

# **Explaining the Emergence of Boko Haram: State Failure and Relative Deprivation**

By

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## Abstract

For more than a decade, Boko Haram terror attacks, although not regular occurrences, have remained the greatest security threats in Nigeria, mostly in the north-east and in neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin. The group has threatened social, economic and political stability, which in turn impedes economic development. Corruption, poverty, unemployment, and inequality remain acute in Nigeria, specifically in the north-east region in which Boko Haram attacks have been dominant and recurring. The study utilises desktop research and employs state failure and relative deprivation theory as the methodology and analytical framework to help explain the emergence and the rise of Boko Haram. The study examines how inequality, corruption, unemployment, and poverty have created fertile grounds for resentment and anger in Nigeria. It also examines the ways in which these factors have made it difficult to curb the terror attacks. The connection between state failure and relative deprivation and its links to terrorism are explored by linking the theory and the empirical evidence of bad governance, poverty, unemployment and human security inequalities in north-east Nigeria. The study contends that Nigeria as a whole should not be called a failed or a failing state. However, the north-east region falls under the umbrella of failed or failing state because of available evidence of the characteristics of a failed or failing state. There the extent of poverty and underdevelopment is relatively higher than other states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The study argues that the state's response to the Boko Haram problem has been the use of a heavy-handed military approach, with severe human rights violations and limited efforts to address the main causes of the crisis. This approach is combined with an absence of non-violent conflict resolution approaches such as negotiations. Regional and continental bodies have also made use of military interventions, while there have been fewer efforts to address the root causes. On a state level, the study argues that corruption, lack of political will, poor security mechanisms, and human rights abuses have worsened the situation and have made intervention efforts less effective. The regional and continental bodies also lacked the capacity and the common will to intervene timeously to resolve the crisis. The thesis concludes by recommending that the state and all parties involved embrace a 'soft' approach that aims to address the root causes of the problem in the north-eastern region, which Boko Haram has capitalised on, in order to garner support from the disgruntled youth.

## Opsomming

Boko Haram se terreuraanvalle, alhoewel nie gereelde voorvalle nie, skep al vir meer as 'n dekade die grootste veiligheidsbedreigings in Nigerië, meestal in die noordooste en in die buurlande in die Tsjadmeer bekken. Die groep bedreig sosiale, ekonomiese en politieke stabiliteit, wat weer ekonomiese ontwikkeling belemmer. Korrupsie, armoede, werkloosheid en ongelykheid bly ernstig in Nigerië, veral in die noordoostelike streek waar die Boko Haram aanvalle hoofsaaklik en herhalend voorkom. Die studie gebruik rekenaarnavorsing en teorieë in verband met staatsmislukking en relatiewe deprivasie as die metodologie en die ontledingsraamwerk om die opkoms en uitbreiding van Boko Haram te help verklaar. Die studie ondersoek hoe ongelykheid, korrupsie, werkloosheid en armoede vrugbare gronde vir wrokkigheid en woede in Nigerië skep. Dit ondersoek ook die maniere waarop hierdie faktore dit moeilik maak om die terreuraanvalle in bedwang te bring. Die verband tussen staatsmislukking en relatiewe deprivasie, en hoe dit by terrorisme aansluit, word ondersoek deur die teorie en die empiriese bewyse van swak regering, armoede, werkloosheid en ongelykhede betreffende menslike veiligheid in die noordooste van Nigerië, met mekaar in verband te bring. Die studie voer aan dat Nigerië in sy geheel nie 'n mislukte of mislukkende staat genoem behoort te word nie. Die noordoostelike streek val egter onder die sambreel van 'n mislukte of mislukkende staat vanweë beskikbare bewyse van kenmerke van 'n mislukte of mislukkende staat. Die omvang van die armoede en onderontwikkeling is daar relatief hoër as in ander state in die Federale Republiek van Nigerië. Die studie voer verder aan dat die staat se reaksie op die Boko Haram probleem die gebruik van 'n hardhandige militaristiese benadering was, met ernstige menseregteskendings en beperkte pogings om die hoofsaake van die krisis aan te spreek. Hierdie benadering word gekombineer met 'n afwesigheid van niegewelddadige benaderings tot konflikoplossing, byvoorbeeld onderhandelings. Streeks en kontinentale liggame het ook militêre ingryping gebruik, terwyl daar minder pogings aangewend is om die grondoorsake daarvan aan te spreek. Op staatsvlak voer die studie aan dat korrupsie, 'n gebrek aan politieke wil, swak veiligheidsmeganismes en menseregteskendings die situasie vererger en pogings tot ingryping minder effektief maak. Die streeks en kontinentale liggame het ook nie die kapasiteit en die gemeenskaplike wil om betyds in te gryp om die krisis op te los nie. Die referaat sluit af deur aan te beveel dat die staat en alle betrokkenes 'n "sagte" benadering aanvaar, gemik op die oplossing van die grondoorsake van die noordoostelike streek se probleme waaruit Boko Haram munt slaan, ten einde die steun van die ontevrede jeug te bekom.

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## Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
CTJF	Civilian Joint Task Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FTC	Federal Capital Territory
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
IDP	Internally Displaced People
ISIS	Islamic States of Iraq and Syria
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
JTF	Joint Task Force
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NBS	Nigerian Bureau of Statistics
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UN	United Nations
US	United States

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*This study is dedicated to all who have fallen and those who are still falling victim to Boko Haram terror attacks in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, mostly the innocent civilians including children, women and all who have worked and are still working hard attempting to curb the crisis.*

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### **1.1 Introduction**

To this day, Boko Haram's insurgency is one of the greatest security threats in Nigeria, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region, and the African continent at large. Boko Haram is generally translated to mean 'Western education is forbidden'. However, Boko Haram has a wider meaning since 'Boko' can also be interpreted as 'Western deception'. The name was given to the insurgents by outsiders, not by the Islamist insurgency militants themselves but Nigerian authorities and the news media houses continue to call them Boko Haram (Smith, 2015:212). The rise of terrorist attacks has negatively affected the socio-political economy of Nigeria and has spilled over to neighbouring countries such as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Looking at the extent of the terror attacks, ruthlessness and killings, family disintegration and high levels of human rights violations in Nigeria, the research uses relative deprivation theory and state failure theory to critically analyse how inequality, poverty, unemployment, and corruption relate to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

This chapter provides a background and rationale for the study. It also comprises a discussion of the problem statement, research questions, the aims of the study, and the theoretical framework. After that, the research methodology, research design, limitations and delimitations of the study, as well as the means to remedy these limitations are described. The final section sets out the structure of the study by outlining the topics and spotlighting what is analysed in each chapter.

### **1.2. Background and rationale**

Nigeria is located in West Africa. According to the World Bank (2019), Nigeria's population is approximately 202 million people and has one of the largest youth populations in the world. It is a key regional player in West Africa. Nigeria is multi-ethnic, and is a culturally diverse federation which consists of 36 autonomous states and the Federal Capital Territory (FTC). Nigeria is resource abundant; it is the biggest oil exporter in Africa, with large natural gas reserves on the continent (World Bank, 2019). Nigerians are deeply religious people, both Christianity and Islam are popular, and each religion has a strong following. In 2002, an Islamic group called Boko Haram emerged under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, a radical Islamic cleric in Maiduguri, in the Borno State in North-Eastern Nigeria. The term Boko Haram is a revealing window to an ideology that derives from the organisation. It can be translated as "Western education is

forbidden”, but according to several experts, the term goes beyond simply secular schooling and means a denial of Western civilisation and institutions (United States House of Representative Committee on Homeland Security, 2013). The reasons for the formation of the group, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2014) are that they want to create a strict Islamic Caliphate in the north of Nigeria, which they believe will address poor governance and corruption. Felter (2018), argues that Nigeria’s record of corruption and inequality have contributed to the group’s rise, hence the use of state failure theory and relative deprivation theory to explain the emergence of Boko Haram.

Like many other Salafi organisations, the group believes that the full implementation of Sharia law requires a change of political regime because the democratic and secular constitution is an affront to the law of God. Initially, the group existed peacefully, with the locals being involved in some community programs, but the group later erupted into a fanatically violent terrorist movement due to mishandled responses by the government and its security apparatus (Montclos, 2014a). Bintube (2015) has argued that the group became violent when Yusuf adopted a radical approach to preaching. Preaching that was directed at attacking not only the state and its operatives but also some Islamic scholars, organisations, and groups who seemed to have compromised the teachings of Islam in relation to injustice and corruption, which was occasioned by leadership deficits in Nigeria. It appears that the Nigerian government’s aggressive response to Boko Haram resulted in the death of Yusuf in 2009, which angered the group and acted as the catalyst to the outbreak of violent attacks by Boko Haram. Pichette (2015:3) contends that Boko Haram seeks to completely displace extant law and install strict Sharia law in Nigeria, and he asserts that such a goal necessitates a complete overthrow of the state at all levels of government, making Boko Haram a threat to national security as well as the lives of endangered Nigerians.

Duke, Agbaji and Bassey, (2017) argue that various forms of deviant or unethical behaviour, malfeasance, and any illegal use of power in both public and private domains alters the ethos and conditions of legal systems and thus also government legitimacy. The International Crisis Group (2014) claimed that poverty is a product of bad governance, including bloated administration, and that corruption leads to poverty. In support of the above, Uzoh (2016:2832) contends that Nigeria is characterised by high levels of poverty, spanning from poor leadership, which breeds corruption. He asserts that Nigeria is plagued by security challenges caused by Boko Haram, which, he argues, owes to political, economic and social instability that is often caused by bad governance and absolute poverty (Uzoh, 2016).

Duke *et al.* (2017:5) also argues that corruption within Nigerian armed forces has made the fight against Boko Haram insurgency more ineffective and has led Nigeria to be characterised by the insecurity of lives and property, fear, and anxiety. This thesis seeks to determine how corruption, poverty, and inequality has resulted in the rise of Boko Haram. Brinkel and Aithida (2012) share the same view, arguing that oil revenues are not being used to invest in communities but are divided amongst the political elites. By doing so, elites have intensified the rate of unemployment, and this has made many youths desperate, so that many have opted to join the Boko Haram insurgency. Although Nigeria is rich in natural resources, most of its population lives under the most appalling conditions. In Maiduguri for instance, many of the residents survive off less than two US dollars a day (USHR, 2013). Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) further argue that 70% of the population is poor with 35% living in absolute poverty.


