HERMENEUTICS AND RHETORICS:

From 'Truth and Method' to 'Truth and Power'

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0. Introduction

0.1 Rhetorics in Conflict with Hermeneutics

The claim that 'rhetorical criticism of literature takes the exegetes of biblical literature beyond the study of the meanings of texts to something more inclusive than semantics and hermeneutics,' ¹ or that 'rhetorical criticism is taking us beyond hermeneutics and structuralism to poststructuralism and posthermeneutics,' needs to be elaborated and qualified. For the unity of hermeneutics and rhetorics has been taken for granted for too long. Schleiermacher, one of the founders of modern hermeneutics, saw this unity resulting 'from the fact that every act of understanding is the obverse of an act of discourse in that one must come to grasp the thought that was at the base of the discourse.'²

Between the claim of rhetorics leading to posthermeneutics on the one hand, and claims to the contrary that rhetorics is currently being rediscovered for biblical hermeneutics,³ we face one of the major issues on the unfinished agenda of Western culture.

0.2 Theories and Practices

Both terms, hermeneutic[s] and rhetoric[s], refer to the practices of the art of interpretation (= hermeneutic), or the practices of the art of communication as interaction (= rhetoric as rhetorica utens), and simultaneously to the respective theories or theoretical constructs or 'systems' and their taxonomies which appear in the academic handbooks on hermeneutics or rhetorics (rhetorica docens). I may not succeed in always clearly and carefully distinguishing between hermeneutic, the interpretive/exegetical practice, and hermeneutics, the theory of interpretation, or between rhetoric, the argumentative/persuasive practice, and rhetorics, the critical theory. But this is my intention in the differentiating use of the two pairs of terms.

0.3 Procedure of the following study

In chapter 1 I seek to show, in an historical sketch of the relations between rhetorics and hermeneutics, that the changes in rhetorical and hermeneutical theories reflect important social and cultural transformations in ancient and modern Western
history. In chapter 2 I want to highlight the hegemony of hermeneutics and the competing realm of rhetoric, and briefly introduce some modern allies in the contest of challenging the hegemony of hermeneutics: modern literary theory, Foucault's interpretive analytics, Jameson's interpretastion in terms of the collective and associative, and others. In chapter 3 I want to outline briefly how the reintegration of rhetorics and hermeneutics, in theory and practice, can revitalize biblical exegesis, which, indeed, it has begun to do.

1. Hermeneutics and rhetorics in Western history

1.1 Classical and Late Antiquity/Early Patristic

When the late 3rd century B.C. rhetorician Demetrius wrote on 'hermeneutic', he actually spoke of 'rhetoric' as elocution in the sense of *rhetorica utens*. Following Murphy's proposal, Enos distinguishes four major traditions of rhetoric according to the differences in emphasis: (1) the Sophistic and 'Second Sophistic' emphasis on language as means of communication; (2) the philosophic traditions; (3) the grammatical, philological traditions; and (4) the traditions emphasizing the orality of rhetoric, even in its literary form. The formative influence which rhetoric had in any one or all of these different emphases on subsequent 'criticism in antiquity' was due 'to the rational framework which [rhetoric] sought to impose on whatever theme or topic was handed to her.'

In her study on 'Hermeneutics and the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition,' Kathy Eden outlines what she takes 'to be the influence of rhetorical theory on the development of interpretation-theory or hermeneutics' (59). She goes on to show 'that the earliest critics or interpreters not only used rhetorical strategies in their exegetical exercises, but actually discussed the interpretive act in these same terms' (60). Eden rightly distinguishes between the strategies of these exegetical exercises and the theories employed to define them. She finds the same 'fundamental split' in the art of rhetoric as 'also central to the development of hermeneutics' (60) -- the split between (the rhetor's or writer's) intention (*dianoia/voluntas*) and the expressed polysemous meaning (*hyponoia/suspicio*), a split that widens (75).

In twentieth century hermeneutics the split formalizes into two kinds of hermeneutics: the traditional, positive hermeneutical sciences which provide by way of commentary direct access to the meaning of discourses or practices, and the hermeneutics of suspicion.

As early as the first Christian century, this fundamental and widening split between intention (or origin) and signification (or senses) is highlighted by 'two further related developments: on the one hand, the increasing prominence of stylistic matters and, on the other, the changing trend in the stylistic strategies most in fashion' (75). What is of interest here is the first century spreading vogue or fashion of the allusive style, viz the use of *suspicio* or *hyponoia* which makes the signs used 'signify more than they say' (80). To ask for the *motives* of such fashions (e.g. 'fear of political reprisals' in times of ideological conflict; see Eden 84) leads us toward...
Hermeneutics and Rhetorics

rhetorics as exercise in 'truth and power;' to ask for the cognitive or esthetic benefits of such exercises leads us toward hermeneutics as interpretive science, as exercise in 'truth and method.'

In the latter case the stylistic strategies of obscurity, ambiguity, polysemy are seen as evidence of 'the liberal arts' being used as hermeneutical instruments. But when 'hermeneutical instruments' are said to be retrieved, e.g., by Augustine, for service in homiletics and its accompanying social practices, then we have gone beyond hermeneutics. Evans speaks of 'serious obstacles in the way of the use of the arts of grammar and dialectic and rhetoric in the interpretation of Scripture' and comments that 'the liberal arts were adapted for uses which they did not always closely fit.'

Hermeneutics and rhetorics, each in its own way, long before they were applied to Christian practices had been taught by teachers of the liberal arts. "The rhetorical criticism of antiquity [was] very largely the work of teachers." There is Augustinian before his conversion; there is Jerome's teacher Donatus; there is the relation of biblical hermeneutics to rhetorics in the Cappadocian Fathers. The liberal arts and exegesis were first brought together in the Greek East in Adrian's *Eisagoge* in the first half of the 5th century. In the Latin West we have first the late 4th century *Liber regularum* of the Donatist Tyconius which Augustine used extensively and refers to in his *De doctrina CHRISTIANA* (III 30-56). Then Cassiodorus' *Institutiones* whose influence extends to the Venerable Bede's *De schematicibus et tropis Sacrae Scripturae* as 'one of the later Roman and Carolingian authors of rhetorical manuals' (Evans 1984: 107). Reinsma sees in Boethius's *De differentiis topicis* the legacy of Aristotle; in Augustine's *De doctrina IV* the legacy of Plato and Cicero; and in Bede's work just cited the legacy of 'the sophists's love of language.'

But 'the fragmentation of rhetoric,' which manifests itself already in Augustine's theory and practice of rhetorical criticism, emerged as early as the fourth century C.E., as Leff has shown in his study of Latin rhetorical handbooks. Their 'tendency to distort and contract the general design of the art [of rhetoric]' reveals an important factor which we need to explore more fully later on, namely 'how the nature of rhetoric [and, we may add, of hermeneutic] reflects the wider social and cultural situation.' Miller would see this as another and early case for the importance of what he calls 'the material base' of antiquity's theories of literature (see 1.4.6.2).

1.2 The Medieval Era, Humanism, and the Two 16th Century Reforms

1.2.1 Medieval Hermeneutics and Rhetorics

The three modes of exegesis emerging in the early Middle Ages: *lectio* or commentary; *disputatio* or controversies; and *predicatio*, whether as homiletics or as spiritual exercise, could be seen as extensions of the three traditional liberal arts: grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. Hermeneutics and rhetoric begin to go their separate ways: with the 12th century, when 'in the nascent universities' biblical exegesis comes to be 'thought of as an 'academic' discipline,' rhetorical and hermeneutical studies run on independent tracks. The 'number of medieval critical
[exegetical] procedures,' unfolding in the 12th century within the different 'schools' of the emerging universities, but also in the sometimes acrimonious tensions between advocates of the monastic *lectio divina* and academic exegesis, between the *via antiqua* and the *via moderna*, are procedures which 'are still with us.'

In his study of 'The Beginnings of Theology as an Academic Discipline,' Evans has shown that the *via moderna* or academic approach arose out of the revival of interest in the liberal arts as part of the *via antiqua*. This revival had begun in the 10th century and soon showed a marked interest in the interpretive hermeneutical sciences which went hand in hand with a neglect of rhetoric. Rhetoric, Evans observes, became 'the most neglected of the trivium studies [of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric]' and, as legacy of the fragmentation of rhetoric noted earlier, leaves rhetoric aligned either with dialectic as part of the skills of argumentation, or with grammar as part of the property of language and the problem of signification.

And even when rhetoric did gain or maintain some recognition of its own merit, then even the best among the medieval minds had increasing difficulty with the reconciliation of 'one [trivium] art ... with that of another' (Evans 1980: 73).

