

The War in Heidelberg: a case study on the effects of the South African War on Cape Afrikaner identity.

by
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DECLARATION

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the effects of the South African War on the rural community of Heidelberg in the Southern Cape. It investigates the complexities of wartime allegiance among Cape Afrikaners that arose as a result of a century of British influence. Intermarriage, cultural cross-pollination, and shared frontier experience combined to create a hybrid Cape Colonial culture characterised by complex allegiances, composite identities, and culturally constructed structures of power. This study explores the local history of Heidelberg and the surrounding region within the context of the historical development of the Cape Colony, and demonstrates the formation of a localised hybrid cultural identity and hierarchical power structures built on the vestiges of the old Dutch system of legal distinctions, which had been transmuted by British rule. As many of the colonial inhabitants had familial ties and sympathies to the Boer Republics, the pressures of the war challenged the complexity that characterised Cape Colonial identity and allegiance. Despite deep connections to those living in the Boer Republics, their status as British citizens made them liable to treason charges which prevented any action of support towards the republican cause.

Although most disapproved of the war and the way in which it was conducted, very few renounced their citizenship to take up arms against the British Empire. Cape Afrikaners had a vested interest in the Cape Colony, and had grown accustomed to the civil liberties and access to Imperial markets which sustained their livelihoods. This study investigates the people of Heidelberg's loyalty to British citizenship and sympathy with the republics by exploring their connections to the republics, incidents of loyalty or sympathy, as well as identifying possible motivations behind such displays. Martial law was the primary point of contention during the war and became the vehicle of change in Cape Colonial society, having both ideological and material effects on the population.

This thesis details how the application of martial law impacted the community of Heidelberg both from outside and within. Externally, this was through the introduction of seemingly foreign ideas on Imperial hegemony and British citizenship which created great animosity between the military and local government. Internally, it was through the challenges to existing hierarchies and civil liberties by the new institutions and practices created for the express purpose of enforcing martial law and

safeguarding the Colony from invasion. This work also highlights how the spectacle of battle and destructiveness of republican invasion shaped the attitudes and inclinations of Cape Afrikaners by exploring the skirmish at Heidelberg as well as its aftermath. Martial law and the battle in town created a climate of civil war and paranoia within the community. This thesis concludes with an examination into how community divisions resulting from the war were addressed by reporting on incidents of reconciliation and retribution in the post-war period, as well as in identifying long term changes in the community. It highlights how the South African War became a critical juncture in formation of ethnic identity among Cape Afrikaners, and how the war in the Cape Colony contributed to the evolution of Afrikaner Nationalism.

OPSOMMING:

Hierdie verhandeling ondersoek die impak van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die landelike gemeenskap van Heidelberg in die Suid-Kaap. Dit ondersoek die kompleksiteite in die lojaliteit van Kaapse Afrikaners wat ontstaan het weens 'n eeu van Britse invloed. Ondertrouery, kulturele-vermenging, en gemeenskaplike grens-ervarings het gely tot die ontstaan van 'n gemengde of hibriede Kaapse koloniale kultuur, gekenmerk deur verdeelde lojaliteite, saamgevoegde identiteite, en kulturgeskoeide magstrukture. Hierdie studie is 'n verkenning van die plaaslike geskiedenis van Heidelberg en die omliggende area binne die konteks van die historiese ontwikkeling van die Kaap Kolonie, en demonstreer die vorming van 'n plaaslike, hibriede kulturele identiteit en hiërargiese magstrukture geskoei op die oorblyfsels van die voormalige Hollandse stelsel van wetlike onderskeidings, aangepas onder Britse heerskappy. Aangesien menig van die koloniale inwoners familiebande en simpatie met die Boererepublieke gehad het, was die oorlog 'n uitdaging vir die kompleksiteit wat Kaapse koloniale identiteit en lojaliteit gekenmerk het. Ten spyte van noue bande met die Boererepublieke, het hulle status as Britse onderdane hulle aanspreeklik gemaak tot die aanklag van hoogverraad en daarvan weerhou om enige bystand aan die republikeinse stryd te verleen.

Alhoewel meeste van hulle die oorlog, en die manier waarop dit gevoer is, afgekeur het, het weinig hulle burgerskap verwerp en die wapen opgeneem teen die Britse Ryk. Kaapse Afrikaners het 'n gevestigde belang gehad in die Kaap Kolonie, en het gewoon geraak aan die burgerlike vryhede en toegang tot Imperiale markte wat hulle lewensbestaan onderhou het. Hierdie werkstuk ondersoek beide die inwoners van Heidelberg se lojaliteit aan hulle Britse burgerskap en hulle simpatie met die Boererepublieke, deur 'n verkenning van hulle verbintenisse met die republieke, stawing van insidente van lojaliteit en simpatie, asook die identifisering van die motiverings agter hierdie verskynsels. Die Krygswet was die primêre twispunt gedurende die oorlog, asook die middel tot verandering binne die Kaapse koloniale samelewing, en het 'n ideologiese sowel as 'n materialistiese impak op die populasie gehad.

Hierdie tesis illustreer hoe die toepassing van die Krygswet die gemeenskap van Heidelberg van buite en binne beïnvloed het. Van buite, het die instelling van uitheemse idees aangaande Imperiale hegemonie en Britse burgerskap groot

vyandigheid tussen die Britse weermag en die plaaslike owerhede veroorsaak. Van binne, was die new instellings en praktyke wat geskep is om die Krygswet toe te pas en die Kaap te beskerm teen inval, beskou as 'n uitdaging van burgerlike vryhede en bestaande hiërargieë. Hierdie werk wys ook hoe die skouspel van geweld en vernietiging van republikeinse invalle die houding en neigings van Kaapse Afrikaners gevorm het deur die skermutseling by Heidelberg en die nadraai daarvan te verken. Krygswet en die skermutseling in die dorp het 'n klimaat van burgeroorlog en paranoia binne die gemeenskap laat posvat. Hierdie tesis sluit dan met 'n ondersoek wat illustreer hoe verdeeldheid binne die gemeenskap aangespreek is, deur te kyk na insidente van versoening en vergelding tydens die naoorlogse tydperk, asook die identifisering van langtermyn veranderinge in die gemeenskap. Hierdie werk onderstreep hoe die Anglo-Boereoorlog 'n kritiese stadium in die vorming van etniese identiteit onder Kaapse Afrikaners was, en hoe die oorlog in die Kaap Kolonie bygedra het tot die evolusie van Afrikaner Nasionalisme.

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my parents, for their endless support and encouragement.

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Inspired by my fascination with the history of the Cape, genealogy and local history, this paper started life as an inspired and long-winded honours thesis that stretched the allowed word limit as well as the patience of examiners. It was only through the graciousness and accommodation of my supervisor, Prof Bill Nasson, that it saw the light of day. My only hope is that it does not underwhelm in its present format.

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"Ik ben een Afrikaander - al slaat de landdrost mij dood, of al zetten hij mij in de tronk, ik zal, nog wil niet zwijgen!"

Hendrik Biebouw, 1707.

"The High Commissioner is of opinion that there will be more trouble in the Cape Colony after the war, than in any other part of South Africa, and the information we glean from various sources has led us to the same conclusion."

The General Manager, Standard Bank, 1902.

"Well, gentlemen, of course you are loyal. It would be monstrous if you were not."

Alfred Milner, 1898.

Introduction

i.) The War in the Cape Colony: Afrikaner Nationalism and ethnic identity

The South African War or Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 is generally regarded as a defining event in the history of South Africa. Like the American Civil War, it can be considered a crossroads which stood between what had been, and what was to be. The war was a brief window of opportunity for determining the course of South African development. Like all wars, the story of the South African War was one of tragedy, heroism, missed opportunities, and folly. Despite its updated and more inclusive title, the war came to define the nature of white rule in South Africa, and was to become the most important event in the formation of Afrikaner ethnic identity and a major flashpoint in the continuum of Afrikaner Nationalism. In *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, Hermann Giliomee quite aptly refers to this as “*The Crucible of War*.” From a regional viewpoint, the war was a clash between two different visions of how Southern Africa should develop and be governed. Politically, it was a war between the British Empire and the Boer Republics regarding the shifting power dynamics resulting from the economic boom of the mineral revolution. The republican vision of agrarian-based economic development clashed with the plans and ambitions of ardent imperialists like Alfred Milner. The resulting conflict, defeat of the republics, and bitterness regarding the atrocities of concentration camps and scorched earth policies are often-cited factors when accounting for the emergence of Afrikaner cultural solidarity, and formed a crucial part of the mythos of Afrikaner Nationalism. Yet, it would require nearly half a century for Afrikaner Nationalism to come to fruition. In the decades following the war, a crucial series of events would combine to create this new exclusive nationalism. These included the 1910 Act of Union, the 1914 Rebellion, South Africa’s participation in the First World War, the cultural and economic mobilisation drive of the twenties and thirties, and finally the issue of participation in the Second World War. Although these events definitely had a more tangible effect in establishing the structures and ideological groundwork of Afrikaner Nationalism, they relied heavily on the ideals and bitter memory of the South African War to define the exclusionary nature of this new ethnic nationalism.

Often overlooked and marginalised, is the impact of the war in the Cape Colony. The Cape had been the launchpad for the ideological war into the South

African interior, and its subdued wartime experiences had a profound effect on cultural identity among Afrikaners. Given that the impetus and agenda of future Afrikaner Nationalism would come to be dominated by the “southern tradition” that emerged amongst the nationalist intelligentsia of the Cape, investigation into the impact of the war on Cape society warrants closer inspection. Despite having intricate family connections to the republics and sharing in the same language and religion, only a small number of Cape Colonists joined the republics in open warfare against Britain. As British subjects, any tangible support to the South African Republic (ZAR) and Orange Free State (OFS) would have been regarded as an act of treason. Many condemned the war as an act of imperial aggression invoked by the greed of opportunistic robber barons. Most sympathised openly with their republican neighbours but refrained from any overt political and military action. The reason for this muted response is one of complexity and requires a more informed understanding of the historical development of Cape Afrikaner identity. Answers can be found when scrutinising the emergence of the unique hybrid culture that emerged at the Cape in the period following the final British occupation of 1806.

ii.) The impact of British rule on the Cape Colony

After a prolonged period of neglect by the profit driven Dutch East India Company (VOC), during which the Dutch settlers were mostly left to their own devices and denied any significant improvements to infrastructure and cultural development, the naturalised Cape Dutch had acquired a strong character of independence and affinity for their adopted country. The change in regime infused the Cape with a firm but benevolent British paternalism which mitigated the deficiencies of the old Dutch system. The British leniently allowed many of the old hierarchical remnants of the VOC to remain intact, and incorporated them into their own systems to govern the Cape more efficiently. The Cape Dutch were also beneficiaries of educational advances, improvements to infrastructure, and an important economic revamp of the market system. As the Cape Dutch adopted British ways and the two groups started to intermarry, many grew wealthy and new social hierarchies and foundations of power started to emerge. Despite the amalgamation of cultures, certain fault lines between the two remained which increasingly manifested in an urban-rural divide. Politically apathetic, rural Cape Afrikaners sought protection for their way of

life, mostly in the form of control over black labour and protective trade tariffs. They were regarded as backwards by their more worldly and progressive British countrymen, who economically dominated the urban spheres of life. Yet, as this hybrid Cape identity matured throughout the nineteenth century, the space keeping cultures apart was narrowed by the shared frontier experience and a political system that recognised the importance of accommodating the Afrikaner electorate. Through compromise and coercion, British rule in the Cape Colony allowed the descendants of the Dutch to remain a culturally distinct group, yet by including them in the apparatus of the state, their identity was transformed through their connection with the British world. The years under Company rule were hallmarked by a lack of cultural achievement and opportunities for expression. When combined with their self-identification as a conquered nation and gratitude over the improvements and allowances introduced by British rule, Cape Afrikaners developed a certain deference to authority which allowed for a duality in allegiance, accommodating both their cultural distinctiveness and British citizenship. The resulting portrait of white Cape society that emerged, was one in which loyalties were often conflicted, contradictory, and subject to regional and even familial patterns of affiliation.

The issue of allegiance among Cape Afrikaners then, was one of complexity. While politicians and patrons in the period leading up to the war had an innate understanding of this hybrid cultural creature, the new High Commissioner, Alfred Milner, and the dyed-in-the-wool British military command that followed on his heels as war bloomed, had limited understanding and even less patience for the complexities in the Cape. Milner became convinced that in order for the war to be won and imperial hegemony successfully installed, it required slaying the chimera of Cape Colonial identity with its multitude and conflicting loyalties. The individuals in the British military tasked to suppress rebellion and maintain law and order in the Cape, were remnants of a British imperial system unprepared for the complexities in cultural identity which characterised Cape society. As martial law was declared, the inherent constitutional rights of Cape Afrikaners as British subjects were suspended, and its enforcement carried out by what seemed to be a completely foreign and alien style of governance. During this period, the privileges, authority and ultimately the identity of Cape Afrikaners were severely challenged. As civil liberties, control over labour, and old hierarchies were swept aside by martial law in the efforts to defend the

colony, Cape Afrikaners increasingly became aware of their cultural exclusion, and thus the war contributed to a greater sense of ethnic solidarity.

iii.) Literature review:

Existing studies on the effects of the South African War in the Cape are sparse and dated. A notable exception is Pierre Burger's *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, an excellent dissertation on the effects of the war on the civilian population of Oudtshoorn, which has proved to be a valuable companion piece to this paper, as both towns were located in the same military jurisdiction during the war. Some of the older studies like CJS Strydom's *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog* (1943) and JH Snyman's *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902* (1979), were written in a distinctly Afrikaner Nationalist vocabulary with providential overtones that tend to gloss over the fractured identity of Cape Afrikaners. Although well researched, both studies are products of a specific historiographical school that tends to forgo interpretation in favour of "scientific objectivity." To be fair, Snyman's studies are generally even-handed regarding the multiplicities in allegiance, and his *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)* (1962) provides valuable contextual information for understanding the constitutional issues regarding the application of martial law by the Cape Colonial Parliament. Likewise, John Galbraith's *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement* (1983), provides insight into the issues facing the British military in the implementation of martial law by recounting the history of its usage throughout the British Empire. Other studies, like Taffy Shearing's dogged and meticulous *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902* (2004) are concerned mainly with the military aspects and movements of rebel commandos in the Cape.

An overarching concern regarding all these studies is the terminology and vocabulary they employ. They tend to create synthetic divisions and dichotomies for the sake of analysis and generalisation, which often obscures complexity regarding allegiance and identity. The term Cape Afrikaner is in itself problematic, as it carries certain connotations of a later era that did not necessarily exist during the period

under focus. Referring to the non-English speaking inhabitants of the Colony as the Cape Dutch would be linguistically more representative but also fails to comprehensively describe the unique culture in question. In their defence, such synthetic divisions are to some extent an unavoidable consequence when writing about a subject so naturally divisive as war. Mordechai Tamarkin's studies on the relationship between Cape Afrikaners and British politicians at the turn of the nineteenth century provides the most informative account on the nature of Cape identity, and fits well onto the foundations of Ross and Giliomee's studies on rural hierarchies and early nationalism at the Cape. However, they stop short at the start of the war, and the issue of Cape Afrikaner identity only re-emerges via oblique references in studies examining the period between the Act of Union and the Second World War. This study ambitiously aims to fill this gap by restoring complexity to the issues of allegiance and identity, in the hope of identifying new and historically significant factors which may have influenced Cape loyalties during the South African War.

iv.) Goals of study

The broad focus of this paper is an examination into the complexities in allegiance among Cape Afrikaners during the South African War. Specifically, it focuses on how the community of Heidelberg experienced the South African War. Its purpose is twofold, and aims to illustrate the complexity and nuance in allegiance among inhabitants of the Cape Colony, as well as contributing to the larger narrative regarding the emergence of Afrikaner ethnic identity and a nascent Afrikaner Nationalism. For the purposes of this study, the Southern Cape town of Heidelberg was chosen as case study. Given that Heidelberg was situated at an administrative crossroads between two regions, its inhabitants had grown accustomed to a certain degree of autonomy free of unnecessary government interference. It shared the spirit of independence which existed in the more isolated areas of the Northern Cape and Cape Midlands where acts of rebellion were more rife. This factor greatly compounded the uncertainty and frustration regarding its efficient administration and loyalty during the war. Heidelberg was also one of the few towns in this part of the Cape to witness a major military engagement between an invading republican force and the British military. Its inhabitants not only experienced the conflict through

martial law measures but also witnessed the physical violence of war in person. Unlike larger towns, where the urban space was dominated by a large English speaking community, in Heidelberg the English community was a minority and the urban sphere was occupied by anglicised Afrikaners with family ties to both language groups.

This study aims to extend and add to the work of scholars like, Hermann Giliomee, Robert Ross, and Mordechai Tamarkin, by placing wartime Heidelberg in the conceptual framework they constructed regarding the emergence of, and challenge to, rural Afrikaner socio-economic hierarchies. It will start by illustrating how the socio-economic structure of the region and local community had emerged in the period prior to and following Heidelberg's founding, while connecting this process to wider currents of cultural development within Cape society. This section contains the fundamental ideas on class, identity, and allegiance in rural Cape society which forms the conceptual framework for this paper. This section will conclude by providing a snapshot of Heidelberg at the start of the war and aims to display the contemporary mood and concerns which preoccupied the community at the time. The next chapter examines the issue of allegiance by examining how local inhabitants displayed their wartime loyalty to Britain and documenting cases of sympathy towards the Boer republics. This chapter aims to add to the complexity regarding the divided loyalties of Cape Afrikaners by examining the non-ideological motivations behind loyalty, as well as scrutinising familial ties to the Boer Republics. Like other chapters in this study, it makes heavy use of genealogical records in order to discern a more nuanced understanding of allegiance and identify alternative patterns of loyalty than the synthetic dichotomies provided by existing studies on the war in the Cape.

The next section concerns the administration and enforcement of martial law in the community of Heidelberg and how the measures of war challenged the traditional hierarchies, sources of power and ultimately the identity of local Afrikaners. It will start by examining the clash between Imperial and Cape British styles of governance and culture which caused a great deal of frustration, contempt, and distrust between the military personnel tasked with defending the colony and the Cape inhabitants subjected to martial law. This section documents incidents and prosecutions under martial law in the Heidelberg region and aims to show how identity and authority was challenged during the war. It also examines how

administrative lags, confusion over authority and mistrust of existing Cape judicial authority filtered down to compound the tension created under martial law. Chapter 4 details the events of the military engagement in Heidelberg which took place when an invading Boer commando attacked the town on 13 September 1901. The battle in town served as a violent culmination of the anxiety and dislocation experienced by the community during the war, and provides further confirmation of conclusions reached in the preceding chapters. The final chapter examines community reactions to the battle and martial law during the closing months of the war, and aims to establish how the community composition had changed regarding issues of allegiance and identity. This section includes incidents of retribution and reconciliation, as well as illustrating how the community had changed in the years following the war.

v.) On the use of local history: limitations and opportunities

The level of detail and extensive use of genealogy in this study arguably places it in the field of local history. In addition to the stigma connected to local history and its amateur origins, this presents certain theoretical dilemmas regarding the representivity and historical significance of this study's findings. Some of the theoretical objections and critiques associated with local history are inherent to the nature of all historical research, while others only pertain to local history's unit of study. In order to avoid the more salient of these pitfalls and ensure the relevance of this study, it is important that some of these concerns be addressed. The most frequent charge laid against local histories concern their amateur nature that relies heavily on anecdotal evidence and apocryphal tales. Conversely, the academic discipline of local history is often criticised as being elitist for relying heavily on documentary evidence whilst omitting oral sources and the histories of common people.¹ The latter criticism, is ironic and only troublesome to those completely blind to the limitations of historical sources and the inherent theoretical issues of their use. Yet, keeping these critiques in mind while producing a study such as this can be highly beneficial to the synthesis of data and findings. This study aims to overcome these pitfalls by utilising both documentary sources and existing amateur local histories. Due to the subject

¹ G. Sheeran & Y. Sheeran: *Discourses in Local History*, p. 67.

matter's distance in the past, obtaining oral testimony from first hand witnesses was impossible. Therefore, the use of existing local histories, both amateur and academic, formed a crucial part of reconstructing historic events and ascertaining vital biographical information of the historical actors of this study. Aside from providing more comprehensive information usually omitted from amateur local histories, the documentary sources in this study are also used to verify, dismiss or clarify anecdotal information in the local histories used. This complementary approach produces a richer historical account while simultaneously addressing the social historian's charge that the use of documentary sources places too much focus on the history of institutions and elites whilst ignoring the history of common people.

Another issue plaguing the application of local history concerns the representivity of the unit of study. Resolving the question of whether local history's small unit of study can be representative of national history as well as subject to wider trends and influences, is the central theoretical problem of the discipline. This issue was first identified by HPR Finberg in his 1952 paper, *The Local Historian and His Theme*, which illustrates the theoretical precariousness connected to the concept of localised national history. Finberg highlights the need for a more nuanced approach that addresses the question of whether local history is simply a reflection of national trends, or if it bucks these trends in a historically significant way.² Therefore it is of paramount importance to tread lightly when attempting to conflate the local with the national through generalisations. Studies have shown that the proper interpretation of local historical data requires not only determining the validity of the data but also the context of its creation, in order to ascertain its significance to the study.³

Acknowledging the context of local historical data and its limitations when connecting the local to the national, highlights the need to identify other modulating factors. This reflects more recent trends which attempt to introduce more interdisciplinary approaches to local history. These include geography, sociology, and cultural anthropology, which take into account factors like natural boundaries, the physical landscape, regional cultural trends and community dynamics. The goal of such approaches is to identify the more salient factors which may have shaped local

² G. Sheeran & Y. Sheeran: *Discourses in Local History*, p. 68.

³ W. Kew: *The value of local history*, p. 16.

history, their weighted significance in relation to larger national trends, and/or their modulating influence on said trends.⁴

This study attempts to take into account any inconspicuous local factors which may have shaped the community reaction to the war and martial law measures. In order to identify these factors and their modulating influence on community allegiance, requires consideration of the historic development of the region surrounding Heidelberg. This pre-war historical account takes into consideration the socio-economic and cultural impact of geography, regional economic development, and the reciprocal relationship between material and cultural change. It primarily illustrates the creation of a regional cultural identity among inhabitants very much in line with the general disposition of all Cape Afrikaners. This meant an identity and disposition shaped by the introduction of British culture and institutions, and modulated by regional geographic and economic realities as well as larger national trends.

An approach to local histories that attempts to address the local vs. national issue is that of the case study or microcosmic study, which can be defined as the analysis of a small area within a larger context. It has been suggested that such studies are distinct from traditional local history and are often referred to as micro-histories. Case studies or micro-histories can either endorse national trends or deviate from them. In his paper *Local history: A new definition and its implications* (1981), Victor Skipp suggests aggregating micro-studies in order to create a national history mosaic. In such a model, local history is used as an approach or field of study rather than a distinct discipline.⁵ This model offers the best solution for this study, as it addresses the inherent theoretical problem of local history by allowing the use of studies on other localities for the sake of comparison.⁶

By comparing the findings of this study with those from other localities during the South African War (eg. Burger's study on Oudtshoorn), and aggregating these into a colonial mosaic, a more comprehensive and representative historiographic record of the war's effects on the Cape Colony can be produced. Although partially in the realm of local history, this study is by no means a comprehensive history of Heidelberg, and is only concerned with the local history to ascertain how it shaped community

⁴ G. Sheeran & Y. Sheeran: *Discourses in Local History*, p. 68.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

⁶ W. Kew: *The value of local history*, p. 15.

response during and after the war. To reiterate, this study makes extensive use of existing local histories to create a highly detailed history of wartime Heidelberg, yet on its own it is not a “pure” local history per se, as it is primarily concerned with matters relating to the South African War. Confining the unit of study is also problematic given the rural setting, and much effort is exerted when selecting what to include. A more inclusive and regional approach such as the one used in the pre-war historical development would probably be better but unfeasible given the level of detail undertaken in the research. This study aims to overcome the limitations inherent to local history and seeks to illustrate its complementary value to academic historical research.

Chapter 1 – Town and Country

1.1) Early Roads

Heidelberg is situated on the banks of the Duivenhoks River at the foot of the Langeberg mountain range. The town lies halfway between Swellendam and Riversdale, on the edge of the vast agricultural area known as the Overberg. Tracing the historical development of this area and its place in the history of Cape society is vital to understanding the character and allegiances of the inhabitants. The root of early colonisation and settlement of the Overberg was driven primarily by the VOC's demand for meat which prompted cattle bartering with the native peoples of the area, resulting in early trekboers reaching the Breede River circa 1720.⁷ Prior to 1707, the vast Overberg region was the exclusive domain of Governor Willem Adriaan Van Der Stel, and consisted of 18 farms managed by company employees appointed as foremen. The present day site of Heidelberg used to form part of the farm Wytgelegen, before Van Der Stel had to forfeit ownership of his property holdings after being dismissed over corruption charges.

The dissolution of Van Der Stel's private fiefdom, led to the recall of his foremen who spread word of the lucrative opportunities of farming in the area. This inspired wealthy peninsula farmers to graze their cattle on the other side of the Hottentots Holland mountains, as well as luring lower ranking Company employees to apply for leasehold farms which formed part of a newly designed land ownership system designed to secure perpetual rents and settle the wild interior of the country.⁸ Most of these early settlers had been drawn from impoverished German states into the service of the VOC as low ranking employees and indentured servants.⁹ Settlement of the Overberg occurred along the path of the old trade route used by the native people who originally inhabited the area. This was the same route used by the seventeenth century explorers Hieronymus Cruise and Olof Bergh, and became known as the *Kaapse wapad* or old *Wagen-weg*, for its adherence to the level areas surrounding the river which could be traversed by wagon.¹⁰

⁷ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 198.

⁸ E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, pp. 7-9.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 24.

Settlement of the area grew slowly yet steadily over the next century, aided by protection from the VOC to ensure a steady supply of meat to the Cape. Starting in the 1780s settlement increased threefold as roughly 200 immigrants seeded the area. These early settlers would establish many of the well known Cape Afrikaner families which came to dominate the region and play an important role in the shaping of its future. Familiar surnames included: Beukes, Beyers, De Kock, Delport, De Wet, Du Toit, Fick, Gildenhuys, Groenewald, Linde, Morkel, Moolman, Otto, Swart, and Wessels.¹¹ The majority of these early farmers were poor stock farmers who also kept sheep for extra income and nourishment in addition to the cattle feeding the VOC's demand for beef. In general, farming in the Overberg remained relatively unprofitable and on a subsistence level throughout the late eighteenth century and first decade of the nineteenth century as the lucrative Cape Town market was still too far away and inaccessible to most of these farmers.¹²

Although the majority of farmers in the region came from humble beginnings and lived simple unobtrusive lives, there were, of course, notable exceptions. Some of the more illustrious settlers to the region included foreign professionals and mercenaries hired by the Company to explore and chart the sparsely inhabited interiors. These included the French Chevalier, Francois Renier Duminy, tasked with charting the Cape coastline from 1782-1790. As part of his remuneration, Duminy was awarded land near Caledon and next to the Breede River in the vicinity of what is today Riversonderend and Malgas. His daughter Jeanne Francois,¹³ inherited the Caledon farm after his death and married the Belgian Charles Johannes Van Helslandt. Duminy's eldest son, Francois Anthonie Duminy,¹⁴ named his own son, Pieter Willem Van Helslandt Duminy,¹⁵ in honour of his brother in law. This branch of the Duminy family eventually settled near the Krombeks River on what would become the outskirts of Heidelberg.¹⁶ Arguably the most well known of the old Company scions were the Van Reenen and Reitz families, who by means of marriage, both to one another and to newly arrived British pioneers, established not only an agriculturally based economic empire, but also one of South Africa's earliest and most influential political families. The Van Reenen's had a wealthy aristocratic

¹¹ E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, p. 13.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

¹³ Duminy b1

¹⁴ Duminy b2

¹⁵ Duminy b2c6

¹⁶ E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, p. 58.

Prussian heritage, which endowed the South African primogenitor's son, Jacob Van Reenen,¹⁷ with a considerable fortune that was supplemented by his lucrative contracts to provide the Company with meat and wine.¹⁸ Van Reenen's sons Dirk Gysbert¹⁹ and Jacob,²⁰ were early agricultural pioneers of the region, and settled the fertile stretch of farmland along the path of the Slang River in the vicinity of Port Beaufort. Dirk Gysbert's farm, Rhenosterfontein, would become the jewel in the Van Reenen crown and base of operation for using their vast fortune and land holdings to experiment with new agricultural techniques and stock breeding which influenced the agrarian development of the region. Dirk Gysbert Van Reenen was an early adopter who experimented with the wool yields of Merino sheep, by crossbreeding these Spanish rams with the Overberg staple, the Cape Fat Tail, as early as 1782 on his farm in the Swartland area.²¹

The Merino sheep was famously introduced to the Cape in 1789 by Captain Robert Jacob Gordon, the ill-fated garrison commander of the Cape who committed suicide after failing to prevent the British from invading in 1795.²² Van Reenen's early tinkering with crossbreeding Merino and Cape sheep would eventually be expanded and brought to fruition by JF Reitz and Michiel Van Breda. The introduction of the crossbred Merino with its bountiful wool yield and robust meat supply would significantly boost the prosperity of the Overberg region starting in the second decade of the nineteenth century.²³ JF Reitz arrived in Cape Town as part of the Dutch Navy in 1794, as a result of Napoleon seizing the Netherlands. Choosing voluntary exile instead of returning to his tumultuous homeland, Reitz settled in Cape Town and married Barbara Jacoba Van Reenen, the daughter of Dirk Gysbert Van Reenen. Their youngest son, Francis William Reitz Snr (1810-1881),²⁴ would

¹⁷ Van Reenen b1

¹⁸ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 143-144.

¹⁹ Van Reenen b1c7

²⁰ Van Reenen b1c8

²¹ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 90-91.

²² E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, pp. 122-123.

²³ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 90-91.

²⁴ Reitz b6

eventually succeed his maternal grandfather as the agricultural baron and spokesman for the interests of the Cape Afrikaner in the Overberg region.²⁵

By the 1830s, the region known as the Overberg had become prosperous, despite the introduction of certain fundamental changes to society, like the emancipation of slaves, which initially seemed to threaten the livelihood of the region's inhabitants. The Merino sheep had replaced the horse and ox as the staple farm commodities, its wool creating a very lucrative market which lifted many farmers out of marginality and into modernity. British rule introduced growth of the rural economy in first half of nineteenth century, and by mid century the Swellendam area had become largest grain growing district in the Cape. This was also the result of the use of Port Beaufort as a harbour which connected the eastern areas beyond mountains to the Cape peninsula by sea. During the period of Company rule, officials had not even bothered with collecting taxes from the area. Wheat now accounted for 60% of grains grown in the Colony, the region having grown prosperous as a result of market access and government contracts supplying cereals to feed the British military on the eastern frontier. The descendants of early trekboers and squatters had become sedentary and deeply connected to the land which they had settled.

In the wake of the final British conquest of 1806, they had become more domesticated, and prone to displays of conspicuous consumption, fuelled by greater access to material objects and larger discretionary incomes. This was also an effect of the British overhaul of the land grant system, whereby loan farms were systematically replaced by free holds from 1814 to 1850 in order to create a property market and tax revenues, as well as in an attempt to stabilise the rural regions by promoting settlement and docility.²⁶ The changes in culture resulting from the booming material prosperity are quite noticeable when comparing excerpts taken from travel accounts recorded during the Batavian and British periods. Lady Anne Barnard described in detail the limited vanities, unkempt yards and lack of personal possessions during her 1798 visit to Port Beaufort and stay at Jacob Van Reenen's farm, Meerlust.

These observations contrast markedly from later descriptions of the displays of wealth at Rhenosterfontein. Accounts describe it's inhabitants as the epitome of rich

²⁵ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 92-93.

²⁶ R. Ross: *Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa*, pp. 51-52.

country squires, complete with all the associated luxuries and personal accoutrements.²⁷ The influx of British culture and resulting material changes had opened up a vital conduit for expression to rural Cape Afrikaners which they had been denied during the Company period. Physically isolated and neglected by a business concern uninterested in providing any inhabitants of infrastructure attuned to their economic, cultural and spiritual needs, led to a lifestyle of seclusion. Cut off from peninsular life and with limited means or access to the simplest of material objects and conveniences, the rural lifestyle of the Overberg people had afforded them little opportunity or conduit for social, cultural or individual expression. In the absence of more traditional and conspicuous outlets of expression, coupled with their relative isolation from one another, occupants of the area developed uniquely rural and culturally specific means of expression. A dearth in personal possessions and lack of occasion to display their rank, station, wealth and individuality, gave rise to the use of more mundane and subtle forms of expression. All aspects of daily life were in some way used as opportunities for affirmation and distinction, which included the hallmarks of rural life such as hospitality, gregariousness, cordiality and politeness. Due to the secluded lifestyle and relative rarity of socialising, all social gatherings became opportunities for distinction and expression, especially events centred around food preparation like the customary Sunday afternoon hosting of visiting neighbours.²⁸ Some accounts have even suggested that the desire for expression extended to the rituals surrounding country funerals.²⁹

The changes to Overberg society primarily originated from the external influence of the British takeover as well as the internal responses to the changes wrought by the new dispensation.³⁰ These material changes had a powerful impact on culture and identity, and go a long way in aiding our understanding of Cape Afrikaner identity. Before the arrival of the British, there had been no need for them to culturally self-identify, as most had been assimilated into the primarily Dutch culture of the Cape, and could simply be called Cape Dutch. The incursion of the British and subsequent transformation of Cape society would also fundamentally change their

²⁷ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 150.

²⁸ E. Prins: *Die kulturele en ekonomiese ontwikkeling van die westelike Overberg in die agtiende en vroeë negentiende eeu*, pp. 103-104.

²⁹ P. Borchers: *An autobiographical memoir*, p. 194.

³⁰ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 62-63.

perception of themselves. The British transformation of the Cape over the course of the nineteenth century significantly contributed to the formation of Afrikaner cultural identity.

Yet the Cape Afrikaners as referred to in this study did not yet represent the modern twentieth century conception connected to the moniker. In the introduction to *Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa*, Robert Ross emphasises the very colonial nature of the culture that characterised Cape society during the nineteenth century.³¹ Culturally and politically, Afrikaners in the Cape Colony would differ markedly from their Republican brethren in the north, having a vested interest, both economically and culturally, in the imperially-connected colonial society of which they had become part.³² The hybrid culture that hallmarked the colonial society at the Cape was primarily the result of how the remnants of the social structure from the VOC period had been reshaped and transformed by the changes and reforms introduced with British rule.³³ The hallmarks of British paternal rule after 1806, directly reflected British intentions for the Cape.

Initially, the Cape was not regarded as a new colonial settlement, nor just as a resource for raw materials, but as a strategic stronghold along the route to their eastern maritime empire. As such, the main objective was control, as to establish and maintain order. Entrenching law and order required a more autocratic and hands-on approach to the administration of the Cape than had been the case during the Company period. For Cape Afrikaners, the firm hand of British paternal rule first manifested itself when the old legal distinctions which stratified Cape society during the Company period were disposed of. The revamp did away with ambiguous position which the Khoi had inhabited within the old system and identified them as subjects on the same legal footing as the Europeans. Torture and capital punishment of Khoi labourers were outlawed and enforced by a new circuit court system that forced farmers and employers to settle labour disputes through official and recorded means.³⁴ Most Cape Afrikaners were wary of the courts due to illiteracy and the fear of punishment when labourers or slaves testified against them on brutality charges. The fear of losing control over labour and the indigenous population helped the British to

³¹ R. Ross: *Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa*, p. 1.

³² A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 20.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

subdue the unruly elements among rural Cape Afrikaners, as well as establishing a precedent of docility and weariness of political involvement among most.³⁵

Despite the seemingly altruistic government measures concerned with the plight of indigenous peoples, the new economic realities of administering the Cape proved to be more pertinent, resulting in the mitigation of most of these policies. In order to realise the blueprint of a financially self-sufficient asset, the British needed the Cape to be productive. After the British invasion, there was an increased demand for meat, and with the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the Cape experienced increasing labour shortages that did not bode well for the British plan of self-sufficiency. As a result the British were forced to institutionalise elements of the existing Dutch labour control system in order to subordinate the large numbers of Khoi people who were absorbed into the labour market after the old legal distinctions were dismantled. The net effect of these economic and administrative necessities was increased control over the labour market and new labour mechanisms that prolonged the existence of measures like passes and indentured servitude.³⁶ Although labour had now become contract based, freedom and mobility was dealt a blow in 1809 through the adoption of Caledon's Code which required Khoi labourers to have a fixed residence and apply for passes should they decide to move.³⁷

The Apprenticeship of Servants Act of 1812 effectively nullified Khoi freedom and reintroduced indentureship by forcing Khoi children into unpaid labour for a period of ten years.³⁸ Ordinance 50 of 1828 repealed these restrictions on the Khoi in an attempt to stimulate labour productivity in anticipation of the emancipation of slaves. Yet, without adequate legislation and measures to enforce the new proclamation, and its enforcement, often the responsibility of disinclined Cape Afrikaner officials in unsupervised rural areas, such gestures had little practical effect.³⁹ By 1833 when slavery at the Cape was officially abolished, former slave owners were already skilled in the arts of coercive labour having drawn from their experience to control Khoi labour. By the 1850s the system and mechanisms for

³⁵ R. Ross: *Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa*, p. 7.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁷ N. Penn: *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century*, p. 268.

³⁸ S. Trapido: *From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834*, p. 84.

³⁹ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, pp. 12-13.

controlling labour were thoroughly entrenched by way of a series of laws which came to be known as the Master and Servant Ordinances.⁴⁰

The new British administration at the Cape realised at an early stage that the primary obstacle blocking its reforms were the remnants of the old Company system in the rural areas. Real authority in the rural districts had always been in the hands of the lower officials who served under Landdrosts and Magistrates. In the old Dutch system, the Landdrosts were very reliant on local boards (*heemraden*) and field cornets (*veldwachtmeesters*) to execute official policy. More than often, these local officials had firm ties to their respective communities on whom they depended for re-election. As such, the way in which they officiated their duties was often coloured by local and even personal interest, resulting in them acting more as agents for local interest than representing the will of the government.⁴¹ Even though the newly created post of Colonial Governor of the Cape was vested with extraordinary executive power, the British elected to leave the bulk of the administration of the colony in the hands of existing officials. The reason for this decision was twofold. Firstly, it aligned with British policy goals of making the Cape more productive by making it pay for its own upkeep.⁴² Secondly, the British recognised that existing local officials represented the elites of Cape Dutch society, and by incorporating them into the new system was vital to ensuring a smooth transition, as they had the necessary power of influence to sway local electorates.⁴³ The decision to accommodate the existing Cape gentry and hierarchies based on the legal distinctions from the Company period, would have a profound effect on the way Cape society would develop over the course of the nineteenth century. Within the new British order these old hierarchies were transmuted into the new social classes of colonial society, and contributed significantly to the cultural identity of Cape Afrikaners.⁴⁴ By allowing old structures of power to continue and ensuring control over labour, British governance established powerful precedents which served to entrench Cape Afrikaner cultural identity in relation to indigenous populations.

⁴⁰ R. Ross: *Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa*, p. 6.

⁴¹ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 8.

⁴² S. Trapido: *From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834*, p. 81.