Duke *et al.* (2017:5) note that:

Boko Haram's fatal activities have caused dangers to the nation and its citizens by causing massive mortality and casualty rates, national disintegration, displacement of north-eastern citizens, destabilized and crippled political and economic activity and worsened insecurity and fear as well as affecting the global image.

The rationale for choosing the topic of the Boko Haram insurgency is that the group's attacks have negatively affected the economic, political, and social conditions in Nigeria. The attacks also threaten peace and stability in Nigeria and neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin. The effects of Boko Haram's attacks have been reported as among the most dangerous in the world. According to Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2019:16), Boko Haram has been ranked as the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2018 and remains the deadliest in Sub-Saharan Africa. The recurrence of the attacks indicates that there is a gap that needs to be addressed. In the first eight months of 2019, Boko Haram was responsible for about 615 combat-related deaths (GTI, 2019:16). This indicates the continued security threats caused by Boko Haram.

There is a power struggle between the Christians and the Muslims, both seeking dominance, and political conflict remains a significant factor in the ongoing unrest. Blanchard and Husted (2019) pointed out that the country has been faced with political turmoil and economic crisis since 1960 when it attained independence from the United Kingdom, and that political life has been marred by conflict along ethnic, geographic and religious lines, and that corruption and misrule has undermined the state's authority and legitimacy. According to Campbell and Harwood (2018), the Nigerian Security Tracker (NST) documented 2,021 incidents of Boko Haram activities from June

2011 to June 2018, in which 37,530 people were killed. This finding has nearly doubled the conventional cited estimates of 20,000, while during the same period the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) indicated 3,346 incidents, noting that 34,261 fatalities were accounted for (Campbell & Harwood, 2018). The extent of the fatalities induced by the Islamist insurgency has triggered a humanitarian crisis, impeded economic development and has also created a refugee crisis (Ali, Adamu & Gana, 2019:1). Because of the above, the research aims to ascertain the birth of Boko Haram and its attacks. See Figure 1.1 for some fatalities posed by the Boko Haram insurgency reported from 2011 to 2018.



**Figure 1.1 Total deaths in incidents involving Boko Haram**

(Source: Campbell & Harwood, 2018)

The reason there were fewer attacks in 2011 is because Boko Haram had been focusing on individuals and small groups, while the upsurge in 2014 has been due to the massive attack method directed to less defended targets and massacring the target population (Cook, 2014:9). Most suicidal attacks are by women. In April 2014, over 5,000 people were killed in Boko Haram-related violence, as the group used new and more deadly tactics to maximise casualties (Heim & McQuaid, 2015). There were high death rates in 2015 because the state failed to stop the 2015 bombings in the south and the Federal Territory of Abuja and because of Boko Haram's deadly

efforts to disrupt the 2015 presidential election. The counterterrorism offensive actions taken by the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) between 2015 and 2016, which saw the MNJTF reclaiming the territory from Boko Haram, has significantly weakened the group (GTI, 2019:16). There have also been more cases of “hit and run” guerrilla-style tactics and fewer instances of high-profile targets (Olojo, 2013:11).

According to UNHCR (2019:1), as of 31 January 2019 there were 2,498,927 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and north-east Nigeria due to insurgency. In addition, as of 31 January 2019, there were 232,378 thousand Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger due to insurgency (UNHCR, 2019:1). The recurrence of attacks and high levels of human rights violations show that Nigeria seems to have failed to deal with the threats of Boko Haram and its effects up to the present day. Thus, there is a need to identify current challenges being faced and possibly provide new insights. Regional responses have varied between military and non-military aspects. Combined with the devastating humanitarian crisis and the destruction that has been wrought, the situation remains dire, especially as the insurgency continues to affect parts of the Lake Chad basin region (Ani & Mahmood, 2018:23).

There has been an increase in violence in north-east Nigeria. In January 2019 Boko Haram caused more than 80,000 civilians to seek refuge in overcrowded camps or towns in Borno State, where they have been living beyond the poverty line and in difficult conditions (UNHCR, 2019). It has also been reported that about 35,000 people fled from the City of Ran to Cameroon, while seeking refuge from the Boko Haram attacks on the last weekend of January 2019 (UNHCR, 2019:1). This implies that Boko Haram remains a threat and there is a need for long-term solutions. Amnesty International (2019b) also reported that about 60 people were killed by Boko Haram attacks in Ran in January 2019. Although not as frequent as before, the continued attacks – combined with the extent of the refugee influx and the displacement of thousands of people – are of great concern. There is a need for longer term solutions and coordination to be initiated and implemented to address the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and prevent further attacks, family disintegration and human rights abuses. In this regard, the study will provide recommendations that are favourable to all parties involved, in order to mitigate the crisis and to bring peace and stability.

### **1.3. Problem statement**

The continued existence of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, although not a regular occurrence, indicate that the maintenance of peace and security in Nigeria is still at risk. Since various scholars

have argued that corruption, inequality, unemployment, and poverty are key causes of concern, the study aims to examine the rise of Boko Haram through the lens of relative deprivation theory and state failure theory. This is undertaken to ascertain how this problem has been and is being dealt with on a state level, and assess how regional organisations have reacted to mitigate the crisis.

### **1.3.1. Research question and aims of the study**

The study has one major research question followed by five supportive questions that relate to the main question. The main research question that the study addresses is:

How does state failure theory and relative deprivation theory explain the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria?

To respond to the main research question, five supportive questions are addressed:

- i. What is state failure theory and how can it explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria?
- ii. What is relative deprivation theory, and how can it explain Boko Haram's rise?
- iii. What is the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria's neighbouring countries?
- iv. How has the Boko Haram insurgency been dealt with on a state level and how have the regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) acted to mitigate the crisis?
- v. Has this regional response been effective, and, if not, what are possible alternative means of countering Boko Haram's impact?

The study aims to analyse the origins of Boko Haram and assess its expansion from a small group to becoming the most dangerous terrorist organisation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. It also aims to assess whether the actions taken by the Nigerian state and regional organisations have been effective, and, if not, to provide recommendations for possible alternatives in dealing with the recurring terror attacks.

## **1.4. Theoretical framework**

### **1.4.1. State failure**

Rotberg (2003:5) posits that failed states are characterised by tense, conflictual, dangerous, and bitter contestations between warring factions. He further indicates that officials in failed states can face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of governance

discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and groups within the state. Thus, the concept of state failure will be utilised in the study because Nigeria has many of the characteristics of a failed state. According to Rotberg (2003:9) failed states provide no safety nets, and the homeless and destitute depend on anyone who can offer food and a cause to join. It has been possible for the unemployed and the deprived to join Boko Haram because the state has failed to provide or cater to the basic needs of its citizens and the youth, whether they are educated or uneducated. As a result, it is probable that state failure has contributed significantly to insecurity and the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Howard (2014:25) posits that without the presence of government and security forces, non-state actors such as rebel groups, terrorist cells, paramilitary units, and insurgents can organise themselves in these spaces and engage in illegal activities without having to contend with the presence of a central government. In Nigeria, the state has lost control to some parts of its territory, mostly in North-east Nigeria.

For instance, Agiboa (2013b) stresses that in July 2013, Boko Haram had taken control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzama, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala- Balge and the Gamboru local government areas in northern Borno, by chasing out local government officials and imposing Sharia Law. This explains the state's failure to prevent Boko Haram's activities, a clear sign of a lack of security and the incapability of the state to act on its responsibility to provide security to its citizens from internal or external threats. There is a link between state failure and relative deprivation.

According to Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017:16), relative deprivation is a contrary feeling held by a person, which emanates from a perceived dichotomy between the deserved and actual entitlement of social provisions such as education, or political freedoms, or economic opportunities. It is a feeling of frustration emerging from the difference between what one perceives one deserves and what one actually gets. For example, one might believe he or she deserves access to education, but might not have such access. The authors argue that the failure of Nigerian leaders to enhance economic policies to secure the wellbeing and the living standard of Nigerians by creating jobs has resulted in unemployment, poverty and illiteracy among youths, which has in turn contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram (Ogbonna & Jimenez, 2017:17). Eveslage (2013:49) contends that another source of discontent which Boko Haram precipitated from is the disparity between Nigeria's resource-rich environment and the disturbingly high poverty rates caused by corruption and poor management of the country's resources. The recurrence of Boko Haram attacks and the continued human rights violations in Nigeria indicate the state's incapability to resolve the crisis.

### 1.4.2. Relative deprivation theory

To respond to the research question and to address the problem statement, relative deprivation theory and state failure theory has been used in this study. Richardson (2011:83) notes that relative deprivation as the term used to “denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes a man to violence”. This means that when people do not get what they expect to get while seeing that others have it, they get angry and frustrated. Howard (2014), argues that individual frustration about perceived deprivation fosters aggression within that person, which can then manifest itself in the form of acts of political violence such as rebellions, riots, revolutions, and terrorism. This view is supported by Utibe (2016:83), who argues that relative deprivation and or inequality, serve as basic conditions for participation in violence.

As frustration is prolonged and feelings of deprivation of what is expected increases, there is a greater probability that the individual or people resort to illegitimate activities in order to actualise their expectations (Onyepuemu, 2015:126). Onyepuemu (2015) contends further that structured inequalities within countries are the basis for violent political movements in general and specifically for terrorism. Relative deprivation theory will form the basis of understanding the factors that have promoted the emergence of Boko Haram. According to the Human Development Report (2018), the north-east region is the most deprived part of the Nigerian federation. This level of frustration and extreme poverty among youths has laid fertile grounds for Boko Haram insurgencies. Furthermore, there is a strong consensus among scholars that relative deprivation theory explains the emergence of insurgency in Nigeria (Kiikpoye, 2015:2). The above review of relative deprivation theory offers context for using the theory for this study.

Smith and Pettigrew (2015:3) show that researchers have invoked relative deprivation theory to explain phenomena including poor physical health, participation in collective protest, and proneness to terrorist recruitment. According to Pichette (2015:5), the Nigerian government has done little to resolve the issue of poverty in the north, nor has it displayed much interest in doing so, and this apparent indifference, according to relative deprivation theory, suggests that the root causes of Boko Haram activity are the poor economic conditions in Nigeria coupled with the state's failure to rectify these conditions (Pichette, 2015:5). In line with these perspectives, the study employs this theory because it appears that issues of inequality, poverty, corruption and economic imbalances in the north-eastern region of Nigeria seem to be predominant. Thus, using

a framework comprising relative deprivation theory paired with state failure theory, the study responds to the research question and its problem statement.

