The supposed "inseparability" of fact and value

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dc.contributor.authorSmit J.P.
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-15T16:02:30Z
dc.date.available2011-05-15T16:02:30Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.description.abstractA wide variety of philosophers seem to agree that there is something dubious about the distinction between fact and value. This paper evaluates some of the arguments made for such a contention. It is argued that only the crudest form of pragmatism leads to a conflation of fact and value. Other arguments against the fact/value distinction, mostly drawn from Putnam's Reason, Truth and History, are examined in order to show that they are either false or trivial.
dc.description.versionArticle
dc.identifier.citationSouth African Journal of Philosophy
dc.identifier.citation22
dc.identifier.citation1
dc.identifier.issn2580136
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/12497
dc.titleThe supposed "inseparability" of fact and value
dc.typeArticle
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