanzibaris]. [3] Then, regarding the national debt, I wanted to know [what happens] when the value of the Tanzanian Shilling goes down, it highly affects the economy of Zanzibar to a large percentage while all this is caused by this part of the United Republic [of Tanzania], not Zanzibar. [4] I wanted to know how Zanzibar is compensated on issues like these. [5] S/he responded by saying that [Zanzibar] requests loans through the United Republic [of Tanzania], and [it] does not repay the debt but [the URT government] does! [6] Honourable Chairperson, that is why I wanted some explanation; with this answer from such a highly profiled person in the Ministry of Finance, it sounds like a favour, not our right.

- (b) [1] Sasa kama ni hivyo ni hisani, basi tutizame mashirika yote ya Muungano ambayo Zanzibar hayajafaidika shilingi hata moja, tutizame sasa muda umefika wa miaka 50 hii ya Muungano, taasisi zote zile za Muungano zifanywe hesabu Zanzibar ilipwe haki na ilipe deni letu isiwe hisani hii ya kuwa tunasaidiwa tena. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, anatuambia Waziri bajeti hii anaomba bilioni 44.03 za kupelekwa Zanzibar, bajeti iliyopita bilioni 44.784 zilipelekwa Zanzibar. [3] Ufafanuzi wa fedha hizi uko wapi? [4] Kilichopo hapa ni budget support pamoja na CDCF, hizi nyingine zina matumizi gani? (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Now, if it is a favour, then we should look at all Union organizations from which Zanzibar has not gained even a single shilling, it is time, after 50 years of the Union, we made a calculation of the amount of money from all Union institutions, and ensure that Zanzibar is paid its rightful portion so that it can pay its debt; we shouldn't be helped like a favour. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the minister has told us that in this budget she requests 44.03 billion for Zanzibar, in the last budget, 44.784 billion was allocated to Zanzibar. [3] Where is clarification for this money? [4] What is here is General Budget Support and CDCF; what is the use of the remaining amount of the requested money?

It should be recalled that in *Extract 5.15*, Ms Hassan requested a usage declarative from Mr Mnyaa regarding his argumentation for Zanzibar's compensation. Thus, in *Extract 5.19*, Mr Mnyaa begins his argumentation by clarifying the argument he advanced in his written contribution to the debate. In (a) [1-3], he states that he once asked the Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance regarding the national debt of TZS 21 billion in relation to the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling. In (a) [4], he states that he wanted to know how Zanzibar is compensated due to the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling since these two are, to large extent, caused by Tanganyika (causal argumentation). In (a) [5], he maintains that the Deputy Permanent Secretary responded that Zanzibar requests loans via the United Republic of Tanzania, implying that Zanzibar cannot be compensated. In (a) [6], Mr Mnyaa is of the opinion that this is like a favour that the URT government does for Zanzibar; it is not the right of Zanzibar. Thus, in (b) [1], he argues that Zanzibar should be paid all its money that it was supposed to receive from all Union institutions/organizations in the past 50 years so that it can repay its own debt. Mr Mnyaa's argumentation implies that the amount of money that the URT government owes Zanzibar is enough for Zanzibar to repay its own debt and that the URT government repays Zanzibar's loans because they know that they owe Zanzibar a lot of money from the Union institutions/organizations.

Moreover, in (b) [2-3], Mr Mnyaa requests further clarification about the amount of money that has been requested for Zanzibar (TZS 44.03 billion). Specifically, in (b) [4], he performs a directive by asking the ministers to explain the use of the other amount apart from the GBS and CDCF. In this argumentative move, Mr Mnyaa requests a usage declarative (or argumentation) from the ministers.

In *Extract 5.20*, the Finance Minister, Ms Saada Mkuya, responds to Mr Mnyaa's argumentative move.

Extract 5.20

- (a) WAZIRI WA FEDHA: [1] Swali lake la kwanza kuhusiana na vipi Zanzibar inafidiwa thamani ikishuka. Kawaida tunapochukua mikopo fedha ambazo hazijatumika kwa sababu tuna implement ile, fedha ambazo hazijatumika popote zilizopo, basi tunasaini increment zile fedha zinarudi zilikotoka. [2] Tunakuwa na ile component ambayo sisi tumechukua. [3] Kwa hiyo, inakuwa mara nyingi hakuna kufidiana. Mara nyingi kunakuwa hakuna kufidiana. [4] Hilo moja. [5] La pili, sina uhakika kama tafsiri iliyokuwa imetolewa na Naibu Katibu Mkuu kwamba majibu yaliyotolewa ambayo yameletea tafsiri hiyo ya kuwa Zanzibar tunafadhiliwa, hapana, [6] Zanzibar ni sehemu ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania na kwa sababu kuna Serikali na arrangement zilizopo ni kwamba Zanzibar inachukua mikopo kupitia miradi mbalimbali yenyewe. [7] Aidha, mradi ambao unakwenda direct Zanzibar, aidha kuna kuwa na miradi mingine ambayo inakuwa inatekelezwa katika sehemu ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. Kuna issue ya MIVAF nadhani juzi alizungumzwa. Ule ni mradi ambao unatekelezwa na Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania pamoja na component ya Zanzibar. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER FOR FINANCE: [...] [1] [Regarding] his first question about Zanzibar's compensation when our currency value drops; usually, when we take loans, [if there is] an amount of money that has not been used anywhere, we sign an increment and the money goes back to where it came from. [2] We usually have that component which we have taken. [3] So, in most cases there is no compensation. [4] That is the first thing. [5] Second, I am not sure whether the Deputy Permanent Secretary's response to his question leads to the interpretation that the URT government is doing favour to Zanzibar; no. [6] Zanzibar is part of the United Republic of Tanzania and, because there is a government, the existing arrangement is that Zanzibar requests loans through various projects on its own. [7] There are projects that go directly to Zanzibar, [and] there are other projects which are being implemented in [both] parts of the United Republic of Tanzania. [8] There is the MIVAF issue which I think we talked about the other day; that is a project which is implemented by the United Republic of Tanzania and there is a component for Zanzibar.

- (b) [1] Kwa hiyo, pale tuna implement kutokana na mahitaji, Zanzibar inataka kutekeleza nini na upande wa pili wa Jamhuri unataka kutekeleza nini. [2] Kwa hiyo, miradi kama hiyo tunakuwa tunaanza wakati wa planning stage. Planning stage very early mradi dhahiri MCC tumeanza katika hatua za awali na katika component ambazo Zanzibar ilipata ni pamoja umeme na barabara. [4] Huku kumetekelezwa miradi ambayo ilikuwepo ya umeme na barabara na kule Zanzibar imetekelezwa miradi hiyo. [5] Hivyo, hakuna ufadhili as such, hakuna ufadhili as such. [6] Na tunapofanya debts sustainability assessments kama nilivyosema awali kwamba ni component yote ambayo Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania imekopa na si Zanzibar, Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania imekopa, hususan deni la nje. [7] Kwa hiyo, nadhani ni maeneo ambayo yanataka maelezo, lakini una hoja nzuri Mheshimiwa ambapo pengine tungeweza kukaa zaidi tukatafakari kwa umakini ili tuweze kuondoa hii migogoro midogomidogo ambayo inaendelea kutokea na kwa sababu tu ya misinformation. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)
- [1] So, we implement [these projects] based on the needs; [we consider] what Zanzibar and the other part of the [United] Republic [of Tanzania] want to implement. [2] So, in such projects, we begin with the planning stage. [3] Planning stage, very early; in the MCC projects, we began at the early stages and the components implemented in Zanzibar include electricity and roads. [4] Here we implemented the existing projects of electricity and roads and the same were implemented in Zanzibar. [5] So, there is no favour as such. [6] And when we do debt sustainability assessments as I said earlier, [we assess] the entire component that the United Republic of Tanzania has borrowed and not Zanzibar [alone], especially external loans. [7] So, I think there are areas which need explanation, but you have a point, Mr Honourable;*

perhaps we could sit and think carefully so that we can remove these minor misunderstandings which continue to exist just because of misinformation.

From this extract, Ms Mkuya suggests in (a) [3] that *1 Zanzibar cannot be compensated*. This substandpoint is defended by three arguments. First, in (a) [1-2, 4], she argues that *1.1 the remaining amount of loans after the implementation of the projects is usually taken back to where it came from*, implying that this amount is not used by Tanganyika. Second, in (b) [6], she maintains that *1.2a the national debt results from the amount of loans requested by the URT government*; not Zanzibar alone, which is combined with the argument that *1.2b Zanzibar is part of the URT*. In this argument, Ms Mkuya implicitly challenges Mr Mnyaa's causal argumentation that the rise of the national debt is caused by Tanganyika. In turn, she seems to suggest that the rise of the national debt is caused by both parts of the Union, not Tanganyika alone.

Another argument is based on Mr Mnyaa's claim that the fact that the URT government repays Zanzibar's loans is a sign that the URT government does favour for Zanzibar, and Zanzibar does not want to be favoured. In (a) [5-6] and (b) [6], Ms Mkuya argues that *1.3 repaying Zanzibar's loans is not a sign of favour* because *1.3.1 Zanzibar is part of the URT*, and *1.3.2 it can access concession loans from donors on its own*. In (a) [7-8] and (b) [1-4], she further argues that *1.4 Zanzibar also benefits from the loans requested for the projects that are implemented in both parts of the URT*. This implies that it is not only Tanganyika which benefits from the loans. These projects include MIVAF and MCC projects (argumentation from example). Ms Mkuya's substandpoint (and its related argumentation) against the requested compensation for Zanzibar is summarised in **Table 5.19** below.

Table 5.19 Ms Mkuya's argumentation against compensation for Zanzibar

No.	Description
1	There is no compensation for Zanzibar
1.1	The remaining amount of the requested loans from donors is usually taken back to where it came from
(1.1')	(This amount is not used by Tanganyika)
1.2a	The national debt results from the total amount of loans requested by the URT
(1.2a')	(The national debt is caused by both Tanganyika and Zanzibar)
1.2b	Zanzibar is part of the URT
1.3	The fact that the URT repays Zanzibar's loans is not a sign of favour
1.3.1	Zanzibar is part of the URT
1.3.2	Zanzibar can access concession loans on its own
1.4	Zanzibar also benefits from the loans requested for various projects which are implemented in both parts of the URT based on the needs
(1.4')	(It is not only Tanganyika which benefits from the loans)
1.4.1	Such projects include MCC and MIVAF projects

Further critical responses to Mr Mnyaa's argumentation are reconstructed from *Extract 5.21*.

Extract 5.21

- (a) MWENYEKITI: [1] Mheshimiwa Waziri, labda ungetusaidia hii sintofahamu waeleza Wabunge kutoka Zanzibar na waelezwe Wabunge wa hapa wajue hii kitu iwe clear. [2] Hakuna sababu kila siku izungumzwe wakati majibu mazuri yapo kama hivyo ulivyosema. [3] Just cristal clear kuwaeleza nchi nzima hali halisi ni hii toka miaka 50 contribution ni hii, mchango ni huu, Muungano wetu unakwenda hivi, mafanikio yetu yanakwenda hivi, changamoto zetu ni hizi, ili kila mtu ajue anaelewa vipi katika hili. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

CHAIRPERSON: [1] Honourable Minister, maybe you should help us clarify this dilemma, explain this to MPs from Zanzibar and those from here [the Mainland] so that they understand it clearly. [2] There is no point in talking about this every day while we have good answers as you said. [3] Just crystal clear, tell the entire nation the actual situation; for the past 50 years, this is the contribution, our Union goes this way, our achievements are these ones, these are our challenges, so that everyone knows this.

- (b) WAZIRI WA NCHI, OFISI YA MAKAMU WA RAIS (MUUNGANO): [...] [1] Lile ambalo umeliuliza sasa hivi, labda nieleze tu kwamba ofisi yangu kushirikiana na Wizara ya Fedha tutakuja na semina ya Wabunge hapa kuhusu mambo hayo. [2] Kilichotoka, kilichokwenda, kilichotumika tutakuja na semina hiyo. [3] Lakini nilikuwa nataka kuzungumzia lile la 44 billion ambalo Mheshimiwa Mnyaa ameuliza. [4] Fedha zilizooneshwa kwenye kitabu cha bajeti Ofisi ya Makamu wa Rais zilizokwenda Zanzibar ni za general budget support na contribution ya PAYE inayokwenda Zanzibar pamoja na Mfuko wa Jimbo. [5] Kwa hiyo, hizo 44 billion kwa mwaka zina component hizi tatu, Mfuko wa Jimbo, PAYE na GBS. [6] Lakini, kuna fedha ambazo zimetajwa separately na hazikujumuishwa hapa na hizi ni fedha ambazo Mheshimiwa Waziri wa fedha amezitungumzia zile za miradi ya pamoja tunayofanya kama Tanzania, TASAF, Maendeleo ya Kilimo, Maendeleo ya Mifugo, Millennium Challenge Account. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Regarding what you have just asked, I should perhaps say that my office together with the Ministry of Finance will organise a seminar for MPs regarding those issues right here. We shall come up with such a seminar; [we shall explain] what we had, what went [to Zanzibar], [and] what was utilised. [3] But I wanted to talk about the issue of 44 billion which Honourable Mnyaa has asked about. [4] The funds that are indicated in the budget [speech] book, Vice President's Office, which were allocated to Zanzibar, are the General Budget Support (GBS) fund and PAYE contributions which go to Zanzibar together with [the money for] the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF). [5] So, the TZS 44 billion has these three components: CDCF, PAYE, and GBS. [6] There is also an amount of money that has been mentioned separately and hasn't been included here and this is the money that Honourable Minister of Finance has talked about; this is for the collective projects as Tanzania, [including] TASAF, Agriculture Development, Livestock Development, [and] Millennium Challenge Account.

In *Extract 5.21*, the Chairperson performs the role of antagonist by asking the minister to provide further argumentation for the minister's second standpoint in order to clear Mr Mnyaa's doubt about the acceptability of this standpoint, as indicated in subextract (a). Responding to Mr Mnyaa's request for compensation, Ms Hassan argues that her office in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance will organise a seminar for the MPs and they will explain all these financial matters, as shown in (b) [1-2]. This response realises (overt) evasion and functions as a non-argumentation strategy against Mr Mnyaa's request for further

argumentation, and therefore violates the relevance rule. Ms Hassan declines from offering argumentation or a usage declarative that could help to resolve the difference of opinion in this critical (sub)discussion. However, in (b) [3-5], Ms Hassan provides clarifications about the amount of money allocated for Zanzibar (TZS 44.03 billion) as requested by Mr Mnyaa. She argues that the allocated amount consists of CDCF, PAYE, and GBS funds. In this argumentative move, the minister offers a usage declarative as requested by Mr Mnyaa, thus satisfies the dialectical requirement of the pragma-dialectical rules. Another usage declarative, which was not requested, is offered in (b) [6], where she maintains that there is another amount of money for the collective projects that are also implemented in Zanzibar, such as TASAF, MCA.

In *Extract 5.22*, Mr Mnyaa once again requests further clarification (usage declarative) and argumentation from the ministers regarding the compensation for Zanzibar, the amount of money allocated for Zanzibar, and the implementation of various projects in Zanzibar.

Extract 5.22

- (a) MHE. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [...] [1] Kwa lile la fedha hoja ilikuwa deni hili la Taifa ambalo linakopwa na upande mmoja mkubwa wa Muungano ndiyo uanotumia, sisi kule ni component ndogo sana, sana kabisa minimum. [2] Tunafidiwa vipi pamoja na devaluation, [3] hilo halijajibiwa Waziri wa Fedha hajajibu. [4] Ametoa maelezo ya mambo mengine kuhusu jibu la Naibu Katibu Mkuu. [5] Hii hoja tunafidiwa vipi Zanzibar, [6] tunaingia katika hasara ambayo haituhusu! [7] Sasa tunafidiwa vipi Zanzibar? [8] Hili linataka maelezo na hii ya bilioni 44 hii PAYE, PAYE ipi? [9] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, fedha zikiletwa katika miradi ya Zanzibar, tumesema hapa mara nyingi sana, Wabunge washirikishwe, hiyo miradi ya TASAF inayozunguzmwa, miradi yote hiyo ya MIVAF, kila aina ya miradi Wabunge hawajui wala hakuna ufafanuzi. [10] Hii PAYE, PAYE gani na hizi shilingi bilioni 21, PAYE gani? (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. MOHAMED HABIB MNYAA: [...] [1] About the fund, the point was the national debt which is borrowed by one big part of the Union which is the lone consumer, for us, we are a small component, very small, minimum. [2] How are we compensated due to devaluation? [3] That hasn't been answered, the Finance Minister hasn't responded [to this]. [4] She has [just] given explanation of other things about the Permanent Secretary's statement. [5] The question is: how is Zanzibar compensated? [6] We get into loss for something that we didn't cause! [7] Now, how is Zanzibar compensated? [8] I need explanation for this and this [TZS] 44 billion, this PAYE, which PAYE? [9] Honourable Chairperson, when the money is brought for Zanzibar's projects, we have said this repeatedly, MPs should be involved; [regarding] the TASAF projects, all those projects of MIVAF, each project, MPs don't know about and there is no explanation. [10] This PAYE, which PAYE, and this is 21 billion, which PAYE?

- (b) WAZIRI WA NCHI, OFISI YA MAKAMU WA RAIS (MUUNGANO): [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, niombe kabla ya ufafanuzi kwamba, Waheshimiwa Wabunge basi na sisi tuwe na interest ya kujua mambo. [2] Hili la PAYE; PAYE ni pay as you earn, hii ni kodi ya mishahara inayokatwa kwa wafanyakazi wa taasisi za Muungano ambao baada ya makusanyo yote ya mwezi, 4.5 ya kilichokusanywa kinakwenda Zanzibar. [3] Huwa tunapeleka shilingi bilioni 1.75 kila mwezi na kwa mwaka zinakuwa kama bilioni 21, hiyo ndiyo PAYE. [4] Nadhani nimesema vizuri. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER OF STATE, VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE (UNION): [1] Honourable Chairperson, before I clarify, may I ask that Honourable MPs should develop interest in knowing these things. [2] PAYE means Pay-As-You-Earn; this is a salary tax deducted from the employees who work for the Union institutions/organizations [and] which, after all monthly revenue, 4.5% of the revenue goes to Zanzibar. [3] We usually take 1.75 billion every month and annually it is around 21 billion; that is what is called PAYE. [4] I think I have made myself clear.

- (c) WAZIRI WA FEDHA: [...] [1] Labda Mheshimiwa Mnyaa tuelewane jambo moja, Zanzibar imo katika sehemu ya lile deni na zanzibar haichangii katika kulipa lile deni. [2] Kwa hiyo, ile principal pamoja na interest inayolipwa ni pamoja na miradi ile ya Zanzibar iliyochukuliwa ambayo iko kwa jina la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [3] Sasa Napata shida kuelewa Zanzibar tunafidiwa vipi katika kitu ambacho kimebebwa, yaani tunalipa pamoja na ile miradi ambayo tulikuwa tumechukua. [4] Sasa hiyo fidia nakuwa Napata tabu kuelewa, iweje au pengine labda anaweza akatupa insight zaidi unavyotaka wewe iwe kama ndiyo reality yenyewe ilivyo. [5] Kwa sasa deni linalipwa na Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano ya Tanzania pamoja na miradi yote ambayo ilikopwa kwa ajili ya Zanzibar, miradi yote ambayo imekopwa kwa ajili ya Zanzibar. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER FOR FINANCE: [...] [1] Honourable Mnyaa, perhaps we should agree on one thing; Zanzibar is part of the debt and Zanzibar doesn't contribute to repaying the debt. [2] So the principal [loan] as well as the interest paid include [the amount of money for] Zanzibar's projects, which was taken under the United Republic of Tanzania. [3] Now, I don't understand how Zanzibar is compensated in a situation like this; we repay [the loans] together based on the amount of money we took for the projects. [4] So I don't understand how the compensation should be, or maybe he can give us some insights on how you want it to be, if that is the reality. [5] Currently, the dept is repaid by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania, including all [the money for] the projects which was borrowed for Zanzibar.

In this extract, Mr Mnyaa insists on knowing how Zanzibar is compensated by Tanganyika due to depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling in relation to the national debt. In (a) [1-7], he argues that the Finance Minister has not responded (satisfactorily) to his argumentation regarding the request for Zanzibar's compensation. He is still of the opinion that Zanzibar should be compensated because the national debt and the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling are largely caused by Tanganyika (causal argumentation). In (a) [8] and (a) [10], he requests another usage declarative about PAYE; he wants the minister to explain what/which PAYE she is talking about. In (a) [9], he argues that MPs (from Zanzibar) are not informed about various collective projects that are implemented in Zanzibar (such as TASAF and MIVAF) because the ministers do not provide explanation or information about the projects to the MPs. This argumentative move raises doubts as to whether these projects are appropriately and successfully implemented in Zanzibar, as suggested by the ministers.

Responding to Mr Mnyaa's request for a clarification about PAYE, Ms Hassan begins her argumentation by accusing Mr Mnyaa of limited knowledge (accusation of incompetence), as shown in (b) [1]. In (b) [2-3], Ms Hassan explains that PAYE means Pay-As-You-Earn, which is a salary tax deducted from the monthly salaries of workers from the Union

institutions/organizations and Zanzibar receives 4.5% of the money; it usually receives TZS 1.75 billion per month and TZS 21 billion per year.

With respect to how Zanzibar is compensated for the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling, Ms Mkuya maintains the argumentation she advanced in *Extract 5.20*. In (c) [1], she argues that Zanzibar is part of the debt and does not repay the debt. In (c) [2], she maintains that the return on principal loans and the interest include the loans that were taken by Zanzibar under the name of the URT. In (c) [3], she wonders how Zanzibar can be compensated when it is also part of the debt. In this argument, the Finance Minister maintains her causal argumentation; Zanzibar cannot be compensated because the rise of the national debt (and depreciation of the shilling) is *caused* by both parts of the Union. Thus, she asks Mr Mnyaa to provide some insights on how he wants this to be handled but the current situation is that the URT repays all the loans, including those requested for the projects implemented in Zanzibar, as shown in (c) [4-5].

In *Extract 5.23*, Mr Mnyaa continues to insist that Zanzibar should be compensated by the URT for the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling.

Extract 5.23

- (a) MHE. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nasikitika kwamba Waziri hajajua fidia ipi inayohitajika mpaka hivi sasa na kwamba haelewi, na hapa hakuna haja ya miwani wala darubini. [2] Kwamba uchumi wa Tanzania kwa kiasi kikubwa kwa sababu ya ukubwa wa Tanganyika na kwa sababu ya kutumia fedha moja ya Tanzania, ni kwamba Zanzibar tunaburuzwa kiasi kwamba uchumi wa Zanzibar tukitaka kujitana hatutanuki kwa sababu ya huku na ni kwa sababu ya deni la Taifa, ni kwa sababu ya thamani ya shilingi kudondoshwa kila siku. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, I am disappointed that the minister still doesn't know the compensation needed so far and that she doesn't understand, and here you don't need glasses or microscope [to see my point]. [2] The point is, [regarding] the Tanzanian economy, to a large extent, because Tanganyika is so big, and because we use the same Tanzanian currency, Zanzibar is pushed to the extent that even if Zanzibar makes efforts to strengthen its economy, it cannot [strengthen it] because of the national debt, it is because the currency value drops every day.

- (b) [1] Sasa hizi gharama ambazo sisi hatupati kujitana kwa sababu ya kutumia fedha moja na uchumi mkubwa huku ndiyo unafanya kila kitu, sisi tutafidiwa vipi Zanzibar ili na sisi tuweza kutembea kwa miguu yetu wakati hizi adha zinazotufika siyo sisi tunaosababisha zinasababishwa na upande wa Tanganyika. [2] Hujanielewa Mheshimiwa Waziri? [3] Mshahara bado nazuia, nataka ufafanuzi wa kina ili miaka yote ambayo tumeathirika ya devaluation ya fedha, [4] mwaka 1978/79 thamani ya shilingi za Tanzania shilingi saba ndiyo dola moja ya Kimarekani. [5] Leo mwaka 2014 shilingi 1600 ni dola moja ya Kimarekani, hili lote limesababishwa na upande wa Tanganyika. [6] Zanzibar tumburuzwa tumesababishwa kuingizwa huku tutafidiwa vipi? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

[1] Now these costs limit our [economic] growth, because we use the same currency with the macro economy which does everything; how will Zanzibar be compensated so that it can walk

on its feet when we suffer the problems caused by Tanganyika? [2] Honourable Minister, you still don't understand? [3] I am still holding your salary; I need an in-depth clarification so that [we are compensated] for all the years that we have suffered due to the devaluation of the [Tanzanian] currency. [4] In 1978/79, seven Tanzanian Shilling was equivalent to one US dollar. [5] Now in 2014, 1600 shilling is equivalent to one US dollar, all this is caused by Tanganyika. [6] Zanzibar has been pushed behind, forced to get here; how are we going to be compensated? (Applause)

From *Extract 5.23*, I reconstruct Mr Mnyaa's substandpoint as *1 Zanzibar should be compensated for the rise of the national debt and the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling*, as suggested in (a) [1] and (b) [6]. This substandpoint (including its related argumentation) functions as further argumentation for his (main) standpoint, as summarised in **Table 5.13**. The substandpoint is defended by two arguments which realise coordinative argumentation. In (a) [2], Mr Mnyaa argues that *1.1a the growth of Zanzibar's economy is affected by the [rise of the] national debt and the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling* (causal argumentation). In (b) [1], he maintains that *1.1b the [rise of the] national debt and the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling are largely caused by one part of the Union*, i.e. Tanganyika (causal argumentation). In (a) [2], he suggests that *1.1a.1a the Tanzanian Shilling depreciates every single day*. For instance, in (b) [4], he maintains that in the 1978/79 fiscal year USD 1 was equivalent to TZS 7, but USD 1 is equivalent to TZS 1600 in 2014 (authority argumentation from statistics). He also argues that *1.1a.1b Zanzibar uses the same currency with [Mainland] Tanzania*. In (b) [3, 6], he asks *1.1a.1c how is Zanzibar compensated for the depreciation of the Shilling for all the years it has been affected?* I summarise Mr Mnyaa's further argumentation for his (sub)standpoint in **Table 5.20**.

Table 5.20 Mr Mnyaa's further argumentation for his (sub)standpoint

No.	Description
1	Zanzibar should be compensated for the [rise of the] national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling
1.1a	The growth of Zanzibar's economy is constrained by the [rise of the] national debt and depreciation of the Shilling
1.1a.1a	The Tanzanian Shilling depreciates every day
1.1a.1a.1a	USD 1 was equivalent to TZS 7 in 1978/79
1.1a.1a.1b	USD 1 is equivalent to TZS 1600 in 2014
1.1a.1b	Zanzibar uses the same currency with [Mainland] Tanzania
1.1a.1c	How Zanzibar will be compensated for the depreciation of the shilling for all these years?
1.1b	The rise of the national debt and the depreciation of the currency are mainly caused by Tanganyika

Ms Mkuya's last response to Mr Mnyaa's argumentation in this subdiscussion is reconstructed from *Extract 5.24* below. In this extract, another member the ruling party also responds to Mr Mnyaa's claim.

Extract 5.24

- (a) WAZIRI WA FEDHA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nadhani hapa hatuwezi ku-calculate fidia, hayo ni mambo ya kisera ambayo pengine tungeweza kuyazungumza katika Bunge la Katiba na siyo hapa ambapo tunaweza tukajibu kwa sababu hilo zoezi halijafanyika, hilo zoezi halijafanyika na kwa sasa hatutaweza kuzungumza masuala ya fidia kwa sababu nadhani huko ndiko ambako tungeweza kitaalam, technically hasa kuweza kuzungumza masuala hayo, component hii ikaingia hasa katika Katiba mpya ambayo tungeweza kujadili. [2] Si suala la Wizara ya Fedha, si suala la Muungano, lakini liwe ni suala la kikatiba zaidi. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

MINISTER FOR FINANCE: [1] Honourable Chairperson, I think we cannot calculate the compensation, those are policy issues which perhaps should have been discussed in the Constituent Assembly and not here where we can answer because the exercise hasn't been done, and for now we won't talk about compensation issues because I think in the Constituent Assembly we could talk about this more professionally, technically, and incorporate this component in the new constitution; we could discuss this [there]. [2] This is not a matter of the Ministry of Finance, nor is it a Union matter, but it should be more of a constitutional matter.

- (b) MHE. CHARLES J. P. MWIJAGE: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] nimesimama kuwasihi Wabunge wenzangu especially Mr. Mnyaa, tusilete ajenda mpya. [2] Hakuna mtu kamuumiza mwenzie, [3] depreciation ya shilingi mimi nakubali Zanzibar najua, najua strength ya Zanzibar, [4] sasa utujengee hoja utuonyeshe kwamba, Zanzibar kipi hicho kilichozalishwa ambacho kingefanya shilingi yako appreciate lakini utukumbushe kwamba Zanzibar karafuu yetu ya Zanzibar ilianguka kama ambavyo mazao yote yalianguka kwenye trade trap ya mazao yote. [5] Kitu gani ambacho kinakufanya wewe ungepata uchumi mkubwa. [6] Uchumi wetu sisi ni wa Watanzania wote nafuu yote. [7] Tusijiburuze kwenda kwenye suala ambalo halihusiki. [8] Karafuu ilidondoka, kila mtu anajua, mbata zilianguka, kila mtu anajua. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. CHARLES P. MWIJAGE: [1] Honourable Chairperson, [...] I am standing up to urge fellow MPs, especially Mr Mnyaa, that we shouldn't bring a new agenda. [2] No one has hurt the other. [3] [Regarding] the depreciation of the [Tanzanian] Shilling, I agree [with you]; I know Zanzibar, I know the strength of Zanzibar, [4] Now advance your argument [well], show us what was produced by Zanzibar that would have made your shilling appreciate, but you should also remember that our Zanzibar's cloves dropped in the trade market just like any other crops. [5] What would make your economy stronger? [6] Our economy is for all Tanzanians. [7] We shouldn't push ourselves into unrelated issues. [8] Clove [market] dropped, everyone knows, copra dropped, everyone knows.

The minister's last response to Mr Mnyaa's claim in *Extract 5.24* realises (overt) evasion. In (a) [1], Ms Mkuya argues that what Mr Mnyaa has raised about compensation is a policy matter that can be discussed professionally and technically in the Constituent Assembly as they cannot calculate the requested compensation during the annual ministerial budget debates. In (a) [2], she insists that the issue of compensation is not a Union matter but a constitutional one. In subextract (b), Mr Mwijage also rejects Mr Mnyaa's causal argumentation. He thinks that the decline of the economy of Zanzibar is not necessarily caused by Tanganyika, as suggested by Mr Mnyaa, and the economy of Zanzibar would not have been any better than the Union's economy. Specifically, his statements in (b) [2-3] suggest that Tanganyika has not affected the economy of Zanzibar due to the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling. In (b) [4-8], he maintains that there is nothing that could make the 'currency of Zanzibar' appreciate because

the price of Zanzibar's sole crops (cloves and copra) have dropped in the trade market. Mr Mwijage's argumentation is summarised in *Table 5.21*.

Table 5.21 Mr Mwijage's argumentation

No.	Description
(1)	(Zanzibar cannot be compensated by Tanganyika)
(1.1)	The decline of Zanzibar's economy is not caused by Tanganyika
(1.1.1)	The depreciation of the Tanzanian currency hasn't affected Zanzibar's economy
(1.1.2)	The price of Zanzibar's sole crops has dropped in the trade market
(1.1.2')	(This has led to the decline of the economy of Zanzibar)
(1.1.2.1)	These crops include cloves and copra
(1.1.3)	There is nothing that would have made the currency of Zanzibar appreciate
(1.1.4)	Tanganyika and Zanzibar have the same economy

In *Extract 5.25*, Mr Mnyaa advances his last argumentation to defend his (sub)standpoint by insisting that Zanzibar should receive compensation from Tanganyika for the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian currency.

Extract 5.25

- (a) MHE. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni kwamba nikisema suala hili la kiuchumi, Zanzibar imejaribu kutaka kujitana kiuchumi, kikwazo imekuwa ni upande za Tanzania Bara. [2] Itakubukwa wakati wa Rais Salmin alitangaza bandari huru, alitaka kufanya offshore banking, alijenga uchumi kupitia EPZ, wawekezaji wakaja Zanzibar... [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa maana hiyo viwanda vyote, viwanda vidogo vidogo katika EPZ kila biashara ilitumika [4] wakileta vitu kusafirisha upande wa Tanzania Bara TRA wanavizua wakasababisha wawekezaji wale wote waondoke na EPZ matokeo yake ikazuiliwa kule ikafunguliwa huku Tanzania Bara. (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

HON. MOHAMED HABIB JUMA MNYAA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, it is that, when I talk about the issue of economy, Zanzibar has tried to strengthen its economy; the problem has been Mainland Tanzania. [2] It should be recalled that, during President Salmin's time, he declared a free harbour, he wanted to do offshore banking, he built the economy through Economic Processing Zone (EPZ), investors came to Zanzibar... [3] Honourable Chairperson, for that matter, [with] all industries and small enterprises in EPZ, every business was done, [4] Whenever they brought commodities to Mainland Tanzania, TRA blocked them and the investors eventually left and EPZ was blocked in Zanzibar and it was opened in Mainland Tanzania.

- (b) [1] Sasa hiyo ni mifano ambayo sisi kila uchumi unapokuja [2] karafuu, imepanda bei na kama hajui Mheshimiwa Mwijage pishi moja ya karafuu sasa hivi ni pesa nyingi sana zaidi ya mara nne tano, lakini bado thamani ya pesa yetu inakuwa chini. [3] Sasa hata karafuu ikipanda bei, tukijaribu kujinasua kiviwanda, kila tunachofanya hatuendi kwa sababu ya devaluation ya shilingi ya Tanzania ambayo prime mover ni upande wa Tanganyika. [4] Sasa hivyo ndiyo Zanzibar tunavyoathirika. [5] Tunahitaji na sisi kufidiwa na tatizo hili. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 12 May 2014)

Now those are examples of how we have been trying to strengthen our economy. [2] Clove price has gone up, and for your information, Honourable Mwijage, one cellar of clove is currently very expensive, four or five times as much but our currency is still low. [3] Now even if the price of clove rises, when we try to strengthen our economy through industrialization, we fail in everything we do because of the devaluation of the Tanzanian Shilling whose prime

mover is Tanganyika. [4] Now that is how Zanzibar is affected. [5] We need to be compensated for this problem. (Applause)

In this extract, Mr Mnyaa continues to reinforce his substandpoint that *1 Zanzibar should be compensated for the rise of the national debt and depreciation of the Tanzanian shilling*, as indicated in (b) [2, 5]. However, this time he concentrates on the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling. In (a) [1] and (b) [4], he suggests that *1.1a the obstacle for the growth of Zanzibar's economy is Mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika)*. This causal argumentation is coordinatively combined with another causal link which suggests that *1.1b Zanzibar's efforts to strengthen its economy are affected by Tanganyika*. In (a) [2-4], he narrates how President Salmin (one of Zanzibar's former presidents) made efforts to improve the economy of Zanzibar (argumentation from narrative). As a result of these efforts, investors came to Zanzibar and opened industries and small enterprises through EPZ. However, according to him, whenever they tried to export commodities to the Mainland Tanzania, TRA blocked them. He further states that this made the investors to leave the country and EPZ was eventually closed in Zanzibar and it was instead opened in Mainland Tanzania. In (b) [1], he suggests that this narrative explains how Zanzibar's economy is affected by Tanganyika. Responding to Mr Mwijage's claim that the price of cloves has dropped in the trade market, in (b) [2], he rejects this claim by arguing that *1.2 the price of cloves has gone up but the value of the Tanzanian Shilling has depreciated*. In (b) [3-4] he maintains that *1.2.1 even if the price of cloves rises, Zanzibar's economy cannot strengthen because of the depreciation of the Tanzanian currency*. Mr Mnyaa's final argumentation for his (sub)standpoint is summarized in **Table 5.22**.

Table 5.22 Mr Mnyaa's final argumentation for his (sub)standpoint

No.	Description
1	Zanzibar should be compensated for the depreciation of the Tanzanian Shilling
1.1a	The obstacle for the growth of Zanzibar's economy is Mainland Tanzania
1.1b	Zanzibar's efforts to strengthen its economy are affected by Tanganyika
1.1b.1	President Salmin declared a free harbour and built economy through EPZ
1.1b.1.1	Investors came to Zanzibar and started opening businesses through industries and small enterprises
1.1b.1.1.1	But whenever the exported commodities to Mainland Tanzania, TRA blocked them
1.1b.1.1.1.1	They eventually left and EPZ was blocked in Zanzibar and was instead opened in Mainland Tanzania
1.2	The price of cloves has gone up but the value of the Tanzanian Shilling has depreciated
1.2.1	Even if the price of cloves rises, Zanzibar's economy cannot strengthen because of the depreciation of the Tanzanian currency

The subdiscussion between Mr Mnyaa and the two ministers was concluded on the basis of the vote, and the minister's proposed budget was consequently approved by the parliament. With respect to the speech acts performed in the argumentation stage, apart from the directive and

the usage declarative, which have been widely performed by both members of the opposition and members of the government, other speech acts performed include the assertive (by expressing the standpoints/substandpoints and advancing argumentation for them) and the commissive (by not accepting the standpoints/substandpoints expressed).

5.5 Concluding stage

As in the previous debate, the main (critical) discussion and the two subdiscussions in this debate are concluded on the basis of the parliamentary procedures. Specifically, while the first subdiscussion between Mr Lissu and Ms Mkuya in the expenditure committee is concluded by the Chairperson's decision, the result of the second subdiscussion between Mr Mnyaa and the ministers as well as the main (critical) discussion in this debate is reached on the basis of a simple majority of the MPs' votes. This manner of concluding a critical discussion does not reflect the pragma-dialectical resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits. Hence the differences of opinion in this debate are not resolved on the merits or, in other words, they remain unresolved, regardless of the fact that the proposed budget was approved by the parliament. It has been further observed that, although some arguments are critically challenged (for instance, the Prime Minister's symptomatic, causal, and authority argumentation), other (unreasonable) arguments remain unchallenged and some other arguments (including the argument that Zanzibar receives its rightful dividend of GBS) are not conclusively defended. Moreover, some arguments which seem to be reasonably defended based on the evidence presented (such as the argument that Zanzibar does not receive 4.5% of GBS) are not accepted.

5.6 Evaluation of the rules for critical discussion

In the confrontation stage, the freedom rule is largely adhered to, rather implicitly or subconsciously. According to the Standing Orders of the Tanzanian parliament, a cabinet minister is required to present the annual ministerial budget speech before the proposed budget or request for funds is authorised by the parliament. In presenting this speech, the minister has the 'freedom' to express various standpoints. The opposition's spokesperson and other MPs are also afforded the 'freedom' to challenge the minister's standpoints in their speeches or contributions to the debate. The obligation-to-defend rule is partly observed. While Ms Samia Suluhu Hassan defends her second standpoint by responding to almost all critical reactions from the MPs, she at the same time evades responding to various critical reactions to her first standpoint. Additionally, to some extent, the Chairperson's decision to 'prematurely' conclude the subdiscussion between Mr Lissu and Ms Mkuya constrains Mr Lissu's freedom to challenge

the minister's second standpoint and Ms Mkuya's obligation to defend this standpoint. There are also a few instances of the violation of the language use rule. For instance, the Finance Minister and her deputy minister take advantage of the missing information regarding the total amount of the disbursed unearmarked GBS in order to resolve the (sub)difference of opinion in the first subdiscussion in their favour. Moreover, there are instances of the violation of the relevance rule when the ministers fail to provide the requested clarifications or usage declaratives. For instance, the Finance Minister strategically declines from stating the total amount of the disbursed unearmarked GBS for members (of the opposition), especially Mr Lissu, to determine whether Zanzibar receives its rightful dividend of 4.5% from the GBS.

5.7 Evaluation of the properties of argumentation in context

This section summarises the three pragma-dialectical properties of argumentation in context with respect to the parliamentary debate on the annual budget speech by the Minister of State – Vice President's Office (Union) as follows.

5.7.1 Strategic manoeuvring and self-presentation

In regard to the topical potential, the parties strategically select the 'topics' that can be appealing to the audience. In the minister's first standpoint, Ms Hassan and Mr Pinda suggest that the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained. In this standpoint, the ministers seem to imply that the Union is ideal and in order. This standpoint is expressed in order to convince MPs and, importantly, members of the electorate to vote for the proposed constitution by the Constituent Assembly (CA) which proposes a two-government structure of the Union. The opposition's spokesperson, Mr Lissu, strategically expresses a standpoint relating to a slightly different topic. He is of the view that the Union should be reviewed and reformed. Thus, the opposition's first standpoint is an attempt to convince members of the electorate to vote against the proposed constitution by the CA which proposes a two-government structure. In this standpoint, it is implicitly suggested that the proposed constitution should adopt or propose a three-government structure, as suggested by the majority of Tanzanians in their opinions as collected by the Commission. In the minister's second standpoint, Ms Hassan puts more emphasis on the areas she thinks her office has performed well and downplays the areas in which the office did not perform very well. For instance, she suggests that her office has addressed many challenges of the Union and only a few ones have remained unresolved. Moreover, the minister strategically evades other criticisms and doubts from members of the opposition with the reason that they are not relevant to the debate. Like

their first standpoint, the opposition's second standpoint also relates to the (structure of the) Union. Mr Lissu suggests that the (structure of the) Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar by Tanganyika. Again, with this standpoint, the opposition's spokesperson attempts to convince members of the electorate that the (structure of the) Union is not ideal or in order, and it should thus be reviewed and reformed. These standpoints are within the institutional preconditions as they address the topic on the table.

Regarding the adaptation to audience demand, Ms Mkuya and Mr Madellu attempt to present the opposition as people who distort the budget statistics/facts for their own interests and that they should not be trusted. With this audience adaptation, the ministers seem to present a negative evaluation of the opposition and their views. However, the opposition's spokesperson defends himself and the opposition by arguing that they are not distorting the budget statistics/facts because they are referring to the same statistics/facts as presented by the ministers.

With regard to the presentational devices employed, Ms Hassan's evasion as a strategy relating to topical potential is reinforced by metaphors. The minister presents at least two metaphors to support her claim that the MPs' criticisms and doubts she did not respond to are not relevant to the debate and suggests that these concerns can be discussed in the CA. There is also a manifestation of personal attack as Mr Madellu accuses Mr Lissu of inconsistency and distortion of the information or statistics. Although personal attacks are restricted by the Standing Orders, Mr Madellu strategically presents the circumstantial *ad hominem* (accusation of inconsistency) within the institutional preconditions by capitalising on Mr Lissu's inconsistency, suggesting that what he said last year is inconsistent with what he says this year. Some other figurative/rhetorical expressions, such as *you can't your cake and have it* are borrowed from English, and they are used to increase the argumentative force of some of the ministers' arguments.

Mr Lissu also employs the presentational devices of metaphors, quotations, and rhetorical questions to reinforce his argumentation. For instance, to support the argument that it is doubtful whether the foundation of the Union is solid enough, he asserts that, according to the conclusion by the Commission, *Tanganyika imevaa koti la Jamhri ya Muungano ya Tanzania* (Tanganyika is wearing the coat of the United Republic of Tanzania), suggesting that Tanganyika has taken control of the powers of the Union government. Another metaphor is *Muungano ni kiinimacho* (the Union is a magic trick), implicitly suggesting that the Union is

just a deception or is not ‘real’. Another metaphorical expression is realised in the claim that, under the current (structure of the) Union, *Zanzibar is like an invited guest*. This is a quotation taken from one of Mr Pius Msekwa’s remarks about the state of affairs in the Union. Generally, the three metaphorical expressions (which are presented in the form of quotations) are employed to reinforce the standpoint that the (structure of the) Union should be reviewed and reformed. By reviewing and reforming the (structure of the) Union, Mr Lissu actually suggests that the current two-government structure of the Union should be reformed into the three-government structure, as proposed by the majority of Tanzanians. Mr Kombo also employs a metaphor to reinforce his standpoint. In one of his arguments, he asserts that *Muungano huu ni Jahanam kwa Wazanzibari* (this Union is hell to Zanzibaris). This is used to emphasise that the Union should be rethought.

5.7.2 Prototypical argumentative patterns

With respect to the first difference of opinion relating to the proposition that the (structure of the) Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar should be protected, strengthened, and maintained, the prototypical argumentative pattern by the Prime Minister and the Minister of State (Union) consists of a positive prescriptive standpoint, which is justified at the first level of defence by symptomatic argumentation which is combined in multiple argumentation with causal argumentation and authority argumentation. Although the opposition’s first standpoint suggests that the (structure of the) Union should be reviewed and reformed, I consider this standpoint as a substandpoint for the opposition’s negative standpoint that the (structure of the) Union should not be protected, strengthened, and maintained unless it is first reviewed and reformed. The opposition’s prescriptive (sub)standpoint (the Union should be reviewed and reformed) is justified at the first level of defence by majority argumentation and authority argumentation (by quotation) realising coordinative argumentation, which is combined in multiple argumentation with authority argumentation by quotation, symptomatic argumentation, and authority argumentation from populist appeal. A similar standpoint is expressed by Mr Kombo, who suggests that the Union should be rethought. This standpoint is justified by causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, and authority argumentation from populist appeal at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is mainly supported by symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation by quotation, experience-based authority argumentation, and causal argumentation.

In the second difference of opinion relating to the proposition that the minister's proposed budget should be approved, the prototypical argumentative pattern by Ms Hassan consists of a positive prescriptive standpoint, suggesting that the proposed budget should be approved, which is justified at the first level of defence by pragmatic argumentation which is combined in multiple argumentation with symptomatic argumentation. The minister is committed to defending her standpoint because she anticipates doubts or other critical reactions from the MPs, especially from members of the opposition.

The last difference of opinion relates to the proposition that the (structure of the) Union is a manifestation of huge exploitation and oppression of Zanzibar by Tanganyika or Zanzibar is exploited and oppressed by Tanganyika. A similar standpoint that relates to this proposition is expressed by Mr Mnyaa, who suggests that Zanzibar is highly exploited in the Union. Mr Lissu and Mr Mnyaa explicitly commit themselves to a positive descriptive standpoint, which is justified by authority argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, and causal argumentation at the first level of defence.

5.7.3 Argumentative style

As regards the arguers' argumentative style, in their first standpoints in the confrontation stage, both parties seem to employ an engaged argumentative style by selecting topics that show their close involvement in trying to achieve a particular political action. The ministers suggest that the Union should be protected, strengthened, and maintained in order to convince members of the electorate to endorse the two-government structure in the referendum. Mr Lissu and Mr Kombo suggest that the Union should be reviewed or rethought in order to get members of the electorate to reject the proposed constitution which proposes a two-government structure. The minister's second standpoint is based on what is to be discussed in the debate as she attempts to convince the parliament to approve the request for funds for her office (detached style). In the opposition's second standpoint, Mr Lissu selects another topic that could help to show his close involvement in the subject under discussion as he further emphasises that the Union is exploitative and oppressive in nature (engaged style). The initial argumentation in defence of the minister's standpoints is realised by the choice of symptomatic argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, causal argumentation, and authority argumentation at the first level of defence. Mr Lissu's initial argumentation for the opposition's standpoints is realised by a strategic choice of majority argumentation, authority argumentation by quotation, and symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence (engaged style). The topic choices by both Ms

Hassan and Mr Lissu in the opening stage consist of the ‘factual stating points (detached style) as both parties are required to observe the Standing Orders which provide such starting points for (critical) discussions in Tanzanian parliamentary debates. However, Mr Lissu, at the same time, appeals to evaluative starting points by strengthening group solidarity. Regarding audience adaptation in the confrontation stage, both parties emphatically connect with the interests of the audience in their first standpoints (the Union and the constitutional review), which realises an engaged style. The presentational devices by the ministers in the confrontation and opening stages are realised by the use of statistics and other formulations intended to indicate facts of the matter (detached). Mr Lissu’s presentational devices are manifested through the use of quotations, metaphors, and rhetorical questions (engaged).

In the argumentation stage, Ms Hassan selects only issues that she finds relevant to respond to (topical choice), and her argumentation is realised by the choice of authority argumentation, causal argumentation, and pragmatic argumentation. Ms Mkuya and Mr Madellu also select causal argumentation and authority argumentation in defence of their standpoints. Members of the opposition maintain the type of argumentation advanced in the confrontation stage. Ms Hassan’s audience adaptation in the argumentation stage involves arguing quasi-neutrally that the proposed budget, if approved, will achieve an indisputably positive result (detached). Based on the last year’s budget, Mr Lissu seems to suggest that, if the proposed budget for the coming year is approved, Zanzibar will continue to be exploited by Tanganyika (engaged). Ms Mkuya and Mr Madellu also rely on the budget statistics to present the opposition as people who cannot be trusted. Ms Hassan has, to some extent, maintained a formalistic expert language. However, Ms Hassan, Ms Mkuya, and Mr Madellu also employ metaphors, narratives, personal attacks, quotations, and sayings to reinforce their argumentation (engaged style). Mr Lissu has maintained the use of personal language reinforced by metaphors, quotations, and rhetorical questions (engaged style). In the concluding stage, the outcome of the (critical) discussion is determined by the vote or the relevant subdiscussion is institutionally concluded by the Chairperson.

5.8 Account-giving and responsibility depiction

In regard to the accusation that Zanzibar does not receive its rightful dividend of 4.5% from GBS, the account-giving strategy by the ministers realises *refusal/denial*. Ms Mkuya and Mr Madellu argue that Zanzibar has been receiving its rightful dividend of GBS as it deserves, which suggests that the failure event has never happened. Regarding the accusation that other

founders of the Union have been completely removed from the official history of the Union, Ms Hassan deploys *silence*, where she chooses not to account for the failure event. With respect to the failure event that Zanzibar has been given fewer positions of ambassadors in the Tanzanian embassies abroad, Ms Hassan seems to employ *concession*, where she admits that the failure event has happened and the government has put in a place a mechanism to revolve such a problem. With the use of concession, the minister accepts the responsibility for the failure event without necessarily denying the pejorative effect connected to it.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the analysis of the reconstructed parliamentary debate on the ‘controversial issues’ of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar through the pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. With exception of the concluding stage, the discussion stages in this debate seem to exemplify, at least to a certain degree, the pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. Regarding the rules for critical discussion, while some of them are largely adhered to by both parties (e.g. the freedom rule), other rules are (subconsciously) violated (e.g. relevance rule). Furthermore, all the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring are realised in the arguers’ argumentative moves. The prototypical argumentative pattern by the ministers consists of prescriptive standpoints which are justified by mainly pragmatic argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation, and causal argumentation. The opposition’s argumentative pattern in the first standpoint consists of a prescriptive standpoint which is justified by majority argumentation, authority argumentation by quotation, and symptomatic argumentation. In their second standpoint, the argumentative pattern consists of a descriptive standpoint which is justified by authority argumentation and symptomatic argumentation. The ministers seem to deploy a detached argumentative style in the first two stages. In the argumentation stage, both detached and engaged styles are realised in the ministers’ argumentative moves. The opposition’s spokesperson and other members of the opposition seem to maintain an engaged argumentative style in the confrontation and argumentation stages and in some part of the opening stage. In the concluding stage, the outcome of the main (critical) discussion and the subdiscussions is determined by the vote or the Chairperson’s decision. The ministers have employed concessions, refusals, and silence to account for failure events.

CHAPTER SIX

DEBATE ON THE ANNUAL BUDGET SPEECH BY THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a systematic pragma-dialectical analysis of the Tanzanian parliamentary debate on the annual budget speech of the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children for the 2015/16 fiscal year as presented to the Tanzanian parliament on 25th May 2015 by the then Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children, Ms Sophia Simba. Hence this chapter focuses on the transcribed spoken discourse as presented in the parliament. However, other segments of the minister's speech and MPs' written contributions (in the confrontation stage) that were not presented verbatim to the parliament but form part of the parliamentary official records are also included in the analysis because they contribute to the resolution process.

Like the previous two debates, this debate is analysed in terms of the four stages of a critical discussion as proposed by the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Thus section 6.2 analyses the confrontation stage, with a focus on the differences of opinion and the arguers' initial argumentation. Section 6.3 discusses the opening stage, with a focus on the arguers' discussion roles as well as material and procedural starting points. Section 6.4 concentrates on the argumentation stage, focusing on arguers' further argumentation and other (sub)standpoints. The concluding stage of the debate is discussed in section 6.5. Section 6.6 focuses on the arguers' adherence to or violation of the rules for critical discussion in this debate. In section 6.7, I pay close attention to the properties of argumentation in context (MPs' modes of strategic manoeuvring and self-presentation, prototypical argumentative patterns, and arguers' argumentative styles). Aspects of account-giving and the notion of responsibility are analysed in section 6.8. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter is presented in section 6.9.

6.2 Confrontation stage

As in the previous two debates, the differences of opinion in this debate manifest themselves through the opposition between Minister Sophia Simba's standpoints and non-acceptance of these standpoints by the opposition's spokesperson, Ms Esther Matiko, and some other MPs. Ms Simba's standpoints and initial argumentation are presented and discussed in section 6.2.1. The opposition's critical reactions to the minister's standpoints are presented and discussed in section 6.2.2. In section 6.2.3, Ms Simba's standpoints receive critical reactions from other

MPs coming from both her own party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), and the opposition parties, especially *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (Chadema).