## **1.5. Research methodology**

A qualitative desktop study research method is utilised in this dissertation. A desktop study provides background information on Boko Haram, Nigeria, the West African region and is useful for acquiring a general overview of and relevant prior research on the group's attacks. Qualitative research offers the opportunity to investigate a given phenomenon in many ways, to obtain data that is rich and diverse, and produce results that cohere with the study's aims (Ogionwo, 2016:21). Thus, the research makes use of secondary data, critically engages scholarly works like books, journal articles, reports from various government departments such as Nigerian Bureau of Statistics and the Nigerian Security Tracker, while reports from intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations Security Council are consulted so that sufficient information on Boko Haram is gathered.

Boko Haram insurgency activities are also widely reported on in the media. Recent, up to date information on attacks was not always been published in scholarly articles. But because they are useful for this study, the researcher consulted major Nigerian Newspapers such as the Nigerian Tribune, as well as major international media broadcasts such as CNN, France24, and the BBC. Information from the Center for Security and Terrorism Studies, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and reports from credible scholarly reviews on Boko Haram's terror attacks were also utilised. The study is complex and diverse, and it required extensive use of empirical materials.

### **1.5.1. Research design**

A case study has been utilised as part of the research design in this paper. Babie (2011:6) notes that a researcher who carefully chronicles events as they occurred satisfies a descriptive purpose. Case studies are suitable for qualitative research because they focus in on phenomena. The phenomena in this study are Boko Haram insurgencies in Nigeria. This research uses a case study approach to examine the emergence and causes of Boko Haram. The research examines Boko Haram from its emergence in 2002 until the present. Rahman (2016:104) suggests that that the advantage of qualitative design is that it is interactive and iterative, in that it has a flexible structure and can be reconstructed.

Because the study is complex and diverse and there is a lot of existing literature about the phenomena, qualitative research is the best because it has the goal of generating new ways of seeing existing data and thus deriving new findings. Maiangwa (2012:7) suggests that unlike other methods, the case study method examines the relationships between variables to provide a thorough understanding of a situation and avoids biases accompanying overgeneralisations.

### **1.6. Limitations and delimitations**

The first limitation of this study is that there are many theories that explain the emergence of Boko Haram. For instance, the study employs relative deprivation and state failure theory to explain the emergence of Boko Haram. But the interpretive framework of Islamic radicalism also explains the rise of Boko Haram (Cook, 2014:6). This is a big limitation that needs to be acknowledged as it limits some significant analysis relevant to the study of Boko Haram. To override this limitation, relative deprivation and state failure theory have been utilised because their definitions are diverse and can include other factors that fall under religious fundamentalism. These two theories have been selected to present a viable explanation for the emergence of Boko Haram.

Another limitation of the study is the challenge of accessing primary data. Boko Haram's activities are violent in nature, its members are extremists, and the group denounces education, which it believes is sinful. This hinders the researcher from conducting direct interviews with the members because it poses a threat to the personal safety of the researcher. Also, the group is known for conducting raids, planting bombs, and employing suicidal attacks. Thus, the researcher did not take the risk of identifying and interviewing Boko Haram members. These limitations, including a lack of funding for travel expenses and accommodation to conduct field research are acknowledged.

However, these limitations are remedied by utilising a wide range of existing sources such as video clips, public records data, and documentaries of Boko Haram previously generated by researchers. In addition, the scope and time for completing the study is a limitation. The topic of the Boko Haram insurgency is complex and diverse in that it involves many actors who were engaged in dealing with its terror attacks. For instance, efforts made by the international community have been omitted in this study and that has to be acknowledged. However, this limitation will be remedied by the fact that the study is looking at understanding the rise of Boko Haram and responds to the research question by examining the crisis and actions taken based

on state-level analysis and the efforts made by regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU.

### **1.7. Outline of the study**

Chapter one has provided a short introduction and established the significance of the research being conducted. It introduced background information to the reader and offered a rationale for the study. The chapter introduced the problem statement, the research questions, and aims of the study. It also described, contextualised, and motivated the theoretical framework. It then described its research methodology and research design. It also identified limitations and delimitations of the study. Below, chapter one provides an outline of the whole study.

Chapter two contextualises and reviews in more detail the relevant literature about the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Chapter two reviews the literature about terrorism and explores the phenomenon of Boko Haram. It offers key concepts that are used in the study. It also indicates links between state failure and relative deprivation theory, and reviews the connection between corruption and terrorism. Further, it reviews levels of corruption, poverty, and unemployment to indicate how they relate to one another, and explain the emergence of Boko Haram.

Chapter three further defines the theoretical framework comprising state failure and relative deprivation theory. The meaning and understanding of these theoretical frameworks are used to analyse the case study of Boko Haram in chapter four. In other words, the chapter provides an in-depth analysis of these two theories and outlines their relevance for analysing the rise of Boko Haram.

Chapter four responds to the research questions by employing the theoretical framework described in chapter three. This chapter studies drivers of the conflict by using relative deprivation and state failure theory. This chapter links the theories with empirical evidence about Boko Haram's terror attacks. Through the lens of the theoretical framework elaborated on in chapter three, the chapter examines how inequality, poverty, dire economic conditions, and political imbalances created fertile grounds for resentment and anger which enabled and fostered the terror attacks in Nigeria.

Chapter five is about counter-terrorism efforts. Chapter five examines how the State has acted and is still acting to combat the violent attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram. The state's use of

offensive retaliation via military expeditions are critically engaged. Weaknesses within the Nigerian judiciary and the influence of elites on justice are also examined. After that, the chapter evaluates efforts by continental and regional organisations, specifically African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to mitigate the crisis.

Chapter six responds to the main research question and the supportive research questions. This is done to explicitly ensure that the problem statement is addressed and the main aims of the study are fulfilled. Chapter six suggests alternatives and practical actions that need to be taken and monitored regularly to counter the impact of Boko Haram. After that, the chapter summarises its key findings, and offers recommendations for further research.

## **Chapter 2: Literature review**

### **2.1. Introduction**

There is a wide range of existing literature about the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. To respond to the aims of the study, this chapter reviews the literature on the emergence of Boko Haram. In so doing, gaps within the literature are identified and new insights are developed and or integrated into the extant literature. This chapter begins by conceptualising terrorism, by discussing the notion of domestic terrorism to understand the ideological roots of the Boko Haram insurgency. After that, it discusses the evolution of Boko Haram, its leadership, recruitment, and sources of income. It then discusses the biggest events orchestrated by the group, and indicates the group's impact on neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The chapter briefly explores the theoretical framework of the study to determine the links between these relative deprivation and state failure and their relations to corruption and terrorism in Nigeria.

### **2.2. Terrorism: what is terrorism?**

As Mahathir Bin Mohammed (2003, quoted in Duruji & Oviasogie, 2013:21) has said:

The world now lives in fear, we are afraid of everything, we are afraid of flying, afraid of certain countries, afraid of Asian bearded man, afraid of shoes airline passengers wear, of letters and parcels of white powder. The countries allegedly harbouring terrorists, their people, innocent or otherwise, are afraid too.

Since September 2001, there has been panic and insecurity due to the rise of terror attacks globally. The Western world increasingly became concerned with 'failed states' in the global South, and this concern raised significant implications for African as well as international responses to armed insurgency groups on the African continent (Botha & Okumu, 2007:7). Strides made by the International community, regional organisations, and continental bodies have not always been fruitful. Oluwadare (2016:41) argues that Africa and particularly Nigeria has in the past decade been plagued by an increase in incidences of insurgencies, with high levels of the devastation to lives and property. He contends that the security situation in the Lake Chad region has not been stable since the emergence of Boko Haram (Oluwadare, 2016:41). However, for one to delve into the emergence of the Boko Haram terror attacks, it is necessary to first explore the concept of terrorism.

There is no commonly agreed definition of terrorism and the term has been defined in differentiated ways. According to Wojciechowski (2009:2), this is because the notion of terrorism is frequently applied to describe highly varied attitudes and behaviours, that range from anarchist or revolutionary acts to criminal acts. He argues, for example, that the same situation can be interpreted as an act of terrorism or a struggle for national independence, depending on one's political, religious, or ethnic views (Wojciechowski, 2009:3). For instance, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) operations, or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna actions, for some Irish or Basque nationalists, are regarded as fighters for independence, while others describe them as terrorist organisations (Wojciechowski, 2009:3).

Also, states have different views. For instance, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, hold the view that every act of violence carried out by irregular fighters against the state must be called terrorist (Brett, 2006). Elements of proposed definitions have been rejected by various nations whose interests were not served by those definitions. For instance, some nations emphasised the need to exclude freedom fighting, anticolonial uprisings, or other related violence from the definition of terrorism (Setty, 2011:9). In addition, Rababa'a (2012) argues that there is no international agreement about how terrorism should be defined because of individuals and states' discrete views, and different ideologies, and goals. The difficulty in defining terrorism is about a basis for determining when violence (directed at whom, by whom, for what ends) is legitimate; which makes definitions of terrorism inherently controversial (Simus, 2016:20).

The United Kingdom Terrorism Act (United Kingdom, 2000:1) states that terrorism is the use or threat of an action, where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use of threat is aimed to achieve a political, religious or ideological cause. The US Department of State (2001:13) defines terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine groups, which usually intend to influence an audience. Cilliers (2003:91) defines terrorism as the illegitimate use or threat of violence against individuals or property to coerce governments or societies for political objectives. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, 1999 quoted in Chinwokwu, 2013:268) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment, to further a political or social objective. While a commonality of these definitions is that terrorism involves the use of violence for a political or social objective, according to Howard (2014:10), violence against a regime in and of itself does not represent terrorism. For instance, the USA's Western allies were conflicted about the aggressive response to 9/11, which

often involved torture and human rights violations (Lotter, 2018:44). The differences and lack of conceptual clarity in definitions of terrorism suggest that the meaning of the term can change to suit political objectives. Setty (2011:9-10) shows that some nations have prioritised an exclusion of state-sponsored actions from definitions of terrorism.

