THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

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I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

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ABSTRACT

The nature of conflict in Africa has changed from the Cold War to the post-cold War era. This is evident in the internal and external factors and actors involved within the conflict dynamics. During the Cold War era politics and the quest for control of the state formed the basis for conflicts in Africa, from anti-colonial wars of independence and liberation struggles to secessionist attempts. In the post-Cold War era with the loss of external superpower support, this has changed with the growing significance of identity politics, and conflicts based on the differences of ethnicity, religion and the quest for the control of resources and land, characterised by extreme violence and the rise of actors other than the state, within failed and collapsed states. These conflicts have thus presented challenges to the United Nations (UN) in relation to its traditional means of maintaining international peace and security, and the internal dynamics of the decision-making processes, political will and accompanying resources and financial factors within the organisation. The challenges faced by the UN in Africa therefore lie not only within the nature of conflict and the nature of the African state but also within the internal constraints inherent within the organisation itself. The conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda respectively represent how the nature of conflict has changed in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era and both illustrate the challenges the UN has faced in light of the changing nature of African conflict. While Mozambique offers an example of a typical Cold War conflict, based on the quest for control of the state and exacerbated by superpower support, Rwanda represents an example of a typical post-Cold War internal conflict based on identity politics and extreme violence manifest as genocide. By comparing and contrasting these two conflicts, and the subsequent involvement of UN peace maintenance operations in these conflicts, this thesis offers a comparative study of "old" and "new" wars in Africa in order that a better understanding of the nature of conflict in Africa can be reached and to illustrate the challenges faced by the UN in light of this changing nature of conflict.

OPSOMMING

Die aard van konflik in Afrika het vanaf die tydperk van die Koue Oorlog tot die na-Koue Oorlog tydperk aansienlik verander. Dit is in die innerlike en uiterlike faktore en akteurs wat by die konflik betrokke is waarneembaar. Gedurende die Koue Oorlog tydperk was interstaatlike konflik 'n hoofkenmerk. Dit was ook die fase van anti-koloniale oorloë wat dikwels met eksterne steun geveg is. In die na-Koue Oorlog tydperk met die verlies van uiterlike supermoondheid ondersteuning, het interne konflik binne swak state dikwels oor die beheer van skaars hulpbronne, of oor identiteit en griewe gegaan. Dié konflik het uitdagings aan die Verenigde Nasies (VN) gestel wie se vredesregime kwalik vir rebelle en kindersoldate voorsiening gemaak het. Dit het ook eise gestel aan die politieke wilskrag van lede van die Veiligheidsraad om in dergelike konflikte betrokke te raak. Die uitdaging vir die VN in Afrika lê dus nie net in die aard van konflik en die aard van die staat in Afrika wat verander het nie, maar ook in nuwe eise vir vrede. Die twee gevallestudies van die konflik in Mosambiek en Rwanda demonstreer hoe hierdie aard van konflik verander het, en hoe moeilik dit is om vrede te maak waar akteurs (rolspelers) kwalik binne konvensionele raamwerke hanteer kan word. Waar Mosambiek 'n voorbeeld van 'n tipiese Koue Oorlogse konflik was – stryd vir die beheer oor die staat en aangevuur deur supermoonhede, is Ruanda weer 'n meer eietydse voorbeeld van 'n tipiese na-Koue Oorlogse interne konflik, gebaseer op identiteitspolitiek wat met ekstreme geweld en volksmoord gepaardgegaan het. Hierdie tesis bied 'n vergelykende studie van sulke "ou" en "nuwe" oorloë in Afrika en bied moontlik 'n beter begrip van die aard en oplossing van sulke konflikte wat by uitstek nuwe uitdagings aan die tradisionele opvattings van die VN stel.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMASUSU – Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the Age-old Deceitful Acts of Unarists

ANC – African National Congress

CDR – Coalition pour la Défense de la République

CORE – Commission on Reintegration

CSC – supervision and Control Commission

DESA – Drought Emergency in Southern Africa

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

FRELIMO – Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana

GPA – General Peace Agreement

MDR – Democratic Republican Movement

MRND – National Revolutionary Movement for Development

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OAU – Organisation of African Unity

ONUMOZ – United Nations Operation in Mozambique

PMC – Private Military Company

RENAMO– Frente de Libertacao Moçambique

RPA – Rwandan Patriotic Army

RPF – Rwandan Patriot Front

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Conference

UN – United Nations

UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNAMIR II – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda II

UNDP – United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

UNDPA – United Nations Department of Political Affairs

UNDPI – United Nations Department of Public Information

UNOHAC – United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-operation

UNOMUR – United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM II – United Nations Operation in Somalia II

UNSGSR – United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative

US – United States

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Statement

In the post-Cold War era, Africa remains a continent struggling with the existence of conflict, yet it faces increasing reluctance by the international community to become involved to prevent or resolve these conflicts. However, since the end of the Cold War, it is noticeable that the nature of conflict is changing as African states have become more vulnerable to civil wars and increasingly fallen victim to the struggle for power and competition over control of scarce resources (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 13-24, Tshitereke, 2003: 82). The traditional "old war" conflicts of anti-colonial wars of independence and liberation struggles based on the quest for control of the state, fought during the Cold War era have evolved into what Kaldor calls "new wars". Here, rather than being about the traditional notions of national interest and state power within the international arena, these wars are about internal 'identity politics' in that the exclusive claim to power is on the basis of movements that mobilise around identity of tribe or ethnicity, nation or religious community (Kaldor, 1999: 76, 2000: 4). Although these conflicts have been mainly internal in nature, the support of external actors in one form or another, as well as the movements of arms and populations across national and regional boundaries has added an international dimension to these conflicts (Booth, 1991: 340, Jackson, 1993: 144, Clapham, 1996: 29).

Resolving these conflicts in Africa remains imperative within the context of international peace and security, as Kofi Annan (1998: 2) has stated: "Preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself". However, the internal and external dynamics within the nature of these "new wars" and within the framework of the African state, have presented challenges to the United Nations (UN) within the framework of its traditional principles and means of international peace and security maintenance. Preventing and solving such wars has been a difficult endeavour because while new conflicts in Africa are mainly internal in nature, the established UN framework

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assumes that conflicts have an interstate dimension. New wars thus pose a major challenge to the UN in its efforts to maintain international peace and security because although the UN was intended to deal with *inter-state* conflict, it is increasingly being called upon to respond to *internal* conflict in Africa (Annan, 1998: 2). In dealing solely with states as the primary focus of conflict in the UN Charter, new security issues are ignored and thus the UN is unable to effectively regulate its involvement in contemporary African conflict. This is so because there are no provisions within the Charter relating to conflict involving non-state actors such as rebel groups, private military companies, warlords or humanitarian groups which have alike become important parties to the conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War era.

Traditionally, security has been focused on states and military concerns, and war fought between states for the definable political goal of state interest (Kaldor, 1999: 15-22, Ngubane and Solomon, 2002: 60). There is however a growing movement in the post-Cold War era away from the traditional notions of the international system being a "war system" and the institution of interstate war being the dominant factor within this (Booth, 1991: 337). This is especially evident within the African context of "new wars" where traditional security threats have evolved into newer non-traditional threats such as small arms proliferation, environmental degradation and mass migrations across state and regional boundaries (Ngubane and Solomon, 2002: 59). This new conflict paradigm is characterised as internal as opposed to inter-state, non-statutory in that it involves irregular forces and militias who employ guerrilla and counterinsurgency doctrines rather than traditional state armies, and civilians have become both the perpetrators and the victims in such conflicts involving the widespread violation of human rights, the mass displacement of people and the destruction of physical infrastructure (Kaldor, 2000: 4-6, De Coning, 2002: 48).

The significant consequence observed from these new conflicts has been the considerable impact on the individual and the threats to the human security of the African people, as civilians have increasingly become the targets within these conflicts. People and their safety and protection have thus become the primary focus within the framework of these new wars, rather than the exclusive focus on the security of the state and national security (Booth, 1991: 341, Solomon, 1998: 7). Nowhere else is the idea of new security thinking more relevant than in Africa where

many factors undermine the idea of the state itself where people's well-being is threatened, and the state becomes a direct threat to its own citizens (Ngubane and Solomon, 2002: 60-61). "New wars" are thus related to the disintegration or erosion of weak and failed states (Kaldor, 1999: 78). Jackson (1993: 145) contends that Africa is an international region consisting of pre-eminently and uniformly weak governments and failed states, which may even constitute 'stateless' jurisdictions. This has been problematic for the traditional means of international peace maintenance, as the viability of a state is based on the ability of that state to provide security to all its citizens and thus a security dilemma has arisen, because with the collapse of state institutions, the state has been unable to carry out its sovereign duty of providing justice and security to its people (Malan, 1999: 11, Reno, 2001: 1, Troeller, 2001: 65).

The UN was established as the principal organisation designed to maintain international peace and security based on the traditional adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. In carrying out this duty, the UN is a collective security organisation on a global scale and endeavours to ensure that all its members take collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to international peace and security.[1] The UN is thus the world's sole collective security organisation with the ability to act on behalf of the international community (Clapham, 1999: 26). As a collective security organisation, the UN originally endeavoured to deal with the prevention of conflict and the maintenance of peace and security *between* states. With the rise of internal conflicts and actors other than the state within failed and collapsing states in Africa, the collective security mechanisms created under the UN Charter thus face a dilemma in terms of the appropriate response to such conflicts. As Booth (1991: 340) contends: "There is a mismatch between the problems we face and the structures we have to deal with them".

Collective security was espoused within the liberalist paradigm of international relations in the post-World War Two era and was viewed as a co-operative method of ensuring mutual peace and security between states. However, in reality, the UN operated during the Cold War within a realist dominated international environment,

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[1] These are the guiding principles of the UN as laid out in the UN Charter.

and as Tickner (1995: 175) points out, collective security was "unrealistic in a world of self-interested and power seeking states". This is especially pertinent as the UN was paralysed in the arena of maintaining international peace and security, particularly due to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council as "dissent by one of the permanent members [was] sufficient to make the execution of any enforcement measure impossible" (Morgenthau, 1960: 30).

As collective security is based on the state, it was only applicable when borders were crossed, but not when force was used against peoples within a state (Rochester, 1995:214). Collective security, therefore, does not fall in line within the contemporary nature of conflict in Africa as it is based on the prevention of conflict between states, rather than within them. While Morgenthau (1960: 298) viewed collective security as the "ideal solution of a problem of law enforcement in a community of sovereign nations", the dilemma we face in the contemporary world is that conflicts are no longer fought predominantly between sovereign nations, but are rather internal, involving actors other than the state. Therefore, in light of internal wars in Africa, deterrence from external attack is no longer an adequate representation of security goals when it is internal insecurity that is the greatest threat (Tickner, 1995: 179).

Whilst traditionally, the concept of security has fallen within the framework of the realist school of thought based on the primacy of the state and interstate conflict (Buzan, 1991: 2-5), "new wars" in Africa are internal in nature, involving actors other than the state, while still maintaining a regional and international dimension; thus the concept of "new wars" can be viewed more within the pluralist framework of international relations theory which rejects the notion that the nation state is the basic unit of analysis, and includes a complex array of interactions at all levels *within* states and across state boundaries (Fetherston, 1994: 90). Realism thus no longer offers a dominant framework of analysis when examining the issue of contemporary conflict in Africa, as a deeper understanding is needed of the *internal* dynamics of such conflicts within the framework of international peace and security. As the notions of security have changed, so too should the ways and means of addressing security in the contemporary international environment be re-conceptualised.

In carrying out its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, the UN has established a number of peace maintenance operations, namely, peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. These traditional concepts of peace maintenance have pointed to the notion of making and keeping peace between states (Clapham, 1999: 29). However, such operations undertaken by the UN in the post-Cold War era in Africa have evolved from the task of upholding a peace between warring states, to the multi-functional and more complex tasks of political, military, as well as humanitarian activities within a state to rebuild failed states and deal with the effects of complex internal conflicts (Cilliers and Mills, 1999: 1-3). These new tasks also include the involvement and participation of civilian police, human rights monitors, electoral officers, and refugee and humanitarian aid specialists playing as meaningful a role as the military (Bhoutros-Ghali, 1992: 11). However, as the UN has taken on these new and 'unprecedented tasks' it has continued to employ old and worn traditional doctrines in its response to the increasing security demands within the international system, even though the current global security situation demands new conceptualisations and approaches, in the face of new commitments (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 17, Knight, 1998: 19). Thus, Knight (1998: 19) contends that the UN security mechanisms are in a "state of crisis".

Africa has experienced some of the most controversial peace operations by both the UN and regional organisations in the post-Cold War era (Nkiwane, 2000: 26). The specific problems faced by the UN where highlighted by the *Brahimi Report* compiled in 2000 as the *Report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations*. This report is significant in that the UN itself has recognised and admitted to the limitations that it faces in its undertakings in maintaining international peace and security and the changing nature of conflicts that have posed a challenge to the principles and implementation of peace maintenance operations. The challenges presented to the UN in peace maintenance lie within the nature of conflict itself as well as within the structures and processes of the organisation. Kaldor (2000: 15) believes that the difficulty of UN peacekeeping operations results in part from the misdiagnosis of these new wars in Africa.

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has noted that the inability of the UN to successfully launch peace maintenance also has less to do with its military efficiency and more to do with its political capacity (Nkiwane, 2000: 31). As seen with past operations the UN management of peace operations in Africa has largely been affected by the internal politics within the organisation, particularly those of the permanent members of the Security Council (Clapham, 1999: 27). As will be shown in this thesis the political will and support of UN members to peace operations is an important element within the framework of successful peace maintenance. The *Brahimi* Report highlighted this view in saying that there can be no lasting impact without the political, operational and financial support of UN members who with their support will enable the UN to become a truly credible force for the promotion of international peace (*Brahimi Report,* 2000: viii). Secretary General Kofi Annan has also expressed these sentiments in relation to the resolution of conflict in Africa, saying: "with sufficient political will – on the part of the international community – peace and development in Africa can be given a new momentum…With political will, rhetoric can truly be transformed into reality. Without it, not even the noblest sentiments will have a chance of success" (Annan, 1998: 27).

The problem remains presently however, that the involvement of states, especially Western states, remains limited by the scope of their own national interests and foreign policy priorities (Malan, 1999: 92). As Malan (2000: 180-184) argues, as long as no Western power feels threatened by African conflicts, the prospects for outside intervention remain weak. Furthermore, the realist notion in international relations prevails that states are the principal actors in international affairs and thus the issue of state sovereignty is a guiding principle in the decision to intervene in conflict. Sovereignty protects the territorial inviolability of a state, its freedom from interference from others, and its authority to rule its own people (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996: 101). However, sovereignty in the contemporary world is not only about authority and a right to non-intervention, but also as much about the responsibility of the state to its people (Jørgensen, 2004: 97). Therefore as Troeller (2001: 71) points out; given the exceptionally high percentage of civilian casualties that characterise internal African conflicts, not to intervene is morally inexcusable and further undermines the validity of international human rights principles and the organisations established to uphold them.

Gelb and Rosenthal (2003: 5) emphasise that the perception that states could invade the sovereign territory of other states to prevent or stop massive bloodshed caused by genocide or ethnic cleansing was inconceivable until the 1990's. This view is changing within the international community in the post-Cold War era as Malan (1999: 93) contends that when people deliberately kill or physically injure other human beings as in the case of genocide, then the Security Council should be obliged to declare this a threat to international peace and therefore action should follow in the form of intervention to prevent this from occurring. In 1991 then Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar expressed the view that "it is now increasingly felt that the principles of non-interference within the essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity" (Cockell, 2001: 17). The importance of the protection of people and the victims of complex internal conflicts is thus increasingly being recognised by the UN, as expressed by Resolution 1265 passed by the Security Council in September 1999, which called for a broad range of measures to protect civilians in armed conflict (Malone and Wermester, 2001: 44).

The challenges faced by the UN in peace maintenance in "new wars" in Africa are most notable in the attempts at peacekeeping and the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. The events that unfolded at that time have been called one of; if not *the* greatest humanitarian disasters of this generation where a conflict involving identity politics found its most brutal expression to date as genocide (Kaldor, 1999: 78, Jones, 2001: 1). The misdiagnosis of the conflict, accompanied by the lack of political will of UN members as well as their reluctance to provide the necessary financial and logistical resources for more robust action is said to represent the most prominent sign of Western indifference to conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War era and furthermore the moral deficiency of contemporary global governance (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 13, Murphy, 2000: 791). Neethling (1999: 27, 2003: 88) points out that the "perceived failure" of the UN in Rwanda highlights "the weakness of [the United Nations] position as diplomatic arbiter, peacekeeper and peace enforcer". Thus Rwanda demonstrates the challenges faced by the UN in peace maintenance process in the post-Cold War era. There is therefore a need to examine why the UN has met

with such difficulty on the African continent in the prevention and resolution of such "new wars".

However, in discussing the difficulties of peace maintenance in Africa, it is important to recognise the fact that there have also been important successful attempts at peace maintenance operations undertaken by the UN. Mpungwe (1999: 14) argues that by concentrating too hard on the negative aspects of the UN's perceived "failure", some positive lessons are missed that can be learned from a peace process that actually worked up to a certain point. Thus, in the examination of the UN's challenges in peace maintenance, the successful role that the UN has played in the resolution of conflicts in Africa cannot be ignored. An important example of this could be the role that the UN played in Mozambique in facilitating the consolidation of peace in that country after a sixteen year long civil war. Conflict in Mozambique is typical of an "old war" in Africa, not necessarily based on any particular regional or ethnic identity but an example of a postcolonial struggle for power and the involvement of external actors in the context of the Cold War superpower scuffle for influence on the continent. (Macqueen, 2002: 165).

Contrary to the operations in Rwanda, the peace operations in Mozambique occurred with the support of the regional and international community, as well as sufficient financial and personnel resources to ensure a successful peace operation (Malaquias, 1997: 87, Aldrich, 2000: 4-5). The UN thus was able to maintain a strong presence in the country with a clear mandate of managing the entire peace process (Malaquias, 1997: 101). Another element that contributed to the success of peace operations in Mozambique was the co-operation between the UN and regional states ensuring a more effective peace operation (Clapham, 1999: 28). Thus, Mozambique may demonstrate that when certain conditions both internally within a conflict itself, as well as within the UN are met there may be the possibility of successful peace maintenance. While Mozambique was not without its challenges, the ability of the UN to eradicate and solve these problems serves as an illustration of the ability of the UN to resolve "old war" conflicts in Africa.

The end to the conflicts in Rwanda and Mozambique were both implemented through peace accords signed by the conflicting parties involved in each conflict respectively

and both called for a significant role to be played by the UN in consolidating the peace. The task of implementing peace agreements has at times fallen to the UN by default (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 23). This has happened because during the signing of a peace accord, while the UN may not have had a role to play in the production of the peace agreement, the parties call upon the UN as a part of the agreement to consolidate the peace through peace operations. While in the case of Mozambique, the peace was implemented through UN peacekeeping, accompanied by comprehensive peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts; peacekeeping and unilateral peace enforcement in Rwanda did not facilitate and end to conflict and rather contributed to the resumption of conflict, and ultimately the outbreak of genocide.

From the examination of the nature of conflict in Africa and the UN responses to such conflict, the question may be formulated of what kind of peace maintenance methods work best in the prevention and resolution of contemporary African conflicts. Every conflict is unique in its origins and consequences and thus a "greater knowledge about the internal dynamics of civil wars would undoubtedly help in assessing the utility of intervention" (Malan, 2000: 167). There is thus a greater need to ensure that the appropriate response is carried out within a conflict and whether that response forms part of peacekeeping, peacebuilding or peace enforcement should depend on the nature of the conflict itself. Guehenno (2002: 20) contends that peacekeeping remains a very specific and limited form of treatment that is not suitable to treat all of the world's conflicts. While peacekeeping has been the main peace maintenance operation utilised by the UN, there is a greater need to incorporate peacebuilding tasks into such operations as there is the increasing need to rebuild failed states affected by conflict. Thus peacebuilding efforts need to play a more prominent role within the framework of UN peace maintenance operations.

1.2 Purpose and Significance

In order for there to be a clear path for the future, the mistakes of the past need to be examined in light of how these mistakes have lessons that can be learnt. As Deng (1995: 207) points out: "Understanding the causes leading to the collapse of the system is critical to developing workable, long-term solutions" (Deng, 1995: 207). Thus understanding the dynamics of a conflict is an important aspect in ensuring an efficient and adequate response to that conflict. This thesis therefore aims to examine

and provide an explanation of the changing internal and external dynamics of the nature of conflict in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and how the UN has responded to such conflicts within the framework of its established means and traditional principles of peace maintenance.

This thesis will examine to what extent the changing nature of conflict in Africa has presented challenges to the UN in terms of its traditional means of international peace and security maintenance. However, these challenges do not only stem from the nature of conflict itself, but also from within the nature of the UN in terms of its structure, decision-making processes and the accompanying political will and financial resources provided for peace maintenance operations by UN members. Thus the internal dynamics within the UN will be examined within the framework of its established means of international peace maintenance.

In order to do this, a comparative study will be presented of UN peace maintenance in Mozambique and UN peace maintenance in Rwanda to illustrate how lessons can be drawn from both successes and failures within both these operations. The similarities and differences between the conflict dynamics as well as the UN response to these conflicts will be examined. It is particularly the differences that will be looked at in order to understand how and why the UN was more successful in Mozambique as opposed to Rwanda. This will be done in order to attempt to illustrate how the UN was successful in peace maintenance in an "old war" conflict fought within the Cold War context, and how the organisation has faced increasing challenges in peace maintenance within "new wars" in the post-Cold War era.

The aim of this thesis is not to offer solutions to the problems that the UN has faced in Africa, but rather to attempt to reach a better understanding of how and why Africa has posed such a challenge to the UN. By comparing and contrasting UN involvement in Mozambique and Rwanda, this thesis will attempt to provide a better understanding of the challenges facing the UN and point out what lessons can be drawn from the possible mistakes made within peace operations in these two countries. This thesis will attempt to show that when the conditions both within a conflict as well as within the UN organisation are conducive there is a possibility of a successful peace maintenance operation in Africa.

1.3   Methodology

This thesis will be qualitative rather than quantitative. Secondary sources in the form of books and journal articles relating to the topic will be consulted. Policy documents and occasional papers written by organisations such as the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies are also important sources of information used in this thesis. Primary documents such as UN policy documents and Security Council Resolutions will be analysed and incorporated into the research. The various libraries on the University of Stellenbosch campus as well as the South African Institute of International Affairs, have been consulted. There is sufficient information to carry out this research.

This thesis will be descriptive as well as analytical in examining the changing nature of conflict in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and the structures and processes within the UN as an international organisation that have been set up to deal with international peace maintenance. A comparative study of the UN peace maintenance operations in Mozambique as opposed to the UN peace maintenance operations in Rwanda will be presented in order to illustrate how the nature of conflict has changed in Africa and the challenges that the UN has faced in light of these changes. The conflict in Mozambique provides a typical example of a post-colonial African state that descended into conflict within the context of the Cold War and superpower external support. Mozambique thus falls within the ambit of an "old war" conflict and has thus been chosen as the case study for this thesis to represent the nature of conflict in Africa during the Cold War. Rwanda, on the other hand, offers a typical example of a post-Cold War "new war" in Africa based on the primacy of identity politics and inequality that descended into the most brutal form of violent internal conflict, namely genocide. Thus, the conflict in Rwanda has been chosen as the case study in this thesis to illustrate the nature of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War era.

The comparative study of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda and the subsequent UN involvement in these conflicts will provide an examination of the similarities and differences between the two conflicts and the role that the UN played in attempting to resolve them in order to attempt to reach a better understanding of where and why the UN has struggled in its attempts to bring peace and security to the

African continent. This will be examined within the context of the nature of African conflict and the impediments that it has presented to the UN's principal mandate of maintaining international peace and security.

In Chapter Two, this thesis will examine how the nature of conflict in Africa has changed and how "new wars" have become contrary to the traditional notions of conflict. This will be discussed within the context of the factors and actors involved within these conflicts and how they have changed from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. While conflicts have become more internal in nature, this chapter will show how they have maintained a regional and international dimension. Within this analysis, the nature of the African state will be examined and it will be demonstrated how the African state has degenerated into what have been termed "failed" and "weak" states.

Chapter three will examine the UN as an international collective security organisation and the traditional means that it has employed to maintain international peace and security, including peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement as well the provision of regional arrangements for peace maintenance. Within this context, the internal dynamics within the organisation will be examined, including the decision making processes, the political will of UN members and the financial and resource constraints within the organisation and how they impact on the success or failure of UN peace maintenance operations, particularly in Africa.

Chapter four will examine the role of UN peace maintenance in Mozambique and the importance of peacebuilding within the framework of the peacekeeping operation to restore peace to the country. This chapter will be descriptive in explaining the background to the conflict and the role that the UN played. It will also be analytical in examining the UN involvement in the conflict and show how when the necessary conditions are in place, there is the possibility of successful peace maintenance in Africa.

Chapter five will examine the role of UN peace maintenance in Rwanda and how the failure to prevent the genocide in the country marked a great blemish on the UN's ability to carry out peace maintenance within the context of "new wars" in Africa.

This chapter will also be descriptive and analytical in its examination of the role that the UN played in the country and how the lack of political will and the accompanying resources were decisive factors in the failure of UN peace maintenance in the country.

Chapters four and five will create the scope for the concluding chapter that will offer a comparative analysis of the two case studies of UN operations in Mozambique and Rwanda and examine what lessons there are to be learnt from both successes and failures within these two conflicts and what peace maintenance methods work best in light of the changing nature of conflict in Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA

2.1 Africa and the International Dimension

One of the central goals of the African state since independence has been the preservation of the inherited system of state boundaries in order to maintain order on the continent and prevent secessionist attempts and border disputes (Herbst, 1992: 105). Therefore conflict in Africa has not essentially been along the traditional lines of the pursuit of political interests within the international arena by autonomous states, and direct conflicts between African states such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been rare (Clapham, 1999: 29, de Waal, 2000: 25). The nature of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War era has shifted from anti-colonial wars and border conflicts to intrastate and civil wars fought within states or across state boundaries by non-state actors (Tandon, 2000: 187, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 229). The nature of the African state and the internal factors inherent within it as well as the external environment within which these states operate have thus decreased the occurrence of traditional conflicts in Africa as African wars in the post-Cold War era have become "highly irregular [internal] conflicts" involving a mixture of both politics and economics (de Waal, 2000: 25).

Although African conflicts have been mainly internal in nature, Kaldor (2000: 4) asserts that the term 'internal' conceals the global nature of these conflicts. The support of warring parties by external actors in one form or another, such as other states, entrepreneurs, firms and private security companies, rebel movements, traders in guns and drugs as well as international organisations, aid workers and human rights monitors, has added an international and indeed global dimension to these conflicts (Jackson, 1993: 144, Clapham, 1996: 29, Kaldor, 2000: 5, Jackson, 2002: 34, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 229). These external players, especially the former colonial and superpowers have not necessarily started conflicts in Africa as much as they have "fuelled the fires already burning", particularly in supplying armaments, financial and political support and expertise, and in developing military doctrines in Africa (de Waal, 2000: 48, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 251). Within this context, it has been the

Cold War that has had the most significant impact in terms of the international dimension within the African security arena. From the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, the nature of conflict and the African security regime has changed and the actors concerned have evolved as these conflicts have become more internal in nature, while still maintaining an international dimension.

The Cold War and the external actors involved have not only impacted on the nature of conflict on the continent, but also on the nature of the African state. Therefore it has not only been the internal failings of African regimes that have been the foremost factor contributing to the weakness of the African state, but the role of external players in African politics and conflicts have impacted on the functioning of the African state as well. Private military intervention in Africa is argued by Musah (2002: 911) to be a key external factor that undermines the state-building process on the continent as this hinders efforts to create accountable governance and entrenches the culture of violence. The impact of external constraints on the political economy of the African state have also had a major effect on the strength and power of the state as the control over informal economies offsets the corrosion of state capability and power, arising from the debt crisis, structural adjustment programmes and decaying terms of trade (Tshitereke, 2003: 83). Therefore, as Macqueen (2002: 23) asserts: "interlocked with the internal dynamics operating within the African state [have been] a number of processes at the level of the international system that were also conducive towards conflict".

African conflicts are varied in origin and intensity and many factors have played a part in starting as well as escalating them. African conflicts in general have been a consequence of internal divisions and inequality, the weakness and collapse of African states and the struggle for control of a country's natural resources. These conflicts have been carried out by a variety of different actors based on a range of different objectives. This chapter will examine the evolving nature of conflict in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. This will be done in light of the different actors and factors that have evolved to make African conflict what it is today. The internal as well as external dynamics will be examined in light of the impact that they have on the nature of African conflict as well as the nature of the African state. The weakness and failure of the African state is a central theme within

the context of African conflict that will be discussed at length in this chapter and the evolving nature of conflict from political motivations to economic motivations is an important element that will form part of this discussion.