In his analysis of 'the literary analysis of experience and its continuity' from classical Greece to early Renaissance Europe, Trimpi makes a convincing case for the importance of rhetoric for literary theory as guide to the literary analysis of experience. It is in 'the nonstylistic contributions of rhetoric to the composition of literature' that Trimpi sees rhetoric's main value. He notes:

> These contributions have not drawn their share of attention largely because of the common tendency [which we noted in the fragmentation of rhetoric as early as the 4th century] to reduce the discipline of rhetoric as a whole to the treatment of style, or *elocutio*, alone. Such a reduction has obscured the importance of both [1] the argumentative structure and [2] the qualitative examination of human action which rhetoric [and not hermeneutic!] has kept alive in the transmission of literary theory.

Brinkmann's study of Medieval Hermeneutics illustrates Trimpi's point. Despite the ubiquity of rhetoric in the pragmatic adaptations of classical rhetorics in Medieval and Renaissance times in the three distinct medieval rhetorical genres -- the rhetoric of verse writing (*ars poetriae*); the rhetoric of letter-writing (*ars dictaminis*), and the rhetoric of preaching (*ars praedicandi*) -- there is only passing reference made in Brinkmann's study to rhetoric as part of the trivium study or the system of the liberal arts. The more his study succeeds in highlighting the peculiarity and the history of Medieval hermeneutics, the clearer and starker looms the distinction between hermeneutics and rhetorics. It is the distinction between the 'preceptive traditions' of the interpretive science assuring access to truths which only expertly trained (trivium trained) interpreters can understand (the hermeneut as excavator), and the 'preceptive traditions' of the advocates of rhetorics. Despite the preceptive traditions elaborated in each of the three distinctively Medieval rhetorical genres (Murphy), and its fourth preceptive tradition, that of classical Ciceronianism (Cicero, not Aristotle, informed Medieval rhetorics!), there is, according to Murphy's summary (363), a commonality to them which he calls 'the essence of
Hermeneutics and Rhetorics

rhetoric.' At one time, this was also the essence of hermeneutic, before the two got separated, and only in our days seek to be integrated again, as it was in the beginning.

In his review of Murphy's book on *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, Kennedy calls attention to McKeon's 'celebrated article, 'Rhetoric in the Middle Ages', in which McKeon noted that rhetorical theories and their preceptive traditions, which were implicated in 'the welter of changes in [Medieval] rhetoric, ... [emerged] in concrete application ...' and not merely in theoretical disputes. We must not lose sight of this contextual, cultural aspect so important for both the practice and the theory of both hermeneutic[s] and rhetoric[s]. The Middle Ages gave a very distinctive form to 'the Western experience of subjectivity' (Foucault) and its religious, moral, and political power. That very distinctive form came to a crisis in the following period.

1.2.2 Renaissance Humanist Hermeneutics and Rhetorics

Ciceronian and Aristotelian formalism, as advocated in some of the humanists' approach to rhetorics, continued trends set since the birth of an academic exegetical methodology in the 12th century. This rhetorical formalism continues in the formation of Cartesian rhetoric and into our days in the close alignment between linguistics and rhetoric. In his study of hermeneutics and rhetoric on 'the road to reformation,' Evans sees the medieval scholastic preoccupation with 'questions of logic give way to questions of language.' Rhetoric did, indeed, play a central role in the new learning. Kallendorf's warning needs to be heeded not to oversimplify the issues and draw the lines of demarcation too sharply between grammarian-rhetoricians and rhetorical philosophers. He sees 'the practice of [14th and 15th century] literary criticism ... [as] thoroughly infused with rhetorical approaches. Thus early humanist literary theory and criticism unite around rhetoric conceived as both res and verba, as both wisdom and eloquence.' The best of the Medieval scholastic exegetes would agree with that. Yet Hausammann claims that, notwithstanding the indisputable interest the humanists had in rhetorics, 'there was not a single one of them who practiced [the rhetorical method in their exegesis].'

What, then, is the nature of 'the new rhetoric' of about 1500 that allegedly supercedes Medieval rhetoric? Schanze makes the following points: What is new are essentially two cultural contextual developments, the vernacular movement on the one hand ('the vernacular idiomatic *latinitas* appeared as an 'anti-rhetoric' movement;' see below also Meerhoff's view of Ramist rhetoric defending the cause of the vernacular), and the print-culture movement on the other which generates a new phase in the progressive 'technologizing of the word,' both for the literature itself, and for the books on hermeneutical and rhetorical criticism. Bolgar notes the paradox that, though 'knowledge of [rhetoric] reaches a wider public through a number of channels,' the study of rhetoric in the epoch of humanism (1200-1500) was 'relatively speaking neglected.'

What crystallized into the legitimation of vernacular literatures and speech communities (including Jewish!) and came to be developed 'by Erasmus and Luther
into different versions of affective semantics in Scripture [was the] new [Renaissance] treatment of grammatical and sociohistorical contexts as semantically constitutive ... 29 On the one hand, as we shall see, the interpretive practices of Erasmus and the Protestant reformers remain embedded in Renaissance culture, even when such practices as the multiple sense of Scripture are repudiated in theory. Waswo speaks of 'the reaccommodation of traditionally "figurative" (or any multiple) meanings within an expanded, but solidly based "literal" sense', as is quite apparent in Flacius' Clavis Scripturae. On the other hand this historical development of Protestant hermeneutics will be contradicted by the hermeneutical principle of the religious reform movement: 'The principle ... that Scripture interprets itself, that the "express words" of the Bible scrutinized by and for themselves [as in later scientific grammatico-historical hermeneutics!] will lead to clear and certain meanings.' But the hermeneutical principle that Scripture interprets itself was and is 'political, not hermeneutic,' 30

This failure of admitting 'that all Bible scholarship is dogmatic and that all Bible scholarship is political,' - a failure persisting since the pre-Reformation days of the humanists - is due 'not so much [to] the inability to see these realities as to explore their implications and face up to their consequence.' 31 That is precisely what Foucault is arguing about. To claim that 'the failure fully to realize that Bible scholarship [of any age], like other enterprises of the modern [no less than the ancient!] academia, is intensely political,' does not mean, as Noll rightly emphasizes, that scholarship on biblical hermeneutics and rhetorics is either reducable to politics, or that it is 'only political,' but it does mean 'that questions of power are [still, as they have been] an inextricable element in the story [of biblical interpretation and its scholarship].' 32

This political principle is for Foucault the product of the 'great crisis of the Western experience of subjectivity ... [as] a struggle for a new subjectivity [which grew out of the need of taking] a direct part [1] in spiritual life, [2] in the work of salvation, [and 3] in the truth which lies in the Book ....' This new subjectivity manifests itself in the emergence of vernacular cultures and the associated rise of national states, leaving aside the other phenomenon noted above: the impact of print technology. Foucault relates the 'tricky combination [in the emerging national political and economic, colonial powers] of individualization techniques and of totalizing procedures' to the 'old power technique which originated in Christian institutions.' Foucault calls this old power technique 'the pastoral power,' 33 and calls for 'the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.'

1.2.3 Hermeneutics and Rhetorics in 16th Century Religious Reforms

In his analysis of Melanchthon, the trained rhetorician, as hermeneut of the Hebrew Scriptures, Sick reflects briefly on the connection between hermeneutics and rhetorics. 34 Sick views the connection in two ways:

(1) Rhetorics as theory of speech contains a theory of interpretation implicitly or explicitly. This is part of the trivium tradition of the interrelationship of the arts of
grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. Some, as Sick does, attribute this approach only to
the Renaissance humanists and its *via modema*. But others see this 'scientific' 
approach rooted in the very beginnings of Western culture. Rational methods were 
used from earliest times to explain the formation and function of both the form and 
content of language (and other 'signs'), or better: the form as content, or the content 
as form!35 These were the common methods and interpretive principles which 
Protestants inherited from humanist philology, philosophy and rhetoric by way of the 
shared education and its ecclesiastically supported educational institutions. But the 

sources of conflict and strategies for coexistence among universities and seminaries, 
among both Protestant and Catholic, and among each other, profoundly affects the 
development of the study of both rhetorics and hermeneutics.36 The biography of 
Mathias Flacius Illyricus, Protestantism's first and foremost hermeneutician, 
provides an illuminating example. The medieval conflict between nascent university 
and traditional monastery provides another example referred to earlier (see 1.2.1).

Rhetorical rules -- such as, perceiving and experiencing the whole as more 
important, as more convincing and affective, than the sum total of the parts of a 
given discourse; or the distinctive nature and function of genres and the topics, 
styles, deliveries peculiar to each -- came to inform the formation of 
hermeneutical rule. Among the reasons enumerated by Hausammann for rhetorics' 
close association with hermeneutics in the work of the early Reformers (in 
distinction from the humanists who kept the two arts separate), she lists the 
following: (1) the linguistic and public character of the Bible; (2) situational context 
and purpose highlighted by rhetorics; (3) various parts of discourse (even of the 
Bible as composite 'Canon') always get viewed in rhetorics as integral to a systemic 
whole; (4) rhetoric offers the 'key' to Scripture (as later in Flacius' *Clavis Scripturae*) 
without recur to traditional 'grammatical' commentary and/or Patristic authority; 
and (5) facilitating the move from exposition to application as integral parts of the 
unitive process of hermeneutics.37

The pedantic application of such rules to the actual interpretation may give this 
'scientific-humanistic' approach 'a very formalistic appearance.' When the classical 
Hellenistic and Roman rules of rhetoric get applied to biblical exegesis to identify 
biblical authors 'as rhetors of the style of Cicero,' then such exercise in 'truth and 
method' may strike us not merely as 'comical,' but moreover as problematical. Why 
problematic? Because the scientific focus, given to rhetorics in collusion with her-
menetics, is turning rhetorics into service of a theory of interpretation ('truth and 
method'), instead of letting rhetorics serve its own and different ends: those of 'truth 
and power.' Waswo calls it the 'affective attention to the text and [the concern with] 
the appropriateness or primacy of applying one context or another to [the text's] 
interpretation.' 38 We find the same problem in Sick's second approach to the 
connection between rhetorics and hermeneutics.