Gupta (2008:7) argues that the term terrorism has been a source of confusion, contradiction, and controversy since its emergence. While unable to find a universal definition, it is important to note that the term is not a new. As Hoffman shows, the term dates back to the French revolution, when terrorism was defined as “a system of terror [and] government by intimidation, as directed and carried out by the [group] in power in France during the French revolution of 1789-1794” (Hoffman 2006, cited in Howard, 2014:10). Another challenge is that over its 230-year existence, the word’s semantic focus has changed many times. While it was originally used to describe the reign of terror by authorities during and after the French Revolution, the term terrorist was not used in an anti-government sense before the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Simus, 2016:1). The old saying “one man’s terrorist is another man’s hero” still holds (Gupta, 2014:7). Linking the above to the current terror attacks conducted by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the group might argue that they are fighting to attain their freedom.

Wardlow (1982 in Rogers, 2008:173), has described political terrorism as acts of violence aimed at inspiring fear, whether for or in opposition to established authority, where such actions are intended to create extreme anxiety and or fear in a target group, so that the target group will accede to the political demands of the perpetrators. The motives and acts of Boko Haram fall within the above scenario. Hence it is important to understand the concept of terrorism in this study. The absence of an agreed definition of terrorism is problematic because terrorists mostly do not regard themselves as terrorists. For instance, Boko Haram members do not regard themselves as terrorists but as a sect fighting both against corruption and to Islamise the northern states. Adeniran (2019:24) argues that terrorist acts can be used by protesters, rebels, or fanatical groups who are not happy with government policies and programs, and are fighting for state power, or to impose their own ideological beliefs. As in the case of Boko Haram, terrorism appears to be a psychological weapon hidden behind an ideological objective (political, economic, or religious).

Johnson (2018:185), cites the US Department of Defence, which defines insurgency as an organised movement that aims to overthrow a constituted government by subversion and armed conflict. He argues that the definition lacks the wider scope and context of insurgencies today,

mostly their protracted and transnational nature, and their political, economic and social dimensions (Johnson, 2018:185). The above analysis is crucial to this study, as the emergence of Boko Haram is not merely a movement, but is driven to achieve religious, political and economic goals. As Bamidele (2013:6) emphasises, Boko Haram believes Western institutions were responsible for imposing Western values onto people who grew up with Western concepts of employment, trade policies, and general administration. This means that apart from being labelled as a terrorist insurgency group, Boko Haram's motives go beyond those of an extreme insurgency group, in that they target systems, values, and practices which they believe have brought suffering into north-east Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2015:9).

Disagreements over of what should count as terrorism and what should be considered legitimate revolutions have indeed plagued academics for a long time, and divisions still exist (Howard, 2014:10). Various terrorist organisations have understood revolutions as secessions or attempts at national self-determination. The principle that people should govern themselves was supported by the American and French Revolutions (Simus, 2016:2), yet Maximilien Robespierre introduced government sponsored terrorism to suppress opposition and maintain power. During the Soviet Revolution in 1917, Lenin and Stalin used state-sponsored terrorism to secure and maintain control of the state against their opposition (Maiangwa, 2012:16). Furthermore, the Spanish Inquisition used arbitrary arrest, torture, and execution to punish that which it viewed as heresy. Also, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, terrorism was adopted by adherents of anarchism in Western Europe, Russia, and the United States, with the belief that the best possibility to effect revolutionary political and social change was to execute persons in the position of power (Agang, 2016:2).

Chinwoku (2013:268) notes that there are over 100 definitions of terrorism and concludes that the only agreed upon characteristics are that terrorism involves violence and the use of threat. Gupta (2014:8) noted 109 definitions of terrorism which, he argued, evidenced a lack of conformity, and indicates that terrorist is often a political term. The United Nations (UN) (2019b) stresses that terrorism is immoral, that it is efficiently used as a justification for religious, political and socio-economic frustrations, and that it fosters violence, fear, insecurity, and anarchy. In the above sense Boko Haram is plausibly understood as a terrorist organisation.

The confusion and lack of a universal definition of terrorism, however, yields the question of whose actions are to be defined as terrorism. For instance, in the Nigerian case, one might argue that the state's use of repressive measures to deal with the Boko Haram insurgency encompasses

terrorism, in that the state's response involved fatalities and high levels of human rights violations. Perhaps the state's strategy was designed to instil fear in the group and its members, which may have deepened the catastrophe.

Similarly, the USA's unilateral invasion of Iraq has been extremely violent, yielded extreme humanitarian consequences, and innocent civilians were caught in the middle of the conflict, but the intervention by the USA has not been labelled as terrorism. Rogers (2008:180) notes that four years after the invasion, at least 100,000 civilians were killed and about four million were stranded as refugees. Looking at the number of fatalities caused by a state, there appear to be tensions regarding what constitutes terrorism. Decision-making institutions, involving politicians, or opinion-forming institutions, such as the media, might intentionally apply the notion of terrorism or terrorist to influence public opinion and discredit certain individuals or groups, to legitimise or de-legitimise activities. Thus, terrorist or terrorism labels can become tools for political manipulation (Wojciechowski, 2009:3).

For instance, consider the case of Bherlin Gildo, a 37-year Swedish national who has been accused of being linked to terrorist activities in Syria, including receiving weapons training from 31 August 2012 and 1 March 2013. His prosecution case collapsed after his lawyers argued that the British intelligence agencies were linked to the same Syrian opposition groups, and this would have embarrassed the British security if the trial continued (Guardian, 2015). Also, in September 2013, the United Kingdom parliament denied permitting the United Kingdom military intervention against the Assad regime in Syria following his use of chemical weapons in Ghouta, Syria (Greene, 2017:429). However, in December 2015, the United Kingdom parliament approved the government's request to launch airstrikes in Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria but not against the Assad regime (Greene, 2017:429). This indicates how decision-makers constitute what determines terrorism and act according to their interests.

Boko Haram might have exploited the shifting understandings of terrorism. For instance, to some, names like Osama Bin Laden have designated heroism, despite him masterminding the September 11 attacks. 2002, for instance, witnessed a rapid increase of babies named Osama in northern Nigeria, specifically in Kano State where many celebrated the September 11 attacks (Olojo, 2013:4). Indeed, seven out of ten babies are believed to have been named Osama, in Kano State (Olojo, 2013:4).

Abang *et al.* (2017:5) argue that coherent discussions about the impacts of terrorism need a clear scenario on which to base discussions, given the challenge of what should and should not be classified as terrorism.

For this study, terrorism as defined by the UN and by the US Department of Defence is utilised. The UN and the US Department of Defence define terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives” (Enders & Sandler, 2011:5). The definition indicates at least five core elements that should be present for an activity to be classified as terrorism. Namely, a) violence, b) political, ideological or religious motivations, c) the presence of perpetrators, d) effects on victims, and e) the targeting of an audience (Abang *et al.*, 2017). Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria has these characteristics. The Nigerian Terrorism Prevention Act (2011) says that terrorism involves the violent destruction of property and or homes, comprises mostly attacks on non-combatant populations, causes many people to become homeless, creates a humanitarian crisis, and can lead to many citizens becoming Internally Displaced People (IDP) (Wilson, 2018:82).

### **2.2.1. Domestic terrorism**

This subsection first focuses on exploring the concept of domestic terrorism in Nigeria, given that Boko Haram's main target appears to be the Nigerian state itself, and that the emergence of Boko Haram is examined by using failed state theory. Adelaja *et al.* (2018:36) argue that the group aims to create an Islamic state, impose Sharia law in northern Nigeria, and get rid of bad governance, corruption and moral deprivation. Boko Haram believe the latter three aspects conflict with Islam. Sandler (2011:280) suggests that domestic terrorism is characterised by perpetrators, targets victims, venues, and audiences within the boundaries of the same state. Agang (2016:4) contends that the political goal of Boko Haram is to create an Islamic nation in the 12 northern states of Nigeria and then later take control of the rest of the country. On these views the actions of Boko Haram are mainly directed at Nigeria as a state.

According to Sinnar (2019:1333), domestic terrorism refers to political violence that is domestic in its origins and intended impact. Boko Haram terror attacks clearly target the Nigerian state, even though it has extended its influence on other countries. Enders *et al.* (2011:330) note that domestic terrorist campaigns might conduct transnational terrorist attacks to attract greater media attention. They note further that domestic terrorists can also look for ways to enter a target country

via neighbouring borders and then attack their home country in that way (Enders *et al.*, 2011:330). This might be the case with Boko Haram, in that they have used the borders of neighbouring countries to fight back against the Nigerian government and the fact that they attracted media when they attacked the UN Headquarters on 27 August 2011.

The concept of international terrorism is also briefly discussed because Boko Haram has lately extended its attacks to neighbouring countries. Ogundiya (2009) shows that Nigeria is a state under perpetual internal security threats that have negatively impacted the state's social, economic, political and environmental domains, which has destabilised the state. Okon (2016:8) regards Boko Haram in Nigeria as a case of domestic terrorism. As regards Boko Haram's domestic threats, Alexander (2015, quoted in Yahaya, 2015:36) notes that "at the beginning of its violent attacks, it has targeted mainly security forces and politicians" but later turned to "civilian spaces, such as schools, churches, and markets, and kidnap[ing] 270 school girls in Chibok on 14 April, 2014". Even though Boko Haram is believed to be linked with other terrorist organisations, its activities often occur within Nigeria.

Utibe (2016) argues that the Nigerian state is trapped in a crossfire, between its national security and the Boko Haram insurgency, and emphasising that the region has turned into a hotspot of crime and violence with terror dimensions, which have led to property destruction and the death of thousands of people, and made the north-east region one of the most dangerous areas. Domestic terrorism in Nigeria has led to a loss of dignity and relevance among the international community, as the acts of Boko Haram have undermined its sovereignty (Utibe, 2016). Based on the above analysis, domestic terrorism in Nigeria is a grave security issue and the continued attacks imply challenges to reducing groups' acts of terror. Okon (2016) has indicated that Boko Haram acts of terror have imposed not only the greatest security threat to the state but also made the areas they control the most dangerous.

### **2.2.2. International Terrorism**

According to Simus (2016:1) the term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens of a territory of more than one country. Botma (2015:26) shares this view, arguing that terrorist groups operating outside their home countries are often termed international terrorists. Boko Haram has more recently launched attacks in neighbouring countries, meaning the group's actions have shifted from being those of a domestic terrorist group to those of an international terrorist group. However, the literature regards domestic terrorism as defined by causes that lead

to a certain terrorist group and not by links with other terrorist groups. In the case of Boko Haram, it has links to other terrorist organisations. as in the case of Nigeria.

