

The Development of Vigilantism in South Africa

By

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Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Political Science) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University

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March 2021

Declaration

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Abstract

This research presented in this study aims to engage the topic of vigilantism. This study serves to demonstrate an overview of the development of vigilantism in South Africa, paying particular attention to the apartheid and democratic eras. The research question posed by this study is: *How has vigilantism developed under the governance of the apartheid and democratic regimes in South Africa?* Thus this thesis delves into how the apartheid and democratic regimes have governed, focusing on the relationship between the state and non-state actors in society. A discussion offering an overview of how the state operated under apartheid and democracy provides insight into the level of state strength and state capacity under each regime. Moreover, this discussion provides the contextual background for analysing the occurrence of vigilantism experienced during apartheid and democracy. A framework compiled for the purpose of this study is used to examine the phenomenon of vigilantism in South Africa in order to identify if and how vigilante groups and their activities have changed from apartheid to democracy.

This study focuses on vigilante organisations as non-state actors that take on the roles of the state in various ways and practise a limited degree of social control on the communities in which they operate. Key findings in this study indicates that experiences of vigilantism have differed from apartheid to democracy in the structure of vigilante groups and in the type of vigilantism practised by these groups. Similarities have been found across incidents of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy in the nature and methods used when engaging in vigilante activity. Key findings indicate that the motivations behind vigilante groups, their activities and objectives are context specific, and thus are always changing. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that various factors such as inequality, marginalisation, inaccessibility and unresponsive state institutions, as well as complicity by the state and its institutions, act as contributing factors to the continued presence of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy.

Opsomming

Hierdie navorsing wat in hierdie studie aangebied word, het ten doel om die onderwerp van waaksaamheid te betrek. Hierdie studie dien as 'n oorsig van die ontwikkeling van waaksaamheid in Suid-Afrika, met veral aandag aan die apartheids- en demokratiese tydperke. Die navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie is: *Hoe het waaksaamheid ontwikkel onder die bestuur van die apartheids- en demokratiese regimes in Suid-Afrika ?*. Hierdie tesis kyk na die bestuur van die apartheids- en demokratiese staat, en fokus op die verhouding tussen die staat en die nie-staatsaktuer in die samelewing. 'n Bespreking wat 'n oorsig bied van hoe die staat onder apartheid en demokrasie opereer, bied insig in die vlak van staatsterkte en staatskapasiteit onder elke regime. Boonop bied hierdie bespreking die kontekstuele agtergrond vir die ontleding van die voorkoms van waaksaamheid wat tydens apartheid en demokrasie ervaar word. 'N Raamwerk wat vir die doel van hierdie tesis saamgestel is, word gebruik om die verskynsel van waaksaamheid in Suid-Afrika te ondersoek om te bepaal of en hoe waaksaamheidsgroepe en hul aktiwiteite van apartheid na demokrasie verander het.

Hierdie studie fokus op waaksaamheidsorganisasies as nie-staatsaktore wat die rolle van die staat op verskillende maniere inneem en 'n beperkte mate van sosiale beheer oor die gemeenskappe waarin hulle werk, beoefen. Belangrike bevindings in hierdie studie dui aan dat ervarings van waaksaamheid verskil het van apartheid tot demokrasie in die struktuur van waaksaamheidsgroepe en in die tipe waaksaamheid wat deur hierdie groepe beoefen word. Ooreenkomste tussen voorvalle van waaksaamheid van apartheid tot demokrasie, in die aard en metodes wat gebruik word, is gevind. Belangrike bevindinge dui verder aan dat die motiverings agter waaksaamheidsgroepe en hul aktiwiteite en die doelwitte wat hulle wil bereik, 'n veranderende eienskap is wat baie kontekstspesifiek is. Verder toon hierdie tesis aan dat verskillende faktore soos ongelykheid, marginalisering, ontoeganklikheid en staatsinstellings wat nie reageer nie, sowel as medepligtigheid deur die staat en sy instellings, bydraende faktore tot die voortgesette teenwoordigheid van waaksaamheid van apartheid tot demokrasie is.

Acknowledgements

My heart overflows with gratitude to my Heavenly Father. This project would not have come to fruition but by His grace. As it says in Ephesians 3:20, all glory belongs to God, who is able to accomplish infinitely more than we might ask or think. Your favour and provision has carried me through the challenges of the past three years. *Deo Gratias!*

To my amazing family, your prayers, texts, calls, and encouragements are deeply appreciated. I would not be here today without your love and support. A special word of thanks to the women in my life who have guided me through different parts of my life journey. You are my prayer warriors, my fierce protectors, my happy place. I am a strong woman because I was raised by strong women.

I would like to extended my deepest thanks to my academic supervisor, Dr. Derica Lambrechts, for your knowledge and support throughout this process. Your contribution to this work is invaluable. It has been a challenging three years and your guidance and insights have made the completion of this project possible. Thank you!

To my dearest friend, Tristanne, you have been my rock. We have encouraged each other, laughed together, and vented our way through postgrad. When looking back on this postgraduate journey, our friendship is my most cherished memory. I wish you infinite success. Friend, you are wonderful.

I would like to especially thank my beloved, Rosko. You have been a soft place to land, and for that I am eternally grateful. You've believed in me on days that I did not believe in myself. You've held me accountable in giving my best. Thank you for supporting me through my goals and pushing me through every challenge. You have never let me believe in limitations on my life. Every day with you is MAGIC!

Last but not least, I would like to thank my extended family and friends for your support and prayers. You are all special to me and I appreciate each and every one of you. *Laat dit juig!*

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Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
CBAG	Community Based Armed Groups
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
ISS	Institute of Security Studies
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
NP	National Party
NSAG	Non-state Armed Groups
PAGAD	People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADF	South African Defense Force
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service
RDP	Redistribution and Development Programme
UDF	United Democratic Front

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

In recent years, South Africa has become known as one of the most violent countries in the world, with staggering figures on incidences of crime and violence being reported. The 2017/2018 crime statistics report released by the South African Police Service (SAPS) recounted that 36.2% of reported crimes involved physical contact, these crimes include murder, assault, robbery, and sexual offences. During the period of 2017-2018, SAPS reported 20 336 murders, 849 of which were linked to incidents of mob justice (Republic of South Africa, 2018). According to Lancaster (2019), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducted an in-depth analysis of the SAPS crime statistics report, which revealed that in South Africa an average of one to two lives are claimed daily at the hands of mob or vigilante violence. Furthermore, Lancaster (2019) argues that, while vigilantism is not new to South Africa, the country has experienced an increase in incidents of vigilante violence, specifically, vigilante violence as a response to criminal activities within communities over recent years.

Throughout international and national discourse, the concept of vigilantism has been associated with concepts such as mob justice, extra-legal justice, community policing, crime and reactionary violence (Nel, 2017; Abrahams, 1998:4-5; Schuberth, 2013:40). While the topic of vigilantism has only recently gained growing interest as a research topic within academic literature, vigilantism has received much of its notoriety through media reports and popular culture references (Nel, 2017; Schuberth, 2013:38). According to Dumsday (2009:49-50), the most popular displays of vigilantism have appeared in movies, comic books and other fictional writings; examples of these include: comics such as *Batman* and *Superman*, and movies such as *Zorro* and *The Equalizer*, where the protagonists are tasked with serving their own brand of justice in order to control or prevent criminal activity and keep citizens in their communities safe. This popular understanding of vigilantism portrayed in mainstream media has manifested in various ways across diverse societies throughout history (Nel, 2017; Dumsday, 2009:49; Nina, 2000:18).

Despite the ability of vigilantism to occur across various environments, attempts to develop a universal definition have been unsuccessful. While various authors, including Harris (2001), Abrahams (1998:7), Schuberth (2013:40) and Petrus (2015:27-28), have developed definitions for vigilantism, the definition put forth by Johnston (1996:220-221) has become the most

frequently cited definition of vigilantism in academic literature. Various scholars have used Johnston's interpretation of vigilantism as an essential basis in order to understand the concept of vigilantism (Harris, 2001). Thus, academic authors in the field of vigilantism such as Harris (2001), Abrahams (1998:1), Schuberth (2013:40) and Nel (2017) among others, have made use of Johnston's definition in their own writings as a basis for understanding vigilantism. In essence, the definition of vigilantism as proposed by Johnston (1996:221) can be understood as any activity performed by a group within society, acting outside of the law, in order to protect their community. Both the fictional representations and academic research captures the ambiguity attached to vigilantism as it illustrates conflicting ideas. These ideas include acting outside of the law to uphold law and order; violating the human rights of alleged criminals in order to protect the human rights of other community members; perceptions of vigilantism as either crime or acceptable punishment; the blurred line between informal law and illegality; and the legitimacy of the state and its agencies in the presence of social movements such as vigilante groups that disregard the rule of law (Johnston, 1996:232-233; Smith, 2019:6-10).

An earlier study conducted by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974), has become essential in enriching our understanding of vigilantism as these authors offer extensive insight into the conditions that may produce vigilantism. Furthermore, they develop a classification system for understanding vigilantism based on the nature and aim of vigilante violence and finally, they present a thorough discussion of the possible effects of vigilantism on society. The classification system developed by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:548) will be used in this study as part of an analytical tool through which to examine vigilantism. This framework categorises instances of vigilantism as either crime control vigilantism, social group control vigilantism, or as regime control vigilantism, based on the nature and aims of vigilante acts.

As previously stated, vigilantism has become a universal phenomenon and, as such, has occurred in various parts of the world. A real-world example of vigilantism includes lynching and attacks carried out by the Klu Klux Klan throughout history. Moreover, Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:552) classify the acts of this American white supremacist group as an example of social control vigilantism, as their attacks on people of colour, religious groups and people of other nationalities were motivated by their desire to enforce and maintain the supremacy of white Americans. Another example of social control vigilantism can be found in India, where incidents of vigilantism spurred by religious beliefs have recently increased (Pande, 2017). In the Hindu faith, the cow is regarded as a sacred symbol. In New Delhi, the capital of India,

groups of devout Hindus have attempted to protect their religious beliefs and idols by attacking non-believers that consume beef, as they are perceived as violating the laws of the Hindu religion; these groups are known as *Gau Rakshaks* (cow protectors) (Pande, 2017). Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:548) identify crime control vigilantism as vigilantism against alleged criminals who have in some way escaped the processes of the justice system, whether it be a failure on behalf of the police to capture and arrest the alleged criminals, corruption or inefficiency in the justice system, or leniency in sentencing. According to Dixon and Johns (2001), the South African organisation known as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), can be considered under the category of crime control vigilantism as put forth by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:548). PAGAD originated as groupings of anti-drug and anti-gangsterism movements and neighbourhood watch groups in the Cape Flats targeting gangs, drug lords and unsavoury elements in the community, through the use and threatened use of violence (Dixon & Johns, 2001). Furthermore, Brazil has experienced increased incidences of crime control vigilantism since 2011, as Barbara (2015) reports increased public lynching, beatings and other violent acts perpetrated by ordinary citizens against alleged criminals, on the streets of major cities such as Sao Paulo. Furthermore, death squads found in El Salvador, originating from the country's civil war, still operate today, exercising vigilante violence through coordinated attacks against drug lords, gangs, and in some cases against government officials perceived as being corrupt (Moncada, 2017:403).

In the South African context, vigilantism was most prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s; however, it is not considered to be a new phenomenon. Instead, it is seen to have an extensive history, stretching back as far as the period of colonialism, and is regarded as something that has changed over time (Haysom, 1989; Kynoch, 2016:65; Petrus, 2015:27; Buur, 2010:35). What is considered as vigilantism in South Africa today found its origin during the 1880s in traditional rural African courts, aimed at informal self-regulation within rural African communities with a low visibility of white authority; these black, non-state self-regulatory bodies known as *makgotla* permeated into migrant communities in urban parts of South Africa and operated parallel to the white minority government, serving the black community in areas the state overlooked, such as crime prevention, delivering punishments or sentencing, and maintaining the social order (Buur, 2010:35; Buur, 2006:737; Botha, 2015:18-19; Super, 2017:516; Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002). At its peak, during the 1980s and 1990s, vigilantism in South Africa had transformed from informal self-regulatory bodies operating within the black communities to more organised groups engaging in reactionary violence in order to over

throw the Apartheid government (Buur, 2006:737; Buur, 2010:35; Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002; Martin, 2010:63-64; Botha, 2015:19-20).

An essential aspect of vigilantism that must be highlighted is its relation to the state, as academic discourse most often discusses vigilantism as occurring in situations where the state or state agencies are non-responsive or do not act to the satisfaction of citizens (Smith, 2019:6-7). State-society relations theory suggests that a relationship exists between the state, state agencies and non-state actors as they exist and interact with each other within society (Moncada, 2017:404; Schubert, 2015:39). Within this perspective, vigilante groups can be classified as non-state actors. By taking on certain roles of the state and/or state agencies, vigilante groups challenge the legitimacy, authority and capabilities of the state; most often vigilante groups act as informal security in poor, disadvantaged communities where police presence is low (Buur, 2006:736; Schubert, 2015:39).

Moreover, another key element of state-society relations theory is that of strong, weak and failed states, which involves the functional capacity of the state (Migdal, 1988:4-5; Migdal, 2004:58; Lambrechts, 2017:19). According to Migdal (1988:32) and Migdal (2004:51), the theory on strong and weak states suggests that strong states can orchestrate and enforce social control over society, while weak states possess an inability to control society; furthermore, the ability to determine whether a state may be strong or weak is based on who makes the rules within society. Migdal (2004:51-52) further argues that a strong state drives societal change, whereas weak states are unable to exercise any control over society, thus a weak state is powerless in affecting change in society. According to Migdal's theory, the laws of the state are created by the government, thus, when these rules are not upheld, and non-state actors decide to act according to their own set of rules, this serves as a sign of a weak state (Migdal, 1988:32). Similar to the works of Migdal (1988) and Migdal (2004), Schubert (2013:42-43) presents a theory on weak and strong states, which argues that strong states, with full functional capacity and the ability to exercise social control, should not experience state institutions or non-state actors acting in opposition to the state; conversely, weak states, lacking the functional capacity, will inevitably encounter state institutions or non-state actors acting in opposition to the state, as the state is then unable to exercise social control.

Therefore, given the concepts and theories mentioned above, inquiries may arise regarding state-society relations, more specifically, the possibility of the presence of opposing state

institutions or non-state actors operating in states based on the level of state strength, and what factors facilitate the presence and operation of these organisations. This study will focus on non-state actors operating in opposition to the state, specifically vigilante groups acting as informal structures for law and order, specific to the South African context.

1.2. Problem Statement

As mentioned in the section above, vigilantism has a far-reaching history in the context of South Africa. Throughout its different eras, namely, colonialism, apartheid and democracy, South Africa has presented variations of instances considered to be vigilantism. The experiences of vigilantism across each period varied in different ways, for example, the nature of vigilante groups, the causal factors leading to instances of vigilantism, the consequences of vigilantism, the aims of vigilantism, and the capacity of the state and its responses to vigilantism. As previously stated, vigilantism became most prominent during the later years of the apartheid era, and then continued into democracy and is still present today.

Therefore, this study will not focus on the period of colonialism due to limited space, and to accommodate the time when vigilantism was most prevalent in South Africa. It is also believed that only focussing on the apartheid and post-apartheid eras, can provide a rich and detailed understanding of the phenomenon. During the apartheid era, vigilantism was recognised as small groupings, informal in nature, and aimed at maintaining social control within rural black communities. As South Africa progressed to democracy, the phenomenon of vigilantism quickly developed and was recognised as more organised groups aimed at changing the status quo on various levels throughout society. Despite the noticeable changes in the organisational structure of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy, the aim of affecting social change has remained. Vigilantism has developed slightly from the apartheid era to the democratic era, as it went from affecting social change on a small scale at the community level during apartheid, to affecting change on a larger scale that includes society as a whole. Most often, these changes, through the use or threatened use of violence, would be enforced. What was once a way of ensuring law and order within communities has become a violent way of expressing dissatisfaction with how the state and society functions. Moreover, during the regimes of apartheid and democracy, the state resembled factors of state strength and weakness, while still experiencing the presence of vigilantism within the state.

While most academic writings regarding vigilantism have been dedicated to understanding the nature of vigilante groups, or what constitutes vigilantism, or why people willingly participate in vigilante violence, few studies have examined how, if at all, vigilantism has changed over time, in one specific context. A gap in the literature exists regarding studies aimed at how or why vigilantism, as a social phenomenon, has been able to survive for decades. A limited number of research has been conducted to identify how vigilantism changed overtime in the South African context and what has caused these changes to occur (if any), especially, given the country's transition from apartheid to democracy. Therefore, the research question presented by this study is "How has vigilantism developed under the governance of the apartheid and democratic regimes in South Africa?" Furthermore, this study seeks to achieve two aims, firstly, to examine how vigilantism has developed from apartheid to democracy; and secondly, to examine the relationship between state strength and vigilantism, if any.

1.3. Literature Review

1.3.1. Conceptualising Vigilantism

Instances of vigilantism, while differing in size, nature, cause, and intent have been reported globally (Johnston, 1996:220; Botha, 2015:16; Kirsch, 2010:139; Schuberth, 2013:40). However, despite its universality, authors have not been able to develop a comprehensive definition for vigilantism. The definition most frequently referred to throughout academic literature is that of Johnston (1996:220-221), in which he proposes that vigilantism can be understood as an activity performed by a group within a community aimed at improving the safety of that community and its citizens from criminals and their activities; vigilante groups perceive the legal system as lacking in some way, and consequently, reprimand alleged criminals by taking the law into their own hands when dealing with these perpetrators.

In addition, Harris (2001) defines vigilantism from a South African perspective, suggesting that vigilantism can be understood as "...the public use or threatened use of violence, intended to serve as a warning or a punishment to generate fear and control through repression, and is based on a model of retributive justice that is unsanctioned by the state". In keeping with the South African context, Petrus (2015:31) constructs a definition of vigilantism specific to South Africa, which is focussed on vigilantism as a result of the failures of government to protect and serve its citizens. From this perspective, state authorities and agencies are seen as corrupt and

self-serving; thus citizens react to this lack of leadership and accountability with the use or threatened use of violence, and thus perceives vigilantism as more reactionary.

Regardless of the varying definitions of vigilantism, as a phenomenon which occurs across various societies, vigilantism most commonly involves securing the personal safety of community members by a person or persons within a community by taking the law into their own hands and is commonly associated with the idea of a state that is incapable of ensuring the safety and security of its citizens (Schuberth, 2013:40-41). The topic of conceptualising vigilantism will be discussed in more detail in the second chapter.

1.3.2. Causes of Vigilantism

As previously mentioned, vigilantism can occur across environments; therefore, a plethora of causes can be used to explain the different experiences of vigilantism. However, for this study, the causes discussed in this section are specific to the South African context. From a historical perspective, the marginalisation of communities can be considered as a causal factor leading to instances of vigilantism, since these communities often experience disproportionate access to formal provisions and services of the state. As a result, these communities suffer poor service delivery, increased crime, and limited access to the country's economy. Thus it can be inferred that these communities lack the necessary resources needed to ensure safe and productive day to day living. According to Super (2014:9-10), as a result of their marginalisation, the use of vigilantism in more impoverished communities becomes more attractive as it assures community members that their livelihood is being protected. Furthermore, the belief that the country suffers from a dysfunctional criminal justice system serves as another causal factor (Buur, 2008:573; Super, 2014:9; Botha, 2015:24; Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002; Nina, 2000:22-23). Vigilantism may occur in instances where the various components of the criminal justice system are not in alignment and thus leave room for vigilante groups to either control crime or punish criminals in accordance to the wishes of the community (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002; Nina, 2000:23).

The lack of adequate policing in communities has become one of the most generalised causes of vigilantism in South Africa (Sekhonyane & Louw 2002; Super, 2014:9; Martin, 2012:61-62; Buur, 2008:573; Botha, 2015:22). Botha (2015:22) and Martin (2012:61-62) present similar ideas as they argue that the low visibility of the police in communities encourages the

presence of vigilante groups that act as self-help mechanisms in informal security. Additionally, Petrus (2015:28) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) suggests that poor governance may also serve as a causal factor that could lead to the emergence of vigilantism. Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) suggest that poor governance leads to violent reactions and counter-reactions by vigilante groups and other community organisations tasked with addressing social issues. Some actions may be directed at the state, while others may be aimed at community organisations, thus sometimes causing a vicious cycle of violence within communities. Botha (2015:23) proposes that another factor that could lead to vigilantism is the occurrence of criminal opportunists that act as groups operating in the interest of combating and preventing crime. Chapter two will present a more detailed discussion of the causes of vigilantism, with specific emphasis on the conditions of each period, that is, apartheid and democracy.

1.3.3. The Impact of Vigilantism

Research conducted by Buur (2008:573), Botha (2015:17-18), Martin (2010:64), and Martin (2012:222-223) reports various consequences of vigilantism that can occur in the social, economic and political domains of society. These consequences carry a significant effect on communities that experience vigilantism. The authors mentioned above have reported that these consequences include: an increase in overall crime statistics; a decrease amongst the public's willingness to adhere to the rule of law; promoting a chaotic and lawless environment; a decrease in the social capital and economic value of a community; and violations of human rights.

Studies conducted by Buur (2008:573), Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) and Botha (2015:17-18) assert that one of the greatest dangers of vigilantism is that it increases criminal activity as opposed to its intended purpose of eliminating crime. Botha (2015:17-18) proposes that most often vigilante groups employ violence and aggression in order to carry out their objectives; therefore, vigilantism possesses the ability to produce a cycle of violent revenge, which contributes to the growing crime statistics. Additionally, a common argument can be identified in the writings of Buur (2008:573) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002), as these authors argue that the anarchic nature of vigilantism creates a lawless environment, which in turn encourages citizens to deviate from the rule of law. Sekonyane and Louw (2002) further stresses this point by suggesting that the illegal methods associated with vigilantism and the lack of action by law

enforcement against vigilantism reinforce the idea that it is tolerated within the community and thereby encourages the illegality associated with vigilantism. Moreover, Buur & Jensen (2004:147) argue that inadequate policing of crime and vigilantism has given citizens and criminals the confidence to subvert the law, thus sending a passive message that the state is complaisant in tolerating informal mechanisms of security which undermine the law.

Moreover, Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) and Martin (2012:221-222) conduct a critical analysis of vigilantism in South Africa and consequently identified the detrimental effect vigilantism has on the socio-economic status of communities. Martin (2012:221-222) argues that in cases of extreme mob violence, violence may escalate to such an extent that public and private infrastructure may be damaged; subsequently, the loss or damage to infrastructure, particularly tangible assets, structures and facilities necessary for the operation of businesses or even society at large, carries with it the potential downfall of the economic value and social capital of the community. Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) argue that institutional vigilantism that is vigilante activity aimed at the state, state agencies, or any other social, religious or professional organisation suspected of injustice or wrongdoing poses the greatest threat to the socio-economic development of a community.

Additionally, Martin (2010:61), Buur (2008:571-572) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) discuss the effects vigilantism may have on human rights; the authors mentioned above concur that incidents of vigilantism threaten the human rights of citizens, which for South Africa has been the foundation upon which its democracy is built. Alleged perpetrators are robbed of the chance of a fair trial, the violent methods used in vigilante activity violates the right to be free of cruel and degrading punishment or treatment, and acts of vigilantism threaten the right to human dignity (Martin, 2010:61; Buur, 2008:572). Crime prevention partnerships such as community policing programmes and community dispute resolution structures were established to assist the courts and police in curbing vigilantism in communities and protect the human rights of all citizens (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002). Moreover, in an attempt to combat vigilantism, the state employed initiatives such as the Integrated Justice System, aimed at improving the functions of the criminal justice system as a whole, such as keeping track of and securing evidence, tracing witnesses, and securely managing case dockets (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002).

1.3.4. Vigilantism and the State

According to the academic writings of Schuberth (2013:40), Schuberth (2018:393), Schuberth (2015:296), Kirsch (2010:144), Nel (2017), and Abrahams (1998:4-5), vigilantism can be classified as an element within a broader spectrum of informal security, and is often associated with terms such as 'mob justice', 'community policing', 'non-state policing', and 'popular justice'. Schuberth (2015:296) argues that these variations used to refer to vigilantism can be grouped under the umbrella term 'hybrid violence'. According to Moncada (2017:407), Lambrechts (2017:6) and Schuberth (2015:297-298), non-state actors are defined as individuals or groups with a degree of political influence, but are not directly associated with a political group or the state; and as such vigilante groups classify as a non-state actor. Schuberth (2015:298) further clarifies this point by classifying vigilante groups as a type of community-based armed group (CBAG), which in turn is a subtype of non-state armed groups (NSAG) within the category of non-state actors. As a non-state actor, vigilante groups and their activities can be analysed using the theory on state-society relations. According to Lambrechts (2017:6), state-society relations theory emphasises the relationship between the state, state agencies and non-state actors that exist within society and interact with one another; furthermore, these actors may work as rival forces or cooperative partnerships, all of which have an effect on the state as the legitimate authoritative figure within society.

Additionally, a leading theory on state-society relations was developed by J.S. Migdal (1988) which centres around the changing nature of the state in society, as either a strong or weak state, based on state capabilities and the ability to exercise social control within society. From this perspective, Schuberth (2013:40-41) argues that vigilante groups are manifestations of weak states, as vigilantism is most often regarded as the alternative response to crime and misconduct by non-state actors when the state is unable to deal with issues within society effectively. However, Schuberth (2013:42-43) does not ascribe all the power to the idea of weak states as the sole factor that explains the emergence of vigilantism; instead, the author argues that in strong, modern states, vigilantism may still occur. Therefore, other factors should be considered as well, namely the history, social nature and economic status of the country. Furthermore, Smith (2019) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) discuss the relationship between vigilantism and state agencies. State agencies and bureaucrats, tasked with the efficient use of state resources, play an integral part in ensuring the safety and security of communities; thus, the failure of these agencies and officials to maintain law and order creates

opportunities for the occurrence of vigilante activity. Additionally, state agencies and officials undermine the legitimacy of the state and their departments when they are guilty of distorting the law or allow vigilantes to act on their behalf to ensure justice and control crime (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002). Migdal (1988:24) also argues that while the state forms the central part of state-society relations, the theory cannot be used to examine the state alone; instead, an analysis of state-society relations must include non-state actors at different levels of society.

Therefore, given the above preliminary literature review, this thesis will provide an overview of the functional capacity of the state under apartheid and democracy, as either a strong or weak state, using the theories of Migdal (1988), Migdal (2004) and Rotberg (2003). In addition, the primary function of this study will be to focus on the presence of non-state actors operating in opposition to the state, that is, groups or persons engaging in vigilante activity during apartheid and democracy. Instances of vigilantism will be analysed using an analytical framework that will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. This study aims to analyse how South Africa's political transition from apartheid to democracy has affected the experience of vigilantism. Moreover, chapter two will provide an in-depth literature review that will expand on the preliminary literature review presented above. It will present key theories such as the theory on state-society relations, and theories on the state; competing definitions of vigilantism; and arguments surrounding the causes and implications of vigilantism, if at all.

1.4. Research Question

The main research question this thesis aims to answer is:

- How has vigilantism developed under the governance of the apartheid and democratic regimes in South Africa?

