Between "Partnership" and Disengagement :
MAPPING THE CONTOURS OF US POLICY TOWARDS
POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

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Pectora roborant cultus recti

Declaration

I the undersigned hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own original work and has not previously in its entirety or in part been submitted at any university for a degree.

ABSTRACT

As Pretoria grapples simultaneously with its apartheid past and its promising but precarious future, an accurate map of US policy towards post-apartheid South Africa is critical. Without such a map, policymakers are liable to miscalculate US commitment to engagement, perhaps to detrimental effect. Seeking to draw the contours of US policy between 1994 and 1999, this study operates at the junctures between realism and liberalism, and between international relations and comparative foreign policy theory, allowing insights from each to illuminate analysis across a broad range of issue-areas.

US calls for "partnership" with South Africa must be considered against the backdrop of global developments, historical patterns, and current political exigencies in the US, especially pressures for disengagement. Discussion thus begins at the system level before presenting a brief overview of the history of US South Africa policy and of policy under Clinton as demonstrated via official statements, administrative initiatives, and US responses to events involving South Africa. Analysis then delves into the sub-unit level, considering the role of public opinion and bureaucratic process and politics in US policymaking. The study disaggregates Clinton's South Africa policy across four issue-areas, as suggested by Zimmerman's "issue-based foreign policy paradigm," in this case namely development assistance, trade, global and regional security, and issues of political symbolism. Issue-area analysis reveals interest group and bureaucratic activity in each of these areas, and indicates the net direction of policy towards Pretoria with regard to engagement.

The research found that the end of the Cold War, a reduced US economic advantage internationally, and globalisation have created the conditions for a return to the fundamental US policy of democracy promotion. Under this policy, South Africa has

featured as both a pivotal state and a big emerging market, and as one of a few nations to share a Binational Commission with America. Democracy promotion is not free from detractors, however, who denounce it as a "recolonisation" of the developing world. Such criticism warrants attention. Further, the analysis confirmed the suggestion that US foreign policy is more accurately described as a set of poli*cies*, and therefore that issue-area analysis has value in clarifying the net direction of the various threads of US policy towards a particular nation, based on the domestic factors underlying policy in each issue-area. At the sub-national level, issue-area analysis showed that, since 1994, both interest group and bureaucratic activity has, on balance, encouraged deeper engagement in South Africa. In fact, there is unprecedented interest from sources within the public and the government. The Binational Commission stands as an example of this, as well as of the Clinton/Gore drive to "reinvent government." On this note, while the BNC has not revolutionised Africa policymaking, it has accomplished projects in record time and established valuable links which should last beyond the current period.

The US emphasis on its "partnership" with South Africa may need reviewing, however, in view of the potential cost of such a liaison for South Africa. Delivery on promises, rather than rhetoric, would be of greater assistance to South Africa in it's quest to grow as a democratic, economically thriving and independent leader among developing nations.

OPSOMMING

Terwyl Pretoria tegelykertyd worstel met sy apartheidsverlede en sy belowende, dog onsekere toekoms, is betroubare insig in VSA beleid teenoor die nuwe Suid-Afrika noodsaaklik. Sonder dié insig sal beleidmakers gevaar loop om die VSA se intensies verkeerd te vertolk, dalk met nadelige gevolge. Hierdie studie teken die kontoere van VSA beleid tussen 1994 en 1999, op die basis van 'n ontginning van die raakpunte tussen realisme en liberalisme, en tussen internasionale betrekkinge en vergelykende teorieë van buitelandse beleid.

Die VSA se beroep op vennootskap met Suid-Afrika moet gesien word teen die agtergrond van wêreldwye ontwikkelinge, historiese patrone en die vermeende herlewing van Amerikaanse afsydigheid teenoor die res van die wêreld. Die analise begin dus by die stelselvlak voordat 'n kort oorsig gegee word van die geskiedenis van die VSA se beleid teenoor Suid-Afrika, en van beleid onder Clinton soos blyk uit amptelike verklarings, administratiewe inisiatiewe, en die VSA se reaksie op gebeure wat Suid-Afrika raak. Vervolgens peil die studie die sub-eenheid vlak van analise en gee aandag aan die rol van openbare mening, burokratiese prosesse en die politiek van VSA beleidvorming.

Die proefskrif ontleed Clinton se Suid-Afrika-beleid in besonderhede, deur te fokus op vier kwessie-gebiede ("issue areas") soos deur Zimmerman se "kwessie-verwante buitelandse beleidsparadigma" voorgestel, naamlik ontwikkelingshulp, handel, politieke simbolisme, en globale en regionale sekuriteit. Kwessiegebied-analise lê eiesoortige belangegroep en burokratiese aktiwiteite ten opsigte van elk van die vier kwessies bloot, en wys op die gevaar van 'n te gemaklike veralgemening oor "die" VSA-beleid. Nogtans identifiseer die proefskrif die netto-rigting van VSA-beleid teenoor Pretoria gedurende die Clinton-era.

Die proefskrif bevind dat die einde van die Koue Oorlog, groter ekonomiese pariteit tussen die groot moondhede, en globalisering die VSA aanspoor om na een van sy basiese beleidsrigtings, naamlik die bevordering van liberale demokrasie, terug te keer. In terme hiervan word Suid-Afrika as 'n sleutelstaat beskou, en vanuit 'n investeringsoogpunt as 'n groot ontluikende mark. Gevolglik is dit een van die min state

wat 'n Binasionale Kommissie met die VSA deel. Die VSA se bevordering van 'n baie bepaalde konsepsie van demokrasie word deur sommige kritici, moontlik tereg, as 'n vorm van herkolonialisering beskou.

Die analise bevestig dat die VSA se buitelandse beleid meer akkuraat beskryf kan word as 'n stel beleide, en derhalwe dat kwessiegebiedanalise waarde het om die netto rigting van die verskeie drade van VSA beleid teenoor 'n spesifieke staat, gebaseer op die binnelandse faktore wat die beleid in elke kwessiegebied onderskraag, op te helder. Op die sub-nasionale vlak wys kwessiegebiedanalise uit dat die aktiwiteite van sekere belangegroepe, sowel as burokratiese inisiatiewe, sedert 1994 meer VSA-betrokkenheid by Suid-Afrika aangemoedig het. Die Binasionale Kommissie is 'n voorbeeld hiervan. So ook is die Clinton/Gore veldtog om burokratiese rompslomp uit te skakel, ter wille van meer effektiewe internasionale betrekkinge. In hierdie verband het die Binasionale Kommissie miskien nie 'n omwentelling in Washington-beleidmaking ten opsigte van Afrika teweeggebing nie, maar dit het wel reaksietyd drasties gesny, en waardevolle kontakte gevestig wat langdurig kan wees.

Die VSA se klem op sy vennootskap met Suid-Afrika sal miskien heroorweeg moet word, in die lig van die potensiële nadeel van so 'n verbintenis vir Suid-Afrika se aansien in die ontwikkelende wêreld. Nakoming van Amerikaanse beloftes, eerder as woorde, sal Suid-Afrika meer help in sy strewe om 'n demokratiese, ekonomiese vooruitstrewende en onafhanklike wêreldburger te wees.

Dedicated to my husband, Murray, and our three children,
Grant, Laura and Grace.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Challenge:
Mapping US policy toward South Africa in the 1990's

CHAPTER TWO   43

A Transformed World:
The Global Context of US South Africa Policy
in the 1990's

CHAPTER THREE   83

The Historical Context
For US South Africa Policy under Clinton

CHAPTER SIX   177
Foreign Policy Making on South Africa under Clinton-Gore:
Policy Process, Bureaucracies, and the BNC

CHAPTER SEVEN   231
CONCLUSION
Issue-Area Analysis
And the Study of US South Africa Policy in the 1990's

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List of Figures and Tables

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xi

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Challenge:
Mapping US policy toward South Africa in the 1990's

1.1   *The Research Problem: To Draw an Accurate Map*

US interest in South Africa, indeed in the African continent south of the Sahara, has been marginal, at best, throughout US history. Since slavery's abolition, and in view of the vigorous competition between European nations to colonise Africa in the 1800's, the US has generally had little to do with the continent outside of mining precious stones and minerals and, after decolonisation, attempting to bring it under the US wing during the Cold War. Consequently, the study of US policy toward African nations, including South Africa, has been sporadic and comprises very little of the great body of literature analysing US foreign policy as a whole. Within the small subset which does deal with Africa, moreover, few studies are devoted to understanding US Africa policy as a function of both global and domestic sources,[1] even though theorists increasingly acknowledge that seldom is foreign policy adequately accounted for by study of just one or the other of these sources (Miller, 1992: 2-3; Putnam, 1993; Caporaso, 1997: 566-567). As the increasing reach and magnitude of transnational relations brings greater complexity to foreign policy with each passing decade, any study of US South Africa policy which aspires to contribute to the policy debate in the 1990's, and beyond, requires a look inside that policy to accurately discern, and bring a depth of understanding about, current trends.

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[1] Clough (1992) does look at both the geopolitical aspects of US Africa policy and (briefly) domestic constituencies for Africa. Schraeder (1994) focuses on bureaucratic processes and politics behind US security policy toward Africa, with a brief look at post-Cold War dynamics. Grundy (1997) breifly considers external and internal factors US policy before turning to analyse South Africa's America policy. Otherwise, the focus of various journal articles on US policy towards Africa/South Africa has been either systemic factors (eg, Connell and Smyth, 1998; Broderick, 1997), or one of the domestic factors under study here (eg, Smyth, 1997; Payne, 1994).

Introduction

Discernment and understanding are especially critical for two reasons. The first is the oft-overlooked gap between rhetoric and reality in the world of politics, between the statements of an administration and the policy actions of a democracy such as the United States. The second reason is that nations relate across a variety of issues, some of which attract more public interest and activism than do others, some of which involve greater conflict at the policymaking level than do others, and all of which can create unexpected contours in the overall policy picture, or "map" of one nation's foreign policy towards another. With regard to the rhetoric/reality gap, most international relations textbooks and numerous political journals can fill in the missing details,[2] although in the age of CNN and 24-hour news coverage via 30-second soundbites, there is much to discourage such study. But even academic publications often offer foreign policy analysis conducted on the basis of a few issues, perhaps those which are most salient at the time, or hold the interest of the writer. Analysis which takes into consideration the gap between words and action in a nation's foreign policy may bring the necessary depth for one set of issues, but without considering the differing issue-areas in that policy such analysis will result in a map which is too narrowly focused, lacking in the breadth required by policymakers to assess foreign policy accurately.

So, in sum, to see US policy purely as a function of systemic power relations is to negate the "power" of domestic politics in the United States. However, to move from the global perspective to view US policy through the policymaking dynamics of only one or two issue-areas is similarly misleading.

It is the conviction underlying this study that, given the importance to South Africa's future of a sound estimation of US policy, and given the importance of South Africa's new non-racial democracy to Africa and to the wider international community,

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[2]See, for instance, Kegley and Wittkopf (1997), or any of the numerous journals in the field such as *World Policy Journal, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs,* and *International Affairs.*

Introduction

including the United States, the neglect of well-rounded analysis of US South Africa policy must be rectified. The cost of continuing without an accurate map, or with a flat, narrowly focused map, is too high. Those costs involve South Africa's future, which holds great importance to the international community, including the United States, but also the future of foreign policy analysis and its usefulness to policymakers in general.

1.1.1 South Africa's Future, and Its Importance to the International Community

The fact that the process of change in South Africa did not deteriorate into war as in Zimbabwe in the 1970's and in innumerable other places around the globe before and since, and that instead peaceful negotiations brought about a new, non-racial constitution, gives great hope to the international community that new inroads into democratic governance have been achieved. For these inroads to be choked off by economic and political tumult after a few years, or decades, would not only undermine that hope but also shake already fragile, indeed volatile, race relations in many places, including America.*

Post-apartheid South Africa still appears committed to achieving political consolidation and addressing the inequities of the past, as well as to maintaining economic policies which will engender strong economic growth based on international reintegration -- all of which are critical to the next phase beyond peaceful transformation. But few would argue that the success of these efforts is by any means assured, or that public pressure in South Africa might not cause the government to abandon its policies in favour of more rapid change. In view of the increased financial pressure on emerging markets the world over since late 1997, calls to reject participation in any "Neo-Liberal Economic Order" will no doubt grow as well. These calls come from without, as well as

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*Though the author acknowledges that the term "America" is also used to refer to North and South America, it is used herein, as a concession to brevity, to connote the United States of America.

Introduction

from within, due largely to the fact that, despite some "Afro-Optimism" in the late 1990's, Africa remains in debt, at war, and marginalised by the developed world to a large degree. The Southern Africa Development Conference, the Organisation for African Unity, and the Non-Aligned Movement, all of whom have looked to the new South Africa for leadership, express growing disillusionment over international efforts to address such issues as the crushing debt burden of the developing world -- at the same time that the US economy enjoys its longest-running economic boom ever.

Thus, while South Africa stands to gain some benefit by a close "partnership" with the US, there are implications. Continued cooperation may, for instance, jeopardise Pretoria's new legitimacy as a leader in the developing world and especially in Africa. However, can South Africa afford to choose to bypass that close relationship? And if South Africa continues to take the risk of appearing close to the US, can Pretoria count on the US to remain engaged in South Africa, in view of the perceived disengagement sentiment in Washington in the late 1990's? While the first of these questions must form the basis of another study, the second highlights the importance of understanding the direction of US policy under Clinton.

For, even as US policymakers acknowledge the dangers, to the US and the international system, inherent in allowing budding democracies such as South Africa to falter, they have wavered in their commitment to act accordingly. Indeed, in some ways, since the end of the Cold War, the US has appeared as a giant unsure of its next move in the international arena -- here taking a step toward disengagement, there a leap into engagement. In the middle of the 1990's, support for international disengagement (or "isolationism," as it is often termed in the discourse[4]), appeared to take its historical place

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[4]Disengagement is here defined as a policy of shaking off or loosening cooperative international bonds -- which can consist of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations and which is the opposite of engagement, or a policy seeking to enter more fully into any of these bonds. The term "disengagement sentiment" will be used throughout this study as the term preferred over that of "isolationism" due to the several and obtuse meanings, and derogative connotations, attached to the latter.

Introduction

among the pressures confronting US policymakers, much to the dismay of internationalists in Washington and abroad. In addition, other factors in the policymaking process seemed ready to relegate South Africa to its traditional place at the bottom of US foreign policy agendas, just above the rest of Africa. Only the fact of South Africa's successful democratic elections, and then the announcement by President Clinton and President Mandela of the formation of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission, prevented South Africa from slipping off that agenda altogether. Indeed, the changed US requisites within a transformed world political economy, the signs of rising disengagement sentiment, and the predisposition of US policymakers to de-emphasise Africa policy in general, remain powerful forces militating against any stated intentions of the Clinton administration to engage with South Africa in a "partnership" for the new, post-Cold War, post-apartheid world.

1.1.2   Foreign Policy Analysis in the 1990's and Beyond

Finally, with regard to foreign policy analysis, as noted earlier, much has been written about the need to incorporate a look at global and domestic sources into the study of a nation's foreign policy. Little, however, has been noted about the need for issue-area analysis to become a vital element of such study.[5] How, for instance, are South African policymakers to assess the cooperation of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission in the area of job creation (a distributive issue) as opposed to the acrimony caused by the US Trade Representative's suspension of trade preferences due to alleged intellectual property rights (a regulatory issue)? Political scientists must begin to recognise the fact that foreign policy differs, or the foreign poli*cies* of a nation toward another differ, in content across issue-areas, often because of differences in processes of formulation between those issue-areas. It is the net effect of these poli*cies* which foreign policy analysis often seeks

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[5]For an excellent attempt at such a proposition, see Milner (1997).

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to illuminate. To fail to recognise issue-areas as critical to an understanding of foreign policy, and to fail to integrate tools for analysis accordingly, is to deny the field of foreign policy analysis, and policymakers, valuable insights which might change the course of foreign relations, and indeed history.

1.2   *Study Aims and Questions for Exploration*

This study does not presume to be a definitive work on US policy toward post-apartheid South Africa, nor on establishing issue-area analysis in the field of foreign policy analysis. Rather, this study aims to open up an analytically-integrated discussion of that policy, utilising issue-area analysis, and in doing so to discern the current degree of US engagement in South Africa as a whole.

Insofar as the following study considers US policy both as a response to its current systemic context, and as a result of its internal politics and policy processes, it seeks to "cross the divide" between two levels of analysis -- international and domestic -- which so often has remained intact with regard to US Africa policy studies (eg, Payne, 1994; Schraeder, 1994; Massie, 1997; Connell and Smyth, 1998). International questions regarding US hegemony and global economic relations and integration receive attention, along with emerging US foreign policy guidelines in response to changed global requisites, all of which must inform any analysis of US policymaking toward South Africa. An outline of Clinton's policy statements on South Africa follows, as well as discussion of US policy actions in the form of initiatives on South Africa and responses to events involving South Africa. Against that backdrop, sub-state level analysis examines two major sources of US policy: 1) society, especially interest groups, and 2) the institutions of the state, or, the bureaucracy, with a special emphasis on the role of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. The author employs issue-area analysis to disaggregate US South Africa policy into the variety of poli*cies* evident across the spectrum of bilateral interactions which result, in part, from the activity of these two

Introduction

factors. As called for above, the methodology employed will enable the analyst to view the different dynamics in play across issue-areas, and then to reaggregate these to gain a more accurate picture of US policy overall.

The questions which this exploratory study of US policy toward post-apartheid South Africa seeks to address are the following:

1. What is guiding US foreign policy generally, and towards specific regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, in the post-Cold War period? Is there a "global logic" behind US policy in the 1990s?

2. With regard to US policy towards South Africa, is there one, unified policy, or, as earlier suggested, are there several polic*ies* which differ in tone and even in direction, depending on the sorts of issues at stake?

3. Does issue-area analysis assist in discerning and understanding more deeply US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period?

4. What are the issues in US South Africa policy? What are the implications of public interest group and bureaucratic activity for policymaking in different issue-areas?

5. What is the significance of the Gore/Mbeki Binational Commission? Has this policy innovation under Clinton changed the way in which policy is made and implemented with regard to South Africa?

6. What is the likelihood of disengagement becoming a salient feature of US foreign policy in the near future? Is the US disengaging from South Africa (and from Africa in general), as is sometimes suggested? Where does South Africa fit, if at all, into US foreign policy priorities in the 1990's?

7. What continuities or discontinuities from earlier periods have carried over into US South Africa policy in the 1990's? What can be said about future directions of US South Africa policy?

With these questions in mind, the following framework is established for exploring the content and context of US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period.

Introduction

1.3   *A Framework for Analysis*

1.3.1   Terms of Reference and Periodisation

The questions above all relate to the question inferred in the title of this dissertation: Where does US policy toward post-apartheid South Africa feature on the spectrum of possibilities between "partnership" and disengagement at the end of the 1990's? As these two words, partnership and disengagement, are the operative terms of reference for this study, it is important to clarify their definitions at the outset. As noted earlier, the term disengagement, for the purposes of this study, is defined as a policy of shaking off or loosening cooperative international bonds -- which can consist of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations, and is the opposite of engagement, or a policy seeking to enter more fully into any of these bonds. "Partnership," a term intentionally borrowed from the Clinton administration pronouncements on its policy toward post-apartheid South Africa, connotes a high level of cooperative engagement, even a consensus on common goals and how to achieve them, perhaps by working together.

The period beginning in 1994 was chosen as the focus of the following study for the simple reason that, before the election of Nelson Mandela as President in the reconstituted South Africa, the only articulated US policy toward post-apartheid South Africa -- besides that inherited from the Bush administration -- was "wait and see." Clinton and Gore may have been ready before mid-1994 to enter the fray to congratulate Mandela and the fledgling nation hatching at the tip of Africa, even to offer development funding and trade incentives, but these policy actions could not be taken until the anti-apartheid lobby in the US was satisfied that apartheid was truly dead. Only Mandela's inauguration in May of 1994 gave such assurance. The study was conducted over the period 1995 to 1998, inclusive, thereby providing the closing date of December 1998.

1.3.2 Levels of Analysis

This study, in submitting that it is necessary not only to take account of the changed global context of US foreign policy but also to look inside the US and to analyse the dynamics posed for that policy by both domestic politics and by the process of US foreign policymaking, operates from the assumptions of "second-image" approaches in its analysis of international relations. That is, state and society are here considered important in the formulation of US foreign policy. Analysis will move from the "third-image," or system level, to the state and sub-state level, in the belief that context is important to the task of issue-area analysis. Analysis at the individual, or "first-image" level, is provided in brief for further context only.[6] An in-depth study of the roles of Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela, or of Thabo Mbeki and Al Gore, in US South Africa policy over the period under study would no doubt bear great dividends from a contemporary historical point of view, but has been left to another to conduct.

Recent studies have found, of course, that internal sources of foreign policy are themselves affected by changes in the international system, evidence of which was indeed observed in this study as well. "Second-image reversed" theory did not, however, form a major focus here.[7] The present work might be considered, for those interested in this theoretical approach, as groundwork for such a study. Instead, US South Africa policy is here scrutinised from within. Specifically, that policy as demonstrated over the 1994-1998 period is disaggregated along issue-area lines in order to learn the content and directional thrust of its domestic sources. The disaggregation process is accomplished

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[6]This decision was based on agreement with the opinion that while a leader's "individual or idiosyncratic qualities influence policy style,... many restraints reduce the impact of personality on policy itself. All recent presidents have found it necessary to bend strong convictions to the force of competing political pressures, because successful presidential performance requires a willingess to satisfy political constituents at home and abroad" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996: 547-8).

[7]The term "second-image reversed" was introduced by Peter Gourevitch (1978). See also the volume edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (1996), as well as Caporaso (1997).

Introduction

using a typology based on William Zimmerman's "issue-based foreign policy paradigm" (Zimmerman, 1973: 1208).

Such a dual emphasis -- on global and domestic sources of US foreign policy -- places this study at two critical junctures: firstly, at the juncture between the realist and the liberal schools of thought, and secondly, at that between foreign policy analysis and the study of comparative politics.

1.3.2.1 *The Realist/Liberal Juncture*

With regard to the realist/liberal juncture, as current developments in the international political economy increasingly challenge several -- but not all -- of the propositions of realism, there is a growing need to explore the overlap between the two approaches. For many contemporary theorists, it seems that "realism and liberalism have always been in conversation; it is hard to imagine one without the other" (Rosenthal, 1995: 324). Even earlier, there was growing acknowledgement that "the sharp opposition between realist and liberal theories is overstated," and that "in fact, the two approaches can be complementary" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: xi).

Much of the following analysis would place this study squarely in the liberal school of thought except for the fact of certain premises borrowed from the realist school. These premises are that states (which are, however, not considered unitary) are most likely to act in their own (albeit aggregated) interests, and that building international relations on more idealistic views about human motivations is bound to lead, at best, to disappointment, and at worst, to conflict. This study is not about to suggest that the US and South Africa are likely to go to war, only that the bilateral relationship must be seen to be constructed on national self-interest, in both cases, for any effective analysis to occur. That should not be seen to preclude discussion of what might be, or "ought" to be, however. In the words of another analyst, "the normative nature of the problem is not dissolved by suggesting that the actors always do (and will) act according to their

respective self-interests," because "what is to count as self-interest is partially determined by normative considerations. [When one nation asserts a policy,]...part of what is being asserted is that [a] particular interest ought to be...defended. (Frost, 1983: 8-9).

Perhaps most important for the purposes of this study, however, is that contemporary developments such as "transnational"[8] relations could be expected to lead to "new definitions of interest" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: xi). If policymakers, and their publics, could begin to see that global and national interests are often overlapping, as they did after the Great Depression of the 1930's when protectionism was largely (though not entirely) discredited, and as they increasingly perceive in issues of environmental degradation in the 1990's, than the proclivity of states to act in their own interests will hopefully begin to bring their policies increasingly in line with the interests of other nations, a state of affairs that would surely support the notion of "international cooperation as the continuation of domestic politics by other means" (Milner, 1997: 246). While evidence to support optimism that such cooperation is imminent is indeed sparse (Milner, 1997: 251), there does appear to be signs that the longer-term, broader perspective on national interest is gaining credence in some quarters.[9]

The following analysis, then, might best be considered to be based on a modification of realist theory. Realist theory is firstly modified in that, unlike classical realism, military issues are not considered most important but rather feature *among* the most important of international issues, along with economic and "new security" concerns such as environmental degradation, international crime and terrorism, and the threat of pandemics of infectious disease. Secondly, unlike realism, this study differentiates

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[8]By "transnational" this study refers to the "multiple channels of contact among societies," that Keohane and Nye refer to as the third aspect (after the minor role of military force, and an absence of hierarchy among issues) of their theory of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 33).
[9]The passage of NAFTA, of the European Union's Charter, of the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women, and of several international environmental treaties, are a few examples. While not all of these have been ratified by the US, the fact of their existence and of continued (and increasingly respected and institutionalised) transnational campaigns on their behalf does support greater optimism.

between issue-areas in expected policy outcomes. The power of a state like the US will not necessarily translate into an ability to assert its will in the international arena every time it wishes to do so, for instance, as coalitions of less powerful states can make enforcement of the US' will too politically costly (as when Pretoria disregards US displeasure over South Africa's friendly relations with Libya). And thirdly, the transnational relations that have mushroomed even further with the development of the Internet and the "world wide web" can undermine stated US policy to an increasing degree, in that independent US actors, whether from the legislature or the business community, can blur the picture of US intentions and lines of authority by either expressing different US goals, or acting according to different goals. The example of national legislators, churches, civic groups and several municipal pension fund managers across America denying support for the US policy of "constructive engagement" with apartheid South Africa in the 1980's is a case in point. Ultimately, government policy as enunciated and acted upon by the administration remains the framework of government-to-government relations. But unless administrations take into account the impact of the many transnational links in bilateral relations, often effected through domestic factors such as interest groups and bureaucracies, that policy will become increasingly ineffective -- or, very occasionally, overturned by congressional action, as in the case, again, of "constructive engagement" and US sanctions against South Africa.

Such modifications allow the following discussion to steer away from the realist preoccupation with theories such as Hegemonic Stability Theory (Kindleberger, 1973, Gilpin, 1975; Isaak, 1991), or those dealing with regime analysis (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984), which deal solely with system level analysis. The concepts of hegemony and regimes remain important, but in view of the increasing globalisation, or widening and deepening of relations between and across the boundaries of the world's nation-states, and of the changed nature of security threats at the end of the twentieth century, both foreign policy analysis and formulation require fresh thinking.

Introduction

On the other hand, neither does the above modifications of realism steer discussion into the preoccupations of "complex interdependence" as developed in the 1970's by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (Keohane and Nye, 1977). That theory posited an "ideal" (though not necessarily universally desirable) world in which mutual (although asymmetrical) vulnerability in international relations reigned. While this ideal, as they noted, "sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism," this study maintains the importance of the nation-state in the late 1990's, based on the continued force of nationalism and protectionism, for instance, and therefore does not share the emphases of complex interdependence theory on multiple channels of transgovernmental and transnational (non-governmental) relations and their direct affect on world politics. The following is concerned, rather, with the impact those -- of state and societal actors and of world politics -- on the policies of a particular nation-state.

1.3.2.2 *The Domestic/International Juncture*

With regard to the second juncture, that between foreign policy analysis and comparative politics, there is much debate in the literature over the wisdom of bridging the gap between the two (eg, Waltz, 1979; Putnam, 1988 and 1993; Caporaso, 1997) While there is no argument with Waltz when he points out that "without prior systemic theory, unit-level analysis of world politics floats in an empirical and conceptual vacuum," there is argument here when he posits the autonomous -- therefore nonreducible -- character of systemic international relations theory. This study agrees, rather, with Caporaso, who comments that "if [Waltz'] position is believed, it rules out explanatory reductionism, that is, the explanation of international phenomena by reference to second or first image factors." Caporaso also notes that, "given the incompleteness of international relations theory, it rarely provides knowledge that is sufficient to explain the actions of the component units," and proceeds to argue that this theoretical insufficiency "provides the motivation to bring the theories of domestic and international politics closer

13

together" (Caporaso, 1997: 563). The dual approach of this study follows just such a motivation.

An emphasis on domestic as well as international factors elicits criticism from other than neo-realists, of course. Those decrying the ramifications for North/South inequalities of "globalisation" and the US drive to establish a neo-liberal or new world order (Falk, 1997; Murphy, 1993; Arrighi, 1997; Chomsky, 1997; Robinson, 1996) would see such detailed focus as perhaps "missing the forest for the trees." Certainly, a step back for a broader vista is valuable, as the numerous writings at the international level on current world affairs demonstrates. However, given these numerous writings, and the dearth of analysis of the domestic sources of the US role in current world dynamics and their relation to specific countries such as South Africa, the study undertaken in these pages provides analysis which is missing in the wider literature.

Feminist critique might likewise find this study of international and domestic sources of US South Africa policy lacking, in that questions of gender roles and women's rights certainly rarely enter US policy considerations, except insofar as do human rights generally (which, they may rightly argue, is all too rarely). Indeed, the need for further analysis of international affairs from the feminist point of view is compelling considering the continued oppression of women the world over. The cultural barriers to US intervention in this realm are, however, prohibitive and better addressed by indigenous women's movements within Southern Africa (Venter and Funk-Bridgman, 1994) than by the predominantly white, male US policymaking establishment (Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice notwithstanding). South Africa has undertaken reforms which place it ahead of the United States in terms of women's numbers in the legislature and in other governmental roles, in any case. In view of these factors, except through any implicit feminist world view underlying the analysis, this study does not seek to address the issue of sexual equality in international relations, nor in US South Africa policy.

Introduction

1.3.3 Normative Questions

The notion that for political science to be useful, it must be void (as far as possible) of normative questions is well-countered, in this author's view, by the argument that for political science to be truly useful it must take into account exactly those questions which will impinge on the "ought" in policymaking. There is little doubt that "actors in the realm of international relations are regularly...called upon to decide what, given the specific situation, would be the right thing to do,...[to face] the moral problem of choosing the ends to be pursued in a given situation and deciding upon what means might legitimately be used in pursuit of those ends" (Frost, 1983: 8). Recent developments in Kosovo illustrate this point far too graphically.

With regard to the normative questions facing US policymakers on South Africa in the 1990's, these are very different from those facing US policymakers throughout the post-World War II period. While apartheid was posing a human rights challenge to the international community on the one hand, the Cold War was dictating from the other (for most US policymakers) the criteria by which allies and enemies were to be chosen and by which issues were to be prioritised. The fight against communism in Africa outweighed the fight for racial equality in US South Africa policy up until 1986 when the US popular will overturned policymakers' choices, as shall be discussed in the following chapters. In the 1990's, the issues in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid world have, more than anything else, to do with the spread of American-style liberal democracy and the sovereignty of the least powerful nations of the world in the face of this overwhelming trend. What should the US do in view of the consequences for developing nations -- and for the globe -- of the unequitable distribution of wealth which has been further reinforced by recent trends in financial flows and investment? Will anyone, whether

nation or "transnational hegemonic elite,"[10] benefit from this phenomenon called globalisation,[11] in the long run? According to one analyst, "a previous era of globalisation shows that heightened interdependence and cooperation does not safeguard stability if inequality between and inside nations is left unaddressed" (Nel, 1998: 2). Meanwhile, as previously mentioned, in the late 1990's Africa remains in debt, at war, and marginalised by the developed world to a large degree, as the US economy enjoys its longest-running economic boom ever, boasting an effective inflation rate of nil and an unemployment rate below 5 percent.

South Africa is different from the rest of the continent in many respects, it is true. It has weathered the financial crisis of 1997-98 remarkably well, and resisted the prognosis of race war beyond the euphoria of 1994. But how can the US engage with Pretoria in a "partnership" when their respective economies differ in scale by a factor of 30? If South Africa cannot afford to bypass the opportunity of close relations with the US, is it right for the US to highlight this budding "partnership" when the political cost of a close relationship between the two nations is so much greater for South Africa than it is for the US? These are the normative questions that must be addressed by policymakers in Washington at the end of the Clinton era.

1.3.4 Sub-Unit Level Theories

At this point, discussion turns to theory about the making of US foreign policy, specifically pluralist and interest aggregation theory, and three models of bureaucratic process and politics. These constructions will guide the discussion in the chapters dealing with the domestic factors in US South Africa policy (Chapters Five and Six).

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[10]See Robinson, 1996, for discussion of an application of the Gramsian theory of hegemony, in which preponderance by one society over others transcends national borders and involves cross-national linkages along class lines, to the process of globalisation in the 1990's.
[11]Globalisation is defined here as the widening and deepening of relations between and across the boundaries of the world's nation-states.

Introduction

1.3.4.1 *Pluralism and the study of US Foreign Policy*

A major assumption underlying this study is that the United States is essentially a pluralist nation. As such, it is a nation in which "power is shared amongst a plurality of competing parties and interest groups" (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 257) who, in any given area, will jostle for position until one, or a coalition of several, can "impose its political orientation" on national policy in that area (Augelli and Murphy, 1988: 8). This definition intentionally allows for the impression that pluralism is not always "of the people and for the people" as a whole, and that there may be inordinate power (ie, inordinate access to decisionmaking processes, due, for instance, either to campaign donation practices, unscrupulous legislators, or a sheer vacuum of policy in certain areas) residing in one or another interest group or party. Concessions to the theory of elitism do occur in the analysis which follows, in that the use of issue-area analysis provides for instances in foreign policymaking where, due either to a lack of interest, or to compelling threats to the survival of a state, or to narrowly-defined redistributive issues, a few at the top of the relevant hierarchy -- whether that be a governmental or social hierarchy -- are left to decide on (and in the latter case, pressure for) policy. It is the proposition that not *all* of foreign policymaking is carried out along elitist lines which is posited here, not that *no* foreign policy is made along elitist lines.

The theory of interest aggregation states that "sentiments at the grassroots level of a pluralist society will eventually be reflected on a higher level of aggregation, to the point that national policy will be affected" (Beitz, 1984: 55). In addition to the qualification regarding issue-areas to be discussed below, this study would add, however, that sentiments must be vocalised -- whether through polls or protests -- and like-minded citizens organised, before national policy is likely to be specifically affected by that sentiment. The US Constitution itself protects the right to "petition the Government for redress of grievances," and the practice in the US of seeking to change policy (or, lobby)

17

in line with the aggregated interests of an interest group apparently predates even the constitution (Eastman, 1977: 4). Interest groups and political parties play an important role in aggregating policy preferences of the US public, and would appear more effective than public opinion polls in communicating those preferences regarding specific policies to policymakers (Kull et al, 1997: 178), even as polling has become increasingly frequent and more sophisticated since the end of the second World War.

Effective communication of aggregated preferences becomes especially important in light of the historical disdain with which many foreign policymakers have viewed the public at large when it comes to matters external. Public opinion, specifically, was long deemed by the "Almond-Lippman Consensus" to provide "inadequate foundations for stable and effective foreign policies" due to its "volatile" nature and lack of "coherence or structure," and in any case was seen to have very little impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992: 439).[12] Subsequent studies (Holsti, 1992: Nincic, 1992; Shapiro and Page, 1994), however, mount a credible challenge to that consensus, in essence refuting all three claims by Lippmann about the inadequacies of public sentiment on foreign policy matters. At the same time, other political analysts have seen a greater willingness among US policymakers to take seriously the public, whether via polling data or interest group activity, in the formation of foreign policy (Foyle, 1997; Powlick: 1991). This may have followed the changed content of US foreign policy, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnic and commercial concerns world-wide (Huntington, 1997; Deese, 1994; Halperin, 1997; Clough, 1994), but surely it is also due to greater information flows to the public through such media as CNN and the Internet, as well as the increased sense of

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[12]Lippman, in two early studies of public opinion (1922 and 1923), dismissed the common man as "too fully engaged in the requirements of earning a living and otherwise attending to his most immediate needs to have the time or inclination to satisfy the...assumptions about the informed and engaged citizen celebrated in classical democratic theory." Lippman was especially pessimistic regarding the qualifications of the greater American polity to comment on foreign policy. Almond, writing in the 1950's, introduced the idea of differences between an "informed public" and the masses, the second of which would fit Lippman's description of the public.

vulnerability among Americans to international political trends. These two aspects of the current state of affairs would seem to provide the fodder and the incentive for the US public to organise and communicate its various policy preferences. The extent to which ethnic interests have increased their leverage in the formulation of US foreign policy (eg, Shain, 1994/95: 812) could have particular implications for this study, in light of the intensity of African-American sentiment on US South Africa policy in the 1980's, and will be explored in some depth in Chapter Five.

1.3.4.2 *Models of Bureaucratic Process and Politics*

In addition to the public, bureaucracies form an important source of US foreign policy, and as such form the second domestic factor under examination, in the issue-area analysis of Chapter Six. The role of the US bureaucracy was highlighted by Graham Allison with his models of bureaucratic (or organisational and governmental) process and politics in his 1971 book, *Essence of Decision*. While some subsequent critiques have disagreed with the premises or the method behind Allison's theorising (eg, Krasner, 1972; Bendor and Hammond, 1992), his models have formed the springboard for a number of other studies (eg Ripley, 1995; Smith 1994; Hunter, 1982; Brewer, 1980; Halperin and Kanter, 1973), and remain an important contribution to the study of domestic sources of US foreign policy, especially for pointing out that implicit conceptual models shape our analysis of foreign policy (Allison, 1971: 4). Offered as alternatives to the "classical" rational actor model which dominated (and, it could be argued, continues to dominate) the field of foreign policy analysis, Allison's second and third models, termed the organisational process model and the governmental politics model, were each an alternative "conceptual lens" for the study of foreign policymaking.

In introducing Model II, Allison posited that "government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own." Thus "governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their

Introduction

component organizations process information" and "act as these organizations enact routines." As such, Allison concluded, governments' behaviour might be understood "less as deliberate choices and more as *outputs* of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour" or "standard operating procedures" which change slowly, if at all, over time (Allison, 1971: 67-68). His Model III focused not on the bipartisan tug-o-war of national politics (as the name governmental politics might infer), but on foreign policy as a "resultant of various bargaining games among players in the national government," each of whom sits atop a large organisation and is also a player in his or her own right, with often predictable "conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals" (aptly captured in the expression, "where you stand is where you sit"). These players must compete with others in similar positions of power within the government in order to advance the policy preference of their organisations, or to gain concessions in some sort of compromise policy outcome. The cumulative effect of such dynamics is decisions not by a "single rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that is politics" (p. 144, 166, 176).

Even given the "tentative" nature of Allison's models, and his insistence that further testing was necessary, they do provide a useful "conceptual lens"[13] through which to view US South Africa policy as disaggregated along the lines of issue-area. How, for example, is the 1997 fiasco surrounding the rumour of South African arms sales to Syria explained, except that a bureaucrat in one position of power (the Department of State) sought to protect his conception of US policy (warm US-South African relations), at the expense of another aspect of US policy (isolating state sponsors of terrorism), while the latter was later vociferously defended by a spokesperson for the White House. This example is only one of several instances in which confusing signals emanate from

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[13]Models II and III will together form the basis of the analysis of bureaucratic activity on US South Africa policy.

Introduction

bureaucratic Washington to cast shadows over a supposedly cooperative bilateral relationship.

An additional aspect of bureaucratic processes which comes under scrutiny for the first time in such a study is that of the Clinton/Gore project in "reinventing government" (REGO). The US-South African Binational Commission is viewed, in part, as an example of these efforts to streamline governmental processes and bring about "outcome-based" approaches to domestic as well as foreign policy problems. The impact on US South Africa policy of REGO, a portfolio assigned to Vice-President Gore's office, comes under analysis at the end of Chapter Six.

The fact of the many layers of authority inherent in the bureaucratic approach does present some limitations for the researcher, it must be added, as unless research is carried out from within the policy process, how can these dynamics be observed? The task of piecing together from the outside the different players and processes and politics behind US policy is difficult. Insofar as first-hand accounts from participants in the bureaucratic policy process and from well-informed policy analysts constitute "the facts," as gained via the research interview process as well as the literature, these accounts form the basis of analysis in Chapter Six, but must be assumed to be less complete than the accounts that will surface in the memoirs of officials in the years to come.

With these theoretical assumptions in mind, the discussion turns to the analytical tool on which much of this study relies for its insights: that of issue-area analysis.

1.4   *Issue-Area Analysis*

Without an organising principle to guide the study of foreign policy, the political landscape of a particular nation during a particular time in history, while observable via historical records and media reports, remains little more than a plethora of facts and faces. To further bewilder the observer, as earlier noted, nations relate across a variety of issues (some of which attract more public interest and activism than others, and some of which

21

involve greater conflict at the policymaking level than do others), creating contours in policy -- changes in tone, or in depth of commitment to a stated policy line, or even in the direction (for instance, towards disengagement) of policy. These contours exist, and must be accurately reflected in any "map" of the foreign policy of one nation towards another for that map to be useful to the analyst and policymaker. Different methodological approaches have organised information, or constructed maps, along the lines of the structure of the international system or of various national governments, or along the lines of geographic size or location, level of development, or political ideology of those nation-states, in order to discern patterns and refine theory. This study would like to suggest however, with other writings in recent years, that "variations in processes and outcomes of foreign policies within and between states" might usefully be seen to be "not between countries so much as between issue-areas" (Evangelista, 1989: 147). The present aim of seeking to discern and understand the policy of the US toward South Africa in the 1994-1998 period is well served by such an issue-area approach. This position is based on the foregoing discussion of the importance of integrating "second-image" approaches into the study of international relations, and on the fact of the increasingly multi-faceted nature of US policy toward South Africa in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid period. A tool to indicate the net effect of US policy actions with regard to engagement/disengagement will give further value to the analysis, as well as some basis for projections about the likely direction US policy may be taking.

1.4.1   Rosenau's Pre-Theory

Introduced into the discourse on foreign policy analysis by James Rosenau in 1966 and 1967, issue-area analysis arose from the "compelling evidence that horizontal systems [eg, national governments] function differently in different areas" of policy, and

that indeed "vertical systems" may even form in the international arena along the lines of "issue-areas" (Rosenau, 1971: 141).[14] Rosenau built his "pre-theory" of issue-areas on earlier writings on public policy which aimed inter alia to explain why one political system might appear both elitist and pluralist in the same period, depending on the issues at hand (eg, Dahl, 1961).[15] Rosenau defined an issue-area as a "cluster of values" facing allocation, following on Easton's conception of politics as the "authoritative allocation of values" (Easton, 1965:50). Building on that and later definitions, this study defines an issue-area as *a distinct set of disputes over various interrelated political goods, the disputes sharing in common certain characteristic qualities.* Political goods here refer to Rosenau's "values" requiring allocation and can range from commodities of trade to tariff barriers, territory, status or sovereignty, all being items over which policy must be made. Thus, in short, an issue-area is a set of similar policy disputes.

Theorists, including Rosenau, have developed several typologies for classifying issues either by substance such as economic, military, or "diplomatic" issues (Brecher et al, 1969; Coplin et al, 1973; Hermann and Coate, 1977; East and Hutchins, 1977); by situational variables such as high threat, short time and surprise, (Hermann, 1969); or by other characteristic qualities such as tangibility, domestic impact, context, salience, or dimension (Rosenau, 1966; Lowi, 1967; Zimmerman, 1973; Brewer, 1973; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981). Subsequently, several studies have shown issue-area analysis to be useful for the indication of domestic foreign policymaking processes that are most likely

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[14]While this study does not focus on the vertical systems that form internationally, such analysis forms the basis (even if not explicitly so) of several lines of inquiry over the past few decades. These include Keohane and Nye (1977), Mansbach and Vasquez (1981). For further discussion , see Potter, 1980: 415-418.

[15]Robert Dahl (1961), in a socio-political "community power" study, found in the policymaking processes of the city of New Haven, Connecticut, different compositions of local actors depending on the issue- area under consideration -- in Dahl's study, public education, urban development, or nominations for local elections. Others contributing to the idea of policy process differing as a function of issue-area were Wildavsky (1962), Polsby (1963) and Lowi (1964). The idea, by the 1990's, had developed to the point that stipulation of an issue-area theoretically allowed the researcher to link discrete actors, processes and even outcomes into a functional whole (Newnham, 1992: 163).

to dominate in the resolution of specific issues that arise between nations, based on the issue's placement within a range of issue-areas (Brecher et al, 1969; Brewer, 1973; Zimmerman, 1973; Vasquez, 1985; Inkenberry, 1988; Evangelista, 1989; Palmer, 1990; Breuning, 1995; Sokov; 1996).   When interwoven with historical analysis of the dynamics and actors characterising a particular period, issue-area analysis furthermore yields insights into likely policy trends, if not necessarily specific policy outcomes (Hermann et al, 1973; Coplin et al, 1973; Dean and Vasquez, 1976; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981; Vasquez and Mansbach, 1984; Diehl, 1992).

While the various strands of theorising have produced different opinions about the best way to carry out issue-area analysis, applied at various levels of analysis and for different purposes, the basis of this study is the "issue-based foreign policy paradigm" suggested by American foreign policy analyst William Zimmerman.

1.4.2   Zimmerman's "Issue-Based Foreign Policy Paradigm"

Zimmerman, in a 1973 "research note in search of a general theory," developed his paradigm on the basis of work by Dahl and Rosenau and on related writings by Wolfers (1962) and Lowi (1964 and 1967).[16]   Specifically, he sought to clarify more precisely what sort of domestic policy processes could be expected to apply in different issue-areas, thus allowing the analyst to "stipulate the social science literature most likely to facilitate the generation of insights relevant to the prediction of outcomes" (Zimmerman, 1973: 1208).[17] Zimmerman's assumption in this endeavour was that "there

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[16]Wolfers' asked "when in the name of analytic parsimony is it justifiable to disregard the impact of the internal workings of the state on foreign policy behaviour?" which yielded by implication the conclusion that "a crucial determinant of the policy process is the nature of the issue at stake." Lowi also posited that policy processes alter as a function of issue area (or, "arena of power," in his terminology) and developed, over two separate studies on domestic policy (1964) and on foreign policy (1967), the four categories of issue-areas utilized by Zimmerman. Lowi, however, excluded Type IV (redistributional issues) from foreign policymaking.

[17]Zimmerman (p. 1208) refers to literature in public policy outlining "logrolling" (Type I), to writings in group theory (Type II), in social psychology and high politics (Type III), and in elite theory and internal conflict (Type IV), (See Figure A).

exists an enormous range of events...[in foreign policymaking] for which domestic politics as normally understood is immensely relevant," and even argued that "in the large majority of 'foreign policy' cases the analysis of policy process is of major concern." (p.1205). At a point in the development of foreign policy analysis when the political structure of a particular government was "generally assumed" to determine policy processes, he also argued that it was possible that "differences in policy process across issue-areas within a given state, the United States or the Soviet Union as cases in point, may be as great as differences in foreign-policy process within a particular arena of power [issue-area] for each" (p.1212).

While critics point out some weaknesses in the predictive value of Zimmerman's work for the purpose of understanding the external behaviour of nation-states, they concede its usefulness in shedding light on the "dynamics of domestic participation and conflict" underlying foreign policy (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981: 40). There is also argument that, with context and better operationlisation, Zimmerman's work can be fruitfully employed in "focused comparison" studies. (Potter, 1980: 425). Several examples of such comparative foreign policy studies exist, utilising Zimmerman's or later typologies (Mandel, 1980; Palmer, 1990; Geortz & Diehl, 1992; Breuning 1995). In a variation on that theme, and in the genre of several other studies (Brewer, 1973; Vasquez, 1985; Gowa, 1988; Evangelista, 1989; Sokov, 1996), the following work attempts to focus not on several nations holding issue-area constant, but on issue-areas holding national context constant.

In a synthesis of observations by Wolfers and Lowi, Zimmerman developed a typology for identifying issue-areas in which, as stated by another theorist, "differences in the properties of policy itself give rise to differences in the organization of politics and, consequently, in the role and influence of societal and governmental actors" (Inkenberry, 1988: 236). Inkenberry adds that "extending this line of analysis, we can delineate the circumstances under which societal groups are likely to dominate the policy process [as in

Introduction

pluralist process] and when state officials are likely to possess more autonomy [as in

elitist process]." In line with the purposes of this study, such "delineations" can help

explain why one nation maintains several threads of policy all at once. In addition, such

classifications revealing policy processes, when presented in conjunction with the facts

and faces of a particular period (such as how active protectionist groups are, or whether

Congress is asserting itself in US foreign affairs), illuminate policy directions, as well as

potential inroads for members of the public (or other nations) wishing to influence US

foreign policy.[18] It is the intention of this study to provide not only the content but also

the context of Clinton's South Africa policy, in order to learn the implications of the

policy processes revealed by the Zimmerman issue-area paradigm (see Figure A).[19]

Zimmerman's "Issue-Based Foreign Policy Paradigm   **Figure A**

Source: Zimmerman, William (1973). "Issue Area in Foreign-Policy Process: A Research Note in Search
of a General Theory." *American Political Science Review* Vol LXVII, No 4 (December): 1208.

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[18]A lobbyist might strategise on ways to move an issue from an elitist issue-area into a more pluralist one
(where the lobbyist would have more access to decision makers) by introducing tangible political goods
onto center stage, for instance. In general, issue-area analysis reveals points of access to the policy process.
[19]Zimmerman, building on Lowi's discussion of issue areas in foreign policy, placed the four issue-areas on
a continuum ranging, in value to "decisional participants," from minimum value (0) at one end to maximum
value (100) at the other end. Three of the issue-areas -- distribution, regulation, and redistribution -- could
be placed in ascending order on the continuum. At either end were the "poles of power and indifference" at
which elitist policy process held sway. At the pole of indifference were issues which "have no perceived
impact," and at the pole of power were issues which constitute a "threat to the core values of the society."
He concluded that if, in terms of process, the politics of protection and interaction are similar, "it ought
theoretically to be possible to treat that continuum as circular and to identify and label a matrix" in which
the two end points reside in the same cell (p.1207 and 1208).

Introduction

Zimmerman classified issues, or policy disputes, according to two "properties of policy": the tangibility of the political goods involved in an issue, and the symmetry or asymmetry of the expected domestic political impact of an issue's resolution. Depending on the assessment of issues in terms of these two properties, they were either *distributive, regulatory, protective/interactive,* or *redistributive.*

Zimmerman appears to use Rosenau's definition of tangibility, that is, political goods are to be considered tangible if they can be "photographed with a camera" (Rosenau, 1971: 146).[20] Zimmerman is careful to note, however, that an issue might involve more than one type of political good (ie, some tangible and some intangible) and that the operative distinction is whether or not the goods in question are exclusively tangible. Issues involving tangible political goods exclusively, Zimmerman suggests, evoke behaviour from decisional actors within a political system associated with pure "resource allocation," and, following Lowi's classification system, would be either distributive or regulatory in nature, with the attendant policy processes (Zimmerman, 1973: 1208). Both of these issue-areas, Zimmerman infers, involve pluralist participation, even if only from leaders of interest groups and constituencies,[21] as they deal with political goods which can be disaggregated to some degree or another. Specifically, political goods in distributive issues are those most easily disaggregated and therefore fairly easily parcelled out acceptably to competing parties (that is, in

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[20]While Rosenau distinguishes between tangible ends, which are photographable, and tangible means, which are measured by the extent to which money must be expended to order to acquire the values at issue, Zimmerman refers only to the tangibility of the political goods at issue, which are presumably those which must be allocated and not those which must be expended in order to achieve the allocation. Rosenau's 'means,' or cost of allocation, may be presumed to be included in the question of the symmetry of impact of a foreign policy decision on a domestic polity. This point must be recalled when comparing Rosenau's expectations about policy process and tangibility (see Vasquez, 1983: 180).