6.2.1 The minister's standpoints and initial argumentation

I have reconstructed four standpoints and related argumentation from Ms Sophia Simba's annual ministerial budget speech. The first standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 6.2.1.1 and summarised in section 6.2.1.2. The second standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 6.2.1.3 and summarised in section 6.2.1.4. Ms Simba's third standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in section 6.2.1.5 and summarised in section 6.2.1.6. The minister's last standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented and discussed in 6.2.1.7 and summarised in section 6.2.1.8.

6.2.1.1 The minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's first standpoint and its related arguments are reconstructed from *Extract 6.1*. In this standpoint, the minister suggests that the ministry's proposed budget or request for funds for her ministry in the next fiscal year should be approved and advances related argumentation to justify the standpoint.

Extract 6.1

- (a) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [1]Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kufuatia Taarifa iliyowasilishwa leo ndani ya Bunge lako Tukufu na Mwenyekiti wa Kamati ya Kudumu ya Bunge ya Maendeleo ya Jamii, iliyoichambua bajeti ya Wizara yangu, naomba kutoa hoja kwamba, sasa Bunge lako Tukufu likubali kupokea, kujadili na kupitisha Makadirio ya Matumizi ya Kawaida ya Wizara ya Maendeleo ya Jamii, Jinsia na Watoto kwa Mwaka 2015/16. [...] [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ili Wizara yangu itekeleze majukumu na malengo yake kwa mwaka 2015/2016 sasa naliomba Bunge lako Tukufu liidhinishe matumizi ya Sh. 31,421,641,000/=. Kati ya fedha hizo: - (a) Sh. 11,038,075,000/= ni kwa ajili ya mishahara, (b) Sh. 9,460,146,000/= ni kwa ajili ya matumizi mengineyo; na (c) Sh. 10,923,420,000/= ni kwa ajili ya kutekeleza miradi ya maendeleo ambapo Sh. 8,000,000,000/= ni fedha za ndani na Sh. 2,923,420,000/= ni fedha za nje. [...] [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika mwaka 2014/15, Wizara yangu iliendelea kusimamia utekelezaji wa majukumu yake kulingana na malengo na shabaha zilizopangwa. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba kuwasilisha utekelezaji wa Mwaka 2014/15 na malengo ya mwaka 2015/16 kwa kuzingatia maeneo yafuatayo: - (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [1]Honourable Chairperson, following the report presented today to your august/esteemed parliament by the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Community Development, which reviewed the budget of my ministry, I beg to move that your august/esteemed parliament now accept to receive, debate and approve the estimates of the recurrent expenditure of the Ministry of Community Development Gender and Children for the 2015/16 fiscal year. [...] [2] Honourable Chairperson, in order for my ministry to [effectively] execute its responsibilities and objectives for 2015/16 fiscal year, I now ask your esteemed parliament to approve the expenditure budget of TZS 31,421,641,000/=. Out of this amount,

TZS 11,038,075,000/= is for salaries, TZS 9,460,146,000/= is for Other Charges (OC), and TZS 10,923,420,000/= is for implementing development projects, where TZS 8,000,000,000/= is from internal sources and TZS 2,923,420,000/= is from external sources. [...] [3] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, my ministry continued to supervise the execution of its responsibilities in accordance with the objectives and targets that were set. [4] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to present the execution of the 2014/15 [objectives/responsibilities] and the 2015/16 objectives by considering the following areas:

- (b) [1] Wizara imeendelea kutoa mafunzo ya Taaluma ya Maendeleo ya Jamii katika ngazi ya Astashahada ambapo jumla ya wanachuo 1,885 walidahiliwa katika mwaka 2014/15. [2] Aidha, katika Taasisi ya Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru wanachuo 276 walidahiliwa katika ngazi ya Shahada ambapo wanaume walikuwa 87 na wanawake 189. [3] Katika mwaka 2015/16, Wizara itaendelea kudahili na kutoa mafunzo kuanzia ngazi ya Astashahada hadi Stashahada ya Uzamili na [4] pia kukamilisha jengo la maktaba katika Chuo cha Tengeru, ujenzi wa uzio wa Chuo cha Rungemba na Ruaha, kujenga jenga la utawala na jengo la maktaba, ukumbi wa mikutano, nyumba za watumishi katika Chuo cha Uyole, kukarabati majengo na miundombinu katika Vyuo vya Buhare, Mlale, Ruaha, Mabughai, Missungwi na Monduli. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika mwaka 2014/15, Vyuo vitano vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi vya Sofi, Mputa, Kilwa Masoko, Tarime, [na] Mwanhala vilifanyiwa ukarabati wa madarasa, mabweni, majengo ya utawala, ujenzi wa vyoo, mabwalo ya kulia chakula, miundombinu ya umeme, maji safi na maji taka. [6] Aidha, Vyuo vya Nandembo, Sengerema na Chala vilipewa magari ili yatumike kwa usafiri na kutolea mafunzo kwa vitendo. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] The ministry continued to provide professional training in community development at certificate level, where a total of 1,885 students were enrolled in 2014/15. [2] Additionally, Tengeru Institute of Community Development enrolled 276 students at undergraduate level, where 87 students are male students and 189 are female students. [3] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to enrol students and offer training from certificate level to postgraduate diploma. [4] The ministry will also complete the construction of a library building at Tengeru, construction of fences at Rungemba and Ruaha, the construction of administration and library buildings, a conference hall, and staff residential houses at Uyole, and renovate buildings and infrastructures at Buhare, Mlale, Ruaha, Mabughai, Missungwi, and Monduli CDTIs. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, the ministry renovated classroom, dormitory and administration buildings, constructed toilets, dining halls, and installed electricity, water and sewerage systems in five Folk Development Colleges (FDCs): Sofi, Mputa, Kilwa Masoko, Tarime, and Mwanhala. [6] Moreover, Nandembo, Sengerema, and Chala FDCs received vehicles for transport and practical training.

- (c) [1] Katika mwaka wa fedha wa 2015/16, Wizara itaendelea kuboresha maeneo ya kutolea mafunzo kwa kujenga madarasa, nyumba za watumishi na majengo ya utawala katika Vyuo vya Ilula na Newala, kuweka mfumo wa umeme katika Vyuo vya Munguri, Ulembwe, Rubondo, Msingi, Malya na Mwanhala na [2] kugharimia upimaji wa upatikanaji wa Hati Miliki wa Vyuo vya Ifakara, Ikwiriri, Msingi, Mwanva, Musoma, Arnautoglu, Chilala, Kilwa Masoko, Chisalu na Kisarawe ili kupunguza migogoro inayosababishwa na wananchi kuvamia maeneo ya vyuo kwa shughuli za kilimo na ujenzi wa makazi. [3] Hata hivyo, Wizara bado inakabiliwa na upungufu mkubwa wa watumishi hasa wa kada ya ukufunzi katika Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi na Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Jamii. [4] Katika kukabiliana na changamoto hizi, Wizara imepeleka maombi Ofisi ya Ofisi Menejimenti ya Utumishi wa Umma kwa ajili ya kupata kibali cha kuwaajiri watumishi wa kada mbalimbali. [5] Mwaka 2015/2016 Wizara itaendelea kuomba kibali cha kuwaajiri watumishi ili kupunguza pengo lililopo. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] In the 2015/16 fiscal year, the ministry will continue to improve teaching environment by constructing classroom buildings, staff residential houses, and administration buildings at Ilula and Newala FDCs, installing electricity systems at Munguri, Ulembwe, Rubondo, Msingi, Malya and Mwanhala FDCs, and [2] paying for the survey and acquisition of title deeds for Ifakara, Ikwiriri, Msingi, Mwanva, Musoma, Arnautoglu, Chilala, Kilwa Masoko, Chisalu, and

Kisarawe FDCs in order to reduce conflicts caused by the invasion of the colleges' areas by villagers for agricultural activities and residence. [3] However, the ministry still faces a shortage of employees especially professional tutors in FDCs and CDTIs. [4] In addressing this challenge, the ministry has submitted an application to the Office of the Public Service Management for a permit to employ professionals with various expertise. [5] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to apply for the permit to employ [public] servants in order to narrow the existing gap.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ili kufikia lengo la kuwepo kwa usawa wa jinsia, uingizaji wa masuala ya jinsia katika mipango, mikakati na bajeti, sera na programu mbalimbali, bado unaendelea kutiliwa mkazo. [2] Katika kipindi cha mwaka 2014/15, Wizara iliendesha mafunzo ya ukusanyaji wa takwimu zilizochambuliwa kijinsia kwa maafisa 50 kutoka Wizara mbalimbali, Taasisi zisizo za Serikali na Taasisi za Elimu. [3] Taarifa hizo zitatumwa na serikali pamoja na wadau mbalimbali katika kufanya maamuzi, ushawishi, utungaji sera na mipango mbalimbali ya maendeleo kwa kuzingatia usawa wa jinsia. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara kupitia vikao vya robo mwaka vya kikundi cha uingizaji wa masuala ya kijinsia katika Sera za Kitaifa na Kisekta (Gender Mainstreaming Working Group for Macro Policies) imeweza kuandaa Mwongozo wa Uingizaji wa Masuala ya Jinsia katika Mpango wa Matokeo Makubwa Sasa (Big Results Now – BRN). [5] Lengo ni kuwezesha kuwepo kwa matokeo makubwa kwa kuzingatia mahitaji ya makundi yote ya wanawake na wanaume. [6] Mwaka 2015/16, Wizara itaendelea kuratibu uingizaji wa masuala ya jinsia katika Sera za Kitaifa pamoja na kujenga uwezo kuhusu uingizaji wa masuala ya kijinsia (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015).

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in order to achieve the objective of having gender equality, gender mainstreaming in national plans, strategies and budget, policies, and various programmes is still being given huge emphasis. [2] In 2014/15, the ministry collected gender-based statistics from 50 officers from different ministries, Non-Governmental Organizations, and education institutions. [3] The statistics will be used by the government and other stakeholders for making decisions, motivating the public, formulating policies, and other development programmes by considering gender equality. [4] Honourable Chairperson, the ministry, through the quarterly meetings of the Gender Mainstreaming Working Group for Macro Policies, has managed to prepare guidelines for gender mainstreaming in the Big Result Now (BRN) initiative. [5] The aim is to facilitate big results by considering all groups of women and men. [6] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to coordinate gender mainstreaming in the national macro policies and capacity building in gender mainstreaming.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Benki ya Wanawake Tanzania ni mali ya umma inayomilikiwa kwa kiasi kikubwa na Serikali ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [2] Katika mwaka, 2014/15, Benki ilitoa mikopo kwa wajasiriamali wapatao 10,847. [3] Kati ya idadi hiyo wanawake ni 8,165 sawa na asilimia 75 ya wateja wote waliopatiwa mikopo. [4] Thamani ya mikopo iliyotolewa ni kiasi cha Shilingi bilioni kumi na mbili milioni mia nne sitini na tisa laki sita na hamsini. [5] Kati ya kiasi hicho, jumla ya Shilingi bilioni nane mia tano sitini na moja laki mbili zilikopeshwa kwa wanawake, sawa na asilimia 69 ya mikopo iliyotolewa. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika mwaka 2015/16, Benki inatarajia kuendelea kutoa huduma zake katika maeneo mengi zaidi kupitia njia [ya] Wakala wa Benki (Agency Banking) kwa kufungua ofisi za kutolea huduma za mikopo mikoani. [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa mwaka 2014/15, Mfuko wa Wanawake umetoa jumla ya Shilingi milioni thelathini na moja kwa Halmashauri tatu ambazo ni Bunda, Iringa pamoja [na] Mkalama. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, Tanzania Women's Bank (TWB) is a public entity owned, to large extent, by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. [2] In 2014/15, the bank provided loans to approximately 10,847 entrepreneurs, [3] where 8,165 are women, equivalent to 75% of all the customers who received the loans. [4] The total loans provided are worth TZS 12,469,650,000. [5] Out of the total loans provided, loans amounting to TZS 8,561,200,000 (which is 69% of the total amount) were provided to women. [6] Honourable Chairperson, in

2015/16, the bank intends to continue providing its services to the community in many other areas through Agency Banking by opening offices for loan provision in various regions. [7] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, the Women [Development] Fund provided a total of TZS 31,000,000 to three (district) councils; Bunda, Iringa, [and] Mkalama.

- (f) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika mwaka 2014/15, Wizara iliandaa Mpango Kazi wa Taifa wa Miaka Mitano wa Ushiriki wa Ushiriki wa Watoto (2014-2019). [2] Lengo la Mpango Kazi huu ni kuongeza ushiriki wa Watoto katika masuala mbalimbali yanayowahusu. [3] Katika mwaka 2015/16, Wizara itaendelea kusambaza mpango kazi huu katika Halmshauri za Wilaya. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara imekamilisha uandaaji wa Rasimu ya Sera ya Malezi, Makuzi na Maendeleo ya Mtoto pamoja na Mkakati wake wa Utekelezaji. [5] Sera hii ipo katika ngazi za juu za maamuzi kwa ajili ya kupitishwa. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara [iliendelea] kuratibu utoaji wa taarifa zinazohusu vitendo vya ukatili dhidi ya Watoto kwa kushirikiana na Asasi isiyokuwa ya Kiserikali ya C-SEMA, [7] ambapo kati ya mwezi Julai 2014 na Machi 2015, jumla ya simu 21,960 zilipigwa kupitia mtandao wa simu namba 116. [8] Taarifa hizo zilishughulikiwa kulingana na aina ya tatizo au suala lililowasilishwa. [9] Katika mwaka 2015/16, Wizara itaendelea kuratibu utoaji wa huduma hii kwa kushirikiana na asasi husika. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15 the ministry prepared a five-year National Plan of Action for Child Participation (2014-2019). [2] The purpose of the action plan is to promote child participation in various issues that concern them. [3] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to spread this plan to the district councils. [4] Honourable Chairperson, the ministry has completed the preparation of a draft policy on early childhood development and its implementation strategy. [5] This draft policy is at higher levels of decision-making for approval. [6] Honourable Chairperson, the ministry continued to coordinate the collection of information on incidents of violence against children in collaboration with C-SEMA. [7] Between July 2014 and March 2015, a total of 21,960 calls were received through the helpline 116. [8] We worked on the information received according to the type of problem or issue presented. [9] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to coordinate this programme in collaboration with the same organization.

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika mwaka 2014/15, Wizara yangu iliandaa vipindi vya runinga na redio, matangazo kupitia magazeti, vipeperushi na mabango, mikutano ya waandishi wa habari kwa ajili ya kuelimisha umma kuhusu masuala ya maendeleo ya jamii, jinsia na haki za Watoto na uratibu wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali. [2] Aidha, kwa kushirikiana na UNICEF, Wizara yangu imeandaa kipindi maalum cha 'WALINDE WATOTO' ambacho kinatangazwa kupitia redio 14 zenye usikivu wa kitaifa na kikanda Tanzania Bara na Zanzibar. [3] Lengo la kipindi ni kuhamasisha wadau wa maendeleo ya mtoto kushiriki kikamilifu katika jitihada za kuzuia na kutokomeza ukatili dhidi ya Watoto. [4] Katika mwaka 2015/16, Wizara itaendelea na kuhamasisha, kuelimisha na kushawishi umma kuhusu masuala ya maendeleo ya jamii, jinsia, haki za Watoto na uratibu wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mwaka 2014/15, Wizara yangu ilizindua rasmi Zana ya Mawasiliano kwa ajili ya kuzuia ukatili dhidi ya Watoto yenye lengo la kueleemisha wazazi, Watoto, wanahabari na wanajamii, jinsi ya kujizuia na kutoa taarifa kuhusu matukio mbalimbali ya ukatili dhidi ya mtoto ambapo nakala 1,000 za zana hizo zilisambazwa kwa wadau wa masuala ya ulinzi na haki za Watoto hapa nchini. [6] Katika mwaka 2015/16, Wizara itasambaza nakala 2,000 za zana hizo na kuratibu utekelezaji wake. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, my ministry prepared television and radio programmes, newspaper ads, leaflets, and posters, as well as press conferences in order to educate the public about community development, gender, children's rights, and the coordination of Non-Governmental Organisations. [2] Moreover, in collaboration with UNICEF, my ministry has been hosting a special programme known as 'WALINDE WATOTO' (PROTECT THE CHILDREN) which is broadcast through 14 radio stations with local and regional emission coverage in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. [3] The goal of the programme is to encourage and motivate child development stakeholders to fully participate in

the efforts to prevent and eliminate violence against children. [4] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to provide [civic] education and advocacy on issues of community development, gender, children's rights, and the coordination of Non-Governmental Organisations. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, my ministry launched an open communication tool for the prevention of violence against children, aimed at educating parents, children, the media, and community members on how to prevent and report various incidents of violence against children, where 1,000 copies of the tool were distributed to stakeholders of child protection and children's rights in the country. [6] In 2015/16, the ministry will distribute 2,000 copies of the tool and coordinate its implementation.

From *Extract 6.1*, the minister's first standpoint is expressed in (a) [1] and can be reconstructed as *1 the ministry's proposed budget of TZS 31 billion for the 2015/16 fiscal should be approved*. This standpoint is mainly defended by pragmatic argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation with symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence. The first argument in the coordinative argumentation is advanced in (a) [3-4], where the minister seems to suggest that *1.1a the ministry executed its objectives/responsibilities effectively in the last fiscal year*. The unexpressed premise for this argument implies that the effective execution of the ministerial objectives/responsibilities in the previous fiscal year is a sign that the ministry is likely to effectively execute its objectives/responsibilities in the coming fiscal year, and for this reason, the ministry's proposed budget for the next fiscal year should be approved. Argument *1.1a* is coordinatively combined with the argument that *1.1b the proposed budget will enable the ministry to effectively execute its objectives/responsibilities in the 2015/16 fiscal year*, as expressed in (a) [2]. In the implicit premise, it is suggested that, if the proposed budget will enable the ministry to effectively execute its objectives or responsibilities in the next fiscal year, the proposed budget should be approved. This argument demonstrates pragmatic argumentation. The basic critical question that should be answered for this subtype of causal argumentation to be considered reasonable is whether it is indeed a foregone conclusion that the ministry will achieve the desired effect. Another critical question is whether there are no possible impediments to the execution foreseen. Probably, some aspects of the ministry's plans or projects could be challenging with regard to the possible obstacles that could hinder or prevent complete or effective execution of the objectives/responsibilities. For instance, it is questionable whether the requested TZS 31 billion is enough for the ministry to 'effectively' execute all its objectives/responsibilities. This amount of money could be considered too little. In fact, in section 6.1.3 some MPs raise this doubt.

Further argumentation in defence of *1.1a* and *1.1b* is presented in the rest of the extract. I will first concentrate on the argumentation in favour of *1.1a*. Five arguments at the second level of defence are advanced as proof of the ministry's effective execution of its ministerial

objectives/responsibilities in the 2014/15 fiscal year. The first argument is advanced in (b) and (c). The minister's discourse in (b) and (c) suggests that *1.1a.1 the ministry improved teaching environment in CDTIs/FDCs and trained students in community development*. This argument realises symptomatic argumentation; improvement in teaching environment and provision of training are considered to be proofs or signs of the ministry's effective execution of its objectives or responsibilities in the last fiscal year. This argument is further supported by four other arguments at the third level of defence. In (b) [5], the minister argues that the ministry constructed/renovated various buildings (classrooms, dormitories, administration buildings, toilets, dining halls) and installed electricity as well as water and sewerage systems in five FDCs (Kilwa Masoko, Mputa, Mwanhala, Sofi, and Tarime). The second supporting argument for *1.1a.1* is advanced in (b) [1], where the minister maintains that the ministry enrolled 1,885 students at certificate level (in various CDTIs) and 276 students at undergraduate level at Tengeru Institute of Community Development (TICD), which seems to realise authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation. The third argument is expressed in (b) [6], where the minister argues that the ministry has improved (or made efforts to improve) teaching environment by providing vehicles for transport and practical training to Nandembo, Sengerema, and Chala FDCs (symptomatic argumentation). The last argument at the third level is reconstructed from (c) [3-4]. This argument begins with a premise that the ministry is facing an acute shortage of professional tutors in FDCs and CDTIs, as presented in (c) [3]. In (c) [4], the minister further maintains that, to address this challenge, the ministry has submitted to the President's Office (Public Service Management) an application for a permit to employ various public employees, including the tutors (practical or problem-solving argumentation). The minister's first argument in defence of *1.1a* at the second level of defence with four supporting arguments at the third level is summarised in *Table 6.1* below.

Table 6.1 The minister's first argument for 1.1a

1.1a.1	The ministry improved teaching environment in FDCs/CDTIs and trained students in community development
(1.1a.1')	(This is a proof that the ministry effectively executed its objectives/responsibilities in the last fiscal year)
1.1a.1.1	It constructed/renovated various buildings (classrooms, dormitories, administration buildings, toilets, and dining halls) and installed electricity, water and sewerage systems in five FDCs (Kilwa Masoko, Mputa, Mwanhala, Tarime, Sofi)
1.1a.1.2	It enrolled 1,885 students at certificate level (at various CDTIs) and 276 at undergraduate level at TICD
1.1a.1.3	It provided vehicles for transport and practical training to Nandembo, Sengerema, and Chala FDCs
1.1a.1.4	It has applied for a permit to employ professional tutors for FDCs and CDTIs

The second argument in defence of *1.1a* is reconstructed from (d) and (e), where the minister suggests that *1.1a.2 the ministry made various efforts to promote gender equality and women's economic empowerment (WEE)*, which is taken to constitute a sign that the ministry effectively executed its objectives or responsibilities in the last fiscal year (symptomatic argumentation). In support of this argument, first, as expressed in (d) [1], the minister argues that the ministry took the initiative for gender mainstreaming in the national macro policies (budget, plans, programmes, and strategies). For instance, in (d) [2], she argues that the ministry collected gender-based statistics from 50 officers of different ministries, NGOs, and education institutions. In (d) [3], the minister maintains that the statistics will be used by the government and various stakeholders to ensure that decision-making, development plans, and policies consider gender equality (causal argumentation from means to goal). In (d) [4], she states that the ministry, through the Gender Mainstreaming Working Group for Macro Policies, has managed to prepare a set of guidelines on gender mainstreaming in the Big Results Now initiative. In (d) [5], the minister further maintains that the guidelines will enable the attainment of 'big results' to consider the needs of all groups of women and men (pragmatic argumentation). Another point of argumentation suggests that the ministry in the last fiscal year empowered women economically. In support of this argument, in (e) [3], she maintains that the Tanzania Women's Bank (TWB), which is, in (e) [1], described as a public entity owned by the government, provided loans to 8,165 women, equivalent to 75% of its clients (authority argumentation from statistics). In (e) [5], the minister further states that 69% of the total amount of loans (TZS 8.5 billion out of TZS 12.4 billion) was provided to women (authority argumentation from statistics). In the other argument, as indicated in (e) [7], Ms Simba argues that, in the 2014/15 fiscal year, the ministry, through the Women Development Fund (WDF), provided TZS 31 million to three district councils (Bunda, Iringa, and Mkalama). This argument also demonstrates authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation as the minister appeals to the 'official' statistics indicating the amount of money provided to the district councils. Generally, the minister's second argument in defence of *1.1a* is summarised in **Table 6.2** below.

Table 6.2 The minister's second argument for 1.1a

1.1a.2	The ministry made various efforts to promote gender equality and WEE
(1.1a.2')	(The efforts made are a sign of the ministry's commitment to effectively execute its objectives/responsibilities in the previous fiscal year)
1.1a.2.1	It took the initiative for gender mainstreaming in the national macro policies
1.1a.2.1.1	It prepared guidelines for gender mainstreaming in the BRN initiative
1.1a.2.1.1.1	The guidelines will enable the attainment of 'big results' to consider the needs of all groups of women and men

1.1a.2.1.2	It collected gender-based statistics from 50 officers of various ministries, NGOs, and education institutions
1.1a.2.1.2.1	The statistics will be used by the govt and stakeholders to ensure that decision-making, development plans, and policies observe gender equality
1.1a.2.2	It empowered women economically
1.1a.2.2.1	TWB provided loans to 8,165 women (75% of the clients)
1.1a.2.2.1.1	These women received 69% of the provided loans (TZS 8.5 out of TZS 12.4 billion)
1.1a.2.2.2	The WDF provided TZS 31 million to three district councils (Bunda, Iringa, and Mkalama)

The third argument in support of *1.1a* is reconstructed from subextract (f), where the minister's discourse suggests that *1.1a.3 the ministry effectively coordinated child development matters in the 2014/15 fiscal year*, which is also considered a sign of the ministry's effective execution of its objectives/responsibilities in the last fiscal year (symptomatic argumentation). This point of argumentation is further defended by two supporting arguments, which realise multiple argumentation. In (f) [1], the minister argues that the ministry has prepared a five-year National Plan of Action for Child Participation (2014-2019). In (f) [2], she maintains that the action plan will increase the participation of children in the issues that affect them (pragmatic argumentation). Another line of defence is indicated in (f) [4], where she argues that the ministry completed the preparation of a draft policy for early childhood development and its implementation strategy. It is further maintained in (f) [5] that the policy is at the higher levels of decision-making for approval. In the other argument, as presented in (f) [6], she argues that the ministry continued to collect information on incidents of violence against children in collaboration with C-SEMA. To further support this point of argumentation, in (f) [7], the minister states that, between July 2014 and March 2015, the ministry received 21,960 calls through the helpline 116, providing information on violence against children (authority argumentation from statistics). In (g) [8], the minister further maintains that the minister worked on the information received according to the type of incident presented. Specifically, the minister's third argument in defence of *1.1a* is summarised in **Table 6.3**.

Table 6.3 The minister's third argument for 1.1a

No.	Description
1.1a.3	The ministry effectively coordinated child development matters
(1.1a.3')	(Effective coordination of child development matters is a sign of the ministry's effective execution of its objectives/responsibilities in the last fiscal year)
1.1a.3.1	It has prepared a five-year action plan for child participation (2014-2019)
1.1a.3.1.1	The plan will increase child participation in the matters that affect/concern them
1.1a.3.2	It has prepared a draft policy for early childhood development
1.1a.3.2.1	The policy is at the higher levels of decision-making for approval
1.1a.3.3	It collected information on violence against children from the community
1.1a.3.3.1	It received 21,960 calls through the helpline 116
1.1a.3.3.1.1	It worked on the information received based on the incident presented

The minister's fourth argument in favour of *1.1a* is advanced in (g) [1], where the minister suggests that *1.1a.4a the ministry used various methods to educate the public about community development, gender, and children's rights* (causal argumentation from means to goal), which is combined with the argument that *1.1a.4b these methods include radio/TV programmes, newspaper ads, leaflets/posters, and press conferences* (argumentation from example). In support of *1.1a.4a*, in (g) [2], the minister argues that the ministry, in collaboration with United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), has been organising a special radio programme known as *Walinde Watoto* (Protect the Children), which is broadcast through 14 radio stations with national and regional coverage in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. In (g) [3], the minister further maintains that the purpose of the programme is to motivate child development stakeholders to fully participate in the efforts to prevent and eliminate violence against children (causal argumentation from means to goal). A further point of argumentation is advanced in (g) [5], where the minister argues that her ministry launched a communication tool for preventing violence against children. 1,000 copies of the tools were distributed to various stakeholders of child protection and children's rights (statistical argumentation). According to the minister, the purpose of this communication tool is to educate parents, children, the media, and the general community on how to prevent violence against children (causal argumentation from means to goal). The minister's fourth subargument is summarised in *Table 6.4*.

Table 6.4 The minister's fourth argument for 1.1a

No.	Description
1.1a.4a	The ministry used various methods to educate the public about community development, gender, and children's rights
(1.1a.4a')	(The methods used helped the ministry to achieve the goal of educating the community)
1.1a.4b	These methods include radio/TV programmes, newspaper ads, leaflets/posters, and press conferences
1.1a.4a.1	It has been organising a special radio programme (<i>Walinde Watoto</i>)
1.1a.4a.1.1	The purpose of the programme is to urge stakeholders of child development to fully participate in preventing violence against children
1.1a.4a.1.2	The programme is broadcast in 14 radio stations with national and regional coverage in both Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar
1.1a.4a.2	It launched a communication tool for preventing violence against children
1.1a.4a.2.1	The goal of the tool is to educate the community on how to report and prevent incidents of violence against children
1.1a.4a.2.2	It provided 1,000 copies of the tool to stakeholders of child protection and children's rights

I have reconstructed four arguments in defence of the argument that *1.1a the ministry executed its objectives/responsibilities effectively in 2014/2015*. These arguments (and the supporting

arguments) demonstrate mainly symptomatic argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), and causal argumentation from means to goal. I will next focus on the related argumentation in defence of argument *1.1b*, which has been reconstructed as *the proposed budget will enable the ministry to effectively execute its objectives/responsibilities in the 2015/16 fiscal year*. As already pointed out, the minister's second argument realises pragmatic argumentation, as indicated in the unexpressed premise (*1.2' if the proposed budget will enable the ministry to effectively execute its objectives/responsibilities, the proposed budget should be approved*). Like argument *1.1a*, this argument is defended by four arguments corresponding to the same areas as the previous four arguments in support of *1.1a*. The supporting arguments for *1.1b* are advanced from subextract (b) to subextract (g).

First, the minister argues that *1.1b.1 the ministry will continue to improve teaching environment in CDTIs and FDCs and provide professional training in community development*. This argument is defended by four (sub)arguments, realising multiple argumentation. One of them is presented in (c) [1] and (d) [4]. In (c) [1], the minister maintains that the ministry will construct various buildings (classrooms, staff residence, and administration buildings) and install electricity systems at various FDCs (Ilula, Malya, Msingi, Munguri, Mwanhala, Newala, Rubondo, and Ulembwe). In (b) [4], the minister further maintains that the ministry will construct and rehabilitate/renovate buildings and infrastructures at various CDTIs (Buhare, Mabughai, Missungwi, Mlale, Monduli, Ruaha, Rungemba, and Uyole), and at TICD. In (b) [3], she argues that the ministry will continue to provide professional training in community development from certificate level to postgraduate diploma level. In (c) [2], the minister maintains that the ministry will cover the costs for survey and acquisition of title deeds for various FDCs (Arnautoglu, Chilala, Chisalu, Ifakara, Ikwiriri, Kilwa Masoko, Kisarawe, Msingi, Musoma, and Mwanva). The minister suggests in this argument that this will reduce conflicts caused by community members who invade the FDCs' areas for agricultural activities and residence, implicitly suggesting that it is a good thing to reduce these conflicts (pragmatic argumentation). Another argument in support of *1.1b.1* is expressed in (c) [5], where the minister argues that the ministry will continue to apply for the permit to employ professional tutors to reduce the existing shortage of the tutors in CDTIs and FDCs (pragmatic argumentation).

Second, the minister argues that *1.1b.2 the ministry will continue to promote gender equality and Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE)*. This argument is defended by two supporting arguments, realising multiple argumentation. In (d) [6], Ms Simba argues that the ministry will continue to coordinate gender mainstreaming for national macro policies and capacity building for the gender mainstreaming initiative. Moreover, in (e) [6], the minister argues that, to promote WEE, the TWB will provide its financial services in many other areas through Agency banking by opening loans offices in different regions of Tanzania (pragmatic argumentation).

Third, the minister maintains that *1.1b.3 the ministry will continue to coordinate child development matters*. This argument is further supported by two arguments, realising multiple argumentation. In (f) [3], she argues that the ministry will continue to spread the five-year national Plan of Action for Child Participation (2014-2019) to the district councils. Another supporting argument is expressed in (f) [9], where the minister argues that the ministry will continue to collect information on incidents of violence against children and work on it.

Fourth, the minister maintains that *1.1b.4 the ministry will continue to use various methods to educate the public about community development, gender, and children's rights*, implying that the methods will be used as the means to achieve the goal of educating the public (causal argumentation from means to goal). This argument is further defended by another argument in (g) [6], where the minister argues that the ministry will distribute 2,000 copies of the communication tool for preventing violence against children and coordinate its implementation. These four subarguments and supporting argumentation in defence of argument *1.1b* demonstrate mainly pragmatic argumentation and causal argumentation from means to goal, and can be summarised as shown in **Table 6.5** below.

Table 6.5 The minister's arguments for 1.1b

No.	Description
1.1b.1	The ministry will continue to improve teaching environment in CDTIs and FDCs and provide community development training
1.1b.1.1	It will construct and rehabilitate various buildings/infrastructures (administration buildings, classrooms, staff houses) and install electricity systems in various CDTIs and FDCs: Buhare, Ilula, Mabughai, Malya, Missungwi, Mlale, Monduli, Msingi, Munguri, Mwanhala, Newala, Ruaha, Rubondo, Ulembwe, and Uyole
1.1b.1.2	It will enrol students and train them in community development from certificate level to postgraduate level
1.1b.1.3	It will cover the costs for survey and acquisition of title deeds for various FDCs: Arnautoglu, Chilala, Chisalu, Ifakara, Ikwiriri, Kilwa Masoko, Kisarawe, Msingi, Musoma, and Mwanva

1.1b.1.3.1	This will reduce conflicts caused by community members who invade the FDCs' areas for cultivation activities and residence
1.1b.1.4	It will continue to apply for the permit to employ professional tutors for CDTIs/FDCs
1.1b.2	It will continue to promote gender equality and WEE
1.1b.2.1a	It will continue to coordinate gender mainstreaming for national macro policies
1.1b.2.1b	It will continue to build capacity for gender mainstreaming initiative
1.1b.2.2	TWB will provide its financial services in many other areas through agency banking
1.1b.2.2.1	It will open offices for provision of loans in those areas
1.1b.3	It will continue to coordinate child development matters
1.1b.3.1	It will spread the five-year action plan for child participation to the district councils
1.1b.3.2a	It will continue to collect information on violence against children
1.1b.3.2b	It will work on the information received based on the type of incident presented
1.1b.4	It will continue to use various methods to educate the public about community development, gender, and children's rights
1.1b.4.1	It will distribute 2,000 copies of the communication tool for preventing violence against children

One of the critical questions that could be raised against the minister's pragmatic argumentation is whether the TZS 31 billion requested by the minister will indeed enable the ministry to achieve what it promises to achieve. Regarding the speech acts performed, the minister performs the assertive by expressing the minister's first standpoint and advancing argumentation in defence of the standpoint.

6.2.1.2 Summary of the minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's first standpoint and its related argumentation can be summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 5.1. This schematic overview serves as a summary of Ms Sophia Simba's first standpoint and its related argumentation in a single diagram. Hence not all arguments in the second and next levels of defence are presented. Implicit premises are also excluded but can be referred to the previous tables.




Figure 6.1 Summary of the minister's first standpoint and related argumentation

In terms argumentation schemes, the minister's prescriptive standpoint is justified by pragmatic argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation with symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, symptomatic argumentation is defended by symptomatic argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), and causal argumentation from means to goal, while pragmatic argumentation is mainly justified by another pragmatic argumentation and causal argumentation from means to goal.

6.2.1.3 The minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's second standpoint (and its related argumentation) is reconstructed from *Extract 6.2*. In order to understand Ms Simba's detailed argumentation in defence of the minister's second standpoint, *Extract 6.2* includes segments of the minister's written speech that form part of the minister's further argumentation for this standpoint. It should be noted that the minister's discourse as presented from subextract (b) to subextract (e) in *Extract 6.2* was not

presented verbatim in the parliament. However, this discourse forms part of the parliamentary Hansard transcripts retrieved from the *Bunge's* website (www.parliament.go.tz/hansards-list) and is relevant to this analysis.

Extract 6.2

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara yangu imetekeleza Ilani ya Uchaguzi ya CCM katika kipindi cha mwaka 2005 hadi 2015. [2] Maeneo makuu manne yalitekelezwa yanahusu: Ajira na Uwezeshaji wa Wananchi; Elimu ya Juu, Uendeshaji wa Makundi Mbalimbali; na Demokrasia na Madaraka ya Umma. [3] Katika kipindi husika, utekelezaji wa maeneo hayo umekuwa wa mafanikio kama inavyoelezwa kwa kirefu kwenye Kitabu cha Hotuba yangu, ukurasa wa 4 hadi 9. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- [1] Honourable Chairperson, my ministry has [effectively] implemented the CCM's election manifesto for the period between 2005 and 2015. [2] The four major areas covered are employment and people empowerment, higher education, development of different social groups, as well as democracy and public administration. [3] During this period, the implementation of the manifesto in these areas has been very successful, as explained in my budget speech book from page 4 to page 9.*
- (b) [1] Mheshimwa Spika, Udahili wa washiriki katika Elimu ya Wananchi na ufundi stadi kupitia vyuo vyetu vya maendeleo ya wananchi umeongezeka kutoka washiriki 25,486 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia washiriki 40,692 mwaka 2015 na [2] idadi ya wasichana waliopata mafunzo ya “Mama course” iliongezeka kutoka 60 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia wasichana 449 mwaka 2014. [3] Wizara yangu ilibuni “mama course” mwaka 2000 kwa lengo la kuwapa wasichana waliopata mimba wakiwa shuleni fursa ya kujiendeleza kielimu kupitia mafunzo ya elimu ya wananchi baada ya kupoteza fursa hiyo katika mifumo rasmi kutokana na kanuni na taratibu za uendeshaji wa Elimu ya Msingi na Sekondari Tanzania. [4] Aidha, kwa mwaka, jumla ya washiriki 36,838 walihitimu katika Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi [...]. [5] Wahitimu 33,319 sawa na asilimia 90.44 ya wahitimu kutoka katika vyuo vya Maendeleo ya wananchi wamejiajiri na wahitimu 3,047 sawa na asilimia 8.27 ya wahitimu wa Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi wameajiriwa katika makampuni ya watu binafsi na Taasisi mbalimbali za Serikali (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015).
- [1] Honourable Speaker, participant enrolment in Folk Development Colleges (FDCs) has increased from 25,486 participants in 2005 to 40,692 in 2015 and [2] the number of girls who received ‘mama course’ training increased from 60 girls in 2005 to 449 in 2014. [3] My ministry initiated ‘mama course’ in 2000 to give girls who dropped out from school due to pregnancies another opportunity for education through folk education after being deprived of this opportunity in the formal education system due to the regulations and procedures for the provision of primary and secondary education in Tanzania. [4] Moreover, a total of 36,838 participants graduated from FDCs [last] year. [5] 33,319 graduates, equivalent to 90.44% of the graduates from FDCs, are self-employed and 3,047 graduates, equivalent to 8.27%, are employed in various private companies and public institutions.*
- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Wizara iliwasilisha taarifa za 3, 4, za 5 ya Nchi yetu kuhusu utekelezaji wa Mkataba wa Kimataifa wa Haki za Mtoto. [2] Aidha, Wizara inaandaa taarifa ya 2 na 3 ya utekelezaji wa Mkataba wa Afrika Kuhusu Haki na Ustawi wa Mtoto [3] ambayo itawasilishwa katika Kamati ya Umoja wa Afrika ya Haki na Ustawi wa Mtoto. [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, Wizara imeandaa na kuanza kutekeleza Mpango Kazi wa Taifa wa Miaka Mitano wa Ushiriki wa Watoto. [5] Mpango huo utatoa fursa kwa wazazi na walezi kujifunza njia bora za mawasiliano na mahusiano mazuri katika yao na Watoto. [6] Aidha, Mpango kazi huo utabainisha namna ya kuwashirikisha Watoto katika majadiliano na hata kunufaika na michango yao kimawazo, kiushauri na katika utekelezaji wa maamuzi mbalimbali ya kutatua matatizo yao. [7] Mheshimiwa Spika, Serikali imeendelea kuwahamasisha wanawake

kujijengeza kielimu na kujenga uelewa wao katika kuweka nguvu za kutetea haki zao na kushiriki kikamilifu katika shughuli za kimaendeleo. [8] Aidha, wanawake wamejengewa uwezo wa ujasiriamali, utaalamu wa biashara, jinsi ya kupata mitaji, masoko pamoja na [9] kutoa mikopo mbalimbali (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015).

[1] Honourable Speaker, the ministry presented three national reports (3, 4, and 5) on the implementation of the international Convention on the Rights of the Child. [2] Moreover, the ministry has prepared other two reports (2 and 3) on the implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, [3] which will be presented in the AU's African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. [4] Honourable Speaker, the ministry has prepared and started implementing the five-year National Plan of Action for Child Participation. [5] This action plan will provide an opportunity for parents and guardians to learn better ways of communication and good relations with children. [6] Additionally, the action plan will specify how to involve children in discussions and benefit from their contributions of ideas, advice, and in implementing various decisions to solve their problems. [7] Honourable Speaker, the government has continued to motivate women to further their education, to fight for their rights and to fully participate in development activities. [8] Moreover, women received training in entrepreneurship, how to do business, and how to get more capital and market, and [9] they also received various types of loans.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Wizara yangu kupitia Baraza la Taifa la Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ilitunga na kupitisha Kanuni za Maadili ya NGOs. [2] Utekelezaji wa Kanuni za Maadili ya NGOs umelenga kukuza uwazi, uwajibikaji na uwezo wa Mashirika haya kujitathimini na kujikagua katika utekelezaji wa shughuli zao kulingana na katiba au miongozo ya kusajiliwa kwao. [3] Kanuni hizi zimeamsha ari ya wadau wa NGOs kujitafiti na kubaini maeneo ambayo wana uwezo mkubwa wa kusaidia jamii na kuyaendeleza maeneo ambayo wako dhaifu kubuni mikakati ya kujijengeza uwezo ili kutekeleza kwa ufanisi majukumu yao katika sekta mbalimbali nchini. [4] Mheshimiwa Spika, hatua nyingine ambazo Wizara yangu imechukua ni pamoja na kuanzishwa kwa Tovuti Maalum ya Uratibu wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali (<http://tnc.go.tz>) [5] ambayo hutumiwa na wadau mbalimbali ikiwemo wanufaika wa miradi ya NGOs kutolea mrejesho kuhusu utendaji wa NGOs katika maeneo yao. [6] Idadi ya wadau ambao wametoa mrejesho kuhusu utendaji wa NGOs hadi kufikia Machi, 2015 ni 30,679. [7] Aidha, Wizara imekuwa ikitembelea na kukagua shughuli/kazi, miradi na program mbalimbali zinazotekelezwa na NGOs nchini kwa lengo la kutathimini utendaji na uendeshaji wa Mashirika hayo, [8] ambapo jumla ya Mashirika 66 yamefikwa hadi kufikia Machi, 2015 (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015).

[1] Honourable Speaker, my ministry, through the National Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), formulated and approved the NGOs' Code of Conduct. [2] The NGOs' Code of Conduct is aimed at increasing transparency, accountability, and the capacity of the NGOs to assess and inspect themselves in executing their activities in accordance with their constitution or registration guidelines. [3] This code of conduct has enabled NGOs to do research and identify their strengths in helping the community and strengthen the areas where they have weaknesses by initiating strategies for capacity building in order to execute their responsibilities efficiently in various sectors in the country. [4] Honourable Speaker, other measures that the ministry has taken include opening a special website for the coordination of NGOs (<http://tnc.go.tz>), [5] which is used by various stakeholders, including beneficiaries of NGOs' projects, to give feedback on the performance of NGOs in their areas. [6] The number of stakeholders who have provided feedback on the performance of NGOs up to March 2015 amounts to 30,679. [7] Additionally, the ministry has been visiting and inspecting various activities, projects, and programmes of NGOs in the country in order to evaluate the performance and operation of the NGOs, [8] where a total of 66 NGOs have been visited by March 2015.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Spika, Wizara kupitia Chuo cha Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru iliendelea kudahili wanafunzi katika ngazi ya Shahada ya Kwanza [...] na stashahada ya uzamili ya maendeleo ya jamii. [2] Udahili wa wanachuo umeendelea kuongezeka mwaka hadi mwaka,

[3] katika mwaka 2012/13, jumla ya wanachuo 139 wakiwemo wanaume 64 na wanawake 75, walidahiliwa. [4] Mwaka 2013/14, jumla ya wanachuo 234 wakiwemo wanaume 88 na wanawake 146 walidahiliwa na katika mwaka 2014/15, jumla ya wanachuo 276, wakiwemo wanawake 189 na wanaume 87 walidahiliwa. [5] Mheshimiwa Spika, katika kipindi cha mwaka 2014/15, serikali ilikipandisha hadhi Chuo cha Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru kuwa Taasisi ya Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru kupitia Azimio Na. 1 la Bunge la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania la mwezi Aprili, 2014, katika Mkutano wake wa 17 Kikao cha 27. [6] Taasisi hii inatarajiwa kuongeza Wataalamu wa Maendeleo ya Jamii wa Ngazi ya Shahada ya maendeleo ya jamii [7] ambao ni muhimu katika kuimarisha utendaji wa shughuli za Maendeleo ya Jamii. [8] Hasa katika ngazi ya Halmshauri ambapo kuna uhaba mkubwa wa watumishi hawa (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] *Honourable Speaker, the ministry, through Tengeru Community Development Training Institute, continued to enrol students at undergraduate level [...] and postgraduate diploma in community development. [2] Student enrolment has continued to increase year after year. [3] In 2012/13, a total of 139 students, including 64 male and 75 female students were enrolled. [4] In 2014/14, a total of 234 students, including 88 male and 146 female students were enrolled; and in 2014/15, a total of 276 students, including 189 female and 87 male students were enrolled. [5] Honourable Speaker, in 2014/15, the government upgraded the status of Tengeru Community Development Training Institute to become Tengeru Institute of Community Development under the Declaration No. 1 of the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania of April 2014, in its 27th meeting of the 17th Session. [6] This institute is expected to increase the number of community development practitioners/professionals with a bachelor's degree in community development, [7] who are very important in strengthening the performance of development activities, [8] especially at council level where there is an acute shortage of these practitioners.*

From *Extract 6.2*, the minister's second standpoint is specifically indicated in (a) [1], where the minister suggests that *2 the ministry has effectively implemented the CCM's election manifesto for the period between 2005 and 2015*. I consider this standpoint to be a substandpoint for the implicit standpoint that *the government has effectively fulfilled the CCM's election pledges between 2005 and 2015*. In (a) [2-3], Ms Simba further argues that the ministry's effective implementation of the manifesto is evident in four major areas: employment and people's empowerment, higher education, development of different groups of people, as well as democracy and public administration. Thus, from subextract (b) to subextract (e), the minister's second standpoint is defended by four arguments, which realise multiple argumentation at the first level of defence.

The first argument is presented in subextract (b) and can be reconstructed as *2.1 the ministry has promoted employment opportunities and people's empowerment*, which is considered to be a sign of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is further supported by two arguments, realising multiple argumentation. In (b) [1], Ms Simba argues that participant enrolment in FDCs has increased from 25,486 in 2005 to 40,692 participants in 2015, which implies that an increase in number of the participants is a consequence of the ministry's effective implementation of

the CCM's election manifesto (causal argumentation supported by statistical data). In (b [4], the minister maintains that, in the last fiscal year, a total number of 36,838 participants graduated from the FDCs (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). This argument in defence of 2.1 is reinforced in (a) [5], where the minister argues that, out of 36,838 graduates, 33,319 graduates (90.44% of the graduates) are self-employed and 3,047 graduates (8.27%) are employed in various private companies and public institutions (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). Another argument in support of 2.1 is expressed in (b) [2], where the minister maintains that the number of girls who received 'mama course' training has increased from 60 in 2005 to 449 girls in 2014. Implicitly, the minister suggests that this increase is a consequence of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (causal argumentation supported by statistical data). In (b) [3], the minister further maintains that 'mama course' provides another opportunity for education to the young girls who got pregnant in formal schools (causal argumentation from means to goal) and who were 'deprived' of the opportunity to continue with their education in the formal education system because of the regulations and procedures for operating primary and secondary education in the country. Implicitly, the minister suggests that the pregnant schoolgirls could not continue with their studies in formal education settings due to pregnancies (causal argumentation). The first argument for the minister's second standpoint is summarised in **Table 6.6** below.

Table 6.6 The first argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.1 (2.1')	The ministry has promoted employment opportunities and people's empowerment (This is a sign of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto)
2.1.1 (2.1.1')	Participant enrolment in FDCs has increased (An increase in the enrolment is a consequence of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto)
2.1.1.1	The enrolment has increased from 25,000 participants in 2005 to 40,000 in 2015
2.1.1.1.1	36,838 participants graduated from the FDCs in the last fiscal year
2.1.1.1.1.a	33,319 graduates (90.44%) are self-employed
2.1.1.1.1.b	3,047 (8.27% of the graduates) are employed in various private companies and public institutions
2.1.2 (2.1.2')	The number of the girls who received 'mama course' training has increased (This increase is a result of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's manifesto)
2.1.2.1	The number has increased from 60 girls in 2005 to 449 girls in 2014
2.1.2.1.a	Mama course training provides another opportunity for education to young girls who got pregnant in formal schools
(2.1.2.1.a')	(Mama course is a means to reach the goal of providing education to young pregnant schoolgirls)

2.1.2.1.1b	The girls were deprived of the opportunity for education in the formal education system due to the regulations and procedures for operating primary and secondary education in the country
(2.1.2.1.1b')	(The pregnant schoolgirls could not continue with their studies in the formal system due to pregnancies)

The second argument in defence of the second standpoint is expressed in subextract (c) and can be reconstructed as *2.2 the ministry has been developing different groups of people*, implicitly suggesting that the ministry's development of different groups of people is a sign of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (symptomatic argumentation). However, this argument seems to focus on the development of children and women. In defence of this argument, in (c) [1-2], Ms Simba argues that the ministry presented three national reports on the implementation of the international Convention on the Rights of the Child and is preparing two reports on the implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. This argument realises coordinative argumentation, as shown in **Table 6.7**. In (c) [3], the minister further maintains that the two reports on the implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child will be presented in the AU's African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). In the other argument, as expressed in (c) [4], the minister argues that her ministry has prepared and has started implementing the five-year National Plan of Action for Child Participation (NPACP). To further support this argument, in (c) [5], Ms Simba 'promises' that the action plan will provide an opportunity for parents and guardians to learn better ways of communication and create good relations with their children (pragmatic argumentation). The minister also argues that the action plan will specify better ways to involve children in discussion and decision-making in order to solve their problems (practical or problem-solving argumentation), as expressed in (c) [6]. Concerning women development, the minister suggests that the government, through the ministry, has continued to motivate women to further their education, fight for their rights, and fully participate in development activities, as advanced in (c) [7]. In (c) [8-9], Ms Simba also maintains that women have also received training in entrepreneurship and various types of loans. The second argument for the minister's second standpoint is summarised in **Table 6.7** below.

Table 6.7 The second argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.2	The ministry has been developing different groups of people
(2.2')	(The ministry's development of different groups of people is a sign of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto)
2.2.1a	It has presented three reports on the country's implementation of the international Convention on the Rights of the Child

2.2.1b	It is preparing two reports on the country's implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
2.2.1b.1	The reports will be presented to the ACERWC
2.2.2	It has prepared and started implementing the NPACP
2.2.2.1	The NPACP will educate parents and guardians on better ways of communication and how to create good relations with the children
2.2.2.2	It will specify how to involve children in discussions and decision-making in order to solve their problems
2.2.3	It has continued to motivate women to further their education, fight for their rights, and fully participate in development activities
2.2.4	Women received training in entrepreneurship and various types of loans

The third argument in defence of the minister's second standpoint is advanced in subextract (d) and can be reconstructed as *2.3 the ministry has made various efforts to improve the performance of NGOs*, and this is considered to be a sign of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is defended by three supporting arguments, realising multiple argumentation. The first argument is expressed in (d) [1], where the minister argues that the ministry, through the National Council of NGOs, formulated and approved the NGOs' Code of Conduct and maintains in (d) [2] that this code of conduct is aimed at increasing the NGOs' transparency, accountability, and the capacity for self-assessment and inspection in executing their activities according to their constitution or registration guidelines (causal argumentation from means to goal). The minister adds that the code of ethics has motivated NGOs to do research on their activities and identify their strengths and address their weaknesses in promoting community development (causal argumentation), as advanced in (d) [3]. The second supporting argument is presented in (d) [4], where the minister suggests that the ministry has opened a special website for the coordination of the activities of NGOs, maintaining in (d) [5] that the website is used by various stakeholders to give feedback on the performance of NGOs in their areas (causal argumentation from means to goal). In (d) [6], the minister further states that the number of stakeholders who have provided feedback on the performance of NGOs by March 2015 amounted to 30,679 (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). Another measure taken to improve the performance of NGOs is expressed in (d) [7], where Ms Simba maintains that the ministry has been visiting NGOs and inspecting various NGOs' activities, projects, and programmes. According to the minister, 66 NGOs have been reached by March 2015 (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation), as indicated in (d) [8]. This third argument for the minister's second standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.8* below.