To answer the research question, this study will look at how the apartheid and democratic regimes have governed to analyse the state according to indicators of state strength. Following this analysis, this study will be able to identify capacity gaps seized by vigilante groups to establish the similarities and difference of vigilante groups and their activities under each regime. These similarities and differences can be compared to determine how vigilantism has changed from apartheid to democracy.

1.5. Research Aims and Objectives

Considering the research question and plan stated above, the objective of this study is to provide a historical analysis of vigilantism in South Africa, from apartheid to democracy; additionally, it aims to identify factors that facilitate the continued existence of vigilantism in South Africa as the country found itself in the process of transitioning from one regime to another while still experiencing elements of a weak and strong state. With the use of various theoretical frameworks such as those developed by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974), Migdal (1988), and Rotberg (2003), this study will be able to analyse vigilantism during both apartheid and democracy, by identifying indicators of state strength according to the strong/weak state model that is present under each regime. Furthermore, this study will analyse the state's capacity to provide political goods to its citizenry, or the lack thereof, which provides the opportunity for non-state actors, specifically vigilante groups, to emerge via capacity gaps. This study will examine instances of vigilantism that emerge in these capacity gaps in order to label these incidences of vigilantism according to their nature and aims, using the classification system developed by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974). Moreover, this study will identify the differences and similarities between apartheid vigilantism and democratic vigilantism to determine how vigilantism has developed over time.

By achieving these objectives, this study will identify the factor(s) that allow vigilantism to progress; furthermore, the identification of these factors can be used by various stakeholders to develop strategies to combat the evolution of vigilantism. Moreover, by identifying the elements of a strong/weak state associated with vigilantism, this thesis will be able to identify the shortcomings of the state that facilitate vigilantism, and identify areas where state capacity needs to increase in order to contain and/or reduce vigilante activity. This study will not only contribute to the field of vigilantism but will also provide insight into state-society relations within the context of South Africa. The objectives of this thesis are to investigate the experiences of marginalised groups in South Africa relating to their dissatisfaction with the state, criminal elements in their communities, and the criminal justice system; to determine why citizens engage in illegal activity (vigilantism), and to identify trends and patterns in vigilante activity. In addition, this thesis aims to contribute to the academic literature involving state-society relations with a particular focus of vigilantism and strong/weak state theory.

1.6. Research Design and Methodology

According to Bryman (2012:44) and Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry (2008:38), the purpose of a research design is to act as the framework that will assist the researcher in generating and analysing data in order to find answers to the research question; therefore, the research design acts as the plan or strategy that the researcher must follow. Moreover, while functioning as an operational plan, the research design also functions as a way of ensuring that methods used to source information and analyse data will provide findings that are both valid and objective, and can act as accurate solutions to the research problem (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:42). This thesis focuses on vigilantism within South Africa; thus, the research design that will apply to this study is a single case study. Vigilantism in South Africa serves as the case for this study as it forms a part of non-state actors within the state-society relations. The use of a single case study design is most useful to this study as it allows for the analysis of various instances of the same phenomenon, in this case, instances of vigilantism in South Africa. In addition, the research method that this study will adopt is a qualitative approach. The case study design is often used within qualitative research, as researchers seek to narrow an issue down through focusing on a specific group, organisation or institution (Babbie & Mouton, 2008:279). Its ability to provide an in-depth look ensures that the case study method is seen as a useful research tool (Babbie & Mouton, 2008:279). The variables used in this study can be identified as incidents of vigilantism acting as the dependent variable, while governance acts as the independent variable, as governance during each regime is expected to have an effect on incidents of vigilantism. Moreover, the political, social and economic climates during apartheid and democracy act as the intervening variables. Burnham, et al (2008:74) explain intervening variables as those factors that may or may not have some bearing on the constant.

Furthermore, using South Africa as the context in which the case of vigilantism takes place will prove useful because of its extensive history with violence, protest action, and non-state actors challenging the state and state agencies. The South African context provides ample examples of vigilantism during the apartheid and democratic era that will be examined in this thesis, such as vigilante acts perpetrated by ‘The Young Lions’, *Witdoeke*, and the Manenberg Residents’ Movement during apartheid, and organisations like PAGAD, *Mapogo A Mathamaga* and *Amadlozi* during the democratic era. These vigilante groups have been carefully selected as examples of incidents of vigilantism for this thesis as they present with most similar features and these features are representative of the ideal type of what vigilantism

may look like as explained by Harris (2001). Harris (2001) suggests that vigilantism is characterised by key qualities, namely, being public in nature, using or threatening the use of violence, serving as a form of punishment, and having some level of organisation and planning. These groups all present as being formal groups, with some degree of organisation and various types of membership structures. The groups selected have stated objectives in their execution of vigilante activity, most commonly aimed at creating law and order and punishing alleged criminals. In addition, the vigilante activity executed by these groups have been public in nature and involved varying degrees of violence. According to these characteristics, i.e. the structure and organisation of the group, the nature and method of activities, and the explicit motives of these groups, this study will be able to provide a comparative discussion in the concluding chapter to better illustrate the development of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy, based on the difference and similarities according to these key characteristics.

In addition, the main source of data that will be used in this study is secondary data and a desktop research process will be applied, as this will be best suited to this research study, as it possesses an element of historical analysis and owing to the covert nature of vigilantism.

1.7. Limitations of the Study

The first limitation that must be considered is the number of incidences of vigilantism that can be addressed by this thesis limits the study, as it would be impossible to thoroughly investigate all incidences of vigilantism within the last forty years. Furthermore, with a time frame of three years to complete this study, the number of cases that can be covered become limited as well; therefore, this study will make use of specific examples of vigilantism within the apartheid and democratic periods South Africa.

Moreover, the use of past incidences of vigilantism during apartheid and democracy can limit the type of sources of information used in this study as individuals involved may no longer be alive to obtain primary data. Therefore the use of secondary data will be applied in this study, as reliable and verified data could be sourced from journals, mainstream media articles, and archival materials. In addition, the nature of violence in South Africa places limitations on the type and quality of information that can be obtained, as it is challenging to research violence and crime due to the illegal nature of such activities. Finally, the acts itself have limited the

information that could be gathered as no person or group may have taken responsibility for the acts of violence.

1.8. Research Ethics

While this study will solely rely on the use of secondary data, the highest degree of Social Science ethics will be observed at all times for the duration of this research project, as the researcher aims to ensure that the research is conducted according to the rigorous standard of academic research. This study will, at all times, observe the ethical requirements as set out by the University of Stellenbosch Research Ethics Committee, as well as complying with all ethical requirements specific to the Department of Political Science.

1.9. Chapter Outline

This thesis will be constructed as follows:

Chapter two will comprise of an in-depth literature review that will expand on the preliminary literature review set out in chapter one. It will present key theories such as the theory on state-society relations, theories on the state, strong states versus weak states; competing definitions of vigilantism, both global and domestic; and arguments surrounding the causes and implications of vigilantism.

Following the literature review in chapter two, chapter three will provide an overview of the South African state under apartheid in order to identify the indicators associated with the strong/weak state model. This overview will facilitate a discussion regarding the conditions of state-society relations during that time. Furthermore, this discussion will allow for the identification of capacity gaps under the apartheid regime that may have led to the emergence of vigilantism. This chapter will also discuss cases of vigilantism during apartheid, paying specific attention to vigilante groups used on both sides of the liberation struggle, with these groups including, *Witdoeke*, 'The Young Lions', and the Manenberg Residents' Movement. This discussion will allow for the application of the analytical framework towards the classification of vigilantism to determine the key characteristics of vigilantism and the types of vigilantism that occurred during apartheid.

Subsequently, similarly to chapter three, chapter four will provide an overview of the South African state under democracy in order to identify the indicators associated with the strong/weak state model. This will facilitate a discussion regarding the conditions of state-society relations during the democratic regime. This discussion will allow for the identification of capacity gaps under democracy that may have led to the emergence of vigilantism. Moreover, chapter four will discuss the various cases of vigilantism following the country's transition to democracy. This chapter will pay close attention to vigilante groups such as PAGAD, *Mapogo A Mathamaga* and *Amadlozi*. To better understand the phenomenon of vigilantism during democracy, this chapter will end with applying the analytical framework for the classification of vigilantism to determine the key characteristics associated with vigilantism during democracy and the identify the types of vigilantism that occurred.

Chapter five will provide an analysis of the data presented in chapters three and four. It will highlight the key differences and similarities in the experiences of vigilantism under apartheid and democracy. Furthermore, this chapter will seek to identify any other explanations for the existence of vigilante groups in South Africa, outside of it originating as a result of capacity gaps by the state. Finally, this chapter will provide concluding remarks regarding governance under the apartheid and democratic regimes and how it has affected the development of vigilantism in South Africa, as well as identify the contributions of this study and the areas for future research on the topic of vigilantism.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The foundation of the theory on state-society relations focuses on the relationships between the state, state agencies and non-state actors that exist within society. At its core, state-society relations theory aims to analyse and understand the interactions between these entities (Lambrechts, 2017:5-6). These actors interact with one another, and as a result, they develop various relationships, which can either be cooperative partnerships or rival forces in society, to establish, change or maintain the order of society (Lambrechts, 2017:5-6). As such, these actors engage in continuous struggles for power; therefore, competing views exist in the literature as to who holds the authoritative power in society, the state or non-state actors.

Historically, the state was considered to be the most powerful actor in society; however, as the conceptualisation of the state has changed over time, so too has its positions of power in society (Strange, 1996:4). Various conceptualisations of the modern state are discussed throughout the existing literature, that attempts to provide a basic understanding of the state, such as the conceptual interpretation of the state in the works of Max Weber (1978), which will be discussed in more detail below. Moreover, according to the existing literature on states, there are various theories on the state which focus on the role of the state, the nature of state power and legitimacy of the state¹.

According to Bryman (2012:8), a literature review is the section of the thesis in which the writer presents an integrated appraisal of all literature relevant to the research question. Therefore, this chapter will provide a discussion surrounding the core themes connected to the research question, as stated in chapter one. These themes include: the conceptualisation of the state, the strong/weak state theory, state capacity and state capabilities, governance under the apartheid and democratic regimes, the conceptualisation of vigilantism, international and African perspectives and examples of vigilantism, a brief overview of the development of vigilantism in South Africa, the causes of vigilantism, and the impact that vigilantism has on the community, the state, and state agencies. Furthermore, this chapter will allow for the construction of a theoretical framework which will act as a guide to answering the research

¹ Theories of state will be briefly discussed in this chapter; however, an extensive discussion is beyond the scope of this study.

question. Firstly, governance under each regime will be discussed in order to identify indicators of state strength. The analysis of state strength using these indicators in subsequent chapters will provide an opportunity for identifying capacity gaps and how they may have led to the emergence of vigilante groups. In addition, the construction of an analytical framework will provide for the analysis of instances of vigilantism within South Africa in subsequent chapters in order to answer the research question.

2.2. Conceptualising the State

Existing academic literature on the state demonstrates several conceptualisations of the state that aims to provide a basic understanding of what the concept ‘state’ refers to. The most prominent understanding of the modern state has been developed by Max Weber (1978:54-56), who defines it as “...A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a ‘state’ in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order. . . . Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. . . . The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and continuous operation....”. According to Lambrechts (2017:9), this conceptualisation by Weber (1978) highlights key elements associated with the basic understanding of the state, and these include, authority, legitimacy, territorial basis, citizenship, administrative order, and a monopoly on the use of force.

Moreover, Weber’s conceptualisation can be considered as a foundation for many academic interpretations of the state as put forth by academic authors such as Migdal (1988), Williams (2002), Rotberg (2003), and Duvenhage (1998), as these authors’ understandings of the state include the key elements as discussed by Weber (1978). Migdal (1988:21-22) perceives the state as a core component within society. In addition to its centrality within society, the state engages in a co-dependent relationship with a society where one cannot exist without the other and in turn these two entities shape one another. It furthermore is considered that the state has specific capabilities, such as the ability to organise society, and the ability to create and implement the rules of society (Migdal, 1988:22). Moreover, in his later work, Migdal (2004:15-16) reconceptualises his understanding of the state, while still locating the state within society and recognising that the two cannot be separated, his revised work further

suggests that the state is the domain of power within society, with a monopoly on the use of force, and establishes the organisation and rules of society within a given territory; thereby including some of the elements of the Weberian conceptualisation as highlighted by Lambrechts (2017:9).

Similar to Weber (1978:54-56), Williams (2002:164) considers the key elements of territorial basis, authority, administrative order and citizenship in his conceptualisation of the state. Williams (2002:164) suggests that the state is a sovereign entity within a specific territory which it controls, the state is the ruling authority which governs its citizens, it is made up of different institutions and the state has various functions, which include the responsibility of creating order in society, providing security to its citizens and ensuring economic and social welfare. Alternatively, Rotberg (2003:2) argues that the state is an entity whose primary function is to provide its people with certain political goods, which are organised according to a hierarchy, with the provision of security within its territory as the primary political good. Nina (2000:22) provides a similar argument to that of Rotberg (2003) by placing the state at the centre of organising society and being a determinant factor organising relationships throughout society. Furthermore, Nina (2000:22) amplifies the notions by Rotberg (2003) arguing that in modern societies the state is tasked with the ensuring of an acceptable standard of living for citizens through the provision of good and services, such as healthcare, human security, education and so forth. Additionally, Duvenhage (1998:30) agrees with the writings of Weber (1978) and Migdal (1988), that the state is the core authority within society and possess the ability to mobilise society. This defining feature of social control enables the state to affect society, by influencing certain relationships and making use of human and natural resources to the benefit of the state.

Before embarking on a more detailed analysis of vigilantism, it is important to offer a brief discussion on the relationship between the state, vigilantism and legitimacy. The term 'legitimacy' is frequently mentioned when discussing the topic of vigilantism as it relates to legitimacy of the state when vigilante groups are present, legitimacy of the vigilante group and their activities and questions surrounding the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

As set out in the opening paragraph of this section, Weber's conceptualisation of the state provides a helpful starting point for the analyses of the state, its position in society and how it relates to legitimacy. Weber (1984:33) provides a more distinct definition of the state defining

it as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory”. This implies that a state is constituted when it succeeds in achieving a monopoly over violence within a specified territorial scope and thus the legitimacy of the state is tied to its ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force. However, in critique of Weber, Nel (2016) argues that this understanding does not imply that the state is the only actor using violence but rather that it is the only actor that can legitimately authorize its use; thus the state can grant another actor the right to use force without losing its monopoly, as long as it remains the only source with the right to use force and that it maintains the capacity to enforce this monopoly. Lipset (1984:88) takes on a different approach in understanding the state and legitimacy and argues that it “...involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society”. This definition implies that legitimacy must be earned, it is not a constant but can be given and taken away.

Similar to Lipset (1984), Beetham (2013:3) defines legitimacy in relation to the state as the rightfulness to power based on whether an obligation to obey is justifiable on normative grounds. This definition highlights that legitimacy is given based on an internal moral obligation as opposed to being given as a result of fear or obligation. Additionally, Nel (2016) argues that state legitimacy and vigilantism are closely linked where the state’s inability to offer order and security, and/or the state’s inability to be responsive to the needs of its citizens causes a lack of or decrease in state legitimacy as perceived by the citizens. Moreover, this perception of decreasing state legitimacy increases the likelihood of citizens taking the law into their own hands and committing acts of vigilantism. Thus vigilantism becomes the public’s response to the states inability to effectively perform its functions.

Moreover, as this study places emphasis on the conceptualisation of the modern state as set out by Weber it is noteworthy to acknowledge other conceptualisation and critiques such as Nel (2016) and Netelenbos (2016:3-4) critique of Weber’s understanding of the state and how it relates to society and how it maintains legitimacy; these authors argue that Weber’s work on the state and the emphasis placed on force as a key criterion for what constitutes a state leaves many questions open, relating to issues such as what this means for the importance of other key state functions, individual perspectives of what determines legitimacy, and the issue of private violence and how it affects the state’s monopoly on power.

Briefly exploring the various conceptualisations of the state is essential in understanding what constitutes the state, how it operates, and what its functions are. In addition, this section establishes how conceptualisations of the state can differ, and how it maintains its positions of power within society.

2.3. Conceptualising Vigilantism

In recent decades, popular culture and media reports have portrayed vigilantism using gruesome images of alleged criminals and those believed to have useful information regarding crimes and perpetrators, being brutalised by angry mobs through beatings, necklacing, stabbing and stoning (Buur, 2010:26; Nel, 2017). According to Nel (2017), the message being conveyed through these acts of vigilantism is most often one of the citizens actively expressing their dissatisfaction with the state and its legal system and thus choosing to bypass the legal systems and processes and take the law into their own hands by exercising their own brand of justice. Instances of vigilantism have been reported globally; however, reports have differed in size, activity, cause, intent and consequence (Johnston, 1996:220; Abrahams, 1998:1; Botha, 2015:16; Schuberth, 2013:40). Despite the ability to occur universally, authors have not been able to develop a universal definition for vigilantism, as the various contexts in which vigilantism has occurred has resulted in an array of definitions by various authors. Authors such as Schuberth (2013:40), Schuberth (2018:393), Nel (2017) and Martin (2010:58-59) argue that vigilantism can be classified as an element within a broader spectrum of informal security, and is often associated with terms such as 'mob justice', 'community policing', 'non-state policing', and 'collective/popular justice'.

One of the first definitions of vigilantism as put forth by Brown (1975:130), explains vigilantism as "...organised extra-legal movements, the members of which take the law into their own hands..." and "... associations in which citizens have joined together for self-protection under conditions of disorder". Alternatively, Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:541) conducted a study in which they classified vigilantism as a variety of organisations that made use of violence, such as paramilitary groups and death squads. Furthermore, Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974:548) classified vigilantism according to three broad categories, namely, crime control vigilantism, social group control vigilantism, and regime control vigilantism. These categories were formed based on the specific objectives of the vigilante groups; however, group size, strategy, and activity were also used as determining factors.

Table 1: Vigilantism Classification System	
<i>Classification</i>	<i>Description</i>
Crime control vigilantism	Aimed at persons alleged to have broken the laws of the legal system
Social group control vigilantism	Aimed at advocating for change of values within a particular system
Regime control vigilantism	Aimed at the preserving of the status quo when the political system is challenged

Compiled for the purpose of this study from the works of Rosenbaum & Sederberg (1974).

However, Johnston (1996:220-221) presents one of the most frequently cited definitions of vigilantism, in which he contends that vigilantism can be defined as an activity performed by a group within a community, with the aim to improve the safety of their community and its citizens from criminals and their activities. Vigilante groups perceive the legal system to be lacking in some way, whether it be policing or sentencing and consequently, reprimand alleged criminals by taking the law into their own hands when dealing with these perpetrators. This definition, as presented by Johnston (1996:222-232), is based on six elements which must be present to constitute an instance of vigilantism, as shown in the table below.

Table 2: Key Elements of Vigilantism
1. Planning, premeditation, and organisation of those engaging in vigilantism
2. Voluntary participation of private citizens
3. Autonomous citizenship, i.e. voluntary engagement in vigilante activities by private citizens, free from state or organisation sponsorship
4. The use or threatened use of force
5. A reaction to crime or social deviance, or the potential thereof, within the community
6. Intent to control crime or social deviance by offering personal and collective security

Compiled for the purpose of this study from the works of Johnston (1996).

This definition, as put forth by Johnston (1996:221), is often used to describe a particular type of vigilante activity, namely, crime control vigilantism. In contrast to the writings of Johnston (1996), Martin (2010:56-57) challenges the element of an autonomous citizen as a characteristic of vigilantism as his research reports instances of vigilantism that involved actors such as gangsters, death squads, militias, and some state agencies. Alternatively, Petrus (2015:27-28) argues that instances of vigilantism cannot be understood solely referring to crime and the dissatisfaction with law and order, but are best understood as a reflection of the violent nature of a community and as symbols of the structural violence within a community. This definition, developed within the South Africa context, is more focused on vigilantism as a result of the failures of government to protect and serve its citizens from this perspective state authorities and agencies that are perceived as corrupt and self-serving. Thus citizens react to

this lack of leadership and accountability with the use or threatened of use violence (Petrus, 2015:31).

In addition, Harris (2001) presents a definition of vigilantism most relevant to the South African context and suggests that over the last two decades incidents of vigilante activity in South Africa have remained relatively stable and can thus be characterised as sharing the following comprehensive qualities:

- They are public;
- They make use of or threaten the use of violence;
- They serve as both a warning and a form of punishment;
- They generate fear and control through repression; and
- They are retributive.

This conceptualisation of vigilantism, as presented by Harris (2001), is most useful, as it was developed according to an ideal type in order to understand what vigilantism might look like, thereby acting as an analytical tool by which to measure approximations of what classifies certain activities as instances of vigilantism. This study will make use of the definition of vigilantism as put forth by Harris (2001), which defines vigilantism as “...the public use or threatened use of violence, intended to serve as a warning or a punishment to generate fear and control through repression, and is based on a model of retributive justice that is unsanctioned by the state”.

This section has provided a conceptualisation of vigilantism by focusing the discussion on the factors used to identify instances of vigilantism. Additionally, this section briefly discussed the different types of vigilantism. Notably, authors have argued that there is no universal definition for vigilantism, as instances differ in cause, nature and consequence across various cases. Therefore, the following sections will discuss vigilantism in the international and domestic spheres, thereby demonstrating the similarities and differences of vigilantism across different environments.

2.4. Vigilantism in the international sphere

Vigilantism as a subject matter for research has only recently become popular, both internationally and domestically (Nel, 2017; Schubeth, 2013:40). Like many social phenomena, vigilantism has been identified as a global phenomenon with many trends and characteristics and can be found in various parts of the world, stretching from the United States, to Mexico, to Nigeria, and South Africa (Abrahams, 1998:1; Moncada, 2017:403; Tankebe, 2009:245-246; Buur, 2010:26). At the international level, incidents of vigilantism have been recorded in several of countries, varying in similarities and differences regarding causes, objectives, consequences and group formations (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974:542-545). According to Moncada (2017:403) and Tankebe (2009:245-246), examples of vigilantism in the international sphere include: self-defence forces in Mexico operating in areas with a high prevalence of drug cartel activity in order to ensure the safety of communities and maintain a monopoly on the use of force and security; death squads operating in El Salvador, originating from the civil war during the 1980s to ensure community safety from gang activity in the area and the United States, stretching from the 19th century to the 20th century, as various groups attempted to uphold a system of racial segregation, attacking African American citizens.

During the late 1980s, toward the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a shift in media attention as it increasingly focused on a surge in vigilante activity and associated incidents of political and social violence such as mobs, xenophobia, militias, rebel activities, gang activities and organised crime (Botha, 2015:16). In contrast to the African perspective, international attitudes toward vigilantism consider vigilante groups to be in direct opposition to the state, acting as non-state creators of law and order through the chaos (Pratten, 2008:8). Alternatively, Tripp, Bies, & Aquino (2007:11-12) argue that a majority of instances of vigilante violence in most western societies typically occurred when communities felt that justice was not served and thus resorted to vigilantism. Moreover, Tripp et al. (2007:11-12) and Pratten (2008:8) suggest that Western incidents of vigilantism often occur in response to an offence by or lack of action by the state or state agencies.

2.5. Vigilantism on the African Continent

Domestically, within the African context, a majority of conflict situations are concerned with issues of legal principles, justice, morality, sovereignty, self-determination, and the legitimate

use of power (Kirsch, 2010:139; Pratten, 2008:1). Like Harris (2001), the works by Kirsch (2010), Schuberth (2013), Buur (2010) and Buur (2008) have conducted research on vigilantism within the African context, and consequently, these authors are in agreement with Harris (2001) that vigilantism must be examined from the ideal type approach, that is by looking at occurrences that most resemble the idea of vigilantism. Harris (2001) defines the ideal type approach as a perspective that examines a social phenomenon according to the sum of characteristics and elements given to describe that phenomenon across various cases; therefore, for the social phenomenon to be identified it only requires the presence of some essential characteristics and does not require the presence of all the characteristics and elements used to describe it. This perspective is useful to the study of vigilantism as it is a social phenomenon that is ever-changing. Accordingly, based on the context in which it occurs, instances of vigilantism may be present with different characteristics across various cases. Moreover, Schuberth (2018:393) and Kirsch (2010:141-142) argue that vigilantism in Africa can most commonly be divided according to two categories, namely with crime control and/or social control.

Throughout the history of Africa, rural African communities typically had variations of autonomous non-state, self-regulation organisations operating to ensure the safety and security of the community by holding informal courts headed by the chief or traditional leaders of the community to deal with any disputes and impose punishments on wrongdoers (Buur, 2010:35; Pratten 2008:8-9). As many African countries experienced colonialism and later democratisation, these organisations were deemed informal and were left to develop in parallel to the Western values and legal systems imposed on the African people. In order to gain some form of social control on the African people, these organisations were often manipulated or influenced by colonial authorities or the state (Buur, 2010:35-36; Buur, 2006:737-738; Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002). From this perspective, vigilante groups found their origins in non-state organisations functioning as an informal security mechanism to protect rural and migrant communities to provide and maintain social control (Buur, 2010:36; Buur, 2006:736-737; Nina, 2000:19; Sekhonyane & Louw; 2002).

Pratten (2008:11) suggests that while African perspectives on vigilantism differ significantly from international, more Western perspectives, they also differ significantly from one another within the African context. Western perspectives on vigilantism place great emphasis on the dichotomous view of vigilantism as state versus society, legitimate versus illegitimate, law and

order versus the chaotic mob (Pratten, 2008:12, Tripp, *et al.*, 2007:12-13). Similarly, Buur & Jensen (2004:140) argue that the African perspective establishes vigilantism in cultural roots, whereas Western perspectives of vigilantism often stress the characteristics of reactionary mob violence against the state. In contrast, the African perspective opposes the tendency of reducing instances of vigilantism to formal versus informal law and order. Within the African context, experiences of vigilantism have differed across nations, cultures, and ethnicities; therefore, these perspectives place more emphasis on the cultural and social aspects of vigilantism and do not typically view it as standing in direct opposition to the state (Pratten, 2008:11-12; Buur & Jensen, 2004:140; Heald, 2006:266). This calls into question the idea that vigilante groups act as alternatives to the state, or threaten the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, particularly when these groups have been established for cultural or social practices. As will be discussed below, groups such as *sungusungu* in Tanzania have both a cultural and social background as they were established for the purpose of herding and protecting cattle, thus their existence and activities had little impact on the state and did not contest the authority of the state or its monopoly on the use of force.

According to Buur (2010:35-37;2006:737-738), Seekings (2001:85-86), and Sekhonyane & Louw (2002), examples of vigilantism in the African context can be found in South Africa, where informal self-regulation organisations, originating in rural African communities during the colonial era referred to as *makgotla*, were found in migrant communities during the era of apartheid; the *makgotla* were used to address security and law and order in urban black communities frequently collaborating with the state. As South Africa transitioned to the apartheid regime and later democracy, these *makgotla* transformed into various vigilante groups. Some groups became pawns for the apartheid regime as they were used to deter the opposition and safeguard the regime in black communities, while other groups operated on behalf of the opposition and protected black communities from the apartheid regime (Buur, 2010:35-36; Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002; Seekings, 2001:85-86). Another example is in East Africa, where groups known as *sungusungu* originated through cultural and social practices in Tanzania. They were established initially to herd cattle and subsequently to combat cattle theft and witchcraft in villages. With the onset of colonialism, some of these groups transformed into state-sponsored vigilante groups that were employed to ensure the regime and social control in communities, while others chose to distance themselves from the state in order to combat the illegitimate use of power and state corruption (Pratten, 2008:11-12; Heald, 2006:265-266).