[21]Lowi in his typology associated distributive issues with a "logrolling" policy process involving "unprincipled" alliances between elites with support groups. As this seemed to the author descriptive of pluralist activity, given the role of support groups, and appears to involve in Zimmerman's estimation some degree of popular activity, the policy process for this issue-area is in this study described as pluralist.

Introduction

Zimmerman's words, to "everyone who counts politically," p. 1206), thereby attracting participation from those parties in the issue. In foreign policy, examples would be free trade agreements, or development or military assistance benefiting the home countries of US ethnic interest groups. Regulatory issues involve political goods which can be parcelled out with less ease, but remain subject to some disaggregation (eg, trade licenses or overseas air routes). Competing parties must jostle one another to change patterns of allocation, as there are winners and losers in this zero-sum game, but relatively widespread participation continues because there are measurable (tangible) benefits to be gained.

Where intangible political goods enter the equation, according to Zimmerman, elite political processes are more likely. Zimmerman credits this to various dynamics. He suggests that the political goods in such cases are less subject to disaggregation because they involve issues where power and status, either absolute or relative, are thought to be at stake. The allocation of such political goods generally effects "classes, 'peak associations,'" and "movements," rather than narrowly defined interest groups (p. 1206). While Zimmerman is not specific about causes, pluralist activity is limited in such instances, it could be argued, due to the difficulty in specifying possible avenues for action or in quantifying short- to medium-term benefits of action.[22] Because it is more difficult to bring the issues down to bite-sized chunks for the general populace to grapple with, mobilisation of constituencies remains limited and elite policy processes reign. As was the case with US opposition to apartheid, only when a (viable) tangible political option arises and takes centre stage, such as in the 1980's when opposition to trade sanctions against South Africa became quantifiably costly for American importers, exporters and investors, does pluralist process dominate. Issues involving intangible

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[22]Gowa (1988) also notes the difficulty of interest groups in acting in issues involving "public goods" (or goods which are not easily disaggregated and therefore bear little "excludability," as with intangible goods), due to the "free-rider" problem (pp 20-23).

Introduction

political goods chiefly entail matters other than domestic resource allocation (p.1207). Such issues may be interactive or protective, such as decisions about conferring diplomatic recognition or most-favoured nation status, or at the other extreme, responding to a perceived threat to the core values of the nation, such as war. Or, they may be redistributive, such as the current debate over sovereignty in applying environmental standards, or redrawing international financial arrangements to disallow unfair advantages for developed nations.

In the operationalisation of the symmetry of domestic political impact, Zimmerman is much more specific. He suggests that it is the asymmetry or symmetry of the expected outcome of an issue that determines the "intensity of the stakes or values at issue," and therefore by inference the degree of domestic contention in the resolution of that issue. For instance, "when the dominant perception of all involved is that the impact of the decision will be symmetrical in its impact on the values of citizens," a kind of "'apolitical' consensual politics" results. By symmetrical he means that "most citizens are affected in the same way, regardless of the substance of the decision." In contrast, he infers, when there are obvious winners and losers, contention ensues (p.1206).

Thus in the Zimmerman paradigm, issue-area, determined by the two policy properties of 1) tangibility of the political goods in dispute and 2) symmetry of expected domestic political impact, stands as the independent variable. That variable determines which policy process will dominate. This study adds that the policy process may also suggest which direction policy is taking, in the main, and which direction it is likely to take, based on the political context of the period in question.

Zimmerman's approach and issue-area typology are applied in the present work on the basis that US policy toward South Africa has many threads and arises from an array of domestic factors which are active to varying degrees and with varying effect across the range of issues facing that policy in the 1990's. This study, however, makes a distinction which Zimmerman did not make, at least not explicitly, in his 1973 introduction: the

29

Introduction

distinction between interest group politics and bureaucratic processes/politics as elements within the "internal workings of the state." While Zimmerman appears to use the terms "domestic politics" and "policy process" interchangeably to refer to internal factors in the making of foreign policy (p.1205), these two domestic factors are considered separate and analysed as such in the present work.

1.4.3   Application of the Paradigm to US South Africa Policy

Four recurring themes in US South Africa policy present themselves from the data, both current and historical, gathered over the course of this study. These are *development assistance,*[23] *trade and investment, security (regional and global),* and *issues of political symbolism (domestic and global).* Issues that lie outside of these issue-types, this study concludes, are not prevalent in US policymaking with regard to South Africa in the 1994-1998 period. That conclusion is based not only on a survey of the literature, but also on the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study.

Each of these themes, or issue-*types*, can be classified according to Zimmerman's typology, based on the content of these types in US South Africa policy. For instance, under the issue-type of trade and investment, specific issues will include decisions on textile tariffs, or reactions to alleged intellectual property rights violations, or pressure to expand trade promotion efforts. This study suggests that these specific issues, while placed under one issue-type according to their substance, all share in common similar policymaking dynamics due to the domestic impact and the exclusively tangible nature of the political goods that characterise trade and investment, as an issue-*type*, in Clinton's South Africa policy. As the issue-types were arrived at inductively, many of the specific issues were scrutinised and separated into themes before issue-area analysis began. The

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[23]Development assistance, it should be noted, did not begin in Africa until the early 1960's, and in South Africa until the early 1980's. But from the time US aid to Africa became a part of US policy, it has been a theme in US policy toward South Africa.

Introduction

discovery that these themes each fit into one of Zimmerman's issue-areas of distribution, regulation, protection/interaction, and redistribution (see Table 1), further supports the assertion made above that they (as themes) represent the whole picture of US policy towards South Africa in this period.[24]

Table 1
The Zimmerman Paradigm and US South Africa Policy

Matrix Quadrant	I	II	III	IV
Zimmerman's Issue Areas	Distribution	Regulation	Interaction/ Protection	Redistribution
Issue Types in US SA Policy	Development Assistance	Trade & Investment	Security	Issues of Political Symbolism
Examples of specific issues from 1994-98	Lobbying to maintain Africa aid share	Anti-Dumping suit vs SA steel imports	Armscor/ ACRI	Gaddafi in SA/ Af/Af-American linkages
Exclusively Tangible Goods?	Yes	Yes	No	No
Domestic Impact Symmetrical?	Yes	No	Yes	No
Expected Policy Process	Consensual Pluralist	Conflictual Pluralist	Consensual Elitist	Conflictual Elitist

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[24]New issues arising in US SA policy after 1998 must not be automatically placed according to substance in an issue-type, but must be tested, individually, under the two questions regarding tangibility and symmetry of impact before they could be placed in an issue-area.

Introduction

1.4.3.1 *The Four Issue-Types in US South Africa Policy*

Development assistance[25] issues in US South Africa policy appear, at the outset, to involve tangible political goods whose disbursement abroad has a largely symmetrical impact on the domestic political front in the US. This is because the goods involved -- money and services-in-kind -- are tangible, and because patterns of US aid distribution have long been established, partly along the lines of domestic political pressures (such as that from the American-Israeli Political Action Committee), partly by Cold War imperatives (although these had largely evaporated by 1994), and partly by long-term policy goals to do with the American drive to spread liberal democracy across the globe. As such this issue-type appeared to fit into the distributive issue-area (quadrant I), expected to involve a consensual-pluralist mode of policymaking, although that must be tested by further analysis.

US South Africa trade and investment issues also appear to deal in exclusively tangible political goods. They are, however, asymmetrical in their domestic political impact in that some interested parties in the US lose out to others in the regulation of the flows of goods and services. As such, the trade and investment issue-type fits under the regulatory issue-area (quadrant II). Further analysis will show whether competition and broad interest on the part of US interest groups in post-apartheid South Africa support the expectation that a conflictual-pluralist process dominates policymaking in this arena.

Security issues in US South Africa policy fitted well into the protective/interactive issue-area (quadrant III), as an issue-type involving both tangible and non-tangible goods and with a largely symmetrical impact on US constituencies. As such, it is expected to involve a consensual-elitist mode of policymaking. Regional security on the continent of

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[25]Development assistance is defined as funding disbursed by the US government for the use of foreign governments in pursuing their own economic or political (but not military) development goals in accordance with clearly agreed upon project proposals.

Introduction

Africa fits under this issue-type, as do "new" security matters such as international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation and the spread of infectious diseases.

Issues of political symbolism are those which touch on values or perceptions important to the US collective psyche and which give rise to strong (but general) responses without any necessarily tangible benefits being immediately threatened or expected as a policy outcome. These fit into the fourth or redistributional issue-area (quadrant IV) based on the asymmetry of their domestic political impact, and the non-tangible nature of the goods primarily at issue. Foreign policy issues of *domestic* political symbolism, such as those involving an ethnic group's concerns with regard to a "home country," or, race relations and official attention to the priorities of African-Americans, have redistributional implications. Issues of *global* political symbolism -- such as challenges to the predominance of the US in international political debates -- deal with non-tangible political goods and thus would be expected to attract the attentions of conflicting elites who are affected by such questions of redistribution -- for instance government officials who support a greater role in world affairs and influential academicians who do not. Both domestic and global issues of political symbolism are therefore most likely to involve a conflictual-elitist mode of policymaking, according to the Zimmerman typology.

The following pages will reveal whether the placement of these issue-types (see Figure B), and the policy processes revealed, indeed support the expectations of the Zimmerman typology. An additional tool of analysis, described below, will also give some indication of the direction under Clinton of US policy with regard to engagement/disengagement.

1.4.4 Indicating Policy Directions: The Engagement/Disengagement Function

To summarise thus far, this study will employ analysis at the system level to delve into international sources of US foreign policy, and at the unit and sub-unit level to

33

Introduction

"unpack" domestic interest group activity and policy process as a further source of US policy. In addition, to offer an indication of the extent of US engagement/disengagement from South Africa under Clinton, a third element will be introduced at the sub-unit level: an engagement/disengagement function. By showing the "direction" of US policy across several instances of policy activity within each issue-type, this study suggests that the net thrust of US South Africa policy under the Clinton administration will become apparent, as well as likely trends for the short-term future.

Figure B

ISSUE TYPES IN US POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE ENGAGEMENT/DISENGAGEMENT FUNCTION

Domestic impact
symmetrical?

	YES	NO	
Dealing in tangible goods? YES	**I: Distribution** Development assistance *Consensual-pluralist*	**II: Regulation** Trade & investment *Conflictual-pluralist*	engage ↑ ↓ disengage
Dealing in tangible goods? NO	**III: Protection/Interaction** Global security Regional security *Consensual-elitist*	**IV: Redistribution** Global political symbolism Domestic political symbolism *Conflictual-elitist*	engage ↑ ↓ disengage

(Based on Zimmerman's "Issue-based Foreign Policy Paradigm")

It may have been noted already that, in one sense, the word "directions" here refers to the net orientation of the US foreign policy under scrutiny. Of all the various pressures to engage or disengage from society and from state sources, which pressures triumphed in the period under study with regard to South Africa? What is the path cut by that policy in the post-apartheid period? What do Americans as a whole -- within both

34

state and society -- actually intend with regard to South Africa, and are they making it happen? In another sense, however, "directions" can be seen to refer to the likely future of US policy. Where is US policy heading after Clinton? Does the path take US policy deeper into the "partnership" touted by Clinton and Gore? Or, is disengagement the more likely future for US South Africa policy? Granted, the path could disappear around a very sharp corner in the future, as attested to by the surprising end of the Cold War and apartheid in the early 1990's. But many sources of foreign policy, international and domestic, will remain in place after the US presidential elections in 2000. Sketching in very broad strokes the direction of the current path with regard to engagement, as seen from current indicators, offers insight into future scenarios for policymakers both in the US and South Africa. In light of the concerns raised in the literature concerning predictions about the external behaviour of states based on domestic political dynamics across different issue-areas, however, the goal will not be to make conclusive statements about future US South Africa policy, but rather to offer some insight into likely future directions based on the content and context of policy under Clinton.

Definitions of engagement and disengagement, it is also important to note, have undergone some revision in the post-Cold War period, as American political party lines have shifted and economic considerations have come increasingly to the fore. According to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, for instance, its survey conducted in late 1998 among US leaders and the public showed that "economics in general has risen dramatically as an important dimension of international activity and US engagement" (Reilly, 1999:105). However, while not always explicitly, economics has long effected attitudes on US involvement overseas. For instance, in the US the stereotypical internationalist in the Cold War period was a Republican who supported military intervention but also free trade, while Democrats supposedly sought to protect US industry as well as to avoid military interventions in favour of diplomatic solutions. There were at the same time elements in the US which opposed free trade but supported

military intervention under the policy of containment (the AFL-CIO and other labour unions are examples). On the other hand, there were those among the NGO community who long supported development assistance (one form of cooperative intervention) but opposed what they saw as "imperialist" military and economic involvement overseas.

The need to state more specifically what is meant by engagement and disengagement (or, at least, by the terms in use, internationalism and isolationism) thus began to surface long before the 1990's (Wittkopf, 1990:25-27; Braumoeller, 1997:3). Several distinctions arose, such as that within the internationalist camp between "hardliners" supporting militant interventionism, and "accomodationists" favouring cooperative internationalism. Both of these approaches to foreign policy were in contrast to isolationists, who opposed both forms of internationalism and chose rather to withdraw from world affairs altogether (Wittkopf, 1990: 26).

Most of these stereotypes have broken down in the 1990's, with Clinton's "new" Democrats supporting free trade but generally seeking to avoid military intervention (at least until the latter part of his second term), and with Republicans decrying the need for any military action overseas without a "Soviet-sized threat" and at times even working against the free-trade initiatives of the administration, if perhaps only for political gain.[26] The definition of engagement which holds for this study, and thus for the engagement/disengagement function to be introduced below, transcends the more narrow roles attributed to isolationist/internationalist stereotypes and remains as stated earlier: a policy seeking to enter more fully into cooperative international bonds, which can consist of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations.

A difficulty in measuring engagement might arise from the fact that both negative (or conflictual) and positive (cooperative) interactions are sometimes construed as

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[26]The failure of the Republican-dominated legislature to pass bills granting the Clinton administration renewed "fast-track" powers to speed the finalisation of trade agreements in 1998 is a case in point.

engagement. As this study considers only cooperative international bonds as constituting engagement (as even military conflict can be seen as a cooperative effort by a group of allies who are the aggressors/defenders against a common foe, rather than "engagement" with the enemy), this difficulty falls away. This definition is supported by the observation that, in any case, negative or conflictual interactions (especially when prolonged) do not usually lend themselves to improved bilateral relations. Indeed, it has been shown that, depending on the importance of the issue over which negative interactions take place, and on the importance of a bilateral relationship in the eyes of US policymakers, such negative interactions can throw the balance against deeper engagement in a downward "conflictive spiral" (Vasquez and Mansbach, 1984:414-415).[27] Such erosion of cooperative engagement may, it would seem, occur incrementally despite intentions to the contrary. The positive/negative balance across issue-areas, in cases of "expendable" relationships, might even serve as a litmus test for deserting a policy of engagement, although this hypothesis must form the basis of a separate study. As South Africa is not a major ally nor trading partner of the United States, any study of Washington policy toward Pretoria must, however, bear this possibility in mind.

In this study, following on the disaggregation into issue-areas will be a further distinction to demonstrate whether specific policy actions taken within each issue-type engendered engagement or disengagement, bilateral cooperation or conflict. This distinction will be graphically represented via a vertical continuum alongside the issue-type matrix, upon which points above the midline will indicate a contribution toward engagement or cooperation, and points below, a contribution toward disengagement or conflict (see Figure B). As such, it will demonstrate the thrust of interest group and bureaucratic activity, two major domestic sources of US foreign policy, with regard to

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[27]See also Coplin and O'Leary, 1971; Brewer, 1973: 106-107, for discussion of issue salience and context.

engagement. Set against the standard of the stated policy of the administration, this exercise will yield a picture of the effective direction (in both senses of that word) of US South Africa policy in the late 1990's. It may also give insight into some of the causes of the "rhetoric vs reality gap" touted by several Africanists, a gap which plagues US foreign policy the world over.

1.5   *Research Methodology*

As an exploratory study seeking to generate insights and questions for further research in a field where little literature exists, this attempt at integrated analysis of US South Africa policy using a modified "issue-based foreign policy paradigm," was both deductive and inductive. The study began with certain theoretical approaches from which, over the course of the research, specific lines of inquiry were deduced and explored, discarded or retained. At the same time, consistent with inductive research, patterns or theories were allowed to emerge from the data and analysis over the course of the study. As suggested in the literature, a "reciprocal relationship between data and theory" thus enabled the author to "generate propositions in a dialectical manner," permitting "use of *a priori* theoretical frameworks, but...keep[ing] a particular framework from becoming the container into which the data must be poured" (Lather, 1986: 267). Finally, the patterns or theories which emerged were correlated with the deduced lines of inquiry, and the result was a set of initial conclusions about a "fit" between the two. Where data appeared not to fit, definitions were reexamined, and explanations attempted. Continued mismatches were allowed to remain as evidence of the need for further theorising.

In order to further insure the validity and reliability of findings to the extent possible in qualitative research, the study employed triangulation, seeking convergence from a diverse set of information sources. Different sources of data included the analytical and historical literature, government documents, interviews, first-hand

observation of official bilateral interaction, media coverage, and polling data. The availability of raw data under the latter was more limited than expected, but some polling results were finally obtained from sources in the US. Otherwise, analysed polling data was utilised, and cross checked against other relevant examples. As there were no polls directly focusing on US South Africa policy in the period under study (although there were a few questions about Nelson Mandela in early 1994), US sentiment on the matter was gleaned from the wider literature and from the interviewing process.

The literature review was largely conducted through the University of Stellenbosch via the sophisticated referencing technology available in the library, although less systematic review was also conducted in Washington, DC, and over the Internet. The major focus was on the literature dealing with US policy towards South Africa, with a secondary focus on issue-area analysis in the study of foreign policy.

The interviewing process centred on a series of semi-structured, uniformly designed interviews with foreign policy analysts, practitioners, theoreticians, and commentators in both South Africa and the US, as well as over the Internet. Interviews, which were for the most part preceded by provision of a precis of the study proposal and the interview questions, and an informed-consent form for signature, were conducted over the period 1995-1998. Interviewees ranged from US embassy officials in Cape Town and Pretoria and representatives of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to journalists, academics, lobbyists from the African-American and US business communities, and former and current US foreign policy officials.[28] The latter consisted

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[28]Several American business people operating in South Africa were approached, late in the research process, for informal interviews regarding their perceptions of US commercial policy and whether the US embassy or foreign commercial service had been of assistance to them in their reentry or setting-up process after 1994. None, except for a representative of Levi's Jeans, had availed themselves of the embassy or FCS services, and so none (except Levi's) felt they could comment. Levi's had found the FCS very helpful, it appeared. The fact that the author obtained contacts via the American Chambers of Commerce, and not through the US embassy, in order to avoid a bias in favour of the US government, means that there may be more interest in the FCS than indicated by this unstructured survey. However, the fact that those contacted had apparently found their way into the South African market on their own begs the question as to whether the FCS efforts to attract and assist US business have been more or less key to the influx of American

Introduction

mostly of representatives from several of the policy-making bodies dealing with US South Africa policy in the current period, particularly under the auspices of the US-South Africa Binational Commission. These included the office of the Vice President, the National Security Council, the White House Office on Science and Technology, as well as the Congress, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense, and the Agency for International Development and the US Trade and Development Agency. A list of these interviews at the end of this study, ordered chronologically and numbered for ease of reference, includes several respondents who wished to remain unidentified, and who appear as "confidential interview #n" in the footnotes.

The interviews were structured around a series of six open-ended questions developed around the themes of the research proposal. Respondents were allowed to answer the questions in their order of preference, if they so requested. Otherwise, the questions were addressed from question A to question F (see below). If there were questions the respondent wished not to address at all, these were skipped, although there was an attempt to learn something in answer to those questions via other questions, or at least why the respondent did not want to address the question. The questions used in the interviews were as follows:

A) What domestic political concerns do you see surfacing most powerfully in America and perhaps affecting US policy toward South Africa?
   -among the foreign policy-making establishment
   -among the public

B) How do you see the US-SA Binational Commission?
   - in relation to US foreign policy in general, and as a policy tool
   - in relation to US foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa
  With your insight into current US South Africa policy implementation, what strengths and weaknesses is the BNC showing?

C) What changes since 1994 do you see in Washington with regard to US policy toward South Africa?
   - in interest groups
   - in bureaucratic politics and processes

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businesses into South Africa. This must, however, form the basis for a separate study.

Introduction

D) What do you think about isolationist tendencies in America in the 1990's? What indicators can you name to support your opinion?

E) What specific policy choices or political events in South Africa do you envisage would adversely affect US perceptions of South Africa?

F) What do you perceive to be the major international challenges facing
the US at present, and how do you rate South Africa's importance in view of these?

When possible, complementary material was sought from the respondents, as well.

The inevitable biases that inform any research, qualitative or quantitative, surfaced and resurfaced throughout this study. Despite rigorous debate and a self-imposed attempt to unseat a few long-held prejudices about the pluralist nature of US policymaking, for instance, basic assumptions remained the same. Also, having been grounded through earlier studies in the perspectives of US policymakers, the compulsion to come up with policy prescriptions from an American viewpoint, rather than with reasoned conclusions on the basis of objective analysis, was strong. Careful scholarly guidance, as well as research across the spectrum of opinion in recognised areas of bias, have hopefully prevented these biases from distorting the findings to an unacceptable degree.

1.5.1 Delimitations of the Study

The usefulness of this study, beyond an early and in-depth presentation of US policy towards post-apartheid South Africa and analysis to discern likely directions in that policy, is limited to the application, with some innovation, of issue-area analysis. Application of the Zimmerman paradigm was augmented by 1) incorporating the distinction between interest group activity and bureaucratic activity into the "domestic political" aspect of foreign policymaking, and 2) adding an engagement/disengagement function to indicate direction of pressure from each of the actors in each of the four issue-areas.

Introduction

The findings of the study are limited by the fact that it does not include analysis of every "domestic source" of influence on US foreign policy. There is, for instance, no examination of the news media or of electoral politics on US South Africa policy. Nor is every exogenous factors considered, such as pressure on the US from the Organisation of African Unity to focus less on South Africa and more on other African nations. These omissions are more a factor of limited scope than of any derogation of the importance of those factors. That fact does not, however, diminish the value of this study insofar as the analysis, the author maintains, offers not only an in-depth study of the effective South Africa policy of the Clinton period (up to December 1998), but also a much improved understanding of important sources of US South Africa policy in the 1990's and therefore of likely future directions of that policy. In addition, new applications of established tools, adjusted to yield further insights, are useful for analysis elsewhere on the American foreign policy landscape.

1.6   *Conclusion: The Key in Hand*

To review, the intention of this study is to examine both the international context of US South Africa policy in the 1990's and to demonstrate the content and directional thrust of two "domestic sources" of US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period, as well as the importance of issue-area analysis to such an endeavour. Special attention is devoted to the US-South Africa Binational Commission, not only as a signpost of US engagement policy in the present but also as an illustration of the experiment in "reinventing government" under the Clinton/Gore administration.

Having provided the key to the map, as it were, for this exploration of the contours of US South Africa Policy under Clinton, analysis will first move to the international context within which that US policy, and any ensuing analysis, must be situated.

CHAPTER TWO
A Transformed World:
The Global Context of US South Africa Policy
in the 1990's

The world in which US South Africa policy finds itself at the end of the first millennium has been compared to a layer cake: a unipolar military top set upon a tripolar economic middle, set upon a bottom layer characterised by "transnational interdependence" and consisting of diffuse and overlapping power relations.[1]   According to this view, the US as the unrivalled military leader sits at the top; the second layer consists of the US, Europe and Japan (the three together accounting for two-thirds of the world's economic product); and the complex web of links across national boundaries, spurred by booming world trade in goods and finance and the new fluidity of the post-Cold War world, comprises the third and bottom tier.

At the end of the 1990's, however, some would argue that the top layer is no longer military but economic,[2] that the sustained growth of the US economy, combined with fluctuating European indicators and the economic crisis in Japan, has left the US unrivalled there as well (Brzezinski, 1997: 24; Zuckerman, 1998: 31), and that the possibility of the third, bottom layer imploding in a "global crisis of capitalism" is not only all too real,[3] but gravely challenges much previous theory about the world and the power relations that exist therein (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 23).

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[1]See Joseph Nye's "layer cake" illustration (Nye, 1992: 88).

[2]Steel, Ronald. "A New Realism." *World Policy Journal* Vol XIV No 2 (Summer 1997):3; Sanger, David E. "Foreign Relations: Money Talks, Policy Walks. War. Peace. Aid. All Issues Are Trade Issues." *New York Times* (15 January 1995): E-1; and, Friedman, Thomas L. "Yesterday's Man." *New York Times* (19 March 1995): E-15.

[3]See Roche, David. "This is not 1929: The global crisis of capitalism will be painful but not disastrous." *Time* (26 October 1998): 62.

Global Context

Indeed, the proposition of a renewed American hegemony at the end of the twentieth century does seem increasingly irrelevant in light of the generally recognised fundamental and irreversible intertwining of the world's nations over the last fifty years. As the one nation in a position of military, economic and (in the vacuum left by the demise of communism) apparent ideological primacy, it is true that the US might have the resources to shut out international threats of military intervention, economic competition, and even cultural antipathy. But no nation has the power to escape global warming, oceanic despoliation, nuclear winter, or (short of prohibiting world travel) pandemics of as yet undetected infectious diseases, all of which loom large, and which would loom larger still in a future of unacknowledged international mutual vulnerability. In short, even given the asymmetry of that mutual vulnerability, some form of "partnership" between the world's nation-states would seem a matter of rather more short-term and overriding national interest than previously recognised by geostrategists the world over.

Realists have been forced by intellectual integrity to confront the "new" reality of the world in the 1990's. Power, or at least military, economic, and ideological power, cannot be seen any longer as the only determinant of a country's good fortune. Interdependence -- the situation of asymmetrical mutual vulnerability referred to above -- has begun to touch even the most "powerful" nations as the United States. Due to these developments, as discussed in the introduction, this study is based on a modification of realist theory which seeks to address aspects of international relations which do not feature in classical and neorealist theory. Specifically, although maintaining the realist premise that self-interest remains the motivating factor behind national behaviour, this study agrees with three statements posited in the theory of "complex interdependence" first articulated by Keohane and Nye in the late 1970's. These are that 1) military issues are not most important but rather feature *among* the most important of international issues, along with economic, new security and other concerns; 2) military power is not assumed to guarantee outcomes in every situation; and 3) the "transnational" relations that

have blurred lines within and between nation states affect policy outcomes, as do other domestic factors.

2.1   *New Requisites: Three Factors*

While differences continue among theorists about the impact of such thinking, beyond dispute is the fact that there has been a transformation in the state of world affairs at the end of the twentieth century.   Underlying that transformation, and central to changing US foreign policy agendas, have been three major factors. These are, presented in no particular order: 1) the advent of a unipolar world, 2) a reduced US economic advantage over other leading economies relative to the immediate post-World War II era, and 3) globalisation -- or the widening and deepening of relations between and across the boundaries of the world's nation-states. The result has been a new set of requisites in a world hardly recognisable to the US foreign policymaking establishment. Each of these systemic factors has implications for US policy in general; each has implications for US policy towards South Africa in particular.

With the foregoing discussion of modified realism in view, the analysis moves to these three factors in the international political economy of the 1990's which underlie changed US foreign policy.

2.1.1   Factor I: The Advent of Unipolarity[*]

Unipolarity arrived. It was not expected, as such, at such short notice. And US foreign policy has yet truly to recover. The United States may, in fact, find a multipolar world dawning before it does recover, as economic considerations rise in the estimation

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[*]The concept of polarity, which during the Cold War was used to describe the magnetism of the competing preponderant military entities of the international system over their respective "satellites," is less accurate a metaphor where there is only one such state and nations are no longer perceived as "orbiting" around opposing guarantors. Nevertheless, as the sudden demise of the Soviet Union has left the US with the legacy of security obligations and attitudes spawned during the Cold War, polarity remains, for the time being, a useful concept.

of a nation's power and as the overlapping security concerns of the twenty-first century begin to erode the importance of military competition between states.

2.1.1.1 *Soviet Disintegration*

With major implications for the international system and within a matter of months, the Soviet Union, representing for the US the threat of communist aggression in the international system -- disintegrated in the early 1990's and with it, the policy framework that had underpinned US foreign policy since the end of the second World War.   Gone were the clear imperatives of the Cold War that had directed American foreign policy and US international relations the world over.   In the place of those imperatives arose a confusing plethora of competing regional priorities, economic trends and political crises, and the need for new tools of foreign policy with which to approach the several new security concerns of the new era.

The end of the bipolar world that had existed in the international system throughout the second half of the twentieth century was evident by 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell without Soviet resistance.   The subsequent process of democratisation in the nations behind the Iron Curtain led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and, by 1992, to the break up of the Soviet Union.   Even before that, when conservatives seeking to maintain communist rule in Moscow attempted a coup in August 1991, their failure signalled the end of the communist experiment throughout the world, Africa included. Although the reinstated Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev would not survive the tumultuous changes in Soviet politics a further year, his policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* had ushered in a new era in international politics: a unipolar world.

2.1.1.2 *Security Challenges in the 1990's*

The US, militarily unmatched the world over but with its economy brought somewhat down to size and its influence in world affairs in a commensurate condition,

became a lone -- some would say reluctant[5] -- global hegemon. For a time, there was talk of a new, "kinder, gentler" world order in which old animosities and the threat of nuclear war would no longer take centre stage. But world events would soon dispel such optimism. The prospect of political anarchy in the disintegrating Soviet Union gave rise to the spectre of massive unregulated nuclear arsenals. The outbreak of brutal internecine fighting in the former Yugoslavia, the intractability of warlord conflict in Somalia, and genocide in Rwanda all seemed to defy international solution. In the midst of this "chaos," there seemed little will to act on the part of the United States. The United Nations and its peacekeeping forces, already overextended, came under further demands, even as the US, its largest donor, squabbled internally over its UN dues arrears. With foreign aid in general disrepute, the non-governmental organisations attempting to address the social ramifications of conflict around the globe fell further behind. At the same time, organised crime took advantage of newly opened economies, pandemics became an increasing threat, and international terrorism struck within America itself, posing new security concerns which challenged traditional military approaches to security. And the US, apparently adrift without a rival, threatened to withdraw back into "Fortress America" in the face of its own domestic political requisites.

However, whether through the enlightened self-interest of a hegemon seeking to preserve the status quo, the largess claimed by two successive Clinton administrations,[6] or the realisation that with or without their government, Americans would remain engaged internationally, the US policymakers had to some degree stepped out of their domestically-preoccupied mood by the late 1990's. With international disengagement no longer a viable option but the emerging American foreign policy consensus far from clear, a few specific security goals have become evident.

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[5]See Haas, Richard (1997). *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations.
[6]See, for instance, remarks from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (1995: 373), and from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1996: 11).

2.1.1.3 *US Security Goals in the 1990's*

Nuclear weapons remain central to US security policy. With the fading of the Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence, US geostrategists turned to focus on the imperative to halt nuclear proliferation, especially in view of the nuclear arsenal left behind after Soviet dissolution. However, at the same time, under the "Stockpile Stewardship Programme" the US pledged to spend $45 billion over the next ten years on computer simulation and "sub-critical" nuclear testing for the purpose of developing further its own nuclear arsenal in anticipation of possible threats in the next century. In the meantime, the US has for the most part sought to control international processes in this area which have produced both the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signed by 149 nations since September 1996, and the review and extension a year earlier of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1967, during which South Africa played a major role in obtaining several new signatures.[7] The subsequent testing of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan in mid 1998 elicited strong criticism from the US, in spite of the fact that Clinton has yet to receive Senate approval for final ratification of the CTBT. Strong incentives exist for American policymakers to encourage South Africa to again wield its moral authority in this field, gained by being the first nation to renounce nuclear weapons and destroy its stockpiles. Opportunity for such influence exists, especially in the fact of South Africa's three-year chairmanship of the reinvigorated Non-Aligned Movement, beginning in 1998, and the leverage it has as such to bring India and Pakistan, both NAM members, back into the international fold. On the other hand, in light of the fodder the tests in South Asia presented to US congressional conservatives, eager to reincarnate Reagan's Star Wars programme, the damage may already have been

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[7]For fuller discussion of US policy and of South Africa's role, see Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 1998: 11-14.

done.[8]   More bipartisan support exists for US leadership in gaining international ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which President Clinton specifically mentioned, along with nuclear weapons, in his general State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress in February 1997.[9]

In terms of conventional weapons, as with other major military powers the US now appears to be aiming at an increased capacity to wage conventional, short-term wars to effectively contain regional conflicts, and has adjusted defence spending accordingly.[10] In regions where perceived strategic interests are relatively minor, such as in Africa, American efforts are directed at encouraging regional powers to take responsibility for containing local conflict -- relieving, among other things, the burden on the US militarily and financially. The African Crisis Response Initiative can be seen as a product of this line of reasoning.[11]

With regard to traditional alliances, however, the US appears to wish to retain control over the management of conflict involving North America and Europe. Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, following an agreement reached between NATO and Russia in 1997 regarding NATO membership for states bordering Russia, is on track, alternately blasted as retrogressive Cold War thinking or visionary in its provision against future large-scale war (Holbrook and Danner, 1997/98:100-102). In any case, enlargement has formed a major focus of foreign policymakers from Washington to Moscow during Clinton's tenure (Goldgeier, 1998: 87). The resulting extension of NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, offered in

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[8]See Stremlau, John. "Chance to put India on spot." *Cape Times* (7 July 1998).
[9]See Clinton (1997: 6). For details of the CWC, see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 465.
[10]According to Kull, Destler and Ramsay (1997: 4), US defence spending declined 11% from 1985-1989, and another 17% by 1993, but "thereafter, defense spending has stabilised."
[11]The initially negative responses of several African leaders, including Mandela, to the idea of a US-sponsored peacekeeping force were made partly on the grounds that such a force could create the impression that participating African states are acting as surrogates of the United States. While the ACRI has gained more credibility by joining up with similar initiatives by Canada, France and the UK, there are still many political hurdles to cross before it is fully accepted. See Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion of the ACRI.

July 1997, allows for subsequent expansion of US military influence over an even greater portion of Eurasia. Whether or not NATO enlargement is indeed "imperial overstretch" (Kennedy, 1988: 515; Calleo, 1998: 18) will become evident as the US economy and national budget shoulder this new military commitment.

While no immediate threats to the US have replaced that of the Soviet Union, the rising power of China constitutes another concern for US policymakers. Having quietly embraced capitalism since before the 1990's, this enigmatic giant to the east is less a worry for the time being, however, than the more antagonistic "rogue" states scattered throughout the international system. The US maintains a list of such countries, many of whom openly support terrorism which is often aimed at American targets as representatives of the West, or of the non-Islamic, world. Nations such as Iraq and Libya fit in this category for the US, as do Syria and Iran. Relations with the latter, as well as with Cuba under long-time adversary Fidel Castro, show some signs of thawing under the Albright State Department, however.[12] There were also significant concessions to Libya concerning where terrorists charged with the 1986 Lockerbie air bombing would be tried.[13] The 1999 NATO campaign, led by the US and the United Kingdom, to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the Balkans has been the second test for the post-Cold War international configuration (after Iraq in 1991 and at various other points under Clinton), but has left much to be desired in terms of international diplomacy and cooperation.

Unipolarity may disappear as quietly as it arrived, and almost as quickly, as other great powers in the international system -- Germany, China, perhaps again Japan -- rise to challenge US supremacy economically, and as the hegemony based on military primacy is eroded by the growing independence of Europe in the absence of an enemy from which such large-scale protection is needed. Even given the enlargement of NATO, the

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[12]See, for instance, "Clinton eases a little on Cuba." *Cape Times* (20 March 1998).
[13]See "Albright sees Lockerbie Families." *Cape Times* (22 July 1998).

multipolarity of the pyramid's middle layer may indeed come to characterise the power distribution of the world more generally as the new millennium approaches.

2.1.2   Factor II: Relative Decline and Relative Growth

In the current era of sharp international competition for markets and goods, it may be difficult to remember that at the end of the second World War, the United States' economy towered over any other in the international political economy. Comprising about 5 percent of the world's population, the US in 1950 held 49 percent of the world's international financial reserves, produced 53 percent of the world's petroleum output, and boasted a labour productivity three times the world average. Its gross domestic product accounted for 50 percent of the world total.[14]   In brief, the US was the undisputed hegemon of the non-communist world.

Following the reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall Plan, however, and with Japan free to devote its defence budget to improving productivity and market share, the dramatic advantage enjoyed by the US in the immediate post-war period soon faded. The 1970's saw the collapse of the Bretton Woods currency arrangement, two OPEC-orchestrated oil shortages which severely rocked the US economy, and a shrinking of US market shares in many sectors. By 1980, the US share of international financial reserves had fallen to 7 percent and its share of world petroleum production to 14 percent. US labour productivity had declined to only one and a half times the world average. US GDP had at the same time fallen to below 30 percent of the world total.[15] In the eyes of some theorists, American hegemony was in severe decline (eg, Keohane, 1984: 179, and Kennedy, 1988: 525). Others, however, disagreed (eg, Strange, 1982: 341; Russett, 1985; Huntington, 1989: 39). Indeed, by the late 1990's, the US seemed to have regained its

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[14]Statistics from Keohane, 1984: 196 and 197, and from Brzezinski, 1997: 23.
[15]From Keohane, 1984: 196 and 197.

economic primacy, although perhaps, in the words of Kennedy, not any longer as "the entity whose performance puts it in a class by itself, hopelessly beyond the reach of any would-be competitor" (Kennedy in Heilbroner, 1989: 35). Is, in fact, the rest of the world "catching up" with the US economically? And, with the turnaround in the US economy after the 1992 recession, is America able to truly recover from its malaise to take on a "second American Century"? The evidence remains ambiguous.

In the early part of the 1990's, indicators supporting declinists views were strong. The US, for instance, had from 1980 to 1990 moved from being the world's largest creditor nation to being its largest debtor nation.[16] With the US federal deficit burgeoning out of control and international market share still slipping to Japan and Germany,[17] US economic prospects were as dim as its political mood was desultory. At the same time, the optimism in Europe and Asia was palpable.

2.1.2.1 *European Fluctuations*

In Europe, growth had accelerated, unemployment was falling, and the fruition of many years of work toward European unity seemed imminent. One economist declared in 1992 that "future historians will record that the 21st century belonged to the House of Europe."[18] "Europhoria," however, ran aground on the subcontinent's long-term structural problems which surfaced again toward the mid 1990's, after which "Eurosclerosis" set in with a vengeance. High unemployment returned and looked set to remain. Only the election of new leaders in Germany, France and Italy provided some promise for structural changes toward the end of the decade.[19]

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[16] Kegley and Wittkopf, 1995: 219. US Department of Commerce statistics for 1998 showed the US international debt had continued to rise throughout the 1990's, reaching $1,288 billion as of March 1998.
[17] According to Fry, Taylor and Wood (1994): 259, "indeed, in the late 1980's, total annual US exports were surpassed by Germany and were only somewhat higher than Japan's."
[18] Lester Thurow quoted in Krugman, 1998: 32.
[19] See Geary, James. "Now for the Hard Part." *Time* (12 October 1998): 35-41.

Partly as a result of the new international structure, and partly due to declining economic indicators and political contingencies at home, members of the European Union had already begun to pull back from traditional military and economic commitments in several areas in the developing world, including former colonies in Africa. The EU announced plans, for instance, to break up the Lome Convention into separate economic agreements to be negotiated with the three ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) regions benefiting from the Convention since 1975. Such agreements would be on an "entirely new basis."[20] France, in particular, dramatically scaled down its historical commitments in Africa after the new Prime Minister Lionel Jospin decried the "failure of France's Africa Policy" in the wake of US-South Africa mediated talks to settle Zaire's crisis in mid-1997.[21] The Zaire/Congo mediation effort was not only "the first major event in Africa where France was totally absent," according to political analysts, but also "marked the end of an era for French influence in French-speaking Central Africa."[22]

The increasing integration of the economies of Europe and the euro, introduced in January 1999, are expected to mount some challenges to to US primacy and the long held assumption that dollars are the currency of choice in international transactions. One analyst predicts that "as much as $1 trillion of international investment may shift from dollars to euros... [and] volatility between the world's key currencies will increase substantially" (Bergsten, 1997: 83). Another expects that "after 50 years of [financial] hegemony...the creation of the euro will usher in a new monetary order...a shift from dollar dominance to a global currency 'duopoly'."[23] Ultimately, however, the euro may be "bad for the dollar, but good for America," as "the more stable and reliable the euro

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[20]See "ACP summit urges EU to maintain aid." *Cape Times Business Report* (7 November 1997).

[21]See Walsh, James. "Ailing States of Sleaze - With Brazzaville's upheaval, Paris starts to rethink its see-no-evil policies in Francophone Africa." *Time* (23 June 1997): 61.

[22]See "France 'losing its influence in Africa'." *Cape Times* (8 May 1997). France has already announced that it will reduce its troops stationed in Africa by 40 percent as part of a downsizing of the French military, as well (Block, 9 October 1997).

[23]See Friedrich, Klaus. "Dollar Diplomacy." *Time* (26 October 1998): 61.

proves to be, the more the dollar will be required to show similar sound stewardship" (Walker, 1998: 3).

2.1.2.2 *Asia in Free Fall*

In Asia, the economic success of Japan and several other newly industrialised countries (NICs) was legendary by the early 1990's. From 1992, however, Japan experienced slow growth, exacerbated when the stock and real estate "bubbles" generated by the financial excesses of the 1980's burst. Investor confidence plummeted even further as subsequent investigations uncovered corporate and government corruption. Further stagnation, and then crisis, followed, and Japanese resistance to structural change appears to have thwarted recovery in the short term (Lincoln, 1998: 57). Japan, with the second largest economy in the world at the beginning of 1998, appeared for the foreseeable future to have lost its role as premier challenger to American economic primacy.

Other Asian economies, in the meantime, were reeling as the currency collapse beginning in Thailand in mid-1997 continued to spread. Capital flight incapacitated in turn the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and to a different but still damaging degree, that of South Korea (the 11th largest in the world), with a speed that shocked even the financial world. The emerging-market nations in the region, labelled "tigers" for their phenomenal rates of growth throughout most of the 1980's and into the 1990's, were impelled to rely on special IMF bail-out funds, with the attendant controversial structural adjustment programmes, and will most likely take years to recoup their losses (Feldstein, 1998: 33).

China is another possible economic contender in the region, based on a population of 1,200 million, a growing per capita GNP, and increasingly open markets. For the time being, however, China remains among the world's low-income economies, as classified by the World Bank (World Development Report,1997).

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2.1.2.3 *America Resurgent*

Even before these setbacks for Europe and Asia, many analysts who decried the claims of US decline and loss of hegemony (see Strange, 1982; Russett, 1985; Nye, 1989; Huntington,1989; and Kotkin, 1989) seemed vindicated when in the early 1990's the US economy turned up. Having undergone rigorous downsizing and modernisation from the mid-1980's, US industries had regained their competitive edge internationally, although a strong dollar and other factors have perpetuated a dismal trade deficit throughout most of the decade.[24] A further boost came with the dawning of the information age when the technological advantage held by the US jettisoned most talk of economic decline, in absolute terms at least. In California alone, for instance, Silicon Valley -- an 80 km corridor running south from San Francisco and the centre of much of the technological and software innovation underlying the semiconductor, personal computer and Internet industries -- added roughly 50,000 jobs in 1996 in what has been described as the "largest single creation of wealth and economic activity in such a short period."[25]

Until the delayed response of the American economy to the financial woes troubling much of the globe -- evidenced in a slowed growth rate in the second quarter of 1998, which lowered projections marginally to just over 2 percent for 1998 -- it appeared to several analysts that visionary monetary policy on the part of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan had broken the traditional business cycle of boom and bust, of growth and recession, in the US (Weber, 1997: 71; Zuckerman, 1998: 19). The US continues to enjoy its longest period of steady growth (2 to 3 percent annually since 1992), record unemployment (at 4.7 percent[26] in mid-1998, the lowest in 23 years) and

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[24]The US trade deficit stood at $38.8 billion in 1992 and had risen every year since the election of President Clinton. *Mail and Guardian* (21-27 February, 1997). Worse, a November 1998 report from the USTR predicted a $240 billion deficit for the year, due to declining US exports to Asia and other troubled regions and to the strength of the dollar. *Cape Times Business Report* (5 November 1998).

[25]From *Business Week*, quoted in "Millionaires typical 'as a sunny day' in Silicon Valley." *Cape Times* (21 August 1997).

[26]The unemployment rate among African-Americans, it must be noted, is 7 percent, a difference which shows up the uneven distribution of the US recovery and which has some significance for US South Africa

minimal rates of inflation (less than 2 percent). Greenspan, however, issued warnings by mid-1998 that the US economy could not "remain an oasis of prosperity" amidst the turbulence of a world "experiencing greatly increased stress,"[27] and proceeded shortly thereafter to lower US interest rates by one quarter of one percent. With regard to US government debt, fiscal policy under Clinton and the Republican Congress of House Speaker Newt Gingrich produced a $9.5 billion surplus in the 1999 budget, the first surplus for three decades.[28]

Other analysts acknowledge America's reduced economic advantage, but argue that the economic advantage held by the United States at the close of the second World War was "disproportionately high". These analysts also suggest that the current US share of the world's GDP -- roughly 30 percent -- is more in line with the long-term American global share over the past century, and sufficient to retain global economic primacy even in the face of renewed competition from economic powerhouses like Germany and Japan (eg, Brzezinski, 1997: 23; Bracken, 1997: 17).

2.1.2.4 *Africa Emergent*

With the demise of communism and the loosing of the structures of Cold War alliances, Africa, newly freed from the client status of that era, began to emerge from its era of "despots and kleptocrats" as the 1990's progressed. For many observers, the age of the "African Renaissance" had dawned. Thabo Mbeki's romantic term for the increased pride in African nationalism -- and the increased economic growth rates on the continent -- captured the imagination of many, both romantic and pragmatic. Africa began to garner increased attention for completely new reasons, such as the end of apartheid and a

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policy, especially with regard to aid and reducing trade barriers. See Chapter 4 for discussion of the state of the African-American community in the 1990's.
[27]See Rebello, Joseph. "Fed 'not averse' to interest rate cut." *Cape Times Business Report* (7 September 1998).
[28]This surplus, it is important to note, comprises not only increased revenues due to economic growth, but also cuts in such programmes as welfare, foreign assistance, and perhaps UN dues.

peaceful transition in South Africa, and the 10 percent growth rate achieved by Uganda under Yoweri Museveni from the mid 1990's. It also began attracting capital again, even if at a cautious pace. US policymakers have become among the most vocal Africa promoters, pointing out on every possible occasion the more than 25 African nations in which democratic elections had been held since the early 1990's.[29] South Africa features at the top of many American business interest lists as a potential investment destination, and the continued stabilisation of the South African economy under the ANC's Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy has increased confidence in spite of US business' concerns over crime and certain trade practices.

While that optimism might seem to have been derailed by the turbulence in Central Africa and by Kabila's autocratic hold on power in the new Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as by the fact that even South Africa is battling with falling currency values and rising interest rates, on the whole there has been much to substantiate calls for "Afro-Optimism" to replace the pessimism of past decades. And while the "New Bloc" of four east African nations -- Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea -- may be less than effective in stabilising Africa while the latter two are engaged in conflict over borders, their earlier unified action with regard to Kabila and General Omar Bashir of Sudan did catch the eye of US policymakers and other Africa watchers (Connell and Smyth, 1998: 88; and Smyth, 1998: 87). Detractors of this optimistic view of Africa fault the lack of multiparty democracy and continuing reports of human rights abuses in several of the African nations under "new leaders." But most analysts appear to find some encouragement in South Africa's democratic renewal, especially in light of South Africa's economic might on the continent.

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[29]Regina Brown, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, pointed this out at a congressional forum on trade vs aid in October 1997, as did Secretary of Commerce Bill Daly at a luncheon in Cape Town when he was in South Africa with President Clinton in March 1998.

Global Context

The fact of Secretary of State Albright's visit to Africa shortly after her installation in January 1997, and that of President Clinton in early 1998, is evidence enough of increased official US interest. Still, the relative insignificance of Africa in US foreign policy over the decades of the Cold War creates a hurdle to US engagement there, as do the negative images created by years of famine and civil-strife news coverage. Total trade with Africa is minimal. In 1997, US exports to Africa equalled less than 1 percent of total US exports, and imports from Africa only 1.9 percent of the US total imports -- and much of that consists of US importation of Nigerian oil. However, new interests in Africa -- in the potential markets represented, in the need for cooperation to confront the burgeoning crime syndicates that are shifting their focus from Russia and eastern Europe, and in the hope provided by South Africa's experiment in multiracial democracy -- are driving new initiatives out of Washington for increased engagement on the continent. The US appears to hold particular interest in South Africa's potential as a stabilising force against armed conflict in Sub-Sahara Africa as well, perhaps through the leadership of an African peacekeeping force such as that envisioned under Clinton's Africa Crisis Response Initiative.

2.1.2.5 *Lost Leverage*

Even as the US is reconsidering its regional priorities around the globe, such as that toward Africa, it faces another dynamic of its reduced economic advantage in the world economy: a greater willingness by friend and foe alike to challenge America's leadership role. Examples abound in the years since the early 1970's, in almost every arena of US relations with the world.

Reuters reported in mid-1996 that "there are growing signs that the US, as the sole remaining superpower, is having trouble in getting others to follow its lead," and cited the

European Union's threat to retaliate against the US for imposing sanctions on foreign firms investing in Iran and Libya.[30] In another example, the World Trade Organisation was due to review US legislation which sought to limit foreign investment in Cuba following a complaint of US extraterritoriality by the European Union. That stand-off was only defused when the US offered to maintain a waiver on the legislation until amendments could be made.[31]

The response of other G7 leaders to advice from President Clinton that they follow the US economic model of the 1990's, proffered at their summit in Denver in June 1997, was as negative as their reaction to his suggestion that they don boots and jeans for the summit banquet. *Le Monde* responded with an editorial entitled "Imperial America" and the French Prime Minister, addressing the National Assembly in Paris, criticised the "hegemonic tendency of the United States." France defied US anti-terrorist legislation later that year with a $2 billion French investment in Iranian gas fields, after which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright bemoaned the lack of convergence in US-European perceptions, saying "It is of great concern to us that our friends and allies don't get it." For the French and other nations -- including South Africa -- it seems that the issue is not one of engaging with states deemed by the US to be sponsoring terrorism such as Iran, but of asserting their own sovereignty.[32]

One analyst has asserted that, based on the US failure to isolate Tehran and Baghdad and to bring Israel back in line with the 1993 Oslo peace accords, traditional US allies are now "more resistant to Washington's presumptive leadership than at any point since 1945."[33] Another example is the 1998 creation, against US objections, of an

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[30]See "Bill and his Elk." *Cape Times* (14 August 1996).