⁴³ N. Penn: *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century*, pp. 269-270.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

Shortly after the invasion of 1806, the British started to court Cape Afrikaners and to mollify the top strata by giving preference to their wine within the imperial market system and by abolishing the trade limitations set in place by the VOC.⁴⁵ Initially, the rural Cape Afrikaner elite were weary of getting politically involved beyond the local level. Most avoided coming to a head with the expansive powers of the Governor and instead relied on patronage to sustain their interests. The proclamation of Ordinance 19 in 1826, which sought to improve the treatment of slaves, prompted some of the disaffected to bemoan the usurping of a master's authority over his slaves.⁴⁶ The vocalisation of such grievances followed in the wake of the 1825 slump in the Cape wine market when imperial preference was withdrawn. Although the Cape's induction into the imperial market system had stimulated agricultural production, and the recent slump in wine prices was to a certain extent ameliorated by the growing export market for merino wool, Cape Afrikaners were becoming increasingly aware of the cultural rift with their new countrymen and colonial government.⁴⁷ The British takeover and subsequent influx of settlers translated into increased population growth, better infrastructure, establishment of towns and diversification of cultures. As British immigrants to the Cape did not assimilate to the pre-existing culture at the Cape but remained distinct, Cape Afrikaners became just one of many minority groups that felt increasingly marginalised and culturally excluded from British civic institutions.⁴⁸

In the Overberg, one of the changes manifested was the completion of the pass in 1830 that crossed the Hottentots Hollands Mountains which guaranteed the survival and prosperity of the region by linking it to the markets and speeding up travel by replacing ox wagons with horse carts. Spearheaded and vigorously defended by Cape Governor Sir Lowry Cole, the pass was testament to benefits of British rule and mutual cooperation between the two groups.⁴⁹ Yet, since the arrival of British settlers from the 1820s, frequent cultural clashes occurred, most commonly resulting over resentment regarding perceived British cultural superiority. A degree of distance and cultural distinctiveness still remained between the two groups, as the Dutch or

⁴⁵ S. Trapido: *From Paternalism to Liberalism: The Cape Colony, 1800-1834*, p. 83.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

⁴⁷ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, pp. 13, 23.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁹ E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, pp. 20-21.

emergent Afrikaners retained a sense of inferiority as a conquered people and clashed at various points in Cape history with the British sense of cultural superiority.⁵⁰

Cultural enmity between the groups was compounded by the fact that those inhabiting the Cape prior to British rule had achieved little economic or cultural achievements. English culture took hold in urban commercial spaces while Dutch-Afrikaners remained largely rural and illiterate.⁵¹ These differences between the groups were often reflected in their respective cultural and leisure activities. While the British inhabitants at the Cape still retained cultural and emotional ties to their original homeland, Afrikaners had been completely separated from their Dutch origins as multiple generations had lived and died at the Cape.⁵² The introduction of the iron plough had initially been a major issue, as many of the existing inhabitants preferred the older wooden plough.⁵³

Colonial institutions, like the new magistrate system that replaced the landdrosts, were solidly British in culture, resulting in the exclusion of the majority of Cape Afrikaners and translated to a loss of their coercive power. For Cape Afrikaners to escape marginalisation and remain part of the political process, required them to participate in the new system, often leading to partial or total anglicisation. Participation was mostly the purview of the wealthier educated burghers with some past experience in public life. As a result, those old institutions and positions that were absorbed into the British bureaucratic machine formed the framework of how Cape Afrikaner society would be structured and was further strengthened by the Victorian system of rank and class.⁵⁴ Wealthy farmers or former company employees with established agricultural empires transformed into urban traders who used the new language as tool without emotional ties. Institutions like the prestigious school established by the *Tot Nut van't Algemeen* society trained many Cape Afrikaner elites between 1804 and 1870, resulting in successive generations of Cape Afrikaners becoming anglicised, despite the exclusionary nature of British institutions having spurred their begrudging involvement in government.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ M. Tamarkin: *Volk and flock: Ecology, identity and politics among Cape Afrikaners in the late nineteenth century*, pp. 4-5.

⁵¹ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, pp. 194-195.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁵³ E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, p. 100.

⁵⁴ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁵ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, pp. 24, 248.

Cape Afrikaner participation was more a reactive response towards their increasing marginalisation and fluctuating economic realities resulting from the changes introduced by British rule during the first half of the nineteenth century. Most were unconcerned with higher democratic ideals for Cape white society, being more inclined towards maintaining and protecting their status quo. Yet, cooperation and interaction between the two cultural groups proved to be a pivotal action in determining Cape Afrikaner identity.⁵⁶ The cultural and institutional dominance of the British had, to some extent, rendered Cape Afrikaners quiet in public debates regarding colonial rule. Their deference to British culture and authority stemmed from a variety of factors. The humiliation of the Dutch in contrast to British military strength during the invasion of 1806 had instilled a sense of defeat and cultural inferiority. For most, the change in regime had been beneficial, especially in light of dissatisfaction with VOC corruption. British rule had various benefits like improvements to infrastructure, access to better markets and prices, better education, and a stronger economy. The inclusion of a top strata of Cape Afrikaners into the political system and administration of the Colony would also ensure future generations of loyalists. They would form the new generation of Cape Afrikaners who decided to hitch their wagons to British success.⁵⁷

In the Overberg region, probably no other figure more than FW Reitz Snr, came to embody the new duality in cultural identity that hallmarked Cape Colonial society. Born into one of the wealthiest Cape families instrumental during the Company period, and raised during the early transitory period of British rule, Reitz became the quintessential Anglo-Afrikaner, and an ideal figure to bridge the divide between the Dutch and British.⁵⁸ Reitz was educated in English at the Faure School in Cape Town, after which he travelled to Scotland 1829 to study farming for two years. His classical education at the University of Edinburgh shaped his ideas on how to combat horse sickness at the Cape during the 1830s, as well as engendering a life-long love for English literature. Reitz, along with his extended family, was a pivotal figure in the British-infused economic awakening of the Overberg. His education and status as a local Afrikaner during the period when local government and commerce

⁵⁶ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, pp. 246-247.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁵⁸ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 137.

became anglicised, made him approachable to parties from both sides of the cultural divide.⁵⁹

Reitz's elite education and reputation as an Anglophile made him an influential proponent of progressive agricultural techniques and scientific innovation, maintaining the momentum to which British ideas and culture were infused into the region and Cape Afrikaner culture. Reitz maintained a life-long friendship and political partnership with Dr Henry White, the medical practitioner at Swellendam and later Cape Treasurer General who lived in a house on Reitz's farm, Rhenosterfontein. Their relationship exemplified the nature of cooperation between the two cultures during this period.⁶⁰ Although Reitz's political involvement was usually restricted to agricultural matters, he was an influential figure in the Anti-Convict movement of 1849, as well as repeatedly calling for more colonial independence in the form of Responsible Government while on the Cape Legislative Council and Assembly.⁶¹ The Reitz family would become one of South Africa's most influential political families, representing a brand of liberal Anglo-Afrikaner political thought representative of the colonial nationalism and hybrid Cape Colonial identity that hallmarked South African politics until the 1930s.

FW Reitz Snr married Cornelia Magdalena Deneys, the daughter of Swellendam's District Secretary.⁶² Their son FW Reitz Jnr,⁶³ was born in Swellendam in 1844. Like his father he was afforded a classical education at Rondebosch and the South African College, leaving South Africa to study law in London in 1864. Although frequently vacationing at the family farm of Rhenosterfontein, he was not as connected to the Overberg as his father and left to become a lawyer in the Orange Free State in 1870. FW Reitz Jnr would become the president of the OFS, and the Secretary of State for the ZAR during the South African War.⁶⁴ His sister, Frances Hester Reitz, married William Philip Schreiner in Swellendam in 1884. Schreiner would eventually become Prime Minister of the Cape

⁵⁹ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 118-120.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125, 127.

⁶² E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 129.

⁶³ Reitz b6c7

⁶⁴ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 132-133.

Colony, just prior to the outbreak of the South African War.⁶⁵ FW Reitz Jnr inherited his grandfather, DG Van Reenen's giant library of British literature from his father. The collection was moved to Pretoria upon his appointment as State Secretary, only to be lost after the British took Pretoria when his home was ransacked and the books distributed among wounded British soldiers in hospital.⁶⁶ His son, Deneys Reitz, was a Boer commando during the war, later celebrated author and South African High Commissioner to London.⁶⁷

The impact of influential Anglo-Afrikaners like the Reitz and Van Reenen's represent just one part of the story of the Overberg's prosperity during the course of the nineteenth century. Another crucial part of the tale concerns the role played by prominent British families who settled the area and contributed to its economic and cultural development. Like the illustrious Reitz family, the Barry family became synonymous with the history and prosperity of the Overberg. The Barry trading empire was instrumental in popularizing the Merino sheep in the region as well as connecting the region to other markets, both of which profoundly boosted the prosperity and sustainability of the region. Their company, Barry & Nephews, became the vital link that connected the cultures of the region's rural Afrikaner's and British settlers, having a profound impact on the shaping of culture and identity. The enterprise consisted of Joseph Barry and his brother's two sons, Thomas and John.

Joseph Barry was born in England and first arrived at the Cape in 1817 as an agent for a London Wine house. He was tasked with sourcing local wine for export, but the substandard quality of Cape wines brought an end to the venture and Barry returned to England in 1819. However, his visit to the Cape and travels through the hinterland had convinced him to return to the Cape and start a different business endeavour.⁶⁸ The initial enterprise was small and consisted only of Joseph Barry travelling across the region buying and reselling fresh produce, as well as performing various maintenance jobs on farms.⁶⁹ In 1822, when the Overberg's grain crop failed and the region faced hunger, Barry vowed to fulfil the contract to deliver a government relief consignment of rice and wheat to the area. In order to do so

⁶⁵ E. Burrows: *Overberg Origins: the English-speaking Swellendam families*, p. 150.

⁶⁶ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 118-120.

⁶⁷ E. Burrows: *Overberg Origins: the English-speaking Swellendam families*, p. 132.

⁶⁸ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 256-257.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

speedily, he chartered a boat from Cape Town to the harbour at Port Beaufort. The successful delivery of the government consignment sparked the idea to use Port Beaufort and the Breede River as a conduit to deliver fresh produce from the Overberg to the market in Cape Town. The long and arduous overland route via the old wagon route and across the Hottentots Holland Mountains had prevented farmers in the Overberg from selling their produce at a profit and the agricultural output had long been relegated to subsistence use and simple goods-for-goods bartering. By establishing a link via the sea, the Barry's had transformed the Overberg from a barter to a cash economy and ushered in an era of prosperity.⁷⁰

In 1825, Joseph Barry married Johanna Marthina Van Reenen.⁷¹ She was the granddaughter of Dirk Gysbert Van Reenen and cousin of FW Reitz Snr. The joining of these influential families had providential consequences not only for the individual members but also for the economic development of the region and its cultural development. Joseph's marriage into the rural Afrikaner gentry bestowed him with respectability and acceptance by the Afrikaner community, as well as granting him access to the agricultural innovation of the Van Reenen/Reitz powerhouse.⁷² JF Reitz and Michiel Van Breda, were undoubtedly the leading innovators experimenting with cross breeding the Spanish Merino and Cape Fat Tail sheep. Yet, it was the tenacity and entrepreneurship of Joseph Barry that popularised the Merino throughout the region. Distributing the Merino and its wool through the Barry trade empire, did much to break down Afrikaner resistance and animosity towards the idea of abandoning the Cape Fat Tail.⁷³ Barry's successful marketing of the Merino was so exceptional that when studying the inventories of Rhenosterfontein, it can be seen that in 1831 the farm had no sheep, yet by the end of 1832, a total of 1743 Merino's were recorded on the books and by 1862 FW Reitz had completely switched over to keeping Merino sheep.⁷⁴

By the end of the 1850s, Barry & Nephews were exporting Overberg-produced Merino wool directly to London via Port Beaufort. By 1857, the business

⁷⁰ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 232.

⁷¹ Van Reenen b6c7d2e1

⁷² E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 256-257.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

was selling wool products over the counter in their own stores.⁷⁵ Joseph Barry's success prompted him to invite his two nephews to join him in South Africa. Thomas and John followed their uncle in business and marriage, with both marrying into the Van Reenen family. Both John and Thomas married women named Aletta Catharina Van Reenen. Thomas' wife was the daughter of Jacob Van Reenen, the granddaughter of DG Van Reenen, and the sister of Joseph's wife Johanna Marthina.⁷⁶ John's wife was the daughter of Daniel Van Reenen, the granddaughter of DG Van Reenen, and the cousin of Thomas and Joseph's wives.⁷⁷

The expansion of the Barry & Nephews enterprise seemed to mirror the growth of the region, as new branches opened in every new town established over the course of the century. Towns like Riversdale, Heidelberg, Riviersonderend, Bredasdorp, Montagu, Robertson, Mosselbay, Ladismith and Barrydale, all contained a branch of Barry & Nephews.⁷⁸ Joseph established himself in Swellendam, while Thomas was stationed at the enterprise's headquarters at Port Beaufort. Thomas' son, John Joseph,⁷⁹ worked and operated the Heidelberg store for many years.⁸⁰ The Barry's were highly influential in determining what the farmers in the region produced and in the way they conducted business. Joseph Barry contributed greatly towards engendering trust and cooperation between local farmers and the British settlers in the way he conducted business. As many Afrikaner farmers resented the cultural superiority of the British and often felt inferior due to such shortcomings as being illiterate, Barry recognised the need to make his clients feel comfortable. Barry & Nephews would often undertake the signing of contracts and other written documentation on the behalf of illiterate farmers. They also recognised the importance of accommodating clientele in their native tongue, and the slogan: *As jy lekker wil lewe, koop by Barry en Nee!*, soon became a well known catchphrase in the district.⁸¹ After the emancipation of slaves in 1833, the Barry's had even filed compensation claims on the behalf of farmers, who had granted them power of

⁷⁵ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 115.

⁷⁶ Van Reenen b6c7d2e3

⁷⁷ Van Reenen b6c7d6e3

⁷⁸ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 263-264.

⁷⁹ Barry b1

⁸⁰ E. Burrows: *Overberg Origins: the English-speaking Swellendam families*, p. 2.

⁸¹ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 255.

attorney.⁸² From 1852 until 1876 Barry & Nephews even operated the Swellendam Bank, which was a subsidiary of their main enterprise. So powerful and influential in the rural economy of the Overberg had the Barry's become that they even started to print their own promissory notes, which farmers used as a currency.⁸³ The popularity and acceptance of the business by rural Afrikaners had much to do with Joseph Barry's formative years in the region, when he had shared in their hardship and endeared himself to them through a reputation of honesty and integrity.⁸⁴

Like the Barry's, the Moodies were another influential British family in the history of the region. Descending from noble Scottish origins, Benjamin Moodie arrived in the area in 1817.⁸⁵ Moodie was employed to bring English craftsmen into the Overberg as part of the 1820s settler drive. For his efforts, Moodie was granted 5000 morgen of land near Port Beaufort by Sir Lowry Cole in 1831.⁸⁶ From here, Moodie established the Port Beaufort Trading Company which exported wheat and imported manufactured goods into the Overberg. The success of the enterprise stimulated the growth of wheat by farmers.⁸⁷ The Moodies soon grew in stature as they settled into the community and became ingratiated to local Afrikaners. Although not part of the DRC, Moodie was granted special membership to attend services at the DRC church in Swellendam. Both Moodie and his son, Donald, become field cornets in the Heidelberg region.⁸⁸

⁸² E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 263-264.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 214

⁸⁶ E. Burrows: *Overberg Origins: the English-speaking Swellendam families*, p. 82.

⁸⁷ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 214.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

1.2) A town is born

The earliest known reference to the site that was to become the town of Heidelberg can be found in a journal entry made by Hendrik Swellengrebel Jnr, while visiting the Cape during 1776. Swellengrebel, the son of one time Cape Governor, Hendrik Swellengrebel Snr, was en route to Swellendam by way of the old wagon road that followed the river in the direction of Zuurbraak. While exploring the surrounds, he recorded making a stop on a farm belonging to the widow Fourie, situated on the banks of the Duivenhoks River.⁸⁹ Like other towns in the Cape Colony, the story of Heidelberg's origin can be traced to the establishment of a Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), when a group of influential and wealthy farmers decided that the monthly excursion for holy communion at Swellendam had become too arduous.

On 13 November 1855, a new congregation was formed when a section of the farm Doornboom, belonging to LJ Fourie, was purchased for the express purpose of establishing a new parish and community. The purchase was undersigned and funded by a number of wealthy agrarian scions of the district, most of whom bore the familiar surnames of the early pioneers of the Overberg. They were JP Eksteen, JJ Gildenhuys, CJ Human, EP Kleynhans, CJ Uys, and JJ Van Wyk.

As the oldest, Gildenhuys and Uys would serve as the first elders in the church council, while the remainder of the undersigned acted as deacons.⁹⁰ Although it would take almost 21 years to erect a building befitting the majesty of the founders' ambitions, community life in both body and spirit quickly started to revolve around the church.⁹¹ Since its original wooden incarnation, the church represented not only the geographic centre of town, but also the heart of the community. The town's inception coincided with a period in Cape colonial history when fraternity and cooperation between Cape Afrikaners and their British countrymen reached a zenith. Following in the wake of such crucial flashpoints like the Anti-Convict movement (1848-1849), Frontier War (1850) and Kat River Rebellion, increased cooperation

⁸⁹ E. Burrows: *Overberg Odyssey: people, roads & early days*, p. 44.

⁹⁰ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 21-28.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

between the two cultural groups lay the path for Representative government (1853).⁹² Within the larger socio-economic area of the Overberg, its inhabitants had by 1855, a venerable history of cooperation and cultural intermingling. As such Heidelberg's DRC congregation contained many English-speaking parishioners alongside their stalwart Afrikaner counterparts.⁹³ It could perhaps be regarded as a fitting tribute or the most ironic of coincidences, that the church was located on the corner of two streets named after individuals representing the different cultures of the region. Named after the original owner of Doornboom and perpendicular to the church was Fourie Street, which ran from the southwest to northeast in the direction of the Duivenhoks River and the old homestead. Parallel to the church's entrance running from northwest to southeast, was Hopley Street which functioned as Heidelberg's main road and thoroughfare. Hopley Street was named for William Musgrave Hopley, a land surveyor who settled near Buffeljagsfontein in 1817 and became one of the first mapmakers in the Overberg, having worked the area for almost 40 years.⁹⁴ Hopley's father was a Royal Naval officer turned teacher, who arrived in the Cape as part of the invasion fleet in 1806.⁹⁵ It was also at this very crossroads where invading Boer commandos and British troops would clash in a bloody skirmish that shook the foundations of the community.

The rapid growth of rural towns around DRC congregations was a hallmark of the structural changes wrought by nineteenth century British rule in the Cape Colony, and had a profound effect on Cape Afrikaner identity and its relationship with authority. During Company rule, inhabitants of the Cape had been culturally, economically and educationally neglected by a business concern only interested in profit. The VOC made very little effort to improve physical infrastructure at the Cape and suppressed DRC efforts to cultivate spiritual and cultural developments which could interfere with company policy. In this environment, Cape Afrikaners developed a spirit of wilful independence, scornful of outside interference, while simultaneously longing for opportunities and vehicles of expression and distinction.⁹⁶ During the

⁹² A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 27.

⁹³ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 176-180.

⁹⁴ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 65.

⁹⁵ E. Burrows: *Overberg Origins: the English-speaking Swellendam families*, pp. 59-60.

⁹⁶ M. Tamarkin: *Volk and flock: Ecology, identity and politics among Cape Afrikaners in the late nineteenth century*, pp. 192-193.

early days of Company rule, few DRC parishes existed beyond the Cape peninsula. In 1795 only 6 parishes existed, all of which were confined to the Cape Town area or to the outlying areas of the peninsula.⁹⁷ As a result of the slow expansion under the VOC, inhabitants of rural areas like the Overberg had to travel vast distances to get married and have their children baptized. Between Caledon and Swellendam no churches existed until the 1840s, and many rural inhabitants had to travel to Cape Town.⁹⁸ Under British rule the number of congregations increased rapidly, with number of churches reaching 14 in 1824, 25 in 1840, 36 in 1850, 49 in 1854, and 64 in 1840. The gratitude towards the British authorities responsible for the proliferation of congregations has often been cited as a vital component of Cape Afrikaners' deference to authority.⁹⁹ Besides the role of churches to officiate the administrative needs of communities, DRC membership was also a way of denoting social status much in the same vein as other symbols and accoutrements associated with status and respectability.¹⁰⁰ Initially, rural Cape Afrikaners had very little connection to religious and educational institutions, yet these remained very important as vehicles for social distinction, much like the legal distinctions from the Company period were to the development of status and identity.¹⁰¹

The practice of establishing towns and churches by way of donations or loans from wealthy Cape Dutch farmers followed a common pattern in the development of Cape society throughout the early to mid nineteenth century. Wealthy Dutch farmers or previous VOC employees often funded these new *kerkdorpe* as a method of investment by securing future debt repayments at a time when access to capital and credit was limited.¹⁰² Records of the DRC council in Heidelberg indicate that the loan for the construction of the first church from JJ Gildenhuis was eventually repaid with interest to his son BW Gildenhuis in 1911.¹⁰³ Patronage to churches was also a way of reinforcing the hierarchies of the old status system from the Company period, and

⁹⁷ S. Duff: *Changing Childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church Evangelicalism and Colonial Childhood, 1860-1895*, p. 26.

⁹⁸ P. Borchers: *An autobiographical memoir*, pp. 23-24.

⁹⁹ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁰⁰ S. Duff: *Changing Childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church Evangelicalism and Colonial Childhood, 1860-1895*, p. 24.

¹⁰¹ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 10.

¹⁰² H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, pp. 204-205.

¹⁰³ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 89.

the structure of new congregations usually adhered to existing stratifications, in which a family's higher status was reflected in the seating arrangement of the church.¹⁰⁴

The DRC's role in Cape Afrikaner allegiance also extended from the very British nature of the church and its clergy, as well as the connection between the church and government. The procedure by which congregations acquired a new minister required that the church council recommend a candidate. Yet, the authority to appoint a minister always remained in the hands of the government.¹⁰⁵ Most of the newly arrived clergy were British, with a proclivity towards ministers from Scottish origins. In 1837, 12 out of 22 ministers were Scottish.¹⁰⁶ The appointment of ministers of British origin meant that the DRC clergy in the Cape were less likely to assimilate within local Afrikaner communities, and dilute the DRC's government-aligned objectives.¹⁰⁷ As the DRC became the primary vehicle for the British educational transformation of the Cape, it was the hope of the Governor Lord Charles Somerset that the British clergy would encourage Cape Afrikaners in the untouched rural areas to send their children to English medium government schools operated by the DRC clergy.¹⁰⁸

The dynamic interplay between the DRC and rural communities would also become an important factor in Cape Afrikaners' continually evolving relationship with authority. The Evangelical movements in the latter half of the nineteenth century became a vital part of orthodox DRC practice and further entrenched a spirit of obedience within Cape Afrikaner society. Partially inspired by emergent Romanticism, the movement was a response to an increasingly mechanistic worldview and chaotic world events. Recognising the need for rewarding people's fortitude in upholding community order, as well as offering an antidote to stale orthodox worship practices, the Cape Revival of the 1860s focused on the importance of personal religious conversion and spiritual experience. The evangelic revivalist movements of mid century overwhelmed the liberal factions within the DRC, who espoused a more unemotional and modern interpretation of faith connected to the

¹⁰⁴ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, pp. 204-205.

¹⁰⁵ P. Borchers: *An autobiographical memoir*, p. 183.

¹⁰⁶ A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁸ S. Duff: *Changing Childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church Evangelicalism and Colonial Childhood, 1860-1895*, p. 24.

democratic spirit and political machinations of the 1853 establishment of the Cape constitution.

This embedded evangelical strain offers an explanation for the lack of political participation among Cape Afrikaners and their deference to the authority of government and monarchy.¹⁰⁹ Records indicate that the Evangelical and Cape Revival movements had a profound impact on the congregation of Heidelberg throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, with revivals occurring in the years 1860, 1868, 1874, 1884 and 1889.¹¹⁰ The Revivals were very much a reaction towards the socio-economic and material changes in colonial society of the time, like the commercial dominance by the British, the general commercialisation of colonial society, industrialisation, imperial rule, and the consolidation of power. Many Cape Afrikaners felt the need to recreate the patterns of social stratification from the old Dutch system in the wake of slave emancipation which appeared to many as a challenge to social order. As such, people gravitated towards revivalism with its components of emotion and predestination, providing them with a way to cope with the material and cultural changes resulting from economic expansion, urbanisation, drought, disease and mass immigration.¹¹¹ The movements came to reflect Cape Afrikaner uncertainty about their identity and place within world.¹¹² By causing a rift with the DRC, the revivals highlighted rural Cape Afrikaners' reaction towards modern society. Their rejection of liberalism and progressiveness provides a more comprehensive understanding of the political apathy and respect for government authority.¹¹³

Cape Afrikaner concerns about modernity within the British Cape Colony were compounded by Legislation of 1865 which mandated all government-funded education to be in English, and provided pressure to anglicise that continued throughout the nineteenth century. Afrikaners and the Dutch language were increasingly regarded as backwards. In nearby Swellendam, merchants and civil servants used social etiquette to differentiate themselves from Afrikaner farmers

¹⁰⁹ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 210.

¹¹⁰ H. Hopkins: *Eufoes gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 49, 54, 60, 62.

¹¹¹ S. Duff: *Changing Childhoods in the Cape Colony: Dutch Reformed Church Evangelicalism and Colonial Childhood, 1860-1895*, p. 23.

¹¹² R. Ross: *Beyond the pale: Essays on the history of colonial South Africa*, p. 189.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

whom they regarded as their inferior.¹¹⁴ Despite the emergence of such ethnic class prejudices, intermarriage, rural isolation and mutual dependence created a system in which old company employees and farmers could easily fit into new hierarchies and benefit from British capitalism and expanded markets, without having their identity challenged by British cultural imperialism.¹¹⁵

Wealthy farmers or former company employees with established agricultural empires transformed into urban traders who used the new language as a tool without emotional ties. In Heidelberg, the Reitz and Van Reenen families used their wealth in agriculture and land to consolidate their influence and social position within the community.¹¹⁶ The community of Heidelberg also had a long history of contact with English traders and merchants like Barry & Nephews and the Moodies who operated the Port Beaufort Trading Company.¹¹⁷ Through intermarriage and commercial ties, other agrarian families started to amass great wealth in the surrounds of Heidelberg. The Du Preez family of the Krombeks River area became wealthy from their connections to the Barry shipping enterprise.¹¹⁸ Another of the town founders and first deacon of the church congregation, CJ Human¹¹⁹ went into a partnership with the Moodies, and over time the Human family became wealthy wool merchants in their own right.¹²⁰ The discovery of diamonds in the 1870s benefitted the agricultural market of the Cape, as demand for produce increased rapidly in support of the diamond industry. Although wheat farmers prospered from increased prices, the diamond boom diverted investment capital away from the Southern Cape and made the market prone to volatile fluctuations based on mining booms and busts.

The period of expansion and affluence of the 1870s was followed by a short but severe recession in the 1880s during which Cape Afrikaners became simultaneously class aware as well as politically active in order to protect their new found affluence. The threat of cheap, foreign grain imports as well as the economic

¹¹⁴ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 203.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

¹¹⁶ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 16; R. Ross: *The origins of capitalist agriculture in the Cape Colony: a survey*, in W. Beinart & P. Delius & S. Trapido (eds.): *Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and dispossession in rural South Africa, 1850-1930*, p. 68.

¹¹⁷ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 16.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹¹⁹ Human b5c3d11

¹²⁰ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 172.

contraction of the market, spurred the wealthy farmers at the Cape into political action and in the late 1870s demands for protective tariffs started to appear. Taking advantage of the Cape being granted Responsible Government in 1872, some of the wealthy agricultural families started entering politics.¹²¹ From Heidelberg, the businessman Johannes Urbanus Human¹²², son of CJ Human, became a member of parliament representing the district of Riversdale from 1874 to 1878.¹²³ Various members of the Human family became politically involved and frequently competed with FW Reitz Snr and his friend Dr Henry White for seats on the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly. The Humans represented the more conservative factions of society, while Reitz and White were advocates for progressive legislation like the separation of church and state.¹²⁴

However, political participation on this level was not that prevalent among Cape Afrikaners, and many remained politically apathetic and mostly unconcerned with parliamentary machinations except when it affected their livelihood. Most preferred to use their personal and economic connections with affluent and politically connected English middlemen to exert influence on government policy.¹²⁵ In the community of Heidelberg, no other family except perhaps the Reitz's, were more politically influential than the Barry's. From an early stage, the economic power of the Barry's and their infiltration into all aspects of local inhabitants' lives had transformed them into the political surrogates for the Cape Afrikaner farmers in the Overberg region. From the inception of the 1852 Cape Parliament, and Representative Government of 1854 until the decline of the firm in the 1860s, the Barry's dominated the Legislative Council, and indirectly prevented the necessity for many Cape Afrikaners to become politically involved and to exercise political decisions.¹²⁶

Despite the emergence of political mobilisation among Cape farmers, there was very little manifestation of ethnic solidarity, and Afrikaners remained divided among socio-economic classes. The amalgamation of the *Zuidafrikaanse Boeren*

¹²¹ H. Giliomee: *Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915*, pp. 39-41.

¹²² Human b3c3d11e6

¹²³ H. Hopkins: *Euufes gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 31.

¹²⁴ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 164

¹²⁵ H. Giliomee: *Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915*, p. 42.

¹²⁶ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, p. 266.

Beschermings Vereniging (BBV) and *Genootskap vir Regte Afrikaners* into the *Afrikaner Bond* did not result in the creation of an inclusive political party stretching across the class divide. Bond campaigns were mainly concerned with protecting the economic interests of agrarian elites by curbing the social mobility of *bywoners* and ensuring cheap supplies of Coloured labour.¹²⁷ In an 1899 census of the electoral division of Swellendam, the ward of Heidelberg contained only 158 voters, the majority being Afrikaner Bond-supporting farmers.¹²⁸ Before and during the existence of the Bond, measures designed to tie Black and Coloured labour to the land had been implemented. Securing labour had become a priority as the lure of the diamond fields resulted in large-scale defections for better pay and treatment. The *Masters and Servants Laws* implemented in 1856, the 1870s, and 1889 were designed to counter such trends and bestowed field cornets with extraordinary judicial powers to prosecute deserting labourers and punish stock thieves.¹²⁹ The title of field cornet became a sign of social distinction within communities, as these positions were usually occupied by wealthy and educated farmers in possession of the necessary literacy and administrative skills. Town co-founder and church elder CJ Uys,¹³⁰ was colloquially known as “Cornelis Veldkornet.”¹³¹ Reports filed with the Swellendam magistrate’s office also indicate both CJ Human and his son had been field cornets in the Heidelberg ward of Stuurmanskraal.¹³²

What started to emerge in Cape society, was a division between rural Afrikaners who were politically uninvolved, and their urban counterparts composed of British and anglicised Dutch professionals and middlemen. Political clashes between the groups were very infrequent, unemotional, and rarely related to national and international diplomatic affairs in the British Empire. Rural Cape Afrikaners sought only protection for their way of life and despite outrages regarding British Imperial interference in 1877 during the First Anglo-Boer War, and the Jameson Raid of 1896, most espoused a colonial nationalism which prized their membership as part

¹²⁷ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 43, 45.

¹²⁸ (KAB) CCP 11/1/40: Voter roll for district of Swellendam, 1 January 1899, pp. 37-43.

¹²⁹ H. Giliomee: *Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915*, p. 47.

¹³⁰ Uys b1c5d9e1

¹³¹ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 30.

¹³² (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter by CJ Human to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, 6 March 1874.

of the British Imperial world.¹³³ What Cape Afrikaners came to despise was a progressive and “foreign” brand of imperial intervention which did not take into account the local conditions and history from which their culture had emerged. Those administrators and rulers who considered such factors and accommodated the unique culture at the Cape were usually held in high regard. Cecil John Rhodes was successful in courting Cape Afrikaners in his bid to use the Cape as a springboard into Africa, by providing them with protective agricultural tariffs, excise taxes on brandy, capital infrastructure in the Northern Cape, and labour protection in the form of the 1894 Glen Grey Act.¹³⁴

The issue over tariffs in the 1870s and 1880s caused a split between the town and countryside, as the more progressive British urbanites preferred a more competitive free market system, while rural Afrikaners demanded protective measures. The clash between conservatism and progressivism reared its head again with the Scab Act of 1894, when Cape Afrikaners rejected new livestock dipping practices, which they considered an infringement on their rights as Cape Colonists by a distant and foreign government.¹³⁵ Despite vocal opposition to incidents of imperial meddling, the majority of Cape Afrikaners remained loyal to authority and to the monarchy, which had become essential parts of their hybrid identity in Cape society. Cape Afrikaners had come to embody a unique and hybrid cultural identity with multiple loyalties resulting from the infusion of elements of British culture of which they adopted those most beneficial for their protection and survival.¹³⁶ After nearly a century of mutual dependence and cross-cultural pollination, the rift between the Dutch and British cultures had almost been mended. Pressure to anglicise over the course of the nineteenth century held open the question of whether the Cape Dutch population should be completely absorbed, or whether a composite nationality be allowed to flourish. In reality, a hybrid culture had already developed. It was this culture that would come under severe strain during the war, as outsiders decided how the struggle over identity in the Cape Colony would be settled.¹³⁷ It was in this cultural environment that the war in Heidelberg would play itself out.

¹³³ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, p. 622; H. Giliomee: *Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915*, p. 48.

¹³⁴ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, pp. 640-641.

¹³⁵ M. Tamarkin: *Volk and flock: Ecology, identity and politics among Cape Afrikaners in the late nineteenth century*, pp. 4-5.

¹³⁶ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, pp. 226-227.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

1.3) Heidelberg at the start of the war

At the start of the war, Heidelberg was very much a town in transition between two different time periods, yet scrutiny of community records gives little premonition of the coming war. The Dutch Reformed Church, around which community life revolved, had recently lost its long serving minister, Reverend AB Daneel.¹³⁸ His replacement, Reverend AJ Van Wijk, only started in March of 1900, and according to his personal files, the young minister was initially more interested in sermons on the role of Darwinism in society than the issue of war.¹³⁹ The Municipal Council, comprised of a mixture of English speaking merchants and professionals, as well as wealthy anglicised Afrikaners, was in the process of securing Heidelberg's stake as the new eastern terminus of the Cape Town-Worcester railway.¹⁴⁰ Most of those involved in the development and functioning of the town had been there for years. In some cases, Municipal Council members were second-generation inhabitants of Heidelberg with connections to both the English and Afrikaner sections of the community. Among these was the town medical practitioner, Dr Henry Grave Biggs,¹⁴¹ a first generation immigrant from Reading, England, who had been mayor of Heidelberg for many years.¹⁴² Other members were Afrikaner farmers who lived near town or anglicised civil servants from wealthy agricultural families like the mayor James Munnik¹⁴³ and secretary James Du Preez.¹⁴⁴

The town also had a cosmopolitan nature, with a number of foreign dealers and civic employees originating from various parts of the globe. 74-year-old Albert White,¹⁴⁵ the special justice of the peace, who had been acting as Heidelberg's de facto magistrate since 1876, was born in Mauritius and often doubled as the town

¹³⁸ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 64.

¹³⁹ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 10 March 1900; (DRCA) K-DIV 1423: Draft of sermon by Reverend AJ Van Wijk, 4 April 1900.

¹⁴⁰ (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 14 December 1899; *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 12 May 1900, p. 2.

¹⁴¹ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/730: Death notice of Henry Grave Biggs, no. 3173, 25 July 1913.

¹⁴² H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 121; (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 7 March 1895.

¹⁴³ Munnik b1c1d8e6; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/17885: Death notice of Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik, no. 138/51, 19 December 1950; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam mentioning the mayor of Heidelberg, no. 170/192, 2 March 1903.

¹⁴⁴ Du Preez b6c6d5e1f2g2h4; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23606: Death notice of Jacobus Du Preez, no. 2288/55, 18 April 1955.

¹⁴⁵ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/457: Death notice of Albert White, no. 2879, 11 April 1902.

pharmacist along with his second wife Susanna Salomina Georgina Pietersen. White was a distant relation of Dr Henry White, the politician and well-known companion of FW Reitz Snr.¹⁴⁶ Stephen George Hall,¹⁴⁷ was a second-generation immigrant from the United States. A shoemaker by trade, Hall doubled as messenger to the court and the lockup keeper of Heidelberg's diminutive jail.¹⁴⁸ The town dentist and local photographer was Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, a German immigrant from Hamburg who had married a local Afrikaner woman from Riversdale after his divorce in 1890.¹⁴⁹ Nicolas Friedman¹⁵⁰ was a first generation Jewish immigrant from Savell, Russia, who operated a general store across from the town church. Heidelberg's biggest hotel, the Masonic, had been operated by the Swedish E.T Friberg for many years.¹⁵¹ As the railway had terminated at Swellendam, the Masonic Hotel had offered intermittent lodging and transport to the people of Riversdale on their way to catch the train.¹⁵²

Construction of the railway was a priority for the progressive Municipal Council which aimed to invigorate their small town by connecting it to modernity. The extension of the railway had resulted in high property prices for farms and urban homes in neighbouring Swellendam, as well as a boom in stock prices. The railway had also resulted in an influx of foreigners and strangers from remote parts of the country who sought to profit from the endeavour. The hope was that Swellendam would become another Oudtshoorn and that the towns of Heidelberg and Riversdale would share in its prosperity due to their relative proximity. The crippling droughts and reliance on ostrich farming kindled the hope among many farmers to sell their land to prospective ostrich farmers from the interior.¹⁵³

As the extension was scheduled to reach Riversdale by May 1901, Heidelberg would be in line to benefit from increased property prices, a proposed irrigation scheme to be undertaken by the railway company, and increased business from the

¹⁴⁶ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 159.

¹⁴⁷ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2455: Death notice of Stephen George Hall, no. 1151, 6 May 1923; Hall b2

¹⁴⁸ (KAB) AG 754: Forwarded application for additional police constables, no. 22/1900, 17 February 1900.

¹⁴⁹ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/811: Death notice of Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, no. 314, 16 January 1916.

¹⁵⁰ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/7045: Death notice of Nicolas Friedman, no. 71517, 25 November 1940.

¹⁵¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Application for transfer of liquor license from Friberg to Hanson, no. 398/1900, 13 July 1900.

¹⁵² *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 12 May 1900, p. 2.

¹⁵³ (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Swellendam Branch, 14 August 1899, pp. 15-16.

influx of foreigners.¹⁵⁴ Despite the optimistic outlook, the community remained divided along urban-rural and class lines. Many farmers displayed little interest or faith in what they perceived to be British institutions. The community's long standing involvement with the English merchant house Barry & Nephews and appetite for future dealings with British institutions had somewhat soured since the insolvency of the Barry empire in 1865. So integral a part of the rural economy had the Barry's been that farmers used the firm's promissory notes to cover their losses during a series of droughts during the 1860s. With the collapse of the business, many farms went under the hammer as debtors called in the promissory notes. Even those lucky enough to keep their farms were required to sell off a portion of their land to cover their debts. As most farms were circular shaped, a triangular wedge of land had to be relinquished, giving rise to a local epithet called *Barry se hoek*.¹⁵⁵ Fallout from the Barry insolvency may have prejudiced local farmers against British financial institutions. When the Riversdale branch of Standard Bank opened in 1877, reports indicated that local farmers showed a lack of interest and wariness in doing business with the bank.¹⁵⁶ Local inhabitants with bank accounts at the branches of Swellendam and Heidelberg, were usually limited to Anglo-Afrikaner elites, wealthy farmers, and English merchants like the Du Preez, Munnik, Human, and Uys families.¹⁵⁷

On 8 February 1900, the secretary of the Municipal Council was instructed to request the appointment of additional police constables for patrolling the town at night.¹⁵⁸ The nearby construction of the new railway extension resulted in the influx of a large number of Coloured workers into town. Complaints regarding public intoxication and rowdy behaviour at night had spurred the council into action.¹⁵⁹ According to the application sent to Swellendam's resident magistrate, Heidelberg's police force at the time consisted only of two men, an ordinary policeman, John Daniel James Manuel, who had occupied the position for 3 years, and the lockup

¹⁵⁴ (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Branch Prospects. Inspection Report for Riversdale, 25 August 1900, pp. 6-7.