The following sections will delve deeper into the South African experience of vigilantism. It will do so by briefly exploring its development, identifying the most common causes of vigilantism in South Africa, and discussing some of the various consequences of vigilantism.

2.6. A Brief Overview of the Development of Vigilantism in South Africa

As mentioned previously, the informal self-regulation groups were found in migrant communities in urban parts of South Africa during the early 1880s up until the late 1980s. These groups originated in rural African communities. According to Buur (2010:35-38; 2006:737), Botha, (2015:18-20), Super (2017), and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002), these non-state self-regulation groups known as the *makgotla* traditionally acted as courts, to resolve disputes and/or punish and sentence wrongdoers in the village community. The practices of the *makgotla* travelled with the villagers as they relocated to urban areas in South Africa. As the country transitioned through its different political regimes, from colonialism to apartheid, the black communities did not enjoy the same level of safety and security provided by the state, and as such, these black communities made use of rural traditions and organised their own initiatives to stop crime, ensure discipline, deliver punishments and maintain social control within the communities (Buur, 2006:738-739; Buur, 2010:37-38; Kynoch, 2016:66). According to Kynoch (2016:66), during the early years of apartheid, the white minority government had little concern for the measures used by these informal non-state organisations or their progress in meeting their objectives, as long as they kept the black communities under control and did not threaten the existence of the state.

However, Buur (2010:38-40) and Botha (2015:18-20) call attention to the use of these informal non-state security organisations by the state. These organisations developed into a more formal non-state organisation as they became representative bodies for black communities prescribed by the state. Buur (2010:35) discusses the importance of this evolution of these self-regulation groups, as some of these groups later became advisory boards to the apartheid regime under the Urban Areas Act of 1923. Moreover, the evolution of the self-regulatory groups in the black communities saw them develop into groups that typically represented vigilante formations known as *iliso lomzi*². The *iliso lomzi* took a more rigid stance on social issues than the advisory boards and actively participated in addressing these issues (Buur, 2006:737-738; Botha,

² '*Iliso Lomzi*' is a Xhosa phrase which means 'watchmen'. This phrase was used to describe the neighbourhood watch groups in black communities.

2015:19-20; Kynoch, 2016:66). Buur (2010:36-38) argues that during the late 1970s just as tensions under apartheid started increasing, the advisory boards and representatives fell under growing suspicion of being collaborators with the apartheid state, and as such became targets of vigilante organisations.

During the 1980s, at the height of apartheid when violence and civil disobedience were most prominent, the emergence of vigilante groups surged (Buur, 2010; Martin, 2010; Botha, 2015; and Seekings, 2001). These groups, crossing racial and ethnic divides, could be found on both sides of the political system. Some vigilante groups were used by the state to further the cause of the apartheid regime and maintain the status quo, while other vigilante groups aligned themselves with liberation movements and operated in collaboration with organisations such as the ANC and United Democratic Front (UDF) (Buur, 2010:37-39; Martin, 2010:60; Botha, 2015:20-21; Kynoch, 2016:738-739). Furthermore, Buur (2010:37-39), Harris (2001), Martin (2010:60), and Botha (2015:20-2) identified various vigilante groups during that time, some of which include the UDF aligned ‘Young Lions’ and the apartheid state-aligned vigilante groups collectively known as the ‘conservative vigilantes’, which included the *Witdoeks*, *Inkatha* and *AmaAfrika*.

As South Africa entered its phase of political transition during the early 1990s, much of the vigilante activity at the time could be defined as being related to anti-apartheid, anti-state or anti-government activities, in an attempt to transform the political system into a democratic system. However, following the country’s transition to democracy in 1994, vigilante activity continued, as renowned vigilante groups such as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), *Amadlozi*³ and *Mapogo a Mathamaga*⁴ emerged operating under various agendas (Martin, 2010:62; Buur & Jensen, 2004:741-743; Botha, 2015:22-26; Petrus, 2015:28-29; Nina, 2000:20). As the notion of anti-state vigilantism faded with the dawn of democracy, vigilante groups started operating under the notion of vigilantism against crime to create law and order in communities, as the ANC faced governance difficulties in its attempt to consolidate its democracy following 1994 (Buur, 2006:740; Nina, 2000:19). Kynoch (2017:75-76) supports this idea and suggests that as the ANC led government faced struggles in governance post-1994, crime increased, state officials and agencies fell into the trap of

³ ‘*Amadlozi*’ is a Xhosa phrase which means to keep an eye on or to care for

⁴ ‘*Mapogo a Mathamaga*’ is the name a vigilante group operating in the Northern regions of South Africa, the name is derived from a Sotho proverb which translates to ‘If the criminal conducts itself as a leopard, the victim can change into a tiger’

corruption, communities experienced poor service delivery and as a result, the government lost its monopoly on authority, thereby giving non-state organisation such as vigilante groups a claim to authority and the right to use violence, to ensure the safety and security of their communities.

Communities in South Africa, specifically poor marginalised communities, possess a history of violence and non-state self-regulation, a trend which continues to the present day. Consequently, vigilante groups, some of which stem from the apartheid era and others which have emerged post-1994, have come to be the protectors of communities that suffer at the hands of criminals, gangs and state negligence, and are therefore considered authoritative figures that are maintaining law and order in these communities. The following section will focus on the causes of vigilantism as it pertains to the South Africa context.

2.7. Causes of Vigilantism

As the topic of vigilantism has only recently caught the attention of researchers, the literature within this field of study is somewhat limited. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, instances of vigilantism are reported to have occurred within various contexts and thus suggest a myriad of causes; however, this section will discuss variables associated with vigilantism specific to the South African context.

From a historical perspective, since the emergence of colonialism, through the apartheid era and following South Africa's transition to democracy, marginalised groups and communities have suffered at the hands of those in power, and as a result have had to rely on their own knowledge and resources to provide for and sustain their communities (Super, 2014:8; Botha, 2015:21; Martin, 2012:218). Therefore, authors such as Botha (2015:23-24), Super (2014:9) and Martin (2012:218) argue that a relationship can be found between marginalisation of communities and instances of vigilantism. These communities are often disregarded and suffer poor service delivery, growing instances of crime and exclusion from the country's economy; thus they lack the basic needs to ensure safe and productive day to day living (Botha, 2015:23-24; Martin, 2012:218). Consequently, these communities have a history of organisations operating within them aimed at managing these communities and enforcing social control (Botha, 2015:23; Super, 2014:10; and Martin, 2012). Moreover, Super (2014:10) suggests that

the use of vigilantism in marginalised communities becomes more attractive as it assures community members that their livelihood is being protected.

Moreover, authors in the field of vigilantism have established a correlation between the belief that the country suffers from a flawed criminal justice system and instances of vigilantism (Super, 2014:9; Botha, 2015:23-24; Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002; Nina, 2000:19-20). According to Nina (2000:20-21), the ability of the state to act as the sole provider of safety and security has become significantly limited in the past two decades as new actors in society emerged in the form of vigilante groups stating a claim on the state's monopoly on the use of force. However, Abrahams (1998:4) and Nel (2016) argue that while vigilantism has the potential for subversion, that does not necessarily mean it will undermine the state's monopoly in the use of force as vigilante groups rather seek to supplement the criminal justice system in circumstances where they are believed to have failed the public.

Furthermore, the criminal justice system is comprised of many parts, and thus it becomes more difficult for one entity to retain the power of all components. The state, in association with various state agencies, co-ordinate to ensure the efficiency of the justice system, that is, both the control of crime and the punishment of a crime (Nina, 2000:20-21). Nina (2000:20-21) relates this to Migdal's (1988) concept of capacity gaps⁵ by arguing that vigilantism occurs in instances where the various component are not in alignment and thus opportunities for vigilante groups to either control crime or punish criminals in accordance to the wishes of the community. Botha (2015:23-24), Super (2014:9) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) agree with Nina (2000:20-21) that a dysfunctional criminal justice system, and uncoordinated components that cause inefficiency, fosters opportunities for vigilante groups to take the processes of the justice system into their own hands. Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) further postulate that an inefficient criminal justice system is most prominent in impoverished, marginalised communities and both criminals and vigilante groups become more brazen in their actions, as they believe the processes of the criminal justice system are far removed from their reality.

In addition, the lack of adequate policing in communities has been identified as one of the most common factors associated with vigilantism in South Africa (Sekhonyane & Louw 2002; Super, 2014:9; Martin, 2012:219; Botha, 2015:22). According to Super (2014:11), police have

⁵ The concept of capacity gaps by Migdal (1988) to be discussed in more detail in subsection 2.9. below.

created the expectation that they will be readily available to serve and protect the citizens of South Africa. Despite this, the expectation often fails to compare in reality as police do not possess sufficient resources and thus are unable to cope with the demands of an ever-growing population. Alternatively, Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) and Martin (2012:219) argue that the police are inaccessible to the public, particularly those communities plagued by poverty and inequality, and thus rely on the operations of vigilante groups to ensure the safety and security of the community; conversely, more affluent communities have the means to employ the use of private security to ensure their safety. In addition, Botha (2015:22) proposes that the absence of policing or the low visibility of the police in communities encourages the presence of vigilante groups that act as self-help mechanisms in informal security.

Petrus (2015:) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) suggests that poor governance may also serve as a causal factor that could lead to the emergence of vigilantism. Poor governance is characterised by corruption, unemployment, poverty, inequality and high crime rates; these characteristics engender feelings of insecurity and distrust in citizens toward the state. Moreover, communities employ vigilantism as a way of expressing their distrust and dissatisfaction with the state (Petrus, 2015; and Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002). Furthermore, Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) suggest that poor governance leads to violent reactions and counter-reactions by vigilante groups and other community organisations tasked with addressing social issues. Some actions may be aimed at the state, while others may be aimed at community organisations, thus sometimes causing a vicious cycle of violence within communities.

Botha (2015:23) additionally proposes that another causal factor leading to vigilantism is the occurrence of criminal opportunists that act as groups operating in the interest of combating and preventing crime. These groups usually seek out situations characterised by chaos and anarchy and exploit them to further their own criminal interests, while operating under the facade of extra-legal non-state security groups, in order to disguise their true identity and gain the trust of the communities in which they operate (Botha, 2015:23).

It is widely reported that instances of vigilantism differ according to the environments in which they occur; as such, it becomes impossible to discuss the numerous causes of instances of vigilantism. However, the causes discussed above are essential to this study as they have been identified throughout the literature as most common causes for instance of vigilantism specific

to the South African context. The following section will pay attention to the impact of vigilantism as it relates to the South African context.

2.8. The Impact of Vigilantism

In their research on vigilantism in South Africa, Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) list a number of consequences of vigilantism that can occur in the social, economic and political domains of South African society, all of which can have a significant effect on communities in which vigilantism occurs. These consequences include: an increase in overall crime statistics, diminishing public willingness to adhere to the rule of law, promoting a chaotic and lawless environment, decreasing the social capital and economic value of a community, and a violation of human rights (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002).

In accordance with Sekhonyane & Louw (2002), the research was done by Buur & Jensen (2004:147) and Botha (2015:29) assert that one of the greatest dangers of vigilantism is that it increases criminal activity as opposed to its intended purpose of eliminating crime. Botha (2015:29) further proposes that vigilante groups, more often than not, employ violence and aggression in order to carry out their objectives. Therefore, vigilantism possesses the ability to produce a cycle of violent revenge, which contributes to the growing crime statistics. Sekhonyane & Louw (2002) place great emphasis on the challenge vigilantism as a method of informal security presents to those who employ it. While citizens use vigilantism to ensure social control and maintain the safety and security of their community, they consequently put themselves and their communities at risk through the use of violence.

Additionally, a common argument identified in the different studies presented by Buur and Jensen (2004:147-148), Martin (2012:221), and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) is the anarchic nature of vigilantism and its relationship to a lawless environment. The presence of vigilantism in society becomes a breeding ground for lawlessness. This state of disorder stemming from a disregard for the rule of law further encourages citizens to engage in vigilante activity. Buur & Jensen (2004:147-148) and Sekhonyane & Louw (2002) argue that the inadequate policing of both crime and vigilantism has given citizens and criminals the confidence to subvert the law; thereby sending a passive message that informal mechanisms of security, which undermine the law, will be tolerated. Schubert (2013:50-51) similarly argues that where the intended purpose

of vigilantism is to ensure security, justice, and order, it ultimately contributes to the violence, injustice, and disorder it wishes to correct.

Similar to Sekhonyane and Louw (2002), Martin (2012:231) conducts a critical analysis of vigilantism in South Africa and consequently identifies the detrimental effect vigilantism has on the socio-economic status of communities. Martin (2012:231) argues that in cases of extreme mob violence, violence may escalate to such an extent that public and private infrastructure may be damaged. Subsequently, the loss or damage to infrastructure, particularly tangible assets, structures and facilities necessary for the operation of businesses or even society at large, carries with it the potential downfall of the economic value and social capital of the community. Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) argue that institutional vigilantism, that is vigilante activity aimed at the state, state agencies, or any other social, religious or professional organisation suspected of injustice or wrongdoing; possess the greatest threat to the socio-economic development of a community.

Moreover, Martin (2012:223-224) and Buur (2008:574) support Sekhonyane & Louw (2002) in their assertion that incidents of vigilantism threaten the human rights of citizens, which for South Africa has been the foundation upon which its democracy is built. Alleged perpetrators are deprived of the chance of a fair trial. The violent methods used in vigilante activity violates the right to be free of cruel and degrading punishment or treatment, and acts of vigilantism threaten the right to human dignity (Martin, 2012:231; Buur, 2008:581). Martin (2010:231) emphasises the issue that disregarding human rights of alleged offenders through the use of vigilante activity, affects the human rights of citizens participating in vigilantism, as it undermines the consolidation of human rights for all.

This section demonstrates the effects vigilantism has on society throughout South Africa. Vigilantism does not just affect the community in which it occurs; instead, the effects can be far-reaching across society. The consequences can reach across different spheres of society which include: the economic, social, and political spheres, all of which may have a collective effect the country as a whole.

2.9. State Capacity and Capabilities – opening the door to vigilantism

The presence of vigilantism in society has forced scholars to question the role of the state, as the central authority in society, having a monopoly on the use of force, and the role and performance of state agencies, in ensuring safety and security within society. According to Moncada (2017:6) and Schubert (2015:296), non-state actors are defined as individuals or groups with a degree of political influence, but not directly associated with a political group or the state, and as such vigilante groups classify as a non-state actor. Schubert (2015:297) further clarifies this point by classifying vigilante groups as a type of community-based armed group (CBAG), which in turn is a subtype of non-state armed groups (NSAG) within the category of non-state actors. Vigilantism most commonly involves securing the personal safety of community members by a person or persons within a community, by taking the law into their own hands and is commonly associated with the idea of a state that is incapable of ensuring the safety and security of its citizens (Schubert, 2013:50-51; Schubert, 2018:393; Schubert, 2015:302). Citizens' ability and willingness to resort to vigilantism places doubt on the state's capabilities as well as the legitimacy of the state.

A prominent theory on state-society relations developed by J.S. Migdal (1988) and Migdal (2004) looks at the changing nature of the state in society as either a strong or weak state based on state capabilities and the ability to exercise social control within society. According to Migdal's theory on strong and weak states (Migdal, 1988:24), the central question asked in order to determine whether a state is strong or weak is "*who makes the rules*". If the answer to this question indicates that the state makes the rules then it can be determined that a state is strong, however, if the answer indicates that the non-state actors, acting as alternatives to the state, make the rules, then it can be determined that the state is weak. Similarly to Migdal (1988), Du Toit (1995:24-25) argues that the state is in constant competition with various social groups in society and when a state is unable to secure power and perform its most basic functions, it results in the state losing some degree of control over society; furthermore, this can result in a gap or need in the community that could be satisfied by an alternative group within society.

Migdal (2004:50-51), Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007:127) and Lambrechts (2017:19-20) present similar arguments, suggesting that strong states possess capabilities, which means that they can influence and regulate society and purposefully use the human and natural resources

in society, which in turn enables the state to exercise social control over society. Alternatively, a weak state is lacking in capabilities and is unable to exercise social control over society and consequently puts its monopoly on the use of force at risk (Migdal, 2004:51; Swanepoel & Duvenhage, 2007:127; Lambrechts, 2017:21). Rotberg (2003) has also contributed to the discussion on strong/weak states. In his work, Rotberg argues that states exist along a strength continuum, ranging from strong states on one end to weak, to failing, to failed and ending with collapsed states on the other end of the continuum⁶. Using this continuum, Rotberg (2003:2) examines various characteristics of the state and the level of strength associated with those characteristics. Accordingly, he suggests that a state can identify with one classification while still exhibiting some characteristics from other classifications on the continuum; for example, a state can be identified as strong while simultaneously exhibiting one or more characteristics associated with a weak state. For Rotberg (2003:3), a strong state exists when a state is able to provide its citizenry with a hierarchy of political goods, with security being at the very top of the list; once the state can provide its citizens with security, it achieves a level of authority and legitimacy, and all other political goods can subsequently be provided. The inability to provide security runs the greatest risk as the failure to do so could lead to the inability to protect borders from international threats and the inability to subdue domestic threats.

Migdal (1988:4-5) makes use of the term ‘state capabilities’ and describes it as the ability of the state to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in a specified, regulated way. Therefore, according to his work, Migdal argues that strong states have high capabilities. Thus the state can perform the tasks as mentioned above or “provide a hierarchy of political goods” as Rotberg (2003:3) puts it. On the contrary, a state that is unable to perform these tasks efficiently or is unable to provide its citizens with specific political goods, can be classified as having low state capabilities and thus will be identified as a weak state. Rotberg’s analysis of state strength/state failure and the identification of weak and strong characteristics ties in with a state’s capability or capacity to provide for its people. He argues that a nation-state puts its legitimacy and authority at risk and falls into a downward trajectory when it no longer has the capacity to provide political goods to its citizenry (Rotberg, 2003:4).

⁶ While Rotberg (2003) discusses the state strength continuum to include a number of categories, i.e. strong, weak, failing, failed and collapsed, for the purpose of this study, and given the South African context that applies, only two categories will be used in this study, namely, strong and weak.

Migdal (2004:50-51) defines social control as the instance where citizens willingly forgo their own or any other social organisations preferences of social behaviour in favour of the preferences for social behaviour as prescribed by the state. Where the state is considered to be the primary authoritative figure, it can exercise social control. For the state to exercise the most prominent degree of social control, it needs to possess the most renowned degree of state capabilities. The state must be able to demonstrate its ability to provide survival strategies for and in the interest of its people, for the people to choose the state above any other opposition with the ability to provide survival strategies and thereby to compete for social control (Migdal, 1988:21-22; Lambrechts, 2017:20). Therefore, where the state is able to exercise the highest degree of state capacity, it is also able to exercise the highest degree of social control.

Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:127) suggest that where the state is unable to exercise social control, gaps emerge in a society which causes a shift from 'politics of structure' to 'politics of survival'. When 'politics of survival' occurs, that gap in society can be filled by other organisations, such as vigilante groups, who can provide order and structure in society. DiGiuseppe, Barry, and Frank (2012:329) provide an argument in line with Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007), suggesting that a link exists between lack of state capacity and internal conflict. They argue that a state with strong state capacity that has the ability to source and efficiently use resources to provide for its citizens has a higher probability of deterring any political, social, economic or any other challenges that may arise within its territories. Internal conflict will most likely be found when states lack state capacity. Gaps start to appear in society that is filled by non-state actors that stand in opposition to the state, for example, if the state cannot provide its citizens with sufficient security, a gap exists for a non-state actor, such a vigilante group, to emerge and fill that gap, thereby challenging the states monopoly on the use of force. Schubert (2013:42) agrees with the writings of Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007) in their argument that vigilante groups are manifestations of weak or failing states, as vigilantism is most often regarded as the alternative response to crime and misconduct by non-state organisations when the state is unable to effectively deal with these issues to the satisfaction of the citizens. However, Schubert (2013:42-43) differs from Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007) on the idea of weak or failing states as the sole factor that explains the emergence of vigilantism. Instead, Schubert (2013:43) argues that in strong, modern states, vigilantism may still occur; therefore, other factors should be considered as well, such as the history, social nature and economic status of the country. Similarly, Meagher (2012:1074-1075) argues that vigilantism can be a product of a weak or failing state. However, it can also have the potential

of becoming a building block for state-building and weak states have the ability to renegotiate a hybrid form of governance using these non-state actors.

Additionally, Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:130-131) and Schuberth (2013:49) argue that when the state and state agencies, for example, the judiciary and the police, do not perform according to the expectations of the people the vigilante groups then take the law into their own hands. The state then subsequently loses its monopoly on power and comes into conflict with vigilante groups and other organisations in society, thereby damaging the sovereignty of the state and placing the legitimacy of the state at risk. Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:131) further argue that the presence of vigilantism in society is not only an indication of society's refusal to accept the state's authority, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the state but also places the security of the state at risk as citizens act outside the law creating instability and disorder.

Furthermore, Kirsch (2010) discusses the relationship between vigilantism and state agencies, suggesting that state agencies and bureaucrats tasked with the use of state resources play an integral part in ensuring the safety and security of communities; thus the failure of these agencies and officials to maintain law and order create opportunities for the occurrence of vigilante activity. Similarly, Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:131) argue that the inefficient use of state resources necessary to provide order in society by state officials pave the way for the emergence of vigilantism. Conversely, the increasing occurrence of vigilantism in society places excessive strain on state agencies, officials and resources. Moreover, Buur and Jensen (2004:144) argue that vigilantism emerges when citizens mistrust state agencies, such as the police. They suggest a causal relationship exists between vigilantism and inadequate policing in South Africa as the inefficiency of the police force and often their willingness to comply with vigilante groups, cause citizens to take the law into their own hands.

Additionally, state agencies and officials undermine the legitimacy of the state and their departments when they are guilty of distorting the law or allow vigilantes to act on their behalf in order to ensure justice and control crime (Kirsch, 2010; Schuberth, 2013:49). Schuberth (2013:49) further argues that when organisations, such as vigilante groups, act outside of the law for long periods of time on behalf of state agencies or without the fear of being stopped or punished for their actions, the state faces the medium and long term risk of vigilante justice becoming institutionalised. Vigilantism is characterised by a lack of impartiality,

accountability and predictability. Therefore, it can easily become the preferred method of maintaining order and security in society, which in turn obstructs the development of formal institutions aimed at ensuring law and order.

Additionally, when discussing state capacity and capabilities, it is essential to mention the topic of governance, particularly good governance and poor governance. The term governance has been interpreted in a number of ways by various organisations and scholars, however, the most common understanding defines governance as the use of authority, whether economic, political and/or administrative, to manage a country's affairs at all levels (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:165-166; Doornbos, 2001:100; Weiss, 2000:796-798; Pillay, 2008:144-145). Organisations and scholars have made a further distinction in conceptualising 'good governance' and 'poor governance', with the former being associated with indicators such as accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law and efficiency and effectiveness, and the latter being associated with indicators such as corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, and arbitrary decision making (Weiss, 2000:796-798; Pillay, 2008:144-145). According to Weiss (2000:805) and Joshi (2011:339-340) the issue of good governance was pushed by various organisations and nations in the international sphere to encourage economic and social development in underdeveloped countries, improve the democracies and political leadership, and integrate economic and social goals of state and non-state actors. This meant that good governance was not only applicable to state but included non-state actors and broader civil society.

Governance relates to state capacity and capabilities in so far as the state possess numerous resources to provide basic function and political goods to its citizenry in order to ensure human well-being and advance human development (Besley & Persson, 2010:1; Pillay, 2008:145; Derouen & Goldfinch, 2012:502). Besley and Persson (2010:1) and Rapatsa (2016:64) further explain the relation between governance and state capacity and capabilities by arguing that a state with strong capacities and capabilities are able to manage and maintain their resources to produce political goods, perform state functions and create and maintain order in society, this becomes indicative of a strong democracy and good governance; in contrast, a state with diminished capacity and capabilities are unable to manage and maintain their resources for basic functions and provision of political good, are unable to maintain social order and are at risk of civil conflict and instability, and as a result suffer poor governance. In addition, Derouen and Goldfinch (2012:504) argue that governance, whether good governance or poor

governance, also extends itself as an indicator of state legitimacy. When a state practices good governance and demonstrates characteristics such as transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, the state is often afforded a certain degree of legitimacy. However, when a state practices poor governance and exhibits characteristics like corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, and a disregard for the rule of law, the state is often considered as lacking in legitimacy.

As stated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the state has historically been recognised as the central figure of authoritative power in society, tasked with creating and maintaining order throughout society. This section aims to understand the relationship between vigilantism and the state by discussing theories that may explain the presence of vigilantism through the lack of state capabilities or its failure to perform its most basic functions. Furthermore, the competition for power by various actors in society calls into question the distribution of power in society, the capacity of the state to perform its functions and the legitimate use of power by various actors in society.

The following section will discuss the theoretical framework that will be used in the third and fourth chapters of this study. This framework is constructed using key authors discussed in this study. Moreover, the theoretical framework will serve as the roadmap needed to guide this study in order to answer the research question.

2.10. Constructing a Theoretical Framework

The foundation of the theoretical framework used in this study was developed using overlapping core ideas in the works of Migdal (1988), Rotberg (2003), and Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007). Based on their works discussed in the paragraphs above, Migdal (1988), Rotberg (2003), Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007) converge on the idea that the state and non-state actors are in constant competition with one another within society. When the state is unable to secure power and to perform primary functions, it runs the risk of losing social control, resulting in the capacity gaps occurring for non-state actors to fill, thereby challenging the state.


A core idea shared by these authors is that the state exists to provide for its citizens, that is, it must perform basic functions that are in accordance with the common interest of its people,

thereby exercising its authority and creating order in society (Migdal, 1988; Rotberg, 2003; and Swanepoel & Duvenhage, 2007). Furthermore, Migdal (1988), Rotberg (2003), and Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007) agree that a state's degree of success can be based on its ability to perform these basic functions. As stated by Rotberg (2003:2), strong and weak states can be distinguished from one another according to their performance; that is, their effective delivery of political goods. According to Rotberg (2003:3-4), the political goods to be provided by the state can be ranked according to a hierarchy, as listed below:

- i. Security – prevent invasion, loss of territory, domestic threats on national order and social structure, dangers to human security, crime prevention
- ii. Political Freedom – open and free participation in politics and the political process for all citizens, upholding essential freedoms and fundamental civil and human rights
- iii. Medical and Health care – supply varying levels and costs of medical and health care for the citizenry
- iv. The Knowledge of Good – supplying varying kinds and levels of educational facilities and instruction
- v. Physical Infrastructure – provision and maintenance of roads, railways, harbours, etc.
- vi. Communications Infrastructure – provision and maintenance of communication networks, broadcasting networks, etc.
- vii. Money and Banking System – provision and preservation of a money and banking system
- viii. Fiscal and Institutional Context – an economic landscape that provides opportunities for personal entrepreneurial goals
- ix. Civil Society – encouraging a positive and active civil society
- x. Environmental Commons – provide and enforce methods of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons

For the purpose of this study the hierarchy of political goods by Rotberg (2003:3) will be adapted into 4 key indicators to measure political goods as shown in the figure below.