[31] See Branegan, Jay. "Trading Truce : the U.S. and Europe back off a trade fight over Cuba - and spare the WTO." *Time* (28 April 1997).

[32]Marshall, Tyler. "Allies Want Sovereignty in Dealing With Rogue States." *Los Angeles Times* (1 October 1997), and "'We'll sell to whom we want: Mandela rejects US warnings on arms deal." *Cape Times* (16 January 1997).

[33]See Karon, Tony. "US fails to put screws on Israel." *Cape Times* (15 December 1997).

international war crimes court under the auspices of the United Nations. The US opposed the court -- which was supported by 120 nations, including South Africa and the major allies of the US -- on the grounds that US soldiers might be indicted for crimes based on "political motives" after carrying out military duties under UN or other peacekeeping missions around the world. The prominent South African jurist Richard Goldstone represented many, it seems, when he said that if the US did not "change its mind" it could not "resume its position of leadership on behalf of international justice."[34]

2.1.2.6 *A Question of Will?*

Americans, on the other hand, even before the end of the Cold War had begun to question the financial and political costs of leadership. The US had, for instance, since the end of the second World War carried the burden of world financial stability. As such it had been seen to be "willing and able to furnish an outlet for distress goods, maintain the flow of capital to would-be borrowers, serve as a lender of last resort in financial crises, maintain a structure of exchange rates, and coordinate macroeconomic politics" (Isaak, 1991: 18), as befits a hegemon. US willingness to carry on with this burden has, however, been called into question since the late 1980's and the wind down of the Cold War. With the annual average GNP growth rate of Japan, Europe, China and the NIC's consistently outstripping US growth rates (from the 1970's until the 1990's, that is), why, some in the US asked, was the US continuing to bear the responsibility -- and the costs -- of hegemony? The US showed classic signs of a hegemon in decline in that it began acting like an "ordinary country," no longer willing (or able to afford, it seemed) to tolerate "free riding" by those countries paying little or nothing to sustain the international

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[34]See Goldstone, Richard. "A Court that needs a Fair Trial." *Time* (3 August 1998).

system, nor to "subordinate its national economic interests to the pursuit of political harmony" in the world political economy (Mastanduno, 1991: 81).[35]

By sheer size of market,[36] however, the US does retain a degree of control over the current trade regime, as well as a vested interest in seeing it remain liberal. There also appears to remain an expectation on the part of other economies that the US will act to stabilise world commodity and financial markets, by dint of its size and residual clout.[37] The expanded purview of the World Trade Organisation may diminish this expectation over the coming years, however, as do the increasing role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and a renewed focus on World Bank and IMF solutions to third world debt in other spheres.   The establishment of the G7 in the mid-1980's to coordinate macroeconomic policy sought to diminish the US role in the currency exchange realm, as well.

The bottom line is that the US has not lost its economic dynamism, yet it is unlikely to resume the towering advantages of the immediate post-World War Two world, and thus its near complete hegemony over the capitalist world (which, by now, is most of the globe). This is not only because the rest of the world's economies are on their feet and expanding, too, when viewed over this past half-century, nor because the US as a sole superpower has, by definition, less magnetism due to the loss of a major and

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[35]Examples of this include protectionist legislation such as Helms-Burton, reticence to pay UN dues, reductions in foreign assistance, and congressional opposition to US funding to bail Indonesia out of its financial crisis of late 1997.

[36] According to the World Bank's Development Report, 1997, the US had the largest of the world's "high-income" economies and its population (1995 figures) stood at 263.1 million, more than twice that of Japan. US imports outstripped any other country's at the value of $1,082,260 million in 1995, despite the fact the US ranked sixth in terms of per capita GNP. US exports also topped the list at $969,220 million.

[37]In one example from June 1997, then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto called on the US to "engage in efforts and in co-operation to maintain exchange stability so we will not succumb to the temptation to sell off Treasury bills and switch our funds to gold." ("Wall Street", *Business Day*, 1997). In another, a WTO official observed that "If the US leads, things get done. It it doesn't, then nothing gets done" (Walsh, August 1997). In a third, one economist asserted that "Only Greenspan can save the global economy as it goes into a tailspin," *Sunday Independent* (30 August 1998).

threatening rival. It is also because the increasingly interdependent nature of the international system militates against such a resumption.

2.1.3   Factor III: Globalisation

Before and throughout these political and economic "tectonic shifts" of the 1990's, another revolution has been weaving its way through the world political economy in the second half of the 20th century: globalisation. An amorphous term applied to a range of phenomena, globalisation for the purposes of this study refers to the widening and deepening of transnational linkages which exist among the world's nations. Controversy surrounds more than the term, of course, as political and economic analysts debate whether globalisation and the ensuing growth of financial capital markets is beneficial for all or only for the wealthy elite of developed and developing countries alike (eg, Richardson, 1995, Murphy, 1993; Robinson, 1996; and Falk, 1997). Should or can globalisation, and the erosion of the nation-state system it engenders, be controlled? Is globalisation not actually rather just an "Americanisation" of the world economy?[38] As this discussion is limited to the effect of changes in the global context on US foreign policy toward South Africa, there is neither space nor time to fully address these debates.[39] This study would be incomplete if it did not take note, however, of the world's deep, complex and growing interdependence, as it constitutes a major characteristic of the international milieu in which US South Africa policy is made.

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[38]This assertion from a French trade unionist, as well as discussion of other points of controversy, can be found in an article by James Walsh, "One World Divided." *Time* (7 July 1997): 37-40.
[39]For further discussion, see Nel, Philip. "The Political Consequences of Globalisation." A paper prepared for the South African Bureau for Economic Research conference on *Globalisation and the South African economy: a medium term perspective.* (13 November 1998).

2.1.3.1 *High Tech and Growing Liberalisation*

The technological innovations of the second half of this century laid the groundwork for the process of globalisation. What was begun with transoceanic telecommunications and air travel has exploded -- through developments in, for instance, satellite, fibre optic, and microchip technologies, and in the application of these in, for instance, cellular phones, electronic mail and teleconferencing -- into a myriad of cross-national dealings at every level. Facsimile machines enabled instantaneous transmission of documents around the world, and electronic mail cut the cost of such transmission to that of a local telephone call. In addition, international news networks such as CNN could bring scenes from events such as the Gulf War to television screens around the world in real time. Through such transformations, the 1990's have prompted predictions of a "Placeless Society" (Knoke, 1996: 20) as well as fears of a "transnational Frankenstein monster" beyond the control of its creators (Hoffman, 1995: 177).

The liberalisation of world markets has also been key to the process of globalisation. Indeed, in the words of one analyst, "technology makes globalisation feasible; liberalisation makes it happen."[40] Since the end of World War II, a dramatic rise in world trade has occurred as stronger economies have increasingly offered their goods on the world market and as tariffs and other impediments to trade have been eroded under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organisation, GATT's successor since 1995. This deepening liberalisation spread wider as capitalism repeatedly filled the vacuum of dissolving communist states around the world from the 1980's. By the mid 1990's, Harvard University's Jeffrey Sachs points out, capitalism had "spread to 90 percent of the world's population, since almost all parts of the world are now linked through open trade, convertible currencies, flows of foreign

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[40]See van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. "SA's foreign-policy challenge." *Mail & Guardian* (20-23 December 1996).

investment, and political commitments to private ownership as the engine of economic growth."[41]

This development has translated into a 24-hour stock market accessible instantaneously via the internet, for instance, and pundits portend such phenomena as an unprecedented equalisation of prices through "global shopping" in a "friction-free" marketplace.[42] Theorists alternately warn that globalisation threatens to relegate labour to the lowest end of the power spectrum, as unprecedented labour flexibility and capital mobility render strikes a nearly-empty threat in the quest for higher wages, or they project the disappearance of "cheap labour" as import tariffs disappear and manufacturers everywhere have to reach a global standard.[43] The "Coca-Colonisation" of the third world achieved by multinational corporations through increased knowledge of local markets is already apparent, welcomed by some and decried by others. The phenomenon of the "unhinged" MNC, located in one nation, majority-owned by members of another, and selling its services or products worldwide simultaneously, has elicited increasing concern about the ability of any one nation-state to regulate these mammoth and well-organised international entities. In fact, MNC's not only blur the lines between nations, they also constitute a formidable non-state actor in the anarchical international system.

Does all this mean the end of the nation-state as the linchpin of international affairs? As stated in the introduction, for the time-being, while nationalism and protectionism still abound, it would seem not (Drucker, 1997: 171). But it does mean that governments of nation-states must integrate the impact of MNC's and other transnational actors and processes into their policy formulation and into multilateral equations.

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[41] See Sachs, Jeffrey. "A common-sense approach will put SA's economic miracle within reach." *Sunday Times Business Times* (1 October 1995).

[42] Gates, Bill. "Vigilant will be able to find bargains on the Net," *Sunday Times Business Times* (7 June 1998).

[43] See D'Angelo, Audrey. "Cheap labour will be a thing of the past, says outgoing Sacob president." *Cape Times Business Report* (6 November 1997).

With the convergence of advances in the development and application of technological innovations and the spread of "global capitalism," the complexity of transnational relations has grown exponentially at the close of the twentieth century. One indicator of the increasingly integrated world political economy is the degree to which world trade has outpaced world output. (See Table 2) With this convergence, the economic stability of one nation depends increasingly on that of the world, as evidenced in the ripple effect on several economies of Asia's 1997 financial woes. Clinton, in his State of the Union address earlier that year noted, for instance, that 2 million US jobs depended on exports to Asia alone.[44] Indeed, even the US, "although still the largest national economy and by far the world's greatest military power, is increasingly subject to the vicissitudes of a world no nation can dominate."[45]

Growth of World Output and Trade, 1981-1996.
Since the early 1980's, the growth of world trade consistently has outpaced the growth of world economic output. As a result, states' domestic welfare has become more tightly intertwined as states have become more closely integrated into the globalising world political economy. (Source: Kegley and Wittkopf (1997): 261.)

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[44]See Clinton, William J. "America's Leadership Role In The 21st Century." *US Foreign Policy Agenda* Vol 2 No1 (March 1997). An electronic journal of the US Information Agency.
[45]See Barnet, Richard J. and Cavanagh, John. *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order.* New York: Simon & Schuster. Quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 272.

2.1.3.2 *Globalisation and Policy Process*

The process of globalisation affects not only the world in which nations must make foreign policy; it has also affected the policymaking process itself. Although many of these technological innovations remain largely inaccessible for citizens of the developing world, change has reached into almost every nation's diplomatic practice. "These innovations -- the jet airplane, CNN, the cell phone, and personal computers -- all change the pattern of our thinking," noted one policymaker. "There has been a paradigm shift...In fact, we can expect 2 or 3 more paradigm shifts over the next two generations of diplomats."[46] Foreign policymakers the world over find themselves working without the limitations (or breathing space) of time and distance that once defined their mode of work. Apart from the direct impact of advanced telecommunications and real time news coverage on the work of foreign policymakers, the interwoven nature of the world itself has changed the content and the process of foreign policymaking. Factors previously considered extraneous to foreign policy now impinge significantly. Policymakers must now consider that the world is linked not only politically and strategically, financially and commercially, but also epidemiologically, ecologically, and demographically. The problems accompanying the spread of disease, environmental degradation and displaced and burgeoning populations have been compounded by an increase -- concomitant with the increased liberalisation of trade -- in international crime and terrorism.

Concepts such as intellectual property rights, those controversial rights protecting what has gone on inside someone else's head, enter into international trade relationships. South Africa has twice since Mandela's election found itself on the US Trade

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[46]Gingrich made these comments during his address on "Diplomacy in the Information Age" at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 7 October 1997. Not widely regarded as an internationalist, Gingrich was the 1997 recipient of Medunsa's Nelson Mandela Award as an "ardent engineer of the current policy of expanding economic links with Africa." He expects the next two generations of US foreign policymakers to experience "changes in diplomacy comparable to those of the sixteenth century after introduction of the printing press." Gingrich made these comments during his address on "Diplomacy in the Information Age" at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 7 October 1997.

Representative's watch list for alleged IPR violations; once for trademark infringements, most notably against McDonalds restaurants, and secondly for perceived loopholes in the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 allowing, the US claims, pharmaceutical patent violations.

Perhaps even more important than the inclusion of these factors in policy formulation, however, has been the acknowledgement, at the highest policymaking levels, that these problems cannot be solved unilaterally but require multilateral, even global, cooperation. Hence such unprecedented attention in foreign policy circles, for example, to the UN Earth Summits of 1992 and 1997, called to address environmental hazards such as global warming and tropical deforestation, and to "Cites" (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species). The latter attracted attention at the US presidential level in 1997 for the controversy over Zimbabwe's appeal to sell off its accumulated stocks of ivory. Heads of government likewise addressed the June 1998 "Drug Summit" in New York, where the "global war on drugs" came under reconsideration after an appeal to the UN by several international leaders in various fields, including former South African parliamentarian Helen Suzman. One result has been the international involvement of such traditionally national agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Departments of Education, Labor, and Transportation. The fact that the Secretaries of the latter two departments accompanied President Clinton on his 1998 tour of Africa, for instance, demonstrates this growing overlap between domestic and international policymaking at the institutional level.

What has been the stance of US policymakers to this process of globalisation and the resulting world of increased transnational complexity? In seeking to elucidate US foreign policy towards post-apartheid South Africa in particular, this study turns next to the overarching terms of US foreign policy in the midst of the world of the 1990's.

2.2   *The Emerging American Response*

With the end of the Cold War, a reduced American economic advantage, and the growing integration of the world political economy, the United States finds itself in a new role vis-à-vis the international community. Several policy frameworks have been punted in Washington to fill the vacuum left after the unexpected demise of the world's only other superpower, even as America's own influence has continued to decline. Some, like George Kennan, author of the US Cold War policy of "containment," asserted in 1994 that "what you need are not policies --much less a single policy. What you need are sound principles: principles that accord with the nature, the needs, the interests and the limitations of our country." Other suggestions from the policy-analytic community ranged from renewed disengagement, or "isolationism" (Kauffman, 1995), to the enlargement of US military alliances (Brzezinski, 1996); from an aid-centred focus on "pivotal states" (Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 1996) to a trade-centred focus on "big emerging markets" (Brown, 1995). The emerging theme of Clinton's second-term foreign policy team appears, amidst all these, to be the consolidation of America's self-appointed role as the "indispensable nation" to the expanding liberal democratic international order of the 1990's, a theme built on traditional goals and on new requisites.

Domestic politics and policy processes, as discussed earlier, play an important role in defining and then filling out the broad strokes of overall policy guidelines in US foreign policy. Discussion of those domestic factors follow in subsequent chapters, after the following brief overview of the major themes that have characterised the post-Cold War foreign policy debate. These themes, or proposed policy frameworks have, for the most part, fallen under the concepts of 1)international disengagement, 2)enlargement, 3)key nation approaches (pivotal states, and big emerging markets), and 4)the promotion of liberal democracy.

2.2.1 International Disengagement

Few campaigns have jolted the US foreign policy community in Washington, DC, as did the vociferous calls for disengagement which Congress made after the Republicans gained majorities in both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in the 1994 midterm congressional elections. The Clinton/Gore administration, having tapped into the same disengagement sentiment with its focus on the domestic economy in the presidential elections of 1992, was nonetheless unprepared for the demonstrated groundswell of opposition to an expanded US international role half-way through its first term.

First, the 104th Congress opposed US military engagement in foreign conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda -- pointedly reminding the US public of the 1993 debacle in Somalia, where 17 Americans were killed and dragged naked through the streets of Mogadishu by chanting mobs in full view of CNN cameras. Congress, and especially the powerful Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, also called into question US commitment to multilateral bodies such as the United Nations. The US dues arrears of $1.3 billion has yet to be fully paid to the UN, even with a new secretary general at the helm and reform measures underway since 1998.[47] Foreign assistance similarly came under fire, especially as Gingrich's "Contract with America" gained prominence. Gingrich led a charge to balance the US federal budget, long a bone of contention in Washington, but even more so since the federal debt had passed the $5,000 billion mark in the aftermath of the Reagan years.

By early 1996, Gingrich's revolution had foundered on the rocks of public backlash when the budget standoff between Congress and the administration caused a series of prolonged federal government standstills from late 1995. But the drive to cut budgets had already caused much damage to US engagement abroad. For months there

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[47]See Karon, Tony. "Uncle Sam, the delinquent debtor." *Cape Times* (5 January 1998).

was little support for the few voices raised in favour of spending on overseas involvements, especially foreign assistance which had, in any case, begun to lose credibility as an effective use of US funds. When welfare at home was being cut, what legislator could justify sending dollars abroad when there was no impending threat to national security? Another casualty, on some points, was international trade, as protectionist elements within the US played on the fears of Americans feeling the squeeze through the vulnerability of US markets to foreign investors and consumers. The legislative climate of the 104th Congress was demonstrated by passage of acts such as the Helms-Burton and D'Amato bills seeking to isolate Cuba, Iran and Libya, but also by protectionist legislation aimed at long-time trading partners from Europe to Japan.[48]

Subsequently, as previously discussed, disengagement sentiment has largely given way to the budgetary optimism of the late 1990's and the growing awareness among the Congress and public of several benefits of international trade. Through the campaigns to garner support for the North American Free Trade Act and the Asia Pacific Economic Conference, first Bush and then Clinton made major inroads against protectionism, the results of which could be seen in such facts as the initial bipartisan sponsorship of the Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation in 1996. However, a few significant US policymakers -- and the memory of their campaign -- continue to limit US international involvements to some degree, as demonstrated by the withdrawal of the Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation (blamed on protectionist lobbying) in late 1998, in order to prevent a likely failure of passage in the 105th Congress.

2.2.2   Enlargement

From within the traditional US foreign policy community came calls not only to remain engaged, but to enlarge the US presence abroad, particularly by expanding

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[48]See Nivola, 1997: 38.

membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to include newly democratic nations of eastern Europe. As discussed earlier, this policy has constituted a high priority for both Clinton administrations and, by late 1997, had resulted in the extension of membership to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary -- with several other nations waiting in the wings. Proponents of the policy placed great weight on bolstering cross-Atlantic cooperation as well as stability on the Eurasian continent -- especially in light of the economic chaos in eastern Europe and Russia following the fall of communism, and the prospect of future competition from the nascent superpower in the east, China. As perceived among the "grand geostrategists," enlargement was the antithesis of disengagement and epitomised a new era of US engagement, albeit on new terms. Those terms included the need for reform in the United Nations and cuts in US foreign assistance, as well as resources to address the "new security" issues such as organised crime and international terrorism, which threaten newly liberalised nations with violence as well as economic disruption. As one prominent publication expressed it in early 1998, "with the threat of major war at least temporarily in abeyance, national security planners are just as likely these days to be thinking about a Colombian drug gang or a Russian mafia kingpin as a tank division or a territorial dispute."[49]

The cost of the expanded security umbrella may yet prove prohibitive, however (Perlmutter and Carpenter, 1998: 6). The question, in that case, will be whether to curtail NATO expenses, or to sacrifice other US foreign policy priorities. These priorities might include other forms of military cooperation, such as the proposed Pacific atomic energy community (PACATOM) or the African Crisis Response Initiative still under discussion, or an increased focus on "key nations" of the developing world.

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[49]See "National Security in Flux." Introduction to articles on security in *The Washington Quarterly* Vol 21, No 1 (Winter 1998): 83.

2.2.3   Key Nation Approaches

During the Clinton years, two "key nation" approaches have surfaced as potential guides for US policymakers with regard to the developing world. These are the "pivotal states" approach and the Big Emerging Market initiative of the late Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown. South Africa appears on both these lists,[50] and as such has received a great deal of US attention, epitomised by the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission but also by the numerous high-level business and government delegations to South Africa since 1994, including that of President Clinton in March 1998.

2.2.3.1 *Pivotal States*

According to the pivotal states approach (Chase, Hill and Kennedy, 1996), with regard to the developing world and in view of downward pressure on US foreign assistance levels, "it is vital that America focus its efforts on a small number of countries whose fate is uncertain and whose future will profoundly affect their surrounding regions." By channelling scarce foreign assistance to these pivotal states, the US would seek to guard against future costs of regional conflict, humanitarian crises such as famine or disease, or even economic and political collapse.   This approach follows from the assumption that, while "the United States must [firstly] manage its delicate relationships with Europe, Japan, Russia, and China, the other major players in world affairs," it is also important to note that "America's national interest also requires stability in important parts of the developing world" (p. 33). For the US foreign policymaker, the pivotal states strategy sought to integrate new security issues, such as migration, overpopulation and environmental degradation, into the "realist emphasis on power and military and political security" of the traditional, state-centred framework.   Outside of that framework,

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[50]Chase, Hill and Kennedy identify as pivotal states Mexico and Brazil; Algeria, Egypt and South Africa; Turkey; India and Pakistan; and Indonesia. On the big emerging markets list of the US Department of Commerce are the Chinese Economic Area (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan); ASEAN, India and South Korea; Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil; Poland and Turkey, and South Africa.

advocates claim, such global issues might otherwise be neglected, as long-term and intangible threats, because of their failure to form the basis for "a compelling case to the American public for an internationalist foreign policy" (p. 36).

Indeed, with regard to South Africa, Clinton's first National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, saw not only an emerging force for economic growth, democracy and stability on the African continent, but also an opportunity for African-Americans to develop positive ties with the African continent, which would "be good for both Africa and America..." (Lurssen, 1996). Mbeki, however, on a visit to the US in early 1996, urged against cutting aid to other nations in Africa in favour of increased assistance to South Africa, warning that such reductions would result in increased migration, greater international drug trafficking and crime, and higher disease rates in the region, placing a greater burden on South Africa.

While the pivotal states framework summed up the reasoning behind the initial $600 million in aid promised South Africa by the Clinton administration in 1994 following the inauguration of Nelson Mandela, the sense of rising disengagement sentiment and an increasing emphasis on "trade, not aid" as a means to develop world economies has moved the US to rather emphasise South Africa's place among the top ten big emerging markets.

2.2.3.2 *Big Emerging Markets*

The Big Emerging Markets (BEM) initiative, introduced in 1995 by the late Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, can be seen as a manifestation of the increased emphasis on commercial concerns within US foreign policymaking following the end of the Cold War. Dovetailing with similar investment trends in the private sector, the initiative focused official and public attention on ten foreign markets identified as providing "particularly great" opportunities for American business. The initiative did not offer aid, but rather a series of conferences and trade delegations to encourage business

contacts, and the establishment or strengthening of US foreign commercial service offices to expedite the processing of export licenses and other redtape which inhibits business. The BEM website pointed out that with a combined GDP of over $2 trillion, the BEM's accounted for as large a share of world output as Germany and the United Kingdom combined, and predicted that "over the next two decades, the markets that hold the greatest potential for dramatic increases in US exports are not our traditional trading partners in Europe and Japan, but...rather...in the ten Big Emerging Markets."[51]

Brown, an African-American who "readily admitted that he had a special attitude toward South Africa," also believed that "economic empowerment for [South Africa's] enfranchised but impoverished black majority was the best way to boost the new democracy." At the same time, the US pledged to work in South Africa to "create new trade and investment opportunities as well as export-related jobs for Americans."[52] Many voiced concerns, however, over the impact of focusing exclusively on the most promising regions or markets in the developing world, pointing out the deleterious effects of neglecting economic development in the surrounding nations. In one attack on "key nation" approaches, a commentator stated that "concentrating...on the states with the greatest economic potential is like sending coal to Newcastle. These nations [already] receive the lion's share of trade and private foreign investment..." (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1996:165-6). Others decried the "divide-and-rule" effect such favouritism caused, especially in Africa where nations such as Uganda and Ghana appeared more often to be scrambling for US business rather than building regional trade.

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[51] See < http://www.stat-usa.gov/itabems.html>

[52] "Ron Brown was South Africa's Friend: Commerce Secretary saw economic empowerment as the basis for the fledgling democracy's success" *See <http://mainstreet.t5.com/peoplew.htm#Ron Brown* (22 April 1996).

2.2.4   Promoting Liberal Democracy

The emerging theme of Clinton's second-term foreign policy team amidst these and other proposed policy frameworks -- some competing, some complementary[53]-- appears to be the consolidation of America's self-appointed role as the "indispensable nation" to the expanding liberal democratic international order of the 1990's. Encapsulated in the term "democracy promotion," this policy framework has taken precedence over others, partly because it has long been a tenet of US foreign policy, even if only implicitly, and partly because it easily incorporates many of the themes that have surfaced to guide foreign policy since the 1992 election.

Clinton, in a campaign speech in 1991, called for "an American foreign policy of engagement through democracy."[54]   While that ideal has since been through the mill of disengagement sentiment and the 104th Congress, the promotion of democracy remains the touchstone by which Clinton forms his ideas about foreign policy priorities.   As portrayed by the Clinton team, democracy promotion involves not only support for democratic reform in developing countries and newly liberalising countries, but also for increased liberalisation of markets in what is seen as a natural convergence between democratic governance and free-market economies worldwide.   While it appears that in some instances, the latter is allowed to precede the former for the sake of "increasing the pie" and providing for a stable domestic polity before democratic reforms are initiated -- as in Uganda where one-party rule is accepted while the eight percent growth rates stabilise the economy --   the goals appear to be viewed as parallel.

In its earlier conception, democracy promotion -- or Wilsonianism, as it is often called, after an early proponent, US President Woodrow Wilson -- focused on the humanitarian merits of political liberalisation.   The Clinton administrations have added a

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[53]See Nacht (1995) for an overview of several other proposed policy frameworks, such as Richard Haass's "Realism Plus," James Schlesinger's "Selective Involvement," and William Maynes' "Spheres of Influence."
[54]From a speech at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 12 December 1991, entitled, "A New Covenant for American Security."

more pragmatic tone to the policy, often pointing out that democracies tend not to go war with each other, not to produce large numbers of refugees, not to engage in terrorism, and tend to make better economic partners (Carothers, 1995: 13). Democracy promotion easily incorporates the dual policy track of enlargement and key nation approaches, although the required resource outlay for each specific instance of these policies has been preceded regularly by controversy from a budgetary point of view. By securing the new liberal democracies of the former Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union, by leading China and other "recalcitrants" via expanded trade links deeper and deeper into capitalist waters, and by encouraging the consolidation of liberal democracy where it has begun throughout the developing world, however, the US aims to reduce security threats, increase economic gain, and at the same time remain "at the centre of a world of its own making" (Inkenberry, 1996: 91).

Critics may point out the many areas in which Clinton-style democracy promotion has proved ineffective, such as in Somalia, or has been placed second behind security concerns, such as in North Korea or Iraq (Carothers, 1995: 24), or has even increased pressure on many developing economies (Arrighi, 1994). In the face of these criticisms, Clinton advisors have appeared to have little trouble reconciling other priorities with an overall theme of democracy promotion, however (Talbott, 1995; Albright, 1997). The confident tone with which Clinton suggested at the 1997 G7 meeting that the American economic and political model should be adopted worldwide is a case in point, although that tone has been somewhat subdued in the aftermath of the currency crashes later that year. The adverse developments on the currency markets served to amplify objections over the ill effects for emerging markets of global capitalism, and the US role therein, from such quarters as Malaysia whose premier called US policy a "new colonialism."[55] But not until the US economy slowed down (briefly) in mid-1998 did US policymakers

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[55]See Mahathir (1997): 4.

seem to take heed. The need to restructure the international financial system topped several agendas at international forums subsequently, but beyond activating IMF assistance programmes, little has been done to change the structures of global capitalism, due no doubt to the renewed vigour of the US economy and the principles of liberal democracy which have supported it. US policymakers seem immune to charges that the US must lead a process of change in the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, where by virtue of its predominant economy it has a dominant role, if the developing world is not to collapse and take the international system with it (Bush and Szeftel, 1995).[56]

The focus of the Clinton/Gore administration on the promotion of liberal democracy has elicited objections from within the policy-analytical community as well, from the "old Democrats" for the deemphasis under Clinton of humanitarian goals, relative to other periods of "Wilsonianism," which seems to have accelerated the decline of aid to the third world. In other quarter, objections arise over the danger presented to traditional foreign policy goals by what is seen as an excessive "commercialisation" of US policy (eg, Nivola, 1997: Huntington, 1997[57]). Although administration officials deny that trade will replace aid altogether and also insist on the need to maintain a strong US defence, commercial considerations have undeniably come to the fore in foreign policymaking under President Clinton. One of his first moves after gaining office, for example, was to create the White House-based National Economic Council (NEC),

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[56]Policymakers are also not open, it would appear, to ideas such as those presented by theorist William Robinson. His analysis of democracy promotion presents it as providing the rationale for US leadership over "new forms of control accompanying the rise of global capitalism." Under this US leadership, an "emergent transnational elite" from among the international community employs "consensual domination" to achieve hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, and to promote neoliberalism and the polyarchy which most Americans take for democracy, to the detriment of the majority of the world's population. (Robinson, 1996: 634).

[57]In this treatise on "The Erosion of American National Interest," for instance, Samuel Huntington decries the rise of multiculturism and the ebbing of assimilation in America, which has allowed commercial and ethnic interests to take over where national interest held sway under the threat of the Soviet enemy.

intended to serve as a counterpart to the influential National Security Agency. The NEC, designed to coordinate the various US national and foreign economic policymaking bodies, has yet to gain the political leverage of the NSA, but stands as a significant signpost to administration goals. Further indications of the commercial bent of US policy can be seen in the flurry of government-sponsored trade delegations and international economic infrastructure projects with an overt focus on gaining contracts for US companies. These demonstrate not only the intent of the current administration to spread the US gospel of economic recovery by export, but also to provide the American economy with growing markets for both goods and services, as in the case of the BEM strategy. Clinton stated as much when he pointed out that "in a departure from the behaviour of previous administrations of both parties, we have unashamedly been an active partner in helping our business enterprises win contracts abroad."[58] The ramifications of this overt push for US benefits does not sit easily with critics

Clinton's frustration with congressional denial of "fast-track authority" in order to expedite trade agreements negotiated by the executive branch is partly a function of this commitment to the merits of free trade and international linkages -- although cynics might also point to the desire of the administration to override congressional prerogatives for political gain. But even without "fast track," which looks unlikely during Clinton's watch due to protectionist elements within his own party,[59] the administration has appeared determined to reduce trade barriers throughout the world. Besides the massive web of trading agreements between the US and the EU, the US is party to the Asian Pacific Economic Conference and, in its own hemisphere, seeks an expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and even establishment of a free-trade area of the Americas by the year 2005.[60] The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act may yet

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[58]See the BEM website < http://www.stat-usa.gov/itabems.html>

[59]See Ogden, Christopher. "A Grownup at State: Clinton will set policy; Albright will dominate implementation." *Time* (16 December 1996): 34.

[60]See Regenstreif, Gary. "Americas pledge free trade by 2005." *Cape Times Business Report* (20 April

provide for a Southern Africa Free Trade Agreement by the year 2005, as well, if it is passed during the 106th Congress.

2.3   *Conclusion: Implications of Global Change for US South Africa Policy*

As the US adjusts to new requisites in the closing years of the twentieth century and to its own changed position in the international arena, what are the implications for US policy toward South Africa? What dynamics have these three factors -- unipolarity, a reduced US economic advantage and globalisation -- introduced into the equation?

Firstly, in a post-Cold War and unipolar world, it would seem that South Africa may have lost whatever strategic significance it previously held for the US, as South Africa need no longer be supported as a bulwark against communist aggression in Africa, nor as a strategic port from which to ward off naval attack from the Indian Ocean around the Cape of Good Hope. On the other hand, global developments have created new concerns. Ethnic discord having replaced economic ideology as the major cause of war in the past ten years, the South African miracle of negotiated transition to a black majority-ruled African nation is perhaps foremost among the reasons many policymakers are watching South Africa closely. South Africa's leadership among the developing world on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has garnered the attention of US national security officials, as well. South Africa also features in the US strategy to build partnerships with regional leaders in order to address other "new" security concerns such as environmental degradation, international terrorism, and the effects of huge populations displaced by civil war or famine on several regions around the globe.

In an era of increasingly "commercialised" US foreign policy and of growing international interdependence, South Africa is again a significant player in US equations. As a "big emerging market," South Africa was cited in late 1996 on a "short list" of seven

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1998).

especially promising emerging markets, next to China, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Korea. As several of these have since experienced severe stress economically, the BEM label may become less of an asset than was intended, but the fact remains that Clinton, or at least his Secretary of Commerce, has maintained the spotlight on South Africa for US trade and investment. The perceived gains from securing an economic foothold in South Africa, as "one of the last untapped markets" globally, were obviously significant to warrant such attention.[61] The withdrawal of France from much of francophone Africa leaves openings for increased US economic activity on the rest of the African continent, as does the Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation under reconsideration in 1999. Such linkages across Africa would, in turn, increase the US stake in a South Africa which is stable, prosperous, and willing to take on responsibilities for maintaining stability in its region and beyond, even if South Africa remains unwilling to act as a "surrogate" of the United States.

Indeed, US reticence to commit American troops abroad without clear strategic imperatives -- a tendency dubbed the "Somalia Syndrome" after the 1993 debacle there -- translated into greater importance in US policy of regional powers such as South Africa. While Pretoria has made tentative moves to lead in regional conflict situations, it has refrained from involvement in peacekeeping efforts on the continent, including the US African Crisis Response Initiative. Mandela declined involvement in the latter on the grounds of protecting African sovereignty from the threats he perceived inherent in the original formulation of the ACRI. Current negotiations between the US and South

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[61] The vulnerability of South Africa's currency on global financial markets, which became patently clear after the rand lost nearly a quarter of its value in a few weeks in mid 1998, has only just begun to change South Africa's prospects for continued growth, although worries about a collapse similar to those in Asia have passed. See Barber, Simon, "SA economy in better shape than most emerging states." *Business Day* (7 October 1998).

Africa, after further consultation and adjustments to the ACRI, may yet result in South African involvement in this area, however.

With regard to development assistance, due to the reduced American economic advantage over the rest of the world, and in the current climate of pessimism with regard to the effectiveness of past aid efforts, the US is most likely to continue to reduce aid to the developing world, including South Africa. Pretoria has been less affected by that policy due to the special aid package promised after Mandela's inauguration, but in any case is expected to "graduate" from aid in the next few years. Regarding the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, which may well play a role in South Africa's post-apartheid economic recovery, it appears that until US reservations about the management of funds by multilateral bodies (especially the UN) are put to rest, US contributions may continue to decline, if they are paid at all.

The impact on US South Africa policy of the changed nature of US foreign policy priorities and processes are clearest in the content and operations of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. The BNC is focused not just on security and on limited assistance in education and human resource development, but on trade, on sustainable development initiatives in South Africa, on law enforcement cooperation to combat the encroaching illicit drugs trade and other organised crime, and on such projects as increased access to advanced technology in South African schools. More detailed discussion of this mechanism in US South Africa policy follows, as well as an evaluation as to how well the BNC goals have been fulfilled.

Negative implications for South Africa in current US policy are greatly downplayed in official statements, but have plagued relations since 1994. US laws which seek to limit trade with states deemed to be sponsoring terrorism (such as Syria, Iran and Libya), and with Cuba, the last bastion of communism in the western hemisphere, impinge on South Africa's role as an independent actor and leader in the developing world. South Africa has felt the wrath of US anger over close relations with Libya's

Muammar Gaddafi, over proposed arms sales to Syria, over a proposed oil storage deal with Iran -- both eventually dropped by South Africa -- and earlier over the doctor exchange program which continues between Cuba and South Africa. The high political cost for South Africa of deepening political and economic ties with the US on a bilateral basis may grow as regional actors and other multilateral bodies such as the G15 take a harder line against such relations with America, as well.

President Clinton, in his March 1998 speech to the South African parliament, sought to reassure South Africans that "America wants a strong South Africa; America needs a strong South Africa. And we are determined to work with you as you build a strong South Africa." What is the policy of the US toward South Africa beyond this simplistic statement? A deeper understanding of that policy is important for policy analysts on both sides of the question, as the decisions made at this juncture in South Africa's history are too important to build on unneccessarily incomplete analysis.

This chapter has endeavoured to set out the international context for US South Africa policy in the 1990's, as well as American responses to global changes and the implications for that policy. The following chapters will set out the history behind and a detailed account of Clinton policy toward post-apartheid South Africa.

CHAPTER THREE
The Historical Context
For US South Africa Policy under Clinton

Over the two hundred years since America first established diplomatic relations with the Cape Colony, South Africa has moved from relative obscurity in the US to notable prominence among nations for its example of peaceful transformation and non-racial, democratic promise. In 1869, for instance, the US Postmaster General sent out a circular to his staff warning of someone "purporting to be Postmaster-General of the South African Republic...attempting to circulate letters carrying postage stamps of that country in the United States." As the postal department had "no record of any such place," the activity was deemed "fraudulent" (Rosenthal, 1938: 176). And yet, in the late 1990's, South Africa features among the few nations with which the US has established a vice-presidential binational commission, and has played host to leaders from several of the world's leading nations, including President Clinton, since the election of Nelson Mandela as president in 1994. The relative lack of importance that South Africa has held in US foreign policy for all but a few periods in history is important in considering the durability of current levels of engagement. How deep is US interest, in fact?

The following historical overview sets the scene for the more detailed account and analysis of US South Africa policy under the Clinton presidency. Traditional security issues associated with the Cold War will serve as a starting point, especially as the legacy of this conflict remains intact in many aspects of US policymaking in the late 1990's. The issue of race, as played out in the rise of anti-apartheid activism in Washington and the national movement it generated -- culminating in the historic overturn of the Reagan veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 -- forms a second critical contextual point for Clinton's South Africa policy. While US public sentiment on South Africa has often turned on the race issue more than any other, US policy has more often been swayed

by the arguments of American business interests, who have long added weight to official arguments for US engagement policy. Thus trade and the social forces behind this most tangible of issues forms a third focus of the chapter. Finally, discussion will focus on the issues which proved decisive in the 1992 US presidential elections, such as the need to regenerate the faltering US economy, on the new generation brought into policymaking with the election of President Bill Clinton, and on the implications of these for South Africa. Throughout, US South Africa policy was -- and continues to be -- qualified by questions of US domestic concerns and by bureaucratic processes in policymaking, as shall be demonstrated in subsequent chapters.

3.1   *The Cold War and South Africa*

From the end of the second World War until the early 1990's, US policy towards South Africa, and towards the nations of Sub-Sahara Africa[*] generally, was framed by American relations with respective European colonisers, and then -- with the advent of African independence beginning in the late 1950's -- by direct competition with the Soviet Union for allegiance among African nations.

The march of communism across eastern Europe over the post-war years, the imperative to reconstruct war-torn western Europe, and the brewing conflict in Southeast Asia which would become the Vietnam War, were of much greater concern to American policymakers in the late 1940's and the 1950's than were African affairs. As the Cold War developed, however, South Africa often featured from among African nations as an ally in the US stand-off with the Soviet Union. With its staunch anti-communist leadership, its geographical position at the tip of Africa along an important sea through-route, and its military capacity to thwart communist aggression in the region, South

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[*]Henceforth Africa will be used to refer to the nations of Sub-Sahara Africa, as the northern-most nations of the African continent are treated in US policy as part of a separate region.

Africa formed a natural partner in America's quest to contain communism. In those early years of the Cold War, despite the rise of apartheid in Pretoria, the US accepted South African assistance in the US-led Berlin airlift, and successfully lobbied South Africa for support against communist forces in Korea (Schraeder, 1994: 194). Joint military manoeuvres in southern Africa and large scale arms sales were all part and parcel of the US preparation for a major East-West military confrontation,[2] as was growing cooperation in intelligence gathering between the CIA and its South African counterpart.[3] Trade was not limited to arms, of course, and the US commercial relationship with South Africa developed significantly in the early post-war years as American business took advantage of South Africa's immense mineral wealth as well as the profitability of importing its off-season fresh produce.

3.1.1 Countering Communism vs Opposing Apartheid

The 1960's, however, began with a shift in focus for US policy. The focus projected from the outset of the Kennedy/Johnson administration was one of opposition to apartheid in South Africa, and engagement with Africa in general -- especially in light of the need to gain a footing on this continent before the Soviet Union or China gained dominance in the wake of African decolonisation. Noting in one campaign speech that the US had "lost ground in Africa because [it] had neglected and ignored the needs and aspirations of the African people," Kennedy moved quickly to increase diplomatic

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[2]For instance, access to the former British naval base at Simonstown was considered critical, in exchange for which the US Defense Department organised joint military manoeuvres with the South African Navy. And in 1952, the US agreed to sell over $112 million in arms (mostly fighter aircraft) to the South African military (Schraeder, 1994: 195).

[3]The installation of US tracking stations by NASA deepened the relationship further. In addition, during the 1950's, the US and South Africa entered into an agreement whereby South Africa would sell to the US its entire output of uranium oxide, an important element in the development of US nuclear devices. Subsequently, between 1952 and 1966, the US would spend over $1 billion on South African uranium products. Schraeder (1994: 196) points the reader to a hearing of the US House subcommittee on Africa, *US Business Involvement in Southern Africa* (Part II), May-December 1971, 92nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, DC: GPO, (1972): 40-76.

activity in several newly independent African nations, as well as aid levels.[4] At the same time, restrictions were placed on certain aspects of military cooperation with South Africa, and Pretoria's objectionable racial policies precluded the establishment of both an aid mission and a government-to-government Peace Corps programme. However, contradictory messages abounded.[5] US policymakers seemed to be seeking a balance between engaging with South Africa on a cooperative basis for the sake of countering communism in Africa, on the one hand, and pressuring Pretoria to abandon apartheid, on the other. The result was a lack of clarity in US South Africa policy, which eventually came to resemble that of Kennedy's predecessors.[6]

Moreover, by the mid 1960's, it became accepted wisdom that Kennedy's high level of interest in Africa generally was, from a strategic point of view, unwarranted, as Africa came to be perceived as "one of the world's striking examples....of the failure of the appeal of communism in new nations."[7] South Africa's importance as an ally diminished, and aid to the rest of Africa declined.[8] In the bureaucratic process of reviewing US foreign policy that often accompanies a new administration, however,

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[4]Between 1958 and 1962, US aid to Africa increased from $110m to $519m, comprising roughly 2 percent of total US overseas aid before this policy decision, and 8 percent after.

[5]On the one hand, the US imposed restrictions (a voluntary arms embargo) on the sale of US arms which could be used for internal security in South Africa, demonstrated a greater willingness to join international condemnation of apartheid in UN resolutions, and issued limitations on joint military exercises and US ship visitations to Cape Town. At the same time, US policy allowed "business as usual" contact with South Africa on trade and investment, nuclear collaboration, and intelligence cooperation, as well as the sale of weapons to Pretoria deemed to be "in the interests of international peace and security" (Mokoena, 1993: xxi). Also, after having pressured South Africa into deferring its planned incorporation of Namibia (then South West Africa) in April 1964 with the suspension of South African investment loan applications and the threat of sanctions, the US then approved the delivery of reactor fuel for South Africa's nuclear power plant, SAFARI-I, in February 1965 (p 16).

[6]For instance, in 1960, following the Sharpeville incident of March that year, the official US reaction -- which was a statement to the effect that the US "deplored" this instance of violence in South Africa -- was followed by backpaddling, as the statement was apparently issued without necessary bureaucratic clearances and was later "disowned" by Secretary of State Christian Herter. It also raised the ire of the Defense Department. See Schraeder (1994: 198).

[7]"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace" (1970). Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (February 18): 84.

[8]Over the decade from 1963 to 1973, total US aid to Africa declined 60 percent, from $519m to $286m (Clough, 1992: 9).

Richard Nixon's foreign policy team did include a review of US policy on South Africa in early 1969 (one of only 61 policy reviews conducted).[9] The result was a relaxation of several constraints on the relationship imposed under Kennedy/Johnson. Trade continued apace,[10] unhindered except in the arms and nuclear field.

It was not until the fall of Portugal in a 1974 coup d'etat in Lisbon, and the ensuing sudden decolonisation of Angola precipitating a civil war, that policymaking towards the region regained any priority status in Washington. Over the next two years, covert support for two pro-western factions in Angola and intelligence-sharing with South Africa on the matter entangled the US in the region's conflict. South Africa, believing it could count on US backing, launched its own military campaign to insure a pro-western government in Luanda, and the Soviet Union responded by rushing to the aid of Cuba in support of an opposing faction. Washington, however, was prevented from doing the same on South Africa's part by domestic legislation terminating the CIA's paramilitary campaign in Angola in 1975.[11] Americans, having just suffered defeat in Vietnam, were in no mood to send their troops to Africa to fight another guerrilla war. South Africa was forced to withdraw in early 1976, and Angola came under the rule of a pro-communist government, already recognised by several neighbouring African states.

US concern grew with the subsequent triumph of Soviet-backed revolutionary forces in Mozambique, and the threat of a pro-communist government coming to power

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[9]This review included the famous "tar baby option," so named for the fear many in the State Department had that it would engage the US inextricably with South Africa at a time when such engagement would be detrimental to US relations in the region, but which became the basis for policy under Nixon.

[10]US direct investment in South Africa rose from $778 million in 1970 to $1,668 million in 1976, more than doubling. Trade figures for this period were relatively difficult to come by, and appeared almost to have been deliberately omitted from the records of the government over this period. The author's search through the National Security Archives, looking at US South Africa bilateral trade, found a gap between 1967 and 1986. See Mokoena, Kenneth. *South Africa: the Making* of US Policy, 1962-1989. Alexandria, VA: Chadnyck-Healy, Inc. (1991). Other sources, quoting in rand when the rand was worth more than the dollar, show an increase in SA imports from the US of R469.3 million in 1971 to R811.8 million three years later, in 1974. South Africa exports to the US rose commensurately, from R121.1 million in 1971 to R429,7 million in 1975. (*Africa South of the Sahara*, various annual volumes.)

[11]This legislation, known as the Clark Amendment, is detailed in Schraeder (1994: 47-48).

in civil-war torn Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In response, US policymakers (including some members of Congress) embarked on a major effort to preclude further Soviet footholds in southern Africa and began to downplay any criticisms of apartheid in favour of diplomatic consultation with South Africa on such issues as majority rule in Southern Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe, and independence for South West Africa/Namibia.

3.1.2 From Confrontation to Constructive Engagement

The violent response of the South African government to the Soweto uprising of May 1976 was, however, the next definitive event for US South Africa policy. In recognition of that landmark event, and in accordance with the Carter administration's early focus on human rights, the US in the late 1970's began to demonstrate a much greater willingness to confront South Africa over apartheid, especially after the death in detention of black consciousness leader Steve Biko.[12] The US actively opposed apartheid in the UN via two successive African-American US representatives, Andrew Young and Donald McHenry. Yet in Carter's short four years in office, he was unable to shift the focus in southern Africa off national security concerns as he had originally espoused, especially in light of marxist threats to Mobuto's Zaire in 1977, Cuban-Soviet interventions in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. US-South Africa trade, meanwhile, more than doubled between 1977 and 1980.[13]

Perhaps the most important contribution of the Carter administration with regard to South Africa was its lead in drafting UN Resolution 435 regarding Namibian independence. Efforts by the US-led "Contact Group" to craft a mutually acceptable

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[12]The Carter administration, for instance, removed South Africa from the list of countries with which the US enjoyed "normal" relations when it entered office (Schraeder, 1994: 216). In October, 1977, the US for the first time supported a UN resolution making the voluntary arms embargo of 1963 a mandatory requirement of UN members.

[13]South African exports to the US rose from $.9bn in 1977 to $2.1bn in 1980. Imports from the US to South Africa rose from $1.1bn in 1977 to $2.5bn in 1980. From *Background Notes: South Africa* (1982). The US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs (July) : 6.

resolution of this issue, though unsuccessful under Carter due to South Africa's lack of faith in promises of Cuban withdrawal from Angola, became the basis for Namibian independence ten years later.

With the resumption of Cold War tensions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and perceived communist inroads in the third world, South Africa's importance as an ally was again highlighted in the early 1980's. The policy of "constructive engagement," crafted by Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, attempted to balance the growing antagonism of the American legislature and public toward apartheid South Africa with the administration's wish to retain strong ties with Pretoria in order, as Crocker saw it, to encourage reform. Throughout the first Reagan administration, the policy remained credible in the eyes of many policymakers due to such signs of progress as the Lusaka Accord between Pretoria and Angola (over respective troop activity), and the Nkomati Accord between Pretoria and Mozambique (ending their respective support for insurgent forces in either country), both brokered by the US and signed in early 1984.[14] There were also efforts in this period to channel US economic assistance to develop democratic institutions in South Africa and to uplift black South Africans, and to offer this as a sign that the US was "working for positive change in South Africa."[15] However, rising popular opinion did not accept constructive engagement as anything more than a smokescreen for continued collaboration with the last white minority government in Africa, whose response to continued civil unrest in South Africa further undermined its own credibility. By late 1986, in a nearly unprecedented move, anti-apartheid forces in Congress garnered the required two-thirds majority to overturn Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-

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[14]For greater detail on these accords, see Schraeder (1994: 226).

[15]See *U.S. Assistance: Working for Positive Change in South Africa.* Washington, DC: US Department of State Bureau for Public Affairs (May 1986). Aid over the period of the two Reagan administrations increased from only $40,000 in 1981 to $4.2m in 1982, and to $13.9m in 1986, when a fully staffed USAID mission was established in Pretoria just before passage of the CAAA.

Apartheid Act imposing economic sanctions on South Africa. In one move, constructive engagement was repudiated and the US joined several other nations -- as well as hundreds of American individual companies, municipalities, universities and other institutions -- in seeking to isolate the South African government until apartheid was ended, regardless of Cold War imperatives. In the wake of the US banks' 1985 refusal to "roll over" South African loans, the CAAA applied great pressure economically on South Africa to end apartheid.

3.1.3 Cold War Denouement and Legacy in US Policymaking

Cold War tensions, in the meantime, had begun to show promise of again relaxing with the rise to power in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev, whose policies of perestroika and glasnost opened the way for a series of Reagan-Gorbachev Summits. These meetings (in Geneva, 1985; Helsinki, 1986; and Washington, 1987), culminated in the signing of an Intermediate Nuclear Forces disarmament agreement between the US and the Soviet Union, which marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. No doubt these summits also sent a message to Pretoria that South Africa's value as an ally against the USSR was once again on the ebb, perhaps irreversibly.

Preoccupied with the rapidity of the global changes during the second half of the 1980's, policymakers in Washington left US Africa policy, for the most part, to the Bush administration's low-profile Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen. As the Eastern Bloc disintegrated and the Soviet Union slipped toward dissolution, US policy toward South Africa appeared to go on hold -- waiting for the outcome of these events and of the changes beginning to occur within South Africa itself.