(2) Rhetorics and hermeneutics were seen distinctively and uniquely integrated by 
the early Reformers, not on scientific, but on theological grounds.

(ad 1) The *scientific* approach links hermeneutics and rhetorics in varying ways, as 
adaptation varies of the trivium tradition in scholasticism, humanism, and
Reformation/Counter-Reformation. In modern times it varies in terms of biblical exegetes' varying adaptations of semiotics, linguistics, language philosophy's variables of semantics and pragmatics, or of communication and interaction.39

(ad 2) The theological approach links hermeneutics and rhetorics by insisting on the primacy of ultimate truth as transcendental, i.e., hidden meaning. Here is where transcendental hermeneutics (as in Heidegger) and transcendental rhetorics (as in all rhetorics of religion, or the rhetorics of every religion) make common cause.

We get peculiar and potent blends of these two approaches, first in Patristic and Medieval 'scholastic' circles; then in Renaissance humanistic circles, at least those friendly to theology; thirdly in Reformation and Counter-Reformation circles respectively; and finally in the peculiar blend of scientific and sacred theories forged in the age of the enlightenment and the rise of modern science and its paradigm shift. In response to claims made that rhetorics, as integral part of hermeneutics, increasingly faded from view even in the life-time of the early Reformers, Hausammann admits to some difficulty of how to explain the phenomenon.40 The rise and rapid spread of Ramism may have had something to do with phenomenon, even though Ramism may have merely popularized what had already been advocated by the 15th century Dutch humanist Rudolph Agricola.

If the history of medieval rhetorics (the old rhetorics, characterized by 1. the technological limitations of the cheirographic culture; and 2. rhetorics in the service of the study of logic and language) can be said to have begun with the 5th century, i.e., 'Augustine and the Age of Transition' (Murphy), this same history can be said to have closed with the 15th century. By 1500 Schanze sees the emergence of a 'new rhetoric.' Its newness is characterized by two features: 1. the technological revolution generated by the typographic culture, and 2. the new emphasis on rhetorics' (social, cultural) usefulness or effectiveness, brought about by the centuries' old growing awareness of indigenous vernacular versus the classical and biblical languages. This contrast between old and new rhetorics surfaces under different labels in the controversy between Ciceronianism (alternately also Aristotelianism, even medieval scholasticism) and anti-Ciceronianism;41 between Catholic and Protestant rhetorics;42 and finally between secular or general rhetorics/hermeneutics and sacred rhetorics/hermeneutics,43 between academic and popular rhetoric, or its related distinction between literary and non-literary rhetoric which had a powerful influence on biblical, especially New Testament interpretation applied to Kleiliteratur as distinct from Hochliteratur.44

In Schanze's view it was the result not so much of the effort of any one person, like Peter Ramus, but the paradoxical side-effect of the print-culture that the formalism of the 'old' rhetorics emerged as the dominant feature in the 'new' rhetoric. With reference to Eisenstein's study of Gutenberg as an agent of change,45 Schanze sees in the emerging reduction of rhetorics to stylistics 'the breaking up of integral rhetorical systems into rhetorical parts.' The break-up is seemingly and fateful final in the work of Peter Ramus46 which crystalized developments noted since classical times, and consolidated the antinomy between reason and passion which is systemic (not only systemic to 'theory' but very much so also to social, cultural
'practice!') to medieval scholasticism and Renaissance humanism. This antinomy between reason and emotion surfaced periodically throughout Christian history and affected the history and theory of both hermeneutics and rhetorics. Foucault sees in this break-up the result of the interrelatedness of three types of relationship which in fact always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, and use each other mutually as means to an end [namely] ... power relations, [systems] of communication [e.g. printing or rhetorics], objective capacities [or 'finalized activities'].

Interrelationships between those three separate domains 'establish themselves according to a specific model,' such as educational and research institutions, or religious institutions (medieval monasticism, or Protestant parochialism), or any number of social and political institutions. Evans' observation of the effect the 'nascent universities' of the 12th century had on both rhetorics and hermeneutics (see above p 4, n 9; and n 8) illustrates Foucault's point.

The pre-history (Vorgeschichte) of the study of exegetical argumentation, which extends for more than a millenium before the 16th century Reformation, is followed, despite the efforts of the early 16th century reformers, by centuries of resumed restraint for rhetoric. Less than a century after Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Bullinger, there is Johannes Cocceius who confines rhetoric again, as in the old and abiding educational tradition of the trivium of the liberal arts, to a place alongside with grammar and logic as one of four genera interpretandi. Peter Ramus' rise and Ramism's success are not causes, but symptoms.

1.2.4 Ramus and the 16th Century Ramist Educational Reform

The Ramist 'system,' which became the influential Ramism extending over centuries and continents, utilized the traditional trivium of the arts of grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. As a 'system' or 'theory' of communication which accounts for the entire range of language study, Ramism is, next to Medieval scholasticism, another perfect illustration of hermeneutics (or rhetorics) operating with the motto 'truth and method'. Stanford contrasts the simplistic view of Ramism, as having separated logic from rhetoric, with 'Ramus' penchant for dividing everything into two,' a dichotomy applying not only to logic and rhetoric, but to all other studies of the traditional 'liberal arts'. Even Ramus' conversion from Catholicism to Protestantism and his subsequent martyrdom is rated by Stanford as a not unimportant factor in assessing the significance and appeal of Ramus' work.

Ramus' greatest influence extended, besides his native France, to Holland, England and the New England colonies. Most of the Puritans were Ramists, if only out of opposition to the educational and exegetical traditionalism or scholasticism in the Anglican religious and educational and political establishment. Adams characterizes the Ramist Puritan as one who perceived 'his status in society [as] determined by his productivity and service and not by his inherited or accidental wealth, bloodline, appointed office, clerical rank or storehouse of knowledge,' as were the prophets and apostles who wrote the Bible. For Adams, the Puritans took
Ramist rhetoric 'as a highly useful instrument [of making speech persuasive within a context of political equality] with ... a sound rationale' which they also applied to biblical hermeneutics. Thus, Adams sees in Ramism 'a part of a Protestant reform movement that eventually intensified into open revolution.' And what has been said of Puritan rhetorics can also be said of the little noticed 'rhetorical principles' of the early Quakers. What impact Ramism and anti-Ramism had on American biblical scholarship, centred on the East Coast till the late 19th century, and thriving on 'intellectual immigration from abroad,' has yet to be studied.

For others, the legacy of Ramism is, as one critic called it, 'a litany of ills.' Even the counterreforms against Ramism, such as those advocated by Thomas Hobbes with his emphasis on 'pathos versus ethos and logos,' add to the litany of ills, because the very debates, both pro- and anti-Ramism, over 'the differences as to which of the parts - reason, ethos, pathos - should be granted priority, [had the same effect, namely] rhetoric qua rhetoric [lost] its nexus to a tripartite conception of persuasion ... The fatal flaw in the tragedy [which is the story of Western rhetorics] is not rhetoric falling from its renowned association with reason to 'mere' rhetoric. Rather it is the creation of a hierarchy of proofs ....

Dialectic was set forth by Ramus as best suited for the hermeneutics of literature. 'Interpretation (which Ramus also calls 'explication') seeks out the nature of an art; its types; the 'architectonic' order of a work; the way this order is founded; its 'topics;' the rules followed; and all its parts.' That will remain the working definition of hermeneutics and of the hermeneutical sciences from the middle of 16th century on -- a legacy of more than four centuries!

What remains of rhetoric? Ramus spelled that out in his 2 volumes entitled 'Rhetoric, Elucidated with Explanations by Peter Ramus,' first in 1548 as the rhetoric of Omer Talon, his close friend and colleague, then, as Ramus', in 1567. It was an instant bestseller as the numerous editions in quick succession confirm. For Ramus, the only proper parts of rhetorics are style (elocutio) and delivery (pronuniatio), leaving for dialectics the other parts traditionally associated with rhetorics: invention, disposition, and memory.