¹⁵⁵ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 272-273.

¹⁵⁶ A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): *The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902*, p. 66.

¹⁵⁷ (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Liability return, Inspection report for Riversdale Branch, 25 August 1900, pp. 8, 17, 27; (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Liability return, Inspection report for Swellendam Branch, 14 August 1899, pp. 4, 7, 19.

¹⁵⁸ (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 8 February 1900.

¹⁵⁹ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Letter from Heidelberg Municipal Council to resident magistrate of Riversdale regarding security of town, no. 71/1900, 8 February 1900.

keeper who had to patrol the town when the other man was indisposed.¹⁶⁰ In the months that followed, a further three requests for the appointment of additional police constables were submitted.¹⁶¹ As the war progressed into 1900, Swellendam became a major source of food supply in the military railway network.¹⁶²

The pressure to supply grains and meat was especially worrisome to the region's inhabitants at the outbreak of the war. Since 1894, the district had experienced a very trying time as a result of a series of severe droughts. As such, the largest agricultural yields of 1899 came in the form of ostrich feathers and wool. Yet an inspections report from both the Swellendam and Riversdale branches of Standard Bank indicated that copious rains from the start of January 1900 had rejuvenated hopes for improved crop yields. The barley crop was expected to do exceptionally well and form the bulk of the harvest of 1900.¹⁶³

The region remained an important supplier of food and horses for British troops throughout the war. An 1898 livestock census shows that the area surrounding Swellendam was the leading producer of merino sheep and stallions in the Southern Cape.¹⁶⁴ Later military inventories confirmed that in the greater district of Swellendam, Heidelberg was the largest producer of wheat, maize, sugar and potatoes throughout the war.¹⁶⁵ Security and protection of the town was therefore of paramount importance to the military. However, an 1899 inspection of the police force and jail indicated that the attitude toward town security was informal and generally undisciplined. The report stated that the town was in no way prepared for war, blaming the special justice of the peace and lockup keeper for failing to address issues of security.¹⁶⁶ So it was in a state of flux and unpreparedness that the community of Heidelberg entered the war.

¹⁶⁰ (KAB) AG 754: Forwarded application for additional police constables, no. 22/1900, 17 February 1900.

¹⁶¹ (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable, no. 42/1900, 6 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable, no. 190/1900, 11 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable no. 59/1900, 18 June 1900.

¹⁶² M. Grant: *The history of the war in South Africa, 1899-1902*, p. 243.

¹⁶³ (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 25 August 1900, pp. 6-7; (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Swellendam Branch, 8 September 1900, pp. 8-9.

¹⁶⁴ (KAB) CO 6043: Statistical report on district of Swellendam, 31 December 1898, pp. 341, 431.

¹⁶⁵ (KAB) AG 936: Report by RM Holt Okes on local inventories, no. 139/1901, 20 December 1901.

¹⁶⁶ (KAB) CO 2207: Inspection report on Heidelberg lockup, no. 868, 20 February 1899.

Chapter 2 - Loyalty and Sympathy

A cursory overview of genealogical records on the people of Heidelberg, provides a good example of the division in loyalties which existed among the inhabitants of the Cape. Two boys born during the course of the war were respectively christened with the names Paul Kruger and Buller. Paul Kruger was Paul Kruger Geldenhuys,¹⁶⁷ the fifteenth son of Gerhardus Bernardus Geldenhuys,¹⁶⁸ whose eldest son, Adriaan Johannes Geldenhuys¹⁶⁹ fought on the Boer side in the ZAR and was eventually exiled to India after his capture.¹⁷⁰ Buller was Adrian Ferdinand Buller Muhsfeldt,¹⁷¹ the seventh son of Heidelberg's German dentist and photographer, Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt who had been a proud Anglophile. Even more astounding, was the fact that the pair were related. Buller's mother, Elizabeth Susanna Geldenhuys,¹⁷² was the niece of Paul's father, making them second cousins. Such phenomena were more commonplace than coincidence, and are clear indications of the extraordinary dynamics at play in the Cape during the South African War. Perhaps even more telling is the fact that in spite of his enthusiastic support of the British, the elder Muhsfeldt was the first person in Heidelberg to adopt three orphans from a ZAR concentration camp after the war.¹⁷³

2.1) Loyalty

2.1.1) Displays of loyalty

2.1.1.1) Military service & law enforcement

This study aims to transcend the traditional dichotomies which define allegiance in existing studies on the war in the Cape. Yet, some of their most visible outward manifestations are useful tools for analysing how inhabitants of the Cape Colony appeared to display their loyalty. These include service in Town Guards, as well as other organs of the Colonial Defence Force like the District Mounted Troop (DMT) and District Mounted Police (DMP). Membership of Heidelberg's Town

¹⁶⁷ Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7h15

¹⁶⁸ Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7

¹⁶⁹ Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7h2

¹⁷⁰ G. Geldenhuys: *Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide*, p. 47.

¹⁷¹ Muhsfeldt b7

¹⁷² Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g4h2

¹⁷³ G. Geldenhuys.: *'n Venster op die Hopkinse en die Muhsfeldts*, p. 38.

Guard and other local law enforcement bodies provides a valuable profile of those inhabitants willing to openly display their loyalty, and serves as a convenient entry point for discerning patterns of allegiance. The republican invasions of the Cape Colony and subsequent rebellions necessitated military intervention by the Colonial authorities in order to restore law and order, and to prevent the conflict from erupting into civil war. Since the start of the war, Cape politicians had been extremely wary of directly involving the Colony in the conflict. Both the Schreiner and Sprigg governments were reluctant for the Cape to be used as a military launchpad into the republics, and dreaded the possibility of waging war against their own people who rebelled in support of the Boer Republics. In response to the challenge, the Sprigg ministry initiated a campaign for recruiting volunteers to defend the Cape. The result led to the creation of the Colonial Defence Force (CDF), a temporary military body akin to the later American National Guard or British Home Guard, which was expressly created to defend the Colony from invasion and deter local rebellion by establishing an extensive and visible local military presence. Volunteers were to report to their local resident magistrates or civil commissioners, an important symbolic gesture aimed to affirm their constitutional legitimacy and mitigate the legal conundrum of martial law application. By using volunteerism, the government could avoid calling up the local militia and prevent the possibility of aggravating the situation at the Cape into a state of civil war.¹⁷⁴

The CDF was comprised of various units, including Town Guards, mounted rifle divisions, as well as contingents of the regular police force. Out of a Cape population of 2 350 000, a total of 18000 men joined Town Guards, while 6000 volunteered for service in the various mounted divisions. As only 517 000 of the colony was white, the majority of the volunteers were Coloured men who joined Town Guards.¹⁷⁵ According to official memos issued by the CDF, Town Guards were to be used only for the defence of the town itself, and in the case of enemy invasion, as an auxiliary force in support of mounted units. Town Guards reported directly to the appointed local commandant, who in turn reported to the commanding officer of colonial forces for the area. Requisitions and pay were administered by the local civil

¹⁷⁴ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 93.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

commissioner or resident magistrate who forwarded all requests to the Principal Paymaster of the CDF in Cape Town.¹⁷⁶

Heidelberg's Town Guard was first called into service on 9 April 1901 and was only active until the end of the same month. Due to the small size of the town, it was considered a subdivision of Swellendam's Town Guard and commanded by the same officer who had also served as temporary acting-commandant at Heidelberg during the period.¹⁷⁷ The list of names and ranks were as follows:

HJ Hanson (Lieutenant)	SG Hall	TH Miller
JL Cantrell (Sergeant)	JM Homan	E Storer
P Silbert (Sergeant)	A Hoffman	JL Swart
W Osmond (Corporal)	JH Human	Gert Swart
AWR White (Corporal)	J Johnson	PJ Uys
DC Batten	A Lombaard	PJ Swart
JC Bester	WL Lombaard	Isaac D Bosman
HJM Biggs	JDJ Manuel	John D Bosman
WH Bosman	J Matthee	Michael Gildenhuis
S Cronje	M Morrison	Peter H Ralll
Herbert Du Preez	EM Morrison	
GM Du Preez	GCC Muhsfeldt	

Swellendam native and later Afrikaner Nationalist writer, Maria Elizabeth Rothman (MER), provides insight into the operation and purpose of Town Guards in the region in her recollections of wartime Swellendam. According to her account, Town Guards were not regarded as serious fighting units by the townspeople and often met with scorn or ridicule. Their presence and public drill practices were a way for certain community members to display their loyalty to military authorities. A powerful albeit transparent psychological tool, Town Guards were also used to reaffirm allegiance and security within the community.¹⁷⁸ A military intelligence report of the time seems to support the inhabitant's perception by revealing that Swellendam's Town Guard of

¹⁷⁶ (KAB) DD 7/13: Official memorandum by the GOC of the CDF, 13 February 1901, p. 2.

¹⁷⁷ (KAB) DD 4/171: Drill and pay sheets for Town Guard District of Swellendam, no. 61/1901 & 62/1901, 6 June 1901.

¹⁷⁸ M. Rothmann: *My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling*, pp. 131-132.

60 men were unarmed and mostly comprised of a cycling corps used for reconnaissance and message delivery.¹⁷⁹

Review of the biographical and genealogical records of those who served in Heidelberg's Town Guard tends to support this view with regards to the majority of the individuals. GM Du Preez was Gerhardus Marthinus Du Preez,¹⁸⁰ grandson of Hendrik Ryk Du Preez,¹⁸¹ the wealthy patriarch of the urbanised Du Preez family who served in Heidelberg's first Municipal Council.¹⁸² GM Du Preez's father, HM Du Preez¹⁸³ was the owner of a general store in town.¹⁸⁴ Herbert Du Preez refers to Herbert Francois Du Preez,¹⁸⁵ son of Hendrik Ryk and uncle to GM Du Preez. The Du Preez's were an influential family in the community who had become partially anglicised as was the custom of wealthy Afrikaners who had become involved in public life. Herbert Du Preez's older brother was James Du Preez,¹⁸⁶ secretary of Heidelberg's Municipal Council. Interestingly, he was born as Jacobus Du Preez, but was colloquially known as James, and signed his name as such on all official municipal correspondence.¹⁸⁷ Incidentally, Heidelberg's mayor, James Munnik, adopted the same affectation, having been born Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik.¹⁸⁸ The Du Preezs and Munniks represented the upper strata of Afrikaners keen to emulate the English as a way of showing their status with the community, having adopted British ideas on progress and social Darwinism.¹⁸⁹

In 1865, the Cape government had decided that instruction in all state-funded educational institutions would be done in English. As a result, a new generation of Anglo-Afrikaners, like the Du Preezs, were absorbed into the civil service. In neighbouring Swellendam, the commercial and economic sections of the urban

¹⁷⁹ (TAB) HC 49: Swellendam Commandant letter to Agent Chowder, Intelligence report, 23 January 1901.

¹⁸⁰ Du Preez b6c6d5e1f2g2h1i2

¹⁸¹ Du Preez bdc6d5e1f2g2; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/485: Death notice of Hendrik Ryk Du Preez, no. 3225, 6 August 1903.

¹⁸² H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 121.

¹⁸³ Du Preez b6c6d5e1f2g2h1

¹⁸⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Complaints by H Du Preez and C Hirschmann regarding martial law, no. 468/1902 & no. 467/1902, 1 May 1902.

¹⁸⁵ Du Preez bdc6d5e1f2g2h6

¹⁸⁶ Du Preez bdc6d5e1f2g2h4

¹⁸⁷ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23606: Death notice of Jacobus Du Preez, no. 2288/55, 18 April 1955; (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 8 February 1900.

¹⁸⁸ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/17885: Death notice of Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik, no. 138/51, 19 December 1950.

¹⁸⁹ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 225.

domain were dominated by English merchants like the Barry trading empire. As Afrikaners were regarded as unprogressive and conservative by English merchants and civil servants, even wealthy farmers were considered as their inferiors.¹⁹⁰ In response, the newly acculturated Afrikaner elites started to adopt English social etiquette and affectations to differentiate them from their more traditional brethren. This trend continued into the war period, as MER recalls how she and her sister often conversed with each other in English as a way of setting themselves apart.¹⁹¹ Other manifestations of Anglophile behaviour to reflect status included pastimes and leisure activities.¹⁹² A photograph taken in 1864 on the lawn in front of the DRC church in Heidelberg, shows a host of characters, both English and Anglo-Afrikaners, participating in a game of croquet.¹⁹³ The sport section from the regional paper, *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, for the year 1900, contains numerous references to tennis matches between members of Riversdale and Swellendam's civil service and Heidelberg's own anglicised Afrikaner elites.¹⁹⁴ A photo, entitled Heidelberg tennis party at Swellendam, also reveals the eagerness for distinction among the upper strata of Afrikaners.¹⁹⁵ A comparison between the Town Guard of 1901 and the 1899 Heidelberg rugby team reveals a match of seven names.¹⁹⁶ Unlike other larger towns in the Cape, like Oudtshoorn and Swellendam, Heidelberg did not have a large section of English citizens.¹⁹⁷ Although most of the English speakers in the community lived in town they did not form the majority, and the town was mostly inhabited by a mixture of anglicised Afrikaners and foreign immigrants. Giliomee refers to this intermittent class as the Queen's Afrikaners.¹⁹⁸ Mainly educated at the aptly named Victoria College in Stellenbosch, they represented the bilingual, urbanised, Afrikaner middle-class trying to transform their rural communities in the modernisation drive at the turn of the century. As such, their subscription and that of

¹⁹⁰ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 203.

¹⁹¹ M. Rothmann: *My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling*, p. 78.

¹⁹² A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 26.

¹⁹³ (KAB) HOP: Croquet team circa 1865, no. 810, Addendum A, Figure 13.

¹⁹⁴ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*,

¹⁹⁵ (KAB) HOP: Tennis party at Swellendam, no. 1028, Addendum A, Figure 14.

¹⁹⁶ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaaipland) 1855-1955*, p. 168.

¹⁹⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 22.

¹⁹⁸ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 193.

their offspring to certain ideas of British citizenship was an important affirmation of identity and status.¹⁹⁹

Peter H Rall was Pieter Hendrik de Necker Rall,²⁰⁰ from the farm Kruisrivier, whose father Johannes Cornelis Rall,²⁰¹ also served on the Municipal Council.²⁰² JH Human was Johannes Hendrik Human,²⁰³ the grandson of town founder CJ Human. JH Human was also the nephew of the member of parliament, Johannes Urbanus Human, and like his grandfather was field cornet for the ward of Stuurmanskraal.²⁰⁴ The display of loyalty through service in the Town Guard seemed a natural extension for the wealthier strata of Heidelberg's urban Afrikaners. Despite such displays, loyalism was a much more complex concept than the clear divisions which the context of war provided. For many of these men, loyalty was loosely based on a general idea of Britain and empire, which conformed more with colonial nationalism interspersed with provincial pride, than loyalty to the political course determined by Downing Street.²⁰⁵ For other community members, volunteer service to the ideal of empire seemed a more natural extension owing to their own heritage. HJM Biggs was Henry John Munro Biggs,²⁰⁶ son of town doctor Henry Grave Biggs²⁰⁷ and Heidelberg's first mayor.²⁰⁸ AWR White was Albert William Robertson White,²⁰⁹ son of the local justice of the peace, Albert White.²¹⁰ TH Miller was Thomas Henry Miller,²¹¹ the son of Richard Petrus Cornelis (Dick) Miller,²¹² who served as chairman of the Heidelberg Municipal Council.²¹³ J Johnson was John Egleston Johnson.²¹⁴

¹⁹⁹ H. Bradford: *Gentlemen and Boers: Afrikaner Nationalism, Gender, and Colonial Warfare in the South African War*, in G. Cuthbertson & A. Grundlingh & M. Suttie (eds.): *Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902*, p. 37.

²⁰⁰ Rall b1c2d7

²⁰¹ Rall b1c2

²⁰² (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 14 December 1899.

²⁰³ Human b5c3d11e2f6

²⁰⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Request from field cornet JH Human to sell his horse, no. 553/1902, 4 March 1902.

²⁰⁵ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, p. 620.

²⁰⁶ Biggs b3

²⁰⁷ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/730: Death notice of Henry Grave Biggs, no. 3173, 25 July 1913.

²⁰⁸ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 159.

²⁰⁹ White b4; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/653: Death notice of Albert William Robertson White, no. 2740, 7 July 1910.

²¹⁰ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/457: Death notice of Albert White, no. 2879, 11 April 1902.

²¹¹ Miller b3c1; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/19749: Death notice of Thomas Henry Miller, no. 3169/52, 11 June 1952.

²¹² Miller b3

²¹³ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Approval of RPC Miller as special justice of the peace, no. 326/1901, 30 August 1901.

Colloquially known as Jockey, Johnson and his brother William James Johnson,²¹⁵ operated a general store in town.²¹⁶ British military authorities generally distrusted Cape Afrikaners due to the complexity in their loyalties and sympathy with the republics. As a result, recruitment for Town Guards were often limited to persons of more concrete British credentials.²¹⁷

The highest-ranking officer in the Town Guard was Lieutenant Henry Jones Hanson.²¹⁸ Hanson had only recently arrived in Heidelberg when the war broke out, and purchased the local Masonic Hotel from ET Friberg.²¹⁹ Born in Lincolnshire in 1854, Hanson was a retired master mariner of the British Merchant Navy, and was, from the British military perspective, the obvious and more trustworthy choice for heading the Town Guard.²²⁰ As the new owner of the Masonic Hotel, Henry Hanson was also responsible for maintaining Heidelberg's gunpowder magazine which was located next to the hotel.²²¹ In a gesture belying his sympathies, minutes of the Municipal Council meetings recorded that Hanson offered the bell on his front gate to be used by the local police for enforcing curfew during the early stage of the war.²²² Although Hanson was the ranking officer with a military background, command of the Town Guard was relegated to Heidelberg assistant-commandant and chief constable for the district of Swellendam, John Alfred Fiveash.²²³ Born in Kent, England, in 1853, Fiveash was a career lawman who also served as inspector of the DMT.²²⁴ Fiveash had been stationed at Swellendam since 1897, and was tapped for the position of chief constable at Oudtshoorn. Fate intervened, and Fiveash was forced to turn down the promotion due to his wife's failing health.²²⁵ For those of limited British pedigree, service in Heidelberg's Town Guard followed other patterns of affiliation. For others, inclusion was purely incidental. P Silbert was the young Philip

²¹⁴ Johnson b4; (KAB) MOOC/6/9/9903: Death notice of John Egleson Johnson, no. 84618, 3 March 1943.

²¹⁵ Johnson b3

²¹⁶ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Johnson vs Roberts, no. 115/1901, 4 February 1901.

²¹⁷ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 46.

²¹⁸ (KAB) DD 6/104: Circular of CDF appointments, No. 14, 16 May 1901.

²¹⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Request for transfer of liquor licence, no. 398/1900, 13 July 1900.

²²⁰ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2887: Death notice of Henry Jones Hanson, no. 9784, 22 October 1925.

²²¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Approval for transfer of gunpowder license, no. 273/1900, 31 August 1900.

²²² (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 1 November 1900.

²²³ (KAB) DD 4/171: Drill and pay sheets for Town Guard, District of Swellendam, no. 61/1901 & 62/1901, 6 June 1901; (KAB) AG 936: Pay requisition for CDF officers, district of Swellendam, no. 75/1901.

²²⁴ (KAB) AG 936: Appointment approval for J Fiveash, no. 37/1901, 23 April 1901; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/4156: Death notice of John Alfred Fiveash, no. 43849, 26 August 1933.

²²⁵ (KAB) AG 754: Report on disciplinary action against J Fiveash, no. 5/1900, 16 January 1900.

Silbert, a recently arrived Jewish immigrant from Luknik, Russia, who had been in partnership with the Friedman family.²²⁶ The Morrison brothers, Eduard Martinus (Boy) Morrison²²⁷ and Murdoch Frederick Morrison,²²⁸ were building contractors from Cape Town who had been busy renovating the foundations and walls of the Dutch Reformed Church when war broke out.²²⁹

Those already involved in some form of local law enforcement were probably more inclined to be selected for inclusion in the Town Guard. JDJ Manuel had been Heidelberg's first and only permanent police constable when the war broke out in 1899.²³⁰ He had been assisted by lockup keeper Stephen G Hall, who had been replaced by William Osmond, making their inclusion to and rank within the Town Guard an inevitability.²³¹ Thomas Henry Miller, along with Dirk Cornelius Batten,²³² Willem Lodewyk Lombaard,²³³ and Jan Matthee,²³⁴ had previously been appointed as temporary police constables by the Municipal Council to keep the peace in town while nearby construction of the railway was underway.²³⁵ Batten, Miller, and Lombaard would later join the District Mounted Police.²³⁶

It would appear that proximity to town and family connections were also factors determining service in law enforcement bodies like the DMT and Town Guard. A striking feature of Heidelberg volunteers was the level of interconnectedness between the families. GCC Muhsfeldt was obviously the Anglophile dentist Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt.²³⁷ Michael Gildenhuis was

²²⁶ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/20275: Death notice of Philip Silbert, no. 5960/52, 25 October 1952.

²²⁷ Morrison b6c4

²²⁸ Morrison b6c3

²²⁹ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaaipland) 1855-1955*, pp. 50, 52.

²³⁰ (KAB) AG 754: Forwarded application for additional police constables, no. 22/1900, 17 February 1900.

²³¹ (KAB) AG 749: Appointment of William Osmond, no. 93/99, 21 November 1899.

²³² (KAB) AG 754: Appointment of DC Batten, no. 32/1900, 9 March 1900.

²³³ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Van Reenen, arresting officer was WL Lombaard, no. 550/1900, 30 April 1900.

²³⁴ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Otto, arresting officer was J Matthee, no. 361/1900, 10 October 1900.

²³⁵ (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable, no. 42/1900, 6 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable, no. 190/1900, 11 April 1900; (KAB) AG 754: Request for additional police constable no. 59/1900, 18 June 1900.

²³⁶ (KAB) AG 936: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 70/1901, 19 June 1901; (KAB) AG 936: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 88/1901, 13 August 1901; (KAB) AG 1013: Employment application of WL Lombaard, no. 82/1902, 18 June 1902.

²³⁷ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/811: Death notice of Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, no. 314, 16 January 1916.

probably Michael Hillegard Janse Van Rensburg Geldenhuys,²³⁸ who was the cousin of Muhsfeldt's wife Elizabeth.²³⁹ A Lombaard was Antonie Jacobus Lombaard,²⁴⁰ a younger brother of Willem Lodewyk Lombaard.²⁴¹ The Lombaard family lived on a smallholding next to the town pound,²⁴² where three of the older Lombaard brothers farmed. They were Jan Hermanus Lombaard, the master of the pound,²⁴³ Christoffel Johannes Lombaard,²⁴⁴ and oldest brother Pieter Jacobus Lombaard.²⁴⁵ Pieter Jacobus Lombaard was married to Maria Elizabeth Batten,²⁴⁶ the sister of Dirk Cornelius Batten. The Lombaards, Battens, Millers and Johnsons were all related in some way. DC Batten's other sister, Marianne Helen Batten²⁴⁷ was married to Dick Miller, Municipal Councilman and father of Thomas Henry Miller. Dick's sister, Cornelia Dorothea Miller²⁴⁸ was married to John James Johnson,²⁴⁹ the father of John Egleson and William Johnson. When DC Batten joined the DMP in 1901, he replaced Willem Jacobus Nothnagel,²⁵⁰ who was the brother of Susanna Wilhelmina Miller,²⁵¹ wife of Thomas Miller.

Although it is clear that many of Heidelberg's sons were involved in loyal support of the British war effort, very few of them experienced actual military action. A notable exception was Gert Swart, who served in the Town Guard and also joined the DMT. He would eventually be deployed to Fraserburg where he did a 4 month tour of duty with the Cape Colonial Force fighting invading republican commandos.²⁵² The other was Benjamin Moodie,²⁵³ who had joined the South African Light Horse Brigade at the start of 1900. Moodie had been a clerk in the Riversdale magistrate's office, and was the son of Donald Moodie, the field cornet for the

²³⁸ Geldenhuys b6c3d10e5f2g7h3; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23540: Death notice of Michael Hillegard Janse Van Rensburg Geldenhuys, no. 649/55, 2 October 1954.

²³⁹ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/811: Death notice of Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt, no. 314, 16 January 1916.

²⁴⁰ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g9

²⁴¹ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g8

²⁴² (KAB) 3/HBG 2/1/1: Letter from CJ Lombaard to Heidelberg Municipal Council, 21 Sept 1892.

²⁴³ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g7; *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 26 January 1901, p. 3.

²⁴⁴ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g3

²⁴⁵ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g1

²⁴⁶ Batten b2c8

²⁴⁷ Batten b2c3

²⁴⁸ Miller b2

²⁴⁹ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/181: Death notice of John James Johnson, no. 2278, May 1881.

²⁵⁰ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/1107: Death notice of Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, no. 1591, 12 May 1918; Nothnagel b1c5

²⁵¹ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/16786: Death notice of Susanna Wilhelmina Nothnagel Miller, no. 324/50, 25 December 1949.

²⁵² (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902.

²⁵³ Moodie b4c1

Grootvadersbosch and Zuurbraak wards.²⁵⁴ Tragically, Moodie was wounded at the Battle of Diamond Hill near Pretoria and died on the 13th of June 1900.²⁵⁵ Although heritage, status and family traditions provide plausible factors for explaining patterns of allegiance in Heidelberg, the disruptive context of war and subsequent restrictions under martial law need to be considered to posit a more representative understanding for the non-ideological motivations behind displays of loyalty.

2.1.1.2) Education

At the turn of the nineteenth century, educational development in rural communities were primarily undertaken by local church congregations. As such, Heidelberg had two schools operating in close proximity to each other. The larger of the two was the public school, operating under the guardianship of the DRC, while the smaller English school was an extension of the Independent Church. The public school was supervised and directed by the DRC minister, Reverend AJ Van Wijk.²⁵⁶ The wives of two men serving in the Town Guard were teachers at the schools. Susannah Wilhelmina Miller, wife of Thomas Miller, was a teacher at the Independent school,²⁵⁷ while Margaretha Johanna Petronella Hall, wife of Stephen Hall, taught at the DRC public school.²⁵⁸ The school became the staging ground for one of the more peculiar and particularly telling displays of loyalty during the war. Inspection reports, filed with the Superintendent General of Education's office in 1899, show that at the outbreak of the war, the DRC public school had 85 pupils enrolled, while the Independent English school had only 47 pupils.²⁵⁹ Curiously, by May of 1901, the number of pupils enrolled with the Independent English school had risen to 79, while enrolments in the DRC public school had significantly declined to 57.²⁶⁰ After the war enrolment numbers returned to the balance prior to hostilities,

²⁵⁴ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 13 January 1900, p. 2.

²⁵⁵ "Hero of the campaign," *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 7 July 1900, p. 2.

²⁵⁶ (KAB) SGE 2/95: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 488, 15 August 1901.

²⁵⁷ (KAB) SGE 2/80: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 2389, 15 November 1900.

²⁵⁸ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2455: Death notice of Stephen George Hall, no. 1151, 6 May 1923.

²⁵⁹ (KAB) SGE 2/67: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 2371, 21 November 1899.

²⁶⁰ (KAB) SGE 2/95: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 492, 9 May 1901; SGE 2/95: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 488, 15 August 1901.

highlighting the peculiarity of the shift.²⁶¹ It would appear that there might have been a concerted effort made by some community members to display their loyalty to the British authorities in this manner. However tempting extrapolations based on these figures may be, they remain speculative in light of the possibility that restrictions on movement under martial law may have prevented children living on farms from regular school attendance.

2.1.1.3) Support of the Monarchy

Like other towns in Cape, the people of Heidelberg had a special affection for the monarchy. In general the people of the Cape regarded the monarchy as above the fray, in much the same way as the church. Throughout the Cape, small rural towns displayed an outpouring of grief and solidarity on the death of Queen Victoria at the start of 1901.²⁶² On a postcard commemorating the passing of the Queen and coronation of the new monarch, an inhabitant of Swellendam had scribbled her undying devotion to the monarchy and referred to the poignancy of the events, considering their context within the war.²⁶³ The monarchy was seen as disconnected from the political and military campaigns which precipitated the war and reflected Cape Afrikaner religious inclinations and political apathy regarding authority. A good example of the complex elements that composed Cape Afrikaner identity can be witnessed in the outpouring of support for the Royal visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in 1901. The visit by the future King George V and his wife, was intended as a reward to colonial subjects for their loyalty and service in the war, and included visits to Australia and Canada.²⁶⁴

To the surprise of the royal couple, who had expected a less than cordial atmosphere given the context of war and recent suspension of the Cape constitution, they received a warm welcome at the Cape, which included the presentation of 100

²⁶¹ (KAB) SGE 2/110: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 1738, 23 September 1902; (KAB) SGE 2/110: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 1740, 25 September 1902.

²⁶² P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 24.

²⁶³ B. Du Plessis Collection: Postcard from the district of Swellendam, 22 December 1901.

²⁶⁴ P. Buckner: *The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South Africa*, pp. 326, 328.

addresses from various towns and attended by a multitude of municipal delegations. The couple even visited rebel and republican POWs at Simon's Town who also held the royals in high regard.²⁶⁵ Heidelberg's Municipal Council requested permission from the Colonial Secretary to send their own delegation to partake in the festivities but like many other towns were denied access to the event.²⁶⁶ The barring of visits from rural delegations was due to the fact that plague had broken out in the Cape and it was feared that the gathering of large crowds could lead to the spread of the disease.²⁶⁷ Support of the crown, by participating in the welcoming festivities, was a way for people to demonstrate their loyalty while simultaneously decrying imperialist greed.²⁶⁸ To Cape Afrikaners the royal family reflected their own values of a-political, anti-capitalist, agrarian romanticism.²⁶⁹

2.1.1.4) Self-identified Loyalists

Although displays of loyalty by the Heidelberg community were in the majority of cases subtle and ascertained through inference, one notable incident bucked the trend and merits investigation. In January 1901, a secret agent working for military intelligence visited Heidelberg and made contact with local loyalists in town. While at the Masonic Hotel, the agent had been given a signed petition from loyalists, by the manager and bartender, Mr JL Cantrell. The petition requested more troops to enforce martial law, and expressed dissatisfaction over the presence of opinionated paroled POWs, as well as a lack of official communication in English regarding the regulations of martial law. According to the petition, the town had only received one official proclamation since the start of the war, and that the proclamation had only been posted in Dutch in front of the court house. The loyalist reasserted their allegiance and assistance to the military authorities, while stressing their fears about looting and ostracization. A choice excerpt from the petition states the following:

²⁶⁵ P. Buckner: *The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South Africa*, pp. 336, 340.

²⁶⁶ (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 6 June 1901.

²⁶⁷ P. Buckner: *The Royal Tour of 1901 and the Construction of an Imperial Identity in South Africa*, p. 327.

²⁶⁸ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 52.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

“We have had quite enough worry and annoyance from boycotting, and also the THREATENING – REBELLIOUS & TREASONABLE TALK of a large proportion of the Dutch inhabitants, assisted by several prisoners on parole in the village and vicinity..”

The following citizens of Heidelberg had added their names to the list:

Henry J Biggs (Surgeon Physician and Justice of Peace)

Reverend PG Schierhout (Incumbent St Barnabas)

P Philipps Halliwell (Contractor)

JW Farrell (Justice of Peace and Post Master)

C Costley-White (Assistant Engineer)

RW Howis (Assistant to Mr White)

HJ Hanson (Storekeeper)

JL Cantrell (Manager of above)²⁷⁰

Although there had been no reported incidents of intimidation in Heidelberg, the fact that loyalists elected to communicate their grievances via backdoor military channels suggest that subtle forms of intimidation may indeed have taken place. Like nearby Swellendam, the English section of the population was relatively small. As such, boycotting of English citizens may not have been necessary. According to reports from Swellendam, English stores were not boycotted because the English community felt so outnumbered that they dared only to display very mild loyalty. With the celebrations following the relief of Mafikeng, stores in Swellendam were supposed to close as a symbol of support for the British war effort. However, reports indicated that most shops were open due to fear of reprisals. Reports indicated that the English section of Swellendam had been affecting false sympathies for the Boer cause in order to appease the local Afrikaners.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 19 January 1901.

²⁷¹ (TAB) HC 37: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 30 May 1900.

2.1.2) Alternative motivations behind displays of loyalty

The following section will examine possible ulterior motives and circumstances for the people of Heidelberg to have become involved in support of the British war effort. Despite the large number of Coloured men who volunteered for service in Town Guards and scouting units during the war, volunteering among the white inhabitants of the Cape remained unpopular. Those who did volunteer were often met with scorn in their communities.²⁷² While the question of whether such responses were motivated by sympathy for the republics or by class discrimination is still open for discussion, economic motivations for volunteering can be readily ascertained.

As the war escalated, a demand for skilled local artisans to assist in the war effort was created. The South African War is to some degree also a story about modes of transport. The war stimulated the demand for blacksmiths, harness makers, farriers, wagon makers, carpenters, and transport drivers. As the British military opted for a centralised supply network and remount system, artisans and labourers not in close proximity to these depots could not benefit from the increased demand for their services.²⁷³ In fact most white artisans struggled to benefit from the war demand, as they were in direct competition with Coloured artisans who offered to work more cheaply and were willing to traverse the great distances to reap the economic benefits. Military transport contracts were also more likely to be granted to Coloured drivers, as the military tended to distrust and look down on poor whites.²⁷⁴ The nearest remount camp to Heidelberg was situated a considerable distance away at Worcester. The situation was compounded by the declaration of martial law in the Cape Colony. Severe restrictions were placed on the possession of items which could possibly aid the invading republican commandos. All horseshoes, nails, harnesses, and wagons were impounded or commandeered for military use. Aside from the inconvenience to individual farmers, this effectively killed off the local artisan industry by freezing their entire client base.²⁷⁵

²⁷² J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, pp. 105-106.

²⁷³ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 198.

²⁷⁴ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 9.

²⁷⁵ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 129; J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, pp. 83-84.

When reviewing the biographical information of certain individuals involved in the Town Guard and local law enforcement at Heidelberg, a pattern correlating with the economic depression of the artisan industry emerges. In an 1899 report on the state of Heidelberg's prison, the inspector mentions that the newly appointed lockup keeper, William Osmond was a farrier by trade.²⁷⁶ DC Batten's applications for employment in the municipal police and District Mounted Police stated his previous profession as blacksmith.²⁷⁷ According to Thomas Henry Miller's application for induction into the municipal police force, he was trained as a carpenter and wagon maker.²⁷⁸ Willem Lodewyk Lombaard's employment application also list his previous profession as wagon maker.²⁷⁹

According to a 1901 CDF employment memo, those enlisted in Town Guards were paid £1 and 10 shillings for year's service, while recruits in mounted units were paid £2 and 10 shillings.²⁸⁰ Employment in Heidelberg's regular police force may also have seemed more lucrative, as pay sheets of the time indicate that Miller, Manuel and Batten, received respective yearly salaries of £75, £80, and £75, which were considerably more than the average pay of £68 for police constables at Swellendam.²⁸¹ Service in the District Mounted Police was also actively encouraged as a complementary part of the British remount system. In a letter from Captain Henry Nourse, head of the DMT, to the General Officer Commanding of the CDF, Nourse suggested that mounted troopers could be used for looking after remounts. As many of the recruits were Afrikaner farmers who had experience with horses, as well as land at their disposal for grazing, they could help to alleviate the shortage of horses while the British troops tasked with these duties recovered from the long sea journey to South Africa.²⁸²

For Lombaard and his brother Antonie, service in the Town Guard might have been motivated purely by financial considerations. The Lombaard's had apparently fallen on hard times in the period prior to the war.²⁸³ Like other subsistence Afrikaner farmers and the rural poor, they had been struck hard by the economic fluctuations in

²⁷⁶ (KAB) CO 2207: Inspection report on Heidelberg lockup, no. 868, 20 February 1899.

²⁷⁷ (KAB) AG 936: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 70/1901, 19 June 1901; (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 32/1900, 9 March 1900.

²⁷⁸ (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 47/1900, 1 May 1900.

²⁷⁹ (KAB) AG 1013: Employment application of WL Lombaard, no. 82/1902, 18 June 1902.

²⁸⁰ (KAB) DD 7/13: CDF employment memorandum, 5 May 1901.

²⁸¹ (KAB) AG 754: Police pay sheets for district of Swellendam, no. 123/1900, 24 August 1900.

²⁸² (KAB) DD 7/13: Letter from H Nourse to GOC of the CDF, 25 Feb 1901.

²⁸³ (KAB) 3/HBG 2/1/1: Letter from CJ Lombaard to Heidelberg Municipal Council, 21 Sept 1892.

the decades prior to the war, and did not benefit from the agricultural boom which had resulted from industrialisation.²⁸⁴ Economic motivations often played a role in fighting on the British side, and Albert Grundlingh has shown how this was the case for poor republican farmers on the urban periphery who seized the opportunities for better remuneration, social mobility and dignity by joining the British.²⁸⁵ It is, however, doubtful that the majority of these men viewed their service in law enforcement in career terms. More likely, is the possibility that service in the Town Guard, mounted and regular police were only temporary methods for alleviating poverty and supplementing income while the restrictions of war legislation threatened and suppressed the earning potential of their chosen occupations.

This may have been the case even prior to and after the war. DC Batten's original application for police constable, states that he had previously been a temporary constable in Swellendam for a year.²⁸⁶ In May 1901, a year after his appointment as police constable, Thomas Henry Miller requested to resign from the position, stating that an increased demand for wagons and carts provided him with better financial opportunities should he return to his original trade.²⁸⁷ When heavy floods damaged the main road between Swellendam and Zuurbraak at the end of the war, JDJ Manuel resigned as police constable and returned to his original occupation of road maker by assisting in the repairs.²⁸⁸ Records from the period directly following the end of the war indicate a surge of applications to mounted units like the DMT, which seem to confirm this hypothesis. Many rushed into these occupations which offered higher wages in order to satisfy the Colony's defence demands in wake of the military withdrawal from the region.²⁸⁹

The Cape Colony's absorption into the war had a double edged effect. As the military needed to feed and supply its troops, farmers received higher prices for their goods. In a war already mired in administrative and logistical difficulties, efforts by military authorities to minimise bureaucratic lag resulted in farmers being paid directly. By foregoing the use of middlemen, local merchants and shop owners were

²⁸⁴ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 6.

²⁸⁵ A. Grundlingh: *The dynamics of treason: Boer collaboration in the South African War of 1899-1902*, pp. 311-312.

²⁸⁶ (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of DC Batten, no. 32/1900, 9 March 1900.

²⁸⁷ (KAB) AG 936: Resignation letter of TH Miller, no. 46/1901, 1 May 1901.

²⁸⁸ (KAB) AG 1013: Resignation letter of JDJ Manuel, no. 42/1902, 29 March 1902.