The Cold War attitudes among US policymakers which had shaped foreign policy for nearly forty years did not, however, disappear so rapidly. Suspicion of the Russian state remained, as did the bureaucratic institutions developed to support US preponderance in that rivalry. Even in the late 1990's, many of these attitudes and

"standard operating procedures" continued to influence policymaking, and looked set to remain in place into the new millennium. For instance, according to one past member of the Bush administration who also worked under Clinton until 1994, the National Security Council, "an artifact of the...highly centralised and secretive policy process" of the Cold War era, still has primary importance in foreign policymaking generally. Though the NSC was created "to deal with the Soviet enemy and reduce the risk of accidental escalation," in doing so "America, in some ways, emulated Soviet centralism." That centralism is "at variance with America's political traditions," but has not been decisively ended, even in the absence of an identifiable enemy.[16]

There have been some changes in the roles and status of such institutions as the Departments of Defense and Commerce, as well as an effort to streamline policymaking, both of which shall be discussed at length in subsequent chapters, but the basic framework for making policy has only begun to be changed in the wake of the momentous events of the early part of the 1990's. The implications of this lag between world trends and institutional change can be seen in US South Africa policy, both in the gap between the rhetoric of "partnership" and the reality of moves toward disengagement by the legislature, and in the creation of the binational commission to expedite administration goals.

3.2   *Apartheid and US South Africa Policy*

Even during the Cold War, the persistence and codification of racial segregation in South Africa, known from 1948 as apartheid, attracted the attention of US opposition groups for decades, especially once America's own civil rights movement gained momentum. Opposition to apartheid effected relations only superficially, however, until the mid-1980's. Following the surrender to public will of the Reagan policy of

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[16]Professor John Stremlau, a member of the Policy Planning office at the US Department of State from 1988-1994, made these comments in discussion on this dissertation.

"constructive engagement" and the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa in 1986, the anti-apartheid movement spearheaded by African-American activists continued to influence US policy somewhat, but had lost momentum by the time apartheid officially ended in mid-1994.

3.2.1   The African American Community and Africa

Approximately 30 million Americans, and roughly 12 percent of the US electorate, are African-American. As such, they constitute a significant constituency in US domestic politics. As with any segment of a population, African-Americans hold diverse opinions and interests, have a range of educational and socio-economic backgrounds, and are not all active or even interested in political, nevermind international, affairs.[17] Among politically active African-Americans, however, human rights in Africa has long topped the international agenda, and apartheid numbered among the worst violations on the continent.

Domestic political pressure to oppose apartheid began to mount from the late 1950's as the US civil rights movement, under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr, and others, gathered strength.[18] But until the 1960's the African-American community active on Africa was often plagued by differences of opinion on issues such as whom to support in African civil wars and how far and how fast they should go in their demands for change in US policy on African issues. Their progress was also stymied by the nationalist, anti-communist persecution of the McCarthy era in post World War II

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[17]Even in 1988, when apartheid was entrenched in South Africa and the anti-apartheid coalition was still riding the wave of support following the imposition of US economic sanctions against Pretoria, an ABC poll showed that the most salient issues for African-American voters were those related to domestic social and welfare concerns such as health care and the "problems of the poor." In this poll, only 6 percent of African-Americans cited defense and foreign policy as their chief concern, as opposed to 24 percent of white Americans (Bolce, De Maio, and Muzzio, 1992: 73).

[18]King led a demonstration in December 1957 denouncing apartheid and calling attention to South Africa's refusal to sign the UN Declaration on Human Rights. For more detail on the role of African Americans in US Africa policy, see Clough (1992: 29-35).

America, during which Africanist sentiment was often construed as "un-American." According to one historian-analyst, apartheid provided the coalescing factor for African-American sentiment in the late 1960's, when America's foreign policy was under fire from many quarters nationally:

> Identity (by black Americans) with Africa particularly and with the fate of the peoples in the third world more generally became much deeper and more widespread during the second half of the 1960s. A conflation of events, domestic and international, reinforced. this development... Inevitably as racial internationalism intensified and domestic race relations deteriorated, black American interest in African affairs focused more and more on liberation movements, especially in southern Africa. These struggles, unlike the complex factors underlying the Nigerian civil war, which colored that tragedy with moral ambiguity, were stark, easily comprehended, and fitted in well with the notions of pan-African solidarity that were growing among American blacks (White, 1981: 88).

3.2.2   TransAfrica and Sanctions

Little had come of the 1962 effort to organise a black lobby on Africa at the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, initiated by Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders. In 1969, however, African-American Congressman Charles Diggs took the chair of the House subcommittee on Africa, and in 1971 the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) was convened on Capitol Hill to work for increased access by concerned African-Americans to the policy process. Further, a 1976 Black Leadership Conference on Southern Africa, called by the CBC, resulted in the formation in 1977 of TransAfrica, an African-American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean. Under the leadership of Randall Robinson, an African-American lawyer and former administrative assistant to Diggs, TransAfrica had by 1980 built up a membership of 10,000, representing a large segment of informed black American opinion on Africa. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, likewise, showed expanded activity on Africa with its 1976 Task Force on Africa, which included in its

1977 recommendations strong advocacy of disinvestment by American firms in South Africa and other economic sanctions, bringing this historically cautious lobby into line with emerging African-American interest groups such as TransAfrica.

Thus began the groundswell of American opposition to apartheid, which included African-Americans and others wishing to promote the cause of human rights. By 1984, constructive engagement -- embodying the fact of US-South African cooperation in strategic matters and continued economic links -- became the focus of the US anti-apartheid campaign in and out of Congress. The event which precipitated the last and successful drive to impose economic sanctions against South Africa was the introduction in September 1984 of a tricameral parliament in Cape Town. This "reform," which provided for limited political representation to "coloureds" and Asians but excluded black South Africans, was met by waves of civil unrest across South Africa. The Congressional Black Caucus in Washington, in conjunction with a broad coalition of groups lobbying against apartheid under the leadership of TransAfrica, led numerous protest marches and rallies and finally succeeded in equating support for sanctions against South Africa with support for America's own struggle for racial equality.[19] Reagan's attempt to preempt congressional action by issuing Executive Order 12532, containing a watered-down version of the sanctions legislation, succeeded in 1985, but opinions had so polarised a year later that a similar attempt in 1986 failed. In October of that year, the CBC carried the day as African-American Congressman Ron Dellums' legislation calling for comprehensive economic sanctions against Pretoria -- tabled every year since 1971 in one form or another -- finally passed in both the House and, in somewhat amended form, the Senate. Support in Congress was such that legislators overrode Reagan's subsequent veto

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[19]David Newsom, who held Crocker's post under Nixon, wrote in 1985 in the *Christian Science Monitor* (18 January) that "the attitudes expressed by Americans about the situation in South Africa have come to be a litmus test of an individual's attitude toward race relations in the United States." He also asked whether "the playing out of our own politics against the backdrop of the tensions and dilemmas of another country is either appropriate or effective."

with an easy two-thirds majority in a nearly unprecedented display of unity in opposing a president in a foreign policy matter. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA)[20] became law with immediate effect.

In general, according to polling information, African-American interest in South Africa remained high in the years subsequent to the passage of sanctions legislation,[21] although the anti-apartheid lobby lost much of its momentum without a specific focus such as sanctions. The business community, whose powerful voice depends less on large numbers of public support and more on economic indicators and its access to high-level officials, generally kept a low profile throughout the apartheid period.

3.3 *US Business Interests and South Africa*

American business interest in South Africa had begun with the discoveries of diamonds and gold in the late nineteenth century, and later increased at the news of deposits of several strategically important minerals. While history books note several Americans who joined the rush to prospect, and a few who became rich in the process (Rosenthal, 1938; Williams, 1948), South Africa's value as a US trading partner and investment destination did not match that of nations in Europe, Asia, and even Latin America.

In any case, except for the early years of apartheid, before attitudes on racism were challenged in the US itself, US business expressed its interest in South Africa quietly. Even by the 1960's the unpopularity of doing business with white South Africa under apartheid had became somewhat of a liability. During the 1970's, based on the growing objections to US commercial activity in South Africa, US firms operating under

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[20]See HR 4868, an Act by the 98th Congress of the United States of America to "prohibit loans to, other investments in, and certain other activities with respect to, South Africa, and for other purposes." The act prohibited, for instance, the importation of kruggerands, of agricultural goods, iron, steel, uranium, coal, or sugar from South Africa, US exportation of computer goods to South Africa, and air transportation directly to or from South Africa. The US-South Africa tax treaty was also terminated.

[21]See *The Gallop Poll Monthly*, No 293 (February 1990): 2-3.

apartheid began to adopt non-racial employment practices (sometimes in contravention of South Africa law) later known as the Sullivan Principles, and justified their continued activity on the basis that they would "remain in South Africa but consciously work for change" (Barber, 1973: 295).

The US government, however, needed little persuading that trade channels with South Africa should remain open. South Africa constituted the only major source of chrome and platinum, for instance, outside of the Soviet Union, as well as an important source of uranium oxide (a critical element in the expansion of the US nuclear arsenal in the 1950's). There was also trade in manufactured and agricultural goods, as well as in gold, diamonds, and other raw materials. At the time the sanctions debate was gearing up in the mid-1980's, South Africa was supplying more than 50 percent of US needs for over two dozen minerals deemed of either "strategic" or "critical" importance to US national defence.[22]

The growing voice of the sanctions movement, as well as the turmoil in South Africa itself, began to undermine business interest in South Africa to some extent by the mid-1980's. Political turmoil and other risk factors began to overshadow profit. In early 1984, there was some effort on the part of the American Chamber of Commerce and others to actively lobby in Washington against sanctions, which in their view would be counterproductive in that they would "inhibit [US business'] ability to maintain affirmative action, influence and pressure" in South Africa.[23] However, once the widely-publicised demonstrations organised by TransAfrica outside the South African Embassy in Washington began, reframing the debate on moral grounds, those business voices were greatly muted. When it came time to defend the role of US business in South Africa -- an integral part of the policy of constructive engagement -- during the final debates over the

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[22]US Department of State, *A US Policy Toward South Africa.* The report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa (January 1987: 3).
[23]See "US Firms Lobby Hill on Anti-SA Legislation." *Washington Report on Africa* (1 March 1984): 40.

Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, US business was loath to stand up and be counted for fear of being singled out for boycotts by the anti-apartheid lobby. At the same time, the protests made it increasingly difficult to do business in South Africa, even when American firms applied the fair-employment practices embodied in the Sullivan Principles.

The divestment campaign was equally successful in discouraging US business interest and, by 1986, there were restrictions on investments by local government in 19 states and 68 cities and counties. Various types of restrictions were also adopted by 131 colleges and universities in the US, affecting nearly $220 billion of assets related to pension and endowment funds (Baker, 1989: 31). Much as the business sector supported Assistant Secretary of State Crocker behind the scenes, it refrained from backing constructive engagement publicly, even following the energetic "public diplomacy" campaign on the part of the Department of State and the White House in 1985 and 1986 attempting to shift the focus of the debate onto the deleterious effects of sanctions for the black population in South Africa. In the end, Crocker stood alone in defense of his policy of constructive engagement, and could do little to stem the tide of opposition.

3.3.1   The CAAA and Change in South Africa

In the seven years of comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa that followed passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 212 US companies --more than the total of all other foreign firms -- withdrew from South Africa completely.[24] The closure of the Ford and General Motors plants in the Eastern Cape pushed unemployment in that region to nearly 70 per cent among the black population. At the same time, however, exploratory and off-the-record talks between the Afrikaners in power and the African National Congress in exile began in the late 1980's, accredited by many to be a

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[24]Ogden, Christopher (1999). "Less Aid, More Trade." *Time* (24 May): 70.

direct result of the slowdown in the South African economy under its increased international isolation.

The surprise unbanning of the African National Congress in early 1990, and the subsequent release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison, signalled the end of Pretoria's attempts to reform -- rather than abolish -- apartheid. Within months, a negotiating process began which would lead to a peaceful transition to majority rule in South Africa. The Bush administration -- no doubt aware of US business prospects -- was eager to partially lift sanctions shortly thereafter, but he sought to do so with such alacrity that the previous anti-apartheid coalition rallied to extend them until a new constitution guaranteeing one-person-one vote in South Africa was in place.[25] By mid 1991, however, when only one of the five conditions required by the CAAA for the termination of sanctions remained in dispute, Bush announced the administration's acceptance that there had been "irreversible" change in South Africa and lifted by executive order all punitive measures associated with the 1986 sanctions legislation.

The negative reaction from the anti-apartheid coalition to Bush's announcements was little noticed amidst the public's generally positive perception of change in South Africa. By 1992, when Bill Clinton was elected as President of the United States, the lobbies which had acted so vociferously on the part of South Africa during the years of apartheid seemed to have moved on to other policy issues, in Africa and beyond. US business, on the other hand, had begun to press for policies toward South Africa that would be conducive to re-investment. Whether or not these two social forces have remained active, in fact, and whether new interest groups might have begun to lobby the US government regarding US South Africa policy, is the subject of Chapter Five.

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[25]For greater detail, see Schraeder (1994: 238-242).

3.4   *1992 US Election Dynamics and Clinton's First Year*

The domestic political imperatives for candidates seeking the US presidency in 1992 were partly a function of the global and national dynamics discussed in the previous chapter. Added to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and fears over US international economic decline and interdependence, however, was a sense of social malaise in America, based on indicators such as continued racial conflict, rising crime rates and deteriorating standards of education, growing federal budget deficits and threatened economic recession. As the Foreign Policy Association noted in one publication recording US public sentiment of the period, "American jubilation" over the demise of the Soviet threat was "marred by continuing uncertainties abroad and an undertone of self-doubt at home." Besides the resurgence of ethnic tensions and the possibility of anarchy in the former Soviet Republics and satellite states, international poverty was still on the rise. At home, the US faced a "shrinking industrial base, a deteriorating national infrastructure and widening personal, corporate and government debt" which seemed to "undercut free-market capitalism at its moment of triumph." These and other troubles noted above were "robbing many people of the faith in the future that Alexis de Tocqueville...called a hallmark of the American character."[26]

The importance of these dynamics for US foreign policy lay in the effect it had on the national debate as the choice for president drew near. As Bill Clinton and the "New Democrats" focused on reviving America by reinvigorating its economy through exports and reconstruction, the advantages the Republicans had held over the Democrats due to the focus on national security throughout the Cold War finally gave way, in spite of George Bush's popularity after the victory in the Gulf War of 1991. The issues had changed, and foreign policy (except for trade) was largely forced out of the campaign

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[26]"US agenda for the 90's: domestic needs, global priorities." In *Great Decisions* (1992 Edition), a publication of the Foreign Policy Association. New York, NY: 3.

debate, at the public level at least. Clinton gained the presidency with what was construed by pollsters as a firm mandate to reconstruct America first, a refrain familiar at other war-ends (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996: 551, 539), though troublesome in its resonance with contemporary calls for an American withdrawal from the international stage (Kauffman, 1995).

3.4.1   The Vietnam Generation

At the same time, Clinton became the foremost representative of "a new and very different generation of national politicians, whose formative political experiences were civil rights and the Vietnam War, not World War II and containing communism." [27] A self-avowed Wilsonian, Clinton during his campaign espoused the goals of recapturing American leadership in building a world where democracy and free-trade would insure US national security as well as promote respect for human rights. Foreign policy theory ran afoul of praxis, however, within months of Clinton's inauguration. The administration's decision to renew China's Most Favored Nation status in May 1993, for instance, was among the first signs that human rights would not trump other issues in foreign relations. The quagmire feared in Bosnia-Herzegovina also bedevilled Clinton's avowed commitment to human rights, as the "ethnic cleansing" by Serbs against Muslims continued unabated and the siege of Sarajevo deepened, despite UN resolutions and other multilateral diplomatic manoeuvres. Any tentative steps toward US military action in the Balkans were halted by the events in Somalia of October 1993, when the humanitarian mission initiated under the Bush administration backfired and 17 American soldiers were killed in an attempt to capture the powerful Mogadishu warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed. Public opinion immediately appeared to turn against US intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, and remained a factor militating against US intervention to stem the genocide

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[27]John Stremlau, in discussion on this dissertation.

in Rwanda the following year. In the meantime, a late-1993 attempt to restore ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti failed, even as Clinton was backtracking on his campaign promises to change the Bush policy of repatriating refugees of that strife-torn neighboring nation. Haitian refugee policy was eventually overturned in early 1994, under pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica, and Aristide was returned to power under American military protection later that year, but not without considerable public controversy.[28]

Clinton did notch up a few foreign policy successes in his first year, the most acclaimed of which were in expanding world trade.[29] The successful passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) is largely credited to Clinton's personal interest and lobbying. His participation at the meeting of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and his role in finalising the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) were likewise lauded in the press (Drew, 1994: 355). And, in the period before the November 1994 mid-term elections (and the switch to Republican majorities in both houses of Congress), Clinton set forth his "Open Markets 2000" trade initiative. As later noted by Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher: "We [President Clinton and I] are convinced that political and economic diplomacy are indivisible," and that "history will judge this priority [that is, promoting open markets and sustainable economic growth] to be a distinctive imprint -- and lasting legacy -- of this administration's foreign policy" (Christopher 1995). By June 1994, when trade discussions with South Africa began under the auspices of a US-South Africa Business Development Council, the Clinton administration -- and especially Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown -- was confident that little stood in the way of a new, burgeoning trade relationship between the US and emerging markets the world over.

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[28]For detailed accounts of Clinton's foreign policy moves in his first two years, see Drew (1994) and, regarding Haiti, Copson (18 January 1996: 31-34).

[29]The Middle East Peace Accord, though signed in September 1993 at the White House, is not credited to Clinton, as it was negotiated by Norway.

Brown, the first African-American to hold the top commerce post, as well as that of Democratic Party Chairman, applied his leadership skills to giving commerce a higher profile in the post-Cold War world. His BEM (Big Emerging Market) initiative, first detailed in a September 1993 Commerce Department report to Congress, formed an important element of the Clinton administration drive to strengthen US economic engagement worldwide, and to influence developments within "regional economic drivers" whose future directions were considered likely to have "a huge impact on regional and global trends that [would] define the post-Cold War era" (Stremlau, 1994/95: 18). Brown's strong personal interest in South Africa could be seen in his emphasis on Pretoria's potential under the BEM initiative. This was the dawning, thought Clinton and his team of advisors, of a new approach for US foreign policy.

3.4.2   First Post-Apartheid US President

Clinton, first to be elected as US president in a world free of Cold War fears, also took up the helm on US South Africa policy after Pretoria's unbanning of the African National Congress and the release of Nelson Mandela. George Bush, vice-president under Reagan during the years of constructive engagement policy, had little credibility with the ANC and even less among civil rights and anti-apartheid activists in the US when these developments occurred in South Africa in early 1990, in the midst of his presidential term. Clinton, while by no means at the head of any anti-apartheid protests as Governor of Arkansas at the time, entered the White House without the baggage of his predecessor, and appeared far more attuned to the groundswell of sentiment on the issue among the African-American population. Clinton's vice-president, Al Gore, Jr, a Southern Democrat who represented the state of Tennessee in the Senate in the mid-1980's, was similarly aware of the domestic political dynamics of South African issues. Moreover, according to one analyst close to events in Washington at the time, unlike his predecessors who had come into office conceiving of US South Africa policy as a

"derivative of higher strategic (East/West) concerns," Clinton "appeared determined to make his policy toward South Africa another key measure of his break with the Cold War past."

In fact, the early moves of the Clinton administration in formulating policy toward South Africa had as much to do with race relations in the US as they had to do with events in South Africa or around the globe, it would appear. Although it was not until 1997 that Clinton launched his "One Nation" initiative on race in the US, several indicators showed his intention that racial reconciliation in the US would be one of the legacies of his presidency. His deliberate placement of African-Americans and other minorities in positions of power within his administration was one early indicator. His openness to the appeals of the Congressional Black Caucus and other influential African-Americans on issues in US South Africa policy was another. Indeed, as the South African negotiations for a transitional settlement progressed during 1993, it became clear that, except for residual worries about the ANC alliance with the South African Communist Party, the US was eager to see Nelson Mandela in the seat of power. Clinton's pledge of $600 million in US development assistance, announced days after Mandela's election, and the ensuing efforts to highlight South Africa's political miracle of peaceful transition to non-racial democracy, underlined this support. It was also reflective, no doubt, of Washington's relief that Pretoria had largely succeeded in avoiding a race war. The consequences for US race relations of a successful "New South Africa" could only be positive, it seemed. South Africa became a role model for America's own struggle to deal with racial diversity, seized upon eagerly by Clinton and Gore.

Subsequently, several substantive initiatives ensued in US South Africa policy, as shall be discussed in the following chapter. However, especially with regard to expanded trade and investment, the US could do little about the fact that South Africa must compete with other newly liberalised countries for international markets and foreign

capital in the 1990's.   Nations of the former Soviet Union, of eastern Europe and Latin America, were far more familiar to US investors than was South Africa, and did not bear Africa's reputation as an economic "black hole." The calls on shrinking US development assistance from these regions and from the rest of the African continent were, likewise, numerous.   The prospect that US policy would become little more than making encouraging noises in the direction of Pretoria was very real.

3.5   *Conclusion*

The reader may well ask what the Cold War and apartheid have to do with policy toward post-apartheid South Africa in the second half of the 1990's, in the midst of a changed world, and facing a transformed South Africa. However, the legacy of the Cold War within policymaking institutions, and indeed the American psyche if you will, as well as the failure of the US to adequately address its own challenges posed by its racial diversity, are factors which impinge greatly on US South Africa policy in the 1994-1998 period.

In the forthcoming chapter on the policy of the Clinton/Gore administration toward post-apartheid South Africa in the period 1994-1998, current US South Africa policy is introduced for reference in the subsequent chapters of analysis. While issue-area analysis is not yet employed, the emergence of the four issues-types prevalent in US policy toward post-apartheid South Africa prepare the ground for the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER FOUR
A Survey:
Clinton's Policy towards Post-Apartheid South Africa

From the successful closure in 1993 of the Kempton Park talks during which parties to South Africa's future hammered out a transitional constitution and made provision for "free and fair" national elections, through the May 1994 inauguration of President Nelson Mandela and the dramatic fly-past of the South African Air Force in his honour, the Clinton administration remained more than attentive. In fact, Clinton and his deputy, Al Gore, Jr, have expressed more interest in South Africa than had any of their predecessors, save Jimmy Carter in the 1970's. Why? Beyond the obvious attraction of South Africa's success in navigating a peaceful transformation process, what is the rationale behind this attention?

Perhaps, as many critics assert, US interest has to do with an American drive to expand and consolidate a post-Cold War, Neo-Liberal Economic Order, one in which the US -- or a transnational elite under US aegis -- retains hegemony and is free to promote liberal democracy as the international ideology (eg, Robinson, 1996; Arrighi, 1994; Layne and Schwarz, 1993). In that case, the US would be looking to coopt the newly democratic South Africa as a surrogate, encouraging Pretoria to become a regional hegemon -- albeit always on US terms. While this may be partly true, the previous global analysis demonstrates that the US is hardly in a position, on its own, to dictate to a nation such as South Africa the terms on which relations must rest. In which case perhaps, it is suggested before the following survey of US South Africa policy, US calls for "partnership" are rising out of American domestic political dynamics and out of the challenges presented to the formulation of US foreign policy by the changed global context of the 1990's.

105

Stated US policy towards South Africa, as expressed by the Clinton administration through all its various mouthpieces and initiatives, is the starting point for drawing up the map of US South Africa policy in the immediate post-apartheid period. A look at the various outworkings of this policy includes US initiatives as well as US responses to events involving South Africa, with a view to drawing the bold strokes for the more detailed and nuanced analysis via the issue-areas paradigm in subsequent chapters.

4.1 *Policy Statements*

"America wants...and America needs a strong South Africa. And we are determined to work with you as you build a strong South Africa." These words from President Clinton in his speech to South Africa's National Assembly, Cape Town, on 26 March 1998, sum up the thrust of American policy pronouncements regarding South Africa in the post-apartheid period. They are the "stated policy," around which most other policy statements can be fitted. The fact of Clinton's visit, the first ever by a sitting US president, adds some credence to his words, as do statements and visits by numerous other high-level US officials since 1994.[1] Congratulating Nelson Mandela from Washington, DC, on his election that year, Clinton outlined America's reasons for placing such importance on South Africa: "...We have important interests at stake in the success of South Africa's journey," said Clinton. "We have an economic interest in a thriving South Africa that will seek our exports and generate greater prosperity throughout the region. We have a security interest in a stable, democratic South Africa working with its neighbours to restore and secure peace." And finally, "We have a clear moral interest.

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[1] These visitors include Vice-President Al Gore, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his successor Madeleine Albright, late Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and his successor William Daly, and Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, as well as several other members of the presidential cabinet. Such a flow of official visitors is unprecedented in US relations with Africa as a whole, and with South Africa in particular due to apartheid.

Clinton's Policy

We have had our own difficult struggles over racial division, and still we grapple with the challenges of drawing strength from our own diversity."

These three interests -- economic, security, and "moral" -- appear to be the basis for current initiatives and responses in US dealings with post-apartheid South Africa. In short, the US is seeking in South Africa a "partner" in Africa who will work toward US goals, if not necessarily always according to US preferences. Those goals do include a world characterised by free-market, liberal democracy, as well as increased regional conflict prevention and peacekeeping capacities, all of which would alleviate the burden on the US to provide resources for international security and humanitarian purposes in Africa. As issues of sovereignty and equal opportunity in world markets continue to dominate the agenda of the nations of the South -- of which South Africa is generally recognised as a leader in its own right -- there are some indications that South Africa won't always wish to cooperate. Its insistence on continuing close relations with states which the US classifies as pariah states is only one example. The refusal of South African Health Minister Nkosazana Zuma to bow to US pressure (on IPR grounds) to change South Africa's new laws regulating drugs is another. Much of the critical literature on US international affairs relates to the inherent pressure of such a large economy as America's dealing with such small, developing economies as South Africa's, and the responsibility that dynamic places on policymakers in the US to be sensitive to such issues as state sovereignty in the "third world" (eg, Arrighi, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1994; Bush and Szeftel, 1995). Rather than liberal democracy, US policy is seen in this view as "free enterprise imperialism" (Arrighi, 1994). Indeed, there is much to the argument that international financial institutions need to rethink current strategies, which have obviously not worked in Africa (Leys, 1994), and that the "democratization of global institutions...making them more accountable" to the wider international community may be the place to begin (Bush and Szeftel, 1995). No doubt the currency crisis in Asia, and the ensuing political and economic decline the region experienced throughout 1998

107

(which occured subsequent to the writing of the works cited above) have increased the probability that "demands for a wider system of international representation and a reduction in the monopoly of decision-making by the core economic powers may well be the site of struggles for independence for Africa and the South in the next century" (Bush and Szeftel, 1995).

From the American perspective, however, according to Clinton's ambassador to South Africa James Joseph, the US "respects and strongly supports South Africa's sovereignty. It is the fundamental on which our partnership is based." He believes that "too many Americans fought too long and too hard for us to engage in any activity which would undermine that."[2]   In the meantime, it generally appears that South Africa has chosen to ride in the slipstream of the US push to promote liberal democracy globally, seeking greater market shares for its own emerging economy. And the US, for its part, continues to express a policy of encouraging deeper US-South Africa ties. Whether US policy actions, in the form of initiatives and responses to issues involving South Africa, support stated US policy should become apparent after the following overview of those actions and the ensuing issue-area analysis.

4.2   *US Policy Initiatives on South Africa*

US South Africa policy from 1994 to 1998 has included several major initiatives, each of which include many programmes and projects. The initiatives may be listed as:

- Increased *development assistance*;
- The *Investing in People* conference in June 1994, at which formation of the US-South Africa *Business Development Committee* was announced.
- Establishment of the US-South Africa *Binational Commission*;
- Trade and investment promotion through the *Big Emerging Market* concept;

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[2]Quoted in Hadland, Adrian (1997). "New US interest in Africa destines SA to become a valued partner, spats aside." *Sunday Independent* (November 16).

- Attempts to bolster South Africa's regional role through the *African Crisis Response Initiative* and support for South Africa's efforts in conflict resolution in Africa, and
- the *Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative.*

4.2.1 Increased Development Assistance to South Africa

Even before Nelson Mandela took up residence at Tuynhuis as President of South Africa, Bill Clinton moved to place the United States at the forefront of foreign assistance to help Pretoria build a broader, more inclusive economy, and to address the inequities of apartheid. On 5 May, 1994, Clinton announced a three-year, $600 million trade, investment and development package to "help the new South African government generate jobs, finance housing and health delivery systems, improve education and promote good governance." This figure, (even though slightly scaled down by Congress[3]), represented a significant increase over previous levels of US assistance to South Africa,[4] though it may be only "peanuts" in terms of the South African economy (with a GDP of $130bn in 1996) and its needs, and in terms of US aid allotments to other regions (in particular to Israel, which received $3bn that year, relative to Sub-Sahara Africa's $2.2bn total).

USAID had, prior to this announcement, begun a thorough "reengineering" of its programme in Pretoria, as a pilot project in "reinventing government," having grown from a staff of 1 in 1985 to 120 in 1994. It had also developed a Country Strategic Plan for South Africa, laying out six "strategic objectives" based on consultation with officials and non-governmental organisations in South Africa. These objectives were in the areas of democracy and governance, education, health, economic policy capacity, private sector development; and housing and urban services. Having already begun the switch from

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[3]Congress later shot down $200 worth of housing guarantees promised to South Africa, of which $81 million was later recovered. See Fabricius, Peter. "Brace yourself for US Vice-President and delegation: We should not become complacent about US aid." *The Star* (30 November 1995).

[4]This amounted to an annual increase of 165 percent from 1993 to 1994 in South Africa's USAID allotment -- from roughly $80m to $211.7m -- followed by $187m in 1995 and $163.5m 1996. Source: "USAID/SOUTH AFRICA: Supporting Sustainable Transformation," USAID Pretoria (June 1997).

working exclusively outside the host government in South Africa to funding through the host government (prior to 1994, government-to-government assistance was prohibited under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986), USAID also stated that it planned to allow the South African government more say in the content of US assistance efforts, relative to other aid recipients, due to South Africa's leading economic role in Sub-Sahara Africa.[5] At the same time, AID has come out in support of the administration's policy to gradually replace aid with trade, and in any case had worked out a "graduation strategy" for South Africa on the basis that by the year 2005, South Africa should have outgrown its need for such aid.[6]

With the inception of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission, much of USAID's work in South Africa was again reevaluated for how well it might fit into planned BNC structures. Programmes have either been subsumed under the aegis of the BNC (though funded by AID, such as the South Africa Economic Development Fund of $100m to assist businesses in South Africa with start up and other capital) or remained separate, based on suitability and whether projects already had their own momentum (such as a large part of AID's education programme). Also, because several US agencies involved with the BNC lacked programmatic funding for international projects, USAID has had to measure each request for funding from these agencies in light of its own strategic plan

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[5] This fact, plus continued funding of some non-governmental advocacy groups (under the democracy and governance strategic objective) which were challenging the ANC policy on such issues as land restitution and affirmative action, were the subject of great controversy in Washington, in the form of the Munson report to Congress ("Trip Report: Review of the US Aid Program in South Africa," submitted to US Representative Benjamin Gilman (5 November 1996) and later in Pretoria. (ANC newsbrief: "US AID BODY HINDERED MANDELA'S GOVERNMENT, SAYS CONGRESS REPORT," Johannesburg (14 February 1998), website <www.anc.org.za> The report eventually led to some joint review with the ANC.
[6] The need for assistance for infrastructure development in the greater southern Africa region will continue, and AID has several long-term projects in process in such areas as transport, environmental conservation, and agricultural production, run out of its regional mission in Botswana. Also, the US Trade and Development Agency, while technically promoting business prospects for American citizens, has effectively supported development in the region through efforts such as the Maputo Railway Network project. For details on this and other USTDA projects in South and Southern Africa, see USTDA's *Infrastructure and Industry Opportunities in South Africa, Arlington, Virginia* (1997). Website <www.tda.gov>

and the needs of the BNC education committee, which is co-chaired by USAID's administrator, Brian Atwood.

Table 3: Leading DFA Recipients
(Obligations, $millions - Ranked according to 1998 allocation)

	FY1996*	FY1997 (est.)	FY1998 (allocation)	FY1999 (request)
South Africa	122.4	89.7	70.6	50.5
Ethiopia	39.8	38.3	45.6	37.6
Uganda	39.6	41.4	44.7	48.3
Mozambique	51.3	31.0	38.4	41.2
Ghana	39.3	41.3	38.2	36.5
Malawi	33.8	36.1	36.1	32.5
Mali	30.3	32.0	35.9	30.6
Tanzania	23.3	18.7	19.7	21.6
Kenya	24.3	20.2	19.5	19.3
Zambia	20.8	17.1	18.3	19.2
Senegal	25.0	23.3	17.3	24.5
Benin	16.5	13.9	17.1	15.6
Madagascar	20.1	18.3	17.0	16.5
Guinea	15.2	13.8	16.9	16.8
Angola	15.9	11.5	13.0	13.0
Zimbabwe	23.3	18.1	11.8	2.0
Eritrea	8.4	9.8	10.6	10.0

(Source: Copson (1998): 6.)

Prior to these developments, from the mid-1980's, US aid to Africa as a whole had come under increasing pressure and began a decline which threatened to become precipitous under the 104th Congress in the early 1990's. South Africa stood out from Africa due to Clinton's 1994 $600 million pledge, a pledge which was politically difficult to cut in view of the euphoria surrounding Pretoria's peaceful transition to an ANC-led government. Thus it easily survived a specific attack from within the House foreign appropriations committee which was attempted on the grounds that "some members of the new South African government were communists."[7] The implications for South Africa in the short to medium term of cuts to Africa's US aid allotments generally, however, are significant, as the principle foreign aid channel for Sub-Sahara Africa (the Development Fund for Africa) includes South Africa's aid allocation and is appropriated as one sum (See Table 3). Moreover, while aid may indeed become less important to South Africa itself, reduced aid levels will affect South Africa's neighbours, in whose economic viability South Africa has a great stake in terms of regional stability, export growth prospects, and refugee flows.

4.2.2   The Business Development Committee

The formation of the US-South Africa Business Development Committee (BDC) was announced at the US-sponsored *Investing in People* conference in early June 1994, in Atlanta, Georgia. This conference, just weeks before a White House Conference on Africa where US policy towards the continent was discussed, focused solely on South Africa and how the US could participate in the realisation of South Africa's political and economic promise. At the signing ceremony inaugurating the BDC, the late Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown announced that he and his counterpart in South Africa, then

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[7]"Bid to cut US aid to SA defeated." *Cape Times* (27 May 1994).

Trevor Manuel, would co-chair this new entity, which many see now as the forerunner of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission.

The BDC, as of 1999, remains an autonomous body, consisting of representatives from 21 US companies and 21 South African companies "working to eliminate barriers and generate an even greater volume of trade" between the US and South Africa, in the words of the late Brown. From 1995, its activities have been largely subsumed into the trade and development committee of the Gore-Mbeki BNC, which is chaired by Brown's and Manuel's successors, William Daly and Alec Erwin. Its focus on the private sector has remained key to its mission, although there are signs that its work has been hampered by some lack of interest among US business and the more influential firms in South Africa.[8]

4.2.3   The US-South Africa Binational Commission

It was during Mandela's first visit to the US as head of state in October 1994 that Mandela and Clinton discussed the establishment of a bilateral forum through which the US and South Africa might normalise relations and expand areas of cooperation. The result was that in March of 1995, the two countries launched the US-South Africa Binational Commission, co-chaired by Vice-President Al Gore and Executive Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, and designed to meet twice a year at alternating venues between the US and South Africa. Organised jointly by the US and South Africa (by the US office of the Vice President and the National Security Council in Washington, and by the offices of the Deputy Executive President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Pretoria), the binational commission affords the opportunity for regular contact between Gore and Mbeki, and for progress on several joint projects carried out by technical committees.

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[8]The Department of Commerce was having trouble recruiting private sector volunteers to serve the two year terms on the BDC (Barber, 9 July 1998), and a previous member of the BDC commented in an interview that "the current BDC has few significant South African players on board."

The committees -- originally numbering five and focused on trade and investment; conservation, the environment and water; human resources development and education; science and technology; and sustainable energy -- are co-chaired at the ministerial-level In 1996, a sixth committee was formed to deal with agricultural issues.   Working groups on health and on housing were created in early 1997. A seventh committee, on defence, was conspicuous for its absence (probably due to the outstanding Armscor case) until Gore and Mbeki created it in July 1997, at the fourth BNC meetings in Washington. An eighth committee, to deal with law enforcement cooperation, was announced at the end of the fifth BNC meeting in August 1998. These committees meet as necessary between the full plenary BNC meetings, and have effectively been required to produce concrete results each six months.

The US holds only one other such binational commission, with Russia, as well as semi-commissions with Egypt, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. While there exist several "joint commissions" between the US and other nations, these do not operate at an 'executive" (ie, vice-presidential) level. The US-South Africa BNC is considered by members of the vice-president's staff to be the most substantive of the binational commissions, or at least "the biggest in terms of issues addressed."[9]   While not initially designed to deal with issues of policy, nor to be a place where differences would be resolved, in practice it has been allowed to be seen as an avenue through which the US and South Africa can discuss sensitive issues such as alleged IPR violations, the Armscor case, rumours of arms sale to Syria, and South Africa's controversial pharmaceuticals legislation.

Examples of accomplishments touted by the BNC as of the August 1998 meeting were a new tax treaty, a new civil aviation treaty, the New Africa Opportunity Fund (sponsored by OPIC to attract investment capital to southern Africa), the completion of

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[9]Confidential interview (#36).

Clinton's Policy

250 energy efficient, affordable homes in Kutlawang and Guguletu, numerous exchanges

for consultation and training, legal and technical assistance with water resource

management, establishment of the GLOBE[10] programme in several South African

schools, enhanced predictions of El Nino's repercussions for southern Africa, US market

openings for South African citrus and proteas and other agribusiness, growing coopertion

between US and South African law enforcement agencies to curtail drug trafficking

through South Africa as well as incidents of international terrorism, and support for the

South African National Youth Commission with the help of US business and voluntary

organisations. In another example of the BNC activities, an estimated 260 US business

people attended a two-day South Africa trade and investment conference coinciding with

the July 1997 BNC meeting in Washington, DC, sponsored by the US Department of

Commerce, the US Trade and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank, and the

Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

The apparent continued momentum of the Gore-Mbeki Commission has surprised

sceptics, as even over the year-long hiatus before the fifth BNC meeting in August 1998

in Washington, the commission seemed to keep up its pace of work and "deliverables" at

the committee level.[11] Scepticism grew when the meetings, originally planned for

February 1998 in Pretoria, were postponed twice due to the need for Gore's presence in

Washington during the US stand-off with Iraq, and then cancelled over scheduling

conflicts (including Clinton's visit in March of that year). There seemed to have been

little beyond logisitical difficulties, however, when Gore and Mbeki finally met in

Washington in August. The two subsequently agreed at the August BNC meeting that

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[10]Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment, a science and education programme at the junior school level that uses the internet to link students, teachers and scientists around the world to share data about the earth's environment.

[11]At the post-BNC press conference on 6 August in Washington, Mbeki followed Gore's listing of recent BNC developments with the statement that "I think this should lay to rest the speculation...in South Africa about the Binational Commission being in trouble...As you can see these reports are not correct." Federal Information Systems Corporation, Transcript 982180305.

the full commission -- the principals, all committees and working groups -- would in future meet only once a year, however. The second meeting each year, described as an executive meeting of the commission, would include mainly "principals" (ie, Gore and Mbeki), with committee co-chairs and functionaries attending on an "as needed" basis.

Further, at the fifth BNC meeting, commerce officials mooted a US-South Africa trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA), and have since set in place such an arrangement. In other instances of US foreign relations, the establishment of a TIFA has been the first step in the development of free trade pacts. In any case, according to US official statements, by providing for regular consultation on "trade concerns" between representatives of both governments, a TIFA serves as a "mechanism for resolving routine issues at the working level." This may prove to be the most enduring contribution of the BNC yet.

While critics have called on the BNC to expand its focus to cover the issues of southern Africa and beyond, officials and other analysts remain certain that the development of the bilateral relationship is most important at this stage.[12] Whether or not the BNC will survive the promotion of Mbeki to the office of president following South Africa's elections in 1999 and the forthcoming elections in the US (in November 2000) is an open question. Certainly, without the original euphoria of South Africa's transition from apartheid and the rapport which Gore and Mbeki reportedly share, it will be a different BNC than that of the period 1994-1998.

4.2.4   The Big Emerging Market Concept

In launching the "Big Emerging Market" (BEM) initiative, an outgrowth of the Clinton administration's National Export Strategy in July 1995, Secretary of Commerce

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[12]From confidential interviews (# 35, #41), and Pauline Baker (#28).

Ron Brown included South Africa as one of ten economies[13] holding particularly great potential as markets and investment destinations for US business. With the post-Cold War period described as "an era when US foreign policy and national security will increasingly revolve around [its] commercial interests, and when economic diplomacy will be essential to resolving the great issues of our age,"[14] the BEM initiative generated substantial interest. And despite the subsequent currency shocks to several of the so-named economies, the commercial content of foreign policy towards the BEMs, including South Africa, remains salient for US policymakers.

Brown pointed out that already US exports to the BEMs exceeded exports to Europe and Japan, and that BEM GDP was 25 percent of that of the industrialised world. Their combined GDP of over \$2trillion accounted for as large a share of world output as Germany and the UK combined.[15] The inclusion of South Africa as a BEM received a mixed reaction on the part of trade specialists in the US, however, as some believed the choice was more a statement of political support, or the personal preference of Secretary Brown, than one of serious economic interest. As an African-American leader who "readily admitted that he had a special attitude toward South Africa" (Mainstreet, 1996), Brown was sorely missed after his death in an aeroplane crash near Croatia in April 1996.

In any case, as one of these chosen markets, South Africa became the subject of heightened trade promotion efforts on the part of the Clinton administration both in the US and in South Africa. These efforts included the establishment or strengthening of US foreign commercial service offices to expedite the processing of export licenses and other red tape which inhibit business, and the organisation of a series of business delegations

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[13]These are: the Chinese economic area (including China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), India, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Poland, Turkey, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam).

[14]Jeffrey Garten, then US Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, quoted in Stremlau (1994/95): 18.

[15]From the BEM website <www.stat-usa.gov/itabems.html>

visiting South Africa.[16]   Before his death, Brown appointed lawyer and South African specialist Millard Arnold to the Commerce Department's one roving ambassadorial post of Minister Counselor, and assigned him to Johannesburg as another signal of US interest in South Africa's economic success.

South Africa has, it would appear, benefited under the BEM programme, as it has seen trade with the US grow steadily since 1994. Some observers question whether this growth might have occurred in any case, with the lifting of sanctions after Mandela's elections, and others point out that trade and investment have not grown nearly as quickly as South Africans were led to expect.[17] Still, the numbers are impressive. From 1994 to the end of 1997, US exports to South Africa had grown by 38 percent (from $2.173bn to $2.999bn), and US imports from South Africa had grown by 23 percent (from $2.030bn to $2.500bn).[18] US companies operating in South Africa had risen to just over 300, bringing the number back to the pre-sanctions level.[19] US foreign investment in South Africa rose by $10.8bn in the year May 1996-May 1997 alone, accounting for nearly 30 percent of all foreign investment in that period.[20] While it is true that these increases may have been largely due to existing private sector interest in South Africa as an investment and export destination, at the very least the BEM initiative served to provide official US support for US firms entering the South African market in the early years after South Africa's transition.

The financial crisis which has plagued many of the big emerging markets since Thailand's currency crashed in mid-1997 has, of course, caused a serious rethink in the

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[16]According to the Department of Commerce South Africa desk officer, speaking in an interview with the author in late 1997, there had been a business delegation to South Africa almost every month since 1994.
[17]From a meeting with David Bridgman, then executive director of WESGRO, an investment promotion agency for the Western Cape, South Africa, 24 August 1998.
[18]Based on the official statistics of the US Department of Commerce. Exports are listed at F.a.s. value (Free alongside ship), which excludes the cost of loading and transporting and insuring the goods. Imports are listed at customs value.
[19]From an Investor Responsibility Research Center report of August 1998, Washington, DC.
[20]From an Investor Responsibility Research Center report of July 1997, Washington, DC.

BEM strategy. Private investors have led the way back into the more traditional markets of Europe and the US, at least for the short to medium term, it appears.[21] While general fears over emerging market volatility have had some adverse effect on South Africa's investment figures, South Africa's few dizzying weeks of falling rand values and capital flight in mid- 1998 have not, however, received the negative reaction that the crisis in Asia received. Credit agencies continue to rate South Africa's economy as "stable" and commend the government's commitment to "prudent fiscal and monetary policy.[22]

The BEM initiative seemed largely to have wound up by late 1998 in any case,[23] although when Brown's successor William Daley travelled to South Africa with President Clinton in March 1998 he assured South Africans that the initiative was still alive and well.[24] Much of the work of the initiative, it seems, has been absorbed by the Binational Commission, which includes the US-South Africa Business Development Committee set up under Brown. What remains is the BEM label, which may or may not be an asset in light of the performance of other "emerging markets" in the late 1990's, but which has, in the meantime, no doubt lent to greater US commercial interest in South Africa.

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[21]See Gwynne, S.C. "What a Drag! Economic Troubles in Asia, Russia and Latin America Threaten the US. *Time* (14 September, 1998): 28.

[22]Investment firm Moody's renewed South Africa's investment-grade debt rating in early October, 1998, as did Duff & Phelps in late September, even after the tumultuous events of the previous months. See Barber (25 September and 7 October 1998).

[23]A search of the US Government's BEM website, for instance, shows the latest update as September 1996. Also, in an October 1997 interview with the Commerce South Africa desk officer (see interview list), the issue of BEM's was not even noted as one of the major concerns of US policy towards South Africa. "Commercial policy-wise...what comes to mind," he said, "is the future of the GSP (generalised system of preferences) programme and the Africa initiative (announced June 1997 by President Clinton)..

[24]At a luncheon in Cape Town hosted by the Cape Chamber of Commerce, Daley and two African-American cabinet members, Secretary of Transport Ronald Slater and Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman, addressed South African government and business leaders on the continuing effort of the Clinton administration to promote South Africa among US business leaders at home. Also present at the luncheon were several members of Congress backing the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and CEO's of major US corporations.

4.2.5 The African Crisis Response Initiative

US interests in seeing South Africa lead the southern African region, and indeed the continent, into greater stability through economic prosperity are expressed through each of the developmental and commercial initiatives discussed above. Another aspect of US policy, embodied in its African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), is its interest in building African peacekeeping capabilities, and encouraging South Africa to take leadership in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts on the continent. This initiative might be seen to reflect an increasing reluctance of the US to carry, in the words of one South African-based commentator, the financial burden of being "sole guarantor of the international security system," as well as America's search for "multilateral approaches to security concerns" and for "alliance with regional hegemons."[25] Such a reluctance would mirror, within the security issue-type, the changes in US policies with regard to the international financial system discussed in chapter 2.

The ACRI began as an attempt to address the potential for further bloodshed in central Africa after the genocide in Rwanda in the first half of 1994. The US had done little to act during that crisis, due mainly to the aforementioned "Somalia syndrome"-- the aversion of the US public to sending US troops to fight in Africa after the death of US peacekeepers in Mogadishu in 1993. Originally touted as an "African Crisis Response Force" (ACRF) during the visit of Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to Africa in late 1996, the idea was rejected by several African leaders -- including Mandela -- as an American attempt to build a standing African force for US purposes. South Africa, in particular, was concerned "not to appear to continue the policies of the previous government, which engaged in military and economic destabilisation of neighbouring states," nor to go ahead of regional attempts to address conflict resolution.[26]

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[25]See comment in Broderick (1997), and also in a forthcoming publication on US-South African relations in the new millennium, edited by Jim Broderick, Gary Burford and Gordon Freer, Johannesburg.
[26]"Mandela wary of plan for intervention force." *Cape Times* (11 October 1996).

Since the appointment of Clinton's second Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and of her Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, the US has undergone further consultations on African peacekeeping with African leaders, the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, as well as with other developed nations involved in generating peacekeeping capabilities in Africa.[27] The US has maintained throughout discussions that its objective in the ACRI is "not to create a standing African army," but to "enhance the capacity of African nations to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping challenges in a timely and effective manner" by creating "rapidly-deployable, interoperable units from stable, democratic countries" throughout the African continent. [28] Over time, the US envisions that African nations would develop standby control structures which would operate in cooperation with the donors, sub-regional organisations, the OAU and the UN to field the peacekeeping units.[29] In addition, the US would ask each participating nation to sign an end-use and non-transfer agreement to ensure any equipment supplied is used only for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes and that it is kept at the ready for such purposes.

During 1997 the US began peacekeeping training in Senegal, Uganda, and Malawi, with plans to begin training in Ethiopia, Mali and Ghana by the following year. Thus far, the training sessions have reportedly included the media and NGO's operating in the locale who expressed an interest, not only as observers but also as role-playing participants.[30] The training sessions, which last 60 days, include provision of "non-

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[27]The latter include the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries. Most of these offered either troops or logistical and training support in the short-lived Zaire peacekeeping plan abandoned in the face of an apparent settlement between Laurent Kabila and Zairean president Mobuto Sese Seko. Mobuto's government was later toppled when the agreement broke down and Kabila took power by military force.

[28]From the testimony of Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie, US Department of State Special Coordinator for the African Crisis Response Initiative, before the House Subcommittee on Africa, 1 October 1997.

[29]From Ambassoador McCallie's testimony.

[30]See congressional testimony by Vincent Kern, prepared for 1 October 1997, House Subcommittee on Africa, regarding the ACRI.

lethal" equipment[31] and training in the establishment of checkpoints, perimeter security, convoy security, the processing of displaced persons, and other tasks traditionally associated with peacekeeping operations.

While the Clinton administration pursued this initiative with great energy before the impeachment trial of late 1998, plans for future training operations were in any case on hold until ACRI funding was approved by the US Senate (funding was assured only through late 1998). there are also administration concerns that the US and South Africa are not seen to be "ganging up and pushing the idea on others."[32] However, without the participation of South Africa, as the African "heavyweight" with the political credentials to lead such an initiative, there is concern that it may eventually fade. Careful bilateral consultations throughout Africa will continue while US and South Africa develop their defence relationship through the BNC committee on defence, it appears. Clinton added his own personal support to the initiative when he visited Africa, and appealed for wider support among African nations. In the meantime, South Africa appears to be watching and waiting. According to one South African official dealing with the US, Pretoria's response to ACRI "will probably be positive in the long run,"[33] but the political cost of such a response, in terms of South Africa's relations on the continent, appears too high for the time being.

4.2.6   The US Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative

South Africa is not the major focus of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative, which promotes trade and economic reform on the African continent as an alternative to traditional development assistance and has taken the form of proposals from

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[31]Non-lethal refers to equipment such as standardised communications gear, night vision binoculars and load-bearing equipment, as well as ammunition for purposes of training ("and training only") in defensive marksmanship. See Kern testimony, as above.

[32]Confidential interview (#39).

[33]Confidential interview (#7).

the Clinton administration and parallel legislation sponsored by the bipartisan African Trade and Investment Causus within the House of Representatives. The initiative, however, does contain important provisions which effect South Africa, both directly and indirectly. While the legislation failed to make it through both houses of the US Congress under the 105th Congress, which ended in late 1998, there appears some potential for success under the newly elected 106th Congress.