Table 6.8 The third argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.3	The ministry has made various efforts to improve the performance of NGOs
(2.3')	(This is a sign of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's manifesto)
2.3.1	It has formulated and approved the NGOs' Code of Conduct
2.3.1.1	The code of conduct/ethics is aimed at increasing the NGOs' transparency, accountability, and capacity for self-evaluation and inspection in executing their activities according to their constitution or registration guidelines
(2.3.1.1')	(The code of conduct/ethics is a means to achieve this aim/goal)
2.3.1.1.1	The code of conduct/ethics has enabled NGOs to do research on their activities and identify their strengths and address their weaknesses in order to execute their responsibilities efficiently in various sectors in the country
2.3.2	It has launched a special website for the coordination of NGOs
2.3.2.1	The website is used by various stakeholders to assess the performance of NGOs
(2.3.2.1')	(Opening the website is one of the means to assess the NGOs' performance)
2.3.2.1.1	30,679 people have provided feedback on the performance of NGOs by March 2015
2.3.3	It has been visiting NGOs to inspect their activities, projects, and programmes
2.3.3.1	60 NGOs have been reached by March 2015

The last argument in support of the minister's second standpoint is expressed in subextract (e) and can be reconstructed as *2.4 the ministry has promoted community development training*. Similar to the previous arguments, the unexpressed premise for this argument seems to suggest that the promotion of community development training is symptomatic of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is defended by two supporting arguments, realising multiple argumentation. The first supporting argument is expressed in (e) [1], where Ms Simba suggests that ministry, through Tengeru Community Development Training Institute (TCDTI), has continued to enrol students at undergraduate and postgraduate diploma levels (symptomatic argumentation). In (e) [2], the minister maintains that student enrolment at TCDTI has continued to increase year after year, implicitly suggesting that an increase in student enrolment at TCDTI is a consequence of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (causal argumentation). For instance, in (e) [3], she states that, in 2012/13, 139 students were enrolled, including 64 male and 75 female students; in 2013/14, 234 students were enrolled, including 88 male and 146 female students; and in 2014/15, 276 students were enrolled, which include 189 female and 87 male students, as expressed in (e) [3-4]. This is a typical instance of authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation). The second supporting argument is advanced in (e) [5], where she argues that the government promoted TCDTI to become Tengeru Institute of Community Development (TICD), which was achieved under the Declaration No. 1 of the Parliament of Tanzania in April 2014 (authority argumentation). In (e) [6], she promises that the upgraded TICD will increase the number of community development practitioners/professionals (henceforth CDPs) with a bachelor's degree in

community development, implying that it is a good thing to increase the number of CDPs in the country (pragmatic argumentation), which is in (e) [8] combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that there is an acute shortage of CDPs, especially at council level, implicitly suggesting that an increase in CDPs will solve the problem of acute shortage of shortage of CDPs (practical or problem-solving argumentation). In (e) [7], the minister further maintains that CDPs are important in strengthening the performance of community development activities, implicitly suggesting that an increase in CDPs will improve the status of community development (pragmatic argumentation). The fourth argument in defence of Ms Simba's second standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.9* below.

Table 6.9 The fourth argument for the minister's second standpoint

No.	Description
2.4	The ministry has promoted community development training
(2.4')	(Promoting community development training is symptomatic of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto)
2.4.1	TCDTI has continued to enrol students at undergraduate and postgraduate diploma levels
2.4.1.1	Student enrolment at TCDTI has continued to increase year after year
(2.4.1.1')	(The increase in student enrolment is a consequence of the ministry's effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto)
2.4.1.1.1a	TCDTI enrolled 139 students in 2012/13
2.4.1.1.1b	It enrolled 234 students in 2013/14
2.4.1.1.1c	It enrolled 276 students in 2014/15
2.4.2	It promoted TCDTI to become TICD
2.4.2.1	This was achieved under the Parliamentary Declaration No. 1 of 2014
2.4.2.2a	TICD will increase the number of CDPs in the country
(2.4.2.2a')	(And it is a good thing to increase the number of CDPs in the country)
2.4.2.2a.1	CDPs are very important in strengthening the performance of community development activities
(2.4.2.2a.1')	(An increase in CDPs will improve the status of community development)
2.4.2.2b	There is an acute shortage of CDPs, especially at council level
(2.4.2.2b')	(An increase in CDPs will solve the problem of acute shortage of CDPs)

Regarding the speech acts performed in the minister's second standpoint and related argumentation, the minister mainly performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing four main arguments in defence of the standpoint.

6.2.1.4 Summary of the minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's second standpoint (and its related argumentation) is presented in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 6.2 below. This schematic overview serves as a summary of the standpoint and its related argumentation in a single diagram. Hence not all supporting arguments or unexpressed premises are presented. However, these arguments can be referred to in section 6.2.1.3.




Figure 6.2 Summary of the minister's second standpoint and related argumentation

Concerning the (sub)types of argumentation employed, the minister's evaluative standpoint is justified by symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence and symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), pragmatic

argumentation, causal argumentation, and practical or problem-solving argumentation in the next levels of defence. Authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation) seems to be frequently used to justify various claims by the minister in the next levels of defence of this standpoint. With the frequent use of statistics, the minister seems to believe that her standpoint could easily be accepted if it is supported by official statistics rather than when the statistics are lacking.

6.2.1.5 The minister's third standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's third standpoint is implicit but it is however suggested in *Extract 6.3* below, where the minister talks about the supposedly effective coordination of the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations (henceforward NGOs).

Extract 6.3

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Sera ya Taifa ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ya Mwaka 2001 na Sheria ya NGOs Na. 24 ya Mwaka 2002 kama ilivyorekebishwa mwaka 2005, zimechangia kuimarisha utendaji wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali hapa nchini. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mchango wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali katika kutoa huduma kwa jamii katika masuala mbalimbali umeendelea kuimarika. [3] Mchango huo unaonekana zaidi katika Sekta ya Maendeleo ya Elimu, Afya, Maji, Maendeleo ya Jinsia, Maendeleo Shirikishi, Mazingira, Ustawi wa Jamii, Kilimo, Utawala Bora, Haki za Binadamu, Huduma za Sheria na Ujasiriamali. [...] [4] Mfano, Shirika la CCBRT liliwezesha matibabu ya akina mama 868 wenye tatizo la fistula katika Hospitali za Seliani (Arusha), KCMC (Kilimanjaro) na CCBRT (Makao Makuu Dar es Salaam). [5] Aidha, wanawake hao baada ya kupona walipatiwa ujuzi mbalimbali kupitia mafunzo yatolewayo na Kituo cha Mabinti kilichopo Dar es Salaam ili kuwawezesha wanawake hao kujitegemea kiuchumi. [...] [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali yameendelea kukuza fursa ya ajira kwa kuhimiza na kutekeleza vyema dhana ya kujitolea. [7] Taarifa ya mwaka 2012 ya Wizara kuhusu mchango wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali katika maeneo inaonesha kuwa, mashirika haya yaliajiri jumla ya watu 60,700 ambapo kati yao, watu 27,312 wanafanya kazi kwa kujitolea. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the national NGOs Policy of 2001 and the NGOs Act No. 24 of 2004 as amended in 2005 have contributed to strengthening the performance of [the activities of] NGOs in the country. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the role of NGOs in providing various community services has continued to strengthen. [3] The NGOs' contributions to community development are more evident in education, health, water, gender development, participatory development, environment, social welfare, agriculture, good governance, human rights, legal services, and entrepreneurship. [...] [4] For instance, CCBRT facilitated the treatment of 868 women with fistula at Seliani Hospital (Arusha), KCMC (Kilimanjaro), and CCBRT Headquarters (Dar es Salaam). [5] Moreover, after the successful treatment, the Mabinti Centre based in Dar es Salaam offered a set of skills to these women in order to empower them economically. [...] [6] Honourable Chairperson, NGOs have continued to create employment opportunities through effective implementation of the concept of voluntary work. [7] The ministry's 2012 report on the contributions of NGOs to community development shows that NGOs have employed a total of 60,700 people, where 27,312 are employed on a voluntary basis.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, pamoja na uwepo wa michango mingi na mizuri ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali, bado kuna changamoto mbalimbali zikiwemo mashirika mengi Yasiyo

ya Kiserikali kujikita zaidi mijini badala ya vijijini, kuendelea kutegemea ufadhili wa nje katika kutekeleza shughuli na ukiukwaji wa Sheria ya NGOs. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kutatua changamoto hizi, hatua mbalimbali zimechukuliwa ikiwa ni pamoja na kutoa elimu kwa NGOs kuhusu umuhimu wa taasisi hizi kuwafikia wadau wengi zaidi nchini hususan vijijini. Kuendelea kuyahimiza Mashirika haya kutumia fursa ya marekebisho ya Sheria ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ya mwaka 2005 kwa kuanzisha miradi ya kujipatia kipato kinachoweza kuepukana na utegemezi uliokithiri kwa wafadhili wa nje katika kuwahudumia walengwa wao na kufuta NGOs zinazofanya kazi kinyume na malengo ya kuanzishwa kwake. [3] Wizara ilifuta usajili wa NGOs 24, kati ya hizo, NGOs 10 ziliomba kuondolewa kwenye rejista ya NGOs baada ya kukamilika kwa miradi na programu zao. [4] Utekelezaji huo upo kwa mujibu wa Sheria ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ambayo inampa Msajili wa NGOs mamlaka ya kuyafutia usajili mashirika ambayo yanakiuka masharti ya usajili wao au pale mashirika husika yanapoomba kuondolewa kwenye rejista ya usajili kutokana na sababu mbalimbali (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, despite many positive contributions of the NGOs, there are still challenges including the fact that many NGOs are based in urban areas instead of rural areas, persistent dependence on foreign aid in carrying out their activities, and breach of the NGOs Act. [2] Honourable Chairperson, in addressing these challenges, various actions have been taken by the ministry including educating the NGOs on the importance of reaching more people in rural areas, continuing to encourage them to use the opportunity of the amendment of the NGOs Act of 2005 to establish projects that will create more funding opportunities [which will help them] to stop extreme dependence on external donors in serving their targeted people, and deregistering the NGOs that operate against the objectives of their establishment. [3] The ministry deregistered 24 NGOs; out of these, 10 NGOs requested to be removed from the NGOs register after the completion of their projects and programmes. [4] This is the requirement of the NGOs Act, whereby the registrar of NGOs is given the mandate to deregister NGOs that have violated the registration conditions or that have requested to be removed from the NGOs register for various reasons.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika mwaka 2014/15, Wizara yangu iliendelea kusajili NGOs ikiwa ni utekelezaji wa Sera ya Taifa ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ya mwaka 2001 pamoja na Sheria ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali Na. 24 ya 2002 iliyorekebisha mwaka 2005. [2] Hadi kufikia mwezi Machi 2015, jumla ya mashirika 7,060 yalipata usajili katika ngazi mbalimbali [3] ili kuyawezesha kutambulika kisheria na kutekeleza malengo yaliyokusudiwa. [4] Katika kipindi cha mwaka 2015/16 Wizara itaendelea na usajili wa Mashirika hayo. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mwaka 2014/15, Wizara yangu ilichukua hatua mbalimbali za kuimarisha uratibu wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali nchini. [6] Hatua hizi ni pamoja na kuendelea kuliwezesha Baraza la Taifa la NGOs kutekeleza majukumu yake ya kisheria kwa kupitisha Kanuni za Uendeshaji wake na Kanuni za uchaguzi za Baraza hilo za ngazi mbalimbali. [7] Kanuni hizi zitaliwezesha Baraza na Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali kujiendesha kwa ufanisi zaidi kwa kudhibiti ili kuimarisha taswira na mchango wao katika jamii. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, my ministry continued to register NGOs, as required by the national NGOs Policy of 2001 and the NGOs Act No. 24 of 2002 as revised in 2005. [2] By March 2015, a total of 7,060 NGOs were registered at various levels [3] in order to enable legal recognition and fulfilment of the targeted objectives. [4] In 2015/16, the ministry will continue to register NGOs. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in 2014/15, my ministry took various measures to strengthen the coordination of the NGOs' activities in the country. [6] These measures include continuing to enable the National Council of NGOs to carry out its legal functions/responsibilities by approving the operational and electoral regulations of the council at different levels. [7] These regulations will enable the Council and NGOs to operate more efficiently and to improve their image in the community and their contributions to community development.

From *Extract 6.3*, the minister's third standpoint can be reconstructed as (3) *the activities of NGOs are effectively coordinated by the ministry*. This implicit standpoint is defended by three arguments which realise multiple argumentation at the first level of defence. The first argument is indicated in (a) [1] and is reconstructed as (3.)1 *the ministry's NGOs Policy of 2001 and NGOs Act of 2002 (revised in 2005) have strengthened the role of NGOs in promoting community development in the country*. This argument demonstrates causal argumentation as the minister seems to imply that the strengthened role of NGOs in promoting community development is *caused* by the ministry's NGOs Policy and NGOs Act of 2002/2005. To further support this argument, Ms Simba suggests at the second level of defence, as indicated in (a) [2] and (a) [6], that NGOs have made various contributions to promoting community development and creating employment opportunities through effective implementation of the concept of voluntary work. This again is considered to be a consequence of the NGOs Policy and NGOs Act (causal argumentation). This argument is further defended by two supporting arguments in multiple argumentation, at the third level of defence. The first argument, as presented in (a) [3], suggests that the NGOs' contributions to promoting community development are more evident in agriculture, education, entrepreneurship, environment, health, human rights, gender, good governance, legal aid, social welfare, and water services. Three supporting arguments, realising coordinative argumentation, are offered in (a) [4-5] to support this argument. In the first supporting argument, which demonstrates authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), the minister argues that CCBRT facilitated the treatment of 868 women with fistula at Seliani Hospital (Arusha), KCMC (Kilimanjaro), and CCBRT headquarters (Dar es Salaam). This is coordinatively combined with the argument that, after the successful treatment of fistula, these women received training in entrepreneurship, which was provided by the Mabinti Centre. The last supporting argument in this coordinative argumentation suggests that the training was aimed at empowering them economically (causal argumentation from means to goal). In the second argument at the third level of defence, as indicated in (a) [7], Ms Simba further maintains that, according to the ministry's 2012 report on the role of NGOs in community development, these NGOs employed 60,700 people, where 27,312 were employed on a voluntary basis (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). The first argument for the minister's third standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.10* below.

Table 6.10 The first argument for the minister's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3.)1	The ministry's NGOs Policy and NGOs Act No. 24 of 2002 (revised in 2005) have strengthened the role of NGOs in promoting community development
(3.1')	(The strengthened role of NGOs is caused by the NGOs Policy and NGOs Act)
(3.)1.1	NGOs have made significant contributions to promoting community development, creating employment opportunities, and implementing the concept of voluntary work
(3.1.1')	(This is the result of the ministry's NGOs Policy and NGOs Act)
(3.)1.1.1	These contributions are more evident in agriculture, education, entrepreneurship, environment, health, human rights, gender development, good governance, legal assistance, social welfare and water services
(3.)1.1.1.1a	CCBRT facilitated the treatment of 868 women with fistula at Seliani Hospital (Arusha), KCMC (Kilimanjaro), and CCBRT Headquarters (Dar es Salaam)
(3.)1.1.1.1b	After the treatment, these women received [entrepreneurship] training, which was provided by the Mabinti Centre
(3.)1.1.1.1c	The training was aimed at empowering them economically
(3.)1.1.2a	The ministry's report on NGOs indicates that NGOs have employed 60,700 people
(3.)1.1.2b	Out of the employed ones, 27,312 were employed on a voluntary basis

The second argument at the first level of defence suggests that (3.)2 *the ministry has continued to register NGOs in the country*, which is considered an indication that the ministry effectively coordinates the NGOs' activities (symptomatic argumentation), as suggested in (c) [1]. In the second level of defence, this symptomatic argumentation is supported by two arguments combined in multiple argumentation. First, in (c) [3], Ms Simba suggests that the registration of NGOs enables NGOs to have legal recognition or status and achieve their objectives (causal argumentation). Second, in (c) [1], the minister suggests that the registration of NGOs is the requirement of the NGOs Policy of 2001 and the NGOs Act No. 24 of 2002 (revised in 2005), which demonstrates argumentation from legal authority. This argument is, at the third level, supported by two supporting arguments combined in coordinative argumentation. The first premise of this coordinative argumentation, as presented in (c) [2], suggests that, by March 2015, the ministry had registered a total of 7,060 NGOs at various levels in the country (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). In the second premise of this argumentation, as described in (c) [4], the minister maintains that the ministry will, in the next fiscal year, continue to register NGOs, implicitly suggesting that, by continuing to register NGOs, the ministry fulfils the provisions of the NGOs Act and NGOs Policy (argumentation from legal authority). The second argument for the minister's third standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.11*.

Table 6.11 The second argument for the minister's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3.)2	The ministry has continued to register NGOs in the country
(3.2')	(This is a sign of the ministry's effective coordination of NGOs)

(3.)2.1	The registration of NGOs enables NGOs to have legal recognition and achieve their objectives
(3.)2.2	The registration of NGOs is the requirement of the NGOs Policy and NGOs Act
(3.)2.2.1a	Up to March 2015, the ministry has registered 7,060 NGOs
(3.)2.2.1b	The ministry will continue to register NGOs in the next fiscal year
(3.2.2.1b')	(By continuing to register NGOs, the ministry satisfies the requirement of the NGOs Act and NGOs Policy)

In the last argument at the first level of defence, as presented in (b) and (c) [5-7], the minister suggests that (3.)3 *the ministry has taken various actions or measures to improve the performance of NGOs*, including addressing the challenges facing NGOs, and this is considered to be a sign of the ministry's effective coordination of the NGOs' activities (symptomatic argumentation). In (b) [1], the minister seems to begin this argument by mentioning the challenges facing NGOs; at least three challenges are mentioned explicitly. First, the minister asserts that most NGOs are based or operate in urban areas instead of reaching more people who reside in rural areas. Second, she maintains that most NGOs are extremely dependent on external funds from donors. Lastly, she states that some NGOs violate the NGOs Act by carrying out activities other than the ones they were registered for. In (b) [2], the minister explains that the measures taken to address these challenges include educating NGOs about the importance of reaching more people in rural areas, continuing to urge NGOs to use the opportunity of the amendment of the NGOs Act (2005) to establish projects that will create more funding opportunities that will help them to minimize extreme dependence on external donors' funds, and deregistering NGOs that operate against the objectives of their establishment or registration (practical or problem-solving argumentation). In (b) [3], she further argues that the ministry deregistered 24 NGOs, where 10 NGOs requested to be removed from the NGOs register after the completion of their projects and programmes. In (b) [4], she argues that the deregistration of NGOs is, in fact, the requirement of the NGOs Act. She further suggests that, according to the NGOs Act, the Registrar of NGOs has the mandate to deregister NGOs that have violated the registration provisions or that have requested to be removed from the register (argumentation from legal authority). Another measure taken to improve the coordination of the NGOs' activities is mentioned in (c) [6], where the minister states that the ministry has continued to enable the National Council of NGOs to perform its legal functions by approving the Council's operational and electoral regulations. In (c) [7], she maintains that the approved regulations will enable the Council and NGOs to operate more efficiently and improve their image in the community and their contribution to community development (pragmatic argumentation). Generally, the third argument for the minister's third standpoint is summarised in **Table 6.12**.

Table 6.12 The third argument for the minister's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3.)3	The ministry has taken various measures to improve the activities of NGOs
(3.3')	(This is a sign of the ministry's effective coordination of the NGOs' activities)
(3.)3.1	It has continued to urge NGOs to use the opportunity of the amendment of the NGOs Act to initiate projects that will create more funding opportunities
(3.)3.1.1	This will reduce the NGOs' extreme dependence on external donors' funds
(3.3.1.1')	(It is a good thing for NGOs to reduce extreme dependence on external donors' funds)
(3.)2	It has educated NGOs about the importance of reaching people in rural areas
(3.2')	(Many people in rural areas don't benefit from the NGOs' community development services)
(3.)3.3	It has deregistered 24 NGOs
(3.)3.3.1	10 NGOs have requested to be removed from the register and the rest have violated the registration provisions
(3.)3.3.1.1	Deregistration of NGOs is the requirement of the provisions of the NGOs Act
(3.)3.3.1.1.1	According to the NGOs Act, the Registrar of NGOs has the mandate to deregister NGOs that have violated the registration provisions or that have requested to be removed from the register
(3.)3.4	It has enabled the National Council of NGOs to perform its legal functions
(3.)3.4.1	It has approved the operational and electoral regulations of the council at various levels
(3.)3.4.1.1	The regulations will enable the Council and NGOs to operate more efficiently and improve their image in the community and their contributions to community development

With respect to the speech acts performed in the minister's third standpoint and its related argumentation, Ms Simba mainly performs the assertive by expressing the minister's third standpoint and advancing three main arguments as justification for the propositional content of the standpoint.

6.2.1.6 Summary of the minister's third standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's third standpoint (and its related argumentation) can be summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 6.3. For the purposes of this summary, not all levels in defence of the standpoint are indicated. Implicit premises are also not presented but can be referred to in section 6.2.1.5.




Figure 6.3 Summary of the minister's third standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of the (sub)types of argumentation advanced (i.e. the argumentation schemes), the minister's evaluative standpoint is justified by causal argumentation which is combined in multiple argumentation with symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence. In the

next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by causal argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), argumentation from legal authority, symptomatic argumentation, and pragmatic argumentation or practical/problem-solving argumentation.

6.2.1.7 The minister's four standpoint and related argumentation

The minister's last standpoint and its related argumentation can be reconstructed from *Extract 6.4*, where the minister talks about the ministry's (supposed) commitment to improve the status of community development sector in the country.

Extract 6.4

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba kuchukua fursa hii kuelezea kwa kifupi hali halisi ya Sekta ya Maendeleo ya Jamii katika maeneo ya ushiriki wa wananchi katika maendeleo ya kiuchumi, maendeleo ya kijinsia, maendeleo ya Watoto na mchango wa mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali katika maendeleo ya nchi yetu. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Watalamu wa Maendeleo ya Jamii ni muhimu katika kuhamasisha na kuwezesha ushiriki wa wananchi katika kujiletea maendeleo yao na Taifa kwa ujumla. [3] Dhana ya maendeleo ya Jamii inatumia mbinu shirikishi inayojenga na kuimarisha misingi ya watu katika jamii kujitambua, kupanga na kutoa maamuzi ya kazi au miradi ya kutekelezwa ili kutatua kero na matatizo yao. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to take this opportunity to briefly explain the present situation/status of community development sector in the areas of people's participation in economic development, gender development, child development, and the role of NGOs in community development. [2] Honourable Chairperson, community development practitioners/professionals are very important when it comes to facilitation and advocacy for community involvement in bringing about their own development as well as community development. [3] The concept of community development involves the use of a participatory approach that builds up and strengthens the foundations of people in the community in creating self-awareness and enabling them to plan and make decisions about which development activities or projects to carry out in order to solve their problems.

- (b) [1] Umuhimu wa Wataalamu wa Maendeleo ya Jamii umeendelea kutambuliwa na wadau mbalimbali kutokana na mchango wao katika maendeleo ya Taifa letu katika kuhamasisha, kuraghabisha, kushauri, kushawishi na kuelimisha wananchi na viongozi wao kwa kuwapatia elimu, maarifa na taarifa mbalimbali ili kuwaongezea uelewa, uwezo wa kufikiri na kufanya maamuzi sahihi ya utekelezaji wa dhana hiyo. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, pamoja na umuhimu wa Wataalamu wa Maendeleo ya Jamii, Sekta hii bado inakabiliwa na changamoto mbalimbali ikiwemo vitendea kazi na kutokuwepo kwa wataalam wa kutosha katika ngazi mbalimbali kama Sera ya Maendeleo ya Jamii inavyoelekeza; [3] kwa mfano, katika ngazi ya Kata kuna upungufu wa Wataalam 2,029. [4] Kwa sasa kuna jumla ya kata 3,339 nchini [...]. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kukabilia na changamoto hizo, Wizara inaendelea kuwasiliana na Ofisi ya Rais, Manajimenti ya Utumishi wa Umma juu ya uwezekano wa kuwaajiri Wataalamu wa Maendeleo ya Jamii moja kwa moja kutoka vyuoni. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] The importance of community development practitioners/professionals has continued to be recognized by different stakeholders due to their contribution to the development of our nation in promoting, facilitating, advising, advocating, and educating citizens and their leaders by providing them with education, skills, and information to increase their understanding and thinking ability so that they can make proper decisions on the implementation of the concept.

[2] *Honourable Chairperson, despite the importance of community development practitioners/professionals, this sector is still facing a number of challenges including lack of working tools and inadequate community development practitioners/professionals at various levels as required by the Community Development Policy. [3] For instance, at the ward level, there is a shortage of 2,029 practitioners/professionals. [4] Currently, there are 3,339 wards in the country. [5] Honourable Chairperson, in addressing these challenges, the ministry has opened consultations with the President's Office – Public Service Management – to discuss the possibility of employing community development practitioners/professionals directly from the training institutes.*

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara imeendelea kutoa mafunzo ya Taaluma ya Mendeleo ya Jamii katika ngazi ya Astashahada katika Vyuo vya Buhare, Rungemba, Missungwi, Monduli, Uyole, Ruaha, Mlale na Mabughai. [2] Chuo cha Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru kilipandishwa hadhi na kuwa Taasisi ya Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru kupitia Azimio la Bunge Na.1 la Mwaka 2014. [3] Aidha, udahili wa wanafunzi katika Taasisi ya Tengeru na vyuo vingine vinane vya Maendeleo ya Jamii umeendelea ukiongezeka. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuna vyuo 55 vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi katika wilaya mbalimbali nchini. [5] Vyuo hivi vinatoa mafunzo na stadi kwa wananchi sanjali na mafunzo ya ufundi stadi kwa kushirikiana na VETA. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the ministry has continued to provide professional training in community development at certificate level at Buhare, Rungemba, Missungwi, Monduli, Uyole, Ruaha, Mlale, and Mabughai CDTIs. [2] Tengeru Community Development Training Institute (TCDTI) was upgraded to become Tengeru Institute of Community Development (TICD) under the Parliamentary Declaration No. 1 of 2014. [3] Furthermore, the number of the students enrolled at TICD and other eight Community Development Training Institutes (CDTIs) has continued to increase. [4] Honourable Chairperson, there are 55 Folk Development Colleges (FDCs) in various districts in the country. [5] These FDCs offer folk education as well as vocational training in collaboration with VETA.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hali ya usawa wa kijinsia katika Nyanja mbalimbali hapa nchini imeendelea kuimarika katika maeneo ya ushiriki wa wanawake katika siasa na ngazi za maamuzi, uwezesaji wanawake kiuchumi, elimu, mafunzo, ajira na upatikanaji wa haki za wanawake kisheria. [2] Idadi ya Mawaziri wanawake imeongezeka kutoka Mawaziri wanawake 6 kati ya Mawaziri 25 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia Mawaziri wanawake 10 kati ya Mawaziri 30 mwaka 2015; Wakuu wa Wilaya wanawake wameongezeka kutoka 20 kati ya Wakuu wa Wilaya 104 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia Wakuu wa Wilaya wanawake 46 kati ya Wakuu wa Wilaya 133 mwaka 2015; Majaji wanawake wameongezeka kutoka Majaji wanawake 8 kati ya Majaji 50 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia Majaji wanawake 24 kati ya Majaji 67 mwaka 2015; na Wabunge Wanawake wameongezeka kutoka Wabunge wanawake 62 kati ya Wabunge 288 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia Wabunge wanawake 127 kati [ya] Wabunge 357 mwaka 2015. [3] Takwimu zilizopatikana kupitia Taarifa ya Hali ya Jinsia Nchini (Tanzania Country Gender Profile) ya 2015, zinathibitisha uimarishaji huo ingawa bado kuna changamoto mbalimbali zinazotokana na mila na desturi kandamizi. [4] Wizara inachukua hatua mbalimbali kupambana na changamoto hizi kwa kushirikiana na wadau hasa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali. [5] Aidha, Wizara imeendelea kutekeleza Mpango Kazi wa Kitaifa wa Kuzuia na Kutokomeza Ukatili Dhidi ya Wanawake, Watoto na Albino wa 2001 – 2015, kwa kuijengea uwezo Kamati hii ili iweze kushughulikia masuala ya ukatili, kuratibu Kampeni za Utokomezaji Vitendo vya Ukatili Dhidi ya Wanawake ili kuongeza uelewa wa madhara ya vitendo vya ukatili katika jamii na kuandaa Mwongozo wa Kuzuia na Kudhibiti Ukatili wa Kijinsia kwa Kamati za Vijiji, Mitaa, na Kata na Wilaya. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- [1] Honourable Chairperson, the status of gender equality in the country has continued to improve in various areas, including women participation in politics and decision-making, women's economic empowerment, education and training, employment, and access to women's legal rights. [2] The number of female ministers has increased from 6 female ministers out of 25 ministers in 2005 to 10 female ministers out of 30 ministers in 2015; female District*

Commissioners (DCs) have increased from 20 female DCs out of 104 DCs in 2005 to 46 female DCs out of 133 DCs in 2015; female judges have increased from 8 female judges out of 50 judges in 2005 to 24 female judges out of 67 judges in 2015; and female Members of Parliament have increased from 62 female MPs out of 288 MPs in 2005 to 127 female MPs out of 357 in 2015. [3] This improvement is confirmed by the statistics of the 2015 Tanzania Country Gender Profile, although there are still many challenges caused by oppressive norms and traditions. [4] The ministry is taking various measures to address these challenges in collaboration with [community development] stakeholders, particularly NGOs. [5] In addition, the ministry has continued to implement the National Action Plan to End Violence against Women, Children, and People with Albinism (2001-2015) by building capacity of the committee so as to enable it to deal with incidents of violence, coordinate campaigns geared towards eliminating violence against women and increase awareness of the effects of violence in the community, and prepare guidelines for preventing and dealing with gender-based violence for village, Mtaa, ward, and district committees.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kuwezesha wanawake kiuchumi, mafanikio yaliyopatikana ni pamoja na kutoa mikopo kwa wanawake wengi kupitia Benki ya Wanawake, Mfuko wa Maendeleo, kutoa mafunzo ya ujasiriamali na uwekaji wa akiba na kushiriki katika maonesho mbalimbali. [2] Aidha, changamoto katika eneo hili ni mahitaji makubwa ya mikopo, mafunzo ya ujasiriamali yanayotolewa kwa wakopaji kutotosheleza kujenga uwezo unaohitajika, marejesho hafifu ya mikopo, mahitaji makubwa ya huduma za Benki ya Wanawake Tanzania hususan kwa wanawake wajasiriamali, idadi ndogo ya wanawake katika nafasi za uongozi na maamuzi hasa vijijini, ndoa na mimba za utotoni na mila na desturi zenye madhara kwa wanawake. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kukabiliana na baadhi ya changamoto, Wizara imefanya tathmini ya uendeshaji wa Mfuko wa Wanawake ili kuuboresha utendaji wake na kufungua vituo zaidi vya kutolea mikopo vya Benki ya Wanawake Tanzania katika Wilaya zote za Mikoa ya Mwanza, Dar es Salaam na Dodoma na kuendelea kutoa elimu juu ya madhara yatokanayo na mila potofu ili jamii iachane nazo. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the achievements in women's economic empowerment include provision of loans to many women by the Tanzania Women's Bank, [and] the Women Development Fund, offering training in entrepreneurship and savings, and participation of women in various exhibitions. [2] However, the challenges facing this area include high demand for loans, the training provided not meeting the training needs of the beneficiaries, poor loan repayment, high demand for the TWB's financial services, especially by women entrepreneurs, limited number of women in leadership and decision-making positions, particularly in rural areas, child marriages and early pregnancies, as well as norms and traditions which have negative impacts on women. [3] Honourable Chairperson, in addressing some of these challenges, the ministry has assessed the operation of the Women Development Fund in order to improve its performance, and has continued to open more TWB's offices for provision of loans in all districts in Mwanza, Dar es Salaam, and Dodoma and to educate the public about the harmful effects of the bad traditions so that they stop practising these them.

- (f) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Sensa ya Idadi ya Watu na Makazi Nchini ya Mwaka 2012 ilibainisha kuwa, Tanzania inakadiriwa kuwa na Watoto 24,377,052 walio chini ya umri wa miaka 18. [2] Kati yao 12,201,122 ni wasichana na 12,175,930 ni wavulana, sawa na asilimia 50.1 ya Watanzania. [3] Kundi hili linahitaji mipango Madhubuti ya kuhakikisha kuwa wanapata haki zao zote za msingi, ambazo ni kuishi, kuendelezwa, kulindwa, kushiriki na kutobaguliwa ili watakapokua waweze kushiriki kikamilifu katika ujenzi wa Taifa. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika kuhakikisha kwamba, Watoto nchini wanapata haki hizo za msingi, [5] Wizara yangu imefanya mapitio ya Sera ya Mtoto ya Mwaka 2008 kwa kuingiza masuala ya malezi, makuzi na maendeleo ya awali ya mtoto na kutoa ufafanuzi wa mahitaji yam toto kiumri na wajibu wa wazazi au walezi, jamii na Taifa. [6] Aidha, tumeendelea kuratibu shughuli za Kikosi Kazi cha Taifa cha Kuzuia na Kupambana na Ukatili Dhidi ya Watoto ambacho hutoa taarifa za utekelezaji wa Mpango Kazi wa Taifa wa Mwitikio na Kuzuia

Ukatili Dhidi ya Watoto kuanzia mwaka 2013 hadi 2016 kwa kushirikiana na wadau mbalimbali. Mheshimiwa [7] Mwenyekiti, ili kuhakikisha kuwa Watoto wanashirikishwa katika kuamua mambo yanayowahusu, Wizara yangu imeendelea kuratibu uanzishwaji wa Mabaraza ya Watoto katika ngazi mbalimbali na kusimamia shughuli za Baraza la Watoto la Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania. [8] Idadi ya Mabaraza ya Watoto katika ngazi ya Mikoa yameongezeka kutoka 12 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia Mabaraza 22 mwaka 2014 na wilaya kutoka Mabaraza 57 mwaka 2005 hadi kufikia Mabaraza 93 mwaka 2014. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the 2012 Population and Housing Census showed that Tanzania has 24,377,052 children under the age of 18, which is equivalent to 50.1 of the entire population of Tanzanians. [2] It further showed that, out of that number, 12,201,122 are girls and 12,175,930 are boys under 18. [3] The government is required to formulate a grand plan to ensure that this group of children get all their basic rights, which are right to life, right to development, right to protection, and right not to be discriminated so that when they grow up they should be able to fully participate in building the nation. [4] Honourable Chairperson, in order to ensure that children enjoy their rights in the country, [5] my ministry has reviewed the Child Development Policy of 2008 and included early childhood development and explained the needs of a child by age and the responsibilities of parents, guardians, community members, and the nation. [6] We have also continued to coordinate the activities of the national task force for preventing and combating violence against children, which has been providing reports on the implementation of the National Plan of Action to End Violence against Children from 2013 to 2016 in collaboration with various stakeholders. [7] Honourable Chairperson, to ensure that children are involved in making decisions which concern them, my ministry has continued to coordinate the establishment of junior councils at different levels and supervise the activities of the [National] Junior Council of the United Republic of Tanzania. [8] The number of junior councils has increased from 12 in 2005 to 22 in 2014 at the level of a region and from 57 in 2005 to 93 in 2014 at district level.

In terms of the minister's discourse as presented in *Extract 6.4*, the minister's fourth standpoint relates to the proposition that the ministry is committed to improving the status of community development in the country, where the minister has adopted a positive standpoint which can be reconstructed as (4) *the ministry is committed to improving the status of the country's community development sector*. This standpoint is not expressed explicitly but it is, however, implied from the extract. At the first level of defence, the standpoint is defended by three arguments in multiple argumentation. In the first argument, the minister suggests that (4.) *I the ministry has continued to promote community development in the country*, implicitly suggesting that the ministry's continued efforts to improve the status of community development is a sign of the ministry's commitment to improve the status of community development in the country (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is reconstructed from subextract (a) to subextract (c) and is further supported by five supporting arguments, realising multiple argumentation at the second level of defence. First, in (b) [1], the minister argues that various stakeholders have continued to recognize the importance of CDPs, implying that this is the result of the ministry's commitment to promote the community development sector (causal argumentation). In (a) [2-3] and (b) [1], the minister further argues that the CDPs play a great role in promoting community development, particularly by educating and motivating

community members to use what they have to develop the community. Second, as indicated in (b) [4], the minister suggests that the ministry is making efforts to address the challenge of insufficient CDPs, implying that the ministry's efforts are aimed at solving the problem of insufficient CDPs (practical or problem-solving argumentation). In (b) [2], she maintains that the current number of CDPs does not meet the requirement of the Community Development Policy (authority argumentation). As presented in (b) [3], the minister maintains that there is a shortage of 2,029 CDPs at ward level, while there are 3,339 wards (authority argumentation from statistics), as indicated in (b) [4]. To address this challenge, in (b) [5] the minister maintains that the ministry has opened consultation with the President's Office (Public Service Management) to discuss the possibility of employing these CDPs directly from the CDTIs. Implicitly, the minister suggests that the consultation is aimed at solving the problem of insufficient CDPs (practical or problem-solving argumentation). Third, as indicated in (c) [1], she states that the ministry has continued to offer professional training in community development at certificate level in various CDTIs (Buhare, Mabughai, Missungwi, Mlale, Monduli, Ruaha, Rungemba, and Uyole). This argument is defended by the argument that student enrolment at Tengeru Institute of Community Development and 8 other CDTIs has increased, which is seen to be a consequence of the ministry's commitment (causal argumentation), as described in (c) [3]. Fourth, in (c) [2], it is maintained that TCDDTI was upgraded to the status of an institute under the Parliamentary Declaration No. 1 of 2014. Lastly, in (c) [4-5], the minister suggests that the ministry has continued to provide folk education training in various FDCs. This argument is further defended by two supporting arguments, which realise coordinative argumentation, where the minister maintains that there are currently 55 FDCs in various districts in the country, (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation) and these FDCs offer folk education and vocational training in collaboration with VETA. From this explanation, the first argument in defence of the minister's fourth standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.13* below.

Table 6.13 The first argument for the minister's fourth standpoint

No.	Description
(4.)1	The ministry has continued to promote community development
(4.1')	(The ministry's continued efforts to promote community development is a sign of the ministry's commitment to improve the status of the country's community development sector)
(4.)1.1	Various stakeholders have continued to recognise the importance of CDPs
(4.1.1')	(This is the result of the ministry's efforts to improve community development)
(4.)1.1.1	CDPs play a great role in promoting community development
(4.)1.1.1.1	They educate and motivate community members to participate in promoting community development

(4.)1.2	The ministry is making efforts to address the shortage of CDPs
(4.1.2')	(The ministry's efforts are aimed at solving the problem of insufficient CDPs)
(4.)1.2.1	The number of CDPs at various level doesn't satisfy the requirement of the Community Development Policy
(4.1.2.1')	(The Policy requires that every ward should have a CDP)
(4.)1.2.1.1	There is a shortage of 2,029 CDPs at ward level
(4.)1.2.1.1.1	The ministry is in consultation with the President's Office to address the challenge
(4.1.2.1.1.1')	(The consultation is aimed at finding possible solutions to the challenge/problem)
(4.)1.2.1.1.1.1	We are discussing the possibility of employing CDPs directly from CDTIs
(4.)1.3	It has continued to offer community development training at various CDTIs, including Buhare, Mabughai, Missungwi, Mlale, Monduli, Ruaha, Rungemba, and Uyole
(4.)1.3.1	Student enrolment has increased at Tengeru and other 8 CDTIs
(4.1.3.1')	(An increase in the enrolment is a consequence of the ministry's commitment)
(4.)1.4	It has upgraded TCDTI to the status of an institute
(4.)1.4.1	This was achieved under the Parliamentary Declaration No. 1 of 2014
(4.)1.5	It has continued to provide folk education to the community at various FDCs
(4.)1.5.1a	Currently, there are 55 FDCs in various districts in the country
(4.1.5.1a')	(Based on the current statistics, the number of FDCs has increased)
(4.)1.5.1b	The FDCs provide folk education and vocational training in collaboration with VETA

In the second argument, the minister suggests that (4.)2 *the ministry is committed to promoting gender equality and Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE)*, which is also considered a sign of the ministry's commitment to improve the status of community development (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is further defended by three supporting arguments in multiple argumentation. The first supporting argument is presented in (d) [1-3]. In (d) [1], Ms Simba suggests that the status of gender equality has improved in various areas of women participation, including politics and decision-making, education, employment, and access to legal rights, and this is considered to be a consequence of the ministry's commitment to promote gender equality (causal argumentation). For instance, in (d) [2], the minister argues that the number of female ministers has increased from 5 female ministers out of 25 ministers in 2005 to 10 female ministers out of 30 ministers in 2015 (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). In (d) [3], she maintains that this improvement in gender equality in various areas is confirmed by the 2015 Tanzania Country Gender Profile (authority argumentation). The two supporting arguments in (d) [1] and (d) [3] constitute coordinative argumentation, as shown in **Table 6.14**. Another argument in favour of (4.)2 is indicated in (e) [1], where the minister argues that there have been various achievements in WEE. The implicit premise for this argument seems to suggest that these achievements are a consequence of the ministry's commitment to improve the status of community development sector (causal argumentation). The minister further maintains that many women have received loans, training in entrepreneurship, and have participated in various exhibitions (symptomatic argumentation).

The last argument in support of (4.)2 is presented in (d) [4-5] and (e) [2-3]. In (d) [4] and (e) [3], she suggests that the ministry has taken various measures to address the challenges in gender equality, including gender-based violence (GBV), and WEE (practical or problem-solving argumentation). Some of the challenges mentioned in (d) [3] and (e) [2] include the practice of oppressive customs and traditions, high demand for loans, poor loan repayment, high demand for TWB's financial services, and limited number of women in leadership and decision-making positions, especially in rural areas. The measures taken to address these challenges, as indicated in (e) [3], include to assess the operation of the Women Development Fund (WDF) in order to improve its performance, to open more TWB's offices for provision of loans in all districts in Mwanza, Dar es Salaam, and Dodoma, and to continue to educate the public about the negative effects of bad traditions so as to stop practising them. In (d) [5], the minister suggests that the ministry has continued to implement the national action plan to end violence against women, children, and people with albinism as an attempt to eliminate (or solve the problem of) incidents of violence against these groups, including GBV (practical or problem-solving argumentation). The two arguments in (d) [4], (e) [3], and (d) [3]/(e)[2] constitute coordinative argumentation, as shown in *Table 6.14*. Generally, the second argument in defence of the minister's fourth standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.14* below.

Table 6.14 The second argument for the minister's fourth standpoint

No.	Description
(4.)2	It is committed to promoting gender equality and WEE
(4.2')	(This is a sign of the ministry's commitment to improve the status of the country's community development sector)
(4.)2.1a	The status of gender equality has improved in various areas
(4.2.1a')	(This is caused by the ministry's commitment to promote gender equality)
(4.)2.1a.1	These areas include politics and decision-making, education, employment, and women's rights
(4.)2.1a.1.1	There is an increase in the number of female ministers, judges, DCs, and MPs
(4.2.1a.1.1')	(This increase is caused by the ministry's commitment)
(4.)2.1a.1.1.1a	Female ministers have increased from 5 out of 25 ministers in 2005 to 10 out of 30 ministers in 2015
(4.)2.1a.1.1.1b	Female DCs have increased from 20 out of 104 DCs in 2005 to 46 out of 133 DCs in 2015
(4.)2.1a.1.1.1bc	Female judges have increased from 8 out of 50 judges in 2005 to 24 out of 67 judges in 2015
(4.)2.1a.1.1.1d	Female MPs have increased from 62 out of 288 MPs in 2005 to 127 out of 357MPs in 2015
(4.)2.1b	This improvement is confirmed by the Tanzania Country Gender Profile
(4.)2.2	There have been various achievements in WEE
(4.2.2')	(These achievements are a consequence of the ministry's commitment)
(4.)2.2.1	Many women have received loans from TWB/WDF
(4.)2.2.2	Many women have received training in entrepreneurship
(4.)2.2.3	Many women have been participating in various exhibitions

(4.)2.3a	The ministry has taken various measures to address various challenges facing gender equality and WEE
(4.)2.3a.1	It has assessed the operation of WDF in order to improve its performance
(4.)2.3a.2	It has continued to open TWB's offices for provision of loans in all the districts of Mwanza, Dar es Salaam, and Dodoma
(4.)2.3a.3	It has continued to educate the public about the negative effects of bad traditions
(4.)2.3a.3.1	The education will help the community to stop practising these traditions
(4.)2.3a.4	It has continued to implement the national action plan (2001-2015) to end violence against women, children, and people with albinism
(4.)2.3a.4.1	It has built capacity of the responsible committee
(4.)2.3a.4.1.1	This will enable the committee to deal with various incidents of violence
(4.)2.3a.4.1.2	It will enable the committee to coordinate campaigns geared towards eliminating violence against women and raise awareness of the effects of the violence
(4.)2.3a.4.1.3	It will also enable the committee to prepare guidelines for preventing and dealing with GBV for the village, Mtaa, ward, and district committees
(4.)2.3b	These challenges include high demand for loans and other financial services, limited number of women in leadership and decision-making positions, violence against groups of people/GBV, and the practice of bad customs and traditions

The minister's last argument in defence of the last standpoint suggests that *(4.)3 the ministry is committed to ensuring that children get their basic rights and make decisions about issues that affect/concern them*, which also demonstrates symptomatic argumentation. This argument is reconstructed from subextract (f) and is supported by two arguments, realising multiple argumentation. The first argument in defence of *(4.)3* realises coordinative argumentation. In (f) [1], the minister argues that the 2012 Population and Housing Census suggests that Tanzania has approximately 24,377,052 children under the age of 18 (authority argumentation from statistics). According to the minister, this number of children suggests that the ministry is required to have a strategic plan to ensure that these children enjoy all their basic rights, including right to life, right to protection, and right to development (practical argumentation), as indicated in (f) [3]. In (f) [4], the minister argues that the ministry has taken various measures to ensure that these children enjoy their basic rights (practical argumentation). One of the measures taken is reviewing the Child Development Policy of 2008 by including matters of early childhood development as well as explanation of children's needs by age, as shown in (f) [5]. Another measure taken is coordinating the activities of the national task force for preventing and combating violence against children, as reconstructed from (f) [6]. In the other argument, as shown in (f) [7], the minister suggests that the ministry has made efforts to ensure that children participate in making decisions about matters that affect/concern them. She maintains that the ministry has continued to coordinate the establishment of junior councils at different levels. In (f) [8], she further maintains that, as a consequence of the efforts made, the number of junior councils has increased from 12 in 2005 to 22 in 2015 at regional level and from 57 in 2005 to 93 in 2014 at district level, implying the increase in number of junior

councils is caused by the ministry's effective coordination of the establishment of junior councils (causal argumentation supported by statistical data). In (f) [7], she suggests that the ministry has continued to supervise the activities of the National Junior Council of the United Republic of Tanzania. The supporting arguments for the minister's last argument exhibit mainly symptomatic argumentation, causal argumentation, and authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation). Ms Simba's last argument in defence of the fourth standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.15* below.

Table 6.15 The third argument for the minister's fourth standpoint

No.	Description
(4.)3	The ministry is committed to ensuring that children enjoy all their basic rights and make decisions about issues that affect/concern them
(4.3')	(This is another sign of the ministry's commitment to improve the status of the country's community development sector)
(4.)3.1a	The 2012 Population and Housing Census shows that Tanzania has 24,377,052 children
(4.)3.1b	The ministry is required to have a strategic plan to ensure that these children enjoy all their basic rights
(4.)3.1b.1	The ministry has taken various measures to ensure that children enjoy their basic rights
(4.)3.1b.1.1	It has reviewed the Child Development Policy of 2008
(4.)3.1b.1.1.1	It has included issues of early childhood development
(4.)3.1b.1.1.2	It has explained the needs of a child by age and the responsibilities of parents/guardians and the community/nation
(4.)3.1b.1.2	It has continued to coordinate the activities of the national taskforce for preventing and combating violence against children
(4.)3.1b.1.2.1	The taskforce provides reports on the national action plan for preventing violence against children between 2013 and 2016
(4.)3.1c	These rights include the right to life, right to protection, right to child development
(4.)3.2	The ministry has made efforts to ensure that children participate in making decisions about matters that affect/concern them
(4.)3.2.1	It has continued to coordinate the establishment of junior councils at different levels
(4.)3.2.1.1	The number of junior councils has increased from 12 in 2005 to 22 in 2014 at the level of a region and from 57 in 2005 to 93 in 2014 at district level
(4.)3.2.2	It has continued to supervise the activities of the National Junior Council of the United Republic of Tanzania

Apart from (general) symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation, most of the arguments and subarguments in defence of the minister's fourth standpoint demonstrate authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), where Ms Simba appeals to the 'official' statistics of the government or its institutions/organizations as she attempts to convince her audience of the acceptance of the minister's standpoint. Regarding the speech acts performed, the minister mainly performs the assertive by expressing the fourth standpoint and advancing three main arguments in defence of this standpoint.

6.2.1.8 Summary of the minister’s fourth standpoint and related argumentation

The minister’s fourth standpoint and the three main supporting arguments are summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 6.4. For the purposes of this summary, unexpressed premises are not presented but can be referred to in section 6.2.1.7.




Figure 6.4 Summary of the minister’s fourth standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of argumentation schemes, the minister's evaluative standpoint is justified by symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by causal argumentation, causal argumentation supported by statistical data, authority argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation, as well as pragmatic or practical/problem-solving argumentation.

6.2.2 The opposition's critical reactions

Four standpoints and initial argumentation can be reconstructed from Ms Esther Matiko's critical reactions to Ms Sophia Simba's annual budget speech. These standpoints do not necessarily relate to the same propositions as the minister's standpoints. The first standpoint, including its related argumentation, is discussed in section 6.2.2.1 and summarised in section 6.2.2.2. The second standpoint (and its related argumentation) is discussed in 6.2.2.3 and summarised in 6.2.2.4. The opposition's third standpoint and supporting arguments are analysed in 6.2.2.5 and summarised in 6.2.2.6. Ms Matiko's fourth standpoint (plus initial argumentation) is discussed in section 6.2.2.7 and summarised in section 6.2.2.8.

6.2.2.1 The opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

In the first standpoint, the opposition's spokesperson strategically talks about the safety of opposition leaders in Tanzania by citing an example of the killing of an opposition leader in Burundi. This standpoint is reconstructed from *Extract 6.5*.

Extract 6.5

- (a) MHE. ESTHER N. MATIKO (K.n.y. MSEMAJI MKUU WA KAMBI RASMI YA UPINZANI KWA WIZARA YA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO): [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kabla ya kuwasilisha Hotuba hii napenda kuchukua nafasi hii kwa niaba ya Kambi Rasmi ya Upinzani Bungeni, kuungana na wananchi wa Burundi na wapenda amani duniani kote kulaani mauaji ya Kiongozi wa Upinzani huko Burundi, Z. Ferouz, Mkuu wa Chama cha Umoja wa Amani na Demokrasia (UPD-Zingamibanga) aliyeuawa kwa kupigwa risasi na watu wasiojulikana Mjini Bujumbura, huku machafuko yakiendelea nchini humo. [2] Kiongozi huyo aliuawa Jumamosi usiku alipokuwa akiingia nyumbani kwake katika eneo la Ngagara; [3] mlinzi wake pia, ameuawa katika tukio hilo. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kambi ya Upinzani Bungeni inalaani mauaji haya kwa kuwa, ni mwendelezo wa Vyama Tawala kudhuru na hata kutoa uhai wa Wapinzani. Wao pale wanapoona wameshindwa ama hawakubaliki tena kwa wananchi. [5] Ni wajibu wetu Wapinzani kusemea haya kwa kuwa, hata nchini kwetu Tanzania hatupo salama na tunaamini kuwa, Mungu atatusimamia. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ikiwa damu yetu itamwagika katika dhuluma na haki, vizazi vyetu vitasimama na kupaza sauti zao dhidi ya watawala dhalimu. [7] Mwenyezi Mungu azilaze roho za wahanga hawa kwa dhuluma ya kisiasa mahali pema peponi. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015).

HON. ESTHER N. MATIKO (ON BEHALF OF THE SPOKESPERSON OF THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION CAMP FOR THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [1] Honourable Chairperson, before presenting this speech, I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the official opposition camp in the parliament, to join the

people of Burundi and all people who cherish peace in the world to condemn the assassination of the opposition leader in Burundi, Mr Z. Ferouz, a leader of the Unity for Peace and Democracy (UPD-Zingamibanga) who was shot dead by unknown people in Bujumbura, and as the aftermath, riots are continuing. [2] He was murdered last Saturday as he was entering his house at Ngagara area. [3] His bodyguard was also killed in the incident. [4] Honourable Chairperson, the opposition camp in the parliament condemns these killings because it is a continuation of the ruling parties' tendency to harm and even kill their opponents when they see that they have failed or are no longer supported by citizens. [5] It is our responsibility as opposition leaders to point this out because even in our country, Tanzania, we are not safe, and we only believe that God will protect us. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, if our blood is shed because of violence and injustice, our generations will stand and raise their voices against corrupt rulers. [7] May God rest the souls of these victims of political violence in eternal peace! (Applause)

(b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa niaba ya Waziri Kivuli...

MWENYEKI: [2] Mheshimiwa Esther? Mheshimiwa Esther, hayo yamo kwenye Hotuba yako? MHE. ESTHER N. MATIKO (K.n.y. MSEMAJI MKUU WA KAMBI RASMI YA UPINZANI KWA WIZARA YA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO): [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, No! [4] Nimeona Taarifa ya Habari jana usiku, nimeyaweke mimi kwenye Hotuba yangu...

MWENYEKITI: [5] Unayoendelea kusema yamo kwenye hotuba yako, soma yaliyomo kwenye Hotuba! (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, on behalf of the Shadow Minister...

CHAIRPERSON: [2] Honourable Esther? Honourable Esther, is what you are saying part of your speech?