²⁸⁹ (KAB) AG 1013: In the period from 1 November 1902 to December 1902, numerous applications to the DMT were received, no. 171/02, 1 November 1902.

severely undercut by military spending. A well-documented and widespread effect of martial law during the war in the Cape was the ruination of a large number of small country storekeepers.²⁹⁰ Under martial law, the commandeering of horses and restrictions on travel damaged their enterprises and greatly affected their livelihood. In response, many affected displays of loyalty in the hope of receiving special courtesies absolving them from such restrictions.²⁹¹ In May 1902, storekeepers Charles Hirschmann and HM Du Preez complained about not being able to sell liquor by the bottle and claimed to be losing their customers to Swellendam and Riversdale, where the practice was allowed.

Another point of contention was the concessions made to private individuals to sell liquor in the Coloured locations at Buffeljags and Slang River. The restrictions on travel resulted in the majority of farmers buying liquor at these locations which were closer in proximity than Heidelberg.²⁹² It is clear then that the traditional categories and divisions regarding allegiance are insufficient in providing satisfactory explanations for outward manifestations of loyalty. Andrew Thompson's studies on loyalism of the period has shown that ethnic identities were fragmentary, and observable loyalty was often modulated by a range of factors, including local economic circumstance, family tradition, and regional patterns of settlement.²⁹³ While the tangible displays of loyalty among the people of Heidelberg could have been a reflection of ideological proclivities and patterns of family tradition, the role of monetary incentives, personal circumstance and economic pressures under martial law provide alternative explanations that invert the superficial and oversimplified dichotomies regarding allegiance.

²⁹⁰ A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): *The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902*, p. 506.

²⁹¹ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 185, 198.

²⁹² (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Complaints by H Du Preez and C Hirschmann regarding martial law, no. 468/1902 & no. 467/1902, 1 May 1902.

²⁹³ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, pp. 620-621.

2.2) Sympathy

2.2.1) Family ties

Studies of the impact of the South African War in the Cape Colony often make mention of how shared language, religion and ties of friendship and family with the Boer Republics compounded Cape Afrikaner feelings regarding the war and had been a crucial component in eliciting sympathy for the republican cause.²⁹⁴

Yet many were conflicted regarding the war, as their complicated Cape identity, with its affinity for the monarchy and the rights and privileges as British subjects, weighed against their sympathy with the plight of their kinsmen.²⁹⁵ Republican appeals to Cape Afrikaners for assistance in the war played not only on the cultural and family ties between them, but also on the special position the republics occupied in the spiritual imagination of those sharing a common history and ancestry.²⁹⁶ Although modulated by nearly a century of British influence, the old Dutch strain of independence became embodied in the republics which to many at the Cape had become a kind of promised land for the rebellious and independent spirit of their past.²⁹⁷ Statements regarding sympathy with the republics resulting from family connections are often superficial and fail to convey the true level of interconnectedness which made this such an influential factor in determining Cape reactions to the war.

Examining the case of Heidelberg reveals the extensiveness of the ties between the Cape and the republics, and provides an indication of how the conflict permeated the entire country. A cursory review of genealogical records of the most prominent Heidelberg families reveals a pattern of migration to the northern regions of the Orange Free State starting in the 1830s.²⁹⁸ In many cases these migrations resulted from droughts, shortages of land, and other financial difficulties within the

²⁹⁴ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 53.

²⁹⁵ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 13.

²⁹⁶ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 221.

²⁹⁷ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 62.

²⁹⁸ A review of genealogical records for prominent Heidelberg surnames like Fourie, Uys, Kleynhans, Eksteen, Moodie, Human, Scholtz, Gildenhuys reveal migratory patterns to the Orange Free State starting in the 1870s.

community.²⁹⁹ In fact, ties between the greater Swellendam area, including Heidelberg, and the OFS had existed for many years. Since the 1780s, Swellendam was the host of a thriving artisan industry, which included blacksmiths, carpenters and wainwrights. Artisan families like the Steyns, Crouses, and Rothmanns had grown prosperous from building wagons intended for the eastern frontier. In the 30 year period from 1830-1860, the demand for wagons had increased exponentially with the opening of the George/Outeniqua frontier which opened the route to the OFS. The demand for wagons from the OFS established a critical link between the two areas. Years of travel between the areas, created an affinity for the place people affectionately referred to as the *Onderland*. Marthinus Steyn, the father of MT Steyn, president of OFS during the war, was a blacksmith from Swellendam who met his wife in the OFS while there on business. In 1853, his blacksmith shop burned down, and he decided to permanently move to the OFS. Many local artisans followed suit during the 1860s when drought in the Overberg and a drop in the market for wagons threatened the local artisan industry with collapse. The discovery of diamonds also lured many families away to the prospect of a brighter future in the OFS.³⁰⁰ The Cape experienced an agricultural depression between the years of 1865 and 1870, resulting from the influx of large amounts of foreign capital with the establishment of imperial banks. This influx occurred after the speculative boom of the 1860s and caused a trade depression, which combined with a series of heavy droughts in the 1870s to spur migrations to the north.³⁰¹ The 1881 collapse of the share market was followed by a recession, the first wave of which affected the Western Cape most severely. As imperial funding was withdrawn following the loss of the ZAR, already overextended merchants went bankrupt. As support for the war was no longer a necessity, banks discontinued their lines of credit.³⁰² Some Heidelberg residents were among those who had overextended themselves through speculative investments following the wake of mineral discoveries and had to leave the Cape when their lines of credit dried up.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 16, 30, 60.

³⁰⁰ E. Burrows: *Overberg Outspan: a chronicle of people and places in the south western districts of the Cape*, pp. 75-76.

³⁰¹ M. De Kock: *Selected subjects in the economic history of South Africa*, p. 103.

³⁰² A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): *The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902*, p. 101

³⁰³ H. Hopkins: *Euufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 60.

In other cases, the system of inheritance among Cape Afrikaners, which mandated that each son receive their own plot of land, had subdivided farms to the point of unsustainability. The second son and namesake of town co-founder, JJ Gildenhuys,³⁰⁴ moved to Lindley in the OFS in the late 1870s after squabbles over inheritance and land following the death of the family patriarch.³⁰⁵ Gildenhuys and his oldest two sons, Cornelis Petrus and Johannes, joined the Bethlehem commando and were captured near Dordrecht in the Eastern Cape near the end of the war.³⁰⁶ Gildenhuys's wife and younger children were captured on their farm at the start of 1901 and interned at the Winburg concentration camp.³⁰⁷ As JJ Gildenhuys's brothers, Burgert Wynand,³⁰⁸ Daniel Johannes,³⁰⁹ and Hans Jacob³¹⁰ still resided at Heidelberg, they were likely to be concerned about the welfare of their brother. In September 1902, Hans Jacob Gildenhuys enquired about the return of his brother and two nephews, who had been scheduled to return from captivity on the SS Armenian.³¹¹ Others, like the grandsons of Benjamin Moodie, of the Moodie wool empire, moved to Ladybrand in the OFS in 1892 to expand the family trade enterprise. They were the brothers John Henry,³¹² James³¹³ and Thomas Moodie,³¹⁴ nephews of Benjamin Moodie who died at the battle of Diamond Hill. Unlike their uncle, they fought on the republican side. James was captured near Koedoesrand on 21 February 1900, while Thomas was captured near Paardeberg on 27 February 1900 and later exiled to St. Helena.³¹⁵

Given the numerous connections to the Free State, the people of Heidelberg became intimately involved in the war as concerns over family in the republics escalated along with the war. In a letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, dated 8 January 1900, Heidelberg's postman, John Rothman, threatened to resign if

³⁰⁴ Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g10

³⁰⁵ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 30; H. Hopkins: *Maar een soos hy: die lewe van kommandant C. A. Van Niekerk*, p. 182.

³⁰⁶ (ABWM): *Prisoners of War Database*, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014).

³⁰⁷ (VAB) SRC 90: Winburg concentration camp register, 17 January 1901, p. 167.

³⁰⁸ Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g9

³⁰⁹ Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g11

³¹⁰ Gildenhuys b6c4d2e3f2g12

³¹¹ (TAB) SOPOW 58: Letter received from HJ Gildenhuys, no. 5539/02, 29 September 1902.

³¹² Moodie b1c2d1

³¹³ Moodie b1c2d4

³¹⁴ Moodie b1c2d5

³¹⁵ (ABWM): *Prisoners of War Database*, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014).

his request for a cart to deliver the mail was not granted. Rothman was responsible for delivery of the mail in the area between Heidelberg and Port Beaufort, a task which had been sufficiently accomplished on horseback prior to the war. According to his letter, the war had increased the volume of mail as to necessitate the use of a cart.³¹⁶ In a report to the Attorney General's office on the community feeling regarding the war, the resident magistrate of Swellendam stated that although the people were quiet and well-behaved, they exhibited strong feelings of sympathy with the inhabitants of the OFS and ZAR due to extensive family ties.³¹⁷

2.2.2) Reaction of the Church

At the heart of the community and at the crossroads of the issue over loyalty was the Dutch Reformed Church. Despite the complex motivations behind displays of loyalty and blurred ethnic identities of those involved, the church provided a thread of commonality which permeated the community. DRC records for Heidelberg indicate that most of the individuals who had served on the Municipal Council, Town Guard, police force, and mounted units, had been part of the large DRC congregation. Only a handful were affiliated with the Independent English Church, which consisted mostly of first generation British immigrants like the Hanson, Biggs and White families.³¹⁸ The generation of clergymen, like Reverend Van Wijk, who entered the service just prior to and during the South Africa War, were split regarding the role of the British Empire in the Cape. The young conservative faction, although sympathizing with the republics, were generally loyal and viewed the British Empire and monarchy as useful elements for Afrikaner progress.³¹⁹

As the war rapidly escalated and news of British military atrocities spread in the Cape, the DRC clergy became increasingly agitated and unsure of about the stance of the church. In nearby towns like Swellendam, congregational life was up-ended due to splits in the community regarding the war.³²⁰ Although the minutes of Heidelberg's church council meetings during the war give little indication of bitter

³¹⁶ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from postman John Rothman, no. 15/1900, 8 January 1900.

³¹⁷ (KAB) AG 754: Report by Resident Magistrate PB Borchers on community feeling, no. 136/1900, 24 December 1900.

³¹⁸ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 176-180.

³¹⁹ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, pp. 204-205.

³²⁰ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 162.

divisions in the congregation, the restrictions on public meetings under martial law and mandated presence of the local commandant caused a disruption in regular meetings which may have obscured the prevailing mood of the community from coming to light.³²¹ The earliest response from the DRC regarding the war was issued in the form of a memorial to Queen Victoria on 11 October 1899, after a sitting of the Ring of Swellendam held at Caledon. Records indicate that the discussion about the war had made a deep impact on all those present, especially the elders who accompanied the minister from their respective congregations. Accompanying Reverend Van Wijk at this particular meeting was DJ Gildenhuys. Many voiced their disapproval over the possibility of the Cape's involvement. The grievances were condensed into a memorial to the Queen that cautioned her about the calamitous effect that a war on the loyal Dutch would have on Victoria's person and throne.³²²

Often cited in works on the impact of the South African War in the Cape Colony, is a reference to the October 1900 sitting of the DRC Ring of Swellendam in Napier.³²³ In fact, this infamous meeting of the synod was originally set to be held at Heidelberg.³²⁴ Due to war restrictions, it was decided that the Ring only meet once a year and the next sitting was scheduled to be held in Heidelberg in 1902.³²⁵ The conference resulted in the DRC's first official ruling that condemned the war as immoral. The DRC decided not to intervene on the political front but decried the way in which the war was waged, especially in regards to the destruction of property by the British military.³²⁶ Instead of seeking mediation with the government, the DRC decided to concentrate its efforts on providing support funds to the destitute citizens of the republics and sending ministers to do relief work in concentration camps. The Ring's declaration was a calculated response in a time of extreme local tension which threatened to tear apart Cape congregations.³²⁷ This tension was reflected in a sermon of Reverend Van Wijk dated 14 June 1900, in which the following words were underscored:

³²¹ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, Between 22 May 1901 and 18 January 1902 no meetings were recorded. At the final meeting for 1901 the minutes record the presence of "Den Commandant."

³²² (DRCA) KR 44 R210/A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, Caledon, 11 October 1899.

³²³ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 56; P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 221.

³²⁴ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 9 May 1900.

³²⁵ (DRCA) KR 44 R210/A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, Napier, 8-10 October 1900.

³²⁶ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 56.

³²⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 221-222.

*“U lewen in een donkere tyd...”*³²⁸

As the war progressed, the tone of Van Wijk’s sermons became more overtly sympathetic towards the plight of those in the OFS and ZAR. In a sermon filled with battlefield imagery, he used the analogy of a fallen son’s letter to his father to refer to the plight of the exiles from the republics and young men from the Cape fighting in the war. In what can be construed as a veiled plea for assisting the republics, the dying request of the son to his father is to treat the comrade carrying the letter as if he was the man’s own son.³²⁹ In Heidelberg, the church devoted its energies to hold collections and to raise funds for the war-ravaged and impoverished inhabitants in the Boer Republics. Given Heidelberg’s extensive family ties to the republics, fundraising activity was quite vigorous after the end of the war when such activities were again permitted. In March 1903, funds collected from a church bazaar for war orphans and widows, totalled £172. The £100 was to be split three ways, with equal amounts going to the ZAR, OFS, and Cape Colony. Interestingly, the remaining £72 was sent to General CC Froneman for the poor relief of the inhabitants of Winburg and Ladybrand.³³⁰ Froneman was infamous for the murder of JJ Morgendaal, an emissary in the Boer peace envoy sent to Kroonstad which aimed to persuade General Christiaan De Wet to surrender in March 1901.³³¹ The church also gave financial assistance to impoverished communities in Mafeking, Hoopstad and Bethal, and collected old clothes that were sent to various families in the OFS and ZAR.³³²

2.2.3) Exiles

Even before republican appeals for assistance, British authorities had feared the possibility of a general uprising in the Cape. As the remote areas of the Cape were invaded by republican commandos and rebellion erupted, gauging the attitude of local inhabitants became paramount in formulating policies in response to the tides of war. When the republican capitals fell in rapid succession during mid-1900, sympathies in

³²⁸ (DRCA) K-DIV 1423: Draft of sermon by Reverend AJ Van Wijk, 14 June 1900, p. 1.

³²⁹ (DRCA) K-DIV 1423: Draft of sermon by Reverend AJ Van Wijk, 24 February 1901, p. 12.

³³⁰ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 21 March 1903.

³³¹ “De Wet and Froneman: The murder of Morgendaal,” *The Melbourne Argus*, 15 March 1901, p. 5.

³³² (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 13 June 1903.

the Cape were exacerbated as numerous refugees, political exiles and paroled POWs streamed into the Colony for temporary refuge with family members. Records on the number of POWs paroled in the Cape vary, but contemporary sources place the number at 310 for the year of 1900.³³³ A report on community feeling during November 1900, conveys the fearfulness of authorities regarding the situation. The resident magistrate of Swellendam reported that although the district had been quiet and without incident, the influx of POWs on parole was worrisome as they could possibly influence those who were not thoroughly loyal.³³⁴ The main concern of authorities was that large numbers of these paroled POWs would spread rumours regarding the situation in the ZAR and OFS. The lack of information, restrictions on movement and communication under martial law, created an environment of paranoia and fear which was very conducive to rumour and suggestion. Authorities feared that the spread of such rumours by outsiders could fan the fires of cultural animosity.³³⁵ In fact, intelligence reports from the period suggest that military authorities even tried recruiting moderate POWs and exiles to the task of spreading pro-British propaganda in order to soothe the local populace. Mention is made of a POW in Swellendam, named Joseph Hoek, who was described as a man of good character and moderate opinion whose statements regarding the situation in the ZAR were exactly what was needed to defuse local tensions.³³⁶

Scrutiny of records from the offices of the resident magistrate and Attorney General confirms that a large number of people from the OFS resided with family during the war. Under martial law, the British military would often deport undesirable or troublesome individuals from a region to go and live in another town where they had relatives. This practice was also applied to POWs from the recently conquered republics who were awaiting trial, and reflected the level of uncertainty regarding the punishment of republican belligerents and Cape rebels that hallmarked the early stages of the war.³³⁷ Although little official documentation regarding the practice

³³³ M. Grant: *The history of the war in South Africa, 1899-1902*, p. 704.

³³⁴ (KAB) AG 754: Report by Resident Magistrate PB Borchers on community feeling, no. 126/1900, 28 November 1900.

³³⁵ (TAB) HC 46: Intelligence report, 11 December 1900.

³³⁶ (TAB) HC 46: Intelligence report from Bromley, 3 December 1900.

³³⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 111-112; M. Rothmann: *My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling*, p. 128.

survived, studies have shown that in the Cape it was a readily and widespread tactic used to punish those accused of seditious talk and inciting rebellion.³³⁸

A letter sent to Swellendam's resident magistrate from Heidelberg's special justice of the peace in August of 1902, containing a list of burghers who were scheduled to take the oath of allegiance to lift their parole, provides a good indication of the number of "foreign" persons residing in the area during the war.³³⁹ The list contains the following names:

AC Higgo	PW Duminy	JL Herholdt
James H De Villiers	DF Scholtz	HFS Van Eden
APJ Van Der Poel	JU Scholtz	DJ Herholdt
JHB Van Der Poel	JJ Badenhorst	SJS Marais
PD Steyn	AB Lombaard	HC Taylor
JM Homan	HJ Van Aswegen	James Rowing
HA Eksteen	HR Middleton	
MJ Van Rensburg	JJ Rall	

PD Steyn was Pieter Daniel Steyn from the ZAR who along with his wife Lucy, arrived in the district during October 1899, and went to stay on his mother's farm Steynsrust. His sister Barbara and her husband Wilfred Hubbard were also refugees from the ZAR, who had been living on the farm since September 1899. AC Higgo, was Alfred Charles Higgo from the ZAR, who had arrived in Heidelberg in October 1899 with his wife Elizabeth. They went to live with Elizabeth's brother Jacobus Muller, on his farm Waterloo. They were accompanied by Higgo's sister, Francis and her husband George Edward Hendriks.³⁴⁰

MJ Van Rensburg and PW Duminy were paroled POWs from the OFS, who had previously been confined to Bredasdorp, but were eventually allowed to go and stay with family at Heidelberg in November 1900.³⁴¹ Duminy resided with his family

³³⁸ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 132.

³³⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Report on paroled burghers who had taken oaths of allegiance, no. 735/1902, 1 August 1902.

³⁴⁰ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report on foreign persons in district by field cornet S Van Der Westhuysen in ward 1, no. 406/1901, 5 May 1901.

³⁴¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on paroled prisoners, no. 752/1900, 12 November 1900.

on the farm Boschheuwel until the end of the war, when he was spared exile and released for good behaviour.³⁴² PJ Badenhorst and HJ Van Aswegen were two undesirables from the OFS, who were paroled from Cape Town to the district of Swellendam in August 1900.³⁴³ As was the practice, Van Aswegen was required to regularly report himself to the special justice of the peace, Albert White.³⁴⁴ Other individuals not included on the list but residing in Heidelberg during the war were three Kroonstad rebels guilty of perjury and contravening military law. They were the brothers Daantjie and David Victor, and Roeloff Beukes, who were sent to Heidelberg to live with family.³⁴⁵

The severity of the restrictions placed on those who were subjected to the practice of exile was primarily determined by the nature and inclination of those responsible for their supervision, which included local commandants and civil commissioners.³⁴⁶ It would appear that for the most part, those sent to Heidelberg were generally well treated and allowed reasonable freedom of movement. JW Herholdt from the OFS, as well as HFS Van Eeden were allowed to move about freely and received early parole upon request.³⁴⁷ A notable exception was the case of DF Scholtz. Daniel Francois Scholtz³⁴⁸ was born in Heidelberg in 1851, but had left for the OFS due to financial difficulties in 1881.³⁴⁹ The Scholtz family were intimately connected with one of Heidelberg's old wealthy families, the Humans. Scholtz's older sister Johanna Petronella, was married to the businessman and member of parliament, Johannes Urbanus Human.³⁵⁰ Daniel Francois Scholtz was married to Margaretha Albertina Human,³⁵¹ the daughter of Jurgens Johannes Petrus Human,³⁵² the brother of Johannes Urbanus and son of the town co-founder Cornelis Jacobus Human.

³⁴² (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: letter from J Herholdt regarding parole, no. 316/1903, 23 March 1903.

³⁴³ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: correspondence regarding prisoner transfers, no. 478/1900, 13 August 1900.

³⁴⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on paroled prisoners, no. 797/1900, 24 November 1900.

³⁴⁵ (KAB) AG 754: Report on exiled individuals in the district of Swellendam, no. 63/1900, 2 July 1900.

³⁴⁶ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 111-112.

³⁴⁷ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: letter from J Herholdt, no. 667/1902, 14 July 1902.

³⁴⁸ Scholtz b3c13; (KAB) HOP: Daniel Francois Scholtz, no. 757 & no. 1163, Addendum A, Figure 12.

³⁴⁹ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaastrand) 1855-1955*, p. 60.

³⁵⁰ Scholtz b3c8

³⁵¹ Human b5c3d11e2f7

³⁵² Human b5c3d11e2

Accordingly, both of Scholtz's sons who were born in Heidelberg, were christened Jurgens Johannes Petrus Scholtz³⁵³ and Johannes Urbanus Scholtz.³⁵⁴

DF Scholtz was arrested on his farm near Winburg in the OFS on 27 June 1900.³⁵⁵ According to the substantial file on Scholtz, he had appropriated a flock of sheep from African labourers who had received the sheep after a roving commando had left them behind when they travelled through the district of Winburg. Scholtz had taken the sheep to his neighbour's farm, who was away on commando duty with two of Scholtz's sons. Scholtz had apparently used the neighbours farm to supply commandos with provisions. When searching the farm, British authorities found cut telegraph wire and a supply of dynamite detonators. Scholtz had signed the oath of neutrality after the British occupation of the OFS, and was therefore classified as a POW and undesirable alien. As punishment for his crimes, his farm was burnt down and he was exiled to Heidelberg to stay with friends or family for the remainder of the war.

Scholtz's wife and daughter were placed under house arrest and forced to stay with friends in Winburg.³⁵⁶ For most of his stay in Heidelberg, Scholtz resided with James Du Preez, secretary of the Heidelberg Municipal Council.³⁵⁷ According to a report filed by the acting resident magistrate of Riversdale, EH Samuels, in January 1901, Scholtz had apparently been a thorn in the side of local authorities since setting foot in Heidelberg. Samuels had visited Heidelberg twice in January 1901, and was confronted by Scholtz on both occasions. Scholtz engaged Samuels about the atrocities committed by the British military in the OFS, and related how his farm had been set ablaze when the military found dynamite intended for blasting, on his property. Scholtz's vocal opposition had attracted the attention of the uncle of president Steyn who had been living with relatives in Riversdale. On the other occasion while Mr Steyn was visiting him at Heidelberg, Scholtz remarked that he had six sons involved in the war, and that in November of 1900 he encouraged them to fight till the end.³⁵⁸

³⁵³ Scholtz b3c13d1

³⁵⁴ Scholtz b3c13d2

³⁵⁵ (ABWM): *Prisoners of War Database*, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014).

³⁵⁶ (TAB) PMO 76: Correspondence regarding Scholtz, no.58/02, 5 December 1902.

³⁵⁷ (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report, 23 January 1901.

³⁵⁸ (KAB) AG 933: Report by CJ Roux, resident magistrate of Riversdale, on community feeling, no. 3/1901, 14 January 1901.

Exactly how much of what Scholtz had said was serious or in jest will probably never be known, but it is evident that he intended to cause a stir among those prosecuting the war. According to records, Scholtz only had two sons. Johannes Urbanus Scholtz was captured near Paardeberg on 27 February 1900, paroled to Heidelberg, and eventually exiled to Bermuda. Jurgens Johannes Petrus Scholtz was captured near Venterstad on 27 December 1900, and exiled to St. Helena.³⁵⁹ According to the terms of DF Scholtz's parole, he was only allowed to travel six miles from the centre of town and had to regularly report his whereabouts to the special justice of the peace.³⁶⁰ As he had grown up in Heidelberg and was on familiar terms with Albert White, Scholtz did not take the agreement seriously, and visited friends in Port Beaufort without permission at the start of 1901.³⁶¹ When the military authorities became involved and queried the resident magistrate of Swellendam about Scholtz's activities, he personally wrote to them complaining about what he regarded as ludicrous requirements.³⁶² Scholtz's activities and statements were particularly worrisome to the authorities as reports suggested that the local inhabitants were greatly distressed about the situation in the OFS, especially in light of a circulating rumour about 500 Boer women in a Bloemfontein hospital who were being treated for venereal disease after being raped. Combined with Scholtz's frequent denouncement of British atrocities, it was feared that local women were especially prone to believing such rumours.³⁶³ Scholtz became such a disruption to village life that authorities considered removing him to Port Elizabeth after complaints from some loyalists.³⁶⁴ Scholtz was eventually paroled in mid 1902, and returned to the OFS having survived the wrath of the military to whom he had caused so much chagrin.³⁶⁵

³⁵⁹ (ABWM): *Prisoners of War Database*, http://www.anglo-boer.co.za/database-search/index.php?section=Prisoners_of_War#sectionHeader (17 August 2014).

³⁶⁰ (KAB) AG 933: Report by CJ Roux, resident magistrate of Riversdale, on community feeling, no. 3/1901, 14 January 1901.

³⁶¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on DF Scholtz, no. 17/1901, 5 January 1901.

³⁶² (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from DF Scholtz, no. 25/1901, 7 January 1901.

³⁶³ (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report, 23 January 1901.

³⁶⁴ (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 16 January 1901.

³⁶⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: letter from J Herholdt, no. 667/1902, 14 July 1902.

2.2.4) Rebellion

During the South African War, a total of 3437 inhabitants of the Cape Colony joined the republics in taking up arms against the British. The Cape rebels were classified in two groupings. Class I Rebels were those who had joined the republicans in open warfare against the British, as well as those individuals considered ringleaders who incited rebellion among their fellow citizens. Class II rebels, who formed the majority of those prosecuted for high treason, was anyone who assisted the enemy by providing information and provisions, or had failed to report their presence.³⁶⁶ In November 1899, the resident magistrate of Swellendam made his first report on suspected rebel activity in the area of Heidelberg. In the report he mentioned that the only persons known to have joined the enemy were two young men who had left the area for the OFS before the start of the war.³⁶⁷ As such, they were unlikely to be classified as rebels dependent on the condition that they renounced their British citizenship upon arrival in the OFS. Records indicate that during the war only one Cape rebel came from Heidelberg. In all likelihood, the two young men referred to in the magistrate's report, were the 30 year old Johannes Jurie Lombaard and his younger brother Andries Benjamin Lombaard. The older Lombaard left Heidelberg in March 1899 for Heilbron in the OFS where his younger brother had already settled in since the start of the year.³⁶⁸ Astonishingly, Johannes Jurie Lombaard,³⁶⁹ and Andries Benjamin Lombaard,³⁷⁰ were the siblings of Willem Lodewyk³⁷¹ and Antonie Lombaard³⁷² who served in Heidelberg's Town Guard.

Given the circumstances of the Lombaard family, financial motivations may have been behind the brothers' decision to move to the OFS.³⁷³ Evidence supports this hypothesis as records indicate that Johannes Jurie Lombaard went to Heilbron, to fight in the war as a second for an English Free State burgher and objector, a Mr J Pierce. Lombaard was captured at Rhenoster River on 11 June 1900, and tried for

³⁶⁶ J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, p. 30.

³⁶⁷ (KAB) AG 754: Report by PB Borchers on rebels in district of Swellendam, no. 93/99, 6 November 1899.

³⁶⁸ (KAB) AG 3537: Class II POWs in Ward 7, Vol. 112, no. 125/1900, 11 June 1900.

³⁶⁹ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g4

³⁷⁰ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g5

³⁷¹ Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g8

³⁷² Lombaard b3c6d6e3f10g9

³⁷³ (KAB) 3/HBG 2/1/1: Letter from CJ Lombaard to Heidelberg Municipal Council, 21 Sept 1892.

high treason as a Cape rebel, due to the fact that he had not been in the OFS long enough to take the oath of allegiance and renounce his British citizenship.³⁷⁴ According to reports, Lombaard had escaped captivity three times, once from a British column just after his capture, once from a train en route to the Cape, and once more from the POW camp at Simonstown, before being exiled to Ceylon.³⁷⁵ Lombaard's brother, Andries Benjamin also fought on the Boer side, but was spared prosecution as a rebel, having become a naturalised citizen of the OFS at the start of 1899, and was released on parole to Heidelberg.³⁷⁶ He was, however, required to give evidence against his brother before the resident magistrate of Swellendam on 7 December 1900. The younger Lombaard was accompanied by William Osmond and Captain Fiveash, and related the tale of his brother's decision to fight in the war. AB Lombaard stated that he was a poor man, and asked for his travel expenses to be reimbursed as he and his family were struggling financially.³⁷⁷ The extraordinary story of the Lombaard family truly embodies the complexities in allegiance which hallmarked the experience of Cape Afrikaners during the war.

The only other notable case relating to the issue of rebellion at Heidelberg involved an incident which first appeared in *The Cape Times* on 20 September 1901.³⁷⁸ Rebellion often held appeal to young men in search of adventure, a feature common to all wars and revolutions.³⁷⁹ Such was the case of David Cornelius Brandt, a young man working as a labourer on the farm Keerom near Montagu. Brandt spontaneously joined Scheepers' commando on 6 September 1901, when they passed through the region.³⁸⁰ The commando was engaged at Kogmanskloof by a detachment of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment, under command of Captain Fiveash.³⁸¹ Brandt remained with Scheepers' commando for 6 days before changing his mind and surrendering himself to authorities. As he was originally from Stinkfontein, Worcester, Brandt was extradited from Montagu to stand trial at Worcester. He was tried by the civil court and, given his decision to surrender, was spared treason

³⁷⁴ (KAB) AG 3537: Class II POWs in Ward 7, Vol. 112, no. 125/1900, 11 June 1900.

³⁷⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Correspondence regarding Johannes Jurie Lombaard, no. 146/1902.

³⁷⁶ (KAB) AG 3537: Class II POWs in Ward 7, Vol. 112, no. 125/1900, 11 June 1900.

³⁷⁷ (KAB) AG 754: Statement and claim by AB Lombaard, no. 131/1900, 7 December 1900.

³⁷⁸ "Worcester Boer recruit captured near Swellendam," *The Cape Times*, 20 September 1901, p. 5.

³⁷⁹ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 71.

³⁸⁰ (KAB) AG 2097: List of persons who joined the enemy, 1899-1902.

³⁸¹ (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902.

charges and only sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment.³⁸² During his trial, Brandt testified that while in the company of the commando, he ascertained that a number of those riding with Scheepers had previously been residents of Swellendam and Heidelberg. Brandt identified them as Jan Nel from Swellendam, and the brothers Jan and Piet Marais from Heidelberg. These men had apparently left the district in the years prior to the war and accompanied the commando to act as guides given their knowledge of the local terrain.³⁸³

2.2.5) Notable displays of sympathy

In other areas of the Southern Cape, where the majority of town inhabitants were English, support for the republics and displays of sympathy were usually subtle and without incident.³⁸⁴ In Heidelberg, where loyalists were in the minority, the situation was reversed and tensions regarding the war often flared up. Like other regions in the Cape, the prominent and wealthy inhabitants of Heidelberg usually kept their heads down and refused to openly declare their support for either side.³⁸⁵ Yet, a number of incidents, mostly recorded in the normal case files of the local magistrate, warrant mention. These cases relate to incidents where the local inhabitants openly displayed forms of sympathy or support for the Boer Republics and their cause. Incidents prosecuted under martial law are reviewed in a separate section of this thesis. A good example of the nature of seditious actions undertaken by the people in the region can be found in an incident in Swellendam, when two brothers from the Tomlinson family, prevented the British from firing a victory salute after the relief of Mafeking, by rolling down the cannons from the mountain during the previous night.³⁸⁶ Probably the first incident sparking the powder keg of community tensions occurred on 30 April 1900, when a farmer called William Van Reenen was locked up after drunkenly shouting anti-British epithets at police constable William Lodewyk Lombaard.³⁸⁷ A similar incident occurred in October of the same year, when a Michel

³⁸² D. Shearing & T. Shearing: *Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave*, p. 194.

³⁸³ (KAB) PMO 81: Report on statement of David Cornelius Brandt, no. R9058, 20 September 1901.

³⁸⁴ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 49.

³⁸⁵ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 92.

³⁸⁶ L. Tomlinson: *Geskiedkundige Swellendam*, p. 104.

³⁸⁷ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Van Reenen, no. 550/1900, 30 April 1900.

Otto was arrested for public intoxication and cursing constables Jan Matthee and William Osmond in the main street of town.³⁸⁸ In March of 1901, a man called Stephan Fouchee was fined £1 or one month's hard labour after drunkenly cursing local shopkeeper, William Johnson, while outside his home. Fouchee threatened to break Johnson's neck if he should come out. As martial law was in effect, Johnson had been unable to summon a police constable and could only do so on the following day.³⁸⁹ Apparently Fouchee had a reputation for conflict with the English-speaking inhabitants of town and was arrested three times in one month before being transferred to the Swellendam jail.³⁹⁰

In May of 1901, a particularly telling incident occurred when Jan Crous assaulted town mayor, James Munnik by kicking his pipe from his mouth while the two were engaged in an argument over the war while playing billiards at the Heidelberg Hotel.³⁹¹ Crous and Munnik were well acquainted, having served together on the Municipal Council and had chaired a committee inspecting flood damage caused by the Duivenhoks River.³⁹² Crous was sentenced to an undisclosed fine or a week's hard labour, and opted for the fine.³⁹³ Perhaps the most interesting incident to occur was the dismissal of Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, a trooper in the District Mounted Police. Nothnagel was dismissed after reports of seditious comments he had made at the end of 1900, came to the attention of the resident magistrate of Swellendam. Nothnagel had served in the DMP since 1888, and was stationed in the area of Slang River.³⁹⁴ At Nothnagel's trial, the lockup keeper, William Osmond, testified that the police constables at Heidelberg had to report any internal seditious comments and behaviour to him, which he was to record in his gaolers book. In a private conversation between Nothnagel and constable JDJ Manuel which had taken place in December of 1900, Nothnagel had apparently said that if the Boers should ever invade Heidelberg and the police were called out to fight, he would shoot Manuel and join the Boers. In a previous conversation with constable Jan Matthee, Nothnagel had stated that he wished the Boers would drive the English into the sea.

³⁸⁸ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Lex vs Otto, no. 361/1900, 10 October 1900.

³⁸⁹ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Johnson vs Fouchee, no. 210/1901, 2 March 1901.

³⁹⁰ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Request for prisoner transfer from Heidelberg special justice of the peace, no. 220/1901, 6 March 1901.

³⁹¹ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Munnik vs Crous, no. 465/1901, 22 May 1901.

³⁹² (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 14 December 1899.

³⁹³ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Munnik vs Crous, no. 465/1901, 22 May 1901.

³⁹⁴ (KAB) AG 754: Application for leave by WJ Nothnagel, no. 86/99, 10 October 1899.

As was procedure, Osmond recorded the events in his gaoler's book, as well as personal diary, but refrained from informing Heidelberg's commandant. Osmond stated that after having known Nothnagel for 12 years, he was sure that he was not loyal but could not prove it, and their friendship prevented him from taking the matter further. Constable Manuel was also unwilling to sign an affidavit regarding the conversation, and was apparently more upset that Nothnagel had said he would shoot him first.³⁹⁵ Probably in an attempt to keep the incident quiet, Nothnagel was not prosecuted for sedition under martial law, as he was subsequently dismissed with one month's salary.³⁹⁶

Reports made to the Attorney General's office regarding the community feeling about the war, indicate that authorities were very concerned about the spread of false rumours of British atrocities which could potentially incite rebellion and generate sympathy for the Boer Republics.³⁹⁷ In July 1901, Willem Stassen of Dassiefontein was charged with using seditious language and spreading rumours after telling his neighbours that the Boers in the ZAR were killing wagons full of British soldiers, and that in the event of a Boer invasion, he would point out members of the district mounted units to the Boers for execution. Stassen was found guilty on both charges and sentenced to 6 months hard labour, but, in consideration of his large family, his sentence was suspended.³⁹⁸ The spread of rumours was an unintended side effect resulting from censorship and restriction of movement under the regulations of martial law, and contributed significantly to creating sympathy for the republics and generating ethnic tension in the Cape.³⁹⁹ Another curious incident occurred near the end of the war. A number of soldiers temporarily stationed at Heidelberg were court-martialled for drunkenness. In the subsequent investigation, an analysis of the brandy led the authorities to believe that a local canteen owner had drugged the soldiers. Apparently inefficient evidence prevented prosecution and the identity of the man in question was never revealed.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁵ (KAB) AG 936: Testimony of William Osmond, no. 53/1901, 1 June 1901.

³⁹⁶ (KAB) AG 936: Dismissal of WJ Nothnagel, no. 48/1901, 18 May 1901.

³⁹⁷ (KAB) AG 754: Report by PB Borchers on community feeling, no. 127/1900, 3 December 1900.

³⁹⁸ (KAB) AG 3635: Military court case against W Stassen, no. 470/92, 2 July 1901.

³⁹⁹ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 67.

⁴⁰⁰ (KAB) AG 1013: Letter from Commandant Nelson regarding court-martial, no. 12/1902, 24 January 1902.

Chapter 3 – Law and Order

This section details cases and incidents tried under martial law. From January 1901 to April 1902, the Swellendam's magistrate's office in conjunction with military courts tried a total of 88 cases and issued fines amounting to £142.⁴⁰¹ As these figures represented the entire district of Swellendam, including Heidelberg, efforts were made to distinguish the cases only pertaining to the community of Heidelberg. In order to do so, the minutes of Heidelberg's church council meetings were used to determine the relevant cases.⁴⁰² Throughout the war, a main point of contention in the Cape revolved around the application of martial law in the Colony. The restrictions and prosecutions under martial law were the most determinant factors in altering the identity of Cape Afrikaners. Under martial law, the right and privileges which British citizenship had extended to Cape Afrikaners were summarily suspended. Martial law was used in support of the war by way of commandeering the goods and property of Cape Afrikaners. The expropriation of property challenged their livelihood and severe restrictions on movement bound them to conscripted patterns of consumption.

The paternalism and constitutionalism of the preceding British century had helped to create and strengthen the social hierarchies which were the sources of power and control at the heart of Cape Afrikaner society. The enforcement of martial law also opened up a brief window for the marginalised sections of Cape society to assert themselves by challenging the old dispensation. The poor and landless, including white *bywoners* and Coloured farm labourers, seized the opportunity for bettering their lives and settling longstanding grievances. This double assault on security and power from outside and within created resentment and insecurity among a new generation of Cape Afrikaners. Their experience of shared suffering formed the foundations and undercurrents of a new ethnic identity. At the heart of the tension and bitterness regarding the application of martial law was a cultural clash aggravated by the increasing difficulties created by the war. Surridge posits that the hatred fostered among Cape Afrikaners, resulted from the conflicting demands of political responsibility and military requirements, modulated by British involvement from

⁴⁰¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Reports on cases tried under martial law, no. 484/1902, 30 April 1902.

⁴⁰² (DRCA) GEM-K 596: A 1904 church council decision to subdivide the congregation into 10 wards included a complete list of the farms allocated to each ward. Cases tried under martial law in the district of Swellendam were compared to these lists to ascertain which cases were relevant to the community of Heidelberg. Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 15 March 1904.

abroad.⁴⁰³ From the start, Alfred Milner was at odds with political culture at the Cape. He distrusted the intentions of local politicians, and became frustrated by their hesitancy to declare martial law and indecisiveness over the issue of rebel disenfranchisement. This frustrated not only Milner, but also an increasingly beleaguered military command, by stunting their ability to effectively counter the invasion and contain the rebellion.

