From Policy to Operational Application:
The South African Defence Force 1969-1989

deur

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Declaration

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third-party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

C. Van den Berg   December 2021

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Synopsis

South African conflicts, if not most conflicts, can be summarised in the phrase by Heinz Guderian; "There are no desperate situations, there are only desperate people".[1] While the years that followed the National Party's (NP) rule were filled with trials and tribulations, the period of 1948 to 1991 was also marked by innovation and growth in almost all aspects of the country. However, most modern histories of South Africa focus on the recalling of those who suffered under NP rule, understandably so since the country's history is littered with injustices. But subjective retelling can cause blindness to developments that influenced the country and population to evolve the way it did. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the continuation of historical writing be based on unbiased grounds, to take full advantage of the opportunity to examine and learn from all aspects of South African history in order to adapt to an evolving society. The South African Defence Force (SADF) was particularly well-adept in adapting to its environment and adjusting its organizational structures accordingly. The institution, however, did not function on its own, but was influenced by numerous external and internal factors. Most academic and non-academic authors have written about the structure, strategy, experiences and development of the SADF, but some of these writings can be regarded as subjective to the experiences of those authors, or politically orientated or motivated, or predominantly focused on the military aspect of the SADF. This thesis does not aim to contradict those authors, but rather to contribute to such knowledge. By combining political, historical, social and military research materials, the objective of this thesis is to chart the interface of the theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus of the SADF during 1969-1989. Through investigating the South African White Papers on Defence and Armaments and various archival materials available in the Department of Defence Archives, it can be determined to what extent defence policy influenced the operational application of the South African Defence Force.

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[1] J. Muth, "Generaloberst Heinz Wilhelm Guderian", [Online.], http://www.achtungpanzer.com/gen2.htm, [Accessed 26 January 2021].

Oorsig

Konflikte in Suid-Afrika, soos in waarskynlik die meerderheid van ander gevalle, kan saamgevat word in die volgende aanhaling deur Heinz Guderian; "Daar is geen desperate situasies nie, slegs desperate mense".[2] Die jare van Nasionale Party (NP) se bewind, was gekenmerk deur verskeie beproewinge, maar die periode tussen 1948 en 1991 was ook gekenmerk deur verskeie innoverings in byna alle sektore van die land. Kontemporêre Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis is meer gesentreer op 'n hervertolking van gebeure vanuit die oogpunt van diegene wat gely het onder die Nasionale Party se bewind, aangesien Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis besaai is met onregmatighede en ongelykhede. Subjektiewe hervertolking kan egter die positiewe ontwikkelinge wat plaasgevind het versluier. Dus is dit uiters belangrik dat historiese werke onbevooroordeeld van uitgangspunt moet wees sodat historiese materiaal benut kan word om Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis te ondersoek tot voordeel van 'n ontwikkelende nasie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (SAW) was uiters aanpasbaar by die omgewings en organisasie struktuur waarin dit moes funksioneer. Die organisasie het egter nie in afsondering gefunksioneer nie, maar is beïnvloed deur talle interne en eksterne faktore. Daar is talle akademiese en nie-akademiese geskrifte beskikbaar oor die SAW, alhoewel sommige van hierdie werke polities georiënteer of gemotiveer kan wees of hoofsaaklik op die militêre aspekte van die SAW fokus. Hierdie tesis poog nie om sodanige skrywers te weerspreek nie, maar slegs om 'n addisionele bydrae tot die betrokke literatuur te maak. Deur politieke, historiese, sosiale en militêre navorsingsmateriaal te kombineer, poog die tesis om die koppelvlak van die SADF se teorie-beleid-strategie-struktuur- verbinding tussen 1969 en 1989 te belig. Deur Suid-Afrikaanse Witskrifte oor Verdediging en Wapenvervaardiging, asook verskeie ander argivale bronne, wat in die Departement van Verdediging se argiewe beskikbaar is te ondersoek, kan daar bepaal word tot watter mate die verdedigingsbeleid oor die operasionele toepassing van die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag gehad het.

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[2] J. Muth, "Generaloberst Heinz Wilhelm Guderian", [Online.], http://www.achtungpanzer.com/gen2.htm, [Accessed 26 January 2021].

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my loving mother and father, who provided me with constant support, understanding and encouragement. They inspired me to be courageous and have the willpower to pursue my passions in life. It is through them that I learnt that I could aspire to do anything.

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The pursuit of knowledge is never effortless and the journey is often troublesome. But when done well, your journey is filled with inspiring individuals who broaden both your mind and your heart. This thesis was inspired by the unheard voices, the constant social development of South Africa and the potential that our country could hold.

That being said, the assistance and graciousness of the following individuals and groups had an extreme impact on the creation and hopeful success of this effort:

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Table of Figures and Organograms

List of Abbreviations

ANC   African National Congress

AP   Afrikaner Party

ARMSCOR   Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation

BOSS   Bureau for State Security

CCB   Civil Co-operations Bureau

COIN   Counterinsurgency

DCC   Defence Command Council

DFAI   Foreign Affairs Intelligence

DMI   Directorate Military Intelligence

DONS   Department of National Strategy

DPC   Defence Planning Committee

DSC   Defence Staff Council

FAPLA   People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola

FNLA   National Front for the Liberation of Angola

Frelimo   Mozambique Liberation Front

GNP   Gross National Product

ICDTU   International Confederation of Free trade unions

MARNET   Military Area Radio Network

MID   Military Intelligence Division

MK   Umkhonto we Sizwe

MPLA   People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NI   National Intelligence

NIS   National Intelligence Service

NP   National Party

NSMS   National Security Management System

OAU   Organisation of African Unity

OPO   Ovamboland People's Organisation

PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SAAF	South African Air Force
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADF	South African Defence Force
SANNC	South African Native National Congress
SAP	South African Police
SCO	Subdivision of Communication Operations
SDU	Self Defence Unit
SMI	Subdivision Military Intelligence
SSC	State Security Council
SWA	South West Africa
SWANU	South West African National Union
SWATF	South West Africa Territorial Force
TNS	Total National Strategy
TREWITS	Anti-revolutionary information task team
UDF	Union Defence Force
UDF	United Democratic Front
UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USA	United States of America

Chapter One: Background to the study

Introduction

The precursor to the South African Defence Force was established on 1 July 1912 under Gen J.C. Smuts, the Union's first Minister of Defence. It was known as the *Unieverdedigingsmag* (UVM)/Union Defence Force (UDF).[3] In 1957, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was established in terms of a new Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957), following the Korean War and a review of the existing legislation.[4] The new Act essentially combined and enhanced the provisions of the preceding Defence Act of 1912, as well as the 1922 and 1932 amendments.[5]

The 1957 Defence Act was passed to facilitate changes that would serve the needs of an independent Republic of South Africa, since such an instrument had been absent from the legislation due to South Africa's commonwealth relationship with Britain.[6] Earlier in the year, Britain had formally handed over the Simon's Town naval base to the Union of South Africa, in terms of the Simon's Town Agreement, signed by the British Minister of Defence, Rt Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, and the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. F.C. Erasmus.[7]

The SADF was composed of the former Union Defence Force, and comprised Reserves, Commandos, the Citizen Force and the South African Permanent Force.[8] Between 1957 and 1959, it was subject to comprehensive reorganisation and restructuring, with further changes made in response to perceived external and internal environmental threats in the years following South Africa's departure from the British Commonwealth. Each change in government policy was accompanied by a refinement of defence strategies, which necessitated frequent structural changes in the SADF.

The year 1948 precipitated a complete shift in racial, cultural and economic dynamics in South Africa, when the National Party (NP), in alliance with the Afrikaner Party (AP), was elected on 28 May 1948.[9] Once in power, the NP developed the policy of Apartheid, founded on the

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[3] C. Nothling, *Kroniek van Die Suid-Afrikaanse Weermag (1912-1994),* Samhik, Pretoria, 2012, p. 8.

[4] W. A. Dorning, "A concise history of the South African Defence Force (1912-1987)", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, (17), (2), 1987, pp. 1-23.

[5] "South African Defence Force (SADF)", *SA History*, [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-defence-force-sadf [Accessed 13 February 2019].

[6] W. A. Dorning, "A concise history of the South African Defence Force (1912-1987)", *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, (17), (2), 1987, pp. 1-23.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] D. Welsh, *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, Jonathan Ball, Jeppestown, 2010, p. 1.

idea of segregation between races. This policy gave rise to internal political resistance and international criticism of the government, although, within the context of the Cold War, communism remained the primary concern of the Western world.[10] This study focuses primarily on the period 1969 to 1989, during which South Africa faced a conglomerate of domestic and international threats as perceived by the NP.

There are few words that accurately encapsulate the Apartheid system; however, George Orwell captures the combination of raw power and social engineering at its heart: *"Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again in new shapes of your own choosing"*.[11]

Apartheid was "successful" in three respects: Firstly, psychologically; it kept the races in South Africa separate both physically and emotionally, through its laws and the effective use of propaganda. The African National Congress (ANC) – not the only opposing force at the time but arguably the most prominent – would use similar tactics in the years to come.[12] Secondly, economically, during the 1960s and 1970s, apartheid amounted to a "cargo cult" on an impressive scale, proving highly lucrative for the white population.[13] It was not, of course, sustainable and the economy began to falter in the 1990s. The third and most prominent aspect of its success was its highly efficient defence force which provided the power needed to maintain the NP's position in government.[14] The NP's slogan "Unity in Strength" appeared on all its White Papers on Defence. With a strong economy and military power, South Africa became the regional superpower on the African continent while still maintaining its status as a "moral pygmy".

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was established on 8 January 1912 in Bloemfontein, and renamed the ANC in 1923. In its early stages, the ANC was characterised by power struggles, political stagnation and a severe lack of resources, yet the cumulative effects of repression by the white minority galvanised the party.[15] The ANC was the leading organisation of the freedom struggle against the injustices of the Apartheid system, having its

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[10] I. Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, Jonathan Ball, Jeppestown, 2015, p. 239.

[11] G. Orwell, *Nineteen eighty-four,* Penguin, London, 2009, p. 336.

[12] Further elaboration on other key players will follow in the study due to longevity and complexity of the subject matter. However other key players would include the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) and the People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA).

[13] P. Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010,* Brassey's UK, England, 1990, p. 4.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 341.

own military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation). Although *Umkhonto we Sizwe* - generally known as MK- received assistance and resources from communist supporters such as the Soviet Union, it was evident that few ANC members enjoyed the benefits of formal military training. The lack of formally trained soldiers resulted in a severe tactical disadvantage for the ANC in comparison with their opposition, the SADF.[16] The ANC therefore had to seek alternative methods of building strength, which it found in the form of widespread international support for its cause.

The ANC relied heavily on propaganda and their international image, in some cases inciting fear into black South Africans to persuade them to participate in the struggle for freedom.[17] The SADF also used propaganda, particularly through its Hearts and Minds campaign, presented in various White Papers on Defence. Through the Hearts and Minds campaign it became involved in peaceful projects such as the provision of medical care in townships, and various forms of structural development in remote areas.[18]

In the 1980s, the country's cultural, socio-economic and political policies reached a climax, when three threats, two external and one internal, occurred simultaneously. The government's response to these three threats or conflicts, each with its own strategies and characteristics, became intertwined with one another, having a common purpose and necessitating a sharing of resources. The first and most prominent threat was the continued struggle for equality and freedom in South Africa against Apartheid, a struggle that would last until 1994. The second was the national liberation wars fought in Angola, Mozambique (1961-1975) and the Rhodesian "Bush War" (1964-1980), and the third was the struggle for the independence of South West Africa (SWA), known as the South African Border War (1966-1989). The latter two conflicts were embedded within the global, ideological struggle of the Cold War.[19]

Along with the rest of the world, South Africa found itself in a precarious situation after World War II, as the Cold War intensified and countries began aligning themselves ideologically. The threat of a nuclear holocaust loomed large for all. After the formation of the United Nations (UN) on 26 June 1945 (in which Jan Smuts played an active role, drafting the preamble to the UN Charter), communist groups began to emerge in many countries. Strikes and unrests in

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[16] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010,* p. 345.
[17] A. Jeffery, *People's War, New Light on the Struggle for South Africa,* Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 2009, p. 21.
[18] J. A. Stemmet, "Troops, Townships and Tribulations: Deployment of the South African Defence Force in the Township Unrest of the 1980s", *Journal for Contemporary History*, (31), (2), 2006, pp. 178-193.
[19] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa,* p. 265.

France and Italy, and the communist takeover in China in 1949, fuelled the Western world's fear of communism.[20] In 1950, the South African government banned all actual and apparent communist groups, including the South African Communist Party (SACP). This wave of ideological conflict coincided with the decolonisation of Africa, with Ghana the first to receive independence in 1957. Many other African states followed, the newly independent countries drawing much interest from the great powers who saw them as possible allies in the Cold War. Africa is, of course, rich in resources and strategically located geographically, making it an ideal playing ground in the global power struggle.[21]

On 5 April 1966, South Africa saw the beginning of the rise of the so-called securocrats[22] with the appointment of P.W. Botha as Minister of Defence.[23] In his capacity as head of defence, he developed a specific ideological stance on the South African threat agenda, extending this ideology into the era when he served as both Prime Minister and State President. The defence and structural changes that arose from this threat agenda were expressed for the first time in the 1969 White Paper on Defence.

Botha became the eighth Prime Minister of South Africa on 28 September 1978, retaining the defence portfolio until October 1980.[24] As head of two such influential portfolios, he wielded enormous power. With the appointment of Gen Magnus Malan as Minister of Defence in 1980, the position of the securocrats in government was solidified.[25] Malan's mission was to adapt the structure and policies of the SADF so that they were in accordance with the NP threat agenda of the Botha administration. During this time, domestic political unrest in South Africa increased to levels not previously experienced and the government responded accordingly.

Literature Review

A plethora of literature on the SADF exists, and even more on the political, social and economic environment of South Africa during the Apartheid era. The volume of perspectives, theories and opinions that saturate this field of interest makes it both accessible and difficult for the researcher, due to the widely varying ideologies, motivations and levels of research quality.

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[20] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa,* p. 216.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[22] The term securocrat refers to a military or police individual who has an influential position in government. It also indicated a close relationship between security forces and government and was term often used by both P.W Botha and Magnus Malan.
[23] H. Hamann, *Days of the Generals*, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2001, p. 50.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Some are personal accounts; others are purely factual and there are several that relate the events of the time from the perspective of a particular political party. Amongst the vast array of literature covering the period, some publications stand out for the comprehensiveness of the information presented. However, despite their comprehensiveness, certain key features are lacking in all.

The ideas of Gen André Beaufre's as outlined in *Introduction to Strategy* (1965) and Col John J. McCuen's as discussed in *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (1966) are being used as theoretical basis for explaining the strategic framework and outlook of the Apartheid government and the SADF. Theorists such as Liddell Hart, Sun Tzu, Jomini and others may provide some interesting insights into the strategic behaviour of the government and its military at the time. Leopold Scholtz, for example, utilises the ideas of Liddell Hart on the indirect approach quite eloquently in his analysis of the conventional operations of the SADF against the Angolan-Cuban forces in Angola in the latter part of the 1980s.[26] For the purposes of this study, the focus, however, is on Beaufre and McCuen; and for two reasons. Firstly, these two theorists were studied by the South African strategists at the time and was instrumental in shaping their strategic outlook of the world. Secondly, these two theorists profoundly influenced both the policy of the government and the operational framework of the SADF in the 1970s and 80s.

Policy and strategy go hand in hand. The former may be described as a deliberate system of principles that guides decisions to achieve rational outcomes. As for the latter, in the case of war or defence, is best described in Beaufre's words: strategy is "the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the end set by political policy".[27] Beaufre's *Introduction to Strategy* describes the pattern of five historical strategies, one being that of Mao Zedong, in which parallels may be found with the ANC's strategies in waging a people's war against the NP.[28] He mentions the importance of policy and its relationship with strategy, stating that the latter serves to fulfil the objectives of the former. His analysis, of course, was coloured by the reality of the nuclear threat. For South Africa, and many in the international community, communism was at the root of this threat.[29]

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[26] L. Scholtz, "Cuito Cuanavale - Wie het Werklik Gewen? 'n Strategiese en Operasionele Ontleding", *Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies*, (28), (1), 1998, pp. 1-199.
[27] A. Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy,* Faber & Faber, London 1965, p. 22.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 26.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 24.

Policy is relatively stable and enduring with relatively small and incremental changes over time; strategy, in contrast, is quite flexible and developed in accordance with the current threat or state of a country, and is easily adjustable to new or unforeseen circumstances. To date, little has been written about how the policy and strategic frameworks of the NP government were translated into the structural, institutional and operational realities of the SADF.

Mao Zedong saw policy as the starting point of a revolutionary party and of all practical actions. Policy thus manifests itself in the process and in the end.[30] Like Beaufre, McCuen adopts Mao Zedong's four-stage revolutionary strategy as a model, but co-opts and adapts them for his four stages of counterinsurgency. The importance of McCuen's book is that he emphasises that these stages may all occur simultaneously. Like numerous authors, both Beaufre and McCuen discuss policy and strategy separately, interpreting each one philosophically. However, a general discussion on each topic separately does not lend itself to easy application in a case study on an entity such as the SADF; it merely creates a foundation for further research, which this study aims to deliver.

The next components of operational success of the SADF to look at would be structure and strategy implementation, on which, once again, much has been written with respect to events in South Africa between 1969 and 1989. The high number of publications can constitute a minefield for the researcher but fortunately, as in the case of Beaufre and McCuen, some stand out for their quality of research. Among these are Ian van der Waag's *a Military History of Modern South Africa* (2015), categorised as South African military history, and Chris Alden's *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State* (1996), focussing on wars and operations. Leopold Scholtz's book, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989* (2013) has a similar focus and is also worthy of mention.

Van der Waag (2015) presents an updated, detailed history and analysis of the Defence Force, broad in scope and not confined to one aspect only. The most valuable section of Van der Waag's book, from a researcher's point of view, is the impressive resource list, directing the reader to further reading. Alden (1996) highlights the role of Botha's administration in the transition process, making frequent mention of the various White Papers that gave effect to policy. He describes the strategic and political manoeuvring of South Africa during the peak conflict period of 1976 to 1990, and Botha's "Total Strategy", emphasising Botha's extensive

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[30] M. Zedong, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, People's Liberation Army General Political Department, China, 1964, p. 5.

use of theoretical literature in formulating this strategy. He specifically discusses the development of the 1977 White Paper and the announcement of "total war" in South Africa.[31] Alden discusses many key aspects of the period, from Botha's prominent role as Minister of Defence to the external and internal conflicts that South Africa faced at the time. He particularly focusses on the failures of both state and military, rarely touching on the success of policy implementation, or strategic and structural development.[32] One other publication with the same level of credibility is *African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010* (1990) by Paul Moorcraft. It gives a detailed description of events, focusing primarily on external conflict during the period.

The problem with the publications mentioned, from this researcher's point of view, is that they lack balance in their discussions, focussing either on the successes of the SADF and refusing to expose its failures, or on the failures of the SADF, refusing to acknowledge its successes. Moorcraft's book, for example, which is very useful for reference purposes, much like Van der Waag's book, has a particular bias in favour of some of the individuals he chose to interview.[33] He also relies heavily on newspaper articles, which in itself is problematic due to their lack of objectivity. In most cases they simply reflect the period during which they were written in.

As to the aforementioned three threats, journalist Leopold Scholtz provides insight regarding the Apartheid governments outlook on military strategy and doctrine in his book *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*,[34] as does Magnus Malan in *My Life with the SA Defence Force* (2006).[35] Malan's book may be categorised under biographies and autobiographies pertaining to the period and is certainly not the only publication of this type. The field is in fact saturated with personal accounts of the SADF, such as *Recce* (2015) by Koos Stadler, *Days of the Generals* (2001) by Hilton Hamman and publications by other writers such as Jannie Geldenhuys and Roland de Vries. These personal accounts yield valuable insight into the culture of the SADF. None of these publications, however, analise how the SADF translated theory into strategy and structure.

On the other side of the political spectrum, Anthea Jeffrey's book *People's War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa* (2009) provides insight into the ANC's actions and strategies at

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[31] C. Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State,* Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1996, p. 46.
[32] *Ibid.,* p. 263.
[33] Members such as Ken Flower.
[34] L. Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989,* Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2013.
[35] M. Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force*, Protea Book House, Pretoria, 2006.

the time. This book is meticulously researched and compiled and the writing is objective, providing a more detailed account and a greater variety of perspectives on the ANC than many other ANC-inclined publications such as *The Road to Democracy, Vols. 1-6* (2010) by the South African Education Trust. These volumes document the historical events leading to democracy in South Africa extensively, and certainly, the series provides more insight into the ANC's struggle for liberation than on the thinking and strategies of the NP government and therefore, despite the excellence of its research, cannot be considered objective. From a tactical and operational perspective, Stephen Ellis' book *External Mission: The ANC in Exile 1960–1990*, provides some interesting insights into the ANC's organisational approaches to the struggle against apartheid. The book is also quite descriptive in demarcating some of the institutional failures and brutalities of the ANC in exile.[36]

The number of publications on the SADF and its troop units, and the general South African environment during the Apartheid era, is astonishing. The majority contain fragments and biased discussions of the theory, policy, strategy and structures of the military at the time and it would seem that no coherent single publication exists on the SADF's theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus.

Apart from secondary sources, one valuable primary source is of great value in yielding information on the topic – the South African White Papers of 1969 to 1989. These provide a fact-based understanding of the apartheid government's perception of the threat.

A White Paper may be defined as a broad statement of government policy. It follows after a Green Paper, which is a more generalised discussion paper. The White Paper is drafted by the relevant department, which for the purposes of this study was the Department of Defence. It is presented to parliament for discussion and, once approved by cabinet, forms the basis for a bill, which once passed, becomes an Act of Parliament. The White Paper is typically published for information purposes as a summary of government plans on topics of significance.[37]

White Papers are of great value to historians, as they are recordings of issues that were topical during a period under investigation and provide understanding on what the government of the day deemed to be threats. More importantly, they provide perspective on how a government planned to respond to such threats. This study discusses eleven important White Papers tabled between 1969 and 1989, with the aim of understanding the threat perspective of the apartheid

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[36] S. Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile,* Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 2012.
[37] J. A. Pershing, "White Paper", *Performance Improvement,* (54), (8), 2015, p. 2.

government. It investigates the policy, how the government intended to address various threats, and how they managed the trade-offs between responses to the various threats. All except one of these papers cover defence and armaments.

The 1988 White Paper was the first historical White Paper drafted by the Minister of Law and Order on the organisation and functioning of the South African Police. A closer scrutiny of this and all subsequent papers proves to be of value for an understanding of the SADF because similarities become apparent between the structural and defence approaches of the South African Police (SAP) and the SADF, especially regarding revolutionary conflicts.[38]

Very specific, clear reasoning and theory underpinned the defence White Papers and policy changes issued after the 1969 White Paper on Defence. As mentioned, Botha had a fixed view on the South African threat agenda, and the White Papers after 1969 were a clear embodiment of these views, generally shared by all in the NP. A 1964/1965 White Paper recognised the instability of international politics and, as a result, a military strategy was devised for all possible threats to South Africa. It was decided, upon analysis, that adjustments needed to be made to the SADF.[39] A 1965/1967 White Paper recognised organisational and structural deficiencies in the SADF, but focused on minor strategic adjustments towards countering the current threats.

In contrast, the 1969 White Paper on Defence may be seen as the start of a series of bold defence developments, the first being the establishment of a larger force in an effort to protect South African interests. This White Paper identified two weaknesses, namely the lack of protection for the coastline, ports, and national key points in South Africa, and the lack of a national service system.[40] Up until 1977, the White Papers on Defence discussed the increasing threat of terrorism both internally and externally, and proposed solutions. The first mention of a Total Strategy was formulated in the 1973 White Paper on Defence, where Botha acknowledged that the concept needed refinement in order to develop an inclusive response.[41]

Accordingly, the 1977 White Paper on Defence presented a comprehensive Total Onslaught Strategy, indicating a clear intention to combat external revolutionary forces while

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[38] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Organisation and Functions of The South African Police*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1988.
[39] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973.
[40] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969.
[41] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 38.

simultaneously engaging in various practical domestic transformations.[42] An analysis of these White Papers supports Beaufre's observation that the nature of the global strategy against communism influenced the NP's strategic approach. This same observation was made by McCuen's concept of revolutionary warfare in his book *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare.*

After the implementation of the 1977 White Paper on Defence, it was clear that the SADF had committed itself to the concept of Total Strategy. The idea sparked the imagination; for many South Africans, the threat of an unconventional enemy and onslaught against the Republic now had concrete form.[43] In using the concept of a Total Strategy, the NP revealed the impact that years of British rule had left on the country's psyche and the influence of the United States of America (USA). Only these two countries had formulated or implemented policies as part of a total national strategy against an unconventional enemy and ultimately communism.[44]

From 1977 until 1989, almost all defence-related White Papers tabled for discussion supported and expanded on the 1977 White Paper on Defence, most suggesting structural changes within the SADF. The 1979 White Paper on Defence, for instance, stressed the importance of expanding the permanent force and providing more benefits for SADF employees to make the military a viable employment option for the younger generation. Another noteworthy adjustment to the running of the SADF was the introduction of chaplains' services to "spread the Word of God" to all SADF members.[45] This played a role in the development of a unified identity, particularly amongst the Afrikaner faction of South Africa.

Besides the SAP 1988 White Paper and the 1984 White Paper on Defence, all other White Papers were created to support and align with the 1977 White Paper on Defence. In 1984, two White Papers were presented which were particularly extensive, one being the White Paper on *Defence and Armament Supply* and the other, the White Paper on *The Organisation of the South African Defence Force and the Armament Corporation of South Africa*.[46] The latter was an elaborate and detailed explanation by Malan of "certain" practices, procedures and activities that the SADF was conducting and in which parliament "might" have been interested.[47]

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[42] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa,* p. 250.
[43] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 49.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[45] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979.
[46] Republic of South Africa, *The Organisation of the South African Defence Force and the Armament Corporation of South Africa,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. V.

Focus and Aims of the Study

The above review highlights some of this study's areas of interest. The intention is to map the interface of the theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus of the SADF from 1969 to 1989 in order to explain the operational application of the SADF in that period. The study will contribute to the body of literature on South African military policy and strategy. Through focusing strictly on how theory led to policy, policy led to strategy and strategy led to structures in the SADF during this period, and how these factors enhanced the operational application of the Defence Force.

The effectiveness of a defence force is difficult to determine since there are numerous variables to consider. This study will consider the structure and strategy of the SADF in the light of national and international events to establish context and rationale for the changes made. Previous research has focused on certain perspectives, whether political or military, but few have combined all factors into a coherent, fact-based narrative to provide a historical context for the processes that led to the operational success of the South African Defence Force.

Limitations

When basing research on primary sources, there is always the challenge of weaving a vast array of factual material – and in this case, data from two disciplines, history and military science – into a coherent, interesting and balanced narrative. Documents pertaining to the budget of the SADF between 1957 and 1967 proved to be difficult to find; they are housed in the Department of Defence archives in Pretoria, and would have to have been retrieved in person. The obstacle was not insurmountable, however, the researcher found alternative documentation that supplied the data needed on the expansion and growth of allocated resources of the SADF. This will provide a foundation to indicate how much the budget grew specifically for the defence of South Africa.

Methodology

The thesis is a descriptive historical analysis based primarily on qualitative data collected from Government Publications, the White Papers on Defence and Armament, as well as some archival material collected from the Department of Defence Archives and a private collection. A variety of archival groups have been consulted, including that of the Chief of General Staff, Groups 1 and 2, Diverse Group 1 and 2, Military Intelligence Diverse Group 28, Chief of the

SA Defence Force Group 2, 3 Vol 1, the Military Intelligence Coms Directorate Group 8 and various others.

In order to contextualise the study and outline the theoretical foundation of the defence policies at the time, the study depends on a wide variety of secondary sources as well. As mentioned, two books of primary concern in this regard are Beaufre's *Introduction to Strategy,* and McCuen's *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War.* Other secondary publications such as journal articles were also consulted to provide context and deepen the understanding of the relevant theory and structures.

Chapter Two: The Theoretical Foundation of the SADF Doctrine

The end of the Second World War (WWII) marked the dawn of a new era, an epoch of rapid universal transformation of societies, economies, politics and the practice of war. With the emergence of the modern age, a global divide between Western liberal and Eastern communist ideology rapidly grew, which affected almost every country in the world, including South Africa. The global stage had been set for conflict between communism and liberal democracy. Simultaneously South Africa faced accelerated socio-economic and political changes. In 1948 the newly elected NP government institutionalised the system of Apartheid, which set in motion an escalation in tension amongst the races, particularly between Black and White.[48]

As conflict emerged in South and Southern Africa in the beginning of the 1960s, it became evident that administrative changes had to be made to combat the numerous threats perceived by the NP. This set the scene for the development of new defence policies and the reorganisation of the SADF. On 5 April 1966, Mr P.W. Botha was appointed as the Minister of Defence. His appointment brought an innovative military outlook and resulted in policy and fundamental structural changes in the SADF that paralleled the national administrative changes. The policy changes drove strategic, structural and doctrinal changes within the SADF. This chapter discusses the dynamics underpinning these developments by addressing the changing nature of conflict, the theoretical framework that shaped South African defence thinking, as well as the development of countermeasures against the growing threat of insurgency in Southern Africa.

1. The Nature of the Conflict

Regular conventional war became less fashionable in the age of decolonisation. These conflicts were predominantly irregular in nature, but became increasingly volatile. More specifically, the wars of decolonisation, especially in Africa, saw the revival of revolutionary warfare. Historically, revolutionary warfare has often been referred to as insurgency, unconventional, irregular and special warfare. More recently, these wars are described as asymmetrical, fourth generation, or hybrid wars.[49] For the purpose of this study the term "revolutionary warfare" is

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[48] A. Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009, p. 17.
[49] L. Herta, "Hybrid Warfare – A Form Of Asymmetric Conflict", *International Conference Knowledge-Based Organization,* (23), (1), 2017, pp. 135–143.

used, in keeping with the convention of John J. McCuen in his book *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*.[50]

There is no official global definition of revolutionary warfare but it can be described as an "aggression from the outside".[51] It is a common agreement that there are certain fixed rules and principles to identifying revolutionary wars but ultimately no two are the same. In a conventional war, there is a geographic region as a chosen battlefield. In revolutionary warfare, however, the population is often both battlefield and weapon acting as pawns for the revolutionary groups in advancing their agenda.[52] Unlike conventional warfare, revolutionary warfare can often be dragged out and be excruciatingly long in order to achieve the objectives of the revolutionary forces by disintegrating the morale of the opposition.[53] It is exceedingly adaptable; however, it still requires precision planning and coordination of actions in any given field that may lead to a strategic advantage, usually in outlasting the opponent. Revolutionary warfare typically aims to challenge the political status quo. It unfolds in the political, economic, military, police, administrative or social domains and has its aim at the collapse and replacement of a government.[54]

Revolutionary forces use any means necessary to achieve their goal. Normally, their best, if not most valuable resource, is the population of the country. The population serves two purposes. Firstly, as an irregular soldier, the insurgent hides within the population. Secondly, if the majority of the population could be "inspired"[55] to share the same credence or belief in the revolutionary cause, the insurgent movement effectively has an endless supply of human resources. As a result, revolutionary warfare often unfolds as a competition between the insurgents and government forces for the support of the population and the legitimacy of their cause.[56]

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[50] J. J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* Faber & Faber, London, 1966, p. 19.

[51] C. A. Fraser, "Unconventional Warfare, Revolutionary Warfare", *Koers,* (36), (2), 1968, pp. 136-147.

[52] C. A. Woodward, *Understanding Revolution in South Africa*, Juta, Cape Town, 1983, p. 4.

[53] A. C. Janos, "Unconventional Warfare: Framework and Analysis", *World Politics,* (15), (4), 1963, pp. 636-646.

[54] C. A. Fraser, "Unconventional Warfare, Revolutionary Warfare", *Koers,* (36), (2), 1968, pp. 136-147.

[55] In some cases, inspiration would be given through the use of force or threats.

[56] C. A. Fraser, "Unconventional Warfare, Revolutionary Warfare", *Koers,* (36), (2), 1968, pp. 136-147.

2. Constructing a Defence Strategy

In the 1960s and with the unfolding of the process of decolonisation in Africa, theorists such as André Beaufre, focused increasingly on the conceptual analysis of revolutionary warfare in the context of the Cold War. In South Africa, the writings of McCuen and Beaufre were to become fundamental in the development of its counter-revolutionary thinking and strategy. Beaufre was a French general who had previously served in Indo-China, Algeria and Morocco. His experiences and intimate knowledge of the Third World made him an expert in counter-revolutionary warfare. In 1968, Gen Magnus Malan attended a series of lectures on Strategic Studies by professors Deon Fourie and Ben Cockram at the SADF's Staff College. This lecture series was organised by Lt Gen C. F. Fraser after his return from France as a military attaché. Both Fraser and Fourie were extremely impressed by Beaufre's approach and development of the idea of a "total" strategy in light of the Cold War.[57] It was during 1968 that Fourie produced what has been the first known domestic strategic analysis of South Africa that employed Beaufrian concepts.[58]

Gradually, senior officers of all the services were exposed to these Beaufrian ideas at the Staff Colleges of the SADF. The topic was of great value, and it soon developed a following that not only included Fraser but also Botha and Adm Henk Biermann.[59] At the time, Botha served as Minister of Defence appointed by Prime Minister B. J. Vorster in 1966 and Biermann served as the Chief of the Navy from 1952 to 1972. Biermann later became the first naval officer to serve as Chief of the South African Defence Force from 1972 to 1976.[60] In 1974, Beaufre visited South Africa and offered, what he thought to be a thorough strategic solution for the conflicts and strategic situation confronting the South African government.