Figure 1: Hierarchy of political goods



Adapted from the works of Rotberg (2003)

This list of political goods (hereinafter referred to as indicators of state strength), or more specifically, the state's ability to provide these political goods effectively, will help in determining state strength. In addition to the provision of political goods as discussed by Rotberg (2003), two other factors previously discussed in section 2.6. will be used to determine state strength; that is, the presence of capacity gaps (filled by vigilante groups) as argued by Migdal (1988) and Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007); and challenges to social control as argued by Migdal (1988), Rotberg (2003) and Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007). By determining state strength, this study will then be able to categorise the state as either a strong state or weak state. As previously discussed, Rotberg (2003) suggests that state strength exists on a continuum and that a state may be able to exhibit characteristics associated with the various categories at the same time. Thus, a state may be categorised as a weak state but still exhibit certain characteristics of a strong state.

Therefore, the state could be categorised as a strong state if it is perceived to possess the ability and resources to provide political goods, has little to no opportunity for capacity gaps and can effectively deter challenges to social control. When all three determinants are present, a strong state can be identified. A state could be categorised as weak if it is found to possess the ability and resources to provide political goods, but this does not necessarily translate into the provision of all political goods, or political goods are supplied at varying degrees. Secondly, a weak state could experience the opportunity for capacity gaps that could be filled by non-state actors; lastly, a weak state may experience struggles when attempting to manage challenges to social control.

Figure 2: The strong/weak state model

Compiled for the purpose of this study from the works of Migdal (1988), Rotberg (2003), and Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007).

With the use of this framework, this study will be able to identify where the state is unable to perform basic functions that have resulted in capacity gaps where non-state actors, for the purpose of this study, vigilante groups have filled the role of the state with the possibility of challenging the social control of the state in the process. The above framework forms a vital part in facilitating the discussion around the governance of South Africa under the apartheid and democratic regimes. By discussing life under each regime according to the four indicators of state strength, i.e. security, political, economic and social climates, this study will be able to achieve two goals. Firstly, this study will be able to provide an overview of the South African state under each regime as either a strong or weak state and secondly, it will allow for the identification of capacity gaps that may lead to the emergence of vigilantism.

The second part of the framework involves analysing the cases of vigilantism that emerged from the capacity gaps in each time period. The framework that will be applied to the examples of vigilantism used in this study will further analyse vigilante groups and their activities to determine the difference and similarities in the incidents of vigilantism that occurred during apartheid and democracy. These vigilante groups have been carefully selected as examples of incidents of vigilantism for this thesis as they present with most similar features and these

features are representative of the ideal type of what vigilantism may look like as explained by Harris (2001). This analysis will be provided by discussing the vigilante groups and their actions according to key characteristics aiming to classify the type of vigilantism practised by each group. This analytical framework is adapted from the works of Rosenbaum & Sederberg (1974), Harris (2001) and Botha (2015). Vigilantism can be classified as three types according to Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974), that is, crime control vigilantism, social group control vigilantism and regime control vigilantism. Moreover, to determine the type of vigilantism, Rosenbaum & Sederberg (1974), Harris (2001) and Botha (2015) suggest looking at the characteristics of each incident of vigilantism. For the purpose of this study, the main characteristics, as identified by the authors mentioned above, will be considered to determine the type of vigilantism, namely, the structure and organisation of the group, the nature and methods of activity and the motive or objective of the group and their vigilante activities. The framework will be applied by offering a discussion on specific vigilante groups and their activities during each period. From this discussion the key characteristics can be identified and the type of vigilantism can be identified.

Table 3: Analytical Framework for Vigilantism			
Characteristics	Vigilantism Classification Type		
	Crime Control	Social Group Control	Regime Control
Structure and Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal or informal membership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal or informal membership - Members are socially aligned 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal or informal membership - Members are politically aligned
Nature and methods of activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use or threatens use of violence - Public in nature - Nature and methods can be violent or passive - Violent: manhunts, beatings, assaults, interrogations - Passive: patrols, informal hearings, intimidation tactics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use or threatens use of violence - Public in nature - Methods can differ from case to case; methods may be aligned with prescribed belief system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use or threatens use of violence - Public in nature - Nature and methods can be violent or passive - Violent: beatings, assaults, interrogations - Passive: patrols, informal hearings, intimidation tactics - Most often violent in nature
Motives and Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintain law and order - Punish alleged criminals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Advocate for certain belief systems or values to be upheld or changed within society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ensure regime compliance and preserving a political system

	- Deter the (re)occurrence of crime		
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Compiled and adapted for the purpose of this study from the works of Rosenbaum & Sederberg (1974), Harris (2001), and Botha (2015).

In applying this framework to the various incidents of vigilantism that will be identified and discussed in the chapters that follow, this study will be able to identify the differences and similarities in the incidents of vigilantism that occurred during the apartheid and democratic era. Moreover, the application of this framework will allow for the analysis of incidences of vigilantism to identify the key changes in vigilantism over time.

2.11. Conclusion

The purpose of this literature review is to set out the conceptualisation and theoretical foundations of this study. This was done by discussing the various conceptualisations of the core concepts in this study, namely, the state and vigilantism. It is clear that cases of vigilantism are context-specific, and as such, cannot be examined in isolation but must consider all the circumstances surrounding these incidents. Moreover, by conceptualising the state this chapter illustrates the purpose and functions of the state, and demonstrates how the state operates in society and how it interacts with non-state actors, namely, vigilante groups. Furthermore, the core theme of vigilantism was examined, giving specific attention to vigilantism within the South African context, in order to identify the causes of vigilantism, the impact of vigilantism on society, and the relationship between vigilantism and the state.

In addition, consideration was given to the theoretical foundation of this study, namely, the theory on state-society relations, and a discussion of the key theorists within this field, and their positions were provided. Theories on strong and weak states, like those developed by Migdal (1988) and Rotberg (2003), provide a lens through which to understand the balance of power by the state and non-state actors in society. Theorists such as Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007), Rotberg (2003) and Migdal (1988 and 2004) provide useful insights into how the failure of the state to exercise effective control on society allows for opportunities to appear that are seized by vigilante groups, which then act as alternatives to the state.

The following chapters will apply the theoretical and analytical frameworks to the South African context in order to investigate how vigilantism may have occurred under each regime and how vigilantism has developed from apartheid to democracy in South Africa.

Chapter 3: Analysing Incidents of Vigilantism during the Apartheid Era

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the apartheid regime of South Africa will be discussed in more detail to gain further insight into the experience of vigilantism within the South African context. This analysis serves as an important step in answering the research question, which is to determine how vigilantism has changed from apartheid to democracy.

Chapter three will begin with an overview of the apartheid state according to the four indicators of state strength, as set out in the theoretical framework in chapter two. Following this overview, this study will be able to classify the state as either strong or weak and identify capacity gaps that have led to the emergence of vigilante groups. The overview of South Africa under apartheid plays a key role in understanding the emergence of vigilantism, as the phenomenon of vigilantism does not occur in a vacuum but instead is often related to the events and circumstances of society. Therefore, to understand vigilantism, one must understand the circumstances surrounding its occurrence. The final part of this chapter will see an in-depth discussion of some prominent vigilante groups identified during apartheid. These groups and their activities will be discussed, after which the analytical framework for classifying vigilantism will be applied. This classification will allow insight into the differences and similarities regarding vigilantism based on the core characteristics as set out in the previous chapter. These similarities and differences will be analysed in the final chapter to determine how vigilantism has changed from apartheid to democracy.

3.2. An Overview of Apartheid in South Africa

The apartheid era in South Africa, led by the Nationalist Party (NP), started in 1948 and was characterised by racial segregation, oppression and white minority rule (Stapleton, 2010:153; Evans, 2019:373). Similar to its demise in the early 1990s, the apartheid regime did not spontaneously appear overnight, instead it was established over a period of time. The apartheid regime emerged from colonialism carrying with it the colonial strategies of repression and oppression. Apartheid advocated the idea of racial segregation and white supremacy, specifically Afrikaner nationalism, and thus the apartheid regime was a legalised system of racial discrimination (Evans, 2019:372). The primary purpose of the apartheid system was to

elevate the white minority throughout society which was achieved by depriving other non-white racial groups access to political, economic and social structures and opportunities (Stapleton, 2010:153; Conway, 2008:424). The apartheid system was built on the foundation of repression, making use of both formal and informal mechanisms.

Segregation of whites and non-whites was implemented on different levels, from everyday life in terms of living areas and work environments, to areas of government as well. Segregation was evident, as the white apartheid government was preoccupied with the interests of white people and relocated black citizens to rural areas and setting up informal representative bodies to oversee the affairs of black people. These bodies mirrored formal government structure, acted as advisory boards to the apartheid regime and were tasked with maintaining peace and order in black communities and keeping black issues off of the apartheid government's agenda (Buur, 2010:36). Shrirer (1992:10-11) suggest that the apartheid regime was able to maintain control for over 40 years based on four reasons, namely:

1. Neglect by the international community – the willingness of the international community to ignore South Africa's social structure led to the institutionalisation of political, economic and social structures, which facilitated the preservation of the regime for so long,
2. Effective economic policies – the regime was able to develop economic strategies that ensured the continued growth of the domestic economic base.
3. Subservience – the willingness of non-white South Africans to concede to white minority rule, which can partly be attributed to the country's history of colonialism,
4. White Afrikaner hegemony – the unity and cohesiveness of white South Africans, specifically Afrikaner whites that were dedicated to the values of the apartheid system.

After four decades under the apartheid system, the 1980s saw the peak of violence and destruction as the liberation movement, headed by the African National Congress (ANC), slowly started seeing its success in breaking down apartheid structures. By the early 1990s, the liberation struggle had succeeded in dismantling the apartheid regime's legislature and officially transitioning to democracy during 1994 as the country experienced its first democratic elections (Buur, 2010:42).

The following section of this chapter will provide a detailed account of the South African state under apartheid. This account will be centred on the four indicators of the weak/strong state model. These indicators are identified as: the state of security, the political climate, the social climate and the economic climate.

3.3. Contextualisation of the Apartheid State

The following section will contextualise the apartheid state according to the weak/strong state model as set out in chapter two. This section will offer more detail into the South African state based on the four indicators identified in chapter two which will provide a glimpse into life under the apartheid regime and highlight the level of state strength by analysing how the government operated during apartheid.

3.3.1. The state of Security

As most academic literature suggests, the responsibility of security belongs to the state; this includes protection of the state or state territory, safety of the people, security of property, enforcing the rule of law and providing a judicial system (Rotberg, 2003:3; Botha, 2015:19). According to Stapleton (2010:xi), Botha (2015:19) and Rogerson (1990:242), the consensus in South Africa has been that the responsibility of security lies with the state. Thus, the apartheid government was responsible for the security of the country and all its citizens. However, while it was generally perceived as being the responsibility of the government, the perceptions of security by various groups in South Africa during the apartheid era differed vastly from one another. As previously stated in this study, a core principle of the apartheid regime was racial segregation, not just spatially but in various aspects of life. Thus, the different experiences of each race group in South Africa informed their unique perceptions and experiences of security under the apartheid regime.

The apartheid government undertook the responsibility of security through two main bodies; namely, the South African Police (SAP), tasked with the day to day implementation of the rule of law and maintaining law and order in the various communities of the country and the South African Defence Force (SADF), tasked with the national defence of the country (Department of Justice, 2020:185; Stapleton, 2010:152). According to Schärff (1989:207-208), the main object of the security forces under the apartheid regime was to combat crime, protect the

territory of the state, protect all levels of government and to ensure social control by the state throughout society. The initiation of the apartheid regime during the late 1940s, led to the government, under the leadership of the National Party, rethinking the country's national defence force as they embarked on a new social order (Stapleton, 2010:153). The restructuring of the national defence force was led by the Minister of Defence, F.C. Erasmus, who had a mandate to 'Afrikanerize' the South African Defence Force (SADF) by amending the 1957 Defence Act. The initiative sought to rid the defence forces, that is, army, navy and air force, of their relations to Britain, disband the use of non-white volunteers (which later changed during the 1970s), and to transform SADF into a truly Afrikaner organisation that embodied the values of the apartheid regime (Stapleton, 2010:153-154). Conway (2008:422) argues that the restructuring of the SADF was a tool of white Afrikaner hegemony; that is, a means to create unity amongst white nationalists, to conform to apartheid values, and to uplift white men into positions of power. Moreover, by removing non-whites from serving in the defence forces it ensured that people of colour were not able to raise to higher stations and ranks and thus could not challenge the very structure that secured the regime.

Even though there were many incidences of resistance, none rose to the level of recognition as those that occurred as from the 1960s to 1980s (Shirer, 1992:11; Stapleton, 2010:159). Resistance to the regime that occurred before the 1960s was characterised as peaceful resistance, as opposition organisations staged peaceful protests, boycotts, marches, etc. (Stapleton, 2010:159). According to authors Rogerson (1990:243) and Stapleton (2010:159), the shift from a passive resistance to the anti-apartheid armed struggle occurred on 21 March 1960 with what is known as the Sharpeville Massacre; a peaceful protest outside of the Sharpeville police station that resulted in the police killing 69 protesters and wounding 180. Rogerson (1990:243) and Stapleton (2010:159) further suggests that this event was considered the catalyst that led to the formation of the ANC military organisation in July 1961 known as *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), which was led by ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) members. MK had command bases in major cities all over South Africa, namely, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth. Agents of the organisation received military training in Mozambique, Angola, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and the many Eastern Bloc countries. The organisation underwent tactical training in order to strengthen the liberation movement (Stapleton, 2010:162; O'Brien, 2011:6).

Following the restructuring of the national defence force in the late 1950s, South Africa saw the shift to an armed struggle by the anti-apartheid movement in the early 1960s. This led to the onset of the militarisation of the state during the 1960s which continued into the 1970s and 1980s (O'Brien, 2011:6; Rogerson, 1990:243-244). With the onslaught of attacks by the anti-apartheid movement, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, the regime deemed the militarisation of the state as a necessary step toward defending the regime against internal and external threats and to secure white minority rule by any and all means necessary (Conway, 2008:423; Rogerson, 1990:243-244; O'Brien, 2011:6). They were thereby causing the SADF to become the dominant force in protecting the regime. According to Stapleton (2010:160), the armed struggle was initiated during 1961 by the release of a public manifesto by MK, declaring their intentions to go to war for democracy, coupled with various bombings throughout South Africa to signify their seriousness. In their attempts to stem attacks, the apartheid state not only engaged in military tactics but also made use of formal Acts to restrict anti-apartheid attacks, such as the Internal Security Act of 1963 intended to allow various forms of detention and interrogation of anti-apartheid activists, the Terrorism Act of 1967 intended for the indefinite detention without trial of suspected terrorists and the Civil Defence Act of 1966 intended for the authorised seizure of people and/or property (Rogerson, 1990:243-244). The primary purpose of military measures and formal legislation was to suppress the anti-apartheid movement in all forms, from economic, to political, to social resistance and to defend the apartheid regime.

In their work Batchelor, Dunne and Lamb (2002:318) discuss that following the expansion of the military during 1960s, the role of the military became interlaced with that of the South African Police, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s when the military provided support to the police to stem uprisings in black communities in urban areas and in the Bantustans or 'homelands', which refer to the designated jurisdictions created by the apartheid regime specifically for black people. As previously mentioned, the 1980s was the pinnacle of the liberation struggle. Many liberation fighters returned from exile, and various anti-apartheid organisations were active in the fight for democracy. Clarke (2018:198) and Montesh & Basdeo (2012) describe the overlapping relationship between the SAP and SADF during apartheid as reinforcing the militarisation of the state. SADF was not only tasked with the duties of protecting the state from domestic and foreign threats but was also deployed to support SAP with fighting internal criminal activity. Therefore the roles and functions specific to each organisation became more difficult to distinguish as apartheid continued. Comparably,

Steinberg (2014:175-176) describes the intersection of SADF and SAP during apartheid as a phase of ‘high policing’, which is a term first coined by Jean-Paul Brodeur. The term refers to policing that aims to protect the political order, as opposed to ‘low policing’ which refers to everyday policing of criminal activity by uniformed police officers and detectives. High policing by interlinking SADF and SAP was used as a tactic by the apartheid state to protect the regime against the anti-apartheid movement that threatened to undermine and dismantle it. High policing by the apartheid state reached its peak during the late 1970s and the 1980s (Steinberg, 2014:175). With the use of high policing and the state’s primary security focus being the protection of the regime, it stands to reason that regular or low policing, as Steinberg (2014:175) puts it, was of less importance, particularly in non-white communities.

In addition, non-white communities had experienced a long history of a lack of security and ineffective policing. Extensively noted in chapter two, the apartheid state made use of informal self-regulation groups in black communities to act as security and as informal judicial systems by way of people’s courts or ‘kangaroo courts’, thereby ensuring the principle of racial segregation and removing black people from formal provisions of security by the state. According to Buur (2010:35), Super (2017) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002:7-8), initially these non-state self-regulation groups acted as courts used to resolve disputes and/or punish and sentence wrongdoers in the village community. As the apartheid state developed, rural and non-white communities in urban areas did not have access to formal structures of safety and security provided by the state. As such, these black communities made use of rural traditions and informal structures and organised their own initiatives to stop crime, ensure the discipline of community members, deliver punishments and maintain social control within their communities (Buur, 2010:35-36; Super, 2017). During the early years of apartheid, the white minority government had little concern for the measures used by these informal non-state organisations, as long as they kept the black communities under control and did not threaten the existence of the apartheid regime.

However, Buur (2010:35-37), Martin (2010:59-60) and Botha (2015:19-20) call attention to the use of these informal non-state security organisations by the state as apartheid developed. To maintain the national order and ensure the longevity of the apartheid system, the state used these informal non-state organisations as representative bodies for black communities prescribed by the state. Buur (2010:35) and Martin (2010:62-63) discuss the importance of this evolution of these self-regulation groups, as some of these groups later became advisory boards

to the apartheid regime. These boards would act as gatekeepers between the state and non-white communities, acting on behalf of the state as informal security and judicial mechanisms. Buur (2010:36-38) and Super (2017) argue that during the late 1970s as tensions under apartheid started increasing, the advisory boards and their representatives fell under growing suspicion of being collaborators with the apartheid state, and as such were commandeered by various factions of the anti-apartheid movement and were transformed into what the apartheid state characterised as vigilante groups. In addition, as previously mentioned, the apartheid state considered any acts against the regime, that is, any acts intended to undermine the apartheid system as vigilante activity. Harris (2001), adds to this conversation, arguing that the apartheid state considered any anti-apartheid movement as vigilante, and therefore, any actions that were intended to target the state and destabilise the regime was classified as vigilante activity. These groups, often crossing racial and ethnic divides, later became aligned to liberation organisation, for example, the 'Young Lions' that aligned themselves with liberation organisations such as the ANC⁷.

According to various authors, namely, Worden (1994:132), Evans (2019:394), Conway (2020:423-423) and Glaser (2005:120), the Sharpeville Massacre of 1961 and the Soweto uprisings of 1976 signalled two significant turning points that sparked intense periods of violence during the apartheid era and essentially signalling a crisis of legitimacy to the apartheid state. As will be discussed later, the ongoing violence and insecurity of many communities can be considered as a possible capacity gap under the apartheid regime. During the apartheid era, specifically in the last two decades, it was clear that the apartheid regime managed the security of the state according to two categories, the formal and informal security structures. The formal security structure involved SAP and SADF and were tasked with implementing law and order, protecting the borders and safeguarding the apartheid state. The second category, the informal security structures, were made up of small groups of citizens in communities ignored by the state and left to construct their own security structures as best they could. Furthermore, these informal groups were often exploited by the apartheid state to ensure compliance with the regime in various black communities. These groups, often considered to be state-sanctioned security groups, were tasked with combating crime in black communities, ensuring compliance with the apartheid system and maintaining social control of the state.

⁷ The 'Young Lions' will be discussed in more detail in subsequent section of this that follow.

Moreover, the nature of the militarised security exercised by the apartheid state can be characterised as authoritarian and repressive.

3.3.2. The Political Climate

With an ideology built on the premise of racial segregation and repression and historical origins stretching to the colonial era, the apartheid government legalised discrimination based on race. According to Worden (1994:104-105), Zhungu (1977:206) and Evans (2019:380-382) to achieve separation between races the government implemented various policies. These include:


- the Group Areas Act of 1950 – which saw the relocation of people of colour to reside in the same areas, while white people were allowed to relocate to more affluent areas;
- the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953 – which enforced the separate use of public facilities based on race, this included public transport, restaurants, sports facilities, etc.; and
- the Immorality Act of 1950, prohibiting mixed marriages,
- the Bantu Education Act of 1953 – which enforced separate education systems and curricula based on race.

According to authors such as Evans (2019:373), Worden (1994:105) and Schrirer (1992:10), apartheid was a form of social engineering. By implementing racially discriminatory policies like those mentioned above, the apartheid government aimed to achieve objects such as, imposing the authoritative power of the state, ensure separation of races across all spheres of life, ensure access to better quality facilities, goods and services for white people, and maintain white supremacy. The exercise of authoritarian rule was a driving force behind the success of the apartheid regime. The government was able to implement its policies and ensure racial discrimination by the use of force and the threat of violence (Schrirer, 1992:11 and Worden, 1994:104). Moreover, the state was able to utilise its laws, particularly those laws on censorship, to curtail global and domestic influence opposing the state (Habib & Taylor, 1999:75; Worden, 1994:103). Thus, the authoritative nature of the state and its leaders was effectively used to restrict operations and activities of opposing groups and organisations.

Moreover, the apartheid government functioned under a Westminster style parliament, with a sitting president and active prime minister. However, Southall (2002:154) argues that this was

a façade as the apartheid government operated as a police state characterised by strong military presence, abuse of power and violations of human rights. In 1983, under the presidency of P.W. Botha, the Office of the President was established, and a greater concentration of powers was ascribed to the president. This later resulted in the position of Prime Minister being erased in 1984, as the president became the official head of state and head of government (O'Brien, 2017:628). O'Brien (2017:627) argues that the NP's authoritarian leadership style began to break down under the leadership of FW de Klerk in 1989, as he tried to incorporate more liberal practices and introduced reforms.

Figure 3: Timeline of the Apartheid Heads of State 1948-1994



Complied for the purpose of this study from the works of Southall (2001), Stapleton (2010), O'Brien (2017) and The Presidency (2020).

Apart from the official government of the apartheid regime, it was clear that the political divide existed in the governing of South Africa during the apartheid era based on race. This divide existed in the formal governing of white citizens by the apartheid state, and the informal governing of black South Africans through state-sanctioned advisory boards that acted as representatives for marginalised groups (Buur, 2010:35-36; Botha, 2015:18; Sekhonyane &

Louw, 2002:7-8). However, Botha (2015:18) discusses the African roots of such groups, stretching as far back as the 1880s, thereby not making them unique to the apartheid regime. According to Botha (2015:18) from their onset these groups were considered to be conservative groups operating according to the African culture, tasked with the resolution of disputes within the community and any other issues; in later years, these groups became more focused on implementing social control on behalf of the state while still keeping 'black affairs' separate from the state.

As the apartheid system came under fire with the rise of liberation movements in the later years of apartheid, these advisory boards and representatives also fell under suspicion of collaborating with the apartheid state. They were subsequently manipulated by anti-apartheid fighters, turning them into unpopular self-regulation groups characterised by violent techniques, kangaroo courts and corporal punishment, punishing any persons suspected of being collaborators of the apartheid state (Botha, 2015:19; Buur, 2010:38-40). As the state practised governing the races according to the formal governance applicable to white people in urban areas, and the informal governance of advisory boards sanctioned by the state applicable to black communities, it implemented a system of bifurcation (Buur, 2010:37). Through this system, the apartheid regime governed white people under civil law, thereby guaranteeing them civil rights. In contrast, black citizens were governed under African traditions and customary law within the self-regulation groups and advisory boards of the black communities, thereby starving black South Africans of civil rights and civil power (Buur, 2010:37).

However, the political system of apartheid did not go unchallenged as various groups resisted the white minority rule and the restrictive and oppressive form of governance exercised by the regime. The resistance to the apartheid system or what later became known as the liberation movement was formed by various groups such as the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, the Congress of Democrats, the South African Coloured People's party, and the Indian Congress (Plasket, 1989:167). These groups became key players in the resistance to the apartheid system and fought it by organising and participating in strikes, marches, boycotts, and various other instances of civil disobedience that embodied dissent (Giliomee, 1995:90).

3.3.3. The Economic Climate

The institutionalised segregation established by the apartheid system was evident in the economic landscape of the country for much of apartheid. This subsection will focus its attention on the disparities in the labour market, and the effects of economic sanctions on the apartheid regime. The ideology of racial segregation seeped into the economic landscape as people of colour were restricted from much of the country's economic activity, causing and intensifying inequality (Schneider, 2003:24; Heintz, 2002:320). The economic policies of the time were centred on the idea of racial discrimination. The policies could be characterised as exercising repression to maintain social stability, implementing labour market policies to ensure low costs for black labour and social welfare systems that ensure the purchasing power of the white minority (Heintz, 2002:320). Non-white South Africans were reserved for cheap, menial labour, most often working in the agriculture, mining or manufacturing sectors. However, Schneider (2003:28) argues that although economic restrictions were detrimental to the black population, the South African state saw significant economic growth, specifically during the 1960s and early 1970s. The apartheid state's decision to establish the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) in the early 1960s for the domestic production of military equipment and weaponry had a significant impact in boosting the state's economy and increasing employment rates.

One of the critical blows that the apartheid government suffered in its commitment to the regime is the pressure from the international community. According to Lowenberg (1997:62), foreign countries that disagreed with the apartheid government's racial segregation policies and authoritarian rule tried to exert extraordinary pressure on South Africa to force it into reform. This pressure was not only political but also economical. Therefore, to force the apartheid government into abandoning apartheid, foreign countries placed economic sanctions on South Africa. Economic sanctions were employed as a subtle tactic by nations to force obedience or compliance; it was regarded as a punitive measure when overt aggression was not desirable (Lowenberg, 1997:62). The apartheid government faced the loss of foreign investors, as well as domestic, as a result of the growing tension and instability within the country caused by riots and violent responses to the regime (Lowenberg, 1997:68; Lundahl, 1992:324). According to Evenette (2002:559 and Lundahl (1992:324), the values and principles of the apartheid regime, coupled with South Africa's inability to peacefully manage the civil unrest challenging the regime during the 1970s and 1980s, led to foreign economic sanctions on South

Africa and disinvestment by foreign companies as well. Foreign governments were not the only entities to use the strategy of economic sanctions, as this tactic was used by the private sector as well which arguably had a larger effect on the economic climate of South Africa (Evenette, 2002:557; Rodman, 1994:313). The use of sanctions from the international community began as early as 1962 and varied between governments and private companies and between being mandatory or optional (Evenette, 2002:559; Rodman, 1994:313).