2.1.1 The Effects of the Cold War – 'Old Wars' in Africa

During the Cold War the superpowers, as well as China and the former colonial powers pursued their rivalries on the continent and intensified African conflicts as these provided convenient "playgrounds" for the Eastern and Western blocs to display their dominance against one another (Osaghae, 1994: 89, Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 13, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 250). The security situation in Africa was thus influenced during the Cold War by the superpowers as they provided the necessary ingredients for certain African factions to enrich themselves by providing large financial subsidies as well as armaments and military support to favoured regimes or insurgent groups of appropriate political leanings (Tshitereke, 2003: 82). This support in Africa intensified African conflicts as it was based upon the desire to spread superpower influence and contain rivals, rather than prevent or resolve African conflicts. Thus African conflicts were left to flourish without regard for the African people and the development of the African state.

The Cold War was a major factor in the internationalisation of African conflicts. This was due to the superpower's objective of accumulating clients and allies in all parts of the world and the desire to maintain order and stability among friendly states and allies in Africa (Annan, 1998: 4). Therefore the superpowers facilitated in the maintenance of African state boundaries by assisting African states in suppressing ethnic rebellions or threats from neighbours in order to maintain a balance of power and influence on the continent (Herbst, 1992: 106). Thus, internal conflicts during the Cold War were less prominent due to superpower intervention. However, the superpowers also distorted the nature of peace and security problems in Africa as they encouraged the separation of the continent into pro-Western and pro-Marxist states and support was given to one state or insurgent group respectively based on these divisions (Gambari, 2001: 15). Buzan and Wæver (2003: 251) contend that these superpower security dynamics have had a substantial and lasting impact on the African security map. This is especially evident in African conflicts that could be

sustained far longer than they should have been without superpower support, such as in Mozambique and Angola.

During the Cold War, the behaviour of many regimes was ignored in favour of sustaining that regimes support within the international bi-polar politics of the time, as Reno (1998: 20) states: "global society tolerated behaviour that patently did not conform to conventional notions of sovereignty, accepting deviations from conventional rules…". Therefore the weakness of the African state was in many respects obscured during the Cold War as those states with weak political and economic structures, such as Somalia benefited from considerable support from one or other superpower (Troeller, 2001: 65). African states became reliant on such support, without which they were very weak and economically unsustainable. With the financial help of the superpowers, African states were able to function (albeit on a very superficial level) as the underlying problems facing these countries were ignored at the expense of the people and the gain of the elites in power. As Annan (1998: 4) points out: "Across Africa undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by competing superpowers in the name of their broader goals". These weak and corrupt regimes were held in power through the support of the superpowers as the West and Soviet blocs ensured that the other was unable to influence their respective clients on the continent, even if this was to the detriment of the African people.

In the Cold War period, African conflicts centred on the three main issues of border disputes, secessionist attempts and liberation struggles (Oyebade, 1998: 145). De Waal (2000: 30) explains that the previous generation of wars in Africa during the Cold War such as in Mozambique were 'dirty wars', in which racist, colonial or Cold War powers - whether directly or indirectly through the support of African rebels or regimes - used irregular insurgency or counter-insurgency methods. Whereas these conflicts in the Cold War period in Africa were fought as 'wars by proxy' on behalf of the superpowers, post-Cold War conflicts have evolved into internal conflicts fought as 'wars by proxy' dominated by warlords and elitist state leaders using agents to fight their war for them (Jørgensen, 2004: 103).

With the withdrawal of the superpowers and their assistance to African regimes in power, the most notable players on the African security scene have become warlords

and rebels who have filled the security vacuum left by the retreat of external powers, who have taken advantage of the poor and weak position of the African state and secured personal gain through others suffering (Jørgensen, 2004: 104). Thus, with the new dynamics involved in African conflicts in the post-Cold War period, Oyebade (1998: 175) describes the end of the Cold War as significantly altering the landscape of conflicts in Africa and the dynamics of conflict prevention and resolution.

The spread of weapons in Africa throughout the Cold War era has been an important contributor to the regionalisation and internationalisation of internal conflicts (Jackson, 2002: 33). This is seen in the fact that Africa in the post-Cold War period has became significantly more militarised and this has created obstacles to future conflict resolution efforts, as a lasting legacy of Cold War interventions has been the immense amount of weapons easily available across the continent (Herbst, 1992: 106, Jackson, 2002: 33). Whether directly or indirectly, a great majority of weapons used in African conflicts - most notably in Angola and Mozambique - have come from Soviet shipments as can be seen by the most prominent use of the AK-47 assault rifle by insurgents (Baynham, 1992: 85, Schutz, 1995: 118, Clapham, 1995: 86). The spread of these weapons in African societies, especially in the hands of warlords and rebels once associated with key politicians or once loyal associates and paramilitary commanders has led to the continuation and intensification of conflicts and has allowed these insurgents to arm themselves and directly challenge their now largely undefended former patrons and vulnerable regimes (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 13, Naidoo, 2001: 2, Reno, 2001: 2). Once such weapons enter a conflict region they attract regional smuggling and trade networks that feed into the economic gains to be found in conflict areas, and in this way contribute to the regionalisation of internal conflict in Africa (Studdard, 2004: 4). Thus, an important element in any attempts to prevent or resolve African conflict must involve the elimination of such weapons and the financial means through which they are acquired as well as the disarmament and rehabilitation of those who acquire and use them.

The Cold War has had a great impact on the political, economic and security environment in Africa and in the post-Cold War era, this impact is still being felt with the continuance of conflict and state collapse on the continent. The withdrawal of the superpowers left African regimes in a precarious position as the great powers no

longer felt compelled to aid these troubled African countries and thus with the withdrawal of superpower support, the preservation of power by African regimes such as Somalia, Ethiopia and Liberia became unsustainable and collapse was inevitable (Jørgensen, 2004: 104). The collapse of the African state in many respects is therefore a legacy of the involvement of the superpowers in Africa and their respective support for illegitimate and unstable regimes. The continuance of conflict in Africa thus has much to do with the legacy of Cold War rivalries on the continent and the collapse of weak African states after the superpower withdrawal.

2.1.2   Africa in the Post-Cold War Era – 'New Wars' in Africa

"The primary challenge posed by Africa's conflict lies in their internally driven character"
(Jackson, 2002: 30)

The end of the Cold War marked a significant decline in external superpower and great-power interests and involvement in Africa's security issues as superpower support was no longer made available to favoured regimes or insurgent groups within the context of the Cold War global bipolarity (Herbst, 2000: 312, Clapham, 2001: 11, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 250). Thus the external maintenance of order and security disintegrated as "Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself" (Annan, 1998: 4). In the post-Cold War period African rulers have therefore faced even greater insecurity and internal wars have become more prevalent as African regimes have become more vulnerable to armed insurgencies (Herbst, 1992: 107, Malan, 1999: 18, Reno, 2001: 2). This is so as the maintenance of security on the continent is no longer within the scope of the superpower's interests and the external checks and balances for African security diminished leaving conflict able to flourish without the fear of superpower involvement.

With the withdrawal of superpower support for some of the major antagonists on the continent African regimes and insurgents no longer have automatic supporters to turn to in times of threat (Herbst, 1992: 106, Jørgensen, 2004: 104). Sustaining a conflict in the post-Cold War era without the superpower financial support has therefore become an expensive endeavour and Tshitereke (2003: 82) contends that in the aftermath of withdrawal of external support many African wars have shifted away from the genuine grievances that initially led to the war and the importance of internal

natural resources has come to the fore in an attempt to finance these wars. Therefore, as Macqueen (2002: 28) points out, although the underlying causes of conflict remain in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period, they are no longer influenced and regulated by the powerful external forces of the superpowers.

Ethnicity and inequality have become important factors contributing to African conflict in the post-Cold War era (Lodge, 1999: 4). A legacy of colonialism has been the ethnic division of the African people across arbitrarily drawn borders and the unequal treatment of different ethnic groups by the colonial powers. Colonisation significantly affected the balance of power among ethnic groups in Africa and created the conditions for the various ethnic grievances of the post-colonial period (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 12, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 221, Gueli, 2004: 127). This was because a common feature of colonial rule was the polarisation of social divisions along communal identity lines, particularly based on religious, ethnic or tribal differences (Cockell, 2001: 21). Rwanda offers a prime example of this, where Belgium promoted ethnic division and animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi groups by favouring the Tutsi minority in education and in placing Tutsi elite within the colonial bureaucracy while the Hutu were treated as second-class citizens, thus contributing to animosity between these two groups (Oyebade, 1998: 159).

Such conflicts based along ethnic lines can have particularly devastating consequences as hostility becomes manifested along the "violent politicisation of ethnicity" (Annan, 1998: 4) and can involve the "systematic violation of human rights and endemic personal security" (Cockell, 2001: 20). Therefore in these conflicts of ethnic or national identity, Tshitereke (2003: 85) contends that minorities are often at risk of total annihilation – as was the case in Rwanda with the genocide in that country. These ethnic conflicts are related to the weakness and failure of the African state as Tshitereke (2003: 89) argues that it is only the breakdown in law and order within the African state that can sustain violence at the levels that have plagued many African conflicts.

A major concern with the nature of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War period is the increasing vulnerability of the African people and the "consistent pattern of human rights violations" occurring within these conflicts (Copson, 1994: 11).

Whereas civilian casualties have previously been an expected indirect consequence of conflict in Africa, innocent civilians have increasingly become the main targets of hostilities in post-Cold War African conflicts, as violence has become deliberately targeted at civilians or entire groups of civilians as the aim of one group (based along political, religious, ethnic or regional lines) is to displace or in the extreme, wipe out another group - as was the case in Rwanda (Annan, 1998: 13, Troeller, 2001: 68, Jackson, 2002: 31).

Actions to instil fear and terror in innocent civilians have become commonplace in African conflicts and have been used to the extreme. Although classified as more of a Cold War conflict, Mozambique offers an example of this where Renamo engaged in methods of terror and destruction to commit atrocities against civilians, such as summary executions, forced labour, mass kidnappings and torture (Copson, 1994: 11, de Waal, 2000: 30). Angola serves as another example were anti-personnel landmines were used as a means of spreading terror and preventing people from living on and using their own land (de Waal, 2000: 30). The extreme case of such violence in the post-Cold War era is Rwanda, where violence was carried out in its most intense form as genocide. Thus we can see how terror methods have been used in a most destructive and extreme way in African wars. A major consequence of such actions in African conflict has therefore been the growing number of refugees and internally displaced people fleeing such atrocities.

The forced migratory movements of people are not only an internal issue for African states, but fit within the greater regional security arena in the post-Cold War era. Not only do refugees constitute a strain on the resources of neighbouring African states, but refugee camps have also become ideal breeding grounds for military mobilisation (de Waal, 2000: 36). States may be unable to control armed factions outside their territories, as insurgents have often been able to find a neighbouring state willing to turn a blind eye to their conduct, even supplying financial support, logistical aid, troops or a base of operations for their activities (Clapham, 1995: 83, Studdard, 2004: 4). Macqueen (2002: 24-25) calls the relationship between these insurgents and host neighbouring states a "symbiotic relationship" as each uses the other in pursuit of their respective political and economic agendas. Examples of this type of behaviour

include the borders between Mozambique and South Africa and between Angola and Zaire (Macqueen, 2002: 24-25).

On the other hand, the presence of these insurgents may not be desirable for a state as the host state may not be able to control insurgent forces from other countries in their territory. For example, the Sudanese government was unable to control Chadian factions on its western borders in the late 1980s and early 1990s (de Waal, 2000: 36). In the Horn of Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have all tacitly supported insurgents in neighbouring territories at one time or another (Clapham, 1995: 83-84). This leads to further destabilisation within the greater region as conflict may spread across borders as the state attempts to rid itself of such factions, thus bringing in neighbours into what began as an internal conflict to become a regional conflict. Thus the outflow of refugees and the support of insurgents by neighbouring states contribute to the regionalisation of African conflict.

A notable feature in African conflicts in the post-Cold War period is the rise of actors other than the state as many formidable non-state actors have arisen on the African security scene (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 226). This is especially apparent as the collapse of the state, and the resultant lack of African state or institutional management has created opportunities for the rise of insurgents who have taken advantage of this and have been able to assert power and control over a specific region within a state and establish commercial activities within it, while keeping the weak central authorities at bay through armed opposition (Tshitereke, 2003: 84). Thus, the link is drawn between military and economic interests in the post-Cold War era as African military power has shifted away from formally constructed armies under central state organization towards rural-based groups that exercise direct control over local economic resources (Clapham, 2001: 12).

Although not a factor within all African conflicts the most prominent among non-state actors within internal post-Cold War conflicts, have been warlords (Macqueen, 2002: 25). Warlords frequently emerge from elite origins, with previous close ties to rulers, often formerly having held a high office in a government that they later attacked (Reno, 2002: 841-842). Examples of this are, Charles Taylor, who ran the state procurement agency for Liberian President Samuel K. Doe, and Somalia's

Mohammed Farah Aideed who was a defence minister for President Siad Barre (Reno, 2002: 842). These warlords are filling the power vacuum left by the weak African states' lack of organisational and participatory capacity as well as the state's inability to address security threats and assert control over the legitimate use of violence (Zartman, 1995: 8, Jørgensen, 2004: 99). Thus they exist in a "situation of anarchy in which they can threaten the local population and engage in illegal business" (Patel and Tripodi, 2001: 144). Warlords and their followers have accumulated significant commercial, territorial and military assets and connections during their tenure in the government and have used these to further their quest for power (Reno, 2002: 841, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 229). They have attained their weapons mainly across the borders of friendly states or through the informal weapons networks that have proliferated in the post-Cold War period, thus playing a part within the regionalisation of African conflict (Clapham, 2001: 12).

The leader is the most visible expression of the warlord phenomenon as Clapham (2001: 14) contends that he is the embodiment of the "big man" syndrome that encompasses many African political systems. The most typical followers of warlords are young men and women - who form one of the most vigorous, yet marginalized segments of society in collapsed states - who use warfare as a means of enriching themselves (Reno, 2001: 4, 2002: 854). The reward for following warlord leaders has become an economic rather than a political one, as these insurgents seek to enrich themselves rather than fighting for any particular cause. Warlords and their followers are therefore increasingly recognised as having no real ideological or political goal as they are armed actors seeking control of resources rather than control of the state (Macqueen, 2002: 25, Jørgensen, 2004: 102). Thus, the resolution of such conflicts involving warlords in the post-Cold War era is more difficult as these actors often do not have any incentive or interest in participating in any serious peace process, especially if it will result in a loss of influence and economic power on their part (Patel and Tripodi, 2001: 144, Jørgensen, 2004: 102).

African conflicts in the post-Cold War era are thus 'post-modern' conflicts in which political groups no longer seek or even need to establish territorial, bureaucratic or consent based political authority in the traditional sense based on some common ideology or specific goal (Tshitereke, 2003: 84). De Waal (2000: 33-34) contends that

contemporary wars in Africa have generally not initially started based on issues of ideology, as these elements have rather been introduced later on in the conflict. He cites the example of Sudan, were religious fundamentalism became a much greater factor later in the conflict and was not an initial causal factor of war. Another example cited by de Waal is that of Rwanda, where the extremist philosophy of Hutu power had existed from the 1950's, but it was only during the civil war in 1990-93 that it was developed into a mass killing force culminating in genocide (de Waal, 2000: 34).

Thus African conflicts in the post-Cold War era are contrary to the traditional factors of conflict in that they are not necessarily fought between states, but are rather internal in nature, involving players such as rebels and warlords who view the ultimate goal in conflict not as state control or being part of an organised political institution, but rather as power and personal wealth creation and enrichment. These conflicts have for the most part expanded into regional conflicts, involving many different internal, regional and international players. The devastation caused by insurgents in African conflicts is a particularly critical factor to note, especially in relation to the impact on human security and the human rights of the African people. Another important element gaining increased attention in African conflicts in the post-Cold War era is the role of resources in prolonging and escalating African conflicts. This economic dimension to African conflict is one that cannot be ignored.

2.1.3   The Economic and Regional Dimension

The economic dimension to conflict in Africa is one that has perhaps had the most important impact on the changing nature of conflict and the African state in the post-Cold War era. This is because the control of natural resources has emerged as a prominent factor of African conflict as the concerns of those involved – both internally and externally - have shifted from political interests during the Cold War to economic interests in the post-Cold War era. With the elimination of external financial support in the post-Cold War era, Reno (2001:1, 2002: 837) contends that a new trend in African internal conflicts is the extent to which economic interests appear to predominate. This is especially so as the absence of superpower support has forced belligerents to develop and seek alternate means of economic sustainability (Naidoo, 2001: 2). Such alternatives come in the form of the utilization of the natural

resources that are available in a country, such as diamonds, timber, oil, narcotics, or the capture of illicit networks and informal economies (Studdard, 2004: 3).

These resources offer insurgents an easy source of income as they are location specific and can be managed within a controlled area and plundered systematically when needed to be sold to international markets; thereby enabling insurgents to arm themselves and further intensify their war effort (Tshitereke, 2003: 84-86). Thus the control of resources within a country has become an important element within the context of African peace and security in the post-Cold War era. As insurgents have gained enormous wealth through the exploitation of these resources, they become less inclined to reach a peaceful settlement to conflict, as they would lose their control and economic power.

The economic factors that have become inherent within African conflicts have become a growing cause for concern for any attempts to prevent or resolve such conflicts as profits, rather than political power, seem to be the growing motivation for violence and wars in Africa as the point of the war has shifted from winning it, to prolonging it so as to continue engagement in lucrative criminal operations under cover of war (Tshitereke, 2003: 89). In Africa, the most notable players within the economic sphere of conflict have been warlords, who have waged war and seized the opportunity to enrich themselves, having access to resources that they would not normally have had in peaceful times (Gambari, 2001: 14, Tshitereke, 2003: 82). Thus, despite the devastation caused by conflicts in Africa, an overriding economic agenda predominates as those who profit from such conflict have an interest in prolonging the conflict, rather than pursuing peace (Annan, 1998: 5, Gambari, 2001: 14). Naidoo (2001: 2) argues that the initial motivation of conflict has therefore become secondary to whether the warring factions can sustain their war effort financially and this "predatory behaviour" may not be the initial objective of the insurgents but becomes the means of extending their war effort. This can be seen in the cases of war in Sierra Leone, Angola and the later Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict in which genuine concerns or grievances initially forming part of the outbreak of conflict have been overtaken by the rewards of the lucrative and rapidly increasing "booty futures market" (Tshitereke, 2003: 88).

The phenomenon of economic motivations within African wars is linked to the weakness of the African state as these states are characterised by an external vulnerability to international actors and weak regimes have been forced to align themselves with foreign companies to trade their resources globally in order to fund their war effort (Jackson, 2002: 39, Tshitereke, 2003: 86). Therefore, it is not only the rebels and warlords that exploit resources and the international market for them to their advantage, but also states, or the regimes that control those states that take advantage of the exploitation of natural resources in enabling them to continue conflict. After state collapse and the collapse of external support networks, those generally with the most well established commercial connections from the previous regime have become the most well armed insurgents (Reno, 2002: 854). African post-Cold War conflicts therefore now tend to revolve around the desire to control natural resources as they have come to mean personal wealth and power for those who acquire them (Tshitereke, 2003: 82). Therefore, rather than the old conception of war being the continuation of politics by other means, Tshitereke (2003: 89) contends that war in Africa is the reverse, as it is increasingly becoming the "continuation of economics by other means".

It is important to note that the role of resources in African conflicts is not only an internal factor of concern, but the role of regional and international actors is another factor that must be addressed, as the availability of natural resources and the lack of central control within African states has attracted a number of foreign and regional players to the field of African conflicts (Tshitereke, 2003: 82, 89). There is a prominent link between the exploitation of resources in African conflict and the international actors involved in these conflicts. As mentioned above African warlords, weak regimes and insurgency movements have drawn financial support for their war effort from the availability of global markets for their resources which have sustained their ability to wage war (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 251).

Private Military Companies (PMC's) and mercenaries are a particularly major set of international actors that have benefited from resource exploitation in African conflicts. PMC's are private "corporate entities comprising military and intelligence entrepreneurs whose activities incorporate the provision of multi-purpose security-related products and services" (Musah, 2002: 913). These actors have become

entwined within the economic dimensions of African conflicts as the close corporate and operational ties with extraction and finance companies represent a key feature of PMC activities in Africa (Musah, 2002: 913). PMC's have also played a large part in shifting the military balance in a number of African conflicts, such as in Angola, Uganda and Sierra Leone (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 251).

International actors have thus become involved both directly and indirectly in the exploitation of these resources and the international trade of them has had a significant impact on the longevity of African conflicts. Such mercenary networks also contribute to the "entrenchment of regional conflict complexes" as they attract African ex-combatants who have not been successfully reintegrated into formal society and are rather enticed to join mercenary forces in neighbouring states (Studdard, 2004: 5). These "floating indigenous mercenaries" are often ex-soldiers who have deserted their warlords or national armies in search of better conditions and economic rewards (Musah, 2002: 914). Thus they contribute to the further regionalisation of internal African conflicts.

Related to the economic dimension to internal African conflict is the growing factor of the regional dimension in which the spread of conflict from one state to a neighbouring state has become "part of a systematic regional conflict complex" (Studdard, 2004: 3). This can be seen because as Studdard (2004: 7) explains: "Conflict economies are embedded in a complex web of regional social, economic, political, and military networks that profoundly impact the behaviour of conflict actors". Within the regional dimension therefore are the related factors of arms movements, mercenaries and the flow of refugees across neighbouring borders as well as the support of neighbouring states for insurgent groups, which not only exacerbate the conflict in the one state but also lead to the destabilisation of the region in general. The outbreak of internal conflict in one state may therefore result in the destabilisation of neighbouring states as it can spur regional movements and conflicts within neighbouring states for territory, resources and power (Studdard, 2204: 3). Studdard (2004: 9) therefore contends that the failure to take into consideration the effect of regional economic linkages may undermine the effective management of conflict and peacebuilding initiatives.

2.2   The Nature of the African State and Conflict in Africa

"The security problem in Africa since decolonisation has been dominated by the
widespread failure of postcolonial weak states"

(Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 252).

A fundamental factor related to the nature of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War era is the nature of the African state. Jackson (2002: 35) contends that the internal conflicts that plague African states are the direct result of a particular form of state politics rooted in the structures and processes of what have become known as 'weak states' in Africa. It is the decay and failure to produce viable and stable states in Africa that has given rise to the destructive and extreme political violence on the continent as seen in the extreme cases of Liberia and Somalia and most notably in Rwanda (Clapham, 2001: 14). The failure of the African state can be seen as both a cause and a consequence of conflict as the nature of the state and conflict are both part of the same cycle of endemic failure of the African continent to develop as well as prevent and resolve its security problems. It is the failure of these states that have thus been said to constitute one of the biggest problems to African security (Breytenbach, 1994: 31). However, although the concept of a failed state is a worldwide phenomenon and not unique to Africa, it is here that the phenomenon is most prominent (Gambari, 1995: 221, Zartman, 1995: 1, Tshitereke, 2003: 84).

In order to understand what constitutes a weak state it is important to examine how it differs from a strong state. A strong state possesses high levels of social-political cohesion and strong national identities, the ability as well as the willingness to maintain social control, devise and implement effective policies, provide basic services, encourage public participation in state institutions as well as maintain state legitimacy (Jackson, 2002: 38). As will be shown in this section, weak states in Africa do not possess such characteristics, as Jackson (2002: 38) points out "weak states are defined by a mirror set of opposite characteristics". The weakness of the African state or 'state collapse' as Zartman calls it, refers to a situation in which the structure, legitimate authority and political order have fallen apart resulting in the state becoming "paralysed and inoperative" thus no longer able to perform the functions required for it to be regarded as a state (Zartman, 1995: 1-5).

Buzan and Wæver (2003: 219) argue that the African state has been weak both as a state and as a power in absolute terms as well as compared to non-African states. This is because the African state has had little of the political, social or economic reality of a functioning state and has never had a chance to be fully institutionalised (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 219, Tshitereke, 2003: 83). Weak African states therefore suffer from a lack of institutional capacity and the inability or unwillingness of the government to exercise regular state functions or implement policies; resulting in citizens of the state being deprived of basic public services that are traditionally associated with independent statehood (Gros, 1996: 456, Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 13, Jackson, 2002: 39, Jørgensen, 2004: 105). The occurrence of weak and failed states in Africa therefore results in a "security dilemma" and thus domestic level security dynamics have become central in the occurrence of conflict on the continent (Malan, 1999: 17, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 224). This is because the basic functions of the state are unable to be performed and regimes especially lack the ability to protect the basic human security and human rights of their citizens.

The collapse of a state therefore results in that state as a decision-making, executing and enforcing institution no longer being able to take and implement decisions and therefore unable to satisfy the demands of different groups within society, resulting in the poverty and discontent of such groups as they feel repressed and may rise up against this (Zartman, 1995: 6-9). This spells an inevitable disaster for the African state as Tshitereke (2003: 84) asserts, "When the social contract between the state and its citizenry fails, war becomes inevitable", thus resulting in internal conflict within a state. This is especially a concern as Musah (2002: 916) contends that a particular feature of the African state has been the fact that the state has at times been the primary source of violence against its own people, as can be seen in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. This stems from the failure of the first generation of African leadership and the "inability to overcome the contradictions of the colonial legacy and to transform inherited structures to meet popular aspirations for human security and peaceful transfer of power" (Musah, 2002: 916). Conflict in Africa has thus resulted from the collapse of state political, economic and social institutions, the absence of legitimate means for political change, and subsequently the failure of opposition or resistance groups to build alternative institutions (Reno, 2001: 1). Because of this weakness of the state, a variety of non-state actors, such as warlords have stepped in

to play a vital role as alternate sources of social and political authority and economic activity (Zartman, 1995: 1-11, Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 220).

State collapse is a long-term degenerative development and therefore needs to be understood within the context of the creation of the state in Africa (Zartman, 1995: 8). Related to this, the framework within which the African state was created is also imperative as a starting point in explaining contemporary African conflict (Tshitereke, 2003: 83, Jørgensen, 2004: 97). Although we cannot generalise about the African state, there is a common thread running through most post-colonial African states in that they share arbitrary boundaries dividing ethnicities and nations, extractionist and exploitative production relations with the colonial powers and repressive internal security apparatuses (Musah, 2002: 915). These African states share the legacy of colonialism and the struggle to build viable states in the aftermath of withdrawal of the colonial powers. The primary purpose of colonial rule in Africa was for the colonial powers to secure resource enclaves for raw materials (Musah, 2002: 915).

This exploitative relationship between the African people and their colonial masters resulted in the formation of African states described by Clapham (2001: 8) to be the product of "an arbitrary colonial partition, lacking internal coherence and *raison d'être*, failing, dysfunctional, even collapsed". The development of the African state in terms of political, economic and social cohesion during this era was neglected. The existence of the African state can therefore be seen as contrary to the existence of most European states which exist as an expression of the identity of the groups of people inhabiting them as African states were formed as a colonial construct and had no other *raison d'être*, other than as a source of wealth for the colonial powers (Clapham, 2001: 8-9).

The post-colonial African state system has been described as one that has been "hijacked by rulers whose policies were both economically disastrous and often politically horrifying" (Clapham, 1995: 92). This is because in the absence of legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of power following colonialism, the trend in Africa has been towards highly personalised, non-patrimonial regimes that have had no interest in developing the state or uplifting the people (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 219-220). The power structure of these states is often centred around a 'winner takes

all' arrangement in which political, social and economic life is under the central and personalised control of the ruling elite of the country (Annan, 1998: 4, de Waal, 2000: 32, Tandon, 2000: 174, Cockell, 2001: 23, Jackson, 2002: 38). Examples of such states include Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire. These states have emerged as one-party states in which leaders become preoccupied with assuring personal power and regime security as they retreated into a state of "security paranoia" (Musah, 2002: 916). Musah, (2002: 917) contends however that the nature of such states and the notion of personal power and regime security, are not unique to Africa and have been observed as far and wide as the former Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil and South Korea to name a few, who all relied on extreme state sponsored violence to project the state's power.