The ideas and scholarly approach of McCuen to revolutionary warfare is of a more operational and pragmatic nature. McCuen focuses on counter-revolutionary warfare from the vantage point of the strategic challenge that confronted the USA in Vietnam. His book was published in 1966, less than two years after the Gulf of Tonkin incident that drew the USA into the war in Vietnam. His views were grounded, mainly, on American special operations and the USA's early experience in Vietnam.[61]

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[57] A. Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 1996, p. 133.
[58] *Ibid*.
[59] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 269.
[60] "Fact File: Chiefs of the SANDF, past and present", *Defence web*, [Online.], https://www.defenceweb.co.za/resources/fact-files/fact-file-chiefs-of-the-sandfpast-and-present/?catid=79%3Afact-files&Itemid=159 [Accessed 10 July 2020].
[61] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa,* p 140.

The 1960s was the peak period for counter-revolutionary related literature. It was therefore no surprise that McCuen's book was an attractive option for coming to grips with the theory behind guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. For the Minister of Defence and the SADF who wanted to solve bureaucratic infighting during counterinsurgency, both Beaufre and McCuen were a seamless blend.[62] At the time, South Africa was facing its own brand of revolutionary forces in the national liberation wars that were being waged in Angola and Mozambique (1961-1975), the Rhodesian "Bush war" (1964-1980), the South African Border War (1966-1989) and the continued struggle for freedom in South Africa itself. The NP government confronted a growing problem of resistance movements across Southern Africa that necessitated a comprehensive understanding of counterinsurgency. Although the SADF was known for being innovative and adaptable, much of its development in counter-revolutionary doctrine was rooted in trial and error. But the inception of counter-revolutionary measures came from McCuen's book and could be deemed a good starting point in late 1960s and early 1970s for the SADF's own theoretical conceptualisation and practical exploration of counter-revolutionary war.[63]

The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War by McCuen and *Introduction to Strategy* by Beaufre, in particular, were used as the theoretical basis for strategic and structural changes in the SADF. *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* shaped SADF counterinsurgency thinking and was used as a guide for operational development for doctrine and training in the SADF. The focus of *Introduction to Strategy* by Beaufre was more strategic in nature and served as a basis for defence planning and security thinking, that eventually unfolded in the development of a national security strategy by the NP government from 1968 onwards. Thus, the ideas of both McCuen and Beaufre ought to be unpacked for an understanding of the NP government's idea of a total onslaught, the need for a total strategy, and the operationalising of these notions.[64]

The ideas of these two authors were essential in shaping Apartheid security thinking and the operational conceptualisation of counterinsurgency military action in the SADF. The question of how successfully these concepts were operationalised and applied, as well as to what extent they shaped South African defence, security, and military action at the time, remains. In order to answer this question in subsequent chapters, the content and nature of both Beaufre and McCuen's ideas are discussed.

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[62] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa,* p. 140.
[63] *Ibid.,* p. 141.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 279.

2.1. Beaufre: An Introduction to Strategy

Introduction to Strategy was written in the context of the Cold War and aimed at understanding and addressing the nature of the problems that emanated from it. The experience of the French in Indo-China and Algiers in the late 1950s was instrumental in the shaping of the ideas of Beaufre. Of course, the increasing use of low-intensity revolutionary warfare as a pathway toward decolonisation in Africa was an ideal means to communism in the context of the Cold War. At the time, the book provided Western governments with a framework for the development and understanding of strategy to counter these emerging revolutionary forces. The influence of the Cold War spread to developing countries in the form of proxy wars and necessitated a new approach to national security. The Cold War meant that the Third World was no longer a spectator to a global struggle for power, but a valuable and active participant.

Strategy is a prominent factor in counter-revolutionary warfare and can dictate both defeat or success, as McCuen stated: "failure of the governing authorities to act in time will allow the revolutionaries to implant their organization and initiate terrorism in an effort to break the government's control of the population".[65] Similarly, Beaufre indicated that a strategy must be adapted continuously to changing circumstances and new threats in order to combat the enemy successfully. Creating a successful strategy demands understanding the essence of strategy, particularly a national strategy, to combat any force and Beaufre illustrates this in *Introduction to Strategy*.

2.1.1. Beaufre: The art of (total) strategy

Beaufre defines strategy as the art of the dialect of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute. He also notes that strategy is "…the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution towards achieving the ends set by political policy".[66] The purpose of strategy would thus be to fulfil the objectives presented by policy and optimally utilising the resources available. These objectives could be the following: defensive (the protection of interests), offensive (conquest) or the maintenance of the political status quo.[67] Through the utilisation of the White Papers, the progression of security objectives will be evaluated contextually with regard to the threats that the NP regime perceived and experienced.

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[65] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 128.
[66] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy,* p. 22.
[67] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

The desired outcome of the strategy could be to compel the enemy to accept the terms proposed by the government. This could be achieved by establishing and then manipulating a situation to result in satisfactory moral collapse of the enemy, or in this case the revolutionary forces.[68]

Choosing and harnessing the correct means for a combined effort could supply enough psychological pressure to achieve the moral effect required for achieving the objective. However, in order to choose the correct or most suitable means to enforce your will on the security situation, its vulnerabilities of opposing strategic entities have to be comprehended fully. If the issues presented are minor, then the mere use of propaganda might be sufficient. However, a more complicated stature of conflict might call for other means, in order to enforce your will, such as the use or the threat to use force.[69]

From a revolutionary perspective, Beaufre argues, the use of forceful actions would most definitely include revolutionary uprisings, prolonged guerrilla campaigns and other actions that would attract attention from the international arena as previously mentioned. The revolutionary forces' reaction might be national or international, political, psychological, economic or military orientated and therefore, each successive counterstrategy must be structured into a coherent whole with the objective of pursuing the strategic plan, in spite of resistance of the revolutionary forces.[70] It is therefore important for any opposing force to form a strategic plan that takes into account all events that led up to the conflict, as well as an adaptable strategy to counter the enemy forces. Both McCuen and Beaufre based their theoretical analyses in the context of a threat or enemy as per their experiences. Strategy as a concept has evolved to the point where it is part of the decision-making process regarding the effective utilisation of resources to reach objectives in an adversarial and competitive environment.

The fundamental areas to focus on in the counter-revolutionary strategy would be diplomacy, economics, politics and military matters, combined to make one total strategy, according to Beaufre.[71] He also states that in accordance with the idea of a total strategy, it is pertinent for any force, revolutionary or government, to have a realistic view of the influence that the international situation has upon their own liberty of action. It is also a vital element of any

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[68] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy,* p. 24.
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] *Ibid.,* p. 25.
[71] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy,* p. 31.

strategy.[72] This will be evident once discussion takes place regarding the South African government and the establishment of their Total National Strategy (TNS) in the chapters to come.

Depending on the resources available, various strategic plans or approaches can be executed. However, Beaufre found that strategic plans can ultimately be divided into two modes. One being direct strategy, which entails the use of military forces as the primary instrument of strategy and that deterrence or victory over the revolutionary forces will be achieved primarily through the use or sustainment of the military. This is what is referred to in more recent literature about counterinsurgency as the kinetic approach. This is the strategy that Clausewitz explains in simple terms as the rational application of force.[73] The other mode is indirect strategy, which uses both military and non-military actions in spheres such as politics, economics and diplomacy. This particular mode has become increasingly popular in revolutionary wars and is explained in more recent debates on counterinsurgency as the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive or indirect approach was the preferred method during the Cold War and has gained popularity since then. The direct mode of war has been paralyzed through the fear of mutual destruction underpinning the possible deployment of nuclear weapons.[74] This reverts to the indiscriminate use of force.

Beaufre also outlined two different manoeuvres, what he refers to as, manoeuvres applicable to the implementation of either direct or indirect strategy. The first is an "exterior manoeuvre" which is the employment of the indirect strategy in the spheres of economy, diplomacy and politics in the sphere of foreign policy and, military force to incapacitate the revolutionary forces through discreditation and delegitimising of the revolutionary forces. The second is the "interior manoeuvre" which consists of the subtle implementation of both indirect and direct strategy in the domestic environment.[75]

As previously mentioned, French strategists believed that the government would have enough instruments to facilitate management and organization of a comprehensive defence strategy against the insurgent and should not require outside involvement. However, Beaufre did not believe in military supremacy and emphasised the need for the armed forces to be subordinate to a higher political and civilian authority. Essentially, making them subject to the government

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[72] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy,* p. 26.
[73] *Ibid.,* p. 43.
[74] *Ibid.,* p. 44.
[75] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 271.

and to operationalise the Clausewitzian idea that "war is a continuation of policy by other means".[76]

Beaufre's concept of "total strategy" informs the formulation of the South African governments' TNS, if not reproduced verbatim.[77] It also constitutes the basis for the outline and the explanation of the threat agenda in terms of a total onslaught. The scholarly and theoretical ideas of Beaufre, together with practical example and experience of revolutionary war in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and SWA, shaped the South African policy and strategic domain in terms of the strategic approach of the South African government.[78]

2.2. McCuen: The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

In *the Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* McCuen introduced a four-phased concept of revolutionary warfare. His logical division of the concept followed from the ideas of Mao Zedong and other revolutionary leaders. The author highlights the nature of revolutionary war as unfolding in four clearly identifiable phases: the organization phase, the terrorism phase, guerrilla phase and mobile phase.[79] McCuen makes it evident that these phases occur individually, overlap, occur simultaneously and in any specific order across a country, essentially, like revolutionary war, being unpredictable.[80] McCuen's theory is developed from the perspective of an "indigenous government dealing with an insurgency" and not "any supporting government wondering apply its often irrelevant power and resources".[81]

Revolutionary war, McCuen noted, is not a new form of war: in fact, it is a form of war that is as old as war itself. Protracted revolutionary warfare in the context of the Cold War was described by McCuen at the time as "…a radically new application and combination of old military, political and psychological principles and techniques".[82] Although revolutionary war has a set of clearly defined principles and strategies, McCuen notes that these principles and strategies might be altered in accordance with the situation and the geographic region where the conflict takes place. A government, as was the case with South Africa, can easily adapt to

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[76] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 134.
[77] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 10.
[78] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production,* 1977.
[79] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 17.
[80] *Ibid.*
[81] *Ibid.,* p. 17.
[82] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 28.

deal with a revolutionary scenario. However, a government must make a careful estimation of the situation in order to combat these enemy forces successfully.[83]

In fighting a counter-revolutionary campaign, government forces ought to keep in mind that the revolutionary forces are "for the people" or their attempts are for a "just cause". This method has gathered a significant amount of sympathetic support from foreign parties and is a key factor in a successful revolutionary war.

2.2.1. The Phases of Revolutionary War

Understanding the various phases is vital to grasp why and how revolutionary forces behave themselves. The application and counter-strategy will be discussed further in the study using the ANC and SADF as an example. In order for revolutionary forces to win a "strategically protracted war", McCuen argues that they need to reverse the power relationship by focusing on the revolutionaries' strength and exhausting it. This can be achieved by building their power through the mobilization of the people and acquiring resources which can then be utilized. These resources and support can reinforce governments to participate in various battles and continued campaigns against the revolutionary forces. "Outside support" as mentioned before is a key factor and can come in the form of political or military support.[84]

The Organizational phase of Revolutionary War

The first phase of a protracted revolutionary war is the organizational phase: revolutionary forces, according to McCuen, start from nothing but an idea or political doctrine in most cases. Building the revolutionary effort, requires the organization of cells, membership of the organisation, and the establishment of extended groups, which in turn will garner popular support through propaganda and other, often violent, means.[85] This often includes front organizations, the penetration of labour movements and use of strikes to create the impression of ungovernability, and the infiltration of groups such as youth movements, armed forces, police and any other possible power centre. Agents will be sought in these power centres to gather intelligence about the enemy. This is a perfect example of using any means necessary in order to undermine the government of the day and its security. However, as the revolutionary forces encounter numerous counter-strikes from government forces, they will continuously adjust their strategy and adapt their organisation. This will result in a more experienced and

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[83] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 28.
[84] *Ibid.,* p. 30.
[85] *Ibid.*

solidified force. As the struggle for political power continues, the measures will continue to become all the more extreme.[86]

The Terrorism phase of Revolutionary War

The second phase of revolutionary war is known as terrorism and necessitates the use of terror against the population and government. Terrorism is deemed necessary for revolutionary forces to gain the overwhelming support of the populace. McCuen quotes Mao Zedong about the necessary use of terror by revolutionary forces: "It was necessary to bring about a brief reign of terror in every rural area; otherwise, one could never suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside or overthrow the authority of the gentry".[87]

The selective employment of terror is often the chosen method of revolutionary forces that are too small or when the terrain is inadequate for guerrilla warfare in rural or urban areas. Geographically speaking, terrorism in South Africa is quite feasible in both towns and cities. In the case of the ANC, rural areas were particularly easy to control but not effective for guerrilla warfare. However, terrorism could easily have been applied in urban centres such as Pretoria. Terrorism can thus be described as the weapon of choice for smaller forces or forces lacking resources.[88] Gaining support via terrorism is unsustainable and short-lived and often drives support in the government's favour. Therefore, terrorism could more accurately be described as a method of destabilisation and short-term tactics, rather than a permanent feature of revolutionary warfare.

The Guerrilla phase of Revolutionary War

The third phase of protracted revolutionary war is guerrilla warfare, which is a favoured method amongst revolutionary forces and is effective in the destabilisation of government and the incitement of panic. Revolutionary forces may choose to reside in either rural or urban areas resulting in either a rural or urban insurgency. Both these geographic areas have unique advantages for the revolutionary forces to hide and be concealed from government forces. In rural areas, the terrain is ideal due to the government's lack of proper intelligence on these areas and often show little interest in revolutionary forces operating in areas that are outside the normal focus of government. This often provides a perfect breeding ground for growing revolutionary forces. Revolutionaries in turn have the opportunity to spread their propaganda,

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[86] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* p. 30.
[87] *Ibid.,* p. 31.
[88] *Ibid.,* p. 32.

recruit informal soldiers to support their cause and grow their organization.[89] Locals often support these organizations as a result of intimidation or persuasion and prefer to turn a blind eye to illegal guerrilla activities.

The first predicament of counter-revolutionary warfare facing a ruling government is whether to engage these rural areas and use tactics such as dislocation to separate the revolutionary forces from the populace, sanctions or intimidation. It will cause the government to lose local support. If the government decides not to immediately engage with these revolutionary forces, then the people's support tends to lean towards the revolutionary forces. This is because the revolutionary forces use terror tactics on the populace or effective propaganda for their movement, since the key to power of any revolutionary force is the steady support of the populaces.[90]

Governing bodies usually underestimate the severity of the problem and the extremes to which the revolutionary forces are prepared to go. This facilitates the revolutionary forces in their mission to expand their activities and power base. After a certain period of time, the revolutionary forces would have infiltrated successfully into the rural areas and would have established a governing body of their own with a legal apparatus and administration mimicking that of the ruling government. At the same time rebels can easily mobilize the people in support of their cause. By isolating the populace, they can easily establish groups such as women's groups, farmers' associations, legal societies, and workers' councils and recruit the youth to participate in guerrilla warfare.[91]

A key strategy in the growth of revolutionary forces' organization, is the continuous deception of the government into making too little effort with tactics that are not practically appropriate at this stage of the war. Consequently, when the government does decide to act, it is usually too late and the chosen tactics to defeat these forces are often self-destructive, essentially bringing about its own downfall.[92] As the rebellious activities increase, the ruling government may realise that it is time to counter the revolutionary forces, which is often unsuccessful due to their underestimation of the strength of the enemy. Revolutionary forces are like weeds - if not eliminated by the roots they will simply return and spread further. In their return, the rebels

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[89] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* p. 33.
[90] *Ibid.,* p. 34.
[91] *Ibid.*
[92] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* p. 35.

demonstrate their resilience to the populace by evading the ruling government and exposing the government's insufficient capabilities in both ruling and countering the guerrilla attacks.

The Mobile or Regular phase of Revolutionary War

The final phase of revolutionary war is mobile warfare, or rather, regular warfare. At this point the revolutionary forces have grown in confidence, size and experience. This step still requires outside support, whether it is military training or equipment. Outside support normally assist in the establishment of formal military command structures and units, which effectively act as a parallel army. The leadership of the revolutionary movement may sometimes still try to withhold the formal military from actual combat, keeping them close to base while the regional and guerrilla forces do the majority of the fighting.[93] When optimal conditions are reached, revolutionary forces will deploy their regular forces gradually (or in some cases as a surprise mechanism against the enemy) such as the Vietminh against the French in the Indo-Chinese frontier battles of 1950 and during the Tet Offensive in 1968.[94]

In order to gain a revolutionary victory, the regular forces of the revolutionary movement fulfil a more routine role. Regular units often attack the periphery of the government while other rebel forces infiltrate their bases where, depending on the population, they will reinforce the local and regional forces already present.[95] In the case of the Indo-Chinese frontier battles, the French had regimental (and in some cases factional) Vietminh units operating behind their lines. Emboldened by receiving support from the local populace, guerrilla forces increased the ferocity and pace of their operations.

This placed the government in a predicament. In the frontier battles, as McCuen explain, the French never had more than 681 000 troops in Indo-China and their large "…hedgehog and mobile operations forced a disastrous depletion of troops in the decisive Red and Mekong Deltas".[96] Hedgehog operations refer to military defence forces draining the strength and breaking momentum of an offensive army. It can be effective against mobile armour attacks or blitzkrieg-type operations as was used during World War II.[97] General Maxime Weygand proposed the hedgehog tactic during the Battle of France in 1940, but it was not successful. Alternatively, the German army successfully applied the tactic on the Eastern Front during the

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[93] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 37.
[94] *Ibid.*
[95] *Ibid.,* p. 38.
[96] McCuen. *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 38.
[97] Centre for Military History, *Military Improvisations during the Russian Campaign*, United States Army, Washington, D.C, 1986, p. 23.

Battle of Moscow in 1941, the Second Rzhev-Sychrevka Offensive in November 1942 and in the battle surrounding Orel during Operation Saturn in 1943.[98] Rebel forces use factional operations to force the government troops to focus on avoiding a gradual defeat in their own bases. The French authorities trained auxiliary forces in fear that the revolutionary forces would occupy the cleared territory. Revolutionary forces found it relatively easy to infiltrate these auxiliary forces and they could proceed to recruit them without any sort of screening.

Recruitment is relatively easy since the same revolutionary forces have displayed success against the government and the continuous use of propaganda and military success tends to sway the local population to join the revolutionary cause.[99] The government, consequently, starts to lose trust in its auxiliary forces. At the same time the revolutionary forces continue to use propaganda and their agents to terminate these auxiliary units. Morale drops and the government loses faith in its own weakened and disintegrating forces.[100]

Government forces may initially make some progress against the revolutionary forces; however, one must keep in mind that these forces are extremely resilient. They anticipate some failure, and usually have alternative strategies in place. Mao Zedong summed up the resilient attitude of a rebelling proletariat as follows: "Struggle, fail, struggle again, fail again, struggle again till their victory… that is the logic of the people".[101]

It is difficult to define and deconstruct the precise nature of revolutionary warfare. However, it is even more problematic to try and create a fixed theoretical strategy to address the unpredictable nature of revolutionary war. The four phases of revolutionary war have been reduced by McCuen to their core elements for easier comprehension, and are the best way, according to the author, to break down revolutionary warfare.[102] Much research has been done on the nature of irregular war over the years and the study of revolutionary warfare is quite popular; specifically, because of the recent experiences of the big and major powers of the world in places like Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Like most of the case studies in McCuen's book, comprehensive insight of counter-revolutionary warfare only happens in hindsight. Strategy is after all a continuous exercise of trial and error. At the time that his

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[98] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War,* p. 28.
[99] *Ibid.,* p. 38.
[100] *Ibid.,* p. 39.
[101] *Ibid.*
[102] McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War*, p. 43.

book was published, it was possibly the most attractive solution to the impending problem facing South Africa.

South African policy-makers at the time used the work of these two authors as basis for their development of a security strategy and a unique doctrine for counter-revolutionary warfare. Historically, these concepts were the basis for both strategic development and countering revolutionary forces in the specific case study of South Africa as indicated by Chris Alden in his book *Apartheid's Last Stand,*[103] Paul Moorcraft's *African Nemesis*[104], and Ian Van der Waag's *a Military History of Modern South Africa.*[105]

2.3. Constructing a Defence Policy

Mao Zedong stated that "policy is the starting-point of all practical actions", and although he was referring to revolutionary groups, it is a fact entirely applicable to governments. Policy plays a vital role in the development of a defence strategy.[106] Defence policy in general has been loosely defined and is often manipulated to fit various levels of security policy, which is often inaccurate.[107] The term has also been used to denote operational capabilities as well as other policies concerning the armed forces, strategies, and the complete range of national security strategies and policies. To further complicate the matter of defence policy, it overlaps with the political sphere and understandably so, due to the military being an extension of politics. It is therefore difficult to pin down a single definition and function for the notion of defence policy. However, for the context of this study and using the theoretical frameworks that influenced the understanding and development of the White Papers on Defence that is discussed in this study, defence policy is understood as national goals with regard to a government's strategic forces and defence or military "posture". "Posture" in this instance refers to the precise composition of these forces. The relationship between the two would thus be "…that policy guides posture, and posture constrains policy".[108] Defence policy would consequently be concerned with all policies, be it national, foreign or security, relating to the utilisation of the armed forces to achieve the government's objectives. The state's primary objective with a

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[103] Alden, *Apartheids Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security,* p. 11.
[104] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010,* p. 46.
[105] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 269.
[106] M. Tse-tung, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*, First Edition, Foreign Language Press Peking,Beijing, 1966, p. 5.
[107] E. Jordaan,"*South African Defence since 1994 : A Study of Policy-Making",*Unpublished MMil dissertation, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, 2004, p. 12.
[108] W. I. Quade, & E.S. Boucher, eds., *System Analysis and Policy Planning Aplication in Defence*, American Elsevier Publishing Company Inc., New York, 1968, p. 279.

defence policy would be, as the term implies', "defence", and often involves the protection of national interests and the population which is also frequently coupled with regional co-operation. [109]

By applying this concept to the South African case, one can determine that in the period 1969 to 1989 policy dictated for a stronger strategic counter-revolutionary force against numerous threats perceived by the NP regime. How it was formed, will be discussed in the following chapters. The threat of communism and revolutionary movements initiated the development of a concept referred to as the National Security State by Alden. This concept echoed the "West's preoccupation as transposed into the context of a traditional society in the throes of modernization".[110]

In his book *Apartheid's Last Stand*, Alden discusses three characteristics of which served as crucial qualities of South Africa as a security state. Firstly, the governing regime's recognition and acceptance of counter-revolutionary strategy (in this case it was formulated according to McCuen's strategy), with the twin pillars of both security and reform, as the foundation of national policy; secondly, the implementation of the counter-revolutionary strategy through security and reform; and thirdly, through policy-making, the constant restructuring and adaptation of the security and reform imperatives in response to the environment that they faced.[111]

The full extent to which Beaufre and McCuen's concepts were implemented and operationalised in the South African defence domain, remains to be discussed in the chapters to follow. There is no doubt that their work was fundamental in the development of strategies. However, how they were adapted and formulated to fit South Africa's needs specifically is of great importance and requires extensive evaluation of policy formation and historical context.

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[109] E. Jordaan,"*South African Defence since 1994 : A Study of Policy-Making",*Unpublished MMil dissertation, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, 2004*, p. 13.
[110] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 6.
[111] *Ibid*.

Chapter Three: Linking Theory to Action in Defence Policy-making, 1969-1977

The period between 1969 to 1977 serves as an introductory and as the first phase of the defence policy making period under discussion. The period is marked by the publication of four White Papers on Defence and as such, requires historical and political contextualisation in order to provide an outline of the causality between the environment and the White Papers on Defence. Understanding the threat perception of the ruling elite is crucial in the development of the defence strategy. Threat perception can determine the extent to which a government may take action against perceived and real threats.

The NP, particularly, labelled the threat of various revolutionary groups that South Africa and its neighbouring countries were facing as "terrorists" and "communists". Today, this is frowned upon and the idea of freedom fighters is used more often. This does not negate the harsh reality that terror was used as a weapon and a strategy by various revolutionary groups in South Africa in their fight against the apartheid government. The chapter contains references of the ANC and other liberation groups as terrorist groups. This is not meant as a label. Rather, the emphasis is on their use of terror. The phrasing is also used for historical accuracy, as well as an understanding of the NP's threat perception. Chapter Three will therefore, outline and discuss each of the White Papers in question to map the progression in the defence policy domain at the time and the influence thereof on the SADF structure and organization.

3.1. White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, April 1969

The 1969 White Paper on Defence was preceded by complex global socio-political and economic turmoil, and for the purpose of this study a few key events are highlighted.

3.1.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1940-1969

In 1945, and in the aftermath of the Second World War in the same year, the realities of the post-war bipolar international system under the leadership of the USA and Soviet Union, and the threat of a nuclear holocaust galvanized the world. This shattering event sparked the creation of two instrumental entities with the aim of preventing future wars, namely the UN and a regional military alliance provided by the UN Charter and personified in the North Atlantic

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Treaty Organisation (NATO).[112] The continuous rivalry, characterised by divergent ideological and national interests, fuelled a progressive divide between Western and Eastern thinking globally. Communism became an imminent threat for the West, whilst capitalism and democracy were seen by the former Eastern Bloc as threatening its existence. The tension between these ideological blocs unfolded in a so-called Cold War.[113]

South Africa was certainly not isolated from these global events. Indeed, South Africa was a founding member of the UN in 1945 with Jan Smuts drafting the preamble to the UN Charter.[114] NATO, formed in 1949, was essentially an anti-communist alliance between North American and Western European countries. The Warsaw Pact followed in 1955 and consisted of a military alliance between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states.[115] At the same time the NP, in alliance with the AP came into power in South Africa on 28 May 1948, marking the dawn of a new era fostering an ideology of segregation. During their campaign, NP candidates mentioned few, if at all, what their policies were going to be against the Black populace of South Africa.[116]

Similarly, 1948 marked the beginning of the Cold War when the Soviet Union triggered an international crisis by the disengagement of overland communication between West Germany and Berlin.[117] The Western world's response was the Berlin Airlift, which signalled the determination of the USA and its allies to counter the spread of Soviet influence. South Africa followed suit by introducing the Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 in 1950 and banning the SACP also known as the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA).[118] The definition of communism in this Act was uniquely wide and could allow for almost any individual or party to be detained or banned.[119] However, the ANC was not originally associated with the idea of communism. The SACP served merely as a lobbying group that advocated for the Black populace in South Africa.[120] The SACP and ANC had their own inter-party relationship that started with Moses Kotane. Kotane who served as the SACP's general secretary as well as being

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[112] L. Thompson, *The History of South Africa,* Yale University Press, United States of America, 2001, p. 181.

[113] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 232.

[114] *Ibid.*

[115] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 232.

[116] S. Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile,* Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 2012, p. 3.

[117] *Ibid.,* p. 233.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[119] A. Chaskalson, "Dignity as a Constitutional Value: A South African Perspective", *American University International Law Review, Washington,* (26), (5), 2011, pp. 1377-1407.

[120] Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile*, p. 4.

an executive member of the ANC, inspired other communist members to join the ANC. This resulted in the development of a complicated relationship between the SACP and the ANC.

The SACP thrived from 1941 and had condemned the actions of Germany during the WWII. Their declaration for the support of the Allied forces, placed their agenda on the same line as the South African government. However, the unwavering allegiance towards the Soviet Union, proved problematic when Germany broke the non-aggression pact between itself and the Soviet Union by attacking it. The ANC and SACP had no illusions as to what the NP's policies would be towards communism. In 1949, members from the newly established ANC Youth League, condemned the communist within the ANC and called for a plan of action against the NP government. Their calls for the removal of the communists from the party were ignored but they managed to succeed in the development of a plan of action.[121] Some revolutionary members of the Youth League, known as radicals, were prominent party members that were to be critical in the development of the ANC and the fight against Apartheid. This includes individuals like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Thambo.

The Youth League distinguished themselves from older party members through proactive political and radical action.[122] This plan would be later known as "the four pillars of the revolution" or People's War when it started in the 1980s.[123] After the ANC's Defiance Campaign in the 1950s against the policies of the NP regime, numerous members of the ANC were banned under the guise of communist activities. Rather than being deterred, the ANC took their activities "underground" and resulted in only more radical and revolutionary actions against the government.[124]

The decolonisation of Africa was initiated in the late 1950s, with Ghana being the first African country to receive independence from European colonisers on 6 March 1957.[125] However, a predicament developed with the systematic decolonisation of Africa: suddenly there were numerous newly created African countries that were exposed to the influence of both the East and the West blocs. Both the USA and Russia identified an opportunity and, in many cases, provided military assistance to revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries in the struggle for

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[121] Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile*, p. 4.

[122] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[123] A. Jeffery, *People's War, New Light on the Struggle for South Africa,* pp. 40-41.

[124] B. Magubane, "Introduction: The Political Context," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970)*, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2004, p. 15.

[125] J. D. Esseks, "Western Political Science Association University of Utah Political Independence and Economic Decolonization : The Case of Ghana under Nkrumah", *The Western Political Quarterly*, (24) ,(1), 1971, pp. 59-64.

independence, resulting in these newly independent countries choosing sides in the Cold War.[126]

With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 (WWI), the Union of South Africa sided with Britain against Germany. South African forces invaded German South West Africa (now Namibia) successfully and occupied the territory after a short campaign in 1915. At the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919, under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the League decided that the Allied coalition could keep the German colonies that were occupied.[127] South West Africa (SWA) became a C-Mandate territory to be governed by the Union of South Africa due to their active role in the territory during WWI.[128] Under the governance of the NP in the late 1940s, it was anticipated that SWA was also to follow the policy of racial segregation that the party had implemented in South Africa. However, during the decolonisation of Africa, both the expectation of never receiving independence, as well as the policy for racial segregation, became problematic.[129] For SWA the struggle for independence became exceedingly complicated. Resistance to South African occupation from indigenous inhabitants started as early as the 1910s. Mandume yaNdemufayo was the last king of Kwanyama which was a subsection of the Ovambo people of Northern Namibia and South Angola.[130] The Kwanyama kingdom was split through colonisation and the redrawing of Africa's borders at the 1884 Berlin Conference, leaving one part of this ethnic group located in German SWA and another in Portuguese West Africa.[131] The death of Mandume yaNdemufayo in 1917 unleashed discontentment from the inhabitants in both Namibia and Angola. The resistance was strengthened in 1959 by keener focus and organisation.[132]

In 1959, the South West African National Union (SWANU) and the Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO) were established. On 19 April 1960, the latter was renamed itself the South West Africa People's Organisation, more commonly known as (South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO).[133] In the same year, South Africa experienced escalating internal

[126] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010,* p. 27.
[127] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989,* p. 2.
[128] C.F.J. Muller, *Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa*, 3rd ed., Academica, Pretoria, 1981, p.570.
[129] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 2.
[130] P. Hayes, "Order out of Chaos : Mandume Ya Ndemufayo and Oral History", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* (19), (1), 2019, pp. 89-113.
[131] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 2.
[132] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 265.
[133] *Ibid.*

revolt from the Black inhabitant during the Sharpeville massacre regarding the protests against pass laws on 21 March 1960.[134]

Sixty-nine protestors were shot during the Sharpeville massacre and more protesters were jailed. This was a clear indication that the South African government was unwilling to diverge from its policy of racial segregation.[135] As a result, the ANC in alliance with the SACP established their military wing, MK in November 1961. This led to further escalation in violence and radical activities under the guise of a revolutionary struggle as the ANC embarked on a sabotage campaign.[136] The campaign came to a halt due to the military wing's inexperience and the presence of government agents and informers in the unit. The fact that high-profile members of the ANC leadership were arrested in Rivonia on July 1963, proved to have created additional complications for the ANC in their struggle for freedom. However, it did end internal resistance significantly for almost twenty years.[137]

Resistance became increasingly popular among the African populaces. National resistance movements were established in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa.[138] The tactics by these resistance movements became progressively violent and radical in nature.[139] The conclusive result was four conflicts interwoven and amassed through the common purpose of liberation, viz. the national liberation war in both Angola and Mozambique (1961-1975), the Rhodesian "Bush war" (1964-1980), the South African Border War (1966-1989) and finally the continued struggle for freedom in South Africa. Thus, Southern Africa faced a thirty-years' war from 1959 to 1989.

The South African Border War commenced on 26 August 1966 when a force of 130 men, under the command of Capt. Jan Breytenbach, attacked a base of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in Ongulumbashe in Ovambo. PLAN was the military wing of SWAPO. However, the South African government did not seem to acknowledge SWAPO as a legitimate threat and opted to use the SAP to handle the matter instead of the SADF. This was the case up until 1974.[140]

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[134] M. Fullard, "State Repression in the 1960s," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970)*, Zebra Press, Cape Town, 2004, p. 344.
[135] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 266.
[136] Jeffery, *People's War, New Light on the Struggle for South Africa,* p. 4.
[137] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 267.
[138] Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DODA), Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, 1978, MI/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Samevatting, pp. 34-39.
[139] *Ibid.*, p. 265.
[140] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 7.

The year 1966 also brought a new form of leadership in the form of Mr. P.W. Botha being appointed as the Minster of Defence on 5 April.[141] Over time, Botha became synonymous with the rise of the so-called securocrats in South Africa. In 1967 the South African government promulgated the Defence Amendment Act that "stipulated that all White 18-year-old men were liable to serve in either the Citizen Force for one year. They would then undergo annual training for the next nine years, or in the newly-created commando reserve for 60 days, with annual training for the following 19 years".[142]

In his book, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, Leopold Scholtz argues that these wars brought about three layers of conflicts. He described them as follows: one was a civil rights struggle against the NP's institutionalised racist policy against Black South Africans, secondly, an anti-colonial liberation war for the independence of Namibia from South African occupation of the territory, and lastly, the global dynamics of the Cold War in the backdrop.[143] It is therefore difficult to isolate each conflict and event due to their interwoven nature.