HON. ESTHER N. MATIKO (ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITION'S SPOKESPERSON FOR THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN): [4] Honourable Chairperson, no! [4] I watched this in the news last night and decided to include it in my speech.

CHAIRPERSON: [5] Is what you continue to say part of your speech? Read what is written in your speech!

Ms Matiko's first standpoint is not expressed explicitly but it is nevertheless implied in subextract (a) and can be reconstructed as *(1) opposition leaders in Tanzania are in danger of being harmed or even killed by the ruling party*. This standpoint is defended by two arguments combined in coordinative argumentation, as shown in (a) [1-4]. The first argument in this coordinative argumentation suggests that *(1.)Ia the ruling parties have been harming and even killing opposition leaders*, implying that what is stated in the standpoint is caused by the tendency of the ruling parties to harm or even kill opposition leaders (causal argumentation). This causal argumentation is reinforced by the argument that *(1.)Ib the ruling parties do this when they lose people's confidence or when they no longer have the public support*, implying that the tendency to harm or kill opposition leaders is caused by ruling parties' lack of support from the public (causal argumentation). Causal argumentation in *(1.)Ia* is defended by argumentation from example which is combined in coordinative argumentation with comparison argumentation. Appealing to argumentation from example, in (a) [1-2], Ms Matiko argues that *(1.)Ia.1a a leader of the opposition party (UPD), Mr Ferouz, was recently killed in*

Burundi, implying in the unexpressed premise that the killing of the Burundian opposition leader was masterminded by the ruling party in Burundi. However, it still needs to be established whether this single example is representative enough to defend the standpoint. Argumentation from example in (1.)1a.1a is complemented by comparison argumentation in (a) [5], where Ms Matiko maintains that (1.)1a.1b *opposition leaders in Tanzania are also not safe*. Implicitly, Ms Matiko compares the political situation in Tanzania to that of Burundi (which may not necessarily be similar) and suggests that what happened to the opposition leader in Burundi is likely to happen to the opposition leaders in Tanzania. It should, however, be clearly established whether the political situation in Tanzania is indeed comparable to that of Burundi. One might also need further evidence whether what happened to the opposition leader in Burundi can indeed happen to the opposition leaders in Tanzania. The fact that an opposition leader was killed in Burundi does not necessarily mean that opposition leaders in Tanzania can also be harmed or killed.

Appealing to argumentation from narrative in support of (1.)1a.1a, in (a) [1], Ms Matiko argues that (1.)1a.1a.1 *Mr Ferouz was shot dead by unknown people in his premises in Bujumbura*, maintaining in (a) [2] that (1.)1a.1a.1.1 *the incident happened as he was entering his house in Ngagara area*. In (b) [4], this argumentation from narrative is defended by authority argumentation, where she argues that she watched this in the news last night. Ms Matiko's first standpoint and its related argumentation can be presented as illustrated in **Table 6.16** below.

Table 6.16 The opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
(1)	(Opposition leaders in Tanzania are in danger of being harmed or killed by the ruling party)
(1.)1a	Ruling parties have been harming and even killing opposition political leaders
(1.)1b	They do so when they lose public confidence or when they no longer have the public support
(1.)1a.1a	A leader of the opposition party (UPD), Mr Ferouz, was recently killed in Burundi
(1.1a.1a')	(The killing of the leader was masterminded by the ruling party in Burundi)
(1.)1a.1a.1	He was shot dead by unknown people in his premises in Bujumbura
(1.)1a.1a.1.1	The incident happened on Saturday night as he was entering his house in Ngagara area
(1.)1a.1a.1.1.1	I watched this in the news last night
(1.)1a.1b	Opposition leaders in Tanzania are also not safe
(1.1a.1b')	(What happened to the opposition leader in Burundi can also happen to opposition leaders in Tanzanians)
(1.1a.1b'.1')	(The political situation in Tanzania is comparable to that of Burundi)

Ms Matiko's first standpoint (and its supporting argumentation) represents a typical example of strategic topic shift as she attempts to manoeuvre strategically to win a 'new' critical

discussion in her favour. Ms Matiko strategically expresses a standpoint (and advances argumentation for the standpoint) that does not relate to the topic on the table. She talks about the killing of opposition leaders, using the killing of an opposition leader in Burundi as an example. Although the killing of opposition leaders was not the topic on the table, Ms Matiko strategically talks about it as a way of initiating a ‘new’ discussion on the subject she can handle in order to win it in her favour. Apart from the rhetorical aim to win the critical discussion in the opposition’s favour, Ms Matiko strategically aims to present ruling parties (in Africa) in general and the ruling party in Tanzania (CCM) in particular as cruel people who are ready to do anything to harm the opposition and present the opposition as victims of these actions in order to get sympathy from the audience, especially from members of the electorate. Although Ms Matiko’s strategic topic shift may be regarded as rhetorically effective, it nonetheless falls short of dialectical reasonableness as she violates section 60(9) of the Standing Orders of the Tanzanian parliament, which prohibits MPs from discussing a topic that is not on the table. As indicated in subextract (b), the Chairperson notices this violation of the Standing Orders. In (b) [5], the Chairperson asks Ms Matiko to read what is written in her speech, which suggests that she should focus on the topic on the table. Although the Chairperson is strictly speaking not a party in this critical discussion, he stands to make sure that the parliamentary institutional rules are observed. Thus, Ms Matiko’s topical potential in the opposition’s first standpoint and its related argumentation is, from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, deemed to be a derailment of strategic manoeuvring as she violates one of the dialectical standards for (critical) discussions in the Tanzanian parliament as established by the Standing Orders. In terms of the speech acts performed, Ms Matiko mainly performs the assertive by expressing the first standpoint and advancing argumentation in defence of the standpoint.

6.2.2.2 Summary of the opposition’s first standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition’s first standpoint and its related arguments are summarised in a schematic overview as shown in

Figure 6.5 below.




Figure 6.5 Summary of the opposition's first standpoint and related argumentation

As regards the argumentation schemes, Ms Matiko's first standpoint is defended by causal argumentation in (1.)1a and (1.)1b at the first level of defence. Causal argumentation in (1.)1a is at the second level defended by argumentation from example in (1.)1a.1a and comparison argumentation in (1.)1a.1b and (1.1a.1b'). Argumentation from example is at the third and fourth levels defended by argumentation from narrative in (1.)1a.1a.1 and (1.)1a.1a.1.1, which is at the fifth level defended by authority argumentation, as manifested in (1.)1a.1a.1.1.1.

6.2.2.3 The opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

In her second standpoint, Ms Matiko returns to the topic on the table by criticising the government for its supposedly unfulfilled election pledges. This standpoint and its supporting arguments are reconstructed from *Extract 6.6*.

Extract 6.6

- (a) MHE. ESTHER N. MATIKO (K.n.y. MSEMAJI MKUU WA KAMBI RASMI YA UPINZANI KWA WIZARA YA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO): [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mwanaharakati wa Haki za Kiraia na Mkulima maarufu wa Marekani Cesar Chavez aliwahi kusema, "Hatuwezi kutaka mafanikio kwa ajili yetu tu na kusahau maendeleo na ustawi wa jamii yetu. [2] Malengo yetu yawe makubwa kiasi ili kujumuisha matarajio na mahitaji ya wengine kwa ajili yao na kwa ajili yetu pia". Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hii ni tafsiri ya maneno ya Cesar Chavez kwa nukuu ya lugha ya Kiingereza ni

kama ifuatavyo; “[...] we cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about progress and prosperity for our community, our ambitions must be broad enough to include the aspirations and needs to others, for their sakes and for our own.” [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ikiwa tumebakiza miezi michache takribani miezi minne mpaka ufanyike uchaguzi mkuu ni Dhahiri kuwa tutasikia kauli nyingi zenye kulenga kuwaaminisha Watanzania kuwa Serikali ya CCM itakwenda kutekeleza matarajio ya Watanzania waliyokuwa nayo chini ya utawala wa Rais Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete yaliyotolewa wakati wa Uchaguzi wa mwaka 2005 na pia uchaguzi Mkuu wa 2010. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, labda tuikumbushe Serikali ya CCM usemi kuwa mla ndizi husahau ila mtupa maganda hasahau. [5] Pamoja na kuwa Serikali ya CCM ilitoa ahadi kemkem zikiwemo za kuinua Maisha ya Watanzania kwa kauli ya Maisha bora kwa kila Mtanzania, mpaka kufikia leo mwaka 2015, hali za Watanzania zimeendelea kuwa duni tangu kuanza kwa utawala wa Awamu ya Nne hasa kwenye Sekta ya Maendeleo ya Jamii, Jinsia na Watoto. [6] Ni wajibu wetu kuwakumbusha wanaoachia madaraka kuwa Watanzania ambao kwao ni watupa maganda, hawajasahau ulaghai na ahadi zilizotolewa kwao mwaka 2005 na 2010 kwa kuzingatia yafuatayo: - (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. ESTHER N. MATIKO (ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITION'S SPOKESPERSON FOR THE MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN): [1] Honourable Chairperson, a famous American Civil Rights activist and farmer, Cesar Chavez, once said “we cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about progress and prosperity for our community. [2] Our ambitions must be broad enough to include the aspirations and needs of others, for their sakes and for our own”. [3] Honourable Chairperson, as four months remain before we hold the general elections, it is obvious that we will hear a lot of statements to convince Tanzanians that the CCM government will continue to meet the hopes and aspirations which Tanzanians had under the rule of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, following the promises he made to them in 2005 and 2010 general elections. [4] Honourable Chairperson, perhaps we need to remind the CCM government that ‘those who eat bananas forget but those who throw away the remains/skins of banana never forget’ (those who promise something usually forget but those who are promised something never forget). [5] Despite the fact that the CCM government made many pledges including improving the living conditions of Tanzanians under the slogan ‘Better Life for every Tanzanian’, up to 2015, Tanzanians’ living standards have remained poor since the start of the fourth phase rule, particularly in the sector of community development, gender, and children. [6] It is our responsibility to remind those who are going to step down that Tanzanians, who are, to them, ‘those who throw away the remains/skins of bananas’, have not forgotten about the trickery and pledges made to them in 2005 and 2010 by considering the following: -

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Maendeleo ya Jamii; ni Dhahiri kuwa kwa hali iliyopo sasa, Taifa letu limekumbwa na mporomoko mkubwa wa maadili unaochangiwa na kasi ya utandawazi. [2] Tanzania ni moja kati ya Mataifa ya Afrika yenye uwezo wa kutumia historia na utamaduni wake katika kukuza maadili na jamii yenye staha. [3] Hata hivyo, katika miaka ya karibuni, Taifa letu limeshuhudia vitendo vya kuporomoka kwa maadili ambavyo vimechangia kukithiri kwa vitendo vya ubakaji na ulawiti, wizi na ujambazi, mauaji, biashara ya ngono, ulevi, ngoma za sherehe zisizo na staha, waathirika wa madawa ya kulevya na ongezeko kubwa la maambukizi ya UKIMWI na magonjwa mengine ya zinaa. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, it is clear that the present situation shows that our nation is experiencing a worse moral decline driven by globalization. [2] Tanzania is one of the African nations capable of using [its] history and culture in promoting moral standards and a respectful society. [3] However, recently, our nation has witnessed incidents of moral degradation that have contributed to [the existence of] immoral acts such as rape, theft and robbery, murder, [presence of] sex workers, drunkenness, immoral and unhealthy celebrations, drug victims, and high levels of HIV infections and other sexually transmitted diseases.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Vyuvo vya Maendeleo ya Jamii na Wataalam wa Maendeleo ya Jamii; kwa muda mrefu sasa Kambi ya Upinzani Bungeni imekuwa ikiitaka Serikali

kuhakikisha kuwa masuala ya kimkakati ya kuzuia ama kupunguza mmomonyoko wa maadili kwa kuvipa uwezo Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Jamii pamoja na vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi ili kuongeza idadi ya wataalam na kuwatumia wataalam hao kwa maendeleo ya jamii nchini. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni Dhahiri kuwa Vyuo vilivyopo vya Maendeleo ya Jamii na Vyuo vya Wananchi havikidhi ongezeko la watu nchini na pia havipevi kipaumbele katika kuviwezesha kutoa elimu na ujuzi unaofaa kwa wataalam wa maendeleo ya jamii nchini kwa kuwa Serikali imeendelea kutenga bajeti finyu. [3] Vyuo vingi vimeendelea kuwepo katika majengo ambayo ni chakavu, vyenye ukosefu wa miundombinu bora na ambavyo haviwezi kuendelea kutokana na gharama kubwa za uendeshaji (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, Community Development Training Institutes (CDTIs) and community development practitioners/professionals; for a long time, the opposition camp has been demanding that the government should have a strategic plan for preventing or reducing moral degradation by empowering CDTIs and Folk Development Colleges (FDCs) in order to increase the number of the practitioners/professionals and utilise them for community development in the country. [2] Honourable Chairperson, it is clear that the existing FDCs and CDTIs don't meet the needs of the increased population in the country and are also not given priority in helping them provide appropriate knowledge and skills to community development practitioners/professionals because the government has continued to allocate insufficient funds to them. [3] The buildings of most of the CDTIs and FDCs are in worse condition, with poor infrastructure, and they cannot make progress due to high operational costs.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Upungufu wa Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii Nchini; tukiwa tunajadili bajeti ya mwaka ujao wa 2015/2016, huku randama za Wizara hii zikionesha kuwa Maafisa wa Maendeleo ya Jamii Nchini wanakadiriwa kufikia asilimia 29 tu, huku Sera ya Maendeleo ya Jamii ikitaka kuwepo kwa mtaalam ama Afisa Maendeleo ya Jamii katika kila Kata. [2] Hii ni mojawapo ya sababu inazofanya jamii za Kitanzania kukumbana na changamoto kama nilivyoorodhesha awali. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni jambo la kushangaza kuwa pamoja na kuwa na Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Jamii ambavyo kwa mwaka 2014/2015, pekee vilikadiriwa kudahili jumla ya wanafunzi 3,594, lakini bado kuna upungufu wa Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii nchini. [4] Ikiwa Serikali inajivunia ongezeko la wanafunzi katika Vyuo hivi, je ni nini kinachowashinda Serikali kuajiri wahitimu wa vyuo hivi ili kukabiliana na upungufu wa Maafisa wa Maendeleo wa Jamii nchini? [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, maslahi duni katika fani za maendeleo ya jamii na wananchi ni mojawapo ya sababu zinazosababisha kuwe na uhaba wa wataalamu hao hasa katika ngazi za Kata. [6] Baadhi ya wahitimu wameshindwa kujiunga na kazi zinazohusiana na fani hii na kukimbilia katika kada nyingine ili waweze kujikwamua kiuchumi. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the shortage of community development officers in the country; as we discuss the [ministry's proposed] budget for 2015/16 fiscal year, the ministry's budget statistics show that the present community development officers in the country are, approximately, only 29% [of the required ones], while the Community Development Policy requires that each ward should have a community development officer. [2] This is one of the reasons why Tanzanian communities face the challenges I listed earlier. [3] Honourable Chairperson, it is surprising that, despite having CDTIs, which in 2014/15 alone were estimated to enrol a total of 3,594 students, there is still a shortage of community development officers in the country. [4] If the government is bragging about the increase in the number of students enrolled in the CDTIs, what makes it fail to employ the graduates to meet the shortage of community development officers in the country? [5] Honourable Chairperson, poor payment in community development sector is one of the causes of the shortage of community development practitioners/professionals especially at ward level. [6] Some graduates have failed to join this profession and ran to other professions so that they can [earn good money and] improve their economic situation.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kumbukumbu Rasmi za Bunge lako zinaonesha kuwa kwa kipindi cha miaka mitano toka kuanza kwa Mkutano wa Kumi, Kambi ya Upinzani katika kila mjadala wa bajeti imekuwa ikiishauri Serikali kuajiri wahitimu wa Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya

Jamii moja kwa moja na kuwapangia vituo katika Kata mbalimbali nchini. [2] Kwa kuwa Serikali imeendelea kupuuza maoni yetu ya Kambi ya Upinzani Bungeni, ni Dhahiri kuwa Serikali imeshindwa kutekeleza jukumu lake la kuwa mlezi wa jamii zetu nchini. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni jambo la aibu kubwa kwa Serikali ya CCM ambayo toka utawala wa Baba wa Taifa, Hayati Mwalimu Nyerere, haijaviendeleza hata Vyuo vilivyoanzishwa na kujengwa kati ya miaka 1950 na 1963. [4] Ni aibu kwa Serikali inayojivunia mafanikio, kujivunia kuchakaa kwa majengo ya vyuo vilivyoanzishwa kwa nguvu ya Baba wa Taifa na kusababisha uchakavu mkubwa. [5] Leo CCM inaposema inamuenzi Mwalimu Nyerere, je, inamuenzi kwa kuchakaza juhudi zake na kugeuza vyuo hivyo magofu? [6] Ikiwa Serikali ya CCM imeweza kuacha kutumia magari ya zamani chakavu na kununua mashangangi kwa ajili ya viongozi wa Serikali, inashindwaje kuvipa hadhi vyuo hivyo vilivyojengwa toka enzi za Mwalimu? [7] Hii ni aibu kubwa kwa Taifa letu. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] *Honourable Chairperson, the official records of your parliament indicate that for a period of five years since the start of the 10th [parliament], the opposition camp in each budget debate has been advising the government to employ the community development officers directly from the CDTIs and allocate them to relevant centres in various wards in the country. [2] Since the government has been ignoring the views of the opposition camp, it is clear that the government has failed to play its role of being the guardian of our communities in the country. [3] Honourable Chairperson, it is a terrible shame that the CCM government hasn't been able to develop the CDTIs/FDCs built since the period of the Father of the Nation, Mwalimu Nyerere between 1950s and 1963. [4] It is a shame that the government is boasting about the worse condition of the buildings of the CDTIs/FDCs that were established by the Father of the Nation. [5] Today, when CCM says that it commemorates Mwalimu Nyerere, does it commemorate him by destroying his legacy and turning the buildings of the CDTIs/FDCs into ruins? [6] If the CCM government has been able to stop using old vehicles and started buying luxurious vehicles for government officials, how comes it fails to rehabilitate the CDTIs/FDCs that were built during the Mwalimu Nyerere era? [7] This is a shame to our nation.*

- (f) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Uwezeshaji wa Kiuchumi; kwa mujibu wa Sensa iliyofanyika mwaka 2012 inaonesha kuwa kati ya Watanzania milioni 45, wanawake ni milioni 23. [2] Pamoja na kuwa kundi hili la wanawake limechanganya na watu walio chini ya umri wa miaka 18, inaleta taswira kuwa idadi ya wanawake nchini ni kubwa na [3] hivyo takwimu za uwezeshaji kwa kundi hili la wanawake zinazoletwa na Serikali zinaacha kundi kubwa la wanawake likiwa halijafikiwa na mafunzo na mikopo ya uwezeshaji. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa mfano, kwa mujibu wa takwimu za Wizara hii zinaonesha kuwa ni wanawake 11,350 tu walioweza kufikiwa na Benki ya Wanawake Tanzania ambao kwa mujibu wa taarifa hii ni sawa na asilimia 87 na wanaume 1,642 sawa na asilimia 13 kati ya mwaka 2009 na 2014. [5] Hii ni kiini macho cha mchana kweupe kwa kuwa ikiwa kwa mujibu wa Sensa, wanawake na wanaume wenye umri juu ya miaka 15 ni takribani 25,200,000, [6] basi kwa muda wa miaka mitano, Benki hii imeweza kuwanufaisha kwa asilimia 0.49 ya wanawake na wanaume wa Tanzania nzima kwa miaka mitano. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] *Honourable Chairperson, Economic Empowerment; according to the 2012 [Population and Housing] Census, there are 23 million women out of 45 million Tanzanians. [2] Although this group of women includes girls under the age of 18, the fact remains that there is a large number of women in the country. [3] Thus, the government's statistics of women's [economic] empowerment leave a large group of women unreached by the training and provision of loans. [4] Honourable Chairperson, for instance, the ministry's statistics indicate that between 2009 and 2014, only 11,350 women were reached by the Tanzania Women Bank (TWB), which is, according to this report, equivalent to 87%, and 1,642 men, equivalent to 13%. [5] This is a clear magic trick because, according to the Census, women and men above the age of 15 are approximately 25,200,000. [6] Then, for five years, this bank has managed to benefit only 0.49% of women and men across Tanzania.*

- (g) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kama ilivyoandikwa katika Mwongozo wa Sera ya Ukatili wa Kijinsia ya mwaka 2011, ukatili wa kijinsia ni tatizo kubwa ambalo linawanyima uhuru

wanaume, wanawake na Watoto kufurahia haki za msingi za binadamu na kufanya wapendavyo. [2] Licha ya tatizo hilo kuwepo katika nchi nyingi duniani lakini halipewi kipaumbele wala halishughulikiwi ipasavyo. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, takwimu zinaonesha kuwa asilimia 45 ya wanawake wametendewa ukatili wa kijinsia. [4] Pia, kwamba wasichana watatu kati ya 10 wametendewa angalau tendo moja la ukatili wa kijinsia kabla ya kufikia umri wa miaka 18. [5] Vile vile, asilimia 13 ya Watoto wa kiume wenye umri ule ule wamefanyiwa matendo ya ukatili kabla ya kufikisha umri wa miaka 18. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mimba za Utotoni; kutokana na taarifa [n]a umaskini ya maendeleo ya watu ya 2011, mimba za utotoni zilifikia 1,056 kwa mwaka mmoja tu. [7] Wasichana wote hawa waliacha shule. [6] Ikumbukwe kuwa, kwa mujibu wa Wizara ya Elimu, mpango wa Serikali kuhusu shule za sekondari za Kata ulilenga shule hizo zijengwe karibu na makazi ya wananchi ili Watoto waweze kutoka nyumbani na kwenda shuleni na kurudi nyumbani kwa urahisi kwa lengo la kuhakikisha kuwa Watoto wengi wanapata elimu nzuri na bora zaidi. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, as stated in the guidelines on the 2011 policy to curb gender-based violence, gender-based violence is a major problem that deprives men, women and children of the right to enjoy basic human rights and make their own choices as they wish. [2] Despite the fact that the problem exists in many countries around the world, it is not given priority and is not dealt with properly. [3] Honourable Chairperson, the statistics show that 45% of women have experienced gender-based violence (GBV). [4] Also, 3 out of 10 girls have experienced at least one act of GBV before the age of 18. [5] Similarly, 13% of male children of the same age group have been victims of violence before the age of 18. [6] Honourable Chairperson, early pregnancies; according to the 2011 Poverty and Human Development Report, early pregnancies amounted to 1,056 in just a year. [7] All these girls dropped out from school. [8] It should be recalled that, according to the Ministry of Education, the government initiative for ward secondary schools focused on building schools closer to the students' homes so that children can easily leave home, go to school and come back home safely, while ensuring that most children get better education.

- (h) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hata hivyo, kwa asilimia kubwa utekelezaji wa mpango huo haujafanikiwa kama ilivyokusudiwa kwa sababu kuna maeneo mengi nchini ambapo wanafunzi wengi tena wenye umri mdogo chini ya miaka 17, bado wanalazimika kutembea zaidi ya kilomita kumi kila siku kwenda shuleni huku wakipita katikati ya mapori, mabonde na milima yenye hatari mbalimbali kwa Maisha yao ukiwemo ubakaji. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni wanafunzi hawa wanaopata mimba za utotoni ambao wanakaa katika maeneo ambayo yana shida za maji na hivyo kulazimika kutembea umbali mrefu baada ya masomo ili kupata maji kwa matumizi ya majumbani mwao. [3] Kushindwa kwa sera ya Serikali ya CCM ndiyo kumepelekea watoto wa kike kukumbwa na mimba za utotoni. [4] Kushindwa kwa Serikali kusimamia utekelezaji wa ahadi zake za kipindi cha uchaguzi ndizo zinazosababisha ongezeko la mimba za utotoni [...] (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, however, to a large extent, the initiative hasn't been successfully implemented as it was planned because there are still many areas in the country where more pupils under the age of 17 have to walk more than ten kilometres every day to school, while passing through bushes, valleys and mountains with a range of risks to their lives including rape. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the students who get early pregnancies are those living in areas where there is a scarcity of water and so they have to walk long distances after school to fetch water for domestic use. [3] The failure of the CCM government's policy has led to early pregnancies. [4] The failure of the government to oversee the fulfilment of the election pledges is the cause of an increase in early pregnancies.

- (i) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ongezeko la watoto wa mitaani na athari zake katika Taifa. [2] Wakati wa piramidi ya idadi ya watu nchini Tanzania inaonesha kuwa idadi kubwa ya watu nchini Tanzania ni Watoto wenye umri wa chini ya miaka 15 na vijana. Asilimia 44 ya watu wote hapa nchini ni watoto wenye umri chini ya miaka 15, ambapo ongezeko la watoto wa mitaani limeendelea kuwa na athari huku sababu mbalimbali kama umaskini katika familia,

mifarakano na ukosefu wa amani kwenye familia na wazazi kutowajibika katika malezi na makuzi ya watoto wao vikipelekea watoto hao kuishi katika mazingira hatari. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sababu nyingine ni vitendo vya ukatili, udhalilishaji na unyanyasaji kwa watoto kutoka kwa familia na jamii kwa ujumla. [4] Nyingine ni kufariki kwa wazazi hasa kutokana na magonjwa mbalimbali, pia huchangiwa na ndoa za umri mdogo pamoja na mimba zisizotarajiwa. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the increase in street children and its impacts on the nation; [2] while the population pyramid in Tanzania suggests that the majority of people in the country are children under the age of 15 and the youth, 44% of the Tanzanian population are children under the age of 15, where the increase in street children has continued to have negative impacts due to a number of factors, including family poverty, disagreement and lack of peace in families, and parents' failure to take the responsibility for childhood rearing and development, which have caused these children to live in vulnerable environments. [3] Honourable Chairperson, other factors are violence, child abuse from family members and the community as a whole. [4] Others include deaths of parents mainly from various illnesses, as well as early and unplanned pregnancies.

- (j) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, wakati wa mawasilisho ya Hotuba ya Bajeti ya Ofisi ya Waziri Mkuu, Mheshimiwa Barwany ambaye ni Waziri Kivuli wa Maendeleo ya Jamii, Jinsia na Watoto lakini akiwa ni mlemavu wa Ngozi alionesha wasiwasi wake juu ya dhamira ya Serikali katika kuwalinda watu wenye ulemavu wa Ngozi. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Waziri wa Sera, Uratibu na Bunge Mheshimiwa Jestina Mhagama alisimama na kutoa maelezo kuwa Serikali imeandaa utaratibu wa kuwalinda watu wenye ulemavu wa ngozi kwa kuwaandalia tracking devices system yaani mfumo wa kutambua mienendo ya mlengwa ambayo inafanywa kwa kushirikiana na wadau mbalimbali wa watu wenye ulemavu wa Ngozi na masuala ya usalama. [3] Mheshimiwa Barwany hakuridhishwa na kauli ile kwa kuwa yeye pia ni mmoja wa watu wanaoishi kwa wasiwasi kwenye Taifa hili. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, zikiwa zimepita siku mbili toka Mheshimiwa Barwany kuonesha wasiwasi wake juu ya mfumo wa ulinzi kwa watu wenye ulemavu wa ngozi nchini mwanamama Remi Luchoma alikatwa mkono na watu wasiojulikana Mkoani Katavi. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, during the presentation of the budget speech of the Prime Minister's Office, Honourable Barwany, who is a Shadow Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children but also a person with albinism, expressed his concern about the government's commitment to protect people with albinism. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the Minister of [State in the Prime Minister's Office,] Policy, Coordination and Parliamentary Affairs, Honourable [Jenista] Mhagama, stood up and stated that the government has prepared a tracking devices system for protecting people with albinism in collaboration with various stakeholders working for the people with albinism in addressing their skin-related problems and security issues. [3] Honourable Barwany was unsatisfied with the statement because he is also one of the people who are living in fear of being targeted in this nation. [4] Honourable Chairperson, after just two days since Honourable Barwany expressed his concern about the protection of people with albinism in the country, a woman by the name Remi Luchoma was cut off her arm by the unknown people in Katavi.

- (k) [1] Hii ni aibu kubwa kwa Serikali na ni dhahiri kuwa, imeshindwa kuwalinda watu wenye ulemavu kwa kuwa kwa masikitiko na uchungu mkubwa, miezi mitatu (3) iliyopita mwili wa mtoto Yohana Bahati aliyekuwa na umri wa mwaka mmoja tu ambaye alikuwa ni mlemavu wa ngozi maarufu kama Albino, ambaye alitekwa siku ya Jumapili Februari, 2015 ulipatikana akiwa ameuawa kikatili katika eneo la Shilabela Mapinduzi kilomita kadhaa kutoka nyumbani kwao Kijiji cha Iilema. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, natoa maelezo haya nikiwa na masikitiko makubwa na huzuni nyingi na huku nikiwa natafakari hatma ya watu wenye ulemavu nchini kwetu wenyewe. [3] Je, waikimbie Tanzania? [4] Je, ni nani atamfunga paka kengele? [5] Ni nani atawasaka na kuwazuia watekaji, watesaji na wauaji wa watu wenye ulemavu hasa wa ngozi? [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, aidha, nitoe wito kwa Watanzania wote kutowabagua watu wenye ulemavu wa ngozi na kuchukua jukumu la kwanza la kuwa walenzi

wa haki ya watu wenye ulemavu wa ngozi kuishi kwa kuwa Serikali ya CCM imeshindwa kuwazuia wauaji na watesaji wa watu wenye ulemavu. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] *This is a crying shame and it is clear that the government has failed to protect people with disabilities because three months ago a dead body of a brutally killed one-year baby, Yohana Bahati, who is a person with albinism and who was kidnapped on Sunday, February 2015, was found in Shilabela, Mapinduzi area several kilometres from their home in Ilelema village.* [2] *Honourable Chairperson, I am giving this information with great sadness and I am contemplating the fate of people with disabilities in our own country.* [3] *Should they run away from Tanzania?* [4] *Who should 'bell the cat'?* [5] *Who will hunt and stop those who torture and kill people with disabilities, especially people with albinism?* [6] *Honourable Chairperson, I would like to call on all Tanzanians not to discriminate people with albinism and take the primary responsibility to protect the rights of people with disabilities to live because the CCM government has failed to prevent murderers and torturers of the people with albinism.*

From *Extract 6.6*, the opposition's second standpoint can be reconstructed as *2 the CCM government has failed to fulfil its 2005 and 2010 election pledges in the community development sector*. This standpoint relates to the proposition that the CCM government has effectively fulfilled its election pledges between 2005 and 2015. By asserting that the government has failed to fulfil the pledges, Ms Matiko suggests that the government has not fulfilled the election pledges effectively or as it was expected to. Thus, she has adopted a negative standpoint to the proposition. Ms Matiko's initial argumentation in defence of this standpoint begins with a quotation from Cesar Chavez, whom she describes as 'a famous American human rights activist and famer', as shown in (a) [1-4] and (a) [6]. She argues that *2.1a Cesar Chavez once said that we cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about progress and prosperity for our community*, implying that the CCM government only sought achievement for themselves and forgot about progress and prosperity for the people (the electorate). In this argument, Ms Matiko appeals to authority argumentation by quotation.

This argument is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that, while the CCM govt has 'forgotten' about its election pledges, *2.1b Tanzanians have not forgotten about the unfulfilled pledges*, implying that Tanzanians are aware of the CCM's unfulfilled pledges. This argument demonstrates authority argumentation, where Ms Matiko appeals to the ordinary people of Tanzania (or members of the electorate) as the authority. This argument is more or less similar to van Dijk's (1997, p. 30) *populist (or nationalist) appeal*, where Ms Matiko appeals to the supposed views of the electorate or ordinary citizens. In this argument, Ms Matiko presents the opposition's or her own evaluation of the government's failure to fulfil the CCM's election pledges as the populist evaluation of the (ordinary) Tanzanians. The basic critical question that should be raised here is whether the opposition's evaluation is indeed the populist evaluation of the (ordinary) Tanzanians. Ms Matiko's authority argumentation from populist appeal is reinforced by the Swahili figurative expression (presentational device)

Mlandizi husahau ila mtupa maganda hasahau, which can be literally translated into English as ‘those who eat bananas forget but those who throw away the ‘remains/skins of bananas’ never forget. With this figurative expression, Ms Matiko metaphorically compares the CCM government to ‘banana eaters’ and ordinary Tanzanians (i.e. the voters) to “the people who throw away the remains/skins of bananas” once ‘the banana eaters’ have finished eating. What is implied here is that the CCM government can easily forget about the pledges because they cannot feel what ordinary citizens, who live in poor living conditions, are going through. But the ordinary Tanzanians cannot forget about the election promises because they are the ones who suffer the consequences and expected the government to meet their hopes and aspirations.

In defence of the argument 2.1b, Ms Matiko suggests that 2.1b.1 *the CCM’s election pledges have remained unfulfilled in various areas in the community development sector*. Generally, Ms Matiko’s argumentation for the second standpoint in the first and second levels of defence is indicated in **Table 6.17** below.

Table 6.17 The first two levels of defence for the opposition’s second standpoint

No.	Description
2	The CCM govt has failed to fulfil its 2005 and 2010 election pledges
2.1a	Cesar Chavez once said that we cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about the progress and prosperity for our community
(2.1a’)	(The CCM govt leaders only sought achievement for themselves and forgot about progress and prosperity for the people)
2.1b	Tanzanians have not forgotten about the unfulfilled pledges
(2.1b’)	(Ordinary Tanzanians are aware that CCM has failed to fulfil the election pledges)
2.1b.1	The CCM’s election pledges have remained unfulfilled in various areas in the community development sector

In defence of argument 2.1b.1, Ms Matiko provides five areas in which the government has supposedly failed to improve or promote as ‘proofs’ of the CCM’s ‘unfulfilled’ election pledges. First, in (a) [5], she argues that one of the many pledges the CCM government made to Tanzanians during the 2005 and 2010 election campaigns was to improve the Tanzanians’ living conditions/standards under the slogan *Maisha Bora kwa kila Mtanzania* (Better Life for every Tanzanian). Ms Matiko suggests that 2.1b.1.1 *the CCM government has failed to improve people’s living conditions/standards* because 2.1b.1.1.1 *Tanzanians’ living conditions have remained poor up to 2015*. This argument is summarised in **Table 6.18** below.

Table 6.18 The opposition’s first argument for 2.1b.1

No.	Description
2.1b.1	The CCM’s election pledges have remained unfulfilled in various areas in the community development sector
2.1b.1.1	It has failed to improve people’s living conditions/standards

(2.1b.1.1')	(Failure to improve the living conditions/standards is a proof that the pledges have remained unfulfilled)
2.1b.1.1.1	Tanzanians' living conditions/standards have remained poor up to 2015

The second argument in support of argument 2.1b.1 is reconstructed from subextract (b) to subextract (e). This argument realises coordinative argumentation with two arguments, as indicated in (b) [1-3]. In the first argument, Ms Matiko suggests that 2.1b.1.2a *the CCM government has failed to improve moral standards of the society*, which is combined with the argument that 2.1b.1.2b *the nation is experiencing a worse decline in moral standards* (symptomatic argumentation), and that 2.1b.1.2b.1 *this has led to the existence of immoral incidents*, such as rape, theft, robbery, murder, sex business, and STDs (causal argumentation). Argument 2.1b.1.2a is further defended by two arguments in multiple argumentation. The first argument in support of 2.1b.1.2a is reconstructed from (c) [1-3] and (e) [1-2], where Ms Matiko argues that 2.1b.1.2a.1 *the CCM government has been ignoring the opposition's advice*, implying that the CCM's failure to improve moral standards is the consequence of ignoring the opposition's advice (causal argumentation). In the other argument, she argues that 2.1b.1.2a.2 *the government has failed to utilise the country's history and culture to improve moral standards and promote a respectful society*, suggesting that it is also caused by the failure to utilise the nation's history and culture (causal argumentation), as indicated in (b) [2].

Argument 2.1b.12a.1 is further defended by two arguments realising multiple argumentation. The first argument is reconstructed from (c) [1-3] and it realises coordinative argumentation. Starting from the premise that the opposition has been advising the government to have a strategic plan to increase the number of CDPs by empowering or giving priority to the CDTIs/FDCs in order to reduce or prevent the decline in moral standards (practical argumentation), as presented in (c) [1-2], Ms Matiko first argues that 2.1b.1.2a.1.1a *the government has failed to empower the CDTIs/FDCs* and that 2.1b.1.2a.1.1b *it has failed to increase the number of CDPs to prevent/reduce the decline in moral standards*, implying that this is the result of ignoring the opposition's advice (causal argumentation). In the second argument in support of argument 2.1b.1.2a.1, as indicated in (e) [2], she suggests that, because the government has been ignoring the opposition's advice, 2.1b.1.2a.1.2 *it has failed to play its role as the guardian of the community/society* (causal argumentation).

In defence of argument 2.1b.1.2a.1.1a, in (c) [3], Ms Matiko's discourse exemplifies coordinative argumentation with two arguments, where she suggests that 2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a *CDTIs/FDCs cannot meet the high operational costs*, which is coordinatively combined with

the argument that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b the buildings and infrastructures of the CDTIs/FDCs are in poor condition*. In (c) [2], argument *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a* is defended by the argument that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a.1 the government has been allocating insufficient funds to the CDTIs/FDCs* (causal argumentation), because *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a.1.1 it spends huge amount of money on buying expensive vehicles for government officials* (causal argumentation), as indicated in (e) [6]. In (e) [3-6], argument *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b* is defended by two arguments in coordinative argumentation; *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b.1a the government has destroyed Mwalimu Nyerere's legacy* (causal argumentation) and that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b.1b the buildings were built during Mwalimu Nyerere's era*. It is further maintained that the government has destroyed Mwalimu Nyerere's legacy because *2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b.1a.1 it has turned the buildings into ruins*.

Argument *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b* is defended by two arguments combined in multiple argumentation. The first argument realises coordinative argumentation with two arguments, as indicated in (d) [1]. Ms Matiko argues that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a there are only 29% of the required CDPs in the country* (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation) and that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1b the Community Development Policy requires that every ward in the country should have a CDP* (authority argumentation). In defence of argument *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a*, in (d) [6], she argues that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1 community development graduates run to other professions* because *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1.1 they are not paid well by the government in community development sector* (causal argumentation), as indicated in (d) [5], and because *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1.2 the government has ignored the opposition's advice to employ the graduate directly from CDTIs* (causal argumentation), as indicated in (e) [1]. Another argument in defence of *2.1b.1.2a.1b* is presented in (d) [3-4]. Ms Matiko suggests that *2.1b.1.2a.1b.2 the government has failed to employ CDPs despite an increase in student enrolment in CDTIs*. In (d) [3], Ms Matiko's critical reaction also suggests that *2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.2.1 CDTIs enrolled 3,594 students in 2014/15 alone* (authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation). Generally, Ms Matiko's second argument in defence of *2.1b.1* is summarised in **Table 6.19**.

Table 6.19 The opposition's second argument for 2.1b.1

No.	Description
2.1b.1.2a (2.1b.1.2a')	The CCM govt has failed to improve moral standards of the society (This is another proof that the pledges have remained unfulfilled)
2.1b.1.2a.1 (2.1b.1.2a.1')	The govt has been ignoring the opposition's advice (This failure is a consequence of ignoring the opposition's advice)
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a	It has failed to empower or give priority to CDTIs/FDCs
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a	CDTIs/FDCs cannot meet high operational costs of the CDTIs/FDCs

2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a.1	The govt has been allocating insufficient funds to the CDTIs/FDCs
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1a.1.1	The govt spends huge amount of money on buying luxurious vehicles
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b	Buildings/infrastructures of the CDTIs/FDCs are in very poor condition
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b.1a	The govt has destroyed Mwalimu Nyerere's legacy
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b.1a.1	It has turned the buildings into ruins
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.1b.1b	The buildings were built during the Mwalimu Nyerere's era of leadership
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.2	The existing CDTIs/FDCs cannot meet the needs of the increasing population
2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.3	CDTIs/FDCs are not enabled to provide appropriate knowledge/skills
(2.1b.1.2a.1.1a.3')	(As a result, they fail to offer appropriate knowledge/skills to the students)
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b	It has failed to increase the number of CDPs to improve moral standards
(2.1b.1.2a.1.1b')	It doesn't have a good strategic plan to address the shortage of CDPs
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a	There are only 29% of the required CDPs in the country
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1b	The Community Development Policy requires that every ward should have a CDP
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1	Community development graduates run to other professions
(2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1')	(The shortage of CDPs is caused by the fact that the community development graduates run to other professions)
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1.1	They are not paid well by the govt in the community development sector
(2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1.1')	(This is caused by not being paid well in community development sector)
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1.2	Community development graduates are not employed directly from CDTIs
(2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.1a.1.2')	(The shortage of CDPs is also caused by the fact that they are not employed directly from CDTIs)
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.2	The govt has failed to employ the graduates to address the shortage of CDPs in the country despite an increase in student enrolment in CDTIs
2.1b.1.2a.1.1b.2.1	CDTIs enrolled a total of 3,594 students in 2014/15 alone
2.1b.1.2a.2	The govt has failed to utilise the national history and culture to improve moral standards and promote a respectful society
(2.1b.2a.2')	(The decline in moral standards is also caused by the govt's failure to utilise the national history and culture)
2.1b.1.2b	The nation is experiencing a worse decline in moral standards
(2.1b.1.2b')	(This is a proof that the govt has failed to improve moral standards)
2.1b.1.2b.1	This has led to immoral incidents such as rape, theft, robbery, murder, sex business, and the existence of STDs

In her third argument in support of 2.1b.1, Ms Matiko suggests that 2.1a.1.3 *the government has failed to protect children's rights*. This argument and supporting arguments are reconstructed from subextracts (g) [1, 4-8], (h), and (i). From these subextracts, argument 2.1a.1.3 is defended by three supporting arguments, realising multiple argumentation. The first argument realises coordinative argumentation and is reconstructed from (g) [1] and (g) [4-5], where Ms Matiko suggests that, according to the policy to curb gender-based violence (GBV), three out of ten girls have experienced at least one act/incident of GBV before the age of 18 as shown in (g) [4], and that 13% of male children are victims of child abuse before the age of 18, as shown in (g) [5]. Both arguments demonstrate authority argumentation from statistics, where Ms Matiko appeals to the official statistics of the policy to curb GBV justify her claim.

The second argument is presented in (g) [6-8] and (h), where this member of the opposition suggests that the government has failed to prevent an increase in early pregnancies in schoolgirls. This argument is further supported by three arguments, which realise coordinative argumentation. In (g) [6], Ms Matiko argues that, according to the 2011 Poverty and Human Development Report, early pregnancies amounted to 1,056 in just a year (authority argumentation from statistics), and that, as shown in (g) [7], all these pregnant schoolgirls dropped out from school. It is suggested in the unexpressed premise that early pregnancies deprive schoolgirls of the right to education (causal argumentation). As shown in (g) [5] and (h) [3, 4], Ms Matiko also argues that the increase in early pregnancies in schoolgirls is caused by the failure of the government's policy to build schools in nearby areas (causal argumentation). To further defend this argument, she argues that many students under the age of 17 in many areas in the country have to walk ten kilometres to school every day, via bushes, valleys and mountains with a wide range of risks to their lives including rape, as indicated in (h) [1]. It is implied in the unexpressed premise that these are the students who get early pregnancies. Ms Matiko also suggests that the students who get early pregnancies live in areas where there is a scarcity of water and that they have to walk long distances after school to fetch water for domestic use, as presented in (h) [2]. The two supporting arguments seem to demonstrate experience-based authority argumentation, where Ms Matiko seems to appeal to her own experience of the lives of people in many or some areas in the country.

The last argument in defence of 2.1a.1.3 is reconstructed from subextract (i), where Ms Matiko suggests that the number of street children has continued to increase and affect the nation, as shown in (i) [1]. This supporting argument is further defended by two arguments in coordinative argumentation. In (i) [2], Ms Matiko suggests that, according to the country's population pyramid, 44% of the Tanzanian population are children under 15 (authority argumentation from statistics) and these statistics suggest that there is a large number of street children, which implies that an increase in the number of children leads to an increase in street children (causal argumentation). To further support this argument, in (i) [2-4], she maintains that an increase in street children is *caused* by family poverty, disagreement and lack of peace in families, deaths of parents, illnesses, parents' irresponsibility, as well as early and unplanned pregnancies (causal argumentation). In (i) [2], she also suggests that these factors have caused children to live in vulnerable environments (causal argumentation). Generally, Ms Matiko's third argument in support of argument 2.1b.1 is summarised in **Table 6.20** below.

Table 6.20 The opposition's third argument for 2.1b.1

No.	Description
2.1b.1.3	The govt has failed to protect children's rights
2.1b.1.3.1a	3 out of 10 girls have experienced at least one act of GBV before the age of 18
2.1b.1.3.1b	13% of male children are victims of child abuse before the age of 18
2.1b.1.3.2	It has failed to prevent early pregnancies in schoolgirls
2.1b.1.3.2.1a	According to the 2011 Poverty and Human Development report, early pregnancies in schoolgirls amounted to 1,056 in just one year
2.1b.1.3.2.1b	All these girls dropped out from school
2.1b.1.3.2.1c	This is caused by the failure of the govt's policy to build schools closer to the students' homes and provide other social services to the community
2.1b.1.3.2.1c.1a	Many students under 17 in many areas have to walk ten kilometres to school every day through bushes, valleys, and mountains with a lot of risks
2.1b.1.3.2.1c.1b	They also live in areas where there is a scarcity of water
2.1b.1.3.2.1c.1b.1	They have to walk long distances after school to fetch water for domestic use
2.1b.1.3.3	The number of street children have continued to increase and affect the nation
2.1b.1.3.3.1a	44% of the Tanzanian population are children under the age of 15
2.1b.1.3.3.1b	These statistics suggest that there is a large number of street children
(2.1b.1.3.3.1b')	(An increase in the number of children leads to an increase in street children)
2.1b.1.3.3.1b.1	The increase in street children is caused by family poverty, disagreement and lack of peace in a family, parents' deaths, parents' irresponsibility, early and unplanned pregnancies
2.1b.1.3.3.1b.1.1	These factors cause children to live in vulnerable environments

In the fourth argument for 2.1b.1, as expressed in (f) and (g), Ms Matiko suggests that 2.1b.1.4 *the government has failed to promote Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) and gender equality*, implying that the government promised to empower women economically and improve gender equality, and this is considered to be another proof that the government has failed to fulfil its election pledges (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is further defended by two arguments, realising multiple argumentation at the fourth level of defence. First, in (f) [3], she argues that 2.1b.1.4.1 *many women have not received the loans and training provided by TWB*. Second, in (g) [1, 3], she adds that, according to the gender-based violence (GBV) statistics, 2.1b.1.4.2 *45% of women have experienced GBV* (authority argumentation from statistics), implicitly suggesting that the government has failed to protect women from GBV.

In support of 2.1b.1.4.1, as shown in (f) [1], she argues at the fifth level of defence that, according to the 2012 Population and Housing Census, 2.1b.1.4.1.1 *there are 23 women out of 45 million Tanzanians* (authority argumentation from statistics). In (f) [2], Ms Matiko performs a usage declarative to clarify her argument. She argues that, although 23 million women include girls under the age of 18, the fact remains that there is a huge number of women in the country. At the sixth level of defence, argument 2.1b.1.4.1.1 is defended by two arguments, realising coordinative argumentation. In (f) [4], she argues that, according to the ministry's statistics,

2.1b.1.4.1.1.1a TWB reached only 11,350 women and 1,642 men between 2009 and 2014 (authority argumentation from statistics). Ms Matiko further suggests that *2.1b.1.4.1.1.1b* TWB reached only 0.49% of women and men across the country. This is because, according to the 2012 Census, there are approximately 25,200,000 women and men above the age of 15 in the country (authority argumentation from statistics), as shown in (f) [5]. It is implied in the unexpressed premise that all women and men above the age of 15 were supposed to receive the loans and training. The fourth argument in support of *2.1b.1* is summarised in **Table 6.21** below.

Table 6.21 The opposition's fourth argument for 2.1b.1

No.	Description
2.1b.1.4 (2.1b.1.4')	The govt has failed to promote WEE and gender equality (Failure to empower women economically and improve gender equality is a proof that the CCM govt has failed to fulfil the election pledges)
2.1b.1.4.1	Many women have not received TWB's loans and training
2.1b.1.4.1.1	There are 23 million women out of 45 million Tanzanians
2.1b.1.4.1.1.1a	TWB has reached only 11,350 women and 1,642 men
2.1b.1.4.1.1.1b	TWB has reached only 0.49% of women and men across the country
2.1b.1.4.1.1.1b.1 (2.1b.1.4.1.1.1b.1')	There are approximately 25,200,000 women and men above the age of 15 (These are the people who are eligible for the loans/training)
2.1b.1.4.2 (2.1b.1.4.2')	45% of women have experienced GBV (The govt has failed to protect women from GBV)

Ms Matiko's last argument in defence of *2.1b.1* is advanced in subextracts (j) and (k), which is reconstructed as *2.1b.1.5 the government has failed to protect people with disabilities*, as suggested in (k) [6]. Further defence of this argument is expressed in the rest of the two subextracts, where the opposition's spokesperson suggests that *2.1b.1.5.1 the government's commitment to protect people with albinism is questionable*, implicitly suggesting that the government is not committed enough to protecting people with albinism. In support of this argument, in (j) [1-3], Ms Matiko argues that *2.1b.1.5.1.1a Mr Barwany expressed his concern about the government's commitment to protect people with albinism*, which is defended by the argument that *2.1b.1.5.1.1a.1 Mr Barwany is one of the people with albinism living in fear of being killed* (authority argumentation). In (k) [6], argument *2.1b.1.5.1a* is combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that *2.1b.1.5.1.1b the government has failed to stop murderers and torturers from killing and torturing people with disabilities*, implying that this is a proof that the government's tracking devices system has failed (symptomatic argumentation). She further offers two examples (argumentation from example) in favour of *2.1b.1.5.1.1b*. First, in (j) [4], she argues that, just few days after Mr Barwany expressed his doubt, a woman with albinism (Remi Luchoma) was cut off her arm by unknown people in

Katavi. Second, in (k) [1], Ms Matiko maintains that a one-year child with albinism (Yohana Bahati) was brutally killed in Ilelema. Argument *2.1b.1.5.1.1b* is strategically reinforced by rhetorical questions in (k) [2-5]. In (k) [3], Ms Matiko asks: *should people with albinism run away from the country?* In the other question, she asks: *ni nani atamfunga paka kengele?* (Who should ‘bell the cat’?). With this rhetorical question, which is framed in a figurative expression, Ms Matiko implies that, if the government has failed to protect people with disabilities, especially people with albinism, who should take that responsibility? With this question, she suggests that it is the government’s responsibility to protect people with albinism. Generally, Ms Matiko’s fifth argument for *2.1b.1* is summarised in **Table 6.22**.

Table 6.22 The opposition’s fifth argument for 2.1b.1

No.	Description
2.1b.1.5	The govt has failed to protect people with disabilities
(2.1b.1.5’)	(Failure to protect people with albinism is a proof that the CCM govt has failed to fulfil its election pledges)
2.1b.1.5.1	The govt’s commitment to protect people with albinism is questionable
(2.1b.1.5.1b’)	(The govt is not committed enough to protecting people with albinism)
2.1b.1.5.1.1a	Mr Barwany expressed his concern about the govt’s commitment to protecting people with albinism
2.1b.1.5.1.1a.1	Mr Barwany is one of the people with albinism who continue to live in fear of being killed
2.1b.1.5.1.1b	The govt has failed to stop murderers and torturers from killing and torturing people with disabilities
(2.1b.1.5.1.1b’)	(The govt’s tracking devices system has failed)
2.1b.1.5.1.1b.1	A one-year child with albinism, Yohana Bahati, was killed
2.1b.1.5.1.1b.2	Remi Luchoma, who is a person with albinism, was recently cut off her arm

One of the basic critical questions that can be raised to challenge Ms Matiko’s argumentation from example in *2.1b.1.5.1.1b.1* and *2.1b.1.5.1.1b.2* is whether the two examples are sufficient to conclude that the government has indeed failed to protect people with albinism.

The speech acts performed in the opposition’s second standpoint and its related argumentation include the assertive, commissive, and directive. First, Ms Matiko performs the commissive by implicitly not accepting the minister’s standpoints, especially the second standpoint. Second, she performs the assertive by expressing the opposition’s second standpoint and advancing argumentation in defence of the standpoint. Finally, she performs the directive by requesting usage declaratives or argumentation from the minister.

6.2.2.4 Summary of the opposition’s second standpoint and related argumentation

Ms Matiko’s standpoint and supporting argumentation, as reconstructed from Extract 6.6, can be summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Fig. 6.6. This summary suffices for the

purpose of presenting the standpoint and its related argumentation in a single diagram. Hence not all arguments or all levels of defence of the standpoint are presented.




Figure 6.6 Summary of the opposition's second standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of the (sub)types of argumentation schemes appealed to, the opposition's second standpoint is at the first two levels defended by authority argumentation by quotation and authority argumentation from populist appeal. In the next levels, the standpoint is mainly defended by authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation, causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, and experience-based authority argumentation.

6.2.2.5 The opposition's third standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's third standpoint relates to the coordination of Non-Governmental Organizations (hereafter NGOs). This standpoint and its supporting arguments are reconstructed from *Extract 6.7*.