The tension between politicians and the military was compounded by changes in both local government and military command, which prevented consensus on formulating a cohesive policy for implementing martial law. The frustration and distrust created in the process filtered down to local administrators and military authorities responsible for prosecuting the war. The Cape government's insistence on including civil authorities in the application of martial law resulted in local commissioners and magistrates becoming burdened with heavy administrative workloads, while military commanders, already vexed by what they considered as disloyal behaviour, became increasingly distrustful of the populace under their supervision.

The British military had arrived at the Cape and entered the war in possession of a culture shaped by a history of colonial warfare which proved insufficient preparation for the situation in the field. Despite widespread usage of martial law to suppress rebellion in other colonies, the military had never before attempted the practice on a predominantly European population. To Cape Afrikaners, the military authorities seemed to espouse a totally foreign approach to governance that assaulted their liberties as British citizens and discriminated against their language and ties with the republics. By indiscriminately lumping together Cape Afrikaners, the war had set in motion a process of ethnic self-identification that would eventually transcend the complexities in identity and provide a platform for the later ethnic solidarity of Afrikaner Nationalism.

⁴⁰³ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, p. 35.

3.1) Cultural clashes and administrative frustrations

3.1.1) Political context and background

In order to fully comprehend the tension between the two different visions regarding the future of South Africa which came to a head during the war, requires a better understanding of the political context which directly preceded and characterised the war. It can be said that ever since his arrival on South African shores, the High Commissioner, Alfred Milner, was at odds with the prevailing culture of the Cape Colony. As the majority of Cape inhabitants were Dutch or Afrikaners, Milner's perception of them certainly played a major role in his approach to the war in South Africa. In light of emergent European tendencies towards nationalism, like the rise of the German state and subsequent geopolitical power plays by proxy of colonial expansion, overprotective imperialists like Milner feared the possibility of pan-Afrikaner republican nationalism which the ZAR and OFS seemed to embody. This fear had been sparked by what appeared to be signs of ethnic solidarity in the outrage among Cape Afrikaners following the first Boer War of 1880-1881.

Yet, such fears proved to be unfounded and quietened down with the introduction of Responsible Government in the 1880s. The affectionate bond between Rhodes and Cape Afrikaners, during his premiership of 1890-1895, also did much to placate these fears. Rhodes gained the support of the Afrikaner Bond, a vital component in the plans for altering the nature of rule involving the Cape Afrikaners. The Jameson Raid at the end of 1895, severely damaged the possibility of a Cape government open to Milner's vision of imperial hegemony. Despite having the pro-empire Gordon Sprigg as prime minister of the Cape, Sprigg's connections with Rhodes and hard-line jingoists alienated him from the Bond majority in the Cape parliament. As a result, Milner became convinced that the pro-imperial faction of loyalists in the parliament were vital for the success of the war.⁴⁰⁴

Milner did not trust the members of parliament elected in September 1898, as many belonged to the Afrikaner Bond.⁴⁰⁵ They comprised the new government headed by WP Schreiner which came to power in April 1899. Milner viewed the

⁴⁰⁴ M. Tamarkin: *Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point of return to a dead end*, pp. 392-394.

⁴⁰⁵ J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, p. 83.

government with its large faction of Bond members as disloyal and detrimental to the war effort. As he could not trust the new government, Milner became resigned to the idea that in order to conquer the Boer Republics, he had to simultaneously conquer the Cape as well.⁴⁰⁶ In reality, the Cape wanted no part in the coming war, and the government exhausted attempts to keep the Colony from becoming involved. This desire was perhaps best expressed in a speech Schreiner made in August 1899, when he stated the desire for the Cape to be “...a little place of peace...” outside the confusion of war.⁴⁰⁷ Unlike Milner, Schreiner understood the multifaceted composition of Cape identity.⁴⁰⁸ Milner could not fathom this hybrid identity, nor had he the patience to try and comprehend its contradicting manifestations. As a committed imperialist during a period of imperial decline, Milner was very much a man out of time. Also, the political culture at the Cape did not congeal with his radical and impatient temperament which regarded the democratic process and tolerance for local complexities with contempt.⁴⁰⁹ As he needed their support to effectively conduct the war, Milner grew exasperated with the neutral stance of Cape Afrikaners who insisted that the Cape not become involved in the conflict. Milner regarded this as fence sitting and vowed to either bypass this multi-faceted political creature or resolve it by obliteration.⁴¹⁰ As the war progressed and the republican capitals fell, Milner became convinced that meetings held by the Afrikaner Bond in mid-1900 were aimed to generate popular support for a political motion to grant the republics semi-independence. Milner believed that this would inadvertently increase rebellion in the Cape, and set about to neutralize the influence of the Afrikaner Bond.⁴¹¹

Another point of contention for Milner, and later the military authorities, was the reluctance of the Cape government to declare martial law. The government was very hesitant to declare martial law in the areas of the Cape not affected by the first republican invasion, as it feared the possibility of alienating the electorate.⁴¹² Initially the military supported this decision as it feared that the deployment of additional

⁴⁰⁶ M. Tamarkin: *Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point of return to a dead end*, pp. 397-399.

⁴⁰⁷ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 15.

⁴⁰⁸ M. Tamarkin: *Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point of return to a dead end*, pp. 408-409.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

⁴¹¹ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 74.

⁴¹² J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, p. 14.

troops to enforce martial law would hamper the war effort by diverting manpower from the republican front.⁴¹³ As a result, the first period of martial law from October 1899 to June 1900 was characterised by the lack of military intervention in the prosecution of offenders. Military high command was willing to let the majority of cases be tried by civil authorities in order to speed up the process and leave the military to get on with their prime task of soldiering.⁴¹⁴ During negotiations with the Schreiner government regarding martial law prosecutions, Milner suggested that civil magistrates and judges should be present at court-martial proceedings. For Milner this was a gesture which acknowledged the legitimacy of local government and an attempt to find middle ground with the increasingly hostile Schreiner ministry. The suggestion also had practical implications, as local magistrates and civil commissioners had local knowledge regarding customs and language, which would make the task easier.

Despite the generousness of the offer, the Cape government rejected the notion of suspending the constitutional rights of its citizens, a decision which Milner regarded as an act of subterfuge, and evidence of the government's disloyalty.⁴¹⁵ Eventually, a compromise was reached by way of the Special Indemnity Act of 1900, which indemnified those administering martial law and created special courts for prosecuting rebels who had committed acts of treason within the period stretching from 11 October 1899 to 12 October 1900. These special courts were composed of civil authorities according to the wishes of the Schreiner government. Unfortunately, the matter of prosecution was further complicated by the second invasion and the issue over rebel amnesty and disenfranchisement.⁴¹⁶

On 13 June 1900, the Schreiner government resigned over its inability to reach a consensus on the issue of rebel disenfranchisement. The government was evenly split regarding amnesty for rebels, but deadlocked on the proposal that Cape rebels lose the right to vote, and on 18 June a new government headed by Sprigg came into office.⁴¹⁷ The Schreiner government's constitutional debates surrounding the Special Indemnity Act had caused great frustration among military authorities trying to

⁴¹³ J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, p. 70.

⁴¹⁴ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, pp. 43-44.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴¹⁶ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, pp. 124-125.

⁴¹⁷ J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, pp. 23-24.

subdue rebellion in the isolated parts of the Cape. As a result, the frustration filtered down through the ranks and created a tension between the military and civilian sections of Cape society.⁴¹⁸ To Milner, the election of the Sprigg ministry appeared beneficial at first, as the new government approved the colony-wide extension of martial law on 17 January 1901. It became apparent however, that the Sprigg government shared the Schreiner ministry's distrust of the military.⁴¹⁹ The Attorney General, James Rose-Innes, detested the fact that the application of martial law often reflected the personal preferences and peccadilloes of local commandants, and actively voiced his opposition towards military involvement.⁴²⁰ In an attempt to respond to the invasion more efficiently, Kitchener proposed leniency to rebels who had been sentenced to death by limiting their punishment to political disenfranchisement. Milner and the British government were unsure about the proposal, believing that examples were needed to be made in order to deter further rebellion. The Sprigg government was outraged by the suggestion of disenfranchisement, as this would undermine the legitimacy of the Cape government and void the constitutional rights of their citizens.⁴²¹

The speed of the second invasion into the Cape had caught both the military and government off-guard, causing massive administrative backlogs and organisational lags in the prosecution of martial law cases.⁴²² Military authorities became increasingly frustrated by the government's inability to formulate clear policies for responding to the situation on the ground. As a result, the frustration and distrust at the top often filtered down to local military authorities and civil commissioners. In the end, it was the civilian population that received the brunt of the frustrations resulting from political intrigues, and the mood and temperament of those responsible for upholding martial law came to determine the severity of punishment for transgressions.

⁴¹⁸ J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, p. 17.

⁴¹⁹ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, p. 44.

⁴²⁰ J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, p. 73.

⁴²¹ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, pp. 47-50.

⁴²² J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 75.

3.1.2) Commandants and Commanders

During the war, the Cape Colony was divided into different areas under military administration. Each area was divided into smaller districts usually centred around the major town in the region. Each town was assigned a commandant to oversee the application of martial law. Local commandants reported to the officer commanding or commandant of their respective region. Area commanders were usually drawn from the British Imperial Yeomanry responsible for safeguarding the Cape from republican forces. Heidelberg was located within area designation no. 5, otherwise known as the Southern Area. As Heidelberg was situated within the region of Swellendam, it fell under the jurisdiction and control of Swellendam's commandant and resident magistrate.⁴²³ The application of martial law and accommodation of the civilian population was often determined by the temperament of local commandants.

While some could be harsh, the majority in the Southern Cape were lenient, owing to the fact that rebellion in this region was less common.⁴²⁴ Still, temperaments varied, and at neighbouring Riversdale, Commandant Lumsdaine had a reputation for cruelty and invasiveness. Riversdale's inhabitants were subject to extensive searches of their homes and were forced to wear mourning clothes after the death of Queen Victoria.⁴²⁵ Swellendam's commandant, Captain A. Nelson, was more lenient and had a reputation for being more considerate of the needs of the local population.⁴²⁶ The situation at Heidelberg, however, was more complicated. In a letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, the commander for the Southern Area considered the magistrate's proposed solutions for issuing permits at Heidelberg and Barrydale, and made the following statement:

“Owing to the importance of the two villages Heidelberg and Barrydale in your district, I shall be glad to know what steps you propose taking for the administration of these places. I have hitherto been obliged to appoint an Assistant Commandant at

⁴²³ (KAB) DD 6/104; Circular of CDF orders, no.11, 27 April 1901.

⁴²⁴ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 111-112.

⁴²⁵ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 2 March 1901, p. 2.

⁴²⁶ M. Rothmann: *My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling*, pp. 134-135.

*Heidelberg, as besides having the reputation of being very disloyal, it is also in an important position both strategically and commercially.”*⁴²⁷

The fact that the area commandant regarded Heidelberg with a degree of disdain, warrants further investigation. The officer commanding for area no. 5 and the man in question, was Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Arthur Burke.⁴²⁸ Burke had been stationed at Oudtshoorn where the headquarters of the Southern Area was situated, but in April of 1901 requested it to be relocated to Swellendam, which had better supplies, access to communication and was more strategically situated due to its geography and proximity to the railway.⁴²⁹ The relocation may also have been motivated by Burke's desire to intercept the encroaching republican commandos which had entered the Southern Cape during 1901.⁴³⁰ Burke was a career military officer and veteran of numerous military campaigns in Africa. Originally part of the 7th Dragoon Guards, Burke had been deployed to Egypt and took part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir in 1882.⁴³¹ Like the rest of the British officer corps deployed in South Africa during the war, Burke had gained experience in occupying foreign territory during the preceding decades of colonial warfare. Men like Burke embodied a different culture and mindset shaped by a life in the military and an older era of colonial warfare, which did not prepare them for policing a problematic area like the Cape.⁴³² While the British military had some previous experience in using martial law to subdue colonial rebellions, the practice had never before been attempted on such a large scale and never on a large European population with a history of political rights.⁴³³

Information on assistant commandants at Heidelberg is very sparse, owing to the fragile state of archival material in the files of the Colonial Defence Force. The fact that Heidelberg was regarded as a subdivision of Swellendam, also resulted in

⁴²⁷ (KAB) AG 936: Correspondence between Lieutenant-Colonel Burke and resident magistrate of Swellendam, no. 135/1901, 9 December 1901.

⁴²⁸ (KAB) DD 4/155: Pay sheets for Town Guard of Heidelberg, no. 179/1902, 2 August 1902.

⁴²⁹ (KAB) DD 1/71: Request from Lieutenant-Colonel Burke to move headquarters, no. 1777/1901, 15 April 1901.

⁴³⁰ D. Shearing & T. Shearing: *Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave*, p. 121.

⁴³¹ *The London Gazette*, 26 September 1876, p. 5201.

⁴³² H. Bradford: *Gentlemen and Boers: Afrikaner Nationalism, Gender, and Colonial Warfare in the South African War*, in G. Cuthbertson & A. Grundlingh & M. Suttie (eds.): *Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South African War, 1899-1902*, pp. 38-39.

⁴³³ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, pp. 35, 36.

regular omissions and misfilings. Available records indicate that from 30 April 1901 until 2 August 1901, Captain John Alfred Fiveash, the chief constable of Swellendam, was the acting commandant at Heidelberg, for which he was paid the sum of £35 and 12 shillings.⁴³⁴ Aside from the numerous reports by intelligence agents which inflated the degree of disloyalty in the region, an alternative explanation for Burke's distrust of Heidelberg, and the appointment of Fiveash, may be had in a curious incident involving a previous assistant-commandant. On 5 February 1901, the resident magistrate of Swellendam received a letter from the commandant at Heidelberg in which he forwarded his decision for granting a large number of passes and permits to local applicants. According to the signature on the letter, the commandant was a Captain H Levoy.⁴³⁵ A military intelligence report filed with the Defence Department, which includes correspondence between the resident magistrates of Oudtshoorn and Riversdale dated 20 February 1901, reveals that Levoy was in fact a confidence man of sorts. According to the report, Levoy had offered his services as a spy and procurer of supplies to the republics at the outbreak of war. While at Heidelberg, he had been very lax in enforcing martial law, and issued passes to anyone willing to offer him a sizeable bribe. Levoy had also caused problems in Riversdale, where he had raised a Town Guard drawn from unscrupulous local characters, handed out weapons to untrustworthy individuals, and accepted bribes for granting passes and permits. He also inconvenienced the local inhabitants by taking control over some aspects of the Resident Magistrate's job.⁴³⁶

Inspection reports from the Riversdale branch of Standard Bank seem confirm these activities. Records indicate a drop in fixed deposits and overdrafts, while large cash withdrawals in the region of £20 000 were made in a six month period since the start of 1901.⁴³⁷ A similar currency panic had swept Swellendam in February 1901, shortly after martial law was declared. Large withdrawals of cash and treasury drafts were made as residents feared for their savings with both the British military and Republican commandos in the vicinity.⁴³⁸ After leaving Heidelberg, Levoy joined Warren's Mounted Division in their drive to enlist recruits. At Oudtshoorn he used his

⁴³⁴ (KAB) DD 4/155: Pay sheets for Town Guard of Heidelberg, no. 179/1902, 2 August 1902; (KAB) AG 936: Pay requisition for CDF officers, district of Swellendam, no. 75/1901.

⁴³⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from H Levoy regarding permits and passes, no. 124/1901, 5 February 1901.

⁴³⁶ (TAB) HC 50: Intelligence report from Riversdale, 7 February 1901.

⁴³⁷ (SBA) INSP 1/1/154: Fixed deposits, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 27 July 1901, p. 4.

⁴³⁸ (SBA) GMO 3/1/37: Report on Swellendam currency panic, 20 February 1901, p. 484.

military credentials to expropriate supplies and animals from local farmers which he would then sell for his own profit.⁴³⁹ Articles published in the *Het Zuid-Westen* during March 1901, confirm these activities, reporting on men going about the region collecting forage and horses while falsely proclaiming to be acting on the behalf of military authorities.⁴⁴⁰ In the intelligence report, the resident magistrate mentioned the need for an imperial officer to be stationed at Heidelberg in order to prevent any further setbacks.⁴⁴¹

The actions of inept and corrupt commandants like Levoy not only damaged local economies, but also did great harm to the already fragile relationships between Afrikaners and their English countrymen. The arbitrary nature of martial law was in itself a potential powder keg which was often ignited when individuals morally unfit for positions of authority were added to the mix. By August 1901, all business in the southwestern districts was suspended in some form due to the maladministration of martial law. The General Manager's Office of Standard Bank became greatly concerned with the situation and blamed the poor choices in local commandants for exacerbating the situation.⁴⁴² In December 1901, the General Manager's Office issued the following statement regarding the situation:

*“It is quite clear, however that throughout the whole of the Cape Colony there is a strong feeling - not by any means confined to the Dutch – that the action of Commandants under Martial Law has often been capricious and arbitrary, and though we think there is much to be said in defence of their action, it would be idle to deny that the belief exists that unnecessary losses have been inflicted on Colonists, irrespective of their loyalty, and such a belief may lead to momentous consequences when Parliament reassembles.”*⁴⁴³

⁴³⁹ (KAB) DD 7/17: Report by magistrate of Oudtshoorn, 20 February 1901.

⁴⁴⁰ *Het Zuid-Westen*, 4 March 1901, p. 2.

⁴⁴¹ (KAB) DD 7/17: Report by magistrate of Oudtshoorn, 20 February 1901.

⁴⁴² (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: The Situation Cape Colony, 11 September 1901, pp. 365-367.

⁴⁴³ (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: Martial Law, 18 December 1901, p. 788.

3.1.3) Neither here nor there

Another possible reason for the military's distrust of Heidelberg owes to its location in an administrative grey area, as well as its history of relative isolation and autonomy. Heidelberg was located on the eastern edge of the district of Swellendam, and was geographically closer to Riversdale. Many inhabitants just across the border, in the Riversdale district, associated themselves with Heidelberg, and many belonged to the local DRC congregation.⁴⁴⁴ In fact, there had been disputes over the borders of the respective church congregations of Riversdale and Heidelberg since 1884.⁴⁴⁵ In the legal sphere, the magistrate's court fell under the jurisdiction of Swellendam, while the jail was administered by officials at Riversdale.⁴⁴⁶ As a result of its location between two major towns, and periodic uncertainty regarding its administrative position, Heidelberg often had to make do without official input and had grown accustomed to a degree of autonomy. This independence would bring it into odds with the military and civil authorities during the course of the war. As such, it is unsurprising that a military agent made the following statement in a 1901 report:

*"This district is an absolutely undefined one; the people do not know under which they come, Swellendam or Riversdale, and I think you will find it advisable to recommend a Military man to be stationed - at Riversdale for preferences, to take charge of these parts."*⁴⁴⁷

A hallmark of the war in the Cape, was that geographically isolated towns, and areas of unresolved authority were more prone to clashes between the military and civilian population.⁴⁴⁸ Tamarkin argues that the old Dutch spirit of independence survived in areas where the inhabitants lived lives unfettered by government interference.⁴⁴⁹ In the case of Heidelberg, this spirit of independence manifested itself in a dispute

⁴⁴⁴ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Request for travel permits by AJ Van Wijk, no. 706/1901, 16 December 1901; H. Hopkins: *Eeufoes gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 27.

⁴⁴⁵ (DRCA) KR 44 R2/9A: Letter from Reverend AB Daneel to the Ring of Swellendam, 6 August 1884.

⁴⁴⁶ (KAB) CO 2207: Inspection report on Heidelberg lockup, no. 868, 20 February 1899.

⁴⁴⁷ (TAB) HC 51: Agent Murphy report from Heidelberg to C Leibrandt, 15 February 1901.

⁴⁴⁸ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 29.

⁴⁴⁹ M. Tamarkin: *Volk and flock: Ecology, identity and politics among Cape Afrikaners in the late nineteenth century*, pp. 192-193.

between the Municipal Council and authorities at Swellendam regarding the use of language in official publications. In October 1900, the Heidelberg Municipal Council published the new municipal regulations in Dutch. On 25 October, the council received instructions from Swellendam's resident magistrate to have the new regulations republished in English as well as in Dutch. According to martial law, all official publications were to be published in both languages.⁴⁵⁰

The council responded angrily, and in a letter to the magistrate, secretary James Du Preez stated that the council viewed republication as unnecessary, owing to the fact that less than two percent of the town's population could not read Dutch, and that regulations had always been published in Dutch. He asserted that republication in English was unconstitutional, scolded the magistrate for proposing such a hindrance, and vowed to write to the Colonial Secretary.⁴⁵¹ During the following day's meeting of the Municipal Council, it was decided that a request to supply the town with martial law regulations printed only in Dutch would be made.⁴⁵² According to martial law, household meetings to elect new officials to the Municipal Council were required to be held in English and witnessed by the local commandant.⁴⁵³ In February 1901, the resident magistrate of Swellendam informed the Colonial Office that the Municipal Council disregarded these regulations by abandoning the meeting attended by the commandant and reconvened the election meeting elsewhere without official consent.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵⁰ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Reply from Colonial Office regarding municipal regulations, no. 341/1900, 25 October 1900.

⁴⁵¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/39: Letter received from Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 803/1900, 28 November 1900.

⁴⁵² (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 29 November 1900.

⁴⁵³ (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 4 March 1901.

⁴⁵⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Correspondence with Colonial Office regarding municipal regulations, no. 71/1901, 19 February 1901.

3.1.4) Magistrates and the Military

Petitions by prominent persons in local institutions were a common occurrence during the war, and placed massive pressure on civil commissioners and magistrates whose loyalty was already questioned by the military.⁴⁵⁵ The war placed intense workloads and pressure on these civil servants, who had to assist commandants in martial law prosecutions, as well as attending to normal civil cases. In addition to these responsibilities, magistrates and civil commissioners were also responsible for reimbursing the local inhabitants for commandeered goods.⁴⁵⁶ A report on the administrative costs incurred under martial law indicates that Heidelberg and the authorities did not have an amiable relationship. Apparently, the administration of martial law at Heidelberg had been a costly affair due to the appointment of individuals to issue travel passes and permits. The two men appointed were Dick Miller, a Municipal Councilman, and Costly White, a recently arrived British engineer overseeing construction of the railway extension into Heidelberg.⁴⁵⁷ The task was usually performed by local magistrates, but according to the report, prior to the appointment of the aforementioned individuals, it had been delegated to Swellendam's chief constable, John Fiveash, who had to constantly travel between towns.

In the report, the resident magistrate of Swellendam requested the appointment of an additional junior clerk in order to process the high volume of requests.⁴⁵⁸ Before the declaration of martial law and arrival of the Imperial Yeomanry, Heidelberg was to be administered by the Swellendam commandant, Major Murray. Yet, reports from the time indicate that Murray was quickly ousted from the position and replaced by an imperial officer due to his leniency. Murray had apparently refused a request from local loyalists to hold a public meeting which condemned a Bond congress in Worcester which denounced Milner.⁴⁵⁹ During the early stages of martial law, when Heidelberg had not yet been assigned a military commandant, the magistracy and

⁴⁵⁵ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 137.

⁴⁵⁶ J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, p. 15.

⁴⁵⁷ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/28: Approval of RPC Miller as special justice of the peace, no. 326/1901, 30 August 1901; (KAB) AG 936: Request by resident magistrate Holt Okes to appoint C White, no. 135/1901, 9 December 1901.

⁴⁵⁸ (KAB) AG 1013: Report on administrative expenses under martial law, no. 13/1902, 29 Jan 1902.

⁴⁵⁹ (TAB) HC 47: Report from Agent Reynecke to H Smith, 20 December 1900.

commandants at nearby Riversdale were tasked with these functions. Aside from their increased workload, the situation was exacerbated and mired in confusion due to Heidelberg's administrative ambivalence. As was the case in many towns during the war, these administrators were unsure about their duties and extent of authority. An intelligence officer described the situation in his report as follows:

"These fellows do not as a matter of fact know their positions, nor their powers, and everything is really chaos." ⁴⁶⁰

EH Samuels, the Resident Magistrate of Riversdale, was appointed as acting Commandant but was soon replaced as authorities viewed him as being physically unfit for duty, and for outsourcing the commandeering of horses to a private firm who mistakenly sold the horses for profit, instead of sequestering the animals for military use. Samuels had also been wary of affronting the local farmers and avoided seizing any arms and ammunition from the community.⁴⁶¹ He was replaced by a Mr Schotland who did not fare much better, with reports declaring:

"The A.R. Magistrate, Riversdale, (Mr Schotland) though a very good man and one who thoroughly understand his magisterial duties, does not know anything about the duties of Commandant, in which capacity he is acting at present." ⁴⁶²

Both the civil commissioners responsible for Heidelberg had occupied their positions for many years, and were not prepared for the pressures and challenges created by the war. Heidelberg's long serving special justice of the peace and de facto magistrate, Albert White, was a much loved character in the town and community, known for his good natured and informal approach to legal matters.⁴⁶³ Despite White's British pedigree, it appears that military authorities considered him untrustworthy due to his affinity and connection with the local community. In a letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, Henry Jones Hanson complained about being unable to sell gunpowder and shot because White was not authorized to issue the required permits

⁴⁶⁰ (TAB) HC 50: Intelligence Report, 7 February 1901.

⁴⁶¹ (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence Report, 22 February 1901.

⁴⁶² (TAB) HC 51: Report from Agent Murphy to C Leibrandt, 15 February 1901.

⁴⁶³ H. Hopkins: *Eupees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaaipland) 1855-1955*, p. 159.

under martial law. Local farmers and inhabitants of town had to travel to Riversdale, as it was the nearest location with a resident magistrate authorised to issue such permits.⁴⁶⁴ In December 1900, Albert White was reprimanded for illegally issuing a gunpowder permit to one Daniel Bester. In a letter to Swelledam's magistrate, White apologized for the incident, claiming that it had been done out of force of habit.⁴⁶⁵

White also earned the scorn of area commander Burke, when reports about DF Scholtz's parole violations started to surface at the end of 1900. He was reprimanded by the resident magistrate for not reporting Scholtz's insubordinate behaviour and failure to report himself to White on a regular basis.⁴⁶⁶ When Scholtz left for Port Beaufort without White's permission, an outraged Burke railed against the aging special justice for his behaviour.⁴⁶⁷ The pressures of war took their toll, and White died before the end of hostilities on 11 April 1902. He was replaced by a new special justice, WF Rogers, who was the first official at Heidelberg authorized to issue passes and permits.⁴⁶⁸ In a touching letter to the resident magistrate of Swellendam written in February 1901, White stated what can be considered as a good summation of the position in which many administrators caught up in the war found themselves:

*"We have had another fine rain, I wish this war will soon end for it does throw everything six and sevens, even in our work."*⁴⁶⁹

The resident magistrate of Swellendam was the 60 year old, Petrus Borchardus Borchers,⁴⁷⁰ who had occupied the position for 41 years prior to the war.⁴⁷¹ Borchers was descended from a long line of Anglo-Afrikaner civil servants and DRC ministers who formed part of a multigenerational civil service resulting from British reforms to government institutions. The discontinuation of the landdrost system and creation of magistrates, along with the rapid creation of new magisterial districts in an

⁴⁶⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from HJ Hanson regarding gunpowder sales, no. 598/1900, 27 September 1900.

⁴⁶⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Letter from A White, no. 840/1900, 13 December 1900.

⁴⁶⁶ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Letter from A White regarding DF Scholtz, no. 610/1900, 1 October 1900.

⁴⁶⁷ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on DF Scholtz, no. 17/1901, 5 January 1901.

⁴⁶⁸ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/457: Death notice of Albert White, no. 2879, 11 April 1902; 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace WF Rogers on incidents of shop breaking, no. 874/1902, 19 September 1902.

⁴⁶⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Letter from A White, no. 150/1901, 14 February 1901.

⁴⁷⁰ Borchers b1c3d1; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/458: Death notice of Petrus Borchardus Borchers, no. 3145, 17 August 1902.

⁴⁷¹ (KAB) AG 754: Application for leave by PB Borchers, no. 91/1900, 14 August 1900.

attempt to establish authority and entrench order in the rural districts from 1827 to 1855, had resulted in the creation of a new class of Cape Afrikaners like the Borchers family.⁴⁷² Borchers' great-grandfather was the Reverend Meent Borchers, who had been appointed by the VOC as minister to the Cape Town congregation in 1784. Borchers' grandfather and namesake, PB Borchers,⁴⁷³ had been the Civil Commissioner and Magistrate for Cape Town.⁴⁷⁴

The elder Borchers led a fascinating life and epitomised the duality in identity and allegiance of Cape Afrikaners. He was born a Dutchman in 1786 during the rule of the VOC, apprenticed as a clerk in the landdrost system, witnessed the transition to British rule, became absorbed into the newly anglicised bureaucracy, and died a loyal British subject in 1871.⁴⁷⁵ Borchers' autobiographical memoir is a fascinating read and insightful window into the profound institutional and cultural changes which shaped Cape Colonial society during the first half of the nineteenth century. Like Albert White, Borchers shared an intimate connection to the town of Heidelberg and the wider district. His uncle and namesake, Reverend Petrus Borchardus Borchers,⁴⁷⁶ had been Heidelberg's first provisional clergyman from 1856 to 1858, and was also responsible for naming the town.⁴⁷⁷

As the resident magistrate for the large district of Swellendam, Borchers had to endure a massive workload during the war, and was often the recipient of the ire and distrust of military authorities. In March 1901, a farmer named Jacob Schoonwinkel and his son were charged with contravening martial law by stockpiling large amounts of firearms, ammunition and horseshoes. In the trial over which Borchers presided, it became apparent that the son, who had harboured republican sympathies, was responsible for the stockpile. As the young man was only 16 years old, Borchers acted leniently by finding only the father guilty and fining him £15 or 2 months imprisonment.⁴⁷⁸ In another case dated 11 March 1901, a local field cornet

⁴⁷² A. Du Toit & H. Giliomee: *Afrikaner political thought: Analysis & documents, Volume One: 1789-1850*, p. 23.

⁴⁷³ Borchers b1c3

⁴⁷⁴ P. Borchers: *An autobiographical memoir*, p. 1.

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁴⁷⁶ Borchers b1c5

⁴⁷⁷ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 21, 28; (DRCA) GEM-K 595: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 13 January 1856.

⁴⁷⁸ (KAB) AG 2045: Correspondence regarding CJ Joubert, no. 29/1901, 8 March 1901.

was accused of concealing a weapon on his farm. Borchers declared the man innocent on the concealment charge but fined him £5 for resisting arrest.⁴⁷⁹

On 12 March 1901, Major Cuthbertson, the commandant at Ashton, and a local man, P Ashenden, who claimed to represent a faction of loyalists, sent an official complaint to CDF headquarters about the leniency of Borchers' sentences. They requested that Schoonwinkel's fine be increased to £17 and that Borchers be reprimanded for conduct which outraged the loyalist community and set a bad example. The letter was accompanied by remarks from Lieutenant-Colonel Burke regarding his suspicions about Borchers.⁴⁸⁰ An intelligence report from 1900 confirmed that the military authorities were hostile towards Borchers and doubted his loyalty, describing him as: "*...aged and very luke-warm, neither fish, flesh nor red herring.*"⁴⁸¹

Aside from his connection to Heidelberg, there may have been another reason that Borchers' loyalty was questioned. His cousin, Meent Borchers,⁴⁸² was employed as the night watchman at Riversdale jail. Meent Borchers' son, AW Borchers,⁴⁸³ worked at Riversdale Post Office prior to moving to the ZAR just before the outbreak of the war. He was recruited for commando duty in Potchefstroom, and fought at the battle of Magersfontein near Kimberley. On his way to Pretoria, he was captured and sent to Delgoa Bay for transport to the Greenpoint POW camp via Mosselbay. Authorities regarded him and his father as great rebels.⁴⁸⁴ When Borchers commuted William Stassen's sentence of 6 months imprisonment regarding the spread of rumours and use of seditious language, Swellendam's commandant, Captain Nelson, undersigned the case with highly indignant remarks regarding Borchers' decision.⁴⁸⁵ The war took its toll on the aging Borchers who submitted numerous applications for leave, and was eventually placed on an indefinite leave of absence due to cardiovascular complications.⁴⁸⁶ Borchers died of heart

⁴⁷⁹ (KAB) AG 2045: Correspondence regarding J Schoonwinkel, no. 29/1901, 11 March 1901.

⁴⁸⁰ (KAB) AG 2045: Letters from Cuthbertson and Burke, no. 357/1901, 18 March 1901.

⁴⁸¹ (TAB) HC 47: Report from Agent Reynecke to H Smith, 20 December 1900.

⁴⁸² Borchers b1c5d5

⁴⁸³ Borchers b1c5d5e6

⁴⁸⁴ (TAB) HC 37: Intelligence report on intercepted letters from POW AW Borchers, 17 May 1900.

⁴⁸⁵ (KAB) AG 3635: Military court case against W Stassen, no. 470/92, 2 July 1901.

⁴⁸⁶ (KAB) AG 754: Application for leave by PB Borchers, no. 86/1900, 1 August 1900; (KAB) AG 936: Application for leave by PB Borchers, no. 123/01, 12 November 1901.

disease on 17 August 1902, and was succeeded by Holt Okes who had been his temporary replacement.⁴⁸⁷

3.1.5) Beleaguered law enforcement

Due to the low number of volunteers in the Colonial Defence Force, and the general unwillingness of white Cape Colonists to take up arms in defence of the Colony, the High Commissioner and the British military became increasingly distrustful of local inhabitants. Massive expenditure and military setbacks in the republics, coupled with the dawning realisation about the Boer resolve to fight and the longevity of the war, affected the attitude of military authorities towards the Cape Colony. To many, the problems at the Cape were an unwanted hindrance, and these frustrations aggravated their distrust of the populace.⁴⁸⁸ Not even those inhabitants willing to serve in the protection of the Colony were completely trusted by their British overseers, and were often regarded as untrustworthy and incompetent. In a letter to the GOC of the Colonial Defence Force, Lieutenant Colonel Burke requested 12 additional men to increase the safety at Barrydale and “...*especially at Heidelberg*.”⁴⁸⁹ A surprise inspection of Heidelberg’s police force in August 1900, had deemed that officers Miller, Batten, and Manuel were too far removed from proper supervision to keep them sufficiently sharp and effective in their duties.⁴⁹⁰ Police enforcement of martial law during the early stages of the war had apparently been a contentious issue in the community.

In May 1901, Thomas Henry Miller submitted his resignation to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, stating that he was concerned for the safety of his wife while he was on the night shift from 9 pm to 5 am, and that the nature of the work did not agree with him. The application of martial law by volunteers to local law enforcement units was more often than not met with scorn. Reports from March 1901 indicate that local Afrikaners who had joined the CDF had become very much out of favour with those who declined to sign up. The report mentions how members of mounted police units and town guardsmen had been insulted while visiting the farm

⁴⁸⁷ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/458: Death notice of Petrus Borchardus Borchers, no. 3145, 17 August 1902.

⁴⁸⁸ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 95.

⁴⁸⁹ (KAB) DD 7/13: Letter from MA Burke requesting additional troops, 21 March 1901.

⁴⁹⁰ (KAB) AG 754: Inspector’s report on police in district of Swellendam, no. 108/1900, 24 August 1900.

of Jan Uys near Slang River in the Heidelberg area.⁴⁹¹ Another report recalls the testimony of the Chief Constable, in which he bemoans the ill-treatment of a private constable by one of the local farmers while out on a four day patrol. He was not offered any food or shelter by local farmers while on patrol.⁴⁹² Despite Miller's protestations, his resignation was initially refused.⁴⁹³ In an accompanying letter from the Municipal Council, secretary James Du Preez explained to the magistrate that the enforcement of martial law by the municipal police had resulted in unease within the community. Du Preez insisted that Miller be allowed to resign and also requested that the municipal police force be exempt from the enforcement of martial law.⁴⁹⁴

Concerns over loyalty and willingness to serve also extended to those serving in mounted units like the DMP and DMT. Intelligence reports on the effectiveness of rural police units compiled during the course of 1900 suggests that military officials held these units in very low regard, and went as far as describing them as useless and disloyal. Some were of the opinion that those recruited into the defence of the Colony were usually drawn from the lower classes of Afrikaners, and as such could not be relied on to do their duty. Newly recruited private constables were described as being the worst as they had friendship and family connections to the people in the district and were therefore compromised, as well as prone to let acts of treason go unreported. Chief constables were regarded as the most loyal assets as most of them had been sourced directly from Britain. Yet they were also prone to idleness having reached the pinnacle of their profession and could be coerced by local magistrates who were fearful of the local farmers.⁴⁹⁵

On 29 July 1901, Heidelberg's resident surgeon, Dr Henry Biggs, had to write a report on the incapacitation and illness of James Albert Mitchell, a trooper in the District Mounted Police. Military authorities were concerned about Mitchell's willingness to do his duty and Biggs had to confirm the diagnosis of Riversdale's surgeon which stated that Mitchell was unable to perform his duties due to inflammation of the liver.⁴⁹⁶ Mitchell died on 25 August 1901 and was replaced by

⁴⁹¹ (TAB) HC 52: Report from Agent Meercat, 17 March 1901.

⁴⁹² (TAB) HC 37: Report by M Knocker on district of Swellendam, 30 May 1900.

⁴⁹³ (KAB) AG 936: Resignation letter of TH Miller, no. 46/1901, 1 May 1901.

⁴⁹⁴ (KAB) AG 936: Letter from Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 417/1901, 7 May 1901.

⁴⁹⁵ (TAB) HC 47: Report from M Knocker entitled Local Police, 27 December 1900.

⁴⁹⁶ (KAB) AG 936: Affidavit by HG Biggs, no. 79/1901, 29 July 1901.

Thomas Henry Miller.⁴⁹⁷ In all, the military's distrust of the Cape population significantly contributed to the often harsh and arbitrary fashion in which martial law was implemented and administered. This distrust was essentially rooted in frustration resulting from larger logistical issues and an inability to comprehend local customs and culture. To the inhabitants of the Cape, especially Afrikaners, it appeared as if their way of life was challenged by an outside and foreign force determined to single them out for punishment. The identification of outsiders or "others" has been shown to be a vital psychological element in the emergence of ethnic nationalism, despite the absence of a clearly defined political ideology.⁴⁹⁸

3.1.6) The role of spies

During the war, dozens of secret agents employed by the British military travelled throughout the Cape Colony gathering intelligence on rebellious individuals and possible acts of treason. These agents reported to an intermediary in Cape Town, who then relayed the information to British military command and the High Commissioner's office.⁴⁹⁹ The district of Heidelberg and the surrounding areas also played host to several of these agents, who made recommendations to local military officials regarding local inhabitants. As was the case in other areas of the Cape Colony, intelligence agents often based their reports on dubious sources coloured by personal prejudices and opportunities for score settling. Agents were also prone to overzealousness and fabrication in order to remain employed and for ingratiating themselves with military command. As a result, the manner in which military officials such as commandants treated the local populace was often the direct outcome of the reports filed by these men, and could determine the severity by which martial law regulations were applied.⁵⁰⁰

The first two agents to visit Heidelberg, apparently had such a disheartening experience, that their animosity towards the inhabitants may have prejudiced future reports indefinitely. The first agent to frequent the area was codenamed Reynecke,

⁴⁹⁷ (KAB) AG 936: Report on death of JA Mitchell, no. 95/1901, 25 August 1901; (KAB) AG 936: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 93/1901, 13 August 1901.

⁴⁹⁸ A. Wimmer: *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*, pp. 32-33.