3.1.2.   The 1969 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

> For those who want to listen I want to say that South Africa is not building
> a Defence Force to attack anybody. It is aimed only at safeguarding and
> protecting that which is lawfully ours. We threaten nobody but are very
> much aware of being threatened. We wish to attack no one but we will
> also not suffer being attacked and occupied with impunity.[144]

This statement was made by the Minister of Defence, Botha, describing the strategic situation facing South Africa in the Border War and the ongoing struggle for Namibia's independence. After the collapse of the League of Nations in 1946, Pretoria became embroiled in an ongoing struggle with the newly formed UN regarding the legality of ownership of SWA. The NP continuously refused that SWA be given independence and recognition as an independent country by the UN due to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations as mentioned

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[141] J. J. Van Rooyen, *P.W. Botha 40 Jaar*, ed., Nasionale Boekdrukkery Beperk, Cape Town, 1976, p. 102.
[142] P. O'Malley, "1967 Defence Amendment Act," Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory", [Online.], https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01925.htm. [Accessed 5 June 2019].
[143] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 4.
[144] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 2.

previously. The NP continued to argue that the territory was theirs by law to keep, indicating that South Africa had no intention of surrendering the territory.[145]

This White Paper was submitted to parliament as part of the government's recognition of an escalating external threat and it was evident that adjustments to the SADF needed to be made. Owing to the increasing external threat it was decided, after extensive evaluations, that the SADF needed to modernise and to bolster what was deemed as an obsolete force. The Department of Defence replaced great quantities of worn-out equipment and increased the force according to the 1967 Defence Act mentioned previously.

An increased Defence budget was requested. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that barely functional old equipment was still being used as a form of "saving money". Botha emphasised the fact that the Defence Force was not overindulging their expenditures. The new budget requested for 1969/1970 was R 271, 605, 000 with the majority of the funds being used for training and the accommodation of new troops.[146] The budget for 1968/1969 stood comparatively lower at R 252, 000, 000, with an estimated increase of 2.5% of the Gross National Product (GNP) in comparison with the 0.9% of 1960/61.[147] Emphasis was placed on purchasing new armaments for countering a "new" threat.

Botha noted that the nature of this "new" military threat facing South Africa was unconventional.[148] He also noted that when it came to unconventional methods of warfare, the entire country could become involved (willingly or unwillingly) and it was thus vital for the Defence Force to be able to counter such threats. Therefore, emphasis was placed on the Commando Force and their importance in facilitating the countering of the unconventional threats. The reorganisation of the Commando Force made provision for the establishment of Industrial, Urban and Rural Commandos. Provision was made in the existing Commandos for reconnaissance elements, snipers, dog handlers and mounted elements.[149]

Botha indicated that since its inception in 1912 as the Union Defence Force, the Defence Force had developed a particular uniquely South African pattern that was the envy of many other

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[145] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010*, p. 102.
[146] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1969), p. 3.
[147] *Ibid.,* p. 2.
[148] *Ibid.*
[149] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 5.

countries.[150] It was an armed force consisting of three Services (Army, Airforce and the Navy) with their own identities within the unified structure of the Defence Force and, under the single authority of the Commandant General as the Commander-in-Chief.[151]

The SADF was further strengthened by the reorganisation and restructuring of 1966, essentially developing a Defence Staff/ General Staff which collaborated the knowledge from all three Services. In addition to this, two combat headquarters were created for conducting landward and seaward combat operations by joint Air Force and Army as well as Air Force and Navy formations. The Commandant General had at his disposal the various specialist staff who controlled the logistical, administrative and medical support services in addition to the Chief of Defence Staff which aided him in the overall function and control of the Defence Force.[152]

The Defence Force Secretariat, responsible for the financial management of the force was replaced by a Financial Control Section under a Controller and the Commandant General. The following final organisational changes were implemented on 1 November 1968: The Chief of Defence Staff was bolstered by separating it into two homogeneous sections namely administration, planning and organisation. Each was managed by a Deputy Chief of Defence Staff with the rank of Major General.[153]

The Chief of Personnel was now responsible for the administration of civilian personnel which had previously been the Defence Force Secretariat's responsibilities. The Quartermaster General had previously been known as Chief of Logistic Services and was essentially responsible for fixed property and building matters. The Controller was now responsible for the remainder of the duties which included financial administration and control, general stores administration and the Stores Inspection Section.[154] It was expected that the respective senior members and the Minister of Defence would maintain continuous close liaison and cooperation. The new Council structure would therefore be as follows:[155]

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[150]Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969*,* p. 12.

[151] *Ibid.*

[152] *Ibid.*

[153] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 12.

[154] *Ibid.,* 13.

[155] *Ibid.,* p. 11.

Chairman: Commandant General, SADF

Members: Commander Maritime Defence and Chief of the Navy

General Officer Commanding, Joint Combat Forces

Chief of the Army

Chief of the Air Force

Chief of Defence Staff

The decision was made to divide the Army Headquarters into two functional bases called Combat Service and Supportive Service, a reorganisation that saved various posts. Similarly, the Command in the North Western Cape and Walvis Bay was channelled into adjacent Commands, thus reducing the number of Commands and placing each on equal status under the command of a Brigadier. This change facilitated Army Command boundaries in line with those of the police divisions.[156] These Commands made up the Territorial Force of the SADF, each located in a strategic geographic region. Ultimately the Territorial Force operated within ten regional Commands namely Western Province, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Orange Free State, Northern Transvaal, Witwatersrand, North-Western Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Natal and the Far North Command.[157]

The final, if not the most important point in this White Paper, was the discussion of the establishment of a Civil Defence Organisation that would have taken effect on 1 April 1968.[158] The Civil Defence Organisation was incorporated as a fundamental part of the overall SADF. Botha indicated that a complete Civil Defence policy would prevent panic in times of crises, yet at the same time protect against a state of overcomplacency in periods of peace. Therefore, Civil Defence made its input to obtain the vital support of the public for its Defence Force.[159] This reorganisation of the structure, specifically those of the commandos, could be interpreted as the beginning of the broader militarisation of South African society by the securocrats.

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[156] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 13.

[157] "SADF Info", *Army,* [Online.], https://sadf.info/Title%20Army.html, [Accessed 2 February 2020].

[158] Note that it was not considered a formal force but rather an organisation with a reserve function.

[159] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 16.

3.2. White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1973

As the global social, economic and political environment evolved and escalated and the Cold War proceeded, South Africa faced growing international isolation and continuous difficulties while simultaneously preparing for an escalated internal and external threat.

3.2.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context 1961-1973

In 1961 South Africa left the Commonwealth to become a republic and, primarily because of its policies of racial segregation, was increasingly isolated from international cooperation and support. South Africa was out of favour with the great powers and excluded from the Organisation of African Unity.[160] South Africa experienced great economic growth and was perceived as stable during the 1960s, and with the internal political unrest being silenced after the Rivonia Trial of ANC insurgents, the NP continued to feel confident in its position. South Africa was apparently protected from the continued spread of African independence with the White governed Rhodesian and the Portuguese colonies acting as buffer states.[161]

In 1969, South African sports teams were excluded from international competitions as an anti-Apartheid campaign against South Africa was launched. As a result, South Africa allowed for some changes in Apartheid policy which allowed Black sport players from different countries to play on South African soil. This policy change was also in alignment with the decision to grant the African diplomats who had "responded to Vorster's 'outward policy' initiative" accommodation and use of amenities in South Africa.[162] These reforms were the result of growing tension between the conservative and the "enlightened" members of the NP and could be seen as the forced evolution of a new cultural identity for South Africa.

The first few years of the South African Border War were not particularly eventful, due to SWAPO's defeat at Omgulumbashe in 1966. As a result, SWAPO did not re-enter Ovamboland for quite some time. A number of SWAPO insurgents were killed at Omgulumbashe when the first of ten groups of insurgents attempted to penetrate Ovamboland via Botswana from Zambia or southern Angola. The other nine groups were also successfully intercepted and subdued by the Portuguese government before even reaching the Namibian border.[163] Zambia became the main arena for the insurgence, after SWAPO relocated their

[160] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 267.
[161] *Ibid.*, p. 267.
[162] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 20.
[163] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 11.

headquarters to Lusaka in 1962. This relocation proved beneficial for South African forces due to the war's centre of gravity being located in Ovamboland and not in the Caprivi Strip. SWAPO relied heavily on local support from the Ovambo tribe, yet, this again did not bring much success to SWAPO and they were subdued once again. In 1971 and 1972, SWAPO tried to penetrate Namibia once more but this time with much more success.[164] Although the SADF had mounted some involvement in low level insurgencies, up until this point, they did not have a coordinated training programme or practical experience.[165] Members of the SAP on the other hand were required to complete a six-week intensive counterinsurgency training during the border war. The Special Task Force was unofficially founded in 1967, following the need to implement counterinsurgency operations to defend the border between Rhodesia and South Africa during the Rhodesian "Bush War" (1964-1980). The SAP took over the SWA Police in 1939 when it was under South African administration. The SAP and SADF had an agreement not to interfere in each other's affairs in SWA. Until 1972 only the South African Airforce (SAAF) was allowed to conduct operations in SWA, providing support to the SAP in counterinsurgency operations. Equally, the SAP provided counterinsurgency support to the British South African Police in Rhodesia against revolutionary forces during the late 1960s and 1970s.[166] Botha's appointment would change the course of SADF involvement and training in counterinsurgency operations indefinitely.

3.2.2. The 1973 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

"And it came to pass from that time forth, that the half of my servants wrought in the work, and the other half of them held both the spears, in the shields, and the bows and the habergeons…"[167] This quotation from the Bible book of Nehemiah reinforces the notion that the Afrikaners were God's *Volk* and served as a manner to bolster unity among them. This is how Botha opened his address to parliament regarding the 1973 White Paper on Defence. The opening preface was informative, even passionate, as Botha valiantly discussed the continued strategy to eradicate the escalating conflicts confronting South Africa. He mentioned that South Africa continued to protect that which was lawfully theirs. Botha recognised as well that the threat that the country faced was rooted in the global events marking the period. Of particular concern was

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[164] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 11.

[165] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 141.

[166] J. S. E. Opolot, *Police Administration in Africa: Toward Theory and Practice in the English-Speaking Countrie*s, University Press of America, New York, 2008, p. 114.

[167] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 1.

the growing threat of communism as well as the national liberation war in both Angola and Mozambique (1961-1975), the Rhodesian "Bush war" (1964-1980), and the South African Border War (1966-1989). From a security perspective, not much occurred between 1969 and 1973. One might even call this the "calm before the storm".

Botha noted that South Africa was involved involuntarily in this greater conflict against communism and that as a country, was essentially isolated from international assistance owing to the NP's segregation policy. The NP's sentiments against the UN were made quite clear when Botha stated that, "leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism, and related ideologies" were what exacerbated South Africa's predicament and the conflict that it was facing.[168]

Due to South Africa's strategic geographic importance, the ideological attacks on the country were progressing in increasingly radical forms such as boycotts, isolation, sanctions and demonstrations. Internationally, the Western world was condemning South Africa for their continued use of the Apartheid policy and, as a result, the country was subjected to isolation in various forms, such as the exclusion from international sporting events previously mentioned.[169] Ironically, the paper emphasised that South Africa would not and did not wish to get involved in the domestic concerns of neighbouring countries, nor did it have any territorial ambitions.[170] Nevertheless, the Republic of South Africa's (RSA) continued involvement in the national liberation war in both Angola and Mozambique, the Rhodesian "Bush war" and the South African Border War indicated otherwise.

This White Paper reviewed that the previous White Papers of 1964-1965, 1964-1967 and 1969 commented on the expansion and reorganisation of the Defence Force. It was also noted that White Papers on Defence would be submitted periodically. As the discussion continued, the increasing regularity of these White Papers became a by-product of the conflicting environment that South Africa was facing. In light of the escalating conflicts both in and surrounding South Africa, the Department of Defence reviewed the SADF's capabilities and efficiency in deterring possible threats. In doing so, the 1973 White Paper on Defence was developed to tackle existing and emerging problems regarding organisation, capability and strategic approach.

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[168] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 1.
[169] *Ibid.*
[170] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The 1973 paper differs from the previous one in the following aspects: a detailed description is given of the "threat", the development of a departmental strategic policy, budget increase, updated organizational structure, armament production and a dedication to landward defence. The threats were listed as: a) continued efforts to isolate the RSA from the rest of the international community by means of economic boycotts encouraged by unfavourable propaganda, boycotts and demonstrations in areas such as sport, culture, art and even science, b) the deterrence of any and all armament sales to the South African government, c) the formation of internal instabilities to disrupt law and order, d) the ongoing support of terrorism against South Africa, e) the generation of real and fabricated situations that could be exploited in order to coax the UN into declaring that these are threats to world peace, and f) efforts by the Western world to encourage the UN to intervene by force.[171] Botha indicated that these threats against South Africa had already been formulated during the 1960s; in some cases the emphasis has shifted from communism to liberation in the form of equality.

The departmental strategic policy of the Defence Force was aimed at prevention rather than finding solutions for a crisis after it had happened. Prevention, according to the White Paper, included the deterrent element, a presence in the threatened region and overall readiness. Relevant aspects would include:

a) the Defence Force should be able to assist the SAP in upholding internal order at all times;

b) in the light of the current terrorist threat at that time, it is critical that the Defence Force should be able to deal promptly and effectively with any attack at all times against any part of South African territory;

c) the Defence Force should have a credible, professionally trained force at its disposal at all times so as to ensure that any attack against the Republic of South Africa is not taken lightly. This would require five years of procuring the correct equipment and many years to train new soldiers sufficiently in the use of modern weapons;

d) it is evident that the Defence Force must become increasingly self-sufficient in armaments; and finally,

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[171] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 5.

e) the Defence Force should take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the National Service system in order to promote the physical and spiritual preparedness of South African youth.[172]

The Defence budget for 1969/70 represented 2.5% of the GNP the newly requested budget for 1973/74 was expected to be 3.0 % of the GNP, amounting to R 447, 022, 000. This might have seemed a significant increase when compared to the 1969 White Paper on Defence, when in the years of 1971/72 the budget had increased gradually to R 335, 336, 000 and 1972/73 to R 357, 936, 000. According to Botha, this increase to almost half a billion rand was still low in comparison to that of other countries.[173] The majority of the funds was to be allocated to landward defence, an estimation of R 150, 000, 000. Certain functions were to be carried out by Armscor, and the Department of Public Works and Community Development on behalf of the Defence Force and if their expenditures were added to the total Defence budget, the requested amount would increase to R 481, 164, 000.

After the rapid increase in threats towards South Africa, further changes to the organizational structure of the Defence Force were proposed. In addition to the structure presented in 1969, the Director of General Military Intelligence was to become directly responsible to the Head of the Defence Force. In 1972, the Minister of Defence (Botha) appointed a Defence Staff Council to replace the former Supreme Command, acting from a position of power granted to the Minister of Defence in section 74 of the Defence Act of 1957 (Act No. 44).[174] The renewed Council structure would be as follows:

Chairman:	The Commandant-General, SA Defence Force
Members:	General Officer Commanding Joint Combat Forces
	Commander Maritime Defence and Chief of the Navy
	Chief of Defence Staff
	Chief of Army
	Chief of Air Force
	Chief of Defence Force Administration

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[172] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 5.
[173] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[174] *Ibid.,* p. 6.

The structure included additional members namely Controller,[175] SADF, Surgeon General as well as co-opted members including all other Section Heads as and when directed by the Chairman.[176] The Defence Act of 1957 also determined that the Defence Staff Council would handle affairs that had previously been assigned to the Supreme Command, provided that the Council Members would serve the Commandant-General as Head of the South African Defence Force, in an advisory capacity. It should be noted that both the Minister and Head of the SADF were members of the State Security Council (SSC) under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The SSC was established in 1972, as the official body that expressed the views and coordinated the various security departments, including the SADF and SAP.[177] However, due to the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), later replaced by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in 1980, the SSC under Prime Minister John Vorster served merely in an advisory capacity.[178] The SSC and the State Security Council Act of 1972 was a direct result of the Potgieter Commission's report.[179] The Potgieter Commission was the result of internal political discord amongst NP members and defence members. A Defence Advisory Council was also instituted, functioning as an advisory body to the Minister who acts as Chairman. The members consisted of the Head of the Defence Force and the President of the Armament Board.[180]

Sanctions and armament boycotts against South Africa made it exceedingly difficult to expand and modernise the Defence Force appropriately. As a result, the Armaments Production Board was established in 1964 according to the Armaments Acts, Act No. 87. The Armaments Development and Production Corporation was established in 1968 and was tasked with managing existing factories of the Armaments Production Board.[181] It took responsibility for obtaining all technical stores for the SADF both locally and abroad. Simultaneously, the Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation (ARMSCOR) was established by legislation to take control of state-owned factories, a function previously performed by the Armaments Board. Armscor served as an instrument of the Armaments Board and was responsible for the production of armaments deemed too strategic, or which could not be

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[175] This role was referred to various controllers, such as mission controller, air traffic controllers, fleet controllers etc.

[176] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[177] K. W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics,* I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London, 1986, p. 6.

[178] R. Davies & D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978", *Journal of Southern African Studies,* (11), (2), 1985, pp. 183-211.

[179] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa,* p. 132.

[180] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 7.

[181] J. P. McWilliams, *ARMSCOR, South Africa's Arms Merchant,* Brassey's, United Kingdom, 1989, p. 5.

produced by private enterprises for economic reasons.[182] Therefore, South Africa needed no support in her internal armaments' productions from abroad and under the direction of the Armaments Board, private enterprise made for a crucial economic contribution.

The 1973 White Paper on Defence discussed landward defence extensively, although much of it was repeated from the previous 1969 White Paper on Defence. The White Paper described that the Defence Force should aim to support and assist the SAP in preserving the internal order and countering insurgencies and conventional threats. The strategic deployment of the Defence Force was evaluated continuously in relation the threat that it might be facing, to determine whether it would be able to neutralise the threat successfully.[183]

The White Paper mentions that the tactical doctrine was also re-evaluated in light of the escalation of threats, which revealed that there was an increasing need for mobility, strike power and extensive training of a higher standard. The Commando organization which was spread countrywide was available in terms of the provisions of section 92(3) of the Defence Act of 1957 (Act No. 44 of 1957), as amended to act immediately in support of the SAP. The Commandos were also trained to defend their allocated territory and act accordingly and assist other forces deployed there pending any insurgencies of perceived threats. In order to assist these Commandos, additional servicemen were trained from 1972 onwards to bring the number more or less in line with the Citizen Force. Their period of training was also extended to nine months. However, there were indications that the Citizen Force was gradually losing their willingness to serve. The reason was unbeknownst to the SADF at the time and was being investigated.[184]

The White Paper also highlighted the fact that there was an increasing awareness that the SADF needed specialization in its forces. This specialization in armaments, tactics and training was to be introduced in the SADF's lower ranks. The need for service ready soldiers seemed dire, therefore additional battalions were established such as the South African Cape Corps Service Battalion in 1973, which consisted of Coloured youths, as well as the Service Battalion for Indians. In 1971, they also experimented with the training of service women and a civil defence and training college was established in George. By 1972 over 265 students had

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Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973), p. 16.

[183] *Ibid.,* p. 8.

[184] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 9.

completed the course and the experiment was deemed a success. In light of this, it was decided that the college needed to be expanded.[185]

3.3. White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1975

One can identify the important elements and perceptions of the state as the evaluation of each White Paper progresses. An example of this would be that in the 1969 White Paper on Defence, the production of armaments was not as important as the reorganization of the SADF. Whereas in the 1973 White Paper on Defence reorganization it became a key element in order for the SADF to be successful in its endeavours. As the environment became increasingly unstable, priorities changed and emphasis was shifted towards the development of a strategic defence policy.

3.3.1.   An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1974-1975

In 1974, a tipping point was reached between South Africa and its neighbouring countries. Previously South Africa had a geographic buffer from the spread of decolonisation of African countries, Angola and Mozambique to be specific, that were under Portuguese rule.[186] In 1974, after the so-called Carnation Revolution, Portugal resolved to surrender its African colonies, which caused an influx of revolutionary activities surrounding South Africa and its neighbours. This entangled it with the international crises of SWA as well as the struggle for liberation in South Africa and the power struggle in Rhodesia.[187] As the Cold War continued, and the process of decolonisation unfolded, national resistance movements appeared all across Africa at an alarming rate. Both the West and the Soviet Union sought this as an opportunity to play an active role in assisting these movements and by default using them as proxies for their own Cold War agendas. The SADF found itself involved in a complicated regional conflict in Angola, while in Mozambique, the advent of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) government assisted the ANC by granting them access to the South African borders.[188]

Angolan resistance was not nearly as simple as the embedded Marxist-Leninist, Frelimo which was the only dominant movement in Mozambique. In fact, Angola had a severe internal struggle for power as one of Portugal's prosperous colonies. There were three dominant

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[185] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 11.
[186] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State,* p. 23.
[187] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 265.
[188] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 23.

revolutionary movements, The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The communist threat intensified for South Africa. In addition, the USA and a number of African countries also encouraged South Africa to become involved in the Angolan Civil War through the deployment of the SADF in support of UNITA and FNLA.[189]

3.3.2. The 1975 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

In the 1973 White Paper on Defence, Botha argued that the international climate was epitomized by total strategy, although, he omitted mentioning that it would be a policy that South Africa too would follow. Up until the 1975 White Paper on Defence, in which he first mentioned the possibility of total strategy being implemented by the South African government due to the escalation of strategic events in the region. Botha emphasised that besides the possibility of total strategy, no great changes needed to be made to the military itself, due to the preparations that had been made in the previous years.[190]

He mentioned that defence strategy did not rely on the military alone, but embraced economic, ideological, technological as well as social dynamics and could only be meaningful when all of these factors had been introduced into the equation. He stated in the 1973 White Paper on Defence that the government policy was not to rely on the military alone for a defence strategy but also on the proper application of the factors mentioned above. Due to the rapid spread of the international conflict emphasis was placed on technological development which was increasingly complicated and costly.[191]

Portugal's surrendering of its colonies proved to be increasingly problematic. Botha argued that due to this occurrence the great powers had been made aware of the important role that South Africa played in the fight against communism. He also mentioned that South Africa's "policy of evolution" was gaining popularity among the inhabitants of both South Africa and a number of other states.[192] Due to the SADF's assistance in the protection of the Northern borders in Angola, this could be a reference to UNITA.[193]

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[189] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 24.

[190] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 3.

[191] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[192] *Ibid.*

[193] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 11.

Botha indicated that the revolutionary movements were increasing and that the leaders behind the movements could only be described as extremists prone to violent actions. He also stated that these revolutionary movements, encouraged by ideological elements, rejected evolution and reform and found any form of progress as a threat to their ideological revolution.[194] This was an ironic statement to make, due to South Africa continuing its policy of racial segregation. In the White Paper, it is noted that the following pertinent actions were to be expected from the revolutionaries: a) persuasive negotiators to insist on impossible demands and conditions, b) sabotage of negotiations, c) the use of extremists to create incidents, d) blackmail against Black states to refuse economic co-operations, e) pressures on neighbouring states to provide more active support to terrorists, f) increased direct support to terrorists, g) efforts to incite internal unrest through subversion and sabotage, h) increased activity from anti-movements from abroad, i) forceful and constant pressure on the UN and its organisations, j) the use of *"détente"*[195] on the international front for blackmail purposes to aggravate co-operation between the Western powers and South Africa.[196] These actions were all to be part of "the four pillars of the revolution" strategy that the ANC initiated in the late 1960s; and began to implement in the 1980s.[197]

It was emphasised that the defence strategic policy needed further developments. This could be seen as possible reference to the development of a TNS catering to South Africa's needs. Once again it was also suggested that the force be increased with the use of Indian, Coloured and now, African soldiers as well which according to Botha, would have been implemented according to policy.[198] Ironically, the ANC worked on better cooperation between other races, specifically the Indian and Coloured population from as early as 1947 during the Joint Meeting between the members of the ANC and the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses.[199]

The key elements for the 1975 White Paper on Defence were the strategic conclusion of the escalating events, the SADF's perceptions of certain facets of the military threat that South Africa was facing supplementary guidelines for their strategic policy and a review of the

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[194] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 5.
[195] Détente is the facilitation of strained relations, especially in a political situation, through verbal communication.
[196] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 5.
[197] Jeffery, *People's War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa*, pp. 43-47.
[198] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 5.
[199] Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exiles,* p.25.

SADF and its structural functions. The White Paper also mentions the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, their interests in Southern Africa, and their habit of supporting revolutionary movements in both Mozambique and Angola.[200]

The 1975 White Paper on Defence acknowledged that the organizational structure that was developed in the 1960s and discussed thoroughly in the 1969 White Paper on Defence was simplified for effective functionality and execution.[201] Still, no structural outline was given in this White Paper. In 1973 the actual Defence budget amounted to R 472, 000, 000 compared to the proposed budget of R 477, 000 000 which represented 2.6 % of the GNP. In the years 1974/75, the defence budget increased significantly to R 692, 000, 000; it represented 3.2% of the GNP and for 1975/76 an estimated budget of R 948, 000, 000 was requested in the 1975 White Paper on Defence. This then amounted to 3.7% of the GNP and was an astounding increase since the 1969 White Paper on Defence.[202] Botha then continued to argue that these figures, despite their enormous increases, were still favourable compared to other Western countries and according to him, only reflected the replacement of obsolete equipment as the SADF continued being modernised.

The majority of funds was still being spent on landward defence, approximately R 383, 200, 000 for 1975/76 and understandably so due to the Defence Force's deployment on the northern borders and assistance in both Angola and Mozambique. In his discussion regarding the rising conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, Botha mentioned that the Defence Force had finalised its doctrine for landward defence, although certain structural changes were still required to satisfy the demands of the conflict, particularly on the borders.

These conflicts were assuming two forms, one conventional and the other unconventional. It was then decided that the landward defence should be divided into two separate command structures, a counterinsurgency force and a conventional force. This would not change the overall structure of the SADF.[203] The SADF already started with special operations as early as 1966 with Operation Blue Wildebeest which was a heliborne assault on a SWAPO training base in Ongulumbashe.[204] This was in support of the SAP with Capt. Jan Breytenbach, as

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[200] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975*, p. 7.
[201] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[202] *Ibid.*
[203] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 10.
[204] M. Matthysen, P. Kalkwarf, & M. Huxtable, *Recce,* 30 Degrees South Publishers (Pty) Ltd., Durban, 2010, p. 22.

discussed in the overview of 1969. On 1 October 1972, 1 Reconnaissance Commando was established.[205] This Commando was specifically trained for the purpose of countering insurgencies, but was not mentioned by name in the 1973 or 1975 White Papers on Defence. Instead, Botha referred to them as being part of the "specially allocated Citizen Force".[206]

Although there was a shortage of manpower, there was an increase in 1974 to 7.9 % in officers and 14.9% in the other ranks compared to the low 5.9% and 13.9% respectively, of 1972. Still, this was not satisfactory and as a result Coloured's, Bantu's and women were being recruited as well. This had also been indicated in the 1973 White Paper on Defence but was made more explicit in the 1975 White Paper on Defence. The White Paper also indicates that in order to make it more appealing to join and stay in the army, the salaries of the Permanent Force members were increased in 1974 to satisfactory levels.[207]

The final point to mention regarding this White Paper would be Botha's explanation regarding the function of the Civil Defence. His comments indicated that there was a misunderstanding or concern that this force would be used internally, as a form of militarisation of society and replacement of the SAP. He proceeded to explain that their only function was the safeguarding of civilians and only in a supportive capacity toward the police. The Civil Defence's primary function was assistance in disastrous events, or simply put, it was only to act in the capacity of safeguarding civilians and property.[208]

3.4. White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, 1977

As conflict escalated both internally and externally, the NP found itself in an exceedingly perilous position. After Portugal had forfeited her colonies, South Africa experienced increasingly more instances of insurgencies from neighbouring territories which resulted in the SADF becoming embroiled in a regional war.[209] Simultaneously, the ANC commenced the initiation of boycotts, unrests and protests countrywide, such as the 1976 Soweto uprising.[210] Together with the aforementioned discord and various others, this called for the development of the 1977 White Paper on Defence.

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[205] Matthysen, Kalkwarf, & Huxtable, *Recce,* p. 31.
[206] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 11.
[207] *Ibid.,* p. 16.
[208] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 19.
[209] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 267.
[210] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010*, p. 33.

3.4.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1972-1977

In 1972, owing to internal quarrels, the SSC evolved into the National Security Management System (NSMS). The SADF became recognized as the state institution that "knew how to do something", alternatively how to take action and "get the job done". The reason for this had to do partly with the conflict in Northern Rhodesia. As previously mentioned, the SADF had been linked to the SAP in a supporting role. However, in 1972 a state of emergency was declared in Ovambo due to the rise in strikes. The SAP could no longer manage the situation on its own and finally withdrew from the region. In 1973, the SADF took action and dominated the Operational Zone.[211] Their operational application was due predominantly to their learned coexistence with the SAP. They knew then, that military decisions had to be linked to non-military ones. This enhanced efficiency, even if only to reduce rivalries. However, during the late 1970s the SADF refused to be openly and directly involved in the conflict in Rhodesia.[212]

November 1975 was planned to be marked by a general election in newly independent Angola, after the Portuguese had systematically withdraw their troops. The FNLA, UNITA and the MPLA agreed to form a coalition government, but all three factions took advantage of the Portuguese withdrawal by assuming strategic positions and acquiring more weapons, essentially to strengthen and enlarge their militant forces.[213] As the parties continuously received a large number of arms from external sources such as the Soviet Union and the USA, their individual military strength grew and with this, tension escalated as well. The MPLA managed to secure control of the capital, Luanda, in 1975, but sporadic violence broke out between the MPLA and FNLA as the FNLA attacked their forces. During April and May that year the fighting intensified as street violence broke out. UNITA finally got involved when an MPLA contingent massacred 200 of its members in June 1975.[214] As the conflict escalated in Angola, it was clear that total independence would be achieved on the battle field and not through a general election as planned.

During 1975/76 the SADF became more intensely involved in the Angolan conflict, supporting UNITA with their struggle against the MPLA, leading to Operation Savannah.

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[211] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 162.
[212] DODA), Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, 1979, Vol. 2, HSAW/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Samevatting, p. XIVV.
[213] S. Weigert, *Angola: A Modern Military History,* Pelgrave MacMillain, New York, 2011*,* p. 57.
[214] *Ibid.,* p. 59.

Since the Portuguese withdrew from Angola, South Africa could no longer rely on Angola as a buffer against the revolutionary forces of SWAPO and the ideological advance of communism. Operation Savannah was therefore an opportune moment to further SADF forces against SWAPO revolutionary forces in aid of UNITA. The political and military situation around South African involvement in the Angolan Civil War created even more disorder. The specifics regarding Operation Savannah are intricate, though for the purpose of this section it is important to highlight the political ramifications and operational reform it had.

Operation Savannah was prompted by the 1974 uprising in Lisbon, when a group of disgruntled military personnel staged a coup against Marcelo Caetano's fascist dictatorship.[215] The Portuguese informed South Africa that it could no longer assist in anti-SWAPO border patrols and essentially left South Africa exposed. SWAPO took action and instantly moved forward seizing the possibilities. By October 1975, they made their presence known in Ovamboland with an infiltration of roughly 500 trained guerrillas.[216] South Africa responded with a few smaller operations in August and September on the Caprivi Strip and North of Ovamboland. The operations did not achieve much, since most SWAPO bases were discovered to be empty. SWAPO emerged successfully from Caprivi and being able to utilise southern Angola, they were in a prime position to allow great bands of guerrilla soldiers to penetrate into Kavanago and subsequently into the war's centre of gravity, Ovamboland.[217]

Prime Minister Vorster was reluctant to send in SADF troops but was ultimately implored by Zambia, Liberia, Zaire and the USA to take action against the MPLA. By November 1975, South Africa had successfully aided UNITA in capturing their traditional region in southern Angola, and South African forces were supposed to withdraw. At the request of the USA, UNITA, FNLA and France, South Africa extended their stay. This was an ideal position to continue their advance to a defendable position. On the 19th of December the USA, however, passed the Clarke Amendment, which prevented groups from aiding parties involved in military operations in Angola.[218] The USA did request that South African forces delay their withdrawal until the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had held their annual summit in January 1976. They had hoped that the member states would condemn the Cuban intervention in Angola, but the OAU vote was split down the middle, half supporting a general election as

[215] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 13.
[216] *Ibid.,* p. 14.
[217] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989,* p. 14.
[218] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

portrayed by the Alvor Agreement, signed on the 15th of January 1975, granting Angola independence.[219] The other OAU member states recognised the Marxist MPLA as the legitimate government. President Idi Amin of Uganda, who was also the OAU's chair, cast the final vote in favour of the MPLA. Suddenly South Africa found itself in an even more precarious position, its international support having evaporated completely.[220] The pending threat of communism at this point seemed much more realistic than before and necessary strategic changes needed to be made to prepare the country. Whilst this was the looming issue, the NP experienced increased internal unrest as well.

On 16 June 1976 numerous students from Sowetan schools protested against Afrikaans being a mandatory medium of instruction in local schools. The protest resulted in a violent clash with the SAP. Although the students did disperse after their altercation with the SAP, they simply spread out over Soweto. Subsequently, this type of uprising in schools spread and continued until 18 June 1976, forcing the government to close schools till 26 July 1976. Another wave of protests hit, but this time students were organising protests outside of schools and the townships. A third wave took force in September 1976 as students conducted campaigns favouring "social austerity". Roughly 6000 people were arrested and sixty youth were killed during June 1976 and February 1977.[221] Besides the arrests and unrests, the Soweto uprising, as well as SWAPO's success, initiated the growth of a new more militant generation of activists, who chose to join the ANC-in-exile. That body had lost touch somewhat with domestic politics and had to reassert itself as the embodiment of "the struggle". Likewise, they and other activists noticed that domestic protests and continued unrests incited international support and had a negative impact on the NP.[222]

3.4.2. The 1977 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

After the events that occurred in Angola in 1975 and 1976, it was evident that South Africa's defence strategy needed upgrading. The opening quotation "without the strenuous efforts of its youth, a people will be forgotten by history" by Botha was a statement, if not a plea, for more youth to join the SADF, as well as an acknowledgment of those who were already involved in the Angolan conflict. [223] It was the escalation of these events as well as the UN-

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[219] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010*, p. 74.
[220] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, p. 21.
[221] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 149.
[222] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 267.
[223] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 3.

imposed arms embargo against South Africa that placed enormous strain on the availability of resources.[224] In the preface of this White Paper Botha stressed that the international political, economic and military developments had direct implications on the RSA. The continued escalation of events surrounding South Africa and its increased unrests proved to be justification for the implementation of a TNS as well as the amendment of military policy, increase in defence budget and increase in force levels.[225]

Botha emphasised the importance of South Africa to the Western world regarding its resources, industrial potential, modern harbours, the various military and civil airports as well as the ability to produce food. This continues emphasis on South Africa's importance in the global sphere could also be interpreted as a plea for the Western world to either not interfere in local matters or to rather support the NP government indirectly. The SADF was under the impression that the USA's changing attitude towards South Africa could bolster revolutionary activities since the revolutionary groups now seems to have international support.[226] He also stressed the military contribution of South Africa during WWI, WWII and the Korean War, again focusing on its importance. After stating the impressive role South Africa played in the international arena, he ironically continued to the elaborate on the isolation that the RSA was experiencing from the international community, and that only the SADF could truly defend all South African inhabitants from terrorist efforts.[227] However, the most notable introductory statement in this White Paper was that "opportunities in the economic, social and political spheres for all population groups in the RSA must be our aim". This would only be achieved by peaceful and evolutionary processes as well as an absence of any outside interference whatsoever.[228]

In the general overview of the White Paper, it is indicated that Botha was aware of the fact that the sovereignty of a state in a conflict situation could not be maintained by military means only, but rather requires national action. He continues to mention that the conflict the state was experiencing at that time was of an irregular nature and required coordinated action in all fields. These fields would specifically be economic, sociological, political, physiological,

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[224] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering, 1977, MI/205/10: Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, Die Militêre Bedreiging teen the RSA: Deel I, pp. 13-14.