It has been argued by Tshitereke (2003: 84) that the African state has nothing within it that is 'uniquely African' as the state was an artificial construct of its Western counterpart. The Westphalian style state in Africa was largely created through protracted low intensity struggles and violent conflicts and anti-colonial wars waged by liberation movements against the colonial powers (Malan, 1999: 18, Tshitereke, 2003: 83). Once independence was attained, however, the postcolonial African state has in many cases been unable to sustain the unity of the different ethnic groups that emerged in the colonial period as there was no longer a common goal of defeating the colonial masters to unite the people and thus competition for control of the state emerged within different ethnic, regional, national or religious groups (Gambari, 2001: 14). Thus weak post-colonial states in Africa have typically lacked a cohesive national or ethnic identity (Jackson, 2002: 39). Rwanda offers a prominent example of this where conflict arose based on ethnic competition for control of the state between the Hutu and Tutsi (Lodge, 1999: 5). As the example of Somalia demonstrates however, the existence even of a strong common ethnic identity within a state does not provide a sufficient basis for the formation of a viable and legitimate state (Clapham, 2001: 10). Thus, as can be seen, contending power factions within the same ethnic, national or religious groups within African states have emerged all vying for power and control of the state and its resources.

The nature of the African state has thus become a prominent feature contributing to the occurrence of conflict on the continent as Osaghae (1994: 87-89) contends that

intense political conflicts are largely structural in that they tend to be endemic, and predisposed by the inherent nature of the African state. This inherent nature of the state, as discussed above, consists of "weak postcolonial states oscillating between dictatorship and civil war, and having their internal instabilities spill over into, and be played into by, their neighbours" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 244). Thus, weak states in Africa have not only been a cause of internal conflict in Africa, but also a factor in the spread of regional conflict. It is especially the nature of political power in these weak African states that Annan (1998: 4) believes to be a major contributing factor to conflict in Africa as he states:

> "The nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the continent … Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important and the stakes become dangerously high … leading to an often violent politicisation of ethnicity … Conflict in such cases becomes virtually inevitable"

Related to the phenomenon of weak states and the issues of ethnic exclusion and inequality within African states is poverty. Many of the issues upon which African conflicts are fought arise from poverty, as poverty creates grievances and dissatisfaction. These can be grievances against the state for not fulfilling its duty, as well as grievances over the unequal distribution of natural resources and inequalities of wealth and political power (Tshiterke, 2003: 87-88). As a result of this, people will seek a means to reverse the situation and express their grievances often through violent means and such grievances arising out of such issues have tended to influence and exacerbate internal wars in Africa (Tshitereke, 2003: 87). The individual poverty of the African people is not the only issue to consider, but the poverty of the African state as a whole is an issue pertinent to African conflict as Tandon (2000: 187) contends that a significant reason for the persistence of conflict in Africa lies in the continuing poverty that is created by the manner in which Africa is integrated into the global economy; African states have to a large extent been marginalised within this arena. Thus, not only is poverty an internal issue within African states, created

through the actions of the state, but it is also a factor for African states as a whole as they interact within the global political economy. Poverty is therefore an important factor that must be addressed within the context of preventing and resolving African conflict.

2.3 Conclusion

The nature of conflict in Africa in many respects can be seen as a consequence of fierce responses to the nature of the African state that comprises a lack of freedom, political accommodation and transparency, as well as corruption and the misuse of public resources for the private interests of those in power within the weak and inefficient African regimes (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 12, Gambari, 2001: 14). All these factors lead to the impoverishment and the disillusionment of the African people, which forms an integral factor within the grassroots of African conflicts as different groups have reacted to their exclusion within the political and economic spheres within the state and the struggle for control of resources. The nature of the state in Africa and the underlying factors within this therefore need to be addressed within the context of African security in order to prevent and resolve African conflicts. These grassroots causes must form a major factor to be addressed within the context of international attempts by the UN in maintaining peace and security in Africa. As Koffi Annan (1998: 13) states: "In Africa as elsewhere, the changing nature of conflict requires new responses".

Internal conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War era have been multi-causal and have been founded on political, military, economic and social factors and thus Stedman and Rothchild (1997: 28-29) argue that measures have to be implemented to address all these factors. Internal conflicts in Africa have proved to be much more complex than traditional interstate wars and have therefore required multifunctional responses ranging from the use of military force to humanitarian assistance (Knight, 1998: 21). As the causes of conflict in Africa stem from a long-term degenerative process within the African state, it is unrealistic to expect short cuts to secure a quick and easy transition from civil war to normal relations (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 33). This is especially evident in the African context were deep-rooted ethnic tensions and suspicion have formed an integral part of the conflict. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect the complex conflicts that have plagued African states in the post-Cold War era to be

resolved by short-term military interventions (Malan, 1999: 14). Cockell (2001: 20) contends that since African conflicts are both dynamic and multi-causal, incorporating not only internal dynamics, but regional and international dynamics as well, effective preventive responses will have to address both the particular phase that the conflict is in as well as the particular causes that have characterised that phase of conflict.

While the nature of conflict has changed in Africa, the traditional means of maintaining international peace and security by the United Nations tend to still be focused on the traditional "old war" notions of conflict and have thus not adequately managed to prevent or resolve African conflicts. The following chapter will examine the UN and the traditional ways and means that it has established to maintain international peace and security based upon the traditional concept of collective security.

CHAPTER THREE

THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE MAINTENANCE

3.1 The UN as a Collective Security Organisation

The primary purpose of the United Nations at its establishment was to deal with disputes and conflicts between states and threats or acts of aggression by states against other states (Urquhart, 1993: 10). The basis of this has been the concept of *collective security*. Collective security is an agreement between states to form an alliance to renounce violence and the use of force in settling disputes, while agreeing to joint efforts to use force against an aggressor within their group who breaks this agreement (Gordenker and Weiss, 1993: 4, Malan, 1999: 11). Ayoob (1993: 50) defines collective security as "the legitimate enforcement of the will of the international community by coercion where necessary against recalcitrant states". Collective security therefore provides for the creation of a self-regulating state system that aims to deter promptly, or at least end quickly, any form of destabilising military conflict within the international arena (Chipman, 1996: 13). Thus the emphasis of collective security falls within the realist paradigm in international relations based on the centrality of the state and conflicts among or between states. This form of maintaining international peace and security is ingrained within the UN Charter as Article 39 of Chapter VII provides for the Security Council to decide when a situation requires collective security action and what form that action should take (Macqueen, 2002).

The establishment of the UN therefore made it possible for international politics to move from balance of power politics, based on order and stability, to collective security, based on peace and security (Schoeman, 2000: 74). However the hope for a triumphant regime of collective security was distorted by the bipolar Security Council politics of the Cold War, especially manifest through the veto power of the permanent members (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93: 97, Urquhart, 1993: 9). This however changed in the immediate post-Cold War period, as there was great promise for improvement in the performance and effectiveness of the organisation in its endeavours of maintaining international peace and security due to the disintegration of constraints on Western

action created by the countervailing power of the Soviet Union (Urquhart, 1993: 9-10, Clapham, 1995: 92). The end of the Cold War is therefore viewed to have opened up many new opportunities for the UN in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict (Goulding, 1999: 161). The constraints placed on the UN during the Cold War have however been replaced by what Richmond (2001: 32) claims to be a "basic tension between human security and sovereign state claims and interests that are inherent to the international system" of the post-Cold War era.

Gordenker and Weiss (1993: 3) argue that the central concept of collective security emerged within an international political system so different from the present one that questions arise over the current relevance of the idea and the plausibility of its assumptions. This is especially relevant in relation to the contemporary nature of conflict in Africa and the means to prevent and resolve conflict within the paradigm of the failed state. The resolution of conflicts that have a distinctly domestic and internal nature are still within the scope of the UN Security Council, however this will only be the case if such a conflict according to Chapter VII of the Charter, has international implications in terms of a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression (Malan, 1999: 11). There is a growing need to realise that African internal conflicts do constitute a threat to international peace and security and therefore the collective security mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter should be extended to prevent and resolve internal African conflicts. This should be extended to include the renunciation of violence by states within their own borders and the rejection of the use of violence by states against their own people.

3.2 Principles of UN Peace Maintenance

"For the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment
and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict"
(Annan, 1998: 2)

Peace maintenance has been used as a "unified concept" to describe the different types of peace operations undertaken by the UN in its efforts to maintain international peace and security (Chopra, 1998: 3). The UN has established a number of peace maintenance methods and actions to prevent and resolve conflict. Former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 identified four main areas of action through which the UN attempts to do this. These are conflict

prevention and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Another method of peace maintenance introduced in *An Agenda for Peace* is peace enforcement.

Due to the changes within the international arena in the post-Cold War era, peace maintenance operations and the tasks involved have taken place under very difficult circumstances and have become more intensive and politically intrusive than those carried out during the Cold War (Chipman, 1996: 17). This has been due to the evolving nature of conflict and the decline of bipolar splits within the Security Council which has meant that the type of peace operations have also evolved in the post-Cold War era to include not only the military element, but also a civilian and humanitarian element as the tasks required have emerged to include the prevention of violence against individuals (Neethling, 2003: 103). Peace maintenance operations have therefore often called for the UN to intervene directly in the internal affairs of a state, essentially intervening in the relationship between the government and its people, and in many cases supporting popular legitimacy rather than the traditional claims of state sovereignty (Bertram, 1995: 392). Within this context, the UN has increasingly been called on to help revive failed states and thus is placed within the domestic politics of a state (Chipman, 1996: 19).

This has been a controversial endeavour that has led to the debate over the issue of sovereignty versus the importance of human rights within the commitment of the UN to international peace and security. The UN Charter upholds the principle of sovereignty by the inclusion of Article 2, which states: "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter". Thus, the question surrounding the issue of intervention in preventing conflict within a state emerges relating to the question of whether intervention should be endorsed in a society of states governed by the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and the non-use of force (Wheeler, 2000: 26).

Sovereignty has in the past provided a mechanism through which states, especially in Africa, have claimed the right to manage their domestic power structures as they

wished, and thus increased their bargaining power in the international system (Clapham, 1995: 92). However the question must be asked whether the traditional claims to sovereignty and the legitimacy of a regime are relevant in the face of the phenomenon of failed states in Africa. In Rwanda, Macqueen (2002: 9) argues that the failure of the UN to oppose 'state authority' underlay what has subsequently come to be seen as one of the major failures of the entire peace maintenance endeavour – the adherence to the concept of state sovereignty regardless of the atrocities that a state may be committing.

Sovereignty protects the territorial inviolability of a state, its freedom from interference from others, and its authority to rule its own people (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1996: 101). In order to enjoy sovereignty however a government should be in control of both its affairs as well as its behaviour (Gueli, 2004: 125). Therefore sovereignty involves not only a right but also a duty as the violability of a state is based on the ability of that state to provide justice and security to all its citizens and thus a security dilemma has arisen within the African context as the collapse of state institutions has meant that the state is unable to carry out this sovereign duty (Malan, 1999: 11, Reno, 2001: 1, Troeller, 2001: 65). Sovereignty in the contemporary world is thus no longer a fixed concept based on authority and a right to non-intervention, but also as much about the responsibility of the state to its people (Hansen, 2000: 10, Jørgensen, 2004: 97). Therefore the doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty should no longer be a banner behind which regimes can hide, as the breakdown of the state's capacity to provide for its citizens and its failure to meet its fundamental obligations to the whole or significant parts of its population, should also constitute a breakdown in that state's sovereignty (Deng, 1995: 214, Jørgensen, 2004: 108).

The Security Council is the principle international organ with the legal right to override the claim to sovereignty according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, if it deems there to be action that constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression (Malan, 1999: 11). This legal right should therefore be invoked in the face of grave human suffering as one of the core responsibilities of the UN is to assist people in times of crisis, especially innocent civilians as ensuring human security is one of the founding principles of the organisation (Annan, 1998: 2, Hansen, 2000: 20). In fulfilling this duty the Security Council should therefore be

obliged to declare a threat to international peace and security when people or specific groups deliberately kill or injure other people or specific groups on a massive scale – as was the case in Rwanda - and to authorise effective intervention in order to end such atrocities (Malan, 1999: 93). This should especially be the case when a regime has committed atrocities against its own people as no state should be allowed to invoke the principle of sovereignty when it has been accused of such serious human rights abuses (Gueli, 2001: 141). This is particularly relevant within the context of African wars as the internal nature of these conflicts; the extent of human tragedy and the increased role of non-state actors belie the international threat that they constitute and the weakness of the argument of sovereignty when so many lives are being threatened. Therefore in a humanitarian emergency, especially within the African context of failed states, the UN cannot simply stand by and do nothing, as it is arguably better to try and fail than not to try at all (Clapham, 1999: 43, Malan, 1999: 88).

In line with the traditional concepts of conflict and sovereignty, UN peace operations have typically been "state-centric, not people oriented" as the organisation has in the past appeared more successful in dealing with interstate rather than internal conflicts, and has been accused of being ill equipped to deal with internal conflicts in which "value differences" are the primary cause of the problem (Jett, 1999: 59, Malaquias, 2002: 419). However, in response to the changing nature of conflicts, especially in Africa, traditional peace operations have undergone fundamental changes in the post-Cold War era due to the unlocking of the Security Council as a decision making forum (Hansen, 2000: 8). This has facilitated the expansion and redefinition of the traditional concepts of security within the UN and the focus is shifting from state security or even regime security to include human security as regimes are increasingly being faced with the prospect of being held accountable for the crimes committed against their own people while they were in power (Richmond, 2001: 43, Jørgensen, 2004: 97). Humanitarian and moral imperatives have therefore assumed a more prominent role in the decisions of policy makers regarding the issue of intervention as military force has increasingly come to be justified on humanitarian grounds (Berdal, 2001: 56-57). This has especially become a legitimate international concern through the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords (Malan, 1999: 90).

The success of peace maintenance operations has been based on a number of principles and requirements. Two questions have been put forward to assess the success of a peace operation: firstly whether the operation prevented the occurrence of a violent conflict and secondly whether it helped to resolve the fundamental causes of the conflict (Richmond, 2001: 34). In order for these questions to have a positive outcome there are certain factors that should be present. Peace maintenance operations require the international community to understand the complexities of a conflict and to promote a stable framework for a peace operation that will address the underlying causes of that conflict, prevent a degeneration into more violence and promote development as part of an overall conflict resolution strategy within the broader regional framework (Hansen, 2000: 25, Tandon, 2000: 168, Guehenno, 2002: 15). As Chipman, (1996: 11) states: "domestic conflicts present complex problems that ask for innovative solutions". This has been a particular concern with peace maintenance in Africa as operations aimed at resolving African conflicts have tended to focus more on the symptoms, rather than the causes of such conflicts, especially when these have involved civil war or genocide (Malan, 1998: 3).

In order for a peace operation to succeed there needs to be a commitment by the majority, if not all the parties to the conflict to reach the conclusion that they can no longer achieve their objectives through military means and are committed to the implementation of a ceasefire and the settlement of the conflict through peaceful means (Carey, 1998: 26, Guehenno, 2002: 15). In line with the guiding principles of peace maintenance, all the key parties to the conflict must therefore consent to the involvement of the UN in helping resolve their dispute and they must have confidence in the UN being a neutral and unbiased actor (Bertram, 1995: 395, Hansen, 2000: 14, Guehenno, 2002: 15).

A UN peace mission therefore requires on the one hand the co-operation and consent of the parties and on the other a clear and realistic political strategy and operations mandate by the UN, alongside the continued support and agreement of the Security Council, who should provide adequate financial and physical resources (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93: 90, Carey, 1998: 26, Anyidoho, 2000: 90, Guehenno, 2002: 15). As will be shown in this thesis, these conditions were in place for the most part in

Mozambique, but they did not exist in Rwanda. Within the African context, UN peace operations in the past have been hampered by the absence of one or more of the above principles on the ground as well as the organisational constraints within the UN itself. These are factors that will be examined in more detail within the framework of the internal dynamics of peace maintenance operations in the following sections.

3.2.1 Conflict Prevention, Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking

Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 37 of Chapter VI indicates that the Security Council may determine whether "the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate." *Conflict prevention* and *preventive diplomacy* fall under this chapter and are actions aimed at seeking to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger and ease tensions before violence erupts and escalates into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 3-5). Thus, this type of action seeks to contain and resolve the underlying causes of conflict using both political and diplomatic actions to diminish the likelihood of an outbreak or recurrence of conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 5, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15). Conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy may be used in conjunction with *peacemaking,* whereby action is taken through diplomacy, limited military forces and civilian personnel to bring hostile parties to agreement (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 4, Chopra, 1998: 3).

Peacemaking aims at helping conflicting parties to reach a ceasefire agreement in order to create a framework in which they can work together in building and consolidating peace (Gambari, 2001: 16). This involves fact-finding missions, the facilitation of dialogue and negotiations, defusing tensions diplomatically, promoting national reconciliation and advancing respect for human rights (Annan, 1998: 6). This implies a continuous search for ways to overcome problems encountered during the implementation of the ceasefire agreements and encouraging the parties to resolve these differences (Gambari, 2001: 17). A major problem however faced by mediators during preventive diplomacy and negotiations comes in the form of "spoilers" who sign agreements but have no intention of living up to their obligations. In Rwanda the

government refused to implement key provisions of the Arusha Accords, and when Habyarimana finally took steps to proceed with the peace plan he was assassinated by hard-line elements within his own military (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 23). Thus, we can see that the less committed and sincere all parties are to peace, the less likely it is that a preventive diplomacy or peacemaking operation will succeed (Jett, 1999: 53).

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking have become commonly used in the post-Cold War era, especially within the African context, as a mechanism for conflict resolution (Jett, 1999: 52). Peacemaking requires the mediating party to understand the causes of conflict as well as the concerns and hesitation of both parties and it requires the commitment of adequate resources (Gambari, 2001: 17). The success of the implementation of any further peace operations following preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are dependent on a clear and balanced peace plan being negotiated during the peacemaking phase and this peace process being agreed to by all the main parties involved in the conflict (Patel and Tripodi, 2001: 147). Once a peace plan has been put in motion, and all parties have agreed to it, a coordinated effort is vital in that there must be communication and understanding between those who have mediated the settlement and those who are to implement the peace agreement (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 26).

3.2.2   Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not specifically indicated in the UN Charter, and has been hailed as the invention of the UN, as 'Chapter VI and a half' action (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 10). The term peacekeeping was adopted through the establishment of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations following the deployment of the UN's first peacekeeping force in response to the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Malan, 1997:3). Since then, peacekeeping has been one of the main peace maintenance methods, consolidating conflict prevention and resolution through the deployment of a UN presence in the field; with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military personnel, police and civilians to work to monitor and verify peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by peacemakers (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 3-4).

Since there are no provisions within the UN Charter stipulating the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the legal basis for each operation becomes the mandate given to it by the Security Council (Jett, 1999: 39). There are three important guiding principles upon which a peacekeeping operation should be based. These are: (1) the consent of the parties to the conflict in having the UN presence; (2) the impartiality of the UN within the conflict zone; and (3) the non-use of force by the UN, except in self-defence (Chipman, 1996: 13, Carey, 1998: 14-16, Clapham, 1999: 29, Jett, 1999: 38-39, Malan, 1999: 86, Hansen, 2000: 8-14, Nkiwane, 2000:27-28).

Consent to some extent confers legitimacy on a peacekeeping force as it refers to the acceptance of such a force by the international community as well as the parties to the conflict (Hansen, 2000: 9). However, consent is thought of as an absolute notion and is a condition that can only be granted fully by the parties directly involved in the conflict (Malan, 1997: 3-4). Furthermore, consent is ultimately something that is given and can therefore be withdrawn at any time (Malan, 1997: 9). Continued consent is therefore essential to the successful implementation of the peacekeeping operation's mandate because without continued consent the cooperation of the parties to the conflict is limited and the implementation of the UN's mandate within a peace operation is restricted (Carey, 1998: 15).

Impartiality is also seen as an absolute concept meaning an absence of bias on the part of the peacekeepers as the UN is required to act as a neutral broker between conflicting parties and therefore it is essential to retain the trust and confidence of the conflicting parties that the UN will act in this way (Malan, 1997: 4-10, Carey, 1998: 16). Related to impartiality is transparency, which allows the parties to become involved and fully aware of the UN's presence and mandate within a peacekeeping operation (Malan, 1997: 4). The major issue with impartiality is evident within conflict were there is no clearly defined division of adversaries and therefore the impartiality of peace forces is difficult to maintain in a situation in which there are no clearly demarcated front-lines or legitimate authorities in the area of operations (Malan, 1997: 10). Clapham (1999: 30) contends that the state-centred nature of the UN renders the principle of impartiality problematic within the context of internal conflicts, as the organisation will inevitably lean more towards the state in conflicts in which one party is a state and the other is not.

The non-use of force, except in self-defence principle is closely related to consent and impartiality as it reinforces the acceptability of a UN force as the UN is less likely to be seen as a direct threat to a conflicting party or be a factor in the escalation of violence within a conflict if it does not use force (Malan, 1997: 5). Therefore the non-use of force by the UN may help to reinforce the consent and impartiality principles within a conflict zone. The use of force however will likely affect the perceived impartiality of a peacekeeping force by the parties to a conflict as they may see the UN as a further threat (Hansen, 2000: 12). The concept of the non-use of force except in self-defence has been extended to some extent to include not only the protection of UN forces, but also the defence of UN equipment and the defence of the mission's mandate (Carey, 1998: 15, Hansen, 2000: 12).

UN peacekeeping operations continue to be based on the abovementioned principles, but as Malan (1999: 86), points out, these are "extremely tenuous in the turmoil of [African] interstate conflicts". Despite the fact that peacekeeping has a chance of being effective when these basic requirements are met, no major peacekeeping operation in Africa, whether undertaken by the UN or any other organisation, has met all three of these conditions at any one time (Stedman and Rothchild: 1997: 18, Clapham, 1999: 29). These principles have been significantly challenged by peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly because such operations have encountered three major organisational constraints in the form of decision-making, co-ordination and funding (Hansen, 2000: 17-25). Attempts at peacekeeping in the absence of peace or a clear desire from all the parties for UN intervention, are where the UN has experienced some of its most prominent failures in Africa (Jett, 1999: 36). Corum (1995: 122) contends that UN peacekeeping operations have been successful in the past more because of luck and the goodwill of the parties engaged in peace talks than the because of the effectiveness of the organisation and the peacekeepers.

In the past peacekeeping mostly involved the maintenance of an agreed peaceful status quo, but in the post-Cold War era in Africa it has often rather involved helping to aid the establishment of a peace to which the conflicting parties have not yet necessarily agreed to (Chipman, 1996: 12). Therefore the term 'peacekeeping' in relation to most African conflicts is a contradiction in terms, as this would assume

that there exists a peace to be kept, which in the case of African conflicts is not always the desired scenario. Jett (1999: 56) cites Berdal as saying that "peacekeeping activities become merely a substitute for addressing the root cause of ethnic and communal violence and are not closely linked to an ongoing political process aimed at conflict resolution" in which case those activities "may prolong the war itself". Thus, Jett (1999: 38) argues that the classical peacekeeping mission may not be relevant in dealing with contemporary internal wars as these wars have not only become more violent in the post-cold War era, but they are also less likely to be resolved through negotiation. Military solutions such as those offered by peacekeeping operations can only offer short-term solutions to the more complex and deep-rooted social, economic and political domestic problems facing Africa today (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 22). Therefore there is the need for more comprehensive means of preventing and resolving African conflicts and these means must be more far-reaching in addressing the underlying factors that contribute to African conflict within the context of the failed state.

3.2.3 Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is another peace maintenance method employed by the UN, which is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, but has developed from Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. Peacebuilding offers a move by the UN towards a more multi-dimensional approach to conflict prevention and resolution and is seen by some to be a fulfilment of the UN's original purpose (Richmond, 2001: 36). Peacebuilding has been referred to as "second generation engagement" and to some extent constitutes all the different stages of peace maintenance, as it is a post-conflict method aimed at preventing, alleviating and resolving conflict or a recurrence of armed confrontation by identifying and supporting structures to strengthen and consolidate peace and promote reconciliation and development in war torn societies (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 4, Annan, 1998: 17, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15, De Coning, 2004: 41-45, Mulikita, 2005: 23-24).

Within a peacebuilding operation, security is the principal factor that must be attained first, as without security, progress on other activities within an operation may not be attainable (Mulikita, 2005: 24). Following from this, the core activities within a peacebuilding operation involve the monitoring of a ceasefire, disarming and

demobilising one or more insurgent groups and integrating them into a new national military and police force, the destruction of weapons and organizing or assisting in the implementation of free and fair national elections, strengthening state institutions, promoting respect for human rights and the repatriation of refugees (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 12, Bertram, 1995: 388-389, Annan, 1998: 17, Carey, 1998: 16). Peacebuilding can therefore offer the opportunity to create the conditions necessary to implement and manage the activities that may create an environment conducive to the elimination of conflict and promotion of a lasting peace.

While preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are aimed more at avoiding a crisis, and peacekeeping is aimed at maintaining a peaceful status quo, peacebuilding has the added element of attempting to prevent a recurrence of conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 12). In order to do this, peacebuilding involves a multifaceted approach covering diplomatic, political and economic factors (Annan, 1998: 17). Thus it is a comprehensive strategy that tries to tackle all the different factors inherent within a conflict by building the political conditions for a sustainable peace within a country divided by conflict, rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states or armed groups (Bertram, 1995: 388). Therefore peacebuilding is particularly important within the context of internal wars within failed states in Africa.

Peace is not only about the absence of political violence, as the attainment of peace must ensure that not only the political issues are dealt with, but also the economic, social, cultural and humanitarian (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 16). These factors are important, as deficiencies in the functioning of these are often what constitute the underlying causes of conflict and the resultant violence, especially in Africa. Peacebuilding thus aims to ensure the long-term stability of agreements and the creation and enhancements of existing institutions that provide incentives for, and an environment in which the parties may resolve their conflicts without resorting to violence. Peacebuilding therefore is not only focused on the military aspect of conflict and the insurgents involved in the direct conflict, but also on the presumption that peace requires social transformation and development not only in the short-term, but as something that must be consolidated over time (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15-16).

Therefore an important element within peacebuilding is the promotion of development as a long-term scheme that can be implemented before, during and after a conflict to ensure a more sustainable peace (Ginifer, 1997: 5). In line with this peacebuilding offers a longer–term engagement aimed at fostering conditions for economic and political reform and human and social development, as well as deterring violence as a means of political competition (Ginifer, 1997: 3, Annan, 1998: 17, Chopra, 1998: 6). This is done through the reform of institutional and socio-economic infrastructure at the local and national level to promote the resumption of normal economic activity and address the underlying causes of conflict, rather than just reacting to the symptoms (Ginifer, 1997: 5, Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 33, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15). UN peacebuilding activities in Mozambique under UNOMOZ offer a positive example of the success of a mission grounded on the assumption that the stimulation of development was central to a lasting peace process (Ginifer, 1997: 4).

Goodhand and Hulme (1999: 16) contend that peacebuilding is not one specific activity with a beginning and an end, but rather a process that can occur throughout all phases of a conflict. Therefore peacebuilding can commence at different stages within the peace maintenance process, such as at the stage of peacemaking or when the peacekeeping operation is being conducted or after its termination (Gambari, 2001: 19). As peacebuilding offers a more multifaceted approach to peace maintenance, there has arisen an increasing need to address the relationship between short-term peacekeeping and long-term peacebuilding and development to ensure sustained peace (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 18). Annan (1998: 17) believes that peacebuilding must be integrated into the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. This is especially important because peacebuilding may contribute to the short-term implementation of a peace settlement to provide the means of maximising the long-term commitment of parties to those agreements and fostering development in the long run (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 18). In this way peacebuilding should provide a bridge between preventive diplomacy and peacemaking on the one hand and peacekeeping on the other hand. Peacebuilding offers an opportunity to create the conditions necessary for the creation of a successful peacekeeping operation as the root causes of conflict can be addressed, the combatants can be disarmed, and the possibility of the UN becoming actively involved in the conflict are reduced as the

Peace enforcement is therefore the "offensive application of coercive measures" (Carey, 1998: 15). The significant difference therefore between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is that while the notion of impartiality remains an important element, there is a notable absence of consent in peace enforcement and the introduction of force into the equation (Malan, 1997: 8, 1999: 96). With the absence of consent, Malan (1999: 96-97) contends that peace enforcement inhabits the grey area between peacekeeping and war. In peacekeeping the military acts as a support force, assisting diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, while in peace enforcement the military acts impartially (without designating an enemy) as an active combatant with the objective of forcibly (and without consent) coercing warring parties to cease fighting (Corum, 1995: 131, Berdal: 2001: 56). Thus peace enforcement doctrine emphasises that force can be applied impartially if the focus of military action is firmly aimed at ensuring compliance with a given mandate (Berdal, 2001: 62).

Corum (1995: 130) believes that peace enforcement as a concept has failed due to the unsound nature of the concept itself. A major problem with peace enforcement is that it borders too closely on the side of war and the UN becoming an active participant in a conflict in which it is supposed to be an impartial player aiming to prevent and resolve the war rather than contributing negatively to it. Thus, Berdal (2001: 59) contends that enforcement in its political and military consequences cannot be impartial. The use of force by the UN can in many instances become counterproductive, as the use of violence to essentially stop violence is by no means a rational action within the context of maintaining international peace and security.