Table 4: Sanctions against South Africa in chronological order	
Date	Organisation/Nation and Sanction
11 November 1962-1963	United Nations (UN) General Assembly - Break diplomatic relations with SA. Closed ports to SA ships. Suspended landing rights to all SA aircrafts. Boycott SA trade. UN arms embargo.
1 July 1979	Sweden – prohibits the launch of new Swedish companies in SA. Prohibits further investments by existing Swedish companies operating in SA.
24-26 July 1985	France (proposed resolution to the UN Security Council) – Imposes voluntary sanctions against SA which include prohibiting new investments. Banning the import of Kruger Rands.
1 October 1985	United Nations – Bans import of Kruger Rands.

October 1985	Nordic Council (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway) – Prohibits Nordic government and private company investments. Ban on certain imports from SA.
January 1986	Denmark – Bans imports of coal. Later bans all trade, except for imports of certain natural resources
4 August 1986	Commonwealth of Nations (excluding United Kingdom) – Restricts the import agricultural goods, coal, uranium, steel, and iron.
16 September 1986	European Community – Ban on import of iron, steel and gold. Ban new investments
19 September 1986	Japan – Ban on imports of iron and steel
2 October 1986	United States of America – Ban on imports of certain natural resources, textiles, agricultural products and goods produced in SA government owned firms
1986	Various global companies (incl. Barclays Bank) – Divest assets in SA
1987	Sweden and Denmark – Comprehensive trade and investment bans

Adapted from Evenette (2002:560) and Rodman (2002:315-317).

With the imposition of foreign sanctions by various actors in their attempts to urge the apartheid government to abandon the regime, the apartheid government soon learned that their racial segregation policies were costing them (Loewenberg, 1997:72; Lundahl, 1992:22). The economic policies that were once an asset to the regime by ensuring that the white population mostly benefited and were thus mainly in a position of power were now proving to be a liability, that costed the regime foreign support, economically and politically. Corresponding financial reports by Jones and Muller (1992:296) and Lowenberg (1997:70) illustrate that from 1946 to 1974 the annual growth of GDP averaged yearly close to 5%, thus reflecting the economic strengths of the apartheid state as previously discussed. However, this GDP growth shrunk to a mere 1.8% average growth annually from 1974 to 1987, reflecting the effects of the height of the liberation struggle on the economy. Moreover, this decline continued for the remainder of the apartheid regime as the economy found itself in a distressed position in the early 1990s, reflecting a negative GDP growth rate of -2.2% (Lowenberg, 1997:70; Jones & Muller, 1992:296).

The regime ensured that the foundation of apartheid, that is, racial segregation, filtered into all aspect of life in South Africa. Therefore, whites and non-whites were separated in so far as they could not compete in labour markets either (Lowenberg, 1997:62; Williams, 1989:121; Mariotti, 2012:1100). Authors such as Lowenberg (1997:63), Lundahl (1992:166-167), Mariotti (2012:1101-1102) and Williams (1989:121) state that the apartheid policies were engineered to geographically exclude black labourers through influx control regulations into urban areas and thereby restricting their opportunity and access to the industrial sectors. Essentially, these policies were constructed to benefit white labourers by connecting them to the urban industrial markets. The division in South Africa's labour markets was divided along racial lines from the inception of the apartheid regime until the 1970s, so much so that a primary and secondary labour market was developed; the former employing semi-skilled white workers and the latter employing non-white, unskilled, low paid workers (Heintz, 2002:320; Kraak, 1995:664, Mariotti, 2012:1101-1102).

Moreover, Kraak (1995:664) discuss the favourable working environment set up for the primary labour market, which entailed competitive wages, job security and the opportunity for career advancement; all of which facilitated opportunities for economic growth and wealth accumulation amongst white citizens. Alternatively, the secondary labour market suffered poor working conditions, inconsistent work schedules, low wages, if any, as wages were often

substituted with other forms of payment, and very little job security. Therefore, non-white workers employed in this labour market suffered economically, with few prospects to improve their economic standing or opportunities for career advancement (Kraak, 1995:664).

Segregation policies in labour markets lasted up to the early 1970s, after which the regime experienced pressure to reform its policies and practices from the international community. This was primarily achieved through the reshaping of the industrial sector as the use of advanced technologies started trending, which would ultimately force changes in the labour markets (Kraak, 1995:664; Lowenberg, 1997:63; Mariotti, 2012:1120). Kraak (1995:664) expands on this, stating that the advancements in the industrial sector caused a spark for change in the composition of the labour markets as a new type of labour force was required to keep up with the demands of the industries. The segregated primary and secondary labour markets as established by the regime would no longer serve the regime to grow the economy, as industry advancements required a semi-skilled and skilled workforce. Moreover, an oppressed non-white labour force led to the establishment of black trade unions, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Many of these trade unions became extremely militant during the late 1970s and joined the anti-apartheid movement aligning themselves with the liberation struggle (Lowenberg, 1997:63; Heintz, 2002:322; Christie & Collins, 1982:60-61; Barchiesi, 1997:193-194). These trade unions took on the fight for democracy, as they championed the fight for economic and social change amongst black workers. Lowenberg (1997:63) and Heintz (2002:322) argue as the unions participated in the workers' struggle of the 1980s, advocating for improved working conditions and increased wages, and as a result of their affiliation with the anti-apartheid movement, trade unions were also classified as vigilante organisations, as they participated in the orchestrated attacks on the state on behalf of the liberation movement.

The economic stifling of the black majority intensified the civil unrest against the apartheid regime. Moreover, the South African economy suffered at the hands of the global economic crisis, as well as the instability caused by domestic unrest, disruption of business operations, and minimizing local and foreign investment. There was an undeniable cycle of economic decline. The civil unrest sparked by the apartheid policies led to the withdrawal of foreign investments and economic sanctions which crippled the economy of South Africa, affecting all citizens, causing more civil unrest as citizens called for change from the regime.

3.3.4. The Social Climate

With the political and economic landscape being one that exercised the oppression and exploitation of people of colour and the upliftment and advancement of white people, the social landscape of South Africa reflected the segregation and oppression of the apartheid system. Racial discrimination and oppression were present in most aspects of life, including the education systems, access to health care, civil society. Shubane (1992:35) argues that by contemporary understanding of what constitutes civil society, the apartheid era, although authoritarian, had a relatively robust civil society. Non-state organisations in support of the state, as well as other organisations opposing the regime, all form part of civil society. Moreover, the relationship between these non-state organisations and how they interact with the state and each other form part of the social climate (Shubane, 1992:35). As with most sectors during the apartheid system, civil society was permitted to exist as long as organisations were orientated toward advancing and serving white communities and maintaining the racial order, as imposed by the government. Organisations that were perceived as being critical of the apartheid state or that were found to be acting in opposition to the state were treated as hostile and were often subjected to ongoing harassment until the organisation would eventually fold or be outlawed by the government (Habib & Taylor, 1999:74).

The political and security attitudes of the apartheid government were to treat any opposition as hostile, regardless of the level of the organisation, size and orientation; if it was acting in opposition and rebelling against the apartheid system, it had to be eliminated (Habib & Taylor, 1999:75). This was true through most of the apartheid era, although during the late 1980s, with the rise of the liberation movement and increased responses from the foreign community objecting to the apartheid system, the political environment was changing. As a result of this outward pressure, the apartheid regime under P.W. Botha allowed for the emergence of non-government organisations motivated to serve marginalised groups (Habib & Taylor, 1999:75). These groups were further bolstered by foreign financial aid from the United States, the European Union and Scandinavian countries, which hoped to grow the anti-apartheid movement (Habib & Taylor, 1999:75; Taylor, Cook, and Habib, 1999).

Before the 1980s, the apartheid regime used its authoritative force to ensure that the only organisations participating in civil society were those supporting the regime, such as the *Broederbond* and the *Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK). However, the 1980s were

dominated by civil society, with organisations aligned with the anti-apartheid movement and aimed at undermining the National Party rule, such as Black Sash, South African Institute of Race Relations, Legal Resource Centre, Trade Union Research Project, etc. (Taylor, Cook, and Habib, 1999). Moreover, as Taylor, Cook and Habib (1999) argue, although civil society was encouraged by the apartheid system in the last decade of apartheid, participation by anti-apartheid organisations did not go unchallenged by the state, as these groups often faced arrests, death threats, assassination attempts, and detention without trial. Furthermore, the state often sponsored organisation in support of the apartheid system to discredit anti-apartheid organisations; therefore, the repressive nature of the apartheid state continued as its actively enforced its authority in civil society.

Kotzé and Du Toit (1995:32) discuss the importance of a robust civil society to facilitate healthy social dynamics between various organisations and to ensure that all groups in society's interests are represented. According to Habib (2003:229), civil society in the apartheid era existed according to racial divides, mainly between black and white civil society representing the interests of their respective groups. During apartheid, the organisations that formed the liberation movement and later became official political parties were considered to be organisations forming part of the black civil society under apartheid; examples include, the African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Democratic Front (UDF), amongst others (Kotzé & Du Toit, 1995:32). Moreover, a report by Lodge and Nasson (1991:5) state that by the end of apartheid the black civil society was made up of a total of 565 organisation, all different, ranging from political, economic, religious, women's rights, worker's rights, and youth/student movements; all of which formed part of the resistance by participating in the anti-apartheid movement to varying degrees.

According to Worden (1994:104), an important tool that could be used to establish the social order of the apartheid regime was the education system, as it acted as an essential method of implementing racial discrimination amongst the people. By teaching according to segregation, the policy of racial discrimination and segregation is enacted socially. For the majority of the apartheid era, Bantu Education was the system used for educating people of colour, specifically blacks, while white citizens were allowed access to formal education systems (Worden, 1994:105, and Zhungu, 1977:206). The Bantu Education system, while being abolished in 1979, had put people of colour at a significant disadvantage by the time it became legal for them to access formal education systems. The Bantu Education system was aimed at training

people of colour for manual labour and menial jobs, thereby gearing people of colour towards jobs that the apartheid government approved as not being suitable for white people (Zhungu, 1977:206-207). The purpose of the distinction in education systems based on race was to support the notion of white superiority to all races and relegate non-whites further to a lower status through the content of the Bantu Education curriculum; a poor education assisted in excluding people of colour from economic and social structures (Worden, 1994:106; Jansen, 1990:200; and Zhungu, 1977:206-207). Although the Bantu Education system was replaced by the Education and Training Act of 1979 to improve education systems for people of colour, it did not easily erase educational disadvantages experienced by marginalised groups. They were subjected to decades of substandard education, resulting in a lower level of knowledge regarding matters of economics, politics and social issues compared to white scholars that had undergone schooling in the formal education systems (Worden, 1994:106; Jansen, 1990:200).

By discussing the apartheid regime according to the security, political, economic, and social indicators, chapter three has given insight into life under the apartheid regime, how the government operated and how it may have affected white and non-white citizens accordingly. Centred around the information offered above, section 3.4, which follows is a continuation of section 3.3 and offers a discussion evaluating the apartheid regime's strengths and weaknesses, based on the indicators discussed here. This discussion will facilitate the identification of the possible capacity gaps seized as opportunities for the emergence of vigilante groups under the apartheid regime. Subsequently, these vigilante groups will be examined to determine the key aspect that will assist in identifying how vigilantism in South Africa has developed over the years.

3.4. State Strengths, Weaknesses and Capacity Gaps

When examining the governance of the apartheid state, it is clear that racial discrimination, oppression, and marginalisation were deeply ingrained in everyday life, causing disparaging inequalities amongst the South African people under the apartheid regime. The unjust society that the majority were forced to live in cannot be disputed, as the apartheid regime was plagued by violence, civil unrest, socio-economic issues, exclusion from the international community. However, upon deeper reflection of the apartheid state, it can be argued that according to certain indicators, such as state security, the apartheid state exhibited tremendous strength, thereby challenging the argument that the apartheid state suffered state weakness throughout

its existence. Despite the severity of social injustices caused by the apartheid state, it managed to deliver certain critical political goods to the population, albeit unequally. This section will evaluate which indicators best demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the apartheid state in order to classify the state as either strong or weak. Moreover, a key function of this section is to identify capacity gaps in the apartheid regime and where these gaps have led to the emergence of vigilante groups.

The first indicator relating to the weak/strong state model discussed in section 3.3.1. concerns the security of the state. The security of the nation is the duty of the state; thus, the apartheid state was responsible for the safety and security of the nation, its borders, the people, enforcing the rule of law and providing an efficient criminal justice system. While it was the responsibility of the apartheid state to provide the citizens of South Africa with safety and security, the perceptions of safety differed across racial groups. The apartheid state possessed both the resources and ability to provide security for all its people, protect its borders and the regime. However, discussed in section 3.3.1., the apartheid state focused its attention on protecting and ensuring compliance with the regime above all else. The apartheid state security forces included the police force, the national defence force, as well as other security organisations, both informal and formal, and intelligence agencies such as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) (Stapleton, 2010:157-159). It is important to note that the official forms of security while acting upon instruction of the apartheid government did not protect all citizens equally but were required to secure the safety of the regime first. Therefore, the official security structures, such as SADF and SAP placed defending the regime, from domestic and foreign threats, at the top of their priority list; practicing high policing over low policing. Furthermore, the apartheid strategy of high policing employed by the state, particularly during the late 1970s and the 1980s, which saw the state use SADF to reinforce the police force for everyday policing, thereby militarising the security forces of the state.

As far as everyday policing and ensuring law and order in society, the priority of the formal security forces was to protect the safety of white people, white areas and white-owned businesses. Therefore, the regime was greatly concerned with protecting the political base that kept the regime in power. Securing the white minority and their businesses meant securing the regime. Consequently, the safety and security of other race groups, Black, Coloured, Indian, and Asian, was left to informal security structures. Marginalised communities were largely neglected by the apartheid state as far as policing them for the safety of community members.

This is not to say that the state's formal security forces, SADF or SAP, did not police in these communities; however, the policing these communities did experience was to ensure compliance with the regime rather than to ensure the safety of the people. The security of marginalised communities was left in the hands of its people. Informal security structures were put into place by community members and community organisations to provide for these people in a way the state had not. These structures included self-regulation groups, kangaroo courts, neighbourhood watch groups, etc.. The self-regulation groups have a long history in South Africa as they formed part of African traditions in rural areas, where these groups were established to perform security duties for their villages. With the increased military presence in non-white communities during the 1980s, informal security groups gained frequency in these communities to protect the people against police brutality and misconduct, as well as protecting the community from criminality by its members. Thus, self-regulation units aimed at protecting communities and preventing criminal activity quickly became self-defence units, which had to protect their communities against the security forces of the state as well as other criminal elements within society. As noted in section 3.3.1., some of these informal security structures were state-sanctioned; however, those groups had less to do with ensuring the security of citizens and more to do with ensuring social control by the state and forcing compliance.

The apartheid state fervently protected the regime and went to great lengths to enforce its authority, especially when dealing with opposition from within. In response to the liberation movement, the apartheid state used various tactics to suppress the domestic resistance against the regime. It banned organisation such as the ANC and the PAC, exiled struggle fighters, imposed curfews and pass laws to control the movement of non-white citizens, and deployed security forces with the mandate to use any force necessary to subdue resistance. The attacks executed by the state and its security force against the anti-apartheid movement caused massive destruction throughout the country. As previously mentioned, Haysom (1989) and Harris (2001) argue that at the height of the liberation struggle the apartheid regime considered any group acting in opposition to the state to be regarded as a threat to the state. Moreover, any anti-apartheid movement or activity was labelled as vigilantism. While literature describes organisation such as the ANC, PAC, and UDF as forming part of the anti-apartheid movement, it specifically notes that smaller, informal organisations participating in the anti-apartheid movement are classified as vigilante organisations, such as the group known as the 'Young Lions'. Therefore it can be argued that, while the apartheid state exerted its dominance as far as ensuring the security of the regime and its political base, the neglect of the security of the

majority, coupled with policies of racial discrimination provided the opportunity for a capacity gap concerning the safety and security of marginalised communities and their people. This capacity gap was seized by informal security groups, which provided marginalised communities with informal security, protecting community members from everyday crime as well as protecting them from the regime, and was thus classified as vigilante groups in the eyes of the apartheid regime, such as the ‘Young Lions’ and the Manenberg Residents Movement.⁸ Furthermore, the state would make use of informal state-sanctioned groups to ensure compliance with the regime, such as the *Witdoeke*, an apartheid endorsed group used to ensure forced removals from within the communities of the Cape. This non-state group later became known as a vigilante group of the apartheid era.

The apartheid state appeared to use its resources, particularly its security forces, to ensure that the regime was impenetrable and to suppress the resistance; thereby indicating a degree of state strength in its ability to defend the regime and national security. However, while exerting its military strength during apartheid, the regime did not rank well according to the three other indicators of the weak/strong state model. When considering the discussion in section 3.3.2 concerning the political climate under the apartheid regime, the literature illustrates how the regime was built on the foundations of discrimination, oppression and authoritarian rule. According to Rotberg (2003:3-4), strong states facilitate participation in politics and the political process for all citizens, and it respects and upholds essential freedoms and fundamental human rights. The apartheid regime was built on the foundations of racial discrimination; therefore, not all citizens were allowed to participate in the political process as white citizens were afforded opportunities for participation above people of colour. Furthermore, the regime implemented policies to ensure the separation of racial groups, and the white populace was treated as superior to all other races, policies such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, and many more enacted the discrimination of marginalised groups (Worden, 1994:104-105).

This type of moral corruption, of viewing one race as superior at the expense of other race groups caused the apartheid state to enter into a violent struggle with liberation movements domestically, as well as causing international tensions between the apartheid state, foreign nations and international organisations. The tension between the apartheid regime and the

⁸ An analysis of the ‘Young Lions’ and Manenberg Residents Movement and their activities as perpetrators of vigilantism will be discussed in section 3.5. which follows.

international community led to various sanctions against the regime, most of which were economic. Thus, the discussion of the economic climate under the apartheid regime in section 3.3.3 shows how the regime's commitment to its policies of racial segregation led to economic struggles. The international community turned its back on the apartheid state by imposing various economic sanctions on the state from the early 1960s until the late 1980s. These sanctions were strategies by the international community to force the state to abandon its discriminatory policies and adapt to a democratic regime. Various countries had imposed sanctions that banned the import of raw materials, which formed a substantial part of South Africa's exports and thereby affected the economic growth of the country.

Furthermore, as Rotberg (2003:3-4) argues, the state is responsible for creating an economic landscape that provides all citizens opportunities for economic growth. The apartheid regime had developed a competitive domestic economic landscape; however, different racial groups did not have equal opportunity. Segregated labour markets ensured that white people were afforded job opportunities that led to economic growth and career advancement. Non-whites were limited to semi-skilled and unskilled employment opportunities, which had limited possibility for advancing the economic status and careers of non-whites, thereby ensuring their positions as the inferior to whites. Therefore, while the apartheid state had established a functioning economy, it was one with limited access for people of colour. This led to the emergence of black trade unions that fought against the economic stifling of marginalised groups, and thus played a significant part in the civil unrest of the 1980s.

Thus, it can be argued that limitations existed within the economic climate, illustrating the weakness of the state in the economic climate. An important implication of inequality in the economic climate was the establishment of trade unions in the late 1980s to fight for equal distribution of income, to the labour rights of people of colour and to increase the degree of inclusion of people of colour into the economic system. As Haysom (1989) and Harris (2001) point out, the apartheid government considered trade unions as rogue units operating in opposition to the state and acting as forces to disrupt the national order, thereby classifying them as vigilantes.

Moreover, the inability of people of colour to have access to economic opportunities and growth has led to various socio-economic issues, such as poverty. Socio-economic issues have been the legacy of the apartheid system. Section 3.3.4. illustrates the troubles of people of

colour, concerning social issues caused and perpetuated by the apartheid state and its discriminatory policies. The state possessed the resources and ability to provide citizens with healthcare, education and a robust civil society; however, under the apartheid regime delivery of these services were split according to racial bias. The highest quality of services was reserved for the white population, while other races were subjected to subpar services. In the social sphere, the education system was most notably one of the services that were tailored to advance the white minority and disadvantage non-white. In addition, civil society before the 1980s was made up of organisations aligned with the apartheid system and thus was not representative of groups in society. Black civil society first emerged when public participation of organisations advocating for the liberation of people of colour started increasing with the civil unrest of the 1980s.

It can be considered that the apartheid state possessed the resources and ability to provide a variety of political goods. Under the system of discrimination, the state succeeded in providing political goods such as economic opportunity and social goods like healthcare and education; however, any political goods provided by the state were delivered according to a sliding scale. Where the resources and ability of the state to provide political goods translated into the tangible delivery of these goods, they were provided to varying degrees based on the race of recipients. Moreover, the apartheid state showed several opportunities for capacity gaps, particularly in the areas of security and economics, where the state failed people of colour immensely. These capacity gaps led to ripe opportunities for instances of vigilantism to develop. Therefore, considering the above discussion in this chapter, it can be determined that the apartheid state can be classified as a weak state, particularly in the last 10 to 20 years of its existence, which exhibited some elements of a strong state. While the apartheid state was physically strong, particularly in defending the regime, in contrast, it did not fare as well according to the other indicators of state strength. The state possessed the ability and resources to provide goods and services to all its citizens. However, it did not substantially deliver all political goods, but the political goods the state did provide was delivered disproportionately based on race. Furthermore, the apartheid state experienced opportunities for the emergence of capacity gaps, some of which have led to the emergence of vigilante groups.

This section has established that the apartheid regime can be considered weak, with its determination to protect the regime as its only indicator of strength. Ironically, its strength in security led to the capacity gap frequently seized by vigilante groups, owing to the states

disregard of the majority of the population. Vigilante groups that emerged during apartheid can be identified as the ‘Young Lions’, the *Witdoeke* and the Manenberg Residents Movement. The section that follows will examine these vigilante groups and their acts of vigilantism.

3.5. Analysing Vigilantism during the Apartheid Era

Despite a longstanding history of vigilantism in South Africa, the apartheid era saw the emergence of surges of vigilante activity, much of which could be considered as the product of the crisis of the apartheid state (Plasket, 1989:165). According to Harris (2001:5), the apartheid state perceived vigilantism as any unlawful and violent act that was performed and that was politically motivated. Similarly, Haysom (1989) argues that the 1980s saw the institutionalisation of vigilantism in South Africa; as the violence associated with vigilante activity could often be linked to the economic and political factors of the apartheid system. The late 1980s saw the rise of vigilantism as the state was no longer able to maintain social control in black communities as vigilante groups in these areas sought to restore the balance of power, as well as improve everyday living conditions for people of colour (Haysom, 1989).

Plasket (1989:169) and Haysom (1989) are in agreement when arguing that the emergence of the ‘maximum force’ policing policy, implemented by the State Security Council (SSC) under the apartheid regime, resulted in mass security force operations in black areas; namely roadblocks, raids, disruption of gatherings, unlawful detention, and the use of lethal force, which resulted in the rise of vigilante activity in these areas against the increased oppression of the state. The violence enacted by the state, the liberation movement and the vigilante groups in the black communities led to the temporary state of emergency declared in July 1985 to March 1986, which then resurfaced in June 1986 and continuing until 1990 (Plasket, 1989:169, and Karimakwenda, 2019:562). Moreover, the apartheid state derived benefits from the chaos created by vigilantism. The apartheid state revelled in the destabilisation caused by vigilantism, especially in black communities, as they could point to ‘black on black’ violence, and suffering and damage in these communities at the hands of its own people, in an attempt to further their agenda as being the only group capable of providing some relief and stability and ensure that the white minority stay in power.

Therefore, this section will examine the examples of vigilantism mentioned in this chapter by using the analytical framework for classifying vigilantism, as illustrated in chapter two. Firstly,

a discussion of vigilante groups and their activities will be provided, after which the three characteristics from the analytical framework will be identified, in order to classify the type of vigilantism that occurred. By discussing the vigilante groups and their activities and applying the analytical framework, this section will allow for the classification of the instances of vigilantism to be classified as either crime control vigilantism, social group control vigilantism, or regime control vigilantism.

3.5.1. The 'Young Lions'

The group known as the 'Young Lions' became notorious for their extreme methods used in fighting the apartheid state and furthering the agenda of the liberation struggle by going above and beyond the limits of the movement (Karimakwenda, 2019:560; Buur & Jensen, 2004:142). According to Karimakwenda (2019:560), Seekings (1993:21,31,44) and Buur and Jensen (2004:142), the 'Young Lions' was labelled as a vigilante group by the apartheid state as they were loosely aligned with the liberation struggle but still maintained their own group identity. Group membership was informal with young men joining in on activities spontaneously. The group engaged in cruel methods and embraced violence, all in the name of dismantling the apartheid state and achieving liberation by any means necessary. As the country experienced increased resistance to the white minority government, and with the majority of the liberation movement leaders being detained and sent into exile, vigilante groups such as the Young Lions seized many emerging opportunities to lead the struggle according to their own brand of violence and means to get things done (Karimakwenda, 2019:562).

When looking at the case of vigilantism during apartheid, such as the 'Young Lions', it can be acknowledged that their activities were very public and were not performed in secret. Moreover, this group openly announced its association with the liberation movement. Additionally, the 'Young Lions' used violence as their main means of confrontation. These violent acts served as both punishment and warning to the victims, also striking fear into the hearts of others to ensure compliance with what the group hoped to achieve.

The 'Young Lions' was motivated by the struggles of the black communities under the apartheid regime. Through their acts of violence, they hoped to not only rid the community of those who supported the apartheid regime but also sought to fight for freedom by any means necessary to improve the circumstances of those living in black communities. Moreover, the

group sought to disrupt the apartheid system in any way they could, most often by attacking apartheid security forces, when present in their communities and prompting other groups to join in. The ‘Young Lions’ was notorious for their use of violence. They often made use of the most barbaric methods to instil fear in community members, as well as the apartheid security forces. Community members suspected of being collaborators of the state would become victims of public necklacing, which at the time was a common practice among various groups of dealing with *impimpi* (informants or collaborators). These young men would use petrol bombs to bomb the houses of suspected collaborators; they would stage blitz attacks on police officers during protests; moreover, those suspected of crimes in black neighbourhoods suffered informal hearings and unlawful punishments such as *sjambok* beatings at the hands of the ‘Young Lions’ members (Karimakwenda, 2019:563; Buur & Jensen, 2004; Buur, 2010).

According to Seekings (1993:80-82) and Karimakwenda (2019:565) the implication of the ‘Young Lions’ participating in politically motivated violence, which was overlooked and tolerated by many all in the name of freedom, made these young men susceptible to participating in other forms of lawlessness, such as robbery, sexual violence, and other forms of criminality. Glaser (2005) augments this idea as he suggests that policing under apartheid was aimed at political control, while little attention was given to civil policing by formal security agencies, especially within black communities; as a result, criminality was able to grow rampant in these communities under the immense political unrest, unchecked by official authorities. This lack of oversight would allow opportunities for groups such as ‘the Young Lions’ to not only take the law into their own hands within their communities but also provided them with the opportunity to establish peoples’ courts and hold informal hearings and pass down punishments to deal with alleged criminals in their own way and exercise their brand of justice within their communities (Glaser, 2005:122).