[225] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 3.

[226] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering, 1977, MI/205/10: Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, Die Militêre Bedreiging teen the RSA: Deel I, pp. 6-7.

[227] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 3.

[228] *Ibid.*

technological, ideological, diplomatic and cultural.[229] Ironically, these were all the fields that revolutionary groups aim to dismantle. It is apparent from this statement that the survival of the state was not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence, but necessitated a deeper involvement of the state and civilians. In justifying the TNS, Botha mentioned the USA and its recognition of "co-ordinated action planning" in WWII, suggesting that his perception of the threat level was soaring. The events that had occurred in Angola were also, if not primarily, used as justification for the use of a TNS. This is evident through Botha's extensive explanation of events that occurred on the Caprivi Strip, in Ovambo and Kavango.[230] This was also the first time that the Department of Defence acknowledged a threat by name, namely SWAPO. Previously, the White Papers had referred to them only vaguely as "terrorist Black movements" or "revolutionaries".[231] Equally, by naming the enemy, Botha listed the SADF's success against these groups and was subsequently bolstering the SADF's reputation and possibly encouraging enlistment. These same successes were used in a contradictory manner by the ANC as the undermining of the Black populace's right to freedom.

As a result, the RSA government had established the SSC which prioritised intelligence and advised the government on the formulation of national policy and strategy regarding the security of the republic.[232] Therefore, one of the functions of the SSC would be formulating the TNS in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. Other than the fields mentioned above, a detailed list of interdepartmental cooperation was listed as follows: political action, military/ paramilitary action, economic action, psychological action, scientific and technological action, religious-cultural action manpower services, intelligence services, security services, national supplies and resources available, transport and distribution services, financial services, community services and telecommunications services.[233] These, according to Botha, were required for the complete spectrum of national security.[234]

This particular White Paper contains a few key features, some that have not been present as separate discussions in the previous White Papers and understandably so, since the

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[229] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 4.

[230] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[231] *Ibid.*

[232] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

[233] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State,* p. 46.

[234] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 5.

environment was constantly changed by increasing turmoil and global ideological shifts. Some of the prominent features that are still to be discussed are the defence budget, military policy, strategic doctrines, national policies and objectives, all centred around the established plan of TNS.

The White Paper continues to list the factors that influenced the TNS directly, the first of which was the strategy, policy and aims of the RSA's enemies. This first section summarises that the enemy wished to expand Marxism by fomenting a revolution in Southern Africa. In order to overthrow White regimes in Southern Africa to establish Pan-Africanism under the guise of destroying racism and colonialism; and to unleash revolutionary warfare by using an indirect strategy to force the RSA to change its domestic policy in favour of Pan-Africanism.[235] Botha stated that other African countries on their own had simply not managed to provoke aggression against the RSA. However, these same countries were receiving aid from other super powers to further their own agendas.[236]

In contrast to the enemy's aims, the RSA's national aims were to stand united and promote the ideal co-existence of all individuals in South Africa; to maintain law and order in the RSA, thereby securing the authority of the government and its institutions; to further the spiritual and material welfare of all in South Africa; to strive for world peace with all peace-loving nations; and to safeguard the freedom of South Africa.[237] In accordance with these aims, the national objects were displayed as the following;

   a) the maintenance and development of body politics; the preservation of the identity, integrity and right to self-determination of all population groups;
   b) the prevention, identification and countering of revolutionary and subversive groups as well as any unconstitutional actions;[238]
   c) the maintenance of a comprehensive military in relation to neighbouring African states; the creation of favourable diplomatic relationships between the states of Southern Africa; the objective to reach peak economic and social self-sufficiency;

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[235] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 7.
[236] *Ibid.,* p. 8.
[237] *Ibid.*
[238] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 8.

d) and finally, to create the ideal TNS that would counter the "multidimensional onslaught against the RSA".[239]

In terms of national policy, the White Paper indicated that the policy consisted of three main sections, namely internal SWA and external. For the internal policy the aim was;

a) human relationships and plural society and summarised that independent development of all population groups was to be the cornerstone of internal relations;

b) to lead the homelands of the RSA to independence and self-determination; to further Coloured and Indian interests by creating their own government bodies;

c) to maintain and acknowledge the dignity of all population groups in RSA and to counter all Marxist groups and revolutionary actions.[240]

This statement regarding internal policy contradicts the national aims which, as mentioned above, asked for the promotion of the socio-economic development as well as the unification of the whole of the RSA, whereas now the proposed policy still promoted separate development. With regard to SWA, the policy simply mentioned assistance to inhabitants and the various population groups in order for them to shape their own political future and prevent external influence. The external policy focused on the foreign policy of the RSA, in which the RSA aimed to further relations with Western communities, cement its geographic importance in the fight against the revolutionary groups and to require assistance from these Western powers to strengthen its position against potential Marxist threats.[241]

From the analysis of the 1977 White Paper on Defence, it is clear that the RSA government perceived the threat of communist and revolutionary groups on a grand scale. However, Chris Alden argues in *Apartheid's Last Stand* that although the threat was real, it was not on the scale that required a TNS.[242] Whether that was the case or not, the fact is that the NP's perception of the threat level against South Africa encouraged military policy reform and cemented the fear of a total onslaught for many South Africans. But these fears, according to the SADF, were not baseless. Defence Intelligence noted that ANC members were smuggling weapons and equipment into South Africa to facilitate their terror activities. At least twenty sabotage attempts occurred between October 1976 and August 1977. This included fourteen

[239] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 8.
[240] *Ibid.*
[241] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[242] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 49.

efforts to sabotage railway property in South Africa, the explosion at the Jabulani police station on 24 October 1976, the Border gate incident of 30 November 1976 and the shooting of John Orr in Johannesburg 13 June 1977.[243]

The military objectives were correlated with the national aims and were described as the development of a national defence structure that was fully capable to counter or prevent any threat to the RSA. The defence and security of the RSA's body politic, the NP, were mustering "all the forces" its command against any external aggression or internal revolution irrespective of its origins.[244] Another objective was the involvement of the whole population in the maintenance of law and order and the defence of the RSA. Finally, the aim was to assist and protect Black homelands, if requested, in developing and maintaining their defence force so that they too might protect their own independence from external forces.[245]

The 1977 White Paper on Defence had a separate section for military policy, unlike its predecessors, and it described the following:

a) The RSA must, as far as practicable, be self-sufficient in the provision of arms and ensure its continued production.

b) Provision must be made for effective counterinsurgency warfare of short or long duration.

c) The major striking power of the Defence Force is based on a part-time force with a strong Permanent Force nucleus to provide specialist leadership.

d) The Defence Force must develop an adequate conventional capability, in defence of the RSA and as a warning to potential aggressors.

e) The Defence Force must be ready to give immediate support to the SA Police in the maintenance of internal law and order.

f) The Defence force must be ready at a moment's notice to support the civil infra -structure in the preservation of lives, health or property and the maintenance of essential services.

g) The Defence Force must maintain and develop an efficient intelligence network in order to contribute to the efforts of the national intelligence

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[243] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering, 1977, MI/205/10: Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, Die Militêre Bedreiging teen the RSA: Deel I, p. 49.
[244] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 9.
[245] *Ibid.*

services in determining the scope and nature of the military or any other threat.

h) The Defence Force must be capable of operating in any part of the RSA and under the Defence Act, in neighbouring states.

i) The Defence Force must be maintained and enlarged to form a highly mobile force to immediate action at any moment.

j) All operations must be guided and carried out in a decisive way.[246]

Although in the previous White Papers, it had never been indicated separately, the objectives listed above were visible and only emphasised now as separate military objectives.

The section pertaining to the doctrine is divided into four sections namely; defence posture, deterrence, counterinsurgency and assistance to the civil authorities. The White Paper expressed that the doctrine had been developed on the grounds of the current perceived threats the national aims and objectives and both national and military policy.[247] Thus, the doctrine was specifically developed and adapted to serve the current situation that the RSA was facing. The Defence Posture was based on the government's policy of non-aggression toward any country or group and the RSA did not have any ambitions to expand their territory, but only to co-operate with neighbouring states. However, due to the escalation of numerous revolutionary groups, the Defence posture was to be defensive but well prepared.[248] A credible deterrent option was seen as the best means to discourage potential aggressors. For this purpose, they maintained a well-structured Army, Navy and Air Force, all equipped with modern weapons available to the RSA. Keeping in mind the UN arms embargo against South Africa, this might have been a difficult task to maintain.[249] As part of the doctrine, effective counterinsurgency measures were essential, and led to the development of a structured and systematic approach and training. Lastly, was the assistance to civil authorities, which implied additional aid for the SADF towards the SAP, should the latter require any, and the specific focus on maintaining internal law and order.[250]

The 1977 White Paper on Defence further discussed in detail the financial position of the SADF. Since the arms embargo against the RSA, it could not afford to get into an arms race

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[246] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 9.
[247] *Ibid.*
[248] *Ibid.,* p. 10.
[249] Thompson, *The History of South Africa*, p.214.
[250] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

with any country.[251] Nevertheless, the military still had to have the capability to defend itself and therefore would rely on the expert training of its personnel. In light of the events mentioned above as well as the worldwide inflation in 1973-1975/76, the defence budget required an increase of 15% per annum. Owing to inflation, devaluation and the increased military threat, the defence budget had to be adjusted accordingly and its functions were described as non-administrative, clearly having a superior function in comparison with other governmental departments.[252] The budget for 1977/78 was to be increased by R M 1 711.7 and would constitute 19% of the state expenditures, but was still lower than the initial budgets of 1964/1965. The majority of funds were earmarked for landward defence, at R M 907, 1.[253]

In an effort to accumulate more funds, National Defence Bonds were issued on 1 July 1976. The SADF promoted the sales of bonds amongst its own personnel late in August 1976, by appealing to their sense of patriotism and stressing the fact that it was a sound financial investment. This effort proved fruitful and grossed R M 100 in additional funds.[254]

A large section of the White Paper is dedicated to the manpower shortage which faced the SADF owing to the escalation of external conflict. In the White Paper these conflicts referred specifically to the RSA's involvement in Angola and SWAPO's advance towards the borders of South Africa.[255] As a course of action, it was stipulated that White male citizens needed to be compelled serving in the Defence Force, either full-time or part-time. However, a restriction also had to be imposed, to prevent upsetting the labour force and further injury to the South African economy.[256] The Citizen Force, at this point, consisted of 55% of the SADF's strengths and the Commando Force 28%. The part-time units, consisting of the Citizen Force and Commando Forces, constitutes 83% of the overall Defence Force strength. But 21% of that 83% had already completed their duty and were not viable again for service.[257]

In the White Paper it was also stated that the SADF's media portrayal played a vital role in the success of the TNS. Therefore, they had full cooperation of the local news media based

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[251] DODA, Verspreiding van Inligting- Propaganda Ontledings-Radio uitsendings: Binnelands, 1977, MI/205/13/1/2: Binnelandse Media-analise, Kwalitatiewe Ontleding: "Die Wapen verbod teen Suid Africa", pp. 6-7.

[252] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 12.

[253] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

[254] *Ibid.,* p. 14.

[255] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 20.

[256] *Ibid.,* p. 15.

[257] *Ibid.,* p. 16.

on an agreement reached with the SA Newspaper Press Union in compliance with the Defence Act.[258] Public opinion regarding the Defence Force remained a vital element. The Defence Force could stand as a symbol of unity and strength in the country. A positive attitude towards a country's Defence Force from the public could create stability and a sense of security and safety. In this regard, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s when South Africa faced international scrutiny, the SADF made a point of compiling national information evaluation profiles on the perception of the SADF in the media both locally and internationally. This was also reflected in the White Papers on Defence.

Conclusion

The 1969-1977 White Papers on Defence are the physical embodiment of the induction of diverse defence strategic thinking. This strategic thinking was brought on by various internal and external factors, in particular the emergence of the Cold War, the liberation of African countries and South Africa's relationship with the Western powers. Botha recognised in the 1969 White Paper on Defence that an unconventional conflict was brewing which called for a reorganization of the defence forces. As the siege against the apartheid regimes race policies grew, the NP regime countered with sterner defence policies, such as the Total Strategy mentioned in the 1977 White Paper on Defence. They recognised anti-Apartheid groups as terrorist or revolutionary groups targeting the foundation of the NP regimes policies in an effort to topple its power. Under Botha's leadership as Minister of Defence, the SADF took its first steps toward becoming a highly efficient force. His structural leadership style, which is present throughout in the above mention White Papers, played a prominent role in the development of organizational structures. This prompted further policy and strategic development in the White Papers to follow.

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[258] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 35.

Chapter Four: Linking Theory to Action in Defence Policy-making, 1979-1984

The period of 1979 to 1984, serves as the second phase of defence policy making. Phase two experienced an avalanche of socio-political changes that would uproot the very foundation of the Apartheid regime. These changes, accompanied with economic turmoil would subsequently obliterate the NP's reputation internally and globally. The White Papers on Defence provide insight into the changing socio-political climate of the period. It also provides insight into the processes of structural and strategic development within the defence environment in general and the SADF as well as Armscor's role in the defence industry. There are four papers discussed during this period, those of 1979, 1982 and in 1984 two separate White Papers were presented, one specifically focusing on the organization and function of the SADF and the other on Defence and Armament Supply.

These papers were developed under two different Ministers of Defence and could ideally indicate leadership style differences, as well as policy understanding between the two. In South Africa's case during the NP's rule, defence policy making experienced radical changes from a political style leadership to a pure militaristic leadership. This shift of leadership styles is but one example of the culmination of changes that contributed to the development of the White Papers from 1979 to 1984. This chapter, therefore, will not only discuss each White Paper against their respective contextual environment but also highlight pinnacle events that contributed to defence policy making.

4.1. White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply, April 1979

With the technological and conflict developments during the Cold War, globalisation was spreading worldwide. However, South Africa became increasingly isolated and its room for political manoeuvring was decreasing exponentially. As a result of the rapid expansion in communication, the major international powers could project their influence, policies and ideologies more easily to further their own strategic agendas. This was to support or oppose both the revolutionaries and its supporters in the South African strategic context or the South African government and its supporters. As such, the South African regime often found itself in unwarranted positions that necessitated alternative strategic approaches.

4.1.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1977-1982

The escalation of the national liberation wars in both Angola and Mozambique (1961-1975), the continuation of the Rhodesian "Bush war" (1964-1980), the South African Border War in Namibia (1966-1989), and the struggle for freedom and equality inside the country, placed South Africa in a precarious position. In addition to financial and moral support to Black power and terror organizations, Western involvement centred on political, economic and psychological measures, by withholding their veto in the UN Security Council, using their veto power as a coercive measure, enforcing limited economic sanctions, and by participating in propaganda against the RSA.[259] According to the SADF, most if not all resources and motivations for the RSA, SAW and Rhodesia's direct enemies were provided by these major powers.[260]

The vacuum created by the withdrawal of imperial powers in colonial territories was increasingly filled by volatile parties, such as SWAPO in the case of Namibia. The flow of communism seemed to follow the liberation of African countries, or so it was perceived by the Western powers and the NP. Although the NP perceived themselves as the last bastion against communism in Africa, the Western powers were no longer eager to accommodate South Africa's strategic and military needs. Perhaps it also suited them to have South Africa as a bastion against communist influence in Southern Africa as an alternative to direct their involvement and resources; a typical proxy state arrangement accompanied by strategic deniability. The policy of Apartheid had become a sore on the face of the South African government and added international awareness brought on by various groups, including the ANC, resolved to impose a mandatory arms embargo in 1977.[261]

The Defence Amendment Bill published in January 1977, which became law on the 7th of March 1977, stated that the president, Nicolaas Johannes Diederichs who served from 1975 to 1978, was permitted to invoke powers of censorship and the confiscation of premises. The bill also stated that service in the SADF now included the active suppression of internal threats or disorder and the execution of anti-terrorist operations, thus providing them with more freedom in tactical mobility and operational flexibility.[262] P.W. Botha, as Prime Minister in 1978,

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[259] Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DODA), Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, 1979, HSAW/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Samevatting, p. II.
[260] *Ibid.*, p. I.
[261] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa,* p. 262.
[262] "General South African History Timeline 1970s", *SA History*, [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/general-south-african-history-timeline-1970s [Accessed 3 June 2020].

shifted government policy to focus on a binary approach by negotiating with the international arena while simultaneously pursuing counterinsurgency in SWA. However, Botha also noted in 1978 that the state was still committed to granting SWA its independence.[263] The UN Security Council resolutions 385 of 1977 and 435 of 1978 had cleared the way for Namibian independence and Prime Minister John Vorster at the time gave his full acceptance of these developments.[264]

As previously mentioned, the military wing of the ANC, MK, was established in 1961. But formal organization, strategy and tactics took some time to be effective. Sabotage units were created that were later merged into formal MK units.[265] As general unrest grew within South Africa, and international awareness of the Apartheid policy picked up speed. The ANC and alliances recognised an opportunity to increase their radical activities to promote the evolution of democracy in South Africa. The NP government had started to respond to the lack of equality in South Africa by the early 1970s through the improvement of Black education in 1972 in order to facilitate the skill shortages and reformed labour laws. By 1975 about twenty unregistered black unions had emerged. During 1979 the restrictions posed upon black unions had been revoked and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu) was formed. Trade unions played an important role in the mobilisation of masses to achieve equality and are still used today as vehicles for empowerment.[266]

Botha recognised that the ANC was planning on taking to arms, this is evident throughout the White Papers, and suggested the implementation of more policy changes. These changes, however, did not ignite the expected response. Similarly, Botha fought against the pressure of the international arena to bring South Africa, and ultimately the NP, to its metaphorical knees.[267]

4.1.2. The 1979 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

The 1979 White Paper on Defence, much like the previous White Papers, recognized the increasing threat of communism in newly-liberated and politically unstable African countries.

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[263] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, 1978, MI/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Samevatting, pp. I-VII.
[264] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 288.
[265] Ellis, *External Mission, The ANC in Exile*, pp. 29-33.
[266] Jeffery, *People's War, New Light on the Struggle for South Africa*, pp. 65-72.
[267] DODA, Verspreiding van Inligting-Propaganda Ontledings-Radio uitsendings: Buitelands, 1977, - MI/205/13/1/2: Binnelandse Media-analise, Kwalitatiewe Ontleding: "SA sal Aanslag Oorleef", pp. 8-9.

Between the 1977 and 1979 White Papers on Defence pertinent changes were made regarding the national security of South Africa. Emphasis was placed on the increasing difficult relationship between South Africa and the major powers and, according to Botha, the continued pressure of moderates in SWA creating misgivings in Western circles.

It is evident that there was a basic three pillar approach to the NP's strategy; the focus was on political reform, counterinsurgency, and civic action.[268] Botha, unlike his predecessor John Vorster, was deemed as an organizational wunderkind and as such in the centralised functions of state, including the Defence Force. Botha's structural and defence reorganization gave the impression that defence was the most important institution of the state.[269] He was assisted in the process by Magnus Malan as Chief of the Defence Force and later as Minister of Defence. Malan had a particular talent for translating defence policy into practical military action.[270]

Botha was not reluctant to assume power of the NSMS, previously known as the SSC, when he became Prime Minister in late 1978. The Information Scandal, dubbed as Muldergate, that took place under Vorster's control of the NSMS, more than just portrayed the NP regime in a negative light but in the public's eye, also placed it on the same level of corruptibility as the enemy groups they were fighting against.[271] Botha was thus given the task to not only restructure the NSMS, but also to regain the public's favour. Already experienced in the reorganization of the SADF, Botha applied the same structural concepts for the NSMS. As Prime Minister, Botha decided to split South Africa's intelligence gathering capabilities into four agencies, namely Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI), Security Branch, Foreign Affairs and BOSS.[272] His reorganization of the NSMS was just the beginning, in order to implement the Total Strategy constructed by Botha and associates. It was essential to incorporate state resources and reconstruct the state's decision-making process. This process would essentially centralise power with the Prime Minister. This had an exponential outcome on the development and growth of the defence forces (SADF, SAP and National Intelligence (NI)) of South Africa, as well as policy development for potential transformation.[273] Botha's primary reform initiative was to include the Indian and Coloured population groups into the

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[268] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 2.

[269] M. Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force,* p. 146.

[270] *Ibid.*, p.171.

[271] Seegers, *The Military in the making of Modern South Africa,* p. 130.

[272] DODA, Hoof van Staff Inligting, Vol. 23, HSAW/205/13/1/2: Binnelandse Media-analise, pp. 85-93.

[273] R. Davies & D. O'Meara, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978", J*ournal of Southern African Studie*s, (11), (2), 1985, pp. 183-211.

new tricameral Parliament. But power would still be maintained by the white majority in the parliament This angered the Black populace, due to the fact that they were excluded under the assumption that they already had their own representative councils within the homelands and essentially fast tracked the armed struggle.[274]

The ANC retaliations and infiltrations increased even though the country appeared peaceful internally.[275] Externally the stage was set in four strategic domains: the international environment, the Southern African region, Namibia and Angola and the domain of nuclear deterrence.[276] The nuclear domain was a prominent feature of Beaufre's idea of a TNS and a prominent theme in the interaction between the Eastern and Western power blocs in the world.[277]

The 1979 White Paper on Defence indicates that the NP was still concerned about the Marxist's influence in Africa and emphasised the expansion of this ideology to Southern Africa. In fact, Botha noted in the White Paper that the USA was trying to rearrange the international balance of power through the termination of their defence treaty with Taiwan as a manner of normalizing their relations with Beijing.[278] Between the 1977 and 1979 White Papers on Defence, a few changes were made regarding the national security situation in South Africa. The first of these was the major powers, who were questioning the South African government's ability to maintain law and order until its transition to majority rule. This meant that the NP was planning to transform South Africa into a democratic state. In fact, Botha had stated numerous times in the previous White Papers that Apartheid was not a sustainable option, particularly due to increased pressure of sanctions from the international arena and escalated unrests from revolutionary forces. But, much like the tricameral Parliament his approach was somewhat flawed.[279] This was rendered a pressing issue for Marxist and communist groups who threatened the "freedom" of every South African. The transition was not expected to occur as promptly as the UN tried to enforce, according to Botha, since the Soviet Union and other revolutionary groups and their ideologies were penetrating South African society. These conflicts and added pressure from the UN, who declared 1979 the Anti-Apartheid year, were

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[274] Jeffery, *People's War, New Light on the Struggle for South Africa*, p. 67.

[275] *Ibid.,* pp. 162-168.

[276] N. von Wielligh & L. von Wielligh-Steyn, *The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,* Litera Publications, Pretoria, 2014, p. 133.

[277] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, p. 30.

[278] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town,1979, p. 1.

[279] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

placing the RSA under immense economic, political and military pressure.[280] The pressure from the UN was perceived as a political and psychological campaign against the South African government.

The Camp David Accords, signed in 1978 by USA President Jimmy Carter, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, established a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, which according to the SADF, resulted in militant Arab states exercising greater influence over collective action. The bargaining power of oil-producing countries posed a potential danger to the RSA. Moderate Arab states were more fearful of the danger of Soviet influence. The SADF saw the possibility of cooperation between some of these Arab states and the RSA. The oil crisis also had a major impact on Western decision-making and priorities toward aid for Africa.[281] The influence of foreign powers and their policies on South Africa were increasingly visible during the Carter administration.

The second of these changes regarding the national security situation, was the alarming escalation of the military threat against the RSA. Resources were utilised as effectively as possible in an effort to ensure the survival of the South African populace. Growing interference from the international community, according to Botha, could lead to an intense military conflict in Southern Africa, even though the primary concern should have been terrorism.[282] The RSA's initiatives in SWA apparently, offered proof that despite international condemnation, the threat against the RSA existed. Terrorist groups, it was argued, were infiltrating neighbouring countries and forced states in the region to either choose between peace and development, or continued conflict and stagnation. Botha kept emphasising the fact that the RSA wanted peace but would not stand by idly while its populace was being threatened by terrorism from outside its borders.[283]

The third and last change concerned SWA, where the populace was increasingly being subjugated and intimidated by SWAPO forces. According to Botha, the election of December 1978 indicated that the populace rejected a Marxist-orientated SWAPO regime.[284] However,

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[280] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town,1979, p. 1.
[281] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, Vol. 2, HSAW/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Samevatting, p. III.
[282] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 1.
[283] *Ibid.*
[284] "Children in Katutura", *Namibia State Archive*, [Online.], http://www.klausdierks.com/Chronology/120.htm , [Accessed 30 June 2020].

SWAPO and the Namibia National Front were banned from participating in the elections. At 80%, voter turnout was still incredibly high. It was the first multi-racial election in Namibian history.[285] Due to international pressure, South Africa was finding it increasingly difficult to maintain peace and protection and to assist the populace of SWA on the pathway towards peace.[286]

The RSA continued to provide military aid to SWA and the SADF was still deployed in Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi to resist revolutionary attacks. And again, as per the previous White Papers, emphasis was placed on the importance of military preparedness.[287] These changes presented a perfect mapping of the political and defence thinking of the period.

The 1979 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production included a few unique focus areas such as the planning at National, Interdepartmental and Departmental levels, Ex-servicemen's Organizations, Project "Ride Safe", the financial budget, command and control, Armscor corporate policy and approach and self-sufficiency. These issues and discussions, besides the financial budget, Armscor and organization, had not been included in previous White Papers and indicates that it became a pressing matter that required primary focus.

Preparing for war requires extreme coordination. This also coincides with Beaufre's concept of being structurally prepared in order to develop and maintain a total strategy. In accordance with the planning of national, interdepartmental and departmental levels, Botha indicated, at a national level the cabinet was assisted by the SSC and its executive agencies in order to facilitate the state's security concerns and objectives.[288] The Prime Minster was responsible for management at this level and for issuing guidelines for the TNS directives.[289]

The National Strategic Planning Process was directed by the SSC, which was assisted by its work committees, secretariat, and fifteen interdepartmental committees, while the management of the executive function was carried out by the National Joint Planning Centre. National security was then further assisted by these fifteen coordinated interdepartmental committees which consisted of a chair, who was responsible for the management of these committees.[290]

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[285] S. Smith & B. Van Wyk, "Namibia votes as ruling party faces unprecedented challenge", [Online.], Namibia votes as ruling party faces unprecedented challenge (apnews.com), [Accessed 12 February 2021].

[286] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 2.

[287] *Ibid.*

[288] *Ibid.*

[289] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 132.

[290] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 2.

The committees processed the TNS objectives of the SSC into individual interdepartmental strategies which, as mentioned before, was then coordinated by the Work Committee and approved by the SSC. Thus, the SSC proved to serve an extremely important function, though still muddled with bureaucracy.[291] The White Paper noted that the Department of the Prime Minister and the heads of government departments would be continuously involved in the planning and development of national strategy.

In 1977, the Permanent Force constituted only 7% of the overall Defence Force strength, according to the 1979 White Paper on Defence. This was hardly a desirable percentage because of the need for training of national service members for conflicts and the strain on the overall structure.[292] For a functional force, Botha argued, the SADF would require at least a 28.6% expansion.[293] As a result, the SADF made efforts toward promoting not only its image to the population but showing the force as a desirable career choice. This included sufficient pension funds and various other benefits. By now, the population's acceptance of the Department of Defence had increased. It was not a sense of fear, but rather this perspective which had the potential for enhancing membership numbers.

Programs such as the "ex-servicemen's organisation" was responsible for the well-being of these servicemen. It served both as an attractive program for those wanting to join the SADF and produced a positive image of the Defence Force. The organization was controlled by the Director General Resources and served as the link between the Chief of the Defence Force and the organization. In another effort to boost morale, the SADF erected a memorial at Fort Klapperkorp in Pretoria in May 1979. Another function of the ex-serviceman's organization was to connect with other South African servicemen in Commonwealth countries and the West in order to improve the South African image and gather support.[294]

A further effort of the SADF was Project "Ride Safe," which was a campaign to encourage friendly motorists to pick up a hitch-hiking "troepie" or soldier who was on leave and on their way home or back to base camp. The initiative was launched by the South African Legion of Military Veterans and was identified by blue signs located in certain municipalities. This initiative was launched at a time when military conscription in the SADF was part of the socio-

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[291] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 2.
[292] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[293] *Ibid.,* p. 9.
[294] *Ibid.*

cultural makeup of South Africa.[295] According to the 1979 White Paper on Defence, the initiative sparked great public interest and at least 40% of servicemen used this facility during that period. It also boosted the SADF's image and created better relations between the civilian population and the SADF.[296] These types of initiatives had not previously been mentioned in the other White Papers, but its sudden emergence in 1979 indicated that public support for the SADF was an increasingly important factor, especially against the increase of internal and external conflicts.

The defence budget was increased extensively to assist the SADF in adapting to changing circumstances. In 1974 the defence budget stood at RM[297] 470 and had increased to RM 1 700 in 1977/78. However, the envisaged expenditure for 1977/78 was not realized due to the French refusing to honour their naval shipping contract, due to the UN's efforts to enforce sanctions against South Africa. Consequently, the budget for 1979/80 increased significantly, especially as a result of the successful marketing of defence bonds and the state revenue account which stood at a surplus. Funds could thus be transferred to the Special Defence account, finalising the defence budget for 1979/80 at RM 1 829 which included R M 100 from the revenue account of 1978/79. The defence budget would rise to 4.5% of the GDP. This is a significant increase from the previous years. The majority of funding was still being funnelled to landward defence while other departments were now given more attention and financial support, such as logistical sustenance.[298] The defence budget had increased every year since 1973 and was to continue increasing until 1989 when it started to decline in accordance with the NP's declining power over South Africa.

Various bodies were established to exercise effective command and control of the Defence Force. These bodies included the Defence Command Council (DCC) which is the highest command body of the SADF. The DCC included the Chief of the SADF, the Chiefs of the SA Army, the SA Air Force, the SA Navy, the Surgeon General, the Quartermasters General and the Chief of Staff Operations.[299] The DCC was responsible for considering matters pertaining to the successful achievement of objectives prescribed for the SADF according to section 3(2)

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[295] "The Observation Post", *South African Modern Military History*, [Online.], https://samilhistory.com/tag/ride-safe/ [Accessed 7 July 2020].

[296] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 9.

[297] RM referring to Millions of Rands.

[298] *Ibid.,* pp. 13-14.

[299] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

of the 1957 Defence Act as well as passing decisions and approving policies for these objectives.

The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) was established in 1976 in order to ensure that all members of the "Defence Family" participated and acted appropriately. The DPC consisted of the Chief of the SADF, the Chiefs of the SA Army, the SA Air Force, the SA Navy, Chief of Staff Operations, Chief of Staff Logistics, the Chief of Staff Finance, the Chairman of Armscor, the Chief Executive Armscor as well as relevant representatives from industry.[300] The DCP was also responsible for the annual budget and five-year plan, together with a procurement plan. They had to ensure that both were in accordance with military policy as formulated by the DCC and approved by the Minister as well as ensure that the plans remained within the Defence Force's financial means.[301] The Defence Staff Council (DSC) consisted of the Chief of the SADF, the Chiefs of the five Staff Divisions, the Chaplain General and Director General Resources. The council was to assist the Chief of the SADF in coordinating matters pertaining to actual management of the Defence Force as well as formulating policy that contributed towards reaching success in its functions and aims.[302]

Corporate policy and approach regarding Armscor was described as: the procurement policy stated that resources had to be sourced locally and would therefore be determined by local capacities and technological capabilities which were continuously being developed and upgraded. Although economic pressures made industrial growth difficult, it was, according to Botha, quite fortunate that the RSA could rely on local industrial infrastructure.[303] The NP had confidence in maintaining its own industrial and economic growth but as history indicates, this was not the case.

The Armscor board of directors were involved in the approval of contracts which should have amounted to a total of 75% annually to the procurement business. The funding of the business contracts was approved individually by top and general management committees with delegated powers linked to the value of contracts.[304]

Armscor's policies were therefore characterized by the following:

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[300] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 17.
[301] *Ibid.*
[302] *Ibid.*
[303] *Ibid.* p. 23.
[304] McWilliams, *ARMSCOR, South Africa's Arms Merchant,* p. 6.

a) Armscor was excluded from making any profit from the execution of tasks for the SADF;

b) It provided for the maintenance and settlement of external loan capital obtained for the establishment of capital facilities; it stipulated that subsidiary companies such as those in the private sector, were subject to unit prices for products in terms of previously approved business planning;

c) It stipulated that the private sector should make use of its own financing in the execution of orders; it should have made provisions for its own financial administrative maintenance on a conventional business basis in order to meet the requirements of the SADF and the obligations imposed by the Armscor legislation and the Companies Act;[305]

d) Armscor's personal policy stated that no distinctions were to be made between races regarding employment opportunities and that employees of any group could have advancement opportunities within the company.[306]

At this stage self-sufficiency was a necessity for South Africa due to the arms embargo and economic sanctions during the 1960s and 1970s.[307] Botha indicated in the White Paper that the RSA should perceive it as a blessing in disguise which had forced local industry to become innovative and technologically advanced. He mentioned that Armscor and the private industry had made sophisticated breakthroughs in advanced weaponry for modern warfare.[308] At the time a thousand private contractors accounted for 70% of the armaments supplied and manufactured for the SADF. Armscor had numerous servicing subsidiaries of ten manufacturing companies and a research laboratory, known collectively as the "magic eleven".[309]

4.2. White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply, August 1982

Soviet expansionism remained a threat to South Africa and the international arena during the 1980s. In Southern Africa, communist surrogate forces such as North Korean military personnel in Zimbabwe were of particular interest. The Zimbabwean Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe indicated that these personnel were assisting in the training of his forces against rebels.