What Meerhoff sees as the driving force behind Ramus' critical struggle with the rhetorical theories of antiquity and their use in Renaissance Europe is the desire to defend the cause of the French vernacular (as was done earlier also for the Italian vernacular [see Dante's essay De vulgari eloquentia as expression of Dante's 'rhetorical realism'], also German and English vernacular), once Renaissance theorists had found it problematic to analyze and interpret vernacular (including Jewish biblical) literature within the system of classical rhetoric. Where Ong saw only the negative side of Ramus' restriction of rhetoric to stylistics, resulting in the destruction of dialogue between individuals, there Meerhoff sees the positive side of Ramus' separation of rhetorics from dialectics or hermeneutics by seeing Ramus in the service of, or search for theories and practices more indigenous to the emerging national cultures (see above the case for Puritan rhetorics and hermeneutics). Read in the latter way, we could claim Ramus as an early example for the motto 'Truth and Power' in contrast to 'Truth and Method.'
1.3 The Triumph of 'Truth and Method' in Rhetorics and Hermeneutics

The Ramist dichotomy between logic/dialectic and rhetoric as separable methods is one dominant strain discernible in the publications on biblical hermeneutics. The split generates social and political dichotomies between established 'orthodoxy' and 'pietists' which resembles the acrimonious tensions between the advocates of monastic and academic approaches to exegesis in the 12th century. The same split may be traceable in the conflicts between main-line Protestantism and the Radical Wing of the Reformation on the Continent, between Anglican and Puritan hermeneutics in England, and between the Jesuits and the nationalistic 'gallicans' in France.

1.3.1 Baroque Rhetorics and Hermeneutics

The late 16th century witnessed a veritable explosion of publications on both rhetorics and hermeneutics of Scripture. Consider the following statistics:

Between 1480 and 1520 there are just two sacred rhetorics published; between 1520 and 1560, twenty; from 1560 to the end of the century the number leaps to forty-eight, and for the following century [the 17th century] close to fourteen new sacred rhetorics appear every decade.

One of the pioneers of hermeneutics of Scripture based on rhetorics is the Albanian born, but later German super-'orthodox' Lutheran Matthias Flacius (Vlacich) Illyricus (1520-75). His *Clavis Scripturae Sacrae seu De Sermone Sacrarum Literarum plurimas genera Regulas continens* first appeared in 1567. It is divided in five parts (with two more as appendix, but both are separate and earlier papers which were added to the 1567 edition):

1. the basic rules for biblical interpretation (*ratio cognoscendi sacras literas*), 122 pages long; followed by 2. the hermeneutical rules established by Patristic authorities (see above on the *via antiqua* in medieval hermeneutics), 100 pages long. 3. The [grammatical] Parts of Speech (*partes orationis*), 50 pages long. 4. The rhetorical Figures or Tropes (*tropi et schemata Sacrarum Literarum*), 178 pages long. 5. The 'style' of Scripture (*stylus*), 74 pages long. Nearly fully 50% of this classic of biblical hermeneutics, 'the real beginning of scholarly hermeneutics,' is supplied by rhetorics! Tract 4 is rated as 'making a special contribution to the determination of the literal meaning of Scripture, as well as to special questions of hermeneutics.'

It well illustrates the claim that the resurgent biblicism with its accompanying hermeneutics goes hand in hand with 'the rediscovery of hellenistic rhetoric.'

In the 5th part on style, Flacius devotes 20 of the 74 pages on the analysis of St. Paul's style, 5 on Johannine style, as illustrations of both the simplicity and laconic brevity, yet also power or efficacy (*deinosis*) of Scripture. What Siegert mistakes as misuse of rhetorics in Flacius to establish a *Sonderhermeneutik*, a special biblical or sacred hermeneutics, is explained by Shuger differently. She sees Flacius seeking to avoid two traps familiar to criticism: (1) the two extremes traditionally employed (even into the 20th century!) of explaining the nature of biblical rhetorics as 'neither
Stoic nor libertine,' but instead as indigenously Christian (what since earliest Patristic times was called *sermo piscatorius*, which Erich Auerbach explored). (2)
The other trap is criticism's 'convenient dichotomy of rhetoric and philosophy,' a dichotomy 'largely a product of Scholasticism; i e humanists contrast the plain, arid style of the Schoolmen to their own rhetorical eloquence.' Even so, Shuger herself recognizes 'the long [Christian] tradition of hostility to eloquence' which was 'fortified by the nascent rationalism of the late Renaissance'(281) - as it had been before between the *lectio divina* of the monasteries and the nascent 12th century universities!

Flacius' rhetorical hermeneutics, or hermeneutical rhetorics, is said to serve the two complimentary foci: 'the interiority of faith ['the emotional activity within a situation' and its transcendent objects' (Shuger 280). Scholars (like Morris Croll) who work with the critical perception of an antithesis between inwardness and cultural forms are told by Shuger that such 'does not apply to religious discourse during the Renaissance.' But it does apply to those developments we witness in the bitter struggles between (Protestant and Catholic) 'pietism' and 'orthodoxy.' For the English tradition, Shuger (281) refers to Milton and Bunyan as example of 'the split between the individual and ecclesio-political structures.'

Due to 'a more unitary conception of the psyche,' which is the result of the yet to be fully explored 'interrelation of theology, psychology and rhetoric during the Renaissance,' there is, for Flacius no opposition between reason and passion, cognition and empathy or sympathy in the act of reading and interpreting the Bible. Flacius' appreciation of Scripture's 'magniloquence, ... suggestive obscurity, and emotional power' (Shuger 284) makes him appear as an early representative of baroque rhetoric. Flacius' emphasis on the *scopus* of the text (i e its goal or aim) to be interpreted reflects the rhetorical matrix of his hermeneutic. *Scopus* meant then, what we mean now by the technical term 'the rhetorical situation,' or 'intentionality' as to the kinds of effects which discourses are intended to produce.

Renaissance rhetoric is well highlighted in the following quote from John Donne:

> The way of Rhetorique ... is first to trouble the understanding, to displace, and to discompose, and disorder the judgement, to smother and bury in it, or to empty it of former apprehensions and opinions, and to shake that belief, with which it had possessed it self before, and then when it is thus melted, to powre it into new molds, when it is thus mollified, to stamp and imprint new forms, new images, new opinions in it.67

What makes Flacius closer to Baroque than Renaissance rhetorics is the move beyond Renaissance traditionalism and conservatism (which Schanz had linked with the impact of print-technology) to the (quite traditional!) emphasis on rhetorics as the practical art, and the theory of this practice, which had its main focus and emphasis in intentional effect. For Shuger (284), Flacius approached the rhetorics and hermeneutics of the Bible as 'incarnate supernatural truth in moving and sensuous language.'
What Barner sees as the characteristic of 17th century Baroque rhetoric is at least in part already discernible in Flacius' work: conceiving and practicing the necessary interrelationship between (1) the peculiarity of the Bible's literary character and the intentionality of the efficacy of this deliberate literary praxis; (2) rhetorics' institutionalization (as in literary correspondence; literary sermons and liturgies, etc) and the basis of such literary activity in education; (3) the function of *exempla* and the normativeness of rhetorical theory. 68

The approach to biblical hermeneutics and rhetorics in 17th century Pietism is another interesting - because controversial and contested - area of study. Its most distinguished exegete was Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752) with his *Gnomon Novi Testamenti* (1742) which stressed the power, hence applicability and efficacy, inherent in the language and rhetoric of the Bible. Pietism's interest in, indeed commitment to, rhetorics was due to the same realization of the dialectic between language and (personal and/or collective!) experience, as we have in 19th century American revivalism. 69

1.3.2 Hermeneutics and Rhetorics in the Era of Historical Criticism

In the era of the rise of historical criticism which affected both, rhetorics and hermeneutics, we note the following interesting phenomena.

1.3.2.1 Division of exegetical publications into separate categories

(1) *Philologia sacra*

What had been part 3 in the 'system' of Flacius' *Clavis*, gets isolated as the study of the philological, grammatical, lexical, textcritical aspects of the Bible. It is the continuation of the 'Grammar' portion of the classical trivium of the 'liberal arts.'

- Johann Jakob Wettstein, *Novum Testamentum Graecum* (1751/52). But, as with Bengel's *Gnomon* (1742), Wettstein's Dictionary included under the lexical, exegetical categories quite consciously the rhetorical traditions in Scripture's use of the *modus* and *ratio* of persuasion. This approach is rated as moving 'in the direction of a really historical investigation.' 71 It is most regrettable that Kümmel's analysis of the history of the investigation of NT exegetical/hermeneutical problems shows no appreciation of the ubiquity of rhetoric, even or especially in its 'restrained' or debilitated forms. Awareness of the importance of these rhetorical dimensions did indeed increasingly diminish in subsequent works on biblical philology. The Schleiermacher champion Friedrich Lücke called anew in 1817, in reaction to the
vogue of interpreting NT language and literature mainly as part of the *corpus hellenisticum*, for a 'Christian philology.'

(2) *Logica sacra*

Works on the syllogistic, dialectical, philosophical/theological/doctrinal aspects of biblical literature. This is the continuation of the 'Dialectics' part of the trivium of the classical 'liberal arts' revived in the West by Renaissance humanism.