Regarding the discussion above, the analytical framework can be considered. This will ensure that this study can identify the key characteristics associated with vigilantism, that is, the structure of the group, the nature and methods of vigilante activity, and the motive and objectives of the vigilante group and their actions. Therefore, given the information available on the ‘Young Lions’ as discussed in this section, it can be determined that the structure and organisation of this vigilante group are made up of loose and informal membership. An additional feature of this group’s structure is that its members are aligned with the liberation struggle, particularly the ANC. The nature and methods of the activities carried out by the

‘Young Lions’ can be noted as being violent in nature, employing the use of brutal methods such as bombings, necklacing and beatings. As this group was structurally linked to the liberation movement, many of their attacks were motivated by anti-apartheid/anti-regime sentiments. The objective of their vigilante behaviour was primarily associated with weakening the regime and strengthening the position of the liberation movement. However, while the group started as being politically motivated, it must be noted that this group also engaged in general criminal activity within their communities. As a result, the case of the ‘Young Lions’ can be classified as a vigilante group practising social group control vigilantism, as the group advocated for a change in the values and belief systems within society under the apartheid system.

3.5.2. The *Witdoeke*

According to Dawes, Tredoux, and Feinstein (1989:16-17), Buur and Jensen (2004:142), Cole (1987:10) and Haysom (1989), the group known as the *Witdoeke* were believed to be community members of the Crossroads squatter area in the Cape which was made up of various informal settlement neighbourhoods such as Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension, Portland Cement camp. Group membership was not a formal process, as people joined whenever an incident occurred. People would also often join if they saw some value of incentive in siding with the state. The leaders of these neighbourhoods formed the group referred to as the *Witdoeke* and were considered to be right-winged groups that were state-sanctioned or collaborators of the state as they often worked to impose the conditions of the state within their community (Lodge & Nasson, 1991; South African Press Association, 1997).

During 1986 the apartheid regime sought to relocate the Crossroads community members to Khayelitsha in order to exert better control over the black population in the Cape; however, this was met with much resistance amongst some community leaders and residents of Crossroads (Cole, 1987:10; Haysom, 1989; South African Press Association, 1997). When community leaders met to vote on the move, it appeared only three leaders were opposed to relocation. Those who did not oppose to the relocation of the community were encouraged by state authorities to ensure the removal of the Crossroads community members (Cole, 1987:20-11; Haysom, 1989; South African Press Association, 1997). According to the writings of Cole (1987:11-12) and Haysom (1989) during 17 May 1986 and 12 June 1986, immense unrest erupted in the Crossroads community, as the state-sanctioned *Witdoeke* commanded by

community leaders in favour of the relocation led the charge in the violent destruction of the community. The forced removal of the Crossroads community members by the *Witdoeke* was met with resistance, as many community members and anti-apartheid activists resisted. However, the *Witdoeke* were armed with weapons, tear gas, and incendiary devices provided by the state security forces, who were seen assisting the vigilante group in terrorising the community to ensure the forced removal. The group engaged in attacks against those who resisted the forced removals, destruction of property as the houses in the informal settlement were burnt down and bombed, people were beaten and tear-gassed in attempts to get them to leave the area (Cole, 1987:11-12; Haysom, 1989; South African Press Association, 1997). This devastating uprising saw 13 community members dead, 75 injured, and 70 000 community members displaced and forced to relocate (Cole, 1987:12; Haysom, 1989; South African Press Association, 1997).

Once relocated to Khayelitsha, the *Witdoeke*, and any other citizens aligned with the apartheid regime were often recruited by state security forces to form part of the *kitskonstabels* (a deputized constable in the police force) (Cole, 1987:12; Dawes, Tredoux, & Feinstein, 1989:17-18). According to Fine (1989:45), the *kitskonstabels* were an organisation created by the state to administer a strategy of black on black policing to ensure control in black communities. The *kitskonstabels* were then either formally employed in the black police force or were allowed to operate informally as state-sanctioned vigilantes (Fine, 1989:45). During the late 1980s, the *kitskonstabels* were used by the state to inform on the para-military Self Defence Units (SDU) of the black communities; these SDU were considered structures of the liberation struggle to fight for the freedom of the nation (Cole, 1987:16; Fine, 1989:45).

Literature regarding the *Witdoeke* was rather limited as it was one of the few state-sanctioned vigilante groups and their operations were rather spontaneous and limited to a small number of vigilante activity. However, when considering the analytical framework and the information given, it can be determined that the group was structurally made up of loose, informal memberships; and those that joined in the activities of the group were politically aligned to the apartheid regime as the group was state-sanctioned. The activities of the *Witdoeke*, particularly the events that occurred at Crossroads in 1986, were planned violent attacks, and state-supplied weaponry. The property of squatter camp residents was destroyed, those who resisted the forced removals were violently attacked, and vigilante members resorted to various methods of violence to ensure the removal of the informal settlers, such as, beatings, tear gas, arson, etc.

The objective of the group was to assist the state by acting on its behalf in relocating residents of the informal settlement. This group aimed to instil fear and control into community members on behalf of the state to ensure compliance with the apartheid regime. The emergence of the *Witdoeke*, their transformation into *kitskonstables* and the use of these so-called vigilante organisations to further the apartheid state agenda served as useful examples of how the state used vigilante groups within the black community to impose its rule and maintain law and order. Therefore, the example of the *Witdoeke* turned *kitskonstables* can be classified as regime control vigilantism. This type of vigilantism aims to preserve the status quo; it works to combat any challenges to the political system.

3.5.3. Manenberg Residents' Movement

The Manenberg Residents' Movement was established during the mid-1970s in the Cape Flats, made up mainly of middle-aged coloured men. Group members would meet regularly to discuss the state of the neighbourhood and strategies to ensure community safety (Fourchard, 2011:615; Kirsch, 2010:139). This group was widely considered the peacemakers within the community. However, when they encountered alleged criminals in the community the group members would be served justice with corporal punishment, and in rare cases, they would mobilise community members to confront violent gangs within the community (Fourchard, 2011:615; Kirsch, 2010:139). The main objectives of this group were to reduce crime within the community, ensure security, control loitering of unsavoury characters, and oppose any illegal businesses such as *shebeens*. The groups most common practices were often peaceful as they relied on passive intimidation tactics, protests, community meetings, etc (Kirsch, 2010:139). When applying Harris' (2001) definition of vigilantism to the case of the Manenberg Residents' Movement, it can be argued that this organisation can be classified as a vigilante group. The organisation was generally known, as they made their presence known throughout the community through neighbourhood watch groups and patrols. They used and threatened with violence against alleged criminals. Their means of punishing alleged criminals served as a warning to other perpetrators, showing what could be expected as punishment if they were caught or suspected of committing crimes; and their methods of intimidation generated fear throughout the community.

According to Fourchard (2011:616), this group could be considered to be state-sanctioned, as they were able to perform their duties freely within their community without fear of persecution

by the state police forces. However, following the political uprising in Soweto during the late 1970s, this group became politically aligned with the anti-apartheid movement. As a result, the apartheid government ordered the group to be disbanded, classifying it as a vigilante organisation in direct opposition to the state. Despite being disbanded, members of the Manenberg Residents' Movement formed smaller groups which became known as Neighbourhood Watch groups. The trend of Neighbourhood Watch groups spread to various coloured communities within the Cape and took on responsibilities similar to those of the original movement, such as ensuring community safety and security but with a less violent approach. According to Fourchard (2011:617), these leaders of these Neighbourhood Watch groups would later band together to form the post-apartheid vigilante group known as PAGAD⁹. The Manenberg Residents' Movement, which later became Neighbourhood Watch groups throughout coloured communities, were primarily focussed on ensuring the safety of community members, maintaining law and order, and serving justice to those found to be breaking the law (Kirsch, 2010:139).

As with the *Witdoeke*, information on the Manenberg Residents' Movement is quite limited; this could be owing to the groups' peaceful nature in ensuring law and order in the Cape communities. When applying the analytical framework, it is evident that the groups were made up of more formal structures, as members were limited to those residing in the Cape communities. The nature and activities of this group were peaceful, making use of community meetings to strategise safety protocols, protests, and patrols; although the group did make use of the threat of violence when it encountered alleged criminals. Moreover, this group was motivated by maintaining the safety and security of the Cape communities in which it operated. Therefore, this group and its activities can be classified as crime control vigilantism, as the group's activities were aimed at those alleged to committed crimes in the neighbourhoods and aimed to ensure law and order.

3.6. Conclusion

The system of apartheid left a longstanding legacy of institutionalised racism that would be experienced for years to come. This legacy is a result of the policies implemented by the state to disenfranchise people of colour and advance the white minority in politics, economics, and

⁹ PAGAD as a vigilante group to be discussed in the next chapter on vigilantism during the democratic era.

socially. Furthermore, while possessing the resources to provide all its citizens with political goods, the apartheid state, in its need to defend the regime, fell just short in providing all these political goods and thereby causing the state to be classified as a weak state with some elements of state strength. This classification was due to the weakness to perform economically, politically, and socially outweighing its single strength of providing security for the regime.

In addition, the inability of the state to provide political goods led to the emergence of capacity gaps which were seized by vigilante groups such as the 'Young Lions', Manenberg Residents' Movement and the *Witdoeke*. These vigilante groups were used by both the state, to ensure the regime, and the liberation struggle, to dismantle the apartheid state. They also acted in their own capacity to ensure law and order within their communities. The neglect by the apartheid state to provide all South Africans with equal access to legal structures of the justice system led to citizens having to provide informal security structures for themselves and their communities using vigilante groups as facilitators. Vigilantism under the apartheid state, while strongly considered a manifestation of community policing, became entwined with the fight for freedom in the 1980s, being used by both sides of the struggle. Furthermore, when applying the analytical framework to the incidences of vigilantism that occurred during apartheid, it is evident that the structure and organisation of vigilante groups during that time varied from formal to informal memberships, with many groups being politically aligned. This was to be expected given the political climate at the time. The methods used by apartheid vigilante groups were mostly violent; this could be because of the destructive nature in which these instances of vigilantism occurred. Thus, it can be said that instances of vigilantism during the apartheid era were greatly influenced by the circumstance from which they emerged.

Chapter 4: Analysing Incidents of Vigilantism during the Democratic Era

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter focused on vigilantism that occurred during the apartheid era, a period in South Africa's history characterised by inequality, violence and social unrest. Many of the incidents of vigilantism, identified during that time and in the previous chapter, were characterised as acts of violence against the apartheid regime or in response to acts committed by those in support of the apartheid regime; thereby suggesting that incidence of vigilantism during this time was primarily motivated by the political struggles. Comparably, to answer the research question, this study will look at how the democratic regime has governed and at vigilantism in this period, in order to produce findings for both the apartheid and democratic eras that will be compared in chapter five. Therefore the first half of this chapter will focus on providing contextual data that can be assessed using the state strength indicators to measure state strength and to provide insight into the circumstances as to how and why vigilantism occurred during democracy. Additionally, this assessment will allow for the identification of capacity gaps which have led to the emergence of vigilante groups. These vigilante groups and their activities will then be discussed in order to apply the analytical framework to classify the types of vigilantism that occurred during democracy. This will be achieved by establishing the key characteristics of democratic vigilantism to identify the similarities and difference of vigilantism under democracy.

This chapter will offer a broad discussion of the democratic era to provide an overview of South Africa and its transition to democracy. Secondly, South Africa, under the democratic regime, would be reviewed according to the indicators of state strength. This will serve as a context by which to understand the circumstances in which vigilantism emerges and thrives. These indicators have been identified as the state of security, political climate, economic climate and the social climate. Furthermore, this chapter will assess the level of state strength based on the strong/weak state model, as well as identifying the capacity gaps that occur under the democratic regime which were seized by vigilante groups. Finally, these cases of vigilantism will be discussed and classified according to the vigilantism classification system using the analytical framework, as discussed in chapter two.

4.2. A Brief Overview of South Africa's Democracy

South Africa emerged from apartheid into a period known as the 'transition to democracy' during the early 1990s, which eventually led to the establishment of the first democratic constitution, followed by the country's first democratic elections in 1994 and thereby officially introducing the country as a democracy (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013:2). Following the devastation caused by apartheid, South Africa sought to build a democracy based on the foundation of pursuing a diverse, multi-racial, equal, and just society for all citizens (Kotzé & Du Toit, 1995:27). South Africa embarked on a mission to ensure of reconciliation, restoration and unity in the years following the transition to democracy, with the freedom fighters turned political party, the African National Congress (ANC) at the helm, having won every national election for the past 25 years (Henrard, 2002:21; Alence & Pitcher, 2019:5).

While the ANC had started their reign full of promises of 'a better life' for all, the ruling party faced the struggles of the apartheid legacy, such as socio-economic inequalities, which would take years to rectify (Buur, 2008:572; Steyn-Kotze, 2017:29). The ANC pledged these promises from the inauguration of the first democratic president, Nelson Mandela, to the current president Cyril Ramaphosa and all those in between. Every electoral campaign and victory that followed, the ANC pledged to uphold the values of the Mandela legacy of equality, restoration, and inclusivity (Alence & Pitcher, 2019:5). However, according to Alence and Pitcher (2019:11) and Steyn-Kotze (2017:29) more than 20 years later and the country still faces many socio-economic disparities, many of which find their origins stemming from the apartheid era; proving that the ANC continuously struggles to create significant change in addressing inequalities of the past and uplifting the impoverished, despite the continued support enjoyed at the polls. Furthermore, following the transition the new democratic dispensation was duty bound to eradicate apartheid legacies, prioritize development and the well-being of all South African citizens, and manage the country's resources in a sustainable manner, thus the post-apartheid government was tasked with ensuring good governance on all levels of government (Rapatsa:2016:65). Thus, contrary to the aforementioned ideas by Alence and Pitcher (2019:11) and Steyn-Kotze (2017:29), Rapatsa (2016:65) argues that the legacy of apartheid cannot be pinpointed as the sole determining factor for South Africa's socio-economic disparities post-apartheid, instead it should be considered as a contributing factor in conjunction with other factors such as poor governance exercised by the new dispensation.

While the South African government continuously experiencing struggles in addressing the legacy of apartheid, it has introduced many initiatives to implement change and has achieved commendable accomplishments along the way. Alence and Pitcher (2019:10-12) identified and discusses some of these achievements:

- the Constitutional Court established in 1995, which is regarded as the highest court in the country, aimed at defending the constitution and protecting human rights;
- the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established in 1996, aimed at dealing with the human rights violations committed during apartheid; and
- Framework of the New Economic Growth Path established in 2010, aimed at enhancing economic growth, increasing employment creation and equity.

The negotiations for a peaceful transition, the construction of the constitution, and the first democratic elections acted as powerful symbols that set the tone for South Africa's democratic regime. At the onset, the primary goal of South Africa's transition focused on the political freedom of people, inclusive representation of all interests in government, and growing the local economy aimed at reintegration into the global economy (Habib, 2003:234-235). Furthermore, the ANC has attempted to implement various strategies over the years to improve the socio-economic conditions of its people, some of which have been successful and some which have failed. Rapatsa (2016:65) argues that where the ANC has failed to implement its ambitious policies and/or failed to meet the demands of the Constitution regarding transformation and development for South Africa and its people has served as a demonstration of the state's lack of capacity, its inability to manage resources and a display of poor governance.

The following section will provide a more detailed account of South Africa's democracy, through examining the South African state under democracy based on the four indicators of the weak/strong state model, namely, the state of security, the political climate, the social climate, and the economic climate.

4.3. Contextualisation of the Democratic State

This section of the chapter will contextualise South Africa's democracy according to the four indicators of the weak/strong state model, thereby adding more detail to comprehend the

experience of life under democracy in comparison to apartheid fully. It also aims to examine the South African state under democracy to establish the level of state strength according to the indicators mentioned above and provide a further understanding of the new democratic government. This will assist in identifying capacity gaps that exist under democracy that could be opportunistic to vigilante groups and vigilante activity.

4.3.1. The state of Security

According to Section 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, every citizen of the Republic has the right to freedom and security; hence, each person has the right to be free from violence. This implies that the state has a duty to provide its citizens with a safe environment in which to live and it must provide citizens with security measures that deter and combat violence (Republic of South Africa, 1996). According to Fourchard (2011:608), the commitment to providing security to the people of the nation was championed by the state as South Africa transitioned to democracy. Moreover, the security measures, as mentioned in the Constitution is apparent in the criminal justice system of the state which includes, the police, the courts, attorneys, and prisons or corrections/rehabilitation facilities.

The democratic regime was faced with many challenges and reforms, emerging from the apartheid era, that needed to be implemented to restructure a divided South Africa according to democratic values (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:71). Montesh & Basdeo (2012:71) argues that one such challenge was the demilitarisation of the South African state. The White Paper on the National Defence of the Republic of South Africa 1996 discusses how the approach to defending the South African Republic would be transformed under the newly elected democratic government, more specifically, under the direction of the newly appointed Minister of Defence, Joe Modise (Republic of South Africa, 1996). At its core, the White Paper (Republic of South Africa, 1996) called for the demilitarisation of the state. The newly elected government was focused on unravelling the military and police services and their roles and function. This would be achieved by withdrawing the military from internal security duties to ensure that the military's primary focus was on issues concerning national security. The Department of Defence was committed to transforming itself and its organisations by reassigning military duties from the police, South African Police Service (SAPS), back to the military, South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and vice versa (Republic of South Africa, 1996). The new dispensation saw it fit to transform the military's role under the

democratic regime. This new role involved protecting and defending the nation, its territory, and its people against domestic and foreign threats, and ensured that the military only be deployed to support SAPS under very specific conditions and were limited to certain functions (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:77-78).

Under the democratic regime, the South African Police Service was expressly tasked with the everyday policing of citizens and crime prevention (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:82). Steinberg (2011:349) states that the new dispensation faced a tremendous challenge in deciding how the state would handle the management of law and order, crime control, and overall safety and security of non-state actors in society. The approach taken by the state was to align SAPS with a two-pronged strategy, which would have them focus on crime prevention and community policing in order to meet these goals and ensure the stability of the regime. Moreover, the notion of crime prevention as a strategy to enforce public safety and security by the police force also gained popularity under many democracies; this strategy involved developing a set of protocols and programmes to combat and/or reduce the incidence of crime by determining risk factors within communities that are most likely to lead to criminal offences or the victimisation of community members (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:82; Steinberg, 2011:350). Montesh and Basdeo (2012:82) argue that the risk factors are most often associated with the socio-economic issues present in a community and can thus be used as determinants of possible criminal activity. Furthermore, this strategy involves including various stakeholders to participate in crime prevention strategies within their local communities (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:82). This approach, also known as partnership policing or social crime prevention strategies, is mentioned in the Police Services Act of 1995, which discusses how participation from various stakeholders within communities can enhance the abilities of SAPS to combat and prevent crime, dissuading feelings of fear and anxiety in community members concerning the possibility of crime and violence, and encouraging a commitment to law and order in society (Super, 2016:330). These crime prevention strategies involving community participation as an indicator is often used, in measuring the effectiveness of crime prevention strategies for SAPS (Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:82; Super, 2016:330).

In the case of South Africa, with its history of violence, crime and violence under democracy have reached exponential heights, causing widespread concern amongst citizens, businesses, social movements and organisations, and political parties (Schönteich & Louw, 2001; Montesh & Basdeo, 2012:91; Super, 2016:331). Schönteich & Louw (2001) report that after a few years

under a democratic regime South Africa experienced an increase in criminal activity during the late 1990s, particularly violent crimes as the country recorded a 5% increase in reported crime between 1997 and 1998 and a 7% increase from 1998 to 1999. Super (2016:376-378), Shaw and Gastrow (2001:245-250) and Schönteich & Louw (2001) provide various reasons that could explain the high levels of crime in South Africa post-1994. These include: a culture of violence, rapid urbanisation, organised crime, inefficient criminal justice system, a proliferation of arms, and misguided youth.

Figure 4: Causes of high crime post-apartheid



Compiled for the purpose of this study from the works of Super (2016), Shaw & Gastrow (2001), and Schönteich & Louw (2001).

Steinberg (2011:350) states that as per the Police Services Act 1995, in the early years of democracy, all police stations implemented strategies geared toward community policing by establishing civilian-police consulting programmes to varying degrees. The Act also stipulates the requirements of every police station to enforce the mandate of crime prevention. Furthermore, Montesh & Basdeo (2012:82-85) discuss the four key crime prevention

strategies, used individually or in combination with one another, which would ensure public safety and security under the direction of SAPS:

- Crime prevention through social development – involves various social, education and training initiatives aimed at possible criminal offenders to deter them from committing criminal offences, e.g. a community-based skills programme that can lead to employment opportunities;
- Community-based crime prevention – involves the participation of community members and respected organisations in actively preventing crime, e.g., through neighbourhood watch programme or community police forums;
- Situational crime prevention – involves changing the immediate environment of communities that present as high risk to reduce the opportunities for criminal activity, increase the risk and cost of getting caught and minimise the benefits of criminal activity, e.g. building a park or community centre for public use to increase surveillance in public areas of the community; and
- Reintegration programmes – involves programmes for individuals who are criminal offenders to prevent them from re-offending, e.g. life-skills programmes for criminal offenders.

While the state focused police attention on crime prevention strategies and incorporating community members, organisations and other community stakeholders, it became apparent over the first few years of democracy that some communities missed out on these new strategies of policing (Steinberg, 2011:359-360). These communities, typically populated by people of colour, have been neglected by SAPS and their democratic policies of social policing. These communities are neglected in as far as the police have displayed a lack of responsiveness, and when SAPS does respond in cases of criminal activity, they lack efficiency in investigations (Steinberg, 2011:359; Fourchard, 2011:608).

In addition, Fourchard (2011:608) argues that this is not a new phenomenon to marginalised South African communities, as these communities have a history of forming their own anti-crime organisations, e.g., neighbourhood watch groups, people's courts, street committees, and vigilante organisations. Therefore, as a result, the people in these communities have had to resort to extraordinary measures to defend themselves. These groups enforced their brand of

justice against criminals and crime prevention tactics to ensure law and order and thereby displaying a type of vigilante justice in the absence of police protection (Steinberg, 2011:359). However, Fourchard (2011:610-611) argues that a distinction can be formed between vigilantism and community policing as vigilantism is more concerned with brandishing its own type of punishment, often extremely violent, when dealing with criminals, while community policing does not resort to extreme violence but rather is more concerned with co-operating with the police and allowing the police to do the majority of the work.

The community-based policing and crime prevention approach has become a core part of police practice in South Africa post-apartheid. Aside from restructuring the defence forces during the democratic era, specifically, separating the SANDF and SAPS and reassigning new roles and functions, the democratic state placed much emphasis on engaging stakeholders in the process of ensuring law and order, safety and security, and ensuring stability in the democratic regime by trying to keep crime and violence as low as possible.


4.3.2. The Political Climate

South Africa's transition to democracy was a momentous occasion for millions of people, both locally and internationally. After years of violence, repression and authoritarianism the apartheid regime finally came to an end, and peaceful negotiations for the transition to democracy ensued from 1990 to 1994 (Von Holdt, 2013:589; Beall, Gelb & Hassim, 2005:681). The negotiations process, named the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), was centred around the issues of resolving the few social conflicts that still occurred during the early 1990s, the redistribution of power, restructuring the social order and the economy to ensure diversity and inclusivity, and restructuring institutions (Beall, Gelb, & Hassim, 2005:681). The parties involved in structuring the new South Africa were the NP, ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), all of whom represented various groups in South Africa (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013:2; von Holdt, 2013:589, Beall, Gelb, & Hassim, 2005:681-682). Following the first democratic election in 1994, which was won by the ANC, South Africa experienced a dominant one-party system with the ANC winning every national election that followed (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2013:2; Steyn-Kotze, 2017:30).

The ANC has had five presidents for the Republic of South Africa, namely, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe, Jacob Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa; with Mbeki and Zuma

being the only two to serve two terms (The Presidency, 2020). Although many opposition parties existed, none of them has possessed the necessary grit or confidence of the people to win at the polls. Moreover, Steyn-Kotze (2017:29-30) draws attention to low voter turnout over the years as a viable explanation for the ANC's unceasing victory, arguing that surveys have reported an overall withdrawal from the democratic process as voters become increasingly politically ambiguous.

Figure 5: Timeline of Democratic Heads of State since 1994



Compiled for the purpose of this study from The Presidency (2020).

Ten years into democracy the Republic faced a one-party dominant system with the ANC having convinced the majority of the population that the party remained committed to a democratic, non-racial regime (Beall, Gelb & Hassim, 2005:682). Twenty-five years into democracy the Republic remains committed to democratic values, and while the ANC continues to dominate at national elections, the political environment has grown quite robust in recent years (Freedom House, 2020;). Several new political parties and civil organisations have emerged, and opposition parties have gained significant support over recent election, e.g.,

former Democratic Alliance (DA) member Patricia de Lille split from the party in 2018 and launched her own political party, named the GOOD party, which won two seats in the National Assembly following the 2019 elections (Freedom House, 2020). However, South Africa is widely considered to be a flawed democracy (The Economist, 2020; Omarjee, 2017). While South Africa enjoys a democratic system, the government has been plagued by allegations of corruption; comprehensive anticorruption laws and several agencies tasked with combating corruption exist, but enforcement has historically been inadequate (The Economist, 2020). A most recent example of the state's failure to root out corruption lies in the Zondo Commission of Inquiry launched by government in 2018 to investigate allegation of state capture (The Economist, 2020).

The Constitution set the foundation for the Bill of Rights; it promises a range of basic freedoms for all South African citizens, guaranteeing civil and political rights for all (Rapatsa, 2015:208-209; Southall, 2001:161-162; Masipa, 2018:1). The 1996 Constitution was constructed with the purpose to fully transform the South African society, focusing on political, social and economic transformation, specifically targeting change amongst previously disadvantaged communities (Rapatsa, 2015:2009). Moreover, the Constitution contains the highest laws that govern South Africa, and its laws are protected and upheld by the Constitutional Court (Rapatsa, 2015:2009; Mubangizi, 2012:1; Southall, 2001:162). The democratic state, unlike the apartheid state, derives its governing authority and legitimacy from the Constitution and South Africa is therefore known as a constitutional democracy (Rapatsa, 2015: 210). Furthermore, Mubangizi (2012:4) argues that the Constitution is a document built on and committed to protecting and promoting human rights, which include civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. This was extremely significant in the South African context considering its history of human rights violations. The post-1994 state's commitment to democratic values and to fostering a culture promoting human rights far extended the Constitution; several institutions were developed to protect the democracy and hold the state and various actors accountable (Mubangizi, 2012:10; Republic of South Africa, 1996). The Constitution lists these institutions under Section 182, and they include the (The Republic of South Africa, 1996).

Table 5: State Institutions Developed post-1994 to promote democratic values and human rights	
Institution	Functions
Public Protector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigate any conduct in state affairs or public administration across all spheres of government • To report any misconduct and take remedial action
Auditor-General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit and report on the accounts, financial statements and financial management of all spheres of government and state institutions, or institutions funded by the National Revenue Fund or Provincial Revenue fund or by a local municipality
South African Human Rights Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote respect for human rights • Foster a culture of human rights • Promote the protection, development and attainment of human rights • Monitor and assess the observance of human rights • Investigate and report alleged or suspected incidents of human rights violations and take remedial action
Commission for Gender Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote respect for gender equality • Promote the protection, development and attainment of gender equality • Monitor, investigate, report and advise on issues of gender equality

Electoral Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage elections of national, provincial, and municipal legislative bodies as prescribed by the national legislature • Ensure free and fair elections • Declare the results of elections within a specific period of time as prescribed by the national legislature
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote respect for rights cultural, religious and linguistic communities • Recommend the establishment or recognition of councils for communities in SA according to national legislation • Promote and develop peace, national unity, tolerance among cultural, religious, and linguistic communities on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association

Adapted from the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996).