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[305] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979*,* p. 24.
[306] *Ibid.,* p. 23.
[307] McWilliams, *ARMSCOR, South Africa's Arms Merchant,* p. 11.
[308] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 25.
[309] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

SADF intelligence suspected that these forces were prepared for actions against South Africa in support of revolutionary forces.[310]

4.2.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1980- 1984

The 1980s can be described as the capstone period for the NP regime. However, economic nationalism was less viable as international financial actions and floating exchange rates continued to defeat the state's financial planning.[311] The years before the 1982 White Paper on Defence introduced transformative change. Between 1980 and 1983, much needed amendments were made to the 1979 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act. These changes were the reformulation of the term "employee" which included all employees, regardless of race or gender, and also included racially mixed unions.[312] The year 1980 was also marked by the abolition of the Senate and the establishment of a multiracial President's Council that consisted of sixty Coloured, White and Indian nominated members. The Council was responsible for developing a new constitution that would give expression to both Coloured and Indian political motivations. General Magnus Malan was appointed as Minister of Defence in 1980. Malan's years of practical experience in the field of security made him an excellent replacement for Botha. He stated in his autobiography, *My Life with the South African Defence Force,* that he did not want to change the defence establishment that Botha had built but rather contribute to it.[313] His approach was direct with a strong militaristic character which became visible in the White Papers to follow.

The ANC terrorist actions increased immensely during the 1980s with events such as the attack on Sasol storage tanks in Sasolburg on 1 June 1980, the sabotage of power stations in the Eastern Transvaal in 1981 and in December 1982 a limpet mine attack at the Koeberg nuclear power station under construction in Cape Town.[314] This would be a prequal to what would be known as the ANC's M- Plan or people's war. Consequently, the Internal Security Act became operative in order to investigate any organization or publication that opposed the "powers" of the authorities.[315]

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[310] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1982, p. 3.

[311] Butler, *Contemporary South Africa,* p. 23.

[312] "General South African History Timeline 1980s", *SA History,* [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/general-south-african-history-timeline-1980s [Accessed 2 June 2020].

[313] Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force*, p. 247.

[314] Anon. "Revenge Bombs, Guerrillas hit a reactor," *Time,* 1 March 1983, p. 34.

[315] "General South African History Timeline 1980s", *SA History,* [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/general-south-african-history-timeline-1980s [Accessed 2 June 2020].

4.2.2. The 1982 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

The 1982 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production referenced the State Security Management System only a few times, but the focus of this paper was defence policy and strategies rather than national security strategies and policies. It did refer to the military threat at the time, as had become routine with the previous White Papers as well, but it also reflects on matters such as propaganda and the attempt by international parties to isolate South Africa economically and politically.[316] The White Paper described the national security situation as the following: Soviet expansion was gaining control in the surrounding regions and was acquiring control of strategic sources of the West and was seen as a main concern for the NP. The sudden increase in proxy forces such as the North Korean military personnel in Zimbabwe were viewed with great concern.[317]

According to the White Paper, Robert Mugabe indicated that the Zimbabwean Fifth Brigade was being trained by North Korean military personnel and would be directed at South Africa. Again, much like the previous papers, this White Paper also demonstrated that the Soviet Union was supporting SWAPO as well as the ANC and the paper estimated that 80% of support to these groups was generated by communist sympathisers.[318] This included the influx of sophisticated weaponry to South Africa's neighbouring states and was seen as an extension of Soviet expansionism.[319] However, this paper indicated a more positive feeling towards the West now, particularly by the USA, whereas in the 1979 White Paper on Defence more emphasis had been placed on the selective human rights policy of the Carter administration. This was due to Ronald Reagan's term as president in the White House, who was more sympathetic to the position of South Africa, through what was called the Reagan Doctrine.[320] This White Paper indicated the possibility of a conventional war, whereas the previous paper of 1979 had focused more on clandestine operations and unconventional warfare.[321]

With regard to the defence policy, the Defence Act stated that the Defence Force was to be used for the following objectives: foremost, defending the RSA, the prevention and

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[316] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982: The Administration of Supplies in a Defence Force in a State of Military Preparedness*, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 1982, p. 2.
[317] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1982, p. iii.
[318] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[319] *Ibid.,* p. 1.
[320] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 236.
[321] DODA, Stand van Ekonomiese Dwangmaatreëls teen die RSA, HSAW/190/3, p. 2.

suppression of terrorist activities, the prevention and suppression of domestic riots within the RSA, maintaining and protecting the life, health and property of essential services and to provide assistance to the Police Force.[322] The White Paper emphasized certain aspects of the defence policy, noted as the following: the Defence Force was primarily a peace task force but if circumstances required they would act as an offence pro-active force. Secondly, the Defence Force had to support the civilian infrastructure of the RSA by providing support to other security forces such as the police. Thirdly, the policy should involve all population groups in the defence of the RSA and the White Paper thus referred to the concept of a "people's army".[323] Lastly, support and assistance were to be lent to national and independent states, formerly known as homelands. According to the White Paper, the concept was to create a Defence Force for each independent state which would have been an extension of the regional units that were placed in or outside the national states mentioned. The White Paper also indicated that the RSA had entered into military agreements with these states in order to promote national security and common interests. This included training, socio- economic support and non-aggression pacts. The state had already at the time forged non-aggression pacts with the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. However, the non-aggression pacts only provided provision and cooperation concerning matters of community security.[324]

Ideas of a broader constellation of states in South Africa had not been fully discussed in previous White Papers on Defence, which contained only indirect references to military co-operations. The 1982 White Paper on Defence, however, placed emphasis on complete military operations between the states in order to protect the population successfully. Another prominent deviation was the conformation of deterrence, such as the development of South Africa's nuclear capacity as a strategic principle.[325] The 1977 White Paper on Defence mentioned the use of modern equipment and a balanced force in the Army, Navy and Airforce as a form of deterrence.[326] As with the previous White Papers, there was a growing concern that a conventional threat was on the horizon; hence the increased emphasis on deterrence. This concern was fuelled by the fact that previous conventional methods were directed at insurgents, who by their very nature used unconventional tactics. This led to complications, as

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[322] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982: The Administration of Supplies in a Defence Force in a State of Military Preparedness*, p. 7.
[323] *Ibid.,* p. 8.
[324] *Ibid.,* p. 15.
[325] *Ibid.,* p. 8.
[326] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 10.

conventional methods and operations in bordering states against unconventional forces were not quite as successful. Cross-border operations were directed at insurgents and not the host states.[327]

The operational aspect of this White Paper consisted of the usual four basic components of the SADF, Army, Air Force, Navy and Medical Services. Landward defence, as per the previous White Papers, was awarded the majority of the budget at R1526 919 500 for the years 1981/82 and was expected to increase to R1637 870 200 for 1982/83.[328] This is a clear indication that the RSA was extremely concerned about the increased revolutionary threat and that landward defence played a prominent role in countering these threats. However, according to the White Paper, counterinsurgency methods were not sufficient and, as previously mentioned, resulted in the development of conventional deterrents. For the first time conventional capabilities such as the Ratel Infantry Vehicle and new artillery were available for these types of operations. The White Paper also emphasises the problem of terrorist bases in neighbouring states and that terrorists were crossing borders into South Africa in order to plant landmines and commit other acts. They considered themselves unassailable after successfully crossing the border and committing these acts, which had a severe negative impact on soldiers' morale. What lowered morale even further was that the SADF would have had to respect the territorial integrity of neighbouring states as well. But this statement was immediately succeeded with a counter-statement by Malan that, "…no government in the world can afford to tolerate such a situation", which resulted in the SADF carrying out pre-emptive operations across the borders to destroy enemy bases.[329]

The inflation rate during 1981 remained extremely high at 15% and was not sustainable. Although at that point it was expected to drop due to economic slackening, experts did not expect it to go lower than 13%.[330] It was therefore vital that the new defence budget be adjusted accordingly and simultaneously be able to provide funding for the necessary measures taken toward the defence of the state. The defence budget in terms of GDP gradually decreased from

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[327] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982: The Administration of Supplies in a Defence Force in a State of Military Preparedness*, p. 8.
[328] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[329] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1982, p. 4.
[330] Institute for Strategic Studies, *The White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982: The Administration of Supplies in a Defence Force in a State of Military Preparedness*, p. 24.

5.5% in 1977 to 4.2% in 1982, with the majority of funds being attributed to operating costs. There was an increase of operating costs from 56.6% in 1979/80 to 72% in 1982/83.[331]

Apart from the normal roles that the SA Navy and Airforce played in the continuing conflicts, a prominent new function arrived in the form of specific support for the SA Army, SA Police and SA Railway police during counterinsurgency and security force operations: air reconnaissance for example was seen as an extremely useful tactic in the identification of revolutionary groups and their bases. However, according to the White Paper, equipment was insufficient. The service lifetime of the Shackleton aircraft had expired and the Albatross and Frelon helicopters had a limited flight radius.[332] In fact, parliament stated that "…the United States should be persuaded to make those larger vessels available to us" which was certainly not going to happen due to the arms and "dual use" embargo implemented in 1963 by the UN.[333] However the embargo was fortified when President Jimmy Carter voiced his and various human rights activists' disapproval of the Apartheid policy during his presidency from 1976 to 1981. Consequently, his administration instituted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[334] Naturally, this did not deter the RSA in manufacturing its own armament through Armscor as well as co-operation with other states that were in a similar position such as the Israel-South African Agreement, Taiwan, Iran, Indonesia, Morocco and Argentina.[335]

A large portion of the 1982 White Paper on Defence discussed the manpower capabilities of the RSA. This discussion included further improvements of service conditions, the Liaison Committee for Defence Manpower, the South African Defence Force Fund and Southern Cross Fund as well as numerous concession schemes for national servicemen.[336] These topics had been discussed superficially in previous White Papers but now played a much more prominent role in the potential success against the threat for the SADF.

There are three basic classifications of military manpower, and a state may use any of them at a certain point to fulfil its needs for battling a threat. It is a system in which participation in Defence Force activities is entirely voluntary, another in which it is compulsory for certain

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[331] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 18.
[332] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[333] RSA, House of Assembly, Debates of the Standing Committee, Vote No 19, *Defence*, 21 April 1982, p.153.
[334] A. Van Wyk & J. Grobler, "The Carter Administration and the Institution of the 1977 Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa: Rhetoric or Active Action?", *Historia*, (51), (1), 2006, pp. 163–99.
[335] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, "Africa Review" (National Security Archive, 1981). p. 164.
[336] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1982, p. 17.

groups of the population and lastly one in which participation is compulsory for the vast majority of the population.[337] However, it should be noted that although some states have a full-time or a part-time force, only certain states are truly permanent in a full-time capacity. In the SADF's case, the full-time force consisted of, among other things, the Permanent Force (28%), the National Servicemen (46%) and Voluntary Servicemen (3%) who were temporary members of the full-time force because their term of service lasted only two years.[338] The 1982 White Paper on Defence notes, just like its predecessors, that South Africa was facing not only an increased terrorist threat but a definite threat of conventional war as well. In 1981, Prime Minister Botha noted, "Soviet strategy is aimed particularly at activating various fronts on the border of the RSA so as to involve the security forces outside the metropolitan areas, thus leaving these areas vulnerable to urban terrorism".[339] From a military viewpoint the pressure was considered extremely high; not only were South African troops, together with the Territorial Forces in SWA fighting against SWAPO, but the borders of South Africa as well as the cities and rural districts had to be defended against infiltration and acts of terrorism.[340] A larger trained force was therefore essential, especially since the Permanent Force was relatively small. However, universal compulsory military service was not quite a viable option at that point due to economic limitations, limited training facilities as well as the precarious political climate within South Africa. During this period, military service for Blacks, Coloureds and Indians was completely voluntary and there was a growing uncertainty of the loyalty of non-white South Africans towards the NP regime.[341]

As previously mentioned, South Africa faced the challenge of the armament supply, especially with the implementation of the arms embargo in 1977. However, the South African government had managed this problem quite effectively by establishing Armscor and various manufacturing industries. The 1982 White Paper on Defence, much like its predecessor, also lists, but with more detail, the various manufacturing fields such as weapons, ammunition, missile technology, electro-optics, aircraft manufacture and maintenance, pyrotechnic products, armoured vehicles, operational vehicles, vessels, radar and computers,

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[337] Institute for Strategic Studies. *The White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982: The Administration of Supplies in a Defence Force in a State of Military Preparedness*, p. 14.
[338] *Ibid.*
[339] Hoofrede deur Sy Edele, die Eerste Minister, P.W. Botha, Sakeleierberaad, Kaapstad, 12 November 1981, p. 16.
[340] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1982, p. 6.
[341] Institute for Strategic Studies. *The White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply of 1982: The Administration of Supplies in a Defence Force in a State of Military Preparedness*, p.16.

telecommunication, weapon electronics, maritime technology and electronic warfare.[342] There were roughly fifty contractors directly involved in the manufacture of the aforementioned weaponry and associated equipment. Armscor alone produced more than half of these same items, approximately 400 sub-contractors manufactured specific components and about 1500 firms were indirectly involved in the manufacture of these military materials.[343]

4.3. White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply, April 1984

The international pressure on South Africa was increasing tremendously, however domestic terrorist attacks were becoming considerably more frequent. The ANC and its allies were gaining momentum and support both internally and internationally for their freedom struggle. This did not, however, occur in a peaceful manner. In fact, guerrilla tactics were often used in urban areas, such as the explosion of a car bomb planted by Abubakar Ismeal, an MK member, outside the SA Air Force headquarters in Pretoria on 13 May 1983. This resulted in nineteen deaths and 220 injured. Hence the need for not only one but two different White Papers on Defence transpiring in 1984.[344]

4.3.1.   An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1982-1984

As previously mentioned, the 1980s were turbulent years for South Africa and internal conflict was reaching a level almost equal to that of the external conflicts. It resulted in a more active approach on three wide-ranging stages: Angola and Namibia, the international arena and the Southern African region.[345] Internally, the general perception held by white South Africans was that it was relatively quiet between 1979 and 1984, but the SADF perceived it differently. In 1983, the SADF increasingly began to use direct intervention against the ANC in order to eliminate its bases and supporting opposition groups who were challenging the RSA government in neighbouring states.[346] This indicated the activation of the people's war or M-Plan by the ANC. The armed struggle was now in full swing. The ANC adopted the "four pillars of the revolution" concept. The ANC announced over broadcasts and declarations that the revolutionary struggle was to rest on the following four pillars: the armed struggle,

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[342] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1982, p. 25.
[343] *Ibid.,* p. 11.
[344] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering,1984, AI(DIV)/257/22: Feitebasis, Hoofstuk 4: Die Terreuraanslag, p. 88.
[345] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 288.
[346] "General South African History Timeline 1980s", *SA History,* [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/general-south-african-history-timeline-1980s [Accessed 2 May 2020].

mobilisation of the masses, ungovernability and alternative structures and finally, isolation of the South African government.[347]

The domestic onslaught against the RSA implied largely negative consequences. The new constitutional dispensation provoked strong negative reactions from the opposition. Overall, the domestic conflict situation was characterized by a significant increase in the revolutionary climate, which was reflected in the continuing unrest. According to the SADF, contributing factors to the further development of the situation were the following:

i)   a feeling of depression especially among the lower income groups in the weak economic sectors;

ii) the socio-economic breaking points such as unemployment, squatter establishments and housing, the radicalization of people of colour as manifested in the nationwide unrest at educational institutions, greater involvement of the ANC in domestic politics as well as violent action by the ANC in support of revolutionary activities;

iii) the development of the UDF as the most influential nationwide extra-parliamentary unity front, the deepening of the credibility crisis of government structures, black local authorities and of persons participating in it because they had to start functioning independently.

The deliberate exploitation of weaknesses and perceived grievances by resistance organizations and part of the media for political gain caused a negative view of both government and the SADF and spurred further unrest.[348] The economic situation found itself necessitating stricter measures, which in certain cases provided the opportunity for anti-government groups to exploit the difficulties or perceived struggles to the point of contention. The external threat, however, was reaching a pivotal point. Zimbabwe had achieved independence in April 1980, and after elections secured a victory for Robert Mugabe and the ZANU party. The political sequence of events that led to this election was as complicated as the actual guerrilla warfare itself.[349]

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[347] P. Powel, "*A Study of The Theoretical Aspects of ANC Mobilizational Methods in the Eastern Cape Townships of Cradock and Port Alfred,1980*-1988", Unpublished MA dissertation, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, 1991, pp. 56-58.
[348] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering,1984, AI(DIV)/257/22: Feitebasis, Hoofstuk 4: Die Terreuraanslag, pp. 21-22.
[349] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010,* p. 143.

4.3.2. The 1984 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

The introduction to the 1984 White Paper on Defence emphasised that the threat shifted towards the ANC with the USSR offering support for these liberation movements deemed as terrorists by the NP regime. General Magnus Malan, the Minister of Defence, assumed a quick but concise approach to the security threats, namely through the formation of a respectable and effective full-time force augmented by part-time personnel. In fact, the tone of the White Paper implies that a strong force could solve the majority of the conflicting threats that the RSA was facing.[350] In previous White Papers, Botha had always portrayed a tactful tone towards the situation and focused on various other factors, such as the economic and social dynamics. Malan's direct and decisive approach to the White Papers on Defence was a strong contrast in leadership style compared to Botha's diplomatic approach. Botha indicated in the White Papers, that even though a defence force was an extremely important feature of a well-functioning state, such force should not interfere with political matters. In fact, Beaufre's theory, which Botha often quoted, indicated that the Defence Force is only an extension of political powers. The 1984 White Paper of the Organization of the SADF indicated that no member of the Permanent Force, Citizen Force or Commando Force should partake in any political actions.[351] The relationship between Botha's administration and the defence elite became increasingly intertwined, blurring the lines between the NP's agenda and the Defence Forces' role as an a-political state institution.[352]

Similar to Botha in his presentation of the White Papers to parliament, Malan also mentioned the use of indirect actions in the form of a revolutionary onslaught by the enemy. In this case Malan listed them to be the SACP and the ANC who acted as a military wing for the SACP. Externally SWAPO played a similar role in achieving Soviet objectives in the Southern African regions.[353] Malan indicated in the White Paper that the UN and OAU also played important roles in furthering the USSR's objectives. The tone of this particular White Paper provides a sense of "us against the world" for South Africa as opposed to the rhetoric of Botha who

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[350] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. iii.

[351] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 6.

[352] Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, p. 107.

[353] *Ibid.,* p. 1.

described it merely as problematic in a diplomatic manner. Both leaders did in fact focus on the Soviet Union being a prominent, if not the biggest threat at the time.[354]

The April 1984 White Paper on Defence saw emphasis on the implementation of a broad policy, which was the Defence Act of 1957 (Act 44 of 1957). This Act gave the Defence Force the mandate to expand its force, develop and manufacture equipment that was specifically tailored to the Southern African terrain, create long-term economic programmes, increase operational action in the suppression and prevention of the terrorist onslaught, combating subversive activities of the ANC and support the SAP in their counterinsurgency measures. The SADF was also able to create relief aids, improved SADF conditions for soldiers as well as interdepartmental co-operation.[355]

The key point in this White Paper, or rather, its most prominent feature is the Operational and Manpower section. Unlike the White Papers under Botha as Minister of Defence, Malan individually listed operational efforts and their subsequent results during 1980 and 1983. The 1982 White Paper on Defence briefly mentioned operations Sceptic (June 1980), Protea (August 1981), and Daisy (October 1981) as successful pre-emptive strikes against revolutionary forces. By continuing in this informative fashion, Malan could equally justify and further the narrative for defence expansion.[356] In the 1984 White Paper on Defence, Malan refers to Operation Askari in Angola as successful due to the availability of a trained "force-in-being".[357] This bolstered the idea of having a larger force of combat-ready soldiers.

The White Paper emphasizes the inadequacies that existed regarding the manpower provisioning system. In order to correct these inadequacies, the Defence Amendment Act of 1982 (Act 103 of 1982) was created, which came into effect January 1983.[358] The Act brought about wide-ranging changes regarding the manpower provision system in the Part-time Force. The most important features stemming from this Act was the amendment of the period of service. The continued service commitment was extended to 720 days and the term of service was extended to fourteen years. Besides these extensions, there was the improved placement and rearrangement of members and various reserves, regarding members who served in the

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[354] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 3.
[355] *Ibid.*
[356] *Ibid.,* p. 5.
[357] *Ibid.*
[358] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 10.

conventional and area protection forces.[359] This meant that soldiers could be utilised for longer periods in order to combat numerous threats surrounding South African borders, as well as be placed and manoeuvred where applicable.

With the extension of military service came the expansion of the force in various factions. The 1982 White Paper on Defence briefly mentioned a proposed 17% expansion of the Full-time Force for 1987, however, the actual growth rate by 1984 was 5.8 %. This slow growth was due to "lack of accommodation for the other population groups" as well as for White women in other centres.[360] In 1984 the force had increased their Coloured recruits by 22% and Black recruits by 13%.

Training, Malan stated that, particular importance was attached to practical experience and that improved training systems and methods were being researched continuously. Training assistance was also provided to independent black states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei) to meet their needs for advancement and specialization. An example would be that during 1982 and 1983, several parachute training courses were run for students from these states. According to Malan, it was successful to such an extent that numerous senior officers reached the stage where they qualified for admission to the South African Army Management and Staff Course.[361]

In addition to providing support for black independent states, the White Paper also mentions the further development of staff as individuals by supplying them with skills that not only contributed to the SADF's needs but to the South African economy as well. An example would be a course in systems engineering in 1984 and other schemes provided by government at technical colleges, approved tertiary institutes and technikons.[362] In the previous White Papers, the individual development of military personnel had not been mentioned, mostly due to the prioritisation of the forces' restructuring, development and modernisation. By 1984 it had become clear that they had the ability to provide substantial support to their staff and simultaneously creating a future skilled workforce that would be able to contribute to economic growth after their military service. The development, organisation and modernisation placed the SADF in a multifunctional position. It not only served as a national defence mechanism,

[359] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 11.
[360] *Ibid.,* p. 13.
[361] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[362] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 15.

but proved its importance in the development and establishment of a viable after-service workforce.

The defence budget had levelled off since 1978/1979 in spite of increased commitments, decreasing from 5.5% in 1977 to 4.2% in 1982.[363] According to Malan, defence expenditures for the years 1978/79 to 1982/83 averaged 15.9 % of state expenditures, as opposed to 18.2% in 1977/78, indicating that the Defence Force was doing their part in combating state expenditures. A decrease in the defence budget during a period of increased SADF activities had resulted in the operating costs forming an increasingly large part of the total defence budget. In 1982/83 it accounted for 72% compared to 56.6% in 1979/1980, which had an effect on development and modernization of the force.[364]

4.4. White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd, September 1984

Terror attacks were on the rise in South Africa in an effort by radical groups to force the NP regime's hand into a democratic system. The role of the SADF became more important in serving the state internally against these threats. But the organisation had changed numerous times over the period covered by this study. This White Paper was developed as an explanation to parliament of the various functions of the Defence Force, possibly serving as justification for the budget increase, increased militarization of the state or the justification of the TNS. There was not one White Paper that was presented with merely one purpose in mind.

4.4.1. The 1984 White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd

In 1984, a second White Paper was presented "…Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of the South African Ltd". As the title suggests, the paper focused on the organizational structure of the SADF and Armscor. The April 1984 White Paper on Defence was superficial in content and besides the few highlighted features previously discussed, was not nearly as comprehensive as this White Paper on the Organization and Function. Similar to the 1969 and 1973 White Papers on Defence, this one focused again on the organizational structure of the SADF. However, according to Malan this paper concentrated on informing parliament of the growth and complexity of the SADF in an attempt to strengthen

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[363] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 17.
[364] *Ibid.,* p. 18.

the spirit of co-operation and goodwill between the members of parliament and the Defence Force.

In comparison with both Botha and Malan's previous White Paper compilations, this particular White Paper was the most comprehensive presented to parliament for the period 1969 to 1989 Therefore, only the following significant features will be discussed:

a) Organizational composition,

b) Legislation matters,

c) Participation in party politics by members of the Defence Force,

d) Personnel division, military intelligence division,

e) Operations division, logistics division,

f) Finance division and the various arms of service organization structures, as well as Armscor.

1. Organizational Composition

The functional organization of the SADF was orientated towards the execution of the tasks imposed on it as per the Defence Act of 1957 (Act 44). The SADF was divided into four Services, namely the SA Army, SA Air Force, SA Navy and SA Medical Service, with supporting services such as the Quartermaster General and the Chaplain General. Five staff divisions assisted the Chief of the SADF in executing his command: Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics division and Finance. The following *organogram 1* is a structural representation of the organisational composition of the SADF.[365]

An Inspector General was established at Chief of Defence Force level as well as for the different Services and Quartermaster General. The main function of the Inspector General was to evaluate the efficiency of the Defence Force and to report back to the Chief of the Defence Force for his decision and action. The Inspectorate had to report back on the efficient utilisation of resources by the SADF, and was also responsible for reporting on the battle-readiness for the operations of the four Arms of the Service. Special Forces were under direct control of the Chief of the Defence Force. This, according to the White Paper, made it possible for the Defence Force to use special capabilities in order to achieve its operational objectives.[366]

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[365] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 18.
[366] *Ibid.*

Organogram 1.[367]

2. Legislation

The SADF was responsible for the application of the following acts:

- The Defence Act, 1957 (Act 44 of 1957);

- The National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act 102 of 1980);

- The Civil Defence Act, 1977 (Act 67 of 1977);

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[367] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 1.

- The Moratorium Act, 1963 (Act 25 of 1963);

The Defence Act of 1957 regulated the employment of the Defence Force, liability for the service of the inhabitants of the RSA and the administration of military justice.[368] Section 3(2) of the Act stated that the SADF or any member and portion thereof might be employed in the defence of the Republic, prevention or suppression of terrorism, prevention and suppression of internal disorder and the preservation of life, health or property, or the maintenance of essential services.[369] The repetition of the legal aspects of the Act and its inclusion in the White Paper was expressly emphasised, in what could be assumed to be a justification of previous operations or deployment regarding the **B**order War and the threat of communism. It could serve as a precedent for future operation or deployments in countering the previously mentioned threats.

Military Service Obligations

In terms of Section 3(1) of the 1957 Defence Act, every White male citizen of the RSA, between the age of seventeen and sixty-five, would be liable to render service or to undergo training in the SADF, with the exception of the following persons:

- members of parliament and of political councils (Section 2 (1)(a));
- females and individuals who were not White as defined in Section 1 of the Population Registration Act, 1950. In terms of the second provision to Section 2 (1)(b) of the Act, these individuals could enter voluntarily for service in the SADF, however with approval from parliament, the president could make these individuals liable for service and training under the Act by proclamation in the *Government Gazette.*
- Non-citizens, unless the state president by proclamation in the *Government Gazette* made a provision of the Act applicable to them (Section 2(2)).[370]

According to the above-mentioned, the majority of manpower of the Defence Force consisted of White males. However, looking at the demographics of South Africa by 1984, White males were in the minority. This particular observation had not been mentioned in any of the previous White Papers, but this restriction on the use of viable manpower can be seen as strategically debilitating.

3. Participation in Party Politics by Members of the Defence Force

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[368] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1984, p. 18.
[369] *Ibid.*
[370] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 3.

Malan indicated that the Defence Force consisted of various individuals with differing political convictions, but since the Defence Force's primary function was to defend the RSA as an instrument of the state, the organization had to remain neutral and was removed from the arena of party politics. No member of the Defence Force was allowed to participate in demonstrations or processions for party-political processes nor participate in any political meeting in uniform. No Defence Force infrastructure was allowed to display any political paraphernalia or be put to political use. Exercising their vote was the extent of Defence members' permissible political activities.[371]

4. Personnel Division

The aim of the personnel division was to ensure that the Defence Force had enough manpower at its disposal, prepared and ready for battle. Functions of the personnel division were the following:

a) the effective manning of the Defence Force,

b) ensuring that the Defence Force developed its manpower according to its needs,

c) the general maintenance of the Defence Force personnel,

d) the optimization of organizational efficiency in the Defence Force and the administration of law in the Defence Force.

Defence Force personnel policy was based on the philosophy that the defence of the RSA against a military onslaught was the responsibility of all its inhabitants within the confines of the existing legal regulations during that time, bearing in mind, that the policy did not discriminate against race, creed, language or sex with due allowance for government policy, military customs and local conditions.[372]

Black individuals were employed in the Defence Force, serving in ethnic contexts in the Defence Force of their various independent states. But voluntary service within existing structures of the SADF did not exclude them on this account. Whites, Coloureds and Indians were employed according to requirements, or to fill the shortage of manpower. At this point the manpower of the SADF consisted of a Full-time Force and a Part-time Force. The Full-time Force consisted of the Permanent Force, national servicemen who were still engaged in their initial two-year military service period, White women, Coloured and Asian men who engaged

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[371]Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 6.
[372]*Ibid.,* p. 7.

in voluntary service, the Auxiliary service and finally, civilians. The Part-time Force consisted of the Citizen Force and the Commando Force.[373]

Women in uniform

According to the White Paper, White women had already been part of the Defence Force for some fourteen years prior to 1984. They served in all the services in sixty-five different fields of occupation. Although not often mentioned in previous White Papers, their roles were seen as vital due to the fact that they could serve as replacements in non-combative roles. This gave the SADF the opportunity to employ more White men for combat.[374]

Manpower development

Besides the normal training that the various Services provided, the SADF also provided tertiary education opportunities as well as opportunities in skilled areas such as engineering at technikons. This promoted future economic development and a future skilled labour force once they were done with their military service, thus contributing to a viable growing economic environment.[375]

5. Military Intelligence Division

Organogram 2. [376]

[373] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 7.
[374] *Ibid.,* p. 13.
[375] *Ibid.,* p. 15.
[376] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 21.

The Military Intelligence Division (MID) was responsible for gathering all military intelligence both internally and externally on national and departmental levels. The aim of the MID was to determine the nature, extent and time-scale of the military threat against the RSA at any given level. The Subdivision Military Intelligence (SMI) was responsible for determining not only the nature but also the scope of the military threat, much like the MID. Another subdivision was created for counterintelligence as well as the Subdivision of Communication Operations (SCO). SCO was responsible for providing an extensive information service for the Defence Force.[377] The SCO controlled the SADF archives, which had two functions, namely the administration of Armscor and the Defence Force as well as chronicling the history of the SADF. The subdivision also provided research and information on the customs, life and attitudes of the inhabitants of South Africa to personnel.[378]

These subsections and further examination of this White Paper indicates that the SADF had developed into an extremely efficient and perhaps self-sufficient organizational body since its initial development as discussed in the 1969 White Paper on Defence.

6. Operations Division

The description and organizational hierarchy of the Operations Division is fairly vague, much like that of the MID represented in *Organogram 2*. It consisted of two tiers, the top being occupied by the Chief of Staff Operations and the second tier was divided into three subsections, namely, the Subdivision Planning, the Subdivision Operations and the Directorate Public Relations. The aim of the Operations Division was to ensure the effective employment of the operational potential of the Defence Force. Functions included the management of Defence Force strategies, co-ordination of Defence Force design, planning and co-ordinating operations initiated by the Chief of Defence Force, the administration of the Civil Defence Act and the National Key Points Act, promoting goodwill towards the Defence Force through the use of the Directorate of Public Relations and lastly, the co-ordination of departmental staff duties.[379]

7. Logistics Division

The Operations Division is a simple description of the Logistics Division, which also consisted of two tiers. The top tier was occupied by the Chief of Staff Logistics and the second tier consisted of two subdivisions, namely Logistic Planning and Logistic Support. The aims of the

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[377] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984*,* p. 21.
[378] *Ibid.,* p. 22*.*
[379] *Ibid.*

Logistics Division were described as logistical preparedness of the Defence Force as required by the Operations Division. This indicates a direct interdepartmental relationship between the various divisions, although Malan's description to parliament of these various divisions made it seem as if they were operating in isolation. In fact, the overall design is intricate and a vast improvement on the original structure presented by Botha in 1968/69. The functions of the Logistic Division were described in two parts as the assurance of a balanced logistics capability for the Defence Force and the overall co-ordination of logistic support.[380]

8. Finance Division

The Finance Division, followed the same simple structure as the previous divisions. Consisting of two tiers, the first tier was managed by the Chief of Staff Finance and the second trier consisted of five subdivisions, namely Directorate Programming and Budgeting, Directorate Accounts, Directorate Financial Administration, Chief Paymaster and Directorate Computer System. The aim of the Finance Division as portrayed by the White Paper, was to run overall financial management in respect of budgeting, accountability and pay matters in harmony with the execution of the Operational tasks of the Defence Force, as well as to co-ordinate a computer service.[381]

The function of the Finance Division consisted of the overall control and management of the SADF programme budget, the control and co-ordination of financial control and accounting in the Defence Force, the overall control and accounting in the Defence Force, the planning, development, implementation and control of remuneration matters in the Defence Force, and lastly the co-ordination, evaluation and support for the establishment of an effective computer service in the Defence Force.[382] The functions, as seen above, did tend to reflect the aims.