3.2.5   Regional Arrangements for Peace Maintenance

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter upholds the provision for regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security. According to Article 52 of the Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements and agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". According to Article 53 it is however further required that "…no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or

by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council". The UN has therefore sought to encourage cooperation with regional organisations as Malan (1997: 1), asserts it never intended to be the sole provider of collective security efforts as it aimed to include provisions for regional organisations and agencies to play a part in peace maintenance.

Although regional arrangements are gaining strength within the international realm of peace maintenance, none has established the same legitimacy as the UN (Hansen, 2000: 12). This is especially apparent as regional players, particularly within Africa, bring into the spotlight the question of impartiality as they are often a part of the problem, because they are directly or indirectly a party to the conflict and therefore a clash of interests arises within the framework of regional intervention for the maintenance of peace and security (Guehenno, 2002: 13). Furthermore, the UN Security Council has conferred upon itself the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, and by passing on this task to regional or non-UN multilateral arrangements, runs the risk of losing control of an operation, and ultimately threatening the legitimacy of the UN in the process when things go horribly wrong, as was the case in Somalia (Cilliers and Malan, 1996: 340).

3.3   The Decision-Making Processes within the UN

According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the power to decide what measures shall be taken if a situation arises that it deems to be a threat to international peace and security. In line with this the decisions taken by the Security Council with regards to peace maintenance are on a consensual basis in that according to Article 27 of the Charter: "Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote". In order for the UN to carry out the decisions and recommendations of the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security Article 43 of the Charter stipulates that UN members "…undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities … necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". Therefore the decisions taken by the Security Council can only be as effective as its members allow it to be, as the basis of a vote determines what action shall be taken, as well as the willingness of members to supply such facilities.

The deployment of any peace maintenance forces by the UN requires two-thirds support within the Security Council and the absence of a veto by any of the permanent members (Clapham, 1999: 26). This veto power of the five permanent members within the Security Council has been an obstacle to the successful deployment of peace maintenance operations by the organisation. This was especially evident during the Cold War era when important decisions regarding the maintenance of international peace and security were stifled by the rival bipolar political ideologies of the Cold War superpowers and their allies. However, the post-Cold War period, as mentioned above, has removed this important constraint on the UN Security Council with the elimination of the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union (Bertram, 1995: 401).

Corum (1995: 128) contends that a major problem with UN peace operations lies within the higher levels of leadership within the organisation. This is due to the fact that within the UN system judicial and executive powers lie in the same hands, namely those within the Security Council - particularly the five permanent members (Hansen, 2000: 19). Therefore there is no division of power, and the act of deciding on action and legalising it, is one and the same (Hansen, 2000: 19). Another major problem with the implementation of peace operations comes in the form of what Omar (2000: 4) calls the "Security Council's failure to keep up with the times". Evidence of this lies in the fact that the UN still lacks the command and control capabilities to manage peace operations effectively due to its "arcane organisational structure and a set of cumbersome operating procedures" (Knight, 1998: 36). This is especially evident in the structure of the Security Council that no longer reflects the global realities of today as it was formed in the balance of power politics of the post World War II era. Countries in the developing world are currently filling a large gap in terms of troop contributions to peace maintenance operations and therefore as they are heeding the call from the West for 'burden-sharing', they understandably want greater 'power-sharing' within the UN Security Council decision-making processes (Guehenno, 2002: 19).

In the consideration of options for conflict prevention and resolution, these should not only reflect the realities of today's global political environment, but they need to also reflect realistically the institutional capacity of the organisation (Cockell, 2001: 21).

This should therefore be examined in line with the existing capacity of the UN in order to facilitate rapid assessment and decision-making at senior management levels (Cockell, 2001: 21). However, within the UN system there remains institutional competition, overlaps and poor co-ordination among key organisations involved in peace maintenance operations (Ginifer, 1997: 8). This is evident in the slow decision-making and time delays within the UN that has become a major impediment to the adequate and timely implementation of peace operations. There is a considerable gap between the amount of discussion and the actual output of action by the Security Council when it comes to peace maintenance operations (Hawkins, 2003: 64). Also, the slow transition from decisions by the Security Council to the General Assembly has affected UN peace maintenance operations. From the time the Security Council takes the decision to deploy a peace maintenance operation to the time it takes the General Assembly to approve the budget for such an operation, the organisation's ability to deploy the operation in a timely and effective manner is severely affected (Carey, 1998: 16). The problems within the decision-making arena of the UN are closely related to the issue of the political will of UN members.

3.4 Political Will of UN Members

"With political will, rhetoric can truly be transformed into reality. Without it, not even
the noblest sentiments will have a chance of success"

(Annan 1998: 27)

Clapham (1999: 26) states: "The UN is not an autonomous actor, but the expression of an international consensus, to the extent that it is possible to obtain". From this we can deduce that the UN is only as strong as its members allow it to be as a most notable limit of the power and ability of the UN to carry out its mandate of maintaining international peace and security comes through the actions of its own members (Bertram, 1995: 401). This is especially evident in the lack of political will of individual states or groups of states both within the Security Council as well as the General Assembly in deploying peace maintenance operations. The lack of political will is especially related to the notion of national interests, as states, especially the dominant ones within the Security Council, remain reluctant to invoke the full force of international law to address issues that are not directly related to their national interests or within the scope of their foreign policy priorities (Malan, 1999: 92, Neethling, 1999: 41). Therefore the lack of political will of influential UN members is

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a prominent factor in the Security Council's lack of sufficient and timely decision-making and action in peace maintenance operations as Hawkins (2003: 62-63) points to the timeliness with which the Security Council responds as an indicator in determining the interests involved and how serious it is in resolving a crisis. As Omar (2000: 3) states: "Unfortunately [member states] constant talk of being interested in robust peacekeeping is not followed by action at the critical moment".

Hansen (2000: 24) contends that a peace operation will only be initiated if there is a group of states that are willing to pay the price and have a particular interest in managing the conflict. Therefore summoning the necessary political will is crucial to the successful implementation and control of a peace maintenance operation (Neethling, 1999: 32, Anyidoho, 2000: 92). Each time the UN creates a peace maintenance operation with the absence of a standing UN force, it has to build a force from scratch, thus relying on the good will of member states to supply the troops and resources required (Carey, 1998: 16). Therefore without the necessary political will there can be no resources, personnel or finances to fund the implementation of a peace maintenance operation. This has especially been evident within the context of African conflict as Malan (1998: 3) points out that in the absence of political will, "luke-warm" Western commitments to resolving African conflicts are fast growing cold. Rwanda offers the most extreme example of this, where the lack of political will and interests, predominantly by the leading powers within the Security Council prevented the organisation from fulfilling its duty of preventing and resolving conflict as it was the absence of political will that in essence crippled UN operations in Rwanda and hindered the UN's ability to reinforce the poorly equipped and relatively small UN operation in that country (Guehenno, 2002: 13).

The willingness of the Security Council to fulfil its duty in the restoration of peace, rather than just the maintenance of peace in Africa remains very low (Hawkins, 2003: 70). The political will of UN members is therefore not only a prominent feature in the decision to implement a peace maintenance operation, but also an important factor in the continuance of an operation to ensure lasting peace or the demobilisation of such an operation. The withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of personnel of a single UN member from a peace operation can spell disaster for an operation (Bertram, 1995: 402). This is especially so if that member is an integral unit within the operation, as

was the case in Rwanda with the withdrawal of Belgium from the operation after the death of ten of its peacekeepers. This severely hindered the success of UN operations in that country.

3.5 Financial and Resource Constraints

"The UN is no more than the sum of its members and available resources"
Neethling (2001: 47)

The issues of resources and financial constraints, as shown above fall within the unending cycle of political will and the contributions and interests of member states within the UN system. The UN relies on donations and the willingness of its member states to provide the necessary funds and resources to finance operations, and these have fallen short of providing it with the necessary "tools to address acute conflicts" (Neethling, 2001: 47). This is because states will only contribute as much as it is within their will or interests to do so. Thus, as Bertram (1995: 415) contends, peace operations may be doomed to fail if member states do not provide the UN with the necessary resources and means to carry out its duty of maintaining international peace and security.

Financial constraints are said to form one of the most crippling challenges to UN peace operations (Hansen, 2000: 18). This is especially pertinent in relation to the implementation of peace maintenance operations as Neethling (2003: 108) contends that the burden of resources lies at the heart of problems faced by past peace operations. Securing the financial and human resources for peace operations is a complex task, which can influence the ability of an operation to carry out its mandate effectively (Carey, 1998: 16). Financial constraints lead to logistical and organisational problems and not only delay the implementation of the peace process but they also place limitations on the activities of a peace operation, preventing it from pursuing a more comprehensive approach (Hansen, 2000: 18, Neethling, 2003: 95). Within this cycle, conflict is left to escalate while the slow decisions and lack of political will and resources cripple the implementation of peace operations, and this can lead to a more complex situation than before where more funds will be needed than initially anticipated (Hansen, 2000: 18), thereby making operations indeed more costly than they initially needed to be.

3.6 Conclusion

Because African conflicts differ from the traditional concepts of war and state-on-state conflicts, a new perception of conflict resolution is required in terms of the basic functions of peacekeeping and the related factors of peacebuilding and peacemaking. The nature of such conflicts and the surrounding environment in which they are fought therefore need to be understood and ways and means of preventing and solving such conflicts need to be developed accordingly. Not only does conflict need to be prevented and resolved, but there is also a need to ensure that it does not reoccur. In ensuring this, a key issue is development and the rebuilding of institutional structures within failed states. The notion of sovereignty is a tenuous one in terms of the nature of African conflict and the nature of the failed African state. Therefore the gross violation of human rights and the devastation inherent in African conflicts should not be ignored in favour of sovereignty and non-intervention. As Malaquias (2002: 433) states: "The main goal of UN peace operations in Africa must be to help create the social, political and economic conditions for the emergence of domestically stable and prosperous, internationally relevant African countries. Thus far, UN peace operations have failed to create such conditions because they adhere to increasingly irrelevant notions of state sovereignty".

The UN has a self-imposed duty to maintain international peace and security and this duty should not be ignored when African conflicts constitute a threat to international peace and security and failed states in Africa have essentially lost the basis upon which they can claim sovereignty. Clapham (1999: 26) contends that there is little to suggest that any other organisation could have done any better than the UN in peace operations in Africa. It is therefore best to attempt to make the existing UN system work, rather than introduce alternatives, such as regional African initiatives in attempting to solve African conflicts (Malan, 1998: 7). Malan (1998:7) points to the fact that if the only global institution tasked with the mission of maintaining international security is incapable of doing so, then it is surely misleading to assume that regional organisations will fair any better.

Boutros-Ghali (1992/93: 95) contends that peace operations and the activities involved within them should not be carried out at the expense of its responsibilities for development as he states: "it is essential that peace and development be pursued in

an integrated, mutually supporting way" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93: 95). Peacekeeping by itself cannot necessarily provide a lasting solution to a conflict and it therefore needs to be accompanied by a wide range of peacebuilding related tasks (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93: 90) that Guehenno (2002: 20) argues have not received enough attention. Peacebuilding with its emphasis on development should therefore be the most important peace maintenance operation employed within the context of failed and weak states in Africa. The UN needs to take a more long-term approach to peacebuilding and it must be viewed as a critical component of a process of peace maintenance in order to prevent and resolve conflict in Africa (Malaquias, 1997: 88). The following chapter on UN peace maintenance in Mozambique will demonstrate how this is possible and how the UN can succeed when the necessary peacebuilding tasks are present along side the traditional peacekeeping operation within the context of an "old war" conflict in Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

OLD WARS IN AFRICA: UN PEACE MAINTENANCE IN MOZAMBIQUE

"Mozambique ... is the clearest example of the success of the peacekeeping process itself"
(Clapham, 1999: 34).

4.1   Background to the Conflict in Mozambique

Mozambique is an example of a typical post-colonial state in Africa, created by the former colonial powers to further their own interests, and embroiled in long-term internal conflict within the Cold War bi-polar dynamics. Schutz (1995: 112) describes Mozambique as a country "created by Portuguese interest, expanded by Portuguese appetite, and, territorially configured by the interests of the international community of states". From the colonial to the post-colonial period, Mozambique was entangled in conflict from an anti-colonial and independence war led by the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) against Portugal to an internal civil war between Frelimo and the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo), for control of the state after the withdrawal of Portugal. Chabal (1996: 5-6) points to the way in which Portugal carried out its decolonisation process and the international context of the Cold War and regional context of South Africa's hegemony as key historical factors to explain why Mozambique was embroiled in such conflict for so long. Thus there has existed an internal, regional and international dimension to conflict in Mozambique as not only was the conflict determined along internal factors, but also by the regional and international factors stirring around it, as Clapham (1999: 34) contends, Mozambique was a classic example of the "extremely messy kind of conflict – part domestic, part international, part ethnic, part ideological, and militarily unresolvable".

On the 25 April 1974 a military coup occurred in Portugal and as a result, the decolonisation and independence of Portugal's colonies was to be realized. With the signing of a ceasefire in Mozambique between Frelimo and the Portuguese Government on the 7 September 1974, the country was declared independent (Thomashausen, 2003: 273). Malaquias (2002: 423) believes that the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime in 1974 set the scene for major transformations within

southern Africa that eventually led to the process of democratic changes within the region. However, as mentioned above, in the interim, the process by which this decolonisation occurred in the country is a major factor lying at the root of conflict in Mozambique. Portuguese decolonisation in Africa occurred fifteen years later than French and British decolonisation and it was achieved by means of anti-colonial struggles through guerrilla warfare, as seen with Frelimo in Mozambique (Chabal, 1996: 6). The departure of the Portuguese had a devastating effect on the state as on their sudden exit the Portuguese destroyed whatever they could before dismantling the material base of the Mozambican state and depriving it of their much needed skills, ultimately leaving Mozambique in a state of "relative deprivation" (Schutz, 1995: 109-115). Added to this, the agreement signed between Portugal and Mozambique provided for all sovereign power to be transferred directly to Frelimo with no provision for future elections or any other procedure to allow for a change in power reflecting the desire of the people in any future system of government (Thomashausen, 2003: 277).

Mozambique after independence thus became a "singularly statist one party state" as Frelimo consolidated its power, while continuing its guerrilla strategy into the post-independence period and ruling by the politics of exclusion (Chabal, 1996: 11, Thomashausen, 2003: 277). When Frelimo came to power it relied on popular rural support but its influence had not yet reached the majority of the population and its message remained unheard by most of the people (Schutz, 1995: 113). Therefore Schutz (1995: 109-113) contends that while Frelimo had at that time attained a semblance of "revolutionary legitimacy", due to its anti-colonial armed struggle against Portugal, it had not yet achieved "popular legitimacy", and in order to do so had to reach more people to convince them that they were the legitimate government. Frelimo's rule was in many instances brutal and destructive, resulting in a mass exodus of over 200 000 mostly skilled Mozambicans, particularly of Portuguese descent, growing political dissent amongst the urban middleclass, boycotts and sabotage against government policies by the traditional leadership in the interior and the collapse of the Mozambican economy (Thomashausen, 2003: 280).

The most visible feature in the resistance to Frelimo's rule was manifest in the creation of Renamo, an anti-government, armed opposition group formed in Rhodesia

that pushed Frelimo and Mozambique into an internal war almost immediately following independence. Although Renamo ruled over a large, populated area of the country, had a working political-military apparatus and an organised, although primitive, economy, it lacked a political tradition and military capacity counterbalanced by any clear ethnic or regional identity, emerging initially with no clear ideology or direction but that of engaging the Frelimo government in a "violent and destructive war" (Malaquias, 1997: 89, Oyebade, 1998: 152, Macqueen, 2002: 165). Renamo's tactics throughout its period of rebellion were "brutal, insensitive and pointless", and the war that engulfed Mozambique has been labelled among the most vicious and violent within Africa (Schutz, 1995: 117, Clapham, 1999: 35, Chachiua, 1999: 3). While Frelimo claimed that the war was the cause of all its problems, Renamo believed that the war was as a result of Frelimo's actions and a consequence of the absence of legitimate and democratic leadership and economic mismanagement in the country (Thomashausen, 2003: 295).

Renamo was ultimately challenging the authority and legitimacy of Frelimo's rule and the capacity of the state to control its territory, and in so doing, challenging the legitimacy of the Mozambican state (Chabal, 1996: 5, Malaquias, 1997: 89, Macqueen, 2002: 104). These claims were justifiable in the fact that by the end of the 1980's the Frelimo regime was barely functioning, rapt by widespread corruption and economic mismanagement, and the concept of a 'Mozambican state' had become a contentious notion as the state teetered on the verge of collapse (Malaquias, 1997: 88, Macqueen, 2002: 154). Frelimo was also increasingly losing legitimacy due to the inability of the military to fight and protect the Mozambican people (Schutz, 1995: 117). This was a major factor for Mozambique on the path to becoming a failed state as without popular confidence in its military and the capacity of the state to defend the state as well as its population, the Frelimo government began to fail the ultimate test of legitimate government (Schutz, 1995: 118).

The 'statehood' of Mozambique was a further issue in question as the Mozambican state was described by some as a "quasi-state" in that Mozambique's statehood was based on a tacit acceptance by the international system that Mozambique should be publicly acknowledged and treated as a state despite doubts over its level of "stateness" in terms of its internal conduct and capacity (Macqueen, 2002: 24).

Conflict therefore emerged in Mozambique as a response to these factors as conflict derived from the "outcome of the degeneration of politics … [and] the outcome of a political process where violence has become endemic" (Chabal, 1996: 8). Furthermore conflict in Mozambique thus derived in part from the failure of Frelimo to "deliver adequately on [its] early promises and to make headway with inter-regional, pan-ethnic 'nation-building' projects" (Macqueen, 2002: 23).

In 1977 Frelimo adopted a hard-line radical Marxist-Leninist approach alongside an unequivocal alignment with the Soviet bloc and an inflexible hostility towards the Western powers (Schutz, 1995: 114, Thomashausen, 2003: 281). This decision ultimately meant that Frelimo, on behalf of Mozambique had decided to join the Cold War, resulting in the disapproval and displeasure within many quarters, not least of all within the neighbouring governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as further abroad within the United States (Schutz, 1995: 114-116, Barnes, 1998: 160). As a result of the Soviet alignment, regional neighbours reacted harshly, particularly South Africa who embarked on an extensive military campaign to destabilise Maputo through direct military attacks, tactical intelligence operations in Mozambique and enhanced training and support for Renamo who were allowed to operate from within South African territory (Schutz, 1995: 116). This managed to aggravate the conflict as Mozambique came to be viewed by the international community as a by-product of South Africa's regional destabilisation initiatives in southern Africa and therefore gained the support of the UN and the international community who viewed Mozambique as a victim of this process (Barnes, 1998: 161).

Within the regional context however, it was not only the South African government that reacted against the Frelimo regime but also the Rhodesian government who carried out direct attacks against Mozambican territory in reaction to Frelimo's support and provision of bases to Zimbabwean freedom fighters, and in turn the Rhodesian government provided covert support and training to Renamo in order to destabilise the Frelimo government (Barnes, 1998: 160). Conflict in Mozambique therefore offers a typical example of a proxy conflict in which external actors backed their respective clients within the civil war in the country and Mozambique therefore bares the legacy of both the Cold War and Apartheid destabilisation (Malaquias, 1997: 87, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167). Thus, coupled with the internal factors

inherent within Mozambique, the conflict became a "regional expression of the Cold War politics which dominated the international environment" (Alden, 1995: 103). Thus the internal conflict in the country took on a regional dimension.

On 8 January 1983, Mozambican President Machal announced his willingness to 'convert' from socialism as he realised that the war that was beginning to engulf the country could not be resolved without the support of Western powers (Thomashausen, 2003: 281). Frelimo was thus prepared and able to manipulate the Cold War tensions between the West and East to its own advantage as and when it suited it to align with one side or the other. On the 16 March 1984 Mozambique and the South African government signed the Nkomati Accord, which was a non-aggressive pact between the two countries whereby Frelimo was to cease support for the African National Congress (ANC) against the South African government and Pretoria would cease support for Renamo in Mozambique (Thomashausen, 2003: 283). Chissano and Botha also subsequently signed the Songo Agreement, reactivating the Nkomati Accord, following which South Africa finally ceased providing official support for Renamo (Venancio, 1993: 146).

The end of the Cold War marked a decisive turning point for the conflict in Mozambique. With the imminent withdrawal of Soviet aid, Frelimo was forced into a more serious recognition of Renamo, coupled with an ever-declining economy, which accentuated Renamo's military advantage (Venancio, 1993: 146). Chapman (1995: 16) contends that the psychological impact of the cessation of the Cold War was a decisive factor in pushing the leaders of both Frelimo and Renamo to the negotiating table. Changes within the regional environment, particularly transformations in the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia were also significant push factors for the end of conflict in Mozambique (Chapman, 1995: 16). Renamo lost its former allies with the end of minority rule in Rhodesia in 1980 and with the added loss of South African support, and finally the end of apartheid, it was left with no significant external support and was therefore also forced to view the prospect of a negotiated peace settlement with Frelimo in a different light (Venancio, 1993: 146, Chapman, 1995: 16, Oyebade, 1998: 152, Clapham, 2001: 13).

Thus in the dying days of the Cold War, a climate of "war weariness" had begun to pervade Mozambique (Oyebade, 1998: 152-153). Both Frelimo and Romano forces increasingly lacked the will as well as the resources to continue fighting and many no longer even understood the rationale behind the war, resulting in a "mutually hurting stalemate" in Mozambique (Venancio, 1993: 148, Barnes, 1998: 166, Thomashausen, 2003: 297). Added to the political changes within the region, the environmental factors were increasingly devastating the country further and acting as a push factor for both parties to move towards a resolution of conflict. In 1992 a devastating drought swept over southern Africa and placed additional pressure on both parties as they struggled to feed their civilian populations (Barnes, 1998: 162). As Oyebade (1998: 152) states: "starvation had killed the appetite for war in Mozambique". The United Nations – Southern African Development Coordination Conference (UN-SADCC) Appeal for the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) estimated that 3.1 million Mozambicans were in need of immediate relief assistance, of which at least half a million of these were in Renamo-controlled areas to which there was little or no access (Barnes, 1998: 162).

In Mozambique there were thus what Schutz (1995: 123) labels a "favourable confluence of external and internal factors" that forced Frelimo and Renamo into a negotiated settlement to end the conflict. The absence of internal natural resources in Mozambique and the withdrawal of support of external patrons after the Cold War was a major factor in the facilitation of the end to conflict. In the immediate post-Cold War period and the end of apartheid in South Africa, no major external power had the desire or interest in helping to maintain the conflict (Clapham, 1999: 35). The end of the Cold War thus facilitated the deployment of a peace operation within the country as transformations within the Soviet Union and South Africa provoked a crisis for both Frelimo and Renamo as their ideological and logistical support from these bases dissipated (Alden, 1995: 103, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167). The first initiative for the reform of Mozambique and the path to peace came in the form of proposals from the Frelimo government. The most significant of these proposals were the resolution of the civil war through a negotiated settlement and the introduction of a multi-party democracy (Macqueen, 2002: 154).

4.2   The General Peace Agreement in Rome: July 1990 to October 1992

It was the international community that played a crucial role in the facilitation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed between Frelimo and Renamo in October 1992 and the creation of an environment in which a ceasefire could be signed and elections held (Chapman, 1995: 6). Not only was there political pressure on the two parties, but also financial incentives presented as Western pledges of money played a part in pushing Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo to sign the GPA (Malaquias, 1997: 91). While the United States and South Africa formed the backbone of international pressure for Frelimo and Renamo to steer towards negotiations, it was particularly the Roman Catholic Church and the Italian government that were at the forefront of international efforts to ensure a location and environment were peace could be negotiated (Venancio, 1993: 148).

The first set of direct meetings between Frelimo and Renamo took place in Rome in July 1990 with the Italian government providing most of the necessary diplomatic resources while the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio community - a non-governmental organisation that had been involved in development work in Mozambique - provided the location for negotiations and played a critical role as an unofficial mediator (Barnes, 1998: 161, Clapham, 1999: 34, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167, Patel and Tripodi, 2001: 147, Macqueen, 2002: 154). In 1984 the Catholic Church, as part of a "coherent and calculated strategy" had begun to call for a peace based on dialogue and placed itself in a unique position between Renamo and Frelimo that formed the basis for its mutually accepted role as a neutral non-state mediator between the two belligerents (Venancio, 1993: 144-150). The UN did not have any major role within the negotiation process of the GPA and was brought in at a relatively late stage of the process as an official observer in June 1992, in order to decide on the role that the UN would play in the future verification of the agreement (Barnes, 1998: 161, Clapham, 1999: 34, Macqueen, 2002: 155).

During the negotiations Renamo insisted on being recognised as a political force, while Frelimo insisted on being recognised as the sole legitimate government (Venancio, 1993: 148). Both of these wishes were addressed to some extent because while the GPA recognised the Mozambican government, its institutions and laws, the

signing of the GPA also elevated Renamo to the international stage alongside Frelimo and advanced the organisation to the status of an equal party with a state in an international agreement (Barnes, 1998, Thomashausen, 2003: 296). Therefore as Venancio (1993: 151) contends; the peace talks in Rome were "no longer simply the government of Mozambique negotiating with a gang of renegades; now it was a negotiation of equals".

The GPA addressed the causes and factors within the conflict first as a prerequisite for the implementation of a general ceasefire, rather than as a consequence of a ceasefire agreement (Thomashausen, 2003: 293). The GPA stipulated that a ceasefire was to come into effect not later than 15 October 1992 and this was to be followed by the separation of the Renamo and Frelimo forces and their concentration within assembly areas as well as their demobilisation (UNDPI, 2001: 2). The GPA also called for the complete demobilisation of all existing forces and simultaneously for the joint recruitment and establishment of a much smaller and entirely new Mozambique Defence Force, the holding of elections and a democratically elected government (Thomashausen, 2003: 293). The Agreement was finally signed in Rome on 4 October 1992 ending the war in Mozambique and beginning the formal transition of the country to peace. The UN was, at the request of both Renamo and Frelimo, given the major task as the central actor in the implementation of this agreement, providing technical assistance for the ceasefire and demobilisation, monitoring the elections and the transformation to democracy and providing humanitarian assistance (Alden, 1995: 103, Barnes, 1998: 161, UNDPI, 2001: 1-2, Macqueen, 2002: 155).

4.3 UN Response to Conflict in Mozambique: Internal Debate and Political Will
Chapman (1995: 16) argues that by 1993 the UN was desperately looking for a success story following its high profile failures of peace operations in Somalia and Angola, which highlighted the urgent need for the UN to justify its existence as the maintainer of international peace and security, particularly within the African context. The UN reaction to conflict in Mozambique and the subsequent operations in the country therefore benefited from the UN's "institutional memory" of the failure of these operations and they thus acted as a push factor for UN involvement in Mozambique and the Secretary General's desire not to repeat the mistakes made specifically in Angola, where the electoral phase of the peace settlement began before

the process of full military disengagement and demilitarisation had been fully implemented (Alden, 1995: 106, Chabal, 1996: 5, Malaquias, 1997: 94, Nkiwane, 2000: 30, Macqueen, 2002: 159). Thus the UN was determined to ensure that the electoral phase of operations was not to be implemented until all soldiers were fully demobilised. On the 3 December 1992 the Secretary General submitted an operational plan to the Security Council for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Here he expressed his belief that it would not be possible to create the conditions for successful elections in Mozambique unless the military situation was brought fully under control, and the GPA would not be implemented unless Frelimo and Renamo made a concerted effort to honour their obligations and commitments under the Agreement (UNDPI, 2001: 4) as he stated: "In light of the recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented" (Alden, 1995: 106).

