The indirect review of administrative action in South African law

Van Eetveldt, Henri-Willem (2018-12)

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2018.


ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) gives everyone the right to just administrative action. Administrative law gives content to, and protects, this right. Administrative law’s primary corrective mechanism is judicial review. This is a procedure through which administrative action may be scrutinised and invalidated by a court. A court can review administrative action directly or indirectly. In direct-review proceedings the validity of administrative action is the court’s main subject of adjudication. In indirect-review proceedings, by contrast, the validity of administrative action is incidental to the court’s main subject of adjudication. While the law on direct review is well developed, the law on indirect review is comparatively obscure and unexplored. The thesis attempts to provide a critical analysis of the South African law on indirect review. After reviewing this body of law, I will argue that it is in need of doctrinal reform. I will propose, in conclusion, that section 36 of the Constitution should be the point of departure for such reform.

AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 33 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, 1996 (“die Grondwet”) gee elkeen die reg op regverdige administratiewe optrede. Die administratiefreg gee inhoud aan, en beskerm, dié reg. Geregtelike hersiening is die administratiefreg se primêre korrektiewe meganisme. Howe gebruik geregtelike hersiening om onregmatige administratiewe optrede te identifiseer en ongeldig te verklaar. Geregtelike hersiening kan op beide direkte en indirekte wyse geskied. By direkte geregtelike hersiening is die geldigheid van administratiewe optrede die fokus van die geding. By indirekte geregtelike hersiening is die hof se fokus elders gerig, en die geldigheid van administratiewe optrede is insidenteel tot die hoofpunt in geskil. Direkte geregtelike hersiening is bekend en goed ontwikkel. Indirekte geregtelike hersiening, aan die ander hand, is relatief obskuur. Hierdie tesis poog om ‘n kritiese analise van die reg op indirekte geregtelike hiersiening te verskaf. Ek betoog dat dié corpus reg hervorming benodig. Ten slotte doen ek aan die hand dat artikel 36 van die Grondwet die vertrekpunt vir sulke hervorming moet wees.

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