Browsing by Author "Scholtz, Ingrid"
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- ItemDie Afrikaner en die demokrasie I : die negentiende eeu(Historical Association of South Africa, 2002) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridThis is the first of two articles in which the authors try to establish at least part of the reasons why the Afrikaners, with their strong democratic antecedents of the nineteenth century, became the perpretators of undemocratic practices after 1948. The pioneer circumstances of the nineteenth century and the regard for patriarchs produced the possibility of both a democratic and an authoritarian development. Calvinism as a source of Afrikaner political thought is largely discarded by the authors, but the Enlightenment played a significant role in the nineteenth-century political theory. However, it appears that the patriarchal tradition won from the pioneer situation and the Enlightenment, as the legislatives of the two Boer republics jealously protected their powers and claimed full and unfettered powers inbetween elections.
- ItemDie Afrikaner en die demokrasie II : die dekades voor 1948(Historical Association of South Africa, 2002) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridThe Afrikaner and democracy II : the decades before 1948
In this second and last part of a series the authors show that one of the most intense Afrikaner debates of the thirties and forties revolved around the nature of liberal democracy, capitalism and imperialism. The need of so many poor Afrikaners, and the fact that capitalism was seen as the other side of the coin of British imperialism, brought about a situation where many Afrikaner thinkers and politicians sought refuge under the umbrella of national socialism. The main protagonist of this trend was the Ossewa-Brandwag (Ox-wagon Sentinel or OB), but in the power struggle with the National Party (NP), the last mentioned also became infected with national socialist about democracy. However, after the OB neutralised itself by not participating in the 1943 election, these ideas largely fizzled out. Nevertheless, in the process the NP started usurping the sovereignty which previously was reserved for the volk and parliament. In the end, this helped bring about a situation where the abuse of power of the NP reign became possible. - ItemBismarck, Hitler, Kohl en die grense van die moontlike(Department of History, University of the Free State, 2004) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridWhat precisely the boundaries of the possible were, how Bismarck, Hitler and Kohl reacted thereupon and what implcations it had for Germany and Europe, are investigated here. The important intermezzo of the Cold War, and thus also the roles of Adenauer and Brandt, are also considered. Ultimately it boils down to the interaction between individual and impersonal factors in the shaping of history.
- ItemDie Britse imperialisme, die Anglo-Boereoorlog en die ontstaan van apartheid(Faculty of Humanities, University of the Free State, 2002) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridHistorical events are not beforehand cast in stone, and this is also the case with the Afrikaners' eventual choice for apartheid and an authoritarian system. In this paper the authors show that an Afrikaner protoliberalism existed during the nineteenth century, and that things could have gone either way, had external factors in the form of British imperialism not intervened. This protoliberalism came under pressure during the last years of the century due to the advance of British imperialism, which reached its zenith during the Anglo~Boer War. The war and ils aftermath, including the impoverishment it caused (which culminated during the Depression in the thirties). subjectively caused Afrikaners to fear for the survival of their people. In these circumstances, the proto-liberalism of the nineteenth century was effectively extinguished. A zero-sum game grew in the relations between Afrikaners and blacks, and in the end aparlheid was devised as an instrnment for survival. In this process, the only liberal paradigm surviving in South Africa was the Biitish variant, which was subjectively seen as a tool of British imperialism, thereby closing ojfthe liberal avenue in the political culture of the Afrikaners.
- ItemDie debat oor die posisie van Afrikaans aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch : 'n ontleding(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2008-09) Scholtz, Ingrid; Scholtz, LeopoldAFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die debat oor die plek van Afrikaans en Engels as onderrigmedium aan die Universiteit Stellenbosch het sedert sy begin in 2002 nie baie duidelikheid verskaf nie. In dié artikel word ’n poging aangewend om die debat te analiseer en vas te stel waar en waarom die opponente verskil. Om dinge kort te hou is drie verteenwoordigers van albei kante – die sogenaamde A-opsioniste en die T-opsioniste – vergelyk. Die eerste groep meen dat dubbelmedium noodwendig lei tot die verdwyning van die swakker taal, in dié geval Afrikaans; dat die Universiteit in werklikheid nie eens die minimum voorwaardes vir die T-opsie nakom nie; dat die dubbelmediumprojek ideologies gedrewe is; en dat dit die belange van die arm gekleurde Afrikaanssprekende studente verwaarloos. Die T-opsioniste is van mening dat ’n universiteit se taak nie is om ’n taal te beskerm nie, maar om akademiese uitnemendheid te bevorder; dat eentalige Afrikaanse onderrig die Universiteit op die glybaan na parogialisme en isolasie plaas; dat ’n multikulturele benadering beter is as kulturele apartheid; en dat die beweging na Engels noodsaaklik is vir transformasie. Die argumente word dan geweeg, en die slotsom is dat waar die A-opsioniste hul argumente hoofsaaklik op akademiese en pedagogiese gronde baseer, die T-opsioniste se benadering veral ideologies is. Daar word ook bevind dat die Topsie op Stellenbosch sodanig toegepas word dat die eindproduk waarskynlik eerder ’n eentalige Engelse Stellenbosch is.