Despite the struggle for democracy, and its various achievements in overcoming challenges involving freedoms, equality, and human rights, the ANC democratic led state struggled with allegations of corruption, distrust in leadership, issues of service delivery, all of which contribute to problems with legitimacy (Bernstein & Applebaum, 2014:25). These flaws indicate the problematic nature of the ANC led government and its display play of poor governance. Despite 25 years of experience in leading the country the ANC led government has lacked the capacity to manage the country's resources and has continually experienced challenges involving the political, economic, and social aspects of life. Deep-rooted issues like discrimination, exploitation, wealth accumulation, and misrepresentation of citizens interests remain in spite of the democratic state's commitment to address and redress these issues through policies and reforms. Inequality levels in South Africa are among the highest in the world, only a small percentage of the population benefits from large state industries, and the economy is controlled by a relatively small number of people belonging to the political and business elite (The Economist, 2020).

4.3.3. The Economic Climate

As the ANC navigated their way through the first few years of leading South Africa, they were tasked with reshaping the economic climate that the country had found itself in post-apartheid. The democratic government structured many of their new economic policies on the foundation of development and strategies advancing previously disadvantaged persons. These policies include: the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994, aimed at relieving poverty through subsidisation; the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) of 1996, a structural adjustment strategy aimed to reduce the country's debt to GDP ratio; the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AGISA-SA) framework of 2005; and the National Development Plan of 2013 (Luiz, 2002:594; Gelb, 2007:17; Bernstein & Applebaum, 2014:5-6, Masipa, 2018:6). Moreover, Barchiesi (1997:193) and Beresford (2009:393) suggest that the economic policies of the democratic government took on a free-market approach.

According to Bernstein & Applebaum (2014:10) and Gelb (2007:17), the first ten years of democracy involved the implementation of new economic policies, which led to South Africa experiencing a limited degree of economic growth, varying under each presidency. One of the first economic policies implemented by the newly elected democratic government during 1994 was the Redistribution and Development Programme (RDP) (Luiz, 2002:595, Bernstein & Applebaum, 2014:10; Gelb, 2007:17). The core purpose of the RDP was to alleviate poverty through subsidisation. The state achieved this by investing in a variety of basic needs, i.e., job creation, housing, water and sanitation, healthcare, welfare, and many more (Republic of South Africa, 1994). With the state subsidising these needs, the expectation was that the demand for goods and services would grow and, in turn, the production would increase to meet the growing the demand and thereby growing the economy (Republic of South Africa, 1994). Economists have critiqued the RDP as being a comprehensive vision for improving levels of poverty and encouraging development in theory, however, in practice the financial planning and management aspect of this policy was run poorly by the government (Luiz, 2002:595; Gelb, 2007:17).

Moreover, Luiz (2002:595-596) and Blumenfeld (1996:4-7) report that following the first year of its implementation, the RDP did not meet its required targets as set out by the state, as

mismanaged funds were allocated as under spent and deadlines for housing projects were not met. Moreover, these authors attribute the failure of the RDP to the following:

- Conceptual uncertainties – a broad vision of the project allowed for various stakeholders to have different interpretations of what the programme was intended to be;
- Funding – the affordability of the programme was questioned as the projected five-year budget was a staggering R40 billion to R700 billion;
- Institutional uncertainties – the programme was never allocated the proper institutional resources, while the programme fell under the office of the presidency it was overseen by various ministries forming a joint committee, causing ‘territorial’ problems between departments;
- Implementation failures – few projects came to fruition than were approved as a result of a lack of capacity to deliver, the state mistakenly assumed it could complete such a tremendous project so early in its leadership; and
- Ideological struggles – the programme was held ransom by differing ideologies within the ANC alliances.

As the RDP produced less than favourable results in reinvigorating the development of the South African economy, the ANC led government realigned its economic policies towards macroeconomics with the introduction of GEAR in 1996, shifting away from redistribution toward foreign direct investment to grow the economy at a more rapid pace (Gelb, 2007:21; Luiz, 2002:597; Mosala, Venter, & Bain, 2017:333). In addition to the poorly performing RDP, the international market was hit with the global financial crisis 1996 which caused the inflow of capital to decline from R11,2 billion to R2.7 billion by mid-1996, and the depreciation of the exchange rate by 18% (Bernstein & Applebaum, 2014:5; Gelb, 2007:20). GEAR aimed to spur the annual economic growth, reduce the fiscal deficit, lower inflation, stabilise exchange rates, and improve the economic standing of South Africa in international markets by focusing on foreign markets (Mosala, Venter, & Bain, 2017:333). Various policies were implemented under GEAR to target fiscal growth, monetary and exchange rates, trade and industry (Department of Finance, 1996). These policies were implemented to achieve the aims of economic growth by increasing exports, stabilising the exchange rate and increasing foreign direct investment and domestic fixed investment (Department of Finance, 1996). Furthermore,

GEAR has been criticised by COSATU as being in direct conflict with the RDP, as it moves away from the focus on redistribution of income and economic opportunities for the previously disadvantaged and has done very little in its promise to improve employment (Gelb, 2007:26; Mosala, Venter, & Bain, 2017:333). Mosala, Venter and Bain (2017:333) argue that the overall impact of GEAR received mixed reviews as it succeeded in certain goals, such as, lowered interest rates, control of inflation rates and strengthening the position of financial institutions. However, GEAR underperformed in its promise to address inequality and poverty as they increased tremendously under the implementation of this economic policy, the GDP was guaranteed to grow 6% annually, but the GDP growth never exceeded 5%, and by 2000 foreign direct investment amounted to less than 1% of GDP (Mosala, Venter & Bain, 2017:333).

Following GEAR the AGISA-SA framework was introduced under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki in 2005. This policy, similarly to the RDP, was aimed toward the reduction of poverty and inequality. The initiative set out to target skills development and infrastructure, by prioritising sectors that involve a large and varied workforce, increasing the likelihood of employment opportunities, for example, the manufacturing industry (Gelb, 2007:26-27). AGISA-SA focused on the shared effort in ensuring economic growth, and it aimed to reduce poverty by 2010 and to halve unemployment from 28% to 14% by 2012 (Mosala, Venter & Bain, 2017:334). Additionally, according to Mosala, Venter & Bain (2017:334), AGISA-SA was committed to overcoming 'binding constraints' that ensured faster economic growth, such as:

- A volatile and overvalued rand;
- Infrastructure and investment backlogs;
- Shortage of suitably skilled workers;
- A lack of competition in various sectors;
- A heavy regulatory burden on small businesses;
- Increase in the cost of transport and services provided; and
- Deficiencies in state capacity and leadership.

With the inauguration of President Jacob Zuma, GEAR was replaced by the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010, which is a long term strategy stretching up to 2030 in order to achieve its goals.

It aims to address the challenges facing South Africa at the time which included unemployment, redistribution, poverty, and inequality (Morris, 2013; Mosala, Venter & Bain, 2017:334; National Development Plan-2030, 2012). While the NDP has several goals involving various sectors, its core economic goals are, to eliminate income poverty, and reduce inequality (National Development Plan-2030, 2012). Few studies have been conducted on the NGP and its progress toward its 2030 goals thus far. However, it can be inferred that irrespective of the economic policies implemented, unemployment, income inequality and poverty have been persistent issues that have yet to be successfully addressed by economic policy.

As the apartheid state-enforced segregated labour market practices and policies, it left a legacy of unskilled and poorly paid black labourers. The democratic state aimed to reinvigorate South Africa's labour market with labour legislation and associations, such as the Employment Equity Act of 1998, labour unions and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA), which altogether aim to ensure the protection of workers' rights, fair remuneration for all workers, and improve labour dispute resolution (Beresford, 2009:393; Natrass & Seekings, 2001:475; Barchiesi, 1997:193). According to Barchiesi (1997:193) and Beresford (2009:391), this reinvigoration of the labour market occurred through alliances via the ANC with organisations such as Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African Communist Party (SACP), also known as the tripartite alliance. Labour became a core topic on the post-1994 governments' agenda. The importance of labour markets and trade unions to the democratic government is understandable, as trade unions played a significant part in the liberation struggle during the 1980s, as well as the transition to democracy. However, this alliance had withered slightly during the late 1990s following the ANC led government's decision to adopt policies like GEAR, which did not coincide with the principles of COSATU (Beresford, 2009:393, Bernstein & Applebaum, 2014:20). According to Natrass and Seekings (2001:47), as post-apartheid South Africa developed, the labour market was no longer divided along racial lines but rather a new type of division had emerged; the labour market under democracy could be more accurately defined now according to class/income gaps. Although Natrass and Seekings (2001:52) argue that a correlation to race still exists, it is no longer the primary determining factor separating labour markets; alternatively, disparities in the labour market under democracy can also be more accurately explained now in terms of education, skills, the type of industry, and location.

While racial divisions still exist in the labour market of post-apartheid South Africa, it is no longer the primary determining factor by which to classify disparities. Economic inequalities can also be ascribed to gender, level of skill, disability, etc. Furthermore, policies such as EEA, have gone a long way in redressing employment inequality. Nonetheless, inequality, as well as unemployment and poverty, remain challenging issues under democracy. These issues are not solely economic in composition, but also affect the population on a social level as well, as will be discussed in the section that follows.


4.3.4. The Social Climate

The social climate is comprised of various aspects, including but not limited to, civil society, cultural diversity, education, human rights, gender inequality, welfare, human development, and so forth. This subsection will look at the role of civil society under democracy, how organisations and social movements are used to champion certain social issues, and how various actors have handled some of these issues.

The issue of service delivery is considered to be primarily economics-based, while other consider it to be a social issue. The economics perspective stems from the fact that it involves reforms concerning the redistribution of resources to achieve equality and accessibility for all; whereas from a social perspective service delivery has many social implications, particularly concerning the livelihood and wellbeing of citizens (Hemson, 2007:49). Mfene (2009:210) explains service delivery as being the government's commitment to public service to endorse and support the welfare of its communities. Thus, the wellbeing of communities and its citizens is the central factor of service delivery. Poor and marginalised communities with a history of suffering, have been promised a better life through improved service delivery in every election campaign since the advent of democracy (Hemson, 2007:49; Twala, 2014:159). However, the demand for service delivery has increased dramatically since 1994, and with the increasing demand, the government has failed to keep up. As a result, the public resorted to a historical strategy in the South African tradition to voice their discontent with the system and attempt to initiate change, namely, public protest (Twala, 2014:159). According to Hemson and Owusu-Ampomah (2004:512-213), Hemson (2007:49) and Twala (2014:161), the significance of service delivery lie in its ability to promote human development and human dignity in a society plagued by inequality; furthermore, products and goods produced through service delivery bridge the gap of inequality to a certain extent. Munslow and Mc Lennan (2009:9-10),

Karamoko (2011:10-11), and Twala (2014:162-165) provide various reasons as to why the South African government fails to provide service delivery effectively, these include:

Figure 6: Causes of poor service delivery in South Africa post-1994



Compiled using the works of Munslow & Mc Lennan (2009), Karamoko (2011) and Twala (2014).

Twala (2014:162) contends that while there may be other explanations for poor service delivery, the reasons mentioned in Figure 6 above are the most prevalent. The early years of the democratic regime have experienced frequent critiques and public protests regarding service delivery in South Africa, especially in the late 2000s. According to Karamoko (2011:10-11) and Twala (2014:165), service delivery protests increased per month, by an average of eight in 2007, nine in 2008, seventeen in 2009, and eighteen in 2010. The discontent

by South Africans participating in these protests was so extreme that protests often turned violent; protesters would engage in criminal acts, such as, destruction of private and public property, arson, physically attacking protesters and/or service delivery providers, physical attacks against the police, and looting (Karamoko, 2011:10-11; Twala, 2014:164). Where the state has failed to deliver, various civil society organisations have stepped up to fill the gaps left by the state to ensure the social development of poor communities. Organisations such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has provided numerous people with access to medication, treatments, and support in their fight against HIV/AIDS, and Cotlands, an organisation involved in early childhood development for children in marginalised communities (Gumede, 2018; & Bernstein & Applebaum, 2014:20).

A variety of organisations that make up South Africa's civil society play a significant role in partnering with local governments in the process of service delivery. Non-state actors such as non-government organisations (NGO), social movements, coalitions, advocacy groups, and professional associations, play a supplemental and supportive role to the government to advance community development (Hemson, 2007:20; Gumede, 2018). According to Kotzé & Du Toit (1995:28), Gumede (2018) and Shubane (1992:38), an engaged civil society is a fundamental feature of any democracy. Civil society bridges the gap between governments, state-aligned actors and communities, and it maintains the relationships between various stakeholders in society. Moreover, an essential task that the democratic government would endure for many years after the inauguration of the new democratic era would be to promote democratic values that the citizens of the country would admire and embrace in everyday life. Various surveys found that while a majority of citizens favoured democracy, many believed it should be practised with certain limitations, thus not embracing liberal democracy to its fullest extent (Southall, 2001:166). In addition, Shubane (1992:38) argues that a strong civil society would go a long way in bridging the gaps that exist as far as overcoming the legacies of apartheid that the government and its reforms could not overcome. While the apartheid era saw a separation of all things, including a "white civil society" aligned with the state versus a "black civil society" aligned with the liberation movement, this divide started disappearing as the democratic era began. The values of democracy were most tangible in civil society as the organisation united behind these values, such as fighting for human dignity, inclusivity, equality, diversity, multiculturalism. (Habib, 2003:228).

Habib (2003:238), Kotzé and Du Toit (1995:33), Gumede (2018) and Rapatsa (2015:215), have argued that civil society is a fundamental driving force in ensuring social development throughout society. Apart from promoting welfare in marginalised communities through assistance in filling the shortcomings of service delivery, civil society organisations have done an immense amount of work to encourage social development by focusing on various socio-economic issues in South African society (Rapatsa, 2015:215; Gumede, 2018). Some of these challenges include illiteracy, marginalisation, unemployment, crime, etc. (Beall, Gelb, & Hassim, 2005:682; Masipa, 2018:6; Rapatsa, 2015:215). A vast majority of these socio-economic issues faced by the larger party of South Africa's society are considered to be systemic issues that are a legacy of apartheid. Moreover, these issues have become the greatest source of social division in society today (Masipa, 2018:6; Beall, Gelb & Hassim, 2005:682). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that many of the social challenges faced by a majority of the South African population are related to socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution (Rapatsa, 2015:215). The continued presence of these social issues will increase the risk of intense instability and risk the sustainability of the democratic state (Masipa, 2018:6). The democratic state has attempted to ease inequalities with social assistance grants; however, these have not been sufficient in changing the conditions of society, at best these grants have merely allowed recipients to scrape by financially, nonetheless most recipients still struggle to access opportunities for social and educational development (Bernstein & Appelbaum, 2014:16-17).

Furthermore, other than the construction of the Constitution, an additional step that the democratic regime followed to restore the nation following the devastation of apartheid was the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 1995 in accordance with the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 and was made up of three committees, namely, Human Rights Violations, Reparations and Rehabilitation and the Amnesty Committee (Masipa, 2018:3; Gumede, 2018). The TRC was recognised to be an organisation forming part of civil society; it is apolitical and unbiased (Masipa, 2018:3). In the late 1990s, the TRC held a series of public hearings aimed to investigate the horrific crimes against humanity committed in the name of the apartheid regime, and was intended to foster resolution, social justice and promote unity (Masipa, 2018:3; Mamdani, 2002:33).

In addition, the country faces various social issues such as xenophobia, gender based violence, and gender inequality. Xenophobic violence, particularly against immigrants from other African countries, has broken out in recent years, with many attacks resulting in fatalities, such

as the attack on foreign-owned shops in March- April 2019 in the city of Durban that resulted in at least three and dozens suffering injuries (The Economist, 2020). Political leadership on countering xenophobic violence has been lacking, and in some cases political leaders have blamed foreign nationals for their own failure to deliver on political promises (Freedom House, 2020; The Economist, 2020). There are frequent reports of physical attacks against LGBT+ people, including instances of so-called corrective rape, in which men rape lesbians, claiming that the action can change the victim's sexual orientation (Freedom House, 2020).

The socio-economic issues that South Africans experience in the democratic era can be traced back to origins stemming from apartheid. While the democratic government and civil society organisation have gone to great lengths to ensure social development and the upliftment and representation of all people, a majority of South Africans still bear the brunt of poor socio-economic conditions, such as suffering in extreme poverty, unequal access to opportunities, poor service delivery, etc. The section that follows will take a more in-depth look into the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic regime according to the indicators discussed above. It will pay particular attention to the shortcomings of South Africa's democracy which may have translated into capacity gaps that pose as opportunities that could have led to the rise of vigilante groups. These vigilante groups will be discussed in detail in succeeding sections of chapter four to determine the ways whereby vigilantism has developed during democracy.

4.4. State Strengths, Weaknesses, and Capacity gaps

This section will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa under democracy according to the four indicators of the weak/strong state model. It serves as a continuation of section 4.3., which discusses the state-society relations, according to these four indicators, which is, the state of security, the political, economic, and social climate of the country. In doing so, this section of the study will be able to identify capacity gaps that may occur in state-society relations, and where vigilante groups may have filled these gaps. In subsequent sections of this chapter, these vigilante groups will be analysed, in order to identify the key characteristics associated with vigilantism. These characteristics will be used for a comparative analysis of vigilantism to determine how vigilantism has developed from apartheid to democracy.

The first indicator of state strength, as discussed in section 4.3.1. concerning the security of the state suggests that the democratic state faced an enormous challenge in reforming the formal security structures of the state. As Rotberg (2003:3) states, the responsibility of security of the state, its borders, and its people lies with the state. The state, with the challenge of demilitarising the state, was tasked with restructuring the country's defence forces and reshaping feeling of trust toward the police. Furthermore, the state faced the task of showing citizens that SAPS could be trusted, and there was no longer a need for informal security structures, as opposed to the apartheid regime. Thus, the democratic state took on the approach of community policing to bridge the gap between community distrust of state security structures. Additionally, the state took on a crime prevention approach by implementing various strategies, such as patrolling high-risk areas to deter criminals from committing offences.

However, crime remained high, and informal security structures such as neighbourhood watch organisations remained in place, despite governments efforts to restore faith in the formal security structures of the state. Thus, a capacity gap existed in the state's provision of safety and security for its communities. This gap was exposed by neighbourhood watch groups which evolved into vigilante groups, as with PAGAD, a vigilante group that developed from members of neighbourhood watch groups in the Cape Flats communities. The emergence of this group shows that the state has been effective in policing these areas as communities continued to feel vulnerable to criminal elements and thus relied on informal security structures to provide what the state could not. Further, vigilante groups that seized the capacity gaps concerning inadequate safety and security of communities are groups such as *Mapogo a Mathamaga* and *Amadlozi*. The three vigilante groups mentioned in this section will be discussed in further detail in the section that follows.

In its attempt to reform the security structures of the state and gain the trust of the people, the new democratic regime also faced the challenge of transforming the entire political system and establishing institutions that would uphold, protect and ensure the democratic values as discussed in 4.3.2. This was a considerable challenge given the devastating legacy the apartheid government had left in its wake. The state fared well in ensuring democracy post-1994, as it created the Constitution which enshrined the civil and human rights of all, the state succeeded in establishing various institutions that are rooted in democratic ideals and are committed to its values, such as, the Public Protector, the Auditor-General, the South African Human Rights

Commission, etc. However, the democratic state does face the risks of political apathy from the voting base as it has a dominant one-party system; as the ANC has won every election since the transition to democracy. As Beall, Gelb and Hassim (2005:682) has stated the democratic state is in a state of fragile stability, where it is democratically stable in as far as the state is recognised as the legal governing authority but is fragile as it still faces extensive social issues which the state has had little success in reducing. It is interesting to note here that the vigilante group, known as *Mapogo a Mathamaga*, considered the democratic state's commitment to upholding human rights as a weakness and a limitation in the state's criminal justice system and its ability to effectively combat crime and punish criminals to deter further criminal activity. *Mapogo* exploited this weakness as they advocated for more traditional African methods when punishing criminals and had less regard for human rights. It will be discussed in more detail further on.

These social issues have been further exacerbated by a rotating door of economic policies, as discussed in 4.3.3., that the democratic regime hoped would soothe the socio-economic issues of the South African people. Furthermore, the regime implemented these economic policies, not only to improve the socio-economic issues of poverty and inequality but also to ensure the economic growth of the economy and to reintroduce South Africa into the global economy. Policies such as RDA and AGISA-SA focused on improving the economics of the country as well as improving the socio-economic issues of the previously disadvantaged people. However, despite the economic policies implemented unemployment, income inequality and poverty have been persistent issues that have yet to be successfully addressed by economic policy. The regime has enjoyed relative success in increasing the GDP of the country since apartheid.

While succeeding in the political transformation of the nation toward democracy and faring moderately in the economic restructuring of the country, South Africa focused much of its attention on improving the social climate. The socio-economic issues that South Africans experience in the democratic era go beyond the social climate; it encompasses the political and the economic climate. The regime has worked extremely hard in cultivating an inclusive and diverse society that will ensure that all South Africans interests, in one way or another, are represented. While much effort has gone into ensuring the social development and representation of all people, a majority of South Africans still bear the brunt of poor socio-economic conditions as a legacy of the apartheid era, such as suffering in extreme poverty,

unequal access to opportunities, poor service delivery, gender inequality, gender-based violence, etc.

Therefore, it can be determined that the democratic regime of South Africa exhibit strengths and weaknesses in its evaluation of the indicators of state strength. The democratic government has been ambitious in its attempts to transform the nation in accordance with the Constitution and to align with democratic values. While the state has worked tremendously hard in embracing and democratic values by establishing democratic institutions it falls short in displaying that same energy to alleviate the socio-economic struggles and display certain characteristics of good governance such as accountability and transparency. The democratic regime possesses the resources to provide political goods and services to all its citizens in equal measure; however, due to issues like mismanagement of resources by government officials has caused inefficiency on behalf of the state. Thus, the democratic state displays strength in its institutional capacity, it lacks in its ability to harness and manage resource that would ensure the fruition of its transformative policies. These inefficiencies have led to the existence of capacity gaps in the democratic regime. Furthermore, vigilante groups, such as PAGAD, *Mapogo a Mathamaga* and *Amadlozi* have exploited these gaps. Therefore, based on the strong/weak state model, the democratic state would be classified as a weak state as it possesses the resources and ability to provide political goods, however, as has been demonstrated in previous sections, this did not translate to the provision of political goods for all, as can be seen with the state strength indicator of security. The state also faced challenges in subduing the oppositions to social control in the form of vigilante groups.

In the section that follows, this chapter will examine vigilante groups and their vigilante acts during the democratic era. Groups that emerged as a result of capacity gaps emerging from the lack of provision in security by the state, including PAGAD, *Mapogo a Mathamaga* and *Amadlozi*, will be analysed to identify the key characteristics associated with vigilantism and classify the types of vigilantism to determine the similarities and differences of democratic vigilantism.

4.5. Analysing Vigilantism during the Apartheid Era

This section will examine examples of vigilantism that have occurred during the democratic era. An analysis of vigilante groups and their activities, namely, PAGAD, *Mapogo a Mathamaga* and *Amadlozi*, will be discussed below. This section will identify the key characteristics of vigilantism as set out by analytical framework discussed in chapter two. Moreover, it will allow for the classification of types of vigilantism under democracy.

The phenomenon of vigilantism has increased dramatically in post-apartheid South Africa, so much so, that it has become an area of concern for many law enforcement agencies. The approach to vigilantism by law enforcement has differed across the different communities in which they exist (Buur & Jensen, 2004:139; Martin, 2012:221). While finding its origins in the apartheid era, the issue of vigilantism, with the transition to democracy, has not been resolved. Many marginalised communities still feel that they are being underserved by the SAPS and thus have to resort their own measures, to ensure the safety and security of their communities. Some have incorporated these organisations into their crime prevention strategies, thus making use of community policing as discussed in section 4.3.1. Alternatively, some have taken a more aggressive approach in combating vigilantism, as they would a criminal organisation since most vigilante organisation are considered to operate illegally (Fourchard, 2011:612; Buur & Jensen, 2004:139; Martin, 2012:221). The perspective of the democratic state is that vigilantism is extra-legal and thus challenges the authority of the criminal justice system and poses issues of human rights (Fourchard, 2011:611; Buur & Jensen, 2004:139; Martin, 2012:221).

4.5.1. PAGAD

According to Fourchard (2011:616-617), Buur and Jensen (2004:145-146), Gottschalk (2005:4-5) and Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:137), the organisation People Against Gangs and Drugs (PAGAD) was established in 1996 and operated in the Cape Flats. Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007:137) report that this group stems from neighbourhood watch groups all over the Cape Flats areas, such as the Manenberg Residents Movement, which operated during the apartheid period. With the continued presence of crime, under-policing, and general safety concerns in the area following the transition, these neighbourhood watch groups joined to form PAGAD. Gottschalk (2005:4-5) highlights the use of religion by PAGAD as a tool of

mobilisation as the group was affiliated with the Islamic faith. However, despite this religious base, the group served a diverse community made up of various religions and cultural backgrounds. Formal membership for this group was required, as members were assigned specific roles within the group.

The organisation started with peaceful protests and public demonstrations to publicly display their discontent with criminal elements in their communities and to pressurise the government into taking action (Harris, 2001; Fourchard, 2011:617; Gottschalk, 2005:4-5). However, the Western Cape officials were unresponsive to the pleas of the organisation; therefore, the group quickly turned to violence. At first, PAGAD warned gangs and criminals to leave the community, or they would be forced to leave. With the continued violence the group decided to engage in violence in order to expel the crime and violence from their communities and restore peace and security (Harris, 2001; Fourchard, 2011:617; Gottschalk, 2005:4-5; Swanepoel & Duvenhage, 2007:137). Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007:137) describe the group as paramilitary in style and secretive, hiding the identity of members when engaging in illegal vigilante activity. As the group became more established, an offshoot developed known as 'G-Force' which focused on more covert activities characterised by violence and destruction, such as bombings and assassinations. According to Gottschalk (2005:4) reports suggest that PAGAD planned strikes against known gangs and criminals, these attacks included, setting fire to drug and firearms stash houses, assaulting and killing low-level drug dealers, and targeting gang leaders where possible. The groups engaged in regular attacks and retaliation, specifically with the Cape Town gang, known as the Hard Livings, which often made use of illicit funds to establish community outreach and development programmes to secure the gang's position and operations in the communities (Gottschalk, 2005:4).