### **2.3. What is Boko Haram?**

Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s as a small Sunni Islamic sect advocating a strict interpretation of Islamic law for Nigeria. Boko Haram has described itself by saying Jama ‘a Ahl as-Sunnah Li-da’wa wa-al-Jihad, which is translated from Arabic as “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad<sup>1</sup>” (Blanchard, 2016:5). The name Boko Haram is derived from the combination of the Hausa word ‘Boko’, meaning book, and the Arabic word ‘Haram’, meaning something forbidden, or Western education is sinful (Maiangwa & Uzodike, 2014:99). The sect’s ideological mission is very clear; it wants to take over the Nigerian government and impose Islamic Sharia law throughout the country. ‘Sharia’ is translated as road, and refers to a Muslim religious code of conduct. It relates to a range of diverse Islamic traditions, including an interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, and can refer to strict rules and broad principles and objectives (Stuart, 2017:XXII). There was a flare-up of the violence in 2004, until the Nigerian police attacked Boko Haram on July 26, 2009, and committed a well-publicised murder of Yusuf by the police, after which the group re-emerged a year later under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, with the aid of Mamman Nur and Khalid al- Barnawi (Cook, 2014:4).

The group then launched violent attacks through 2010 and 2011, assassinating prominent politicians and clerics who opposed it, and attacked educational and medical institutions (Cook, 2014:4). Cannon and Iyekekpola (2018:374) show that the group enhanced its attacks against the Nigerian state after the extrajudicial killings of some of its leaders in the same year, with a rapid increase of attacks from about 10 in 2009 to 45 in 2012. The group heavily condemns western civilisation. Boko Haram has reportedly attacked churches and schools, pubs and hotels. For instance, Mambula (2018:11) notes that over 1000 classrooms have been burnt, 350 teachers killed, and 512 schools have been destroyed by Boko Haram attacks in Borno State. Key factors contributing to its rise in Nigeria include a legacy of overlapping intercommunal and Muslim-Christian tensions in the country, perceived disparities in access to jobs, state services and investment in the north, and popular frustrations with elite corruption and other state abuses (Blanchard & Husted, 2019:8).

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<sup>1</sup> Literally translates as ‘struggle’; interpretations range from a personal effort to live according to Islam, to defending Islam by means of an armed struggle and physically fighting in the way of Allah in order to establish Islam.

### **2.3.1. The leadership of Boko Haram**

Mohammad Yusuf was the founder of Boko Haram and leader from 2002 to July 30 2009 (Centre for International Security & Cooperation, 2018). He was executed by government forces while trying to escape after the July 2009 uprisings. From 2002 to January 2012 Mamman Nur was third-in-command under Yusuf. Misunderstandings with Shekau caused Nur's followers to form a splinter group, named Ansaru in 2012 (Centre for International Security & Cooperation, 2018). Nur reportedly plotted the UN bombings in 2011. After the IS accepted Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance in late March 2015, the IS realised that Barnawi would take over leadership in 2016, which did happen. (Centre for International Security & Cooperation, 2018). It has been reported that Shekau denounced Barnawi's leadership claiming the leadership was a coup plotted by the IS. Barnawi was a spokesperson of Boko Haram, but he left and joined Ansaru, a Splinter group of Boko Haram. He re-joined the group in 2015, and the leadership split resulted in two competing factions within Boko Haram, Islamic State's West Africa Province headed by Barnawi and Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah li-l Dawa wal-Jihad headed by Shekau. Abu Musab al-Barnawi was the leader from August 3 2016 to December 29 2016. Abubakar Shekau had led Boko Haram from 2010. Three reports of Shekau's death were released but he mocked these claims in jihadist videos released by Boko Haram (Centre for International Security and Cooperation, 2018).

### **2.3.2. Recruitment of members and sources of weapons**

According to Udama (2013:105), since 2001, mostly male Muslim youths, often from the same middle class and educated background, aggressively embraced a stricter version of Islam, denying anything Christian as well as Western education and culture. Such youths have enacted terrorist attacks particularly in the northern states of Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Plateau, Kaduna and the FTC. Udama (2013:105) notes further that they also launched the first suicide bomb attack in the Abuja police force headquarters. When Boko Haram began as a social movement with considerable popularity, its members were predominantly young men, believed to have joined the sect voluntarily. When the group expanded, so did its financial resources, and young unemployed men found themselves with money and access to guns, which they later used to obtain money from others within the society (Amnesty International, 2015:14).

Between 2005 and 2009, Yusuf established a sect at a compound in Maiduguri's Railway's District, consisting of hundreds of followers, mainly unemployed and impoverished Islamic students, clerics, university students, and others (Buchanan-Clarke & Knoope, 2017:7).

According to the International Crisis Group (2016:13), Mayo Sava, close to Boko Haram strongholds in Borno, was the main area for recruitment between 2012 and 2014. Since 2011, between 3500 and 4000 Cameroonians, mostly men, reportedly joined Boko Haram as fighters, spiritual guides, and logisticians (International Crisis Group, 2016). Similarly, Connor (2017:9) shows that Boko Haram and its affiliates recruited fighters, including women from Cameroon and southern Niger, indicating that as of 2011 about 4 000 Cameroonians, have been recruited by the militants, including fighters, spiritual guides, and logisticians.

Boko Haram has capitalised on socio-economic motivations, ideology and religion, coercion and or persuasion to secure recruits (International Crisis Group, 2016:13). Boko Haram provides its recruits with a motorbike and a recruitment bonus ranging from 300 up to 2000 dollars and promises salaries to range from 100 to 400 dollars during the initial months as well as a substantial sum of money to the family of a fighter killed in combat (International Crisis Group, 2016:13). Walker (2012:3) also shows that the group has attracted more people to become its members by providing welfare handouts, food, and shelter. As recently as 2016, Boko Haram recruited fighters by offering young entrepreneurs loans and then conscripting them as recruits when they failed to repay (Entz & Fanusie, 2017:7). They further contend that Boko Haram pays the widows and children of its fighters. Apart from that, through means of coercion, residents had to attend their daily prayers, and punishment for not adhering to Boko Haram's rules were cruel, which has made many people join the group involuntarily (Amnesty International, 2015:18).

According to Heim and McQuaid (2015:32), Boko Haram obtains its weapons, ammunition and other materials from the Nigerian Army after defeating government soldiers or by raiding barracks. They further illustrate that corrupt military officials redirect what should go to troops to members of Boko Haram in exchange for money (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:32). They also note that other sources of finance, especially between 2003 and 2009, were dues from members and donations from wealthy people and politicians (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:32). Vehicles used for suicide attacks were usually stolen, and many weapons were stolen from the government armouries (Campbell, 2014:3).

Boko Haram generates money in the ways disclosed in the Table 2.1 below.

Kidnapping for ransom	Boko Haram takes local villagers, foreigners, and political family members as hostages. Ransoms have ranged from \$10 for locals
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	to \$3 million for a European family. In 2013, Boko Haram receives a \$3 million ransom in exchange for a French family.
Taxation and extortion	Boko Haram forces people to join if they cannot repay microfinance loans given by the group. Governors of some Nigerian states have purportedly paid Boko Haram monthly fees to avoid attacks. When in control of territory, Boko Haram levies taxes on locals
Looting and spoils	Boko Haram gains money and food through cattle rustling. The group is outfitted with equipment stolen from the Nigerian Army.
Cash from the Banking System	A 2014 estimate put Boko Haram's overall revenue from bank robberies at \$6 million. The group robbed at least 30 banks in 2011, and the stolen money was distributed among the community rather than centrally held.
Smuggling and Trafficking	Boko Haram is primarily involved in human trafficking, primarily through kidnapping girls and women. The group has sold captives into sex slavery or used them as leverage.
Donations	Donors from the region and the Gulf have funded the group through cash couriers. Financial facilitators have received funding from contacts in Qatar.
Commercial enterprises and agriculture	Boko Haram taxes farmers, forces farmers to give up produce, or sometimes takes over farms outright. The group's involvement in the cattle and fish trade led the Nigerian government to close those markets.
External Assistance	Osama bin Laden sent \$3 million in 2002 to Nigerian Salafists, much of which to be used to start Boko Haram. From 2012 there was growing support from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), including financial assistance of \$250,000.

**Table 2.1 Main sources of funding and significant financial events**

(Source: Entz & Fanusie, 2017:2-3)

From Table 2.1 above it is evident that the group has various ways of getting funds for its survival. Cook (2014:23) shows that the group has used its organisation in northern Cameroon to kidnap

Westerners for ransom. For instance, in July 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped the wife of Cameroonian deputy prime minister Amdou Ali for ransom (Cook, 2014). Other examples include seven French citizens, including an employee of GDF-Suez, Tanguy Moulin Fournier, who were kidnapped in the Waza National Park on 19 February 2013. On 13 November 2013 a French priest was abducted in Nguetchewe (Mayo Tsanaga); on 19 April 2014, two Italian priests and a Canadian nun were kidnapped in Tchere (Diamare); and ten Chinese workers were abducted in July 2014, (International Crisis Group, 2016:15-16). The release of the Moulin-Fournier family in November 2013 came after a ransom of \$5 million to \$7 million from Cameroonian sources and \$3.2 million by Nigerian sources (Cook, 2014).

The release of 27 hostages, ten Chinese and 17 Cameroonian members of the vice prime minister's inner circle on 10 October 2014 is said to have proved more costly (Cook, 2014). In this case Boko Haram managed to extract payment of \$5.7 million; \$2.6 million for the Chinese and \$3.1 million for the vice Prime Minister's family together with the release of 31 of its members, including senior figures such as Abaka Ali (International Crisis Group, 2016:16). In Cameroon, Boko Haram also raise funds by stealing cattle and selling them in the markets of the far north of Nigeria; the group has been reported to have stolen about 12,000 cattle since 2013, worth \$3.4 billion, and thousands of sheep and goats (International Crisis Group, 2016:17). Botma (2015:117) has also pointed out that Boko Haram has engaged criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, bank robbery, and illicit trafficking to obtain funds used for conducting terror attacks.