Despite initial problems within the Security Council in terms of the financing of the proposed operations, shortly after the GPA was signed the General Assembly approved a budget of $ 140 million to finance the initial stages of a peace operation and the first steps to deploy 5,500 peacekeepers to Mozambique (Malaquias, 1997: 94, Macqueen, 2002: 157). According to Resolution 782 of 13 October 1992, the UN was to establish a team of military observers and on the 15 October 1992, the day the GPA came into force, the interim Special Representative Aldo Ajello and a team of 21 military observers drawn from existing UN peacekeeping missions arrived in Mozambique (UNDPI, 2001: 2). On 16 December 1992, the Security Council in support of the Report of the Secretary General of 3 December 1992 approved and passed Resolution 797 officially establishing ONUMOZ under a Chapter VI mandate. This Resolution called upon the Mozambican government and Renamo to co-operate fully with UN operations and to respect the ceasefire and all commitments entered into under the GPA, while calling for UN members to respond positively to the requests for organisational and logistical contributions towards a peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation (S/RES/797, 1992: 1-2)

UN members provided active and unified political support in encouraging both Renamo and Frelimo to implement the GPA (Carey, 1998: 18). The international

community also pledged $760 million towards an economic recovery plan at a conference sponsored by the World Bank in December 1992 and the Italian government pledged a further $402 million in support of the demobilisation and electoral processes (Alden, 1995: 105). The largest donors in humanitarian and long-term development programmes were the US, Britain, the European Community, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland (Barnes, 1998: 167). Even the financial resources necessary to carry out a number of tasks that were not funded under the initial budget of ONUMOZ were supplied (Carey, 1998: 18). These tasks such as the provision of funds to enable Renamo to participate in the electoral process, the reintegration of displaced persons and demobilised soldiers and the formation of a unified army, were essential to the implementation of the peace agreement and the success of ONUMOZ (Carey, 1998: 18). Thus political and financial support by UN members for operations in Mozambique appears to have been forthcoming without any major difficulties or debates. From the negotiations of the GPA to the deployment of ONUMOZ, the international community was actively involved within all stages of the peace process.

4.3.1 The Deployment of ONUMOZ: October 1992 – December 1994

ONUMOZ is one of the clearest examples of the success and importance of the multidimensional UN peace maintenance process involving the implementation of a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, accompanied by the complementary programmes within a peacebuilding operation, and a range of diplomatic and humanitarian assistance initiatives that worked side by side to build and maintain a political, economic and social environment to consolidate a lasting peace (Barnes, 1998: 159-160, Clapham, 1999: 34). ONUMOZ therefore extended the boundaries of traditional peacekeeping both operationally and conceptually in that it was given a largely non-military mandate within the multifunctional peace operation (Potgieter, 2000: 31). An important point to note is the fact that both Renamo and Frelimo had requested the implementation of the peacekeeping operation through the GPA, thus implying the principle of consent. Furthermore this implied that the implementation of a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation was not necessary.

The UN played a key role in all aspects of the peace process in Mozambique, as ONUMOZ was able to establish a central controlling and co-ordinating position in the

country (Clapham, 1999: 34, Malaquias, 2002: 423). In being in charge of all aspects of the peace operations from the military through to the political and humanitarian aspects, this meant that co-ordination and co-operation of all aspects were therefore more easily maintained and ensured. To do this ONUMOZ planners pooled the resources, knowledge and already established networks of the different NGOs and foreign development assistance projects already at work in Mozambique in order to carry out the humanitarian assistance programmes effectively without duplicating or overlapping responsibilities between all the agencies involved within the country (Alden, 1995: 109).

The UN Secretary General's Special Representative (UNSGSR) Aldo Ajello was able to call on the support of a "remarkably united international community" (Clapham, 199: 35). Up to thirty-five states provided troops, military observers, civilian police and election monitors, with Italy, Bangladesh, Uruguay and Zambia providing the most substantial contingents (Macqueen, 2002: 158). However, there were internal delays within the UN system in the deployment of these forces as difficulties arose in securing these troops from member states and deploying them in a timely manner (Carey, 1998: 18). Military personnel were not deployed in significant numbers and the military infrastructure of ONUMOZ was not fully established until May 1993 - six months after the resolution for ONUMOZ was passed - and only coming to its full initial strength of 6000 in late July of that year (UNDPI, 2001: 7, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 168, Macqueen, 2002: 157).

Related to the internal delays, was the fact that the Frelimo government was slow and reluctant to conclude the customary status of forces agreement with the UN, which allowed for the necessary immunities for ONUMOZ personnel and operations, and despite pressure from New York, the agreement was only finally concluded in May 1993 (Macqueen, 2002: 157). However, these initial obstacles have been viewed as not essentially a problem because as much as time is a critical element in implementing a peace operation quickly, it can also be a positive factor as the delayed response to a situation may affect the operation positively. Aldo Ajello believes that the seven months it took the UN to field substantial numbers of troops was useful because it gave Renamo time to organise as a political party and to lay a foundation and create the conditions necessary for implementing the GPA (Jett: 1999: 56).

ONUMOZ sought to ensure that the conditions for a lasting peace were put in place and that peace could be sustained long after the elections. In carrying out this task, ONUMOZ had a relatively simple mandate including within it the interrelated tasks of military, political, electoral, humanitarian and administrative components, as well as a Technical Unit on Demobilisation (Barnes, 1998: 164, Aldrich, 2000: 5, UNDPI, 2001: 4). As called for in the GPA, ONUMOZ had a wide-ranging military role in monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, the separation, concentration and demobilisation of the armed forces, the collection, storage and destruction of weapons, the monitoring of complete withdrawal of foreign forces and disbanding of all private and irregular armed groups, the provision of security in the four transport corridors, as well as providing security for UN and other international activities in support of the peace process (UNDPI, 2001: 5). The UN insisted on flexible mechanisms to help carry out this mandate and when it became apparent that the timeframe set forth for the operation would not be met, the deadlines for ONUMOZ were extended without having to expand the mandate (Malaquias, 1997: 94, Aldrich, 2000: 5). Thus ensuring adequate time and the necessary attention to fulfil all tasks set out within the mandate.

Humanitarian activities formed a major part of ONUMOZ's overall responsibilities in Mozambique as it became clear that the maintenance of peace would be closely linked to the effectiveness of the humanitarian programmes and thus the military factors of the UN operations corresponded directly alongside the humanitarian efforts (Barnes, 1998: 163, UNDPI, 2001: 5, Macqueen, 2002: 158). This was because as the disarmament and assembly of the soldiers occurred, they were immediately in need of food and other relief support (UNDPI, 2001: 5). Added to this was the need for ONUMOZ to respond to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans, especially those returning to resettle in their original communities, as the failure to do so could increase tensions amongst the people and place additional strain on resources within the country (UNDPI, 2001: 12). In order to achieve this, the provision of humanitarian assistance, especially to Renamo controlled areas was a critical element in the "side-payments" needed to keep Renamo on board the peace process so that the UN could have access to these areas and continue its efforts throughout the country (Clapham, 1999: 34).

Therefore a unique factor within ONUMOZ was the involvement of humanitarian assistance agencies within the different aspects of the demilitarisation process (Alden, 1995: 109). ONUMOZ was the first major UN operation in which the Department of Humanitarian Affairs could be included within the apparatus along side the Department of Peacekeeping (UNDP) and the Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) (Barnes, 1998: 163). The key agency on the humanitarian side of UN operations in Mozambique was the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (UNOHAC), which was established at the international donors conference in December 1992 under the Declaration on Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance signed between Frelimo and Renamo on the 16 July 1992, and was administratively under the control of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Alden, 1195: 110). Thus humanitarian assistance co-ordination was placed "firmly within a peacekeeping context in which neutrality and impartiality [in the assessment of need and the delivery of assistance] were part of the modus operandi" and thus the "humanitarian programme concretised the peace for many rural Mozambicans" (Barnes, 1998: 162-167).

The UN worked closely and personally with both parties to the conflict and included them in all the different aspects of the peace process. This was done through the creation of different commissions set up for the implementation of the GPA (Malaquias, 1997: 94). The two key commissions were the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) and the Ceasefire Commission. The CSC held primary responsibility for the implementation and interpretation of the GPA, the everyday management of the transition process, the settlement of disputes that might arise between the parties and it was to direct and co-ordinate the activities of the other commissions (Alden, 1995: 104, Malaquias, 1997: 3, UNDPI, 2001: 3). Related to the CSC, the Cease-Fire Commission was set up to deal with incidents, complaints and alleged violations of the agreement from both sides and charged with the task of approving the location of the assembly areas, the procedures for cantonment as well as troop movements and conduct within the assembly areas (Alden, 1995: 106, Malaquias, 1997: 95, Barnes, 1998: 171). Other Commissions included the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilising Military Personnel and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. These

Commissions were chaired by the UN and included within them Renamo, Frelimo and representatives of other external states.

4.3.2 Demobilisation and Peacebuilding

The demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration processes were an extremely important factor for the future of peace in Mozambique. This formed perhaps the most important element within the peacebuilding role of the UN, as the demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers were preconditions for the holding of elections, the social and economic development within Mozambique and the future of political peace within the country, as Ajello commented: "Lesson number one: no elections without demobilisation" (Bertram, 1995: 399). The first component of the demilitarisation phase was to begin with the introduction of UN forces to monitor the phased pull out of Malawian and Zimbabwean troops from the transport corridors across Mozambique (Alden, 1995: 116). The UN also had primary responsibility for the management and implementation of the registration, encampment and demilitarisation of up to 100 000 Frelimo and Renamo troops as well as the creation of a new national army with equal numbers drawn from both Frelimo and Renamo forces (Alden, 1995: 105, Malaquias, 1997: 95). Added to this, the UN had the task of monitoring the ceasefire agreement between Renamo and Frelimo. However, the majority of reported violations of the agreement did not concern accusations of shooting or attacks but rather the movement of troops as both Renamo and Frelimo's regular shifting of troops was in anticipation and response to uncertainty within the peace process, particularly within the context of the upcoming demobilisation and elections (Alden, 1995: 117).

In November 1993, Renamo and Frelimo forces where to be concentrated in the assembly areas and final demobilisation was to begin in January 1994, with half the process to be completed by March and the rest by May, with the new national army to be deployed by September (Macqueen, 2002: 160). Because of the reluctance of both Frelimo and Renamo, all areas were not opened to the UN until late February (Jett, 1996: 4). This was due to the reluctance of both Renamo and Frelimo to disarm fully due to their need to "preserve their recourse to military force" if war resumed after the elections (Jett, 1996: 4). Therefore demobilisation only formally began in April 1994 and by July 1994, two months later than anticipated; the demobilisation process was virtually complete (Barnes, 1998: 171, Macqueen, 2002: 160).

The demobilisation process was one of the most closely monitored elements of ONUMOZ, especially due to the fact that this had to take place before the national elections were held (Bertram, 1995: 399, Malaquias, 1997: 95). ONUMOZ was therefore the first time that it was recognised within a UN operation that demobilisation was not solely the responsibility of the military component of the operations, as the military had the task of disarming the soldiers and verifying the process, while a Technical Unit assumed responsibility for the overall organisation of the process (Barnes, 1998: 164). The Technical Unit thus had the responsibility for the "delicate set of procedures entailed in demilitarisation" (Alden, 1995: 107).

Troop cantonment commenced on the 30 November 1993 (UNDPI, 2001: 10). The Technical Unit recognised that the period of cantonment was an important time to lay the foundation for the psychological, economic and social reintegration of the ex-combatants into society and thus it planned a number of social adjustment programmes and activities to keep the combatants entertained and informed throughout this process (Alden, 1995: 108, Malaquias, 1997: 95). The GPA set up a Commission on Reintegration (CORE) chaired by the UN to undertake the planning, organisation, supervision and monitoring of these programmes, covering three phases of the process; namely the demobilisation phase, the reinsertion phase and the actual reintegration phase (Barnes, 1998: 171-172).

The reinsertion phase in general, begins with demobilisation and runs through to the moment when the demobilised soldier and his family are transported and settled into their home area (Barnes, 1998: 173). In Mozambique, the Technical Unit was to co-ordinate the activities within this phase alongside the International Organisation for Migration and these activities included the transport of ex-combatants to their chosen destination, provision of civilian clothing, seed and agricultural tool kits, and financial assistance provided by the government for when they left the assembly area and returned home (Alden, 1995: 108-120, Barnes, 1998: 173). Programmes set up for the social reintegration and development of soldiers included; civic education programmes that consisted of health education, literacy classes, sports and cultural activities as well as information for soldiers concerning the nature of the peace process and their rights, duties and entitlements within this process (Alden, 1995: 108,

Barnes, 1998: 172). Programmes were also set up to provide vocational and entrepreneurial training and supply kits for self-employment, thus teaching ex-combatants the skills needed to encourage the transition from the life of a soldier to that of a civilian away from the conflict (Alden, 1995: 119, Barnes, 1998: 173).

The UN through a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP aimed to provide soldiers with reasonable assurance of financial support for an extended period of time during which they could be reintegrated back into their communities (Alden, 1995: 119). Therefore once home, the ex-combatant received a three months food ration, another three months pay cheque from the government, and after four months started receiving a further subsidy for another eighteen months (Barnes, 1998: 173). These financial incentives were recognised as an important factor in persuading the two parties to increase troop movement into the assembly areas in order to speed up the demobilisation process (Barnes, 1998: 172). The success of this initiative was demonstrated in the fact that once soldiers knew the benefits of demobilisation, ninety seven percent of them were willing to be demobilised (Barnes, 1998: 173). However, as much as this was a success in the direction of demobilisation for ONUMOZ it created problems in the formation of the new army, as the benefits of demobilising appeared to far outweigh the benefits of remaining in the army. Therefore substantial delays occurred regarding the selection of troops for the new national army as despite the desire by the government and Renamo to have a large army, the vast majority of soldiers wished to rather demobilise than become a part of this (Alden, 1995: 117-120, Carey, 1998: 18).

Not only was the reintegration of soldiers an important element within the peace process, but also the reintegration of civilians who had fled the conflict, formed an important part of ONUMOZ activities in Mozambique. The repatriation of refugees was viewed as an important factor as the influx of returning exiles once peace was attained was likely to place strain on the already stretched capacity of the existing resources and institutions designed to cope with emergency situations (Alden, 1995: 109). While officials were still negotiating agreements and developing programmes for the return and repatriation of refugees, many had already began to return in large numbers with 150, 000 Mozambicans making their way back in the year following the

signing of the GPA and by April 1994 almost 1,5 million refugees and over 2 million internally displaced Mozambicans had returned home (Alden, 1995: 122).

While ONUMOZ was successful in the demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers, the demilitarisation process was not entirely successful, as there still remained a vast number of arms within the country. This was especially due to the fact that ONUMOZ failed to negotiate an arms embargo on Mozambique at the time of the implementation of the GPA and therefore while the UN was attempting to implement disarmament, arms were potentially still flowing into the country via external sources to Frelimo and Renamo as they feared the outcome of a failed GPA implementation (Oosthuysen, 1996: 42, Leão, 2004: 14). Furthermore, ONUMOZ concentrated on disarmament in traditional terms of disarming distinct military and politically organised groups, whereas the situation in Mozambique had escalated beyond this to include armed civilian groups and others who thus fell outside of the disarmament process (Chachiua, 1999: 1).

Thus many weapons continued to circulate throughout the country and remained in the hands of former combatants and civilians, posing a threat to regional peace and security (Oosthuysen, 1996: 39, Chachiua, 2000: 197, Potgieter, 2000: 50). This is especially evident in the fact that there have been estimates of between 250 000 to 1 million landmines laid out throughout the country due to the war (Sherman and Stott, 2000: 2). Therefore one of the weakest factors of ONUMOZ was mine clearance, as Alden (1995: 122) quotes Aldo Ajello as saying that the de-mining programme had been 'a disaster'. This was particularly due to the abundance of these mines along important transport routes and the reluctance of both Renamo and Frelimo to reveal the locations of minefields, as well as Renamo's reluctance to allow access to areas under its control (Alden, 1995: 109, Malaquias, 1997: 97).

The lack of adequate demining and demilitarisation throughout Mozambique has left a lasting legacy of armaments within the region. This has especially posed a problem for South Africa, as Mozambique has become the largest source of small arms for the South African domestic market, contributing to the increase in violent crime within the country (Potgieter, 2000: 50). The Mozambican people themselves have thus taken a lead in the process of demining and the determination of the South African

and Mozambican governments to eradicate these weapons has formed the basis for important initiatives within the region. In 1995, South Africa and Mozambique signed the cooperative agreement of *Operation Rachel*. The common goal of Operation Rachel for South Africa and Mozambique was to join forces and undertake combined police and military operations into Mozambique to search for and destroy arms caches before they are seized by smugglers operating across the border (Oosthuysen, 1996: 52, Chachiua, 2000: 201, Leão, 2004: 17). These operations have proved successful, especially due to the cooperative gathering and analysis of information between the two countries (Oosthuysen, 1996: 52). Since the initiative has been implemented, over 600 arms caches have been discovered and several tons of armaments and ammunition destroyed (Leão, 2004: 17).

Mozambique has also shown its commitment to the control and elimination of landmines within its borders and the greater region. On 25 February 1997 Mozambique put forward a proposition for a landmine ban to the OAU and SADC at the International NGO Conference on Landmines (Sherman and Stott, 2000: 4). Following from this, various coalitions of NGOs and concerned civil society groups within Mozambique began campaigns to ban landmines (Sherman and Stott, 2000: 6). Mozambique signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction on the 3 December 1997 and ratified it on the 2 June 1998 (Sherman and Stott, 2000: 15); thus committing itself to the elimination and destruction of such weapons within the region.

4.3.3 The Electoral Role of the UN

The GPA stipulated that elections would take place within one year of the signing of the Agreement. However, by mid 1993 it was evident that this would not be possible due to delays within earlier phases of the peace process and the timetable for elections was changed accordingly, postponing them to the end of October 1994 (Barnes, 1998: 160). Once the demobilisation phase was successfully completed, ONUMOZ was then able to turn its full attention to the electoral phase (Jett, 1996: 5). The UN had been given a central role in the organisation of the elections and was to monitor the logistical components of the democratic process; the registration of voters, the manner in which the electoral campaign was carried out as well as monitoring the casting and

counting of votes in order to guarantee the validity of the outcome (Alden, 1995: 111, Macqueen, 2002: 161).

In line with this, the National Electoral Commission was established to get all parties to the conflict involved in the peace process, and encouraging the Mozambicans themselves through the Commission to administer the electoral process such as the registration of voters, the establishment of polling stations, the counting of votes and the creation of a legal framework for the electoral process (Alden, 1995: 111, Malaquias, 1997: 95). However, Frelimo and Renamo took many months to agree on the make-up of the National Electoral Commission and it took the personal intervention of the Secretary General in October 1993 and a subsequent intervention by Aldo Ajello to get discussions back on track (Alden, 1995: 125, Carey, 1998: 18). The path to elections on the part of the Renamo and Frelimo was thus eventually paved by the approval and passing of the Electoral Law on 9 December 1993, which was circulated by President Chissano, coming into force on 12 January 1994 (Barnes, 1998: 171, UNDPI, 2001: 12). The National Electoral Commission in close co-operation with ONUMOZ worked hard to ensure that complaints submitted about irregularities were fully investigated (UNDPI, 2001: 19). Accordingly, ONUMOZ also established an Electoral Division composed of 148 international officials, which was to monitor and verify all aspects and stages within the electoral process (UNDPI, 2001: 5, Macqueen, 2002: 161). On the eve of the elections around 2,300 international electoral observers were also deployed to observe and verify the elections throughout the country (UNDPI, 2001: 18).

Alden (1995: 124) contends that the elections were in fact "subject to a number of near fatal postponements". On the eve of the election, Afonso Dhlakama placed the entire electoral process in jeopardy, threatening to pull out of the elections and calling for a boycott by his supporters, alleging irregularities and refusing to demobilise his troops or accept the result if Renamo lost unless more funds were provided for transforming his organisation into a political party (Chapman, 1995: 17, Malaquias, 1997: 97, Carey, 1998: 18, Adebajo and Landburg, 2001: 168). The role of Aldo Ajello, was crucial in defusing this situation as his efforts combined with regional and international pressure, were critical in persuading Dhlakama to implement the peace agreement, stating that his actions would not be tolerated by the international

community and military action would be taken if necessary (Chapman, 1995: 17, Malaquias, 1997: 97, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 168).

President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki were two important individual regional players who played an important role in personally persuading Renamo not to withdraw from the elections (Schutz, 1995: 120). The Secretary General agreed that a trust fund be established by the sponsors of the peace process towards Renamo's efforts to transform itself into a political party and US$ 12 million was contributed towards this endeavour and a further US$ 300 000 was paid to Dhlakama as 'election expenses' by the Portuguese government (Macqueen, 2002: 163). Following this, Dhlakama agreed to Renamo's reintegration into the electoral process and the elections were extended for another day to accommodate the delay and confusion caused by Dhlakama's actions (Macqueen, 2002: 164).

Despite a tense atmosphere during the run up to the elections, voter registration was successfully carried out from June through September, and the elections took place from 27 to 29 October (Barnes, 1998: 171, UNDPI, 2001: 17). The results of the elections were announced on 19 November 1994. President Joaquim Chissano won the presidential election with 53,3 percent, amounting to 2,633,740 votes, to Afonso Dhlakama's 33,7 percent, amounting to 1,666,965 votes (Jett, 1996: 6, UNDPI, 2001: 20). Frelimo won the legislative election with 44.3 percent, and Renamo got 37.8 percent (Malaquias, 1997: 90). Frelimo won a narrow parliamentary majority, winning 129 of the 250 seats, with Renamo winning 112 seats, and a coalition of minor parties winning nine seats (Jett, 1996: 6).

The success of the elections is evident in the fact that voters turned out in massive numbers with almost ninety percent of registered voters casting their ballots in the first ever legislative and presidential elections in Mozambique (Jett, 1996; 5, Malaquias, 1997: 90). The election results were welcomed and endorsed by the Security Council through Resolution 960 on the 21 November 1994 and called on all parties to abide by their obligation and accept the results and continue the process of national reconciliation (UNDPI, 2001: 20). Although Renamo asserted that the government had manipulated the electoral campaign, they did accept the results and

Aldo Ajello was able to declare that the elections in Mozambique reflected the will of the people and thus were free and fair (Jett, 1996: 6-7). Even though he insisted the elections were not free and fair, Dhlakama did accept the results and committed Renamo to playing a peaceful role as Frelimo's political opposition in parliament, thus putting Mozambique on the path to further consolidating peace (Malaquias, 1997: 90). The success of the elections and the subsequent acceptance of all parties of the elections in Mozambique thus marked the success of the peace process and UN peace operations in the country.

4.3.4   Initial Problems for ONUMOZ

The success of UN operations in Mozambique by no means looked inevitable at the time (Clapham, 1999: 35). Although the UN was able to overcome the initial logistical problems, political difficulties still persisted and slowed down the peace process (Jett, 1996: 3). There were many issues still surfacing between Frelimo and Renamo even after they had signed the GPA as mutual accusations abounded based on a "deep mistrust" between the two groups (Jett, 1996: 4, Carey, 1998: 18). There was the issue of the 'missing 12,000 Frelimo troops' whereby the government had claimed that its army was 12,000 smaller than previously believed, causing suspicion on the part of Renamo (Malaquias, 1997: 96). Alternately, Frelimo accused Renamo of hiding away its most sophisticated weapons as it observed that the weapons Renamo soldiers were handing in were old and obsolete and did not correspond with the principle of one man, one weapon (Malaquias, 1997: 96). It also became clear to UN observers from the pattern of registration that *both* sides were withholding their best troops and weaponry (Alden, 1995: 119).

Added to this were the disputes between Frelimo and Renamo over the location of assembly areas since both sides sought to retain effective control of their respective territory (Alden, 1995: 117). These issues resulted in reluctance from both sides to begin assembly and demobilisation of troops and contributed to the initial delay in the deployment of UN military observers and troops (UNDPI, 2001: 6). Logistical and legal problems also arose for ONUMOZ due to the absence of a status of forces agreement from the Mozambican government, which further delayed the deployment of UN troops (UNDPI, 2001: 6). However the UN demonstrated its ability to deal with and overcome these delays and still implement its mandate successfully.

Although the financial contributions from UN members were generous and eventually put forward, they were by no means always easily obtained as the financial factors of the operation where a recurring issue within the Security Council as reluctance set in to supply such funds (Macqueen, 2002: 157). The final budget for ONUMOZ was not confirmed until well into 1993 and this climate of financial rigidity and uncertainty affected the military side of operations as this further affected the concerns and reluctance of potential troop contributors (Macqueen, 2002: 157). Added to this the GPA initially put forth unrealistic timeframes within which ONUMOZ had to work as such political, administrative and logistical delays and difficulties impeded the initial implementation of the GPA (UNDPI, 2001: 6). The political and military components of ONUMOZ therefore came into effect slowly and the first military cease-fire observers only arrived four months after the cease-fire came into effect (Barnes, 1998: 165). However there had been very few significant violations of the cease-fire during this period that would have significantly affected the peace process (Barnes, 1998: 165, UNDPI, 2001: 11).

One aspect of the success of peace operations in Mozambique did in fact cause initial problems. The speed with which ONUMOZ was able to encamp most of the soldiers, meant that they were not able to demobilise them quickly enough (Malaquias, 1997: 96). The time delay meant that many soldiers became involved in mutinies and riots within the camps as uncertainties abounded about their future and they demanded a return to civilian life immediately (Jett, 1996: 5, Malaquias, 1997: 96). Such disturbances involved attacks on UN officials, blocking major roads in assembly areas and looting in neighbouring towns (Alden, 1995: 119).

Despite the humanitarian declaration in July 1994, access to civilians in Renamo controlled rural areas was also still difficult until the cease-fire was agreed (Barnes, 1998: 165). This was manifest in the slow and delayed disbursement of food and medical assistance across these areas due to the refusal by Renamo officials in some areas to allow international relief workers into affected areas to assess the needs of the Mozambican people as well as disagreements between Renamo and relief agencies on distribution procedures (Alden, 1995: 121, Barnes, 1998: 166). Added to this, the humanitarian assistance programme was "dogged by controversy" manifested in

disagreements between agencies and governments on the ground, the international donor community, NGOs, components of ONUMOZ and UNOHAC over a range of practices and procedures (Alden, 1995: 121, Goulding, 1999: 162).

4.4   Assessment of UN Peace Maintenance in Mozambique

Mozambique offers an example of an African Cold War 'old war' conflict in which external powers fuelled the flames already burning in the country and who subsequently had the political will to assist in ending the conflict in the initial post-Cold War optimism to end conflicts on the continent. The end to conflict in Mozambique and the success of the subsequent UN peace operations in the country is therefore due to a number of internal and external factors and is based within the context of the nature of the conflict and the international context within which it was fought. Thus Mozambique demonstrates that the resolution of Cold War 'old wars' in Africa have been much easier to resolve from a UN standpoint. The confluence of these internal as well as regional and external factors all merged to guarantee an end to the conflict in Mozambique and the push towards democracy and development in the country.

Internally, both Renamo and Frelimo had lost the desire to continue fighting due to increasingly dire environmental factors, a lack of resources and a lack of will on the part of the soldiers themselves to continue the war. Both sides were therefore ready for peace and with the incentives offered from the international community, peace seemed a more rewarding prospect than the continuation of war, and both sides were able to form the necessary will to negotiate for peace and implement the subsequent peace agreement. Within the regional context, Mozambique's transition had been part of a movement of democratic change that had engulfed the sub-region, most apparent with the end of apartheid in South Africa.

With the additional elimination of regional and international support for the conflict the prospects for peace were increased. With the end of the Cold War there was a move towards peaceful resolution of disputes and a desire to assist in finding a resolution to the conflict in Mozambique. Furthermore, the involvement of civil society, particularly the Catholic Church facilitated a move towards peace. The international community's active involvement in the peace process and its political

and financial support for UN operations in the country thus played a decisive role in bringing the conflict to an end and guaranteeing the success of the peace process (Malaquias, 1997: 88, Carey, 1998: 18, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167). Operations in Mozambique proved to be one of the most costly peace operations (Barnes, 1998: 160); thus demonstrating the commitment of the international community and a much greater regional and international engagement (Malaquias, 1997: 87). The UN experiences in Mozambique thus demonstrate that the "unanimity of purpose and willingness to act in a coherent manner can enhance the authority of the international community" (Annan, 1998: 9).

ONUMOZ managed the entire peace process, thus ensuring conformity and co-ordination of all aspects of the peace process from the military to the humanitarian factors. The UN integrated the use of a multidimensional peace operation incorporating the complimentary activities of conflict resolution and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as the use of humanitarian and social development initiatives. Barnes (1998: 159) contends that an important element of ONUMOZ was this interplay and consolidation of the political and military hardware of peacekeeping and the software of peacebuilding in the form of humanitarian assistance, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Thus, the co-ordination of all aspects in the resolution of the conflict meant that peace was more strongly consolidated. The success of peace operations in Mozambique was thus made possible because of the complementary programmes of peacebuilding in the country, which occurred along side the traditional military apparatus. Thus, peacekeeping was sustained through peacebuilding, which created and sustained an enabling political and social environment to consolidate the peace (Barnes, 1998: 160). Thus the focus was not only on the military aspects of the conflict, but also on the political, social and economic.