Extract 6.7

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali; Serikali ya CCM imeendelea kuuma na kupuliza kuhusu usimamizi wa mashirika yasiyo ya Kiserikali. [2] Ni Serikali hii ambayo kwa miaka kadhaa imekuwa ikiyapa usajili Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali, lakini Serikali hiyo hiyo ikashindwa kufuatilia utendaji wake kama inavyotakiwa kwa mujibu wa Sheria. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni kweli kuwa kuna baadhi ya Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ambayo yamelenga kutumia mwanya uliopo kufanya kazi kinyume na utaratibu uliowekwa, [4] lakini ni ukweli usiopingika kuwa mashirika ambayo yamegeuka kuwa mwiba kwa Serikali hasa kwa kufichua uozo na uovu wa Serikali hii, ndiyo yamekuwa walengwa wa mkakati wa Serikali wa kuyafuta [5] kwa kuwa yanafanya kazi bila kufuata mashinikizo ya CCM. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, tunaendelea kuamini kuwa Serikali inatekeleza mpango wa kuyafutia Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali hasa kutokana na hofu ya kazi inayofanywa na mashirika hayo, kutoa elimu kwa umma na hasa tunapoelekea Uchaguzi Mkuu Oktoba (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); the CCM government has continued to 'bite and blow' in the supervision of NGOs. [2] It is this government that for many years has been registering NGOs, but the same government has failed to monitor the operation of NGOs as required by the (NGOs) Act. [3] Honourable Chairperson, it is true that there are a few NGOs that use the existing loophole to operate against the Act, [4] but it is an undisputable fact that the NGOs that have turned a thorn in the side of the government, especially by exposing the government's wrongdoings and evils, are the ones that are targeted by the government's deregistration strategy [5] because these NGOs operate without complying with the [political] conditions CCM has been imposing on them. [6] Honourable Chairperson, we continue to believe that the government is deregistering NGOs due to the fear of the activities executed by the NGOs, especially in providing [civic] education to the public particularly now that we are heading towards the general elections in October.

- (b) [1] Ni jambo la kushangaza kuwa Serikali inaeleza changamoto mojawapo za Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali ni kujikita mijini na siyo vijijini kwenye wananchi wengi wenye uhitaji, [2] ikiwa nayo inashindwa kutekeleza wajibu na majukumu yake ya kuhakikisha maendeleo ya jamii yananafaisha vijiji na si miji peke yake, inawezaje kuyafuta mashirika haya? [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, aidha, ni jambo la kushangaza kuona kuwa taarifa ya Wizara ya utekelezaji unaelezea changamoto kuwa mashirika haya yanategemea ufadhili wa nje katika kutimiza

majukumu yao, [4] je, si Serikali hii hii ya CCM ambayo inategemea fedha za nje kuendesha miradi ya maendeleo nchini? (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] *It is surprising that the government says that one of the challenges of these NGOs is that they are based in urban areas instead of the rural areas where there are many people who need their services. [2] If the government also fails to fulfil its role and responsibility to ensure that community development projects also benefit rural dwellers and not only urban residents, how can it deregister these NGOs? [3] Honourable Chairperson, it is surprising that another challenge mentioned in the Ministry's performance report is that these NGOs depend on external funds from donors in executing their responsibilities. [4] Isn't this the same CCM government which depends on external funds [from donors] to run the country's development projects?*

From *Extract 6.7*, the opposition's third standpoint can be reconstructed as (3) *the government's deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated*. This unexpressed standpoint is defended by two arguments, realising multiple argumentation at the first level of defence and other related arguments at the next levels. The first argument in defence of the opposition's third standpoint is reconstructed from subextract (a). This argument realises coordinative argumentation with two arguments. First, in (a) [3], Ms Matiko argues that *3.1a there are a few NGOs that operate against the NGOs Act* (argumentation from legal authority). Second, in (a) [4], she maintains that *3.1b the NGOs that are targeted by the government's deregistration strategy are those which 'have been a thorn' in the side of the government*, implying that most of the NGOs are deregistered because they criticise the government (causal argumentation)

To further support argument *3.1a*, in (a) [2], Ms Matiko suggests that these few NGOs which violate the NGOs Act do so because the government has failed to supervise their activities, implying that NGO's violation of the NGOs Act is caused by the government's failure to monitor or supervise the activities/operation of NGOs (causal argumentation). To further defend this argument, in (a) [3], she suggests that these NGOs capitalise on the government's failure to supervise their activities to operate against the Act, implicitly suggesting that these NGOs are not to blame but the government.

Argument *3.1b* is further defended by other arguments, realising coordinative argumentation. In (a) [4-5], Ms Matiko suggests that these NGOs have been operating without complying with the political conditions the CCM government has been imposing on them and that the NGOs have been exposing the government's evils and wrongdoings. This argument implies that the targeted NGOs are deregistered because of their failure to comply with the CCM's political conditions (causal argumentation). In (a) [6], Ms Matiko further maintains that the CCM government is worried about the activities of NGOs in providing civic education to the public, especially at the moment when the country is approaching the next elections in October 2015.

Implicitly, this argument implies that the CCM government is worried that the civil education provided to the public will ruin its image and, probably, make CCM lose the next elections to the opposition (causal argumentation).

The second argument in defence of this standpoint is reconstructed from subextract (b). Ms Matiko suggests that (3.)2 *the government's reasons for deregistering NGOs are baseless/surprising*. This argument is defended by other two arguments in multiple argumentation. In these arguments, Ms Matiko refutes what she describes as the government's reasons for deregistering NGOs with counterarguments. The first argument in defence of (3.)2 is advanced in (b) [1-2]. In (b) [1], Ms Matiko argues that the government says that the NGOs are based in urban areas, instead of reaching more people in rural areas. In the counterargument, as expressed in (b) [2], she suggests that the government cannot deregister NGOs for operating only in urban areas because the government has *also* failed to ensure that the government's development projects also benefit rural dwellers, further implying that the government and the NGOs should be treated in the same way (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). The second argument in favour of (3.)2 is provided in (b) [3-4]. In (b) [3], she argues that the government says that the NGOs depend on external donors' funds. In (b) [4], she further suggests that the government *also* depends on external support funds from donors to run the country's development projects, which implies that the government cannot deregister NGOs for depending on external donors' funds, because the government is doing exactly the same thing and that the NGOs should be treated in the same way as the government (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). Ms Matiko's third standpoint and its related argumentation can be specified as illustrated in **Table 6.23** below.

Table 6.23 The opposition's third standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated)
3.1a	There are a few NGOs that operate against the (NGOs) Act
3.1a.1	This is caused by the government's failure to monitor their activities
(3.1a.1')	(These NGOs are not to blame but the government)
3.1a.1.1	The NGOs utilise this loophole to operate against the Act
3.1b	The NGOs that are targeted are those which 'have been a thorn' in the side of the government
(3.1b')	(They are deregistered because they criticise the government)
3.1b.1a	They operate without meeting the conditions CCM has been imposing on them
(3.1b.1a')	(Their deregistration is caused by the failure to meet the CCM's political conditions)
3.1b.1b	These NGOs have been exposing the government's evils and wrongdoings
(3.1b.1b')	(Exposing the government's evils/wrongdoings is the cause of their deregistration)
3.1b.2a	The government is worried about NGOs' provision of (civil) education to the public

3.1b.2b	This is especially true because of the coming general elections in October 2015
(3.1b.2b')	(CCM is worried that the (civil) education provided will ruin the govt's image and probably make CCM lose the elections)
(3.)2	The government's reasons for deregistration are baseless/surprising
(3.2')	(This is a sign that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated)
(3.)2.1a	The government says that the NGOs are based in urban areas instead of rural areas
(3.)2.1b	It cannot deregister NGOs for providing their services in urban areas instead of rural areas
(3.)2.1b.1	The government has also failed to ensure that its development projects also benefit rural people; not only urban residents
(3.2.1b.1')	(The NGOs and the government should be treated in the same way)
(3.)2.2a	It also says that the NGOs depend on external donors' funds
(3.)2.2b	The government also depends on external support funds from donors to run the country's development projects
(3.2.2b')	(The NGOs should be treated in the same way as the government)

In regard to the speech acts performed in the opposition's third standpoint and its related argumentation, Ms Matiko performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing two main arguments and other supporting arguments in defence of the standpoint. She also performs the commissive by implicitly not accepting the minister's third standpoint. Finally, she performs the declarative by requesting usage declaratives (or argumentation) from the minister.

6.2.2.6 Summary of the opposition's third standpoint and related argumentation

The opposition's third standpoint and its supporting arguments can be summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 6.7.




Figure 6.7 Summary of the opposition's third standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of the (sub)types of argumentation employed; at the first level of defence, the opposition's third standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation. At the second level of defence, the standpoint is justified by causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, as well as comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice.

6.2.2.7 The opposition's fourth standpoint and related argumentation

In her fourth standpoint, Ms Matiko turns the parliamentary debate into a campaigning platform by implicitly requesting Tanzanians to vote for Ukawa in the coming general elections, which took place on 25th October 2015, because, according to this member of the opposition, the CCM government has proved failure in coordinating issues pertaining to community development, gender development, children's rights, and the coordination of NGOs. This standpoint is reconstructed from *Extract 6.8*. However, since this extract is also related to the previous two

extracts, some arguments in support of the opposition's last standpoint are reconstructed from *Extract 6.6* and *Extract 6.7*.

Extract 6.8

- (a) [1] Ni nini kinachoifanya Serikali ya CCM ifute mashirika kwa kushindwa kujikita vijijini na nini kitaizuia UKAWA kuifuta CCM ambayo imeshindwa kutimiza wajibu wake kwa Watanzania? [2] Tunapenda kuikumbusha CCM kuwa, mwanzako akinyolewa upara, nawe tia maji kichwa chako. (Makofi) [3] CCM imechoka na hii ndio lala salama yao. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
[1] What makes the CCM government deregister NGOs for not reaching people in rural areas and what will stop Ukawa from removing CCM from power for failing to execute its responsibilities to Tanzanians? [2] We would like to remind CCM that, when your colleague is 'having a haircut', you should also get prepared' (=CCM should get prepared to suffer the same consequences as do the NGOs). [3] CCM is tired and this is their last time.
- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kambi ya Upinzani inaamini kuwa matumizi makubwa ya Serikali, misamaha ya kodi isiyoyana tija kwa Taifa, imekuwa chanzo kikubwa cha kudumaza Taifa. [2] UKAWA inajipanga kukabiliana na matumizi makubwa ya Serikali pamoja na kupunguza misamaha ya kodi ili kujenga Vyuo vya Maendeleo pamoja na kuvikarabati vyuo chakavu kwa mustakabali wa Taifa letu na vizazi vyetu. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
[1] Honourable Chairperson, the opposition camp believes that huge government expenditure and unnecessary tax exemptions have been the source of underdevelopment of this nation. [2] Ukawa is determined to deal with the huge government spending and to reduce tax exemptions in order to build Community Development Training Institutes (CDTIs) as well as renovate the buildings of the CDTIs that are in poor condition for the future of our nation and our future generations.
- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni ukweli usiopingika kuwa, ili kuendeleza jamii yoyote kuwa jamii bora na yenye maendeleo, basi kipaumbele kikubwa kiwe kuhusisha masuala ya wanawake katika mikakati ya kiseru na ujumuishaji wake katika shughuli mbalimbali za maendeleo. [2] Pamoja na kuwa na ongezeko la wanawake katika ngazi mbalimbali za maamuzi ikiwemo ongezeko la Majaji, Mawaziri, Wakuu wa Wilaya pamoja na Wabunge ni dhahiri kuna changamoto kubwa katika kuhakikisha wanawake wanapewa nafasi kutokana na sifa walizonazo. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
[1] Honourable Chairperson, it is an undisputable fact that in order to develop any society, the top priority should be the inclusion of women matters in the policy strategies and their integration in various development activities. [2] Despite the increasing number of women at various levels of decision-making, such as judges, ministers, district commissioners, and Members of Parliament (MPs), it is still obvious that there is a major challenge in ensuring that women are given positions based on their qualifications.
- (d) [1] Kambi ya Upinzani Bungeni imenuia kujenga mfumo wa utambuzi wa miji inayoongoza kwa watoto wa mitaani na kuwaweka Watoto hawa wa mitaani chini ya uangalizi wa walezi watakaokuwa wakiwezesha na Serikali yaani Foster Parents ili kupunguza idadi ya Watoto wa mitaani. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, aidha, Kambi ya Upinzani imejiandaa kuhakikisha kuwa vituo vya kulelea Watoto wanaoishi katika mazingira hatarishi hasa yatima, wanaweka mfumo wa kumbukumbu na taarifa kamili ili kufuatilia maendeleo yao popote walipo nchini Tanzania kwa kushirikiana na wadau wa maendeleo ya Watoto kwa kuwa vituo vingi vimeendeshwa bila kuwanufaisha Watoto hasa wanaoishi katika vituo hivyo na kwenye mazingira hatarishi. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
[1] The opposition camp in the parliament is determined to create a system for identifying towns with a large number of street children and placing these children under the supervision of the government-enabled caregivers (Foster Parents) in order to reduce the number of street

children. [2] Honourable Chairperson, moreover, the opposition camp is determined to ensure that a system for recording details of children in child-care centres, particularly orphanages for vulnerable children, is created to track their progress wherever they are in Tanzania and that can be done in collaboration with child development stakeholders because most centres are not run for the benefits of children who live in such centres and in a vulnerable environment.

- (e) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hitimisho, ni katika kadhia hizi ndipo tunaamini kuwa, [2] kwa kuwa ushauri wetu kwa miaka mingi umepuuzwa; [3] Serikali ya CCM ijiandae kuachia ngazi ifikapo Oktoba, 2015 kwa kuwa Serikali itakayoongozwa na UKAWA imepangwa na imetarajia kurudisha maendeleo ya jamii katika ngazi ambayo Baba wa Taifa Mwalimu Nyerere alitarajia kutufikisha Watanzania. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nimalizie kwa kunukuu maneno ya Baba wa Taifa aliyowahi kusema; [5] “Uhuru na Maendeleo ni vitu vinavyohusiana sana; uhusiano huo ni sawa na uhusiano baina ya kuku na yai! [6] Bila ya kuku hupati mayai na bila mayai kuku watakwisha. [7] Vile vile, bila ya uhuru hupati maendeleo na bila ya maendeleo ni dhahiri kwamba uhuru wako utapotea”. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- [1] Honourable chairperson, to sum up, it is due to these inconveniences that we believe that, [2] since our advice has been ignored for many years, [3] the CCM government should be prepared to step down in October 2015 because the government under Ukawa will be well structured and it is expecting to bring back community development in the society to the level/status that the Father of the Nation, Mwalimu Nyerere, expected Tanzanians to reach/attain. [4] Honourable Chairperson, let me conclude by quoting the words of the Father of the Nation, who once said: [5] “Freedom and development are as completely linked together as are chickens and eggs! [6] Without chickens you get no eggs; and without eggs, you soon have no chickens. [7] Similarly, without freedom, you get no development; and without development, you very soon lose your freedom”.*

Reconstructed from *Extract 6.8*, the opposition’s four standpoint can be presented as (4) *Ukawa should be voted for in the next general elections*. This standpoint is not expressed explicitly but it is clearly implied from the extract. The standpoint is defended by two arguments, realising coordinative argumentation, at the first level of defence. In (a) [1], Ms Matiko suggests that (4.)*Ia the CCM government has failed to execute its responsibilities in the community development sector in Tanzania*. In (e) [3], (b), (c), and (d), she further suggests that, because the CCM government has failed to execute its responsibilities to Tanzanians in the community development sector, (4.)*Ib the Ukawa government will improve the coordination of various issues in the community development sector* or, in other words, it will improve the status of community development in the country. The unexpressed premise for (4.)*Ib* seems to suggest that, if the Ukawa government will achieve what the CCM govt has failed to achieve for all the years it has been in power, Ukawa should be voted for (pragmatic argumentation). A further argument in defence of (4.)*Ia* is reconstructed from *Extract 6.7*, where Ms Matiko suggests that (4.)*Ia.1 the government has failed to ensure that many people in rural areas also benefit from the government’s development projects*. This is taken to constitute a ‘symptom’ that the government has proved failure in improving community development (symptomatic argumentation). In favour of (4.)*Ia.1*, she argues that (4.)*Ia.1.1 the CCM government has been ignoring the opposition’s advice*, as indicated in (e) [2]. It is also implied in the unexpressed

premise that the government's failure is caused by ignoring the opposition's advice (causal argumentation). This causal link is in (e) [3] and (a) [2] defended by the argument that, since it has been ignoring such advice, *(4.)1a.1.1.1 the CCM government should be prepared to step down.*

In defence of *(4.)1b*, four arguments, which realise multiple argumentation, are advanced. The first one is reconstructed from (e) [3], where Ms Matiko argues that *(4.)1b.1 the Ukawa government will bring back the status of community development that Mwalimu Nyerere wanted the country to attain.* In the unexpressed premise, it is implied that, if the Ukawa government will enable the country to attain such a status of community development (which is considered to be a desired effect), Ukawa should be voted for in the next general elections (pragmatic argumentation). In this argument, Ms Matiko also appeals to Mwalimu Nyerere as the authority. In (b) [2], she further suggests that, in order to attain such a status, *(4.)1b.1 the Ukawa government will establish [other] CDTIs and renovate the existing CDTIs' buildings that are in poor condition* (causal argumentation from means to goal). To achieve all this, Ms Matiko suggests that *(4.)1b.1.1 the Ukawa government will reduce the government huge expenditure and unnecessary tax exemptions* (practical argumentation).

The second argument in defence of *(4.)1b* is advanced in (c) [1-2], where Ms Matiko seems to suggest that *(4.)1b.2 the Ukawa government will include women matters in the macro policy strategies and development plans*, further suggesting that *(4.)1b.2.1 this will help to ensure that women are given positions based on their qualifications*, and that *(4.)1b.2.2 this will help to develop the society.* These arguments demonstrate practical or pragmatic argumentation. Argument *(4.)1b.2.1* seems to be a counterargument against the minister's causal argumentation and authority argumentation from statistics. In these arguments in favour of the minister's second standpoint, Ms Simba suggested that the minister has improved gender equality because the number of female ministers, judges, and district commissioners has increased, and this was considered to be a result of the minister's commitment to improve the status of community development sector in the country (causal argumentation). This causal argumentation was also defended by authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation). However, in (c) [2], Ms Matiko implicitly suggests that the increase in number of female ministers, female judges, and female district commissioners is not based on their qualifications.

The third argument in defence of (4.)1b is expressed in (d) [1-2]. In this argument, Ms Matiko argues that (4.)1b.3 *the Ukawa government will have a good mechanism to address the challenge of street children* (practical or problem-solving argumentation). To further maintain this argument, two other arguments are advanced. First, she argues that (4.)1b.3.1 *the Ukawa government will ensure that child-care centres/orphanages have a recording keeping system for the children they take care of*. According to Ms Matiko, this will help to track the children's progress and wellbeing, because most centres are not run for the benefits of the children who live in vulnerable environments in such centres. In the other argument, as indicated in (d) [1], she maintains that (4.)1b.3.2 *the Ukawa government will take street children and place them under the care of foster parents*. According to Ms Matiko, this will reduce the number of street children. Argument (4.)1b.3 and its supporting arguments demonstrate mainly practical or problem-solving argumentation.

The last argument in defence of (4.)1b is reconstructed from (e) [4-7], where Ms Matiko seems to suggest that (4.)1b.4 *the Ukawa government will ensure that community development and freedom go together* (pragmatic argumentation) because, according to Mwalimu Nyerere, freedom and development are as completely linked together as are chickens and eggs and that one cannot exist without the other (authority argumentation by quotation). This argument is reinforced by the metaphorical expression *uhuru na maendeleo ni (kama) kuku na mayai*, which translates as freedom and development are (like) chickens and eggs. This presentational device is employed to emphasise that the Ukawa government is committed to providing both freedom and development because the two are inseparable. It could also imply that the CCM government has failed to offer the two or it has provided one but not the other. The opposition's fourth standpoint and its related argumentation can be specified as shown in **Table 6.24** below.

Table 6.24 The opposition's fourth standpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
(4.)	(Ukawa should be voted for in the next general elections)
(4.)1a	CCM has failed to execute its responsibilities in the community development sector
(4.1a')	(This is the reason why Ukawa should be voted for)
(4.)1a.1	It has failed to ensure that many people in rural areas also benefit from the govt's development projects
(4.1a.1')	(This is a sign that it has failed to execute its responsibilities)
(4.)1a.1.1	It has been ignoring the opposition's advice
(4.1a.1.1')	(The CCM's failure is a consequence of ignoring the opposition's advice)
(4.)1a.1.1.1	CCM should be prepared to step down
(4.)1b	The Ukawa government will improve the coordination of various matters in the community development sector or improve the status of community development
(4.1b')	(If the Ukawa government will achieve what the CCM govt has failed to achieve for all the years it has been in power, Ukawa should be voted for)

(4.)1b.1	It will bring back the status of community development that Mwalimu Nyerere wanted the country to attain
(4.)1b.1.1	It will establish [other] CDTIs and renovate the CDTIs' buildings that are in poor condition
(4.)1b.1.1.1	It will reduce the govt's huge expenditure and unnecessary tax exemptions
(4.)1b.2	It will include women matters in the policy strategies and development plans
(4.)1b.2.1	This will help to ensure that women are given positions based on their qualifications
(4.)1b.2.2	It will help to develop the community
(4.)1b.3	It will set a good mechanism to address the challenge of street children
(4.)1b.3')	(The mechanism will solve the problem of street children)
(4.)1b.3.1	It will take street children and place them under the care of the govt-based foster parents
(4.)1b.3.1.1	This will help to reduce the number of street children
(4.)1b.3.2	It will ensure that child-care centres/orphanages have a record keeping system for the children they take care of
(4.)1b.3.2.1	This will help to trace the children's progress and wellbeing
(4.)1b.3.2.1.1	Most centres are not run for the benefits of the children who live in vulnerable environments in such centres
(4.)1b.4	It will ensure that community development and people's freedom go together
(4.)1b.4')	(It is a good thing for the two to go together)
(4.)1b.4.1a	According to Mwalimu Nyerere, the two are completely linked together
(4.)1b.4.1b	The two are inseparable

With respect to the speech acts performed in the opposition's fourth standpoint and related argumentation, Ms Matiko performs the assertive by expressing the standpoint and advancing coordinative argumentation to justify the standpoint at the first level of defence and other arguments in the next levels of defence. She as well performs the commissive by implicitly not accepting the minister's standpoints (especially the second one).

6.2.2.8 Summary of the opposition's fourth standpoint and related argumentation

Based on *Extract 6.8* and *Table 6.24*, the opposition's fourth standpoint and its related argumentation can be summarised in a schematic overview as shown in Figure 6.8.




Figure 6.8 Summary of the opposition's fourth standpoint and related argumentation

In terms of the argumentation schemes, the opposition's last standpoint is defended by causal argumentation and pragmatic argumentation at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, practical or problem-solving argumentation, causal argumentation, as well as authority argumentation (by quotation).

6.2.3 MPs' related contributions

Ms Esther Matiko is not the only MP who puts the minister's standpoints into question. Other members of both the ruling party (CCM) and the opposition parties, especially Chadema, also challenge the minister's standpoints in their related contributions to the debate. In these contributions, the MPs speak for their constituencies as representatives of the electorate in an attempt to win the voters' confidence. Because most of these contributions address the same issues that have already been addressed by Ms Matiko, I will present only a few contributions that are instrumental in resolving the difference of opinion. The first critical reaction from other MPs relates to the amount of money (TZS 31 billion) requested to be approved by the parliament in order to enable the ministry to effectively execute its objectives in the next fiscal year. This critical reaction to the ministry's proposed budget is reconstructed from *Extract 6.9* below.

Extract 6.9

- (a) MHE. MUSTAPHA B. AKUNAAY: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, siungi mkono bajeti [2] kwa sababu ni ndogo sana [3] shilingi bilioni 31 zitafanya nini? (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
HON. MUSTAPHA B. AKUNAAY: [...] Honourable Chairperson, [1] I don't support the [proposed] budget, [2] because it is too little. [3] What will the ministry achieve with TZS 31 billion?
- (b) MHE. DKT. HAJI H. MPONDA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naunga mkono hoja. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, bajeti iliyotengwa kwa Wizara hii ni ndogo sana kulingana na majukumu ya Wizara. [3] Aidha, hata fedha zilizotengwa mwaka 2014/2015 bado zimekuwa zikicheleweshwa hivyo kuiathiri Wizara kutekeleza majukumu yake. [4] Naiomba Serikali kuongeza bajeti iliyotengwa kwa Wizara hii ili na [5] fedha hizi zipelekwe katika wakati mwafaka. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
HON. DR HAJI H. MPONDA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, I support the motion. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the budget allocated to the ministry is too little compared to the responsibilities of the ministry. [3] Even the fund that was allocated to the ministry in 2014/15 was still delayed, which affected the ministry in executing its responsibilities. [4] I request the government to increase the budget allocated to this ministry and [5] the ministry should receive the fund on time.
- (c) MHE. ZARINA S. MADABIDA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwanza naunga mkono hoja hii. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara hii haijapewa umuhimu na Serikali mbali na kwamba inahusu suala zito la Maendeleo ya Jamii nzima ya Watanzania. [3] Fedha iliyotengwa ni ndogo sana kiasi unauliza ni maendeleo gani fedha hii inaweza kufanya. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
HON. ZARINA S. MADABIDA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, first of all, I support this motion. [2] Honourable Chairperson, this ministry hasn't been given priority by the government despite the fact that the ministry deals with a crucial issue concerning the development of the entire community of Tanzanians. [3] The allocated amount of money is too little to the extent that you ask yourself what kind of development the ministry will achieve with this amount of money.
- (d) MHE. RITTA E. KABATI: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, bajeti finyu: [2] Wizara hii ni nyeti sana na [3] inashughulikia mambo muhimu ya watoto na wanawake ambao ndio msingi wa

maendeleo yetu, [4] lakini haijaweza kupewa kipaumbele. [5] Tunaona kila mwaka inapatiwa pesa kidogo sana na haifiki kwa muda muafaka na [6] kusababisha miradi ya maendeleo kutopewa kipaumbele kabisa. [7] Hii inaathiri sana ustawi wa shughuli za kijamii zinazosimamiwa na Wizara. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. RITTA E. KABATI: [1] Honourable Chairperson, the budget is limited; [2] this is a very important ministry and [3] it deals with important matters concerning children and women who are the foundation of our development, [4] but it hasn't been given priority. [5] We have noticed that every year a small amount of money is allocated to this ministry and the ministry doesn't receive the money on time. [6] As a result, development projects are not given priority at all. [7] This affects the community [development] activities coordinated by the ministry.

In this extract, the MPs express their critical doubts as to whether the ministry will effectively execute its objectives in the next fiscal year, given the amount of money allocated or requested. They are of the opinion that the budget is too little to enable the minister to effectively execute its ministerial objectives or responsibilities. The first MP in the extract, Mr Akunaay, who is a member of the opposition, categorically asserts that he does not support the budget. According to him, the reason for rejecting the proposed budget is that the amount of money allocated or requested to be authorised by the parliament is too little to enable the ministry to achieve anything. The other three MPs from CCM implicitly support Mr Akunaay's critical doubt. Although Dr Mponda and Ms Madabida begin their contributions by asserting that they support the ministerial budget motion, their actual contributions challenge the minister's first standpoint in a more or less indirect and polite manner. Specifically, the MPs' critical doubts challenge the minister's pragmatic argumentation in defence of the first standpoint as shown in **Table 6.5** and Figure 6.1. With the choice of practical argumentation, the minister suggested that the proposed budget will achieve a desired effect. However, these MPs raise doubts as to whether the ministry will indeed achieve the desired effect with such little budget. Dr Mponda goes a step further to ask the government to increase the budget to the ministry. In the argumentation stage, Ms Simba is expected to reasonably respond to the MPs' critical reaction regarding the amount of money allocated for or requested by the ministry.

Another critical reaction from the MPs challenges the minister's first standpoint and the last one. These MPs implicitly suggest that the ministry (or rather the government) is not committed enough to promoting folk education and community development training, as shown in *Extract 6.10* below.

Extract 6.10

- (a) MHE. AGNESS E. HOKORORO: [...] [1] Katika Kitabu cha Waziri ukurasa wa 13, inaonekana Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Wanachi kwa Tanzania jumla yake viko 55, [2] lakini utakubaliana na mimi na katika Hotuba ya Waziri pia ameonesha kwamba wana changamoto nyingi, [3] lakini pia ameonesha mikakati ya kuweza kutatua hizo changamoto. [4] Katika

Mkoa wa Mtwara tuna Vyu vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi vitatu, kimoja kiko Masasi, cha pili kiko Kiduni kwenye Kata ya Mtonya pale Newala na cha tatu kiko Mtawanya Wilaya ya Mtwara. [5] Mheshimwa Mwenyekiti, kama ambavyo kitabu cha Mheshimiwa Waziri zimeonekana changamoto hizo na katika Vyu hivi kuna upungufu mkubwa wa watumishi, [6] hakuna fedha kabisa za uendeshaji ambazo zinakwenda na [7] hivyo kufanya mafunzo katika Vyu vyote hivyo kuwa magumu. [8] Kwa mfano, katika Chuo kilichopo Masasi kuna jengo pale, kuna karakana iliezuliwa tangu mwaka 2006, [9] lakini mpaka ninavyozungumza hivi sasa lile jengo halijafanyiwa ukarabati. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. AGNESS E. HOKORORO: [1] The minister's [budget speech] book, on page 13, shows that there is a total of 55 Folk Development Colleges (FDCs) in Tanzania. [2] But you will agree with me and the minister in her speech has shown that the FDCs face many challenges, [3] although the minister has also indicated the strategies to address the challenges. [4] In Mtwara region, we have three FDCs; one is in Masasi, the second one at Kiduni within Mtonya ward in Newala, and the third one is located at Mtawanya in Mtwara district. [5] Honourable Chairperson, as indicated in the minister's speech about the challenges facing FDCs, these FDCs in Mtwara also experience an acute shortage of personnel and [6] they receive no operational funds at all, and [7] this makes it difficult for the three FDCs to provide training. [8] For instance, at the FDC found in Masasi, there is a workshop building that was unroofed [by the wind] since 2006 [9] but, up to the moment I am speaking, the building has not been repaired.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hata Vyu vilivyopo Newala na Mtawanya, yale mafunzo yao kwa vitendo badala ya kufanyia kwenye karakana, wanalazimika kufanyia nje na [2] wakati mwingine sasa kama hali ya hewa hairuhusu, ina maana mafunzo yao kwa vitendo yanakuwa hayawezi kufanyika kikamilifu. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini kuna upungufu mkubwa wa watumishi, wa walimu na wale wasio walimu, pia [4] hakuna vitendea kazi. [5] Natambua Sera ya Serikali kwa nini ilianzisha hivi Vyu vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi na hasa sasa hivi tumekuwa tukilalamika kwamba vijana wanaosoma katika vyu vyetu na vyu vikuu kwamba hawapati ajira. [6] Kwa hiyo, wale vijana wanaomaliza darasa la saba na wanakwenda kwenye Vyu vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi tulikuwa tunatarajia kwamba waweze kupata ujuzi na maarifa kule waweze kujiajiri. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, even the FDCs which are found in Newala and Mtawanya are forced by the circumstances to conduct their practical training outside instead of conducting them in the workshop, and [2] when there is a bad weather outside, it means that, on such days, the practical training cannot be conducted as successfully as required. [3] Honourable Chairperson, but there is a serious shortage of workers, both tutors and non-tutors, [4] also there are no working tools. [5] I know the government's policy and the reason why it established these FDCs and especially currently as we have been complaining that the youth who study in our colleges and universities don't get employed. [6] Thus, these young people, who complete their studies at standard seven and join the FDCs, were expected to attain knowledge and expertise from the FDCs so that they can be self-employed.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, niombe Serikali yangu, pamoja na kwamba Waziri ameonesha katika Kitabu chake kwamba wanaendelea na kutatua hizi changamoto na nimeona katika Chuo cha Newala bajeti hii ya 2015/2016 kutakuwa na ukarabati wa madarasa na kutakuwa na ukarabati wa majengo ya utawala. [2] Hata hivyo, niombe sasa kwamba, kwa hali iliyopo sasa kwenye Vyu vyote hivyo vitatu hali ni mbaya na [3] kwa kweli vijana wapo lakini je, wanakwendaje kujifunza useremala na ufundi mwingine na study zingine za kazi kama miundombinu na vitendea kazi haviko kwenye hayo maeneo? [4] Je, tunatarajia kweli vijana wanaotoka katika hivyo Vyu vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi waweze kupata ujuzi na maarifa ya wao kuweza kujitegemea na ya wao kuweza kujiajiri? [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hapa nina mashaka, [6] niombe Serikali yangu kwamba, wakati Serikali inaelekeza nguvu katika Vyu Vikuu ni wakati sasa pia kuelekeza nguvu za kutosha katika Vyu vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi na Vyu vya Maendeleo ya Jamii ili [7] vijana ambao wanajiunga katika vyu hivyo

wanapohitimu waweze kufanya shughuli zao, waweze kujiongezea kipato na waweze kujijiri wenyewe. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, let me beseech my government, despite the fact that the minister has shown in her [budget speech] book that they are continuing to solve these problems and I have seen in the 2015/16 budget that they will renovate classrooms and the administration building at Newala FDC. [2] Nevertheless, let me say that currently the prevailing situation in all the three FDCs is very bad and [3] to be honest the young people are there, but how are they going to learn carpentry and other arts as well as other skills if there are no good infrastructure and working tools in those places? [4] Do we expect the young people who complete their studies from these FDCs to attain the knowledge and experience that can enable them to be self-reliant and self-employed? [5] Honourable Chairperson, I have doubts about this issue, [6] let me advise my government that, as it places more emphasis on universities, it is also the right time for it to focus on the FDCs and CDTIs. [7] The government must ensure that the youth who join these FDCs/CDTIs are able to do their own activities, they should be able to generate more income for themselves and they should be ready for self-employment after completing their studies.

- (d) MHE. RIZIKI OMAR JUMA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba nianze na Chuo kile cha Tengeru; [2] chuo kile kizuri sana, kinafanya kazi nzuri, [3] lakini ukienda ukiangalia nyumba za wafanyakazi au nyumba za Walimu, ambazo zimejengwa tangu labda mimi ndiyo kwanza nazaliwa mpaka leo bado nyumba zile ziko katika mazingira yale yale [...]. [4] Naomba sana Serikali kupitia Wizara, izingatie zile nyumba, zina umuhimu wake mkubwa sana. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. RIZIKI OMAR JUMA: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, let me start with Tengeru CDTI; [2] the CDTI is very good, it is doing a great job, [3] but if you go there and have a look at the workers' or tutors' houses, which were built since the time when perhaps I was just born till today, those houses are in the same environment [...]. [4] I extend my request to the government through the ministry to have a look at those houses, they are very important.

- (e) MHE. MENDRAD L. KIGOLA:- [...] [1] [K]wenye Wilaya ya Mufindi tuliomba kile Chuo cha Rungemba, [2] kile chuo ni cha miaka mingi sana na kinatoa wataalam wengi na kilianza kutoa Diploma, [3] sasa tuliomba kiwe chuo kikuu. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa kwenye mipango ya maendeleo ya jamii, naomba hili lipitishwe, [5] Chuo cha Rungemba kiwe chuo kikuu ili tuweze kupata wafanyakazi wazuri kutoka pale. [6] [I]nachukua miaka mingi bado hatujapata tamko la kuwa chuo kikuu. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. MENDRAD L. KIGOLA:- [...] [1] In Mufindi district, we requested that the very old Rungemba CDTI, [2] which produces many [community development] professionals and it started offering diploma programmes, [3] be promoted to a university. [4] Honourable Chairperson, I request this matter to be approved in the community development plans. [5] Rungemba CDTI should be upgraded to a university so that we can get good employees from the CDTI. [6] Many years have elapsed without hearing that the CDTI has been promoted to a university. (Applause)

- (f) MHE. RITTA E. KABATI:- [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Vyuo vyetu vya Iringa, kuna Rungemba na kile cha pale Ruaha, bado havitengewi fedha za kutosha. [2] Kuna mwenzangu alizungumza asubuhi Mheshimiwa Kigola kwamba kile Chuo cha Rungemba kilitakiwa kiwe chuo kikuu, [3] sasa nami niulize tena ni lini na [4] vile vile pesa inatengwa kidogo sana. [5] Kama kile cha Ruaha kilichopo Iringa Mjini bado kina miundombinu siyo mizuri, wafanyakazi wanafanya kwenye mazingira magumu sana. [6] Naomba mnapotoa hizi bajeti, basi tuangalieni na pale Iringa kwa sababu vyuo vyetu vinatakiwa viangaliwe ili watoto waweze kusoma zaidi, [7] wasiendeele kuajiriwa kwenye ajira ambazo bado hazijawa na sharia. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. RITTA E. KABATI:- [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, our CDTIs in Iringa, Rungemba CDTI and the other one in Ruaha, are not allocated adequate funds. [2] My fellow MP, Honourable Kigola, talked about this in the morning that Rungemba CDTI was supposed to be

[promoted to] a university, [3] let me also ask once again, when will it be [promoted to] a university? [4] Also, the amount of money allocated to the CDTIs is too little. [5] For example, the CDTI found in Ruaha in Iringa Urban still has poor infrastructure; the workers do their jobs in a quite uncondusive environment. [6] I suggest that when you allocate the budget, try to consider people of Iringa since our CDTIs need to be considered so that the children can further [their] studies, [7] they should stop getting employed in these types of employment which are not guided by the law.

From *Extract 6.10*, the MPs' contributions collectively suggest that the ministry is not committed enough to promoting folk education and community development training. In subextract (a), Ms Hokororo begins her contribution by quoting the minister's statement about the number of Folk Development Colleges (FDCs). Her contribution suggests that, although there are 55 FDCs, most of them are in poor condition. This contribution implies that the point is not to have a good number of FDCs; the point is to ensure that the FDCs are empowered and are in good condition. This argumentative move challenges the minister's authority argumentation from statistics or statistical argumentation. She further gives an example of the three FDCs from her region, Mtwara (argumentation from example), maintaining that the buildings of these FDCs are in poor condition. For instance, according to her, the workshop building of the FDCs in Masasi has remained unroofed since 2006. She argues that she is aware that the ministry is planning to renovate various buildings in FDCs, including one from her region (Newala-Mtwara) but maintains that all the three FDCs are in poor condition and should all be renovated. Ms Hokororo's argumentation from example challenges the minister's pragmatic argumentation as indicated in *Table 6.6*. It should be recalled that, in this argument, the ministry mentioned various FDCs (and CDTIs) whose buildings will be renovated in the next fiscal year. However, Ms Hokororo suggests that the ministry's rehabilitation of FDCs will not achieve a positive result because other FDCs, particularly from Masasi and Mtwara districts, are not included. She also argues that these FDCs receive no funds to run the colleges. In subextract (c), she maintains that, with the current state of affairs, she doubts whether the government will achieve its goal of producing graduates with appropriate skills in folk education and vocational training and who can be self-employed.

In (d) and (f), Hon. Juma and Ms Kabati also talk about the poor condition of the buildings at Tengeru, Rungemba and Ruaha. At the same time, Ms Kabati implicitly concurs with Ms Hokororo that CDTIs and FDCs have been receiving little or no funds to cover the operational costs. Again, in (e) and (f), Mr Kigola and Ms Kabati argue that the ministry has not implemented the request to promote Rungemba CDTI to a university. Generally, in *Extract 6.10*, these MPs express their doubts as to whether the ministry has indeed improved teaching

environment and promoted folk education and community development training in FDCs and CDTIs respectively. In the argumentation stage, the minister is expected to respond to these MPs' doubts about the government's commitment to promote folk education and community development training.

In *Extract 6.11*, the MPs talk about the shortage of community development professionals or officers/workers, giving examples and statistics of the shortage from their constituencies or regions.

Extract 6.11

- (a) MHE. AGNESS E. HOKORORO: [...] [1] [K]atika Kata zetu kumekuwa na upungufu mkubwa wa Maafisa wa Maendeleo ya Jamii, [2] kama Wizara ya Utumishi inaweza ikajiri Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii moja kwa moja kama ambavyo sasa hivi Walimu wanachukuliwa, [3] hiyo itaturahisishia sana hasa katika kuchakata maendeleo katika maeneo yetu ya Kata. [4] Wote tunatambua Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii ndiyo waliosoma fani ya kuhamasisha mikakakti ya kim[a]endeleo na miradi ya maendeleo katika maeneo yetu. [5] Sasa kwa upungufu huu tuliokuwano wa hawa watumishi 2000 haitakuwa rahisi sana. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba suala hili lipewe uzito na Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii waliopo katika vyuo vyetu vyote nchini waweze kupata ajira moja kwa moja ili wakatumasishie. [7] Hata wale wanaopita kuhakikisha kwamba miradi ya maendeleo, maabara hazijengwi, zahanati watu hawajitolei na michango mingine haitolewi, [8] Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii watatusaidia kuhakikisha kwamba miradi inahamasishwa [9] kwa sababu wanajua na wao ni chachu katika maendeleo yetu. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. AGNESS E. HOKORORO: [...] [1] In our wards, there is an acute shortage of community development officers, [2] if the ministry of public service can employ the officers directly from CDTIs in the same way as teachers are currently being employed, [3] it will make it easy for us to process development in the areas within our wards. [4] We all know that the community development officers are the ones who have studied the skills of advocacy for development strategies and projects in our areas. [5] Thus, now with this shortage of 2000 [community development officers], it won't be easy to do so. [6] Honourable Chairperson, I suggest that this matter be given paramount importance and the officers who are found in all our CDTIs across the country be employed directly [from the CDTIs] for them to go there and accelerate [community] development. [7] Even those who go there in order to check if the development projects [are not implemented], laboratories are not built, people don't volunteer in dispensaries and don't make other contributions, [8] the officers will help us in ensuring that these projects are hastened [9] since they are knowledgeable and they are the catalyst for our development.

- (b) MHE. LOLESIA J. BUKWIMBA: [...] [1] Tumeona jinsi ambavyo katika nchi ya Tanzania tuna upungufu wa Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii 2029, [2] ni watu wengi sana na ni changamoto kubwa katika Taifa letu kwani wananchi watawezaje kuchochea maendeleo yao wasipowezeshwa na hawa watendaji wetu ambao kazi yao ni kutuwezesha sisi wananchi? (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, niombe Serikali iangalie uwezekano wa kuongeza bajeti kwa ajili ya kuweza kuajiri Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii katika kata hizi ikizingatiwa kwamba, ni watu muhimu sana [4] kwa sababu bila maendeleo endelevu ambayo yanatokana na sisi wenyewe wananchi. [5] Mimi sina uhakika kama kweli tutaweza kufikia malengo ya millennium ambayo yanatutaka kupunguza umaskini. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nikiangalia tu katika Mkoa wangu wa Geita, kati ya kata 97 ni 23 tu ndiyo zina Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii. [7] Kwa hiyo, upungufu huu ni mubwa sana. [8] Naiomba Serikali iweke mkazo katika kuona umuhimu wa kuwa na hawa Maafisa Maendeleo ya Jamii katika

kata zetu ili waweze kufanya kazi nzuri ya kuelimisha wananchi [9] kwa sababu bila ya hawa haiwezekani kutatua changamoto za kimaendeleo ambazo zipo katika jamii ya Watanzania. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. LOLESIA J. BUKWIMBA: [...] [1] We have seen that Tanzania has a shortage of 2029 community development officers. [2] This is a huge number of people and it is a big challenge to our country, because how can the citizens contribute to community development if they are not empowered by these people whose responsibility is to empower citizens? (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, thus, let me urge the government to see the possibility of increasing the budget so as to employ the officers in our wards, considering the fact that these are highly important people because, [4] without sustainable development brought by ourselves as citizens, [5] I am not sure if we can realise the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which want us to alleviate poverty. (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, if I concentrate on my home region, Geita, among 97 wards, only 23 wards have community development officers. [7] This means there is an acute shortage. [8] I urge the government to put more emphasis on the importance of having these officers in our wards so that they can do a great job of educating the public [9] as, without them, it is impossible to solve the development challenges the Tanzanian community has been experiencing.

- (c) *MHE. ENG. RAMO M. MAKANI: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwanza nizungumzie upungufu wa wafanyakazi wa Maendeleo ya Jamii. [2] Umuhimu wa Maendeleo ya Jamii, umefafanuliwa vizuri katika ukurasa wa tisa aya ya 15 ya hotuba ya Mheshimiwa Waziri. [3] Upungufu wa wataalam katika sekta hii Kitaifa ambao ni asilimia 61 (ukurasa wa 65) ni mkubwa sana. [4] Naishauri Serikali kuongeza nguvu ya kibajeti na kimkakati ili kuondoa tatizo hili. [5] Kwa kuwa, upungufu huo ni mkubwa zaidi katika Wilaya ya Tunduru (Kikata asilimia 86) kupita ule wa kitaifa kwa mbali, [6] naomba mkakati wa kuondoa tatizo hilo uipe kimbaumbele Wilaya ya Tunduru (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)*

HON. ENG. RAMO M. MAKANI: [1] Honourable Chairperson, first of all, let me talk about the shortage of community development workers. [2] The importance of community development has been nicely explained on page 9, paragraph 15 in the minister's budget speech. [3] The shortage of the professionals in this sector at the national level which is 61% (on page 65) is very acute. [4] I advise the government to increase the budget and set a strategic plan in order to eradicate this problem. [5] Because the shortage [of these professionals] in Tunduru district (at the ward level, it is 86%) is even worse than the shortage at national level, I request that the strategy to eradicate this problem should give the first priority to the Tunduru district.

In *Extract 6.11*, the three MPs talk about the shortage of community development practitioners/professionals (CDPs) in the country. In (a) and (b), Ms Hokororo and Ms Bukwimba suggest that the shortage of 2019 CDPs at ward level is an acute shortage of these workers (authority argumentation from statistics). Specifically, in (b) [6] Ms Bukwimba gives an example of this shortage in her home region, Geita (argumentation from example). She argues that Geita has a total number of 97 wards but only 23 of them have a CDP. This argumentative move also demonstrates authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation). Additionally, in (c) [5], Mr Makani maintains that in his Tunduru district, the shortage of CDPs is 86%, which is far greater than the shortage at the national level (61%). This is also a case of authority argumentation from statistics. With this shortage, these MPs have doubts as to whether the government or the ministry will be able to successfully promote community development and achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of

eradicating poverty in the country (challenging the minister's pragmatic argumentation). Generally, these members of the ruling party appeal to argumentation from example and authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation) to challenge the minister's argumentation for her first and fourth standpoints. In the argumentation stage, the minister is expected to advance further argumentation as a response to this critical reaction about the shortage of CDPs in the country.

Extract 6.12 presents the MPs' contributions which challenge the ministry's commitment to promote Women's Economic Empowerment.

Extract 6.12

- (a) MHE. EUGEN E. MWAIPOSA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, niongelee Mfuko wa Maendeleo ya Wanawake, [2] katika jamii ya Tanzania, wanawake ni wengi kuliko wanaume, [3] lakini ndiyo walioonekana kujishughulisha vizuri sana na ujasiriamali na shughuli nyingi za kiuchumi katika nchi yetu. [4] Nafikiria kwamba, hawa wanawake wangewezeshwa vizuri, wangeweza wakainua uchumi wa nchi kwa kasi iliyo kubwa zaidi. [5] Mfuko huu wa Maendeleo ya Wanawake, unategemea asilimia zile tano. [6] Tumeshuhudia katika Halmashauri nyingi kutokutenga zile fedha, [7] lakini hata wale wanaotenga, basi nyingi zinaishia kwenye Mifuko ya walio wajanja, haziwafikii wale wanawake waliolengwa. [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, naomba sana pia, utaratibu wa kutoa fedha hizi kwa pale ambapo zinakuwa zimetengwa, basi uangaliwe upya. [8] Fedha hizi zikipatikana zina ukiritimba mkubwa na utaratibu wake ni mrefu sana. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. EUGEN E. MWAIPOSA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, let me talk about the Women Development Fund (WDF). [2] In Tanzania, the population of women is bigger than that of men. [3] But women are the ones who can be seen to involve themselves in entrepreneurial activities and many other economic activities in our country. [4] I think, if these women were well empowered, they could contribute to the growth of our country's economy in a greater pace. [5] The WDF depends on that 5%. [6] We have witnessed in many councils that the money is not allocated. [7] Even in the councils which allocate the money to the WDF, a huge amount of money enters the pockets of few clever people; the money doesn't reach the targeted women. [8] Honourable Chairperson, I kindly request that the modality of giving out the money after the budget has been allocated has to be reviewed. [9] When the money is received, it has a lot of bureaucracy and [women have to] follow a long procedure to get it.

- (b) [1] Mara wanawake wanaambiwa lazima wakae kwenye vikundi, saa nyingine lazima wapeleke mchanganuo benki, mara nyingine lazima uwe na account au biashara unayoifanya ni lazima imesajiliwa, saa nyingine lazima iwe na faida kubwa na mambo yanayofanana na hayo. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hili ni tatizo kubwa kwa hawa wajasirimali wadogo, [3] kwa sababu ukiangalia kutengeneza mchanganuo ni kitu kinachohitaji fedha, kuwa na account benki, inahitaji fedha. [4] Kwa hiyo, tukiwawekea masharti magumu hivi, tutafika mahali tutakuta kwamba wanawake wanaokopa fedha hizo, siyo wale waliolengwa, ni wanawake wenye uwezo. [5] Kwa hiyo, naomba pale ambapo fedha hizi zinapatikana, basi Serikali iangalie ni namna gani inaweza ikafanya utaratibu ukawa mwepesi zaidi kwa wajasiriamali hawa wadogo. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

Sometimes these women are told to form small groups, sometimes they are told to submit to the bank an analysis of how the money will be spent, sometimes they are told to have a bank account or to own a registered business, sometimes they are told to have a highly profitable business and the like. [2] Honourable Chairperson, this is a very serious problem facing these small entrepreneurs, [3] since the issue of preparing a financial analysis costs money, to open a bank account needs one to have money. [4] Therefore, if we put strict conditions for them, we will

find that the women who take the loans are not the targeted women; they will be the financially capable women. [5] Thus, I suggest that, whenever there is an availability of funds, the government has to find an appropriate way of creating easy access to securing these loans for these small entrepreneurs.

- (c) MHE. CHRISTOWAJA G. MTINDA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, umuhimu wa kuwa na vituo vingi hasa vijijini kwa Benki ya Wanawake ni kubwa [2] maana itasaidia wanawake wengi kupata mikopo ya riba nafuu, hivyo kujiendeleza wao wenyewe na kujitegemea hususan kwenye shughuli za ujasiriamali. [3] Je, kwa mwaka huu wa fedha Serikali itatimiza ahadi yake iliyoitoa hapa Bungeni ya kuanzisha kituo cha benki hii katika Mkoa wa Singida? [4] Ahadi hii ilitolewa na Mheshimiwa Pindi Chana, Naibu Waziri akijibu swali langu nililomwuliza: ni kwa nini mpaka sasa hakuna kituo Singida? [5] Kwa kuwa ilikuwa ni ahadi ya Serikali kwamba mwaka huu wa fedha itatekeleza, naomba kujua mchakato wake uko katika hatua gani? (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. CHRISTOWAJA G. MTINDA: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, it is very important for the [Tanzania] Women's Bank to have many centres especially in rural areas [2] because this will help many women to get loans at lower interest rates; hence they will be able to develop themselves and to be self-reliant especially in the entrepreneurial activities. [3] Will the government fulfil its promise to open a centre of this bank in Singida region, which was made in this very house? [4] This promise was given by Honourable Pindi Chana, the deputy minister, when responding to the question which I asked her: why until now there is no centre in Singida? [5] Since it was the government's pledge that it will fulfil it in this fiscal year, I want to know the stage reached in its [fulfilment] process.

- (d) MHE. FAIDA MOHAMMED BAKAR: [...] [1] [N]apenda kuipongeza Serikali lakini kuna neno moja ambalo kila siku nalifuatilia hapa Bungeni kuhusu Zanzibar. [2] Mama Sofia naomba sana hii Benki ya Wanawake ifike katika Visiwa vya Zanzibar [3] kwa sababu na kule nako kuna wanawake wengi ambao wana miradi mbalimbali ya biashara ili waweze kujikomboa. [4] Naishukuru sana Serikali kwa kazi hiyo na naamini kwamba, Serikali hii ni sikivu, benki hii itafika Zanzibar ikawakomboa wanawake na wanaume wa Zanzibar. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. FAIDA MOHAMMED BAKAR: [...] [1] I would like to congratulate the government, but there is a word that I have always been making a follow-up in this parliament about Zanzibar. [2] My mother, Sophia, I kindly request that the [Tanzania Women's] Bank should go to the islands of Zanzibar [3] because there are also many women who own different business projects for them to empower themselves economically. [4] I express my profound thanks to the government for the job [well] done and I believe that this is a government that listens, this bank will open its branches in Zanzibar so as to empower women and men in Zanzibar. (Applause)

From their contributions in *Extract 6.12*, these MPs challenge the government's commitment to promote Women's Economic Empowerment (WEE) through the ministry. The MPs suggest that the government or the ministry is not committed enough to empowering women economically. In (a) and (b), Ms Mwaiposa argues that many councils do not allocate funds to the Women Development Fund (WDF). For those councils which allocate the funds, these funds do not reach the targeted women but a few 'clever' people. In (a) [8], she further maintains that, when the money is allocated to the WDF, the WDF has a long, complicated procedure for providing loans to women. For instance, as shown in (b) [1], women are asked to form groups, have a bank account, submit a business proposal to a bank or have a registered

business (argumentation from example). As a result of what she describes as ‘bureaucracy’, many targeted women do not receive the loans but a few financially capable women (causal argumentation). In (c) and (d), Ms Bakar and Ms Mtinda suggest that the Tanzania Women’s Bank (TWB) has not reached many other women in Singida and in the islands of Zanzibar because the bank has not opened branches or centres in such areas (argumentation from example). As a result, women and men in those areas do not benefit from the TWB’s loans and other financial services (causal argumentation). Thus, in the argumentation stage, the minister has to explain why the TWB is not providing its financial services in (many) other areas, including Singida and Zanzibar.