#### **2.3.4. Boko Haram's links with other terrorist groups**

Boko Haram first appeared as a domestic terrorist group, targeting only the Nigerian government. The group's attack on the UN Headquarters raised concerns about the group's potential links with other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and al-Shabab. According to Maiangwa and Uzodike (2014:104), after the rise of Boko Haram's violent attacks in 2009, the Nigerian State Security Service claimed that Boko Haram members were being trained in Afghanistan and Algeria by Al-Qaeda. Cannon and Iyekekpolo (2018:378) emphasise that some of its members were reportedly trained in Somalia in 2009 by al-Shabab while al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb supported Boko Haram with weapons and a €200 000 transfer. Buttressing the above, it has been argued that Boko Haram's initial funding could have come from Osama bin Laden who had reportedly promised to distribute €3 million to fund global Jihad in Nigeria as early as 2002 or 2003 (Cannon & Iyekekpolo, 2018:378).

Entz and Fanusie (2017:2) contend that under Shekau, Boko Haram received training and support from AQIM and the Somalia-based al-Qaeda branch, al-Shabab. This strengthened Boko Haram to manage its operations through suicide bombing and kidnapping for ransom. Onouha (2014) shows that AQIM is believed to have trained Boko Haram recruits in areas of bomb-making and launching shoulder-fired weapons. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was a franchise of Osama bin Laden's Jihad network and the only one to have escaped the decline and crisis of other branches of al-Qaeda in the Arab world. AQIM nurtured its most lethal expansion via its Saharan networks (Filiu, 2009:2).

In addition, Basar (2012:2) also pointed out that Boko Haram is believed to have had links to AQIM. He further notes that some governments believe that Boko Haram is also active in Niger and its militants from Nigeria and Chad were trained in AQIM camps in Mali in 2011 (Basar, 2012). Botman (2015:118) shares that view, highlighting that the financial support offered by the Islamic World Society, the Al Muntanda Trust Fund, and an unknown Algerian sect, as well as the training provided by Al-Shabab and AQIM, gave Boko Haram the means to conduct terror attacks, whether nationally or internationally.

### **2.3.5. The impact of Boko Haram to its neighbouring countries**

Even though Boko Haram is believed to have started as a Nigerian domestic terrorist group, it is very important to highlight its influence and negative impact on neighbouring states because the group has extended its influence in Lake Chad basin. According to Goyei (2018:110), the extremism of Boko Haram insurgents in north-eastern Nigeria has not only impacted the security dynamics of Nigeria, but it has also negatively impacted security in the Lake Chad Basin states, namely Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The situation on the Lake Chad basin is very tense in that the recurrence of attacks and influx of refugees threatens day to day security. Oluwadare (2018:7) narrated that the continued raids and suicide bombings instils fear and widespread trauma for people, blocks them from accessing basic essential services, and destroys infrastructure. The region consists of about 21 million inhabitants from Nigeria, with improper security to support the territorial integrity, involving all sorts of human security issues, affecting health, environmental resilience, food access, economies, politics, and comprising negative psychological or social effects.

High volumes of refugees in these countries have worsened poverty and intensified criminal activities. The Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2019a) estimates that over 60,000 Nigerians were living as refugees in neighbouring countries since May 2013. In Niger,

about 40,000 Nigerians were living as refugees, and about 28 000 in Cameroon, adding to food insecurity concerns and health facility burden, as Boko Haram destroyed clinics and caused nurses and doctors to fear for their lives and flee (Onuoha, 2014:9). The threat of insecurity extends businesses as well, as illustrated further by Onuoha (2014:9), who notes that cross-border attacks have driven off potential tourists and caused a sharp drop in customs' revenues for the central African country. Furthermore, while attempting to resolve the impact of Boko Haram insurgents in the region, some of the measures implemented were drastic, for instance, Ani and Mahmood (2018:16) demonstrate that Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, like Nigeria, have enacted restrictions, banning some local activities under the guise of a state emergency, such as blocking locals from selling fish and red peppers, because these were reported to have benefitted militants. This disadvantaging people in the Diffa region since such trade was their means of survival.

The following table temporally arranges major Boko Haram attacks and notable events.

<b>Date of terror attack</b>	<b>Location and event</b>	<b>Casualties and numbers wounded</b>
12/24/2003	Attack on police stations in Geiman and Kanama in Yobe state; Afghanistan Taliban Flag was raised.	Unknown
27/07/2009	A series of attacks in Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria, including burning multiple churches, police stations and a prison.	More than 75 people killed, and others wounded.
26/08/2011	A suicide bomber from Boko Haram crashed a car filled with explosives into the main building of the UN headquarters in Abuja.	23 people killed and 87 wounded.
20/01/2012	A series of bomb attacks and shooting sprees in the city of Kano, with police stations being the main targets.	187 people killed and 50 wounded.
17/09/2013	Boko Haram raided the town of Benisheik. Members impersonated military officials and set up checkpoints outside the town. Those who attempted to escape were shot.	142 people killed with unknown numbers wounded.

14/04/2014	<p>More than 300 girls aged 16 to 18 were kidnapped from a secular school in Chibok by the Boko Haram insurgency. On November 14, the group claimed that the abducted girls had converted to Islam and were married. Up until May 2016, 219 girls were missing but a few who were living as wives and mothers among Boko Haram fighters were rescued.</p> <p>Most girls were still alive and by January 2018 106 girls had escaped.</p>	Unknown numbers killed.
27/07/2014	<p>Attack on the Kolofata town in northern Cameroon and kidnapping of the wife of Cameroon Deputy minister, Amadou Ali. Akaoua Babiana and 27 others who had been kidnapped by the group during other incidents were released.</p>	Three people killed and unknown numbers wounded.
3/01/2015	<p>Boko Haram insurgents attacked the towns of Baga and Doron Baga, and Borno for more than 4 days. Boko Haram shot randomly from armoured vehicles and burned several buildings.</p>	<p>On January 12, 150 people were reported dead by the Nigerian government. Amnesty International released Satellite images showing about (2000) people killed and unknown wounded.</p>
18/01/2015	<p>80 civilians kidnapped from northern Cameroon involving many children. Cameroon's army free 24 hostages and chase Boko Haram into Nigeria.</p>	Three people killed, none wounded.
6/02/2015	<p>Boko Haram insurgents attack Bosso, first major attack in Niger.</p>	57 people killed and seven wounded.

13/02/2015	Village of Ngouboua in Chad attacked, two-thirds of the homes in the village set on fire before the Chadian military intervened. This was Boko Haram's first attack in Chad, probably in retaliation for Chad's collaboration with Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon in joint military campaigns against Boko Haram.	10 people killed and four wounded.
28/ 03/2015	Boko Haram attempted to block civilians from voting during election day in Nigeria.	41 people killed, unknown wounded.
October 2015	Boko Haram militants bombed Abuja, Nigeria, and suicide bombed the main Nigeria refugee camp in Chad.	54 people killed and 51 wounded.
30/01/2016	Boko Haram attacked Dalori, Nigeria, using suicide bombers; children were burned alive.	86 people killed and unknown number wounded.
09/02/2016	Two female suicide bombers detonated explosives at a displaced persons camp in Dika, Nigeria.	58 people killed, over 80 wounded.
21/08/2016	Attack on Kuburvwa village, Nigeria.	11 people killed and unknown numbers wounded.
09/12/2016	Attack at a market in Madagali village by two female suicidal bombers.	Nigerian military officials claimed 30 killed and 68 wounded, whereas open source news agencies reported 57 killed, and 177 wounded.
28/07/2017	Boko Haram attacked an oil exploration team in north-east Nigeria.	Over 50 were killed and unknown numbers wounded.

15/08/2017	Three female suicide bombers attacked an internally displaced persons camp and a market in north-eastern Nigeria.	20 killed and over 80 wounded.
21/11/2017	A teenage suicide bomber detonated explosive during a morning service at a mosque in Mubi, Nigeria.	50 people killed.
17/01/2018	A male and a female suicide bomber attacked a market in Maiduguri, Nigeria.	12 people killed and over 45 wounded
21/02/2018	110 schoolgirls were seized by the militants from a school in Dapachi, Nigeria.	No fatalities recorded.
02/03/2018	Suspected Boko Haram militants attacked military barracks in the town of Rann, in the north-east of Borno State near the Cameroonian border.	11 people including three aid workers were killed, two aid workers were contractors with the International Organisation for Migration, the third was a doctor working as a consultant for the UN International Children's Emergency Fund.

**Table 2,2 Major Boko Haram attacks and notable events**

(Source: Centre for International Security and Cooperation, 2018)

The above timeline does not include all attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram militants. From the above it is extremely clear that Boko Haram has challenged and threatened the security not only of Nigeria but also its neighbouring countries. The attack on military barracks has challenged the security systems of Nigeria as a state and demonstrates how brazen the militant organisation is. Attacks persist. In February 2019, Amnesty International reported that about 60 people were killed following the Boko Haram attacks on Rann, and about 30,000 people fled to neighbouring Cameroon borders seeking refuge (Amnesty International, 2019b).

## 2.4. Factors that explain the emergence of Boko Haram

In deploying state failure theory and relative deprivation theory to help explain the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, it is very important to acknowledge and briefly highlight some ideas that might help to explain what drives collective violence and terrorism. Thereafter the significance of employing the theoretical framework comprising state failure and relative deprivation theory is explored more deeply.

Tilly (2003:5) outlines three camps that help explain why different people engage in violent activities, these are ideas, behaviour, and social interaction. Idea people stress that ideas concerning the worth of others and a willingness towards aggressive actions affect the propensity of individuals or groups to engage in collective violence (Tilly, 2003:5). For behavioural people, the emphasis is on motives, impulses, and opportunities. Many refer to human evolution as the origin of aggressive actions, individually or collectively; suggesting that people are driven to use aggressive means to obtain mates, shelter, food, and protection from attacks (Tilly, 2003:5). Aggression might link to Boko Haram's ideological beliefs in that they want to impose Sharia law in the northern part of Nigeria using extreme violence. Revolutionary theories also help to explain collective violence. Shaw (2009:102) highlights revolutions as one of the highly regarded forms of political violence, illustrating that the 1789 French revolution has inspired social historians and evolutionary theorists in the twentieth century. Given the fact that that reign of terror was a successful revolution, it might as well drive groups or individuals to use violence. According to Shaw (2009:102), terrorism can involve terrorising populations by exposing the public to mass executions of civilians.