- Christoph Wittich, *Dissertationes duae de sacrae scripturae in philosophicis usu* (1654).
- Glassius' *philologia sacra* was to be complemented by books on logic and rhetoric, but, according to Siegert, did not get published.
- The English Deists' interpretation (e.g. John Locke, 1695) contributes to a 'truly scientific New Testament research [to] come into being', perhaps due to the Ramist distinction between (universal, rational) logic or dialectic and the specific, 'historical', affective rhetoric (see above on Ramism and Puritan rhetoric).

This focus on logic, as formerly a constitutive component of rhetorics but now a separate part related to interpretation, continues into our days with such works as A Schwarz, *Die hermeneutische Antinomie* (Vienna/Leipzig, 1913); H Göttner, *Logik der Interpretation* (Munich, 1973); H Lipps, *Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik* (Frankfurt, 1938); T M Seebomh, *Zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Vernunft* (Bonn, 1972); O F Bollnow, *Zum Begriff der hermeneutischen Logik* (1964); M Beetz, 'Nachgeholte Hermeneutik. Zum Verhältnis von Interpretations- und Logiklehren in Barok und Aufklärung,' *DvLG* 55 (1981) 591-628.

(3) *Rhetorica sacra*

What had been Tracts 4 and 5 as integral parts in Flacius' *Clavis*, becomes an isolated study of the rhetorical aspects of biblical literature, which later on, with Schleiermacher/Dilthey, become identified with the psychological or better 'intentional' aspects.

- Leonard Cox, *Arts or Craft of Rhetoryke* (1530) gives indication of an evolving system of literary criticism
- Bartholomew Westheimer, *troporum, schematorum, ... liber* (1551)
- John Prideaux, Sacred Eloquence: *The Art of Rhetoric as it is Laid down in Scripture* (1659).
Hermeneutics and Rhetorics

- Robert Boyle, *Some Consideration Touching the Style of Scripture* (1668). The scientist and stalwart Anglican mingles religious reverence with aesthetic appreciation for a structure embodying God’s design.

- Johann Heinrich Ernesti, *De orationibus in libris NT historicis* (1692).


- Christian Gottlob Wilke, *Neutestamentliche Rhetorik* (1843) was conceived as complement to (1) his own *Clavis novi Testamenti Philologica*, and (2) Winer’s NT Grammar which had several editions, but Wilke’s rhetorics had only one edition.

- William Bullinger, *Figures of Speech used in the Bible* (1898).

- Georg Heinrici, *Der literarische Charakter der neutestamentlichen Schriften* (1906) focuses on ‘stylistic’ features, where Schleiermacher spoke of ‘psychological’.

*(4) Interpretatio of Hermeneutica*

- J L Vives, *De ratione studendi ac legendi interpretandique auctores* (1539).

- Laurentius Humphrey, *Dr ratione interpretandi*, Libri III (1559).

- Johann Gerhard, *Tractatus de legitima scripturae sacrae interpretatione* (1610).

- Wolfgang Franzius, *Tractatus theologicus novus et perspicuus de interpretatione sacrae scripturae maxime legitima* (1619).

- Johann Konrad Dannhauer, *Hermeneutica sacra sive methodus exponendarum sacrarum litterarum* (1654) is said to be the first to have used ‘hermeneutic’ as book title.

- Jean Alphonse Turretini (1671-1737), *De Sacrae Scripturae interpretandi methodo tractatus bipartitus* (Dordrecht 1728) with reference to Lutheran Flacius and Reformed Grotius.

- A H Francke, *Praelectiones hermeneuticae ad viam dextre indagandi et exponendi sensum Sacrae Scripturae* (1717-23) on the affective (= psychological/pietistic) aspects of religious literature.


- Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706-57), *Unterricht von der Auslegung der hl. Schrift. Compendium der bibl. Hermeneutik* (1742; the first written in German; 2nd ed, 1759 with foreword by Semler). On Johann Martin Chladenius (1742) as the first vernacular German hermeneutic, see C von Bormann, 116.

- Friedrich Meier, *Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst* (1757)
Johann August Ernesti, *Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti ad usus lectionum* (1761), the first hermeneutic focusing solely on the New Testament, 'thereby reveal[ing] an insight into the historical difference between the Old Testament and the New and the necessity of their separate examination - an insight that was to have important consequences.'

Johann Salomo Semler (1725-91), *Apparatus ad liberalem Novi Testamenti interpretationem* (1767), and his *Neuer Versuch zur Förderung der kirchlichen Hermeneutik* (1788; the first time that 'ecclesial hermeneutic' appears!) with 'a conservative rationalism and a historical interest ... gave the scientific study of the NT [a] more vigorous impetus to further development' which Kümmel explains as putting the text 'into its ancient setting and explain[ing] it as a witness of its own time [which includes understanding the texts in terms of its own grammatical (even rhetorical!) structure], and not primarily as intended for today's reader.' What is noted by Kümmel (66) as virtue for 18th century hermeneutics as having 'deliberately divorced [interpretation] from edifying [that is, all pragmatic!] concerns, is felt by few (still) as growing liability arising from the neglect, and finally downright ignorance of the rhetorical/hermeneutical legacy of the 16th century reform. Subordinating historical-scientific (= objectively neutral) interpretation 'to dogmatic interest' (which Kümmel sees as introduction of 'a fateful and perverse factor into the [hermeneutical] situation') is quite different from (1) the subordination of literature to rhetoric, and (2) the largely unfelt, even unrecognized need 'to admit that all Bible scholarship is dogmatic [even, or particularly when it is presumed to be scientifically objective and neutral] and that all Bible scholarship is political.'

S F N Morus, *Super hermeneutica Novi Testamenti acroases academicae* (1797).


C F Stäudlin, *De interpretatione librorum Novi Testamenti historica non unice vera* (1807) protested against the hegemony of the grammatico-historical hermeneutics by asserting that moral, religious, philosophical aspects are integral to hermeneutics. The combination he looked for is variously called historical criticism combined with philosophical criticism, 'or the theological task of interpretation, etc. Boers analyzed this in his survey of the history of New Testament theology.'

Friedrich Lücke, *Grundriss der neutestamentlichen Hermeneutik* (1817).

K A G Keil, *Opuscula academica ad Novi Testamenti interpretationem grammatico-historicam ... pertinentia* (1821).

F Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutik und Kritik mit besonderer Beziehung auf das Neue Testament* (1809; published posthumously by Lücke, 1838) is called 'a
rigidly systematizing hermeneutics' which complements 'the grammatico-historical understanding by the psychological understanding.'

The phenomenon of 19th century hermeneutics priding itself of a methodological basis that was free from every judgment on the truth of the text to be interpreted, has been frequently noted and analyzed. We will return to this phenomenon when we contrast the legacy of this hermeneutical tradition with Foucault's interpretive analytics and his critique of the Schleiermacher/Gadamer tradition.

While in the 18th century these hermeneutical handbooks still combine several disciplines (rhetoric not being one of them!), in the 19th century these handbooks get more and more replaced by ones on individual sub-disciplines: textual criticism, philological-literary criticism, historical and theological interpretation. Rhetoric had long disappeared, and by mid-19th century hermeneutics itself begins to totter. The hermeneutical discussion around 1800 begins slowly to include (again) in its task of 'an explanation of the content of the text' (Küimmel, 108) besides the text's language and history.

1.3.2.2 Professors of Biblical Exegesis as Professors of Rhetoric

There is the perhaps startling fact that a number of the distinguished exegetes, especially during the 16-18th centuries, held dual appointments in both exegesis and rhetoric (sometimes even more than two!). Melanchthon is, of course, the primary example. Flacius was his student, but he held, only briefly, while writing his Clavis Scripturae, a chair in biblical exegesis, before he changed (or better: was made to change) from one university after another as excessively 'orthodox' theologian.

Unlike Catholic university and seminary training which could rely on solid training of its students in rhetorics before coming to the university, Protestant universities could not rely on it. But rhetoric was a prerequisite for all students in theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, and even medicine. The teaching of rhetoric, largely propaedeutic, was based on the rhetorical triad of precept, example, emulation. While the rhetorical precepts were taken from the classical rhetorical handbooks, the example, at least for theologians, was seen in the Bible (whose literary, that is rhetorical character Flacius had compared with Homer!), and the emulation was sought mainly in preaching, but also in secular writing. But even in homiletics the model of emulating the example which illustrated the (classical) precepts declined. In exegesis the decline was even more rapid. But in the beginning (i.e. in the medieval, humanist and 16th century universities) it was not so! The major Protestant university centres renowned for their professors of rhetoric through the 17th century were Wittenberg, Rostock, Strasbourg, Helmstedt, Tübingen, Heidelberg, Leipzig, Königsberg, and Leiden. But lest we forget, contemporary Catholic exegetes were just as subject as their Protestant counterparts to the 'ubiquity of rhetoric' in Renaissance and Baroque Europe. A list of Catholic academic centres with renown for rhetorical study would further illuminate our point. The 16th and 17th century was a 'golden age of exegesis' for Catholics no less than Protestants!
Johann Rudolf Wettstein (first half of the 17th century) taught rhetoric, classics, theology, and exegesis. His son, by the same name, in the second half of the 17th century, held university chairs first in rhetoric, then jurisprudence, then Old and finally also New Testament. The Johann Jakob Wettstein, mentioned earlier, is unrelated to them.