In the following extract, the MPs’ contributions focus on the government’s commitment to stop violence against people with disabilities (especially those with albinism), children, and women.

Extract 6.13

- (a) MHE. RIZIKI OMAR JUMA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, suala la ukataji wa viungo wa ndugu zetu au Watoto wetu Albino, ni jambo linalosikitisha sana, [2] kila siku, haichukui muda mrefu, utakuta kijana amekatwa kiungo, kijana ameuliwa, [3] yaani vitu vya kusikitisha, vinatisha, [4] hivi Taifa hili tunaelekea wapi? [5] Lazima, naomba sana, Serikali ichukue hatua za haraka sana, kuhakikisha kwamba jambo hili linatokomezwa, halitokei tena katika nchi hii, [6] ni aibu, ni fedheha! [7] Hivi sisi tuna uwezo wa kuwalinda Wanyama wetu, tembo mmoja akipotea ni balaa, [8] lakini albino anakatwa viungo, albino anauliwa, lakini Serikali haionekani kuchukua effort yoyote, kuona kwamba wanakomesha jambo hili! [9] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hili ni jambo la kusikitisha jamani, [10] wenzetu wanatembea hawana amani, hawawezi hata kufanya kazi katika mazingira mazuri kwa sababu ya uoga ambao umewatawala katika vichwa vyao, [11] anatembea anahisi kana kwamba hatofika popote anaweza akauawa. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. RIZIKI OMAR JUMA: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the issue of cutting off the body organs of our relatives or children with albinism is a very saddening matter. [2] Every day, it doesn't take long, you will find that a young person has his/her body organs cut off, a young person has been killed. [3] I mean horrible incidents happen every day; it is terrible. [4] Where are we heading to as a nation? [5] I kindly request the government to take quick and tough measures to ensure that this problem is eradicated and make sure that this doesn't happen again in this country. [6] It is a shame; it is a disgrace! [7] We have the capacity to protect our animals, if one elephant goes missing, it becomes a disaster, [8] but a person with albinism gets their organs cut off, people with albinism are killed but the government doesn't seem to make any efforts to eradicate this matter. [9] Honourable Chairperson, this is a saddening matter, comrades! [10] Our fellows walk with no peace, they cannot even work in conducive environment due to the fear which dominates them in their heads, [11] they walk while suspecting that they might reach nowhere as they might be killed.

- (b) MHE. RITTA E. KABATI:- [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ukatili na ubaguzi wa kijinsia. [2] Hivi vitendo vya ukatili dhidi ya mwanamke hata wewe umekuwa ukisaidia sana pale Iringa na umefungua kituo, [3] lakini bado bado kabisa wanawake wananyanyasika. [...] [4] Kuna wanawake ambao wamezaa Watoto wenye ulemavu, wanaachwa na waume zao ndoa zinavunjika [5] kwa sababu tu mwanamke amezaa mtoto mwenye ulemavu, hata wenye ulemavu wa ngozi. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. RITTA E. KABATI:- [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, gender-based violence and discrimination; [2] concerning incidents of violence against women, you have also been

providing a helping hand in Iringa and you have opened a centre [3] but still women are being harassed/humiliated. [4] There are women who have given birth to children with disabilities, they are being divorced by their husbands and the marriages break down simply [5] because a woman gave birth to a baby with a disability, or a baby with albinism.

- (c) MHE. MARGARETH A. MKANGA: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ukatili wa kijinsia hasa kwa Watoto ni mkubwa na unakithiri na wanawake na Watoto hapa naenda mpaka Watoto wenye ulemavu siku hizi wana matatizo kweli kweli. [2] Kwa upande mfano tu, kulikuwa na mtoto mwenye ulemavu Morogoro kule, akateswa akateswa baadae akaishia kufariki maskini ya Mungu, [3] tukamwita mtoto wa box! [4] Ulemavu huu wa watoto hasa wenye ulemavu ndiyo ambao unajionesha sasa hata kwa tatizo hili la mauaji ya albino. [5] Wengi mimi naona wanauawa, kukatwa mikono ni Watoto ama wanawake [...]. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. MARGARETH A. MKANGA: [1] Honourable Chairperson, gender-based violence especially for children is a serious problem, and it affects women and children, including those with disabilities; it has been a serious problem to them. [2] For instance, there was a child with disability in Morogoro who was tortured a great deal and who eventually died, poor kid! [3] We nicknamed the kid a 'box child'. [4] This kind of disability, especially for children, has been persistent these days, particularly this problem of killing people with albinism. [5] In my view, many people who are killed, people whose arms are cut off, are children and women [...].

In this extract, the MPs' contributions suggest that the government, through the ministry, has failed to stop gender-based violence (GBV) and other forms of violence against children, women, and people with disabilities, especially people with albinism. In (a), Hon. Juma argues that there are various cases of killing or harming people with albinism (by cutting off their body organs). This MP is wondering why the government cannot protect people with albinism but is at the same time able to protect animals like elephants. In this argument, the MP thinks that protecting this group of people is similarly to protecting animals like elephants, implicitly suggesting that people with albinism should also be protected (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). Thus, this MP fails to understand why the government can protect elephants but fail to protect people with albinism. In subextract (b), Ms Kabati focuses on violence against women and children. Lastly, in subextract (c), Ms Mkanga gives a vivid example of a child who was tortured and died in Morogoro (argumentation from example). In the argumentation stage, the minister has to respond to these reactions concerning the ministry's failure to protect these groups of people.

The last reconstructed contribution from the MPs is presented in *Extract 6.14*. This contribution from Ms Christowaja Mtinda specifically puts the minister's third standpoint into question. Moreover, Ms Mtinda's critical reaction to the minister's standpoint is more or less similar to Ms Matiko's argumentation about the ministry's coordination of Non-Governmental Organisations.

Extract 6.14

- (a) MHE. CHRISTOWAJA G. MTINDA: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, katika Mashirika yasiyo ya Kiserikali; Mheshimiwa Waziri akiwasilisha hotuba yake kuhusu mapitio ya utekelezaji wa bajeti ya 2014/2015 na Makadirio ya Mapato na Matumizi ya Ofisi ya Rais, Mahusiano na Uratibu kwa mwaka wa fedha 2015/2016, Mheshimiwa Esther N. Matiko aliitaka Serikali kutoa maelezo ya kina, ni kwa nini Serikali imekusudia kuzifutia usajili wake NGOs zaidi ya 1000 katika kipindi hiki tunapoelekea Uchaguzi Mkuu? [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Selikali ilitoa sababu zifuatazo: - [3] kwamba NGOs nyingi zimejikita mjini badala ya vijijini na hivyo kukiuka masharti ya usajili; [4] NGOs nyingi zinapokea fedha kutoka nje ya nchi; [na] [5] NGOs hizi hazijatoa taarifa za uendeshaji wake toka mwaka 2005 kwa miaka 10 sasa. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. CHRISTOWAJA G. MTINDA: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); when the Honourable Minister was presenting her speech concerning the review of the implementation of the 2014/15 budget and the estimates of revenue and expenditure of the President's Office – Relations and Coordination – for the 2015/16 fiscal year, Honourable Esther N. Matiko urged the government to give a detailed explanation as to why the government has intended to deregister more than 1000 NGOs during this period when we are heading towards the general elections. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the government provided the following reasons:-[3] that many NGOs are based in urban areas instead of rural areas, hence violating the registration conditions; [4] many NGOs receive funds from external donors; and [5] these NGOs have not presented their performance reports for ten years now since 2005.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, napenda kupata maelezo ya kina, [2] kwa sababu hizo zilizotolewa na Serikali: [3] Je, kwa NGO kujikita mijini ni kosa la NGOs au la Serikali kushindwa kuweka mazingira mazuri ya kuziwezesha kufanya kazi vijijini? [4] Je, ni jitihada zipi zimefanywa na Serikali kuhakikisha kwamba maeneo ya vijijini yanakuwa ni Rafiki kwa NGOs hizi? [5] Pili, kwa kusema kwamba NGOs hizi zinapokea fedha toka nje hata kwa masuala madogo madogo hata yale ya ujenzi wa vyoo vya shule: Je, fedha hizi zinawanufaisha hawa wenye NGO au Watanzania kwa ujumla wake? [6] Nataka maelezo ya kina, ni kwa namna gani fedha za nje zinaweza kuhatarisha usalama wa nchi kama zinapatikana kwa kufuata masharti na utaratibu uliowekwa na nchi? (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to get a detailed explanation. [2] With the reasons given by the government, [3] for NGOs to operate only in urban areas, is it the NGOs' fault or the government's fault for failing to create conducive environment for the NGOs to operate in rural areas? [4] What efforts has the government made to ensure that rural areas become friendly for these NGOs [to work]? [5] Second, to say that these NGOs get funds from abroad even for minor issues, like building school toilets, does the money benefit the NGOs owners or all Tanzanians in general? [6] I want detailed explanation; how can the financial resources from the external donors terrify the security of the country if they come by adhering to the conditions and procedures laid down by the country?

- (c) [1] Tatu, kwa kusema kwamba NGO hizi hazijatoa taarifa zake toka mwaka 2005 mpaka sasa, nani ni mzembe? [2] NGOs au Serikali ambayo ndiyo msajili wa NGOs hizi? [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ni kwa nini Baraza la Taifa la NGOs halikuhakikisha kwamba NGOs zote zinatoa taarifa zake kila mwaka kama ambayo sheria zinataka? [4] Serikali kwa kukiuka Sheria ya Ukaguzi wa NGOs, imechukuliwa hatua gani? [5] Nani amewajibishwa kwa hilo? [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mwisho, nataka kujua kama WAMA nayo itafutiwa usajili wake kwa sababu nayo imekiuka masharti ya uanzishwaji wake kwa kumjumuisha Waziri mwenye dhamana ya kusimamia NGOs kuwa mjumbe wa Bodi hiyo. [7] Vinginevyo hatutendi haki kwa kuzifutia NGOs usajili wakati kazi zake ziaonekana na zimefanya kazi kubwa ya kufichua maovu, uchafu na ufitadi wa Serikali. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Third, to say that these NGOs have not presented their reports since 2005 till today, who is negligent; [2] NGOs or the government which is the registrar of these NGOs? [3] Honourable

Chairperson, why didn't the National Council of NGOs ensure that all NGOs present their reports every year in accordance with the provisions of the [NGOs] Act? [4] What measures have been taken against the government for violating the NGOs Act? [5] Who should be accountable for this issue? [6] Honourable Chairperson, lastly, I want to know if WAMA has also be deregistered because it has also violated the provisions for its establishment by appointing the minister responsible for coordinating NGOs as one of its board members. [7] Otherwise, we won't do justice by deregistering NGOs while they are doing a great job and they have done a lot in exposing the government's evils, dissipation, and [grand] corruption.

From *Extract 6.14*, Ms Mtinda begins her argumentation by citing what she describes as 'the government's reasons' for the deregistration of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Specifically, these reasons are expressed in (a) [3-5]. In (b) and (c), Ms Mtinda suggests that she is not satisfied with the government's reasons for deregistering NGOs. Starting with the government's reason that most NGOs are based in urban areas instead of rural areas, she suggests that it is the government that should be blamed for failing to create good environment in rural areas to enable NGOs to provide their services in such areas, implying that the NGOs' failure to reach more people in rural areas is caused by the government's failure to improve the working environment in rural areas (causal argumentation). Concentrating on the government's reason that NGOs depend on external donors' funds to run their activities, she suggests that this is not a 'crime' because this money does not benefit the owners of NGOs but Tanzanians. Concerning the government's last reason that NGOs have not presented their performance reports since 2005, she suggests that the National Council of NGOs and the government are the ones to blame for not ensuring that NGOs submit the reports. This implies that the NGOs' failure to submit the reports is caused by the government's failure to ensure that they do so (causal argumentation). Ms Mtinda concludes her argumentation in (c) [6] with another counterargument. She asks whether WAMA¹¹ has also been deregistered because it has also violated the NGOs Act by appointing the minister responsible for the coordination of NGOs (Ms Sophia Simba) as a board member. Implicitly, Ms Mtinda suggests that WAMA should also be deregistered because it has violated the NGOs Act and that WAMA should be treated in the same way as other NGOs (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). In fact, in (c) [7], Ms Mtinda suggests that it is unfair to deregister NGOs based on the reasons provided by the government while at the same time WAMA has not been deregistered for violating the NGOs Act; implying that this is a double standard. In the

¹¹ WAMA stands for *Wanawake na Maendeleo* (Women and Development); a 'non-profit' NGO that was founded by the [former] Tanzanian First Lady, Mama Salma Kikwete, in October 2006 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (<https://tz.linkedin.com/in/wamafoundation>).

argumentation stage, Ms Simba has to advance further argumentation to defend the reasons for the deregistration of the NGOs.

6.3 Opening stage

As indicated in the previous two debates, the opening stage of the (critical) discussion in this debate is also realised rather implicitly. Like in the previous debates, the starting points for the (critical) discussion in this debate are established by the Standing Orders as discussed in chapter three (see section 3.8.2). However, another starting point that seems to be implicitly agreed upon is the soundness criterion for argumentation from legal authority in defence of or against the minister's third standpoint, regarding the ministry's 'effective' coordination of the activities of the NGOs, as well as the opposition's third standpoint suggesting that the deregistration of NGOs is 'politically motivated'. In the actual discussion, the provisions of the NGOs Act and the NGO Policy seem to be implicitly used to evaluate whether a party's appeal to legal authority (the NGOs Act/Policy) is reasonable.

As regards the discussion roles, the reconstructed discourse in the confrontation stage suggests that Ms Sophia Simba acts as the protagonist of the minister's standpoints and Ms Esther Matiko assumes the role of antagonist to the minister's standpoints. Contrary to the previous debates, in this debate, both members of the ruling party and members of the opposition perform the role of antagonist to the minister's standpoints. However, members of the ruling party do this in a more or less indirect and polite manner compared to members of the opposition. Because the opposition's spokesperson has also expressed standpoints in the confrontation stage, the minister also performs the role of antagonist to the opposition's standpoints and Ms Matiko plays the role of protagonist of the opposition's standpoints (especially the third standpoint) in the argumentation stage. Moreover, in the argumentation stage, the deputy minister, the Attorney General (AG), and, surprisingly, the Chairperson presiding over this debate perform the role of protagonist of the minister's third standpoint and the role of antagonist to the opposition's third standpoint on different occasions.

6.4 Argumentation stage

In terms of the reconstructed argumentative discourse in the (critical) discussion in this debate, the argumentation stage begins with the ministers' responses to the raised issues or queries by the opposition's spokesperson and other MPs in their contributions to the debate, as discussed in section 6.4.1. Section 6.4.2 presents further argumentation in the expenditure committee, focusing on the subdiscussion about the ministry's coordination of NGOs' activities.

6.4.1 Ministers' responses

In *Extract 6.15*, the Minister and Deputy Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children respond to various issues or queries raised by the opposition's spokesperson and other MPs in their contributions to the debate.

Extract 6.15

- (a) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [...] [1] Kutokana na ufinyu wa muda sitoweza kujibu maswali au hoja zote zilizotolewa na Waheshimiwa Wabunge, [2] lakini naahidi kwamba Wizara yangu itajibu hoja zote na kuwasilisha Ofisi ya Bunge. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] Waheshimiwa Wabunge, wengi wameonyesha concern au kusikitishwa na ufinyu wa bajeti ya Wizara yetu. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Wizara kwa upande wake, inachukua hatua mbalimbali za kupambana na ufinyu wa bajeti. [5] Moja ya hatua hizo ni kuandika maandiko ya miradi na kuwasilisha Serikalini na kwa wabia wa maendeleo. [...] [6] Serikali [...] itaangalia katika vipaumbele vyake kuhakikisha kwamba Wizara yetu, Wizara ambayo ni mtambuka inapata bajeti, inaongezewa bajeti. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [...] [1] Due to time constraint, I will not be able to respond to all the questions and arguments raised by the Honourable MPs, [2] but I promise that my ministry will respond to all the arguments and submit the responses to the parliament's office. [3] Honourable Chairperson, most of the MPs have expressed their concerns about the limited budget of our ministry. [4] On its part, the ministry is taking various measures to address the shortage of the budget. [5] One of the measures taken is to write project proposals and submit them to the government and development partners. [6] The government will [also] review its priorities to ensure that our ministry, which is a crosscutting ministry, is given additional funds.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kambi ya Upinzani [...] imezungumzia suala la kuajiri wataalam wa maendeleo ya jamii ambapo jibu lake ni [...] kwamba mazungumzo yanaendelea kuomba kwamba waajiriwe moja kwa moja. [2] Kambi ya Upinzani pia imezungumzia uwezekano wa kukarabati miundombinu ya majengo ya vyuo vya wananchi na vya maendeleo ya jamii ili kurudisha majengo haya katika hadhi yake na kutoa elimu inayostahili. [3] Wizara imekuwa ikikarabati majengo na miundombinu ya vyuo kwa awamu kufuatana na upatikanaji wa bajeti. [4] Vyuo saba vilikarabatiwa katika mwaka 2015/2016 na hivyo vinane vinatarajiwa kukarabatiwa. [5] Naomba mkumbuke vyuo vingi hivi siyo kama vya enzi za Mwalimu, [6] vyuo vingi hivi toka enzi za ukoloni, kwa hiyo ukarabati wake una kazi kubwa sana; [7] hizi nyingine ndiyo zile zilizokuwa middle schools ambazo wengine hamziju. [8] Kwa hiyo, ni majengo makuuku sana, [9] hata hivyo tunajitahidi kuweka mazingira yawe mazuri na vijana wetu bado wanafaidika kwa kutumia majengo hayo kwa kupata ujuzi wa stadi mbalimbali za maisha. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the opposition camp [...] talked about the employment of the community development practitioners/professionals and the response is [...] that discussions are underway to request that they are employed directly [from CDTIs]. [2] The opposition camp also talked about the possibility of renovating the building infrastructures of the Folk Development Colleges (FDCs) and Community Development Training Institutes (CDTIs) in order to restore the good condition of the buildings and provide appropriate education. [3] The ministry has been renovating the buildings and infrastructures of the FDCs/CDTIs in phases depending on the availability of funds. [4] Seven FDCs/CDTIs were renovated in 2015/16 and other eight [FDCs/CDTIs] are expected to be renovated. [5] I would like to remind you that most of these FDCs/CDTIs were not [built] in Mwalimu's era. [6] Most of them were [built] in the colonial era, so they demand a lot in their rehabilitation. [7] Some of these are those which used to be middle schools, which some of you are not aware of. [8] Therefore, the buildings are very old. [9] However, we are trying our best to create a conducive environment and our

young people are still benefiting [from these FDCs/CDTIs] by using such buildings to get various life skills.

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini pia kulikuwa na swali la Chuo cha Rugemba ili kiwe Chuo Kikuu. [2] Hili limeulizwa na Mheshimiwa Kigola, lakini pia Mheshimiwa Ritta ameulizia. [3] Napenda kuwajibu kwamba, Chuo cha Maendeleo ya Jamii Rungemba kitaanza kutoa mafunzo kwanza kwa kujiunga (affiliate) na Taasisi ya Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru. [4] Wizara inaendelea kuboresha rasilimali watu na miundombinu ili kiweze kufikia vigezo vya kutoa shahada, [5] baada ya hapo ndipo utaratibu wa kukipandisha hadhi utaendelea. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Mheshimiwa Riziki Omar Juma amezungumzia uchakavu wa nyumba za wafanyakazi wa Taasisi ya Maendeleo ya Jamii Tengeru. [7] Jibu ni kwamba, nyumba za wafanyakazi wa taasisi pamoja na miundombinu mingine kama kumbi za mihadhara mabweni na ofisi hazijafanyiwa ukarabati kwa muda mrefu kutokana na ufinyu wa bajeti. [8] Hata hivyo, juhudi zinafanywa kupitia vyanzo vingine vya fedha ili kuweza kufanya ukarabati. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, there was also a question about [upgrading] Rungemba CDTI to become a university. [2] This was asked by Honourable Kigola and Honourable Rita. [3] I would like to respond that Rungemba CDTI shall start offering [community development] training as an affiliate training institute of Tengeru Institute of Community Development (TICD). [4] The ministry is continuing to improve human resource and infrastructure for it to be able to meet the requirements for offering a [Bachelor's] degree. [5] After that, the procedures for upgrading [the training institute] shall follow. (Applause) [6] Honourable Riziki Omar Juma talked about the poor condition of the workers' houses at TICD. [7] The response is that the worker's houses as well as other infrastructures, such as lecture rooms, dormitories and offices, have not been renovated for such a long time due to the limited budget. [8] However, efforts are being made to carry out renovation through other sources of income.

- (d) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kambi ya Upinzani pia imesema Benki ya Wanawake ina mikakati gani kuwafikia wanawake na wanaume wengi zaidi. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, suala la Tanzania Women Bank (Benki ya Wanawake Tanzania) limezungumzwa karibu na Wabunge wote [...]. [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuna wengine wamechangia kwa maandishi na wao pia wanazungumzia wangependa Benki hii kuwafikia. [4] Kwa kutambua changamoto ya kuwafikia Watanzania wengi, Benki ya Wanawake imedhamiria kutoa mfumo wa uwakala wa benki (agency banking) utakaowezesha benki kufikia mikoa yote. [5] Kama nilivyosema, kujenga au kuweka branch ya benki inahitaji pesa nyingi kwa hiyo tunafanya agency banking kwa vituo mbalimbali. [6] Wanawake pia wataendelea kupatiwa mikopo kupitia vyanzo mbalimbali ikiwepo mifuko ya Self, VICOBA, SACCOS na kadhalika. [...] [7] Mheshimiwa Mabumba na Mheshimiwa Faida Bakari wao bado wana hamu sana kuona Benki hii inafika Zanzibar. [8] Benki itakapopata mtaji wa kutosha itaanza mchakato wa kuanzisha matawi katika maeneo mbalimbali ya Zanzibar. [9] Tulianza, lakini kulikuwa na matatizo tukarudi nyuma, kwa hiyo ikabidi twende kwingine. [10] Serikali ya Jamhuri wa Tanzania itajadiliana na Serikali ya Mapinduzi kuangalia ni namna gani Benki ya Wanawake itaweza kufanya kazi Zanzibar kwa sababu ya taratibu mbalimbali za kisheria. [11] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, aidha, Mheshimiwa Zarina Madabida, Mheshimiwa Zaynabu Vullu, na Mheshimiwa Mwaiposa, nao pia wamesema utaratibu wa kuunda vikundi na taratibu nyingine zinawakataza wanawake kupata mikopo ya Mfuko wa Wanawake. [12] Wizara inahamasisha wanawake kuunda vikundi ili kupata mikopo kwa kuwa vikundi ndiyo dhamana ya mikopo, [13] haiwezekani kuwapa mikopo halafu hatuji wanaenda wapi. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, the opposition camp wanted to know what strategies the [Tanzania] Women's Bank (TWB) has put in place for reaching more women and men. [2] Honourable Chairperson, the issue of the Tanzania Women's Bank has been talked about by almost all MPs [...] [3] Honourable Chairperson, there are others who made their contributions in writing; they also say they would like this bank to reach them. [4] By recognising the challenge of reaching many Tanzanians, the [Tanzania] Women's Bank intends to use agency banking system which will enable the bank to reach every region. [5] As I said,

opening a bank branch requires a lot of money, so we are doing agency banking at various centres. [6] Women will also continue to receive loans through various sources including Self, VICOBA, SACCOS, etc. [...] [7] Honourable Mabumba and Honourable Faida Bakari are still very eager to see this bank reaching Zanzibar. [8] When the bank gets enough capital, it will start the process of opening branches in different parts of Zanzibar. [9] We started but there were complications and we retreated, so we were forced to go somewhere else. [10] The government of the United Republic of Tanzania shall discuss this with the Revolutionary Government (of Zanzibar) to see how the [Tanzania] Women's Bank can operate in Zanzibar due to various legal procedures. [11] Honourable Chairperson, Honourable Zarina Madabida, Honourable Zaynabu Vullu, and Honourable Mwaiposa also said that the process of forming groups and other processes deprive women of the [opportunity] to access loans from the [Tanzania] Women Fund. [12] The ministry is encouraging women to form groups to access loans because the groups are the loans' collateral. [13] It is impossible for us to give them loans while we don't know where they are going.

- (e) [1] Kambi ya Upinzani inasema Serikali ina mkakati gani wa kuwalinda watoto wenye ulemavu iliwemo ulemavu wa ngozi! [2] Serikali inaendelea kushirikiana na wadau wa maendeleo ikiwemo Halmashauri, Asasi za Kiraia na wengine wote. [3] Lakini pia Wizara ya Afya na Ustawi wa Jamii imeendelea kuhamasisha uanzishwaji wa timu za ulinzi wa mtoto katika wilaya ili kuzuia ukatili dhidi ya watoto, [4] mpaka sasa timu hizo zipo katika wilaya 31 hapa nchini. [5] Wizara kwa kushirikiana na Jeshi la Polisi imehamasisha uanzishwaji wa madawati ya jinsia na watoto katika vituo 417 vya polisi ili kushughulikia vitendo vya ukatili dhidi ya watoto wasichana na vishawishi vinavyosababisha mimba katika umri mdogo. [6] Aidha, wadau wa maendeleo wamekuwa wanaunga mkono Serikali katika ujenzi wa mabweni maeneo mbalimbali. [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, masuala ya ukatili yamezungumzwa sana, yamezungumzwa na Waheshimiwa wengi [...]. [8] Serikali imefanya kazi kubwa kuhamasisha wananchi, wanapoona ukatili unafanywa wanaenda wenyewe polisi kuripoti na ndiyo maana ripoti zimekuwa nyingi kuliko huko. [9] Mheshimiwa Riziki alitaka kujua ukataji wa viungo vya binadamu, Serikali ichukue hatua za haraka kukomesha ukatili huu. [10] Pamoja na juhudi za kuhamasisha na kuelimisha jamii, Wizara itaendelea kushirikiana na Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani kuhakikisha kuwa vitendo vya ukatili vinatokomezwa ikiwa ni pamoja na kuchukua hatua kali kwa ambao wamefanya maovu hayo. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] The opposition camp wants to know what strategy the government has put in place in protecting children with disabilities, including those with albinism! [2] The government continues to collaborate with development stakeholders including [district] councils, civil society organizations, and all others. [3] Also, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare continues to encourage the formation of child protection teams in districts in order to prevent violence against children. [4] Up to now such teams have been established in 31 districts in the country. [5] The ministry in collaboration with the police force has encouraged the establishment of gender and children desks in 147 police posts/stations in order to deal with the incidents of violence against female children and temptations that lead to early pregnancies. [6] Also, the development stakeholders have been supporting the government in constructing dormitories in various places. [7] Honourable Chairperson, incidents of violence have been talked about extensively; many MPs have talked about these incidents [...] [8] The government has done a great job in encouraging the citizens to report the incidents of violence to the police and that is why there are many reports of the incidents now compared to the past. [9] Honourable Riziki wanted to know about the cutting off of the human body organs; the government should take drastic measures to stop this violence. [10] Apart from the efforts [made] to encourage and educate the community, the ministry continues to collaborate with the Ministry of Home Affairs to ensure that incidents of violence are eliminated, including [putting in place] strong measures against those who have committed such evils.

- (f) [1] Kwa kushirikiana na wadau mbalimbali imeanda mpango kazi, in fact, inatekeleza mpango kazi wa kudhibiti tatizo la watoto wanaoishi na kufanya kazi mitaani. [2] Mpango huo ni wa kutoka 2014 mpaka 2019. [3] Mpango kazi huo unatekelezwa na Wizara, Halmshauri na Asasi

za Kiraia zinazoshughulikia masuala ya watoto. [4] Mpango kazi huo unawezeshwa kutolewa kwa elimu kwa jamii, huduma mbalimbali kama vile lishe, malezi, afya pamoja na kuwatenganisha watoto na familia zao. [5] Mpango kazi huu pia unatoa fursa kwa wazazi na walezi kujifunza na kuendesha miradi ya ujasiriamali ambayo itasaidia kukuza kipato cha familia. [6] Na hapa TASAF inafanya kazi kubwa sana kuhakikisha familia hizi zinakuwa na uwezo na hivyo kuweza kulea watoto wao. [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa watoto walio nje ya shule watapata elimu ya ufundi stadi ambayo itawezesha kujijiri wao wenyewe badala ya kwenda mitaani na kufanya kazi zisizokuwa na tija. [8] Hapa kubwa ni kwamba watoto wale kukubali kuondoka mitaani. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] In collaboration with various stakeholders, [the ministry] has prepared an action plan, in fact, it is implementing an action plan for preventing the problem of street children. [2] This plan is from 2014 to 2019. [3] This action plan is being implemented by the ministry, [district] councils, and civil society organizations working on child [development] matters. [4] This action plan ensures the provision of education to the society, various services such as dieting, parenting, health plus separating children from their families. [5] This action plan also provides an opportunity for the parents and guardians to learn and implement entrepreneurship projects which will help to ensure that these families are able and therefore manage to take care of their children. [6] TASAF is also doing a great job to ensure that these families are financially capable of raising their children. [7] Honourable Chairperson, children who are out of school will receive vocational training skills which will enable them to be self-employed instead of going into the street to do activities which are not productive. [8] Our main concern here is that these children agree to leave the streets.

- (g) NAIBU WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] kulikuwa na hoja inayohusiana na suala zima la uchakavu wa majengo na miundombinu katika Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi. [2] Kwa kweli, Wizara imekuwa ikikarabati majengo na miundombinu ya vyuo kwa awamu kufuatana na upatikanaji wa fedha. [3] Mwaka 2014/2015, vyuo saba vya Tarime, Mwananhala, Kilwa Masoko, Mputa, Msaginya, Nandembo na Mto wa Mbu vilikarabatiwa. [4] Wizara imepanga kukarabati Vyuo vya Maendeleo ya Wananchi vinane kwa mwaka 2015/2016. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

DEPUTY MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, [...] there was a concern regarding the whole matter of the poor condition of the FDCs' buildings and infrastructures. [2] Honestly, the ministry has been renovating the buildings and infrastructures of the colleges in phases depending on the availability of funds. [3] In 2014/15, seven FDCs, Tarime, Mwanhala, Kilwa Masoko, Mputa, Msaginya, Nandembo, and Mto wa Mbu, were renovated. [4] The ministry is planning to renovate eight CDTIs in 2015/2016.

In this extract, the minister and deputy minister respond to various arguments against the acceptance of the minister's first two standpoints and the last one. In subextract (a), the minister advances further argumentation as a response to the MPs' doubts as to whether the ministry will successfully execute its objectives and plans for the next fiscal year due to the limited budget. She argues that the ministry is taking various measures to address the shortage of funds in the proposed budget, implicitly suggesting that these measures will solve the challenge of limited funds (problem-solving argumentation). One of these measures is to write project proposals to the government and development partners in order to get more funds. Moreover, she argues that the government will review its priorities to ensure that this crosscutting ministry is given more funds. These arguments seem to strengthen the minister's pragmatic

argumentation for her first standpoint, as she implicitly insists that, although the budget is limited, the ministry will still achieve the desired effect because it has taken or it will take various measures to get more money and thus address the challenge of limited budget.

In (b) and (g), the minister and her deputy minister respond to the opposition's and MPs' criticisms about the poor condition of the FDCs and CDTIs. They argue that the FDCs and CDTIs are renovated in phases depending on the availability of funds. Implicitly, the ministers suggest that the failure to rehabilitate the CDTIs/FDCs is caused by the shortage of funds (causal argumentation), which further suggests that the ministry is not to blame (or is not responsible) for this failure event (an account of excuse). They maintain that in the 2014/2015 fiscal year various buildings and other infrastructures in seven FDCs were renovated, which is considered a sign of the ministry's commitment to improve the condition of the buildings/infrastructures (symptomatic argumentation), and that the buildings and other infrastructures in eight CDTIs will be renovated in the next fiscal year (practical or pragmatic argumentation) based on the availability of funds. Responding to Hon. Juma's criticism about the poor condition of workers' houses at TICD, Ms Simba similarly argues that the workers' houses, dormitories, and other buildings at TICD have not been renovated for such a long time due to the limited budget. The minister seems to suggest that the ministry is not to blame for the poor condition of the houses (an account of excuse). She further implies that the failure to renovate the houses is caused by the limited budget (causal argumentation) but her ministry is making efforts to renovate the buildings from other sources of income. Apart from the account of *excuse*, in (b) [9], the minister seems to appeal to *justification*, as she attempts to justify the state of affairs in the CDTIs/FDCs. She suggests that, although the buildings (or infrastructures) of CDTIs and FDCs are in poor condition (the failure event), the youth are still benefiting from them by using such buildings to get education. This implies that the situation is not as bad as it is made to appear. I consider this argumentative move to be the minister's attempt to minimise or neutralise the pejorative effect of the failure event. In subextract (c), Ms Simba responds to Mr Kigola's question regarding the upgrading of Rungemba CDTIs to the status of university. This question was also raised by Ms Kabati. In her response, the minister argues that the CDTI will first start offering training as an affiliate CDTI of TICD, while making efforts to improve human resource and infrastructure. Once this is done, the procedures to promote the CDTI will follow.

In subextract (d), the minister responds to the opposition's and other MPs' critical doubts about the efforts made by the ministry to empower women economically, through the Tanzania

Women's Bank (TWB), Women Development Fund (WDF), and other Funds. In the opposition's speech, Ms Matiko criticised the government for the TWB's failure to reach many women (and men) in different areas of the country (failure event) and other MPs wanted TWB to reach people in their constituencies or regions by opening branches or centres of the bank. In her response, Ms Simba argues that, due to the limited capital, the bank cannot open branches in those areas because opening a branch requires a lot of money (an account of excuse), which implies that the TWB's failure to open branches in such areas is caused by the TWB's limited capital (causal argumentation). However, she maintains that TWB has started using agency banking system by opening various centres of the bank in various areas. Regarding the request for the bank to reach people in Zanzibar, the minister similarly argues that, when the bank gets enough capital, it will open branches in Zanzibar, similarly implying that the failure to reach people in Zanzibar is caused by the limited capital of the bank (causal argumentation). In fact, she argues that the bank started the process to opening branches in Zanzibar but, due to some legal procedures, the process was not materialised (causal argumentation). However, she maintains that the URT government is in consultation with the RGZ to see how to materialise the process (practical argumentation).

In subextract (e), the minister responds to various issues raised about the government's or the ministry's efforts to stop violence against children, women, and people with disabilities, especially those with albinism. He argues that the ministry, in collaboration with other ministries and stakeholders, has put in place various strategies to stop incidents of violence against these groups of people (causal argumentation from means to goal). In subextract (f), the minister responds to the opposition's and other MPs' critical doubts about the government's efforts to help street children. She mentions the strategies which will be put in place by the government to help these children or to solve the problem of street children (practical or problem-solving argumentation) but concludes that all these strategies depend on the children's willingness to leave the streets, implying that, if the strategies fail, the government is not to blame because it cannot force these children to leave the street if they are not willing to (an account of excuse).

In *Extract 6.16*, the ministers defend the minister's third standpoint about the supposedly effective coordination of the activities or operation of NGOs. In this extract, the ministers assume both the role of protagonist of the minister's third standpoint and the role of antagonist to the opposition's third standpoint.

Extract 6.16

- (a) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, Kambi ya Upinzani inasema kwamba Serikali imeshindwa kufuatilia utendaji kazi wa mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali kama yanavyotakiwa kisheria. [2] Hapana, sio kweli kwamba Serikali imeshindwa kufuatilia utendaji wa NGOs, bali imekuwa ikifuatilia utendaji wa mashirika hayo na [3] matokeo ya ufuatiliaji huo yanathibitika kwa kuimarika kwa michango ya NGOs na hatua zinachukuliwa kwa yale yanayoenda kinyume na sheria na [4] ndiyo maana kuna manung'uniko mengi. [5] Hatuwezi kuvumilia kuona NGOs zinafanya shughuli ambazo hazikuwa-registered kufanya. [6] Kwa hiyo, mimi nadhani ni wakati umefika kuipongeza Serikali kwa sera yake ya NGOs. (Makofi) [7] Serikali kuyafutia mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali kwa mashinikizo ya CCM! [8] Mmh! Hizi ni ndoto sio kweli kwamba Serikali imekuwa ikiyafutia usajili mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali kwa shinikizo la CCM. [9] Wanafuatiwa NGOs kutokana na kukiuka Sheria ya NGOs, Sheria ya Na. 24 ya Mwaka 2002 kama ilivyorekebisha mwaka 2005 na Bunge hili Tukufu; [10] tumetunga wenyewe sheria. [11] Aidha, Serikali imeweka mazingira wezeshi kwa NGOs kufichua maovu, kuongeza uwazi na uwajibikaji, [12] lazima wafanya kazi kwa uwazi na wawajibike. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, the opposition camp says that the government has failed to monitor/supervise the operation of NGOs as required by the [NGOs] Act. [2] No, it is not true that the government has failed to monitor/supervise the operation of NGOs; it has been monitoring/supervising the operation of the NGOs and the result of such monitoring is evident in the improvement of the contributions of NGOs and [3] the measures taken against those which operate against the [NGOs] Act and [4] that's why there are a lot of complaints. [5] We cannot tolerate to see NGOs doing the activities that they were not registered for. [6] Therefore, I think it is high time we congratulate the government for its NGOs Policy. (Applause) [7] The government suspending the operation of NGOs due to the [political] pressure from CCM! [8] Mmh! these are dreams; it is not true that the government has been deregistering NGOs due to the CCM's [political] pressure. [9] NGOs are suspended for violating the NGOs Act, No. 24 of 2002 as it was revised in 2005 by this august/esteemed parliament. [10] We enacted this Act ourselves. [11] The government has also created conducive environment for NGOs to expose evils, to increase transparency, accountability; [12] they have to do their activities with transparency and accountability.

- (b) NAIBU WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kulikuwa kuna hoja inahusu kusudio la Serikali kufuta NGOs. [2] Hii iliulizwa na Mheshimiwa Christowaja Mtinda. [3] Ufafanuzi ni kwamba, si kweli kwamba Serikali inakusudia kuyafutia usajili mashirika 1,000 kwa sababu ya kujikita mijini na kupokea fedha kutoka nje ya nchi. [4] Hiyo, siyo sababu ya msingi kwamba ya NGOs kufitiwa usajili. [5] Hata hivyo, ieleweke kwamba, kusudio la Serikali kuzifutia usajili NGOs hizo halina uhusiano na masuala ya kisiasa, bali linatokana na ukiukwaji wa Sheria ya NGOs kwa kutowasilisha taarifa zao kama zinavyotakiwa na sheria. [6] Kila mwaka NGOs zinapaswa kuwasilisha taarifa [7] kwa hiyo, zisipowasilisha maana yake hazikidhi matakwa yale [8] kwa hiyo, zinaweza zikafutiwa. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

DEPUTY MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, there was a concern regarding the intention of the government to suspend the operation of NGOs. [2] This was asked by Honourable Christowaja Mtinda. [3] The clarification is that it is not true that the government intends to deregister 1000 NGOs because they are based in urban areas and receive funds from abroad. [4] That is not the basic reason for being deregistered. [5] It should be understood that the government's intention to deregister these NGOs is not politically motivated [by CCM]; but it is based on the violation of the NGOs Act by not presenting their [annual performance] reports as required by the [NGOs] Act. [6] Every year NGOs are required to submit such a report. [7] If they don't submit it, it means they have not fulfilled the provision, [8] and they can therefore be suspended.

In *Extract 6.16*, the ministers respond to the opposition's claim that the government has failed to monitor or supervise the operation of NGOs and that the government's deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated. Responding to the opposition's argument that the violation of the NGOs Act by 'a few' NGOs is caused by the government's failure to monitor or supervise the NGOs (causal argumentation), in (a) [2-3], Ms Simba argues that this accusation is not true because the government has been effectively monitoring or supervising the activities of NGOs and this is proved by the improved contributions of NGOs and measures taken against NGOs which violate the Act. In this argument, she seems to challenge the reasonableness of the opposition's causal link. She suggests that the NGOs' violation of the NGOs Act is not caused by the government's failure to monitor or supervise the operation of NGOs. In (a) [4], she adds that, as a result of this monitoring (or supervision), there have been a lot of complaints. The minister's argumentative move implies that NGOs are deregistered for violating the NGOs Act (argumentation from legal authority). In (a) [5], she maintains her argumentation from legal authority, arguing that the government cannot tolerate NGOs which violate the Act. In (a) [6], she further argues that, instead of complaining, the government should be congratulated for the job well done. Regarding the other claim from the opposition that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated, Ms Simba continues to maintain her argumentation from legal authority by arguing that the deregistration strategy is not politically motivated but these NGOs have violated the NGOs Act, which was enacted by the very parliament, as indicated in (a) [7-10]. In this argument, she also appeals to the parliament as the authority. In (a) [11] and [12], she argues that, in fact, the government has been creating conducive environment for NGOs to expose evils, but NGOs should also work transparently and be accountable.

Similarly, in subextract (b), the deputy minister, Ms Pindi Chana, responds to the claim raised by the opposition that the deregistration is politically motivated because the government's reasons are baseless or surprising. In (b) [2-4], she argues that the reasons cited by Ms Mtinda (and Ms Matiko) are not the government's reasons for deregistration; NGOs are not deregistered because they are based in urban areas or because they rely on external donors' funds. Appealing to argumentation from legal authority, in (b) [5-8], she maintains that NGOs are deregistered because they have violated the NGOs Act by not presenting their annual performance/financial reports as required by the Act.

With the use of argumentation from legal authority, both the minister and deputy minister seem to believe that appealing to the (provisions of the) NGOs Act as the legal authority is the most

effective and reasonable way to challenge the opposition's claim that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated. However, this does not stop Ms Matiko (and other members of the opposition) to challenge the ministers' appeal to legal authority, as demonstrated in the next section.

6.4.2 Argumentation in the expenditure committee

Further argumentation in the argumentation stage is reconstructed from the expenditure committee where the parliament sits as a budget committee to go through various sections of the budget before authorising the proposed budget. However, for the purposes of the present chapter, this section focuses on argumentation in defence of or against the opposition's third standpoint that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated (by CCM). This subdiscussion, which is highly argumentative, begins with Ms Matiko's further argumentation for her third standpoint and request for usage declaratives or argumentation from the minister(s), as shown in *Extract 6.17*.

Extract 6.17

- (a) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mimi ningependa nipate ufafanuzi wa kina maana kumekuwa na statements zinajichanganya; nisiporidhika nitatoa shilingi. [2] Kuhusiana na suala zima la mashirika yasiyo ya kiserikali, kupitia Msajili wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Serikali alitoka orodha ya Mashirika zaidi ya 1000 ambayo yamefutuliwa [...] [3] wakati Waziri anajibu alisema ni shirika moja tu la Sisi kwa Sisi. [4] Lakini leo kwenye kitabu chao wamesema ni mashirika 24 na kati ya mashirika 24 hayo, mashirika 10 yaliomba yenyewe kujitoka [5] kwa maana ni mashirika 14. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa nilitaka kujua, huu mkanganyiko, Msajili anasema haya mashirika yamekosa sifa kwa sababu hayajawasilisha taarifa zao za mwaka, lakini hayo mashirika ni kati 2005 na 2007. [7] Sasa yamesajiliwa 2005 – 2007 na kwa mujibu wa Sheria Namba 24 ya mwaka 2002 ambayo imefanyiwa marekebisho mwaka 2005. [8] Walikuwa wanasubiri nini kama kweli ana makosa hayo, kuyafuta au kuyaondoa hayo mashirika kati ya 2007 mpaka leo tunazungumza ni 2015? [9] Ni kwa nini tusiamini kwamba, yanafutwa kwa sababu yanasema yale ambayo Serikali ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi hamtaki kuyasikia? (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- Honourable Chairperson, I would like to get detailed explanation on the contradicting statements and, if I am not satisfied [with the explanation], I will withdraw a shilling. [2] Regarding the whole issue of NGOs, the Registrar of NGOs released a list of more than 1000 deregistered NGOs, [...] [3] [but] when the minister was responding [to the queries raised], she said that only one NGO, known as Sisi kwa Sisi, [was deregistered]. [4] Moreover, in their [budget] speech book today, they said [only] 24 NGOs were deregistered and out of them, 10 NGOs voluntarily requested to be deregistered. [5] So, it seems only 14 NGOs [are deregistered]. [6] Honourable Chairperson, I would like to know [the reasons for] this confusion because the registrar says these NGOs are deregistered because they didn't present the annual [performance] reports but these NGOs [were registered] between 2005 and 2007. [7] Now if they were registered between 2005 and 2007 as required by the [NGOs] Act No. 24 which was revised in 2005, [8] what were they waiting for to deregister these NGOs if they really failed to comply with the [NGOs] Act until now we are talking of 2015? [9] Why shouldn't we believe that they are deregistered because they say things that the CCM government doesn't want to hear? (Applause)*

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini zaidi wakati Waziri anaongea hapa alisema changamoto mojawapo mashirika yanaomba hela kutoka nje, [2] lakini kingine akasema mashirika yamejikita zaidi mjini na [3] akasema ndiyo maana inapelekea kuwa sifa mojawapo ya kuondolewa. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa nataka nijue, na mnijibu kwanza mkanganyiko; ni kwa nini Msajili anasema mashirika takribani 1000 yanafutwa, siku ile Waziri alisema ni shirika moja la Sisi kwa Sisi [...]. [5] Leo kwenye kitabu chenu mnasema ni mashirika 24, 10 yamejiondoa yamebaki 14! [6] Naomba kwanza mkanganyiko huo na mtueleze bayana ni sababu zipi ambazo zinapelekea hayo mashirika kufutwa. [7] Kwa sababu kama ni kutopeleka taarifa za mwaka kati ya 2007 na 2014, na watendaji wawajibishwe na ninyi mwenyewe muwajibike kwa sababu kwa nini hamkuweza kuyafuta haya mashirika kama yalienda kinyume na sheria tuliyotunga sisi wenyewe Bungeni. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, moreover, when the minister was speaking here, she said one of the challenges facing these NGOs is to request funds from [external] donors. [2] Also, the NGOs are based in urban areas and [3] she said that these are some of the criteria/reasons for their deregistration. [4] Honourable Chairperson, now I want to know, and you should first clarify this confusion; why does the Registrar say the deregistered NGOs are about 1000 while the minister says only one NGO, known as Sisi kwa Sisi [...], [was suspended]? [5] Today in your [budget speech] book you say that the deregistered NGOs are 24, 10 of which voluntarily requested to be deregistered and [only] 14 NGOs remain. [6] May you, please, first clarify this confusion and explain the real reasons for the deregistration of these NGOs? [7] If they never submitted annual [performance] reports from 2007 to 2014, the administrative officers and yourselves should also be responsible for failing to deregister the NGOs if they breached the [NGOs] Act that we ourselves enacted in the parliament.

In *Extract 6.17*, Ms Matiko continues to challenge the acceptability of the minister's third standpoint on the coordination of NGOs by the ministry, as she attempts to further justify the opposition's third standpoint. First, in (a) [1-5] and (b) [4-5], she requests clarification (usage declarative) on the three contradicting statements about the number of the deregistered NGOs. She argues that, while the Registrar of NGOs stated that more than 1000 NGOs are (or will be) deregistered, the minister in her speech says that only 24 NGOs are deregistered. What is even worse is that, out of 24 NGOs, 10 NGOs requested to be deregistered, which, according to her, means that the number of the deregistered NGOs is only 14. She also adds that, on a different occasion, the minister said that only one NGO known as Sisi kwa Sisi was deregistered. In this argumentative move, Ms Matiko accuses the minister (and/or the government) of inconsistency for making statements which contradict one another. She thus wants the minister to perform a usage declarative by stating the right number of the deregistered NGOs. Second, in (a) [6-9] and (b) [1-3, 6-7], she wants to know the 'real' reasons for the deregistration of the NGOs. For instance, in (a) [6], she states that one of the reasons mentioned by the Registrar is that these NGOs have not presented their annual performance reports (authority argumentation). Since the NGOs were registered between 2005 and 2007, she questions why the government did not deregister them until 2015 (when the country is approaching the October elections), as shown in (a) [7-8]. In (a) [9], she suggests that this makes them believe that the NGOs are deregistered

because they say things that the CCM government does not wish to hear (causal argumentation). In (b) [1-3], she argues that, according to the government, other reasons or challenges that lead to the deregistration of the NGOs are that these NGOs depend on external donors' funds and that they are based in urban areas. However, it should be recalled that the deputy minister has already argued that these are not the (basic) reasons for the deregistration. In (b) [7], Ms Matiko puts pressure on the minister to provide the (basic) reasons for the deregistration, which implies that she is not satisfied with the reasons provided. In (b) [8], she argues that, if the NGOs did not submit the annual reports between 2007 and 2014, the government should also be accountable for failing to ensure that NGOs adhere to the provisions of the NGOs Act enacted by the MPs themselves in the parliament, implying that the NGOs failure to submit the reports is caused by the government's failure to ensure that NGOs comply with the provisions of the NGOs Act (causal argumentation). Ms Matiko's argumentation from *Extract 6.17* is summarised in **Table 6.25** below.

Table 6.25 Ms Matiko's argumentation for the opposition's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated)
(3.)1	There are [three] contradicting statements about the number of deregistered NGOs
(3.1')	(This is a token that the deregistration is politically motivated)
(3.)1.1a	The Registrar of NGOs stated that more than 1000 NGOs are deregistered
(3.)1.1b	The minister said that only 24 NGOs are deregistered; 10 of them requested to be removed from the register of NGOs
(3.)1.1b.1	This means that the number of the deregistered NGOs is only 14
(3.)1.1c	The minister also said that only one NGO (Sisi kwa Sisi) is deregistered
(3.)2a	Registrar said the NGOs are deregistered for not presenting annual performance reports
(3.)2b	Since the NGOs were registered between 2005 and 2007, why did the government wait until 2015 to deregister them?
(3.2b')	(This is a sign that they are deregistered for political reasons)
(3.)2b.1	Why shouldn't we believe that they are deregistered because they say things that the CCM government doesn't want to hear?
(3.2b.1')	(NGOs are deregistered because they say things that the CCM govt doesn't want to hear)

In *Extract 6.18*, the minister responds to Ms Matiko's critical doubts about the reasons for the deregistration but evades performing the requested usage declarative; confirming whether the number of deregistered NGOs is 1000, 24, or just one.

Extract 6.18

- (a) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sijui kwa nini analing'ang'ania suala hili la NGO! [2] NGOs hizi zimefutwa kwa kukiuka kanuni na taratibu na Sheria Namba 24 ya NGO ya mwaka 2002. [3] Kama NGO yoyote inaona kwamba imefutwa kinyume na utaratibu, haiwezi kuja ku-appeal humu Bungeni, kuna vyombo vyake vya kwenda kua-appeal. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa jibu langu nililompa hapa Bungeni bado linabaki vilevile. [5] Kwanza, Sheria ya NGO kama hukutimiza

yale masharti, unajifuta wewe mwenyewe. [6] Ikumbukwe kwamba Sheria ya NGO imeanza baada ya Sera ya NGO ya 2001, halafu 2002 ikatungwa sheria. [7] Huku nyuma kulikuwa hakuna Sheria ya NGO, [8] kwa hiyo kwa vile kulikuwa hakuna Sheria ya NGO, NGOs ziikuwa zikisajiliwa BRELA, zikisajiliwa RITA, zikisajiliwa Home Affairs (Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani). [9] Kwa hiyo, sheria hii ilipokuja, wale wote ambao wamesajiliwa kule, sasa wanatakiwa wajisajili hapa. [10] Lakini kwa bahati mbaya sheria zile tatu kule ambazo zilikuwa zina-register hizi NGOs hazijarekebisha ili wasiwe wana-register NGOs. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [1] Honourable Chairperson, I don't know why she keeps insisting on this issue of NGOs! [2] These NGOs have been suspended for violating the regulations stipulated by the NGOs Act No. 24 of 2002. [3] If any NGO finds that it has been unfairly deregistered, it cannot appeal in this parliament; there are authorities to which it can submit its appeal. [4] Honourable Chairperson, the answer I have given her in the parliament remains as it is.[5] After all, in accordance with the NGOs Act, if you fail to comply with the provisions, you automatically deregister yourself. [6] It should be remembered that the NGOs Act was effective after the NGOs Policy of 2001, then the Act was enacted in 2002. [7] We didn't have an NGOs Act before and, because of that, [8] NGOs were registered under BRELA, RITA or the Ministry of Home Affairs. [9] After the enactment of the NGOs Act, all NGOs which had been registered under those other authorities were required to register themselves here. [10] Unfortunately, the other three acts which allow those authorities to register NGOs have not be abolished to stop them from registering NGOs.