A comprehensive corporate plan, the Master Plan, was drawn up from the strategy, aimed at providing for a period of fifteen years or even longer. The reasoning behind this concerned the nature and extent of the Defence Force's weapons systems which were highly complex according to Malan. Consideration had to be given to the fact that equipment could have been used for fifteen years and longer before being phased out and replaced by new equipment. Each objective in the Master Plan required alternate courses of action as a precautionary measure. The means required for each course of action and costs involved were determined in accordance

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[380] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984*,* p. 27.
[381] *Ibid* p. 29.
[382] *Ibid.*

a main budgetary programme, namely Command and Control, Landward, Air and Maritime Defence and overall support.[383]

The Defence Command Council considered the Master Plan in order to establish whether its objectives were in agreement with the Defence strategy, what the advantages and disadvantages of every alternative course of action were, as well as whether the priorities of the recommended alternatives had been arranged according to strategic requirements. The Defence Planning Committee then considered the feasibility of the various requirements, after which the Master Plan is referred to the State Security Council.

The State Security Council's recommendations were then presented to the cabinet for final decision. The Master Plan constitutes the basis for the Defensive Five-Year Plan. The Master Plan was designed in cycles of five years and was referred to as the Defence Force Five-Year Plan, and constituted of a summary of the Defence Force programmes, goals and objectives which were quantified in monetary terms for the following five years.[384]

9. The Various Services

As per *Organogram 1*, the Defence Force service consisted of the SA Army, SA Airforce, SA Navy and SA Medical Service. Their structures are set out graphically in Addendum A, B, C and D for visual representation.

The aim of the SA Army was to ensure the national safety of the RSA and SWA in the geographic context of the land domain. The functions included;

a) the observation, evaluation and the extent of a threat as far as the involvement of the SA Army was concerned,

b) the development of a credible deterrent capability in order to discourage landward conventional onslaughts and insurgencies,

c) providing the landward defence of the RSA,

d) to engage in conventional land battle in co-operation with the other combat services and expeditiously ending it in its favour,

e) preventing or suppressing internal unrest in support of the SAP in the maintenance of law and order.

f) providing emergency relief during disasters or emergencies,

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[383] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 30.
[384] *Ibid.*

g) and maintaining essential services under these conditions.[385]

The White Paper, much like its predecessors, mentions the East-West conflict that was engulfing the RSA. However, there is reference to the parallel Revolutionary Onslaught against the RSA. As such conventional operations and counterinsurgency operations received an additional explanatory section in this White Paper.

Brigades and combat groups employed for conventional operations had to comply with the following requirements:

- These forces had to be highly mobile as well as mechanized to be able to operate over a wide front for simultaneous attacks on numerous targets.
- They had to be self-supporting since the battles were conducted predominantly outside the RSA.
- They had to possess superior fire power in order to support dispersed fighting elements effectively.
- They had to have counterinsurgency capabilities and be able to operate at night.

Due to organization developments mentioned in the previous White Papers and the changing nature of the threat, the SADF had developed the capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

To provide an effective second line of defence, territorial forces (Commandos) were organized throughout the RSA. Their function, according to the White Paper, was to provide blanket cover for combating terrorist infiltration and actions. These territorial forces were mainly responsible for intelligence operations and protection of home and hearth until such time as reaction forces could take over the task.[386]

In the domestic environment, the SAP was primarily responsible for counterinsurgency operations, while the Army provided support. According to this White Paper, the Army only accepted primary responsibility when the situation escalated to organized engagement. Territorial commands, in co-operation with, amongst others, the SAP, were responsible for combating the counterinsurgency threats in their areas and for conducting counterinsurgency

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[385] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD*, Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 36.
[386] *Ibid.*

operations. For this purpose, the ten territorial Commands and the Walvis Bay Military area had full-time, Citizen Force and Commando units at their disposal.[387]

The Army was the only service responsible for counterinsurgency operations. The other three services as well as the Quartermaster General provided only superficial descriptions of their aims and functions as well as their relations to the Army, which as can be seen in the organizational structure of *Organogram 1.*

Another noteworthy section in this White Paper addressed the structure of Armscor, which has been created to fulfil the need for self-produced weaponry and other auxiliary equipment. The arms embargo had crippled South African defence for quite some time and Armscor not only filled that need but surpassed expectations by becoming a major economic player in South Africa.

As an autonomous state corporation, it was directly accountable to the Minister of Defence, to whom it had to report on a continuous basis. An illustration of its corporate structure can be found in Addendum E. Armscor was the leading manufacturer in weapons and defence equipment for the Defence Force, who was their primary client. Armscor had to continuously develop new and innovative equipment to keep up with the threats that South Africa faced. As a result, Armscor was at the forefront regarding research and development and operated a series of specialised activities. These activities included Operational Research assisting the Defence Force in defining and quantifying threats and the appropriate counter-measures, service subsidiaries performing data processing for the Defence Force as well as for certain subsidiaries and departments.[388]

Through an initial inspection, this White Paper seemed thorough and explanatory to the functions of the Defence Force. However, upon closer examination, there is an abundance of repetitive information displayed regarding the interdepartmental relationships and functionality of all the services. Therefore, *Organogram 1* is in fact the ideal illustration of the structure and its functions.

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[387] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 37.
[388] *Ibid.,* p. 60.

Conclusion

The structural altercations in the 1979-1984 White Papers on Defence, indicated that the Defence Force was continuously evolving and adapting to circumstances brought by both the NP regime and the international arena. Serving as a body of the state, the practical application of the responsibilities and legislations mentioned previously could have been difficult. Translating academic theory, to policy, to strategy, to doctrine, to tactical and practical success, can have an inhibiting effect on the final objective and this is truly evident in the White Papers on Defence, and the constant need for another White Paper every few years. A conventional threat transformed into an unconventional threat, although only serving as a proxy for communist countries such as the Soviet Union, the ANC pursued its own agenda through the means presented to them by these countries. Therefore, it is not only the Defence Force that was evolving but also the realisation that revolutionary forces proved to be a greater threat than conventional forces. This realisation peaked for the NP government between the late 1970s until the mid-1980s. The discussion of the White Papers provides an excellent foundation and understanding of the continual deviations of why the Defence Force structure kept changing at an exuberant rate.

Chapter Five: The Final Link of Theory to Action in Defence Policy Making, 1986-1989

As phase three, the final linking of theory to action in defence policy making approached, so did the threat of communism as the world prepared for the dawn of a new decade. Similarly, South Africa faced the winds of change as political wills were tugged back and forth between the revolutionary forces and the NP government. The NP regime as an entity experienced its own severe inner-party politics during this period. The inner-party politics signalled a change within the defence policies as well as contributed to external factors of change amongst the South African populace. As such, an odd anomaly occurred, which was the development of the first and only South African Police (SAP) White Paper to exist in the history of the SAP. The development of this paper could indicate that there was a strained relationship between internal defence forces (SAP) and the external defence forces (SADF).

This final phase analysis of the last White Papers on Defence and Armament between 1986 to 1989, with the inclusion of the SAP White Paper, will be discussed. The chapter aims to highlight certain historical events as contextual reasoning for the development and changes that occurred within the White Papers of 1986 to 1989.

5.1. White Paper on Defence and Armament Supply, April 1986

The mid-1980s can be described as a historical zenith in the evolution of South African politics. Similarly, it can be said that this period marked the peak of the SADF's power capabilities.[389] Therefore, an overview of the final events before the RSA transformed into a democracy is worth examining.

5.1.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1984-1986

Political wills were not only tugged on South African soil, but internationally as well. The national liberation wars in Angola and Mozambique came to an end when a leftist military coup in Lisbon overthrew Portugal's Estado Novo regime in April 1974. The new regime had promised independence to Portugal's African colonies without delay which stopped all military actions in these colonies. Later in September 1974, a ceasefire was called in Mozambique and

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[389] Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force,* p. 434.

negotiations for independence started.[390] The Nkomati Accord that took place between Mozambique and the RSA on 16 March 1984, had a particular impact on the internal conflict situation of South Africa.[391] The accord recognised that both South Africa and Mozambique were sovereign states in their own right and reaffirmed the right of neither to interfere in each other's affairs. The Mozambique government thus expelled 800 ANC members from its state.[392] However, SADF intelligence inferred that the accord was kept superficially and that states such as Mozambique and Lesotho were still supporting the "freedom struggle".[393] Other states such as Botswana and Swaziland, who, with Lesotho were part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) attempted to emphasise their independence by allowing the ANC to operate from within their borders. This instigated sour relations between South Africa and those Southern African states and required further SADF actions to keep anti-apartheid groups out of South Africa so as to fulfil their defence role.[394] In the September manifest of 1985, the ANC declared in its Sechaba document: "We in the ANC note that the nationalist struggle and the socialist struggle are not one and the same thing, and they do not belong to the same historical period. The two represent two distinct categories of the revolution".[395] The same document reflects the following:

> We must not allow our desire for socialism to intoxicate us. The people of South Africa must be taught the bitter truth simply, clearly and in a straight forward manner: the chief content of the present phase of our revolution is the nationalist liberation of the Black people. It is actually impossible for South Africa to make even the advance to socialism before the national liberation of the black oppressed nation.[396]

In accordance with the above statement the ANC strategy as referred to, were standing on "four pillars of the revolution". The first pillar could be referred to as the all-round vanguard activity of the underground structure of the ANC. The second pillar was the establishment and development of a mass political army. This can be better explained through the words of Oliver

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[390] G. Wright, *The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy Towards Angola Since 1945,* Pluto Press, Chicago, 1997, p. 9.
[391] AI(DIV)/257/22: Nasionale Inligtingswaardering, 1984. P. 78
[392] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa,* p. 291.
[393] Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DODA), DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering,1984, AI(DIV)/257/22: Feitebasis, Hoofstuk 4: Die Terreuraanslag, p. 20.
[394] *Ibid.,* p.21.
[395] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, SADF, Chapter 2.
[396] *Ibid.,* Oliver Tambo, 1984,

Tambo in 1984: "Allow me to single out the creation of the UDF as a historic achievement in our people's efforts to unite in the broadest possible front for the struggle against the inhumane apartheid system".[397] The third pillar was the organising and intensifying of the armed struggle by MK. The fourth pillar was the establishment of worldwide support morally, politically and materially wise as well as the complete isolation of the RSA in the international community. Thus, the ANC strategy and strategic objective was seizure of power and not reforms or a negotiated transfer of power.

P.W. Botha's reform strategy in the form of the Tricameral parliament and the creation of local black authorities was met with severe resistance from radical groups and the Black masses. This initiated further unrest and internal conflicts in South Africa, which had to be promptly managed by the NP regime, the SADF and other security forces.[398]

5.1.2. The 1986 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production

The 1984 White Papers on Defence, although extremely long and detailed, focused on the continued build-up of arms which dominated the Southern African military stage. The detailed explanations of the functions of the various Services served as a reminder to parliament and the public what an important role the Defence Force played in the ongoing fight against the perceived communist and revolutionary threats the RSA was facing. By 1986, Gen Magnus Malan continued the discussion regarding these threats in the White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply. He emphasised the need of the SADF to adapt its posture accordingly. The internal security situation had worsened as civil unrest rose and international pressure continued to cripple the South African economy. As a result, a committee was established after the publication of the 1984 White Paper on Defence. The committee was to conduct a comprehensive investigation to ensure that the SADF and Armscor were meeting their anticipated demands and requirements in order to effectively counter the onslaught against the RSA. Malan appointed the committee, which was led by Chief of the Army, Lt Gen J.J. Geldenhuys.[399]

The committee's findings, known as the Geldenhuys Report was published in this White Paper and although the paper follows the traditional outline of the previous White Papers regarding the functions of the Services, budget, manpower etc., it is much more concise and to the point

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[397] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering,1984, AI(DIV)/257/22: Feitebasis, p. 21.
[398] Alden, *Apartheids Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State,* p. 151.
[399] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1986, p. iii.

within regard to its specific focus of the Geldenhuys Report's results. During 1984, when the committee started its initial investigations, an environmental analysis was also conducted. The analysis conclude that the following factors were to be considered regarding the stability of the RSA:

- A widespread drought in 1984 could have sped up urbanisation and the rural areas would consequently become more difficult to control and could facilitate potential infiltration actions;

- The low economic growth that was occurring could lead to large-scale unemployment and labour unrests. This would create an ideal environment for revolutionary activities;

- Unemployment amongst disadvantaged population groups and a shortage of skilled manpower were the most important features. Since it required minimum disruption to the economy, it was important to use the existing Full-time Force and only use Part-time Force members when necessary;

- In order to counter the high inflation rate that occurred, the SADF had to carefully consider what was an immediate priority to use funds effectively and efficiently. Therefore, emphasis was placed on self-sufficiently of South Africa's armament industry;[400]

- The report stated that regarding external politics, the RSA could not expect a favourable diplomatic attitude towards the country in the foreseeable future. This realisation and explicit mention of it in this White Paper can be seen as the tip of the NP's political power;

- The lack of settlement between the international community and South Africa regarding SWA resulted in the continued presence of the SADF in the SWA territory.[401]

The Geldenhuys Report also identified the objectives of the revolutionary onslaught as the following:

- Creating and intensifying a revolutionary climate;

- Isolating South Africa;

- Destroying the South African economy;

- Subverting the will and ability of the South African government and the population to resist the revolutionary onslaught;

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[400] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1986, p. 2.
[401] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

- Intensifying and conducting the terrorist onslaught;

- Neutralising South Africa's security forces;

- Destroying the new political dispensation.[402]

By this description, the common characteristics mentioned in McCuen's book are present. The report also emphasised that the geographic region of South Africa was quite large and that the space between the threat and South African territory was being narrowed by the threat and the alarming build-up of conventional forces from the enemy. This could place a significant strain on the SADF and its forces which then required special attention to logistics, strategic and tactical mobility, the need for blanket cover, night fighting capability and decentralization of executions.[403] The committee thus concluded that due to the nature and scale of the threat, it would have been impractical to scale down of the Defence Forces' capabilities and that it would be wise to rather utilize existing resources to their limit. This included the use and streamlining of existing manpower, rather than expanding it. However, Malan argued that the Defence Force could not cope by using the Full-time Force only and this was due to the nature of the conflict as well as the rate to which it was escalating.[404] The committee thus set the following guidelines for future planning of manpower: the Permanent Force must provide leadership, instructors and administrative cadres, whereas the Full-time Force must supply troops on the ground and regional units had to be established and developed according to operational priorities.[405]

At this point, the SADF functioned according to the design that was introduced in 1972. The Geldenhuys Report found that although the structure was more focused than in the past, the span of control of the Chief of the SADF and Chief of the Arms Service varied between 14 and 47 which caused concerns for mismanagement and lack of co-ordinations. Their recommendation was for it to be corrected. They also found that the SADF had issues with changing thought patterns from "operational" to "long-term planning and strategy".[406] This is an interesting note, since long term planning and strategy is not sustainable during revolutionary onslaughts, a fact often pointed out by McCuen. However, Beaufre stated that sub-divisions of strategy may differ as long as the overall object of total strategy stays the same.[407] One of the

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[402] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1986, p. 4.
[403] *Ibid.,* p. 3.
[404] *Ibid.,* p. 5.
[405] *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[406] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1986, p. 8.
[407] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy,* p. 30.

reasons why the SADF was successful regarding their strategies on a fluid battlefield was because they adapted accordingly to a threat that equally adapted its own strategies.

The Geldenhuys Report also found that the expenditures on the Defence Force were not excessive. From the previous White Papers on Defence, it was evident that they did increase in expenditures, but during the late 1970s they dropped accordingly. From 1977 to 1983/84 they dropped by 3.2% in comparison to other government sectors. By the late 1970s and early 1980s it was evident that the SADF did not just serve as a mere state organ created to defend the RSA, but as a machine that produced viable economic growth. Every one rand spent internally in the SADF, according to the Geldenhuys Report R 2.42 contributed to the economy.[408] Since 1986/87 the financial year funds voted were 5.12 billion rand, 13.7 % of state expenditures and 3.5% of GDP.[409]

A large portion of this White Paper was dedicated to reporting the SADF's expenditures and how the organisation prevented overspending. Besides the economic contributions of the SADF, it can be said that as an institution it created a culture of pride and respect amongst supporting population groups to the point where it was an honour to serve in the Defence Force much like any other respective army in history. This was present through the media such as *Huisgenoot, die Burger* and common under Afrikaner culture.[410]

Upon inspection of the rest of the White Paper, it can be seen that a focus was placed on revisiting the threats and the reasons for threats. This White Paper also included some specific tactics used by opposing forces such as propaganda, which according to the SADF was predominantly spread over radio stations, broadcasting anti-apartheid sentiments and rallying for support against "colonialist" powers. An example of this would be the message that was broadcasted over Radio Zambia on a show called Radio Freedom in 1985 by Thabo Mbeki; "Compatriots, we must go to arms, this year, let us see the further spread of underground ANC units to every locality, factory, mine and farm, school, village and every Bantustan".[411]

In an effort to propagate their strength and unite more members Mbeki also stated that the enemy, the SADF or NP, had admitted that they could not defeat the ANC, which was not the

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[408] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1986, p. 9.
[409] McWilliams, *ARMSCOR, South Africa's Arms Merchant,* p. 184.
[410] K. Mariana. "Culture and Power: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism Revisited." *Nations & Nationalism*, (16), (3), 2010, pp. 402–22.
[411] T. Mbeki, "Radio Freedom", *Radio Zambia*, 1 December 1984. Radio Broadcast.

case. In fact, the strength of the SADF was at an all-time high on the borders.[412] The SADF estimated that revolutionary activities had gone up by 50% since 1984 and used this as reasoning why they should continue to act as support for the SAP. Another factor that indicates that unrest and revolutionary activities had increased is the first historical White Paper of the Police, which will be discussed at a later stage. As a precautionary measure, the SADF aided internally in protecting infrastructure in urban areas, as well as providing medical aid in unrest situations, explosive weapon disposal and protection services for schools in urban and rural areas. This is an example of maintaining the status quo in an effort to maintain peace. However, when a defence force participates internally in any country, whether in a supportive role or otherwise, it is usually a red flag and an indication that the ruling regime is struggling to maintain control. This could also be to the reason as to why a White Paper on the Police was produced.

With the Geldenhuys Report in mind, other clandestine branches were developed in order to counter internal unrests. By late 1985, Defence Minister Malan and Defence Force Chief Geldenhuys received plans for the formation of a so-called Civil Co-operations Bureau (CCB). Major-General Abraham Joubert, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff of Military Intelligence, took command of the CCB on the 1 November 1985. According to him he was aware that the covert unit assumed the named CCB in the form of the Special Forces units of April 1985. Joubert also indicated that before he took command of the Special Forces in late November 1985, Chief General of Defence, Constant Viljoen had already sanctioned operations against the ANC, more specifically MK. Joubert also mentioned that once he took responsibility for the Special Forces, the plans were set in motion. This covert organisation was to be used specifically against the ANC and its military wing, and disrupt, if not end any terrorist-deemed actions that they took. Any activities that would be carried out by the covert organisation would purposefully not be traceable back to the SADF.[413] However, the SAP had been active in clandestine branches for quite some time before the establishment of the CCB.

5.2. White Paper on the Organization and Functions of the South African Police, 1988

The White Paper on the Organization and Function of the South African Police was the first of its kind in South Africa at the time the NP regime. The pre-amble of the paper is the creed of the SAP declaring its responsibility towards the various population groups of the RSA in the

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[412] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1985, AI(DIV)/257/28: Besinning en Vooruitskouing, p. 40.
[413] "Malan was told of plan to start CCB in 1985, General tells HARMS", *Business Day*, 7 March 1990.

name of God. This declaration towards God could be an indication of the cultural identity that the NP created amongst the country and how the Afrikaner was *God se Volk,*[414] it is also present throughout the White Paper.[415] Like many of its Defence Force counterparts, the Police White Paper had organizational functions, structures, funding, objectives, duties, etc. It also specifically mentions the revolutionary threat South Africa was facing internally. According to the White Paper, the reasoning behind its creation was the escalated internal conflict that was occurring as well as the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the SAP since their creation in 1913.[416] Civil unrest in rural areas increased dramatically, especially since the creation of the Tricameral parliament. However, this Tricameral parliament still excluded Black citizens from governmental affairs, but included by a small margin Indians and Coloureds.[417] This situation created further outrage amongst the Black populace and stimulated civil unrest.

This White Paper specifically emphasised the important relationship between the actions of the Police Service and the constitutional and national aspirations of the RSA.[418] Its main functions were thus simplified into four points, namely, the preservation of internal security, the maintenance of law and order, the prevention of crime, and the investigation of any offence or alleged offence. And for the most part, it acted accordingly to these objectives to serve both country and government, as the Apartheid Law and the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 deemed it to be. Although, through historical evidence it was clear to what activities covert police service men were commanded to do. Similar to the SADF, the SAP was also an authoritative body of the state and received communication from higher ranks. However, the matter of *Koevoet*, Eugene De Kock's role and various associated parties and groups, is not the purpose of this research topic. But like many other occurrences in South African history, defence strategy and action cannot be evaluated in isolation.

The Police White Paper, was the most ambiguous paper in comparison with the previous Defence White Papers. There was no formal mandate for the SAP to follow, which made the implementation of state objectives difficult. It is in this White Paper that the police's formal role in counterinsurgency was discussed. However, as previously mentioned, they also

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[414] God's nation.

[415] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Organization and Functions of the South African Police,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1988., p. 1.

[416] *Ibid.*

[417] "General South African History Timeline 1980s", *SA History,* [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/1980s-and-crisis-apartheid. [Accessed 11 January 2021].

[418] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Organization and Functions of the South African Police,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1988, p. 2.

performed other duties in South Africa's neighbouring state conflicts. A country's first line of internal defence is the Police Force that serves the agendas of the state, but the SAP in particular fulfilled numerous other functions that were also unknown to the public.

5.2.1. Structure of The SAP Security Branch pre-1994

Organogram 3.[419]

Different Desks

- ANC
- PAC/AZAPO
- TRADE UNIONS
- RIGHT WING
- TERRORISM - *Vlakplaas*

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                                    ┌─────────────────────┐
                                    │  Commisioner of SAP │
                                    └─────────────────────┘
                                               │
        ┌─────────────────────┐                │
        │ Department          │────────────────┘
        │ Commisioner         │
        │ Security Branch     │
        └─────────────────────┘
               │
        ┌──────┴───────┐
 ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
 │ Divisional   │ │ Intelligence     │
 │ commanders   │ │ Branch           │
 │ Later        │ └──────────────────┘
 │ Provincial   │
 │ Cmmanders    │
 └──────────────┘
        │
   ┌────┴──────┐
   │ Branches  │
   └───────────┘
        │
   ┌─────────────────────┐
   │ Provincial          │
   │ Intelligence        │
   │ Branches            │
   └─────────────────────┘
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The above is an organogram of the structural representation of the SAP security branch. One of the tasks of the South African Police (later Service), according to the South African Police Act, was to maintain internal security in the RSA as previously mentioned. The South African Police was divided into three main divisions: Visible policing (Uniform branch), Detective Branch and the Security Branch.[420] The task to secure internal security in the county was

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[419] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, *Correspondence with Security Police member*, 12 January 2021.
[420] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Organization and Functions of the South African Police,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1988, p. 14.

bestowed on the Security Branch (sometimes wrongfully referred to by the public as the Special Branch).

In order to fulfil its mandate, the Security Branch operated on two pillars: the gathering of intelligence on any acts or attempted acts aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the state and, to investigate any crime or alleged crime against the state. Crimes mostly concerned the Terrorist Act of 1967 as amended. At police headquarters this task was divided among different divisions or desks, for instance the ANC division, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)/ Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)/Black Consciousness movements, trade unions, right wing desk and a specific anti-terrorism division under which the later infamous *Vlakplaas* unit resided. There were also a specific Intelligence division.[421]

This structure was mostly carried through to the Provincial Headquarters and branches. Where provincial offices and branches relied on the services of external sources to gather intelligence, the Intelligence division at headquarters and provincial levels concentrated on infiltrating agents (undercover police officers) into the ranks of the ANC (especially MK), other freedom movements and right-wing groups. The ANC and SACP believed in a two-phase revolution; phase one was ANC leadership, revolution and democracy under the banner of the Freedom Charter. Phase two was SACP leadership, socialistic revolution and people's democracy, with the end objective being a classless communistic community.[422] These are two contradictory ideologies and objectives. These served as extreme threats for the NP government and had to be dismantled by the various security branches.[423]

All intelligence gathered by the divisions of the Security Branch was aimed at preparing a case docket to bring perpetrators to justice. Intelligence gathered would be analysed before being sent to Cabinet and the State President. After 1982 the Securocrats began to play a larger role and additional structures were formed such as the SSC which resided directly under the State President and intelligence would also be forwarded to this structure. Under the SSC provincial and district structures were also formed.[424]

Apart from these structures another structure called *TREWITS* (Anti-revolutionary information task team) was formed on national and provincial levels. The aim of this team was mostly to assemble and analyse intelligence about prominent figures within "enemy" structures and

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[421] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, *Correspondence with Security Police member*, 12 January 2021.
[422] AI(DIV)/257/22: Nasionale Inligtingswaardering, 1984, p. 78.
[423] Private Collection of J. Van Den Berg, *The South African Communist Speaks.*
[424] Seegers, *The Military in the making of Modern South Africa,* pp. 165-167.

facilities in neighbouring countries. Members consisted of individuals from the Security Branch, National Intelligence and Military Intelligence.

With all these various structures and role players from different entities, it is no wonder that confusion sometimes reigned and different interpretations were lent to phrases and words. Phrases such as "*uit die samelewing verwyder*" or "he/she must be taken out" were often used and could easily be interpreted the wrong way.[425] At these meetings representatives would report back to their own entities and due to these different interpretations, miscommunication often led to confusion.

5.3. White Paper on the Planning Process of the South African Defence Force, April 1989

This final White Paper, was the last remnant of NP defence rule. As such, it does not abide by the same agenda as the previous White Papers on Defence. The year 1989 was the final year of the Botha administration and as such, also the end of certain conflicts. It would therefore be crucial to examine the final paper, because it signifies both the end and the beginning of a political phase of South Africa.

5.3.1. An Overview of the Political and Historical Context, 1986-1989

South Africa was overwhelmed with internal conflict and the SADF was equally overwhelmed with external conflict. The notion of terrorist and communist was by now intertwined. It was not only knocking at the proverbial backdoor of the NP government but was also visibly establishing strongholds inside the RSA. The ANC and its allies were openly exercising their revolutionary activities through protests, guerrilla actions and mass mobilisation of civilians in rural areas. By now, they had garnered enough international support to continue their struggle for freedom. On 14 November 1985, Botha gave his parliamentary speech envisioning a formal program for the transition of South Africa into a democratic state:

> Various planned reform steps with regard to black communities were
> envisaged, to summarize it means that the government is committed to
> the principle of a united South Africa, joint citizenship and franchise for
> all within structures chosen for South Africa by South Africans. [426]

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[425] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, *Correspondence with Security Police member*, 12 January 2021.
[426] *"L116544", AP Archive,* [Online.],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLR0KkkwHEA&t=561s&ab_channel=APArchive [28 December 2020].

The SADF also acknowledged this transformation to democracy as a formal state's principle. The objective was:

- The short-term expansion of the existing informal negotiation process;
- The short-term and medium-term establishment of observable negotiation mechanisms so that the negotiation process can formally continue;
- To give the highest priority legitimacy to the negotiation process;
- To establish, in the longer term, political structures through negotiation that meet the democratic requirements.[427]

In order to stimulate and promote the negotiation process, the government had already announced its principles as one of the participants in the negotiation process which involved:

- Government's acceptance and citizenship for all South Africans, which also implied equal treatment and opportunities;
- The sovereignty of the law was recognized as the basis for the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals as well as groups;
- There should be a just legal system so that peace, freedom and democracy could be maintained;
- Human dignity, freedom and property of all must be protected;
- A democratic order that accommodates all the legitimate aspirations of South Africa's communities must be negotiated;
- All South Africans must be able to participate in government through their elected representatives.

P.W. Botha also declared that the outdated colonial system of paternalism and the outdated notion of Apartheid was no longer applicable or relevant to the NP's proposed modern South Africa.[428]

Ironically, the ANC's principles were somewhat paralleled by those of the Botha administration, but perhaps not in the immediate timeframe they demanded or expected. But Botha indicated that gradual reform was the ideal manner into which transformation could be implemented to ensure that all cultural minorities, which included Coloureds, cultural groups

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[427]DODA, Indeks van Staatsveiligheids Raad, 1987, HSAW/191/3, p. 6.
[428] DODA, Werkkomitee vir die Kabinetskomitees, AI(DIV)/292/28: Verslag insake Prioriteite vir die Optredes ter Voorkoming en Bekamping van die Rewolutionêre Klimaat (Onruspotensiaal) Binne Bestaande Strukture, pp. 6-7.

such as the Venda's, the Whites as well as the additional eight minority groups could be protected from the majority.[429]

Three months prior to this speech, Botha made his infamous "Rubicon" speech at the opening of the National Party Natal Congress in Durban 15 August 1985. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, had set expectations among the public that extensive policy changes were to be announced in this speech. However, Botha shocked the country and the rest of the world, when he refused to consider immediate and major reforms in the country's Apartheids system. This indicated that he would not give in to international hostility and agitation, which only encouraged militant groups. After his speech the economic situation in South Africa became bleaker, the rand traded extremely low against the dollar and economic sanctions against South Africa continued.[430] This ignited internal conflict and revolutionary activities to such an extent that the Defence Force now had to adapt in order to maintain their mandate of serving and protecting the state and populace internally.

In March 1986, Botha announced the withdrawing of the partial state of emergency which was initially implemented on 20 July 1985.[431] The result of this first state of emergency was the death of 575 individuals killed in political violence. However, the withdrawal of the 1986 state of emergency was short lived due to the fact that it was four days prior to the Soweto Uprisings 10th anniversary.[432] Political uprisings and unrests grew tremendously, this resulted in a declaration of a National State of Emergency on 12 June 1986 which resulted in the most arrests made in a year in the history of South Africa. Between June 1986 and June 1987 an estimated 26 000 individuals were detained.[433]

In August 1989, Botha resigned from his position as state president due to the deterioration of his health, however in his final interview with Cliff Saunders he stated that it was an orchestration to remove him from his seat of power and that he could have easily kept governing until the early 90s.[434] He expressed that F.W. De Klerk was a particularly ambitious politician

[429] DODA, Werkkomitee vir die Kabinetskomitees, AI(DIV)/292/28: Verslag insake Prioriteite vir die Optredes ter Voorkoming en Bekamping van die Rewolutionêre Klimaat (Onruspotensiaal) Binne Bestaande Strukture, p. 5.
[430] H. Giliomee, *"The day apartheid started dying," Mail and Guardian*, 1 November 2012, p. 30.
[431] DODA, Inligtingswaaardering, 1985, AI(DIV)/257/28: Stand en Kenmerker van die Veiligheids Situasie, pp. 9-10
[432] Alden, *Apartheids Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State,* p. 221.
[433] "States of Emergency in South Africa: the 1960s and 1980s", *SA History*, [Online.], https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/states-emergency-south-africa-1960s-and-1980s [16 February 2021].
[434] Cliff Saunders Interview with P.W. Botha. *The interviews: P.W. Botha*, Thuthuka Productions, 30 March 2006.

and insinuated that De Klerk, with support from the western powers, managed to encourage western agendas, through his new position as state president of the RSA. De Klerk's presidency resulted in the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and South Africa's first democratic elections. This change of power resulted in the change and revaluation of defence policy. Malan mentioned in his autobiography that the first action by De Klerk, who succeeded Botha as State President, was to dismantle the "structures of power that the so-called securocrats" created under Botha. Malan continues to mention that De Klerk had no understanding of the culture and effect such dismantling could have on those men who gave their lives for their patriotic duty and who served to protect the RSA from an onslaught perceived by the NP regime.[435] Malan's statement was incredibly noteworthy and an indication that the SADF had reached its peak. Military culture is often argued to be deteriorating on society and an abuse of power, but depending on the modus operandi of the politicians and country's objectives, it can be an economically uplifting, highly functioning and valuable entity of the state.

5.3.2. The 1989 White Paper on the Planning Process of the South African Defence Force

This final White Paper in the saga of Defence White Papers, is not like its predecessors. From a superficial point of view, it would seem to follow the structural status quo of the previous White Papers of planning, structural development and organisation. But upon closer inspection it reads as a plea and justification of the SADF's embodied structural, strategic and organizational function.

Malan, still Minister of Defence during this period, exuded excitement in the White Paper at the development of new management theories and strategic planning as suggested by the previously mentioned Geldenhuys Report. He indicated that this new approach could prove fruitful in the development of a more purposeful and productive management in the SADF.[436] The sentiment is quite different from the previous White Papers. It is more democratic than the authoritative tone of previous White Papers.

The development of this White Paper was not only due to the internal changes the RSA was facing but was also a "natural" result of the end of the Cold War, although some might argue

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[435] M. Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force,* p. 355.
[436] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Planning Process of the South African Defence Force,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1989, pp. 9-16.

that it was an unnatural result of political usurpation within the NP regime.[437] Numerous countries, who once stood on the side of communism and repressed policies now had to revaluate the stance in the global wave of liberalism and free thinking that prevailed globally. New security challenges arose, but for the time being the RSA had to face its own political, economic and social instabilities that would arise in a new democratic South Africa. In the White Paper, it became apparent that Malan recognised that the fluctuating environment was continuously affecting the structure of the SADF. Therefore, this White Paper was aimed at providing a structural, organizational and strategic solution for what would be a presumably different South Africa without compromising the already well-functioning sections. It was a proposed plan to incorporate new managerial development and organization structures in order to create an institution that could withstand historical changes without losing its integrity. As well as successful techniques that were developed and adopted over the decades since its inception to is supposed transitional form.[438] The structure presented in Addendum F is a breakdown of the Force Structure Plan into Development Plans.

The RSA, and the world for that matter, was facing transition. Malan's voice in the last Defence Force White Paper was tinted with a realisation of the change to come, thus the paper is filled with suggestive measures as how to apply transition in the defence force structure.