According to Fourchard (2011:617), PAGAD's relentless efforts in attempting to banish gangs and crime from the Cape Flats is what initiated the governments' declaration of a 'war on gang' during 2001, as the government and its institutions faced immense criticism for not doing enough to ensure the safety of those communities. Moreover, Fourchard (2011:617) and Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007:137-138) states that violence between PAGAD and gangs on the Cape Flats became so extreme that the government condemned PAGAD as strongly as it did gang and criminal activity, identifying PAGAD as a vigilante group operating outside of the law. Many community members and organisation also expressed their dissatisfaction with the tactics PAGAD used, claiming it did more harm than good and only increased the levels of

violence in the communities as every attack by PAGAD resulted in retaliation from gangs (Fourchard, 2011:618; Swanepoel & Duvenhage, 2007:138). The group would often march throughout communities wielding weapons and carrying posters with phrases such as ‘One gang, One bullet’ and ‘One drug merchant, One bullet’ (Gottschalk, 2005:6). These tactics concerned communities as, various organisations and community members were concerned for their safety. Before the group relied on violence, it had a fluid rapport with the state, engaging in communication, sitting in on meetings, and brainstorming resolutions to the community’s concerns of crime and safety (Gottschalk, 2005:5).

However, the group’s use of violence and extreme force, led to the state dissolving any relationship and condemning the group altogether. PAGAD’s persistence to resort to violence forced the state to engage with some kind of resolution, the 2002 initiative, known as ‘Bambanani’. They aimed to provide security in high-risk areas exposed to violent crime and gangs (Fourchard, 2011:618). The programme involved the training of volunteers within the communities, to patrol and protect vulnerable public areas. These volunteers would then notify police of any suspicious activity as well as performing citizens arrests where possible (Fourchard, 2011:618).

Given the information mentioned above and considering the key characteristics as set out by the analytical framework, it is evident that PAGAD’s membership was of a formal process, and most of its members were of the Islamic faith. The group openly engaged in violence and threatened the use of violence as a tool to generate fear and control within the community and used violence as a form of punishment and/or warning to gangs and other criminal offenders. PAGAD would often resort to violence and engage in activities such as assaults, armed assaults, interrogations, arson, and more. The group and its activities aimed at banishing gangs, the drug trade and any other criminal elements from the Cape Flats communities, thus the organisation can be classified as Crime Control vigilantism. This type of vigilantism is aimed at persons alleged to have broken the laws of the legal system. Vigilante groups then take the law into their own hands to fight these criminal elements and ensure the safety of their communities, as was evident with PAGAD.

4.5.2. Mapogo a Mathamaga

Mapogo a Mathamaga, established in 1996, has become known as a popular vigilante group operating in Limpopo who claim to offer marginalised communities, specifically rural villages, an alternative to official security systems and institutions by providing these communities with informal security systems that include, strategies like corporal punishment, justice following traditional customs, etc. (Harris, 2001; Smith, 2015:342; Gottschalk, 2005:2). This vigilante group became known for and appreciated by numerous rural communities for dealing with customary issues, that is, issues related to African cultures, which is often disregarded by the police (Smith, 2015:342; Harris, 2001). Moreover, this vigilante group operates from the belief that criminal activity is a product of a breakdown of traditional values and African methods of dealing with crime, which has given way to secular, modern customs and practices.

According to Harris (2001), *Mapogo a Mathamaga* was comprised of young and older men from various communities and membership was obtained through the recognitions of the group leader. *Mapogo* declared their agenda as a group fighting against criminals within their communities and claim that the state is too soft on crime in South Africa as criminals are afforded too many rights, which the group believes has led to justice not prevailing (Smith, 2015:345). Von Schnitzler, Dithlage, Kgalema, Maepa, Mofokeng, and Pigou (2001) and Smith (2015:347) have reported claims by *Mapogo* that criminals violate the human rights of others and thus should not be entitled to enjoying human rights themselves; they argue that by engaging in crime these offenders are infringing on various human rights, such as, the right to live in peace, to private property, to safety and to prosper. In addition, Von Schnitzler *et al.* (2001) and Smith (2015:347) argues that the emergence of *Mapogo* came at a time of growing anxiety over changes in the social order with the onset of the new democratic dispensation . Chiefs and elders in the rural communities felt their authority was being challenged by young members within the communities, while white farmers feared becoming targets of crime and intimidation, which they believed was meant to drive from a the land and their position of economic power. Both the black and white communities in rural areas believed the change on social order brought on by democracy would result in panic, disregard for the law, and a soft response to crime by the authorities owing to South Africa's recently adopted rights-based constitution (Smith, 2015:347).

Smith (2015:349), Swanepoel and Duvenhage, (2007:138-139) and Harris (2001) report that the tactics used by *Mapogo* grew in popularity as community members recognised and admired their rapid and effective response to criminals and criminal activity; the group dealt with criminals without remorse. Tactics included throwing suspected criminals into crocodile-infested waters, public beatings and humiliation. Furthermore, Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:139) argue that one of the most one well known methods used by the group is force alleged criminals to ingest a traditional potion that would cleanse them of their intentions to commit crime and ensure that they do not commit any crimes in future. This vigilante groups' brand of justice stood in sharp contrast to that of the state and their institutions. By the year 2000, *Mapogo* claimed to have between 50,000 and 70,000 members spread across 72 branches throughout South Africa (Gottschalk, 2005:2; Swanepoel & Duvenhage, 2007:133). According to Smith (2015:349) and Harris (2001), members associated with this vigilante group have faced numerous criminals charges, including murder, assault and possession of illegal weapons.

Mapogo's high membership numbers proved that it was in demand to operate in various areas, which indicated the approval of the group's methods and ensured a code of silence amongst everyone involved. According to police reports, one of the many reasons for low conviction rates of crime in the rural communities where *Mapogo* operates is that witnesses and police officers involved in the investigations have been intimidated by members of *Mapogo* (Sekhonyane & Louw, 2002). Furthermore, Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:139) argue that *Mapogo-a-Mathamaga* thrived as South Africa continuously experienced high crime rates, which ensured the expansion of the groups into becoming a notorious vigilante group. *Mapogo's* primary function was not only to ensure and maintain law and order in rural communities; apart from that the group also sought to function as a business as it charged community members for its services (Swanepoel & Duvenhage, 2007:139). Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) and Swanepoel and Duvenhage (2007:139) argue that the presence of *Mapogo*, the willingness of community members to seek out their service as opposed to trusting the police, and the business of exchanging money for their services, highlights the severity of crime and the failure of the state to ensure safety and law and order in these communities. Furthermore, Von Schnitzler *et al.* (2001) suggest that *Mapogo's* ability to secure 'business' stems from the support afforded to the group by chiefs, leaders and businessmen in local communities, which gives the group a certain level of legitimacy among community members; it is argued that *Mapogo* has enlisted populist rhetoric by appealing to the cultural beliefs and

values of chiefs, leaders and community members, and has spread rhetoric that using the group for protection is the only way to regain control from a failing government system. The business element of services in exchange for payment by the group catapults the group into the realm of private security; private security firms may be used by the state to complement the work of state law enforcement, thus with a shift from vigilante to private security the group may rid itself of being considered illegal and acting outside the confines of the law (Von Schnitzler et al, 2001; Martin, 2012:221). Martin (2012:221) argues that should such a shift become a reality, the group will no longer be seen as standing in opposition to the state but could rather be seen as supplementing the state in a legitimate way.

Mapogo not only acted as the informal security structure for rural communities, but it also challenged the state on its rights-based approach to the criminal justice system. Its blatant refusal to respect the rights of citizens, even those suspected of allegedly committing a crime undermines the country's fight and commitment to democracy and its values. This group openly challenges the state and its legal system. *Mapogo's* use of extreme punitive techniques was aimed at striking fear into offenders and served as warnings of what they could expect as punishment should they be caught. When considering the key characteristics of vigilantism, it can be determined that the structure and organisation of this group were made up of men within the African culture and was made up of formal memberships. The activities carried out by these men were violent and included beatings, armed assaults, interrogations, traditional practices, etc. This group can be classified as both crime control and social group control vigilantism. *Mapogo* and its vigilante activities were aimed at alleged criminals and also to advocate for the change of values within a particular system, as the groups call for the state's legal system to be less reliant on considering the rights of alleged offenders as this becomes a stumbling block in serving justice. The group believes in extreme punishment to deter criminality above human rights considerations.

4.5.3. Amadlozi

The group popularly known as *Amadlozi* emerged post-1994 in the Eastern Cape and mainly operate in townships in and around the city of Port Elizabeth (Buur, 2006:741; Masuku, 2004:23; Cohen, 2003; Baker, 2002:161). In 1999, when the original group formed by community members of the New Brighton township, the group was first named 'Abahlali Concerned Residents Against Crime' (CRAC) and their focus was on eliminating criminal

elements in the community (Buur, 2006:741; Masuku, 2004:23; Cohen, 2003). However, as the group became renowned for its successes in dealing with criminal elements, more groups emerged throughout the Eastern Cape townships adopting the same agenda, and thus these groupings took on the Zulu name *Amadlozi*; which translates to ‘those who can be trusted when there is no one else’ (Buur, 2006:741). Masuku (2004:23-24) argues that members of the group ranged across various ages and backgrounds and comprised of mixed genders, however, frontline members engaged in vigilante activity were comprised of mostly young men.

While openly having declared no political ties, the leaders of this group were known local political figures and liberation struggle fighters, such as former MK soldiers. The structure of the group saw it divided into two parts, the public side and the private side (Buur, 2006:742). The public side dealt with resolving day to day disputes and petty crimes, hosting community meetings, organising protests, holding quasi-court sessions, and directing general operations (Buur, 2006:742). The private side handled negotiations and any matters that concerned official state structures, as the group was comprised of prominent community members with significant connections in the economic and political domains (Buur, 2006:742).

With a strong anti-crime agenda, the *Amadlozi* grew in popularity as it saw many successes in fighting crime; from physically deterring crime through planned operations, to handling disputes in informal court cases, to conducting spot searches and organised raids, to arranging rallies and protests (Masuku, 2004:23; Buur, 2006:743; Baker, 2002:161). According to Baker (2002:161), the group found its legitimacy in the popularity and success it enjoyed in the township throughout the Eastern Cape; few community members felt the need to make use of formal security structures, such as the police, to resolve issues as they considered the *Amadlozi* to be more successful. Their investigative methods involved door to door visits and interviews, the group would often threaten with the use of violence to source the information required and in extreme cases engage in violence to achieve their goals and ensure that the complainants were satisfied (Masuku, 2004:23; Buur, 2006:743; Baker, 2002:161). Masuku (2004:24) reports that community members know that *Amadlozi* acts outside of the law, but prefer their services as they find the police and judicial system to be unresponsive and ineffective, while the vigilante group is quick to respond and effective. Moreover, Cohen (2003) reports that despite its popularity and claims of improving the communities in which it operates, *Amadlozi* not only charges community members for their services but have also been associated with

murder for hire contracts, specifically amongst younger, unemployed members in need of money.

In addition, *Amadlozi* have made public their use of informal court systems to resolve disputes, hold hearings regarding alleged crimes and sentencing those found guilty (Baker, 2002:161; Buur, 2006:733). According to Buur (2006:733-734), the use of these quasi-court systems stems from the African tradition of 'people's courts'. In the *Amadlozi* organisation, these courts are presided over by an official appointed by the organisation, small groups are tasked with investigating the complainant's allegations, and witnesses may be summoned to give a testimony (Buur, 2006:734; Cohen, 2002). Cohen (2002) mentions that should the organisation incur any costs involved in carrying out investigations, the complainants must cover those costs. Buur (2006:744) and Baker (2002:161) further highlight that sensitive case, such as rape or domestic assault allegation, is conducted in a closed session and handled by the *Amadlozi* quasi-courts, which is not open to the public.

Given the accounts of vigilante activity committed by *Amadlozi*, the structure and organisation of this group can be recognised as having formal members, with both private and public factions made up of economic and politically influential people working on the group's behalf. The activities employed by this group stemmed from a violent nature. They were known for their practices of holding informal courts and then handing out its own brand of justice to alleged criminals. The alleged criminal's punishment was often violent and public, to discourage further criminal activity within the communities. Vigilante activities of this group included armed assaults, beatings, patrols, intimidation tactics, etc. The objective of this group was to handle community disputes and to ensure law and order. Therefore, this group can be classified as crime control vigilantism, as it aimed to establish its own informal security structures and its own informal legal system. This group's main agenda is to eliminate and prevent crime in its communities.

4.6. Conclusion

The democratic government has committed itself to the transformation of South Africa post-1994, by reconstructing the political climate through the establishment of the Constitution, democratic institutions, and other political reforms which have ensured political freedoms and equal rights for all its people. Moreover, economic and social reforms have attempted to soothe

the socio-economic struggles of the previously disadvantaged. Despite its success in re-aligning the security structures of the state to reflect democratic values, distrust of the police remained throughout marginalised communities. Besides, the presence of vigilante groups in democratic society has revealed the link between vigilantism and community policing, since the primary aim of these groups is to erase crime and criminals from their communities to ensure safety and security. Furthermore, vigilantism post-1994 has highlighted the need for improved formal security structures in South Africa and the lack of resources by the regime to serve high-risk communities adequately.

Moreover, this analysis has illustrated the willingness of the state to tolerate vigilante groups, as long as they do not engage in extra-legal activities, and solely focus on maintaining law and order in their communities. Vigilante groups would be able to operate as part of the community policing strategy, providing that they leave the 'real policing' to the official security structures of the state. Furthermore, the phenomenon of vigilantism, under the democratic regime, can be characterised as vigilante groups made up of formal memberships, where members usually align around a common social issue, religion or culture. The vigilante activities of these groups have a violent nature as the groups employ gruesome methods to carry out their causes. Finally, vigilantism under democracy is mostly associated with crime control vigilantism; these groups thus aim to ensure the safety and security of their communities by deterring criminal activity, punishing alleged offenders and maintaining law and order in society.

The final chapter will offer concluding remarks on the vigilantism in South Africa under both the apartheid and democratic regimes. This chapter will offer a comparative analysis of the research findings as it will provide a summary of the key findings from chapters three and four of this study, followed by a brief discussion of these findings to provide an answer to the research question as well as final thoughts on the development of vigilantism in South Africa. Finally, chapter five will conclude with comments on the contributions of this study and suggestions on areas for future research.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1. Introduction

This study focuses on vigilante organisations as non-state actors that take on the roles of the state in various ways and practise a limited degree of social control on the communities in which they operate. The assumption is that the state's inability to provide for its citizenry, especially in the area of safety and security, has led to communities establishing their own brand of informal security to provide in ways in which the government has not, through punishing and warding off criminals, and/or reinforcing law and order. The chapters above have illustrated that the idea that non-state actors acquire a certain degree of social control within their communities is not novel, especially when those communities are underserved by the state as a result of state weakness, as discussed various authors, such as Migdal (1988), Schubert (2013), and Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007).

Chapter two discussed the various definitions by which vigilantism can be understood; these definitions are characterised by various factors, such as, the context in which they emerge, the methods they use and the purpose they serve. This study has discussed various causes that lead to vigilantism. These causes include dissatisfaction with the state regarding poor service delivery, lack of resources for social and economic provisions, distrust in the police, dissatisfaction with the processes of the criminal justice system, fear and feelings of insecurity, and/or poor resolution of socio-economic issues. Moreover, chapter two discussed the implications of vigilante activity in communities, that is, the effects it can have on the social and economic spheres. These effects include destruction of public and private property, excessive violence enacted on suspected perpetrators, infringing on various human rights of supposed perpetrators, undermining the processes of the criminal justice system and its associated authorities, deteriorating the economic possibilities and progress of a community and the businesses that operate within it, and causing a cycle of crime and destruction within communities.

Chapters three and four offered discussions focused on the indicators of state strength under the apartheid and democratic regimes in South Africa. These indicators have shown how the South African governments have governed under each regime according to the political, economic, social and security spheres. The performance of the state, in terms of each indicator,

has demonstrated the overall level of state strength as either strong or weak. By discussing the South African regimes according to these indicators, this study has been able to determine capacity gaps that exist in the governance of the country and its people. These capacity gaps have served as opportunities for the emergence of vigilante groups that exert some degree of social control on the communities in which they operate and act as alternatives to the state and state institutions.

The focal point of this thesis has been to understand state-society relations, particularly those of the state and non-state actors within South Africa. This thesis has focused on how governance under the apartheid and democratic regimes have influenced instances of vigilantism in order to answer the research question centred around how the South African experience of vigilantism has changed over time. This concluding chapter will summarise and compare the instances of vigilantism under apartheid and democracy, respectively, according to the four key characteristics described in the analytical framework developed in chapter two. These four characteristics will aid in identifying the differences and similarities of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy to be discussed in section 5.2.3., which will offer a concise response to the research question. Finally, this study will conclude with some remarks on the contributions of this study and considerations for future research.

5.2. Analysis and Research Findings

The following section will summarise the instances of vigilantism as discussed in the preceding chapters and compare them based on four characteristics described in the analytical framework. These four characteristics are the structure of the organisation, the nature and methods of vigilante activities, the motive(s) and objective(s) behind the organisation and their activities, and the type of vigilantism. In doing so, this section will attempt to identify the differences and similarities of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy that may be indicative of vigilantism having changed overtime.

5.2.1. Apartheid and Vigilantism

Table 6: Characteristics of vigilante groups during apartheid			
Characteristics	Vigilante Groups		
	'The Young Lions'	The <i>Witdoeke</i>	The Manenberg Residents' Movement
Structure and Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Loose/informal membership - Mostly young men - Focused around liberation movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Loose/informal membership - Various ages and genders - State sanctioned/apartheid state collaborators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal membership limited to Cape Flats community - Middle aged coloured men - Focused on community safety
Nature and methods of activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent methods - Blitz attacks - Attacks not always formally planned - Bombings - Necklacing - Intimidation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent methods - Planned attacks - Bombings - Arson - Armed with state sponsored weapons and tear gas - Destruction of property 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Street patrols - Community committee meetings - Protests (mostly peaceful) - Corporal punishment - Intimidation - Inspire fear to deter criminal activity
Motives and Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Compliance with ANC/liberation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Apartheid state mandated eviction and relocation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Instil and maintain law & order - Deter crime

	struggle mandate (fight for democracy) - Attack apartheid state and police - Attack collaborators	- Ensuring compliance with apartheid state	- Punish criminals - Handle community disputes
Type of vigilantism	Social Group Control Vigilantism	Regime Control Vigilantism	Crime Control Vigilantism

Compiled by the author for the purpose of this study.

5.2.2. Democracy and Vigilantism

Table 7: Characteristics of vigilante groups during democracy			
Characteristics	Vigilante Groups		
	PAGAD	<i>Mapogo a Mathamaga</i>	<i>Amadlozi</i>
Structure and Organisation	- Formal membership - Religiously aligned (Islam) - Men of various ages	- Formal membership - Aligned with African traditions - African men of various aged	- Formal membership - Public and private factions - Economically and politically influential members

Nature and methods of activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent methods - Armed (weapons) - Assassinations - Arson - Intimidation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent methods - Armed (weapons) - Assassinations - Public beatings - Intimidation - Used African traditional potions to cure criminals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Violent methods - Armed (informal weapons) - Informal courts - Interrogations - Beatings - Intimidation
Motives and Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Instil and maintain law & order - Eliminate gangs and crime - Punish criminals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Instil and maintain law & order - Deter crime - Punish criminals - Resolve Disputes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Instil and maintain law & order - Deter crime - Punish criminals - Hold Court to resolve disputes and sentence criminals
Type of vigilantism	Crime Control Vigilantism	Crime Control and Social Group Control Vigilantism	Crime Control Vigilantism

Compiled by the author for the purpose of this study.

As mention in previous chapters, the topic of vigilantism is context specific, thus it not surprising that instances of vigilantism should differ from one another as shown in Table 6 and 7 above. The tables show difference in structure and organisation, methods used, motives and type of vigilantism. Regarding the structure and organisation of vigilante groups the tables above indicate that membership differed slightly between groups in the apartheid era, with groups being centred around different agendas, however, vigilante groups in the democratic era showed similarities in membership make up while also focusing on different agendas. Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) argue that the restrictive nature of the apartheid era prohibited many gatherings of people of colour and as such posed a challenge to vigilante groups in forming more structured membership styles. Moreover, when looking at the characteristic of structure and organisation, it differed greatly from the apartheid to the democratic era, with

vigilante groups shifting from loose/informal membership to more formal membership styles since people were allowed more freedoms. A characteristic that hasn't appeared to have changed from apartheid to democracy is the violent nature and methods associated with vigilantism. Martin (2012:220), Harris (2001) and Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) relates the violent nature of vigilantism in South Africa to the deep root history of violence in the country, particularly in marginalized black and brown communities where violence often occurred. However, a characteristic that differed greatly in instances of vigilantism between each political regime and differed in instances of vigilantism within each era is the motive and objective of vigilante groups. This relates back to the notion that vigilantism is context specific and thus each environment in which it arises brings with it its own set of motives and objects. In turn, a combination of these various characteristics, namely the structure and organisation, methods, and the motive and objectives, determine the type of vigilantism that is exercised by the vigilante groups (Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1974:548).

5.2.3. Key findings to the Research Study

Based on the discussions presented in the previous chapters, specifically, the discussions offered in chapter three and four, the section that follows aims considers the findings of the study in relation to the research question, "*How has vigilantism developed under the governance of the apartheid and democratic regimes?*". Table 5 and 6 above provide a summary of chapters three and four and are based on six cases as examples of incidents of vigilantism. Thus, some evidence is provided by which to deduce the changes that vigilantism has undergone from apartheid to democracy. While more cases need to be considered in order to provide a broader perspective of how vigilantism has changed from apartheid to democracy and to reinforce the findings of this thesis, useful insights have been highlighted by this study that could indicate possible trends relating to the development of vigilantism overtime.

Table 5 and 6 illustrate that vigilantism according to the cases discussed in this study indicate possible changes occurring in the structure and type, while still making use of similar methods in vigilante activity across the two eras. Furthermore, it has become apparent that the motivations behind vigilante groups and their activities and the objectives they hope to achieve is an ever-changing characteristic which is greatly context specific; however, it is worth highlighting that the vigilante groups post-1994 discussed in this study centred their objectives around ensuring and maintaining law and order in their respective communities.

Based on the incidences of vigilantism discussed in the preceding chapters, the structure and organisation of vigilante groups, during apartheid, can be inferred as loosely formed memberships based on a political alliance. In instances where vigilante activity took place members, including non-members, participated in the violence. Young men who had not been members of the vigilante groups were encouraged to participate in vigilante violence, irrespective of whether they agreed with the cause or motivations of the group. In the democratic era, through a more strict process of membership, vigilante groups were formed, where participants were committed to the group and its cause(s). Furthermore, vigilante groups post-1994 were often rooted within communities, which served as the base from which members were derived.

The methods of vigilante activity have remained similar across the apartheid and democratic eras, with violence remaining a key feature. Vigilante groups practised various forms of interrogation and intimidation tactics. These methods were often used to source information and/or to instil fear and ensure compliance. In addition, vigilante groups often made use of violence by attacking alleged criminals and planning attacks against government systems and organisations, planning bombings and causing destruction to private and public property. Pre-1994 vigilante groups aligned themselves with either the apartheid state and acted as reinforcements in subduing the anti-apartheid movement, or with the liberation struggle and engaged in civil unrest and violence in various attempts to undermine the apartheid system. Vigilante groups under democracy that are associated with traditional African practices have continued the use of informal court systems, as were used in the earlier years of apartheid, to hear grievances, resolve community disputes and sentence criminals.

A change in the types of vigilantism that occurred from apartheid to democracy can be identified, based on the application of the analytical framework. Instances of vigilantism that occurred were mainly characterised during the apartheid era by the political struggles and causes of that time. Despite the prevalence of issues of safety and security that are mainly associated with vigilante activity existing at the time, vigilante groups operating during the apartheid era were more focused on being politically aligned to the liberation movement and participating in the fight for freedom, or they were aligned with the apartheid state and worked as collaborators to reinforce the rules of apartheid and ensure compliance with the state and state agencies. Therefore, the types of vigilantism practised under apartheid were mainly social group control vigilantism, which aimed at initiating a change of values within a particular

system, namely changing the values of the apartheid era to democratic values. Regime control vigilantism can also be identified, which aimed to preserve a political system when challenged, such as apartheid state-sanctioned vigilante groups that aimed to enforce apartheid rules and ensure compliance. In comparison, vigilantism during the democratic era has focused more on the issues of human security and maintaining law and order within communities. As such, most of these incidences of vigilantism such as crime control vigilantism which aimed to circumvent the criminal justice system and deal with alleged criminals, deter crime, and maintain law and order, were classified.

Finally, this study has shown that the theory of vigilantism as a product of a weak state is not the only reason for the existence of vigilante groups in society, as other factors may also play a role in the emergence of vigilantism, and not solely the theory of a weak state. In the case of South Africa, the regime performed well in a number of the state strength indicators under both apartheid and democracy. Therefore, while some elements of state weakness were present, the presence of vigilantism could be explained as a result of alternative factors in conjunction with some aspects of state weakness. Factors such as inequality, marginalisation, inaccessibility and unresponsive state institutions, as well as complicity by the state and its institutions, act as contributing factors to the continued presence of vigilantism from apartheid to democracy.

5.3. Contributions of this Study and Suggestion for Future Research

This study has contributed to the field of political science, particularly state-society relations and vigilantism in three ways. Firstly, this study expands on the literature comparing vigilantism under apartheid and democracy, respectively. While the topic of vigilantism is widely reported on, a limited number of studies cover this topic in the academic arena, particularly within the South African context. Thus, on a primary level, this study expanded the knowledge base of vigilantism in South Africa. Secondly, by analysing vigilantism from the perspective of state strength, this study has contributed to the discussion of vigilantism being a product of a weak state. While South Africa demonstrated elements of state strength and weakness under each regime according to the indicators of the state strength model, it still produced instances of vigilantism across both regimes.

Thirdly, this study has highlighted that not all instances of vigilantism are associated with acting as informal security structures, as some studies have assumed. In the case of South

Africa, instances of vigilantism have been associated with the purpose of achieving regime change, calling attention to poor service delivery, as well as ensuring the security of communities by maintaining law and order. Finally, this study has contributed to the discussion on vigilantism by looking at this phenomenon under two regime types, namely the authoritative regime of Apartheid and the liberal democratic regime; and how these styles of governing have impacted the development of vigilantism.

The most evident takeaway from this study, and what is considered the main point for further exploration, is the need to examine more cases in order to solidify the research findings. Moreover, this study specifically focused on vigilante groups that displayed some degree of organisation, however many recent acts of vigilantism occur more spontaneously and involving individuals rather than groups. Therefore, future exploration of this study using more cases to account for these factors will be essential in determining trends in vigilante activity in South Africa. In addition, further exploration in the area of vigilantism in countries that have undergone political transitions or regime change like South Africa would be able to provide additional insights into how vigilantism can develop and the possible relationship between regime type and vigilantism. A country such as Brazil, which has undergone regime change and where vigilantism is prevalent, would be an interesting case for further exploration. Brazil exhibits many political, economic and social similarities to South Africa, thus a comparative study between these two countries may offer significant academic contributions. Additionally, Nigeria and its experience of vigilantism may prove to be an interesting avenue for future research within the African context, as this country has a tumultuous history with political conflict, regime change and the presence of non-state armed groups exercising social control within society.

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