- (b) [1] Kwa hiyo, kwenye sheria tukaweka kipengele kinachosema wale wote waliokuwa registered kwenye hizo sheria waje kwenye Sheria ya NGO wapate Certificate of Compliance ya ukabilifu. [2] Wengine wamefanya, wengine hawakufanya. [3] Kwa hiyo, tukatangaza kwenye gazeti tukawapa muda wa mwaka mzima waje wapate Certificate of Compliance kama inavyotaka sheria ili tutekeleze matakwa ya sheria. Sasa sijui unapingana na sheria au unataka vipi? (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] So, we said that all those NGOs which had been registered under other authorities have to apply for a certificate of compliance as stipulated by the new NGOs Act. [2] Some did that but others didn't. So, we issued a notice in newspapers and gave them one year to come for the certificate of compliance in order to comply with the [NGOs] Act. [4] Now, I don't know; are you against the [NGOs] Act or what do you want?

- (c) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, na hilo jambo la kwamba CCM, CCM, [2] sisi wala hatuna shida na NGOs. [3] Hapa nilichosema changamoto wanazozipata NGOs hizi [4] ni changamoto kwamba wanategemea zaidi wafadhili, fedha za nje. [5] Ni kitu kigumu, huwezi ukaanzisha NGO yako ya watoto yatima halafu utegemea upwe pesa kutoka nje, [6] lazima utafute njia ya kutengeneza pesa uweze kulea kituo chako, [7] matokeo yake wale watoto watahangaika. [8] Hicho ndiyo ninachokisema. [9] Sikutaja zile fedha zinazokuja pengine zinawafikia, aha ahaa, hizo wala sijazigusa, [10] nilisema kwa ujumla changamoto ambazo NGOs zote wanapata. [11] Kuna watu wanafungua NGO kwa kutegemea pengine kuna pesa kutoka nje, mimi huwa wanafika ofisini kwangu, Mheshimiwa tutafutie wafadhili kwa NGO yangu, hiyo hamna, [12] hiyo ni changamoto. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, regarding this issue of [political influence from] CCM, [2] We have no problem with NGOs. [3] What I talked about were the challenges facing these NGOs. [4] One of the challenges is that NGOs are more dependent on external donors' funds. [5] It is a huge challenge; you cannot establish an NGO for taking care of children, for instance, but you depend extremely on external donors' funds. [6] You must have a reliable source of income in order to manage your centre. [7] Otherwise, children will suffer some day. [8] That is what I said. [9] I didn't talk about whether the funds reach them or not; no, I didn't talk about that. [10] I talked about the general challenges facing all NGOs. [11] Some people establish NGOs, expecting that they will get some money from external donors; they come to my office to ask me to find donors for their NGOs. [12] That is a challenge.

In *Extract 6.18*, the minister advances further argumentation in support of her third standpoint or against the opposition's third standpoint. However, she concentrates on the reasons for the deregistration and strategically evades Ms Matiko's doubt on the right number of the deregistered NGOs. The minister advances three counterarguments against the opposition's third standpoint. These arguments are advanced to support the negative descriptive standpoint that (3) *the deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated*, which is left implicit. As suggested in (a) [4], in her first argument, she continues to appeal to legal authority. In (a) [2] and (a) [5], she insists that (3.)1 *the NGOs are suspended for violating the provisions of NGOs Act of 2002*. This is further defended by two arguments. The first argument realises coordinative argumentation. In (a) [7-8], she maintains that (3.)1.1a *before the enactment of the NGO Act, NGOs were registered under various competent authorities* (authority argumentation), such as BRELA, RITA, and the Ministry of Home Affairs (argumentation from example). This is in (a) [9] and (b) [1] combined with the argument that (3.)1.1b *after the enactment of the NGOs Act, all NGOs registered elsewhere were required to register themselves under the new NGOs Act and receive a certificate of compliance* from her ministry. In (b) [2], she maintains that (3.)1.1b.1 *while some NGOs have complied with the provision, others have not*. Therefore, according to the minister, the NGOs which did not apply for the certificate of compliance must be deregistered because they have violated the lawful provisions of the NGOs Act. Another argument in favour of (3.)1 is advanced in (a) [3], where she argues that (3.)1.2a *if any suspended NGO thinks it has been deregistered unfairly, it cannot appeal to the parliament*, which is combined with the argument that (3.)1.2b *there are relevant competent authorities to submit the appeal*. In the second argument, as expressed in (c) [1-2], she maintains that (3.)2 *CCM has no problem with the (operation of) NGOs*, implying that the decision to suspend NGOs is not politically motivated.

Responding to the opposition's claim that the government stated that NGOs are deregistered because they depend on external donors' funds and they are based only in urban areas, in (c) [3-4] and (c) [10], the minister maintains that (3.)3 *'what I have mentioned are the challenges facing NGOs'*, implying that they are not the reasons for the deregistration. In defence of this argument, in (c) [5] and (c) [11], she argues that (3.)3.1a *you cannot establish an NGO for taking care of orphans and depend on external funds*, which is in (c) [6] combined with the argument that (3.)3.1b *you must have a reliable source of income to run the orphanage*, implicitly suggesting that having a reliable source of income leads to the effective running of

an orphanage (causal argumentation). To further defend argument (3.)3.1b, she maintains that (3.)3.1b.1 *otherwise, children will suffer*, as suggested in (c) [7]. The unexpressed premise for (3.)3.1b.1 seems to suggest that lack of a reliable source of income will cause children/orphans to suffer for not getting basic needs or services such as food (causal argumentation). In the other argument, as expressed in (c) [11], she argues that (3.)3.2a *'some come to me to ask me to find donors for their NGOs'*. This argumentation from example is in (c) [12] combined with the argument that (3.)3.2b *this is a challenge*, implying that it is not a reason for deregistration. The minister's argumentation against the opposition's third standpoint is summarised in the following table.

Table 6.26 The minister's argumentation against the opposition's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated)
(3.)1	NGOs are suspended for violating the provisions of NGOs Act of 2002
(3.)1.1a	Before the enactment of the NGO Act, NGOs were registered under various competent authorities,
(3.)1.1a.1	These authorities are such as BRELA, RITA, and the Ministry of Home Affairs
(3.)1.1b	After the enactment of the NGOs Act, all NGOs registered elsewhere were required to register themselves under the new NGOs Act and receive a certificate of compliance
(3.)1.1b.1	While some NGOs have complied with the provision, others have not
(3.)1.2a	If any deregistered NGO thinks that it has been suspended unfairly, it cannot appeal to the parliament
(3.)1.2b	There are relevant competent authorities to submit the appeal
(3.)2	CCM has no problem with the [operation of] NGOs
(3.2')	(This is a sign that the deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated)
(3.)3	What I have mentioned are the challenges facing NGOs
(3.3')	(Those are not the reasons for the deregistration)
(3.)3.1a	You cannot establish an NGOs for taking care of orphans and depend on external funds
(3.)3.1b	You must have a reliable source of income to run the orphanage
(3.3.1b')	(Having a reliable source of income leads to effective running of an orphanage)
(3.)3.1b.1	Otherwise, children will suffer
(3.3.1b.1')	(Lack of a reliable source of income will cause children/orphans to suffer for not getting basic needs, such as food)
(3.)3.2a	Some come to me to ask me to find donors for their NGOs
(3.)3.2b	This is a challenge

Ms Matiko does not seem to be satisfied with the minister's argumentation. Thus, in *Extract 6.19*, she requests further argumentation from the minister, as she continues to defend the opposition's third standpoint.

Extract 6.19

- (a) MHE. ESTHER N. MATIKO: [...] [1] Kiuhalisia Waziri hajajibu kabisa swali langu [...]. [2] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mimi nimeuliza mantiki nzima, Msajili wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya

Kiserikali alisema yanafutwa mashirika zaidi ya 1000, na hayo mashirika asitupe story za 2001 sijui sera ikaja ikaenda ikarudi, yamesajiliwa kati ya 2005 na 2007 na sababu mliyotoa; hayajatoa taarifa ya mwaka. [3] Nikataka nijue kitabu chenu kinasema ni mashirika 24, Msajili wa Mashirika anasema ni Mashirika 1000. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] sababu ya kutokupeleka taarifa; siku ile Waziri wakati unajibu hapa ukasema ni shirika moja tu la Sisi kwa Sisi [...]. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. ESTHER N. MATIKO: [...] [1] Actually, the minister has not answered my question at all [...]. [2] Honourable Chairperson, I asked about the logic of the statement by the Registrar of NGOs who said that more than 1000 NGOs registered between 2005 and 2007 are deregistered because they have not presented their annual [performance] reports [to the registrar]; she shouldn't give us the story of the [NGOs] policy of 2001. [3] I want to know [this]; your [budget speech] book says that it is 24 NGOs but the Registrar [of NGOs] says it is 1000 NGOs. [4] Honourable Chairperson, regarding the reason that [NGOs] have not submitted their reports, the other day when you were responding to the question here, you mentioned only one NGO, Sisi kwa Sisi [...]

- (b) [1] [K]wa kusema kwamba hajatimiza vigezo, kwamba yanaomba hela sijui kutoka nje, yanajikita mjini zaidi. [2] [M]ashirika mengi zaidi na mengine wewe mwenyewe Mheshimiwa Waziri ni Board Member, kwa WAMA, fedha nyingi za kuendesha inatoa nje, nyingi, asilimia zaidi ya 80 wanapata kutoka kwa wafadhili wa nje. [3] Nataka nijue, unijibu swali langu la msingi, bado hujalijibu, [4] usipige siasa nyingi mama yangu, [5] nijibu swali la msingi, ni mashirika 1000 au ni mashirika hayo 24 ambayo umeyataja leo kwenye hiki kitabu na ni sababu zipi? [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] mnipe majibu ya kina, [7] aidha NGOs mnazozisajili mnasajili ili ziweze kuwasaidia Watanzania na zinatuelimisha sisi wote ikiwepo ninyi Serikali. [8] Msije mkaleta enzi zile za Mkapa Haki Elimu imeongea, imeongea ikafungiwa, yaani mkiona zinawasema mnazipiga chini. [9] Toa majibu ya msingi, ni NGOs hizo 1000 za Msajili wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Umma au ni NGOs hizo 24 ambazo umezitaja leo au ni ile NGO moja ya Sisi kwa Sisi! [10] Maana unaji-contradict kati ya juzi, leo na jana. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] To say that they have not fulfilled the requirement; that they ask for funds from external [donors], [and that] they are based in urban areas, [2] many other NGOs, including WAMA in which you are a board member, receive most of their operational fund, more than 80%, from external donors. [3] I want you to answer my basic question; you have not answered my question. [4] Stop politics, my mother. [5] Respond to my basic question; is it 1000 or 24 NGOs that you mentioned today in this [budget speech] book and what are the reasons? [6] Honourable Chairperson, [...] give me detailed answers. [7] Moreover, the NGOs that you register are registered in order to help all Tanzanians and educate all of us including the government. [8] Don't take us back to the Mkapa's era, when HakiElimu was suspended just because it was criticising the government. [9] Respond to the basic question; is it 1000 NGOs of the Registrar of NGOs or 24 NGOs that you mentioned today, or it is just that one NGO, Sisi kwa Sisi? [10] You are contradicting yourself between the day before yesterday, today, and yesterday.

In *Extract 6.19*, Ms Matiko criticises the minister's response to her critical reaction, as she attempts to further defend the opposition's third standpoint. In (a) [1-2] she argues that (3.)*Ia 'the minister has not answered my basic question about the right number of the deregistered NGOs'*, implying that not answering the question is a proof that the deregistration is politically motivated (symptomatic argumentation). This argument is in (b) [3-6] and (b) [9] combined with the argument that (3.)*Ib my basic question should be answered*, which is in (b) [10] justified by the argument that (3.)*Ib.1 the minister is contradicting herself in her statements*

between the other day, today, and yesterday. In defence of (3.)*Ib.1*, in (a) [3-4], Ms Matiko reiterates what she describes as contradicting statements by the minister and the Registrar of NGOs (see **Table 6.27**). These three statements constitute coordinative argumentation and exhibit authority argumentation, where Ms Matiko appeals to the statements by the minister and the Registrar of NGOs as the authority. With these contradictory statements, Ms Matiko continues to accuse the ministry (and the government) of inconsistency. Regarding the government's reason that most NGOs are extremely dependent on external donors' funds, Ms Matiko challenges this reason in (b) [1-2]. She suggests that, if NGOs are deregistered because they depend on external funds, and because (3.)*2 more than 80% of WAMA's operational fund comes from external donors*, WAMA should also be deregistered (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). In this argument, Ms Matiko implicitly suggests that WAMA is doing the same thing as other NGOs and she seems to suggest that WAMA and other NGOs should be treated in the same way. In favour of this argument, she argues that the minister is a board member of WAMA, implying that she should know that 80% of WAMA's operational fund comes from external donors. By asserting that the minister is a board member of WAMA, Ms Matiko implicitly accuses the minister of being a board member of an NGO while she is the minister responsible for the coordination of NGOs. It is implied that this could result in conflict of interests.

To further support her standpoint, she also appeals to comparison argumentation in (b) [8]. She argues that (3.)*3 during Mr Mkapa's phase of presidency, HakiElimu was suspended for criticising the government.* Implicitly, Ms Matiko suggests that the current deregistration of NGOs is comparable to the suspension of *HakiElimu* during Mr Mkapa's phase of presidency (analogy), and for this reason NGOs are deregistered for criticising the government. Ms Matiko's argumentative move in (b) [7] further suggests that NGOs are important because they play a great role in educating the community, including the government. This argumentative move implies that the government should have sound reasons for the deregistration of NGOs. The following table summarises Ms Matiko's further argumentation for the opposition's third standpoint.

Table 6.27 Ms Matiko's further argumentation for the opposition's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated)
(3.)1a	The minister hasn't answered my basic question about the correct number of deregistered NGOs
(3.1a')	(Not answering the question is a proof that it is politically motivated)
(3.)1b	My basic question should be answered

(3.)1b.1	The minister is contradicting herself about the number of suspended NGOs between the other day, today, and yesterday
(3.)1b.1a	In the budget speech book, she says the number is 24
(3.)1b.1b	The other day she said there is only one NGO (Sisi kwa Sisi)
(3.)1b.1c	The registrar said there are 1000 NGOs
(3.)2	More than 80% of the WAMA's operational fund comes from external donors
(3.2')	(If NGOs are suspended because they depend on external funds, WAMA should also be suspended)
(3.)3	During Mkapa's phase of presidency, <i>HakiElimu</i> was suspended for criticising the govt
(3.3')	(The current deregistration of NGOs is similar to the suspension of <i>HakiElimu</i> during Mr Mkapa's presidency)
(3.3'.1')	(NGOs are deregistered for criticising the government)

In *Extract 6.20*, Ms Simba denies the accusation of inconsistency as she insists that she is not contradicting herself and her response to Ms Matiko's critical reaction remains the same.

Extract 6.20

- (a) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII JINSIA NA WATOTO: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, siji-contradict, [2] nalielewa hili somo vizuri sana. [3] Sheria ya NGO ina kanuni zake, ukikiuka tu huo utaratibu, kwanza aidha umejifuta mwenyewe, unajifuta automatically hatukutambui. [4] Kwa hiyo, hiyo mambo ya NGO zako 1000 ulizozikazania ulikozitoa na takwimu zako, nipe hiyo source of information yako! [5] Mimi nafuata mambo yanayofanyika ofisini kwangu. (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hizi NGOs zimesajiliwa kwenye taasisi nne tofauti, [7] usiniambie niwajibie na Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani. [8] Mimi kwangu nimekuambia mashirika 24 ambayo 10 wenyewe wameamua... [9] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, ili wenye NGOs wajue, kuna kanuni zake, ni lazima kila mwaka ulete taarifa ya kazi, kila mwaka ulete taarifa ya fedha ambazo zimekuwa audited na kampuni inayotambulika, umelipa ada. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [1] Honourable Chairperson, I am not contradicting myself; [2] I understand this subject very well. [3] The NGOs Act has its provisions; if you violate these provisions, you automatically deregister yourself. [4] We don't recognise you. [5] Give me the source of information on the 1000 NGOs you are talking about. [6] I rely on what is done in my office. (Applause) [7] Honourable Chairperson, these NGOs have been registered under four different authorities; don't tell me to respond for the Ministry of Home Affairs. [8] I told you there are 24 NGOs under my ministry and ten of them decided... [9] Honourable Chairperson, those who own NGOs should know that there are regulations; they have to present annual [performance] reports, they have to present an annual financial report which has been audited by a competent auditor, and they must pay a fee.

- (b) [1] Kwa hiyo, lingine alilozungumzia kwanza nakataa, namwambia hayo 1000 anayajua yeye, [2] mimi yangu ninayojua ni haya kutoka Bodi ya NGO ambayo iko chini yangu. [3] Hizo nyingine ambazo unazijua kama una interest nazo, zilete! [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, hayo mambo tumezungumza toka last week, leo ungekuja na hiyo list hapa halafu nikwambie, hii nime-register katika Sheria ya NGO au hii imekuwa registered wapi, au BRELA, ningekwambia. [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, [...] nimalizie kwa kusema hivi, hivi ni kitu gani, kila mkiongea lazima mtaje WAMA, [6] where is the problem? [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nimechoka kujibu masuala ya WAMA [8] kila siku, mimi ni mkurugenzi katika WAMA na ninajitolea, sina monetary benefit pale, ndiyo maana siku-declare interest. [9] Kwa hiyo, mkumbuke kwamba, wake wa Marais duniani kote wana organization yao. [10] Ndiyo, na kila mke wa Rais anakuwa na NGO yake. [11] Mama Bush ana NGO yake, mama Clinton ana NGO yake [12] na mama Salma ana NGO... (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] *I don't agree to what she said about the 1000 [NGOs] that are just known to her; I only know these ones from the NGOs board which is under my ministry. [2] If you have interests in the other [1000 NGOs], bring them to me! [3] Honourable Chairperson, we have been talking about these things since last year; I expected you to come with the list of those NGOs so that I could explain to you if they are registered under the NGOs Act, BRELA or somewhere else. [4] Honourable Chairperson, [...] let me finish by asking; what makes you mention WAMA every time you speak? [5] Where is the problem? [6] Honourable Chairperson, I am tired of answering questions about WAMA every day. [7] I am a director at WAMA, but I am just volunteering; I get no monetary benefits, and that is why I didn't declare interest. [8] So, I would like to remind you that all First Ladies in the world have their NGOs. [9] Yes, every first lady has an NGO; Mrs [George] Bush [Jr.] has an NGO, Mrs [Bill] Clinton too, [12] and Salma also has her an NGO... (Applause)*

- (c) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMIL, JINSIA NA WATOTO: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, yale yale niliyosema. [2] Sasa taarifa nilizozipata sasa hivi kutoka kwa wataalam wangu ni kwamba, NGOs 1000 ilikuwa ni tangazo la Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, hilo unalolisema hilo, [3] lakini sisi bado tuko pale pale kwenye 24. (Makofi) [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, mimi namalizia kwa kusema, mtoa hoja nimemjibu, zile NGOs zake 1000 anazosema ni za Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, [5] NGOs 24 ni zetu! (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [1] Honourable Chairperson, [It's] the same thing I said. [2] The information I have just received from my experts shows that the 1000 NGOs are the ones which were [listed] on the notice by the Ministry of Home Affairs but we still have 24. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, let me finish by saying that the 1000 NGOs she has been talking about are from the Ministry of Home Affairs; ours are 24!

In this extract, the minister further defends her new negative standpoint with two main arguments at the first level of defence. These arguments also function as counterarguments against the opposition's third standpoint. In her first argument, she denies the accusation of inconsistency (contradiction) about the number of deregistered NGOs. In this argument, the minister suggests that she is not contradicting herself about the number of suspended NGOs and the reasons for the deregistration. In (a) [1], she argues that (3.)1 *'I am not contradicting myself'*, which implicitly suggests that, as a minister responsible for the coordination of NGOs, she cannot contradict herself about the deregistration of NGOs (authority argumentation). This argument is in (a) [2] justified by the argument that (3.)1.1 *'I understand this subject very well'*. This argument also demonstrates authority argumentation where Ms Simba appeals to her position as the minister, implying that, as a minister, she is in a better position to understand the 'subject' of NGOs better than the opposition. Therefore, she cannot contradict herself, as already suggested in (a) [1]. Although this authority argumentation seems to be very effective, being the minister does not necessarily mean that the minister understands the 'subject' of NGOs better than anyone else or that she cannot contradict herself. In defence of (3.)1.1, she advances two other arguments. In (a) [6], she suggests that, as a minister (authority argumentation), she understands that (3.)1.1.1 *NGOs are registered under four different*

authorities. This argument is justified by three other arguments combined in coordinative argumentation. First, in (a) [4] and (b) [1, 3], she performs a directive; (3.)1.1.1*a* ‘give me the source of information on your 1000 NGO’s, implying that, because NGOs are registered under different authorities, she doubts whether those NGOs are registered under the NGOs Act in her ministry. By asking Ms Matiko to provide the source of her information or statistics, Ms Simba attempts to shift the burden of proof to Ms Matiko. In (b) [4], she maintains that, if Ms Matiko provides the list of 1000 NGOs, she will be able to tell her which NGOs are registered under the NGOs Act and which ones are registered under other authorities (such as BRELA). Second, in (a) [5] and (b) [2], she argues that (3.)1.1.1*b* ‘I rely on the information from my office’, implying that she does not work based on information from elsewhere. According to the information from her ministry, the number of deregistered NGOs is 24, and 10 of which have requested to be removed from the register, as shown in (a) [8] and (c) [3, 5]. Third, in (a) [7], she performs another directive; (3.)1.1.1*c* ‘don’t tell me to answer for the Ministry of Home Affairs’, implying that, because NGOs are registered under different authorities, they might be registered under the Ministry of Home Affairs. In fact, in (c) [1-2] and (c) [4], she argues that, according to the information she has just received from ‘her experts’, the 1000 NGOs are from the Ministry of Home Affairs (authority argumentation). This means that the 1000 NGOs are not from her office, which further suggests that ‘she is not contradicting herself’. Another argument in favour of (3.)1.1 is advanced in (a) [9], where she argues that (3.)1.1.2 *according to the provisions of the NGOs Act, NGOs are required to present annual performance reports and audited financial reports and pay fees*. In support of this argument, in (a) [3], she suggests that, if NGOs violate these provisions, they are automatically deregistered (argumentation from legal authority).

The second argument against the opposition’s third standpoint is advanced in subextract (b). In this argument, she responds to the opposition’s claims about WAMA. In (b) [5], she rhetorically asks: (3.)2*a* *why do you mention WAMA every time you speak?* Argument (3.)2*a* is in (b) [6] combined with another rhetorical question: (3.)2*b* *where is the problem?* This implies that there is nothing wrong with WAMA, and members of the opposition attack it for nothing. These two arguments combined in coordinative argumentation realise overt evasion. Instead of responding to the argument(s) advanced about WAMA, the minister is questioning the questioner(s). However, in her further argumentative moves, the minister attempts to advance counterarguments against Ms Matiko’s or the opposition’s arguments about WAMA. Thus, in defence of (3.)2*b*, in (b) [9-10], the minister argues that (3.)2*b*.1*a* *every First Lady in*

the world has an NGO, which is in (b) [12] combined with the argument that (3.)2b.1b *Mama Salma Kikwete also has an NGO*. The unexpressed premise for (3.)2b.1b suggests that, because every First Lady has an NGO, and because Mama Salma Kikwete is the Tanzanian First Lady, Mama Salma Kikwete should also have (or has the right to have) an NGO (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). Argument (3.)2b.1a is in (b) [11] justified by argumentation from example. She argues that (3.)2b.1a.1 *Mrs [Bill] Clinton has an NGO* and (3.)2b.1a.2 *Mrs [George] Bush has an NGO* as well. However, one could question whether these two examples are enough to prove that all First Ladies in the world have NGOs. The minister's further argumentation against the opposition's third standpoint is summarised in the following table.

Table 6.28 The minister's further argumentation against the opposition's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated)
(3.)1	I am not contradicting myself
(3.1')	(As a minister responsible for the coordination of NGOs, I cannot contradict myself about the number of deregistered NGOs and the reasons for deregistration)
(3.)1.1	I understand this 'subject' very well
(3.1.1')	(As a minister, I am in a better position to understand the 'subject' about NGOs)
(3.)1.1.1	NGOs are registered under four different institutions
(3.1.1.1')	(This is what I know as a minister)
(3.)1.1.1.1a	Give me the source of information on your 1000 NGOs
(3.1.1.1.1a')	(I doubt whether those NGOs are registered under the NGOs Act in my ministry)
(3.)1.1.1.1a.1	If Ms Matiko provides the list of 1000 NGOs, I will be able to tell which NGOs are registered under the NGOs Act and which ones are registered elsewhere
(3.)1.1.1.1b	I rely on the information from my office
(3.1.1.1.1b')	(I don't work based on information from elsewhere)
(3.)1.1.1.1b.1	Based on the information from my office, the number of deregistered NGOs is 24
(3.)1.1.1.1c	Don't tell me to answer for the Ministry of Home Affairs
(3.)1.1.1.1c')	(The 1000 NGOs are registered under the Ministry of Home Affairs)
(3.)1.1.1.1c.1	According to the information I have just received from my experts, the 1000 NGOs are from the Ministry of Home Affairs.
(3.)1.1.2	According to the provisions of the NGOs Act, NGOs are required to submit annual performance reports and audited financial reports and pay fees
(3.)1.1.2.1	If NGOs violate these provisions, they are automatically deregistered
(3.)2a	Why do you mention WAMA every time you speak?
(3.)2b	Where is the problem?
(3.2b')	(There is nothing wrong with WAMA)
(3.)2b.1a	Every First Lady has an NGO
(3.)2b.1a.1	Mrs [Bill] Clinton has an NGO
(3.)2b.1a.2	Mrs [George] Bush has an NGO
(3.)2b.1b	Mama Salma also has an NGO
(3.2b.1b')	(Because every First Lady has an NGO, and because Mama Salma Kikwete is a First Lady of Tanzania, Mama Salma Kikwete should also have an NGO)

Regarding the accusation that she is a board member of WAMA, in (b) [8], she suggests that, although she is a board member of WAMA, she is just volunteering. She further argues that

she does have any monetary benefits, and that is why she did not declare interest. After the accusation that the minister is a board member of WAMA, it was necessary for the minister to make such an argumentative move because, in accordance with section 61(1) of the Standing Orders (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013), MPs are not allowed to discuss a subject of which they have monetary benefits without first declaring interest and indicating how much they benefit from the subject under discussion. That is why the minister defends herself, arguing that she does not have monetary benefits by being a board member of WAMA.

In *Extract 6.21*, other members of the opposition who support Ms Matiko's motion or position continue to challenge the minister to offer further argumentation and clarifications about the deregistration of NGOs, especially the right number of the deregistered NGOs and why WAMA has not been deregistered.

Extract 6.21

- (a) MHE. RAJABU MBAROUK MOHAMMED: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, moja ya Sheria za NGOs, ni NGO kutojihusisha na masuala ya kisiasa. [2] Pale NGO itakapokuwa inajihusisha na masuala ya kisiasa, NGO inahitaji kufutwa! [3] WAMA inajishughulisha kisiasa, Board Members wote wa WAMA ni maCCM! [4] Mwenyekiti wa Bodi, Zakia Megji, Wajumbe mke wa Mheshimiwa Lowassa, mke wa Waziri... (Makofi) [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, board members wote ni wana CCM watupu, wanaishikilia kwa ajili ya siasa, na hii WAMA hawawezi kuifuta, kwa sababu Waziri mwenyewe ambaye anasimamia hii sheria, yeye ni board member, atawezaje kuifuta WAMA? (Makofi) [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kwa hiyo, kwa hayo mafupi tu mimi namuunga mkono Mheshimiwa, [...] tunasema kwamba WAMA iko zaidi ya kisiasa, na imekiuka hata hi sheria ambayo imeunda NGO. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. RAJABU MBAROUK MOHAMMED: [...] [1] Honourable Chairperson, one of the provisions of the NGOs Act is that NGOs shall not engage in political activities. [2] When an NGO engages in political activities, it has to be deregistered. [3] WAMA engages in political activities; all its board members are CCM members! [4] The chairperson of the board, Zakia Megji [is a CCM member], [board] members [are] the wife of Honourable Lowassa, the wife of minister.... (Applause) [5] Honourable Chairperson, all board members are CCM members; they are there for political reasons, and they cannot deregister WAMA because the minister who is implementing this law is a board member, how could she deregister WAMA? (Applause) [6] Honourable Chairperson, so with this brief explanation, I support Honourable Matiko's [motion]; [...] WAMA engages more in political activities and it violates the NGOs Act.

- (b) MHE. DAVID E. SILINDE: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, muda mwingine sisi kama Bunge tunatakiwa tuwe tunaangalia hoja kwamba, mantiki ya hoja ni nini. [2] Ukimsikiliza Mheshimiwa Esther Matiko, alichokuwa anakihitaji hapa tangu awali, alikuwa anataka atueleze, kwa nini panakuwa na contradiction ndani ya Serikali moja kwamba, Wizara inasema kuna NGOs 24 [...] wakati ukija kwenye usajili ziko zaidi ya 1000. [3] Sasa Waziri anapokuja na majibu mawili yanayokuwa yana-contradict panakuwa na tatizo kubwa. [4] Kwa hiyo, hapa tunachohitaji ufafanuzi, na katika hizo NGOs ambazo zimefutwa, tunataka sababu, usiwe unataja tu NGO moja kwa nini imefutwa na NGOs zingine zimeshindwa kufutwa. [5] Kwa hiyo, hicho ndicho tulichokuwa tunahitaji. [6] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lakini suala la WAMA limekuwa na malalamiko mengi siyo tu ndani ya Bunge peke yake, yaani hata Taifa zima wanajua nini kinachoendelea, na hii siyo kweli kwamba eti kila mke wa Rais ni lazima

awe na NGO, huu utaratibu umekuja sasa hivi, [7] Mama Maria Nyerere hakuwa na NGO katika hili Taifa. [8] Wake wa Marais wa sasa wamekuwa wakitumia NGO kuiba, uwizi tu huu ndiyo umekuwa ukifanyika kwenye hizi NGOs. [9] Sasa hatuwezi kuendelea na huu utaratibu, eti ukishakuwa mke wa Rais... (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. DAVID SILINDE: [1] Honourable Chairperson, sometimes we as the parliament need to consider arguments and the logic of such arguments. [2] If you heard Honourable Matiko [clearly], you could understand that she wanted from the beginning a clarification as to why there is a contradiction within the same government; that the minister says there are 24 NGOs... [...] but if you go to the registration there are more than 1000. [3] So, when the minister comes with two contradicting answers, it becomes a big problem. [4] So, we want a clarification, and, for the deregistered NGOs, we want to know the [real] reasons for the deregistration, not just saying why one NGO has been deregistered while others haven't been deregistered. [5] That's what we want. [6] Honourable Chairperson, regarding the issue of WAMA, there have been a lot of complaints not only from the parliament but also the whole nation knows what is going on, and it is not true that every First Lady must have an NGO; this is a new [trend]. [7] Maria Nyerere never had an NGO in this country. [8] The recent First Ladies have been using NGOs to steal; it is just theft which is done in the NGOs. [9] We cannot continue like this; that once you are the First Lady...

In *Extract 6.21*, Mr Mohammed argues that WAMA should be deregistered because it engages in political activities, as indicated in subextract (a). He maintains in (a) [1] that one of the provisions of the NGOs Act stipulates that NGOs shall not engage in political activities. In (a) [2], he maintains that when an NGOs violates this provision it should be deregistered (argumentation from legal authority). To further support this argumentation, he states that WAMA engages in political activities because the chairperson of the board and board members are CCM members. In this argument, having CCM members as WAMA's board members is considered a sign that WAMA engages in political activities (symptomatic argumentation). He further asserts that the minister cannot deregistered this NGO because she is one of its board members (causal argumentation), as indicated in (a) [3-6]. In (b) [6-9], Mr Silinde supports Mr Mohammed's argumentation that WAMA should also be deregistered by arguing that not every First Lady must have an NGOs because Mama Maria Nyerere (the wife of Mwalimu Nyerere) did not have an NGOs. Implicitly, Mr Silinde seems to suggest that, because the former Tanzanian First Lady Mama Maria Nyerere did not have an NGO, the current First Lady should not have an NGO either. This argument exhibits a negative version of comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice. With this argumentation, Mr Silinde challenges both the minister's comparison argumentation and argumentation from example, as advanced in *Extract 6.20* and specified in **Table 6.28**. Mr Silinde further maintains that First Ladies have been using NGOs to steal, implying that this is another reason why WAMA should be deregistered (causal argumentation). Based on this description, the argumentation advanced by Mr Mohammed and Mr Silinde is summarised in **Table 6.29** below.

Table 6.29 Further argumentation for the opposition's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated)
(3.)4	WAMA should also be deregistered
(3.1')	(Not suspending WAMA is a proof that the deregistration is politically motivated)
(3.)4.1a	WAMA has breached the NGOs Act
(3.)4.1b	The Act stipulates that NGOs shall not engage in political activities
(3.)4.1b.1	WAMA has been engaging in political activities
(3.)4.1b.1.1	The board chairperson and board members are CCM members
(3.)4.1b.1.2	The minister is also a board member
(3.4.1b.1.2')	(The minister is a CCM member)
(3.)4.1b.1.2.1	Hence the minister cannot deregister WAMA
(3.)4.2	Not every First Lady must have an NGO
(3.)4.2.1	The former Tanzanian First Lady Mama Maria Nyerere didn't have an NGO
(3.4.2.1')	(The current Tanzanian First Lady Salma Kikwete shouldn't have one either)
(3.)4.3	The recent First Ladies have been using NGOs to steal
(3.4.3')	(This is another reason why WAMA should be deregistered)
(3.)4.3.1	We cannot continue like this
(3.4.3.1')	(It is not a good thing to use NGOs to steal)

Regarding the correct number of deregistered NGOs, in (b) [1-5], Mr Silinde insists that the minister should clarify the correct number of the NGOs, instead of providing contradicting answers. He wonders how the same government could have contradicting answers regarding the number of deregistered NGOs. With this argumentative move, Mr Silinde accuses the government of inconsistency for making statements which contradict one another. Performing a directive, Mr Silinde asks the minister to state categorically the right number of deregistered NGOs.

In *Extract 6.22*, Mr Selemani Jafo and the Chairperson of the expenditure committee continue to defend Ms Simba's argumentation as they challenge the opposition's third standpoint.

Extract 6.22

(a) MHE. SELEMANI S. JAFU: [...] [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nimefuatilia mijadala [2] nadhani lilikuwa suala zima la contradiction ya statement, lakini bahati nzuri Mheshimiwa Waziri ameishotoa clarification kwamba zile NGOs 1000 ni katika Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani na katika Wizara yake ni NGOs 24, [3] kwa hiyo, hakuna tatizo hapo. (Makofi) (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

HON. SELEMANI S. JAFU: [...] Honourable Chairperson, I have been following the discussions. I think it was just a contradiction of statements, but fortunately, the minister has already clarified that the 1000 NGOs are in the Ministry of Home Affairs; in her ministry the number of [deregistered] NGOs is 24. [3] So, there is no problem anymore. (Applause)

(b) MWENYEKITI: [1] Sasa, [...] naomba niweke vizuri haya mambo. [2] Kwanza, mimi naomba ku-declare interest kwamba niko kwenye NGO sekta muda mrefu. [3] Napenda niwaambie ili Watanzania wote msikie, kwamba, wake wa Marais duniani kote, wanafanya kazi za jamii na wanafanya hizi kazi kupitia kwenye mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali, [4] badala ya kupokea hizo fedha wao wenyewe, yanayopokea ni mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali. [5] Mheshimiwa Silinde amesema siyo kweli kwamba wake wa Marais... [6] Kamati yangu

imetoka Kenya, imetoka Uganda, tumeona shughuli zinazofanywa na mke wa Rais, [7] naomba niyaseme kabisa haya, mnataka kupotosha umma. [8] Tumeona masuala yanayofanywa na mke wa Rais wa Kenya, tumeona masuala yanayofanywa na mke wa Rais wa Uganda. (Makofi) [9] Tumeona Marais wote duniani, wake wa Marais, naomba niliweke vizuri ili Watanzania wasifikiri ni WAMA. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

CHAIRPERSON: Now, [...] I would like to put things right. [2] I would first like to declare interest that I have been in the NGOs sector for a long time. [3] I would like to tell you, and all Tanzanians should hear this, that First Ladies all over the world are engaged in community [development] activities through NGOs. [4] It is the NGOs which receive funds instead of them. [5] Honourable Silinde said that it is not true that the First Ladies [...]. [6] My committee went to Kenya and Uganda and we saw what is done by the First Ladies; I would like to say this straight [because] you want to mislead the public. [7] We've seen the activities done by the First Lady of Kenya, we've seen the activities done by the First Lady of Uganda. (Applause) [8] We have seen all First Ladies in the world [do this]; let me put that right so that Tanzanians should not think that it is just WAMA.

- (c) [1] La pili, kila mwananchi duniani hapa, anayo haki ya kujiunga na shirika lisilokuwa la kiserikali mahali popote, [2] ni haki yake, na unapokwenda kujiunga na shirika la kiserikali hupeleki kadi yako, unakwenda wewe mwenyewe. [3] Civil Society hiyo inatoa fedha nyingi kwenye mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali, bila kujali vyama vyao. [4] Hata Mama Maria Nyerere anafanya kazi kwa uwezo wake, na [5] naomba tusitumie jina la Mama Maria Nyerere kufanya tubadilishe mambo hapa. [6] Ukweli ndiyo huo hata kama hamuukubali. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Second, any individual in the world has the right to join any NGO anywhere. [2] It is their right, and when you join an NGO you are not required to present your [political membership] card; you go as just an individual. [3] The Civil society provides a lot of funds to NGOs regardless of their political affiliations. [4] Even Mama Maria Nyerere does various activities in her capacity, and [5] please don't use the name of Maria Nyerere just to change things here. [6] That is the truth even if you don't accept it!

In subextract (a), Mr Jafo attempts to put an end to the subdiscussion about the correct number of deregistered NGOs by suggesting that there is no longer a contradiction (an inconsistency) regarding the number of deregistered NGOs because the minister has already clarified that, in her ministry, the number is 24, and the other 1000 NGOs are from a different ministry (i.e. the Ministry of Home Affairs). However, the antagonists could still question how the same government can produce two contradicting answers on the number of deregistered NGOs. In fact, Mr Silinde has already raised this doubt in *Extract 6.21*. Moreover, because Ms Simba's ministry is responsible for the coordination of NGOs in the country and since the minister has claimed that she understands the 'subject' of NGOs very well, one could also question why she does not know about the correct number of NGOs even if there were registered under a different competent authority.

Responding to the argumentation advanced by the opposition about WAMA, the Chairperson expresses a substandpoint that *1 the opposition is misleading the public about WAMA and its activities*, as expressed in (b) [1, 5-7]. In defence of this substandpoint, in (b) [2], she argues that *1.1a 'I have been in the NGOs sector for quite a long time'*, implying that she knows better

about NGOs than the opposition. This argument demonstrates experience-based authority argumentation, as she appeals to her experience in the NGOs sector as the authority. In (c) [6], this argument seems to be combined in coordinative argumentation with the argument that *1.1b this is the truth about NGOs in general and WAMA in particular*, which implies that the opposition did not tell the truth. Argument *1.1b* is further supported by the argument that *1.1b.1a First Ladies all over the world engage in community activities through NGOs*, as indicated in (b) [3]; which is complemented by the argument that *1.1b.1b WAMA is not the only NGO owned by a First Lady that engages in community development activities*, as shown in (b) [9]. Implicitly, the Chairperson seems to suggest that, because First Ladies all over the world engage in community development activities through NGOs and because Mama Salma Kikwete is a First Lady, Mama Salma Kikwete should also engage in community development activities through an NGO or, to be precise, should also have an NGO (i.e. WAMA). Thus, this argument also demonstrates comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice. As an attempt to prove that First Ladies all over the world have NGOs (argument *1.1b.1a*), in (b) [6, 8], the Chairperson appeals to argumentation from example. She maintains that *1.1b.1a.1 the First Lady of Kenya engages in community development activities through an NGO* and that *1.1b.1a.2 the First Lady of Uganda also has an NGO which engages in community activities*. In addition to the two examples provided by the minister, with this argumentative move, the Chairperson provides two more examples of First Ladies who own NGOs and/or who engage in community development activities through NGOs, but this time examples come from African countries. It should be recalled that the minister had already provided two examples of First Ladies who own or owned NGOs from the US (Mrs Bush and Mrs Clinton).

Concerning the opposition's accusation that WAMA has breached the NGOs Act by having board members who are CCM members, the chairperson's counterargument in (c) [1-2] is that every citizen in the world has the right to join an NGOs anywhere in the world. Another point of argumentation is advanced in (c) [3], where she maintains that WAMA has been providing a lot of funds to (other) NGOs regardless of their political affiliations. Responding to the argument that Mama Maria Nyerere did not have an NGOs, in (c) [4-5], the chairperson argues that the opposition should not use Mama Nyerere's name to change things. In this argument, the Chairperson challenges Mr Silinde's comparison argumentation. It should be recalled that in his negative version of comparison argumentation (based on the principle of consistency/justice), Mr Silinde suggested that Mama Salma Kikwete should not have an NGO

(i.e. WAMA should be deregistered) because Mama Maria Nyerere did not have an NGOs. Thus, with this counterargument, the Chairperson implies that the fact that Mama Maria Nyerere did not have an NGOs does not necessarily mean that Mama Salma Kikwete should not have either, which further suggests that the situation during Mama Maria Nyerere's time and the current situation are not necessarily similar. I summarise the Chairperson's substandpoint and its related argumentation in **Table 6.30**. This substandpoint is considered to be further argumentation for the negative standpoint that the deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated.

Table 6.30 The Chairperson's substandpoint and related argumentation

No.	Description
1	The opposition is misleading Tanzanians about WAMA and its activities
1.1a	I have been in the NGOs sector for quite a long time
(1.1a')	(I know better about NGOs than the opposition)
1.1b	This is the truth about NGOs in general and WAMA in particular
1.1b.1a	First Ladies all over the world have NGOs which engage in community activities
1.1b.1a.1	The First Lady of Kenya has NGO which engage in community development activities
1.1b.1a.2	The First Lady of Uganda also has an NGO which engages in community development activities
1.1b.1b	WAMA is not the only NGO [owned by a First Lady] which engages in community development activities
(1.1b.1b')	(Because First Ladies all over the world engage in community development activities through NGOs and because Mama Salma Kikwete is a First Lady, Mama Salma Kikwete should also engage in community development activities through WAMA or, to be precise, should also have an NGO – WAMA)
1.1b.2	Every citizen in the world has the right to join an NGO anywhere in the world
(1.1b.2')	(CCM members have the right to be board members of WAMA)
1.1b.3	WAMA has been providing a lot of funds to [other] NGOs regardless of their political affiliations
1.1b.4	We shouldn't use Mama Nyerere's name to change things
(1.1b.4')	(The fact that Mama Maria Nyerere didn't have an NGO doesn't necessarily mean that Mama Salma Kikwete shouldn't have either)

In *Extract 6.23*, the Attorney General (AG) also defends the minister's argumentation against the opposition's third standpoint.

Extract 6.23

- (a) MWANASHERIA MKUU WA SERIKALI: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kazi kubwa ya Bunge ni kutunga sheria, na sisi Wabunge wajibu wetu ni kuzitetea sheria zilizotungwa. [2] Mojawapo ya sheria muhimu sana zilizotungwa na Bunge hili ni Sheria ya Mashirika Yasiyokuwa ya Kiserikali (The Non-Governmental Organization Act, 2002). [3] Sheria hii ilirekebishwa mwaka 2005 na Sheria Na. 6 ya mwaka 2005 na zinaweka masharti. [4] Moja, inaweka masharti ya kusajili hizi NGOs na sifa zake. [5] Sasa, tunajua kwamba imekuwepo mifumo kabla ya sheria hii. [6] Usajili wa hizi taasisi ulikuwa uko katika Wizara mbalimbali au taasisi nyingine tofauti. [7] Kwa hiyo, katika Sera ya 2001 ilisema kwamba: - "...to put in place registration procedures which are transparent, decentralized and which will facilitate

bet[t]er coordination of non-governmental organizations where safeguarding the freedom of association.” (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

ATTORNEY GENERAL: [1] Honourable Chairperson, the fundamental function of the parliament is to make laws and we MPs have the responsibility to defend the laws that we make. [2] One of the most important laws that have been enacted by this parliament is the Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2002. [3] This Act was amended in 2005 by Act No. 6 of 2005 and it puts in place [various] provisions. [4] First, it stipulates the NGOs registration provisions and their criteria. [5] We understand that there had been regulations before this Act. [6] The registration of these organizations was conducted under various ministries or other different institutions. [7] The [NGOs] Policy of 2001 states that: “...to put in place registration procedures which are transparent, decentralised and which will facilitate better coordination of Non-Governmental Organizations where safeguarding the freedom of association”.

- (b) [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sasa, kutokana na sera hii, ndiyo ilitungwa hiyo sheria ya mwaka 2002 ya Non-Governmental Organizations na ikarekebishwa mwaka 2005. [2] Iliporekebishwa mwaka 2005, iliweka sharti kwamba, non-governmental organizations ambazo zimesajiliwa katika mamlaka mengine tofauti na haya yaliyoko kwa Msajili ya hizi NGOs, Wizara ya Maendeleo ya Jamii, Jinsia na Watoto, basi wataomba certificate of compliance, [3] kwa hiyo, mashirika haya yanatakiwa yaombe certificate of compliance. [4] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, moja ya sababu nyingine, mbali na ile iliyotolewa na Mheshimiwa Waziri, kwamba kushindwa kutekeleza masharti ya usajili wa hizi, kwa mfano, kutoa ripoti za mwaka za fedha, ni kwamba wametakiwa, watoe taarifa, waombe hizi, wamepewa notice ya kuomba hii certificate of compliance, [5] hawaendi kusajiliwa, wakishapewa certificate, basi inatosheleza kwamba sasa wanachukuliwa kwamba wamesajiliwa pale, lakini unatekeleza sharti la kisera na ni sharti la kisheria, na katika kuomba kule, kwa mujibu wa sheria, hawatozwi ada yoyote ile. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] Honourable Chairperson, following [the requirement of] this policy, the NGOs Act was enacted in 2002 and amended in 2005. [2] When it was amended in 2005, it put in place the provision that NGOs which were registered under the authorities other than [the Office of] the Registrar of NGOs in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children were required to apply for a certificate of compliance. [3] Therefore, these NGOs are required to apply for the certificate of compliance. [4] Honourable Chairperson, another reason [for deregistration] apart from the one mentioned by the minister about the failure to comply with registration provisions such as failure to produce annual financial reports, they are required to apply for such a certificate; they have been given a notice to apply for the certificate of compliance. [5] They will not be reregistered; getting the certificate is enough to consider them registered, but they also satisfy the legal and policy requirements, and in accordance with the law, they are not charged any fee when applying for [the certificate].

- (c) [1] Na Mwalimu Nyerere alisema hivi, Serikali ni sheria, hakuna kitu kinaitwa Serikali bila sheria na sheria zikishatungwa lazima zifuatwe, na ndicho tunachokifanya ka[m]a Serikali, kwamba, haya mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali haya, nayo sasa yafanye kazi zake kwa kuzingatia sheria, na ndiyo hizo hatua zimechukuliwa. [2] Waziri amesema ziko 24 na tena nyingine 1000, haijalishi, lakini suala hapa tunachotaka tu ni kwamba, haya mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali yafanye kazi zake kwa mujibu wa sheria. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, la mwisho ni hili la wake wa Marais kuwa na hizi NGOs, hii inatokana na Geneva Convention on the Laws of First Ladies. [4] Na wana mchango mkubwa na wana vyama vyao wanakutana kila mwaka. [5] Juzi wamemchagua mke wa Rais mteule wa Nigeria kuwa Kiongozi wa First Ladies. [6] Kwa hiyo, hiki kitu haiwezi kuwa ni issue, issue ingekuwa ni kwamba wanakiuka masharti yao ya usajili. (Makofi) [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, WAMA inaweza tu ikachukuliwa hatua za kisheria kama nayo imevunja taratibu za usajili wake. [8] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, sheria hii, kwa sababu muda umeenda, lakini mimi ningeweza kuwafafanulia, labda waisome sheria hii kama tafasili yake ilivyotolewa kwenye mabadiliko ya mwaka 2005. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

[1] And Mwalimu Nyerere once said that government is the law and that there is no government without laws and, once laws are enacted, they have to be adhered to, and that is what we do in the government; these NGOs should operate in accordance with the law and that is why we take actions. [2] The minister said they are 24 and somewhere else they are said to be 1000; it doesn't matter; what matters is that these NGOs must carry out their activities in accordance with the law. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, the last one is the issue of First Ladies to have NGOs; this is the result of the Geneva Convention on the Laws of First Ladies. [4] They have a huge contribution and they have their associations; they meet every year. [5] The other day they elected the Nigeria's First Lady to be the leader of First Ladies. [6] This cannot be an issue, but it could be so if they violate their registration provisions. [7] Honourable Chairperson, legal measures can be taken against WAMA only if it violates its registration provisions. [8] Honourable Chairperson, I could explain more about the NGOs Act, but we don't have enough time; perhaps they can read this Act as it was revised in 2005.

In *Extract 6.23*, the AG reinforces the minister's argumentation from legal authority. However, this time, Ms Simba's argumentation from legal authority is supported by authority argumentation by quotation. In (a) and (b), he insists that the NGOs have breached the NGOs Act of 2002, which was revised in 2005. He further cites the NGOs Policy of 2001 in (a) [7]. This Policy led to the enactment of the NGOs Act. According to the AG, NGOs are required to comply with the registration provisions by presenting their annual performance reports to the Registrar, as indicated (b) [4]. In (b) [2-3, 5], he maintains that NGOs which were registered under other authorities are also required to apply for a certificate of compliance in order to satisfy the legal and policy requirements. This suggests that the deregistered NGOs have failed to comply with these requirements. In (c) [1], the AG argues that the government is deregistering NGOs which have breached the Act in order to ensure that NGOs operate according to the law because, according to Mwalimu Nyerere, there is no government without the law (authority argumentation by quotation). Concerning the correct number of the deregistered NGOs, the AG strategically evades the opposition's request for clarification by arguing in (c) [2] that it does not matter whether the number is 1000 or 24; what matters is that these NGOs should operate in accordance with the Act. However, the number does matter. Arguing that 1000 NGOs have breached the Act could raise more questions than arguing that only 24 NGOs have breached the Act. The difference in number could probably help, in one way or another, to confirm or deny the opposition's claim that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated. Another evasion is applied in (c) [8], where the AG evades giving further explanation about the NGOs Act with the reason that time is not enough.

Regarding the opposition's claim that WAMA should also be deregistered because it has breached the NGOs Act, in (c) [7], the AG argues that WAMA can be deregistered only if it violates the registration provisions, implying that WAMA has not breached the NGOs Act (argumentation from legal authority). He adds that, according to the Geneva Convention on the

Laws of First Ladies, First Ladies shall have NGOs, as shown in (c) [3]. While the minister and the Chairperson defended the First Lady of Tanzania to have an NGO with comparison argumentation and argumentation from example, the AG defends this with authority argumentation. In (c) [4], he maintains that the NGOs owned by the First Ladies play a great role in community development (causal argumentation), they have their associations, and they meet every year. In (c) [5], he adds that the First Ladies recently elected the First Lady of Nigeria as their leader. The AG's argumentation is concluded in (c) [6], arguing that it is not a problem for First Ladies to have NGOs if they do not violate the registration provisions.

In *Extract 6.24*, the minister finalises the government's argumentation about WAMA.

Extract 6.24

- (a) WAZIRI WA MAENDELEO YA JAMII JINSIA NA WATOTO: [1] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, nashukuru sana kwa kunipa nafasi hii nifafanue masuala ambayo wameyazungumza ambayo hawana uhakika nayo. [2] Kwa mfano, Mheshimiwa Mbarouk nimesikitika sana kwa uwezo wako mkubwa leo unasema kwamba WAMA imekiuka kipengele, kipengele gani? [3] WAMA inafanya kazi kubwa hapa nchini. [4] Inaelimisha, ina shule... [5] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, imejikita katika elimu, inaelimisha watoto yatima kuanzia standard seven mpaka wanafika form six kutoka mazingira magumu, [6] na watoto hawa si kama wanakuwa hand picked, wanaombwa, [7] TAMISEMI ndiyo inawatafuta inawapeleka WAMA. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)

MINISTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER AND CHILDREN: [1] Honourable Chairperson, thank you for giving me this opportunity to clarify the issues that have been raised [by MPs] without being sure of. [2] For instance, I am very disappointed by Honourable Mbarouk [Mohammed]; with your [good] knowledge [of issues], you say that WAMA has violated provisions [of the NGOs Act]; which provision? [3] WAMA plays a great role in this country. [4] It educates people; it has schools... [5] Honourable Chairperson, it has been providing education to orphans from vulnerable environment from standard seven to form six. [6] These children are not handpicked; they are requested. [7] TAMISEMI has been collecting these children and take them to WAMA.