Conclusion

The period of 1985 to 1989 was a deteriorating period for the NP regime and period of progression for its nemesis, the ANC and its allies, a climactic period of revolutionary change. The end of the liberation wars marked the independence of African countries such as Angola and Mozambique. It created a window of opportunity for democratic transition as well as serving as prime examples for revolutionary forces that their objectives could be achieved. However, certain policy changes by the NP suggested that South Africa was on the cusp of entering its own transitional period. Botha's Rubicon speech, however, stopped public support in its tracks and instigated further unrest and political upheavals. The 1986 White Paper on Defence served as a justification and reminder to parliament of the important functions that the SADF provided. The Geldenhuys Report was conducted to investigate the potential mismanagement of any faction or branch within the SADF. The report was taken into

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[437] Cliff Saunders Interview with P.W. Botha. *The interviews: P.W. Botha*, Thuthuka Productions, 30 March 2006.
[438] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Planning Process of the South African Defence Force,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1989, p. 14.

consideration in the development of the 1986 White Paper on Defence and it was actively mentioned that the suggestion of the report would be taken into account and adapted to the SADF structures and functions. The 1988 SAP White Paper was the first of its kind and could be described as a superficial representation of the functions of the SAP, as well as a justification for past and future actions. The final White Paper, the 1989 White Paper on Defence, was as ambiguous as the SAP White Paper, but its development suggests that Malan and the Defence Force made a last attempt at suggesting and justifying the functions and critical role the SADF played in the RSA. The paper itself seems like an appeal to maintain existing structures, because both Botha and Malan were of the opinion that the structure developed between them with the assistance of various other SADF members and scholars, was brilliant and had the potential to become a first-class defence force. This particular period was enmeshed with political turmoil for the NP regime and the ANC and its allies, however the SAP White Paper and final SADF White Paper on Defence indicated a lack of understanding of the transformation to come.

Chapter Six: Theory to Operational Application- A Contextual Overview

The discussion on the White Papers on Defence and Armament from 1969 to 1989 in the previous chapters, provided an appropriate contextual basis for the final discussion regarding the theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus. Policy design by the NP displayed the reasoning behind the development of certain strategic approaches, new organizational structures and even the NP threat agenda. The implementation of any policy based predominantly on theory is extremely difficult. The White Papers on Defence (1969-1989) were complex and the interpretation and execution thereof was even more problematic. The real challenge for the SADF was to operationalise and optimise these policies for strategic effect. This challenge was especially evident through the translation of theory to policy, policy to strategy, strategy to structure and structure to operational application. Various actions launched, such as operational restructuring and tactical success, were based on the theoretical framework of the different White Papers. In some cases, operational and tactical success were contributed to practical experience and trial and error. However, a number of contributing factors have become apparent in the development of the NP's defence policy. Chapter Six aims to highlight these factors and elaborate on their contributory nature.

6.1. Theory to Policy: Influence and Formulation

South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961 to become a republic.[439] In this process two governmental positions were formally established, namely a State President who, similar to the British monarch served a ceremonial purpose, and a Prime Minister, who was the de facto political head of government. The ceremonial position of the State President was active until P.W. Botha proposed a new constitution in 1983.[440] The new constitution transformed the executive branch from a parliamentary system, that was a model of the Westminster model, to a presidential system combining the position of Prime Minister and State President under one function of head of state.[441]

Before 1983, the presidents of South Africa were C. R. Swart (1961-1967), Tom Naudé (1968-1975), N. J. Diederichs (1975-1978), B. J. Vorster (1978-1979), and M. Viljoen (1979-1984),

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[439] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 267.
[440] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1984, AI(DIV)/257/22, pp. 78-79.
[441] Thompson, *The History of South Africa*, pp 225-226.

all serving as ceremonial heads of state. As state presidents, Vorster and Botha, however, also contributed to the militarization of the state.[442] The centralization of power enhanced the development of defence strategy and policy according to those who were in power. This was evident through Botha's leadership in the 1969 to 1979 White Papers on Defence and Armament. Therefore, the theoretical material used for policy development is highly influenced by leadership.

Vorster, who was favoured by H. Verwoerd to succeed him as Prime Minister from 1966 to 1978, continued most of Verwoerd's Apartheids policies after the latter's assassination. Verwoerd appointed Vorster as Minister of Justice in 1961.[443] During his tenure as Minister of Justice 1961 to 1966, Vorster suppressed various organizations such as the ANC, MK, and PAC, deemed as communist groups by the state. These groups were increasing their revolutionary activities, especially after the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960.[444]

As Minister of Justice, Vorster had the authority to initiate security legislation that empowered the police to detain, ban, or put anyone deemed as a threat to the state under house arrest.[445] Vorster tried to establish diplomatic relations with neighbouring African countries, through a policy of détente. Despite his diplomatic attempts, Vorster directed South Africa to war with Angola and ignited the process of the militarization of the state. This policy was continued and intensified by Botha as Minister of Defence, and later as Prime Minister and State President in the period 1978 to 1989.[446] These policies are prevalent throughout the White Papers.

Vorster kept close relations with the police after his tenure as Minister of Police during 1966 till 1968.[447] This explains partly why the police fulfilled a key role in counterinsurgency during the South African Border War (1966-1989), the national liberation wars of Angola and Mozambique (1961-1975) and Rhodesian Bush war (1964-1980).[448] During Vorster's tenure as Prime Minister of South Africa, he encouraged the Department of Information to engage in clandestine activities internally and externally, especially after the Soweto Uprising of 1976.

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[442] "Balthazar Johannes Vorster", SA History, [Online], https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/balthazar-johannes-vorster [Accessed 21 February 2021].

[443] *Ibid.*

[444] *Ibid.*

[445] *Ibid.*

[446] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, 1978, MI/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Samevatting, pp. 60-62.

[447] Balthazar Johannes Vorster", *SA History,* [Online], https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/balthazar-johannes-vorster [Accessed 21 February 2021].

[448] A. Esterhuyse & E. Jordaan, "The South African Defence Force and Counterinsurgency, 1966-1990". in *South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency Roots, Practices, Prospects,* UCT Press, Claremont, 2010, p. 167.

Vorster, however, did not inform his cabinet of these activities and financed it through the secret Defence Account. In the end, this illegal action was exposed by the press which was referred to as the so-called Information Scandal.[449]

As a result, Vorster resigned and Botha was appointed as Prime Minister of South Africa while still retaining his role as Minister of Defence. The Information Scandal increased friction between the SAP and the Defence Force, which had already started during the Vorster Administration. The establishment of the National Security Council serves as prime example of the internal quarrels that the NP faced and the power struggles between the SAP and the SADF. At this stage, the SADF were recognized for its growing role in the security domain, including intelligence gathering which used to be primarily a function of the SAP and other security branches of the state.[450]

The White Papers in the 1980s, also reflected on the leadership style differences between the two prominent Ministers of Defence, namely, P.W. Botha and Magnus Malan. In addition, it reflected on the extent to which the Department of Defence was involved in policy formulation. This was an arrangement that would continue to serve both the policy and military domains throughout the 1980s. This does not imply that either controlled or manipulated the other, but merely that their co-existence was fluid; and perhaps mutually beneficial.

Numerous scholars and writers have attempted to define revolutionary warfare, but Botha and Malan relied on J.J. McCuen's understanding of revolutionary and counterinsurgency for the conflicts that South Africa faced internally and externally.[451] Beaufre's and McCuen's concepts complimented Botha and Malan's leadership styles and objectives.

In general, the training was adjusted and the structures amended to facilitate the SADF in its successes. This was all possible through the leadership of Botha. Botha, was considered an organizational wunderkind because of his ability to create structures and ensure proper management, an important function which severely lacked during the Vorster administration. However, Vorster had already been exposed to counterinsurgency practices in the early 1960s. In fact, he received a book by David Galula called *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, *Theory and Practice* by a dear friend of his in 1965. Ironically, Galula is also a French strategist much like Beaufre.[452] Galula who published his book in 1964, a year after Beaufre's book in 1963, had

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[449] E. Rhoodie, *Die ware Inligtingskandaal*, Orbis, Pretoria, 1984, pp. 3-4.
[450] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1984, AI(DIV)/257/22.
[451] Alden, *Apartheids Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State,* p. 100.
[452] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg. David Galula, signed copy.

theories and explanations of insurgency and counterinsurgency that paralleled that of Beaufre and McCuen. Galula does not particularly elaborate on how to identify revolutionary or insurgency activity. He merely states that conflict rises from the insurgents aiming to seize power through action.[453] Lieutenant General C.A. Fraser particularly used Galula's work to clarify the role of politics in revolutionary warfare, in that revolutionary warfare consists of 80% politics and 20% military power.[454] Galula's publications were not present in the White Papers, in comparison to Beaufre and McCuen, but his concepts were taught as introductions to the understanding of insurgencies to SADF personnel.

Malan stated in his autobiography that Vorster often shied away from military action on South African borders and rather chose to employ the police in "unrest" situations.[455] This serves as contextual reasoning, among others, why police members were initially used for clandestine operations and countering revolutionary activities.

By the development of the 1973 White Paper on Defence, Botha already had a good understanding of Beaufre's ideas and concepts and conveyed them almost verbatim. Similar to the 1969 White Paper on Defence, Huntington's concepts were also apparent. Again, Botha focused on strategic military policy and structural defence policy. The continued focus on external elements of the international conflict was an excellent argument, and at this point the only reason, to formally develop and expand the Defence Force. This is evident in the painstakingly detailed description of what the NP perceived as a threat; in this case, the threat of communism and the spread of revolutionary forces in neighbouring countries. By further reorganizing the defence structure and expanding the budget, Botha displayed the use of a structural defence policy. At this point it would be plausible to assume that an equilibrium was reached between the strategic and structural realities of the defence policy.

In the 1975 White Paper on Defence, Botha again mentioned that a defence strategy did not rely on the military alone. This was another indication that Beaufre's concepts were cemented in the White Papers on Defence. In fact, he also argued that the international climate was characterized by total strategy.[456] The White Paper even went as far as insinuating that since the threat was communist-orientated, South Africa was essentially the keystone in the defence

[453] D. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Frederick A. Preaeger, New York, 1964, p. 3.
[454] DODA, Rewolusionêre Oorlogvoering: Grondbeginsels van Opstandbekamping, 1985, Aard van Rewolusionêre oorlogvoering, p. 5.
[455] Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force*, p. 74.
[456] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security Stat*e, p. 24.

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of the Western world. This might be seen as further justification for the implementation of a total strategy defence later.[457]

The TNS is the physical embodiment of the ideas and concepts discussed in Chapter Two and will be referred to below. In the section of the general overview of the 1977 White Paper on Defence, Botha stated that national action was required which; a concept emphasized by Beaufre. Simultaneously in this section, he quoted Beaufre almost word by word regarding the coordination of the various fields. Beaufre mentioned that these fields are of utmost importance in the formulation of a total strategy.[458] The use of the term "indirect strategy" in describing the enemy's aims and objectives is another indication of Beaufrian influence.[459] In fact the White Paper's definition of total strategy was "a comprehensive plan to utilize all means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies".[460]

As a response to the total strategy proposed in the 1977 White Paper on Defence, the SADF adopted a comprehensive strategy that was also based on Beaufre's concepts as well as McCuen's design for countering revolutionary forces.[461] By 1977 it was evident that South Africa could no longer rely on international support. The arms embargo and escalating pressures from external forces were beginning to take a toll. It could therefore be assumed that at this point the South African defence policy was a product of its regional dominance and its vulnerability in the international arena.[462]

For Botha, the independence of South Africa and the ability to determine its own future was of utmost importance. But ironically, Botha's worst fear was realised when the liberation movements' urge for rapid political change surpassed the need for gradual political reform. The path that Botha had carved out for South Africa, could provide the South African state with the ability to become a super power in Africa with a strong conventional military capability. His actions enabled the SADF to become expertly adapted to composite warfare,

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[457] Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, p. 13.

[458] Alden, *Apartheid's Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State*, p. 46.

[459] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 7.

[460] Van der Waag. *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 270.

[461] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 10.

[462] N. Anderson & M. S. Bell: "The Limits of Regional Power : South Africa ' s Security Strategy , 1975 – 1989," *Journal of Strategic Studies,* 2019, pp. 1–23.

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but his actions were also the result of numerous internal and external influences as per Huntington's "two worlds" theory, which led to policy progression.

The 1979 White Paper on Defence indicated that the state's perception of the enemy evolved. After Botha became Prime Minister, the Department of Defence became more enmeshed in the creation of policies.[463] Besides the three major pillars, the NP was still maintaining a Beaufrarian approach in its foreign policy and the fight against SWAPO in Angola. Both direct and indirect strategies were being employed. In the direct strategy, military forces served as a primary source for countering the enemy and its forces, and sustainability would determine the outcome. The indirect strategy focused on the forces that allied with SWAPO, such as the ANC, and included any method that does not require the actual use of force.[464]

In the 1979 White Paper of Defence, it is indicated that at departmental level, national security was conducted by the heads of government departments by means of departmental organization. Directives and strategies formulated at this level were used by executive officials as a framework to develop appropriate plans.[465] Within the SADF itself, the force design or the organizational design according to this White Paper, was the following: the SADF's strategies were shaped by the SSC's TNS directives and strategies by an analysis of both the threat and the SADFs capabilities.[466] The concepts outlined by Beaufre were being followed step by step and to the letter. The strategies would thus determine the missions and tasks executed by the SADF. The force development would be determined by the necessary requirements of the strategic plan, considering the availability of force strength, and needed for the execution of the strategic plans developed by the SSC.[467] As Beaufre's theory indicated, a strategic plan could be executed only once an assessment had been made about the availability of resources.[468] In this manner, it was assumed that optimal utilisation of available resources would occur, as well as maintaining some flexibility and coordinated planning with regard to force adaptability in field.[469] A key feature of the SADF, according to Botha, was the emphasis that was placed on quality over quantity.[470]

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[463] Grundy, *The militarization of South African Politics,* p. 35.

[464] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, p. 43.

[465] *Ibid.*

[466] DODA, Totale Nasionale Strategie: Politiek, 1985, Totale Strategie ter Bekamping van die African National Congress, 303/6/1/1, pp. 1-2.

[467] Seegers, *The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 133.

[468] Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, p. 43.

[469] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[470] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 2.

The overall budget was determined by the particular threat that the RSA was facing, the availability of existing resources, the condition of existing resources, and the action required to eliminate or deter the threat.[471] The following graph is a full representation of South African defence military expenditures from 1949 to 2001.

Graph 1.[472]

Defence strategy may be proactive, reactive or a combination of both. It can therefore be mentioned that Beaufre and McCuen's work, did not merely influence the NP's defence thing but served as actual foundation for their understanding of an unusual threat.

6.2. Policy to Strategy: Influence and Formulation

As previously discussed, Beaufre and McCuen's concepts were influential in the formulation of both strategy and counterinsurgency, to name but a few. It is only now, through analysis of these White Papers that the extent of their influence can be observed. It should also be mentioned that these White Papers were developed in "two worlds", as is usually the case with military policy, according to Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington argues that a state's defence policy is shaped by a combination of both domestic and foreign deliberations.[473] According to Huntington, strategic military policy decisions are made primarily to the international environment and covers aspects such as the composition and size of the force,

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[471] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 30.
[472] "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database", *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, [Online.], https://sipri.org/databases/milexn. [Accessed 6 September 2021].
[473] S.P. Huntington, "The Two Worlds of Military Policy," in *Comparative Defence Policy,* John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, pp. 107–33.

practical use and geographic deployment. Structural defence policy, on the other hand, consists of domestic political content and includes matters such as the defence budget, organizational format, personnel policies and supply. Huntington emphasises the importance of an interrelationship between these two worlds and that they can shift between periods of policy equilibrium and disequilibrium.[474] In the 1969-1977 White Papers on Defence, both these concepts are apparent.

The 1969 White Paper on Defence took cognizance of its international environment and focused on adjusting and reorganizing the Defence Force accordingly. Emphasis was placed on geographic deployment through the reorganization of the Commando Force.[475] This would be a good indication that the initial outline for defence policy was on track. Though Beaufre and McCuen's concepts are not yet as apparent, there are such indications when Botha noted the shortage in resources regarding military power as well as the reference to maintaining the status quo. This indicates that Botha already understood Beaufre's notions of direct and indirect strategy, as explained in Chapter Two.

In 1968, Botha wrote an article regarding the strategic and military position of South Africa, mentioning clear examples echoing Beaufre's concepts. These concepts were only visible from the 1973 White Paper on Defence onwards. He mentioned that modern warfare did not occur in a vacuum and was in fact total. It included, much like Beaufre, all aspects of a country such as the economy, diplomacy, technology, etc.[476] The SSC that was formed in 1972 for the purpose of acting as an advisory body for the RSA, was to become the source for total strategy.[477]

Defence policy and strategy development is highly influenced by external factors, internal factors and the state's objectives, as presented by *Figure 1*. External factors would include international events such as conflicts, international relationships with the country, foreign policy, ideological developments and economic developments. Internal factors would include the social development of the country, economic development, cultural and political developments. State objectives are normally subject to both external and internal factors but

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[474] Huntington, "The Two Worlds of Military Policy," in *Comparative Defence Policy,* p. 110.
[475] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 5.
[476] Koue Oorlog en die Vrye Wêreld, "Die Militêre En Strategiese Posisie Van Die Republiek Van Suid Afrika Sy Edele P.W. Botha , Minister Van Verdediging Mode M E Oorlogvocring," n.d., pp. 148–55.
[477] Van der Waag, *A Military History of Modern South Africa*, p. 270.

are prioritised in different manners, i.e., the NP's initial objective to counter communism and later to counter revolutionary activities deemed as acts of terrorism.[478]

Figure 1. Defence Policy Development[479]

The NP's objectives evolved over the years but the most prominent development of defence policy occurred during Botha's administration. Due to Botha's preferences towards Beaufre's theoretical work on strategy and McCuen's work on revolutionary warfare, during his tenure as Minister of Defence, Botha orchestrated defence policies that synchronised with these theoretical works.[480] This was particularly evident in the 1973 White Paper on Defence when Botha mentioned Beaufre's concepts of Total Strategy and this was implemented in 1977. With the gradual progression of the Cold War and the changing context thereof, as well as the swift evolution of unconventional threats and methods, the White Papers on Defence had to continuously adapt to these conditions. References were made to unconventional threats and the potential threat of an unconventional war in the White Papers. The SADF started to develop ideas on the concepts of revolutionary warfare by the late 1960s, but only started formulating theoretical concepts and training by the mid-1970s. By the late 1970s and 1980s, formal concepts and training had developed in order to facilitate the countering of the revolutionary activities.[481] Hence the cause of eleven White Papers on Defence being developed in such a short period of time. This is an indication that the NP government and RSA had to adjust its policies and doctrines to the changing nature of the Cold War realities. Policy progression did

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[478] Quade, & Boucher, eds., *System Analysis and Policy Planning Application in Defence, American,* p. 279.
[479] Constructed by researcher.
[480] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 3.
[481]DODA, Departement Staatsleer, MI/11/28: Kort Kursus in Strategiese Studies, 1983, p. 5.

eventually lead to organizational success for the SADF as it continued to adapt the structure to facilitate its effectiveness in functioning as a defence force.

External Factors for Consideration

External factors have been discussed in their historical context in the previous chapters, however there are some factors that require repeating for the purpose of this chapter. These factors had a specific influence on the development of operational application as well as the creation of more White Papers on Defence and Armament.

- <u>The Arms Embargo</u>

In 1963 an international voluntary arms embargo was initiated against South Africa leave, which initiated the inception of the Armaments Production Board in 1964 and by means of legislation Armscor became an official structure in 1968.[482] The UN-imposed arms embargo caused great difficulties for South African defence strategy and policy.[483] Botha pointed out in the 1973 White Paper on Defence that the Defence Force had outdated equipment and in order to proceed with the state's defence objectives against the escalating threats in neighbouring countries, the development of equipment and weapons was an urgent requirement.[484] This was not a prominent topic of discussion, until the 1973 White Paper on Defence when South Africa faced the possibility of participating in a conventional war. After the Carter administration in the USA forced an official arms embargo against South Africa in 1977, the country was forced to become innovative as well as economically and technologically independent. Armscor created viable economic solutions to South Africa's defence budget and had the potential to become the leading arms manufacturer in the Southern Africa on the African continent.[485]

- <u>Sanctions against South Africa</u>

The apartheid system had been a global discussion in the UN since 1946. By then the Cold War had already started and political turmoil was on a worldwide increase. The question of racial conflict in South Africa became more pertinent after the ANC's Defiance Campaign in 1952. South Africa's initial response to the UN was that this issue was a matter of internal affairs. However, the increased political actions of liberation movements and the NP government's

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[482] McWilliams, *ARMSCOR, South Africa's Arms Merchant,* p. 3.
[483] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 16.
[484] *Ibid.,* pp. 16-17.
[485] DODA, Stand van Ekonomiese Dwangmaatreëls teen die RSA, HSAW 190/3, 1987, p. 20.

unwillingness to conform to the social developments of the western world resulted in the first phase of informal sanctions against South Africa. South Africa experienced boycotts of cultural and sporting events, and the NP government saw it as an unnecessary humiliation by the international community.[486] Refusing to budge on its apartheid policies, the USA took action with its Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 in an attempt to cripple the system.[487]

All the White Papers on Defence mentioned, in the introductory sections, the sanctions against South Africa. This indicated that it was a primary topic and crucial factor for the development of the defence structures. The effects of the sanctions crippled South Africa but also supplied -motivation for the RSA to become economically and technologically independent and played a significant role in the evolution of the Defence Force's structural and policy development.[488] Foreign anti-RSA organizations such as TransAfrica, a human right advocacy agency, the USA and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) decided in October 1986 at a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, that they would take responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the coercive measures in terms of South African trade unions. This incited further political unrest in South Africa.[489]

Internal Factors for Consideration

The internal situation that South Africa faced was extremely turbulent and has been touched upon in the previous chapters in their respective historical contexts'. For the purpose of this section, a few factors require repeating that had major influences on the development of operational application and the establishment of internal security branches.

- <u>Liberation struggle</u>

The increase in liberation movements inside and outside South Africa ignited revolutionary activities. Events such as the Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto uprising created volatile environments and friction between the various population groups in South Africa. The ANC and its allies' position on peaceful actions came to a halt and the need for action against the apartheid regime was pronounced.[490] The liberation movement was presented to the global stage, countries such as Russia and Cuba sought an opportunity to infiltrate the region by using

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[486] DODA, Stand van Ekonomiese Dwangmaatreëls teen die RSA, HSAW 190/3, 1987, Aanhangsel K.

[487] *Ibid.,* pp. 1-3.

[488] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1977, p. 3.

[489] *Ibid.*

[490] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1984, AI(DIV)/257/22, p. 78.

liberation movements as proxy forces for the progression of communism in Southern Africa. Their association with communist states was perceived as extremely problematic by the NP government and its governmental policies.[491] From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, the struggle progressed rapidly and the need for immediate change from these revolutionary groups became all the more urgent. The NP argued that the ANC's proclamations of unification and freedom among all South Africans were false, and that the mere fact that they aligned with the USSR, posed a severe communist threat for South Africa. Internal unrest escalated to such levels that the SAP was no longer able to provide the necessary safety and security. The fact that the SAP did not have a formal mandate to act as a safety and security force made the prospect of internal conflict all the more a burning issue.[492]

National Party State Objectives

The evolution of the White Papers on Defence between 1969 and 1989 presents a chronological development of the threat to South Africa. Since the onset of the Cold War in 1945, the primary threat to South Africa, according to the government, was the spread of communism. The NP government regarded itself as the last bastion against the spread of communism and the primary leader in preserving western ideologies in the Southern African region.[493] This was ironic since apartheid policies were not predominantly focused on the maintaining of western ideals. But this objective of being the last bastion against communism served as justification for the expansion and development of the Defence Force and additional security structures. As soon as revolutionary groups started using unconventional methods, the threat transformed from communism to revolutionary activities against the state. It justified the implementation of more stringent security measures and the promotion of a super defence structure that could take action both internally and externally, ultimately justifying the NP government's enforcement of Beaufre's concept of total strategy and creating a militarized state.

6.3.Strategy to Structure: Influence and Formulation

The SADF created numerous structures that facilitated its organizational and operational efficiency, a few of these have been added as appendices. Writers such as P. Moorcraft, L. Scholtz, I. Van der Waag, R. de Vries and many other official and unofficial scholars have listed and discussed these structures. For the purpose of this discussion, the following structures

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[491] *Ibid.,* pp. 24-26.
[492] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1988, HSAW/191/3: Feitebasis, p. 16.
[493] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting 1979, MI/205/10: Samevatting van die Faktore wat die Militêre Bedreiging Beinvloed, pp. I-III

will be discussed as prime examples of structures that facilitated the SADF's functionality: The South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF), the National Security Management System (NSMS) and the overall SADF structure.

6.3.1. The South West Africa Territorial Force

The 1975 and 1977 White Paper on Defence mentioned providing assistance towards the South West African security situation. Although this particular structure is not formally mentioned in the papers, it is hidden in the subtext of territorial support. Similar to the commando system of the SADF, the SWATF (1977-1989) was an auxiliary arm of the SADF and consisted of South West Africa armed forces as illustrated in the following organogram:

Organogram 4.[494]

The SWATF was of particular importance and was divided into operational sectors by 1979. Sectors 10, 20 as well as 70, were under direct control of the SADF and its South West Africa Command, whereas the other four Sectors, 30, 40, 50 and 60, protected the rest of SWA. Since 1980 all these sectors were directly commanded by SWATF officers; or then, officers from the SADF that were seconded to the SWATF.

Operation Boswilger (1985) was executed by the SWATF during the Angolan Civil War and the South African Border War. SWAFT members pursued SWAPO's and PLAN insurgents who had sabotaged twenty telephone poles, essentially mortaring the Eenhana SADF base. The SWATF forces were given orders to cross into Angola, if necessary, in order to counter these insurgents in accordance with the Lusaka Accords of 1984.[495] The Lusaka Accords of 1984 was the Angolan version of the Nkomati Accord, but the agreement only held for a year. There

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[494] "Military Operations", SADF Info, [Online], https://sadf.info/SWATF%20Operations.html, [Accessed 10 February 2020].

[495] W. Steenkamp, *South Africa's border war, 1966–1989,* Ashanti, Gibraltar, 1989, pp. 131-132.

were numerous disagreements on the interpretation of the treaty's implementations form both Angola and South Africa. The SADF, who was represented by General Johannes Geldenhuys, requested for the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops in concert with their own. The SADF also insisted on the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) to assist in the expelling of Namibian insurgents form the Angolan region but FAPLA had no intention of allowing their Cuban allies to depart.[496]

Operation Prone (1988) was a planned military operation by the SADF and SWATF, also during the Angolan Civil War and the South African Border War. With the advance of the 50th Cuban Division towards the SWA border and Calueque, the SADF formed the 10 SA Division to counter this threat. The plan for Operation Prone had two phases, namely Operation Linger and Operation Pact. Linger was to be a counterinsurgency phase and Pact a conventional phase. Brigadier Chris Serfontein was appointed to command of 10 SA Division and Col. Roland de Vries served as his Chief of Staff.[497] Previously in the 1986 White Paper on Defence, Malan noted that the unconventional threat was escalating to a high intensity war, the last White Paper on Defence was presented to parliament in 1989.[498] The period between these two White Papers were marked with military success for the SADF, particularly the Operations of Modular, Hooper and Packer. It can therefore be assumed that the lack of a defence papers produced between 1986 and 1989, indicated that SADF deemed its organizational structure as sufficient and successful in its functionality in order to successfully carry out these operations.[499]

6.3.2. The National Security Management System (NSMS)

The following organogram is a structural representation of the NSMS as represented by K. O'Brien in his book *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005* (2011).[500] The NSMS was designed specifically to combine all efforts of the government and created uniformity amongst the SADF, SAP and Intelligence services.[501] This security body was to analise and produce solutions to any and all threats pertaining to the RSA's security situation.

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[496] Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, pp. 215-216.
[497] R. de Vries, *Eye of the Storm. Strength Lies in Mobility*, Naledi, Tyger Valley, 2013, pp. 724-727.
[498] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1986, p. 12.
[499] R. de Vries, Lessons of The South African Border War, *Australian Command and Staff College*, 2020, p. 11
[500] O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, p. 85.
[501] Ellis, *External Mission: The ANC in Exile*, p. 131.

Organogram 5.[502]

The NSMS was the result of Botha's administration, all intelligence related branches and sections fell under one central structure which conducted all clandestine and intelligence operations.[503] The NSMS was to have a drastic effect on the fighting capacities of the SADF in terms of revolutionary and conventional warfare. The result, however, of the structure was the militarization of society and state politics. The NSMS was responsible for producing assassination units and served as the basis for the Total National Strategy.[504]

6.3.3. Organization of the SADF

Organogram 6 illustrates the last general structural composition of the SADF as presented to parliament in the 1989 White Paper on Defence.[505] This structure, in comparison with the very

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[502] O'Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005,* p. 85.
[503] *Ibid.,* pp. 67-68.
[504] *Ibid.,* p. 80.
[505] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Planning Process of the South African Defence Force,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1989, p. 7.

first introductory Defence Force structure in 1969 as seen in *Organogram 7*, was a vast and complex improvement that allowed for optimal functioning.[506]

Organogram 6.[507]

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[506] See Chapter Three.

[507] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Planning Process of the South African Defence Force,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1989, p. 7.

Organogram 7.[508]

The theory-policy-strategy-doctrine nexus does not always translate into the required operational effect. It would therefore be ignorant to argue from only the theoretical, organizational or the strategic position, due to the volatile environment that South Africa was experiencing during 1969-1989. The practical experience of defence personnel has often been overlooked, due to the fact that personal experience can be misinterpreted and is often subject to bias. In short, strategic effects and outcomes were often not the same as envisioned in their original planning; irrespective of how rational the policy input may have been. Scholtz and De Vries have mentioned this fact more than once in their work. It can also be traced to the views of Mao Zedong and Clausewitz. The key would be a discussion of all variables in order to achieve equilibrium, but the discussion of all such aspects would result in a highly complex study. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, a few aspects of relevance are highlighted.

6.4. Structure to Operational Application: Influence and Formulation

South African military doctrine has not been thoroughly investigated according to Leopold Scholtz. However, he acknowledges that the most coherent doctrine development regarding mobile warfare can be attributed to General Roland de Vries.[509] Mobile warfare is not a particularly new tactical method, South Africa had been practicing forms of it as early as 1800s. But mobile warfare became a preferred method of deterring revolutionaries and insurgents during the period of 1970 to 1989.

Friedrich von Mellenthin who wrote *Panzer Battles* in 1956, and who immigrated to South Africa after the Second World War, assisted Roland de Vries' in the understanding and development of mobile warfare doctrine. The German Blitzkrieg concept was conventionalised

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[508] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1969, p. 13.
[509] L. Scholtz, "Die Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Doktrine", *LitNet Akademies*, (16), (2), 2019, pp. 337-355.

into the South African concept of mobile operations. De Vries used practical experience to develop a conventional doctrine of mobile warfare that served the South African context.

According to Scholtz, it is evident that the South African conventional doctrine had the following objectives; to keep casualties as low as possible, and to avoid linear warfare with frontal attacks and rather to rely on the mobility manoeuvring, overturning, flank attacks and deceptions of the enemy.[510] Thus, the relationship between policy, strategy and doctrine can be described as somewhat fluid, but the application of doctrine is to be adjusted equally according to operational failures and successes. Therefore, both operational and policy domains are influenced by the strategic realities a country confronts. Doctrine was influenced by these same factors.

The fact that the SAP was neither structured for nor had a specific mandate for cross border insurgency operations caused confusion in the leadership echelons of the force and led to the deployment of the Defence Force, which at the time (1970s) was ill-equipped, trained, and structured for counterinsurgency. The study of revolutionary warfare, with its different definitions and interpretations, was categorised into insurgency or guerrilla warfare and composite warfare.[511] This further complicated the understanding and interpretation of the White Papers on Defence. The theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus was also complicated by the Defence Force's definition and implementation of counterinsurgency operations; in short, the lack of a comprehensive and nuanced doctrine.

It was therefore imperative that a definition and understanding was developed through doctrine. The doctrine was eventually developed through military relations, research, and trial and error. The military relations involved, amongst others, the exchange of attachés, the participation in military courses abroad, weapon exchange programmes as well as combined military technology development programs. The South African government was forced to align itself with military juntas, such as Chile and Argentina, as well as pariah states such as Taiwan and Israel, which, politically, were isolated from and not fully recognised by the international community. This was done to enhance South Africa's military capabilities as well as to promote Armscor's armament export that was critical to the RSA's survival. Diplomatic military relations were closely maintained with the USA, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Israel, Russia and Taiwan while military liaison with the foreign intelligence services of Portugal, Germany and

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[510] *Ibid*.
[511] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, Danie Theron Krygskool, Revolutionêre Oorlogvoering, GEHEIM 08/85, 1985.