⁴⁹⁹ (TAB) HC 37: Intelligence Report, 31 May 1900.

⁵⁰⁰ J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, pp. 76-77.

who made contact with local loyalists at the Masonic Hotel and the post office. Apparently, the unidentified loyalists, either through careless overzealousness or contempt for the said agent, had revealed the true motivation behind his presence to their fellow townsfolk. When the second agent, codenamed M Knocker arrived to replace Reynecke, the locals had taken great satisfaction in informing him that they knew who he really was. He recommended that future agents not make their mission known to the indiscreet loyalists, and that they should not frequent the Masonic Hotel as it only played host to loyalist elements in town. The Heidelberg Hotel also known as Swart's Bar, was preferable, as it was frequented by the more rebellious inhabitants.⁵⁰¹ In Knocker's previous intelligence report on 19 January 1901, he included a signed statement by self-identified loyalists, who reaffirmed their allegiance and asked for the removal of paroled POWs from town. One of the undersigned was the Post Master, Mr JW Farrell.⁵⁰² Surprisingly, in Knocker's final report on 23 February 1901, he called for the removal of Mr Farrell, citing the man's affinity for whiskey and lack of attention to his office. He also admonished Farrell for letting an assistant Telegraph clerk, named Morrison, to speak out of turn and to do as he pleased.⁵⁰³ The timing of these events may be purely coincidental, yet there appeared to be some vindictiveness towards Mr Farrell on behalf of agent Knocker.

Unsurprisingly, the new agent codenamed Murphy continued in this trend in his report on the 23rd of February 1901, stating:

"I find that these two districts, Riversdale and Heidelberg, are really about the as bad as possibly can be, not only in the outlying parts, but the towns themselves. The inhabitants are ripe for anything that comes their way. The few loyalists here have rather a rough time, and the presence of someone in authority would not only have the effect of making matters easier for them, but keeping the others in check." The rebel portion of the community are pretty strong, and make their presence felt. I can assure you it only requires a man here, one who can speak the language, to keep them properly in hand and prevent unpleasantness. I have ridden through the greater portion of these districts and find the farmers rather a bad lot. They do not take the

⁵⁰¹ (TAB) HC 49: Report from M Knocker to C Leibrandt, 25 January 1901.

⁵⁰² (TAB) HC 49: Report from M Knocker to C Leibrandt, 19 January 1901.

⁵⁰³ (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence report from M Knocker, 23 February 1901.

trouble to disguise their feelings at all, and would join to a man, any party that should come their way; they are very different to those I came across in Mossel Bay district."⁵⁰⁴

Throughout his stay in Heidelberg and the surrounding districts, agent Murphy continued decrying the disloyalty of the local inhabitants. In a later report, he commented on the treasonous nature of the civilians in the Swellendam area, stating a belief that they were in constant communication with roving commandos in the mountains.⁵⁰⁵ These reports do not seem to have reflected the reality of the situation, given the extremely small number of local inhabitants tried for treason under martial law. Even during the high point of commando activity in the area, including Scheepers' invasion of Barrydale and the attack on Heidelberg, not a single person joined the commandos.⁵⁰⁶ Yet military despatches based on these intelligence reports had estimated that a minimum of 1000 locals would join the Boer commandos, should they enter the district.⁵⁰⁷ There can exist little doubt that these intelligence reports greatly affected the way military authorities regarded the local inhabitants. The fact that the manner in which martial law was enforced varied according to the temperament and disposition of individual commandants, such reports could very well have been the deciding factor in determining how inhabitants experienced the war. An intelligence report by Allen G Davison from Zuurbraak to the Pro-British commandant of Ashton, Major Cuthbertson, provided a chilling example. Davison declared that he was convinced all Afrikaner farmers were hostile despite their proclamations of loyalty, and states:

*"I can only add that the present is no time to consider the feelings of the disloyal Dutch, they should be made to feel the full weight of British Supremacy, and to learn who are masters and rulers in this country."*⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁴ (TAB) HC 51: Report from Murphy to C Leibrandt, 23 February 1901.

⁵⁰⁵ (TAB) HC 52: Report from Murphy to C Leibrandt, 13 March 1901.

⁵⁰⁶ (TAB) FK 813 (CO 48/554): Report on invasion by RM PB Borchers, 4 September 1901, pp. 263-264.

⁵⁰⁷ (TAB) FK 810 (CO 48/553): Weekly Summary Cape Colony, 10 August 1901, p. 814.

⁵⁰⁸ (TAB) HC 50: Report from Allen G Davison to Major Cuthbertson, 30 January 1901.

3.2) Challenges to the status quo

During the initial period of martial law, enforcement was very lenient and great care was taken as not to alienate and aggrieve the Cape Colonists. This soft approach was a reflection of the cautiousness of the colonial government under the Schreiner administration, as well as the British military's lack of experience in implementing martial law and desire to employ the entirety of their manpower in the republics.⁵⁰⁹ General law and order was restored as rebel activity in the Northern Cape and Midlands started to subside by mid-1900 after the occupation of the republican capitals. Civil authorities in these regions quickly returned to power, even more so in the yet to be affected Southern Cape regions.⁵¹⁰ The situation changed rapidly when on the night of 15 December 1900, Scheepers and Kritzinger's forces crossed the Orange River into the Colony. The second invasion differed markedly from the first, as the invaders no longer intended to conquer and indefinitely occupy Cape territory. Instead their aim was to incite a general uprising and gather recruits for the republican cause.⁵¹¹ In response, martial law was again declared in areas where invading commandos operated, and eventually extended to the entire Colony on 17 January 1901. In the Southern Cape, martial law regulations first appeared in the *Het Zuid-Westen* on 18 February 1901. These included the restriction on selling liquor after 10 pm, a ban on any seditious language and publications, a strict curfew which prohibited citizens from leaving their homes after 10 pm, and prohibition of all public meetings and travel outside of the area under martial law without the consent of the local commandant or resident magistrate.⁵¹²

Records on expenditures for the reimbursement of commandeered goods indicated that those responsible for martial law administration were initially keen on paying out Heidelberg farmers for their losses.⁵¹³ In fact, reports from the Riversdale branch of Standard Bank indicated a drop in advances, as farmers were making large cash profits from cattle sales due to increased war demand.⁵¹⁴ In general, responses to losses incurred by farmers subjected to martial law varied according to the different colonial administrations in power. While the Schreiner ministry was more willing to

⁵⁰⁹ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 121.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁵¹¹ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 91.

⁵¹² *Het Zuid-Westen*, 18 February 1901, p. 1.

⁵¹³ (KAB) AG 936: Report on martial law recompensation, no. 57/1901, 10 June 1901.

⁵¹⁴ (SBA) GMO 3/1/36: Report on Riversdale farmers, 24 October 1900, pp. 931-932.

reimburse losses in order to prevent alienating the electorate, the speed of the second invasion and large scale rebellions resulted in the British military pushing for harsher penalties. While the Sprigg ministry was more compliant to the will of the Home Office, the adoption of harsher methods of enforcement rankled the judiciary and the office of the Attorney General tried desperately to protect the rights of the Cape citizenry. Ultimately, the application of martial was an arbitrary affair determined by the demeanour of local commandants and their subordinates.⁵¹⁵

3.2.1) Restriction of movement

The severe movement restrictions under martial law intruded into every aspect of the lives of those who had to live through this period. In order to replenish supplies, all inhabitants of a field cornetcy were required to do their shopping at a designated depot on the same day. As farmers were not allowed to store hay or grind wheat to make flour, food supplies usually lasted only 14 days. Besides impeding the physical welfare of the population, these regulations on movement also affected shopkeepers by severing them from their clientele.⁵¹⁶ In a letter addressed to the resident magistrate, HH Fouche from Malgas requested financial help as the expropriation of food supplies from his farm and inability to replenish, them given the restrictions on movement, had left him and his family starving.⁵¹⁷ Simple daily activities became subject to scrutiny and suspicion. On 5 February 1901, HJ Van Der Merwe wrote to the resident magistrate, requesting a pass to go to the post office.⁵¹⁸ The following day Van Der Merwe again queried the magistrate on the matter and mentioned how the inability to freely move about had made the sale of something as small as a gross of eggs impossible without a pass.⁵¹⁹ In fact, this section of the resident magistrate's files is littered with numerous requests for travel passes. Even normal community activities were disrupted, as can be ascertained when examining a request sent by Reverend AJ Van Wijk for inhabitants from a Riversdale farm to receive passes in order to cross into the Swellendam area and get married at Heidelberg.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁵ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, pp. 144-145.

⁵¹⁶ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, pp. 83-84.

⁵¹⁷ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from HH Fouche, no. 30/1900, 12 January 1900.

⁵¹⁸ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from HJ Van Der Merwe, no. 140/1901, 5 February 1901.

⁵¹⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from HJ Van Der Merwe, no. 171/1901, 6 February 1901.

⁵²⁰ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Request for travel permits by AJ Van Wijk, no. 706/1901, 16 December 1901.

3.2.2) Challenges to basic livelihood

The restrictions and expropriations imposed by martial law had a significant impact on farming communities like Heidelberg, as the equipment, manpower and supplies needed to cultivate and maintain crops were extremely limited during the war. As a result, agricultural yields decreased significantly during and after the war. In 1891 total wheat production in the Cape amounted to 909 000 two hundred pound bags. By 1904 production had almost halved to a 567 000.⁵²¹ In March 1900, James Joubert of the farm Joubertsdal, wrote to WP Schreiner, complaining about the martial law regulation restricting the availability of buckshot and rifle ammunition. Regulations dictated that farmers were only allowed to keep shotguns and fine-grained ammunition, while all rifles and heavy shotgun ammunition were impounded. Joubert related how baboons were systematically destroying his maize crops, and requested to be issued a permit for 100 Mauser bullets to be used solely for pest control.⁵²² Besides hampering their ability to protect their crops from predators, the practice of impounding farmers' guns also contributed to a growing sense of persecution, especially in light of Coloured scouts and Town Guards being armed and allowed freedom of movement.⁵²³

The dipping of sheep also became a point of contention during the war. As movement was severely restricted and farming became regulated by centralised patterns of operation, only a limited quantity of sheep could be inoculated against a range of diseases. In a letter to Swellendam's resident magistrate, one man related how the local commandant had allocated him insufficient time to dip his sheep and cursed him when he voiced his concerns. As a result, 75 of his sheep died because he had only been allowed a single day to dip his entire herd.⁵²⁴ Farmers weren't the only victims of martial law restrictions. Reports from Riversdale indicated that the restriction of movement and sequestering of draught animals had severely crippled urban businesses.⁵²⁵ The situation for merchants and farmers selling and producing ostrich feathers was further compounded when the military authorities decided to

⁵²¹ M. De Kock: *Selected subjects in the economic history of South Africa*, p. 187.

⁵²² (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Response from Colonial Office to letter of JDW Joubert, no. 26/1900, 25 March 1900.

⁵²³ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 19.

⁵²⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from F Rall, no. 1054/1901, 16 December 1901.

⁵²⁵ (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: Riversdale Branch, 22 August 1901, p. 260.

restrict the movement of ostrich feather buyers. The decision was made after dubious claims that feather buyers operated as double agents or spies on behalf of the Boer republics.⁵²⁶

3.2.3) Commandeering of horses

During the war, the military initiated a massive drive to collect all horses in every district of the Cape Colony. Horses were needed by the military to effectively wage the mobile war which crisscrossed the South African landscape. As the district of Swellendam had been a leading producer of stallions for many years prior to the war, the area was considered a prime source for supplying military needs. A newspaper article published in November 1900, confirmed that horses from the southwestern districts were reportedly the best suited for use in cavalry units.⁵²⁷ The second invasion into the Cape also necessitated the commandeering of horses to prevent them from falling into the hands of republican commandos. As a result, forage supplies were destroyed and horses were kept in well-guarded central locations.⁵²⁸ As the railway did not yet extend to Heidelberg, horses were still the main mode of transport for the majority of the inhabitants. The loss of the community's horses severely impacted farming activities and impeded the conduct of business. In a letter to Swellendam's magistrate, local storekeeper, Nicolas Friedman, requested to be absolved from having to send his only two horses to Swellendam for inspection by the military. Friedman remarked that the loss of his horses would harm his business, as he had no other means of conveying his goods between customers and suppliers.⁵²⁹ The practice of commandeering horses generally caused great antagonism among the inhabitants of the Cape. Farmers resented the arbitrary and condescending nature in which the authorities deprived them of their property, as well as losing their most important tools of cultivation and transport.

⁵²⁶ (TAB) HC 52: Report by Agent Murphy from Riversdale, 19 March 1901.

⁵²⁷ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 10 November 1900, p. 2.

⁵²⁸ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 128; J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, p. 31.

⁵²⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from N Friedman, no. 76/1901, 22 January 1901.

For many the loss was also more personal, as emotional bonds between man and animal had been forged by years of companionship.⁵³⁰ A letter from Hans Jacob Gildenhuis of Goedemanskraal, requested the magistrate's intervention so that he might be allowed to keep his oldest two horses. After taking his horses to Swellendam and Riversdale for inspection by the military, authorities refused to release them despite declaring both to be useless for military service. Gildenhuis went on to state that both horses were very old, having been in the family for many years, and were of great personal value to his family.⁵³¹ Stallions which the authorities deemed unfit for military use but which may have been of use to invading commandos, were usually castrated. In November 1901, two Heidelberg farmers, named Beukes and Van Zyl, complained about the practice, as several of their horses which were castrated under orders from the local commandant had died as a result.⁵³² In general, the assault on the horse population of the Southern Cape, impacted heavily on farming activity and the agricultural output of the region, despite receiving good rains in 1901.⁵³³ In the wider agricultural context, the war also resulted in a general shift in ownership of draught animals to animals kept expressly for slaughter.⁵³⁴

3.2.4) Loss of control over labour

Another challenge to the existing status quo was the issue over labour. During the war, many Coloured and Black farm labourers simply absconded from their duties in order to seek better remuneration and living conditions in service of the military. Control over labour had long been a point of contention between the different cultural factions at the Cape, and one of the few issues which spurred Cape Afrikaners from their general political apathy. The urban-rural divide between the English and Afrikaans sections of Cape society constituted the framework regarding the issues over control of labour. As the English-speaking sections usually dominated the economic sphere in urban spaces, they had better access to capital and the ability to

⁵³⁰ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 125.

⁵³¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letter from HJ Gildenhuis, no. 178/1901, 23 February 1901.

⁵³² (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Claims by Beukes and Van Zyl, no. 379/1901, 26 November 1901.

⁵³³ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 192.

⁵³⁴ M. De Kock: *Selected subjects in the economic history of South Africa*, p. 216.

protect the value of artisanal skills. As a result, they advocated for a more competitive free market system.

In contrast, rural-based Afrikaners wanted more protection in the form of tariffs and a guaranteed supply of cheap labour. Accordingly, legislation and other measures of social control were instituted to stabilize access to farm labour. The war challenged this entrenched system of subservience as many farm labourers went off in response to the opportunities which the war had made possible.⁵³⁵ Loss of control over labour eroded the profit base of Afrikaner agrarian elites, and the sight of Coloured labourers enforcing martial law by service in Town Guards and scouting units challenged their hierarchy and status.

In the Southern Cape, where farming activities were dependent on cheap labour, the issue over labour absconsion was especially contentious.⁵³⁶ In Heidelberg the issue was very apparent, as the magistrate's files are littered with cases of absentee and deserting labourers, starting from as early as April 1900.⁵³⁷ In May of 1900, Jacobus Migiels, a labourer hired by Louis Peters to clean a section of Heidelberg's fresh water canal, was fined 5 shillings in absentia for never showing up.⁵³⁸ Ezak Joers was found guilty and fined £1 for absconding from the service of Morden Darcey, having been apprehended at Swellendam's railway station on his way to Worcester.⁵³⁹ On 13 August 1900, Frederik Stoffels was fined 10 shillings in absentia for illegally leaving the employ of Peter Lombaard. Authorities ascertained that he had left his residence at the Slang River location for work at the military remount camp at Worcester.⁵⁴⁰ Hendrik Johannes, a shepherd in the employ of mayor James Munnik, was fined 10 shillings for refusing to fulfil his duties, having stated flatly during the proceedings that he could get better pay in employ of Swellendam's Town Guard.⁵⁴¹ Records from the trial proceedings of Adonis Eyster in February 1901 highlighted the futility of prosecuting such cases. The accused could not be tracked down and the justice of the peace stated that he was disinclined to award a

⁵³⁵ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 285.

⁵³⁶ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 194.

⁵³⁷ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Index of cases involving labour absconsion, no. 517/1900, 21 April 1900.

⁵³⁸ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Peters vs Migiels, no. 583/1900, 8 May 1900.

⁵³⁹ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Joers vs Darcey, no. 865/1900, 16 July 1900.

⁵⁴⁰ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Stoffels vs Lombaard, no. 1070/1900, 13 August 1900.

⁵⁴¹ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Munnik vs Johannes, no. 1195/1900, 8 October 1900.

fine owing to the fact that the restrictions on movement set in place by martial law had made the persecution of offenders impossible.⁵⁴²

3.2.5) The language issue

Despite declarations by the government, like Milner's manifesto of 23 November 1899, that the English and Afrikaans sections of the Cape would continue to enjoy equal rights, blatant language discrimination regularly occurred throughout the war. The pro-British press was especially guilty of assaulting the Dutch and Afrikaans languages in their attempts to display loyalty.⁵⁴³ In a section entitled *Vragen en Gedachten* the Southern Cape newspaper, the *Het Zuid-Westen*, commented on a disturbing trend that promoted an unnatural and artificial demarcation between "*Engelschen and Afrikaanders*."⁵⁴⁴ In Southern Cape towns like Oudtshoorn, authorities insisted that only English be used for all official publications.⁵⁴⁵ Likewise, at Heidelberg the Municipal Council was engaged in a polemic with the Colonial government and the Swellendam magistrate's office over the use of Dutch and English in municipal regulations.⁵⁴⁶ The Council regarded the redrafting of municipal regulations in English as an unnecessary expense, especially since the majority of the community's inhabitants were Dutch/Afrikaans.⁵⁴⁷ The dispute may have arisen after a loyalist faction in town secretly complained about the lack of martial law proclamations published in English. Military intelligence also suspected the secretary of the Municipal Council, James Du Preez as having republican sympathies due to his friendship with DF Scholtz. Throughout the polemic, Du Preez had been the primary voice of dissent to the Magistrate of Swellendam's insistence on the matter.⁵⁴⁸ The dispute only ended when the Colonial

⁵⁴² (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Odendaal vs Eyster, no. 169/1901, 25 February 1901.

⁵⁴³ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, pp. 97-98.

⁵⁴⁴ "Vragen en Gedachten," *Het Zuid-Westen*, 1 November 1900, p. 2.

⁵⁴⁵ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 136.

⁵⁴⁶ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Reply from Colonial Office regarding municipal regulations, no. 341/1900, 25 October 1900.

⁵⁴⁷ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/39: Letter received from Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 803/1900, 28 November 1900.

⁵⁴⁸ (TAB) HC 49: Intelligence report, 23 January 1901.

Office interceded by admonishing the council over its refusal to republish in English.⁵⁴⁹

3.2.6) Challenges to existing power structures

Incidents like the Municipal Council's dispute over language also damaged the trust of the loyal inhabitants of the Cape in their government, and forced them to reassess their collective identity while under constant suspicion. The questioning of loyalist allegiance and the often needless persecution for petty offences under the blanket terms of martial law, resulted in alienation and contributed to an emerging cultural consciousness.⁵⁵⁰ The war and imperialist ideology brought the issue over identity at the Cape to a head. The ultra-narrow imperial definitions of loyalty, like Milner's famous statement to the people of Graaff-Reinet in 1898, made loyalty sound obligatory and part of an ideology of subjugation that was unpopular among those at the Cape.⁵⁵¹ When efforts to display loyalty were made, they were often snubbed or met with disdain. Such was the case when the Heidelberg Municipal Council was denied its request to be allowed the honour of sending a welcoming delegation to Cape Town for the arrival of the royal couple on their tour to South Africa in 1901.⁵⁵²

The blanket application of martial law spared no one from being subjected to its restrictions and demands, and resulted in the social status of those occupying higher positions in the rural hierarchy being challenged. A prominent position in rural societies of the time was the office of field cornet. A remnant from Dutch rule, field cornets performed a vital role in the community before the advent of civil commissioners and a institutionalised police force. Field cornets were usually wealthy, literate farmers who acted as intermediaries between the judicial office and community.⁵⁵³ As such, a degree of distinction and privilege was attached to the office. In the early stages of the war, civil and military authorities relied heavily on

⁵⁴⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Letter from Colonial Office to Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 21/1901, 12 January 1901.

⁵⁵⁰ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 176-177.

⁵⁵¹ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, p. 635.

⁵⁵² (KAB) 3/HBG 1/1/1/2: Minutes of Heidelberg Municipal Council meeting, 6 June 1901.

⁵⁵³ F. Van Jaarsveld: *Die veldkornet en sy aandel in die opbou van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek tot 1870*, p. 204.

field cornets for grass roots intelligence on community feeling and enemy movements. The colony-wide declaration of martial law and creation of the Colonial Defence Force changed this relationship, as the status and power of the office was challenged and the privileges of the title effectively nullified.

At Heidelberg, the policy of commandeering horses outraged many field cornets and many resigned or threatened to do so. On 30 January 1901, Gert Rynier Uys⁵⁵⁴ resigned his post as field cornet for the Karnemelks River ward due to the commandeering of his horses.⁵⁵⁵ GR Uys was a wealthy farmer on the outskirts of Heidelberg, whose uncle, Cornelis Janse (Veldkornet) Uys, was one of the town co-founders and Uys' predecessor as field cornet.⁵⁵⁶ Uys' resignation may have been an attempt to elicit a sympathetic response from authorities to indemnify him from being subjected to martial law. Despite being reimbursed for the two horses commandeered by the military, Uys was adamant in his resignation.⁵⁵⁷ In a telegram to the resident magistrate of Swellendam, Uys asked if he could get his horses back given his recent resignation.⁵⁵⁸ Following in this trend was HJ Duminy, field cornet for the Krombeks River ward, who tentatively resigned his commission after two of his horses were commandeered by military authorities at Riversdale. After some coaxing, Duminy was eventually persuaded to retract his resignation.⁵⁵⁹ Both Uys and Duminy had been identified as rebellious individuals who were unsuitable for their stations in an intelligence report from 1901.⁵⁶⁰

It is highly possible that their resignations followed in the wake of these assaults on their character. Another reason for these resignations may have been that the act of spying on their neighbours and impounding their firearms could have turned these men into social pariahs. Although the title had the potential to bestow status, it also had a history of strife whenever field cornets had to enforce unpopular policies.⁵⁶¹ Aside from the loss of productivity and the assault on property exacted by the practice of military expropriation, many of these higher ranking rural elites

⁵⁵⁴ Uys b1c5d8e1f14; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2219: Death notice of Gert Rynier Uys, no. 3747, 17 November 1921.

⁵⁵⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Resignation of GR Uys, no. 96/1901, 30 January 1901.

⁵⁵⁶ Uys b1c5d9e1

⁵⁵⁷ (KAB) AG 936: Resignation of GR Uys, no. 23/1901, 16 February 1901.

⁵⁵⁸ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Telegram from GR Uys, no. 116/1901, 4 February 1901.

⁵⁵⁹ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Letter from HJ Duminy, no. 207/1901, 14 March 1901.

⁵⁶⁰ (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence Report, 23 February 1901.

⁵⁶¹ N. Penn: *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist & Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the 18th Century*, p. 116.

resented the challenge to their authority by the individuals responsible for the commandeering of horses.⁵⁶² Prior to the war, field cornets were often required to travel extensively within their own wards to inspect communal facilities, record births and deaths, and assist in legal matters such as arrests. Under martial law, this freedom was severely curtailed by the restrictions placed on movement. For individuals used to a great amount of personal freedom and autonomy, this represented an assault on their way of life and social standing. In July 1900, Henry Charles Hopkins,⁵⁶³ field cornet for the village of Heidelberg, was required to submit an application requesting a leave of absence to attend to personal business in Cape Town.⁵⁶⁴ A well known figure at Heidelberg, Hopkins owned a general store and served as treasurer on the DRC council.⁵⁶⁵ For men like Hopkins, the war greatly diminished the power of their office, especially as military authorities, frustrated and unfamiliar with local conditions, became increasingly distrustful of local loyalists. Hopkins was a second generation immigrant from Britain, yet despite his British credentials, his connection to the community and marriage into a local Afrikaner family may have led to doubts regarding his loyalty in the eyes of military officials. An intelligence report from February 1901 identified him as among a list of rebellious individuals and recommended that his commission should be cancelled.⁵⁶⁶

On 4 March 1902, JH Human, field cornet and member of Heidelberg's Town Guard, requested to privately sell one of his horses in order to cover losses resulting from floods. His request was denied under the restrictions imposed by martial law.⁵⁶⁷ Another field cornet named Wessels, was removed from his post for allegedly distributing pamphlets and copies of the newspaper *Onse Land*, at a political gathering held in Heidelberg.⁵⁶⁸ Even the stoutest British supporters, like field cornet Donald Moodie, who lost his son to the war, were regarded with suspicion. When rumours surfaced that the forester at Grootvadersbosch, a man called Reinhardt, had hidden a small cache of arms and ammunition somewhere on the banks of the

⁵⁶² J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, pp. 83-84.

⁵⁶³ Hopkins b6

⁵⁶⁴ (KAB) AG 754: Request for leave of absence by HC Hopkins, no. 69/1900, 15 July 1900.

⁵⁶⁵ H. Hopkins: *Eupees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 87.

⁵⁶⁶ (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence Report, 23 February 1901.

⁵⁶⁷ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Request from field cornet JH Human to sell his horse, no. 553/1902, 4 March 1902.

⁵⁶⁸ (TAB) HC 47: Intelligence Report, 20 December 1900.

Duivenhoks River, Moodie's allegiance was also called into question.⁵⁶⁹ After having the area searched and finding nothing, the agent spent the night at Moodie's home to ascertain his loyalty. Moodie was not discharged, yet it was recommended he be kept under watch.⁵⁷⁰

The greatest challenge to the authority of field cornets came in the form of the mounted units like the DMP and DMT, which were comprised of recruits from a younger generation and a different social background. Jurisdictional uncertainty and sharing of authority often resulted in power struggles and clashes among those responsible for the administration of martial law.⁵⁷¹ Uncertainty about authority and paranoid suspicion were often exacerbated by reports from overzealous intelligence officers, who often based these on dubious sources inspired by personal vendettas.⁵⁷²

A pertinent example of the clash between the old and new factions of authority occurred on 11 March 1901, when field cornet Cornelis Jacobus Joubert of the farm, Tilney, was charged with the illegal concealment of a rifle and resisting arrest. On 22 February 1901, Joubert was confronted on his farm by James Coppens, a trooper in the DMT, regarding an allegation that Joubert had failed to hand in a Mauser rifle to authorities. Joubert denied the allegation and allowed Coppens to search his home. Coppens found an empty rifle scabbard and placed Joubert under arrest, believing the rifle to be hidden somewhere on the farm. As Joubert's farm fell under the jurisdiction of Barrydale, he was taken to the Barrydale magistrate's office for processing. While entering the town on the 24th, Joubert escaped custody and headed for Swellendam to clear the matter with Commandant Nelson. On the 25th Joubert encountered DMP trooper William Henry Batten,⁵⁷³ whom Joubert believed to be responsible for the accusation. Joubert told Batten that he knew he was responsible and would see to it that Batten would be dismissed. Incidentally, Batten was the older brother of Dirk Cornelius Batten, who also served in the DMP.⁵⁷⁴ In the trial, Batten stated that he witnessed Joubert in possession of a Mauser rifle the previous year, but denied that he had been the source of the anonymous allegation against Joubert. Testimony from Jan

⁵⁶⁹ (TAB) HC 47: Report from Reynecke to H Smith, 17 December 1900.

⁵⁷⁰ (TAB) HC 47: Report from Reynecke to H Smith, 20 December 1900.

⁵⁷¹ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 134.

⁵⁷² J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, pp. 76-77.

⁵⁷³ Batten b2c1

⁵⁷⁴ Batten b2c11

Boschstander, a herder employed by Joubert, confirmed that the rifle in Joubert's possession the previous year was not a Mauser but an old shotgun to which the scabbard found in Joubert's home belonged. The trial revealed that Joubert had indeed handed in the weapon to authorities, along with 34 other rifles collected from farmers in Joubert's field cornetcy. Joubert had personally taken the weapons to Barrydale by hiring a wagon, without remuneration for the cost of the undertaking. Joubert was acquitted on the weapons charge, and the magistrate remarked on the dubious nature of Batten's testimony. Joubert was found guilty on the charge of resisting arrest and fined £5 or one month imprisonment.⁵⁷⁵

The case of field cornet Joubert, reflects how the war magnified the undercurrents of class conflict in Cape society, as well as providing a clear illustration of how loyal inhabitants were alienated by distrustful authorities. War often acts as a catalyst or intensifier for existing tensions and social stratifications, providing a mutable context for individual actions which would otherwise be unacceptable.⁵⁷⁶ The South African War opened up a brief period for marginalised groups to assert themselves.⁵⁷⁷ Bill Nasson refers to this as "*a popular assertion from below*", which afforded the poor and disenfranchised the opportunity for restitution. Although this reference was made to the scores of Black and Coloured men who supported the British war effort, it is equally applicable to marginalised white Afrikaners in the Cape.⁵⁷⁸

Grundlingh has shown that economic motivations and opportunities for social mobility were instrumental in encouraging poor and landless Afrikaners in the OFS and ZAR to join the British side.⁵⁷⁹ The Cape government's decision to use volunteers for defending the Colony was calculated out of distrust of the British military and intended to prevent alienation of the electorate. In reality, this approach resulted in abuse of the system, especially regarding the application of martial law, as many used the opportunity to settle old scores, inadvertently up-ending the existing social order.⁵⁸⁰ The commandeering of horses and stock seizures resulting from martial law

⁵⁷⁵ (KAB) AG 2045: Correspondence regarding J Schoonwinkel, no. 29/1901, 11 March 1901.

⁵⁷⁶ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 9.

⁵⁷⁷ G. Cuthbertson & A. Jeeves: *The Many-sided Struggle for Southern Africa, 1899-1902*, p. 3.

⁵⁷⁸ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 10.

⁵⁷⁹ A. Grundlingh: *The dynamics of treason: Boer collaboration in the South African War of 1899-1902*, pp. 311-312.

⁵⁸⁰ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, pp. 37-38.

often left poor tenant farmers and small business owners without much of a financial future and many were compelled to join mounted police divisions in order to survive.⁵⁸¹ Intelligence reports on local police from the period also suggest that the majority of recruits in small towns and villages had been drawn from the lower rural classes, stating: “(they are) recruited from the laziest class of farmer who will not work on the farm.”⁵⁸² In the district of Swellendam, enforcement of martial law was often synonymous with humiliation carried out by the underclasses, and paired with the depression of the local artisan economy, provides compelling evidence for a yet unexplored class dimension of the war in the Cape.⁵⁸³

3.2.7) Challenges to civil rights

One of the fundamental aspects of the war in the Cape was the severe challenge which martial law posed to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants. The suspension of the civil courts and arbitrary judgements of military courts soured an increasingly beleaguered citizenry against their existing notions of British citizenship. Although the full effects of martial law would only materialize in mid 1901, signs indicating the abridged powers of local government already appeared in 1900, when the Colonial Office denied an application for deputising a local man as issuer of permits and passes at Heidelberg.⁵⁸⁴ Records indicate that during the war, Heidelberg’s jail was never authorised to incarcerate prisoners for long periods of time, and the police were required to transport prisoners to Riversdale and Swellendam.⁵⁸⁵

In April 1901, military courts assumed control of prosecutions under martial law. This coincided with the intensification of republican invasion activity in the Colony.⁵⁸⁶ On 15 April 1901, the administration of the southern area and district of Swellendam came under control of the imperial government and Heidelberg’s

⁵⁸¹ A. Mabin & B. Conradie (eds.): *The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on economic conditions in Southern Africa, 1865-1902*, p. 506.

⁵⁸² (TAB) HC 47: Report entitled Local Police from M Knocker, 27 December 1900.

⁵⁸³ M. Rothmann: *My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling*, pp. 140-141.

⁵⁸⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/12: Letter from WP Schreiner to Heidelberg Municipal Council, no. 171/1900, 1 June 1900.

⁵⁸⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Request for prisoner transfer from Heidelberg special justice of the peace, no. 220/1901, 6 March 1901.

⁵⁸⁶ H. Shearing: *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902*, p. 274.

magistrate office closed on 28 May, only reopening on 17 January 1902.⁵⁸⁷ Within this period, the local inhabitants were subjected to the harsh sentences that reflected the arbitrary interpretation of martial law. On 8 June 1901, the Cape constitution was suspended until 1903. The decision was rooted in Milner's dislike of populism and democracy, and was underscored by his belief that the Responsible Government at the Cape was detrimental to the war effort.⁵⁸⁸ In an article appearing in *The Cape Times* on 13 September 1901, the pro-British editorial tried to justify the unconstitutional nature of the decision by linking it to the martial law restrictions on public meetings.⁵⁸⁹ In reality, the decision was made in order to prevent the Sprigg ministry from being deposed by way of submitting a vote of no confidence. Sprigg's cabinet would govern without the consent of the Cape Colonial Parliament, which meant that all the decisions made and expenditures incurred during this period were in fact unconstitutional.⁵⁹⁰

These actions were a direct challenge to the British citizenship rights of the people at the Cape and fostered a deep rooted aversion to their partial British identities. The interim power vacuum at the top was filled with martial law and military courts. To many, the threat of disenfranchising Cape rebels was regarded with bitter irony in light of the pre-war issue over the Uitlander franchise.⁵⁹¹ Coupled with the military practice of paying Coloured witnesses to provide exaggerated or false testimony in treason trials, the joint experiences under martial law was probably a powerful catalyst in the formation of ethno-ideological identification.⁵⁹²

Despite its relative isolation and removal from the hotbeds of rebellion, the community of Heidelberg did not go untouched by the iron hand of martial law. On 20 August 1901, two brothers, Jacobus Francois Kleinsmidt and Pieter Gabriel De Wet Kleinsmidt, from the farm Lemoenshoek, were charged with assisting the enemy when Scheepers' commando crossed their farm. Their only crime was failure to report the commandos' presence to the local commandant. In their defence they claimed that

⁵⁸⁷ (KAB) DD 7/13: CDF orders, 15 April 1901; (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Last case of 1901, no. 482/1901, 28 May 1901; (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: First case of 1902, no. 1/1902, 17 January 1902.

⁵⁸⁸ J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, p. 81.

⁵⁸⁹ "The Prorogation," *The Cape Times*, 13 September 1901, p. 4.

⁵⁹⁰ J. Galbraith: *British War Measures in Cape Colony, 1900-1902: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement*, pp. 83-84.

⁵⁹¹ J. Snyman: *Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, met spesiale verwysing na die Militêre howe (1899-1902)*, p. 27.

⁵⁹² B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 150.

they were unable to leave the farm as their children had been ill with the measles. Despite the mitigating circumstances, both were found guilty and sentenced to 6 months hard labour and a £50 fine.⁵⁹³ Another dubious incident occurred in September 1901, when Wynand Scott from Adamskraal was arrested for treason. Three troopers in the Riversdale DMT impersonated rebel commandos from Graaff-Reinet and asked Scott for fresh horses and the names of potential recruits. Scott refused to join the “rebels” or give them his horse, but offered them bread and told them the mountain pass was clear of patrols. Scott was arrested and sentenced to one year hard labour.⁵⁹⁴ Cases of entrapment were commonplace, despite regular dispatches by the prime minister to the CDF which strongly condemned the use of such tactics.⁵⁹⁵

Despite Milner’s convictions regarding the allegiance of the inhabitants of the Cape, the reality was quite different. Most were deeply loyal to the Colony and the British Crown, with no interest in military involvement against the Boer Republics or secret desires for republicanism at the Cape. In fact, Cape Afrikaners were still in a state of cultural and political maturation. Preceding incidents like the Scab Act and Jameson Raid had spurred Afrikaners as an ethnic group to low-grade political mobilisation. By insisting on clarifying their loyalty, Milner had reluctantly dragged them into the unwanted position of choosing sides, which was aggravated by the assault on their civil liberties through the application of martial law.⁵⁹⁶ The military further inflamed local passions by blaming the mismanagement and abuses of martial law on the low quality of Cape volunteers. In December of 1901, attempts were made to counteract civilian distrust by replacing military commandants with civil commissioners and magistrates who reported to military administrators for large areas.⁵⁹⁷ A Martial Law Board had been created in October to review cases of military abuse and reimburse the losses incurred under martial law.⁵⁹⁸ Starting from October 1902, a slew of angry letters and claims started to appear in the files of Swellendam’s resident magistrate. Many wanted compensation for commandeered animals, most

⁵⁹³ (KAB) AG 3635: Military court case against JF Kleinsmidt and PGDW Kleinsmidt, no. 472/92, 20 August 1901.

⁵⁹⁴ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 5 October 1901, p. 2.

⁵⁹⁵ (KAB) DD 1/71: Memorandum from Prime Minister’s Office, no. 1779/1901, 22 April 1901.

⁵⁹⁶ M. Tamarkin: *Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point of return to a dead end*, pp. 400-402.

⁵⁹⁷ K. Surridge: *Rebellion, martial law and British civil-military relations: The war in Cape Colony 1899-1902*, p. 46.

⁵⁹⁸ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 127.

demanded their firearms to be returned, while others waited in vain for some form of official apology.⁵⁹⁹ The damage, however, had been done.

⁵⁹⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Letters dated to the period 25 October 1902 to December 1902.

Chapter 4 - The Battle

4.1) Opening shots

During August and September of 1901 a state of heightened anxiety and fear reigned throughout the Southern Cape as 500 invaders from the Boer Republics operated within the area.⁶⁰⁰ The Boer commandos operating in the region originally formed part of the republican invasion strategy to incite rebellion among Cape Afrikaners while opening up another front and attracting international attention in hope of foreign intervention. By this time, the second invasion drive had lost much of its momentum, and due to the lack of provisions and constant hounding by the British military, the primary objective of most commandos had devolved into keeping life and limb together. On 13 September 1901, Heidelberg was attacked by a Boer commando unit known as Theron's Scouts (*Theron's Verkennings Kommando* or TVK). The TVK started out as a cycling corps, and was the inception of Danie Theron, a young lawyer from Klerksdorp in the ZAR. The movement quickly evolved into a scouting unit and gained notoriety for their valorous and courageous actions during the occupation of Bloemfontein.⁶⁰¹

Danie Theron was killed in battle on 5 September 1900 and the TVK fragmented into smaller units. Leadership of the TVK passed to Jan Lombard Theron,⁶⁰² who was believed to be Danie Theron's cousin.⁶⁰³ Interestingly, subsequent genealogical research has shown that the two Theron's were not cousins at all but were only distantly related.⁶⁰⁴ Jan Lombard Theron was born in Tulbagh and grew up in Ceres, but became a naturalised citizen of the ZAR just prior to the war.⁶⁰⁵ British intelligence reports of the time described Theron as a short, conceited man.⁶⁰⁶ Although not as tactically brilliant as his predecessor, Theron was daring and aggressive when engaging the enemy. This aggressiveness appealed to younger men, and the TVK had the reputation of luring away recruits from other more war-weary

⁶⁰⁰ (TAB) FK 815 (CO 48/554): Confidential despatch to Joseph Chamberlain, no. 34908/1901, 25 September 1901.