In the Ernesti family of the 18th century we have the distinguished exegete Johann August Ernesti (1707-81), the famed 'German Cicero' who started out as professor of rhetoric (1756; published an *Initia rhetorica*, 2nd ed, 1757) and then acquired his theological and exegetical professorship (1759). He published his famous *Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti ad usus lectionum* (1761) in which he subsumes rhetoric along with philosophy and other disciplines among the 'hermeneutical instruments'. His older brother Johann Christian Gottlieb became famous for the to this day still useful two rhetorical handbooks: The *Lexicon technologiae graecorum rhetoricae* (1795), and the *Lexicon technologiae latinarum rhetoricae* (1797).

For a while, exegetes were combining their calling with formal and substantive commitments to the discipline of rhetoric, but, as we will see, there soon came about first an increasing marginalization of rhetorics (both inside and outside of theology), which was followed by the demise of hermeneutics, at least within academic theology by the end of the 19th century, at the zenith of historical criticism's influence.

Semler's contemporary Christoph Wolle, as quoted by Siegert (8-9), can still recommend to his 18th century contemporary German exegetes that they study, of all things, French rhetoricians in order to appreciate the rhetorical force and pathos of Paul's letters! But, as Siegert points out, in Johann Salomo Semler's works on biblical hermeneutics (1760-1774) the advice is given in one place, not to pay too much attention to the uses of tropes in the Fourth Gospel, because the res, the subject matter, was more important than the rhetorical verba. From there it is only a small step to the polemical, indeed also political, agenda of Vilmar's 'theology of reality' as opposed and opposing any and all 'theology of rhetoric' (by which he meant 'scientific theology')!

1.3.2.3 Books on biblical Rhetoric Authored Outside the Academe

Worth exploring also is the observation, made by Siegert and earlier by Barner, that those writing on (biblical) rhetoric as part of biblical hermeneutic came to be scholars outside of the university and theological faculties. Siegert sees in Carl Ludwig Bauer's work (2nd half of the 18th century) one of the first of such outsiders. But Anglican scientist Boyle's book on biblical style (1668) must be cited as an even earlier example of this trend. Mayāns created a 'national rhetoric' for his native Spain with his *Rhetórica* (1757) written in the vernacular, while 'in frequent and open conflict with official policy on education, religion, and national history.' Barner pleads that students of 17th and 18th century rhetorics (and by implication also hermeneutics), in the light of the 'unattractive reality of the teaching of literary rhetorics' in these centuries, that attention be given also to the 'conservative, institutionally entrenched foundation-structures of baroque rhetoric' along with
What we have just shown (in 1.3.2.2 and 1.3.2.3) is surely an illustration of what Miller will call 'the material base' and the importance of the recognition, if not study, of its role in modern hermeneutical and rhetorical theory (see 1.4.6.2). Barner calls it the 'Unterbau.'

What had occurred earlier in Europe was later repeated in America, but with a telling reversal. The 'educated elites' who published books on biblical rhetorics and hermeneutics were, until the end of the 19th century, 'largely Protestant ministers but also including Catholic and Jewish scholars.' But in the triumph of the scientific age, which was also the triumph of industrialization, the books published on rhetorics and hermeneutics are more and more 'by the professionally academic, purportedly disinterested, self-consciously nonsectarian or secular [scholar] in the university.'

1.3.3 Hermeneutics and Rhetorics in the Romantic and Scientific Age of Schleiermacher and Dilthey

We noted earlier, in connection with the rediscovery of the affective or pathos component of classical rhetoric, that Dockhorn had pointed out that the roots of Schleiermacher's psychological hermeneutics reach back to rhetorics' traditional emphasis on the importance of pathos as integral part of both the rhetorical and hermeneutical activities and their respective theories. But, as Dockhorn observes,

> With Schleiermacher we have indeed reached the point where hermeneutics no longer wants to remember its roots in rhetoric and moves solely on the path which transcendental philosophy has pointed out to it. ... in the final analysis Schleiermacher considers the text independently of its truth claim, as a pure phenomenon of expression ... [viz, reducing the text to its signified theme].

How do we account for Dockhorn's claim that 'the fullness of the rhetorical tradition' will always be lost, as it was with Schleiermacher, when the theory of the hermeneutical circle becomes the only standard of judgment?

For Schneidau the answer is twofold: on the one hand there is 'the dynamic incompleteness of language itself, the gap or lack that gives it an endless, never-catching-up-to-itself character' of the Bible as a whole, or for any of its individual books, posing for us 'the [hermeneutical] problem of retracting urgent but unfixable messages, located in a series of texts which come to no real end or conclusion.'

On the other hand, despite 'the utility of preunderstanding' and the related hermeneutical issue of 'familiarization,' there is the inevitable contextual coming together of 'elements not previously familiar with one another' which give rise to interpretation and insight. Waswo sees this as the legacy of the 'affective semantics' which arose in the Renaissance; Bakhtin will appeal to 'the dialogical imagination' based on rhetorics and constitutive for hermeneutics.
The characterization of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics as psychological is but one label among others for the 19th century development as alternately subsumed under 'romanticism,' Romantic 'pragmatism,' or under 'historicism,' with various forerunners or antecedents identifiable for each. Rhetorics 'restrained' or reduced to stylistics (as in Hugh Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, published 1783) runs parallel now to hermeneutics reduced either to the psychological, or to the logical-dialectical.

The characterization of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics as psychological, familiar since Dilthey and Gadamer, is being challenged on the grounds that dialectics, not psychology of affects, explained for Schleiermacher the relation between language and thought. While dialectics explores this relation moving from logic to language, from the general or universal to the particular, individual, historical (as in medieval hermeneutics), the exploration in hermeneutics moves from language to thought, from the particular to the universal. Linguisticality and historicity are the categories of the individual, of the existential; but thoughts and ideas are the categories of the universal, the ontological, the metaphysical, the ideal (in theology: the spiritual, eternal, kerygmatic, etc).

But surely there are other developments no less important for the growing controversies over hermeneutics no less than over rhetorics. Among these other developments one could name:

1. On the side of philosophy the development of philosophical idealism in contrast to philosophical materialism and pragmatism; the philosophy of language in contrast to studies in vernacular and primitive orality.

2. On the side of 'the material base' we have the effects of the French Revolution on the political and cultural institutions, - effects which were counteracted by the Restoration movements.

3. On the side of academic theology we have the shift in 'the material base' from lecturing and publishing in elitist Latin to the vernacular, and also the first signs of addressing the task of exegesis within a sociohistorical context, i.e. recognizing the kerygma as social gospel as distinct from exegesis or theology serving Kultur-Protestantism or Catholicism. Vilmar's equation of *scientific*, that is purely rational, analytic, neutrally descriptive theology, the popular *Religionswissenschaft*, with 'theology of rhetoric' surely did the cause of rhetorics as matrix for hermeneutics no good whatsoever.

How did we get to this point within less than 3 centuries after the two great reform movements of the 16th century? I see the following developments:

1. The reaction against Flacius and his cohorts among Catholics, Anglicans, the Reformed tradition, separated and put into dialectic tension, what previously, i.e from earliest Patristic times until the rise of the respective 'orthodoxies', had been a unified entity. Both rhetorics and hermeneutics of the Bible had always been considered in terms of the Canonical unity and indivisible authority of the biblical text as a whole. The reaction to Flacius' *Clavis Scripturae* as 'the real beginning of scholarly hermeneutics' comes to focus in two areas:
(1.1) The semantic, logical contradictions in the different parts of the allegedly unified Bible, hence the argument for disunity, mainly on the grounds of universal criteria of logic and dialectic. This aspect is easily recognizable as belonging to that part of traditional rhetorics which was concerned with shared premises, common topics, and the like. This is the 'Logiktradition der Hermeneutik' (C von Bormann, 112).

(1.2) The linguistic, i.e. grammatical, syntactical, and stylistic idiosyncrasies, not only between Hebrew and Greek, as a result of the humanistic renaissance running side by side with medieval scholasticism, but also between individual biblical authors and books. Here, again, it is easily recognizable that these concerns for style were and remained a part of traditional rhetoric. Though the Ramist reform wanted only to systematize the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic by putting the two disciplines into a polarity, the actual result was soon a downright separation of the two. This first phase may be traceable into the mid-17th century. Traditionalists and anti-traditionalists, reformists and counterreformists each had their full say. Neither party could claim full victory.

