Browsing Faculty of Military Sciences by browse.metadata.advisor "Esterhuyse, Abel"
Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
Results Per Page
- ItemThe appropriate and optimal role and function of special forces in peace missions(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2022-04) Bester, Louis Andries; Esterhuyse, Abel; Stellenbosch Universty. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies. Dept. of Political Science. (Mil)ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The fascination with special forces, which is especially prevalent in books, movies and news articles, could be ascribed to the prominence of their use in contemporary conflicts across the globe. The public’s imagination of special forces has become linked with military actions and the armed struggles in the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Special forces are also strategically very appealing to policymakers for a number of reasons. The political confidence vested in special forces is clearly demonstrated in the creation of specialised commands across the world. This goes hand in hand with an increase in operating budgets, manpower and supporting structures for special forces operations. There is, however, a paradox of employing such a highly lethal force in order to pursuit peace. With peacekeeping evolving parallel with the strategic environment, especially in Africa, the trend towards more robust interventions has become prevalent since the end of the Cold War. As such, the requirement for accurate and timely intelligence in peace missions has become crucial. Admittedly, special forces would not necessarily be the soldiers expected to wear blue berets and participate in peace missions. It may come as a surprise to the uninformed, though, to learn that special forces have indeed participated, and are still involved, in peace missions across the globe. The dichotomy of this phenomenon leads one to enquire as to what gave rise to elite military forces, renowned for their rigorous training, specialised skills, and sophisticated equipment to be employed in peace missions.
- ItemIn the eye of the public: Military-media relations in South Africa(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2022-12) Theunissen, Jacobus Danie Johannes; Esterhuyse, Abel; Jordaan, Evert; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Political Science.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The conflict of interest between the military and the media originates from the inception of professional journalism. Militaries are as old as humanity and throughout history required various aspects to be victorious. The most important of them being operational security. The media on the other side want to provide an account of what occurred in a truthful and factual manner. Historically the relationship between these two entities have been strenuous as the military needs total control over information and access to conflicts as opposed to the media who required access in order to be able to provide an objective narrative. In the first 10 years of democracy in South Africa there was a congruent relationship between the military and the media. This relationship steadily deteriorated over the years where it is considered to be non-existent at present by certain journalists who regularly interact with the military. The media is of the opinion that the military does not communicate intentionally, timeously, and courteously by taking editorial processes into consideration. From the media’s side the level of professionalism in journalism has dwindled due to the juniorisation of its editors and journalists who no longer understand the military. Up to 2004 corporate communication officers in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) were highly specialised and had many years of experience in dealing with the media. The media liaison function was decentralised and there were continuous liaison between the different management levels of the military and the media. This changed when media liaison was centralised to the Defence Headquarters in 2000. Since then officers without corporate communication qualifications and experience have been appointed in various senior corporate communication and media liaison posts. The Policy on Corporate Communication in the Department of Defence details the role of corporate communication functionaries and their responsibilities to ensure a positive public image on behalf of the command cadre. It is an extensive document addressing the command and control of the discipline on all the management levels as well as the education, training, and development aspects for the discipline. In South Africa it seems as if reporting on the military by the media is either predominantly of a negative nature or there is very little coverage of substance on the SANDF. The purpose of the study is to determine and explain what underpins the relationship between the military and the media in South Africa. The public needs to know what the military does, and the most effective way for the military to communicate with its stakeholders is using the media as a mass communication tool. Communication plays a pivotal part to ensure that the role, functions and activities of the SANDF is presented to ensure a positive public opinion.
- ItemSouth African defence policy and capability : the case of the South African National Defence Force(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2013-12) Louw, Gerhard Martin; Esterhuyse, Abel; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Sciences. School for Defence Organisation and Resource Management.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities that force development brings about. The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm: a theory implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of military forces. This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the outcomes of a military’s force development activities. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities. A general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). By 2006, the South African Army has interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security environment. There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible. While the armed forces appear to be skilful enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that policy demands is unlikely. In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational realities. The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the defence force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate.
- ItemSouth African Defence Policy-Making, 1994-2015(Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2023-12 ) Jordaan, Evert; Esterhuyse, Abel; Mandrup, Thomas; Stellenbosch University. Faculty of Military Science. School for Security and Africa Studies: Military History.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study focused on the making of South African defence policy from 1994 to 2015. Since democratisation, South African defence spending declined as socio-economic development became the national priority. After integration, the South African National Defence Force struggled with affordability regarding its personnel, main equipment, internal deployments, and increasing operational involvement in African missions. The research question was to determine why there is a disconnect between the means and ends in South African defence policy since 1994. To answer this question, a theoretical case study with emphasis on domestic policy-making was done. The work of Graham Allison was used to analyse South African defence policy-making in terms of rational choice, organisational process, and bureaucratic politics. This study found that South African defence policy is not made in a rational, logical, or cost-effective manner – as society expects – but is predominantly influenced by party-political considerations and vested military institutional interests. Established strategy processes of rational choice within the military, including threat assessments and cost–benefit analysis are prevented from informing defence policy or from addressing the separation between the means and ends of policy. From a perspective of organisational process, the military has, in the absence of coherent and knowledgeable political direction, protected its institutional interests, culture, and expensive conventional equipment by using standard procedures, conventional warfare doctrine, and secrecy to resist civilian-led policy processes, legislative oversight, affordability, and austerity measures. As a result, the military has become isolated from government and society, making it politically ineffective to convince Treasury and Cabinet to fund defence appropriately. In terms of bureaucratic politics, the liberation struggle norms, values, culture, and subjective practice of civil–military relations within the African National Congress, dominate the making of defence policy within the executive branch of government and the legislature, with little distinction between party and state. Although defence ministers have significant power to determine defence policy, most lack the expertise, skill, and influence in cabinet to curb ambitious foreign policy, obtain support for a bigger defence budget or to deal with difficult trade-offs involving matters such as personnel nationalisation. The prominent role of Treasury in national planning and budgeting, as well as the skill and influence of its leaders within cabinet and the presidency, created a tense relationship with the military. Military leaders encultured with a war-funding model never adjusted to the bureaucratic politics in a democracy where the defence budget has to be justified in terms of national priorities and financial principles. Treasury was never consulted regarding the available funding for new defence policy, and the military avoided deal-making and compromise with Treasury. Consequently, since democratisation, South African defence was unaffordable. A key argument is that South African defence policy is based on the ruling party’s fears about what the military could do to jeopardise democracy and domestic and regional security rather than objective security realities, budgets, and threats. To address these fears, the military was willingly and conveniently tied to a conventional role, force design, and funding pattern, from which it could not escape.