⁶⁰¹ L. Amery: *The Times history of war in South Africa*, p. 81.

⁶⁰² (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Jan Lombard Theron, no. 142, Addendum A, Figure 1.

⁶⁰³ D. Shearing & T. Shearing: *Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave*, p. 25.

⁶⁰⁴ G. Geldenhuys: *Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide*, p. 50.

⁶⁰⁵ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/466: Death notice of Jan Lombard Theron, no. 3, 14 April 1902.

⁶⁰⁶ (NLSA) *Boer Army List*, 31 March 1902, pp. 125-126.

commandos. Theron's charismatic enlistment ability made him the ideal candidate to head the republican recruitment drive in the Cape, and on 12 July 1901, the TVK received orders from General De Wet to cross the Orange River into the Colony.⁶⁰⁷

Theron entered the Cape near Venterstad in the Eastern Cape on 16 July 1901, and joined forces with the commandos of Botha, Lotter and Smith in the vicinity of Fish River station. On the 8th of August, this contingent attacked British forces and dynamited the railway tracks, after which the commandos were scattered by the 9th Lancers under Colonel Scobell. The TVK broke south and continued on to Graaff-Reinet where they routed French's Scouts, capturing 54 and replenishing their arms and ammunition supplies.⁶⁰⁸ The TVK continued this trend when they raided the town of Aberdeen on 23 August, and recruited four local men to the commando.⁶⁰⁹ On the 26th, the replenished commando mounted a daring attack on a British armoured train near Klipplaat.⁶¹⁰ Four days later, Theron entered the Oudtshoorn district and engaged the local DMT at Vlakteplaas on 1 September 1901.⁶¹¹

During the war, Boer commandos often made use of Black and Coloured auxiliaries or *agterryers*. Many of them were coerced into service and entire communities were often stripped of able bodied men. Fear of reprisals on their families and community kept many in the service of the republican invaders.⁶¹² On 5 September, the TVK sacked the mission community of Dysseldorp, and impressed 35 Coloured men into service as auxiliaries. What Theron lacked in innovation, he made up for in cruelty, and during the TVK's campaign in the Cape, he acquired a reputation for extreme cruelty towards all races of the opposition. Upon exiting the district, Theron ordered that an intercepted consignment of perfume be poured over the Coloured auxiliaries from Dysseldorp.⁶¹³

Theron's next intended target was Mossel Bay, but after clashing with the 10th Royal Hussars under Colonel Kavanagh at Brandwacht on 9 September, the TVK fled north towards Herbertsdale, where they crossed the Gouritz River near

⁶⁰⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁰⁸ H. Shearing: *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902*, pp. 130-131.

⁶⁰⁹ (TAB) FK 812 (CO 48/554): Report from Acting Resident Magistrate of Aberdeen on Aberdeen Rebels, 26 August 1901, p. 125.

⁶¹⁰ (TAB) FK 812 (CO 48/554): Weekly Summary Cape Colony District, 31 August 1901, p. 91.

⁶¹¹ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 16-17.

⁶¹² B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, pp. 101-103.

⁶¹³ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 16-17.

Zandfontein.⁶¹⁴ After spending the night at Weyders River, the commando entered the district of Riversdale near Drooge Vlakte on the 12th of September 1901.⁶¹⁵ Theron's audacious actions and ability to evade capture, frustrated British military high command, and his reputation for looting and destruction of private property was especially troublesome to a colonial administration trying to mollify the increasingly outraged inhabitants of the Cape.⁶¹⁶ Consequently, Theron became a priority for Burke, who actively pursued him throughout the latter half of 1901.⁶¹⁷ As such, advanced preparations were made for intercepting the TVK as they neared Riversdale and Heidelberg. On the afternoon of the 12th, as the Heidelberg Municipal Council held its final meeting for the month of September, a combined force consisting of DMT troops from Swellendam, Caledon, Oudtshoorn and Riversdale, met up with Kavanagh's Hussars and entered the small plateau of Drooge Vlakte near Still Bay.⁶¹⁸ Among the Swellendam DMT was the young GJ Swart who had also served in the Heidelberg Town Guard during the preceding April.⁶¹⁹

Apparently Theron had prior knowledge of the attack and positioned his men in a crescent formation atop the hills overlooking the plain. In the midst of heavy rain, a fierce battle ensued, resulting in numerous British casualties and the wounding of two of Theron's men.⁶²⁰ According to a later report sent to the Attorney General by Riversdale's resident magistrate, CJ Roux, one of the wounded men captured at the battle was a man named Tiell, who served as Theron's bookkeeper. The other heavily wounded man sought refuge at a local farmstead before surrendering at the Riversdale on 15 September. His name was Van Biljon, an ex-field cornet from Kroonstad in the former OFS.⁶²¹

Overwhelmed by the numerical superiority of the British and Colonial forces, the TVK abandoned the high ground and escaped westward into the dense fynbos underbrush. In the early hours of the 13th September, the commando reached the farmstead of Oude Muragie, situated on the Krombeks River just outside Heidelberg.

⁶¹⁴ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 29 September 1901, p. 2.

⁶¹⁵ "Theron Attacked: Routed north of Mossel Bay, his plan disturbed," *The Cape Times*, 13 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶¹⁶ H. Shearing: *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902*, pp. 130-131.

⁶¹⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 16-17.

⁶¹⁸ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 29 September 1901, p. 2.

⁶¹⁹ (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902.

⁶²⁰ "Heidelberg Attacked," *The Cape Times*, 16 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶²¹ (KAB) AG 933: Report on invasion by magistrate CJ Roux, no. 116/1901, 28 September 1901.

The owner, Andries Odendaal, awoke to find his home surrounded by Theron's men. They intercepted Morris Reuvid, a scout from Riversdale, who had been dispatched by the Riversdale commandant with a message for Colonel Burke. Theron accused Reuvid of being a plain clothes spy and wanted to execute him, but due to Odendaal's pleas for lenience, decided to have him flogged instead. In the confusion that followed, Reuvid managed to escape towards Riversdale.⁶²² During the preceding night, the TVK had also captured and flogged a Coloured scout carrying a message from Burke to Kavanagh requesting his immediate assistance in the defence of Heidelberg.⁶²³

It has been generally accepted that Theron's decision to attack Heidelberg was based on the intelligence contained within these dispatches, believing the town to be poorly defended.⁶²⁴ Based on subsequent evidence, it can be speculated that Burke, who had become dead set on capturing Theron, had purposefully understated Heidelberg's defensive capabilities in order to lure Theron there for a final showdown. Shearing has stated that the decision to move the southern district headquarters to Swellendam, was partly informed by Burke's anticipation of invading commando movement into the area.⁶²⁵ In fact, under orders from Burke, Heidelberg had been occupied by a platoon of 28 soldiers of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment under Major Sir William Henry Mahon,⁶²⁶ who had arrived the previous day.⁶²⁷ The 44 year old Mahon was the 5th Baronet of Castlereagh from Northern Ireland and commanded the 4th Battalion from 21 October 1900 to 31 January 1901. Mahon and the Regiment had extensive battle experience, having been deployed in the ZAR and OFS during September and October of 1900, and in various locations throughout the Cape Colony from March 1900 until the end of the war.⁶²⁸

It is apparent that Burke was not willing to leave the defence of Heidelberg to its fledgling Town Guard in face of such an aggressive foe, especially in light of his distrust of and contempt for the local population. The decision may also have been influenced by Captain Ryrie, a previous commandant at Heidelberg, who had

⁶²² *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 5 October 1901, p. 2.

⁶²³ (KAB) AG 933: Report on invasion by magistrate CJ Roux, no. 116/1901, 28 September 1901.

⁶²⁴ M. Grant: *The history of the war in South Africa, 1899-1902*, p. 283.

⁶²⁵ D. Shearing & T. Shearing: *Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave*, p. 121.

⁶²⁶ W. Mahon: Photograph of 4th West Yorkshire Regiment, Figure 2, 13 September 1901, Addendum A.

⁶²⁷ "Attack on Heidelberg," *The Cape Times*, 25 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶²⁸ *The London Gazette*, 10 September 1901, p. 5960.

remarked that more men were needed to secure the area as nine tenths of the district, including the Town Guard, could not be relied on should trouble arrive.⁶²⁹ Burke himself had arrived on the afternoon of the 12th to direct the construction of defences around town, and intended to personally direct the approaching engagement.⁶³⁰ The soldiers had been busy constructing defensive ramparts around Henry Hanson's Masonic Hotel, which was considered to be in a strategically advantageous position as it was located in the then centre of town with vantage points that covered the main entrances into Heidelberg.⁶³¹ Situated on the corner of Fourie and Hopley Street, next to the Masonic Hotel, was the gunpowder and ammunition store. It, too, had been heavily fortified with sandbags.⁶³² It was on this corner where some of the heaviest fighting would take place. Although the soldiers constructed the defences with haste, they could not be fully completed as the same heavy rain which had raged during the battle at Drooge Vlakte interrupted the work.⁶³³ On the morning of 13 September, Mahon and Burke ordered all privately owned forage and saddles located in town and the surrounding area to be rounded up. As a precautionary measure, the forage was loaded onto wagons and transported to Swellendam for safekeeping. Among those employed to carry out this task, were Municipal Council member Jan Crous, Willem Lodewyk Lombaard of the Heidelberg Town Guard, and his older brother, Christoffel Johannes Lombaard (both brothers of the rebel, Johannes Jurie Lombaard).⁶³⁴ The commandeered saddles were distributed among a contingent of white and Coloured scouts, who were dispatched in all directions in an attempt to spot the approaching Boer commando.⁶³⁵

Among those tasked to go looking for the enemy were, Dirk Cornelis Batten of the DMP, and William Osmond, the gaoler and corporal in the Town Guard. Under orders from a lieutenant of the West Yorkshire Regiment, the pair departed from town

⁶²⁹ (TAB) HC 52: Intelligence report from M Knocker on Riversdale, 7 April 1901.

⁶³⁰ (KAB) DD 4/171: Pay sheets indicate that Heidelberg Town Guard was only operational for the month of April 1901. Drill and pay sheets for Town Guard District of Swellendam, no. 61/1901 & 62/1901, 6 June 1901; W. Mahon & (KAB) HOP: Photographs taken before the battle confirm that the only members of the Town Guard present was Henry Jones Hanson and JL Cantrell. Photograph of Henry Jones Hanson, no. 1446, Figure 7, Prominent men of Heidelberg, no. 1495, Figure 11 & Photograph of 4th West Yorkshire Regiment, Figure 6, 13 September 1901, Addendum A.

⁶³¹ (KAB) HOP: Panoramic view of Heidelberg, no. 1326, Addendum A, Figure 10.

⁶³² (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Masonic Hotel, no. 2442, Figure 3, Addendum A; W. Mahon: Photographs of Heidelberg, Figures 4 & 5, 13 September 1901, Addendum A.

⁶³³ "Attack on Heidelberg," *The Cape Times*, 25 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶³⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from J Crous, no. 1014/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from WL Lombaard, no. 1015/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from C Lombaard, no. 1013/116/1902, 19 February 1902.

⁶³⁵ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from MJ Geldenhuys, no. 1006/1903, 18 September 1903.

late that morning and headed in the direction of Riversdale. At approximately 3 o'clock in the afternoon, near the farm Zeekoegat, in the vicinity of the Krombeks River just outside of town, they noticed they were being followed by a small party of men, one of whom was dressed in khaki. Believing them to be from the regiment stationed in town, Batten and Osmond approached without caution. The men turned out to be an advanced party of Theron's men, and at gunpoint they captured both Batten and Osmond.⁶³⁶ The man dressed in khaki was most likely the 28 year old Lieutenant John George Niewenhuis, who often played the role of the English officer due to his good command of the language. Niewenhuis was a citizen of the ZAR, and had a reputation of extreme cruelty towards captured scouts.⁶³⁷ Both were stripped of their weaponry, horses and spare clothing. According to Batten's statement before Swellendam's resident magistrate regarding the incident, Osmond's riding leggings were also taken, as well as his personal diary and gaolers book.⁶³⁸

Interestingly, in all other official correspondence and military intelligence reports from the period, this detail was omitted.⁶³⁹ The information regarding local loyalties contained within Osmond's gaol book and the details of Willem Nothnagel's seditious talk, may have informed Theron's decision to attack Heidelberg, as these items were undoubtedly taken to Theron to be scrutinised. For the first three hours of their ordeal, Batten and Osmond were made to walk in front their captors. After refusing to walk any further, they were mounted and taken across the mountains towards Ladismith to the Brandrivier are.⁶⁴⁰ Along the way, they were nearly killed along with Theron's men when the party was fired upon by the Riversdale DMT. At Brandrivier, they were guarded by a small contingent of Theron's force for two days before being released on the farm of a Mr Nel, from where they set off to return to Heidelberg on foot, a journey which took them a further two days.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁶ (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borchers, no. 100/1901, 15 September 1901.

⁶³⁷ (NLSA) *Boer Army List*, 31 March 1902, p. 129.

⁶³⁸ (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901.

⁶³⁹ (TAB) FK 815 (CO 48/554): Boers entering the district of Swellendam, no. 317/1901, 17 September 1901.

⁶⁴⁰ (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901.

⁶⁴¹ (KAB) AG 1013: Report on war service by local mounted officers, no. 185/02, 26 June 1902.

4.2) Into the breach

Around four 'o clock in the afternoon, between 150 and 200 commandos entered the northeastern periphery of town in the vicinity of Lemoenstock farm.⁶⁴² First contact was made when the TVK opened fire on the sentries guarding the road bridge leading into town. The commandos fired from three elevated hills located roughly 1000 yards from the centre of the town, and rapidly cleared the bridge for their entry into Heidelberg.⁶⁴³ At 4:30 pm, the main body advanced into town via Hopley Street, only to be met with a heavy rate of fire from the entrenched soldiers surrounding the gunpowder magazine and Masonic Hotel, which halted their advance to a distance of 800 yards.⁶⁴⁴ Under sustained fire, the commandos were forced to take cover in a culvert which had recently been excavated in preparation for the planned railway extension. From here, the main body maintained a steady rate of cover fire, while a smaller group of about 50 to 80 men splintered off to flank the enemy position from the south west on the Port Beaufort side. The southwestern flank used a dry river bed from an artery of the Duivenhoks River for cover. With 20 feet high banks, the river bed formed a natural trench from where the commandos engaged the British position at a distance of 300 yards. Displaying the aggressive reputation that hallmarked the TVK, a party of 30 men on horseback charged up Fourie Street from this position, only to encounter heavy resistance from the two ramparts surrounding the Masonic Hotel which were manned by 14 members of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment.⁶⁴⁵ Three of the commando's were shot from their horses, their wounds apparently only superficial as later reports indicate that the horses took the brunt of the volley.⁶⁴⁶

While the battle continued to rage, the remainder of the group on horseback scattered for cover among the town buildings and used the opportunity to replenish their supplies. The shop of Nicolas Friedman was ransacked for provisions, and a total of six horses were stolen during the engagement.⁶⁴⁷ Among the horses stolen, were

⁶⁴² (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borchers, no. 100/1901, 15 September 1901.

⁶⁴³ "Heidelberg Attacked," *The Cape Times*, 16 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶⁴⁴ "The Attack on Heidelberg," *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 19 September 1901, p. 2.

⁶⁴⁵ "Attack on Heidelberg," *The Cape Times*, 25 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶⁴⁶ (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borchers, no. 100/1901, 15 September 1901; "The Attack on Heidelberg," *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 19 September 1901, p. 2.

⁶⁴⁷ (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901.

two belonging to Dr Henry Biggs, whose residence was situated across from the Dutch Reformed Church,⁶⁴⁸ and near the very centre of the battle.⁶⁴⁹ It was in this area that the 21 year old Petrus (Pieter) Jacobus Bellingan⁶⁵⁰ was fatally wounded while attempting to make his escape on one of the stolen horses.⁶⁵¹ Bellingan was a young rebel from Aberdeen who had previously been captured at Oorlogspoort on 16 January 1901, and tried under the first Special Indemnity Act of 1900, before acts of rebellion came under the sole jurisdiction of the British Military.⁶⁵² After his capture, Bellingan was sent to Green Point prison from where he would have been deported to Ceylon according to his sentence. His father, who had been a prominent member of the Legislative Council for the southeastern districts, intervened on his behalf and convinced authorities to have him returned to the prison in Aberdeen for a retrial. On 12 February 1901, he was released on parole after the original charges of treason against him were dropped for lack of evidence.⁶⁵³ However, the adventure of war which appealed to many young men during the conflict once again beckoned, and on 23 August 1901, Bellingan joined Theron's commando as they were racing toward the coast.⁶⁵⁴ Bellingan was wounded in the stomach near the stables behind the Biggs residence, and crawled into the home of Coloured servants, who concealed and attended to him while the battle continued to rage.⁶⁵⁵

By all accounts, the ensuing battle had been ferocious. Local witnesses recalled that during a certain point the soldiers manning the ramparts fired continuously for more than two hours to keep the commandos at bay.⁶⁵⁶ The fighting continued until midnight when heavy reinforcements of the Swellendam DMT under Captain Cockburn arrived.⁶⁵⁷ Under cover of darkness the TVK slipped away and regrouped north of town near Kruisrivier, the farm of Cornelis Rall. While Theron's men were making their retreat towards the Ertjiesvlei mountain, 600 km away

⁶⁴⁸ (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Heidelberg Dutch Reformed Church, no. 1295, Addendum A, Figure 8.

⁶⁴⁹ "The Attack on Heidelberg," *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 19 September 1901, p. 2; H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 168.

⁶⁵⁰ (KAB) HOP: Photograph of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1746, Addendum A, Figure 9; Bellingan b1c6d7

⁶⁵¹ H. Hopkins: *Eeufees gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 162.

⁶⁵² (KAB) AG 3558: Prisoner of War Records for Aberdeen, p. 1.

⁶⁵³ G. Geldenhuys: *Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide*, p. 49.

⁶⁵⁴ D. Shearing & T. Shearing: *The Rebel Record*, p. 28.

⁶⁵⁵ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/471: Death notice of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1150, 15 September 1901.

⁶⁵⁶ "Heidelberg Aangevallen Door Theron," *Het Zuid-Westen*, 17 October 1901, p. 2.

⁶⁵⁷ L. Tomlinson: *Geskiedkundige Swellendam*, pp. 102-103.

General Smuts' commando was still trapped perilously atop of the Stormberg mountains near Dordrecht.⁶⁵⁸ In the final tally, the TVK suffered 12 wounded, including Bellingan, while among the British military, one corporal was heavily wounded in two places and had to be removed from town for advanced medical care. For his role in the battle, Major Mahon received the King's Medal with two clasps and was created a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order.⁶⁵⁹ The walls of the Masonic Hotel and gunpowder magazine were riddled with bullet holes, and the surrounding residences, shops and church parsonage also suffered damage.⁶⁶⁰ On the morning of 14 September 1901, the TVK departed for Brandrivier, and caught up with their compatriots who were guarding Batten and Osmond, just in time to be briefly pursued by the Riversdale DMT.⁶⁶¹

4.3) Aftermath

Late on the afternoon of 14 September, Bellingan was brought to the home of Petrus Arnoldus Lourens and his wife Anna Marthina. The aging couple were looking after their grandchildren when the servants alerted them to the presence of the mortally wounded young man. The Lourens family attended to him as best they could, but Bellingan died in the early hours of 15 September 1901. Incidentally, Bellingan's passing coincided with the death of American president William McKinley, who died from gangrene after being shot in an assassination attempt on the 6th of September.⁶⁶² In a statement accompanying Bellingan's death notice, Lourens stated that before succumbing to his wounds, Bellingan had asked for his belongings to be forwarded to his father. These included a watch and chain, a purse of money and a pocket book.⁶⁶³ Bellingan was buried in the town cemetery, with Reverend AJ Van Wijk presiding over the funeral. Van Wijk contacted Bellingan's father, who had his son's body reinterred on the family farm after the war.⁶⁶⁴ In all probability, Bellingan may have been the southernmost casualty of the South African War.

⁶⁵⁸ (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901.

⁶⁵⁹ *The London Gazette*, 27 September 1901, p. 6326.

⁶⁶⁰ "Attack on Heidelberg," *The Cape Times*, 25 September 1901, p. 5.

⁶⁶¹ (KAB) AG 936: Declaration of DC Batten, no. 102/1901, 17 September 1901.

⁶⁶² "Roosevelt sworn in," *The Cape Times*, 16 September 1901, p. 4.

⁶⁶³ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/471: Accompanying statement by P Lourens. Death notice of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1150, 15 September 1901.

⁶⁶⁴ G. Geldenhuys: *Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide*, p. 49.

The TVK crossed the Langeberg mountains and regrouped near the mineral springs of Barrydale, where Theron would once again display his trademark cruelty towards the enemy. On 15 September 1901, having arrived on the farm of a Mr Le Grange, Theron's men happened upon two Coloured scouts from Swellendam. Michiel Holster and Jan Hartnick had arrived on the farm the previous evening while reconnoitring the area. They had departed early on the morning of the 15th and returned to their encampment in the afternoon when they were captured by Theron's men. According to later testimony by Le Grange and his neighbour Van Der Vyver, both men were blindfolded and shot twice, once in the chest and once in the head. Despite pleas by Le Grange for Theron not to murder the men on a Sunday and in cold blood, seeing as they were unarmed, one of Theron's men was adamant and carried out the executions himself.⁶⁶⁵ The man in question was named Simon, and was probably the 40 year old Simon Bloem, a former corporal of Hertzog's commando from the Free State.⁶⁶⁶ The murders of Hartnick and Holster contributed to Theron's growing reputation of cruelty which started to equal that of Gideon Scheepers, and by 16 September 1901, Theron and his men were wanted in connection with the murder of 16 Black and Coloured men in the Cape Colony.⁶⁶⁷

The TVK crossed over the mountains and into the Heidelberg region once more on their way to Montagu, when they entered the ward of Tradouw in late September 1901. According to a report filed by field cornet CJ Joubert, Theron's men raided the farms Brakrivier, Keesekraal, and Zevenfontein. Eleven sheep were slaughtered, three horses stolen, one farm house raided for food, and wheat harvests were used as forage for their horses. On the farm of Zandfontein, the young son of Pieter Coussard was kidnapped and impressed into service by the TVK. The young Coussard was given a horse but not armed, and later managed to escape his captors.⁶⁶⁸ At Montagu, Theron's man in khaki captured a 13 year old white scout named Jan Neethling. Neethling was severely flogged along with Jan Niewenhuis, a 64 year old farmer who had refused to assist the TVK.⁶⁶⁹ By the end of September, the TVK had

⁶⁶⁵ (TAB) FK 823 (CO 48/555): Affidavits connected with shooting by enemy of two scouts, no. 452/1901, 23 November 1901.

⁶⁶⁶ (NLSA) *Boer Army List*, 31 March 1902, p. 129.

⁶⁶⁷ H. Shearing: *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902*, pp. 130-131.

⁶⁶⁸ (KAB) AG 936: Report from CJ Joubert, no. 110/1901, 28 September 1901.

⁶⁶⁹ (TAB) FK 823 (CO 48/555): Affidavits connected with shooting by enemy of two scouts, no. 452/1901, 23 November 1901.

evaded capture and reached Sutherland, leaving a trail of destruction and murder in their wake, of which Heidelberg was only a small part.⁶⁷⁰

In a sense, the battle in town had been a culmination of the anxiety and fear which gripped the region throughout the latter half of 1901. For the British military, its worst fears regarding the spread of war and sedition in the Cape had been realized and the incident informed their subsequent decisions and attitude towards the people in the region. For the inhabitants, the complexities of their loyalties were compounded by the spectacle of death and destruction to property which the battle had brought to their community. Aside from the physical destruction it had inflicted, the battle also held other repercussions for the people of Heidelberg. In a military trial held in Riversdale on 9 November 1901, Andries Odendaal was convicted of treason for allegedly aiding Theron when the commando had occupied his farm on the night prior to the attack on Heidelberg.⁶⁷¹ Odendaal was eventually sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and hard labour.⁶⁷² At the same trial, HJ Duminy, field cornet for the ward of Krombeks River in the district of Riversdale, was convicted of treason for failing to report the presence of the enemy.⁶⁷³ Duminy was relieved from his position as field cornet and sentenced to one year imprisonment and hard labour.⁶⁷⁴ Jan Lombard Theron eventually died of typhoid fever in the district of Calvinia on 14 April 1902.⁶⁷⁵ Like so many others in the war, he died unceremoniously, while still trying to gather support and recruits for a cause which had grown decidedly unclear. Theron's actions caused great indignation and fear amongst the people of the Cape, and consensus holds that his aggression and cruelty severely hampered the movement and reception of other commando units operating in the Cape throughout 1901.⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷⁰ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁷¹ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Sentence details of military trials, no. 319/1901, 4 December 1901.

⁶⁷² (KAB) AG 2084: Persons convicted of high treason, district of Riversdale, 14 November 1901.

⁶⁷³ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/5/3: Suspension of HJ Duminy, no. 433/1901, 4 November 1901.

⁶⁷⁴ (KAB) 1/RDE 4/1/8/4: Sentence details of military trials, no. 319/1901, 4 December 1901.

⁶⁷⁵ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/466: Death notice of Jan Lombard Theron, no. 3, 14 April 1902.

⁶⁷⁶ H. Shearing: *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902*, pp. 130-131.

Chapter 5 – Community reactions

5.1) Reactions to invasion

Community reactions to the invasion by commando forces and battle in town were mixed, and tended to reflect the difficult position in which the war placed Cape Afrikaners. Unlike other towns in the Southern Cape, for whom the spectacle of death had only been a distant affair, the people of Heidelberg had experienced the actual threat and violence of war.⁶⁷⁷ Arguably, those who had witnessed the battle first hand displayed more tangible signs of being affected. For the Lourens family, the presence and death of Bellingan in their home, apparently had a profound impact. In a statement accompanying the death notice of Bellingan, Pieter Lourens related how the event had impacted on their household and expressed dismay that the personal items which the young man had entrusted to him for safekeeping had been confiscated by the commandant and British military.⁶⁷⁸ Reverend AJ Van Wijk, who presided over Bellingan's funeral and contacted the young man's family, was similarly affected. In March 1902, Van Wijk asked the church council's permission to do volunteer work at concentration camps in the republics.⁶⁷⁹ Subsequently, in August 1902, Van Wijk joined his brother, ZJ Van Wijk, at the Winburg concentration camp, where he would do a month's service before returning home to Heidelberg.⁶⁸⁰ Van Wijk and his wife had almost been killed during the battle, when stray shots smashed through a window in the front room of the parsonage where they had been sitting.⁶⁸¹

For many, the violence of the battle threatened not only their property, but their lives as well. A letter written by a lady from Heidelberg to her family in Grahamstown which appeared in the *Het Zuid-Westen* on 17 October 1901, details how the battle had created fear and resentment among the residents in town. The lady relates that her house was struck 10 times during the crossfire of the battle. Eight bullets were lodged in the wall of her home while two had gone through her door into

⁶⁷⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 144.

⁶⁷⁸ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/471: Death notice of Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, no. 1150, 15 September 1901.

⁶⁷⁹ H. Hopkins: *Euufes gedenkboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, p. 73; (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 24 March 1902.

⁶⁸⁰ J. Boje: *Winburg's War: an appraisal of the Anglo-Boer War as it was experienced by the people of a Free State district*, p. 315.

⁶⁸¹ G. Geldenhuys: *Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die verre suide*, p. 48.

the stairwell. According to the account, the people in town were gripped in panic and were concerned about a renewed attack the following day, which made sleeping difficult and caused her to wake at 4 am. She went on to mention how the invading commandos had done great harm to her community, referring to the damage of property and the mistreatment of two young men who were robbed of their horses and had to walk back home without anything to eat.⁶⁸²

Such resentments reflected the difficult situation faced by many Cape inhabitants during the war. They were in the unfavourable position of having to decide if they would assist the invading forces and face the possibility of treason charges, or incur the wrath of commandos if they did not. Most gave very little tangible assistance, opting only to supply commandos with food.⁶⁸³ Incursions during the latter half of 1901, like the TVK's attack on Heidelberg, often resulted in murder and destruction of property, which came as an affront to the Cape constitutionalist tradition rooted in the rights and privileges of living under British rule. Commando terror tactics like personal assaults and destruction of property bred resentment among inhabitants, and many commandos received a cool reception by the end of August.⁶⁸⁴

The lack of support for commandos also resulted from the absence of a tangible front and clearly demarcated areas of authority. Unlike the first invasion, where large areas came under republican control, borders varied continuously during the second invasion, and the severe enforcement of martial law curtailed the possibility of local support.⁶⁸⁵ On 29 August 1901, a combined force of 400 men under Scheepers and Van Der Merwe entered the district and burned the home of Mr Jan Nel at Brandrivier for refusing to supply them with provisions. The commandos occupied Barrydale on the 4th of September, where they raided the town for forage and clothes, inflicting damage to the amount of £240.⁶⁸⁶

The damage inflicted by the likes of invaders such as those at Barrydale and Brandrivier rankled local farmers and businessmen whose livelihoods were already affected by martial law. The looting of towns and farms generally undermined the Cape Colony's sympathy for the republics as these actions violated the right to

⁶⁸² "Heidelberg Aangevallen Door Theron," *Het Zuid-Westen*, 17 October 1901, p. 2.

⁶⁸³ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, pp. 72, 77.

⁶⁸⁴ D. Shearing & T. Shearing: *Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the search for his grave*, p. 122.

⁶⁸⁵ C. Strydom: *Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog*, p. 92.

⁶⁸⁶ (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by PB Borchers, no. 91/1901, 4 September 1901.

protection of property which formed a crucial part of Cape identity.⁶⁸⁷ While the pillaging committed by invading commandos did not result in a decidedly pro-British stance, it did modulate Cape sympathies towards the republics.⁶⁸⁸ While feeling towards the roving commandos may have differed from family to family, reports from time to time indicate that most inhabitants in the district were deeply fearful of their presence. As early as February of 1901, intelligence reports indicated that the possibility of an imminent attack by a commando of 100 men, had caused panic and fear among the local populace.⁶⁸⁹ The military intelligence agent present at Heidelberg described the prevailing mood as follows: “...*feeling is running extremely high and the district seems to be very unsettled.*”⁶⁹⁰ The local inhabitants’ fear of invasion was compounded by the likelihood that their already meagre provisions would be confiscated and that they would be placed under arrest by the military officials.⁶⁹¹

The situation became even more exacerbated during the latter half of 1901, when republican commandos ventured further south into the area. Reports from the Riversdale branch of Standard Bank describe the locals as being “*in laager*”, indicative of the unsettling limbo most inhabitants had found themselves in.⁶⁹² What most of the towns like Heidelberg, Riversdale, and Swellendam feared most was punishment, either for failure to cooperate after being captured by commando invaders, or being made an example of by the British military for complying with commando demands.⁶⁹³

Commando activities were also interpreted in class terms. Many farmers regarded those who rebelled and joined the roving commandos as opportunistic freebooters drawn from the lower social spectrum of society. The carefree commando lifestyle offered not only material gains by means of looting, but also a life free of social responsibility and an escape from the servitude of rural hierarchies. As such, many of the landed elite had an intense dislike and fear of the underclass elements

⁶⁸⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, pp. 146, 187.

⁶⁸⁸ B. Nasson: *Abraham Esau's war: a black South African war in the Cape, 1889-1902*, p. 11.

⁶⁸⁹ (TAB) HC 50: Telegram from Agent Murphy to Lynx, 5 February 1901.

⁶⁹⁰ (TAB) HC 51: Intelligence report from Heidelberg by Murphy, 14 February 1901.

⁶⁹¹ (TAB) HC 49: Report from M Knocker to C Leibrandt regarding Swellendam community, 14 January 1901.

⁶⁹² (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: The Situation – Riversdale, 4 September 1901, p. 353.

⁶⁹³ (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: The Situation, no. 30, 25 September 1901, p. 436.

which comprised commandos operating in the Cape.⁶⁹⁴ In a report on the commando occupation of Barrydale, field cornet for the Tradouw ward, M Versfeld, describes the invaders with contempt, referring to them as being of the “...*filthy Bywoner class*.”⁶⁹⁵

5.2) The fate of loyalists

Regardless of the individual motivations that lay behind the decision to actively display support for the British war effort by means of volunteering in law enforcement or the Town Guard, for many Cape Afrikaners their decision had become an act of social suicide by the end of the war. The reforms to martial law enforcement in December 1901 and eventual withdrawal of the military from the district in July 1902, resulted in a power vacuum, and those who had rendered their services to the military and colonial authorities no longer enjoyed the same level of protection and prestige.⁶⁹⁶ In an attempt to encourage reconciliation and reconstruction after the war, the Peace Preservation Act caused an equalisation between those who had volunteered for service in the CDF and those who had not. As a result, many volunteers felt betrayed and abandoned in lieu of no reward for their service and loyalty.⁶⁹⁷

As the military started to relinquish control during the final months of the war, those at Heidelberg who had openly displayed their loyalty, struggled to secure remuneration and reward for their services. In February 1902, the town and surrounding areas suffered severe flood damage resulting from heavy rains. On 14 February 1902, Henry Jones Hanson sent letters to the deputy administrator of martial law in Swellendam and to Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, urgently requesting financial assistance for the damages incurred by the recent floods. Hanson mentioned that he had still not been compensated for the losses and damages incurred by the military occupation of his premises and subsequent battle in town. The damage inflicted on the Masonic Hotel and gunpowder store amounted to £896, and £115 of rations had been consumed by the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment while they had been stationed there.

In light of the recent floods, and his loyal service, Hanson asked Burke to intervene by authorising early payment of the amounts he was owed. In the

⁶⁹⁴ J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 78.

⁶⁹⁵ (KAB) AG 936: Report on invasion by M Versfeld, no. 100/1901, 9 September 1901.

⁶⁹⁶ (KAB) AG 1013: Report on community feeling by H Okes, no. 95/1902, 9 July 1902.

⁶⁹⁷ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 87.

correspondence forwarded to Burke, the resident magistrate mentioned Hanson's generosity to those in town who had suffered heavy losses due to the flooding. Burke replied indifferently, stating that he was unable to offer general assistance to the village and could not intervene in matters which were the purview of the Martial Law Board.⁶⁹⁸ Similar claims by those involved in the defence of the town were submitted in the months that followed. On 19 February 1902, Jan Crous, Willem Lodewyk Lombaard, and Christoffel Lombaard requested for payment to be made on the outstanding fees owed to them for transporting forage and saddles back and forth to Swellendam on the morning of the battle.⁶⁹⁹ On 18 September 1903, Petrus Jacobus Lombaard and Marthinus Johannes Geldenhuys requested compensation for the loss of their saddles which had been commandeered by the military on the morning of battle.⁷⁰⁰ Master of the village animal pound, JH Lombaard, requested compensation to the amount of £20 for the loss of one of his stallions which had been castrated under order of Swellendam's commandant, Captain Nelson.⁷⁰¹ As no records referring to any of these preceding claims could be found in the archives of the Martial Law Board, it is assumed that none of the claimants ever received any compensation.

5.3) Reconciliation and Retribution

It is apparent that the war created a significant amount of tension within the community. The artificial divisions of "loyalists" and "sympathizers" imposed by external entities had created much enmity amongst the people of Heidelberg. While collective relief over the ending of the war, the mediating role of the church, and the bonds of affection and mutual dependency of small town life, did much to aid reconciliation, resentment towards loyalists did manifest in a number of notable incidents. During the final months of the war, loyalist shop owners and merchants were also affected by the military's indifference to their plight. Their overt displays of loyalty designed to carry favour with the military authorities in many cases failed to elicit the concessions needed for survival and alienated them from their fellow inhabitants. The boycotting of loyalist shopkeepers was a common occurrence during

⁶⁹⁸ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from HJ Hanson, no. 194/1902, 14 February 1902.

⁶⁹⁹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from J Crous, no. 1014/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from WL Lombaard, no. 1015/116/1902, 19 February 1902; (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from C Lombaard, no. 1013/116/1902, 19 February 1902.

⁷⁰⁰ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Letter from MJ Geldenhuys, no. 1006/1903, 18 September 1903.

⁷⁰¹ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/46: Claim by JH Lombaard, no. 115/1902, 24 October 1902.

the war, and many disgruntled citizens often displayed their dissatisfaction by opting to acquire their supplies from the centralised military distribution points instead of local merchants.⁷⁰² In Heidelberg this had also been the case, when farmers opted to buy liquor from native locations rather than support loyalist shop owners.⁷⁰³

In September 1902, a series of incidents involving shop breaking of loyalist stores occurred in Heidelberg. The stores of Henry Jones Hanson, HM Du Preez and Thomas Varkevisser were broken into and vandalised without any inventory being stolen. The owners complained about the lack of police presence in town since the withdrawal of the military and made numerous requests to increase the size of the police force.⁷⁰⁴ An inspection report on the police station in May 1902, indicated that only one foot constable and two mounted troopers, responsible for safeguarding the town, were stationed at Heidelberg. Despite recommendations by the commandant for an increase in the size of the permanent police force, requests for additional appointments were denied.⁷⁰⁵ In October 1902, a report emerged regarding the suspicious death of storekeeper William Johnson's horses. Johnson and his brother John Egleson, who served in the Town Guard, operated a general store in Heidelberg. Upon investigation, it was discovered that Johnson's horses had been poisoned. Two of the horses that died had been from the remount camp at Worcester and temporarily under Johnson's care.⁷⁰⁶ The motives behind the poisoning are debatable, as Johnson also had a reputation for dishonesty and cruelty towards Coloured townspeople.⁷⁰⁷

The Dutch Reformed Church in Heidelberg, as was the case in many other towns in the Cape, tried to resolve community grudges by appealing for reconciliation. The church, like the monarchy, was regarded as above the fray and served as a unifying element to restore the relationships which the war had fractured.⁷⁰⁸ Despite its public appeals for reconciliation, it appears that the church in

⁷⁰² J. Snyman: *Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902*, p. 108.

⁷⁰³ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/13: Complaints by H Du Preez and C Hirschmann regarding martial law, no. 468/1902 & no. 467/1902, 1 May 1902.

⁷⁰⁴ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace WF Rogers on incidents of shop breaking, no. 874/1902, 19 September 1902.

⁷⁰⁵ (KAB) AG 1013: Inspector's report on police in district of Swellendam, no. 68/1902, 12 May 1902.

⁷⁰⁶ (KAB) 1/SWM 11/42: Report by special justice of the peace on the death W Johnson's horses, no. 950/1902, 9 October 1902.

⁷⁰⁷ (KAB) 1/HDB 1/1/1/1: Johnson was involved in an altercation with a coloured man named Petrus Roberts in February 1902 regarding the sale of a rotten watermelon. Johnson assaulted Roberts by tearing his shirt and kicking him out of the store. Johnson vs Roberts, no. 115/1901, 4 February 1901.

⁷⁰⁸ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 251.

Heidelberg may have engaged in subtle forms of retribution against the loyalist element of the community. The invasions of the privacy of church council meetings, and the strong undercurrent of sympathy with family members in the republics, may have inspired the church to use its position as social gatekeeper to punish certain individuals exempt from persecution through legal channels. In a church council meeting held on 24 March 1902, it was decided that Costly White, the issuer of passes and permits, be spoken to about the roof of his barn which occasionally spilled rainwater onto church grounds.⁷⁰⁹ Although speculative, the trivial nature of such a grievance may point towards a subtle reprisal. Under martial law, White probably yielded great power by determining the access to movement and supplies, a reality which undoubtedly bred resentment in the community. In July 1902, Thomas Henry Miller and his wife were expelled from the church after a dispute involving the daughter of a fellow parishioner. References to the incident are sketchy and oblique, but according to the minutes of the church council, a young lady named Kitty Swart had publicly insulted Miller regarding his role in the enforcement of martial law while he had been in the employ of the municipal police.

