Browsing by Author "Van Eetveldt, Henri-Willem"

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    The indirect review of administrative action in South African law
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2018-12) Van Eetveldt, Henri-Willem; Quinot, Geo; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Law. Department of Public Law.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) gives everyone the right to just administrative action. Administrative law gives content to, and protects, this right. Administrative law’s primary corrective mechanism is judicial review. This is a procedure through which administrative action may be scrutinised and invalidated by a court. A court can review administrative action directly or indirectly. In direct-review proceedings the validity of administrative action is the court’s main subject of adjudication. In indirect-review proceedings, by contrast, the validity of administrative action is incidental to the court’s main subject of adjudication. While the law on direct review is well developed, the law on indirect review is comparatively obscure and unexplored. The thesis attempts to provide a critical analysis of the South African law on indirect review. After reviewing this body of law, I will argue that it is in need of doctrinal reform. I will propose, in conclusion, that section 36 of the Constitution should be the point of departure for such reform.
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    Standing on unsteady ground : AREVA NP Incorporated in France v Eskom SOC LTD
    (ASSAf, 2019-03-18) Van Eetveldt, Henri-Willem
    Areva NP Incorporated in France v Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd 2017 6 BCLR 675 (CC) was a dispute over a multi-billion-rand tender. Although the majority of the Constitutional Court recognised the public importance of the case, it adjudicated the dispute entirely on a preliminary point. It found that the applicant did not have legal standing to seek the judicial review of the award of the tender. This case note has three aims. First, I will argue that the Constitutional Court's majority judgment in Areva was generally unpersuasive. Second, I will attempt to show that Areva exposes an unresolved legal question: when should a court consider the merits of a case made by a litigant with questionable standing? Third, I will propose a method for resolving this question by way of substantive judicial reasoning in any given case.