In support of this view, Stoddard (2019:302) notes that revolutionary rebels do not only aim to achieve power, but also transform the society by an extreme reorganisation of social and political orders. Revolutionary warfare is ideological, and both factions of the Boko Haram insurgency support revolutionary calls to transform the political order in Nigeria and beyond (Stoddard, 2019:305). Other scholars have pointed out that class theory also helps to explain terrorism in Nigeria. Ogunrofito (2013:47) emphasised the significance of class theory in explaining the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, arguing that the ruling class's misinterpreted religious prescripts are used to divide people. He asserts that prevalent poverty, unavailability of jobs, untold misery caused by the Nigerian military, Structural Adjustments Programmes, and unresolved issues by the civilian regime have affected the working and the lumpen class, mostly in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has exploited failures to develop and advance the living conditions of the people (Ogunrofito, 2013:47). On general theories of violence, revenge and protection have also been

conceptualised as driving factors of more than 70% of pre-modern wars, making them the most prominent motives for violence in human history (Eisner, 2009:47).

The above briefly highlighted theories for explaining drivers of collective violence or terrorism. It is important to note the reasons why revolutions exist, or why groups act violently. They do so to achieve their socio-economic, political and ideological wishes which might not be achieved by soft approaches. In this case, the state is central and cannot be easily separated from the above-mentioned reasons. State failure is a broad term which involves a lot of the above theories. The emergence and persistence of Boko Haram occurs in the north-east, where all the characteristics of state failure exists. A wide range of scholars share the view that state failure and relative deprivation play a significant role in explaining the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The study provides empirical evidence on the nature and extent of state failure and relative deprivation in north-east Nigeria to justify the significance of the theoretical framework. This occurs in chapters three and four. The next section describes the characteristics of state failure and relative deprivation.

## **2.5. State failure and relative deprivation**

Based on current literature from several scholars, and even though other factors also explain the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, state failure and relative deprivation theory have earned a lot of credibility. This section highlights the characteristics of state failure and relative deprivation. It also explores conceptions of corruption, bad governance, poverty, and unemployment in Nigeria, and establishes how they explain the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria because they all fall under the category of state failure, which then leads to relative deprivation. In support of ongoing analysis, notice that Maiangwa (2012:180) states that:

Given the rise in the number of failed and failing states, particularly in Africa, scores of books, articles, and reports published in the last two decades have usefully underscored the link between failed states and terrorism. By this, it has been substantially argued that the conditions of state failure such as political tyranny, loss of state legitimacy, bad governance, etc. predispose people to acts of terrorism and create the conducive ambiance for terrorist activities.

The above supports the view the failed states and their effect drive people join or conduct terrorist attacks. However, this is discussed in more detail in chapter three when explaining the link between state failure and terrorism. According to Rotberg (2002:7), failed states exhibit flawed

institutions. That is, only the institution of the executive functions. If legislatures exist at all, they are rubber-stamping machines. Democratic debate is noticeably absent. The judiciary is derivative of the executive rather than being independent, and citizens know that they cannot rely on the court system for significant redress or remedy, especially against the state. In the Nigerian situation, political development has always been marred by governance crises and corruption at all strata of the society (Omilusi, 2013:5). Omilusi further illustrates that there is a disconnect between the governed and the ruling government (Omilusi, 2013:5). This disconnect has been exacerbated by the security personnel who have been used to protect politicians who take money from the public till, and have conducted themselves in a despicable manner, rather than performing their primary responsibility of protecting lives and properties (Udama, 2013:103).

Rotberg (2002:6) outlined another characteristic of a failed state, arguing that failed states cannot control their borders and they lose authority over sections of territory. Often, the expression of official power is limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Plausibly, the extent of state failure can be measured by how much of its geographical expanse is genuinely controlled (especially after dark) by the official government. Boko Haram controlled about 20 local government areas at the beginning of 2015 and could operate across borders into Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (Idahosa, 2015:7), which is a clear indication that the Nigerian government does not have complete control of its territory. Furthermore, Omilusi (2013:7) posits that any government that derogates from the fundamentals of securing lives and property soon becomes irrelevant and obsolete, as citizens may be forced to resort to self-help for their security.

According to Pichette (2015:4), relative deprivation theory is a simple, widely recognised explanation of terrorism. He asserts that the core belief underlying this idea is that people who are not having their basic needs fulfilled are more likely to resort to violence, and that poverty is a key factor in explaining terrorism in less developed parts of the world. In Nigeria, the northern region associated with Boko Haram activity is the poorest region of Nigeria where the government has done little to resolve issues of poverty (Pichette, 2015:4). He contends that relative deprivation theory and the failure of the state to improve economic conditions explains the emergence of Boko Haram. Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017:14) share this view, arguing that Boko Haram's insurgency is deeply rooted in the perceived discrepancy between the expected life conditions and the actual ones, together with the hard life experience of many youths in north-eastern Nigeria.

### 2.5.1. Corruption and bad governance

Corruption can be defined as the abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused for private gain when an official accepts, asks for, or demands a bribe. Corruption also occurs when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit (Adeniran, 2019:23). Political corruption is a manipulation of policies, Institutions, and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political makers who abuse their position to sustain their power and wealth (Ogbuehi, 2018:371). In Nigeria, corrupt public officers are known to hold huge amounts of money in foreign bank accounts, despite being statutorily blocked from having such accounts. Such abuse has negatively impacted the inflationary trend in the economy, thereby lowering the living standards of a large majority of Nigerians (Okogbule, 2007:50).

Udama (2013:107), stresses that in Nigeria the government at all levels, including the federal state and local governments, have not done well in the provision of public goods like infrastructure, health, education, employment, and security, regardless of the abundance of oil revenues distributed to their offices. Instead, funds allocated to them are being diverted for personal gains, hence kidnapping and terrorism are signs and consequences that formal authority is not effective and there are no checks and balances in governance (Udama, 2013:107).

When arrested in January 2004, one of Yusuf's followers explained to a journalist that their group has suffered a setback and that they wanted to institutionalise an Islamic government in the near future, and claimed that the group's belief is that Islam is against corruption and that if Sharia law were applied, corruption would be eliminated (Akuva, Igyoroko & Zumwe, 2013).

Corruption and patronage systems came to be the order of the day since independence and it has led to the development of civil wars, and security threats, the latter mainly from Boko Haram, as claimed by various academics. Achebe (2012:227) illustrates that economic deprivation and corruption generate and intensify financial and social inequities in a population, which in turn fuels political instability. He asserts that extremists of all kinds, specifically religious zealots and other political mischiefs, have a foothold to recruit supporters and sympathisers to help conduct terrorist attacks and cause havoc for ordinary citizens.

Akuva, Igyoroko and Zumwe (2013:122) argue that terrorism and corruption are inter-related due to the damage they cause to society and people, while terrorism kills immediately, corruption kills by causing poverty. Udama (2013:108) argues that the Boko Haram insurgency is thriving in the northern parts of Nigeria because their government is greedy and corrupt, injustice and

marginalisation are acute, and unemployment is high. Corruption is a key tool for terrorists, just as it is for members of organised crime, and terrorists depend not only on crime for revenue, but criminal activity provides recruits employment and generates funds that can deliver social services not provided by corrupt and fragile states (Shelly, 2018:4).

There is a strong consensus that corruption breeds terrorism (Mukolu & Ogodo, 2018) and that corruption is a major cause of insurgency in Nigeria. Onuoha and Abimbola (2010) share the view that Nigeria's leadership and its institutional weakness, caused by high levels of corruption, poverty, and unemployment has generated the basis of Boko Haram. Salihu (2018) also indicated that security threats like Boko Haram are exacerbated by inadequate protective factors, and have led youngsters to become extremists because they are left without options to navigate the society's inadequacies. Even though the Boko Haram insurgency also encompasses religious views, much has been said about Nigeria's glaring corruption as the major catalyst of the crisis and so it cannot be taken for granted.

In addition, Adisa and Gbadamosi (2018:17) indicate that corruption in Nigeria is prevalent and has been described as Nigeria's biggest challenge. Albert (2016) indicates that Nigeria's post-independence leaders have corruptly misappropriated available state resources for private benefit rather than using those funds to benefit the public. To buttress, Shelly (2018:5) argues that conflict regions where corruption is prevalent provide key opportunities for interactions between criminals and terrorists. For instance, AQIM has operated in Libya and Algeria, collaborating with criminals to raise funds and secure transport and arms. In West Africa, terrorist groups like Boko Haram, have capitalised on the high levels of corruption to take part in various criminal activities such as the trade of elephant ivory and kidnapping for ransom (Shelly, 2018:5).

Adeniran (2019:25) also contends that corruption facilitates terrorism as it undermines governance, the economy, health, social order and sustainable development in all regions of the globe. Albert (2016) argues that the general consequence of corruption in Nigeria is the deprivation and impoverishment of the majority to the advantage of the few. The general implication of state officials' involvement in corruption in Nigeria is that money that is supposed to be utilised for building schools, hospitals, water schemes, and generally to boost industrialisation so as to ensure better living standards, has been stolen by those holding public office position (Albert, 2016). Corruption cannot provide basic services, create jobs, encourage growth or improve the lives of the general population, and so corruption has enabled terrorism (Mukolu and Ogodo, 2018).

The NBS and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have claimed that sectors and institutions (public and private) are overwhelmed with bribery and corruption, and that the judiciary is extremely corrupt (Gholani & Salihu, 2018). A vast amount of judicial corruption occurs among court clerks and registrars, while prosecutors work with judges to destroy evidence or case files (Gholani & Salihu, 2018). The judiciary has been implicated in high levels of corruption in the form of bribery. For instance, the National Judicial Council proved that Justice Okwuchwukwu Opene acquired the sum of 15 million naira (\$100,000) through bribery, while Hon. Justice David Adedoyini Adeniji accepted 12 million naira or \$80,000 (Gholani & Salihu, 2018).

		CORRUPTION TACTICS							
		Bribery	Extortion	Auto-corruption	Contract fraud	Subsidy abuse	Favoritism	Deliberate waste	Legal corruption
CORRUPTION BY SECTOR	Political Party								
	Media		1						
	Electoral	2							
	Legislative								3
	Bureaucratic								
	Petro-corruption								
	Trade-related					4			
	Industrial								
	Agricultural								
	Infrastructure							6	
	Power sector								
	Financial sector								
	Environmental				5				
	Defense sector			7					
	Police								
	Judicial								
	Anticorruption						8		
	Educational								
	Health								
	Humanitarian								

**1. Noisemaking (Media/Extortion)**  
Extortion that occurs when someone threatens to make noise in the press or by sponsoring protests to embarrass a public figure or government entity—and then extorts money to spare them from reputational damage and bad press.