(2) After the canonical unity of the Bible as a linguistic, conceptual, authoritative whole was no longer the basis for either rhetorics or hermeneutics, the second phase of the development generated another and further division along Ramist lines:

(2.1) What the Bible as a whole, or its individual books, contained was claimed to be far more 'rational' than the conventional emphasis on the supernatural substance of religious discourse. What Kümmel and others see as the Deists' contribution to the development of biblical exegesis as a discipline, not to speak of as a science, can be seen as this recognition of the 'universally valid' features embedded in the 'culture-specific' features of the biblical text. It is one of the 'striking results' of Kennedy's study of New Testament hermeneutics through rhetorical criticism to realize 'the extent to which forms of logical arguments are used in the New Testament.' These enthymematic expressions of thought in logical form even in religious, kerygmatic, mythic discourse can best be appreciated by 'conceptual rhetoric.' 97 This conceptual rhetoric had called attention to the commonly held premisses and the logic arising from them as the indispensible components of the processes of communication and their analysis.

(2.2) The stylistic component continues to be explored, but now focused on the issue of its arguable apostolic authenticity. The sermo humilis tradition, functioning in the framework of conventional 'conceptual rhetoric', as analyzed by Erich Auerbach, 98 led to critical questioning of the 'genuineness' of a biblical author's 'style' in the context of a dual set of criteria: the uneducated style befitting the NT author's sociohistorical context (the later proverbial sermo piscatorius), and the normative style of contemporary culture. The linguistic-stylistic component in 17th through 19th-century 'critical' scholarship cannot possibly deny its origin in the 'conceptual rhetoric' which was and remained part of the Western hermeneutical tradition to this day.

It is easier now to see how we came to be where we were by the time of Schleiermacher and his hermeneutical legacy. As one of the founders of modern
hermeneutics, Schleiermacher saw the unity of rhetorics and hermeneutics resulting, as we saw at the beginning, 'from the fact that every act of understanding is the obverse of an act of discourse in that one must come to grasp the thought that was at the base of the discourse.' What he recalled for modern biblical hermeneutics was 'the affective semantics' (Waswo) as the legacy of the Renaissance understanding of language. The liability of Schleiermacher's psychological hermeneutics with its focus on style remains the liability of all stylistic-rhetorical studies in isolation from their matrix within a 'conceptual rhetoric' where expressive elocation is an integral part of topical, propositional, logical concerns. It is the same liability Plato-Socrates saw in Sophistic rhetoric, that Dockhorn saw in Schleiermacher's approaching a 'text independently of its truth claim, as a pure phenomenon of expression.' Perhaps no wonder that Vilmor called such 'scientific' biblical hermeneutic a 'theology of [sophistic] rhetoric'? What became increasingly lost from sight, as hermeneutics aspired, and attained, its 'scientific' status in the Schleiermacher era was, what Kennedy put so succinctly, the hermeneutics of the power of a text, and not just 'its sources.'

Dockhorn's critique of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics in the light of rhetorics as the matrix of hermeneutics is valid in that it highlights but only one side of the rhetorical pathos legacy: the emotive and imaginative part of the author or reader *qua individuals*. Without disputing the applicability of each of the three components of 'conceptual rhetoric' - logos, ethos, pathos - to the biblical author as an individual, to the individual biblical document, and to the biblical hermeneut as an individual, we need to extend Dockhorn's merit of highlighting the crucial importance of pathos for the very effectiveness, i.e., 'force' of both logos and ethos, by including the collective, the social, cultural side of pathos. This will take us to include concerns voiced vigorously only recently: the concern with ideology as 'the rhetoric of basic communication' (Ricoeur); the concern with *Rhetoric as Social Imagination* (Dillon), and 'the social grounds of knowledge' affecting rhetorics (Willard) no less than hermeneutics (e.g., feminist or third world hermeneutics; see 3.2.2 below).

1.3.4 The New Hermeneutic (Bultmann/Gadamer/Ricoeur/Eagleton)

It seems it was only yesterday when 'the New Hermeneutic' came on the scene and asserted itself for the better part of two or three decades in the middle of the 20th century. Why the relatively short-lived fury with which it impacted the theory and practice of biblical interpretation? Is the alternative to hermeneutics really only structuralism, or are we really headed now 'beyond hermeneutics and structuralism'? Are we prepared to take the step from the preoccupation with 'truth and method' (even rhetorical method or theory) to return (or advance) to 'truth and power'? This step is implicit in the rediscovery of the kerygmatic or even mythic character of religious texts promoted in circles devoted to 'dialectical theology' and its advocates of theological hermeneutics or promoted in circles devoted to demythologizing and its advocates of phenomenological, existentialist hermeneutics. Either alternative objected to viewing the practice, and the theory, of the interpretation of a text as mere object of scientific inquiry. Earlier, Bakhtin had charged that 'the
Hermeneutics and Rhetorics

complex event of encountering and interacting with another’s word ha[d] been almost completely ignored ... [Instead] The real object of study is the interrelation and interaction of ‘spirits’. Interpretation, like reading, is not a ‘dialogic relationship with an object.’ Exegesis as a form of reading is more than ‘explanation’ which has ‘only one consciousness, one subject’; it is ‘comprehension’ which has ‘two consciousnesses and two subjects’ which constitutes ‘contextual meaning’ which, in turn, requires a responsive understanding, one that includes evaluation.102

Despite the heavy, though increasingly hidden or opaque legacy of rhetorics in the developments of modern hermeneutics, the new hermeneutic turned to philosophical hermeneutics, as developed by Heidegger. How different it would have been, had the turn been to rhetorics! For what else but rhetoric are we talking about, when we speak with Bakhtin of ‘responsive understanding, one that includes evaluation,’ or with Bultmann of the goal of hermeneutics as not the text (as object), but the reader/interpreter as the goal? Pistis is a rhetorical category, a rhetorical concern with conviction and persuasion.103 Fuchs’ hermeneutic with its focus on the language-character of (our, or all) being104 and Ebeling’s hermeneutic focusing on proclamation/kerygma as ‘Word-Event,’105 all come agonizingly close to the underlying, but buried and obscured legacy of rhetoric as the matrix of hermeneutic, but it is philosophical hermeneutics which determines all further developments, whether in the train of Gadamer, or Jüngel, or Ricoeur, or the hitherto only indigenous American alternative: the advocates of biblical hermeneutics based on process philosophy.106

Where do we go from here? As Kennedy put it, the reason why ‘For some readers of the Bible rhetorical criticism may have an appeal lacking to other modern [hermeneutical] approaches [is] that it comes closer to explaining what they want explained in the text: not its sources, but its power.’ Or, in the words of W Booth who contributed greatly to the renewal of theoretical interests in the rhetorical analysis and interpretation of literature: ‘Rhetorical study is the study of use, of purpose pursued, targets hit or missed, practices illuminated for the sake not of pure knowledge, but of further (and improved) practice.’107

It is tempting to conclude the historical overview on this note. But we pointed out earlier, when we urged the extension of Dockhorn’s agenda for an ‘affective semantics’ to include the social, and ideological aspects of hermeneutic, that both hermeneutics and rhetorics are also concerned with what Eagleton calls ‘the kinds of effects which discourses produce, and how they produce them.’ With rhetoric recognized as ‘the oldest form of “literary criticism” in the world,’ it is rhetoric again which helps reconstitute literary theory as the theory of ‘discursive practices in society as a whole [with special attention to] such practices as forms of power and performance.’ For Eagleton, rhetoric is worth being reinvented, or, if dead, worth being resurrected, because it makes us approach the task of hermeneutics applied to literary forms ‘as forms of activity inseparable from the wider social relations between writers and readers ... and as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which they [= the literary and rhetorical forms] were embedded.’108 It is rhetorics’ ‘preoccupation with discourse as a form of power and
desire' which attracts Eagleton to rhetorics, which is also Hillis Miller's interest in deconstructive criticism as a form of rhetorical reading. 

1.4 Review and Conclusion of the Historical Part

In review and conclusion of this part on the history of the relation between rhetorics and hermeneutics, we must ask: what have we learned from it? Was Jakob Burckhardt perchance right in judging that antiquity's interest in rhetoric was a 'monstrous aberration'? We have certainly come to experience at least some aspects of the truth in C S Lewis's claim that rhetoric is the 'greatest barrier between us and our ancestors'. Yet, because of the ubiquity of rhetoric in many areas (and not only or especially in hermeneutics!) throughout Western civilization to this day, rhetoric may also be the greatest aid in bridging the barrier. For neither rhetorics, nor hermeneutics, turn out in the end, all appearances to the contrary, not to be some one, or the other, specific method. Throughout Western history, we can notice periods when the two become 'restrained' or confined. It is in just such periods of confinement of scope, such as the one we called 'the era of historicism,' modern scientism or rationalism, that the practice and theory of both rhetoric and hermeneutic get reduced to method. The triumph of theory and method may be exemplified uniquely in 'absolute historicism' which is Marxism.