In order to assess whether ONUMOZ was a success or not we must ask the question of whether the mandate of ONUMOZ was fulfilled. The most important elements within this being whether the UN was able to create an environment conducive to a lasting peace and whether the country has been fully demobilised, soldiers reintegrated into society and free and fair elections successfully held. Although ONUMOZ did face many obstacles in fulfilling its mandate we can answer in the

affirmative to all the above questions. The war in Mozambique ended through the commitment of both the combatants to the conflict and the international community to a negotiated settlement. The vast majority of both Frelimo and Renamo soldiers have been disarmed and reintegrated into society and despite delays a new army was established incorporating Frelimo and Renamo forces. Lastly, elections were held and accepted by all parties allowing for the formation of a multiparty democratic government. These are therefore the measures of success within the country, in that the combatants agreed to cease fighting, the underlying causes of conflict were addressed and the path to peace was paved with development strategies and renewed political participation. As Jett (1996: 3) claims, ONUMOZ thus allowed Mozambique to begin rebuilding the nation and the state.

Not only did ONUMOZ have a clear mandate as well as the resources to ensure the success of the mission, the UN also showed the flexibility needed to pursue the peace process, extending the mandate of ONUMOZ and the timeframes within which it operated when necessary (Malaquias, 1997: 101, Carey, 1998: 18). ONUMOZ for the most part enjoyed the confidence and co-operation of the Mozambican people and the parties to the conflict, particularly due to the UN's constant dialogue with the parties both on the ground, especially through individuals such as Aldo Ajello and even UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (Annan, 1998: 9). Added to this, ONUMOZ remained neutral and impartial throughout its entire operation and did not become involved in the conflict (Aldrich, 2000: 4). Thus, it is important to observe that ONUMOZ adhered to the three guiding principles of UN peace maintenance of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. This behaviour was an important factor in strengthening the UN's influence in the country and acquiring the trust of both Frelimo and Renamo in order to successfully carry out its mandate. Thus, ONUMOZ demonstrates that the adherence to these principles, accompanied by a clear and flexible mandate and the political will and related commitment of adequate resources are important factors that can contribute to the success of a peace maintenance operation. ONUMOZ demonstrates the need to gain the trust of the combatants and provide programmes and incentives for peace in order to show those fighting that there is a better way of life.

With the conclusion of the elections, the peace agreement was fully in place and the mandate of ONUMOZ formally came to an end on the 9 December 1994, with the swearing in of Joaquim Chissano as the elected president. The last ONUMOZ contingent left at the end of January 1995. Since the end of the operation, Mozambique has continued to liberalise its economy, while the Frelimo party and their former adversaries appear to have settled into a stable, albeit uneasy (as can be expected from former adversaries within a conflict) relationship as political opponents (Paris, 2001: 111). Frelimo remains an important actor at the international level and the continuing party of choice at the domestic level while Renamo has "subordinated its "bandit" image and has gained credibility as an opposition party" (Schutz, 1995: 119-121).

Although ONUMOZ has been hailed as a success, there are still challenges that remain in terms of disarmament within Mozambique. The end of the conflict has left a large amount of weapons in the hands of demobilised soldiers and civilians, as ONUMOZ failed to recover many weapons supplied to the combatants (Oosthuysen, 1996: 52, Chachiua, 2000: 197). Because of this, arms proliferation has flourished and remains a major threat to peace and security within the southern African region (Oosthuysen, 1996: 39, Potgieter, 2000: 50). However, regional peacebuilding initiatives following the withdrawal of ONUMOZ, such as the Mine Ban Treaty and the cooperative efforts of Operation Rachel, which is still ongoing today between South Africa and Mozambique, have gone a long way to support and control the implementation of disarmament within Mozambique and the region. The importance of demobilisation and the destruction of weapons within a post-conflict state are thus extremely important within the context of regional and international peace and security and should form an integral part of any peace maintenance operation undertaken by the UN.

This chapter has shown that UN peace operations in Mozambique were not without their problems, but the ability of the UN to resolve these initial problems proved the determination and capability of the organisation to resolve and prevent African conflict fought within the context of the Cold War arena. ONUMOZ proves that UN peace maintenance can be successfully implemented when the basic conditions both within a conflict as well as within the UN are present. Granted the conditions within

every conflict are different, there are important lessons to be learnt from the success of UN peace maintenance operations in Mozambique that should be used in the future and which could have been drawn from for the subsequent conflict and peace operations in Rwanda.

CHAPTER FIVE

NEW WARS IN AFRICA: UN PEACE MAINTENANCE IN RWANDA

"It was within the borders of Rwanda … that the United Nations faced perhaps its most serious crisis of credibility"
(Macqueen, 2002: 61)

5.1 Background to the Conflict in Rwanda

Rwanda offers an example of a typical "new war" in Africa in the post-Cold war era. This conflict was characterised by the extreme radical politicisation of ethno-classes and political identities, where the state became the main instigator of violence against its own people, culminating in genocide in a state that was reaching the point of political and economic collapse. Massive refugee flows and internally displaced people, as well as the support of regional and other external states contributed to the regionalisation and indeed internationalisation of war in Rwanda as the conflict moulded within the regional conflict sphere within the entire Great Lakes Region. Significant factors therefore to note in trying to understand the background to the conflict and the subsequent genocide must take into account the manipulation of external forces, domestic pressures, the manipulation and politicisation of ethnic, racial and political identities through stereotyping and the construction of imagined truths by elites, the physical exclusion and elimination of different groups and the enormous refugee flows throughout the region resulting in an environment favourable to the easy proliferation of arms and the mobilisation of militias that continue to contribute to the instability of the entire region (Hintjens, 1999: 241, Alusala, 2005: 2).

Rwanda was a German colony until after the First World War when it was handed over to Belgium by the League of Nations under the Trusteeship Council (Macqueen, 2002: 62). Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium on the 1 July 1962 and by this time, had undergone a dramatic alteration in its external and internal relations (Barnett, 2002: 52). The Rwandan population is divided into the three groups of Hutu (about 85%), Tutsi (about 14%) and the Twa (about 1%) (UNDPI, 1996: 341). These three categories predate colonialism and deep-rooted class and political tensions, suspicions and hatred, particularly between the Hutu and Tutsi, have defined the

Rwandan society, despite the fact that they all share a common language, culture and customs and lived within the same areas in relative peace together for centuries before colonialism (Lemarchand, 1994: 587, Mpungwe, 1999: 14-15, Mamdani, 2001: 52, Barnett, 2002: 49-51). Mamdani (2001: 74) contends that while Tutsi may have existed as an ethnic identity before the establishment of the state of Rwanda, Hutu did not exist as an identity outside of the state, and emerged as a trans-ethnic identity of subjects within the Rwandan state. The Tutsi identity has been porous in that through intermarriage, rulers were able to assimilate the most prosperous of their subjects from other identities such as the Hutu into their ranks, and thus the Tutsi too emerged as a more trans-ethnic identity (Mamdani, 2001: 74). Therefore the two groups of Tutsi and Hutu were not distinct ethnic identities within the Rwandan state, but rather an amalgamation of the different identities. Thus Mamdani (2001: 73) suggests that Hutu and Tutsi be seen not as ethnic identities, but rather as *historical political identities* that have changed with the changing history and nature of the Rwandan state.

It was colonialism that institutionalised the perception of an "ethnic" division of the Rwandan people, as state-enforced identities within the emergence of the Rwandan state materialized when Belgium introduced an identification system distinguishing Tutsis, Hutus and Twa with all Rwandan citizens issued identity cards depicting their membership to one or the other group (Mamdani, 2001: 74, Barnett, 2002: 50, Alusala, 2005: 2). The possible social elevation from a Hutu to a Tutsi or vice versa as seen in the precolonial period was no longer possible as Belgium in essence concretised the identities of Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001: 101). Belgium thus took an existing socio-political distinction within Rwanda and "racialised" it by considering the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as distinct races, thus distorting the existing realities and historical relations between these three groups (Mamdani, 2001: 99, Rusagara, 2005: 21-22).

Belgian policies reinforced and solidified Tutsi supremacy and conferred on them privileges and power, as they were treated favourably, and become the colonial elite with superior ideological, political and economic status (Mamdani, 2001: 101, Barnett, 2002: 50-51, Macqueen, 2002: 62). Animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi was thus entrenched within the colonial history of Rwanda and the mutual suspicions

between the two groups became further exacerbated after independence and exploited from that point on by ambitious elites (Oyebade, 1998: 159). Thus not only was the division between Hutu and Tutsi created and extended during the colonial period, these divisions became further exacerbated and exploited after independence, culminating in the attempted elimination of the Tutsi by the Hutu in 1994. Thus, Mamdani (2001: 34-102) argues that the Hutu/Tutsi violence in Rwanda lies in the way in which Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial state with the Hutus perceived to be an identity of indigenous "nativised" subjects and the Tutsi as a non-indigenous identity of "subordinate power". He further asserts that the continued violence within the country is a result of the failure of Rwandan nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of Hutu and Tutsi as native and alien (Mamdani, 2001: 34).

Due to the Tutsi being the political and economic elite, there was an assumption that they would be the beneficiaries of the transfer of power from Belgium at independence (Macqueen, 2202: 62). However it was the Hutu majority that gradually took complete political power under Grégoire Kayibanda and the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR) (Hintjens, 1999: 248, Barnett, 2002: 52, Macqueen, 2002: 62). This transfer of power began with the "Hutu Revolution" from 1959 to 1961 where a series of violent outbreaks in Rwanda ended the elite Tutsi monarchy and led to the flight of over a hundred thousand Tutsi to neighbouring countries (UNDPI, 1996: 341, Barnett, 2002: 52). Tutsi power was dismantled at the local administrative level and broader constitutional and political developments led to the complete transfer of governmental power from the Tutsi elite to a Hutu elite and the diminished role of the Tutsi within the political sphere (Mamdani, 2001: 104-134). During this time Kayibanda used terror to sow divisions and maintain power, and ethnic and political violence became a central feature within Rwandan politics as an uneasy coexistence developed between the newly developed administrative Hutu elite and the existing economic Tutsi elite (Hintjens, 1999: 257, Barnett, 2002: 52). Therefore the Revolution not only left in place, but also reinforced, the political identities and divisions created during the colonial period (Mamdani, 2001: 104).

In 1973 Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, a French speaking northern Hutu took power in a military coup against the Kayibanda regime (Barnett, 2002: 52-53).

Habyarimana declared Rwanda to officially be a one party state and everyone to belong to the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), centralising his control using all means at his disposal, from the bureaucracy to the party, church and military (Barnett, 2002: 53). Habyarimana maintained a tight rule over the state and amongst non-communist states; Rwanda became arguably the most tightly controlled state in the world (Melvern, 2000: 25). He also further reinforced and exacerbated the divisions of the Hutu and Tutsi and further marginalized the role of the Tutsi within the political, military and social spheres.

During this time the Rwandan economy appeared well managed with the lowest debt, the lowest inflation and the highest rate of growth of any country in the region (Hintjens, 1999: 256, Mamdani, 2001: 144). However, in 1986 coffee prices fell and coffee sales plummeted to almost a third of what they had been previously and the availability of land for crop expansion was depleted and soil fertility was decreasing as Rwanda approached an economic crisis (Hintjens, 1999: 256, Mamdani, 2001: 146). Added to this the southern parts of Rwanda were suffering from famine, with major food shortages resulting from a crisis in agricultural production in early 1994 (Hintjens, 1999: 257-258). Thus, the dependence on a single export commodity accompanied by drought and a decrease in international demand left Rwanda with a heavy debt burden (Barnett, 2002: 53). Added to the looming economic crisis was a deteriorating human rights record and it was becoming increasingly evident that the government could no longer provide for or protect its own citizens (Hintjens, 1999: 259-261). Thus the government was not meeting its sovereign obligations as Rwanda moved closer to becoming a failed state.

On the 1 October 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from its bases across the Ugandan border (Macqueen, 2002: 64, Mpungwe, 1999: 15). The RPF was established in Uganda in 1988 as a predominantly Tutsi political and military organisation with the support of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni with the aim of repatriating Tutsi refugees and establishing a power sharing agreement with the Rwandan government (Melvern, 2000: 26, Barnett, 2002: 55, Macqueen, 2002: 63). This group, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, was formed predominantly from the children of Tutsi refugees who had fled Rwanda in the 1960s, but was not exclusively Tutsi as the Habyarimana regime had driven a significant

number of moderate Hutu across the border due to its extreme Hutu nationalism policies (Barnett, 2002: 55, Macqueen, 2002: 63). The RPF formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) with its recruits coming from armed forces within Uganda who were well trained, disciplined and experienced in combat (Melvern, 2000: 27).

The RPF invasion ultimately exacerbated divisions within Rwanda and "set the stage for [the] further radicalisation of politics" and the redefinition of national identity along exclusively racial and ethno-political lines, becoming the catalyst for racial subversion and a prelude for the later implementation of genocide (Lemarchand, 1994: 589, Hintjens, 1999: 242, Barnett, 2002: 55). This was due to the fact that the invasion displaced up to three hundred thousand Hutus into informal camps, which later became potential breeding grounds for Tutsi resentment (Barnett, 2002: 55). Resulting from the invasion was the rise of "Hutu Power" based on the ideology and perception that the Tutsi were a race alien to Rwanda and not an indigenous ethnic group (Mamdani, 2001: 190). The RPF and their Tutsi allies, and later all Tutsi (who had by this time achieved great economic and professional success) and moderate Hutu who were suspected of supporting the RPF and later the Arusha Accords were blamed for the spectrum of economic and political crisis gripping the country from the colonial period and since independence (Hintjens, 1999: 256-263).

Habyarimana consequently used the RPF invasion as an excuse to move against his enemies, exploiting the race card by denouncing all Tutsis and their allies as traitors (Barnett, 2002: 55). It was argued that in order for the Hutu to be safe, all Tutsis should be removed from society (Hintjens, 1999: 262). Immediately following the invasion, Congo, Zaire, Kenya and especially France sent military assistance in support of the Rwandan government, becoming intimately involved in the military training and expansion of the Rwandan armed forces (Melvern, 2000: 30, Barnett, 2002: 56, Macqueen, 2002: 64). This active support for the Rwandan regime in terms of such military and financial assistance added an international dimension to the conflict and constituted a major hindrance later on for the government to make concessions to the opposition within the framework of peace initiatives (Lemarchand, 1994: 603).

The external military pressure from the RPF, coupled with internal political pressure for multiple political parties finally pushed Habyarimana, albeit reluctantly, to undertake political reforms and embrace the concept of multiparty democracy in December 1990 (Mpungwe, 1999: 16, Barnett, 2002: 54). However these measures are argued to have been too little too late as the war raged on while the internal political pressures and resistance further intensified with the continuation of the radicalisation and violence of Rwandan politics (Mpungwe, 1999: 16, Barnett, 2002: 54). The move towards democratic reforms elicited strong reactions from within the ruling elite and the MRND began to form the radical youth militia group the *Interahamwe* ("those who work together" or "those who attack together") (Mamdani, 2001: 204, Barnett, 2002: 54). The Presidential Guard also became increasingly opposed to the idea of power sharing with the Tutsis, becoming actively involved in the recruitment and political and military training of the Interahamwe in early 1992 and the systematic massacres of civilians; predominantly Tutsis became a common feature of Rwandan politics during this time (Lemarchand, 1994: 601, Barnett, 2002: 54-55).

It appears that Habyarimana had increasingly lost power or control over hard-line elements within his regime and although he appears to have been making compromises with the RPF in some areas, he was not representing all those under the name of the government, as the Presidential Guard, Interahamwe and the political elite actively worked to sabotage any moves towards peace. Thus Habyarimana was stuck in the nexus between the Rwandan government, military, RPF and external states pushing for peace. The death of Habyarimana on the 6 April 1994 in a plane crash triggered the start of mass killings and violence against the Tutsi, culminating in genocide and arguably the "fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century" (Power, 2001: 84). The *génocidaires* included members of the Rwandan government forces, the Presidential Guard and the Interahamwe (UNDPI, 1996: 346). Their first task was to assassinate moderate Hutu political rivals within the government (Jones 2001: 162). Therefore it was not only Tutsi that were killed, but Hutu as well. However, while Hutus were killed as individuals, Tutsis were killed as a distinct group demonstrating that they were the targets of genocide in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001: 5). Between five hundred thousand and a million people died during the months of the genocide (UNDPI, 1996: 346). Once this began, the peace process

collapsed, and Rwanda descended into a "full-scale conventional conflict between the RPF... and the Hutu army around the capital" (Macqueen, 2002: 72).

As our observations in previous chapters have shown, the nature of the state in Africa is pivotal in understanding the nature of a conflict. Rwanda offers no exception to this, as Hintjens (1999: 241) asserts, "The nature of the Rwandan state must be seen as absolutely central" in understanding the conflict in the country. She further (1999: 241-251) contends that the genocide in Rwanda was rooted in the reaction to a deep structural crisis of state legitimacy as racialist ideologies mainly served as a disguise for the more fundamental goals of a regime grappling to hold onto power in the face of growing political opposition, economic recession and social tension as genocide represented a "last ditch attempt at survival" by the Rwandan regime. Thus genocide was a result of both planning and participation and not the result of spontaneous fighting between two competing groups, but rather a premeditated mass killing of one group by the regime in an attempt to cling to state power (Hintjens, 1999: 246-247, Mamdani, 2001: 7). This is evident in the extent of ideological and military preparation and hate propaganda prior to the genocide and the systematic use of conspiracy theories and myths to justify covert plans for killing innocent people (Hintjens, 1999: 242, Melvern, 2000: 56).

Both sides to the conflict, especially the government, were the recipients of large amounts of post-Cold War weapons sales from former Warsaw Pact countries (Alusala, 2005: 3). Rwanda was therefore becoming increasingly more militarised and the Rwandan government became the third largest arms importer in Africa with France, Egypt and South Africa reportedly being the main suppliers of arms shipments to the Rwandan army at this time (Melvern, 2000: 32, Barnett, 2002: 56, Alusala, 2004: 138). Prior to the genocide, the government had been stockpiling weapons - particularly machetes and agricultural tools - for some time and then passing them on to Hutu militias as part of the planning for the killing of the Tutsi and by the time the genocide occurred, up to eighty five tons of armaments are said to have been distributed throughout the country (Melvern, 2000: 64-65, Tshitereke, 2003: 85, Alusala, 2004: 138). The impending genocide therefore appeared an "open secret" as plans for the genocide were openly broadcast; yet a deceptive air of normality was maintained within the country (Hintjens, 1999: 267).

In examining the conflict in Rwanda it is imperative to observe the regional environment in which this conflict occurred as neither the 1990 RPF invasion, nor the 1994 genocide can be understood outside the regional context (Mamdani, 2001: 36). Macqueen (2002: 60-61) contends that Rwanda in respect of its neighbours lies at the "nexus between Anglophone and Francophone central Africa" with the former British colonies of Uganda and Tanzania to the north and east and the former French colonies of the DRC and Burundi to the south and west. The conflict in Rwanda thus falls within the greater regional and ethnic sphere of conflict within the entire Great Lakes Region where nowhere else in Africa is the issue of the arbitrary division of ethnicities, or identities across colonial boundaries more apparent than between Rwanda and its neighbour Burundi (Macqueen, 2002: 61). Thus Lemarchand (1994: 585) asserts that Rwanda and Burundi cannot be looked at in isolation from each other.

Within the Great Lakes Region, it was only within Rwanda and Burundi that the distinctions between Tutsi and Hutu as separate identities were realised (Mamdani, 2001: 36). In Uganda and the Congo Hutu and Tutsi tended to belong to a single political identity known as the Banyarwanda (Mamdani, 2001: 36). Rwanda and Burundi have presented an "inverted mirror image of each other" as while Rwanda was controlled by Hutu elites, Burundi was controlled by Tutsi elites and each state was administered in such a way as to benefit one particular social group (Hintjens, 1999: 276). Thus both countries have had a "dominant minority situation" in which a specific ruling minority has used the powers of the state to maintain its political and economic control over subordinate majorities (Alusala, 2005: 2).

Hintjens (1999: 276) contends that since 1962 each country's domestic politics has affected the perceptions of socio-political conflict within its neighbour. Events in one country thus have had an effect in the other, as the persecution of Hutu in Burundi has been used to justify the persecution of Tutsi in Rwanda and vice versa (Lemarchand, 1994: 585, Hintjens, 1999: 277-279). In Rwanda an important catalyst therefore for the genocide in relation to Burundi was the assassination of the first Burundian popularly elected Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 by the predominantly Tutsi army (Lemarchand, 1994: 585, Hintjens, 1999: 277, Melvern,

2000: 83-84, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 174, Mamdani, 2001: 215-216). The Hutu extremists in Rwanda took advantage of the tragedy in Burundi, blaming the assassination on "progressive politics" and proof of the consequences of attempting to reconcile with the Tutsi (Melvern, 2000: 84). The genocide thus had immediate regional implications as the neighbouring states of Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda were drawn into the crisis (Furley, 1998: 252). Following the genocide there was also a mass exodus of refugees across Rwanda's border into Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC – said to be one of the largest and quickest refugee movements ever seen (Furley, 1998: 240). The huge concentration of these refugees on the Zairian side of the border following the conflict was a catalyst of enduring and violent cycles of conflict throughout the entire Great Lakes Region and the outbreak of civil war in Zaire in October 1996 has further compounded the problem (Furley, 1998: 253-254, Macqueen, 2002: 79).

The war finally ended with the complete victory of the RPF (Furley, 1998: 258). Mamdani (2001: 185) points out that the RPF invaded Rwanda as an army of liberation and came out as an army of occupation. The RPF established military control over most of the country in July 1994, taking control of Kigali on the 4 July (UNDPI, 1996: 353). On the 19 July 1994 a Broad-Based Government of National Unity was formed in Rwanda and subsequently extended its control over the whole national territory (UNDPI, 1996: 353). However, the RPF, though victorious, was still considered to be a Tutsi minority force and therefore doubts remained as to the sustainability of its potential control over the Hutu who formed the majority of the population (Mpungwe, 1999: 17).

5.2 The Arusha Peace Agreement: July 1992 – August 1993

In the second half of 1992 Habyarimana was under great pressure from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Tanzanian government to steer towards the negotiating table with the RPF and the OAU arranged for peace talks to take place in Arusha in Tanzania (Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 173, Macqueen, 2002: 64). The Arusha peace talks thus took place in the period July 1992 to August 1993 between the Rwandan government and the RPF under the guidance of international mediation to lay out a clear process for the "implementation of a new political order"

and called for a UN operation to help assure security while the transitional arrangements were being put in place (Clapham, 1999: 38, Jones, 2001: 165).

As with the Rome Agreement for Mozambique the Arusha Agreement similarly called for the creation of a new transitional government to be installed by the 8 April 1994, and the disarmament, assembly, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants into a new army, the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced people, the creation of transitional institutions as well as elections for a new Rwandan power-sharing government to be held before the end of 1995 (Hintjens, 1999: 262, Melvern, 2000: 53, Barnett, 2002: 62, Macqueen, 2002: 65). The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed on the 3 August 1993 and Mpungwe (1999: 18) contends that at the time this was heralded as the most strategic and successful response to an African conflict as an entirely African initiative.

The UN had no significant role to play in the negotiation phase; rather sending a "goodwill mission" acting on behalf of the UN Secretary General, as an observer to the talks (Barnett, 2002: 61, Macqueen, 2002: 64-65). Like Mozambique the UN was called in at a relatively late stage of negotiations to help implement the agreement (Clapham, 1999: 38, Macqueen, 2002: 65). The UN was called upon to provide an observation and peacekeeping presence to play a central role in carrying out the agreement and to be the guarantor and monitor of the process, as well as to assist in the maintenance of public security and the delivery of humanitarian aid, disarmament and search for weapons caches and to oversee the demobilisation of existing armed forces and all aspects of the formation of the new army (UNDPI, 1996: 343, Macqueen, 2002: 65). Macqueen (2002: 65) contends that the UN was called upon to carry out these tasks without it having even assessed the feasibility of such an operation for itself.

On the surface the Arusha Accords promised change in Rwanda and appeared to work temporarily, but soon proved to be flawed (Furley, 1998: 258, Barnett, 2002: 62). Melvern (2000: 53) contends that the trouble for Arusha did not stem from the Accords themselves but the unwillingness of the parties to Arusha to allow it to work. The mere signing of a peace agreement does not imply that the parties themselves are necessarily committed to peace and prefer a peace settlement to continuing the war

and with the mere signing of Arusha, the UN too readily assumed that the agreement was ready for implementation (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 20, Jones, 2001: 103). Both the Rwandan government and the RPF were compelled by external forces to go to the negotiating table in the first place and the Arusha process was conducted under extreme external pressures – particularly from the OAU, France, Tanzania, the US and Belgium - and thus the "transition bargain" of Arusha was arguably doomed from the start as it was signed more because of external pressure than an internal willingness for peace (Lemarchand, 1994: 591, Barnett, 2002: 57). Furthermore, while the international community pushed the parties to peace, there appeared no willingness on their part to help implement the agreement that had been built around the prospect of future external management that looked unlikely to be forthcoming (Macqueen, 2002: 67).

There was little enthusiasm for Arusha from the Rwandan government and hard-line Hutu elements within the government ranks opposed the agreement outright, calling it and the concessions offered to the RPF a 'sell out' that would bring a reversion to Tutsi domination, and as will be shown later became "spoilers" to the process (Lemarchand, 1994: 591, Macqueen, 2002: 68). The insincerity of the Rwandan government towards the Arusha process is demonstrated in the fact that while the negotiations were taking place, the regime entered into a massive arms deal with a French company to the value of US$12 million, and there were further arms deals with Egypt even after the ceasefire had been signed (Melvern, 2000: 55), thus demonstrating that the government was not disarming or aiming to confirm a dedication to peace.

Furthermore, the Rwandan government refused to comply with important conditions of the Arusha Accords. While there were moves to include political opposition parties within the interim government, there were no moves to incorporate RPF forces into the army (Hintjens, 1999: 258). Therefore, instead of ushering in and providing a stable platform for peace in Rwanda, the Arusha Accords became the focus of violent disagreements between the government and RPF, becoming a catalyst of the radical polarisation of politics in Kigali, greater demonization of the RPF and its allies and the mobilisation for the massive rejection of Arusha, culminating in the genocide (Lemarchand, 1994: 592, Jones, 2001: 103). Hence, Stedman and Rothchild (1997:

18) contend that many more people died after the peace agreement failed than during the war years that preceded it.

5.3 UN Response to Conflict in Rwanda: Internal Debate and Lack of Political Will

On the 22 June 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 846 establishing the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) to observe movements on the Ugandan side of the common border with Rwanda in order to monitor the ceasefire between the RPF and government forces and to verify that the transit of arms and supplies to the RPF had ceased in line with undertakings made to facilitate the Arusha process for an initial period of six months (UNDPI, 1996: 342, Barnett, 2002: 61, Macqueen, 2002: 66). Following from this, during and after the signing of Arusha, the UN had received a joint request from both the Rwandan government and the RPF for further UN involvement to resolve the conflict within Rwanda's borders and to oversee the implementation of Arusha (Jones, 2001: 109).

The Security Council, along with the international community viewed the situation in Rwanda as a "civil war", "ethnic conflict" and a "failed state" (Barnett, 2002: 103). These simplistic views ultimately influenced the response to the conflict as diplomatic responses from within the Security Council became incompatible with the emerging realities on the ground (Jones, 2001: 117). This was seen in the fact that for the UN there appeared to be a "two track of events in Rwanda" of simultaneous war and genocide that confused policymakers who had very little prior knowledge of the country (Power, 2001: 89). Furthermore, Barnett (2002: 58) contends that UN decision makers were labouring under superficial and often incorrect perceptions of some of the most basic features of Rwandan politics and thus were not ascribing Rwanda any high-profile attention. This is evident in Western perceptions of the conflict as an "ethnic conflict" between the Hutu and Tutsi, when in fact the conflict was much more deep-rooted in terms of the dynamics between these two groups.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was approved through Resolution 872 as a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation on the 5 October 1993 with the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial ninety days only upon a review by the Security Council (S/RES/872, 1993: 2). UNOMUR was to be

incorporated into UNAMIR. This Resolution was passed two days after eighteen American Special Forces troops were killed in Somalia, an event that fundamentally changed American perceptions of peacekeeping in Africa and thus essentially shaped the way in which the UN Security Council responded to the further crises in Rwanda (Macqueen, 2002: 67).

The Rwandan crisis occurred at a time when the UN's resources were at "full stretch" and suffering from excessive wear, with almost 70 000 military personnel from seventy countries engaged worldwide in seventeen operations (Barnett, 2002: 68, Macqueen, 2002: 65-66). At the time of the genocide, the UN peacekeeping capacity was as a result already stretched to its limits and UN members within the Security Council were increasingly concerned over the high cost of peacekeeping, and the potential for failure following the Somalia debacle (Barnett, 2002: 66). Thus Carey (1998: 20) contends that UNAMIR was established in "an atmosphere of caution and fiscal austerity" and provided with a modest mandate, and very little manpower and resources.

