Browsing by Author "Phakeng, Madimetja A. L."

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    Regulation of takeovers and mergers with an emphasis on the mandatory offer rule: a comparative and critical analysis of the law and the institutions that have been set up to enforce the law
    (Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2019-04) Phakeng, Madimetja A. L.; Sutherland, Philip; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Law. Dept. of Mercantile Law.
    ENGLISH ABSTRACT :This dissertation assesses the regulation of takeovers and mergers and the institutions created to enforce the law, from a comparative perspective. It uses South Africa as its point of departure and takes the laws of Delaware in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia into account. The dissertation indicates that numerous takeover provisions in South Africa are poorly formulated, making them difficult to interpret and apply. Accordingly, the dissertation recommends amendment and improvement of certain Takeover Provisions. Special emphasis is placed on the mandatory offer requirement. The dissertation critically and comparatively analyses this requirement and especially its impacts on the market for corporate control, efficient usage of capital, corporate governance and (in South Africa) Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment. It appears from the literature explored that the mandatory offer requirement originated from the Perlman case in the United States as an expression of the equal opportunity rule. According to the equal opportunity rule, the controlling stake of a company is enriched with a premium of control, which must be shared with other shareholders when there is a change of the controlling shareholder. Shareholders must be given an equal opportunity to share in this control premium. Hence, a mandatory offer must be made to the remaining shareholders of the company by the new controlling shareholder at a price at which control was bought. Perlman case was decided in the United States of America during 1955. It is contended in the dissertation, that the mandatory offer requirement in section 123 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Act”), can ultimately be traced back to this case. Researchers have criticised the mandatory offer requirement in a number of respects. It has been pointed out that the rationale for the decision in the Perlman case was not clear and applied in limited circumstances. Other scholars point out that the case was not a final decider on the sharing of the control premium due to later judicial pronouncements that differed with that case. Despite these commentaries, it appears that the case became a basis for imposing and enforcing this most debated rule in takeover and merger law. The dissertation concludes that the sharing of a premium of control, as envisaged by the mandatory offer requirement, is not enforced in the state of Delaware. It further concludes that in the UK, the mandatory offer rule forms the cornerstone of enforcement of the equal opportunity rule, but that widely dispersed shareholding ameliorates it negative consequences in that jurisdiction. The dissertation favours the Australian approach. That jurisdiction does not require a mandatory offer similar to that in section 123 of the Act, but, Australian Takeover Provisions, unlike their South African equivalent, have been tailor-made for Australian market conditions. The dissertation accordingly concludes that the mandatory offer requirement in section 123 of the Act in its current form is not appropriate for South Africa.