But the triumph of theory and method (Blake's dread of 'single vision and Newton's sleep') is exemplified at its worst in modern structuralism which attempts to dispense with both meaning and the subject by finding objective laws which govern all human activity.' For Foucault, structuralism and hermeneutics are, in our days at least, only two sides of the same coin:

Structuralism, with its theory and method, ends up systematizing the analysis of the human objects ('signs', and 'the signified' or 'codes') which had been produced by what Foucault calls 'the organized and organizing social practices' - 'objects' like words, ideas, literature, etc. Hermeneutics, with its theory and method, ends up either as explicating what human subjects (the 'signifiers') produce in interaction with the historical, social practices; or as conjoining with 'the phenomenologist's attempt to preserve meaning' by locating this meaning in [1] the social practices and [2] the literary texts produced by them.

In the post-structuralist (post-hermeneutic?) era of the last few decades the focus is on the theory and method which can best account for 'the mode of structural difference and determinate contradiction' (what since Patristic times were the problematic obscurities and contradictions in, first the Canon as a whole, then the individual authors), and thereby celebrate the rebirth of rhetoric.

The following highlights derived from our historical survey are intended to serve the reassessment of the relation between rhetorics and hermeneutics which is to follow in parts two and three.

1.4.1 We learned what Dockhorn expressed as compliment to Gadamer for having 'correctly recognize[d] that hermeneutics has arisen from rhetoric.' Heidegger's comment is noted by Dockhorn 'that the rhetoric of Aristotle is the first systematic hermeneutic of everyday life.' Dockhorn's translator will speak of Gadamer's and
Dockhorn's contributions for the continued study of the 'rhetoric of hermeneutics' and Dockhorn wants Gadamer to recognize 'the hermeneutics of rhetoric.'

1.4.2 We have noted that rhetorics around 1500 AD, at the beginning of the modern era, had its public, political, practical dimension restored and revalued when the reformers 'sought to replace scholastic philosophy by rhetoric as the means of education' for the emerging bourgeoisie of 'the common man.' Rhetorics was, again and anew, a system of communication of a universally applicable body of practical, i.e. 'social and affective knowledge.' Without rhetoric, 'neither the theology of the reformation nor the hermeneutics of pietism can be understood correctly.' We may add that the institutional and political setting for the appropriation of rhetoric in the age of the Protestant reformation is a later parallel to what happened earlier in the age of Pharisaism and the gestation of rabbinc Judaism.

1.4.3 We can see with Dockhorn that there exists, since the Renaissance and its rediscovery of rhetorics, a significant dual phenomenon, each generated by rhetorics: (1) what Gadamer calls, and is quoted by Dockhorn as, a 'basic ontological interpretation of affects,' which is to say, rhetorics participates in the rise of scientific, clinical psychology and psychologism, and the rise of what Dockhorn calls 'irrationalism' and Barner 'the large area of Baroque mysticism;' and (2) 'rhetorics participates in the rise of historicism in a significant manner which up to now has not been sufficiently acknowledged.'

1.4.4 We have seen that, as in the history of the fateful relation between rhetoric and philosophy, so in the history of the relation between rhetorics and hermeneutics, it was always rhetorics, and still is so to this day, which suffered 'enormous misunderstanding.' Dockhorn sees this misconception epitomized in the hermeneutics of both Schleiermacher and Dilthey, indeed by all advocates of 'the hermeneutical circle.' Foucault and his advocates Dreyfus/Rabinow will make a similar case concerning the image of 'the horizon' (instead of 'circle' as in Gadamer's rhetorical hermeneutics) when they distinguish between 'truth and method' and 'truth and power.'

1.4.5 We have seen, primarily in the considerations about pro- and anti-Ramism, that the persistent division of rhetoric into parts, or of calling attention to a part at the expense of the whole, had an increasingly debilitating effect on rhetoric, regardless whether the parts emphasized was the priority on logos, as in medieval scholasticism, Renaissance humanism, or Protestant orthodoxy; or on ethos and pathos, as in the lectio divina of monastic exegesis, or Protestant pietism, or Catholic Jansenism. Even the modern taxonomy used by Kennedy and others of distinguishing between 'primary rhetoric' (with focus on invention, on disposition and argumentation) and 'secondary rhetoric' (with emphasis on the various persuasive techniques or 'style') continues the predisposition toward approaching rhetoric divided into parts. Even Dockhorn's plea for seeing rhetoric's contribution not only to rationalism, historicism, semantics, and the like, but also to irrationalism, psychologism, romanticism - while redressing the imbalance in favour of logos and its dialectic - contributes to the fragmentation enhanced by modern scientism. This
makes the history of rhetoric what Ricoeur sees as 'an ironic tale of diminishing returns,' a history of rhetorics increasingly 'restrained.' 117

1.4.6 If, with Sutton, we both mourn over 'rhetoric is a dead discipline' and simultaneously rejoice over 'the rebirth of rhetoric ... ,' what rebirth is there? And will it bring about another and new rise of hermeneutics from rhetoric? The answers to these questions may be found (1) in philosophy; (2) in theory of literature and its related theory of reading and of reception; and (3) in ideology critique. Yet another answer may be found (4) in Foucault's interprettive analytics, which goes beyond the hermeneutics of suspicion; I will be elaborating on this option in portions of Parts 2 and 3 below.

1.4.6.1 Rebirth into Philosophy

For Sutton, today's rebirth of rhetoric is 'into philosophy' 118 - a philosophy not just of reasoning and cognition (as in Cartesian and Port-Royal rhetorics119), nor just of language and signs, but a philosophy of the mind in terms of intentionality,120 or Ricoeur's philosophy of the imagination, and the philosophy of the will.

But, as Horner observes, this rebirth into philosophy had been tried at least once before, in the 18th century:

Just as modern theorists view rhetoric as closely connected with twentieth century cognitive theory and language philosophy, so for eighteenth-century theorists, it was closely allied with empiricism, faculty psychology, the doctrine of association, the philosophy of common sense, and the study of belles lettres.121

This modern reconceptualization of intentionality as part of the philosophy of the mind, and of the 'cognitive sciences,' is closer to the fuller range of rhetorics' investment in intentionality than the somewhat paler version of perceiving intention as 'a shorthand for the structure of meaning and effect [emphasis mine] supported by the conventions that the text appeals to or devises; for the sense that the language makes in terms of the communicative context as a whole.' 122

1.4.6.2 Rebirth into Literary Theory

For Miller, rhetoric is reborn in modern studies on literary theory. By 'theory' Miller means

the displacement in literary studies from a focus on the meaning of texts to a focus on the way meaning is conveyed ... theory is the use of language to talk about language ... theory is a focus on referentiality as a problem rather than as something that reliably and ambiguously relates a reader to the 'real world' of history, of society, and of people acting within society on the stage of history.123

The deconstructive critics understand themselves as advocates of one way, among others, of making a case for a 'theory of rhetorical reading,' 'theory in the sense of
the conceptual presuppositions of rhetorical reading,' as well as explaining the apparently unavoidable, perhaps 'systemic' resistance to theory, or the attacks on theory. What, asks Miller, is the challenge literary theory poses to the ideologies on the right and the left of the political spectrum? He himself sees the main reason in the perception which theorists of rhetorical reading have of 'literary theory as active interventions in history and politics.'

Miller focuses on two areas of concern here:

1. 'The role of language in this engagement; what Eagleton quoted above calls 'the kinds of effects which discourses produce, and how they produce them.' Rhetorics for Eagleton, as for Miller and others, reconstitutes literary theory as the theory of 'discursive practices in society as a whole [with special attention to] such practices as forms of power and performance.'

2. An important second issue for Miller is what he calls 'the material base,' which is 'the name for the whole region of what presumably exists outside language,' which includes the 'unexamined ideology of the material base.' The following five aspects of 'the material base,' both of the Bible itself, and of the hermeneutical and rhetorical theories about the Bible, can be identified. Some of them we noted above in the historical survey.

1. 'The material base of the particular texts for which the theory purports to account.' For us biblical exegetes, it is the material base of the Bible as Canon; as authoritative; as basic text for educational curriculums; but also more technical issues, such as epistles as distinct from narratives and apocalypses. The biblical form critic only asked for the oral Sitz im Leben; but Miller asks for the material base, or Sitz im Leben, of the written genres!

2. The material base of 'the day-to-day life of those who are writing the theory, their social, class, institutional, professional, familial situations.' Luther and the religious reformers had a material base different from the Ramists and the educational reforms; books on hermeneutics and rhetorics written by salaried university professors (of what faculty? and dependent on which political or ecclesial patronage?) had a material base different from those written by those outside of the ecclesial or educational 'system.' Noll (496) refers here to 'the Bible as a concern of the academy,' and 'the Bible as a standard for competing ideological groups.'

3. The material base of 'the substance on which something is written.' Here we encounter the issues raised by Schanze, Ong, and others of the impact of print-technology (and related issues as the book-business, new genres of libraries, etc.) on the rhetoric of reading. The impact of the modern computer on reading and studying of any literature, let alone biblical literature, will be no less momentous than that of print technology. Noll points to 'the Bible as an industry of print' (496) - but so also does biblical scholarship become an industry of print!