- ItemDie Eerste Wereldoorlog as faktor in die Suid- Afrikaanse toetrede tot die internasionale gemeenskap(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2016-03) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridWhen the First World War started on 4 August, 1914, the Union of South Africa was barely four years old. In international terms the country was on the far end of the world and not very important. In addition, the country was a self-governing British Dominion, not able to pursue an independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, at the Versailles Peace Treaty of1919, co-signed by its representatives, Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, South Africa was recognised as a player in its own right on the international political podium. This was brought about by especially two factors. The first was South Africa's military role in occupying German South West Africa and its important role in the occupation of German East Africa. The second was the participation of an infantry brigade on the Western Front in France and Flanders. Although this role was limited, it was exploited to the hilt by Jan Smuts during his sojourn in London and Paris during 1917-1919. Smuts was received as a hero when he arrived in London in the first months of 1917, and became a member of both the Imperial War Cabinet and the British War Cabinet. As such, his contribution to the Imperial Conference of April 1917 was conclusive in getting recognition for the Dominions' right to independence - although it would take until 1926 and 1931 for this to be legally formalised. Nevertheless, Smuts played a decisive role in winning the right for the Dominions to be represented in their own right at the Paris Peace Conference and sign the Versailles Peace Treaty. In the months before the Armistice of November 1918, he was Prime Minister David Lloyd George's right hand man and did an unbelievable amount of work, including advising the British High Command on Western Front operations, the founding of the Royal Air Force, solving various labour disputes and even sounding out the Austrians about peace. After the Armistice, Smuts played a huge role in conjunction with President Woodrow Wilson in bringing about the League of Nations. However, the last weeks before the Peace saw Smuts locked in a bitter fight with French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau-full of hatred for the despised Boches - as well as Woodrow Wilson (who had all but abandoned his own conciliatory approach) and an opportunistic, vaccillating Lloyd George, Smuts resisted the severe peace conditions dictated to the Germans. He repeatedly drew the others 'attention to the British magnanimity after the Anglo-Boer War as an example of how conciliation could be achieved, and pleaded for a similar approach to the Germans. Moreover, he saw that Germany had to play a decisive role in any future Europe. He feared that the severe conditions would fuel so much bitterness in Germany that it could lead to a future war - which, of course, did happen barely 20 years later. Smuts felt so strongly about this that he threatened not to sign the peace treaty, and it took massive pressure by Lloyd George and his own Prime Minister, Louis Botha, to change his mind. Nevertheless, in spite of his failure, by June 1919 especially Smuts had carved out for South Africa an international standing which nobody could have imagined five years previously.
- ItemDie Konferensie van Kabwe en die ANC/SAKP se gewapende stryd(Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 2011-12) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridAFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die ANC/SAKP se bewerings dat sy gewapende stryd ’n hoë morele inhoud had, word in dié artikel onder die loep geneem. Die gevolgtrekking is dat dit tot 1983 inderdaad ten doel gehad het om burgerlike ongevalle te vermy. Die eskalasie van die stryd het egter in 1983 gelei tot die Kerkstraatbom, toe 19 mense – met inbegrip van 12 burgerlikes – gedood is. Te Kabwe het die ANC in 1985 verder ooreengekom dat die moontlikheid van burgerlike ongevalle nie meer in die pad van die gewapende stryd kon staan nie. Dit is met die voetsoolvlak gekommunikeer op ’n manier dat die operateurs kon verstaan dat alle vroeëre morele grense oorskry mog word, en die gevolg was ’n ordinêre terreurveldtog wat moreel met dié van Al-Kaïda gelykstaan. Teen 1987 het die leiers vir die slegte publisiteit geskrik en MK probeer inhou, maar die gewapende vleuel was buite beheer. Bowendien het die gewapende stryd, volgens ANC-leiers se eie erkenning, misluk.