There was a notable lack of commitment on behalf of UN members, particularly concerning the provision of the necessary resources to carry out an appropriate response to the conflict in Rwanda (Macqueen, 2002: 263). Therefore bureaucratic procedures within the UN delayed approval for the operation until nearly three months after the signing of the Arusha Agreement and the number of soldiers sent to carry out the mission was half the amount requested by the warring parties (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 27, Mpungwe, 1999: 20, Macqueen, 2002: 67). These delays in the establishment of the operation ultimately had a negative ripple effect on the implementation stages in terms of the adherence to time schedules and delayed the establishment and the implementation of transitional structures within Rwanda (Mpungwe, 199: 20).

Once the genocide began in April, the Security Council "was groping for a response" and it took nearly six weeks to resolve to do something following the massacres, as the organisation failed to condemn the genocide immediately and to urge the international community to do the same (Furley, 1998: 241-248). The Rwandan government even maintained its rotating seat on the Security Council at the time and

there was no move made by any other UN member to expel it (Furley, 1998: 248, Power, 2001: 98). Within the Security Council, the acknowledgement that what was happening was indeed genocide would have placed an immediate moral obligation on its members to take robust enforcement action to prevent and punish such behaviour according to the Genocide Convention of 1948 (Macqueen, 2002: 73). Thus UN members, particularly the US were reluctant to use the word genocide in reference to Rwanda for fear of being obliged or pushed by public pressure to act (Jones, 2001: 123, Power, 2001: 85-94).

The US delegation within the Security Council actively led the opposition to a UN response to the genocide, demanding additional safeguards and highlighting the cost of a new operation (Herbst, 2000: 309, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 173). This was especially due to Washington's memory of the disastrous operations of UNOSOM II in Somalia that in essence impacted on the 'permitted' response of the UN as a whole to events in Rwanda (Nkiwane, 2000: 30, Macqueen, 2002: 71). Following the disaster in Somalia, staying out of Rwanda had become a specific US foreign policy objective as American support for peacekeeping was fading and US hostility towards the UN had reached a peak (Jones, 2001: 109, Power, 2001: 85-87). France on the other hand lobbied for a UN operation in Rwanda trying to extricate itself from the situation in the country and making it difficult for the Security Council to ignore the possibility of UN action (Barnett, 2002: 69). However, France's motives for such an operation were questionable particularly due to the uncomfortably close relationship between the French government and the Rwandan regime that they had helped to arm (Clapham, 1995: 83). Internal politics thus played a significant factor in Security Council responses to Rwanda because the US realised that if it completely objected to such an operation it could expect a similar reaction from France when the US called for UN action in another part of the world were US interests were particularly at stake, such as in Haiti (Barnett, 2002: 69).

Macqueen (2002: 75) quotes Boutros-Ghali as saying: "The behaviour of the Security Council was shocking: it meekly followed the United States' lead in denying the reality of genocide". The US thus appears to have had the upper hand within the Security Council in its response to Rwanda as US disinterest in resolving the conflict embodied "a general, embarrassed shrugging-off of responsibility at the level of the

international system as a whole" (Macqueen, 2002: 70). Thus Annan (1998: 4) argues that the inability of the UN to restore peace to Somalia soured not only American but also international support for involvement in conflict intervention and produced a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. This reaction was particularly due to the reluctance of capable states to risk the lives of their own troops yet again in such an uncertain environment following Somalia (Jones, 2001: 127). Thus it was both internal as well as external factors that contributed to the lack of response to the conflict in Rwanda within the UN.

The lack of political will of UN members was an important contributing factor to the weakness of all stages of UNAMIR and was a factor that would significantly shape the destiny of the operation as Jones (2001: 110) contends: "At key moments the lack of political support within New York would place serious limitations on UNAMIR's ability to interpret its mandate broadly, communicate effectively with its political masters, respond to events and information on the ground, and in other ways help shape the implementation phase in Rwanda".

5.3.1 The Deployment of UNAMIR and UNAMIR II: October 1993 – March 1996

UNAMIR was premised on the implementation of a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission based on the consent of the parties and the pacific settlement of disputes, without the use of force (Goulding, 1999: 163, Melvern, 2000: 93, Jones, 2001: 105-106, Power, 2001: 101, Barnett, 2002: 66). UNAMIR's mandate was to end following national elections and the installation of the new Rwandan government by October 1995 and not later than December 1995 (UNDPI, 1996: 344). The primary purpose of the UNAMIR peacekeeping force was to oversee the creation of an environment conducive to the implementation and operation of the Arusha Agreement (Carey, 1998: 20, Mpungwe, 1999: 20, Barnett, 2002: 112, Macqueen, 2002: 22).

According to Resolution 872, the mandate of UNAMIR was to contribute to the security of designated areas already established as 'weapons-secure' by the Rwandans within the city of Kigali and to monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the elections (S/RES/872, 1993: 2). To respond to instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of

Arusha relating to the integration of the armed forces, and pursue any such instances with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General (S/RES/872, 1993: 2). To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, calling for the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new demilitarised zone and other demilitarisation procedures (S/RES/872, 1993: 2). To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandan refugees and resettlement of displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner and to assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations (S/RES/872, 1993: 2).

The UN personnel dispatched to Rwanda were selected because of their availability rather than their deep-rooted knowledge of the conflict (Barnett, 2002: 59). On the 18 October 1993 Canadian Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire was appointed UNAMIR Force Commander and on the 12 November former Cameroon Minister for External Affairs Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (a personal friend of Boutros-Ghali) was appointed as the UNSGSR for Rwanda (UNDPI, 1996: 344, Melvern, 2000: 94). Although Dallaire had previous experience in multilateral operations, he lacked any deep or adequate knowledge of Rwanda or even Africa for that matter (Barnett, 2002: 65). Booh Booh was said to have made a difficult situation worse, as he lacked experience within the peacekeeping arena and was even accused of being pro-Habyarimana and having Hutu leanings from the outset (Melvern, 2000: 94, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 181, Barnett, 2002: 75). Thus unskilled and biased personnel at the top levels of UNAMIR contributed to the problems already facing the operation. Furthermore there was a lack of other important and necessary personnel with the absence of a public affairs officer, legal advisors and humanitarian or human rights experts (Melvern, 2000: 85). These were all important posts that were essential within the functioning of the operation to fully understand the situation on the ground and what action to take. It was especially the humanitarian and human rights experts who would have had a pivotal role to play considering the human rights situation in Rwanda at the time of the operation.

The Security Council struggled to recruit national contingents and eventually the force was built from sub-battalion units from Belgium, Ghana and Bangladesh (Macqueen, 2002: 67-68). UNAMIR was established with a total authorised strength

of 2 545 lightly armed and equipped troops, as well as 126 international and 68 local staff (Carey, 1998: 21). The deployment of these troops was however delayed until February 1994 – a full six months after the signing of the peace treaty, two months later than planned and without the necessary armoured units and helicopters authorised by the Security Council (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 27, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 173).

Consequently, when UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda the peacekeepers were for the most part unskilled and untrained and few troops had the apparel or resources to carry out even the most basic tasks (Power, 2001: 87, Barnett, 2002: 92). It was planned that UNAMIR would have a transportation unit including four utility helicopters, plus twenty-two armoured personnel carriers and eight military helicopters (Melvern, 2000: 85). In fact no military helicopters arrived and only eight armoured personnel carriers were provided (already worn out from ONUMOZ in Mozambique), of which only five were operable (Melvern, 2000: 85). UNAMIR's budget was only authorised two days before the genocide began; yet the first funds were only received one month after the genocide ended (Jones, 2001: 107). Thus, every aspect of UNAMIR from the personnel to equipment contributed to a financially and logistically weak operation from the outset (Jones, 2001: 107, Power: 2001: 87).

Added to the resource, logistical and political weaknesses of the operation, Adebajo and Landsberg (2001: 173) contend that the Security Council made crucial changes to the resolution establishing UNAMIR, omitting an important request found in the Arusha agreement, which ultimately weakened the peacekeeping force before it was even deployed. While Arusha called for the UN to guarantee overall security throughout Rwanda and to confiscate illegal arms, the UNAMIR mandate called for the peacekeepers to only contribute to the security of Kigali and its environs and did not call for a seizure of arms (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001: 173). Thus the mandate for the operation was not sufficient in terms of creating an environment in which the Arusha Agreement could be implemented fully. Also, the lack of any strategy for a seizure of arms was an important missing link in the chain of maintaining security in Rwanda. Therefore UN troops were insufficiently equipped to carry out an insufficient mandate that was doomed from the start in all respects from planning to

implementation. UNAMIR thus bore little resemblance to the multi-faceted ONUMOZ operation approved just a year before in Mozambique (Carey, 1998: 21).

Avoiding combat was essential for UNAMIR policy makers and neutrality was paramount (Power, 2001: 92). The use of force for deterrence or retaliation within UNAMIR was therefore strictly forbidden (Jones, 2001: 107), thus ruling out the possibility of peace enforcement measures during the operation. Yet the question must be asked how neutrality and the non-use of force can be maintained when it is obvious that one side of the conflict is deliberately eliminating innocent people in the name of "ethnic" differences. Added to this the issue of the use of force in protection of civilians was unclear and the extent of UNAMIR's operational range remained unresolved, as the UN headquarters did not respond to Dallaires's enquiries regarding this matter (Macqueen, 2002: 67).

Not only did New York not respond to this, but communication on the whole between UN headquarters and the operation on the ground was sorely lacking. This was evident in the lack of response by New York to further enquiries by Dallaire regarding matters such as the clarification of the day to day mandate of UNAMIR, the responsibilities of UN personnel, and permission to enforce the 'weapons secure area' that had supposedly been established in Kigali (Macqueen, 2002: 68-69). Dallaire had repeatedly conveyed to UN headquarters that a serious crisis and genocide was looming and he continued to press for more forceful action regarding the seizure of weapons, but to no avail (Melvern, 2000: 107). In many instances what was communicated to UN headquarters from Dallaire was watered down when headquarters conveyed this information to the Security Council. An example of this is when Dallaire conveyed the situation in Rwanda as a "well organised plan for ethnic cleansing", while headquarters explained this to the Security Council as "an image of violence that was spontaneous, erupting from long-standing tensions and hatreds" (Barnett, 2002: 220).

On the 5 April 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 909 extending the UNAMIR mandate until the 29 July 1994 with a threat to pull out if the Arusha Accords were not implemented (UNDPI, 1996: 346, Melvern, 2000: 245). The very next day the downing of Habyarimana's plane signalled the start of the genocide. The

lack of planning for the prospect of such future violent opposition meant that the UN "security guarantee" of the Arusha Accords was increasingly becoming meaningless and with limited understanding of the circumstances or communication with those on the ground, the UN was progressively more limited in its capacity to interpret the sounds of increasing opposition to peace prior to the outbreak of genocide (Jones, 2001: 166-167). The chaos that descended on Rwanda in early April 1994 thus effectively ended the Arusha process, with the ceasefire forgotten, UNAMIR's mandate was over and the operation left without a *raison d'être* as it had been deployed to assist in the management of this process and therefore it was argued that it should be withdrawn (Barnett, 2002: 99, Macqueen, 2002: 71). Thus giving the UN an 'easy-out' from the situation as the mandate for the operation had in effect failed to be implemented in terms of the provisions of Arusha due to the conflicting parties themselves, by their violent actions ending this process.

With the establishment of a peacekeeping force and the deployment of troops into a conflict zone the risks are inevitable. Belgian peacekeepers were particularly the target of hostility in Rwanda, especially due to Belgium's connection as the former colonial power (Furley, 1998: 240). The killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers led to the unforeseen and irresponsible withdrawal of its entire contingent, stranding UNAMIR and the Rwandan people at a critical time (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001: 174, Power, 2001: 97). Once Belgium withdrew it lobbied for the withdrawal of all the peacekeepers "so as to avoid the historical stain on its peacekeeping record" and not to be seen to be withdrawing alone or the cause of UNAMIR's demise (Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 174, Power, 2001: 97, Barnett, 2002: 104). Belgium's withdrawal had devastating consequences for UNAMIR as it meant the loss of the operation's "backbone", leaving the UN with a scarce 1500 infantry troops mostly concentrated in the Kigali area (Power, 2001: 98, Barnett, 2002: 104, Macqueen, 2002: 71).

Following the outbreak of the genocide and the Belgian withdrawal, the UN was left with two choices: withdrawal of the entire operation, or a new reinforced operation with a new mandate to replace the one that had effectively been made obsolete (Mamdani, 2001; 213, Barnett, 2002: 99). The UN chose to all but pull out with the passing of Resolution 912 on the 21 April 1994, deciding to further downscale its force to symbolic levels, leaving the operation with a meagre military strength of 270

troops with the bulk of UNAMIR evacuated from Kigali by the 25 April (Carey, 1998: 22, Jones, 2001: 121, Mamdani, 2001: 213, Power, 2001: 98, Barnett, 2002: 127). The downscaled UNAMIR would act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure a renewed ceasefire, assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations and monitor developments in Rwanda (UNDPI, 1996: 347). And thus apart from the small contingent left behind, Jones (2001: 121) argues that the UN "left Rwanda's genocide planners a clear field to put their killing machine into motion", leaving the "population unprotected from the *génocidiares*".

On the 4 May 1994, the word genocide was finally used by the Secretary General to describe the situation in Rwanda and he urged the UN to act quickly or later be accused of passivity (UNDPI, 1996: 348). It was not until 17 May that the Security Council responded to this with the passing of Resolution 918, imposing a compulsory arms embargo on both sides to the conflict under Chapter VII and reinforcing UNAMIR to 5 500 troops, providing it with a more proactive mandate (UNDPI, 1996, 350, Carey, 1998: 22, Jones, 2001: 122, Macqueen, 2002: 75). This operation was now to be referred to as UNAMIR II. UNAMIR II was authorised to contribute to the security and protection of the Rwandan people and thus was effectively mandated to stop the genocide by force (Macqueen, 2002: 75). However, even though these changes were proposed for the mission, the necessary financial, logistical and political support from troop contributing states within the UN was once again not forthcoming (Carey, 1998: 22, Jones, 2001: 122), thus rendering the operation once again weak, unsupported, ill equipped, and in effect useless.

No further troops were deployed to UNAMIR II until the middle of August 1994, by which time the genocide and the civil war were well over (Jones, 2001: 122). UNAMIR II was thus a classic case of too little, too late on behalf of the UN and was inadequate and could not build a new peace militarily or politically with the inadequate mandate given to it by the Security Council and the subsequent lack of support from UN members (Furley, 1998: 248). UNAMIR II remained in Rwanda until March 1996.

5.3.2 Disarmament of the Parties and the Génocidaires

As shown above, an important omission within the UNAMIR mandate was any reference to the primary task ascribed to the UN during the Arusha process, namely ensuring the overall security in the country, providing security for civilians, tracking arms flows, and disarmament (Jones, 1999: 107). Therefore unlike in Mozambique, the UN was to play a minimal role within the peacebuilding aspects of conflict resolution as the implementation of a programme for disarmament and demobilisation, the creation of a unified army and the gendarmerie, resettlement of displaced persons and the holding of elections were expected to be implemented by the transitional government on the basis of voluntary contributions provided by the international community (Carey, 1998: 21). Thus the UN did not foresee UNAMIR being the primary actor within these tasks and rather ascribed such tasks to the Rwandan people themselves who had no relevant experience or resources to carry out such tasks adequately, rather relying on the generosity of the international community, who had already shown their lack of interest or commitment within this arena.

Kuperman (2003: 100) points out "no policy of humanitarian military intervention should be implemented without a sober consideration of its unintended consequences". In the case of Rwanda, the humanitarian consequences of the genocide "contained within it the seeds of renewed conflict" as the international aid response was deeply flawed and ultimately part of the problem (Jones, 2001: 136). This was evident as the *génocidaires* not only deliberately moved along side displaced populations as they retreated towards the Zairian border, but also moved within the camps set up for refugees, using them as a shield between themselves and the RPF forces, and recruiting many to form new militias (Jones, 2001: 138, Alusala, 2005: 2). Thus the *génocidaires* for the most part unchallenged amidst the refugees, were able to cross into Zaire with most of their weapons and vehicles intact (Jones, 2001: 140). Thus, hindering the work of humanitarian aid workers who could not separate the militia from innocent refugees as these soldiers blended into the wider refugee population (Jones, 2001: 140, Alusala, 2005: 2). Thus the humanitarian response to the conflict doubtless saved many lives, but also created a new dimension to the conflict in allowing the *génocidaires* to reinforce their strength and reengage the RPF,

thus not adhering to any principles of disarmament or demobilisation (Jones, 2001: 150).

The lack of any comprehensive disarmament strategy by the UN in Rwanda still carries consequences for the country and indeed the entire Great Lakes Region as a major challenge to disarmament and reconciliation in Rwanda and the region today is the presence of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces hiding within the DRC and other countries in the region, who have been able to recuperate and reform, posing a continuous threat to Rwanda and its neighbours (Jones 2001: 140, Alusala: 2005: 6, Baregu and Ramadhani, 2005: 5). This is evident in the reluctance of the Kabila government in the DRC to disarm the Interahamwe, which was a direct motivation for the Rwandan government support for Congolese Tutsi rebels and a joint attack on the DRC government in 1996 (Alusala, 2005: 6). Therefore disarmament and social reintegration of ex-soldiers from across all borders within the Great Lakes remains to this day a regional problem (Alusala, 2005: 9).

5.3.3   The "Spoilers" to Peace in Rwanda

While on the surface it appeared at the beginning of the peace process that both sides to the conflict wanted peace and a transition to a power-sharing democratic government, there were those within the government ranks who were opposed to this and worked to prevent such an outcome. These were the "spoilers to peace" in Rwanda who complicated the peace effort throughout (Jones, 2001: 157). It was especially the refusal of elements within the Rwandan government to accept terms of the Arusha Accords that led to the massive outbreak of violence and ultimately the genocide (Macqueen, 2002: 30). Militant forces within Rwanda remained opposed to the Accords and blocked the path of implementation, deliberately playing upon the security fears of opponents and using them as tools of conflict rather than just the outcome of it (Knight, 1998: 24, Jones, 2001: 158). It was especially senior officials within the Rwandan army, CDR (*Coalition pour la defence de la République*), Interahamwe and Presidential Guard who viewed the incorporation of RPF forces within the army as an openly hostile action against the Rwandan regime and an association of senior military officers known as AMASASU (Alliance of Soldiers Provoked by the Age-old Deceitful Acts of Unarists), under the leadership of Colonel

Bagosora violently rejected the Arusha proposals for military integration (Lemarchand, 1994: 597, Hintjens, 1999: 261, Melvern, 2000: 62-63).

Those within the Rwandan government who had agreed to the Arusha process where viewed as traitors and the CDR, along with other groups worked to recruit the so called 'losers' of the Arusha process within the government to create an opposition force to peace that would nurture the growing movement towards genocide (Jones, 2001: 159). They all cooperated in actively killing innocent Tutsi civilians as well as moderate Hutu "in the hope of creating enough chaos to derail the transition" (Lemarchand, 1994: 597). These extremists also launched an attack on UNAMIR and Arusha and no measures were taken to stop these opponents and no contingency planning occurred with regards to this possible scenario as the threat these extremists posed was for the most part ignored (Jones, 2001: 117, 160). Thus the lack of planning for the possibility of "spoilers" in Rwanda was a major flaw within UNAMIR as this group managed to derail the peace process and plunge the country into further chaos, without any staunch response from the UN.

5.4 Unilateral Intervention: France and *Operation Turquoise*

France sought Security Council approval for the deployment of 2000 French troops into Rwanda to establish a 'humanitarian protected zone' in the southwest of the country to protect refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk (UNDPI, 1996: 352, Carey, 1998: 22, Furley, 1998: 243, Jones, 2001: 123, Macqueen, 2002: 76). Although UN members were sceptical about France's motives, the "temptation to use an immediately available force won the day" and *Operation Turquoise* was authorised by the Security Council through Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994 and launched within a week (Carey, 1998: 22, Furley, 1998: 232-244, Melvern, 2000: 210). This operation was not a formal UN mission, but was politically and legally legitimised by the Security Council as a unilateral undertaking to be authorised for a period of sixty days, at the end of which it was hoped that a reinforced UNAMIR II would be up to sufficient strength to take over (Melvern, 2000: 210, Macqueen, 2002: 76-77). *Operation Turquoise* was equipped with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter allowing it to use all means necessary (i.e. force) to achieve its humanitarian objectives - powers that had essentially been denied the official UN

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forces within UNAMIR (UNDPI, 1996: 352, Jones, 2001: 123, Melvern, 2000: 211, Macqueen, 2002: 79).

Operation Turquoise was deployed while UNAMIR was still operating within Rwanda and would be operating out of Goma on the western Congo/Rwanda border, while the UN peacekeepers were mostly confined to Kigali in the centre of Rwanda, with the RPF frontline and government forces in between them (Melvern, 2000: 211). With *Operation Turquoise* authorised to use force against the belligerents, this placed UNAMIR in a precarious position as a Chapter VI operation directly between a Chapter VII operation and the belligerents (Melvern, 2000: 211); thus potentially placing UN forces directly in the line of fire and enforcement action.

Melvern (2000: 24) contends that the Habyarimana regime would not have lasted as long as it did without the support of France. France by its previous actions had been associated with Hutu interests and had supplied arms to the Rwandan government and was responsible for helping the government fight the RPF invasion in 1990 (Furley, 1998: 243, Macqueen, 2002: 77). Subsequently, France maintained its ties with and continued to provide military support to the Rwandan government and armed forces even after the genocide began and had material interests in arms sales until May 1994 (Hintjens, 1999: 273, Berdal, 2001: 69). France had thus exacerbated the conflict and was accused of prolonging the conflict in the first place (Melvern, 2000: 58). Thus the question of French impartiality within the operation was a question that loomed large not only for UN members but especially for the RPF. France's motives for becoming involved in Rwanda in the way and at the stage that it did were therefore indeed questionable as *Operation Turquoise* was seen to be an attempt by the French government to "wash its hands in public" (Furley, 1998: 245, Jones, 2001: 125, Macqueen, 2002: 11).

Despite being met with hostility and suspicion by the RPF, the French reportedly saved many lives and played a part in the opening up of territory for humanitarian agencies to operate in and allowed them to move more freely in Rwanda (Furley, 1998: 244, Jones, 2001: 139). However, the French appeared to establish a presence only in a part of Rwanda where the genocide had already predominantly been completed and failed to prevent massacres continuing in the zone (Melvern, 2000:

215, Jones, 2001: 123). Furthermore, the success of *Operation Turquoise* in the south west of Rwanda in fact compounded the problems of innocent Rwandans as the safe zones exposed more civilians and thus attracted the *génocidaires,* who were moving alongside and within the refugee movements (Furley, 1998: 245, Berdal, 2001: 69, Jones, 2001: 124). Thus, by declaring a safe zone and threatening to respond to any attack within it, the French in fact created a protective umbrella for the retreating *génocidaires*, as well as some FAR units, enabling them to escape into the Congo (Melvern, 2000: 214, Jones, 2001: 125, Mamdani, 2001: 214), thus contributing to the further insecurity and instability of the region.

While it did have some positive humanitarian outcomes, *Operation Turquoise* nevertheless did nothing to further aid any process of conflict resolution in Rwanda and France withdrew at the end of July, just over halfway through the two-month mandate given to it by the Security Council (Jones, 2001: 126, Macqueen, 2002: 79).

5.5 Assessment of UN Peace Maintenance in Rwanda

The conflict in Rwanda was fought within the context of the colonial legacy of the arbitrary divisions of different ethno-political groups across colonial boundaries and the failure of the Rwandan people themselves to transcend these divisions after independence. The regional sphere of conflict within the Great Lakes Region compounded the conflict within the context of the post-Cold War era and the role of regional and other powers in fuelling the conflict. Rwanda during the conflict had reached a crisis point in terms of its economic, political and social spheres forming what Barnett (2002: 56) calls a "double movement of political compromise and reactionary politics" comprising economic crisis, political turmoil, and the RPF invasion. The nature of the conflict was therefore such that although there appeared an atmosphere within the country of a willingness to pursue political power sharing and reconciliation, there were those within the government opposed to this, acting as "spoilers" to peace, compounding the problems within the conflict.

Thus, the failed implementation of peace in Rwanda and a key obstacle to peace efforts stemmed from within the nature of the conflict itself with fear high and trust low between the RPF and government who for the most part failed to carry out their commitments within the peace process, convinced that the other would take advantage

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of them (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 20, Jones, 2001: 175). Even though the war finally ended with the victory of the RPF, Jones (2001: 140- 141) points out that the regime responsible was not truly defeated but merely chased across the borders into Rwanda's neighbours, not forming a part of any future peace or development strategies within the country and adding to further regional insecurity and instability.

Policy makers within the UN had a very simplistic view of the Rwandan conflict and did not take into consideration the dynamics of the situation on the ground, the historical relationships of the Rwandan people, the colonial legacy and the greater regional conflict sphere within which the conflict was fought. The peace process and the conflict were therefore misread, as the conflict was perceived to be an "ethnic conflict" between the Hutu and Tutsi despite the fact that they were not separate ethnic identities but as shown were rather different class and political identities originating from within the same historical ethnic identity. The RPF was not exclusively made up of Tutsi, as there were many Hutu among them, even within the top ranks of the RPA, and thus the perception of the RPF as a Tutsi organisation was misread and the notion that the war was fought purely between Hutu on the one side and Tutsi on the other was false.

These misperceptions were a major factor in the misdiagnosis and inadequate response to the conflict and the implementation of an appropriate peace maintenance operation by the UN. Decision makers within the UN were inflexible in their accommodation or understanding of the shifting circumstances on the ground. As Clapham (1999: 38) contends; the tragedy of UNAMIR did not arise from its failure to carry out its original mandate, but rather from the refusal of UN headquarters to permit it to attempt a completely different one. The Security Council was always too reluctant to undertake more robust action or make important decisions regarding Rwanda and instead of adjusting the mandate to undertake more forceful action to deal with the increasing violence, the UN chose to withdraw its peacekeeping force, abandoning the Rwandan people at a most critical time. The warning signs of what could happen in Rwanda - the enormous stockpiles of weapons, the major militarisation of Rwandan society, and the further radicalisation of Rwandan politics – had been ignored.

It is evident that the Arusha Accords had "multiple fault lines" (Jones, 2001: 161). The Accords failed both internally and externally as the parties to the conflict themselves in the form of "spoilers" were not willing to implement the agreement fully and the international community represented by the UN was slow and reluctant to help or force them to implement the agreement, nor did it take into account the likelihood of such spoilers to the process. The fact that the Arusha process was heralded as a resolution of conflict by Africans themselves meant that those directly involved had a responsibility to ensure the implementation process was successful. Instead it was left to the UN to ensure this implementation. Mpungwe (1999: 20-21) argues that Rwanda's regional neighbours, particularly important players such as Uganda and the DRC, as well as the OAU should have maintained closer observation of the internal as well as regional developments immediately following the Agreement, instead of placing all the responsibility in the hands of the UN. Thus the regional actors within the peace process are as much to blame for their failure to act more proactively in terms of the implementation of the peace operation. There was accordingly no co-ordination between the mediation and implementation phases of peace maintenance in Rwanda. This was evident in the fact that UNAMIR's mandate did not fully reflect what had been set out and requested by the parties at Arusha, nor did UNAMIR attempt to put in place the underlying political mechanisms that were essential to the long-term success of Arusha (Macqueen, 2002: 67). While Arusha called for the UN to ensure security throughout the country, the UNAMIR mandate only called for the provision of security for the city of Kigali (Melvern, 2000: 80). Furthermore, Arusha called for the seizure of arms, but the UN mandate omitted such a task (Melvern, 2000: 80).

UNAMIR was established as a result of a compromise as a "small and cheap mission" (Melvern, 2000: 79). The equipment eventually supplied to UNAMIR was already worn out and old, having been passed on from other UN operations such as Mozambique and Somalia. The UN never established political authority in Rwanda and it has been argued that if it could have done so, the prevention of the genocide may have been possible (Knight, 1998: 24). However, the ability of the UN to do so was limited by its mandate, resources and the unwillingness of UN decision makers to mould the operation to the changing situation on the ground. Not only was UNAMIR's force level too small and not well equipped enough to take offensive and

effective action to prevent the violence, the international community was not prepared to react quickly or provide troops to do so or establish a multinational operation necessary to prevent the crisis (Carey, 1998: 22). UNAMIR was thus denied the tools that might have helped generate better options for a response to the violence that erupted into genocide and effectively ended the peace process (Jones, 2001: 117).