After a lengthy polemic, the council informed Miller that the lady's parents had been spoken to and that the matter was regarded as closed. Miller remained indignant and insisted that his name, along with his wife's, be removed from the church roll. In response, the council expelled them both.⁷¹⁰ Only after an examination of the civil court cases preceding the war, does the full picture come to light. Apparently, Miller and Swart had been engaged to get married prior to war, but Miller broke off the engagement during the course of 1899. Swart then filed suit against Miller for damages in the range of £20 which had resulted from the breaking of the engagement. The court found in her favour and Miller was ordered to pay £5 in restitution.⁷¹¹ In February 1900, Swart again filed for restitution against Miller, who was forced to pay 5 shillings a month until the remaining £12 was paid off.⁷¹² Clearly, the history of animosity between both parties had contributed significantly to the incident and highlights the manner in which a war climate can amplify and exacerbate existing conflicts.

⁷⁰⁹ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 24 March 1902.

⁷¹⁰ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 12 July 1902.

⁷¹¹ (KAB) 1/SWM A/2/2/2: Catharina Swart vs Thomas Miller, no. 10, 25 September 1899.

⁷¹² (KAB) 1/SWM A/2/2/2: Catharina Swart vs Thomas Miller, no. 3, 14 February 1900.

The incident is notable for a variety of reasons. Given his disagreeable experience enforcing martial law and eventual resignation from the municipal police, the incident could indicate that Miller's conduct had been offensive to some. Miller's father, Richard Petrus Cornelis (Dick) Miller, had been the other appointee to issue passes and permits, but was never a member of the DRC.⁷¹³ Thomas Miller's connection to the DRC came through his Afrikaner wife, Susanna Wilhelmina Nothnagel. In his original application to the municipal police, Miller stated his ethnicity as being "*Scotch Africander*", undoubtedly in reference to his marriage.⁷¹⁴ Miller and his wife's expulsion may have been a punishment for his wife's perceived betrayal, punishment for his conduct while enforcing martial law, or even indirect retribution against his father. No record regarding the incident with Ms Kitty Swart could be found in the proceedings of the military courts. Although such an incident would clearly have been regarded as sedition under martial law, it was quite common for women to be spared the full intensity of prosecution during the war. The products of patriarchy and social isolation, Afrikaner women were often the most fervent and outspoken anti-British agitators during the conflict.⁷¹⁵

In a similar fashion, Willem Lodewyk Lombaard and his wife were placed under censorship and eventually expelled from the congregation in March 1903. The exact reasons for their expulsion were omitted from church council records, but mention is made of an "impertinent" letter sent to the council by Lombaard regarding matters during the war.⁷¹⁶ Lombaard had served in the municipal police, Town Guard, and DMT, despite having two brothers in the OFS who fought against the British. These incidents may point to a degree of discrimination against those members of the Heidelberg community who openly assisted the British war effort, and who may have abused the power temporarily allotted to them. Alternatively, it may also indicate the presence of subtle Afrikaner identity and reactions towards its perceived betrayal.

Taken at face value, the actions of the church may seem like petty attempts of retribution directed at a certain section of the community. Although there may have been some component of score-settling to church actions after the war, the more likely reasons behind such decisions can be ascertained when studying the minutes of

⁷¹³ H. Hopkins: *Eupees gedenboek van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk Heidelberg (Kaapland) 1855-1955*, pp. 176-180.

⁷¹⁴ (KAB) AG 754: Employment application of TH Miller, no. 47/1900, 1 May 1900.

⁷¹⁵ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 232.

⁷¹⁶ (DRCA) GEM-K 596: The minute entry written in Dutch refers to a "parmantige brief". Minutes of Heidelberg church council meeting, 21 March 1903.

meetings held by the Ring of Swellendam after the war. During mid-October of 1902, the Ring assembled at Heidelberg for a series of meetings to discuss the state of the church in light of the effects of the war. The main point of contention during the meetings was the adverse effects of martial law. At the first sitting, mention was made of the large degree of moral and religious degradation which had resulted from denying the community regular access to the church and its facilities.⁷¹⁷ During the final meeting, reports by church elders about the effects of martial law on the community were discussed. The clergy present declared that the application of martial law had amounted to a test of community faith, which in most cases did not result in a good outcome. Those present recounted tales of vanity, worldliness, lack of empathy and snobbishness. As martial law had regulated the sale of alcohol to twice a week, including on Sundays, the resulting misuse of alcohol and disrespect for church authority led to lengthy discussions over the institution of church censorship (tucht), degeneration of moral fibre, and the desecration of the holy Sunday. Throughout the meetings, the common theme seemed to be about the church's loss of authority over its parishioners and its reduced role in the community in the aftermath of the upheavals of martial law. The disciplinary actions and acts of retribution could very well have been the result of an institution deeply concerned about losing its authority and standing within what appeared to be a changed society. Although the loss of power may have been its primary concern, the DRC may very well have become partially politicised and more ethnically aware as result of the war. In its final meeting, the Ring discussed the disrespect shown towards Dutch language rights and vowed to write to the Inspector General of Education and the parliamentary commission on education regarding the importance of protecting Dutch in schools.⁷¹⁸

5.4) Long-term schisms and community trends

Examination of the long term effects of the war on the people of Heidelberg reveals very little beyond the immediate period following the conclusion of the war. The absence of notable incidents and references to the war in this period is quite commonplace. Shearing refers to the aftermath of the war as the Cold War period,

⁷¹⁷ (DRCA) KR 44 R2/10 A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, 13 October 1902.

⁷¹⁸ (DRCA) KR 44 R2/10 A: Minutes of the Ring of Swellendam, 15 October 1902.

when resentment remained subdued while Afrikaners had not yet acquired the means to mobilise politically and economically.⁷¹⁹ Although Afrikaner ethnic and cultural nationalism had not yet awakened, its maturation was inadvertently encouraged by the hostile and gloating pro-British press. Assaults on the Dutch and Afrikaans languages were already commonplace in prominent newspapers, but in the period immediately following the war, even local newspapers adopted a more divisive tone.⁷²⁰ In a September issue of the regional newspaper, *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, reference is made to “backward Dutchmen” who were deemed as having been ignorant of the inevitability of British victory.⁷²¹

Efforts were also made to anglicise and urbanise Afrikaner communities during the post-war period. Afrikaner farmers were urged to abandon their agrarian lifestyle in favour of skilled and educated professions.⁷²² In Heidelberg, the drive towards anglicisation appeared to fail, and the already small English section of the community were completely Afrikanerized in the decades following the war. Enrolments in the English school administered by the Independent Church continued to decline throughout 1902, and the school eventually closed in 1906.⁷²³ The old DRC-supervised school would eventually be transformed into a dual medium government school in 1912.⁷²⁴ In general, the drive towards anglicisation failed, even in areas with large English populations, like the Western Cape. English immigration to South Africa was insignificant and could not counter the Afrikanerisation in rural areas.⁷²⁵ This trend was also a feature of the effects of imperialism, which had a tendency to enhance and reaffirm regional identity.⁷²⁶

An interesting long term effect of the war is revealed when scrutinising the archives of the Standard Bank which refer to Heidelberg and the surrounding area in the years after the war. According to the Inspection Reports for the branches of Heidelberg, Swellendam and Riversdale, the extension of the railway did not meet

⁷¹⁹ H. Shearing: *The Cape Rebel of the South African War, 1899-1902*, p. 266.

⁷²⁰ P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 245.

⁷²¹ *The South Western Echo and Riversdale Advertiser*, 9 September 1902, p. 2.

⁷²² P. Burger: *Die invloed van die Anglo-Boereoorlog op die siviele bevolking van die distrik Oudtshoorn*, p. 247.

⁷²³ (KAB) SGE 2/110: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 1740, 25 September 1902;

(KAB) SGE 2/186: Inspector's report for district of Swellendam, no. 1892, 17 October 1906.

⁷²⁴ (SBA) INSP 1/1/223: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Heidelberg Branch, 30 November 1911, pp. 11-12.

⁷²⁵ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalty in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, p. 648.

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

expectations regarding the economic rejuvenation of the area. The Heidelberg section of the line was completed in September 1902, only reaching Riversdale in September of 1903.⁷²⁷ Yet, railway transport costs were still too high for farmers to take advantage of the link, and although farmers were making abundant profits from selling their stock to buyers from Mossel Bay, George and Knysna, most opted to retain their profits in the form of cash instead of investing it with the bank.⁷²⁸ The Swellendam branch reported a 12 year period of difficulty in making a profit from farmers uninterested in investment, and suggested that lingering animosity over the war may have been to blame.⁷²⁹ Initial reports suggested the reason for local apprehensiveness was the result of the collapse of the Barry trading empire 17 years prior to the war, as well as some residual ill-feeling towards British institutions after the war.⁷³⁰ Reports from Riversdale indicated a marked drop in investment, which was decried as owing to the lack of education and backwardness on behalf of local Afrikaner farmers.⁷³¹

Given the fact that the movement restrictions and incidents of bribery under martial law prompted many local clients to withdraw large sums of cash from their accounts, goes a long way in explaining the drops in fixed deposits and loans, as well as accounting for the animosity towards British institutions.⁷³² Already during the period of heightened anxiety in the latter half of 1901, when the application of martial law was at its most severe, Standard Bank management was expressing concern over the long term impact of the practice on community relations.⁷³³

The decline in business relations between the Standard Bank and local Afrikaners is a very subtle yet profound indication of how the war had impacted on community relations and prompted the formation of ethnic identity. Throughout the post-war period, the Riversdale branch repeatedly inquired into the feasibility of opening a branch at Heidelberg. In all instances, reports indicated that local feeling

⁷²⁷ (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 9 September 1902, p. 11; (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Riversdale Branch, 10 September 1903, p. 13.

⁷²⁸ (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Riversdale, 15 December 1904, pp. 11-12.

⁷²⁹ (SBA) INSP 1/1/276: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Swellendam, 15 December 1904, pp. 11-16.

⁷³⁰ (SBA) INSP 1/1/276: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Swellendam, 27 January 1908, p. 13.

⁷³¹ (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Generally, Inspection report for Riversdale, 9 September 1902, p. 11.

⁷³² (SBA) INSP 1/1/167: Fixed Deposits and Advances Generally, Inspection Report for Swellendam, 21 September 1901, pp. 3, 7.

⁷³³ (SBA) GMO 3/1/38: Secretary of Standard Bank letter to London Office, 27 August 1901, p. 288.

was still against the institution and that the inhabitants preferred to do business with local money lenders.⁷³⁴ Standard Bank had to wait until 1911 to open a branch in Heidelberg, as the town had not exhibited significant expansion after the completion of the railway and the prospects for a branch seemed unfeasible for a very long time. Even though farm prices were high, and farmers did exceptionally well, many remained disinclined to do business with the bank.⁷³⁵

Another curious feature of the war's impact on the community of Heidelberg comes to light when reviewing the death notes of its most prominent Anglo-Afrikaner loyalists. Most of those who had prominently displayed their loyalty, moved away from Heidelberg in the years following the war. Willem Lodewyk Lombaard, the mayor James Munnik, council secretary James Du Preez, the Johnson brothers, Thomas Henry Miller, and Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, all moved to the southern suburbs of Cape Town to live out the remainder of their days.⁷³⁶ Curiously, potentially controversial figures like Henry Jones Hanson and John Alfred Fiveash, remained at Heidelberg for the rest of their lives.⁷³⁷ Like Henry Biggs and Albert White, they had become town institutions despite their British heritage. Undoubtedly, Hanson's generosity towards the townsfolk in the years after the war had played a part in his acceptance, but his and Fiveash's acceptance probably stemmed from their foreignness and status as newcomers.

It can be speculated that the people of Heidelberg reserved the bulk of their condemnation for those whom had committed the worst betrayals in the eyes of the community, and subsequently felt compelled to leave town after the war. This phenomenon tends to predate and to reflect later patterns of settlement, in which urban English and Afrikaans communities increasingly lived apart. The schism of the war and mutual distrust resulted in their congregating in different suburbs, while their

⁷³⁴ (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Riversdale, 15 December 1904, p. 12; (SBA) INSP 1/1/266: Branch Prospects, Inspection Report for Riversdale, 22 December 1906, p. 13.

⁷³⁵ (SBA) INSP 1/1/223: Branch Generally, Inspection Report for Heidelberg Branch, 30 November 1911, pp. 11-12.

⁷³⁶ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/4205: Death notice of Willem Lodewyk Lombaard, no. 36368, 21 December 1933; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/17885: Death notice of Jacobus Adam Willem Munnik, no. 138/51, 19 December 1950; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/23606: Death notice of Jacobus Du Preez, no. 2288/55, 18 April 1955; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/9903: Death notice of John Egleson Johnson, no. 84618, 3 March 1943; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/19749: Death notice of Thomas Henry Miller, no. 3169/52, 11 June 1952; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/1107: Death notice of Willem Jacobus Nothnagel, no. 1591, 12 May 1918.

⁷³⁷ (KAB) MOOC 6/9/2887: Death notice of Henry Jones Hanson, no. 9784, 22 October 1925; (KAB) MOOC 6/9/4156: Death notice of John Alfred Fiveash, no. 43849, 26 August 1933.

children attended different schools.⁷³⁸ Yet, despite the crisis in identity which the war created, Cape Afrikaner identity remained very much the product of local and regional historical experience. The people of the Cape's provincial and colonial sensibilities still outweighed any real sense of ethnic solidarity, although the war had done much to change this on a subconscious level.⁷³⁹

The South African War was a turning point in Anglo-Afrikaner relations. Although manifestations of cultural alienation were in most cases negligible and synthetic, the lack of compensation for losses under martial law, and the absence of reward for loyalty, resulted in a loss of control over the term "loyal" when the country was left to its own devices in the decades after the war. Following the failure of anglicisation during reconstruction and the eventual transformation of empire into commonwealth, Afrikaners seized control of the term and turned it into an epithet.⁷⁴⁰ The Jameson Raid, martial law, and disenfranchisement had increased the rift between English and Afrikaans communities in the Cape, but the split was only solidified during the three decades following the war when exclusive Afrikaner Nationalism had been made possible by the ethnic mobilisation drive of the twenties and thirties.⁷⁴¹ However, when considering the following remark made by the General Manager of Standard Bank on the impact of the war in the Cape with the gift of hindsight, it appears quite prescient regarding a feature of Afrikaner Nationalism:

*"The High Commissioner is of opinion that there will be more trouble in the Cape Colony after the war, than in any other part of South Africa, and the information we glean from various sources has led us to the same conclusion."*⁷⁴²

The ultimate irony of the South African War relating to issues of identity and allegiance in the Cape was realised with Act of Union in 1910. The new South Africanism as espoused by Botha and Smuts, was based on the type of colonial nationalism present at the Cape prior to the war. Colonial nationalism replaced

⁷³⁸ H. Giliomee: *The Afrikaners: biography of a people*, p. 294.

⁷³⁹ M. Tamarkin: *Milner, the Cape Afrikaners, and the outbreak of the South African war: From a point of return to a dead end*, p. 405.

⁷⁴⁰ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalty in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, pp. 640-641.

⁷⁴¹ H. Giliomee: *Western Cape Farmers and the Beginnings of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1870-1915*, pp. 59, 60.

⁷⁴² (SBA) GMO 3/1/39: The Situation, General Manager's Office Letters to London, 30 April 1902, p. 356.

imperialism to become the dominant South African ideology until at least the 1930s.⁷⁴³ Its dominance was only made possible by the league of administrators responsible for overseeing the reconstruction of South Africa after the war. Known as Milner's Kindergarten, their experiences in South Africa led to a reinterpretation of the imperial model that abandoned ideas of hegemony and made it possible for South Africa to become an independent nation.⁷⁴⁴

Ultimately, the future drive of Afrikaner Nationalism was undertaken by the generation which had come of age during and after the South African War. Nurtured by tales of wartime British oppression and absorbed into the *kultuurpolitiek* that followed in the years after the war, this new generation became the carriers of the war's legacy. Even in Heidelberg, where ethnic identity and allegiance had always been in a state of fluidity, the new nationalism would eventually rear its head. In a newspaper article detailing the events of the war in Heidelberg, the grandson of Andries Odendaal, the farmer who was imprisoned after the TVK occupied his farm, recalled how the injustice to his grandfather had led to him joining the *Ossewabrandwag* during the 1930s.⁷⁴⁵ Similarly, the son of Hans Jacob Gildenhuys, whose horses had been commandeered by the British military, became the regional commander of the *Ossewae Brandwag* during the Second World War.⁷⁴⁶

Yet, despite the seemingly inevitability of these developments, reconciliation rooted in the better angels of human nature still seemed possible, and offers an antidote to the foregone conclusion that paints the war as an indefatigable catalyst for ethnic exclusion. In July 1906, William Osmond, lockup keeper at Heidelberg, wrote a letter to Reverend AJ Van Wijk, thanking him for his service to the community during the war. Osmond remarks how the war had created many regrettable incidents and unwanted hostility in the community, but concluded with his belief that the ties of friendship and magnanimity of community leaders like Van Wijk had helped to keep Heidelberg intact.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴³ A. Thompson: *The Languages of Loyalism in South Africa, c. 1870-1939*, pp. 644-645.

⁷⁴⁴ G. Cuthbertson & A. Jeeves: *The Many-sided Struggle for Southern Africa, 1899-1902*, pp. 3, 15.

⁷⁴⁵ "Heidelberg se Rebel Bellingan uit stoere Boere geslag," supplement to *Die Burger*, 11 July 1998.

⁷⁴⁶ M. Rothmann: *My beskeie deel: 'n outobiografiese vertelling*, p. 150.

⁷⁴⁷ (DRCA) K-DIV 1424: Letter from W Osmond, 6 July 1906.

Conclusion

The South African War is widely acknowledged to have had a significant impact on altering the course of South African development. Although the antecedents of Afrikaner Nationalism are regularly identified and debated, the war has come to be accepted as an influential event in the creation of Afrikaner ethnic solidarity and cultural identity. Yet, historiographic consensus holds that the war's immediate aftermath was less instrumental in establishing Afrikaner cultural consciousness and identity than the cultural mobilisation drive of the twenties and the issue over participation in the First and Second World Wars. That said, the memory of the South African War was employed to further the nationalist agenda in the first half of the twentieth century. Emphasis was placed on the bitterness regarding the British scorched earth policy and the deaths of Afrikaner women and children in concentration camps. Internal division and regional deviations in allegiance were glossed over in the drive for cultural solidarity, and the memory of the war as it was experienced in the former Boer Republics was extended to a national level. The role of the Cape Colony in the war was omitted in order to promote a unitary version of the past that complied with the myths of Afrikaner Nationalism. Although acceptance of this version was facilitated by the passing of time and a more susceptible, younger generation, its adoption by Cape Afrikaners seems perplexing, considering the historical development of the Cape Colony.

A century of British rule had created complexities in the allegiance of Cape Afrikaners. While allowing the Cape Dutch to retain many of their existing freedoms, British paternalism had infused the Cape with new rights and privileges, resulting in the emergence of a hybrid culture. Cape Afrikaners shared the British affinity for the monarchy and prized their rights as British citizens, but remained culturally distinct from the British. Despite these complexities, the Afrikaner intelligentsia in the Cape Colony came to determine the course of the Nationalist agenda in the decades following the war. Understanding how the war impacted on Cape Afrikaner identity is, therefore, vital in accounting for this discrepancy. The significance of the war's impact on the Cape Colony and its subsequent consequences for South Africa, have received relatively scant coverage and, while indispensable, the majority of studies are limited to the periods preceding and following the war. Only a handful of studies on the war in the Cape exist, and very few attempt to address the issue at hand. General

works on the South Africa War tend to rely on the republican experience of war to account for the formation of cultural consciousness and ethnic solidarity. Blanket explanations tend to be vague, and fail to identify the significance of the war's impact on the Cape. A need exists for a more detailed and comprehensive synthesis that accounts for historical and regional contexts vital to understanding the impact of the war and its consequences for the subsequent development of South Africa.

This thesis has attempted to bridge the divide by using the case study of Heidelberg to illustrate the complexities in allegiance among Cape Afrikaners, and how the war challenged their hybrid identities to create the cultural consciousness and ethnic solidarity vital to the emergence of Afrikaner Nationalism. Investigation into the history of Heidelberg revealed that the town's origins and cultural composition conformed to general patterns of development in the Cape Colony during the nineteenth century. The rural community, composed mainly of Dutch/Afrikaner farmers who had benefited from the economic opportunities and infrastructure of British rule, was centred around the large Dutch Reformed Church congregation. Contact with English merchants and access to new markets, had created a landed gentry as well as strengthening the status of wealthy remnants from the Company period. Dutch ranks and offices like field cornets, were retained and invested with enhanced power under British rule. For the wealthy farmers responsible for the establishment of the new congregation and town, the church provided them with the opportunity for social distinction, as well as a means of investment. The new social stratification at the Cape was the result of an amalgamation of the old Dutch rankings and the Victorian class system. The wealthiest Afrikaner farmers moved into the traditionally British urban sphere, and started to anglicise as a result of intermarriage, access to education and the desire for social distinction. As Heidelberg contained only a small British component, anglicised Afrikaners dominated the urban sphere and were responsible for the progressive attempts at modernising the town at the turn of the century.

At the start of the war, cultural identity at the Cape was fragmentary and complex, composed of varying allegiances which seemed to contradict one another. Cape Afrikaners had no appetite for war nor republicanism and enjoyed their benefits as British subjects, but condoned the war due to extensive family ties with the republics. The war challenged the hybrid cultural identity of Cape Afrikaners, by compelling them to participate or to display their support for a war against the ZAR

and OFS. In Heidelberg, displays of loyalty manifested themselves mainly through service in the Town Guard, mounted units and local police force. For the urbanised Anglo-Afrikaners, enrolment in these units may have been an expression of their progressiveness and Anglo credentials. For first generation British inhabitants, displays of loyalty may have seemed a natural expression of their heritage. Despite ideological leanings, tangible displays of loyalty during the war may have been inspired by other factors. Store owners and merchants may have used enrolment as a calculated display of loyalty to elicit special concessions while subject to martial law. To others who had already served in some law enforcement capacity, service in these units came as a natural extension. Genealogical records also revealed family patterns of involvement in law enforcement at Heidelberg. Economic motivations may also have inspired participation. The war effectively killed off the local artisan economy by commandeering horses and banning possession of horseshoes, harnesses and nails. Employment records of those involved in law enforcement reveal that most had been artisans prior to the war, while others were impoverished farmers living in close proximity to town. These findings seem to confirm Thompson's studies on regional patterns of loyalty, and identify the need for a better understanding of the motivations behind displays of loyalty during the war.

At the centre of the community lay the DRC, which had become an influential component in Cape Afrikaner identity since the introduction of British rule. Under British governance, Dutch Reformed churches proliferated and the lack of interference from the government in church affairs informed a deference to authority that was passed onto Afrikaner congregations. The evangelical revivals in the latter half of the nineteenth century, to which Heidelberg congregations bared witness on several occasions, also inspired a conservative sense of obedience to authority. While the DRC refrained from involvement in the politics of the war, it did declare the conflict as immoral and opted to show support for the republics by way of donations and relief missions. At Heidelberg, the DRC minister became increasingly concerned over the plight of the republics and eventually applied for leave to do relief work in the OFS.

Like the church, loyalty to the British monarchy formed an essential part of Cape Afrikaner identity during the war. Most regarded the monarchy as removed from the war and a symbol of incorruptibility as opposed to the capitalist agitators and oppressive imperial politicians. As such, the Duke and Duchess of Kent and

Cornwall, received a warm welcome at the Cape during their visit in 1901. Heidelberg's Municipal Council applied to send a welcoming delegation but was denied access due to the outbreak of plague in the rural areas of the Cape Colony. Similar affection was displayed on the death of Queen Victoria at the start of 1901.

Allegiances among Cape Afrikaners were further complicated by their ties with the Boer Republics. In the case of Heidelberg, these ties were much more concrete than the superficial statements which studies on the war tend to make about shared language and religion between Afrikaners in the Cape and the republics. Genealogical records indicated that the community of Heidelberg had extensive family connections in the OFS. Concerns over family members involved in the war inspired sympathy and complicated allegiance. Even individuals in the Town Guard and law enforcement had family members in the republics fighting on the Boer side. Further complications resulted from the presence of large numbers of POWs and exiles from the republics. In the early stages of the war, before the intensification of martial law, troublesome individuals and prisoners on parole were sent to live with families at the Cape. Undoubtedly, their presence transformed the distant and abstract war into a reality for many at Heidelberg. Although official documentation regarding the practice is limited, its effects on the sympathy and allegiance of Cape Afrikaners definitely warrants further investigation. Like the majority of towns in the Cape, notable incidents based on sympathy for the republics that resulted in hostility towards authority at Heidelberg were limited and subtle. Most incidents were prosecuted under civil law and revealed how community members went to lengths to protect one another from military prosecution despite their differences regarding the war.

The primary challenge to Cape Afrikaner identity manifested itself through the application of martial law. Imperial-minded politicians like Milner disliked the complexities in Cape society and settled to resolve them by installing British hegemony. The military authorities responsible for the administration of martial law were unfamiliar and impatient with the complexities in allegiance at the Cape. Many distrusted Afrikaners, and became frustrated as a result of the disagreements between the military command and the Cape government regarding the application of martial law. Frustration filtered down to the local level and exacerbated the arbitrary way in which martial law was enforced. At the heart of the clash between authorities and Cape Afrikaners, were two very different interpretations of loyalty. To Afrikaners, the

military and politicians seemed to espouse a completely foreign notion of British citizenship. To the British, Afrikaners seemed blatantly disloyal by sympathising with the republics and refusing to participate in the defence of the Colony. The situation was compounded by the military's lack of experience in the use of martial law over a large European population. Heidelberg earned the ire and disfavour of the regional British military commander, whose exposure to British military culture and impatience with local customs, resulted in a lack of trust in local officials and law enforcement. In Heidelberg, the local justice of the peace was not granted the authority to issue the community with the passes and permits needed under martial law, and the local jail could not be used for the incarceration of martial law offenders.

The situation was aggravated by a further number of factors. Heidelberg's history of isolation and administrative uncertainty meant that the local inhabitants had grown accustomed to a degree of autonomy that was incompatible with the demands of martial law. The age and familiarity of local civil commissioners with the community eroded their trustworthiness in the eyes of the military. The presence of military intelligence agents inclined towards exaggeration prejudiced the already skittish authorities towards the community. Enforcing martial law was unpopular with local law enforcement, and this reluctance had effectively discredited the local policing units in the eyes of the military. The appointment of a commandant with criminal tendencies also severely hampered the trust of the local community.

Under martial law, the rights and privileges which Cape Afrikaners had grown accustomed to under British rule were effectively nullified and they felt increasingly singled out for persecution. Martial law threatened the constitutional rights, property, livelihoods, language and social power base of rural Afrikaners in the Cape. In Heidelberg, where the majority of inhabitants were farmers, the expropriation of tools, firearms, food supplies and animals by the military threatened the livelihoods of farmers and violated their basic rights as British citizens. As farmers in Heidelberg relied heavily on draught animals for farming, the military practice of commandeering horses was especially unpopular and disruptive. The Dutch language came under fire during the war, and at Heidelberg, the Municipal Council was admonished for failing to publish the town's regulations in English. Integral to the economic security of Cape farmers was access and control over farm labour. The war lured many Coloured farm labourers to abscond from their duties by providing them with opportunities for better pay and dignity in service of the British military. Heidelberg was no exception, and

the magistrate's files are filled with cases of labourers absconding from the employ of farmers.

The creation of the CDF to protect the Cape from external and internal threats often resulted in clashes between the old and new forms of authority. The war intensified existing tensions in communities and volunteers often abused their new found authority to settle grudges and upend the social hierarchy. In the case of Heidelberg, the authority and social status of field cornets were challenged by individuals in mounted units like the DMP and DMT. While most field cornets were loyal and provided intelligence reports to authorities, many resigned due to the distrust by the military and the assault on their authority by those of a lower social standing. The role of class conflict in the enforcement of martial law and its influence on the formation of Afrikaner ethnic solidarity in the Cape Colony is an unexplored dimension of the war that warrants further investigation, especially in light of the rapidly deteriorating archival material of the Colonial Defence Force.

The military takeover of the courts in April 1901, effectively suspended the power of civil authorities, and combined with arbitrary application of martial law, made a mockery of the British ultimatum regarding the Uitlander franchise. In Heidelberg, the civil courts were closed for 6 months, and members of the community were entrapped and prosecuted for martial law violations by over-zealous members of law enforcement. Despite the total assault to which martial law had exposed them, community response was muted. Yet, martial law was probably the most influential factor in altering allegiances and fostering cultural consciousness and solidarity among Cape Afrikaners. The administration and enforcement of martial law challenged not only the entrenched rights and hierarchies of Cape Afrikaners, but also threatened to resolve the complexities which characterised the hybrid cultural identity which had existed prior to the war.

The story of Heidelberg diverged from the general trend in the Cape when it was attacked by Boer commandos on 13 September 1901. The ferocity of the battle and the violent death of the young rebel in town, changed the war from a distant conflict into a local reality, and put a face on a hitherto faceless and abstract enemy/brother. The damage inflicted on private property and demands posed by invading commandos during this period was not unlike the challenge to the rights of local inhabitants under martial law. The assaults on property and bodily harm inflicted upon residents of the community affronted the local population and severely

dampened sympathies for the republics and mitigated some of the dissatisfaction regarding local law enforcement. Yet, the reprisals against the local population by military authorities following the battle probably left the issue unresolved.

The end of the war resulted in the withdrawal of the military and the reinstatement of civilian authority. The abrupt departure of the military created a power vacuum in the Cape and dismantled the power base and credibility of loyalists. Many feared reprisals from their fellow countrymen and resented the lack of reward for their wartime service. At Heidelberg, loyalist elements of the community struggled to recoup the losses incurred in support of the military preceding and following the battle. As financial restitution was the purview of civil authorities and the Martial Law Board, many loyalist appeals to the military for assistance went unanswered. At Heidelberg loyalist losses were exacerbated by flood damages resulting from heavy rains. Despite numerous appeals for help, military authorities did not intervene.

In general, pre-war circumstances at the Cape were restored after the military withdrawal, and acts of retribution were minimal in comparison with the former republics. Although the bonds of friendship, mutual dependence and relief over the ending of the war did much to aid reconciliation, some minor incidents of retribution did occur at Heidelberg. Most notable were incidents involving the Dutch Reformed Church, which had generally purported to be in favour of reconciliation. The incidents highlight the importance of cultural institutions like the church for subscribing acceptable behaviour related to cultural identity. The role of the church also foreshadowed the ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners in the twenties and thirties, and their experiences in campaigning and relief work placed the clergy on the frontline of future cultural mobilisation.

An interesting anomaly at Heidelberg was the fact that reprisals were mostly aimed at anglicised Afrikaner loyalists instead of first generation British immigrants. The possibly exists that the betrayal of locals with Afrikaner heritage was considered more despicable than acts of loyalty by persons of British origin. Recently arrived people of pure British descent, like Hanson and Fiveash, were probably regarded as removed from the internal community strife and viewed in much the same way as the monarchy. The fact that reprisals were aimed mainly at local English persons and anglicised Afrikaners is indicative of the levels of tension and animosity the war created within the community, and may also account for Afrikaners' continued

affinity for the monarchy well into the twentieth century. Although reprisals were never overtly political and limited to acts of social shaming, a long term trend emerged in which the community of Heidelberg acquired a distinctly Afrikaner character that concealed its pre-war cosmopolitan nature. English and anglicised Afrikaner individuals who had supported the British war effort moved to the southern suburbs of Cape Town after the war. The phenomenon predates later trends of separation between English and Afrikaans communities resulting from the pressure and subsequent failure of anglicisation efforts during the Reconstruction period. The war in the Cape may indeed have accelerated ethnic exclusivity, although in a more complex manner than traditional narratives based on republican bitterness regarding British atrocities. Yet, for all their teleological significance, bitterness and divisions regarding the war in Heidelberg and the rest of the Cape Colony remained subdued. The effects of the war would only be realised by a new generation of culturally conscious Afrikaners in the decades that were to follow.

This work has aimed to demonstrate how the South African War as experienced by the people of the Cape had significant consequences for South African society in the first half of the twentieth century. Although not advocating a Cape-centric interpretation of the impact of the South African War, it does acknowledge the importance of the war's effects in creating the southern nationalist intelligentsia which came to determine the Afrikaner Nationalist agenda in the decades following the war. British influence in the Cape in the century prior to the war had significantly altered Dutch culture to create a complex and hybrid cultural identity among Cape Afrikaners. The war placed Cape Afrikaners in the unfavourable position of hosting an imperial war aimed against the Boer Republics. This study has illustrated the level of family interconnectedness between the Cape and the republics, and has attempted to restore complexity to the issue of allegiance by transcending synthetic divisions in its examination of the motivations behind displays of loyalty and sympathy. The introduction of an imperial interpretation of British citizenship collided with the nuanced allegiances of Cape Afrikaner identity.

Political and military authorities unfamiliar with the traditions at the Cape could not fathom its peculiarities and misconstrued them as disloyalty. To Cape Afrikaners, those representing this imperial ideology were foreign outsiders who seemed intent on cultural discrimination. This study has demonstrated how cultural incompatibility and administrative frustration created mutual distrust between

civilians and authorities, resulting in the aggravation of pre-existing tensions and the harsher application of martial law. The introduction of martial law effectively mitigated the rights and privileges of Cape inhabitants, as well as challenging their social distinctions and sources of power. As an unintended result, powerful antecedents to ethnic solidarity and cultural awareness among Cape Afrikaners were created, which held far-reaching consequences for the evolution of South African society.

This thesis has illustrated the value of local history, especially the use of micro-histories to add valuable context to documentary sources, as well as using multiple local histories to form an aggregated mosaic of national history. The first section has revealed how wartime responses were tempered by the very regional and local patterns of socio-economic and cultural development. While these developments seem to confirm wider historical developments in Cape society, a localised or regional framework for interpreting responses to the war would undoubtedly lead to new discoveries regarding the war in the Cape.

Yet, studies of the impact of the South African War in the Cape are still few and far between. Without companion pieces which could be used for comparison studies, the story of the war in the Cape could remain mired in disconnected pockets of local history or even revert back to older narratives that gloss over regional and local responses to the conflict. The impact of the war on Cape society was an important component in the development of South African society, which merits a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis. Hopefully, this study has provided some useful insight into the possible approaches available to those interested in this very rich seam of South African history.

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HOP 1295:	Dutch Reformed Church, Heidelberg.
HOP 1326:	Panoramic view of Heidelberg.
HOP 1446:	Henry Jones Hanson and Mary Hanson.

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MOOC 6/9/1107:	Death Notices.
MOOC 6/9/2219:	Death Notices.
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ADDENDUM A

Figure 1



*Commandant Jan Lombard Theron of Theron's Verkenningkorps (TVK)
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 142)*

Figure 2



Soldiers of the 4th West Yorkshire Regiment at Heidelberg. Major William Henry Mahon, second from the left in the middle row, seated behind the dog.

(Photo courtesy of Sir William Walter Mahon)


Figure 3



The Masonic Hotel as it looked during the war. The Anglican Church is just visible behind the hedge, to the right of the tree. The gunpowder magazine was located slightly behind and to the right of the hotel.

(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 2442)

Figure 4



The fortified gunpowder magazine next to the Masonic Hotel. The stains on the wall were probably the result of heavy rainfall from the previous day when the fortifications were hastily constructed. These photos are dated 13 September 1901, and were probably taken just prior to the attack, as the walls still appear free of bullet holes. Although the photographer is uncredited, they were likely taken by Gustav Christian Carl Muhsfeldt.

(Photo courtesy of Sir William Walter Mahon)


Figure 5



The gunpowder magazine from a distance. Behind it, the thatched roof of the Masonic Hotel. To the left, one of the ramparts on the corner of Hopley and Fourie streets is visible. On the right hand corner of the photograph, the roof and spires of the Dutch Reformed Church. This photo was taken from the northeastern side of town, the same direction from which the attack was launched.

(Photo courtesy of Sir William Walter Mahon)

Figure 6



Soldiers of the 4th West Yorkshire regiment and unidentified civilians of Heidelberg. Seated in the middle row, from left to right are: JL Cantrell & Henry Jones Hanson, the owner of the Masonic. (Based on photographic comparisons with figures 7 & 11). In the background, behind the hedge, Anglican Church.

(Photo courtesy of Sir William Walter Mahon)

Figure 7



An elderly Henry Jones Hanson and his wife Mary. Hanson's trademark moustache and stern deportment is clearly visible in figure 6.
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1446)

Figure 8



The Dutch Reformed Church in Heidelberg as it looked during the war. Designed by the architect Carl Otto Hager, the church was inaugurated in 1873. Due to problems with the foundations, the main spires were removed in 1907. It was eventually demolished in 1912, and a new church building was erected in 1914. The current church has recently celebrated its centenary.


(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1295)

Figure 9



*Petrus Jacobus Bellingan, the young rebel from Aberdeen. Fatally wounded during the battle in Heidelberg, he was probably the southernmost casualty of the South African War.
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1746)*

Figure 10



Panoramic view of Heidelberg from the northwest circa 1904. The DRC church and Masonic Hotel, just left of centre

(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1326)

First Row:

CJ Kemp, P Moolman, L De Jager, P Odendal, W Odendal, AJ Geldenhuis, H Du Preez, P De Jager, HJ Gildenhuis, J Van Wyk Snr

Second Row:

W Grove, C De Wit, GR Uys, R Miller, J Uys, EM Hoffmann Snr, Dirk Uys, A White, H Bosman, C Kleinhans

Third Row:

J Uys, G Odendal, D Gildenhuis, E Hoffmann, C Uys, J Uys, J Human, C De Jager, A Bosman, J Van Wyk, W Van Rensburg

Fourth Row:

James Munnik, E Batten, Rev AB Daneel, Rev A Stewart, JW Farrell, HR Du Preez, CJ Human, R Human, R Swart, James Du Preez, HM Du Preez

Fifth Row:

W Osmond, E Friedman, M Friedman, J Dickson, ET Friberg, HG Biggs, Rev Schierhout, HC Hopkins, N Friedman, S Hall, S Helm

Sixth Row:

H Uys, S Klopper, W Van Wyk, M Eksteen, J Pentz, J Johnston, D Lotz, M Uys, J Rall Snr, L Kuntz, P Uys Snr

Seventh Row:

JL Cantrell, J Moodie, S Morrison, D Moodie, C Van Der Merwe, S Hall Jnr, P Hopkins, W Swart, M Gildenhuis, J Pentz

Eighth Row (Bottom):


P Lombaard, P De Villiers, P Heiberg, S Rall, J Bunford, S Bunford, M De Jager, P Odendal, H Uys, F Badenhorst

Figure 11



Photo entitled Prominent men of Heidelberg 1900 (See previous page for list of names)
(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1495)

Figure 12



The mischievous Mr Scholtz, who seemed to cause trouble wherever he went.

(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 757 & HOP 1163)

Figure 13




Figure 14

Heidelberg croquet team on lawn in front of DRC, circa 1865. In the background are the homes of Dr Henry Biggs and Henry Charles Hopkins.

(Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 810)



Heidelberg tennis party at Swellendam. The bearded gentleman in the middle is PB Borcherds, Resident Magistrate.

Hopkins photo collection, reference HOP 1028)