- (b) [1] Hawa watoto shule mbili ninazozijua sasa hivi zinahudumia watoto hawa. [2] Isitoshe WAMA imekuwa iki-supply, ikipeleka hospitalini vifaa vya afya. [3] Hapa Wabunge wengi katika vituo vyao kuna vifaa hivyo. [4] Ile sio siasa. [5] Hivi kweli unahudumia wagonjwa hospitali unaita siasa! [6] Jamani, fanyeni haki, semeni yale ambayo yako kweli! [7] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, lingine ambalo wamelisema; msimtaje Mama Maria Nyerere hapa. [8] Wakati wa enzi za Mama Maria Nyerere hii convention aliyoitaja AG ilikuwa bado, na wakati ule hata NGO zenyewe zilikuwa bado. [9] Kwa hiyo, pengine kwa umri ndiyo maana mnadhani toka miaka ya 1960 NGOs zilikuwepo, hapana! (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015) *I know [at least] two schools which take care of these children. [2] Apart from that, WAMA has been supplying medical tools in hospitals. [3] Many MPs have these tools in their centres. [4] That is not politics! [5] You help patients in hospitals, and you call it politics! [6] Do justice; speak the truth! [7] Honourable Chairperson, they also talked about [Mama Maria Nyerere]; please, don't mention Mama Nyerere here. [8] During her time the Convention that the AG mentioned was not yet there; even NGOs were not there. [9] So, maybe it is because of your age that you think there were NGOs in the 1960s, no!*

In this extract, the minister advances her final argumentation as proof of the substandpoint that WAMA cannot be deregistered and the standpoint that the deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated. In (a) [1], she argues that members of the opposition are talking about issues they are not sure of. For instance, in (a) [2], she maintains that WAMA has not violated any provision of the Act, as claimed by Mr Mohammed. In this argumentative move, Ms Simba seems to accuse Mr Mohammed of failing to correctly interpret the provisions of the NGOs Act ‘despite his good knowledge of issues’. In Ilie’s (2004) terms, this can be interpreted as an insult against Mr Mohammed’s intellectual ability. She further maintains that, in fact, WAMA does a great job in the country; it educates orphans from primary school to form six, and these children come from vulnerable environment and they are taken to WAMA by the office of Regional Administration and Local Government, as indicated in (a) [3-6]. In (b) [1], the minister states that she knows at least two schools which take care of these children (argumentation from example). In (b) [2-3], she maintains that, apart from providing education to the orphans, WAMA supplies medical tools to various hospitals in the country, including those from the MPs’ constituencies. In (b) [4], she asserts that helping patients is not politics. Regarding the opposition’s argumentation that WAMA should also be deregistered because Mama Maria Nyerere never had an NGO, the minister supports the AG’s authority argumentation, arguing that during the era of Mama Nyerere the Geneva Convention on the Laws of First Ladies was not operating, and even the NGOs were not there, as indicated in (b) [7-9]. However, the AG did not say when the Convention was established. Thus, members of the opposition may need to know whether it is indeed the case that during the era of Mama Nyerere the Convention was not effective. The minister’s final argumentation against the opposition’s third standpoint is summarised in *Table 6.31* below.

Table 6.31 The minister’s final argumentation against the opposition’s third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated)
(3.)1	Members of the opposition are not sure of what they are talking about
(3.1’)	(And this is a proof that the deregistration is not politically motivated)
(3.)1.1	What WAMA does is not politics
(3.)1.1.1	WAMA does a great job in the country
(3.)1.1.1.1	WAMA educates orphans from primary to form six
(3.)1.1.1.1.1	I know two schools which take care of these children
(3.)1.1.1.2a	WAMA supplies medical tools to various hospitals in the country
(3.)1.1.1.2a.1	Many MPs receive these tools in their constituencies
(3.)1.1.1.2b	Helping patients in hospitals is not politics

In *Extract 6.25*, Ms Matiko advances her last critical reaction against the minister’s argumentation as she attempts to justify the opposition’s third standpoint.

Extract 6.25

- (a) MHE. ESTHER N. MATIKO: [...] [1] Msajili huyu aliyesema amefuta mashirika 1,000 yuko chini ya Wizara yako, ameanika kabisa Msajili wa Mashirika Yasiyo ya Kiserikali chini ya Wizara ya Maendeleo ya Jamii, Jinsia na Watoto. [2] Kwa hiyo jibu langu bado hujalijibu, unapiga dana dana. (Makofi) [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kuhusu hii ya WAMA kwa nini tunaisema, [4] hatukatai, kama wake wa Marais wameamua sasa kuanzia awamu hiyo ya Mkapa sijui ya Kikwete, lakini tunajua Mama Mwinyi na wengine hawakuwa nayo. [5] Na hata mkitoa reference ya dunia yote wanawake wanashiriki wana hizi NGO, hawazitumii kisiasa. [6] Leo hii WAMA ikienda hata kutoa misaada huko mnavaa magwanda ya CCM, mnataka msembe hii WAMA ni... (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- [1] *The registrar who said he had deregistered 1000 NGOs is under your Ministry; s/he actually wrote 'The Registrar of NGOs under the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children'. [2] So, you haven't answered my question; you are just beating about the bush. (Applause) [3] Honourable Chairperson, regarding WAMA, [she wants to know] why we talk a lot about it. [4] We don't disagree [with her] that recently First Ladies from the phase of Mkapa or Kikwete have decided to have NGOs, but we know Mama Mwinyi and others didn't have one. [5] Even if you refer to the world, women who have these NGOs don't use them for political interests. [6] Today, even when WAMA goes [to a place] to provide [financial] support, you wear CCM clothes; you want to say WAMA is... [...]*
- (b) [1] Haya mashule ambayo unayataja yamesajiliwa kwa jina la Salma Kikwete... [...] [2] [H]ayajasajiliwa kwa WAMA, is not it? [3] Mheshimiwa Mwenyekiti, kingine, mnapokwenda kutoa release za fedha hamtuambii, mbona haiku hata open tujue. [4] Kwa hiyo, tunapongea WAMA tunaona inakiuka, [5] mkienda kutoa zawadi, jezi, board members wote ni CCM, mnakwenda kutoa zawadi jezi za CCM. [6] Na zaidi imejikita Pwani zaidi... [7] Kwa nini isisambae Tanzania kote, [8] ije na kule Mara tuone, iende sijui wapi tuone, [...] [9] Mwisho, [...] tunataka haki zitendeke kote. [10] Hakuna shirika hata moja litasimama hapa liseme mimi naitetea kwa nini, [11] nataka haki itendeke isije ikawa... [12] Yanakuja yale ya Haki Elimu ya kufutiwa mashirika kwa sababu yanasema Serikali. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- [1] *The schools you are talking about are registered under the name of Salma Kikwete... [...]*
 [2] *They are not registered under the name of WAMA; is not it? [3] Honourable Chairperson, another thing is that, when you go to release funds, you don't tell us; it is not even open/transparent. [4] So, we talk about WAMA because we see that it violates [the NGOs Act]. When you go to offer prizes, you give them CCM uniforms; all board members are CCM members. [5] On top of that, it is mainly based in the Coastal Region... [...]; Why doesn't it go to all places in Tanzania? [6] We need to see it in Mara and in other regions. [7] Lastly, [...] we want justice to be done everywhere. [8] There is no NGO that will question why I speak for it. [9] I just want justice to be done, it shouldn't be like... [10] This is like what happened to HakiElimu; suspending NGOs just because they criticise the government.*
- (c) MWENYEKITI: [...] [1] Lakini sio kweli kwamba WAMA imejikita mkoa mmoja, [2] sio kweli. (Hansard transcripts, 25 May 2015)
- CHAIRPERSON: [...] *But it is not true that WAMA is based in [only] one region. [2] That is not true.*

In Extract 6.25, Ms Matiko makes what could be considered her last attempt to challenge the minister's argumentation for her standpoint. In (a) [2], she argues that (3.) *I 'my question is not yet answered by the minister'*, implying that the contradiction (i.e. the accusation of inconsistency) has not been cleared. In this argument, she refers to the question about the correct number of deregistered NGOs. By saying that *unapiga danadana* (you are beating about the bush), Ms Matiko challenges the minister's avoidance strategy. *Unapiga danadana* in this

context suggests that, instead of clarifying whether the number of deregistered NGOs is 1000, 24, or just one, the minister is dodging the question. In defence of (3.)1, in (a) [1], she maintains that (3.)1.1 *the Registrar of NGOs who provided the list of 1000 deregistered NGOs is from your ministry* (maintaining her authority argumentation). This is further defended by the argument that s/he actually wrote ‘the Registrar of NGOs under the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children’. With this authority argumentation, Ms Matiko rejects the minister’s clarification that 1000 NGOs are from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In the second argument, she seems to suggest, rather implicitly, that (3.2) *if the deregistration of NGOs is not politically motivated, WAMA should also be deregistered*. This argument is defended by two arguments, realising coordinative argumentation. In (a) [5], she argues that (3.2.)1a *First Ladies who have NGOs all over the world do not use them for political interests*, implying that WAMA is used for political interests. This argument is in (b) [4] combined with the argument that (3.2.)1b *WAMA violates [the provisions of the NGOs Act]*. This argumentation from legal authority is justified by six arguments. Most of these arguments demonstrate symptomatic argumentation as they are considered to be signs that WAMA violates the NGOs Act and is used for political interests. First, in (a) [6], she states that, when WAMA goes to provide (financial) support or jerseys to a place, they wear CCM uniforms. Second, in (b) [1], she argues that the schools that the minister mentioned are registered under the name of Salma Kikwete (challenging the minister’s argumentation from example). To prove that what she asserts is true, in (b) [2], she asks a rhetorical question: *is not it?* Third, in (b) [3], she maintains that ‘when you release funds, you don’t tell us’ and suggests that the release of funds is not open/transparent. Fourth, in (b) [5], she further maintains that, when they (WAMA) go to a place to give prizes, they give people CCM jerseys. Fifth, in (b) [5], she argues that WAMA board members are CCM members. This argument was also advanced by Mr Mohammed in *Extract 6.21*. Lastly, in (b) [6], he suggests that WAMA is based in Coastal Region, which is in (b) [7] combined with the argument that why doesn’t it reach all places in Tanzania? In (b) [8], she concludes that WAMA should also reach other regions such as Mara.

Another argument in support of (3.2) is advanced in (a) [3-4], where Ms Matiko argues that (3.2.)2 *Mama Mwinyi and ‘others’ never owned NGOs*, implying that, because other First Ladies did not have NGOs and because Salam Kikwete is a First Lady, Salma Kikwete should not have an NGO (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). It is not clear which ‘others’ are being referred to here. However, it is most likely that ‘others’ could refer to the wife of the first president of Tanzania, Mama Nyerere, who, according to Mr

Silinde, never owned an NGO or Mama Anna Mkapa (the wife of former president Mkapa) or both. Although the Chairperson, the minister, and the AG would generally accept that Mama Nyerere and Mama Mwinyi never own NGOs, it is questionable whether Mama Anna Mkapa did not have an NGO. Nonetheless, Ms Matiko's argument seems to challenge the Chairperson's and the minister's argument that all First Ladies own NGOs. Additionally, although the minister has argued that, when Mama Nyerere was the First Lady of Tanzania, the Convention the AG referred to was not in place, by stating that Mama Mwinyi never had an NGO, Ms Matiko's comparison argumentation still raises doubt to the acceptability of the minister's claim that all First Ladies own NGOs.

The last argument in support of the opposition's third standpoint is expressed in (b) [9] and (b) [11], where Ms Matiko argues that (3.)3 *we want justice to be done to all [NGOs]*, implicitly suggesting that WAMA and other NGOs should be treated in the same way (comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice). Two arguments are advanced in favour of (3.)3. In (b) [10], she argues that no single NGO can question 'why I fight for them', suggesting that what she is doing will benefit all NGOs. In the other argument for (3.)3, as indicated in (b) [12], she suggests that what happened to HakiElimu should not happen to these NGOs, implying that HakiElimu was deregistered for criticising the government, further suggesting that it may also be the case that NGOs are deregistered for criticising the government (comparison argumentation), and that is why members of the opposition are fighting for the justice of NGOs. I summarise the final argumentation advanced by Ms Matiko in the following table.

Table 6.32 Ms Matiko's final argumentation for the opposition's third standpoint

No.	Description
(3)	(The deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated)
(3.)1	My question hasn't been answered by the minister
(3.1')	(The contradiction about the number of deregistered NGOs hasn't been cleared, which is a sign that the deregistration is politically motivated)
(3.)1.1	The Registrar of NGOs who provided the list of 1000 deregistered NGOs is from your ministry
(3.)1.1.1	S/he actually wrote 'the Registrar of NGOs under the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children'
(3.2.)1a	First Ladies who have NGOs all over the world don't use them for political interests
(3.2.)1a')	(WAMA is used for political interests)
(3.2.)1b	WAMA violates the provisions of the NGOs Act
(3.2.)1b.1	When they go to a place to provide [financial] support or jerseys, they wear the CCM uniforms
(3.2.)1b.2	WAMA's schools are registered under the name of Salma Kikwete
(3.2.)1b.3	When they release funds, they don't tell us
(3.2.)1b.3.1	The release of funds is not open/transparent

(3.2.)1b.4	When they go to a place to give prizes, they give people CCM jerseys
(3.2.)1b.5	WAMA board members are CCM members
(3.2.)1b.6a	WAMA is based in the Coastal Region
(3.2.)1b.6b	Why doesn't it reach all regions in Tanzania?
(3.2.)1b.6b.1	WAMA should also go to other regions such as Mara.
(3.2.)2	Mama Mwinyi and 'others' never owned NGOs
(3.2.2')	(Mama Salma Kikwete shouldn't have one either)
(3.)3	We want justice to be done to all NGOs
(3.3')	(WAMA and other NGOs should be treated in the same way)
(3.)3.1	No single NGO can question why I fight for them
(3.3.1')	(What we are doing is for the benefit of all NGOs)
(3.)3.2	HakiElimu was once deregistered for criticising the government
(3.)3.2.1	NGOs are deregistered for criticising the government
(3.3.2.1')	(What happened to <i>HakiElimu</i> is similar to what is happening to NGOs now)

In subextract (c), one of Ms Matiko arguments, as indicated in (3.2.)1b.6a, is challenged by the Chairperson, who asserts that it is not true that WAMA is based in one region as suggested by Ms Matiko. This subdiscussion was then concluded through the vote. With respect to the speech acts performed in the argumentation stage, apart from the directive and the usage declarative, both members of the government and members of the opposition perform the assertive by expressing the (sub)standpoints and advancing argumentation for or against the (sub)standpoints. They also perform the commissive by not accepting the (sub)standpoints expressed by the other party.

6.5 Concluding stage

It is tricky to reasonably identify the winner(s) of the main (critical) discussion in this debate and the subdiscussion between Ms Matiko (and other members of the opposition) and the minister (and other members of the government) in the expenditure committee because the result of the (critical) discussion and the subdiscussion is not reached on the basis of the soundness of the argumentation advanced by the two parties but determined by a simple majority (of the MPs' votes). For instance, Ms Matiko's request for further argumentation from the minister was rejected by the parliament on the basis of the MPs' majority votes against it. Hence, from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, the difference of opinion is not resolved in favour of any of the two parties. However, while the minister and other members of the government could not successfully refute the opposition's third standpoint that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated, in the argumentation stage the minister and the deputy minister have, to a large extent, responded reasonably to the other issues or queries raised by the opposition's spokesperson and other MPs in the confrontation stage. It is also worthwhile to note that, although the first three stages seem to exemplify the respective pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion, and because the result of the critical

discussion is not reached as proposed by the theory, some ‘unreasonable’ arguments remain unchallenged and are thus implicitly accepted, and those which are challenged are not necessarily defended conclusively and/or are not necessarily rejected. Additionally, some arguments which could be considered reasonable on the basis of soundness criteria or which seem to be reasonably defended are not necessarily accepted.

6.6 Evaluation of the rules for critical discussion

To a large extent, the freedom rule has been implicitly or subconsciously adhered to. In fact, the minister is not only ‘free’ to express the positive prescriptive standpoint relating to the proposition that the proposed budget or request for funds should be approved but is also required to do so. Thus, according to the Standing Orders, the minister is given the ‘freedom’ or is required to express standpoints and advance argumentation for such standpoints before the ministerial proposed budget is approved. Other MPs also have the ‘right’ to challenge these standpoints as they react critically to the acceptability of the minister’s standpoints. However, the manner in which the main (critical) discussion and the subdiscussion in this debate are concluded limits, at least to some extent, the MPs’ freedom to continue challenging the minister’s standpoint until the outcome of the discussions is reasonably reached. In the opening stage, the obligation-to-defend rule is, to a greater extent, implicitly or subconsciously adhered to by the protagonist. According to the Standing Orders, as discussed in chapter three (see section 3.8.2), the minister must respond to the MPs’ queries before the proposed budget is authorised. However, as in the case of the freedom rule, the manner in which the main (critical) discussion and the subdiscussion are concluded restricts, to some extent, the minister’s obligation to defend her standpoints until the differences of opinion are reasonably resolved.

At the argumentation stage, the relevance, starting point, and validity rules are, to a large extent, implicitly or subconsciously adhered to by both parties. For instance, the minister advances arguments which are relevant to the standpoints expressed in the confrontation stage. However, there is an instance of the violation of the unexpressed premise rule by some members of the opposition as they distort the minister’s unexpressed premise in the argumentation regarding the reasons for the deregistration of NGOs, as discussed in 6.3.2.

6.7 Evaluation of the properties of argumentation in context

As in the previous two debates, this section focuses on the three properties of pragma-dialectical theory that can be analysed in an institutionally contextualized argumentative practice with respect to the main (critical) discussion and the subdiscussion in this debate.

These properties are (the institutional preconditions for) strategic manoeuvring, prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style.

6.7.1 Strategic manoeuvring and self-presentation

In the confrontation stage, the minister focuses on the institutional topic on the table. However, in her first two standpoints, she also gives priority to the issues that show the effective fulfilment of the previous ministerial objectives and the CCM's election manifesto. The opposition's spokesperson attempts to make the most effective choices of potential issues to be discussed in the argumentation stage. In her standpoints, Ms Matiko strategically expresses standpoints which do not relate to the same propositions as the minister's standpoints in order to shift the topic of discussion in the argumentation stage and win the critical discussion in the opposition's favour. For instance, her first standpoint does not relate to any proposition to which the minister's standpoints relate, and it is also not relevant to the topic on the table, and it violates section 60(9) of the Standing Orders. From the perspective of pragma-dialectics, Ms Matiko's topic shift in her first standpoint constitutes a derailment of strategic manoeuvring and is thus deemed fallacious. Moreover, while the minister's third standpoint relates to the proposition that the activities of NGOs are effectively coordinated by the ministry, Ms Matiko's third standpoint relates to the proposition that the government's deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated. This is another instance of topic shift from this member of the opposition. However, this time Ms Matiko cannot be accused of (or sanctioned for) violating the institutional rules because her 'new' standpoint is still within the scope of the topic on the table. Thus, she has successfully combined her rhetorical aim with the dialectical goal in the institutional context. Other MPs also focus on the areas they think the ministry did not perform well in their constituencies or regions.

In terms of the arguers' adaptation to audience demand, in the confrontation stage the minister talks about the achievements that could be accepted by the MPs and the general public. However, the opposition's spokesperson attempts to create an impression that the government has failed to fulfil their 2005-2010 election pledges. This is strategically done in order to win the public support and motivate citizens to vote for them in the next general elections. In the argumentation stage, both the minister and the opposition's spokesperson attempt to advance argumentation that 'could be accepted' by the audience. For instance, regarding the reasons for the deregistration of NGOs, the minister and the AG maintain that the NGOs have breached the NGOs Act. Because this reason for the deregistration is based on legal authority (the provisions of the NGOs Act), the minister and AG are aware that the audience will most likely

accept this argumentation. However, Ms Matiko and some other members of the opposition maintain that the NGOs are deregistered because they have been criticising the government and the government is worried that this will ruin their chances of being re-elected as the country heads towards the October general elections. These members of the opposition are confident that the audience will most likely accept their argumentation as it is not uncommon for the ruling parties, especially in Africa, to take such measures against their critics.

In regard to self-presentation (and other-presentation) in the parties' audience adaptation, as indicated in the previous two debates, the self-presentation strategies by members of the opposition seem to realise positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. In the opposition's first standpoint, Ms Matiko attempts to present ruling parties in Africa, including CCM, as cruel people who are ready to do anything to harm the opposition and present the opposition as victims of these actions. In the opposition's second standpoint, Ms Matiko presents the CCM government as a government that has failed to fulfil its election pledges in various areas in the community development sector, including its 'supposed' failure to improve people's living conditions. In the third standpoint, Ms Matiko and other members of the opposition present the CCM government as the government that suspends the operation of NGOs for political reasons. In the last standpoint, Ms Matiko presents Ukawa as the prospective government which will improve the status of community development once elected. Some members of the ruling party (for instance, the Chairperson) also present members of the opposition as the politicians who mislead the public by not telling the truth, as indicated in *Extract 6.22* and summarised in *Table 6.30*.

Lastly, with respect to the parties' presentational devices, the opposition's spokesperson, Ms Esther Matiko, attempts to employ the most effective presentational devices in the confrontation and argumentation stages. Ms Matiko employs quotations, metaphors, rhetorical questions, and other figurative expressions. The quotations are employed to support the opposition's second and fourth standpoints. In defence of the second standpoint, Ms Matiko quotes Cesar Chavez who once said that "we cannot seek achievements for our own and forget and the prosperity of the community. Our ambitions must be broad enough to include the aspirations of the community". This quotation is utilised to defend the opposition's standpoint that the CCM government has failed to fulfil its election pledges. This is reinforced by the Swahili figurative expression *Mlandizi husahau bali mtupa maganda hasahau* (see section 6.2.2.3). In her part, the minister stereotypically employs statistics and other 'facts' to support various claims in her standpoints and related argumentation.

6.7.2 Prototypical argumentative patterns

The first difference of opinion in the (critical) discussion in this debate relates to the proposition that the proposed ministerial budget or request for funds should be approved. This difference of opinion is single, non-mixed. As regards this proposition, the minister adopts a positive prescriptive standpoint, justified by pragmatic argumentation which is combined with symptomatic argumentation in coordinative argumentation at the first level of defence. Symptomatic argumentation at the first level is at the next levels defended by symptomatic argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, and authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation). Pragmatic argumentation at the first level is at the next levels defended by pragmatic argumentation and authority argumentation. Although the opposition's spokesperson does not directly express a negative standpoint, the minister's prescriptive standpoint still receives critical doubts from other MPs from both her own ruling party and opposition parties. These MPs specifically challenge the minister's pragmatic argumentation advanced at the first level of defence. They express their doubts as to whether the allocated TZS 31 billion will enable ministry to achieve a positive result in the next fiscal year. One of them is of the opinion that the requested amount of money is too little to achieve anything.

As pointed out in section 6.2.3, the minister's second standpoint is considered to be a substandpoint of the unexpressed standpoint that the CCM government has effectively fulfilled the CCM's election pledges. Thus, the second difference of opinion relates to the proposition that the CCM government has effectively fulfilled the CCM's election pledges between 2005 and 2015, where the minister implicitly adopts a positive standpoint. This difference of opinion is single, mixed. I will, however, focus on the explicit (sub)standpoint that the ministry has effectively implemented the CCM's election manifesto between 2005 and 2015. This evaluative (sub)standpoint is justified by symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence and symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), pragmatic argumentation, and causal argumentation at the next levels of defence. With respect to the proposition that the CCM government has effectively fulfilled the CCM's election pledges, the opposition's spokesperson adopts a negative standpoint. Ms Matiko is of the view that the CCM government has failed to fulfil (or has not effectively fulfilled) its election pledges. Thus, Ms Matiko's argumentative pattern consists of an evaluative standpoint which is, at the first two levels of defence, justified by authority argumentation by quotation and authority argumentation from populist appeal. In the next

levels, the standpoint is defended by authority argumentation (from statistics), causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, and argumentation from example.

Based on the confrontation stage, the third difference of opinion is characterised as single, non-mixed, and it relates to the proposition that the activities of NGOs are effectively coordinated by the ministry. The minister implicitly adopts a positive standpoint; the activities of NGOs are effectively coordinated by the ministry. The minister's argumentative pattern consists of an evaluative standpoint, justified by causal argumentation which is combined in multiple argumentation with symptomatic argumentation at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by causal argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), argumentation from legal authority, symptomatic argumentation, and pragmatic argumentation. Although the opposition's unexpressed standpoint (the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated) does not relate to the same proposition as the minister's third standpoint, it nevertheless raises critical doubts as to whether the minister's third standpoint can be accepted. Ms Matiko's argumentative pattern is realised by an evaluative standpoint which is justified at the first level of defence by symptomatic argumentation and causal argumentation. At the second level of defence, the standpoint is justified by causal argumentation, symptomatic argumentation, as well as comparison argumentation (based on the principle of consistency/justice).

However, in the argumentation stage, the minister adopts a negative standpoint relating to the proposition that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated. In this stage, while authority argumentation (especially argumentation from legal authority) is frequently employed in defence of or against the opposition's standpoint that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated, comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency or justice is frequently used to attack or support the substandpoint that WAMA should be deregistered. The frequent use of authority argumentation with regard to the opposition's third standpoint has been attributed to the NGOs Act as the (main) legal authority being appealed to as well as the minister and the Registrar of NGOs as the authority in terms of their positions in the ministry. Moreover, the frequent use of comparison argumentation based on the principle of consistency/justice is attributed to the comparison made at the centre of the subdiscussion, first, between the (former) Tanzanian First Lady Mama Salma Kikwete and other First Ladies with respect to owning NGOs and, second, between WAMA and other NGOs. As regards the comparison between Mama Salma Kikwete and other First Ladies, while Ms Matiko and other

members of the opposition suggest that Mama Salma Kikwete should not have an NGOs because other First Ladies in Tanzania never had NGOs, the minister and the Chairperson suggest that Mama Salma Kikwete should have an NGO because other First Ladies all over the world have NGOs. With respect to the comparison between WAMA and other NGOs, Ms Matiko suggests that, if NGOs are deregistered because they extremely depend on external donors' funds, WAMA should also be deregistered because it does exactly the same thing.

The fourth difference of opinion relates to the ministry's commitment to improve the status of community development sector in the country. This difference of opinion is single, non-mixed. The minister implicitly expresses an evaluative standpoint, justified by symptomatic argumentation in the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by causal argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics (or statistical argumentation), as well as argumentation from legal authority.

The fifth difference of opinion relates, rather implicitly, to whether Ukawa should be voted for by Tanzanians in the next general elections. This difference of opinion is also single, non-mixed. As regards this proposition, Ms Matiko implicitly expresses a positive prescriptive standpoint, which is defended by causal argumentation and pragmatic argumentation at the first level of defence. In the next levels of defence, the standpoint is defended by symptomatic argumentation, pragmatic argumentation, causal argumentation, as well as authority argumentation (by quotation).

The last difference of opinion relates to whether the opposition leaders in the country are in danger of being harmed or killed by the ruling party. The opposition's spokesperson implicitly expresses a positive descriptive standpoint, justified by causal argumentation in coordinative argumentation at the first level of defence. This causal argumentation is at the second level of defence justified by argumentation from example combined in coordinative argumentation with comparison argumentation. Argumentation from example is at the third and fourth levels of defence supported by argumentation from narrative, which is at the fifth level defended by authority argumentation.

6.7.3 Argumentative style

In the confrontation and opening stages, the minister's argumentative style exemplifies a strategic combination of detached and engaged argumentative styles. As regards the topical potential, the minister selects issues that relate precisely to the institutional topic on the table.

She also indicates both achievements of the ministry in coordinating community development matters and the challenges facing the community development sector. In the audience adaptation, the minister attempts to preserve objectivity. However, the minister also attempts to show the audience that the CCM's election manifesto has brought achievements to the community. This can be regarded as a feature of an engaged argumentative style. In regard to the presentational devices, the minister deploys formulations which tend to show 'facts of the matter'. These formulations are accompanied by the relevant official statistics. In the argumentation stage, the minister's topical potential is determined by the issues raised by MPs, especially members of the opposition. In her responses to the MPs' critical reactions against the acceptability of her first three standpoints, the minister attempts to show that there are various challenges affecting the effective execution of the ministerial objectives and plans, but the ministry is committed to meeting the challenges. Arguing against the opposition's third standpoint, the minister attempts to show that the deregistration of NGO is not politically motivated because the suspended NGOs have violated the provisions of the NGOs Act. The minister defends her standpoints with authority argumentation, causal argumentation, comparison argumentation, and argumentation from example. The minister's presentational devices are realised by personal attacks, evasion, and strategic use of argumentation from example.

In the confrontation and opening stages, Ms Matiko seems to maintain an engaged argumentative style. As regards the topical potential, she strategically expresses standpoints which relate to slightly different propositions (topic shifts) in order to show the opposition's close involvement in the subject under discussion. In audience adaptation, Ms Matiko attempts to connect emphatically with the interests of the audience by indicating how the CCM government has failed to fulfil what it promised in the 2005 and 2010 election campaigns as she attempts to get members of the electorate to vote for Ukawa in the 2015 general elections. Ms Matiko's choice of presentational devices is realised by quotations, metaphors, rhetorical questions, and other figurative expressions. In the argumentation stage, Ms Matiko strategically selects comparison argumentation, argumentation from example, and authority argumentation to justify her third standpoint (topical potential). She also strongly expresses her views to suggest to the audience that the government's deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated (audience adaptation), and this is achieved through accusation of inconsistency, quotations, rhetorical questions, and other figurative expressions.

6.8 Account-giving and responsibility depiction

In terms of the account-giving strategies for the failure events, the minister's discourse demonstrates the use of excuses, justifications, and silence. As regards the failure event resulting from the poor condition of CDTIs and FDCs, and that the government's initiative to empower women economically has failed to reach more women in different areas, the minister has deployed *excuses* to account for the failure events. She argues that the failure events are caused by limited budget, suggesting that the minister or her ministry is not to blame. In this account, she seems to accept that it is a bad thing for the CDTIs/FDCs to be in a poor condition and to fail to empower more women economically, but she denies being responsible for the failure event. There is also a use of *justification* when the minister accounts for the poor condition of the buildings in CDTIs and FDCs. She argues that, although the buildings are in poor condition, the youth still get education using such buildings, which implicitly suggests that the situation is not 'that bad' (minimising the pejorative effect of the failure event). *Justification* is further used to justify the deregistration of NGOs, where the minister appeals to the legal authority. *Silence* is used when the minister does not respond to other critical reactions raised by the MPs. Finally, when talking about the challenges facing the community development sector, the minister shifts the blame to other factors, such as limited budget and the practice of bad traditions (*excuses*).

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the Tanzanian parliamentary debate on the annual budget speech by the Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children. In the confrontation stage, the differences of opinion are realised by the opposition between the minister's standpoints and non-acceptance of these standpoints by the opposition and other MPs. Based on the opening and argumentation stages, the minister, deputy minister, AG and the Chairperson act as protagonists of the minister's standpoints and antagonists to the opposition's standpoints, while the opposition's spokesperson and other MPs perform the role of antagonist to the minister's standpoints. The opposition's spokesperson and other members of the opposition also assume the role of protagonist of the opposition's third standpoint in the argumentation stage. Moreover, the opposition and other MPs perform various directives by asking the minister to explain various issues regarding the performance of her ministry. In the argumentation stage, the minister responds to MPs' arguments and some of her responses are in turn challenged by members of the opposition. In the concluding stage, the differences of opinion are not reasonably resolved as proposed by the theory because the parliament relies on its rules to end

the main (critical) discussion about the coordination of various issues in community development, gender, and children and the subdiscussion about the deregistration of NGOs. Regarding the evaluation of the rules for critical discussion, not all of them are successfully adhered to by the two parties. The parties also employ various modes of strategic manoeuvring to win the discussions in their favour, including the use of evasion, personal attacks, quotations, strategic use of examples or the use of ‘official’ statistics, rhetorical questions, and rhetorical figures or figurative expressions. The minister’s prescriptive standpoint regarding the proposed budget is, at the first level of defence, justified by pragmatic argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation with symptomatic argumentation. Additionally, the minister seems to employ a strategic combination of detached and engaged argumentative styles, particularly in the first three discussion stages. The opposition’s spokesperson maintains an engaged style in the relevant stages. Excuses, justifications, and silence are the strategies used by the minister to account for failure events in this debate.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises key issues from the previous chapters in section 7.2, presents the major findings from chapter four, chapter five, and chapter six in section 7.3, briefly explains the scope of the present study and suggests areas for further research in section 7.4. Finally, the concluding remarks of the chapter are given in section 7.5.

7.2 Summary of the study

This section presents a summary of the key issues as discussed in the previous six chapters. In chapter one, which serves as an introduction of the study, I have demonstrated that the present study focuses on the pragma-dialectical analysis of the empirical argumentative reality in the Tanzanian parliamentary debates. In the background to this study, I reviewed a few studies that have examined parliamentary discourse in Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe and then situated my study in the research problem statement. I next specified the research objectives and research questions, which were followed by a brief description of the theoretical grounding. I then demonstrated how the research data were collected and analysed. Next, I indicated how significant this study is to the existing theoretical and empirical research knowledge. This was followed by the organisation of the study before the conclusion of the chapter was drawn.

In chapter two, I reviewed relevant theoretical and empirical studies on political discourse in general and parliamentary discourse in particular. I also indicated that, in order to provide an in-depth analysis of argumentation in the Tanzanian parliament, parliamentary discourse is in this study examined not only as an institutional discourse but also as a deliberative discourse, public discourse, and political dialogue. Furthermore, because politicians are known for using different strategies to reinforce their viewpoints, I discussed various argumentative (or rhetorical) strategies that may be used by MPs in the Tanzanian parliamentary debates. Since this study also analyses account-giving, I discussed five strategies that can be employed by politicians to account for failure events, and this was also linked to the notion of responsibility, where, in giving accounts, account-givers may accept, deny, or evade responsibility.

In chapter three, I analysed the relevant pragma-dialectical dimensions, facets, and principles, and then indicated the manner in which they are employed in the present study. The most relevant ones to this study include the meta-theoretical starting points, the critical discussion stages, rules for critical discussion, argumentation structure, and argumentation schemes. Other

properties relate to the analysis of argumentation in context, which include strategic manoeuvring and the institutional preconditions, prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative style. I also reviewed a few pragma-dialectical studies that have been carried out to examine (the institutional preconditions for) strategic manoeuvring and prototypical argumentative patterns in an institutional context.

In chapter four, I analysed the reconstructed parliamentary debate on the constitutional review process in Tanzania through the four stages of a critical discussion. In the confrontation stage, I focused on the differences of opinion, the standpoints expressed, and the initial argumentation for these standpoints by both parties. In the opening stage, the discussion roles of protagonist and antagonist were implicitly established. The discussion was largely determined by the Standing Orders as the starting points. In the argumentation stage, the discussion was, to large extent, realised by the argumentation for or against the opposition's second standpoint. In the concluding stage, the result of the discussion was determined by the vote. I moved on to indicate how the rules for critical discussion were implicitly or subconsciously adhered to or violated by the parties. This was followed by the analysis of the pragma-dialectical properties of argumentation in context. I then analysed a few instances of account-giving strategies by the ministers before the concluding remarks of the chapter were given.

Chapter five focused on the analysis of the reconstructed parliamentary debate on the 'controversial issues' of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Passing through the four stages of a critical discussion, I attempted to show how the resolution of the differences of opinion is reached. The differences of opinion in the confrontation stage were about the Union structure and how Union matters are coordinated, and both parties advanced initial argumentation for their standpoints. As in chapter four, the discussion roles and the starting points were implicitly established in the opening stage. Further argumentation for the minister's and the opposition's standpoints was advanced in the argumentation stage, and the discussion focused on the argumentation for or against the claim that Zanzibar is highly exploited in the Union. In the concluding stage, the result of the main (critical) discussion and the subdiscussion between Mr Mnyaa and the ministers was determined by the vote. However, the subdiscussion between Mr Lissu and Ms Mkuya was institutionally concluded by the Chairperson's intervention. Instances of violations of the rules for critical discussion were also observed. The MPs' modes of strategic manoeuvring, the prototypical argumentative patterns, and the argumentative style were then discussed. Next was the discussion about the account-giving strategies by the ministers, which was followed by the conclusion of the chapter.

Chapter six is the last analysis chapter. In this chapter, I analysed the parliamentary debate on the annual budget speech by the Minister of Community Development, Gender and Children through the four critical discussion stages. The differences of opinion in the confrontation stage resulted from non-acceptance of the minister's standpoints by the opposition's spokesperson and other MPs from both the ruling party and the opposition. Like in the previous two debates, the discussion roles and the starting points were implicitly established in the opening stage. In the argumentation stage, the minister advanced further argumentation for her standpoints as she attempted to respond to various issues or queries raised by the MPs. In the expenditure committee, the argumentation stage was realised by the argumentation for or against the opposition's third standpoint that the deregistration of NGOs is politically motivated. As in chapter four and chapter five, the result of the critical discussion was determined by the vote. I then evaluated instances in which the discussion rules were implicitly/subconsciously observed or violated. After that, I indicated how the modes of strategic manoeuvring have been realised by the MPs, and I identified the prototypical argumentative patterns that came into being and the type of argumentative style realised. I next analysed the account-giving strategies by the ministers, and finally the conclusion of the chapter was given.

7.3 Key research findings

Based on the research questions presented in chapter one (see section 1.4), this section provides the key research findings from the pragma-dialectical analysis of the argumentative reality in the reconstructed ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. For ease of reference, the six specific research questions are presented as follows:

- (i) To what extent does the resolution of differences of opinion in the selected annual budget debates exemplify the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion and its various rules?
- (ii) To what extent are the strategic manoeuvrings of topical potential, audience adaptation, and presentational devices successfully realised in the MPs' argumentative moves within the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament?
- (iii) What prototypical argumentative patterns come into being as a result of realising the institutional point in the selected annual ministerial budget debates?
- (iv) How are the *detached* and *engaged* argumentative styles manifested in the selected annual ministerial budget debates?
- (v) Which account-giving strategies are realised in the ministers' accounts of failure events?

- (vi) How is the responsibility for a failure event (or the failure event itself) accepted, denied, or evaded in the ministers' accounts of failure events?

The first research question aims to find out the extent to which the resolution of the differences of opinion in the selected annual ministerial budget debates exemplifies the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion and its various rules. As regards this question, the first three stages of the (critical) discussions in all the three debates seem to exemplify, to a greater or lesser extent, the proposed pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion. Specifically, the confrontation stage and the opening stage exemplify, to a large extent, the first two stages proposed by the theory, although the opening stage is realised rather implicitly. The findings on the realisation of the opening stage in the selected annual ministerial debates in the Tanzanian parliament seem to be in line with one of the conclusions by Jakaza (2013), who found the opening stage in Zimbabwean parliamentary debates to be “very implied” (p. 249). In fact, as already pointed out in chapter three (see section 3.4.1), in the actual argumentative discourse the pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion may not necessarily occur explicitly (van Eemeren, 2018; van Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2015). Concerning the argumentation stage, while Nyanda (2016) found the argumentation stage to “diverge from what is proposed in the pragma-dialectical theory” (p. 305), the findings from the present study suggest that, to some extent, the argumentation stage in the (critical) discussions in these debates seems to exemplify the proposed argumentation stage of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion except that, although cabinet ministers and MPs attempt to challenge the soundness of (some of) the opponent's arguments, other ‘unreasonable’ arguments remain unchallenged and are thus implicitly accepted, and other arguments which could not be considered conclusive on the basis of the soundness criteria are also accepted. Additionally, some arguments which could be considered ‘reasonable’, on the basis of the soundness criteria, are neither explicitly nor implicitly accepted.

Further findings on the realisation of the discussion stages suggest that the concluding stage of the (critical) discussions in these debates deviates from the model as the result of the (critical) discussions in all the three debates is determined by the vote or the relevant (sub)discussion is institutionally concluded by the Chairperson, which impedes a successful resolution of the differences of opinion. Similarly, Nyanda (2016) found that the result of the discussions in the two annual budget debates he analysed in the Tanzanian parliament was determined by the Chairperson, who announced the winners of the discussions in the two debates (p. 306). Although, from the perspective of pragma-dialectics, the institutional manner of establishing

the result of a (critical) discussion in the Tanzanian parliamentary debates prevents a successful resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits at the concluding stage, it nevertheless manifests the actual argumentative reality in the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament, which can be incorporated in the theorizing about pragma-dialectics.

With respect to the rules for critical discussion, while in some instances some rules are subconsciously adhered to, in the other instances these rules are (subconsciously) violated. For instance, in all the three debates, the freedom rule and the obligation-to-defend rule are, to a greater extent, implicitly or subconsciously adhered to. Specifically, in accordance with sections 99(7) and 99(2) of the Standing Orders, cabinet ministers are not only afforded the 'freedom' to express their standpoints and advance initial argumentation for these standpoints but they are also required to do so. However, the manner in which the outcome of the (critical) discussions in these debates is established constrains, in one way or another, not only the antagonist's freedom to continue challenging the protagonist's (sub)standpoints but also the protagonist's obligation to further defend the expressed (sub)standpoints until the relevant difference of opinion is reasonably resolved. Furthermore, there are various instances where other rules for critical discussion, such as the relevance rule, the language use rule, and the argumentation scheme rule, are violated, although there are also cases where they are implicitly or subconsciously adhered to.

The second research question attempts to find out the extent to which the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring are successfully realised in the MPs' argumentative moves within the institutional context of the Tanzanian parliament. The findings suggest that, to a large extent, the MPs' strategic manoeuvres in all the three aspects tend to be successful. Starting with the topical potential, the opposition's spokespersons have in the confrontation stage successfully made topic shifts within the institutional preconditions by expressing standpoints which relate to slightly different propositions than the ministers' standpoints. Eventually, in the argumentation stage in all the three debates, the ministers had to advance argumentation against the opposition's 'new' standpoints as they attempted to further justify the standpoints they expressed in the confrontation stage. However, not all attempts of topic shifts were successful. For instance, in her first standpoint, Ms Matiko's topic shift results in a derailment of strategic manoeuvring, as she violates section 60(9) of the Standing Orders of the Tanzanian parliament, which 'prohibits' MPs from discussing a topic that is not on the table. In terms of presentational devices, the opposition's spokespersons (and other members of the opposition) have successfully employed metaphors, rhetorical questions, quotations, and (other) figurative

expressions to reinforce their argumentation. Some figurative or metaphorical expressions employed by the ministers and MPs, such as *you can't eat your cake and have it* and Zanzibar is like *an invited guest* in the Union (as captured in chapter five), are borrowed from English. The use of metaphors, rhetorical questions, and sayings in African parliamentary debates (and speeches) has also been observed by Jakaza (2013) and Nyanda (2016). In the last debate in the present study (see section 6.2.3), other MPs strategically and reasonably appeal to argumentation from example and authority argumentation from statistics to challenge the minister's standpoints. However, some of Mr Lissu's instances of (authority argumentation from) quotation, as captured in chapter four, result in a violation of the argumentation scheme rule, and hence a derailment of strategic manoeuvring. The ministers also employ personal attacks, quotations, and official statistics in their argumentative moves as they attempt to justify their standpoints. In chapter five, for instance, Mr Madellu strategically appeals to circumstantial *ad hominem* to challenge Mr Lissu's supposed inconsistency in one of his arguments. While some of the strategic *ad hominem* attacks observed in these debates may be considered reasonable, others seem to result in a derailment of strategic manoeuvring or violation of the discussion rules. The use of *ad hominem* or personal attacks has also been observed in the Namibian parliamentary discourse (Amakali et al., 2019). Moreover, the MPs' adaptation to audience demand is linked to self-presentation strategies, where ministers and other members of the ruling party seem to present themselves as well as their actions and views in the positive terms and present members of the opposition and their views in the negative terms. Similarly, the opposition's spokespersons and other members of the opposition seem to positively present themselves and their views and present members of the government as well as their actions and views negatively.

The third research question concentrates on the prototypical argumentative patterns that come into being as a result of realising the institutional point in the selected annual ministerial budget debates. The findings suggest that the main difference of opinion relates to the proposition that minister's proposed budget or request for funds for the relevant ministry or government office should be approved. This difference of opinion is single, mixed in chapter four and single, non-mixed in chapter five and chapter six. In the initial argumentation in the confrontation stage, the minister's prescriptive standpoint at the first level of defence is justified by pragmatic argumentation in coordinative argumentation as in chapter four, pragmatic argumentation combined in multiple argumentation with symptomatic argumentation as in chapter five, or pragmatic argumentation combined in coordinative argumentation with symptomatic

argumentation as in chapter six. The opposition's negative prescriptive standpoint in chapter four is at the first level of defence justified by comparison argumentation combined with authority argumentation (from statistics). In the next levels of defence, different (sub)types of argumentation are advanced. Other standpoints and substandpoints by the ministers, the opposition's spokespersons, and other MPs are, at different levels of defence, justified by various (sub)types of argumentation, including symptomatic argumentation, authority argumentation from statistics, authority argumentation by quotation, argumentation from legal authority, argumentation from example, comparison argumentation, causal argumentation from means to goal, and practical or problem-solving argumentation.

The findings further indicate that authority argumentation from statistics, authority argumentation by quotation, and argumentation from legal authority are frequently used to support different standpoints at different levels of defence in all the three debates. However, argumentation from legal authority is more evident in chapter four, and this can be attributed not only to the fact that the debate was on the constitutional review process in Tanzania which was supposed to be coordinated in accordance with the Constitutional Review Act but also to the matters coordinated or supervised by the ministry. As its name suggests, the Ministry of Constitution and Legal Affairs is responsible for coordinating and supervising all matters pertaining to the constitution and legal affairs. It thus comes as no surprise that argumentation from legal authority is used frequently in this debate.

Other MPs' contributions in the confrontation stage demonstrate argumentation from example, authority argumentation, and symptomatic argumentation. In the argumentation stage, the relevant discussion in all the three debates is directed towards the standpoints by the opposition. In this stage, the argumentation by both members of the government and members of the opposition demonstrates mainly authority argumentation, causal argumentation, argumentation from example, and pragmatic argumentation. Comparison argumentation is also appealed to by members of the opposition in the argumentation stage. Based on the findings from these debates, especially from chapter four and chapter six, authority argumentation (particularly argumentation from legal authority and authority argumentation from statistics) may thus be taken to constitute the stereotypical argumentative pattern in specific annual budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament.

As regards the argumentation structure, the argumentation by the ministers is less complex in the confrontation stage but becomes more complex in the argumentation stage due to the

critical reactions from the opposition, especially in chapter four. The argumentation by the opposition in both the confrontation stage and the argumentation stage is even more complex compared to the ministers' argumentation. This is mainly caused by the fact that the opposition's spokespersons tend to advance as many arguments as possible in order to effectively challenge the minister's standpoints or justify their own. These arguments are realised in coordinative argumentation, multiple argumentation, as well as subordinative argumentation.

The fourth research question concerns the manner in which the two types of argumentative style are manifested in the selected annual ministerial budget debates in the Tanzanian parliament. The findings show that the ministers' argumentative moves tend to generally exhibit a strategic combination of a detached argumentative style and an engaged one. For instance, as regards the topical potential, while the ministers focus on the topic on the table (detached), they also attempt to select potential issues which demonstrate the achievement of the ministerial objectives in the previous fiscal year (as in chapter four and chapter five) or the effective implementation of the CCM's election manifesto (as in chapter six), which could be considered a feature of an engaged style. The ministers' engaged style is also realised by strategic use of evasion, personal attacks, quotations, and rhetorical questions. The opposition's spokespersons and other members (of the opposition) in all the three debates seem to maintain, to large extent, an engaged argumentative style, especially in the confrontation and argumentation stages. They strategically select potential issues to be discussed in the argumentation stage by expressing 'new' standpoints relating to slightly different propositions in order to shift the subject matter under discussion within the institutional context. The opposition's strategic choices of presentational devices are realised by metaphorical expressions, quotations, accusations of inconsistency, rhetorical questions, and other figurative or idiomatic expressions.

The fifth research question focuses on identifying the specific account-giving strategies that are realised in the ministers' accounts of failure events. The findings indicate that all the four account-giving strategies (concessions, excuses, justifications, and refusals) as well as silence (as a nonverbal account-giving strategy) are employed. However, excuses, justifications, and refusals are frequently used. This is attributed to the fact that, in order for the ministers' standpoints to be accepted, ministers should justify their actions and minimise the pejorative effect of the failure event with *justifications*, deny or evade being responsible for the failure event with *excuses*, or maintain that the failure event never happened with *refusals*.

Concessions are rarely used. In fact, there is only one clear instance where a minister uses a concession. One of the reasons why concessions are rarely used is probably that accepting the responsibility for the failure event or admitting being guilty of the failure event without minimising the pejorative quality associated with the failure event may lead to non-acceptance of the ministers' standpoints. Additionally, the use of silence (and evasion) by the ministers can be attributed to the Standing Orders of the parliament as there is no specific institutional rule that requires ministers to respond to every critical reaction from the MPs (Bunge la Tanzania, 2013; Nyanda, 2016), probably due to time constraints.

The last research question is about the way in which the responsibility for a failure event (or the failure event itself) is accepted, denied, or evaded in the ministers' accounts of failure events. With excuses, the ministers have attempted to deny or evade being responsible for a failure event. For instance, accounting for the failure event that the CDTIs/FDCs are in poor condition since the Nyerere's era (as shown in chapter six), Ms Simba argues that this is caused by the limited budget that the ministry has been receiving from the government, implicitly suggesting that the ministry or the minister is not to blame. Responsibility for a failure event is also denied or evaded with refusals. With justifications, the ministers seem to accept the responsibility for a failure event but deny the pejorative quality linked to it.

7.4 Scope of the study and areas for further research

This section briefly explains the scope of the present study and recommends a few areas for further research.

7.4.1 Scope of the study

The findings of this research can only be interpreted and generalised within the scope of the research data analysed. The study focused on the research data selected from the last three years of President Kikwete's second term of presidency in Tanzania. It specifically focused on three annual ministerial budget debates on the speech by the Minister for Constitution and Legal Affairs in the 2013/14 fiscal year, the speech by the Minister of State, Vice President's Office (Union) in the 2014/15 fiscal year, and the speech by the Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children in the 2015/16 fiscal year.

7.4.2 Areas for further research

No study has ever covered all dimensions and facets of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation in all domains of analysis in a single research. This study is no exception. I would thus like to recommend the following areas for further research:

First, further research can be carried out to examine the manifestation of the four discussion stages, rules for critical discussion, strategic manoeuvring, prototypical argumentative patterns, and argumentative styles in other communicative activity types in the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse. This may include, but not limited to, parliamentary question time and the prime minister's question time.

Second, since this study has observed frequent use of quotations in the parliamentary debates, especially in chapter four, it could be interesting for future studies to closely examine the strategic use of quotations in the Tanzanian parliamentary discourse in order to find out the extent to which the strategic use of quotations by members of parliament could result in misquotation and manipulation of the subject matter under discussion.

Third, the dimensions and facets of the theory examined in this study can also be examined in other argumentative practices in the political domain, such as political interviews, public debates, and online political discussions. Close attention should be given to the types of argumentation advanced by politicians to justify their standpoints or criticise those of their opponents, the modes of strategic manoeuvring employed (in an institutional context), the prototypical argumentative patterns coming into being as a result of realising the institutional points, as well as the types of argumentative style realised in specific communicative activity types.

Lastly, the critical discussion stages, rules for critical discussion, and most importantly the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, prototypical argumentative patterns, as well as argumentative style can be investigated in other domains of analysis in the Tanzanian context, especially in academic, legal, and medical domains.

7.5 Conclusion

The findings from a systematic pragma-dialectical analysis of the three reconstructed parliamentary debates suggest that, while the first three stages of the (critical) discussions (i.e. the confrontation, opening, and argumentation stages) in all the three debates are more or less similar to the proposed pragma-dialectical stages of a critical discussion, the concluding stage deviates from the model. The findings further indicate that, while there are cases where rules for critical discussion (e.g. the freedom rule and the obligation-to-defend rule) are, to a greater degree, implicitly or subconsciously adhered to, there are various instances where the rules of the code of conduct are violated. Furthermore, to a large extent, MPs successfully manoeuvre strategically with the institutional preconditions in all the three aspects of strategic

manoeuvring. However, there are instances where the MPs' modes of strategic manoeuvring derail and are deemed fallacious. The ministers' prescriptive standpoints relating to whether the proposed budget or request for funds should be approved are mainly justified by either pragmatic argumentation or pragmatic argumentation combined in multiple or coordinative argumentation with symptomatic argumentation. Other standpoints are defended by various (sub)types of argumentation, including authority argumentation, causal argumentation, argumentation from example, comparison argumentation, and practical or problem-solving argumentation. Authority argumentation, particularly argumentation from legal authority, is appealed to at different levels of defence of almost every standpoint. However, it is appealed to even more frequently in the critical discussion(s) in chapter four, and this has been attributed not only to the fact that the debate focuses on the constitutional review process in Tanzania, which was supposed to be coordinated in accordance with the Constitutional Review Act, but also to the matters coordinated or supervised by the ministry. The ministers' argumentative moves seem to generally realise a strategic combination of detached and engaged argumentative styles. The argumentative moves by the opposition's spokespersons and other MPs seem to manifest an engaged argumentative style. Moreover, all the four account-giving strategies (plus silence) are employed by ministers when accounting for failure events. In these accounts, the ministers either accept, deny, or evade being responsible for the failure event.

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