Morocco was established.[512] The doctrine facilitated the launch of major transborder search and destroy operations of SWAPO and FNLA bases. The interpretation and understanding were that, if the bases could be found and destroyed, a buffer zone could be created to protect South West Africa from insurgency operations. This concept was also utilised by the Rhodesian Defence Force. These types of operations did not, however, resolve the issue of counterinsurgency and guerrilla operations

6.4.1. Regular Operations vs Irregular Operations

The discussion of regular and irregular operations poses some difficulty. This is predominantly due to the fact that many operations were the result of either operation failures or the continuation of other operations. The overlapping of operations is therefore inevitable and presents a chronological nightmare. However, Moorcroft in his book *Total Onslaught: War and Revolution in Southern Africa since 1945*[513] and Scholtz in his books *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*[514] and *Die SAW en Cuito Cuanavale: 'n taktiese en strategiese analise*[515] were among a few scholars who had great successes in discussing such operations as the primary focus of their research. Personal encounter literature such as *Journey Without Boundaries: The Operational Life & Experiences of A SA Special Forces Small Team Operator* by Col Andre Diederick [516] *A Greater Share of Honour: The Memoirs of a Recce Officer* (2008)[517] and *RECCE: Small Team Missions Behind Enemy Lines* by Koos Stadler are also worth mentioning.[518]

Most military personnel served in the SADF for a short period and may have experienced any one of the different wars South Africa was facing at the time. But the professional soldier was able to gain more nuanced insights into both the thinking and the actions of the SADF and ANC. These individuals operationalized the guidelines in the White Papers on Defence by analysing and adapting to the initial threat directed at the RSA and SADF. As the conflict increased, initial conventional threats directed at the SADF moved towards insurgency

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[512] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1985, AI(DIV)/257/28: Anti-RSA-Druk en Belangegroepe, p. 27.
[513] P. Moorcraft, *Total Onslaught: War and Revolution in Southern Africa since 1945*, Pen & Sword Military, United Kingdom, 2018.
[514] L. Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989*, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2013.
[515] L. Scholtz, *Die saw en Cuito Cuanavale: 'n taktiese en strategiese analise,* Delta Boeke, Johannesburg, 2020.
[516] A. Diedericks*, Journey Without Boundaries: The Operational Life & Experiences of A SA Special Forces Small Team Operator,* Just Done Productions, South Africa, 2007.
[517] J. Greeff, *A Greater Share of Honour: The Memoirs of a Recce Officer,* Just Done Productions, 2008.
[518] K. Stadler, *Recce: Small Team Missions Behind Enemy Lines*, Tafelberg, Cape Town, 2015.

operations.[519] Those who were actively involved in the execution of the instructions given to them had to, to the best of their knowledge, training and abilities adapt and apply these actions in accordance with the interpretation of the White Papers throughout the different time frames of 1969 to 1989.[520]

6.4.2. Operations and Projects

The need for special operations rapidly arose within the revolutionary and counterinsurgency context. The manner in which the White Papers on Defence defined the threat to South Africa, did not necessarily accommodate these types of operations. At an operational and tactical level, a new concept was required to facilitate the SADF in its implementation of the notions in the White Papers on Defence in the counterinsurgency domain. During the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s, the SAP still did not have its own White Paper. The establishment and deployment of a safety and security branch of the SAP was initiated in an effort to combat a revolutionary and counterinsurgency war.[521]

The mandate of the SAP's, safety and security branch was to actively combat revolutionary warfare within the borders of South Africa, as well as ensuring the protection of citizens from any possible internal threat. This was a vague and broad description of duties with no White Paper such as the White Papers on Defence, as guideline. Consequently, there was considerable room for abuse of the mandate.[522] As the modus operandi of the MK and various other radical groups changed, the nature of operational actions of the various SADF and SAP safety and security branches also changed. The establishment of the CCB was but one example of such agencies employed to counter various MK actions.[523]

- Operations

The SADF, through innovative thinking and experience, managed to interpret the White Papers on Defence as guidelines for their military practices.[524] By identifying the evolving threats that South Africa was facing, a suitable policy and doctrine for each of the military disciplines had

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[519] Department of Defence Archives (hereafter DODA), Direktoraat MilitêInligting,1977, MI/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Sammevatting, p. 4
[520] M. Malan, *My Life with the SA Defence Force*, Protea Book House, Pretoria, 2006, p. 52.
[521] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010*, pp. 106-108.
[522] Private Collection van J. Van den Berg, *Correspondence with Security officer,* 12 January 2021.
[523] K. O' Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005,* Routledge, London, 2011, p. 134.
[524] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting,1977, MI/205/10: Die Militêre Bedreiging teen die RSA, Deel 1: Sammevatting, p. 2

to be developed.[525] Such matters complicated the SADF's practical application of the White Paper guidelines and initially caught it off guard. Therefore, a quick re-evaluation of the area of operations, the operations themselves, and doctrine, as well as the establishment of counterinsurgency operations served as two examples the complicated nature of the theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus and the importance of ground adaptability.

Practical experienced was gathered from operational successes and failures in the South African and international context. The White Papers on Defence indicate that scholars and military personnel alike sought advice, knowledge and research through international experiences. This is not only evident from Beaufre and McCuen's concepts but also through the application of certain tactics and practical actions taken by the SADF. Through lessons learned from the failures of the Portuguese in Angola during the liberation wars,[526] the experiences of Col Mike Hoare and his mercenary 5th Commando in the Congo, as well as the Rhodesian Bush War, a better strategy could be developed and policy could be adapted by the SADF.[527] Past experiences made the prediction of practical efforts more successful, and the SADF was able to create a suitable and practical solution for counterinsurgency.[528] Although it should be noted that Mike Hoare was a controversial figure and a mercenary, his tactical success can still be evaluated from an objective perspective. His tactics were applied in the South African context in order to combat guerrilla groups. References of his experiences are for example, made in the *Inligtingswaardering* 1979 document of the SADF as reference point for countering insurgent forces.[529]

Revolutionary warfare was an aspect not completely understood at the time and the SADF still tried to fully comprehend this notion of warfare, although the White Papers on Defence were beginning to address the unstable political situation South Africa was facing. During the 1970s the SADF experienced extensive changes in order to ensure that it could maintain its mandate as was discussed in the 1973 White Paper on Defence.[530] The launch of Operation Savannah, the first major conventional operation, was a mere example of the SADF attempting to utilise

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[525] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1985, HSAW/191/3: Rewolusionêre and ander Versetgroepe se Optrede in die Buiteland, pp. 116-120.
[526] See Carnation Revolution in Chapter Three, paragraph 3.3.1.
[527] M. Hoare, *Congo Mercenary,* Robert Hale Ltd, London, 1967.
[528] DODA, Indeks van Staatsveiligheids Raad, 1987, HSAW/191/3, p. 9.
[529] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting, 1979, HSAW/205/10, pp. IV – VII.
[530] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1973, p. 6

the concept of mobile warfare.[531] The 1975 White Paper on Defence recognised the threat of a pending conventional war and that action had to be taken.[532]

From the 1970s onward, the SADF would be fighting on two fronts (internal and external). Cross-border operations such as Savannah, Hooper and Packer were well executed according to the SADF, considering the circumstances that its forces were facing. These were conventional operations, where the conventional threat was met head-on. The SADF's equipment, although not fully battle proven in all instances, was utilised successfully through the adaptive experience and ingenuity of the SADF soldiers.[533]

Some of the SADF's biggest campaigns were Operations Savanna, Modular, Hooper, Packer, Daisy, Protea, Smokeshell, Reindeer and Askari. These operations were extremely successful from the SADF point of view, some lasting a month and others lasting more than five years. It is remarkable that these operations or campaigns had a very limited casualty rate, which complied with the doctrine that the SADF developed. The SADF was extremely successful in combatting ANC military initiatives. The deployment of SADF Special Forces, in conjunction with covert military actions, put the ANC on the back foot. These operations and campaigns enabled the RSA to effectively neutralise the guerrilla operations against the country. These successes prompted Russia and Cuba to escalate military support towards the ANC and SWAPO.[534] It also led to an escalation of revolutionary warfare into South Africa territory.

Special Forces became involved in the infiltration surveillance and the elimination of the enemy internally in South Africa. A continuous sequence of events occurred where Special Forces operations were conducted within South Africa with specific reference to Natal, Commandment Wits, Eastern Transvaal and Western Cape. Most of these operations were directed straight at the elimination of prominent Self Defence Unit (SDU) cell members or MK Cell members. The SADF was directing operations now externally and internally to all means possible to ensure internal and external stability. These operations classified as Special Covert Operations included assassinations, kidnapping, extortion, support, influence, and destabilisation against targets inside and outside South Africa. These operations were classified under the policy of the Total Onslaught that was waged against South Africa. It should be noted that these operations were approved with the understanding that South Africa was in fear of

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[531] Scholtz, *The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989,* pp. 13-16.
[532] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1975, p. 3.

[534]DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1984, AI(DIV)/257/22, pp 77.

falling into a communist regime. The minority classes, that included cultural groups such as the Coloureds, black groups such as the Venda's and whites would not be represented under the one-man one-vote system.

Other projects were part of a hearts and minds campaign to establish friendly relations between the Defence Force and the civilian populace such as the "Ride Safe" initiative referred to in the 1979 White Paper on Defence as discussed in chapter four.[535] In the context of the White Papers on Defence and Armament published tween 1969 and 1989, Operation Bruilof (1978), Operation Reindeer (1978), Operation Boswilger and Operation Prone (1988) were discussed in this thesis. Other SADF operations have been organised in regional categories for cognisance in Addendum G and a list of additional readings on the subject were placed under Addendum H. It should also be noted that although the SADF was involved in the South African Border War since the 1960s. Its role manifested mainly in supportive measures to other security forces such as the Rhodesian Police. These conflicts were of small scale. Once the USSR and Cuba began to provide additional support to the revolutionary forces, the conflict escalated to full blown conventional warfare, hence the reason why the first major SADF operation was Operation Savannah in 1975.[536]

Operational successes were achieved through various operational concepts such as a focus of main efforts (concentrating efforts on achieving objectives), the application of mobility, momentum and the centre of gravity theory. The centre of gravity theory by Clausewitz is often misinterpreted, but according to his original work *On War*, it can be described as "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act". Therefore, the centre of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength".[537] This concept and many similar scenarios led to the successes achieved, thus promoting a positive reputation of the SADF's military competence.

In terms of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency, the SADF was compelled to search for alternative options. The revolutionary and counterinsurgency war made the SADF realise that both its manner of warfare and means of practices had to be changed. The SADF would

[535] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence and Armament Production*, Government Printer, Cape Town, 1979, p. 9.
[536] DODA, Direktoraat Militêre Inligting,1977, MI/205/10, pp. 15-17.
[537] C. Von Clausewitz, *On war*, Translated and edited by M. Howard & P. Paret, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1976, pp. 248-249.

have to face a prolonged and drawn-out war against both revolutionary and counterinsurgency war.

Within the revolutionary and counterinsurgency context need for special operations arose. The manner in which the White Papers on Defence defined the threat to South Africa, did not necessarily accommodate these kinds of operations by the late 1960s. At the operational and tactical level, a new concept of understanding was required to facilitate the SADF in its implementation of the notions reflected in the White Papers on Defence in the counterinsurgency domain. By the 1970s the SAP still lacked a White Paper providing guidelines for police action in a counterinsurgency environment therefore the Safety and Security Branch was created in an effort to combat a revolutionary and counterinsurgency war.[538]

The mandate of the SAP was the protection of the South African populace from any possible internal threat and its Security Branch was mandated to actively combat revolutionary warfare within the borders of South Africa. This was however, a vague and broad description of the SAP's duties and with no guideline, such as the White Papers on Defence, there was abundant room for abuse of this mandate.[539] As the modus operandi of the MK and various other liberation groups changed, the operational actions of the various SADF units and Police, safety and security branches changed accordingly. The establishment of the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) was but one example of such branches used to counter various MK actions.

- Projects

Project Barnacle and Project Coast were born out of necessity according to the NP government and security force and is often mentioned as subtext in the White Papers on Defence as deterrent actions.[540] Information on Project Barnacle's existence has been made available to the public only partially, but it was Project Coast that drew notoriety in the public sphere. Project Coast was a clandestine chemical and biological weapons program created by the NP government to enable South Africa to have its own chemical and biological warfare deterrent. The program was headed by doctor Wouter Basson. Project Barnacle launched part-time special operations and was essentially an assassination unit.[541] From the point of view of the SADF both were given the South African Defence Force strategic advanced in combating insurgency operations.

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[538] Moorcraft, *African Nemesis, War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010*, pp. 106-108.
[539] Private Collection van J. Van den Berg, *Correspondence with Security officer,* 12 January 2021.
[540] DODA, Nasionale Inligtingswaardering 1988, HSAW/191/3: Feitebasis, p. 85.
[541] O' Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005*, pp. 130-131.

The execution of the operations and projects were theoretically and technologically ahead of their time and made the SADF a reputable force. Although some aspects were managed incorrectly, most operations and projects were deemed to be successful by the NP government and SADF.

The South African Military Intelligence did not enjoy adequate military capability for intelligence gathering, therefore a more operational specific organisation or structure was required. This led to the creation of Project Barnacle which later became the CCB. The CCB had the flexibility and mandate to operate in five regions collectively. These five regions included operations in Europe, America, and Africa including the RSA. The CCB had the opportunity and resources to both infiltrate and neutralise threats to the state without SSC approval. It placed the RSA in a whole new dimension of operations where any threat could be neutralised in a timely manner to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, according to the SADF.[542]

The White Papers on Defence, published between 1969 and 1989 was a desperate effort to try and adapt to the rapidly changing political and military milieu the SADF found itself in. It was also an effort to try and understand the new and evolving threat to South Africa. The fact that Angola supported these radical actions with the help of USSR and Cuba made it necessary to defend the RSA with more radical measures.

Politician and scholars, as in most military history, were often involved in the creation of theoretical practices that promoted a certain objective, with no definitive manner of achieving this objective. Prompt communication between administrative groups and ground groups were often misconstrued or impossible.[543] The SADF military successes were due to its flexibility, speed, and destructive capability throughout the 1980s in order to provide integrity, safety, and, security especially if one measures it against the pillars of the state.

The SADF was capable of establishing peace and security and developed its organizational structure throughout the events in 1970s and 1980s, but was always in an ongoing struggle with BOSS/Department of National Strategy (DONS)/NIS/SAP and Department of Foreign Affairs Intelligence (DFAI).[544] The SADF dominated the SSC and advised the council on the impact of actions and decisions to the betterment of the RSA. Although the SSC occasionally ignored their counsel and made contradictory decisions such as the state's strategy of retribution after

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[542] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, SADF, ANC.
[543] DODA, Indeks van Staatsveiligheids Raad, 1987, HSAW/191/3, p. 9.
[544] Private Collection of J. Van den Berg, *Correspondence with Security officer*, 12 January 2021.

the Church Street bombing in Pretoria by military veterans of MK. The SSC decided against the recommendation of the SADF Military Council and Chairman and demanded immediate retribution. This led to the attacks in Angola and Botswana on ANC bases, although SADF council members recommended that sufficient intelligence should first be obtained to identify specific MK targets that initiated the attack in South Africa.

The creation of so-called Hammer Units, that were specialised anti-terrorist counterinsurgency units established in the Eastern Cape in the 1980s, was another example of combatting the internal threat, to South Africa. The open deployment of another specialised unit, *Koevoet* in a counterinsurgency role and internal stability role was never formally approved by the SSC. Therefor the role of *Koevoet* and Police Units were never properly authorised and can be regarded as an exponent weakness within the SAP.[545]

It should be noted that the White Paper on Defence constantly changed as the threats evolved against the RSA. Within this context, all operations must be seen within the development of the armament industry and this relates back to the strategic projects referred to above. Full-scale armament was based on the requirements, acquisition or development in order to enable the RSA to supply the armament required for the SADF. Where the technology did not exist, Project Barnacle kicked in to supply the technical knowledge and technology that enabled the South Africa armament industry to design or procure the weapon systems required by the SADF to combat the threats against the country.

Since the publication of the first White Paper on Defence in 1969 and with the official signing over of the British Simonstown naval base to South Africa as a Southern Hemisphere Strategic Base, South Africa started a full armament plan which continued until the onset of the post-apartheid era in 1994. South Africa's indication and intent between 1969 and 1989 was that the country should form part of NATO under the command and control of NATO forces. Thus, enabling the Western Powers to have a controlling region and authority in Africa with specific reference to Sea Routes around the southern tip of Africa.

When P.W. Botha assumed power, a new class of military leaders and bureaucrats came into the force called "the securocrat". The SADF produced officers who could make strategic and operational decisions while being professional soldiers in command positions supporting political agendas. The SADF lost its culture as an apolitical body. Through the White Paper on

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[545] DODA, The Hammer Unit and The Goniwe Murders, 1985, AI(DIV)/217/28, pp. 1-4.

Defence the SADF became a means to support NP policy and objectives. It no longer served the citizens of South Africa and was only an extension of the political body, whilst on the tactical and technical level, SADF members were fighting in the war.

Military operations in the African townships consisted out of the following: SADF members took control of the administering municipalities, local government, supply of essential services, housing and infrastructure development whilst at the same time ensuring stability and peace and countering any political unrest.[546] It should also be noted that during this time the ANC launched its own self-defence units, which was a new modus operandi unfamiliar to the SADF. What made the SADF operations unique was the quick adaptions to the new conduct operations of the ANC.

Special Operations was no longer directed at strategic operations outside South Africa, but also deployed to further internal stability. The most outstanding feature of the White Papers on Defence is that they are all orientated towards a specific threat which faced South Africa in a certain time period. The idea was to alert the government timeously to prepare for new threats in a foreseeable five-year period. The White Papers on Defence was an effort by government to prepare the means and ways to combat new threats or perceived threats that faced the country. The White Papers on Defence thus enabled the SADF to prepare within a timely manner.

6.4.3. Technology

The utilisation of equipment and weapons played an integral part in the development of the SADF doctrine. The means that were made available had to be utilized as efficiently as possible. A typical example of this would be the Ratel infantry fighting vehicle. The Ratel, according to De Vries was originally designed to fight alongside armoured vehicles in order to protect the territorial stability of South Africa against a conventional onslaught. But the threat prediction that it was created for, never realised. There was a doctrine in place for this type of vehicle, called the "Conventional Land Battle" doctrine, but De Vries argued that this doctrine would not have suffices in the bush war environment that the SADF was facing in the 1970s and 1980s.[547] The Ratels did make their debut in the late 1970s and essentially served as wheeled tanks as they were suited for the mobility as well as providing some armoured

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[546] DODA, Indeks van Staatsveiligheids Raad, 1987, HSAW/191/3, p. 4.
[547] R. de Vries, "The Influence of the Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle on Mobile Warfare in Southern Africa", *Scientia Militaria*, (43), (2), 2015, pp.174-186.

protection. Its flexibility and mobility were excellent for the difficult terrain of the Bush War in Northern Namibia.[548]

Operation Bruilof (1978) was a military operation that was planned to be executed by the SADF during the South African Border War and the Angolan Civil War between 1975 and 2002. This operation is of particular interest because 61 Mechanised Infantry Battalion Group conducted the operation and it introduced the first mechanised force to be deployed by the SADF since its inception, using the Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle and Eland Armoured Cars as per *Figure 2* and *3*. It was, however, not successful due to the SADF's inability to cross the SWA-Angola border and thus, merged into operation Reindeer.[549]

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[548] *Ibid.,* p.178
[549] Steenkamp, *South Africa's border war, 1966-1989*, pp. 73-80.

Figure 2. Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle[550]

Figure 3. Eland Armoured Cars[551]

Operation Reindeer (1978) was the SADF's second major conventional operation, after Savannah (1975), conducted in Angola. The operation consisted of an assault by two South African Infantry Battalion on two SWAPO base facilities, Chetequera and Dombondola. These facilities were located in Angola near the South West Africa-Angolan border. The assault was launched by the elite 32 Battalions on SWAPO's Omepepa-Namuidi-Henhombe base facility,

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[550] "South Africa", The online Tank Museum, [Online], https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/south_african_tanks.php, [Accessed 28 September 2021].
[551] "South Africa", The online Tank Museum, [Online], https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/south_african_tanks.php, [Accessed 28 September 2021].

located 20 km east of Chetequera. This type of operation was replicated in Operation Protea (1981) and Operation Daisy (1981). Both operations were regarded as conventional war successes by the SADF. Operation Protea resulted in the capture of six to nine T-34 tanks, three to four PT-76 tanks, four BRDM-2 APC armoured vehicle, two BM-21 MRL vehicles mounted rocket launcher, 25 to 43 ZIS-3 76 mm guns, sixteen ZU-23 AA guns, seventeen 14.5 mm AA guns, thirteen M-55 20 mm AA guns, 94 to 97 SA-7 missile system, 240 trucks,1,800 small arms, 250 tons of ammunition, 490 000 litres petrol and 120 000 litres diesel, which was highly valuable for South Africa in an era of sanctions and the arms embargo.[552]

Operation Carrot (1981) was launched with the aim of locating and destroying SWAPO special units which were sent specifically to attack white farmers, and to sabotage infrastructure and water installations in SWA. The 61 Mechanised Battalion group was deployed to counter these insurgents. What makes this operation unique was the use of a military area radio network (MARNET). This system was reliable and excellent in the use of countering terrorism.[553]

The following strategic projects were created to facilitate in the technological developments of South Africa and the SADF:

a) A space satellite project;

b) The development of nuclear capabilities as a deterrent method;[554]

c) Project Coast: This enabled the RSA to obtain a chemical and biological capability and to counter the risk of the use of chemical and biological warfare as was identified by the SADF;[555]

d) A missile capability developed at Bredasdorp to enable the RSA to find a solution to various missile threats experienced during operations Savanna, Modular and Hooper;

e) The armament of the South Africa Army and the redesigning of an effective artillery system to counter the D30 artillery weapon deployed on the border by SWAPO and its allies;

f) The implementation of the Ratel fighting vehicle to support mobile warfare and to support the effective doctrine of enabling smaller forces to combat bigger forces.[556]

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[552] DODA, Stand van Ekonomiese Dwangmaatreëls teen die RSA, HSAW 190/3, 1987, p. 23.
[553] "Operation Carrot", *61 Mech,* [Online.], http://www.61mech.org.za/operations/operation-carrot-1981 [Accessed 20 February 2021].
[554] DODA, Stand van Ekonomiese Dwangmaatreëls teen die RSA, HSAW 190/3, 1987, p. 20.
[555] O' Brien, *The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 1948-2005,* p.11.
[556] R. de Vries, "The Influence of the Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle on Mobile Warfare in Southern Africa", *Scientia Militaria*, (43), (2), 2015, pp.174-186.

g) The redesigning of the Centurion tank into the main battle tank as the MK 1A and MK 1B. This enabled the RSA forces to neutralise the T34, T55 and T72 Russian tanks.

h) The effective development of the *Valkiri weapon system,* to neutralise the Russian *Stalin's Organ* or URAL used by communist allies. The *Valkiri weapon system* was a self-propelling multiple-rocket-launcher as per *Figure 4* that is still used today.[557] It was a 127 mm system with a wheeled launcher vehicle, disposable pods, and fire control equipment developed by Denel Land Systems.

Figure 4. Original Valkiri Weapons System[558]

Figure 5. Modern Valkiri Weapons System[559]

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[557] *Old Weapon Systems*, [Online], https://old.weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/DD05%20-%20Valkiri.html [20 February 2021].

[558] *Old Weapon Systems*, [Online], https://old.weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/DD05%20-%20Valkiri.html [20 February 2021].

[559] "South African Artillery Vehicles", The online Tank Museum, [Online],https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/coldwar/south_africa/denel-bateleur-fv2-mrl.php , [Accessed 28 September 2021].

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The projects described above were the means developed for the successful execution of the mandate in the White Papers on Defence of 1975 to 1986. These initiatives, and others, branded the SADF as a formidable opponent on the battlefield. Although the war was fought on various stages, the RSA, through the SADF, was capable of engaging the enemy at any level, whether in conventional, revolutionary or insurgency operations. This eventually stimulated various other technological breakthroughs such as the Rooivalk attack helicopter and a variety of other weapon systems. Against the background of the political instability of the 1970s and 1980s it was a major South African accomplishment.

South Africa reached the pinnacle of its technological development with the production of nuclear weapons, and thus became the first atomic power on the African continent. Simultaneously, the first ballistic missiles were completed to launch a nuclear head to retaliate against foreign threat. It is also critical to understand that South Africa was in full production and prepared to meet chemical and biological challenges to its internal stability. The harbour of Simonstown was also upgraded successfully to accommodate seventy naval ships and any submarine carrying nuclear arms. It became evident that the RSA had the potential to become a super military power that could dominate and control any threat in sub-Sahara Africa. Botha's leadership priorities were such that he would not hesitate to utilise any means available to protect the citizens of South Africa or any South African interest.

Conclusion

The national defence of a country is often a complicated matter and as history has indicated, often formed by an assortment of factors. The White Papers on Defence and Armament have indicated that leadership played an important role in the choice of defence theory, as did the domestic and global environment that South Africa faced. These factors, including the practical experience by military officials contributed to the development of policy, structure, strategy and operational application. By developing these systems and evolving their perception of a threat, great organizational changes could occur. Simultaneously technological advancements could be made. These same advancements contributed to operational success in some form or another. The SADF was relatively successful in managing both the operational, tactical and the policy domains. Tension between these domains was a given; politicians were of the opinion that soldiers were forcing their hand and soldiers who were of the view that they were forsaken by politicians. Often the Defence Forces' true understanding of warfare and tactics have been

misinterpreted or subjectively explained. As in any other discipline, the knowledge of this field is expanding and the understanding of it evolving. This is however a natural process and dichotomy that is often in the interplay between practical and theoretical domains. The NP regime and the Defence Force was therefore no exception in this regard.[560]

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[560] L. Scholtz, "Die Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Doktrine", *LitNet Akademies*, (16), (2), 2019, pp. 337-355.

Conclusion

Defence Policy is influenced by external factors and its immediate surrounding environment. This includes the country's relationship with international and neighbouring countries, threats, the political and social climate internally and externally, as well as its cultural demographic. The process of the analysis of the White Papers on Defence and Armament between 1969 and 1989, as well as the SAP White Paper of 1988, has been intricate and as detailed as the historical context would allow. This analysis is both companioned to be an example of the convoluted history of South African defence and operational successes. The development and expansion of the SADF can be seen through this analysis in three phases. Phase One could be described as rapid expansion of the organizational structure during 1969 to 1977, phase two was a phase of audacious and enterprising equilibrium for the SADF from 1978 to 1984, and phase three should be viewed as a phase of stagnation from 1986 to 1989. The stagnate phase could be contributed to the National Party's internal conflict. The Botha administration was also criticized for being overly militaristic and Botha himself had been accused of being a Securocrat, a term that is still used today to describe overly militaristic leaders and dictators.

The influence of international strategists such as André Beaufre and J. J. McCuen was evident throughout the White Papers on Defence and served as inspiration for Botha's grand design of an optimal South African Defence Force. It is clear that the grand design of the SADF was a product of its time and was influenced by numerous negative environmental factors such as pending communist threats, revolutions and conventional war which resulted in a positive structural and doctrinal outcome for the organization. It is therefore also clear that the presence of a threat in any form incites transformation and development, however misguided the politics of it may be.

The start of the Cold War had a global effect and South Africa was no exemption. However, the extent to which this impacted the development of strategy in South Afrca has often been debated. A study of the White Papers on Defence makes it clear that the Cold War threat of communism played a leading role in the development of South African Defence strategy. With the independence of buffer states such as Mozambique and Angola, South Africa faced an additional threat beyond communism - the threat of a rising black majority who no longer accepted the policies of apartheid. Again, the South African Defence Force's structure had to be adapted accordingly. It would therefore be accurate to state that the White Papers on Defence were subject to trial and error, much like the operational application of the Defence Force.

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The South African Defence Force peaked during 1984 to 1989 regarding reputation, operational success and organizational function. Political wills within the National Party, as mentioned before, changed that fact. The SADF and the SAP were not at terms with one another, this was quite evident during B. J. Vorster's administration. He favoured the SAP and shied away from militaristic action. It provided ample opportunity for the SAP to be in charge of most, if not all, intelligence gathering branches. When Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, he initiated separate intelligence gathering structures for the Defence Force. This explains why the *Intelligensiewaarderings* (Intelligence evaluations) of the SADF were only compiled from 1978 until 1988.

Botha's leadership style and relationship with Magnus Malan played an important role in the development of the South African Defence Forces' organization structure. Botha was a highly efficient individual and Magnus' military experience contributed immensely to the relationship. Upon closer inspection, one may notice the unique adaptive strategic approach that was applied not only to operations and tactics, but on an organizational level as well. In other words, although Beaufre and McCuen's theories on strategy and revolutionary warfare served as basis and incited various ways of countering these threats, those principles were applied to the whole South African Defence Force structure and state body. Instead of following the principles to the exact format, the Defence Force adapted it to the South African context and applied South African thinking to those same principles. Creating a highly adaptive functional organisation, those same basic adaptive principles that made the Defence Force, unique could be applied in a modern context to develop existing functions and organisational structures. One could argue that the core values are still relevant in the modern context where the terms "threat" and "enemy" have also adapted.

There is but one problem with the theory-policy-strategy-doctrine nexus, and that is the fact that theory does not translate well into practice. Roland De Vries and Leopold Scholtz have discussed the topic extensively. What is known; is that the operational application, as mentioned previously, was received with numerous complications and required swift adaption in order to achieve operational success. This is evident through De Vries' doctrine of mobile warfare, as well as through the numerous failures that occurred in order to best achieve the states objectives. Operational success or failures are always easier to examine after they have occurred and the South African Defence Force did not have much experience in this field in the beginning of the period discussed. Their adaptability to threats that was innovative and strong willed, should be applauded and is what made the defence force exceptional. Finally, through this study, it

became apparent that policy indirectly contributed to organizational efficiency to some extent. Operational success can be attributed to those who applied practical experience to their understanding of the policy, which was not always possible.

The importance of a defence force remaining perpetually in a functional state is of the utmost importance, even when it operates merely in a defence capacity. Globally, modern warfare has indicated that the threats are constantly evolving and that the core doctrines and structures could still be applied in a modern context. Through McCuen's work it is also evident that revolutionary warfare is a strong contender for the preferred warfare method. Political relationships between various countries are of utmost importance and history has shown that after World War II that a full-blown conventional war does not serve any country economically, socially or politically. But that does not prevent them from acting in revolutionary ways and using guerrilla methods to achieve their objectives. African conflicts are a prime example of civilians using revolutionary warfare as their chosen method for undermining a regime.

The thesis objective was to map the interface of the theory-policy-strategy-structure nexus of the South African Defence Force from 1969 to 1989. All eleven White Papers during the critical period in South African history were discussed in order to indicate the relationship of policy and operational application of the South African Defence Force in that period. The effectiveness of a defence force is difficult to determine since there are numerous variables to consider. This thesis has evaluated the structure and strategy of the SADF in the light of national and international events to establish context and rationale for the changes made. Previous research has focused on certain perspectives, whether political or military, but few have combined all factors into a coherent, fact-based narrative to provide a historical context for the processes that led to the operational success of the South African Defence Force.

Addendums

1. Addendum A[561]

[561] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD*, Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 35.

2. Addendum B[562]

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                    Chief of the Air Force
                            │
              Inspector General, SAAF
                            │
    ┌────────┬────────┬─────┴─────┬────────┬────────┐
Subdivsion  Subdivsion  Subdivion  Subdivsion  Subdivision
Personnel   Intelligence Operation  Logistics   Finance
    │           │           │           │           │
    │           │           │           │           │
┌───┴───┬───────┴───┬───────┴───┬───────┴───┬───────┴───┐
Air      Training  Southern   Western    Airspace   Tactical
Logistic Command   Air        Air        Control    Support
Command            Command    Command    Command    Command
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[562] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 40.

3. Addendum C[563]

The organisational chart depicts the structure under the Chief of the Navy:

- **Chief of the Navy**
  - Inspector General, SAN
  - Subdivision Personnel
  - Subdivision Intelligence
  - Subdivision Operation
    - Naval Operations Command
    - Naval Command Natal
    - Naval Training Command
    - Naval Logistic Command
    - Naval Command Cape
    - Naval Command Walvis Bay
  - Subdivision Logistic
  - Subdivision Fiance

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[563] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 42.

4. Addendum D[564]

An organisational chart headed by "Surgeon General" with "Inspector General, SAMS" below it. Reporting under are subdivisions: Subdivision Personnel, Subdivision Intelligence, Subdiviosn Operation, Subdivision Logistics, Subdivision Fiance. Under Subdiviosn Operation are: Medical Command Northern Transvaal, Medical Command Southern Transvaal, Medical Command Western Cape, Central Medical Command, Central Medical Command, Medical command SWA, Medical Command Eastern Cape, Medical Training Command.

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[564] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 46.

5. Addendum E[565]

Organisational chart boxes:

- Chairman & Board of Directors
- Executive General Manager
- Director Personnel
- Head Armscor Security
- Director Public Relations
- Secretary
- Senior General Manager Vehicles
- Senior General Manager Electronics
- Senior General Manager Finance and Services
- Senior General Manager Foreign Procurement &Research & Development
- Senior General Manager Aviation and Maritime
- Senior General Manager Marketing
- Senior General Manager Internal Production
- Senior General Manager Financing

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[565] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on the Organization and Function of the SADF and the Armaments Corporation of South Africa LTD,* Government Printer, Cape Town, September 1984, p. 59.

6. Addendum F[566]

Breakdown of the Force Structure Plan into Development Plans

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[566] Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on The Planning Process of the South African Defence Force,* Government Printer, Cape Town, 1989, p. 14.

7. Addendum G

Angola	South West Africa/Namibia	Mozambique	Unknown
Operation Savannah (1975)	Operation Seiljag (1978)	Operation Skerwe SAAF Operatio (1983)	Operation Vastrap (1980)
Operation Bruilof (1978)	Operation Safraan (1979)		Operation Vasbyt (1981)
Operation Seiljag (1978)	Operation Super (1982)		Operation Konyn (1981)
Operation Reindeer (1978)	Operation Phoenix (1983)		Operation Carnation (1981)
Operation Rekstok (1979)	Operation Boswilger (1985)		Operation Rekstok III SAAF Operation (1982)
Operation Sceptic-Smokeschell (1980)	Operation Prone (1988)		Operation Maanskyn SAAF Operation (1983)
Operation Klipklop (1980)	Operation Merlyn (1989		Operation Drama (1983)
Operation Wishbone (1980)			Operation Gordel (1984
Operation Protea (1981)			Operation Kabul (1985)
Operation Daisy (1981)			Operation Salamander (1985)
Operation Kerslig (1981)			Operation Vuiswys (1988)
Operation Super (1982)			Operation Linger (1989)
Operation Meebos (1982)			Operation Agree (1989
Operation Bravo (1982)			
Operation Dolfyn (1983)			
Operation Karton (1983)			
Operation Klinker (1983)			

Operation Askari (1989)			
Operation Nobilis (1984)			
Operation Egret (1985)			
Operation Argon (1985)			
Operation Magneto (1985)			
Operation Wallpaper (1985)			
Operation Cerebus (1985)			
Operation Abrasion (1985)			
Operation Southern Cross (1986)			
Operation Alpha Centauri (1986)			
Operation Moduler (1987)			
Operation Firewood (1987)			
Operation Hooper (1988)			
Operation Packer (1988)			
Operation Excite (1988)			
Operation Displace (1988)			

8. Addendum H

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