The inability of the UN to prevent or at least hinder the flow of arms into Rwanda was a major factor in the continuation and escalation of the conflict into genocide (Alusala, 2004: 139). The lack of disarmament or demobilisation initiatives by UNAMIR marked a grave error on the part of the peacekeepers as the continued availability of arms depleted incentives for peace and continues today to pose a threat to regional peace and security. The arms embargo that eventually came with UNAMIR II was passed far too late considering the "open secret" of the genocide and the mass stockpiling of weapons from both sides prior to the outbreak of the genocide. The arms embargo only came into effect after the genocide had already occurred and thus was another factor in the argument of too little, too late. Therefore despite the massive humanitarian response to Rwanda there was no effective conflict management in terms of disarming the parties or creating incentives for peace with the immediate result of renewed hostilities on the Rwanda-Zaire border (Jones, 2001: 144).

The period between dictatorship and democracy is one of the most dangerous times for peacekeeping where any delay or hint of a lack of commitment serves only to encourage hardliners who do not want peace (Melvern, 2000: 82). The UN arrived at a time when Rwanda was hovering on the edge of the war, where not all parties were committed to peace and where the lack of commitment of the UN served to further worsen the situation on the ground. UNAMIR's presence and actions (and lack thereof) produced a tragic though unintended dynamic within the conflict as the reluctance and inability of the UN to undertake more robust action in fact gave impetus to the extremists' actions and the further spread of violence in Rwanda without the risk of a forceful UN interference (Barnett, 2002: 90). Following the outbreak of genocide, UNAMIR thus found itself in a precarious situation in which it was "no good to anyone and a danger to itself" (Barnett, 2002: 99).

It has been argued that UNAMIR was never a peacekeeping operation in any meaningful sense of the term (Clapham, 1999: 39). UNAMIR was inadequate considering what was happening in Rwanda. The operation was deployed on the assumption that it was being sent to supervise a mutually agreed upon peace and that both sides to the conflict would hold to their obligations under Arusha (Melvern, 2000: 79, Jones, 2001: 160). However, this was not the case as the security situation deteriorated in the country, compounded by the determination of spoilers to derail the peace process. Thus, UNAMIR was unable to provide any real security against the growing sense of chaos that increasingly gripped Rwanda prior to the start of the genocide (Jones, 2001: 113). Rwanda therefore demonstrates the difficulties faced when UN peacekeepers enter into a situation in which there is in fact no established peace to keep and the infrastructure to ensure peace has not yet been put in place. This demonstrates a case for peacebuilding in Rwanda prior to the implementation of a peacekeeping operation as the groundwork for peace could have been put in place.

It is therefore important to implement the appropriate peace maintenance operation according to the circumstances found within a specific conflict. The implementation of the peacekeeping operation by the UN was inadequate as Chapter VI action was too soft for the reality of the situation on the ground. Rwanda required a more multidimensional response in the form of peace enforcement, accompanied by peacebuilding efforts in order to halt the conflict and establish an environment in which peace could be consolidated through peacekeeping. The lack of peacebuilding efforts was a major weakness within the framework of peace maintenance in Rwanda (Jones, 2001: 166). The UN responded to the symptoms of the Rwandan conflict with the peacekeeping operation rather than the causes through peacebuilding as massive humanitarian efforts were made without addressing the root political and developmental factors within the country. No incentives or initiatives were offered for disarmament or demobilisation and thus there was no prospect presented of a better life for ex-combatants. Due to the UN's unwillingness to take any robust enforcement action during the beginning of 1994, the organisation "was left as a largely passive witness to the continued decline of the political and security situation in the country" (Macqueen, 2002: 68).

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Melvern (2000: 212) contends that *Operation Turquoise* had everything that UNAMIR had lacked and desperately needed, particularly the Chapter VII mandate, sufficient troops, armoured vehicles, helicopters and a battalion of heavy mortars. However, the Chapter VII operation undertaken by France was too unilateralist and such action should have taken place within the framework of a multilateral and multidimensional operation under the auspices of an official UN operation. France compounded the conflict because the *génocidaires* were able to move within the safe zones created and the French were accused of harbouring the most notorious instigators of the genocide during this time. Furthermore, by the time the French withdrew the RPF had already become the dominant force in Rwanda and the remnants of the old Hutu regime had fled mostly to Zaire (Macqueen, 2002: 79). While *Operation Turquoise* offered the UN time to sort out its operational difficulties while the French took on the bulk of humanitarian work the UN did not seize upon this opportunity. Considering France's tainted history in Rwanda, *Operation Turquoise* should never have been given enforcement powers under Chapter VII. Chapter VII mandates should be reserved for multilateral UN operations in which neutrality and impartiality are likely to be ensured. A Chapter VII mandate should have been granted to UNAMIR and the French troops incorporated within this operation.

In order to assess whether UNAMIR was a success or not we must ask the question of whether the mandate of UNAMIR was fulfilled and whether the operation was carried out in accordance with the established principles of peacekeeping. The most important elements within this being whether the UN was able to create an environment conducive to a lasting peace and whether the country had been demobilised, demilitarised, combatants reintegrated into society and free and fair elections held. For all these questions, the answer is a resounding no. UNAMIR was ineffective in creating an environment in which peace could be established or consolidated. The most graphic illustration of this is the fact that the genocide broke out while UNAMIR was still operative in the country and without the peacekeepers being able to prevent it. Demobilisation and reintegration was non-existent and the *génocidaires* in fact escaped, moving alongside the refugees. The refugees thus inevitably faced greater risks within the safe zones and became exposed to more danger sitting between the UN forces and the *génocidaires*. The escape of the *génocidaires* was therefore

facilitated, though not intentionally through the humanitarian efforts and exacerbated by *Operation Turquoise.* Thus the UN activities within Rwanda did not facilitate a peaceful transformation, and rather contributed to the regional instability and increase in security threats within the entire region.

While the conflicting parties both requested a UN operation in the country to help with the implementation of Arusha, the fact that spoilers actively worked to derail this process negates the principle of consent for the operation. While UNAMIR appeared to maintain impartiality throughout the operation, the role of France and the question of French impartiality was a contentious issue following France's history in Rwanda. France's credibility surrounding the principle of consent was immediately questionable, and rightly so from the side of the RPF. Thus it can be noted that UNAMIR did not adhere to the guiding principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force in peace maintenance operations. The non-use of force principle within UNAMIR was one that should have been adjusted with regards to a more forceful initiative from the UN as soon as the genocide began, as it was obvious that one group was a specific target of hostilities and innocent civilians were being killed en masse. The UN had an obligation to prevent and stop the genocide and the technicality of using the word *genocide* was an excuse used to negate the international obligation present when genocide occurs.

It can be concluded that the UN failed in Rwanda. From UNAMIR to *Operation Turquoise* to UNAMIR II there was no sincere international intervention or conflict management efforts of any seriousness established or deployed to prevent or stop the genocide (Jones, 2001: 126). The Secretary General believed that the international community's delayed reaction to the genocide "demonstrated graphically its extreme inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crisis entwined with armed conflict" (UNDPI, 1996: 351). The UN's desertion of Rwanda in its time of greatest need left a lasting impression, and it is therefore not surprising that many African countries are suspicious of the UN and its members' intentions when it comes to the implementation of peace operations on the continent.

Rwanda offers a typical example of UN peacekeeping failure in terms of a weak mandate, the lack of political will and resources, a lack of understanding of the

dynamics on the ground and the lack of will of the parties themselves to cease fighting. All these factors plus the difficulties faced by peacekeepers on the ground point to a failure of the UN to prevent a great human tragedy. Thus, the lack of action by the UN is contrary to its most important mandate of maintaining international peace and security. The inability of the UN to prevent the genocide once again demonstrates the inability of the organisation to act decisively in the post-Cold War period when no Western interests are apparent. However, it is not necessarily the case that the UN could have prevented the genocide that gripped Rwanda at the time. But Rwanda does demonstrate how the inherent nature of conflict in Africa has presented challenges to the UN in the post-Cold War era, and how a lack of understanding of such conflict accompanied by a lack of political will on the part of UN members to become involved in such situations that they do not adequately understand, can have devastating consequences.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1   Brief Overview

The nature of conflict in Africa has evolved from the Cold War to the post-cold War era. This is evident in the internal and external factors and actors involved within the conflict dynamics. During the Cold War era state politics based on power and the quest for control of the state, formed the basis for conflicts in Africa from anti-colonial wars of independence and liberation struggles to secessionist attempts. In the post-Cold War era with the loss of external superpower support, this has changed to incorporate the primacy of identity politics and conflicts based on the differences of ethnicity, religion and the quest for the control of resources and land, characterised by extreme violence and the rise of actors other than the state, within failed and collapsed states. These conflicts have thus presented challenges to the UN in relation to its traditional means of maintaining international peace and security, and the internal dynamics of the decision-making processes, political will and accompanying resources and financial factors within the organisation. The challenges faced by the UN in its attempts at maintaining peace and security in Africa therefore lie not only within the nature of conflict and the nature of the African state but also within the internal constraints inherent within the organisation itself.

The nature of "new wars" within the context of the failed state in the post-Cold War era has particularly posed a problem to the UN's traditional adherence to the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention. In the past, the UN concentrated on collective security and state-centred solutions to conflicts. However, the nature of conflict has become more internal, accompanied by the rising concern of human rights abuses within the context of mass violence of regimes against their own people within states that have collapsed. Thus, the notion of collective security is one that needs to be addressed, as it is not suited to dealing with internal conflicts, particularly when the notion of sovereignty within failed states is a tenuous one as states are losing their legitimacy when they are not upholding their sovereign duties. "New wars" thus

require new and more robust solutions within the framework of the UN's traditional means of peace maintenance.

The case studies of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda each demonstrate how the dynamics of conflict have evolved from the Cold War to the post Cold War era and how the UN has responded within the framework of such changes both internally and externally. While UN peace maintenance was a success in Mozambique, it was a failure in Rwanda. It is important therefore to examine how the UN succeeded and failed in light of the nature of the conflicts and the internal dynamics within the organisation. These two case studies therefore need to be compared and contrasted to reach a better understanding of the UN's experiences with peace maintenance operations within Africa. The criteria for comparing and contrasting these conflicts should include the nature of the conflicts within the Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics, the implementation of the peace processes and the outcomes for each conflict and the response of the UN in terms of the internal dynamics of political will, financial and logistical resources within the organisation and the subsequent implementation of an appropriate peace maintenance operation.

Mozambique was an "old war" starting as a war of independence and continuing as a civil war following Portugal's withdrawal, fought within the context of the Cold War bi-polarity and the support of external states and superpowers with both parties fighting over the legitimacy and control of the state. Rwanda was a "new war" fought within the post-Cold War dynamics of ethno-class and political identities and inequality within the regional sphere of conflict dynamics, with civilians and innocent people being the victims of brutality manifest as genocide by the regime in power at the time. As shown in this thesis the UN was able to successfully carry out peacekeeping within Mozambique to accommodate an end to the war and a peaceful transition within the country, while it was unable to do so in Rwanda.

6.2   Major Similarities

Both Mozambique and Rwanda share a colonial legacy, which impacted on the future consolidation of peace within each country with the roots of conflict evident within the colonial history and the way in which the colonial powers ruled the countries and subsequently, how decolonisation occurred. Both Mozambique and Rwanda became

one party states with both Frelimo and the MRND respectively, ruling Mozambique and Rwanda by the politics of exclusion, maintaining a tight control over the state and excluding others within this process. Both countries subsequently suffered economic crises and reached the point of economic and political collapse, with their populations suffering due to drought, famine and increasing human rights abuses. Thus both countries were on the path to becoming failed and collapsed states.

Resulting from the internal political dynamics within both countries was the rise of a dissatisfied group, formed within a neighbouring state, which rose up against the regime in power, plunging each country into civil war. Thus both conflicts were fought between the government in power at the time and an insurgent group. Both conflicts also maintained a regional and international dimension through the support of external actors. However, while in Mozambique external actors withdrew from the conflict, France continued to play a pivotal role in supporting the Rwandan government, even after the genocide had occurred. Thus while the combatants in Mozambique lacked the resources to continue fighting, in Rwanda there was still the availability of external resources, fuelling the conflict. The support of external powers within African conflicts is a factor therefore that has continued through from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and remains an impediment to peace maintenance and the principle of impartiality within peace operations.

In both Mozambique and Rwanda, the conflict ended through a negotiated peace agreement signed as a result of external pressure, with negotiations facilitated by international actors. During the negotiation phases of both conflicts, the UN was called in at a relatively late stage as a monitor of the process and to verify the peace agreement and was subsequently called upon to play a central role within the implementation of a peace maintenance operation. However while in Mozambique the parties themselves showed the will to implement the agreement, in Rwanda they did not. Therefore, while the GPA ushered in peace in Mozambique, the Arusha Accords became the catalyst for further violence and conflict, culminating in the genocide in Rwanda.

Both ONUMOZ and UNAMIR were premised on the establishment of a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operation. While ONUMOZ was a success in Mozambique

and UNAMIR was a failure in Rwanda, there are some similarities to observe between these two operations. ONUMOZ and UNAMIR both suffered delays in the formation of the peacekeeping operation with regards to troop contributions and financial resources. However, the delays in the deployment of ONUMOZ in Mozambique in fact had positive implications in that it gave Renamo time to organise itself as a political party and to lay the foundations for the implementation of the GPA. However, in Rwanda, time was of the essence and the delayed deployment of UNAMIR had devastating consequences as it allowed the génocidaires more time to put their plans into action. An important factor lacking in both operations was the absence of an adequate demilitarisation effort. Both ONUMOZ and UNAMIR failed in establishing an adequate arms embargo to prevent the flow of weapons into the conflict zones. Thus while peace operations where underway, there still remained the availability of arms to the combatants. This was an essential weakness within both operations as the continued availability of arms helped fuel tensions and carried further implications for regional security both within southern Africa and the Great Lakes.

However, these similarities are overshadowed by significant differences between these two case studies, particularly within the nature of the conflicts themselves and the UN response that contributed to the respective success and failure of peace maintenance operations.

6.3   Major Differences

Macqueen (2002: 167) contends that it was the fundamental nature of the Mozambique conflict itself rather than the UN response to it that is a key factor in the success of peace operations in the country. He contends that the conflict was by its nature resolvable at the particular time at which external intervention took place. This can be seen in the fact that Mozambique was a long-standing conflict that had finally reached a point of war fatigue whereby the combatants themselves were tired of fighting and ready to pursue peace. Therefore by the time the UN entered Mozambique the war had run its course and there was an atmosphere primed for transformation following the demonstrated internal willingness and international support for peace at the signing of the GPA. Subsequent UN operations in

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Mozambique therefore demonstrate how it is much easier to implement a peacekeeping operation when there is an established peace to maintain.

The conflict dynamics within Rwanda were much more complex and the misdiagnosis of the conflict ultimately contributed to the failure of subsequent UN operations in the country. In Rwanda the conflict was still on-going, with suspicions running high and the combatants still demonstrating unwillingness to pursue peace, even after the Arusha Agreement was signed, particularly "spoilers" within the government who were determined to derail the peace process. There was therefore no established peace to maintain and the implementation of a peacekeeping operation was tenuous in light of the nature of the conflict. Mozambique and Rwanda therefore demonstrate the importance of the appropriate response to the different time or phase in which a conflict is in and the implementation of the appropriate peace maintenance operation by the UN according to this phase, as attempts to implement a peacekeeping operation within an ongoing conflict can prove unproductive and further exacerbate tensions, as was the case in Rwanda.

Ethnicity and ethno-class or political identities were not a central factor within the Mozambican conflict, compared to Rwanda where it was the most fundamental element. While the RPF had a specific identity in terms of ethno-political leanings, Renamo did not have any clear political tradition or ethnic identity and there were no clear ethnic or class differences between Frelimo and Renamo. Therefore while Rwanda suffered extreme violence manifest as genocide, there was no plan for the total elimination of one group by another along the lines of ethno-political or class differences in Mozambique. Rwanda therefore demonstrates how it is much more difficult to resolve a conflict when such extreme ethno-political tensions are present.

As shown in Chapter Three, peace maintenance operations require the international community to understand the complexities of a conflict and to promote a stable framework for peace to address the underlying causes of that conflict, prevent a degeneration into more violence and promote development as part of an overall conflict resolution strategy within the broader regional framework. Furthermore the implementation of a peacekeeping operation requires the adherence to the three traditional principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. Within

Mozambique, ONUMOZ was able for the most part to fulfil these requirements while in Rwanda; UNAMIR was not able to do so.

While ONUMOZ ended up being one of the most costly peace operations undertaken by the UN, UNAMIR was run on a shoestring (Barnes, 1998: 160, Power, 2001: 97). Added to the financial resources ONUMOZ also had the political will from UN members to allow it to be implemented successfully, with no members actively working to block any UN response to the conflict. ONUMOZ also had a clear and realistic mandate and the UN insisted on flexible mechanisms to carry out and adjust this mandate according to the shifting circumstances on the ground. ONUMOZ therefore was successful in meeting the objectives of its mandate, as it worked to ensure that the conditions were put in place to ensure a lasting peace in Mozambique. This was aided by the fact that ONUMOZ's mandate was in line with the GPA as the operation addressed the issues within this agreement and fulfilled the request of the parties in helping to implement it.

UNAMIR on the other hand was unable to do the same. Not only was the UNAMIR mandate unrealistic, it was not set out in line with important requests within the Arusha Accords and thus was an insufficient response in terms of what it had been requested to do by the parties. This was further compounded by the financial and logistical constraints on the peacekeepers, as well as the unwillingness of the Security Council to adjust the mandate according to the shifting circumstances on the ground, rather deciding to downscale the operation at a crucial time, leaving the Rwandan people to their fate. This was further compounded by the demonstrated unwillingness of the combatants themselves through their violent actions to allow the UN to do so.

The regional contexts within which these two conflicts were fought and the timeframe in which they were coming to an end are important factors within the framework of UN operations in both countries. Mozambique was part of a wave of change within southern Africa that demonstrated a noticeable atmosphere and willingness within the region for peace and reconciliation. However, in Rwanda, the regional context of conflict was overpowered by the colonial legacy of the arbitrary ethno-political divisions across colonial boundaries throughout the entire Great Lakes Regional, with not only Rwanda, but also the DRC and Burundi both embroiled within a cycle of

internal conflicts of their own. Thus the regional conflict sphere within the Great Lakes Region provided for the easy proliferation of arms from one conflict to another and the widespread movement of refugees and displaced people within the region, as well as the involvement of regional neighbours within all these conflicts. These factors fuelled the conflict in Rwanda and decreased the possibilities for peace.

In Mozambique there was a co-ordinated effort with regards to all phases from peace negotiations to peace implementation, while in Rwanda there were major discords between the negotiation phase and implementation phases. While ONUMOZ was able to establish political control and a central co-ordinating position within Mozambique, UNAMIR was unable to establish political control in Rwanda. The UN was therefore able to help maintain and consolidate peace in Mozambique, while it was unable to do so in Rwanda or prevent the outbreak of further extreme violence as it had in essence lost control of the situation. ONUMOZ was able to promote development in Mozambique and tackle the underlying causes of conflict through co-ordinated efforts to involve both sides of the conflict throughout the operation and promote free and fair elections to ensure the establishment of a new legitimate and democratic government, while stopping "spoilers" before they could derail the process. In Rwanda there appeared very little communication between the UN and the government or the RPF and both parties in turn viewed the UN and its motives with suspicion. Consequently the UN was unable to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict, particularly due to its misunderstanding and simplification of the conflict as "ethnic" rather than a more complex understanding of the historical relations between the Hutu and Tutsi. The UN was thus unable to allay the animosity between these groups or prevent the genocide, and had no capacity to deal with "spoilers".

Peacebuilding efforts formed a crucial part of peace maintenance in Mozambique while in Rwanda there was no implementation of any effective peacebuilding. While there was a comprehensive strategy put in place to encourage the combatants to demobilise and be reintegrated into society in Mozambique, there were no moves to do so within Rwanda. UNAMIR did not even reach the reintegration phase of peace maintenance and no efforts were made for the reform of ex-combatants. However, in Mozambique there was a willingness of the combatants themselves to cease fighting, particularly after the incentives to do so were known. In Rwanda arms were still being

shipped into the country even while peace was being negotiated, demonstrating that the combatants had no will to cease fighting or be demobilised. No incentives were offered to combatants to demobilise and UNAMIR operations on the ground were uncertain of the mandate regarding this task, as communication from UN headquarters was vague regarding UNAMIR's role in this.

While the appropriate response and peace maintenance operation was implemented in Mozambique, the same cannot be said for Rwanda. Within Mozambique, a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation accompanied by peacebuilding was adequate in terms of the conditions within the country, namely a willingness of the parties to cease fighting and an established peace to enforce and maintain. This meant that a robust peace enforcement operation was unnecessary. Within Rwanda, the violent nature of the conflict and the presence of spoilers necessitated the implementation of a far more robust response, as a Chapter VI operation was inadequate. Mozambique and Rwanda therefore demonstrate the importance of an adequate assessment of a conflict and the implementation of an appropriate peace maintenance operation in light of the nature of the conflict. Rwanda further demonstrates the need for more robust action by the UN in contemporary African conflict in the post-Cold War era, while Mozambique reveals the importance of peacebuilding efforts to ensure an environment first for peace, where combatants are disarmed before peace can be kept through a peacekeeping operation.

6.4   The Lessons to be Learnt

The nature of conflict is evolving in Africa and the traditional adherence to the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention based on the primacy of the state are becoming outdated principles within the context of "new wars" in Africa and the accompanying threat to the human rights and lives of innocent people by regimes grappling to hold onto power within failed and collapsed states. Troeller (2001: 78) believes that there is a need for the recognition of the overriding value of human security, coupled with the political will to act upon rather than turn away from the problems. The failure of operations in Rwanda demonstrates how the lack of political will and ignorance of the human rights abuses occurring in the country contributed to the failure of UN peace maintenance. The evolving nature of conflict thus requires far more robust action and a greater need to understand the internal and external

dynamics inherent within these conflicts in order that the appropriate response and peace maintenance operation may be implemented.

ONUMOZ was not without its problems, but the ability and the will of not only the UN, but also the parties themselves to overcome these problems demonstrates that UN peacekeeping accompanied by wide-ranging peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts can prevent and resolve conflict in Africa when the conditions both internally and internationally in terms of the nature of the conflict and the international response are met. The process of conflict in Africa is an extended one rooted in the historical experiences of the Africa state and therefore initiatives to resolve such conflicts should not be expected to be a short-term undertaking (Clarke and Herbst, 1996: 70). Mozambique and Rwanda both demonstrate that the implementation of an adequate peace maintenance operation within a deeply rooted conflict in Africa requires an accurate analysis of the conflict, while encompassing effective follow-through mechanisms aimed at implementing not only short-term measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict but also long-term measures to address the root-causes of the conflict, accompanied by the active engagement of all regional neighbours as well as the international community as a whole (Goulding, 1999: 166, Mpungwe, 1999: 24). Thus there is the need to create an entire process for preventing and resolving conflict as well as putting in place the necessary institutions that can sustain peace.

Because different members within the UN have different interests and objectives within the international arena, there will always be debate and disagreements over the deployment of an operation and the necessary resources and political will, and the nature and degree of involvement needed within such an operation (Jones, 2001: 128). Thus the implementation of a peace maintenance operation will always be a difficult task without the necessary political will of UN members. Political will imperative within any response to conflict as the lack of political will affects all aspects of a peace maintenance operation from its establishment to completion as it may have an adverse effect on the provision of troops and equipment, the adherence to time schedules, fulfilment of mandates and the successful implementation of an appropriate operation. Related to the issue of political will is the need to address the decision-making processes within the UN so that there can be more consistency within the organisation and its reactions to conflict around the world (Malan, 2000:

184). The UN should not allow failure within one conflict to dissuade members from reacting to a tragedy in another or prevent the organisation from fulfilling its intended purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Mozambique shows that UN peace maintenance can be successful and positive lessons must be taken from UN successes to ensure further success in the future.

Post war transitions should be properly managed, especially in terms of disarmament, demobilisation and the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life (de Waal, 2000: 51). Rwanda and Mozambique demonstrate from opposing sides of the scale the importance of disarmament and demilitarisation within a conflict zone. Weapons flood conflict regions, not only contributing to the escalation of the conflict but most importantly as Rwanda demonstrates, undermines efforts to embargo arms and compel opposing parties to respect human rights (Alusala, 2004: 139). Mozambique on the other hand demonstrates the importance of helping former combatants break from the conflict and how their willingness to hand in their weapons and the incentives offered to them to do this was a major factor in the success of UN peace maintenance. However, while ONUMOZ did have a working demobilisation and demilitarisation process, it was not sufficient in halting the amount of weapons still circulating throughout the region. Therefore for both Mozambique and Rwanda, the availability of weapons throughout southern Africa and the Great Lakes respectively represent continuing challenges for the maintenance of peace and security. This is especially the case in the Great Lakes where violent conflict is still rife. Disarmament and demobilisation are thus imperative within the greater structure of peacebuilding initiatives.

Peacebuilding within the broader framework of peace maintenance is essential within any implementation of UN peace operations. Peacebuilding becomes an important tool to ensure that conflicts are brought under control before they escalate into unmanageable disasters were violence erupts and peace becomes harder to sustain. Peacebuilding offers an opportunity to create a framework for peace and lay the foundation for further initiatives to consolidate peace within a post-conflict state. Peacebuilding should therefore not come as an extension of a peacekeeping operation but should fall within the wider and more prominent role of setting the stage for the implementation of a peacekeeping operation. Peacebuilding is especially pertinent

within the African context of post-Cold War "new wars" as it offers a more realistic path to sustainable development as it resolves to address the root causes of conflicts and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the state. As Bertram (1995: 389) contends: "full-scale peacebuilding efforts are nothing short of attempts at nation building; they seek to remake a state's political institutions, security forces, and economic arrangements". Rwanda demonstrates how the lack of peacebuilding initiatives had devastating consequences for the implementation of a peacekeeping operation before there was an established peace to keep. Furthermore, Rwanda demonstrates the need for more robust action in "new wars" and peace enforcement by the UN within a conflict in which there is a demonstrated lack of will of one side of the conflict to cease fighting.

Internal African conflicts still maintain regional and international dimensions. Thus regional efforts following the implementation of UN peace maintenance operations are important within the framework of consolidating regional peace and security. The cooperative initiatives of Operation Rachal between Mozambique and South Africa are an important example of the success of such initiatives. Rwanda on the other hand demonstrates how the lack of such initiatives has spill over effects with the further propagation of conflict within a region as weapons continue to flow throughout the Great Lakes. Regional efforts are thus central in preventing the proliferation of arms into conflict zones and regional states have a responsibility to prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

6.5   Issues for Future Research

This thesis has examined the challenges faced by the UN in terms of its traditional means of maintaining international peace and security in light of the evolving nature of African conflict and the internal factors within the UN as an international collective security organisation. From these challenges comes the need to further examine probable solutions for the future of UN peace maintenance. Scope still remains for further research into how these issues can be dealt with in terms of the internal decision-making dynamics within the UN system and how the UN should and can be reformed to facilitate the implementation of peace operations accompanied by the necessary political will and financial resources. Such reforms could include the restructuring of the Security Council as a decision-making organ and the veto power

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of the permanent members in line with the dynamics of contemporary world politics. Furthermore, there is scope to assess the viability of a permanent peace maintenance force within the UN consisting of trained peacekeepers that are able to respond immediately to conflicts without having to wait for the generosity of UN members in terms of troop contributions and financial and logistical resources

While the UN remains the principal organisation tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security, the viability of regional organisations and regional capacity for peace maintenance is an important consideration to address within the study of peace maintenance operations. There is a need to determine what possibilities there are for the implementation of regional peace maintenance operations and how they fit within the broader framework of UN peace maintenance.

6.6   Final Assessment

Lessons can be learnt from both successes and failures and should be used for future reference so that peacekeeping and the related tasks of peacebuilding and peace enforcement can be successful and effective in the future. It is unfortunate that the positive lessons that could have been learned from Mozambique did not last long in the minds of those within the UN and international community as the crisis in Rwanda occurred. Rather, the debacle in Somalia was more prominent in their minds as they shied away from involvement in that country. While Rwanda has left a major stain on the UN's peace maintenance record, the success of peace operations in Mozambique demonstrates that the UN can be successful in resolving African conflicts when the necessary conditions both internally and externally are in place. There is a role for the UN to play and its existing mechanisms should be enhanced to further extend the prospects of peace not only in Africa but globally as well. Conflict in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security and Africa's security problems are global problems, which thus require global solutions (Gambari, 2001: 20). The UN remains the sole global collective security organisation aimed at preventing conflict and maintaining international peace and security and it should continue to function as such an organisation.

MAP 1: MOZAMBIQUE [2]

[2] http://www.lib.utexas.edu/africa/Mozambique_pol95.jpg

MAP 2: RWANDA [3]

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