With regard to benefits for South Africa, both the Clinton and legislative proposals call for an extension of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), for instance, which provides duty free access to the US market for the importation of eligible items from developing countries. The 1998 legislation (HR 1432) attempted to extend the GSP for qualifying Sub-Saharan African countries beyond the present year-to-year basis, until the year 2007 (Sec 9(c)). Whereas in 1995, South Africa saved only $6m in duties under GSP,[34] in mid-1998 South Africa's exports of unwrought gold and other items gained duty-free status, increasing significantly South Africa's stake in the GSP system.[35] In another example, South Africa could gain up to 100,000 jobs[36] under provisions in the legislation calling for duty-free access to the American market of African textiles and apparel, and a no-quota status on these items ahead of the 2005 abolition of quotas under World Trade Organisation rules (Sec 8).

Several other provisions[37] of the legislation seek to benefit South Africa's neighbours and other African nations to the north, encouraging economic growth on the continent and thereby, according to liberal democratic thinking, the prospects for political

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[34]See Barber, Simon. "US preferential system comes out of hibernation." *Business Day* (26 September 1996).

[35]See Barber, Simon. "US duty review set to boost trade." *Business Day* (6 July 1998).

[36]"Africa Trade and Opportunity Act 'will create 100 000 clothing jobs'." *Cape Times Business Report* (25 March 1998).

[37]These provision include $150m from OPIC for a private equity fund (the New Africa Opportunity Fund) for investment in Africa (excluding South Africa), a $500m infrastructure fund, and a free-trade area between the US and eligible African economies by the year 2020.

stability and peace in Africa. The initiative has, however, run into opposition both in the US and in Africa, notably from South Africa in early 1998, on the grounds of placing conditions inappropriate to Africa on nations seeking to qualify for the proposed benefits. These conditions include "progress toward establishing a market-based economy" which is defined by various indicators such as "the protection of property rights" and removing "restrictions on investment," as well as requiring membership in the World Trade Organisation and compliance with any IMF programmes or obligations (sec.4 (a) and (b)). TransAfrica and other Africa lobbies (in opposition to other leading African-Americans) voiced similar concerns, but other lobbies -- notably the textile lobby and organised labour -- opposed the legislation on grounds that it threatened US exports and jobs.[38] Even after South Africa decided to support the legislation, with assurances that the "conditionalities" would be interpreted favourably through subsequent regulations, and even though there were provisions protecting against transshipment of goods from other markets (where labour was cheap, such as in Asia) through Africa, the legislation eventually lost momentum and was withdrawn in late 1998 to be reintroduced afresh in 1999.

There have, in any case, been tangible benefits already from the initiative. The first has been the raised profile of Africa in US foreign policy circles -- for reasons other than war or humanitarian crisis. For instance, the announcement of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative was preceded by unprecedented activity surrounding trade and investment with Africa in the US congress and administration. A mid-April 1997 conference between legislators and African business representatives and officials indicated African support for the bill,[39] which was introduced as HR 1432 later that

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[38]See <www.citizen.org> for the lobbying efforts of the Public Citizens Global Trade Watch, a Washington, DC coalition of labour and industry protectionist groups.
[39]US Information Agency's Jim Fisher-Thompson reported on this conference in "Africans Respond Favorably to McDermott Trade Bill." USIA File ID: 97042101.AAF (21 April 1997).

month.[40] HR 1432 followed submission by the administration in February 1997 of its "Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for the Countries of Africa" as fulfilment of requirements flowing from US legislation implementing the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations. The administration formally launched its adjusted "Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa" at the mid-1997 summit of the G7 (or the G7+, as it included Russia). The announcement of an African Economic Forum, to be hosted in Washington by the US Secretaries of Commerce, Treasury, and State, planned for December 1998 and similar to fora the US shares with the Pacific Rim states and Latin America, also holds some promise. This forum is purported to bring African finance and trade ministers of the "most strongly reforming" nations of the continent together to discuss, among other things, the Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation and how to improve it for reintroduction.[41]

The Africa Growth and Oppurtunity initiative, perhaps more than the others, demonstrates the tension US policy must hold between singling out South Africa -- whether in military cooperation against communism, in confrontation over apartheid, or, in the 1990's, for special trade and investment efforts -- and incorporating South Africa into an overall approach to the Sub-Saharan region. While South Africa will benefit under the Africa Growth and Opportunity initiative, the fact that it has not been the focus of the initiative may be intended as a lever in US policy toward greater Africa.

The above initiatives underline the stated policy of the Clinton administration toward post-apartheid South Africa. Policy is likewise expressed in US responses to international dynamics, often with telling effect.

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[40]An initial attempt to pass similar legislation through Congress in 1996 failed at an early stage. See Dagne (April 1997) for details.

[41]This announcement came from an unnamed Clinton official, quoted by Simon Barber in "Africa growth act 'is dead for the year'," *Business Day* (15 October 1998).

4.3   *US Responses to South Africa*

US South Africa policy as expressed through responses to events involving South Africa is less clearly defined than that expressed through policy statements and initiatives. It is in this category that the US has dealt with specific issues in ways perhaps unpredictable based on stated policy. But there are also instances where US responses underline the interests of the US as expressed in Clinton's speech in May of 1994, the "economic, security, and 'moral'" interests in South Africa's success as a sound, nonracial, and free-market democracy.

The most salient responses in US South Africa policy over the period 1994-1998 have been in four categories: 1)the Armscor case and, related to that, 2)South Africa's ongoing relations with "rogue" states such as Syria, Libya, and Iraq; 3)the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension; and 4)commercial disputes over perceived or threatened trademark violations in South Africa (eg, against McDonald's restaurant and US pharmaceuticals firms) and unfair trade practices (examples in this study are US chicken and South African steel dumping charges).

US engagement policy has been hampered, and not derailed, by these differences of opinion between the US and South Africa; the conflicts that have arisen over the 1994-1998 period, except perhaps the Armscor case, seem to be "teething problems" in the expanding political and commercial relationship more than anything else, from the US point of view. Whether or not South Africa can continue to expand the relationship in spite of these conflicting perspectives, in view of its relations with other nations of Africa and of the developing world, is likely to become more apparent as its new government refines its own foreign policy. Such a question should form the basis for a separate, though perhaps parallel, study.

4.3.1 Armscor

The Armscor case, involving charges against South African firms for arms smuggling during the apartheid-era, was a "thorn in the side" of US-South African relations until its resolution in mid 1996, and even in 1998 continued to plague their defence relationship as they sorted out the resulting compliance programme and "agreed to disagree" over "rogue" state relations. The insistence on the part of the new South African government that it not be held responsible for the sins of the apartheid past was equalled by that of the US on maintaining the ban on US arms technology sales to South Africa until amends were made.

South African arms manufacturing giant Armscor, its affiliate Kentron, and Fuchs Electronics were all charged in 1991 with operating front companies in the US which illegally acquired sensitive weapons technology, using fraudulent "end-use" certificates, and then organised the re-export of that technology to South Africa in the late 1980's. In one case, Fuchs allegedly used illegally-acquired American artillery shell fuse technology to make arms that were then sold to Iraq in 1990. The fact that US soldiers were deployed against systems based on that technology in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq made persecution of the case a non-negotiable in the US, even after installation of a new government in Pretoria. The ANC government, on the other hand, refused to bow to the steep fines (of over $60m) nor to the idea of the compliance programme allowing US investigators access to any South African defence facility and to arms dealers' customer files. It also contested the jurisdiction of the US courts in the matter.

Finally, in discussions between Vice-President Gore and Deputy Executive President Mbeki during Mbeki's visit to Washington for the second round of BNC meetings, there was a breakthrough and a signed agreement followed in early 1997. The US reduced fines considerably (to $1.5m for Armscor/Kentron and $10.5m for Fuchs), and the South Africans agreed to implementation of an internally designed and enforced compliance programme, to be approved by the US Department of State and lasting five

years. During that period, any revelations of illegal activity would result in prosecution under US federal law. By March 1998, the US lifted the last debarments on US arms technology sales to South Africa.

The implied mistrust of South Africa's arms industry, especially with regard to the "end-use" of US military technology, stood in contrast to the close relations implied by formation of a binational commission and the expansion of trade ties in almost every other area. Yet US insistence that the Armscor case was not to be surrendered is an important footnote on US South Africa policy in the 1990's:· security concerns remain important, even in a field as lucrative as military technology.

4.3.2   South Africa's relations with "Rogue" states

Just before the Armscor agreement was signed in February 1997, rumours of pending South African arms sales to Syria reached the US Department of State. Reacting quickly, US officials informed the offices of Thabo Mbeki that US law prohibited foreign assistance to any state selling weapons to terrorist-sponsoring, or "rogue" states. Thus began a volley of diplomatic arrows, shot mostly through the press, between the US and South Africa, the former chiding South Africa for even considering entering into any such deal, and the latter defending its right to sovereignty.

The basis for this conflict, and for similar US reactions to South African diplomatic relations with Libya and Iran, as well as with Iraq and North Korea and to a lesser degree with Cuba, is the rising US concern over international terrorism and its increasing impact on US national security. In view of the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in early 1993 by Arab extremists, and several other incidents perpetrated by either American nationals in the US or by foreign nationals against US troops and civilians outside the US, the US passed new counterterrorism legislation in the

form of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.[42] This legislation tightened restrictions on the export of defence materials to nations deemed by the US to be state sponsors of terrorism, and extended that restriction to US allies receiving foreign assistance (sec 326).

Decision on the South African sale to Syria was quietly deferred, relieving the US of the pressure to follow through on its threatened suspension of aid. While there is provision in the anti-terrorism legislation for a presidential waiver in cases considered "important to the national interests" of the US, apparently this did not apply.

South African relations with Libya have been more nuanced, taking the form of formal diplomatic relations and respective visits and honours from Mandela and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, in defiance of US signals opposing such contact. Mandela has repeatedly publicly confirmed his commitment to Libya, stating that South Africa would "never renounce [its] friends," including Gaddafi, "no matter how unpopular they may be with [the US]."[43] Libya had been one of the states that assisted the ANC during the apartheid years in exile.

Iran, an additional former ANC ally under apartheid, is also South Africa's major oil supplier. But while South Africa continues to conduct cordial diplomatic relations with Tehran, a deal to store Iranian oil off South Africa's west coast was stalled in late 1996, blamed in part on US objections. The deal would have provided R750m annually to Pretoria's state funds, but remained subject to "commercial and diplomatic acceptability," and was subsequently referred for environmental assessments, seen by some observers to be "a political device to delay a final decision."[44] Clinton, at this

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[42]Subsequent bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and of the Planet Hollywood Restaurant in Cape Town, in mid-1998 appear to have further strengthened US resolve to counter international terrorism. The US itself bombed suspected terrorist installantions in Afghanistan, weeks after the embassy bombings, in a controversial countermove.

[43]"Mandela 'thinking of asking' Gadaffi to SA." *Cape Times* (12 February 1996).

[44]See Lamont, James. "Back to square one on Iran oil deal." *Cape Times Business Report* (16 September 1996).

point, had just signed into law controversial legislation punishing foreign companies investing in oil or gas ventures in Iran or Libya.[45]

South Africa's 1998 establishment of diplomatic relations with Iraq and North Korea is apparently also of concern to the Clinton administration. Mbeki explained the ties, in response to a question from the press following the August BNC meetings, as necessary due to the fact that the next meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (of which Iraq and North Korea are members) was to be hosted by South Africa later that month. Gore, on the other hand, responded simply that "where we have disagreements, we work through them respectfully and privately."[46]

US policy on South Africa's relations with Cuba appears to have undergone some reformulation in the wake of Pope John Paul's visit to Havana in early 1998. Before that visit, the US continued to voice disapproval of the ongoing ties between Cuba's Castro and South Africa (albeit increasingly quietly),[47] which included a government-to-government agreement providing Cuban doctors to fill vacancies in South Africa. Moves toward capitalism on the part of Cuba in 1997, as well as a recognition that communism's threat to the US was truly dead, have made inroads into the staunch anti-Castro lobby's hold on US policy, it seems, and Clinton's announcement that the US is prepared to ease sanctions against Cuba, even if only for "humanitarian" purposes,[48] would indicate less tension over South Africa's close ties with Cuba in the future.

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[45]The US law, which met with an outcry from European leaders charging extra-territoriality, has been quietly sidelined by the administration, which, after a near show-down with the European Union before the World Trade Organisation over similar legislation on trade with Cuba (the Helms-Burton law) in April 1997, offered to consider waivers of the Iran-Libya law.

[46]From the post-BNC press conference on 6 August in Washington, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Transcript 982180305.

[47]"US soft-pedals on SA's ties." *Cape Times* (15 February 1996).

[48]"Clinton eases a little on Cuba." *Cape Times* (20 March 1998).

4.3.3   The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension

The US response to South Africa's stance on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has been much more in line with the positive, embracing rhetoric of the major US policy initiatives noted earlier. While Armscor may have been a "thorn in the side" of US-South African relations, American pronouncements on South Africa in the wake of the April/May 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference created the sense that the two nations were taking great strides ahead in their defence relations.

The US sought indefinite extension of the existing treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, under which the developed world could maintain some control over the spread of nuclear weapons while ostensibly working to reduce its own stockpiles. South Africa, as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of developing nations, faced a difficult decision in that NAM was opposed to such an extension, favouring instead only a fixed period extension, for the purposes of future negotiations that might change the status quo under which NAM countries were at a distinct disadvantage. However, the US was clear about its expectations that South Africa should support the US line.[49] South Africa, having voluntarily disposed of its own nuclear weapons stockpile in the early 1990's and sworn off development of future nuclear weaponry, was in a strong moral position to lead NAM countries along a similar path. The impetus behind the fact that in the end South Africa lobbied for the US position, and persuaded NAM to go along with it, is a matter of ongoing analysis.[50] From late 1994, indications were of closer US-South Africa cooperation in the nuclear field, as the US announced conclusion of a bilateral treaty with South Africa on adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime Guidelines, and publicly supported South Africa's pursuit of membership in several important nuclear regimes (the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group,

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[49]Based on reports in the *Washington Post* (17 April 1995), "the American ambassador to South Africa quietly warned the South African elite what was expected from them." See Nel et al (1998): 13.
[50]See, for instance, Black, Ian (1996), Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen (1998), and Vesely (1998).

and the successor entity to the Multilateral Coordinating Committee (COCOM)[51]). The US provided powerful incentives for South African allegiance in this field with its promises of aid and trade, as well.

In any case, the US was glowing in its praise following South Africa's stance at the NPT conference. Speaking at the first meeting of the US-South Africa Binational Commission in late 1995, Vice President Gore proclaimed that "clearly South Africa has a tremendous amount to offer the United Sates and the entire world. Your leadership on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation provides a model for the rest of the world."[52]

4.3.4 Commercial Disputes

While overall, US commercial policy has been to promote South Africa as a trade and investment destination for US business, there have arisen several disputes which have threatened to undermine that stance. Among these were a much-publicised law suit brought by McDonald's restaurant of the US in 1995, and, in 1997, objections of the US pharmaceuticals lobby, Pharma, to South Africa's new Drug Control Act. Both of these disputes have received considerable attention from the Clinton administration, which has applied pressure on the South African government to create more US business-friendly conditions in South Africa. Other cases, involving tariffs on US chicken exports to South Africa and anti-dumping duties on South African steel in the US, have been trade disputes of a more traditional nature. While the latter seem to underline the growing normalisation of US-South African commercial relations, there has been concern that such tensions will rock the current consensus in the US supporting favourable policies toward South Africa.

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[51] See *US, South Africa to Create Binational Commission.* White House statement and fact sheet.
[52] *Gore Praises South AFrica's Leadership on Nuclear Non-Proliferation.* United States Information Service (5 December 1995).

The McDonald's case arose from the use of the famous trademark name by a Durban businessman, who was able to register the familiar name and accompanying golden arches for his own restaurants because the American McDonald's had not operated in South Africa during the years of US sanctions. When the US firm -- whose worldwide turnover of R96 billion in 1995 exceeded the value of all South Africa's exports for that year[53] -- sought to establish restaurants in South Africa, it sued for trademark infringement. At first, McDonald's lost its case on the grounds that under South African law, the Durban businessman had done no wrong. This, as well as similar cases involving other American trademark names such as "Toys R Us" and "Burger King," resulted in the US Trade Representative placing South Africa on its "watch list" of countries deemed insufficiently respectful of US intellectual property. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown raised the issue at a December 1995 meeting of the US-South Africa Business Development Council, saying that "we are concerned that American companies are encountering real problems on the trademark front." McDonald's later received a favourable judgement on appeal, and South Africa was "provisionally" removed from the watch list in 1996 on the basis of its undertaking to adjust South African intellectual property laws along the lines of World Trade Organisation standards. By 1997, the USTR had dropped South Africa from its watch list, but even then the International Intellectual Property Alliance, the main US lobby on the issue, was pushing for South Africa to receive "special mention" until South Africa passed the relevant legislation.[54] Further allegations of software, book and video piracy continue, even with the passage of South Africa's Counterfeit Goods Act in early 1998.

Meanwhile, progress on IPR issues made through the McDonald's case was eclipsed by controversy over the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment

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[53]Herbert, Ross. "McDonald's storms the market." *Cape Times Business Report*
(13 November 1995).
[54]Barber, Simon ."US trade officials take much better view of SA." *Business Day* (7 May 1997).

Act of 1997. The legislation, which Minister of Health Nkosazana Zuma defended as critical to providing affordable medicine to South Africans, allows for "parallel imports" of patented medicines, outside of the marketing channels of the patent holder, taking advantage of the lower charges on these medicines from such countries as India. Pharma, the pharmaceutical industry lobby in the US, has made representation to Congress, the White House, the Department of Commerce and the US Trade Representative, claiming the law stands in violation of South Africa's World Trade Organisation commitments. South Africa reappeared on the USTR watch list in April 1998, and in July, the US announced that it would withhold trade benefits promised on certain South African minerals and machinery until "substantial progress" had been made in addressing US concerns with the new pharmaceuticals law. While implementation of the law has been delayed because of a constitutional challenge from local industry, the USTR is considering declaring its own official dispute before the WTO.

Other commercial disputes include charges of unfair trade practices. In one example, confusion arose when after an agreement reached through the BNC committee on agriculture to increase US poultry access to the South African market in later 1996, US chicken exporters began selling chicken at prices far below South African market levels. Industry representatives from both the US and South Africa appeared on the brink of a dispute, but on closer investigation found that the price differential was due not to unfair pricing but to an "efficiency backlog" of 27 percent between South Africa and the US poultry industries. Thus, even with the general tariff of R2.20 per kilogram, the US chicken prices remained very competitive.[55]

The case of South African steel has proved more acrimonious, and flies in the face of US policy promoting free trade. Anti-dumping suits against South Africa's Iscor and Highveld were suspended in 1997 after the South African steel producers agreed to

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[55]Maharaj, Ravin. "US chicken dumping row continues." *Cape Time Business Report* (4 December 1997).

charge a floor price for their steel plate on the American market. But in late 1998, new suits are likely as US producers face a new wave of cheap imported steel products due to the collapse of several steel-producing economies, such as Russia, Japan, Brazil, and South Korea. Iscor may be forced to reduce its share of the US market for cold-rolled steel below 3 percent in order to escape the charges. US policymakers are likely to be caught in a dilemma between defending free trade, and raising tariffs or imposing quotas in order to satisfy the powerful steel industry in the US in an election year.

At the same time, US officials continue to call for a lowering of barriers to trade in South Africa. Besides calling for an end to some tariffs, the US is critical of South Africa's lack of anti-trust legislation, regular customs duty delays, and slow pace of privatisation. The US Trade Representative, in her 1998 foreign trade barriers report, gave South Africa a poor rating for the third year running, noting that anti-competitive practices prevailed in South Africa over 1997. Perhaps more fundamental to the investment climate in South Africa, however, have been the concerns expressed regarding crime and the instability in the labour sector. The former concern is behind the formation of the eighth BNC committee on law enforcement, and behind previous efforts of the FBI and other US law enforcement agencies to support South Africa in this area.

These disputes and concerns do not in fact dominate US commercial policy towards South Africa, however. Instead, they underline the growing normalisation of US-South African commercial relations. While there have been concerns that such tensions will rock the current consensus in the US supporting favourable policies toward South Africa, that scenario is unlikely in light of the overall thrust of US policy, as expressed in stated US policy and in the several US policy initiatives discussed above, and in light of domestic political activity on trade issues.

4.4 *Conclusion: New Issues, Enduring Issue-Types*

Sanctions and apartheid are gone as issues in US South Africa policy in the late 1990's, as are Cold War concerns about Soviet expansion in southern Africa. US concerns about race relations at home and American influence abroad -- whether through military, commercial, or development means -- remain, however, inherent in US foreign policy formulations on South Africa. It is the fact of enduring *issue-types* which allow insight into the sources and likely direction of US foreign policy, via the issue-area paradigm. The issue-types distilled from application of issue-area analysis to US South Africa policy earlier in this study -- based on the questions of tangibility of political goods at issue and of the symmetry of domestic political impact -- are those of development assistance, trade, security, and political symbolism. The foregoing chapters demonstrate that these issue-types can be seen as enduring; the forthcoming chapters will demonstrate just how significant they are to a deeper understanding of US policy.

The following pages move into analysis of US South Africa policy in the 1990's based on the framework of the above four issue-types, first through the perspective of domestic political sources of policy -- public opinion and interest group activity -- and then from the perspective of governmental sources of policy -- bureaucratic processes and politics. This step moves this study from the international and national levels of analysis, where the focus is on the contextual sources and broad strokes of US South Africa policy over the period 1994-1998, to the sub-national level of analysis, where policy contours become more apparent. Such study will aim to discern the depth of support in US society for continued engagement in South Africa, and the direction of policy actions taken by government in the period under study -- whether engendering or discouraging further engagement. Issue-area analysis of these domestic sources of US policy will thus round out the picture of the likelihood of South Africa as a salient feature in US foreign policy at the start of a new century.

CHAPTER FIVE
Disengagement Sentiment, the American Public, and US policy toward Post-Apartheid South Africa

Nearly simultaneously, US foreign policymakers and the US anti-apartheid coalition declared victory over their respective foes as the crumbling of apartheid in South Africa coincided with the end of the Cold War worldwide and the emergence of a new set of parameters in international relations. These dramatic developments have produced new dynamics in US domestic politics affecting foreign policy, one of which has been a mixed picture of public sentiment on international disengagement. While disengagement sentiment has not been directed at Pretoria, per se, it does have important repercussions for US policy towards post-apartheid South Africa.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the following analysis at the sub-unit level will operate from the assumptions that US policymaking as a whole is characterised by pluralism, but that the degree to which public opinion and interest group activity contribute to the formulation of policy is largely dependent upon the nature of the issues involved. As detailed in earlier chapters, interest groups and public opinion have been undeniably of great importance in past US South Africa policy, perhaps never more so than in 1986 when, even over a Presidential veto, Congress -- under extreme public pressure -- enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. With the normalisation of relations between the US and South Africa in the 1990's, however, is there still interest in South Africa among the US public and their representatives in the national legislature? What role do interest groups and public opinion play currently in the different issue-types present in US policy on South Africa, and do the findings support the suggested patterns of Zimmerman's issue-area paradigm? Where domestic politics do play a major role, in

137

which direction -- toward or away from engagement -- are different interest groups pressing policy?

Support for disengagement among Americans, already mentioned as part of the US response to global factors affecting US foreign policy in the second chapter, comes under more detailed scrutiny in this section. As defined earlier, disengagement refers in this study to a policy of shaking off or loosening of cooperative international bonds, which can consist of military commitments, commercial ties, political allegiances, or other relations. A closer look at the activities of the national legislature over the 1994-1998 period, as well as polling data and other indicators, begins to reveal the thrust of US sentiment on the issue of international disengagement in post-Cold War America. Following the discussion of engagement/disengagement sentiment, the chapter turns to analyse interest group activity on South Africa policy over the 1994-1998 period within the framework of the Zimmerman paradigm.

5.1   *A Disengaging American Public?*

By the end of 1994, not only was the US foreign policy machinery casting about for a new paradigm for foreign policymaking, but for the first time since the end of the second World War, a Democratic president was coupled with a Republican majority in Congress, and the latter's main agenda seemed to be disengagement abroad. The 104th Congress under the leadership of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, engaged in their own fierce budget debate to cut expenditures at home and abroad, had little time for international organisations or foreign assistance, never mind the continent of Africa. In any case, with the inefficacy of past aid efforts in Africa under the spotlight, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms reportedly charged that expending US resources on Africa was like "pouring money down a rat hole."[1] The newest members of

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[1] Interview with congressional staff member Lester Munson, # 22.

both the House and the Senate were especially opposed to "entangling alliances," fighting against both the enlargement of NATO and sending US troops to Bosnia.[2] Several interest groups ran vocal campaigns against further trade liberalisation,[3] and public opinion polls appeared to show support for reducing America's commitments overseas.[4] Viewed from abroad, the US populace seemed to be closing its shutters, more concerned with domestic issues of economy, moral decay, anti-government terrorism, and crime than with the international order of the 1990's.

Several aspects of US foreign policy reflected this perceived opposition to engagement on the part of the American public. Appropriations for the "150 account" which covers spending on international affairs for the US government, including contributions to multilateral organisations, declined by more than 25 percent between 1991 and 1997, from $25.5 billion to around $18.8 billion (Nowels, 1997b: 6). The budget covering the Department of State's basic operations was cut by 17 percent between 1993 and 1997, down to $2.6 billion -- which resulted in the closing of 30 US embassies and consulates around the world.[5] And foreign aid spending declined 36 percent between 1991 and 1997, from $18.2 billion to $11.5 billion (Nowels, 1997b: 17).

Public sentiment, on the other hand, appeared to begin to shift in the post 1996 period, away from support for disengagement and towards support for engagement. This apparent shift has been attributed to the concurrent economic upturn in the US (which despite the financial crisis sweeping the globe, in 1998 had not yet stalled) and a greater

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[2]Doherty, Carroll J. "New Generation Challenges Established Orthodoxy: Accused of isolationism, younger Republicans say they're just turning to domestic, district needs." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* Washington, DC Vol 54 (3 February 1996): 306-307.

[3]Opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement was rife, for instance, not only from labour groups protecting US employment, but also from groups worried about increased illegal immigration into the US (Deese, 1994: 18). Also, see Baer, M. Delal, "North American Free Trade." *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1991): 132-49.

[4]See polls from 1993 cited in Steel (1995), and the 1994 survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations cited in Schlesinger, Jr. (1995).

[5]US Department of State, *The FY1998 International Affairs Budget Request* (February 1997): 6.

appreciation of the benefits of free trade among Americans.[6]   For some analysts, however, it has been not so much a change in sentiment as a re-interpretation of earlier signs from the public. Eugene Wittkopf, for instance, writes credibly that polls from 1993 and 1994 supposedly showing increasing sentiment for disengagement among the American public were incorrectly interpreted, and that in fact Americans generally have remained supportive of engagement. "Rethinking [America's role in the world] does not mean rejection," he asserts.   "Polling organisations have asked Americans since the 1940's if they 'think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out.' In 1947, 70 percent said active involvement would be best; in 1994, 69 percent echoed that sentiment" (Wittkopf, 1996: 93). Steven Kull of the US-based Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) agreed that "the assumption that the [American] public has become parochial and isolationist is a misinterpretation of a more complex trend." He contends, based on his own findings, that while "the overwhelming majority of Americans want the US to move away from playing the hegemonic role in the world -- being the 'world policeman' -- and carrying a disproportionate share of the burden of promoting economic development and maintaining world security...the public is not, however, seeking to retreat from the world." Kull proposes that Americans would like to see international organisations strengthened in order to increase their effectiveness and to take over many of the roles carried by the US during the Cold War years, and that "provided others are carrying their fair share," Americans are ready to support such a system (Kull, 1995/96: 102-3).

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[6]See Gwynne, S.C. (1998). "What a Drag! Economic Troubles in Asia, Russia and Latin America Threaten the U.S." *Time* (14 September): 31.

5.1.1 The "Foreign Policy Gap"

Indeed, a series of polls conducted by PIPA and published in 1997 showed up a "foreign policy gap" between policymakers and the public in the US, revealing misperceptions held in Washington which have apparently plagued policymaking on foreign assistance, trade, peacekeeping and other aspects of US engagement abroad. According to this account, while policymakers "perceive the public as going through a phase, in the wake of the Cold War, of wanting to disengage from the world (a fact they often bemoan),...a comprehensive analysis of polls shows that the majority of Americans supports a foreign policy of broad global engagement." The two-year effort included polls, focus group discussions in various cities, interviews with policymakers, and an analysis of all publicly available polling data. PIPA concludes that it was not the general public that pressed for disengagement, blaming in part the reliance of policymakers on small "self-selected samples of vocal [anti-engagement] citizens," rather than on available polls (Kull, Destler and Ramsay,1997: 184). Several examples support the PIPA conclusion that the US public is not seeking disengagement.

5.1.1.1 *US Sentiment on Development Assistance*

Foreign assistance has come under fire since the declining economic status of the US in the late 1980's and early 1990's caused a hard relook at the effectiveness of US aid efforts. Aid levels declined and, by 1995, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development had placed the US -- once the world's top donor -- last among 21 industrial nations in aid allocations as a percentage of GDP, at 0.10 percent. That ranking appeared set to remain stable in mid 1997.[7] Foreign aid advocates admit that reforms are necessary, however, noting that "many nations in Sub-Saharan Africa are poorer than

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[7]These are figures for Overseas Development Aid (ODA), from the OECD 1996 report on "Financial Flows to Developing Countries in 1995," quoted in Graham and O'Hanlon, 1997: 100.

when they began receiving aid." They note that "while aid has had success in humanitarian relief, family planning, and reducing infant mortality, its record in promoting economic growth has been mixed...and growth is a necessary condition for meeting most of the broad objectives of aid" (Graham and O'Hanlon, 1997: 96). These analysts called on donors "not to end foreign aid, but ...to know when to say when, cutting off countries that fail to adopt sound economic policies and rewarding those that do." This distinction seems to have been too difficult to maintain in the hurly-burly of congressional politics in the mid 1990's, however, and aid in general continued to decline,[8] based on an assumption that it was no longer considered a worthwhile expenditure by the US public (Kull, Destler, and Ramsay, 1997: 97). One January 1995 PIPA poll found, however, that when misperceptions about the percentage of the US federal budget spent on foreign assistance (then, and currently, less than 1 percent) were rectified, those who felt the US spent too much on foreign aid dropped from 75 percent to 18 percent. "Americans overwhelmingly support the principle of giving some foreign aid.... though there are a great number of changes [in emphasis] Americans would like to see," Kull concludes (Kull, 1995: 25).

In the greater aid debate, of course, South Africa is viewed as an exception (along with Botswana) in Sub-Saharan Africa, in that it is able to attract significant amounts of private investment on its own (van de Walle, 1996: 1). Indeed, USAID officials announced in early 1996 that the agency would "begin a process of phasing down" the South Africa programme, to be completed by the year 2005.[9] Though aid may not remain of direct significance in US South Africa policy, it will however remain indirectly

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[8]Except in the case of the Middle East, where aid to Israel and Egypt has remained at the long-stable $3 billion and $2.1 billion, respectively, based on perceived US national interests (security concerns) in the region, as well as domestic political constraints.

[9]US AID Administrator Brian Atwood made this announcement, based on the assessment that South Africa was acquiring the reources to deal with its own development problems, quoted in Copson, 1997: 11.

important both as a barometer of US willingness to engage internationally and as a critical factor in developing economic stability among South Africa's neighbours.

5.1.1.2 *US Sentiment on Free Trade*

Polls on free trade show similar engagement sentiments among the US public, in that Americans appear to be more and more in favour of lifting trade barriers. According to one Gallup poll, prior to the 1992 presidential elections, 48 percent of Americans saw foreign trade as a threat compared to 44 percent who saw it as an opportunity. By 1994, the numbers had changed to 38 percent and 53 percent, respectively.[10] Protectionist voices remain raised, of course, in support of increased barriers -- and no less so in trade relations with South Africa, as will be discussed -- but these voices often seem to be shouting into the wind in the overall picture of US sentiment on, and investment in, international economic activity.

5.1.1.3 *US Sentiment on Peacekeeping*

Peacekeeping, likewise, may be an issue which seems not to impinge directly on US policy toward South Africa during the current period, when little threat of South African civil war or foreign aggression remains. On the other hand, the African Crisis Response Initiative can be seen as a direct result of US policymakers' perceptions that the US public is not willing to send American soldiers abroad to join multilateral efforts to keep the peace when there is no vital US "national interest" at stake. According to this mindset, the establishment and sponsorship of local, regional peacekeeping capabilities would be preferable. But PIPA found that a majority of the US public did not, in fact, disapprove of contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping efforts, even in polls taken

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[10]Steven Rattner quotes a 1994 Gallup Poll showing increased US public support for free trade in "Kantor Can." Letters to the Editor: *Foreign Affairs* Vol 75 No 4 (July/August 1996): 182.

shortly after the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia after the debacle there in October 1993.[11] The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations likewise found, in October 1994, that 51 percent of their sample agreed that the US should contribute to UN peacekeeping in general, and an additional 23 percent in some cases.[12] Another poll, by Roper Starch in March 1997, found that 72 percent would support or probably support sending US troops for UN peacekeeping efforts, in general.[13]

The underlying message, it would appear, is that while the American public no longer wanted to appear the bully on the international block, and objected to ineffective expenditure of US resources (including the lives of American soldiers), they were not opposed to engagement internationally. It would seem, in fact, that the 104th Congress and Newt Gingrich's second American revolution had been an exaggerated response to the ruminations of the US about its role in the post-Cold War world. "The US carries this latent virus [of 'isolationism']," asserted one interview respondent. "Depending on the overall health of the body, it may manifest itself...[But] most Americans, when properly informed, tend to be supportive of some level of involvement. Even Helms couldn't turn his back on the world."[14]

5.2   *Factors affecting US Engagement with South Africa*

Public sentiment supporting international engagement does not automatically translate into increased US engagement in South Africa, and factors that would militate against public support for expending resources on post-apartheid South Africa do exist. These include a changed focus -- some would say a lack of focus -- among the African-American community following the demise of apartheid, and the "Africanisation" of

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[11]*Americans and UN Peacekeeping: A Summary of Research on US Public Attitudes.* Program on International Policy Attitudes (February 1995): 2.
[12]Summarised in Rielly, ed (1995), quoted in Kull, Destler and Ramsay (1997): 81.
[13]See Kull, Destler and Ramsay (1997): 81.
[14]From interview with Kevin Luther, of Africare (#31).

South Africa in American perceptions generally. These must be weighed against new incentives for engagement in South Africa, however.

5.2.1   African-Americans Changing Focus

When, in early 1990, South Africa suddenly turned about-face and abandoned the policy of apartheid, the anti-apartheid coalition in the US watched with a sense -- rightly or wrongly -- of having had a significant role as Nelson Mandela was released and as negotiations for a new constitution began. But, after a brief period of suspicion over whether apartheid was truly and irreversibly over -- and a cold-shoulder from the ANC, by some accounts[15] -- many of the anti-apartheid groups, among whom African-Americans had leading roles, began to spend their energies elsewhere, or to dissipate. A few groups chose to make the transition from policy advocacy to programmatic involvement in South Africa, which they have achieved with varying degrees of success. Others chose to pursue business opportunities they perceived in the new South Africa. But in most cases, the ability to garner interest from the wider public had become more difficult. Why?

In the midst of the perceived isolationist turn in American society, it seemed to many that African-American interest groups were focusing inward, onto the situation of African-Americans themselves. Having "participated in the righting of the enormous injustices of apartheid," they had "moved on."[16] And like most middle-class Americans, they were "not that interested in Africa." Supporting that view, one political scientist writing in 1994, just after the election of the 104th Congress, noted that "like most Americans, African-Americans...are now more preoccupied with domestic problems."

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[15]Randall Robinson, founder of TransAfrica, writes in his 1998 memoirs *Defending the Spirit* that, on more than one occasion after Mandela's release in 1990, the anti-apartheid coalition was rebuffed by Mandela or the ANC who, he thought, "had virtually no understanding of how US political society worked," and so underestimated the importance of interest groups such as TransAfrica. Quoted in Barber, Simon. "Pressure groups did not win the struggle." *Business Day* (3 February 1998).
[16]From interview with Robert Price, University of California, Berkeley (#11).

He concluded that "as the problems in South Africa come to closely resemble those that many African-Americans face at home [crime, grinding poverty, educational crisis], it is unlikely that there will be enough support for foreign policies which transfer financial resources from domestic problems to foreign countries, including South Africa" (Payne, 1994: 67,73).

This view was not entirely borne out by subsequent polls, however. According to PIPA polls in 1996, for instance, minorities in the US (including African-Americans) "tended to favor higher allocations for foreign aid than white Americans did." Minorities favoured devoting a higher portion of the GNP to aid to poor countries (a median of $100 per $1000), while whites favoured a much smaller amount ($15). And "despite having proportionately the most to gain by putting tax dollars toward aid for poor people in the US, minorities favored having a higher percentage of assistance going to poor people in other countries (29 percent)...[while] white Americans thought only 22 percent of assistance should go to poor people in other countries" (Kull, Destler and Ramsay, 1997: 187). In addition, once any misperceptions of assistance percentages were corrected, "the argument that 'aid to newly democratic countries is a good investment for America' won 66 percent agreement from whites, but 78 percent agreement from African-Americans" (p.188). Relative to other Americans in the 1990's, then, African-Americans appear to remain in favour of the US assisting developing countries such as South Africa.

5.2.1.1 *Diffused Agendas*

More likely than African-Americans opposing US engagement with South Africa, it seems, is the possibility that the changed nature of issues with regard to South Africa has left the greater African-American public without a handle on US South Africa policy. This change has not necessarily reduced activism among all African-American interest groups, but their focus has shifted either to other African crises, such as Rwanda or Nigeria, or to more routine Africa policy areas, such as development, or trade, or to the

Caribbean.   Close relations with South Africa remain important, it seems, from a politically symbolic viewpoint, but unless those relations are threatened, interest in US policy toward South Africa -- and financial support for the relevant lobbies -- from the wider African-American community is most likely to remain diffuse.

One important factor in this development may be that the general thrust of US Africa policy, undertaken by a Democratic administration expressing commitment to racial harmony in the US and consisting of several African-Americans in key posts,[17] is in accord with the general thrust of expressed African-American opinion on the region. Encouraging democracy and economic development (even if not in line with some groups who oppose WTO guidelines for African nations), celebrating South Africa's new dispensation, and welcoming an African renaissance with black leaders at the forefront of positive developments in Africa (even if, again, some groups disagree that these leaders are democratic), characterise both the administration's and African-American lobbies' general approach to the continent.

In any case, the galvanising days of the anti-apartheid movement are over. Several respondents noted this phenomenon, but insisted that "South Africa continues to be on the agenda" of African-American and human rights interest groups. They also admitted, however, that "the concern is uneven" and that "not all organisations have made the transition to programmatic involvement."[18]   Because many former anti-apartheid

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[17]Examples are the late secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, and Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Laurie Fitz-Pegado. The Secretary of Labour, Alexis Herman, and the Secretary of Transportation, Rodney Slater -- both of whom accompanied President Clinton on his 1998 Africa trip -- are two more, as are the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, and the Assistant Trade Representative for Africa, Rosa Whittaker. At the American Embassy in South Africa, Ambassador James Joseph is an African-American, as well as Minister Counselor Millard Arnold and several of the AID South Africa key officials. There are also African-Americans at the forefront of US efforts to finance economic development in Southern Africa: Andrew Young heads the Southern Africa Development Fund; and New Africa Advisers, a unit of the Sloan Financial Group, America's largest African-American-owned asset management firm, manages the New Africa Opportunity Fund.

[18]From interview with Francis Kornegay of the African-American Institute (#1), reiterated by Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service (#13) and foreign correspondent Simon Barber (#29).

groups have changed the focus of their policy advocacy to other regions in Africa and the Caribbean, where the issues involved are less straightforward or less compelling than apartheid, lobbyists find it increasingly "difficult to mobilise forces in the US."[19] And, among the African-Americans still active on South Africa policy, many appear to agree with Jesse Jackson's call that they should become the "conduit" through which US-South African trade and other links expand.[20] This approach has met with mixed reactions from South Africans, however.[21]

5.2.1.2 *CBC Worries*

It is in the detail that disagreement arises, and detail is a more difficult agenda around which to rally opposing forces.   This has been the experience, it appears, of the Congressional Black Caucus. Since 1994, the CBC has faced not only declining public interest in African issues, but a declining hold on power in the legislature. With the Republican take-over of Congress and subsequent reforms under Newt Gingrich, CBC members lost their majority standing, their chairmanship over key committees, and much of their support funding. Also, subsequently, senior African-American legislators such as William Gray and Ronald Dellums retired, and differing approaches to several African conflicts shook the strong consensus that had existed over South Africa under apartheid and then, in the early 1990's, over aid to Africa. Thus, when Congressman Bill Jefferson of Louisiana and Senator Carol Moseley-Brown of Illinois came out in support of sanctions against Nigeria in 1997, for instance, others such as Representative Donald Payne opposed them.   Payne based his view on his constituency's dependency on

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[19]From interview with Douglas Tilton of the Washington Office on Africa (#25), and also Timothy Sisk of the US Institute for Peace (#47).

[20]See "Jackson Recalls Past, Points to Future of U.S.-African Ties." Text of speech from the 1997 Harare African/African-American Summit, USIS publication File ID:97072403.AAF (24 July 1997): 5.

[21]See Daley, Suzanne. "Top US paper picks up on debate raging about role of African-Americans in South Africe." *Sunday Independent* (19 April 1998).

Nigerian-grade oil, which was most suitable for certain industry in New Jersey.[22] Maxine Waters (the CBC chairperson) was at the same time denouncing lobbyists of the Nigerian regime and calling on African-Americans to "part company with African dictatorships and their US supporters."[23]

This case supports the theory that "without race as an anchor for deciding which side to take [in African conflicts], unity is more difficult for African-American interests to maintain." [24] Indeed, it appears that for the time being, except on domestic issues of civil rights for African-Americans, the Congressional Black Caucus is no longer the most effective point of departure for effecting change in US policy. Their future role will be greatly affected by whether or not Democrats remain in the minority in Congress -- determining their status on committees where Africa legislation lives or dies -- beyond the year 2000, following only minor gains in the 1998 elections.

5.2.2   The "Africanisation" of South Africa

Another of the factors militating against deeper US involvement in South Africa, according to one interview respondent (whose view was echoed by others), is the fact that "there is a growing -- though not yet dominant -- tendency for the public image of South Africa to be one of a country slipping into the "African condition."   According to this view, post-apartheid South Africa is increasingly equated with other, failed, African countries with black majority governments, which "allows the imagery of the rest of the continent to wash over South Africa."   The media apparently contribute to this perception as, with little of political interest to report on in South Africa in the late 1990's, they focus on human feature stories, which "translate into crime and corruption,"[25]   or else, as

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[22]From interview with Lester Munson, professional staffer for the House International Relations Committee (#22).
[23]From the forward by Imani Countess in Countess, et al (1997). *Making Connections: Report from a Constituency Builders' Dialogue.* Washington, DC: Africa Policy Information Center: 5.
[24]Countess, 1997: 5.
[25]From interview with University of California Professor Robert Price (#11).

another respondent put it, on nature footage, portraying a "dark, dangerous continent, a primordial Eden." Furthermore, by "aggregating" Africa, the US public "undermines South Africa's ability to have a straightforward relationship with the US," as South Africa gets "lumped into a constituency in the US which is complicated for reasons of Americanness, not Africanness."[26]

5.2.3   New Incentives for Engagement

There are promising indicators, however, that post-apartheid South Africa has neither slipped completely off the US public agenda after sanctions, nor been swamped with the negative perceptions (which in any case are changing, in some observers' views, with the hopeful signs in Uganda, Ghana, and other "New Leader" states) of the African continent. Beyond the demonstrated trend toward support for engagement internationally, there is continued and new interest in South Africa among specific US interest groups, a fact which has served to maintain the high profile of South Africa for American foreign policymakers. These include new African-American organisations, coalitions of legislators, activists and political analysts, and some new business lobbies. Many members of these groups fought for sanctions, some did not, but they now share an interest in South Africa of a very different nature than that of the heady days of the 1980's. A few, and by 1998 even fewer, lobby for increased -- or at least maintained -- levels of development aid for the continent, including South Africa. Others, noting the new promise of some African economies, have increasingly trained their gaze (albeit more warily after the Asian currency crisis[27]) on Africa, and especially on South Africa.[28] These groups lobby for greater access to South Africa's market, for policies

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[26]From interview with Dale Lautenbach, former foreign news editor (#43).

[27]See Green, Matthew. "Battered commodity prices will blunt Africa's growth." *Cape Times Business Report* (5 November 1998).

[28] See Spira, John. "SA among top emerging market club." *Cape Times Business Report* (4 December 1996).

which will develop that market, and for US pressure against any changes in current South African macroeconomic policies which might have a deleterious effect on South Africa's credit rating.   There are also many Americans who see a model for the US in the nonracial democracy occurring in South Africa, based on parallels in South African and American struggles to improve race relations.

The Clinton Administration policy of visibly promoting US involvement in post-apartheid South Africa through, for instance, the BEM initiative, the Binational Commission, visits by high-level officials, and the African Growth and Opportunity Initiative, as well as links with the One Nation initiative on race in America, must be seen, at least in part, as a function of these domestic interests. Vocal and potentially powerful interest groups lie behind each of those initiatives. There was also some public impetus behind the ACRI in the perceived public unwillingness to shoulder peacekeeping responsibilities, as previously discussed, and there appears to be some interest group activity generally on "new security" issues such as environmental degradation, organised crime and international terrorism which might be seen to overlap with US South Africa policymaking.

Issue-area analysis will reveal how important such domestic political considerations are in the issue-types present in US South Africa policy, and in which net direction they seek to influence policy -- towards or away from deeper engagement.

5.3   *Interest Groups and Issue-Types in US South Africa Policy*

As posited by Zimmerman in his issue-area paradigm, interest groups will have a greater or lesser effect on foreign policy depending on the issue-areas occupying a nation at any given time. An issue-area, it is remembered, is, in short, a set of similar policy disputes. This study, moreover, notes that different interest groups and other public sources of pressure will be active on particular issues within each issue-area, pressing in perhaps oppositie directions to affect policy. Each issue-area in US South Africa policy,

151

then, will have its own configuration of public influences, involving a different group of interest groups and other domestic political sources such as members of the legislature and results of public opinion polls. Observation of these will yield the net direction of public pressure on foreign policy in that issue-area. As there have been no US public opinion polls specifically on engagement in South Africa in the period 1994-1998, polls on US engagement generally, as well as legislative activity on Africa and South Africa specifically, will form the backdrop for subsequent issue-area analysis of interest group activity on US South Africa policy.

Issue-*types* in US South Africa policy, in a further development on the Zimmerman paradigm, were those recurring themes which presented themselves from the data for the period under study. Most, if not all, issues which were on the South Africa policy agenda during the Clinton period (up to the end of 1998) appear to fit into these categories. Due to the specific issues involved, the four issue-types identified over the course of this study -- development assistance, trade and investment, security, and issues of political symbolism -- can be placed under Zimmerman's issue-areas of distribution, regulation, interaction/protection, and redistribution, based on his two questions: 1)Are the political goods in question exclusively tangible? and 2)Is the expected domestic political impact of the issue's resolution symmetrical? Whether the policy processes uncovered in this study coincide with those suggested to be inherent in Zimmerman's different issue-areas -- that is, whether conflictual or consensual, and whether pluralist or elitist -- will become apparent.

In addition, an engagement/ disengagement function, introduced earlier, is applied within each issue-type (as indicated by a vertical continuum alongside the issue-type matrix) to show the direction of interest group activity on US South Africa policy (see Figure C). Interest groups can then be placed, based on the issues on which they have lobbied with regard to South Africa in the latter half of the 1990's, and on the direction in which they are lobbying in terms of engagement, in one section of the matrix.

US Public & South Africa Policy

The thrust of US interest group activity on US South Africa policy -- whether encouraging or disparaging of closer relations with South Africa -- will thus emerge to round out the picture of pluralist influences underlying US policy.

Figure C

INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY ON US SOUTH AFRICA POLICY AND DIRECTION OF ACTIVITY

Engage
vs
Disengage

US Domestic Impact
Symmetrical?

YES   NO

I: Development Assistance	II: Trade & Investment
CBC & CFA pre 1996 Development NGO's	Africa T & I Caucus CFA, AAI, US ABI, AIG Rainbow Coalition Af/Af-Am Summit CCA, US-SABC, Africa Trade Forum AMCHAM et al, State Trade Offices
Congressional budget-cutters	Protectionist Groups (citrus, steel & textile industries) Labour (AFL-CIO)

engage

disengage

YES

Tangible
Benefits?

III: Security	IV: Political Symbolism
Business Groups on "New Security"	NPT & "New Security" Interest Groups*	CFA NSA	Landmine interest groups*
---Regional----------\--Global-------	---Domestic---------\--Global--------
ACRI opposition*	Congressional budget-cutters	Opposition to "rogue" states

engage

disengage

NO

* very little visible interest group activity *vis-a vis* US - South Africa Policy

(Based on Zimmerman's "Issue-based Foreign Policy Paradigm")

153

The analysis now proceeds with an examination of the interest group activity underlying US South Africa policy in the period 1994-1998, via the framework of the issue-types paradigm moving from development assistance (quadrant I), around the matrix to issues of political symbolism (quadrant IV).

5.3.1   Development Assistance and the Public

Aid to South Africa, as discussed in Chapter Two, has not been a major focus of US interest groups, even under apartheid.[29]   The years immediately after the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 saw greater activity on the part of interest groups on the issue of aid to Africa as a whole, however.   This activity, for reasons of South Africa's interests in the region and its share of the overall Africa aid budget, does affect US South Africa policy, even if indirectly.

When US development assistance to Africa came under increasing budgetary pressure in the late 1980's -- due to the sense of US decline as a world power, to fiscal constraints, and to the growing disillusionment with aid generally -- the Congressional Black Caucus succeeded in creating an earmark for that aid in the form of the Development Fund for Africa (DFA) . From FY1988 to FY1995, the DFA protected aid levels for Sub-Sahara Africa from diversion to other regions by allowing Congress to specify the total aid level to Africa within the USAID development assistance budget. Overall aid levels, including aid to Africa, continued to decline each year from 1985, however. This trend was arrested for Africa in 1990 when the CBC, working by now apparently without the constituent pressure that lay behind the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act but with the support of the TransAfrica lobby

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[29]If anything, the Reagan administration tried to promote its aid efforts in the public eye. See *US Assistance: Working for Positive Change in South Africa.* US Department of State, Southern Africa Working Group/Bureau of Public Affairs (May 1986). But, due to the general unpopularity of constructive engagement, and even though aid to South Africa under apartheid went to non-governmental groups only, lobbying for increased assistance was not a feature of interest group activity in that period.

(Lancaster, 1991: 2), was able to increase the allocation for the DFA over the administration's request of $560 million to $800 million. At this time, there was also concern outside the CBC in Congress and in the administration that overall aid could not be cut more deeply without "compromising US foreign policy interests" (Lancaster, 1991: 1). Thus aid levels rose again until the advent of the 104th Congress, with their agenda for disengagement challenging not only aid levels, but the concept of development aid itself.