- ItemNelson Mandela se houding teenoor die kommunisme(Historical Association of South Africa, 2014-11) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridDie doel van dié artikel is om wyle oudpres. Nelson Mandela se houding teenoor die kommunisme, wat 'n wit vlek in die geskiedenis vorm, uit te lig en die mitevorming rondom die saak op 'n akademiese wyse af te breek. Die doel is pertinent nie om sy beeld af te breek nie; slegs om 'n versweë aspek van sy lewe te belig. Om dit te bereik is grotendeels staat gemaak op Mandela se eie geskrifte in die jare vyftig, voor hy tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf gevonnis is, asook twee belangrike geskrifte uit die jare sewentig, waarvan een die onlangs gepubliseerde, geheime outobiografie is wat hy op Robbeneiland geskryf het. Daar is ook staat gemaak op die nuutste bevindings van akademiese historici rakende Mandela se relatief kortstondige lidmaatskap van die SA Kommunistiese Party. Die gevolgtrekkings is kortliks dat Mandela in die laat vyftigs en vroeë sestigs 'n senior lid van die SAKP was, en dat hy dit toe om taktiese redes en met toestemming van die party laat vaar het. Verder was hy reeds in die vroeë jare vyftig 'n onkritiese aanhanger van die Marxisme-Leninisme, en hy het dié geloof minstens tot die laat jare sewentig gehou. In die loop van die jare tagtig, en veral ná sy vrylating in 1990, het hy klaarblyklik ingesien dat hy sy geloof moet wysig.
- ItemPirrhiese oorwinning : die Oorlog in Kosovo(Stellenbosch University, Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy), 1999) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridNet soos elke historiese gebeurtenis is elke oorlog uniek. Tog vertoon die oorlog in Kosovo soveel eienskappe wat totaal afwyk van feitlik elke vorige oorlog in die geskiedenis dat dit die moeite kan loon om dit van nader te bekyk. So was daar min oorloë - dalk geen enkele - wat in soveel omstredenheid ontvang en gebore is en so 'n enorme openbare debat (en veral kritiek) uitgelok het. Die uitlating van die Britse krygshistorikus Alistair Home is tipies van die fiole van toom wat wêreldwyd oor die hoofde van die beplanners en uitvoerders van Operasie Allied Force uitgestort is: "Like many people of my generation who know Yugoslavia, the past two months have made me utterly miserable. As a military historian having written about many wars, and served in one, I cannot recall any campaign that I have disliked so much." Dit was die eerste oorlog in die ganse geskiedenis wat (in elk geval aan Navo se kant) nie soseer om redes van harde strategiese eiebelang gevoer is nie, maar om 'n "sagte" rede soos menseregte. En dit het aanleiding gegee tot 'n nuwe internasionale politieke leer op grond waarvan sekere groot moondhede hulle nou die reg toe-eien om in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van soewereine state in te gryp wanneer menseregte verkrag word. Op operasionele vlak was dit die eerste oorlog in die geskiedenis waar die finale uitklophou nie deur 'n grondoffensief gegee moes word nie, waar die wenners feitlik uitsluitend op lugaanvalle staatgemaak het, en waar die wenners geen enkele ongeval in gevegte gely het nie. Dis ook duidelik dat die oorlog 'n fundamentele keerpunt in die na-Koue-Oorlogse geskiedenis beteken. Trouens, 'n mens kan redeneer dat dit die einde van die na-Koue-Oorlogse era was en die begin van 'n nuwe, nog ondefinieerbare historiese fase ingelui het. Die feit, so sal ons verder sien, was een van die belangrikste redes.waarom die oorlog die katalisator geword het om Rusland en China drasties van die Weste te vervreem.
- ItemVoels van eenderse vere : die totalitere ideologiee in die twintigste eeu(Historical Association of South Africa, 2001) Scholtz, Leopold; Scholtz, IngridBirds of a feather: totalitarian ideologies in the twentieth century For various reasons it has long been taboo to name communism and national socialism in the same breath or to compare them. Since the publication of Stéphane Courtois' sensational book about the crimes of communism in 1997 this is, however, being done more and more. In this article the comparison is made by looking at the systemic resemblances and differences, the natural affinity that leaders like Hitler and Mussolini on the one hand and Stalin on the other displayed towards each other, and the easy way in which they exchanged their enmity for cooperation. the conclusion is that there were indeed differences in content, but that the way in which they manifested themselves in practice, the mentality behind the ideologies, showed great similarities.