At that point, the CBC was joined by a new movement in support of US engagement in Africa to take up the defence of aid to the region. In terms of the issue-type analysis, aid to Africa at that point can be said to have moved from being a distributive issue to being a redistributive issue, reframed in the debate as a trade-off between the status (an intangible good) of foreign and domestic assistance programmes. Whereas prior to the 104th Congress, a consensual-pluralist process (or at least the remains of the public movement of the 1980's) had maintained aid levels to some degree, now a conflictual-elitist process came into play to challenge the concept of aid as it had been understood in the past. Public sentiment as a whole, it is to be remembered, was understood to be against aid at this stage. The general consensus in support of aid that held during the Cold War had, it seemed, broken down.

The leadership of the movement to save aid to Africa, very different in configuration from the anti-apartheid coalition of the 1980's, was spearheaded by a small but influential African-American-led organisation called the Constituency for Africa, as TransAfrica was by then focused on US policy on other human rights abuses in Africa and in Haiti. The CFA was begun in 1990 as a loose coalition of "Africanists and citizens representing major organisations with an interest in Africa ...to build organised support for Africa in the United States." By 1994, the CFA was registered as a non-profit organisation with a board of directors including several major figures in the African-American community such as David Dinkins, Andrew Young, Herman Cohen, and

Dorothy Height. According to director Mel Foote, the CFA was "in the forefront for the movement pushing to retain Africa's aid levels" in 1995, with its Summit on Africa Aid and other lobbying efforts. These efforts, joined by others', were successful in saving more than $200 million in the US budget for Africa that year,[30] over the objections of Senator Jesse Helms and several freshmen in Congress who opposed such federal spending, and in fact sought to eliminate USAID altogether.[31] As a concession to the opponents of aid in the 1995 debate on the FY1996 budget, however, Congress and the Clinton administration did agree to drop the separate line-item for Africa, "folding Africa into the worldwide development assistance account" (Nowels, 1997a: 18). While continued attention to Africa's aid budget was provided for through a non-binding call on the administration to continue the proportion of aid Africa had received under the DFA (36 percent, which later grew to 41 percent), as aid continued to decrease generally,[32] Africa's development aid dropped from $745 million in FY 1994 to $675 million in FY1996. In a reflection of increased support on the part of the administration -- based no doubt in part on public interest in trade opportunities -- for economic reform in African nations such as Mozambique, Uganda, Ghana, and Malawi, aid to Africa rose again, to $700 million, in 1997. Many interviewees reported some resentment on the part of other African nations to the "US preoccupation with South Africa," however, which receives the "lion's share of aid to the region."[33]

The CFA, meanwhile, "after looking at the facts" about previous aid efforts and Africa's concomitant economic decline, began "pushing trade" and calling on the United Nations and such organisations as the Africa Development Foundation to adjust their

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[30]From interview with Mel Foote, Executive Director, Constituency for Africa (#27).

[31]See Copson (1997) for discussion of that opposition, as well as Doherty (1996) on sentiment among new legislators.

[32]For detailed discussion of US aid in the 1990's, see Nowels, 1997.

[33]From interview with Kevin Luther of Africare (#31), and echoed in interviews with MacArthur DeShazer (#20) of the National Summit on Africa and Melanie Bixby of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (#38).

development strategies, as well.[34] The shift represented by CFA, in addition to the increasing fragmentation in the Congressional Black Caucus over USAID's focus on rewarding increased economic liberalisation in developing nations (without requiring political reforms or a broad distribution of the economic benefits of liberalisation), has undermined the development assistance lobbying effort significantly. TransAfrica, for instance, opposed the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which provides some development assistance, on the grounds that it represented the "recolonisation" of Africa by the developed world.[35] The Africa Faith and Justice Network also opposed the legislation, asking whether "if Uganda registers a comparable growth rate of 9.4 percent, does that mean more people are in schools?" [36] A few non-governmental development organisations continue to press quietly for increased Africa aid levels, and funding to meet humanitarian crises has remained available despite the pressures applied on aid over the 1994-1996 period (Copson, 1997:13).

With trade "trumping" aid at the moment, there is little leverage behind any efforts to increase aid generally, but the initiative to eliminate USAID altogether has, for the time being, apparently failed. Whether this latest development theory focusing on trade will survive is a matter for watching and waiting for some sceptical NGO's, who hope that the interest generated in Africa by the Africa Growth and Opportunity Initiative will, at the least, have some future benefit for Africa. In the meantime, the issue of development aid appears to have remained a matter for conflicting elites, and in terms of the typology of issue-areas, seems to have become more a matter of political symbolism than one of goods distribution. How long it will remain in the fourth, redistributive quadrant is a

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[34]From Mel Foote interview (#27).
[35]Gumede, WM. "Hand of Friendship or deadly grip?" *Sunday Independent/ Reconstruct* (29 March 1998).
[36]From the contribution of AFJN policy analyst Ezekiel Pajabo to the 25 September 1997 Overseas Development Council congressional staff forum on "The US and Africa: Can Trade and Investment Replace Development Assistance?"

matter for further study, based on the political imperatives governing the greater aid debate.

This finding, while it contradicts the prediction made at the outset that development assistance to South Africa was not a redistributive issue, also may demonstrate how issues could change in nature from one issue-area to another over time.

5.3.2 Trade and Investment and the Public

Several interest groups, instead of watching and waiting to see what the trade approach in US policy towards South Africa and Africa will bring, have actively involved themselves in that approach. These include groups which were previously active on US South Africa or Africa policy, new groups which have their genesis in the growing US business interest in the continent as a whole, and labour groups seeking protection from the threat of competitive African imports.

Several factors at the global, regional and domestic level have contributed to the enhanced interest in Africa among the business community. The globalisation of trade and finance, the increasing liberalisation of world markets, and the end of the Cold War, together with the promise of Africa's emerging markets and the booming American economy of the mid 1990's, have combined to focus attention on trade and investment opportunities in Africa, and on US policy in that regard. The dramatic switch between the 1980's and the 1990's within this issue-type, from opposing sanctions to promoting trade, has brought to the fore new voices speaking out on trade and investment in Africa as a whole, as well as a renewed willingness among traditional actors to be heard and seen publicly promoting commercial engagement in South Africa. Even in the years since 1994 new voices have emerged, as some groups have switched their focus from promoting assistance to promoting trade. The Constituency for Africa, cited in the previous chapter, is only one example of a group which has shifted its focus after 1995 from the programmes of USAID to those of the Department of Commerce. It is of note

that the CFA and other interest groups who have decided that "trade is not a dirty word" might be seen to be working in tandem with US policy, without a need to lobby for change -- yet the fact of their existence, and of the constituents they can mobilise, has arguably helped to push Africa up the foreign policy agenda.

5.3.2.1 *An African Trade and Investment Caucus*

Signalling the changes taking place in interest group activity was the formation of the bipartisan African Trade and Investment Caucus, which came together in early 1996 to "initiate broader discussion" on US policy towards Africa. This move constituted unusually high congressional attention on Africa from members outside of the Congressional Black Caucus. Resulting legislation, which formed the basis for the Africa Growth and Oppurtunity Act, followed consultation with, and lobbying by, several Africa-related groups. Besides the CFA, these included the African-American Institute, the US Africa Economic Institute, and the American International Group (a US-based international insurance organisation), as well as members of the African diplomatic corps in Washington.

As one of the most visible African-American-led groups actively lobbying in support of the AGOA, the CFA focused its 1997 "town hall meetings on Africa" on this aspect of US policy, seeking to "make the connection between trade [with Africa] and US interests" for Americans.[37] The Reverend Jesse Jackson, a leader in the African-American community and director of the Rainbow Coalition, was also active on lobbying for US trade initiatives prior to his appointment as the US special democracy envoy to Africa in late 1997. Jackson led a delegation, with US Secretary of Transportation Ronald Slater, to Harare in July 1997 for an African/African-American Summit, co-chaired by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and the Reverend Leon Sullivan,

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[37]From Mel Foote interview (#27).

where education and business in Africa were the focus. Representatives from more than 300 companies, including major actors such as Procter & Gamble and Chevron, attended.

While several members of the Congressional Black Caucus participated in the Africa Trade and Investment Caucus, none were original sponsors of the resulting legislation (although CBC member Congressman Charles Rangel was reportedly instrumental in garnering wider support for the AGOA among his colleagues in 1997[38]). The loss of key Africa committee and subcommittee chairs to the new Republican majority in 1994 had somewhat undermined CBC leadership on Africa policy by this point, and in any case, there were several divergent views on the trade proposals among CBC members. Another factor militating against greater CBC activity on the Africa trade and investment initiatives over the 1996-1998 period, it appears, was the fact that CBC energies -- as usual, in tandem with those of TransAfrica -- were being expended elsewhere on US Africa policy, specifically toward the ongoing political crises in the central Africa region and on events in Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

5.3.2.2 *New Voices*

In addition to the lobbying and business endeavours undertaken by the African-American community on the part of increased trade with Africa, several efforts have emerged from within the traditional business community. Whereas before the 1990's, "there were always the three C's -- coups, curses and catastrophes," now Africa had "come of age."[39] Corporate America was beginning to speak out about Africa because they perceived that "African governments...[were] starting to do the kinds of things that make the continent look like a real market."[40]

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[38]Statement by Congressman Philip M. Crane in the US House of Representatives on the African Growth and Opportunity Act. *Congressional Record* (24 April 1997).
[39]From interview with David Miller, executive director of the Corporate Council on Africa (#24).
[40]See Barber, Simon. "Corporate US turning its eyes to Africa." *Business Day* (6 May 1997).

New organisations to promote and protect US commerce and investment in Africa have emerged at several levels to serve the growing business interest. Others which have existed for years have become much more vocal in their support for a US policy supporting expanding commerce with the continent, and with South Africa.

The website for the US Foreign Trade Office, for instance, lists the American-South African Chamber of Trade and Industry in New York; the US-African Chamber of Commerce with offices in both New York and Washington, DC; the World Africa Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC; the Africa Trade Forum, created in 1995 and operating out of Samuel's International, a Washington, DC, investment consulting firm; as well as the African-American Institute and the Constituency for Africa. Also listed are the Washington-based Corporate Council on Africa and US-South Africa Business Council which, based on interview responses, seem to have attracted the most attention in policymaking circles since their creation in 1992 and 1993 respectively.

The Corporate Council on Africa is a non-profit, non-partisan organisation and, as such, claims that nothing in its newsletter "should be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any legislation." Yet by its activities, it has done a great deal to promote US investment and trade in Africa, and to bring issues of concern to US business in Africa to the attention of the US government. Its stated goals are to "strengthen and facilitate relationships between African and American individuals and organisations" through a series of exchange opportunities, "educational, cultural, and commercial" in nature. It aims to educate constituencies about the different social customs and economic climates on both continents, at the same time "utilising a network of business executives and government officials to promote US-Africa relations." Most notable among CCA activities thus far has been the April 1997 "Attracting Capital to Africa" summit, at which first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton gave the keynote address following her visit to Africa a month earlier. US Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, World Bank President James Wolfensohn, and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki also featured as speakers. The 700 CCA

summit delegates, mostly business representatives, when compared to the 75 that attended a similar conference sponsored by the US Departments of Commerce and State in 1983, are a further indicator of the increased US business interest in Africa. The summit addressed such topics as progressive taxation for economic growth, privatisation in Africa, investment financing, health care economics, telecommunications, and emerging transportation technologies in Africa. The CCA also works in partnership with the US Trade and Development Agency -- for instance, introducing African health care officials to the US pharmaceuticals industry through a visitors' programme in May 1997 -- and with the Departments of State and Commerce in hosting annual Africa Trade and Investment Seminars at various business centres around the US.

The US-SA Business Council, on the other hand, describes itself as "dedicated to assisting the entry and activity of US companies in South Africa by...advocating on behalf of US business interests directly to senior level decision makers of both countries." Sponsored by the National Foreign Trade Council, it was formed in 1993 to "reconnect the private sectors of the two countries," apparently as one product of the ad hoc South Africa Working Group at the Department of State.[41] It is well connected in policy circles in that its executive director has extensive experience with the Senate, and its managing director worked as the South Africa desk officer at the Department of Commerce under the first Clinton administration, when both the Business Development Council and the Binational Commission began operation. While their website specifies that they "do not assist exporters," the US-SA Business Council does offer extensive research facilities and information on current policy to its member companies, and ensures its members that their concerns are "highlighted on the agendas" of both the BDC and the BNC meetings.

Another significant indicator of increased business interest in Africa are the state

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[41] From interview with Whitney Schneidman, then of Samuel's International financial consultants, now a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (#34).

trade offices established in Africa over the past few years. Representatives from Virginia, Ohio, Texas, California and Michigan now work to promote US trade with the continent. California, especially, is a significant trading entity in itself, often cited as among the top ten economies (including national economies) worldwide. While these offices seek to promote trade and investment opportunities for their own constituents, they will undoubtedly be applying pressure through state channels on US national policy affecting US-South Africa trade relations.

The specific issues that have arisen under this issue-type, about which groups such as those named above are pressing for increased engagement with South Africa, are varied. According to one senior administration official, referring to the BNC-brokered 1997 US-South Africa tax treaty, for instance, there was lobbying from a "huge chunk of US business" who said completion of such a treaty was "critical to getting involved" in South Africa. [42] Other issues have been protection of intellectual property rights, demonstrated in the trade mark violation case brought by McDonald's against a South African restaurateur, and the still-pending patent violation complaint made by Pharma, the main US pharmaceuticals lobby, over South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997. Other issues include pressing South Africa for increased access to markets through reduced tariffs and elimination of import quotas, as well as improved anti-trust legislation and an increased rate of privatisation. They are also concerned about the insistence by South African labour that South Africa modify its Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, and about South Africa's crime statistics and their related effects on the business climate. The American Chamber of Commerce, for instance, expressing concern over what US companies saw as a "punitive" trend in Pretoria's economic policy, was seeking in late 1998 to engage the South African government in order to stave off a reversal of US corporate sentiment on

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[42]Confidential interview (#36).

South Africa as an investment destination, due to these several concerns.[43] AMCHAM envisioned a forum for US-South Africa economic dialogue, which may eventually dovetail with the TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement) which was created as a "dispute resolution mechanism" for commercial disagreements after the August 1998 meetings of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission.

5.3.2.3 *Protectionist and Anti-WTO Voices*

Conversely, the voices of various protectionist elements within the US have also been raised on issues of US Africa policy. These are not new voices, but have rarely had reason to protest any trade threat from Africa in the past. While these lobbying efforts are pressing for less engagement with South Africa by protecting US markets from South African imports to the US, they have generally "not dominated the debate" in the 1990's.[44] There was, however, enough concern over these voices to stall the passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act in the 105th Congress.

US industries threatened by specific South African imports, such as steel, citrus, and textiles, have raised vociferous voices against such trade with South Africa.[45] One of the largest efforts has been directed at the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Certain industries, particularly the textiles industry, perceive an inherent threat in the provisions of the bill calling for a relaxation of US tariffs on their products. In this campaign, industry lobbies joined forces with human rights groups such as the Africa Faith and Justice Network, TransAfrica, Friends of the Earth and UNITE, who believed the legislation would exploit rather than benefit Africa with its conditions of WTO membership, its structural adjustment programmes, and its "radical, mandatory

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[43]See Fabricius, Peter. "SA's 'punitive' trend alarms US." *Cape Times Business Report* (5 November 1998).
[44]From interview with Rosa Whittaker, then senior staff member for Representative Charles Rangel, now the Assistant US Trade Representative for Africa (#46).
[45]See, for instance, Barber, Simon. "Lift on Cape citrus ban irks Californians." *Business Day* (2 September 1996) and "Iscor, Highveld struggle with US duties." *Business Day* (24 November 1997).

privatisation" requirements.   The Public Citizens Global Trade Watch, deeming the AGOA the "Sub-Saharan Africa NAFTA Bill," lobbied vigorously on both human rights grounds and, more to the point, on grounds that it would jeopardise the jobs of US workers -- especially textile workers -- by instigating a loose free-trade zone which made no provision to stop transshipment of Asian textiles and clothing via Africa to take advantage of these benefits.[46] A subsequent letter to the press from the American Textile Manufacturers' Institute outlined similar objections, and derided "an erroneous International Trade Commission study...[arriving] at the ludicrous conclusion that its economic model is accurate enough to predict the loss of 700 jobs in a domestic industry of 1.4 million employees."[47]   The fact that organised labour in the US, in the form of the AFL-CIO, was opposed to the AGOA,[48] while many African-American legislators were supportive of the bill, created a difficult situation for the Clinton administration. Traditionally, Democratic administrations and legislators rely on the support of both labour and the African-American constituency in national elections. The juxtaposition of this legislation with the mid-term congressional elections in November 1998 would have underlined this split at a time when Democrats were hoping to regain at least some of the seats they lost in 1994 to the Republican Party.   For this and other reasons, as has been discussed, the legislation was withdrawn for reintroduction in the next Congress, allowing for further consultation with opposing parties and for the November 1998 elections to pass.[49]

The wide variety of voices that have been raised over trade and investment in South Africa demonstrates a conflictual-pluralist policy process which, as suggested by

[46]See www.citizen.org for more detail, as well as links to other statements opposing the AGOA, including those from TransAfrica, the Africa Faith and Justice Network, the AFL-CIO, and Friends of the Earth.
[47]Letter to the Editor from JP Danahy, President, American Textile Manufacturers' Institute. *Washington Times* (28 August 1998).
[48]See www.citizen.org/pctrade/aflcio.htm
[49]See Barber, Simon. "Africa bill's backers unwilling to back their words with dollars." *Business Day* (28 October 1998).

Zimmerman, generally applies in the regulatory issue-area. As that is the issue-area where trade and investment issues in US South Africa policy appeared to fit, according to the criteria of tangibility and symmetry, this set of issues appears to support the Zimmerman paradigm's usefulness.

5.3.3   Security Issues, Old and "New," and the Public

Of the issues falling specifically into the security issue-type, only a few have entailed much articulated interest from the public, either in the current period or in the past. Instead, as the Zimmerman paradigm would suggest, these are issues which, for the most part, attract a consensual-elitist policy process. In the past, issues in this category dealt with the threat of communist expansion on the African continent, with protecting the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope for US access, and monitoring the nuclear weapons technology of which South Africa was rumoured to be in possession. These concerns have faded with the end of the Cold War and with South Africa's own admission of possessing, and voluntarily destroying, its nuclear arsenal. These, it is clear from the record, were not the issues which occupied interest groups active on South Africa in the 1980's or before, unless they were used as a justification by pro-South Africa lobbies in the US seeking continued support for Pretoria as a "bastion against communism" in Africa.

In the 1990's, other issues have arisen, but these remain a matter mostly of elite debate. The issue of the African Crisis Response Initiative, for instance, has remained outside the focus of interest group activity on South Africa, except in passing reference as comment on the wider US policy toward the region or as an issue for fringe groups of which neither the public nor the administration take much heed.[50] Public opinion was

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[50]Present at the 1 October hearing on the ACRI was a member of an unnamed organisation (who suspected Henry Kissinger was a spy for the UK) opposing any US engagement with peacekeeping in Africa, whose remonstrations with Defense official Vincent Kern during a recess were later rejected as inaccurate and irrelevant.

initially a factor in the development of the concept of the ACRI, in that perceived opposition to US participation in peacekeeping forces was no doubt one impetus behind sponsorship of an African peacekeeping capability. But public debate and interest group activity has not focused on the ACRI subsequent to its introduction, based on the findings of this study. Similarly, the US response to South Africa's support for indefinite extension of the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 seemed to garner little public interest, except perhaps from specialised interest groups following the wider non-proliferation debate. South Africa's role in calling for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines along with other nations such as Canada and Norway, while at first glance an issue of security, would in fact fit better in the fourth, or redistributive issue-area. Landmines are not an issue in US South Africa policy except for the fact of South Africa's participation in the international defiance of the US on this issue, details of which will be provided in later discussion.

Other security issues, termed "new security" issues in the current literature, consist of such threats as international terrorism, organised crime, environmental degradation, and the spread of infectious diseases. These issues attract some attention from sectors in the US concerned about them specifically, either as they pertain to US business interests in South Africa, or to global security in general. Many new security issues appear to be high on the agenda of US South Africa policy, as a factor in issues of trade and investment -- as manifested in the committees of the BNC, for instance. Interest group lobbying, therefore, has to do with increasing the administration's degree of commitment to addressing these security issues more than with any change in policy. Security, thus, constitutes a secondary focus of groups promoting, for instance, trade with South Africa, or sustainable development worldwide, or a general focus on infectious disease.

The evidence would thus appear to confirm the suggestion that the security issue-type in US South Africa policy, which falls under the interactive/protection issue-area,

does attract a consensual-elitist policymaking process as posited in the Zimmerman issue-area paradigm.

5.3.4 Issues of Political Symbolism and the Public

Politically symbolic issues, being difficult to distil into discrete activist campaigns, do not attract widespread public attention as do more tangible issues. The main issues in US South Africa policy which fall into this issue-type are 1) the quest for fair and harmonious race relations, shared by certain leaders in the US and South Africa, and 2) perceived threats to US global hegemony, based on US perceptions about its preeminent position in the post-Cold War world and America's ability (or inability) to impose its will on other nations. The following looks at each of these in turn through the perspective of polls and US interest group activity.

5.3.4.1 *Issues of domestic political symbolism*

Issues of domestic political symbolism in US South Africa policy have attracted specific interest from members of the public pursuing changes in the status quo of social relationships, and as such fit into the fourth, redistributive issue-area, suggesting that a conflictual-elitist process would dominate in policymaking in these issues.

Public elite sentiment on US engagement with South Africa, and on a close association with Pretoria's experiment in nonracial democracy and the person of Nelson Mandela, derives for many US leaders from the importance they place on racial equality in the United States. In fact, for the activist and non-activist African-American alike, South Africa had provided a spark of optimism after the dimming of Martin Luther King's thirty-year-old dream of a nonracial society in America. Indicators show that interest in the success of South Africa ran high in the early stages of Pretoria's transition from minority rule: in 1990, 60 percent of African-Americans said they were closely following stories concerning Nelson Mandela's release from prison, as opposed to 30 percent of

whites.[51]   Also, following the changes in South Africa in 1994, several African-Americans (1000 by 1998) had moved to take up jobs or seek to be part of South Africa's new democracy, and hopes of business opportunity in a black majority-ruled South Africa ran high.[52]   But that widespread interest in issues of political symbolism, it would seem from interviews and interest group activity, has not been sustained, and has come rather to reside in the leadership of the African-American community seeking specific changes in US policy calculations.

There are, of course, members of the US public who are opposed to changes in the status quo, who make it their business to remain informed on issues that may impinge on their preferences.   These detractors may press against increased engagement with South Africa, and against the inferred transfer of resources to and emphasis on African-American priorities that such a policy represents.   Senator Jesse Helms might be seen as representative of this segment of US society.   A compromise position between the policy preferences of these two poles of opinion -- between support for increased engagement with South Africa on the grounds of racial solidarity on the one side, and opposition to increased engagement with South Africa, for various reasons such as budgetary constraints or lack of concern about racial inequality, on the other side -- will most likely be a matter of recurring give and take between these conflicting elites.

The fact that before the 1990's, a broad public seeking racial solidarity with South African blacks was specifically opposed to any form of engagement with the South African (apartheid) state is one fundamental change in activity in this issue-type between the past and the period under study.   But in fact, race continues as a compelling interest behind that policy, though activism on that basis is not as broadly supported as in the period before sanctions.

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[51] *The Gallup Poll Monthly,* No 293 (February 1990): 2-3.
[52] See Moses, Charles. "African-Americans are not dupes, professor; we're here to make a contribution." *Sunday Independent* (1 March 1998).

In 1994-1998, a major factor behind public activity on issues of domestic political symbolism vis-à-vis South Africa -- besides the changed circumstances in South Africa itself -- has been the raised visibility of race as an issue within the US itself. This raised visibility has been manifested in administration programmes such as Clinton's One Nation Initiative. Termed a "national conversation on race," the initiative invited Americans of every race to join in a year-long series of "townhall" meetings, conferences and probing reports. Launched with great fanfare in June 1997 at about the time that the White House Initiative on Trade and Growth in Africa surfaced, the One Nation Initiative was a direct response to a sense of continuing discrimination against African-Americans and of deteriorating race relations within America. Ironically, the despair over US race relations had grown with Clinton's enactment of legislation drastically reducing federal welfare programmes (of which blacks form a substantial proportion of recipients),[53] with the retreat of affirmative action programmes at the state level (including in California and Texas) and with rumours of blatant racial slurs in corporate boardrooms.[54] Furthermore, while crime statistics were dropping nationally, one in three young black males was either in jail, on probation or awaiting trial.[55] Education statistics were little more promising. Indicative was the example of the school district in Oakland California that experimented with "ebonics"[56] in 1997, where African-Americans who accounted for 53 percent of the district's pupils constituted 71 percent of remedial classes and 80 percent of suspensions.[57] As a backdrop to these trends, there were also the nearly diametrically opposing responses from black and white Americans to the Rodney King and OJ

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[53]See Ogden, Christopher. "Bye-Bye, American Pie." *Time* (12 August 1996): 24, and "Advances still far far short of King's dream." *Cape Times* (6 April 1998).
[54]See "Texaco's White-Collar Bigots." *Time* (18 November 1996): 65.
[55]See Karon, Tony. "Racial divide gets wider in US." *Cape Times* (8 December 1997).
[56]Ebonics -- a hybrid of ebony and phonics -- was the name given to the dialect spoken by inner city African-Americans. In 1997 in Oakland, California, one school board adopted ebonics as an official second language and then dropped it amidst controversy within the African-American academic and political community.
[57]See Reed, Christopher. "Ebonics pushed out the back door." *Mail & Guardian* (9-15 May 1997).

Simpson trial verdicts.[58]   These revelations underlined the racial divide persisting between African-Americans and "mainstream" white America.   By late 1998, with the Clinton administration mired in the Starr investigation into misconduct in the White House, however, the report of Clinton's race advisory board was received with little note, and a hush seems to have settled over the public "conversation on race."   The symbolic significance of the One Nation Initiative had not, however, been lost on influential African-Americans.[59]

Meanwhile, a parallel, private-sector effort in the realm of foreign policy was also working to give African-Americans increased leverage at the national level in issues of politically symbolic importance to that community.   This effort, the National Summit on Africa, aims to build the African-American constituency into a force for political change on US Africa policy.   In line with the notion that ethnic diasporas, by focusing on political causes in their respective lands of origin, become "better positioned to mobilize their political communities for empowerment inside the United States" (Shain, 1994/95: 812), it is likely that the National Summit for Africa will dovetail in many ways with the One Nation Initiative.   One aspect of the Summit's programme[60] will be a series of regional summits to debate "key US-Africa issues," which will no doubt involve leaders in the African-American community who would also have participated in the One Nation conferences throughout the US, as well as the Constituency for Africa's "townhall meetings."   These overlapping agendas will most likely contribute to building a connection between mobilising this community for domestic and for foreign policy goals.

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[58]Gallup Poll of 7 February, 1997.

[59]See Rosenblatt, Roger. "Talking Race with the President." *Time* (20 July 1998): 68.

[60]The National Summit's series of regional summits throughout the US over 1997 and 1998 will culminate in a five-day national summit in Washington, DC, in 1999. Also in this Ford/Carnegie funded programme is the *African Odyssey* multi-year arts and cultural festival run by the prestigious Kennedy Center, which will tour the US, and production by an African-American multimedia company, Blackside, of an historical documentary on Africa, *Hopes on the Horizon*. A proposed "Study Commission on Africa," will also complement the Summit's programme. The Summit is currently under executive director MacArthur DeShazer, an African-American formerly on Clinton's NSC Africa team, whose inside knowledge of US policy processes will augment the work of the Summit.

It would be interesting to learn what causal relationship exists, if any, between these efforts and politically symbolic moves on the part of the Clinton administration, such as the numerous high-level visits to Africa, the president's near-apology for slavery delivered during his visit in March 1998,[61] and continued support for the US-South Africa Binational Commission.   As the work of the National Summit on Africa and the Constituency for Africa unfolds, the impact on US Africa policy overall would, it seems, merit further study.

5.3.4.2 *Issues of Global Political Symbolism*

Perceived threats to US hegemony -- representing issues of global political symbolism in US South Africa policy-- fit into the fourth, or redistributive, issue-area as well, although it is more difficult to perceive the asymmetrical domestic impact of such an issue-type without considering the wider debate over the benefits of globalisation and of a reformed role for the US in the increasingly interdependent "global village." The conflictual-elitist policy process inherent in the redistributive issue-area would, however, seem an accurate description of the process underlying the issues in this issue-type, as few members of the public are active on such an esoteric level, and yet opinions vary widely on the part of the political-analytical community that debates such issues as perceived threats to US hegemony.

One example confronting US policymakers in this issue-type is the case of South Africa's stance against US opposition to the complete ban on anti-personnel landmines. The US opposed the ban on the grounds that, until alternatives were available to protect US soldiers in conflict areas such as North Korea, these mines remained a necessity. Maintenance of this position on the part of the US precipitated in 1996 a move by several

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[61]Clinton said that "American participation in the slave trade was wrong" before his visit to Goree Island, the site off the coast of west Africa where slave traders loaded their human cargo for their long trip over the Atlantic. See "Bongo drums and cigars for 'vindicated' Clinton." *Cape Times* (3 April 1998).

nations, including South Africa, to circumvent the established process which the US and other major powers had created for the gradual phasing out of anti-personnel landmines. In spite of US pressure to the contrary, South Africa, with Canada and Norway, led the way to create this alternative process which was able to garner by late 1997 support from over 100 governments for the need to ban these mines immediately and completely (Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 1998: 16-17). The message to the US was clear: America could no longer assume that it would be ultimately in charge of such processes, as it has been able to assume in the past based on its resources and its clout internationally, nor could America pressure allies -- including South Africa -- to follow the US lead in every instance. Interest group activity vis-à-vis US policy on South Africa on this issue did not become apparent during the course of this study, though it may be occurring within small groups in the US focusing on the abolition of landmines. There are likely some linkages at the transnational level between groups in the US and in South Africa focused on the landmines campaign.

Another example of global political symbolism in US South Africa policy, discussed in Chapters Two and Four, is that of South Africa's continued diplomatic relations with "rogue" states which the US has deemed to be sponsoring terrorist activity, such as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, or has attempted to ostracise on anti-communist grounds and for human rights abuses, such as Cuba. The negative effect on US South Africa policy of South Africa's rejection of US pressure on this issue has been demonstrated by the recurring tensions that arise whenever South Africa's diplomatic visits to these states are reported in the press.[62] However, these actions do not attract specific US interest group activity on US South Africa policy, per se.[63] The effects are

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[62]See, for instance, "'We'll sell to whom we want': Mandela rejects US warnings on arms deals." *Cape Times* (16 January 1997), and "US accused of playing the 'bullyboy'." *Cape Times* (27 January 1997).
[63]With regard to "rogue" states, the American-Israeli Political Action Committee and others are, however, considered a root cause of the anti-terrorist legislation underlying this US opposition to maintaining relations with certain third-party states. A vocal anti-Castro lobby was similarly behind the Helms-Burton legislation.

not such therefore that they have derailed engagement with South Africa, as seen in the ongoing Binational Commission meetings and Clinton's 1998 visit.

Any interest group input on these issues in the US would have focused on the wider issues -- a total ban on anti-personnel landmines or relations with "rogue" states -- more than on South Africa's role therein. Such examples of interest group activity, therefore, have little direct effect on US South Africa policy in this issue-type, in which the policy process suggested by the issue-area typology -- conflictual-elitist -- would appear to hold sway.

5.4 *Conclusion: US Public Sentiment and Clinton's South Africa Policy*

Clinton administration policy on South Africa must be seen, in part, as a function of domestic political concerns, expressed through public opinion, legislative action, and interest group activity. In review, public opinion has formed an important backdrop for each of the issue-types identified in US South Africa policy during the 1994-1998 period. Due to a "foreign policy gap," perceptions among policymakers of strong disengagement sentiment on the part of the public led to signs of imminent US withdrawal from such regions as Africa. However, as public support for engagement in Africa, and especially South Africa, became more evident in the second half of the 1990's, forces for disengagement lost momentum.

In this first attempt to apply the Zimmerman issue-area paradigm to interest group activity behind US South Africa policy, the predictions regarding expected policy processes appear to hold. There are, however, instances where the changing dynamics of an issue -- where it involves more or less tangibility or symmetry of impact than before -- can move an issue-type from one issue-area to another (such as in the case of US development assistance to South Africa after 1995). To review, depending on the issue-type in question, interest group activity has been either significant (as in the issue-type of

trade and investment), or minimal (as in the issue-types of security and political symbolism), or has varied over the period in question (as in the issue-type of development assistance.)

General observations about US engagement policy are borne out by the location of interest group activity on US South Africa policy in the issue-area matrix, the majority of which has fallen in the top half of the quadrant in question (see Figure C). This pattern indicates that the net thrust of interest group activity in the post-apartheid period has been in a positive direction, pressing for engagement with South Africa at a deeper level sociopolitically and commercially.

Specifically, concern about US Africa policy have been expressed by the African-American community, both through public opinion and through its elite, creating pressures for delivery on two related issues: Clinton's stated aim that racial harmony in the US be a legacy of his presidency, and US engagement in support of South Africa's experiment in nonracial democracy. Business interests also express concern about US South Africa policy, via a broad range of interest groups (including African-American groups). While current policy runs parallel with most business interests' agendas (the exception being that of the vocal protectionist minority), these groups are pressing for specific changes in US or South African economic policies which will increase US market shares and access to profitable investments.

According to several respondents in the interviewing process behind this study, even with such efforts as the CFA and the National Summit on Africa, there is unlikely to be a constituency for Africa as powerful as that for Israel in American politics, partly because, as one interviewee noted, "the constituencies for Africa in the US are diverse, both within and beyond the African-American community."[64] If interest groups do seek

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[64]See Minter, William. *Making Connections for Africa: Constituencies, Movements, Interest Groups, Coalitions, and Conventional Wisdoms.* Background paper 008, Washington, DC: Africa Policy Information Center (March 1997): 1.

to oppose US policy toward South Africa, they will most likely need another coalescing issue around which they can again become the force they were in fighting Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy. However, if that coalescing issue arises, another interviewee noted, "the NGO and civic activist groups...are not to be ignored."[65]

Moving from the public to the government sector at the sub-unit level of analysis, the following chapter will focus on the bureaucratic politics and processes which constitute a second important factor behind the formulation of US foreign policy.

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[65]From interview with former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker (#26).

CHAPTER SIX
Policymaking on South Africa under Clinton:
Foreign Policy Process, Bureaucracies, and the BNC

Within the context of global developments in the 1990's, and of current US foreign policy goals as set out by the Clinton administration, perceived US public opinion and interest group activity have continued to play an important role (though to a greater or lesser degree depending on the issue-type under examination) in the formulation of US South Africa policy in the 1994-1998 period. The net effect of that contribution has been enhanced engagement with South Africa, especially in the areas of commercial policy and identification with South Africa's new nonracial democracy.

The chapter at hand seeks to move the discussion forward, holding these several other factors in tension, to examine a further important factor shaping US South Africa policy: that is, the institutional framework underlying US foreign policy in general, and the process by which the whole of that institutional framework, made up of its many parts, "makes policy." This *policy process*, to use Zimmerman's term,[1] is multilayered and complex, insofar as most foreign policy decisions must wend their way through a multitude of checks and balances, organisational levels, standard operating procedures, and bureaucratic politics before they reach an outcome. These components of the policy process are each discussed and debated in depth in the literature (eg, Allison, 1971; Snow and Brown, 1994; Hilsman,1993), but constitute, for the purposes of this study, one factor underlying US foreign policy. Before the following issue-area analysis of these bureaucratic politics and processes begins, two aspects of the policy process will be pulled out for fuller discussion: 1) executive-legislative tensions in foreign policy, and 2)

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[1] The reader is reminded, however, that while Zimmerman did not differentiate between domestic politics and policy process in the development of his "issue-based foreign policy paradigm," but chose to lump both together as one factor termed "domestic political processes" in foreign policymaking (p 1205), this study has chosen to separate the two out for the sake of more specific analysis.

the burgeoning US Africa policy bureaucracy. Preceding even that discussion is a brief overview of the constitutional guidelines upon which the American foreign policy process relies for its fundamental form.

Unique to this study, relative to past studies of US foreign policy process, is the intensive campaign on the part of the Clinton administration and spearheaded by Vice President Gore to "reinvent government." This campaign arose from the conviction that the cumbersome nature of the bureaucratic process, intended to safeguard against abuse of power, was often serving rather to obstruct effective policymaking. In this context, the US-South Africa Binational Commission may thus be seen not only as an attempt to take advantage of the "window of opportunity" presented by South Africa's transition to democracy, but also as a pilot project in the Clinton/Gore programme to reform the federal bureaucracy. Whether or not the BNC has succeeded in "reinventing" the US policy process vis-à-vis policy towards post-apartheid South Africa will be addressed in ensuing discussion, as will the implications of success or failure in that venture for future US South Africa policy.

As previously discussed, the controversy over exactly what role policy process plays in the making of foreign policy carries on from the time the concept was first mooted. While this study does not contend, as Henry Kissinger once put it, that "the process is the policy," it does argue that without taking the policy process into account, any attempt to understand foreign policy outcomes will be incomplete. In attempting to discern the degree of US engagement in South Africa in the 1994-1998 period, as this study does, issue-area analysis of the bureaucratic activity within each of the issue-types in US South Africa policy is critical. As in the previous chapter, each instance of activity will be located along the engagement/disengagement continuum within each issue-area quadrant, in order to gain a picture of the net direction of governmental pressure on US South Africa policy under Clinton.

Discussion begins with policy process and the US Constitution.

6.1   *A Survey of the American Foreign Policy Process*

From the end of the second World War, US foreign policymaking has been centralised in the National Security Council (NSC), a highly-elitist organ of the executive branch upon which the president relies for counsel in foreign affairs under most administrations, and whose membership is left to the president's discretion. As such, the NSC has varied in membership with each president since its creation in 1947, but under the Clinton/Gore administration it consists of the Vice President and the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a matter of course, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of the Treasury, the US Representative to the UN, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the White House Chief of Staff are "invited to attend all meetings of the Council," while the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of National Drugs Control Policy attend only those meetings "pertaining to their jurisdiction."[2]

However, the United States, a presidential democracy, is also one of the few nations in the world where the leader of the government is not also the leader of the majority party in the legislature, but is elected by separate ballot. While American leaders have from the beginning debated the wisdom of such an arrangement,[3] the US constitution remains in its original form -- save fewer than 40 amendments over 200 years -- and is defended still as a document "to save the people from autocracy,"[4] or at least from an "imperial presidency" (Fulbright, 1972: 227). The implications of this separation of powers for foreign policy are that while the executive branch, including the NSC, is technically the beginning and the end of the process of US foreign policy formulation and

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[2]See the Clinton administration's website at <www.whitehouse.gov>
[3]See comment by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay at the time of the ratification of the American Constitution (1789), in Rossiter (1961): No 23 & 29.
[4]From Justice Brandeis in the 1926 Myers Case, quoted in Abshire (1979): 68.

execution, the legislature has wide ranging powers to alter or even obstruct the foreign policy programme of any presidential administration. The overturning of President Ronald Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act is cited as one of a few instances in US history in which Congress has ever turned the tide of an administration's foreign policy, in that case, "constructive engagement" (Lindsay, 1994: 281).

6.1.1 Conflict by Design -- The Constitutional Separation of Powers

The sanctity of this separation of powers, which is further extended to include an independent judiciary in matters of procedure, is perhaps one of the least understood aspects of the US foreign policymaking process. Consider, for example, this note from history:

> During his presidency in the late eighteenth century, Thomas Jefferson intercepted a letter from the French government to the US Congress and sent it back to Paris with the message that the President was to be the only channel of communication between the United States and foreign nations. It was from him and him alone that "foreign nations or their agents [were] to learn what is or has been the will of the [American] nation (Corwin,1917: 1).

There is no questionning the plethora of communications between Congress and representatives of other states in the 1990's, the age of electronic mail and easy international air travel. But there are still basic understandings in the US as to a separation of foreign policy powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. The US constitution separates authority in American foreign policy without, however, granting complete independence of action to either the legislative or the executive branch. Thus, not only is an American administration not guaranteed support for its policies, but it must govern the nation on the basis of political agreements with an independently elected legislature. Compromise is often the result.

With regard to foreign policy, the American Constitution endowed the president with the responsibility to negotiate and sign treaties (the latter on Senate approval), to command the armed forces, and to appoint and receive ambassadors. Congress, on the other hand, in addition to its general authority over the appropriation of government funding, received the power to advise and consent on treaties, to confirm or reject presidential nominees for cabinet posts and diplomatic missions, to declare war, and to regulate trade. Congress' power to override a presidential veto of legislation also impinges on presidential powers, but requires a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

This delegation of foreign policy powers, while traditionally interpreted as vesting the conduct of US foreign relations in the executive branch, has often presented difficulties for US policymakers. There have also been several instances, which continue to occur, where the tug and pull of the foreign policymaking process has assured that administration initiatives which began well have floundered not on the rocks of substantive disagreement, but on the rocks of executive-legislative discord.[5] This problem has been the subject of many a proposal for reform in the policymaking process[6] and is likely to be even more so with the increasing importance of trade in US foreign policy in the post Cold War period, pointing to increased legislative influence over US foreign relations.

Woodrow Wilson, in his 1884 commentary on American government, termed periods in which a strong willed American legislature dominated a weak president "congressional government."[7] These surges of congressional activism typically followed

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[5]The recent defeat of President Clinton's request for renewed "fast-track" authority in trade negotiations is only one example. Another is the fact that Congress has not enacted a foreign aid authorisation bill since 1985, leaving most foreign assistance programmes unauthorised. (Nowels, 1997a: 2).

[6]See, for instance, *Strengthening Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy.* Congress and Foreign Policy Series No 8, US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC (1983) ; and for discussion of the general issues, Spanier, John and Nogee, Joseph. *Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy.* New York: Pergamon Press (1981).

[7]From the introduction by Walter Lippman, p. 14, in Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government.*

periods of war or economic depression, when the legislature perceived that it must wrest back some of the control commonly gained by the executive during such testing times.[8] One recent example is that of the Post-Vietnam War "democratisation" of Congress. Throughout the 1980's, however, several of the new provisions for congressional authority in matters of foreign policy, such as the War Powers Resolution, were called into question[9] or even, in the case of a legislative veto on matters of policy, struck down as unconstitutional.[10] Indeed, when President Bush was calling on America to support war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq over Kuwait in 1991, Congress again (after some objections) followed the prevalent historical pattern in American foreign policy: congressional deference to the executive branch.[11] Subsequent cuts in government spending under House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich, in his campaign to balance the US federal budget, included reducing House committee staffs by a third, a move which further eroded the "democratisation" efforts of the 1970's and early 1980's.

How has this affected US South Africa policy? For one thing, there were fears that, once again, there might be moves to abolish the House Subcommittees on Africa -- fears that were quelled only after a meeting between the Congressional Black Caucus and House Speaker Newt Gingrich in which the latter gave assurances to the contrary (Copson, 1996: 31). However, signalling revived congressional foreign policy activism and an increased ability to drive policy on Africa and South Africa under the current emphasis on trade in foreign relations, Congress' Africa Growth and Opportunity Act was

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Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1981). Originally published in 1885.

[8]Professor Seth Tillman concludes this in his course notes on *Vietnam and the Teaching of Congress and Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University (1984): 7.

[9]Robert F. Turner called the War Powers Resolution "unconstitutional, ineffective, unwise" in his critical analysis of the Act in *The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice*. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute (1983): 107.

[10]The supreme court ruled in 1983, in *I.N.S. vs Chadha*, that the legislative veto is constitutional only when affecting congressional procedure, but not policy. See discussion in James M. Lindsay, "Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism" in the *International Studies Quarterly* (1994): 286.

[11]For a chronology and discussion of congressional opposition before the "resolution authorising the use of force" against Iraq was passed, see Snow/Brown, *Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom*: 242-4.

presented (in its original form) ahead of the similar White House initiative on Africa (Dagne, 1997: 1). Factors extraneous to the constitutional delineation of powers -- developments in communications, in cross-national relations, in interest group activism and influence, for instance -- would also point to a continued increase in congressional activism and influence on foreign policy generally (Lindsay, 1992-3: 609; Tierney, 1994: 103; and Huntington, 1997: 46).

As Congress, in effect, mirrors domestic political trends, discussion at this point overlaps greatly with the earlier issue-area analysis of public opinion and interest group activity. To review, the Zimmerman paradigm suggests that domestic politics have their greatest influence in those issue-areas involving tangible political goods, as in issues of distribution and regulation. Likewise, congressional activism in foreign policy matters would tend to fall in the categories of regulation and distribution.[12] This study suggests, however, that members of Congress might also be seen as elite players if their activism is undertaken without the support of constituents.

This study now turns to an examination of the wider Africa bureaucracy before setting out on issue-area analysis of the bureaucratic processes and politics in US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period.

6.1.2 The Burgeoning Africa Bureaucracy

The growth of the US bureaucracy on Africa, as with most of the US foreign policy bureaucracy, began in the context of the Cold War, when US interests in the continent revolved around issues of geopolitical security and competition for third world loyalties. In 1957, ten years after the Department of State emerged as a separate bureaucratic entity from the War Office,[13] US Vice-President Richard Nixon visited

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[12]One exception was in the 1994-96 period, when elites were most active on issues of development assistance due to perception that aid had become a redistributive issue nationally. See the section on development assistance in Chapter 5.

[13]1947 saw the creation of the Departments of State and Defense, and of the National Security Council, in

Africa to assess US interests and options on the continent. At that time, the Soviet Union was actively seeking to influence nations of the third world and the "winds of change" were gathering force over colonial Africa, bringing independence to one nation after another. In his trip report, Nixon predicted that "the course of [Africa's] development...could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between the forces of freedom and international communism,"[14] and recommended the creation of a Bureau for African Affairs. Previously handled by the Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs (which was preceded by the Bureau for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs), US relations with Africa were boosted by the installation of a separate bureau in 1958. The focus on Africa (though by no means at the top of policy agendas) grew under President Kennedy in the early 1960's with the inception of the Peace Corps and new experiments in Africa in the area of development assistance. As the threat of communist influence over the newly independent African nations largely faded in the latter part of the 1960's -- the former colonies either choosing to remain in the western camp or rejecting both east and west to try their own political arrangements -- US strategic interest waned. The ensuing thirty years showed a pattern of low priority status given to the continent in US policy circles, interrupted by occasional high-profile African political events which required some American response. These included, for instance, the Biafran War of the late 1960's, Angolan independence in the mid 1970's, the intensification of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa in the mid 1980's, and South Africa's peaceful triumph over apartheid in the early 1990's.[15]

The latter event, happening as it did soon after the more general transformation in international relations with the end of the Cold War, opened the way for more diverse US

order to deal with the growing threat of war with the Soviet Union.

[14]"The Vice President's Report to the President on His Trip to Africa, February 28-March 21, 1957," April 5, 1957, White House Office Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Quoted in Clough, 1994: 6.

[15]Peter Schraeder posits this perspective, and discusses each of these cases in detail, in *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa* (1994).

relations with the nations of Africa, and specifically with South Africa. This expansion of relations has been mirrored in the bureaucracy which deals with Africa, from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce and beyond. While this expansion of relations has added to the complexity of policymaking on Africa, there have also been efforts on the part of the Clinton/Gore administration to reform the process on the grounds of both efficiency and relevance. This reform drive includes the formation of the US-South Africa Binational Commission.

6.1.2.1 *The Need to Reorganise*

In the 1790's, the Secretary of State oversaw a "bureaucracy" that consisted of five clerks, one translator, two messengers, and two overseas diplomatic missions. In the 1990's, the Secretary of State oversees a department which employs over 24,000 people and supports 300 embassies, consulates and missions overseas -- yet remains the smallest of all the cabinet-level agencies and has a budget roughly six percent that of the Department of Defense (Snow and Brown, 1994: 91). These figures indicate not only the vastness of the US federal bureaucracy, but also the challenge for students of the current US foreign policy process: namely, increased complexity. The Department of State alone presents a myriad of overlapping functional and regional offices to confound even the most determined observer, and represents only the tip of the iceberg which is the foreign policymaking process. With regard to policy on international trade, for instance, depending on the issue, upwards of 20 different federal bureaucratic entities, in and outside of the Department of State, will be involved in the decisionmaking process (Nunn, Domenici, and Miller, 1994: 34).

Activity on Africa policy is likewise scattered throughout the US federal government, in offices and bureaux which are either focused on Africa, or from time to time overlap with the process of policymaking on Africa. At the Department of State (DOS) -- besides the Africa Bureau -- the Bureaus for International Organisations,

Refugee Programmes, Legislative Affairs, and Humanitarian Affairs are often active on US Africa policy. The Agency for International Development and the US Information Service (which have been reorganised as of 1997 to fall under the purview of the Secretary of State) have regional offices dealing with Africa, as does the US Trade and Development Agency. Outside of DOS, there are the regional desks within the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce and its attendant trade-related bodies, as well as in the Department of the Treasury and the Office of the US Trade Representative. And this list expands greatly with the inclusion of the many new bureaucratic agents involved in the US-South Africa Binational Commission, including for instance the Departments of Transportation, of the Interior, of Energy, of Health and Human Services, and the White House Office on Science and Technology. These federal agencies, in turn, must cooperate with the legislative branch, which has its own set of committees, subcommittees and staffers which affect US policy on Africa. Besides the Africa Subcommittees of the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there are the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, with their subcommittees dealing with trade; the House and Senate committees dealing with military affairs; and the respective Appropriations Committees, to name a few.

Even before (but especially after) the budget crisis of late 1995 and early 1996, when the US federal government was virtually shut down while lawmakers sought a resolution to the impasse between Congress and the executive branch over balancing the federal budget (which included severe cuts to the foreign affairs account), several ideas for reorganising the foreign affairs bureaucracy surfaced (eg, Stokes, 1994: 231-235; Eagleburger and Barry, 1996: 4-8). Efforts to reframe the debate abounded, focusing on the small size of the foreign affairs budget -- at less than a tenth of one percent of the federal budget in 1997 -- relative to its importance in the current global age (eg, Walker,

1997: 1; Muravchik, 1996: 8). There was also an attempt at structural reappraisal by the Department of State which began with an outline of new, post-Cold War challenges. A Department of State task force charged with this effort listed several: renewing the US economy to compete in an increasingly interdependent world; supporting democracy and market economies worldwide; confronting global issues such as the environment, drugs, and AIDS; redefining national security in the light of the rising threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, directing US diplomacy in order to capitalise on new opportunities for multilateral cooperation (US Department of State, 1992: 217). In 1998, they would no doubt have added the need to reform the current international financial regime, which appears insufficient to meet the threat of financial meltdown facing a large part of the world. Even as it stands, however, the list is surprising for its admission that the US economy, generally the domain of the Department of Commerce, is a top US foreign policy priority.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) also came in for some critical scrutiny, by advocates and detractors alike (Graham and O'Hanlon, 1997; Gordon, 1996; Kull et al, 1997: 95-114) during the reorganisation process. Declining foreign aid budgets brought the message home even louder: increase effectiveness, not spending. Despite the 1997 bargain struck with Senator Jesse Helms over the resubordination of USAID under the DOS umbrella, USAID continues to fight declining budgets.

Perhaps most germane to the discussion of US policy on South Africa, however, has been the reordering of foreign policy priorities in which trade and investment have become the keystone of Clinton's foreign policy, and the resulting changes in the bureaucratic processes and politics.

6.1.2.2 *Commerce to the fore*

As trade and investment are the watchwords of global relations and of US foreign policy in the 1990's, it is not surprising that elements of the foreign policy bureaucracy

charged with developing and implementing US trade policy have come to the fore, in South Africa policy and in general.

In an early attempt to drive this transformation, and making good on his campaign promise to focus on the reinvigoration of the US economy through expanded trade and investment opportunities, President Clinton established by an executive order in January 1993 a National Economic Council. The NEC was designed to coordinate domestic and international economic policy from a central point in the White House, forming an economic counterpart to the National Security Council -- the powerful hub of foreign policy formulation established during the Cold War years. Clinton's was not the first administration to attempt coordination of international economic policy; in 1971, for instance (just as Nixon was about to drop the gold standard), the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) was established. The CIEP followed years of wrangling over the creation of a department to deal comprehensively with such matters as trade, investment, balance of payments issues and finance. Such a department, envisioned under the Special Trade Representative (now, the USTR), never reached the floor of Congress due to fears that ""trade policy" might become isolated from "economic and foreign policy interests" (Destler, 1980: 208). Instead, the CIEP was set up much like the National Security Council, as an "umbrella for a staff of substantive aides reporting directly to the president," and mandated to provide a "clear top-level focus for the full range of international economic policy issues" (p.213). However, as it became "not so much a coordinator as a competitor" with the departments already dealing with each of the issues under its mandate, the CIEP was allowed to expire by 1977.

Similarly, the NEC has not, as yet, successfully taken up the challenge of pulling the disparate players in the foreign trade policymaking process together. Its emphasis on domestic, as opposed to international, economic affairs is reflected in the fact that only three of the 18 NEC staff focus on international issues. The National Economic Advisor, Gene Sperling, is hardly a visible foreign policy actor, and reports little activity in the

realm of coordinating US international trade and investment policy.[16] Instead, under the leadership of the Department of Commerce, a Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee operates to bring together agencies involved in trade. Through the vehicle of the TPCC, Commerce and other agencies such as the US Trade Representative (which has operated out of the White House since 1962), the Department of the Treasury, and the various trade related offices referred to above, appear to have gained influence in many of the foreign policy issues facing the Clinton/Gore team. This commercial emphasis is reflected in US policymaking on South Africa, which shall be demonstrated in succeeding pages of issue-area analysis.

6.1.2.3 *"Reinventing Government"*

The broad and deep domestic content of trade policy, coupled with the explosion of activity in the financial and commercial realm of the mid 1990's, have both played a role in bringing commercial policy further to the fore in foreign policy considerations. Even as international trade policy became a matter of increased domestic interest, the urgency of addressing at the multilateral level such issues as environmental degradation, nuclear and chemical weapon proliferation, organised crime, and the possibility of global financial "meltdown," became increasingly apparent. These dynamics have brought greater complexity to the policy process even as rapid responses are increasingly critical in the world of real-time news coverage as discussed in Chapter Two.

It is in this milieu that President Clinton and Vice President Gore's initiatives on "reinventing government" have captured the imagination of some bureaucrats, even as they have frustrated others. Before turning to discussion of "reinventing government" and the innovation inherent in the Gore-Mbeki BNC, the discussion first turns to an analysis of the US bureaucracy on South Africa in terms of issue-areas. By analysing these

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[16]See www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/nec/html/sperling.html

bureaucracies within the same framework employed for the study of interest groups, the goal is to provide an overall picture of the role of, and direction of pressure on engagement policy from, the domestic politics and policy process behind US policy on South Africa under President Clinton.

Figure D

**BUREAUCRATIC ACTIVITY ON US SOUTH AFRICA POLICY
AND DIRECTION OF ACTIVITY**

Cooperative
vs
Conflictual

US Domestic Impact
Symmetrical?

YES   NO

I: Development Assistance	II: Trade & Investment
BNC*	*BNC**
DoState	*DoTreasury*
US AID	*USTR*
USIS	*DoCommerce***
	USTDA

cooperative ↑↓ conflictual

YES

Congressional budget-cutters	*USTR Congress*

Tangible Benefits?

NO

III: Security	IV: Political Symbolism
White House, OVP, CIA DoState (ACDA)	*BNC**
DoState FBI, INS, DEA	*Some*
DoDefence Customs, White	*African-*
US Rep to House office on	*American*
the UN Science & Tech	*Officials*

cooperative ↑↓ conflictual

---Regional--------\----Global------ ---Domestic-----\----Global--------
DoDefence *(landmines)* *Congressional budget-cutters* *White House NSC, DoS DoDefence*

* BNC includes activity under the OVP by Departments of Transport, Energy, Interior, Health, Labour, Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, the White House office on Science and Technology.

** Involved under the auspices of the Department of Commerce are the Export-Import Bank, the International Trade Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, OPIC, the foreign commercial service, and the Minister Counselor Arnold, as well as the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee.

(Based on Zimmerman's "Issue-based Foreign Policy Paradigm")

6.2 *Bureaucratic Process and Politics, and Issue Types in US South Africa Policy*

As with societal sources of foreign policy where different issue-areas involve different configurations of interest groups and other actors, so in the institutional case different issue-areas involve different groups of bureaucracies, each of which have their own peculiar sets of hierarchy, culture and politics.   The specific placement of US bureaucracies within policymaking on South Africa under Clinton is illustrated in the matrix above (see Figure D), based on their involvement in different issues and on whether they are thereby encouraging conflict or cooperation (and therefore, encouraging engagement or disengagement). The BNC and the policy process which that entity entails will be addressed both within each issue-type, and as an example of a unique policy process on its own.

6.2.1   Development Assistance and the Bureaucracy

While development assistance is often used to garner public favour from interested American constituencies, it is more expressly used by policymakers to support US national interests abroad. Through the economic development of allies and potential allies, US assistance aims to contribute to the stability of the international system, as well as increased US leverage therein. US aid levels to the Middle East are the highest, but have long exceeded any developmental rationale and are based on strategic and economic interests in the region, as well as on domestic political considerations. US aid levels to Africa, on the other hand, are historically among the lowest in the world, and remain so, (see Table 4 below) based on the perceived relative lack of strategic interests in the continent as well as a perceived lack of public interest in Africa.

In line with aid in general, as well as with the mid-1990's anxieties about US economic performance, the US proportion of total international overseas development assistance (ODA) to Africa has been on the decline in the 1990's (although the decline has been slowed by the public support for aid to Africa shown in the 1994-1995 period, as

191

Table 4. Leading Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid: FY1997 and FY1998 Request
(appropriation allocations — $ in millions)

	FY1997 Allocation	FY1998 Request
Israel	$3,000.0	$3,000.0
Egypt	$2,116.0	$2,116.1
Russia	$100.1	$246.2
Turkey	$208.3	$231.0
Ukraine	$228.4	$229.1
Bosnia	$218.1	$225.5
Greece	$122.5	$122.5
Armenia	$96.0	$81.1
Bolivia	$76.3	$78.1
Jordan*	$47.1	$75.6
West Bank/Gaza	$75.0	$75.0
Peru	$48.7	$74.9
South Africa	$79.5	$72.5
Haiti	$73.2	$71.7

(Source: Copson, (1997b): 8)

discussed in the previous chapter). In 1994, the US was the second leading donor of ODA to Africa after France. By 1995, according to the OECD, the US had slipped to fourth place behind France, Japan and Germany. Some 14 developed countries gave a larger share of their net ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa than did the US in 1995.[17]

Likely institutional reaction to this downward pressure on aid levels is well-documented: agency representatives will seek not only to protect aid levels in order to

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[17]From *Development Cooperation.* The OECD Development Assistance Committee 1996 Report, quoted in Copson, 1997: 9.

meet developmental goals in recipient states, but also to maintain "turf," or even institutional survival (Halperin & Kantor, 1973: 10). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, there was recently a major challenge to the concept of foreign assistance itself, in the form of the 1995 campaign by Republican legislators to eliminate most forms of aid and the attendant bureaucracies.[18] With the end of the Cold War as a backdrop -- robbing aid of its political justification in the eyes of many -- these antagonists reframed aid funding as a redistributive issue, playing on the sense of national economic malaise of the early 1990's, and projecting cuts in the aid budgets as a trade-off for threatened domestic welfare budgets. The campaign was successful in cutting foreign assistance spending, but not in ending aid altogether and, as of 1998, the aid bureaucracies have remained intact, though reorganised and with reduced budgets.[19]

While aid to Africa was spared somewhat from the worst of the cuts in 1995 due to pressure from a coalition built by the Constituency for Africa, the effectiveness of many of the African programmes is under review after reports that most African countries are worse off now than they were before aid began (Graham, 1997: 19). The threat to aid has, however, only peripherally affected US aid to the newly democratic South Africa which, it appears, remains a matter of overriding domestic political importance. Besides South Africa's economic reforms and strong performance since apartheid's end, the general euphoria surrounding South Africa's transition appeared not to allow the administration or Congress to countenance major cuts to Pretoria's programme, except in the future on the grounds of South Africa's readiness to "graduate" from development assistance to more commercial forms of US policy engagement.[20]

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[18]Legislation along these lines was introduced in the 104th Congress, based on an overwhelming perception among legislators that Americans would like to "nix aid" (Kull, Destler and Ramsay, 1997: 97), but failed. See also Copson (1997):1.

[19]Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Jesse Helms achieved this reorganisation by promising (partial) payment of UN arrears, which was later held up over a controversial provision on international population control.

[20]See Copson, 1997: 11, on South Africa as a special focus of Clinton's aid policy in Africa.

From within the US government itself, however, came a highly publicised congressional attack on USAID's mission in South Africa. These objections, noted in the press and at the ANC national conference in early 1998,[21] were not based on changing geostrategic priorities or lack of economic effectiveness, but rather on the lack of accountability of the mission and a perceived inappropriateness of specific projects. Debate, in short, focused on the implementation and not on the existence or size of US development assistance to South Africa. The conflictual-elitist process entailed in that debate, however, contradicts expectations that a consensual-pluralist policy process would apply in this issue-type, placed as it was in the distributive issue-area at the outset of this study. But, as noted in Chapter Four, this apparent contradiction is actually caused by the fact that development assistance in US South Africa policy shifted out of quadrant I and into quadrant IV, the redistributional issue-area. This shift was largely due to changes in systemic and national factors which undermined the consensus upon which aid policy had been based since its inception, as well as the unique nature of the USAID mission to South Africa over the 1994-1998 period (as shall be demonstrated more fully below). This failure to meet the expectations established at the outset signifies not so much a weakness in the expectations of the Zimmerman paradigm as a limitation of this study in making judgements about an issue-type. The issues within this issue-type obviously changed in nature in terms of the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of impact, and the change was enough to move development assistance to a new issue-area. This is an important limitation which must be noted for the future application of the Zimmerman typology using issue-types. At this point, however, we turn to the specific bureaucratic dynamics of South Africa's development assistance programme under Clinton.

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[21] See Mandela, Nelson. "Looking Ahead to the Millennium." Special Supplement on the ANC 1997 national conference, *Cape Times* (23 December 1997): 2.

6.2.1.1 *USAID/SA*

The USAID mission in South Africa (USAID/SA) was formally established in late 1986, based on a legislative mandate to "assist victims of apartheid and promote a peaceful, negotiated end to the apartheid system" (CAAA, 1986, Sections103 and 106). Funding increased dramatically (from $7 million in FY1985 to a peak of $212 million, including $81 million in guarantees, in FY1994[22]), and the USAID representative at the US embassy in Pretoria was replaced by a mission director and several personnel. This new entity relocated itself away from the embassy compound in separate offices, to underline its independence from the anti-sanctions campaign of the (by then defunct) policy of constructive engagement. This move, according to USAID's own evaluation from Washington, DC, "created considerable tension" between USAID/SA and the embassy. But it was the "unique political activist role" of the USAID mission in South Africa (relative to other USAID missions) which provided the grounds for the congressional attack on the mission in 1996. In a trip report to the (Republican) chairman of the House International Relations Committee, staff members warned that, contrary to the overall mission of the US government in South Africa after 1994 to "support President Mandela and his government to address his country's needs," USAID had carried on with "intensely political, potentially controversial interventions" in internal South African political affairs. Listing among its goals (which also included black private sector development, jobs and infrastructure, education and health delivery) the strengthening of democratic and political institutions in South Africa, USAID was still funding advocacy groups to monitor and lobby for changes in government policies and "even setting up trust funds to pay for legal challenges in court against the new government's action or inaction" (Munson and Christenson, 1996:2). Congress found this

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[22]In the US, a fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September. Levels have declined somewhat, but remain the highest in Africa, and higher than those to Latin America and the Caribbean due to commitments from President Clinton following the election of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first democratically elected leader.

state of affairs unacceptable, and its declaration that USAID was "making President Mandela's task more difficult" was quoted in the press on more than one occasion.[23]

Also pertinent to the bureaucratic analysis of this section was criticism directed at the administration of the USAID programme in South Africa. "The AID South Africa program was selected for inspection because the program represents the new direction in AID's management and program strategy," wrote the staffers, pointing out that USAID had been chosen as a model agency for the Gore "reinventing government" initiative. However, they found not only that the "highly political nature of the South Africa program raises...serious questions about AID's integration into the overall foreign policy structure of our government," but that the disproportionate employment of foreign nationals undermined the ability of anyone in Washington, including USAID headquarters, to oversee the project approval process to an appropriate degree. The report concluded that "further Congressional review of the relationship between AID's expanded political agenda and the traditional foreign policy prerogatives and responsibility of the Secretary of State appears warranted" and that "some realignment of responsibilities and authorities appears to be long overdue" (Munson and Christenson, 1996: 2). This appraisal was, of course, in line with calls by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, to submit USAID to the authority of the Secretary of State, as in the original conception of the agency. The reorganising legislation of 1997, providing for changes to that effect, may well have been due in part to the congressional staffers' critical appraisal of USAID/SA. Subsequently, embassy officials point out, USAID/SA has gradually become more a government-to-government programme, and the practice of reserving USAID contracts for businesses run by "historically disadvantaged minorities" from the US has been curtailed.[24]

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[23]Besides the ANC conference report coverage in the press, see Randall, Estelle. "State to take action on 'meddling' US aid agency." *Cape Times* (16 February 1998).
[24]Confidential interview (#51).

Perhaps with USAID's South Africa mission entering a more normalised stage of operation, the conflictual-elitist process which has characterised its first twelve years may revert to the more expected consensual-pluralist process, in accordance with the pattern suggested by the placement of the development assistance issue-type under the distributive issue-area. On the other hand, with the introduction of the BNC, there have been further challenges to bureaucratic norms for USAID/SA.

6.2.1.2 *USAID and the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission*

Concomitant to this controversy about authority over USAID programmes and administration, and about USAID's mission to South Africa in particular, was the creation and consolidation of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. This commission introduced yet another hierarchical element directly over USAID/SA -- the office of the Vice-President (OVP) -- as well as several new bureaucratic actors in the US foreign assistance efforts in South Africa. According to both USAID/SA and OVP, the BNC has not replaced the USAID/SA mission but, in the initial stages of the commission in 1995, there was some jostling and negotiation to sort out which programmes would remain under the purview of USAID/SA exclusively, and which programmes might be subsumed under the BNC. Most of the USAID/SA education programme, for instance, has remained separate from the BNC, as it "already had its own momentum." At the same time, several federal agencies and departments involved with the Gore-Mbeki Commission, but lacking international programme funds, have sought to work through USAID/SA's budget. The Department of Transport, for instance, has few funds for overseas programmes (although the AGOA would have provided some), and has been working with USAID in Washington to further develop its initiative to develop the transportation infrastructure of Southern Africa (Peasely, 1997: 2). The Peace Corps programme in South Africa, which sent its first volunteers in early 1998, was negotiated and signed via the BNC, but is funded by USAID. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, Donna Shalala, signed a joint statement with South African Minister of Health Nkosazana Zuma on violence as a public health problem, and another on occupational safety and health, yet both these initiatives appeared later under an USAID/Ministry of Health joint effort on health issues which also includes cooperation in addressing HIV/AIDS, emerging infectious diseases, and substance abuse. Further BNC-driven development assistance initiatives operate out of the Departments of Energy, of the Interior, of Labor, of Agriculture, and of Housing and Urban Development, and several are relying on USAID at least in part for funding.[25] In addition, several of these initiatives include exchange programmes for South African officials under the Transition Support Fund, an USAID fund administered by the US Information Service in Pretoria. All of these initiatives put increased pressure on USAID budgets.

Thus, while USAID has asserted that its South Africa programmes are being phased out over a ten-year period, actually foreign assistance has expanded -- under the aegis of the BNC -- as a component of US bilateral relations with South Africa since 1994. The expansion has brought many new bureaucratic actors into the process, each with their own set of standard operating procedures and organisational politics. Foreign assistance policy formulation, it would seem, rests with the Department of State (and more so since the reorganising legislation of 1997), but also to an unusual degree with the Office of the Vice President. All of the above serves to heighten the conflictual-elitist nature of policymaking on development issues in US South Africa policy.

6.2.2   Trade and Investment, and the Bureaucracy

The fact of the rise of commercial issues within foreign policy generally, in response to international developments in the post Cold-War world, has placed commercial bureaucracies in a new position of power in US foreign policy-making, as

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[25]Confidential interview (#8).

discussed earlier.   The fact of South Africa's new nonracial democracy is a further impetus behind the rise of trade and investment issues to new prominence in US South Africa policy.   In the past, even as commercial ties were rationalised in terms of US security concerns -- the threat of communist aggression in Africa, and the need for access to strategic metals of which South Africa was a major supplier -- business was downplayed due to the liability of a close association with apartheid.   In the post-1994 era, however, enhanced US-South Africa trade and investment ties stand on their own as worthy policy goals.

Turning to the issue-area paradigm, US-South Africa policy with regard to trade and investment in the 1994-1998 period appears to fit in the second, or regulatory, quandrant.   It should therefore involve a conflictual-pluralist policymaking process.   Is this corroborated by the specifics underlying US commercial policymaking on South Africa?

6.2.2.1 *Africa on the Commercial Agenda*

Trade and investment (the latter to a lesser degree) are regulated by a number of ..deral bureaucracies, as discussed, all subject to the tug and pull of executive-legislative wrangling over administration goals and congressional authorisation.   Trade and investment in Africa has, by many accounts, received unprecedented attention from the foreign policy bureaucracy under the Clinton/Gore administrations, attention generated not only by Africa's economic realities but by various efforts to highlight them. Congress, for instance, in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, required a series of five reports from the administration on how to address the marginalisation of Africa from the new international trade regime emerging at that time.   This legislation set in motion an "interagency process" which coincided with the legislature's own initiatives on Africa. A White House conference on Africa in June 1994, for instance, brought together administration officials and members of Congress and the public to discuss "critical

African issues and the US response to them," including bilateral trade and investment ties. Three years later, the administration announced its plans for a "Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa," which resembled the AGOA in many respects. All of the above contributed momentum to a process which seems to have broken the bureaucratic inertia of the Cold War years on US Africa policy, prompted both by the interest of the wider public and that of the policy community seeking to promote liberal democracy wherever possible.

6.2.2.2 *Secretary Brown sets the pace*

At the same time that Africa, and particularly South Africa, was rising on US commercial agendas, commerce as a whole was coming to the fore in US foreign policy. This phenomenon was reflected widely in US policymaking on South Africa, due in large part to the strong leadership taken on the policy by the US Department of Commerce under the late Secretary Ron Brown. The first high-level Washington official to visit South Africa after US sanctions were lifted, Brown considered the role of the Department of Commerce (DOC) to be "the bridge between domestic and foreign policy," telling one journalist that "commercial interests are now on a par with security in the world of foreign policy" (Ogden, 1996: 37). This did not always sit well, according to several interview respondents, with Department of State officials who saw George Moose, their own Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, upstaged in the formulation of policy and initiatives on South Africa in that period. For instance, after South Africa's elections in early 1994, the Department of Commerce moved quickly to promote trade and investment with South Africa. Millard Arnold, appointed as the department's highest ranking foreign commercial officer and the one roving minister counsellor available to DOC, was stationed with much publicity in Johannesburg. Together with South Africa's Ministry for Trade and Industry, DOC created the US-South Africa Business Development Council, a precursor of sorts for the Binational Commission. And in early 1995, DOC's

Policymaking on South Africa

Big Emerging Market conference focused foreign trade-related bureaucracies on US policy towards South Africa and nine other BEM's.

The Commerce Department was well equipped to handle the burgeoning trade and investment relations with South Africa, wielding not only its regional and sector specialists, the but also the International Trade Administration, the Export-Import Bank and the Foreign Commercial Service in its set of bureaucratic tools. The Department of State's Africa Bureau, on the other hand, is not designed for such purposes. The Office of Southern Africa Affairs has one economic counsellor to deal with the region, who must coordinate policy with the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs under the Undersecretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, neither of which appear to have taken any lead on US Africa policy. The US Trade and Development Agency, which operates only when mandated to do so by the Department of State, has been active in South Africa since 1993, but only within the narrow confines of that mandate: to assist in the economic growth of low and mid-income countries, and to promote the interest of US companies. Overall, the contributions of the Department of State, contrasted with those of the Department of Commerce, were much less visible, the little-noted testimony by Moose before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade in March 1995 serving as a good example. Another public appearance by a DOS Africa Bureau official, that of Deputy Assistant Secretary Regina Brown at an Overseas Development Council congressional staff forum in September 1997, showed up a DOS tendency to defend the continued use of aid, a powerful tool in its own arsenal, in economic development efforts. Such pronouncements are no doubt indicative of the turf battles waged behind closed doors between these two new rivals for foreign policy supremacy, DOS having always before had the upper hand over DOC and instead focusing on competition from the Department of Defense.

Subsequently, under the second Clinton administration, a stronger Department of State team on Africa -- including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Assistant

Secretary for African Affairs Sue Rice (whose immediately prior appointment was with the NSC on Africa) -- has reasserted its voice in Africa trade policy. Both these officials made visits to the continent early in their tenure (as opposed to Warren Christopher, Clinton's first Secretary of State, who waited nearly four years to make the trip), and show strong support for the policy of increasing both trade and investment in the region, especially insofar as it effectively supports the department's other policy objectives of countering transnational threats such as terrorism and organised crime, and building mechanisms for conflict resolution (Smythe, 1998: 82).   A previous member of the NSC who worked with Rice predicted that "for the remains of [Clinton's second] term," in any case, "policy making on Africa should shift back to State. Joe Wilson (Rice's successor at the NSC as senior director on Africa) seems to assume he will take his lead from State."[26] The Department of Commerce has, however, maintained a high level of activity on US South Africa policy under Brown's successor, William Daley. It is significant, for instance, that Secretary Daley, according to one Cape Town embassy official, has become the most frequent official visitor to South Africa since his appointment in 1997. In 1998 alone, Daley visited South Africa in March, September and December, with plans to visit in February 1999 as well.

6.2.2.3 *Other Bureaucratic Actors on Trade and Investment*

Another important bureaucratic actor in this issue type has been the Department of the Treasury. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who featured as a keynote speaker at the well-attended CCA "Attracting Capital to Africa Summit" in April 1997, visited South Africa, and other nations on the continent, in July 1998 to discuss fiscal and monetary policy with national leaders and with representatives of small business. His deputy

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[26]Confidential interview (#20).

Lawrence Summers made a similar tour in mid 1997, just before the Denver G7/8 conference where the administration's own Africa initiative was announced.

The White House-based Office of the US Trade Representative has similarly notched up its involvement on the continent, creating the new post of Assistant Trade Representative to Africa. The first incumbent, Rosa Whittaker, visited Johannesburg in April 1998 to seek increased support among South African leaders for the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. USTR has, however, had a more negative role in US South Africa policy than have other bureaucratic players, as it has responsibility for intellectual property rights. South Africa's appearance on the USTR watch list for alleged IPR violations, both in 1996 over misuse of the McDonald's restaurant trademark and, in 1998, over South African pharmaceuticals legislation which contained potential threats to patent rights, has hovered in the background of two Binational Commission meetings. US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, moreover, carries the responsibility of reporting annually on any foreign trade barriers, and in 1998 felt impelled to label South Africa as "anti-competitive" for its weak competition laws as well as for the use of non-tariff barriers to trade.

Finally, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an independent government agency that sells investment services to assist US companies investing abroad, "because it is in America's economic and strategic interest" to do so, draws in private sector financing to develop markets in emerging economies. In 1997, under the White House "Partnership" initiative, which included $650 million in investment funds for OPIC to promote business and pay for infrastructure projects, OPIC opened the New Africa Opportunity Fund. The NAOF provides loan guarantees for US private investment in the SADC nations. (OPIC's Modern Africa Fund offers similar benefits to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.)

6.2.2.4 *The BNC and US commercial policy*

The introduction of the Binational Commission to this hive of bureaucratic activity has both complicated the bureaucratic politics affecting US policy on issues of trade and investment in South Africa, and expedited policy formulation and execution. By imposing lateral thinking on project design, for instance, it has drawn together offices from different departments and agencies, but focusing on results. One project, for instance, under the auspices of the Science and Technology Committee of the BNC, involved the US Department of Agriculture sharing technology with its South Africa counterpart, with the primary goal of supporting "small-scale farmers and creating business enterprises in rural areas through joint technology development." A practical output of that effort was an exhibit in Washington, DC, of indigenous South African flowers in late 1997 which drew considerable interest from US importers.[27]

While the BNC has certainly added to the conflictual nature of policy-making in one sense, in that "some bureaucrats get whacked out of shape when they have the White House wanting special programmes,"[28] it has also drawn the process more deeply into the elitist realm, away from the more pluralist mode expected in issues involving such tangible goods. In any case, having brought the weight of the vice-presidency to bear on issues of trade and investment, the BNC has certainly altered the normal trade policymaking processes.

6.2.2.5 *Concerns about the Commercial Agenda*

Pulling against this general thrust of increased engagement in matters of trade and investment, even more so than the USTR who at least is seeking improved trade relations, have been elements within the Congress reacting to constituency concerns of job

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[27]Based on interview with South African Embassy official, October 1997, Washington, DC.
[28]Confidential interview (#20).

competition. Also, Africanists within both the executive and legislative branches are likely to share concerns with colleagues outside of government that the general commercial thrust of US policy is tilted toward the wealthy in Africa, and therefore detrimental to the continent in the long run. These fears have been fuelled by recent volatility in currency markets among emerging economies worldwide, although not yet realised in the case of South Africa.

The bureaucratic processes and politics underlying US South Africa policy must be taken together with the activities of interest groups and with public opinion in order to see whether the overall nature of the policy process in this issue-type is truly conflictual-pluralist, as the issue-area paradigm would suggest. Judging from the breadth of public activity and debate on trade and investment in US South Africa policy, and the high degree of responsiveness to that activity on the part of the several bureaucratic actors and the Congress, it would seem that the facts do support the proposed pattern of policymaking for regulatory issues.

6.2.3   Security Issues and the Bureaucracy

Military security issues viewed through the prism of their bureaucratic processes and politics are, for the most part, more enigmatic (at least for an academic without a government security clearance) than issues of other types in current US policy on South Africa. In most matters of this issue-type, only the public record is available for scrutiny, and not the processes behind that record nor deeper agendas based on military intelligence. That said, it is still worthwhile to analyse the available material, in conjunction with interviews with members of the security bureaucracy in Washington -- keeping in mind that the resulting picture is likely to be less complete than in the other issue-types in this study.

On the other hand, in matters that would fall under the "new security" category -- such as threats to the environment or the spread of infectious diseases -- the institutional

component of policymaking is less concerned with secrecy and more concerned with research and multilateral coordination, making bureaucratic processes more observable. However, as these security matters have been incorporated into security policy only relatively recently, and tend to fall under the purview of non-Africa related offices, the connections to US South Africa policy lack a history and, in any case, are generally less direct.

The demise of the Soviet Union, as discussed in Chapter Two, fundamentally changed US perspectives on security concerns in Africa. No longer was South Africa an ally against communism, in cooperation -- even if sometimes covertly -- with the US military and intelligence communities. Instead, since 1994, the US has had to deal with an ANC-dominated government which was incorporating elements of Umkhonto We Sizwe (the military wing of the ANC) into its national security forces. In addition, tensions created by the US litigation against Armscor clouded the new relations until early 1998, including discussions of a new committee within the BNC on defence, created in 1997. With the gradual resolution of that arms smuggling case, relations have improved somewhat. South African Defense Minister Joe Modise, who at first refused to enter the Pentagon during the July 1997 BNC meetings, did finally agree to meet his counterpart there, and in 1998 joint US-South African military exercised resumed. The US Navy also twice visited the South African naval base in Simonstown in 1998, the first official US port visits to Africa's tip in over twenty years.[29]

The placement of the security issue-type in the interactive/protective issue-area suggests that consensual-elitist policy processes would most often attend policymaking in this issue-type. The following analysis shows that the evidence supports such a prognosis for traditional security issues, but may point toward a more pluralist approach behind the new security issues in US South Africa policy.

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[29]See Schraeder (1994): 205.

6.2.3.1 *Security Structures*

The Department of Defense remains at the head of the bureaucratic process in issues of military security, under the authority of the President and the National Security Advisor, who in turn formulate policy in consultation with the National Security Council (NSC). With regard to Africa policy in particular, the Department of Defense (DOD) delegates related tasks to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. That official often must work closely with the Political/Military Affairs Advisor in the State Department's Africa Bureau. Inevitably, as questions of turf and seniority arise, the incumbents must rely on their representatives in the NSC to prevail if their department's point of view is to direct policy, after which they are called upon to -- and generally do, considering the authoritative culture of the military arms of government -- support stated policy.

Security policy with regard to South Africa has rarely featured as a major issue for the weighty group of US foreign policymakers in the NSC, however. The exception would have been US deliberations over an American response to requests from Pretoria for assistance in reacting to the sudden independence of Angola in 1974. But in the post-Cold War period, without a communist threat justifying the protection of sea routes around Africa's tip and the securing of a capitalist ally, South Africa would seem to hold even less interest for US security policymakers. In the midst of the continuing aggression of Serbs in central Europe, the stand-off with Iraq, and the wavering peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as ongoing military conflicts throughout Africa itself, it would seem there is little compelling the US security bureaucracy to devote time and energy to South Africa.

6.2.3.2 *South Africa as Leader in Africa, and Beyond*

In spite of these circumstances, however, South Africa has indeed attracted the attention of the traditional security bureaucracy -- in particular those agencies charged with reformulating US security policy globally -- for its potential both as a force for stability in the region and as a force to be reckoned with (or co-opted) in the process of international, and especially North-South, negotiations on security arrangements. With the Armscor issue resolved, South Africa is increasingly viewed by this sector as a "partner," perhaps even a surrogate,[30] in Africa, and South Africa's military cooperation and transparency is viewed as critical. Regionally, the US has encouraged South Africa's still-new role as a peacebroker in African conflicts, as well as cooperation in the creation of local peacekeeping capabilities. Internationally, US concerns which overlap with policy on South Africa revolve around the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of international terrorism and organised crime, environmental degradation and infectious disease, all of which require the strong lead of a nation with the moral authority of post-apartheid South Africa.

Beyond noting with interest (and encouraging noises) the nascent role of South Africa as a peacebroker in Africa, the US has downplayed its activity on this matter. This has been true especially after the intervention by the US Representative to the UN, Bill Richardson, at a critical stage in the Zaire/Congo crisis. Richardson was subsequently castigated for "muscling in" just as South Africa was "poised for a major foreign policy coup."[31] Regional peacekeeping on the continent, on the other hand, has been an issue of considerable activity on the part of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Predictably, it has also been an issue over which bureaucratic politics have affected the process behind the policy. For instance, from which department did the African Crisis Response

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[30]See Mamdani, Mahmood. "Naive South Africa must not adopt missionary position." *Mail & Guardian* (23-29 May 1997).
[31]See "US 'muscles in' to deny Africa the glory." *Cape Times* (2 May 1997).

208

Initiative (ACRI) originate?   According to one interview respondent, it was a policy concept fashioned for the most part by NSC and Department of Defense officials, designed specifically to address the threat of renewed violence in Central Africa, especially Burundi, in 1995-96. On the eve of Secretary of State Warren Christopher's trip to Africa in late 1996 it seems that DOS gained approval from the NSC, based on informal consultations with African missions in Washington, to broaden the concept to cover Sub-Saharan Africa, and to discuss it with African heads of state during his visit. After Christopher's unsuccessful diplomatic effort, in which President Mandela's cautious response was especially discouraging,[32] responsibility for the ACRI appeared to be relocated under the relevant office at the Department of Defense. Judging from the presentation of testimony at congressional hearings on the ACRI in October 1997, while DOD and DOS were still working together on the initiative (State having created a Special Coordinator/ACRI position in its Africa Bureau), there was little question that DOD (under the guidance of the NSC) was in charge. In any case, the US Senate, in the meantime, refused to appropriate any funding for the plan, which as of late 1997 was operating instead under a continuing resolution, in limited form, and had trained troops in Senegal, Malawi and Uganda. President Clinton lent his own considerable leverage to the initiative during his visit to Senegal in April 1998, when he called for wider support for the ACRI. Press reports on the appeal quoted NSC Senior Director for Africa Joe Wilson on the matter.[33] The Gore-Mbeki BNC committee on defence adds yet another high-level voice to security issues, though according to one DOD official, US officials are careful not to use the BNC to "flog the ACRI." They do, however, "discuss peacekeeping in general." [34]

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[32]See "Mandela wary of plan for intervention force: 'Africa wants own initiatives.'" *Cape Times* (11 October 1996).
[33]See "African force 'could prevent Rwanda repeat'." *Cape Times* (2 April 1998).
[34]Confidential interview (#39).

South Africa's strong sentiment about remaining an independent player are perhaps most evident in its reaction to the Armscor case, and related charges from the US about South African relations with "rogue" states. South Africa stood its ground in the face of the US fines for arms embargo violations under the previous government. US embassy officials in Cape Town insisted, in late 1995,[35] that Armscor was not a political issue but a legal one, and that the case was being handled by the FBI, US Customs, and the US Department of Justice. As discussed in Chapter Four, resolution was reached, in principle, in mid-1996 through the diplomatic channels established by the BNC, allowing the US and Pretoria to soften the stances they each had made in public. Subsequent negotiations have focused as much on those past violations as they have on assurances that South Africa will not in the future export any arms or arms technology purchased from the US to nations such as Libya, Iran or Syria. Taking the baton handed on by the Office of the Vice President, Defense officials -- specifically, the US Defense Trade Control -- authorised a South African-designed compliance programme to insure against export to third parties, and will inspect South Africa's arms industry at regular intervals.

Through the encouragement of South Africa's peacebroker role on the continent and initiation of the ACRI, the US has demonstrated its hope that South Africa will take on the responsibilities of regional leader. At the same time, the facts surrounding the resolution of the Armscor case (as well as other instances of thinly-veiled defiance, to be discussed under the next issue-type) demonstrate South Africa's own determination to remain a sovereign actor in its sphere of influence. Based on international realities, Pretoria may not have a choice about taking the lead in Africa or within the nations of the developing world, but it appears to reject the role of surrogate of the US outright.

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[35]Confidential interview (#i).

6.2.3.3 *Nuclear Non-Proliferation*

South Africa's status as the first nation to voluntarily and unilaterally destroy its arsenal of nuclear weapons has definitely attracted the attention of the security bureaucracy in Washington, as has South Africa's role in international negotiations on the 1995 review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1967.

The Central Intelligence Agency, at the behest of the National Security Council, has apparently been seeking to confirm that South Africa has indeed destroyed its nuclear devices and disabled production and test facilities in 1993, as the new government claimed in 1995.[36]   Just in case, the Department of State has underlined -- with threatened economic disincentives -- US prohibitions on the exportation of arms, nuclear or conventional, to "pariah states" by recipients of US aid, as in the case of South Africa's proposed sale of tank equipment to Syria.

At the same time, South Africa's ability, and willingness, to garner support from the nations of the developing South for an extension of the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty deeply impressed US policymakers. This is evident from Vice President Gore's praise of South Africa at the first meeting of the Binational Commission, where he said that Pretoria's "leadership on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation...provides a model for the rest of the world."[37] In the wake of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in mid-1998, the pressure will have increased on US security bureaucracies to contain any further nuclear proliferation just as the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is dismantled and subsumed into existing Department of State bureaux.

The fact that as of June 1998, Congress had yet to approve American ratification of another important nuclear agreement, the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, must

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[36]See **Vesely**, Milan. "SA Nuclear power worries US." *African Business* (July/August 1998): 9.
[37]*Gore Praises South Africa's Leadership on Nuclear Non-Proliferation.* United States Information Service (5 December 1995).

only further frustrate the federal agencies charged with carrying out administration policy in this area. In any case, South Africa, as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (of which India and Pakistan are members) for three years from mid-1998, may perceive increased pressure from the US to lead the developing world in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation.

All of the above "traditional" matters of security policy have followed the expected mode of policymaking for interactive/protective issues, that is, a consensual-elitist one. The overlapping jurisdiction of the bureaucracies might, as usual, be a source of low-level conflict, but appear not to have impinged on the substance of policy over the 1994-1998 period. It is in the area of "new" security issues, to which this study next turns, that more pluralist modes of policymaking have entered in, bringing greater conflict as well.

6.2.3.4 *"New" Security Issues*

"New" security issues, or those which are increasingly recognised as security issues and arise from transnational threats such as international crime and terrorism, environmental degradation, overpopulation, and the spread of infectious diseases, have involved South Africa insofar as it is a leader among the developing world, and at the same time a nation in transition. As such, it is not only well-placed to develop progressive policies in the areas of health and the environment, and to gain endorsement for these abroad, but it is also particularly vulnerable to saturation by organised crime and terrorist operations.

The activity of the US policymaking community on these issues is varied, and has drawn in many actors not traditionally associated with foreign or security policy matters, which in turn has drawn in more pluralist policymaking processes than are usually attendant in security issues. The BNC has, to a great degree, been responsible for introducing these elements to US South Africa policy, through its committees on

sustainable energy, on science and technology, and on conservation, the environment, and water. Key to the activity of these committees, it would appear, is the White House Office on Science and Technology. Currently under presidential advisor Jack Gibbons, the office coordinates research on specific projects by the Departments of Energy, Commerce, Defense, Transport, and Agriculture, as well as by the National Institute for Health, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and various other bodies. For instance, on the issue of the impact on South Africa (and the Southern Africa region) of the weather phenomenon El Nino, Gibbons' office worked with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce (as well as South Africa's Weather Bureau) on the predictions of El Nino's arrival and duration in the region, and then turned those findings over to the BNC committees on agriculture (under Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman on the US side) and water conservation (under Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt for the US) for further action. On another area, Gibbons' office is still working on a specific programme to develop South Africa's communications technology, and with the respective health ministries in the US and South Africa to strengthen collaboration in biomedical research on several health concerns, including HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases.

The status of the White House behind all these efforts, and the impact of increased expectations of performance on bureaucratic politics and processes, is a factor which no doubt weighs on each of the BNC committees. "I do think AID and State resent the BNC," commented one White House interviewee involved in this area, who had described the BNC committees as "special mechanisms to bypass the bureaucratic mess."[38]

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[38]Confidential interview (#40).

In another example, US resources for combating international crime and terrorism have been brought to bear on South Africa after a July 1996 US-South Africa "memorandum of understanding" on law enforcement cooperation provided for the introduction of four new US bureaucratic players into the US South Africa policy process. These were the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the US Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, all of which have established a presence at the US embassy in Pretoria with at least one representative. One US embassy official noted this "expansion of the US mission in South Africa," pointing out additional new posts for USAID and the Foreign Commercial Service. According to this official, speaking in late 1998, "over the last two years alone, the size of the mission has grown by 10-20 percent each year."[39] Additional personnel arrived when, immediately after the bombing of the Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town in September 1998, a delegation from the FBI and other anti-terrorism offices visited the site to lend expertise. While there may be suspicion as to the motives for US law enforcement activities in South Africa, the working relationship has lent to smoother relations -- according to another interviewee, from the NSC, for instance, the relations between the FBI in Pretoria and South African law enforcement agencies helped resolve the row caused by FBI agents posing as South Africans in the US to trap American spies in late 1997.[40]

As mentioned in the previous chapter, many of these "new" security issues garner some public interest, though not necessarily with regard to US policy towards South Africa specifically. (One exception to this is the business community's interest in increased US pressure on South African law enforcement efforts, in order to curtail crime and enhance the business climate for US investments.) But on the whole, there is a more

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[39]Confidential interview (#51).
[40]Confidential interview (#36).

consensual-pluralist policy process at work within the "new" security issues in US South Africa policy than expected by its placement in the interactive/protective issue-area. Because that pluralist activity (except on the part of business groups) is not directed at changing US South Africa policy, per se, it should not necessarily be weighted as equal to other factors -- such as the elitist activity on traditional issues of security -- in US policymaking on South Africa, however. Taken as a whole, then, security matters should be considered to be appropriately placed in the third quadrant dealing with issues of protection/interaction, involving for the most part a consensual-elitist policy process, but noting the consensual-pluralist process involved in several "new" security issues. Perhaps the issues of health and environmental degradation, terrorism and international crime, are still considered as "intangible" political goods, not yet a reality for many policymakers and interest groups, thus dividing the security issue-type into two (the third and fourth) issue-areas.

6.2.4   Issues of Political Symbolism and the Bureaucracy

The bureaucratic politics and policy processes involved in issues of political symbolism, which fall into the redistributive issue-area due to the intangibility of political goods at stake and the asymmetry of their expected outcomes, should, according to the issue-area paradigm, be conflictual-elitist. As introduced in the previous chapter, the two most prominent issues of this type in Clinton's South Africa policy are 1) the quest for fair and harmonious race relations, shared by certain leaders in the US and South Africa, and 2) perceived threats to US global hegemony, based on US perceptions about its preeminent position in the post-Cold War world and America's ability (or inability) to impose its will on other nations. The following looks at each of these in turn through the perspective of the bureaucratic politics and processes described above.

6.2.4.1 *Issues of Domestic Political Symbolism and the Bureaucracy*

Since 1994, South Africa's experiment in nonracial democracy has offered hope for US race relations in the eyes of many American leaders, President Clinton and Vice President Gore included. The imperative to assist with that experiment appears to run strong throughout the US government, except among those who would point out that resources might be better spent on poorer African nations, on African-Americans themselves, or on Americans in general. The redistribution to South Africa of US resources, whether it be foreign assistance or goodwill, grates on this latter group, who even as a minority can exert considerable influence (Senator Jesse Helms being a classic example, as an "isolationist" at the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).

But race is a sensitive issue within American government, as the US history of racial inequality and affirmative action have skewed the perception of the issue for both blacks and whites. The bureaucratic processes and politics which involve questions of race are often concealed far below the surface. There is scepticism, for instance, that the enthusiasm for South Africa among those in elected positions in the executive and legislature has more to do with winning domestic political points with African-American constituents than with South Africa itself. Critics also claim that the Clinton administration presumes that by placing African-Americans in positions of power on US South Africa policy, or on US Africa policy in general, it will appear on the right side of the racial question. One interview respondent went so far as to claim that the Clinton administration "has made Africa the sole purview of African-Americans." It would be of interest to the field of political science to see a survey of African-American incumbents and their level of interest in Africa, as well as the impact their tenures have had on US Africa policy so far.[41]

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[41]Michael Clough made this suggestion in his interview, March 1998.

What has been the impact, for instance, of the advent of an African-American woman as Assistant Secretary of State in the mostly male, mostly white enclave that forms the high elite of the foreign policy bureaucracy, even in the 1990's? At the age of 33, Susan Rice is also the youngest person ever to take up this post, and has reportedly had to fight a series of "internecine battles," only some of which she has won, in order to take charge of US policy on Sub-Saharan Africa. One of these was with her senior in both years and position, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, over policy towards Sudan, which, eventually and with the support of Secretary Albright, Rice won. Even given the fact of Rice's rumoured high intellect and her experience as the Director for Africa at the NSC under the first Clinton administration, one account quotes a "veteran diplomat" as asking "Why would I expect a 33-year-old black woman to know how to run a large bureaucracy?" (Smythe, 1998: 84). There are obviously power plays still to be won, and which will affect policymaking to some degree, for Clinton's second Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

The active role of the Secretary of Transportation, African-American Rodney Slater, in US policy on Africa is another example. His department has little funding for involvement in foreign relations, and is limited to appropriations for international aviation, maritime administration and Coast Guard responsibilities. Yet Secretary Slater has, under the second Clinton administration, launched from his office a "Transportation Initiative and Partnership with Africa" in support of the administration's Africa initiative. While this effort focuses on improving aviation safety and airport security throughout Africa, in Southern Africa one aspect has been a computerised rail car tracking system to improve commercial rail services. Slater has travelled to Africa three times since his appointment (although only once to South Africa, with the President),[42] has carried out

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[42]Slater's first visit to the continent was with the Reverend Jesse Jackson to co-lead the fourth African-African American Summit in Harare in July 1997, where he spoke on much more than transportation, delivering the message that America wants Africa as "a full partner in the cause for freedom, democracy, and prosperity." He did speak on the need to strengthen Africa's transport sector in the interests of greater

extensive "constituency outreach," mostly to business executives in the US with an interest in investing in Africa, and has met with African diplomats as well, in order to "discuss how the Department's initiative can best address the needs of individual African nations."[43]

It would appear that, more than the administration using the appointment of an African- American to promote the perception of good race relations in the US, Slater is using his position to demonstrate his own interest in African (and African-American) development. Many interviewees independently, in discussion on the bureaucratic dynamics of the current administration, posited that Slater is well positioned to take up the mantle dropped by the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown as an African-American who can give leadership on policy toward Africa for the Clinton administration. In any case, the result has been increased visibility of the African continent in US foreign policy. Several transport projects are in the pipeline, for instance, after US-South Africa discussions at the first meeting of the Gore-Mbeki Commission. The failure of the 105th Congress to enact the Africa Growth and Opportunity Bill, which contained provisions of funding for Department of Transport projects in Africa, may slow Secretary Slater's progress, but there should be little doubt that he will pursue other means by which to remain involved in US Africa policy. Clinton's Special Envoy to Africa for Democracy, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr., appears to share the same compelling interest, as well as a large following among the African-American community.

The conflictual-elitist nature of such bureaucratic politics is difficult to uncover when the issue of race is involved, as it is in matters of domestic political symbolism in US South Africa policy. However, based on interviews and the observable facts, it would

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trade and investment in the region. See http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Africa/
[43]See <http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Africa>

appear that the evidence supports the existence of a conflictual and elitist policy process behind these issues.

6.2.4.2 *Issues of Global Political Symbolism and the Bureaucracy*

The second category under this issue-type, that of perceived threats to US global hegemony on the part of South Africa, has been one of the areas over which US policymakers have expressed greatest concern. The powerful symbolism of Nelson Mandela embracing Libya's Muammar Gaddafi in 1997, in "defiance" of US diplomatic requests to the contrary, reverberated throughout the US government, and seared the image of South Africa as a nation of questionable loyalties into the American psyche. The elites and counter-elites of the various members of the National Security Council, with their competing viewpoints over which response was appropriate to such perceived threats to US hegemony, have travelled a long road (or left the administration) since 1994 and Mandela's early rebuffs over Libya, Cuba and Iran. Following an agreement worked out via press reports that the US and South Africa would "agree to disagree" about these third-party relations, there were also some American overtures to Cuba in 1998, signs of a growing willingness to thaw relations with Iran, and concessions made on the Lockerbie trial involving alleged terrorists sanctioned by Libya. The incident in which a desk officer at the Department of State apparently telephoned his counterpart in South Africa to warn of the imminent cut-off of US aid if a rumoured arms sale to Syria went through -- based purely on the requirements of the Anti-terrorism Act of 1996 -- was also a lesson for all concerned. The immediate and angry reaction from Pretoria began a major diplomatic tiff over South African sovereignty, US "bullying," and South African double standards, which was only resolved when assurances were exchanged that the Syrian deal would be deferred indefinitely. But before that, the White House issued a strong

statement condemning the proposed arms sale, though the Department of State reportedly had lobbied for a less strident tone.[44]

Similar, but less vociferous, US reactions greeted the mooted deal to store Iranian oil off South Africa's west coast, Mandela's trip to Libya, and Cuba's offer to send doctors to help South Africa meet new health policy norms over 1995 to 1997. Each of these events has underlined the fact that, despite the leverage of its trade, investment and foreign assistance, not to mention that of its military might, the US is no longer able to "call the shots" as it once could. Helms-Burton and other legislation limiting allies' trade with "pariah" states must be seen in this context.

US landmine policy constitutes another highly publicised example of an issue of global political symbolism that has come up between the US and South Africa. While the details of the bureaucratic politics behind US policy on the campaign to ban completely the use and production of anti-personnel landmines are unavailable for this analysis, it is important to note South Africa's leadership in this 1997 campaign, and its success in garnering broad support for the resulting convention, over the objections of the US. The opposition of the Department of Defense, particularly the Department of the Army, to the immediate banning of the mines -- on the grounds that, until a viable alternative is operational, they are necessary to protect US soldiers on the ground -- most likely prohibited movement from stated policy, which was support for the principle of a ban, but one qualified by national requisites and to be implemented over time. There was not, however, concerted effort on the part of interest groups with regard to US South Africa policy specifically.

Thus each of the issues above involved mostly conflictual-elitist processes. As such, they again support the Zimmerman paradigm expectations.

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[44]Barber, Simon. "SA arms trigger a new US power battle." *Business Day* (4 February 1997).

The many types of issues, the many configurations of bureaucratic process, as well as the many layers of bureaucratic politics evident within US South Africa policy are not unique. As the processes and politics in US policymaking have become increasingly complex, more than one member of the foreign policy establishment has decried the "cautions, clearance processes, and bureaucratic overkill."[45] The case of the US-South Africa Binational Commission is but one of the Clinton administration attempts to overcome what he and his vice-president saw as the inefficiencies of the US foreign policymaking system. Discussion turns now to "reinventing government" and the US-South Africa BNC.

6.3   *The BNC – Reinventing Government, or Business as Usual?*

"Our thesis is simple," wrote David Osborne and Ted Gaebler on page 11 of their bestselling 1993 book, *Reinventing Government*. "The kind of governments that developed during the industrial era, with their sluggish, centralised bureaucracies, their preoccupation with rules and regulations, and their hierarchical chains of command, no longer work very well. They accomplished great things in their time, but somewhere along the line they got away from us. They became bloated, wasteful, ineffective. And when the world began to change, they failed to change with it."

It was due to the thesis of Osborne and Gaebler, which garnered the attention of newly-elected President Clinton and Vice President Gore, that "reinventing government" became a theme for the new administration. "Hierarchical, centralised bureaucracies designed in the 1930's or 1940's simply do not function well in the rapidly changing, information-rich, knowledge-intensive society and economy of the 1990's," wrote these two political consultants. "They are like luxury ocean liners in an age of supersonic jets: big, cumbersome, expensive, and extremely difficult to turn around."   Presenting

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[45]Confidential interview (#40).

evidence of "entrepreneurial government" at the local level throughout the US, the authors posited that "gradually, new kinds of public institutions are taking their place," and deemed this development "an American *Perestroika*" which was reaching into federal government as well. Osborne and Gaebler insisted that though "government can't be run like a business," it can become more effective and measure performance by "focusing not on inputs but on outcomes."[46]

The new White House team took up the challenge in 1993, and launched a "revolution" to give Americans "better service from [their] government." A White House website tells viewers, "You are going to see something different this year -- courtesy, convenience, and cooperation that equals the best in business."[47] At the same site one can also view a list of "customer service standards" for the more than 200 agencies of the US federal government. Congress joined the effort, legislating the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the Government Management Reform Act of 1994. Under the former, agencies were required to choose a pilot programme for implementing new management practices. As mentioned earlier, the USAID mission in South Africa from 1995 was one such pilot programme. In effect, so is the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission.

The creation of the BNC, according to one former member of the Department of Commerce, was a response on the part of the White House to Ron Brown's Business Development Council, the June 1994 signing ceremony of which "basically represented Commerce taking charge of US policy toward South Africa." Two dynamics apparently contributed to the Gore-Mbeki Commission's inception: one was the personal and political interest Gore had in involving himself in this promising new US-South Africa initiative; the other was a request from Princeton Lyman, the Ambassador to Pretoria at

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[46]See Osborne and Gaebler (1993): 11-19.
[47]<www.whitehouse.gov>

the time, that the administration coordinate under one over-arching umbrella the deluge of cabinet visits and trade missions beginning to engulf the US embassy in South Africa. The resulting structure was a vice-presidential and cabinet level commission which could, by dint of its political clout, make executive decisions, thereby cutting across many of the decisionmaking channels and bureaucratic processes normally involved in initiatives such as the BDC. Congress has little leverage by which to thwart the work of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission either, as, according to a congressional staffer, "there's no line item for a BNC ..[all their projects] are funded out of other agencies."[48]

The Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission is not, in fact, a pure example of Osborne and Gaebler's "entrepreneurial government," however, as it does not so much reorganise the existing foreign policy bureaucracy on South Africa as create an overarching and executive authority to direct and coordinate action of that bureaucracy, on an indefinite basis. But it has attempted to "reinvent" US policymaking on South Africa in so far as it has redirected US officials and bureaucrats to "focus not simply on providing...services, but on catalysing all sectors -- public, private, and voluntary -- into action to solve...problems" (p.20). The declining foreign operations budget in any case meant that, in the words of one interviewee, "the US has to do what it does *better*."[49]

The concept of "reinventing government" surfaced in several of the interviews conducted over the course of this study with members of the policy-analytical community in Washington, especially in discussions of the BNC as a foreign policy tool. A recurring theme was the BNC's effectiveness in overcoming bureaucratic inertia and in forging new coordinating links between bureaucracies, as well as across several layers between the US and South Africa. According to the interviewee cited above, "Gore genuinely believed the US could show the world how to do foreign policy

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[48]From interview with Lester Munson (#22).
[49]Confidential interview (#17).

differently...The BNC is an experiment to achieve and demonstrate the leadership of the VP, but also to show a new era in governance, to approach problems without the rigidity of hierarchical government structures."

Indeed, benefits of the BNC appear to be numerous, if not unqualified. Several interviewees who were either current or past participants in the Gore-Mbeki Commission noted that, in addition to the symbolic value of such a unique arrangement on the current world stage, the BNC is an effective foreign policy tool for several reasons. The reasons listed, some repeatedly, are that:

- It cuts through bureaucratic red tape;
- It is a catalyst for new projects due to the pressure of presenting "deliverables" at the biannual meetings;
- It accelerates the completion of these projects through deadlines and by improving interagency coordination;
- It develops links between actors at the ministerial and functional levels in the US and South Africa;
- It brings greater depth to counterpart contact, engendering "otherwise impossible" openness in relations;
- It provides continuity in what have been portrayed as close relations between US Vice President Al Gore and South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.
- Due to the last two points, resolution of conflict in US-South Africa bilateral relations overall has been eased;
- It is a creative way to involve the private sector in US South Africa policy;
- It has brought in sectors of the US government never before involved in foreign policy; and provided a framework for coordination without overwhelming the Department of State; and
- It focuses high level attention on South Africa twice a year, which raises the profile of South Africa and Africa in US foreign policy generally.

With only one exception,[50] interviewees' complaints about weaknesses in the BNC focused on ways to improve the current structure and emphasis, and on deleterious side effects which needed attention. These complaints were that:

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[50]The exceptional case saw the BNC as a waste of Thabo Mbeki's time, in that two weeks out of the year was far too long to spend on issues that were not contributing in a real sense to the RDP, moreover in Washington, DC, "which is not where US business is." This interviewee suggested that the BNC be cut

- The BNC is very labour intensive, straining the capacity of the bureaucracy with its twice yearly meetings and causing some ill will between the Office of the Vice President and BNC member agencies;
- It takes up a great deal of time, on top of regular responsibilities, with interim meetings and preparation for the commission meetings;
- It imposes "artificial time frames" on project completion;
- It focuses too much on issues which do not help South Africa with its critical problems of poverty;
- It lacks bipartisan appeal, being the creation of a Democratic administration;
- It excludes civil society and needs to move out beyond Washington, DC, to create people-to-people links;
- It has not done enough to institutionalise the private sector arm of its work;
- It creates too many expectations by engaging in great fanfare at its meetings;
- It is not accessible to the public, nor does it communicate well with the public, and therefore its benefits are generally lost on the public in both the US and South Africa; and
- It dominates US policy on Africa, and should expand to cover at least the SADC,[51] if not all of Sub-Saharan Africa, if only at a ministerial level.

In the words of one governmental interviewee, the BNC has provided US policymakers with a "low-cost, high pay-off way to be engaged in South Africa." But has it "reinvented government" with regard to US policy on South Africa? Has it been a worthwhile "pilot programme" and is it likely to become a permanent feature in US policymaking towards South Africa?

The BNC has certainly short-circuited many of the standard operating procedures and bureaucratic politics on several issues in US South Africa policy. Examples would include not only resolution of Armscor, the McDonnell's case, and the Syrian arms sale fiasco, but also a bilateral tax treaty negotiated in "record time" (eighteen months), a "working for water" employment/conservation project in South Africa up and running by February 1997, a major US-SA trade conference organised between February and July

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back to one-day visits to Washington, followed by trade missions throughout the US with an emphasis on projects and investments that would create jobs in South Africa.

[51] See Salih Booker's viewpoint on this in "US-SA body needs a more focused agenda." *Business Day* (30 July 1997); also, Millard Arnold is quoted in Dludlu, John, "'SA-US binational commion should expand agenda' --trade envoy," *Business Day*, 22 January 1998. This was also the view expressed by a staffer with US Representative Rangel's office.

1997, and the numerous people exchanges (over 75 between the July 1996 and February 1997 BNC meetings). But in so doing, the BNC has introduced its own set of processes and politics. It would seem that rather than streamlining the policymaking process on South Africa, the BNC has accelerated the processes still in place, and made use of the executive powers of the heads of the bureaucracies in charge, as well as the overriding authority of the Vice President, "to get things done."

One telling comment stands out. In discussing the fact that several other nations had expressed an interest in convening similar binational commissions with the US, one political-appointee noted that, "the US-South Africa BNC is out there as a model, but it is not sustainable with several countries at once."[52]

Another interviewee, from the White House, noted that "weaknesses in any system would be amplified through a BNC type structure." Elaborating, he explained that, "for instance, there will be differences in getting programs prepared for a report out to superiors and to the BNC. These reflect differences in bureaucracies and interagency process, which are weak in any case. But the Vice President's office does not micromanage -- it does not have the money to do so. It helps with the overall management from the top."[53]

Reinventing government, it would appear, the BNC is not. Rather, it is "business as usual", but with a twist: While processes and politics stay in place, the bureaucracies and agencies must produce "deliverables" for each BNC meeting, or, in Osborne/Gaebler terminology, focus on outputs instead of inputs.

The result has been frenetic activity on either side of the Atlantic which, by August 1998, resulted in the agreement to reduce one of the biannual meetings to a "BNC-lite," as discussed in Chapter Four. While the Trade and Investment Framework

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[52]Confidential interview (#39).
[53]Confidential interview (#35).

Agreement now provides for the resolution of routine issues at the working level, according to the new protocol, "priority issues" will be brought to ministerial levels for resolution, regardless of whether the BNC is meeting or not.

The failure of the architects, or perhaps the implementors, of the US-South Africa BNC to "reinvent government" does not, however, mean that it has not been a worthwhile exercise. In the brief period since March 1995, and during a critical point in South Africa's history, the BNC has resulted in several valuable new programmes and trade links, in normalised -- some might add improved -- US-South Africa relations, and in the creation of a myriad of US-South Africa links via bureaucratic and programmatic interactions.

"Has the BNC done any good?" one respondent, generally critical of US policy process and politics, asked rhetorically. "At the low, functional level, yes; as a political bun-fight, it has been useless. But, as in the bigger picture of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, perhaps it is these little, functional outcomes which add up to the importance of international relations."[54]   Summarising on a similar note, another respondent -- an embassy official -- pointed to the lasting significance of the links forged through the work of the BNC committees. "Even if the BNC does not survive the departure of Thabo Mbeki and Vice President Gore from their present positions (after elections in South Africa and the US in 1999 and 2000, respectively), where there is a need for them, the links will remain."[55]

Thus it is the enduring nature of the bureaucracy, with its institutionalised roles and relationships, that may define the greatest contribution of the BNC beyond the 1990's. Whether the BNC is likely to remain in place over the longer term remains an open question. The changed roles of both Gore and Mbeki following respective national

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[54]Interview with Simon Barber (#29).
[55]Confidential interview (#51).

elections would open the way for graceful closure to the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission by the end of the century. Instead, there might be Gore-Mbeki Summits. In any case, the probability is high that US policy towards South Africa will be dominated by the expanded bureaucratic processes and politics outlined in the previous pages, rather than by the BNC.

6.4   *Conclusion: Bureaucratic Processes and Politics and Clinton's South Africa Policy*

The institutional framework underlying US foreign policy in general, as well as the policy process and bureaucratic politics of the 1990's, constitute another factor behind Clinton's South Africa policy. The American constitution's provision of checks and balances in policymaking through a separation of power between the executive and legislative branches affects foreign policy through, on the one hand, allowing representation of public sentiment via the Congress and, on the other hand, allowing alteration and even obstruction of the foreign policy programme of a presidential administration, sometimes on party political grounds. The burgeoning of the foreign policy bureaucracy since the end of the second World War has brought further complexity to the policymaking process, Africa policymaking included. The end of the Cold War further highlighted the need to reorganise the foreign policy bureaucracy at the same time that Congress began its "revolution" to balance the overblown federal budget. In the reordering of priorities that ensued, the Department of Commerce and related agencies came to the fore as the liberalisation of trade markets became a key component of democracy promotion under Clinton. At the same time, consistent with the Clinton administration's campaign to "reinvent government" generally, the US-South Africa vice-presidential level binational commission was established to expedite policymaking and execution, as well as normalise relations between Washington and Pretoria, after Mandela's election.

Policymaking on South Africa

Viewed through the four issue-types in Clinton's South Africa policy, bureaucratic activity appeared to have greatest importance for policymaking in the issue-areas expected by the Zimmerman paradigm.   In accordance with that paradigm, elitist processes held sway in the issue-areas of protection/interaction and of redistribution, which for US South Africa policy consisted of the issue-types of security and of political symbolism.   Bureaucratic politics and processes were not absent from the issue-types of development assistance and trade, which were originally placed in the issue-areas of distribution and regulation based on the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of impact, but elites were forced to compete with pluralist forces in the formulation of policy to a greater extent in these issue-areas than in the others.   Development assistance, again, showed a shift from one issue-area to another over the period under study, for the same reasons cited in the previous chapter: namely, a shift in the perceptions of aid.   Aid moved from being an issue of distribution to one of redistribution as foreign assistance generally came under fire in the campaign to balance the budget.   As the public largely withdrew support for the concept of aid to Africa as a whole, the locus of policymaking moved into the bureaucracy, where there was a particularly acrimonious debate over South Africa's USAID mission on questions of accountability and project appropriateness.   Although bureaucratic activity on trade with South Africa has mushroomed since 1994, there has been a commensurate increase in pluralist activity, and so the expected conflictual-pluralist policy process expectation is indeed supported by the evidence. Bureaucratic dominance in security issues likewise supported the expectations of Zimmerman's issue-area paradigm, in that issues in this issue-type attracted very little public activity or pressure, except perhaps indirectly via "new" security concerns. Issues of political symbolism, both domestic (involving US race relations and the priorities of African-Americans) and global (involving perceived threats to US hegemony), were found to involve a conflictual-elitist process, as expected.

Woven throughout the bureaucratic activity on US South Africa policy under Clinton has been the work of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. Drawing in many more actors from the bureaucracy than are traditionally involved in foreign policymaking, the BNC has in some ways complicated the policymaking process. On the other hand, because of the executive powers of those chairing the commission, and the lack of veto power on the part of Congress over most BNC projects, the bureaucracy has accomplished much more vis-a-vis South Africa, over the time-frame of the three years the BNC has existed, than usual.   Whether the policymaking process has been truly changed by the BNC, or merely accelerated, is the question. This study concludes the latter.

With regard to engagement, as with interest group activity, bureaucratic activity appears to occur mainly in the upper half of each issue-area quadrant (see Figure D), indicating that the majority of activity has encouraged cooperation in US-South Africa relations, and has therefore supported the stated policy of the Clinton administration concerning engagement in South Africa.

CONCLUSION
Issue-Area Analysis
And the Study of US South Africa Policy in the 1990's

South Africa is at a critical juncture in its history. At the end of the twentieth century, with the euphoria of 1994 passing, the imperatives of political and economic consolidation, coinciding as they do with that of addressing apartheid's inequities, pose a major challenge to the nascent state in Pretoria. International reintegration -- key to economic growth -- is progressing apace, but often meets with confusing signals from the behemoth of the post-Cold War international political economy, the United States. Without a sound estimation -- a good map, as it were -- of US policy towards South Africa, policymakers in Pretoria are likely to misjudge the contours of that policy, to run up against the differing US poli*cies* in different issue-areas. The possible consequences for the future of South Africa, and therefore Africa and indeed the international system, are too costly to ignore.

7.1   *The Framework of Analysis Reviewed*

As stated at the outset of this study, given the importance to South Africa's future of a sound estimation of US policy, and given the importance of South Africa's new non-racial democracy to Africa and to the wider international community, including the United States, an accurate map of US South Africa policy seems of considerable import. Yet, among the few works written on US Africa policy in the 1990's, little exists to help an observer find his or her way through the contours of Clinton's South Africa policy. In an effort to draw such a map, the author recognised that foreign policy analysis is conducted all too often through the lens of either realist or liberal international relations theory, at either the system or the unit/sub-unit level of analysis, and through the

231

Conclusion

perspective of perhaps one or two of the issues confronting nation-states in their foreign relations. Such one-sided approaches, it was evident, often result in misleading pictures of international affairs. The preceding study has thus attempted to set aside these either/or distinctions and to allow insights from both realism and liberalism, international relations and comparative foreign policy study, as well as issue-area analysis as posited by William Zimmerman, to grant a greater perspective.

Discussion began by setting the international context for US South Africa policy in the post-Cold War, post-apartheid period. It then moved into a review of the history of that policy, and an overview of Clinton's South Africa policy via administration policy statements and actions, including initiatives and responses. In order to gain a greater depth of understanding about the Clinton policy, especially with regard to engagement, analysis then took a look inside, at the sub-national level, to reveal the actors involved in the policymaking process in different issue-areas of US foreign policy, and to learn when they might hold greater or lesser sway in that process. In applying the issue-area methodology, introduced at some length in Chapter One, analysis at the sub-unit level entailed a disaggregation of Clinton's South Africa policy into the four issue-types that emerged from the historical and current policy review, each of which fitted, it appeared, into one of the four issue-areas of Zimmerman's "issue-based foreign policy paradigm." Analysis at this level included discussion of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission and the significance of that new foreign policy tool, both for US-South African relations but also for policymaking in Washington. In an innovation on Zimmerman's paradigm, an engagement/disengagement function was introduced to allow evaluation of domestic factor activity according to the direction of pressure exerted by each actor on US policy.

Having completed analysis at the designated levels, and across issue-areas, an overview of the research findings, as well as an assessment of Clinton's South Africa policy, are provided below.

Conclusion

7.2 *The Findings*

7.2.1 The Global Context and US South Africa Policy

In view of the vacuum left for US foreign policymakers by the Cold War's abrupt end, and of the perceived tilt toward international disengagement on the part of the US electorate in the 1990's, one of the aims of this study was to explore the emerging guidelines for US foreign policy generally under the Clinton administration and to learn what is guiding US foreign policy towards regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. Research found that, due largely to the three factors in global affairs -- the demise of the Soviet Union and the advent of "unipolarity", the levelling out of the world economy relative to the post World War II period, and the spread of global capitalism encouraged by the phenomenon known as globalisation -- the Clinton administration returned to a fundamental American policy of "democracy promotion." As the "global logic" behind US policy in the 1990's, democracy promotion involves not only support for democratic reform in developing countries, but also for increased liberalisation of markets in what is seen as a natural convergence between democratic governance and free-market economies worldwide. Democracy promotion is not free of detractors, however, and currency crashes late in the decade served to amplify objections from emerging markets such as Malaysia, as well as from critics within the US, about the negative ramifications of global capitalism for the developing world. Protectionist elements in the US have raised their own objections, as have the few vocal but powerful "isolationists" in Congress. There was also criticism in the policy-analytical community that such "excessive commercialisation" of US foreign policy was bad for US interests overall, in that strategic security issues might be left unattended. As yet, these discordant notes do not seem to have swayed the Clinton administration from pursuing its stated goals, but they could grow loud enough to do if the US economy, or the global economy, takes a turn for the worse again.

Conclusion

With regard to regional policy and the impact of the changing global context, South Africa features in US policy toward the nations of the South and towards the region of Sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons. Ethnic discord having replaced economic ideology as the major cause of war in the past ten years the world over, the South African miracle of negotiated transition to a black majority-ruled African nation is perhaps foremost among the reasons many policymakers are watching South Africa closely. In addition, in this era of increasingly "commercialised" US foreign policy and of growing international interdependence, South Africa is a significant player in US equations as an especially promising "big emerging market." The perceived gains from securing an economic foothold in South Africa, as "one of the last untapped markets" globally, are obviously significant to have warranted such attention. South Africa's leadership among the developing world on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation has garnered the attention of US national security officials, as well. South Africa also features in the US strategy to build partnerships with regional leaders in order to address other "new" security concerns such as environmental degradation, international terrorism, and the effects of huge populations displaced by civil war or famine in several regions around the globe. US reticence to commit American troops abroad without clear strategic imperatives translated into greater importance in US policy of regional powers such as South Africa, although Pretoria has refrained from involvement in peacekeeping efforts on the continent, including the US African Crisis Response Initiative, due to perceived threats to African sovereignty. The withdrawal of France from much of its former colonies in Africa has left openings for increased US economic activity on the continent, as does the Africa Growth and Opportunity legislation under reconsideration in 1999. Such linkages across Africa have, in turn, increased the US stake in a South Africa which is stable, prosperous, and willing to take on responsibilities for maintaining stability in its region and beyond, even if South Africa remains unwilling to act as a "surrogate" of the United States.

Conclusion

Although development assistance in general has suffered in the 1990's, mostly because of the reduced American economic advantage over the rest of the world and the current climate of pessimism with regard to the effectiveness of past aid efforts, Pretoria has been only minimally affected by attempts to reduce aid. The US, in fact, announced a special aid package after Mandela's inauguration, but expects South Africa to "graduate" from aid in the next few years. Regarding the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank, which may well play a role in South Africa's post-apartheid economic recovery, it appears that until US reservations about the management of funds by multilateral bodies (especially the UN) are put to rest, US contributions may continue to decline, if they are paid at all. Pressure for US action to address the currency crisis in the developing world through a reevaluation of the international financial institutions' approach is likely to increase, though, both inside and outside America, and this may affect US-South African relations more as South Africa gains momentum as a leader among affected nations.

The impact on US South Africa policy of the changed US foreign policy priorities and processes resulting from its changed global context are perhaps clearest in the content and operations of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. The BNC is focused not just on security and on foreign assistance, but on the expansion of trade links, on environmentally sustainable development initiatives in South Africa, on law enforcement cooperation to combat the encroaching illicit drugs trade and other organised crime, and on such projects as increased access to advanced technology in South African schools.

Negative implications for South Africa of some threads of Clinton's policy are greatly downplayed in official statements, but have plagued relations since 1994. US laws which seek to limit trade with states such as those deemed to be sponsoring terrorism impinge on South Africa's role as an independent actor and leader in the developing world. The political cost for South Africa, regionally and domestically, of deepening political and economic bilateral relations with the US may grow as regional

actors and other multilateral bodies such as the G15 take a harder line against such cooperation in the US-sponsored "Neo-Liberal Economic Order."

The "global logic" of democracy promotion behind US policy in the 1990s is limited by such regional realities around the globe, as well as by fiscal and domestic political constraints on US engagement generally. However, as democracy promotion has emerged as the "principle" on which to hang US foreign policy, it is likely to remain as such for the duration of the Clinton administration. Whether the US will remain proactive in its approach to regions like Africa -- as seen in the White House Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa initiative, as well as in its legislative counterpart -- and whether these initiatives are more "smoke and mirrors" than substantive in content, remains, however, to be seen.

7.2.3   Issue-Area Analysis and the Study of US South Africa Policy

Having gained some global perspective on US policy toward South Africa in the 1990's, discussion turns now to the unit and sub-unit level of analysis and the related questions posed at the outset.

7.2.3.1 *Policy, or Policies?*

Firstly, with regard to US policy towards South Africa, the question was posed: Is there one unified policy, or are there several polic*ies* which differ in tone and even in direction, depending on the sorts of issues at stake? It seems evident that the latter is true. For instance, throughout 1994 and 1995, even as Mandela was welcomed with open arms by the US as president of the new South Africa, and even as the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission held out the promise of increased bilateral cooperation, a series of public disagreements over South African commercial policy and over South Africa's relations with "rogue" states such as Libya, clouded the otherwise bright horizon. Which approach constitutes US policy? Through the overview of policy statements, as well as policy

236

Conclusion

actions in the form of US initiatives in South Africa and US responses to affairs involving South Africa in Chapter Four, it is apparent that indeed there are different threads of US policy, in which different and even contradicting sentiments are expressed. An account of US policy, or more precisely, of the different US polic*ies* in the different issue-areas of bilateral relations, was a first step in gaining an understanding of the direction of the whole. But deeper analysis was required to begin to accurately map these various strands of US policy towards South Africa, as this study intended.

7.2.3.2 *The Value of Issue-Area Analysis*

Issue-area analysis arose out of insights in the 1960's regarding the differing behaviour of states in different areas of their international relations. As such, it appears well-suited, indeed critical, to analysis of policy in the globalised international political economy of the post-Cold War world, where nations interact across numerous issue-areas daily. It thus presented itself as the logical tool for understanding US South Africa policy under Clinton, and for mapping the contours that had become apparent through analysis at the global and national levels.

Defining issue-areas as *a distinct set of disputes over various interrelated political goods, the disputes sharing in common certain characteristic qualities* -- in short, a set of similar policy disputes -- this study set out to apply the Zimmerman issue-area paradigm to the study of US South Africa policy, in all its various manifestations, in order to gain an understanding of the sources and the direction of that policy. Zimmerman's criteria for classifying issues, it will be remembered, are the tangibility of the political goods at stake and the symmetry of the expected domestic political impact; his four issue-areas are those of distribution, regulation, protection/interaction, and redistribution. Policymaking underlying the issues in US South Africa policy, the latter grouped into issue-*types* according to their four themes, mostly supported the expectations of the Zimmerman typology with regard to policy process; that is, whether a matter involved conflictual or

237

consensual policymaking, and whether it attracted mainly pluralist or elitist attention. In the one example (development assistance) where policy process appeared not to live up to Zimmerman's expectation, the issue-type actually shifted from consensual to conflictual and from pluralist to elitist process, midway through the period under study due to changing systemic and national factors. Therefore, Zimmerman's typology was not proved false, but the assumptions made about development assistance as an issue-type were found lacking. The need to test each issue according to the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of domestic political impact is again emphasised by such an instance. While the author maintains the usefulness of noting themes, or issue-types, in the operationalisation of the issue-area paradigm, this instance demonstrates that additional tests may need to be introduced to ensure that extraneous factors, such as the global and national context with regard to certain types of issues, have not changed so much as to cause shifts between issue-areas during the period under study.

In any case, taking into account the changed classification of the development assistance issue-type, expected policy processes were confirmed for each issue-type. This fact is graphically illustrated in the matrices depicting interest group and bureaucratic activity on US South Africa policy (see Figures C and D), and shall be discussed in more detail below. Having tested the paradigm and having found it indeed useful for predicting policy process in the various issue-areas, the question remains as to how it has enlightened US South Africa policy.

But this answer too seems evident. Issue-area analysis insights into policy process, taken together with the context provided by the global, historical and national analysis of US South Africa policy, has shed light on the various threads of policy that exist in Clinton's South Africa policy, as well as their sources and (with the inclusion of the engagement/disengagement function) the direction of pressure exerted thereby. The latter shall also be discussed more fully below, based on findings of Chapters Five and Six. In sum, issue-area analysis as operationalised in this study (except for the need to

institute further contextual checks) has indeed proved of value in the mapping of US South Africa policy under Clinton, providing insight into the contours that have bedevilled US-South Africa relations throughout the post-apartheid period.

7.2.3.3 *Interest Groups and Bureaucracies behind US South Africa Policy*

Considering the issue-types in US South Africa policy, and their context, what, specifically, are the implications of public interest group and bureaucratic activity?

Depending on which of the four types of issues that arose from the analysis of Clinton's South Africa policy -- development assistance issues, trade and investment issues, security issues, and issues of political symbolism -- policy has either engendered or discouraged engagement. An important factor behind these nuances in policy were the articulated interests of the US public and the goals of various actors within the US bureaucracy. The first, interest articulation, can best be seen via public opinion polls and interest group activity.

(i)   Interest Articulation

Clinton administration policy on South Africa must be seen, in part, as a function of domestic political concerns, expressed through public opinion, legislative action, and interest group activity. In review, public opinion has formed an important backdrop for each of the issue-types identified in US South Africa policy during the 1994-1998 period. Due to a "foreign policy gap," perceptions among policymakers of strong disengagement sentiment on the part of the public led to signs of imminent US withdrawal from such regions as Africa. However, as public support for engagement in Africa, and especially South Africa, became more evident in the second half of the 1990's (except regarding aid), forces for disengagement lost momentum.

Specifically, this study found that interest group activity on US South Africa policy has been concentrated on trade and investment issues in the period under study,

even among interest groups based in the African-American community (after aid was largely abandoned in 1996). Several new actors, newly formed or newly interested in commercial matters in South Africa, are involved in lobbying for increased engagement in the trade and investment issue-area, and these compete with one another for policymakers' attentions. Such lobbying includes opposition to any US complaisance over South African intellectual property rights violations or suspected concessions to labour in Pretoria's Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy, and concerns over crime and corruption in South Africa and their affect on the business climate, as well as objections from advocates for humanitarian goals in foreign policy and for the rights of the developing world to "catch up" with the developed world before the "playing field" is levelled completely by such entities as the World Trade Organisation.

Other US groups, such as the American textile industry and the AFL-CIO, are actively opposing expanded trade with South Africa on protectionist grounds, and seemed to have made inroads when the AGOA was shelved by the 105th Congress. Their activity, however, has not impinged greatly on trade relations with South Africa specifically, which are by now established and growing in several sectors and would stand to gain little more than increased protection of the reduced tariffs under GSP from AGOA passage.

The finding that there is continued African-American support (though not at the mass level of the anti-apartheid era) for engagement in South Africa, and specifically for aid (albeit to a lesser degree after 1995), ran counter to theory posited elsewhere that African-American sentiment in the post-apartheid period was likely to be against international engagement, generally, and against the transfer of US resources to other countries, particularly (Payne, 1994: 67,73). Theory postulating the increased leverage of ethnic lobbies in general in US foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War period also found little support in the African-American experience vis-à-vis South Africa, however. Instead, the study at hand found reduced leverage for African-Americans relative to

previous periods (especially the 1980's), due to structural reforms and switched majorities in Congress, to a dissipation of interest in foreign policy among this community after the end of apartheid, and to increasing disagreement among those African-Americans active on Africa policy with regard to the free-market agenda of the US. Action to address some of these problems has taken the form of efforts to build an African-American constituency for Africa.

In this regard, the fact that the quadrant depicting domestic politically symbolic issues (race relations) shows only two interest groups (see Figure C) is perhaps not a fair reflection of the depth of interest among the African-American elite (some of whom are not in government) demonstrated during interviews in the course of this study. Such discrepancies might, in the future, be accounted for in similar issue-area analysis by a simple weighting procedure, which, had it occurred to the author earlier, would have been useful in this study to convey the relative impact of interest group activity more fully. According to several respondents in the interviewing process behind this study, however, even with such efforts as the CFA and the National Summit on Africa, it is unlikely that a powerful constituency for Africa will form in the short-term (short of another coalescing issue similar to apartheid) due to the diversity of that constituency.

(ii)   *The US Bureaucracy*

The institutional framework underlying US foreign policy in general, as well as the policy process and bureaucratic politics of the 1990's, constitute another factor behind Clinton's South Africa policy. The American constitution's provision of checks and balances in policymaking through a separation of power between the executive and legislative branches affects foreign policy through, on the one hand, allowing representation of public sentiment via the Congress and, on the other hand, allowing alteration and even obstruction of the foreign policy programme of a presidential administration, sometimes on party political grounds. The burgeoning of the foreign

policy bureaucracy since the end of the second World War has brought further complexity to the policymaking process, Africa policymaking included. The end of the Cold War further highlighted the need to reorganise the foreign policy bureaucracy at the same time that Congress began its "revolution" to balance the overblown federal budget. In the reordering of priorities that ensued, the Department of Commerce and related agencies came to the fore as the liberalisation of trade markets became a key component of democracy promotion under Clinton. At the same time, consistent with the Clinton administration's campaign to "reinvent government" generally, the US-South Africa vice-presidential level binational commission was established to expedite policymaking and execution, as well as normalise relations between Washington and Pretoria, after Mandela's election.

Viewed through the four issue-types in Clinton's South Africa policy, bureaucratic activity appeared to have greatest importance for policymaking in the issue-areas expected by the Zimmerman paradigm. In accordance with that paradigm, elitist processes held sway in the issue-areas of protection/interaction and of redistribution (the latter via the numerous and symbolically significant programmes of the BNC), which for US South Africa policy consisted of the issue-types of security and of political symbolism. Bureaucratic politics and processes were not absent from the issue-types of development assistance and trade, which were originally placed in the issue-areas of distribution and regulation based on the criteria of tangibility and symmetry of impact, but elites were forced to compete with pluralist forces in the formulation of policy to a greater extent in these issue-areas than in the others. In noting again the migration of development assistance into the redistributional issue-area, this section of analysis showed that as the public largely withdrew support for the concept of aid to Africa as a whole, the locus of policymaking moved into the bureaucracy, where there was a particularly acrimonious debate over South Africa's USAID mission on questions of accountability and project appropriateness. Regarding the trade issue-type, although

bureaucratic activity on trade with South Africa has mushroomed since 1994, there has been a commensurate increase in pluralist activity, and so the expected conflictual-pluralist policy process expectation is indeed supported by the evidence. Bureaucratic dominance in security issues likewise supported the expectations of Zimmerman's issue-area paradigm, in that issues in this issue-type attracted very little public activity or pressure, except perhaps indirectly via "new" security concerns. Issues of political symbolism, both domestic (involving US race relations and the priorities of African-Americans) and global (involving perceived threats to US hegemony), were found to involve a conflictual-elitist process, as expected, as well, including many members of the African-American community from within the bureaucracy in the case of the former issues.

7.2.4 The Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission and "Reinventing Government"

Woven throughout the bureaucratic activity on US South Africa policy under Clinton has been the work of the Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission. Drawing in many more actors from the bureaucracy than are traditionally involved in foreign policymaking, the BNC has in some ways complicated the policymaking process. On the other hand, because of the executive powers of those chairing the commission, and the lack of veto power on the part of Congress over most BNC projects, the bureaucracy has accomplished much more vis-à-vis South Africa, over the time-frame of the three years the BNC has existed, than usual.

The BNC is arguably more than just another joint commission established to normalise relations between the US and South Africa, therefore. As one of two full US BNC's (the other is the US-Russia BNC, while two "semi" BNC's with Ukraine and Egypt exist, as well), the US-South Africa BNC indeed sends out an important message. The US obviously attaches a degree of significance to its relations with Pretoria.

Conclusion

But the BNC might also be seen to represent a fundamental drive on the part of the Clinton/Gore administration to change the way government works. Apparently converted even before their election to the idea of "reinventing government" as posited in the 1992 book by that name (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), Clinton and Gore entered the White House determined to streamline the huge federal bureaucracy during their watch. The result has been a highly publicised campaign to change the modus operandi of the US government, to cause federal employees to focus "not on inputs but on outcomes." The BNC exemplifies this approach to policymaking. By cutting through the red tape of bureaucratic policymaking, and requiring "deliverables" every six months at BNC meetings, the Office of the Vice President has set in motion a process which has had several beneficial effects for US South Africa policy. Not least of these are the resulting linkages between bureaucratic counterparts, which have apparently smoothed the resolution of a few subsequent diplomatic faux pas. The BNC meetings have also provided opportunities for Vice President Gore and Deputy Executive President Thabo Mbeki to discuss sensitive matters out of the hearing of the press or even that of other bureaucracies such as the Department of State. BNC meetings have been credited, for instance, with resolution of the McDonald's trademark dispute, the Armscor case, and the Syria arms sale confrontation.

But has the BNC changed the way in which policy is made and implemented with regard to South Africa? In the short term, it has. By short-circuiting the bureaucratic process, requiring results, and placing executive co-chairs over the BNC meetings, the BNC has created a means to "get things done" at this important juncture in South African history. It has also coordinated a large number of departments and agencies working on US South Africa policy through a variety of new issues, such as climatic consultation, housing development, AIDS research coordination, conservation of water and educational exchange via the Internet. The high-level attention on US South Africa relations, while not necessarily a feature in US media reports, has served to focus increased attention on

Conclusion

the bilateral relationship among the US foreign policy community and in South Africa itself, as well as on the relationship between Al Gore and Thabo Mbeki (which may have future ramifications, depending on election results).

The political significance of the BNC is, it would appear, considerable in light of the above. But what of the substance behind the spotlights? Concrete benefits for South Africa and the US, flowing from the BNC process, include increased trade and investment on both sides, as of late 1998, and access to important actors in the policymaking communities for actors on both sides of the table. But "revolution" it is not. The BNC has not changed the structures of US policymaking on South Africa, but rather accelerated the process by which that process must achieve increased policy goals. The BNC does form an executive coordinating umbrella over the wide range of bureaucratic actors involved in US South Africa policy, and organises the funding from existing monies to expedite the delivery of projects in record time. But it has not involved the private sector to the degree envisaged in its early stages, and nor has it necessarily helped policy to run more smoothly by the end of the 1990's -- higher productivity has come at the cost of higher stress and sometimes reduced goodwill among the US actors involved, it would appear.

These facts do not mean that the BNC has not been worthwhile for the US and for South Africa in this point in the latter's history, however. The conclusion of this study is that, while the BNC is unlikely to leave a "reinvented" policy process behind, it will leave behind several US-South Africa joint undertakings, as well as new linkages across the two national bureaucracies. From that point of view, the BNC has been positive in terms of the previous discussion of the threats to South Africa's future and the value of an increased understanding of US policy. Whether the political cost to South Africa of the close relations signified by the US-South Africa BNC are worth those gains are another matter which, while they should feature in US policy formulations, must also form the basis of another study.

7.2.5   US Disengagement and South Africa under Clinton -- and Beyond

To summarise, this study has employed analysis at the system level to delve into international sources of US foreign policy, and at the unit and sub-unit level to "unpack" domestic interest group activity and policy process as further sources of US policy. In addition, to offer an indication of the net thrust of US domestic factor activity with regard to engagement in South Africa, an engagement/disengagement function was introduced to the issue-area typology. Overall, this integrated approach, it has been suggested, offers a sound estimation of US foreign policy, as well as insight into likely trends for the future. These insights become possible, as the issues themselves have become one determinant of the nature of likely policy, based on the actors and the interests involved.

In light of the concerns raised in the literature concerning predictions about the external behaviour of states based on domestic political dynamics across different issue-areas, however, the goal will not be to make conclusive statements about future US South Africa policy but to sketch, in very broad strokes, likely outlines for a map of that policy.

Looking at the Clinton period, the prospect of disengagement as a salient feature of US foreign policy has dimmed considerably since its inception in the early 1990's. The globalisation which continues to bring such economic benefit to the US has also made deeper the "mutual vulnerability" which characterises an interdependent world, and like it or not, the US appears to have little choice about at least certain minimum degree of engagement. There is, however, some prospect of stepping back from such engagement in some regions, as the US seeks to balance limited resources with far-reaching goals. Amidst these exigencies, Africa remains fairly low on the US foreign policy agenda. Aid to Africa has continued to decline, even in view of the increased aid to South Africa until 2005. Meanwhile, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act has yet to successfully pass through both houses of Congress.

Conclusion

South Africa, it would appear however, retains a special place among US bilateral relations. Besides the continued and apparently active Gore-Mbeki Binational Commission, there have been several high level visits in the past few years, including that of President Clinton, the first ever to South Africa by a sitting US president. The Department of Commerce continues its active role in promoting South Africa as an investment destination through its one roving post, that of Minister Counsellor, assigned to Johannesburg. As South Africa features both as a "pivotal state" and as a "big emerging market," it garners attention from that policymaker focused on "key nation" approaches within the policy of democracy promotion. In America's eyes, South Africa appears to genuinely "fit the bill" as a key nation in that it has significant promise as both a regional stabiliser and an economic powerhouse in terms of generating growth in Africa. Moreover, South Africa has considerable leverage among the developing nations of the world through its leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Southern Africa Development Community, and in the fact of Nelson Mandela's moral authority, which speaks loudly in forums such as the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity. At the same time, US engagement has been spurred because, as a newly liberalised country, South Africa is particularly susceptible to infiltration by international crime rings and terrorist operations. Traditional military cooperation has resumed with the end of apartheid, and joint military exercises may lead eventually to South African participation in the African Crisis Response Initiative which underpins the US approach to peacekeeping on the continent. Such a move on the part of Mandela, still far from certain, would be an important signal to Washington that South Africa has accepted the US offer of "partnership."

Most of the domestic activity in this period likewise engendered deeper engagement, as demonstrated by the greater amount of activity in the upper half of each quadrant in the two illustrating matrices (refer to Figures C and D). As such, the net effect of that activity would seem to dispel the sense that either the public or the

government was moving away from supporting engagement with South Africa in the current period. This finding parallels that of the Program on International Policy Attitudes study on general engagement sentiment among the public, but contradicts their findings on sentiment among the foreign policy bureaucracy. According to PIPA, policymakers were seen to have worked toward disengagement generally, based on erroneous perceptions that the public opposed engagement internationally (Kull et al, 1997). One possible explanation for the discrepancy in findings between this study and PIPA's, it seems, is the special status of South Africa in US foreign policy over the period of study, as seen in the several US initiatives from the Clinton administration.

So it is that a greater understanding of US South Africa policy becomes possible through issue-area analysis. For, without taking into account these differences across issue-areas, the many signals from Washington -- from interest groups, legislators (whether acting on their own or as representatives of a constituency), functionaries, and administration officials -- create a confusing spectacle. When viewed through the issue-area paradigm, however, policy process and therefore, in view of the specific interest groups and bureaucratic politics, policy directions (in both senses of that word), become apparent. Thus the contours of US South Africa policy can be drawn, to the benefit of both American and South African policymakers, and a more accurate and useful map results. It has been said that the best way to anticipate the future is to understand the present. The foregoing exercise, while valuable on its own, also allows an informed look ahead at US South Africa policy beyond Clinton.

7.2.6 Historical Continuities and Discontinuities, and Likely Policy Directions

As noted at the close of the historical review of US South Africa policy, sanctions and apartheid are gone as issues in US South Africa policy in the late 1990's, as are Cold War concerns about Soviet expansion in southern Africa. These, together with US business interest in the resource-laden region, were important factors in US South Africa

Conclusion

policy throughout the decades following the second World War. US concerns about race relations at home and American influence abroad remain inherent, however, in US foreign policy formulations on South Africa, as do the push for expanded trade and investment links. It is the fact of these enduring *issue-types* which allow insight into the sources and likely direction of US foreign policy, under Clinton and beyond, via the issue-area paradigm. Contextual dynamics are key to these insights (as learned via the development assistance issue-type). In addition, each new issue must be tested for issue-area suitability according to the two questions posed by Zimmerman regarding the tangibility of political goods and the symmetry of expected domestic political impact, before assumptions can be made about issue-type and policy process. But, within these limitations, and augmented by the engagement/disengagement function, issue-area analysis yields important indicators about likely future directions of US South Africa policy.

Much about whether the US will remain engaged with South Africa into the new century can be gathered, for instance, from the fact of increasing business interest among the African-American community, which generally seems to have deeper commitment to South Africa than pure mercantilists and may ride the ups and downs of the emerging market in South Africa with more equanimity than most hedge fund dealers or other global capitalists. In fact, unless the nonracial experiment in South Africa fails utterly, African-Americans (or at least the leaders of the various segments of that community) look set to remain a force for US engagement in South Africa, perhaps substantially through programmes such as those undertaken under the auspices of the BNC, and perhaps only symbolically through international initiatives similar to Clinton's One Nation Initiative.

The enduring nature of US interest in South Africa from a security point of view -- even though the specific issues have changed with the end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism and environmental degradation -- also supports the notion of

engagement beyond the Clinton administration years. No president of the future will be able to negate the threat of the international menaces highlighted by the Clinton/Gore administration without some repercussions politically, even if not directly pertaining to US South Africa policy. The connection between South Africa's future success and the danger of these threats for Africa and the developing world (and thus, due to interdependence, eventually America) seems to have been made by the new generation of leaders in Washington in the post-Cold War period as "new" security issues have been allowed to surface. Questions remain as to how best the US might support South Africa through its transition into political consolidation and economic integration, and these will be addressed below.

While development aid appears less enduring than the other issue-types in US South Africa policy due to its demise as a credible means of sustainable development (at least in current forms), this issue-type in any case looks set to fade in importance in US South Africa policy as South Africa itself gains in economic resilience.

For further insight into the continuities and discontinuities in US South Africa policy, there might be benefit in comparing the "net effect" of the two domestic factors under study in the previous pages, over time. Such an exercise, grounded in the contextual dynamics of selected periods of study from a policy's history, may yield even richer insights, but is offered as a suggestion for further application in another study rather than attempted in these pages.[1]

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[1] If issue-area analysis were to be undertaken for several periods of study within a particular policy, and grounded in the relevant systemic factors of each period under study, conceivably the input of (aggregated) domestic factor activity could be plotted on a graph to show the changes in content and direction of that activity over time. With, for instance, engagement on the vertical axis and time on the horizontal axis, variations in aggregated domestic factor activity could be located over the years. Such a long-term perspective on domestic factor activity with regard to a policy such as enggement would be of great value in presenting a more integrated view of foreign policy.

7.3   *Clinton's South Africa Policy Assessed*

Finally, having drawn in a number of the missing contours on the map of US South Africa policy under Clinton, what can be said about the policy itself in light of the normative questions raised early on in this study?   Those questions had to do with the spread of American-style liberal democracy and the sovereignty of the least powerful nations of the world in the face of that overwhelming trend. As one of the more advanced developing nations of the South, South Africa is perhaps in a stronger position than most to resist the forces of gravity inherent in the US and other centres of global capitalism. Through Pretoria's firm stance in the face of US criticism over relations with such pariah states as Libya and Syria, and the fight it has put up over the Armscor case and various other points of disagreement with the US since 1994, South Africa has made it clear that it remains a sovereign state and not a surrogate at the beck and call of the US government. On the other hand, South Africa can hardly refuse to take the hand of friendship offered by the US, laden as it is with promises of aid, expanded trade links and the general status that accompanies attention from the leader of the international political economy.

The onus thus rests on the United States to recognise these conflicting pressures on this fledgling leader of the South. How can the US expect to engage with Pretoria in a "partnership" when their respective economies differ in scale by a factor of 30? If South Africa cannot afford to bypass the opportunity of close relations with the US, is it right for the US to highlight this budding "partnership" when the political cost of a close relationship between the two nations is so much greater for South Africa than it is for the US?   Is there not another approach the Clinton administration should consider in attempting to achieving its goal of supporting South Africa in its experiment in nonracial democracy?

Certainly, by some measures of success, Clinton's policy is doing very well. If measured by the standards of political gain, for instance, Clinton's South Africa policy

Conclusion

appears to have surpassed expectations. The BNC has firmly cemented relations between the US and South Africa in the post-apartheid, post-Cold War period. New links have been established for trade and investment, as well as for cooperation in matters of security, both national (traditional security issues) and international ("new" security issues). The African-American community appears generally satisfied that the Clinton administration has taken their preferences with regard to South Africa seriously -- so much so that there is little public opinion expressed on US South Africa policy in the 1990's from this community, except through African-American leaders attempting to mobilise a constituency for Africa in general. Development aid packages promised at Mandela's inauguration created the impression of US support for South Africa's new nonracial democracy in the form of grants and loans, and the subsequent controversy over the USAID programme in Pretoria has been largely missed by the US public, whose gaze has turned to other issues in Africa or to the potential for trade to bring South Africa through its transition and into political and economic soundness. Only the occasional diplomatic scuffle over relations with "rogue" states, or over Pretoria's support for the abolition of landmines or the establishment of an international court of justice, have marred this apparently flourishing -- if relatively low-priority -- bilateral relationship.

However, there are other measures of success. Earlier, the question was raised as to whether the political cost to South Africa of the close relations signified by the US-South Africa BNC are worth the gains achieved by each in that forum. While the details of South African foreign policy have not featured highly in this study on US South Africa policy, the matter is one which might figure more highly in US policy calculations and therefore merits some discussion here. Does the US recognise the implications of isolating South Africa from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, or indeed the whole of the South, by its public pronouncements of partnership? Would a clearly independent Pretoria not be a more valuable ally, as it were, in the fight against instability on the continent and economic turmoil the world over, than one believed to be a surrogate of the

252

United States? Perhaps the pronouncements should be muted and the resources to back up earlier promises of assistance -- whether in the form of trade benefits or housing loan guarantees -- should be more forthcoming. While it may be domestic political and bureaucratic sources of foreign policy which often thwart intentions such as those displayed in the US promises made soon after Mandela's election, the Clinton administration must resist playing to those sources for political points -- especially when it is at the expense of South Africa's future. For, the consequences of US policy backfiring by pushing South Africa to a place where it is forced to defend its sovereignty to such a degree that it loses the good grace of the US Congress and the American public would be deleterious for all involved, as well as for the international community as a whole. By recognising South Africa's sovereignty ahead of a show down, to a greater degree than demonstrated over the past four years of the Clinton presidency, US South Africa policy may not appear as successful as before to its domestic audience, but it would no doubt be proved more fruitful in the broader purposes of lending to South Africa's international integrity.

7.4   *Future Research*

A study such as this produces a number of ideas for research which, if time allowed, would no doubt have enhanced the contribution made thus far. However, they will rather be posited for future research.

The application of the Zimmerman issue-area paradigm might be fruitfully repeated in other studies, adding the suggested contextual tests to ensure the proper placement of issues throughout the period of study, as well as a weighting system to show where domestic factor activity has a greater impact than demonstrated by the number of actors involved, for instance. The noted suggestion that issue-area analysis be carried out for several periods in a specific foreign policy, and then compared (in the aggregate) for

Conclusion

insights into continuities and discontinuities is another possible expansion on the methodology of the foregoing study.

Another subject for future study, and one which might build on the study at hand, would be analysis of other domestic sources of US foreign policy with regard to their impact on US South Africa policy in the post-apartheid period. For instance, what role has the media had in US South Africa policy between 1994 and 1998? The increased access to a wide range of information, often available in real-time coverage, on the part of the public via cable news networks, the internet, and expanding world travel has broken down many of the stereotypical obstructions to informed foreign policy analysis on the part of the wider public. How have these developments affected US policy towards South Africa, and towards Africa as a whole? Election politics would form another important domestic factor affecting foreign policy. In more than one interview over the course of this study, mention was made of the midterm elections in late 1998 and the likelihood of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act being set aside due to legislators' seeking to downplay controversy within various constituencies. In fact, it appears that such speculation was correct. It is altogether possible that the upcoming US presidential elections in the year 2000 will make it similarly difficult to pass the AGOA legislation into law during the next congress. What are the implications of such "electioneering" for US policy toward South Africa?

The US-South Africa Binational Commission is an example of only a few such commissions, and as such might be fruitfully studied as a generic foreign policy tool, in conjunction with the US BNC's with Russia, Egypt, and the Ukraine. Research into the value of these as an example of new foreign policy tools to meet the challenges of the 1990's would seem warranted. Might the drive to "reinvent government" on the part of the Clinton/Gore administration spill over into other innovations, where normal channels of authority are overlooked and several new actors on the foreign policy stage report

Conclusion

directly to an executive office such as that of the vice-president? What are the implications for the pluralist system of policymaking in the US?

What affect will African-American efforts to build an American constituency for Africa have on US South Africa policy over the long-run? Might South Africa be excluded from such efforts, as it escapes the marginalisation of the rest of the continent? Might new dynamics be introduced into the policymaking process by such close links between the elites in government and outside in the African-American community? These ideas also constitute a subject worthy of future research.

Finally, how can the integration of study at various levels of analysis be moved forward even further? The example of using issue-area analysis to augment the analysis of current systemic factors behind US foreign policy is only one of many approaches that might result in more integrated foreign policy analysis. But the proclivity of foreign policy analysts to remain in one "camp" or another remains. Research into the attitudes of policymakers about "crossing the bridge" with regard to realist and liberal theoretical approaches to policy, as well as international versus comparative policy studies, may yield important insights to move this cause forward.

But then, as the globalisation of the international political economy progresses -- as domestic issues become international, and international issues domestic -- perhaps the field of study will progress as well, leaving behind the entrenched, hard divisions between realism and liberalism, between foreign policy analysis and comparative studies, and between different issue-areas in the study of a nation's policies, for the greater perspective of us all.

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271

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