**2. 2015 INEC Bribes (Electoral/Bribery)**  
Former oil minister Diezani Alison-Madueke allegedly used \$115 million to bribe election officials to help the PDP win in 2015. Although the payoffs did not affect the presidential election, it likely skewed many governorship and legislative races.

**3. Excessive Pay (Legislative/Legal)**  
Though ostensibly legal, federal legislators' excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits—amounting to \$540,000 per lawmaker in 2017—are also seen by many Nigerians as akin to corruption. Top officials also receive generous retirement packages.

**4. Import Duty Waivers (Trade/Subsidy)**  
Protectionist trade policies have made import duty waivers—granted by the president or trade minister to firms controlled by ruling party financiers—a lucrative form of patronage.

**5. Eco-Fund (Environment/Contract)**  
Environmental remediation programs have long been a lucrative corruption mechanism. A recent audit of the Ecological Fund revealed how politicians, civil servants, and contractors connived to embezzle hundreds of millions of dollars.

**6. PH Monorail (Infrastructure/Waste)**  
The previous governor of Rivers State spent \$400 million on an inflated contract to build a mile-long monorail in Port Harcourt. Deeming it wasteful, the new governor abandoned the near-completed project.

**7. Security Vote (Defense/Auto-corruption)**  
“Security votes” are opaque slush funds given to certain federal, state, and local officials. Totalling over \$670 million annually, security vote expenditures are unaudited, cash-based, and exempt from procurement rules. Most of the money is diverted into private hands.

**8. EFCC (Anticorruption/Favoritism)**  
Successive presidents have used the EFCC and its sister agencies to go after corrupt political rivals while pressuring them to turn a blind eye their own allies' misdeeds. Critics complain that President Muhammadu Buhari's anti-corruption efforts are similarly lopsided.


**Figure 2.1 Overview of corruption in Nigeria with categorized examples**

(Source: Page, 2018:5)

Figure 2.1 indicates that corruption in Nigeria is diversified; it involves legalised corruption and deliberate waste. These categories are not recognised as forms of corruption. For instance, according to Page (2018:7), due to corrupt officials, the National Space Research and Development Agency, the Defence Space Administration and the Nigerian Communications

satellite cost Nigerians \$32.7 million in 2018. High levels of corruption in defence spending has a negative impact on curbing the attacks by Boko Haram in north-east. For example, the death of 83 soldiers in late 2016 by a Boko Haram ambush was due to insufficient resources caused by the rise of corruption among army leaders (Page, 2018:14).

Salihu (2018) shows that poor leadership at all governmental levels, occasioned by unbelievable levels of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, weak institutions, bribery, and corruption have made Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants the most challenging threat in Nigeria.



**Figure 2.2 Perceived corruption among public officials in 2017**

(Source: Afrobarometer, 2019)

The survey data above shows that citizens believe that corruption in Nigeria is highly prevalent, in particular among police and the National Assembly. This makes it easier to understand why there are high rates of underdevelopment and poverty. Blanchard and Husted (2019:12) assert

that Nigeria lost \$65 billion to the power sector from 1999 to 2015, and Nigerian officials are estimated to have taken \$4.6 billion in bribes between 2015 and 2016.

The uprisings of violence by Boko Haram terrorists or militants in the Niger Delta emerged because of anger generated by corruption and the attendant social discomfort of poverty, lack of jobs, extreme levels of economic distress or deprivation caused by official corruption (Akuva *et al.*, 2013:131). Every government must ensure that leaders and those chosen to serve the public are committed to performing their duties accordingly and to ensure that the demands of the society are being attended to. Good governance is a system where the resources of the society are managed transparently with accountability and room for popular participation in governance by responsible leaders (Othman *et al.*, 2015:38). Nigerian leaders use state resources for personal aggrandisement at the expense of the majority directly and indirectly in government (Othman *et al.*, 2015:38). Misallocation of resources due to corruption is responsible for teeming unemployed youths in the country, these unemployed youths such as Almajerri in the north, Agbero in the south west, the Bakassi boys in the south East and the Nigerian Delta militants in the south-south, are often recruited as terrorists by disgruntled politicians and opportunistic religious leaders - where the Boko Haram insurgency lays its roots (Faleye, 2013:81).

### **2.5.2. Poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria**

The federal government of Nigeria puts the unemployment and youth unemployment rates at 23% and 40% respectively, and it is believed that over 70% of the youth population are unemployed (Ayeba, 2015:96). A statistical distribution of poverty in Nigeria indicates that northern Nigeria is extremely affected, with the north-central states recording a 67% poverty rate, north-west states 71%, and the north-east states 72%. It is evident that poverty is so prevalent in northern Nigeria due to injustice, absence of fairness in policy, and negligence on the part of the political class to develop education in that region, as well as an imbalance in resource allocation (Oluwadare, 2016:43).

The most immediate source of the disconnect between Nigeria's wealth and its poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels, as well as the lack of transparency and accountability, which has destroyed the government's legitimacy, and has facilitated the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject the authority of the state (Faleye, 2013:181). Recent statistics as by World Poverty Clock (WPC, 2018) named Nigeria as the poverty capital of the world with statistics showing 87 million people were living in poverty, and the latest figures

indicating that 4 million Nigerians have become impoverished, occasioned by factors such as unemployment, and insecurity, among others. It is indicated that by 2030, the percentage of Nigeria's population living in extreme poverty is estimated to a total of 120 million people living under \$1.90 per day. There is a population growth of approximately 2.34% per annum and it is estimated that by 2030, Nigeria's population will grow up to 263 million, of which 150 million will be below under the age of 25, and if current economic trends persist, they may have consequences as their mean disposable income could approximately decrease by 9% between 2018 and 2030 (World Poverty Clock, 2018).

Country	Poverty rate, 2018 (%)	Forecasted poverty rate, 2030 (%)
South Sudan	85	95
Burundi	74	85
Congo	45	54
Nigeria	44	46
Venezuela	15	23

**Table 2.3 Nigeria's forecasted poverty rate**

(Source: World Poverty Clock, 2018)

Table 2.3 indicates estimates that the poverty rate in Nigeria will keep increasing instead of decreasing, which poses challenges to the current situation. If the poverty rate is determined to increase, there is also a risk of enhancing frustration.

Poverty and underdevelopment are one of the biggest challenges affecting the lives of the majority despite the resource abundance, especially in the north-east region, leaving a huge number of youths miserable and desperate for survival. Bamidele (2013) has cited poverty as responsible for explaining the existence of Boko Haram. The northern region is the poorest with people who have been denied access to education and proper or enough economic resources for basic survival, and this is where Boko Haram has its operational base (Akuva *et al.* 2013). Ani and Mahmood (2018:7) have indicated that poverty in Borno State, the epicentre of Boko Haram crisis is so acute, was 70% in 2017, making it higher than many states in the south of the country where the poverty rate was lower than 20%. Development should entail substantive and quantitative

improvements in people's standard of living over time to such a point that levels of inequality, unemployment, and poverty are minimised (Coker & Genyi, 2014:1131). Hogendoorn (2018:7) posits that development cannot happen overnight, but most radical groups prey on a loss of hope. He argues that radical groups would have much less support if the government implemented reforms and programs that provide hope for and confidence in a better future (Hogendoorn, 2018:7).

In addition, Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017:17) argue that several scholars agree that poverty, extreme level of unemployment, illiteracy, economic disparities and marginalisation in the North-east made it easy for Boko Haram to mobilise the youth and easily attract them. The inability of successive administrations in Nigeria to resolve poverty issues, lack of employment and an unbalanced distribution of wealth within ethnic nationalities is one of the core causes of insecurity in Nigeria (Achumba *et al.* 2013:82). Othman *et al.* (2015:35) illustrate that the presence of political and socio-economic frustrations, mostly in north-east Nigeria where Boko Haram thrives, and where poverty, unemployment and the absence of education are more acute than other parts of the country, serve as reasons for the emergence of Boko Haram. Faleye (2013:40) argues that unemployment harms the youth as it makes them available for easy inducement for militancy, terrorism and other social services.

## **2.6. Efforts made by the Nigerian state**

Various scholars have heavily condemned how the Nigerian state has responded to curb the terror attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram. The Nigerian state resorted to violence and oppressive military expeditions. In 2009, the then President Umaru Musa Yar' Adua primarily resorted to using the military to stop Boko Haram attacks, his successor Goodluck Jonathan enhanced military operations to fight against Boko Haram, claiming to regain the territory. In 2015 president Buhari vowed that military operations against Boko Haram were part of restoring peace and resuscitate the economy (Bala & Ibrahim, 2018:4) However, even though the number of terrorist deaths declined from 4,940 in 2015 to 1,832 in 2016, this did not fully curtail the full operations of Boko Haram. These military interventions have been heavily criticised for their harshness, and which resulted in violations of human rights.

Pichette (2015:7) asserts that the Joint Security Force has earned itself a reputation of brutality, similar to Boko Haram's. In addition, Amnesty International (2019a:8) shows that there have been serious human rights violations perpetrated by the Nigerian military forces during its security operations in curbing Boko Haram's terror attacks. The military forces have executed more than

1,200 people, arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys, and have engaged in torture. The Nigerian state did not properly strategise proper means of dealing with the Boko Haram attacks. However, other than Military intervention, the Nigerian government, according to Ani and Mahmood (2018:21) has established an amnesty program for repentant Boko Haram fighters through Operation Safe Corridor. He asserts that the operations entailed a 16-week rehabilitation program, of which 95 ex-combatants graduated in February 2018. However, while this could help, local populations affected by the crisis hold different views and some are not willing to see or mix with former Boko Haram fighters.

## **2.7. Efforts made by the Economic Community of West African States and its effectiveness for curbing the crisis**

This section examines efforts conducted by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as attempts to curb the terror attacks. On a more collective level, the ECOWAS, which had for a while maintained a limited reaction to the crisis, has of late been influential curbing the terror attacks by Boko Haram. Of significant importance is the adoption by the ECOWAS of a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism in 2013, which provides for a regional counter-terrorism strategy and an implementation plan to help member states combat terrorism. The strategy has been designed for the implementation of regional, continental, and international measures to curb terrorism and to provide a common operational framework for community-wide actions to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related events (Onuoha, 2014). However, according to Brenya and Kuffor (2015:87), Boko Haram activities started in 2003 and yet, as of 2015, not even an emergency meeting had been held by the authority of the heads of state to deliberate on Boko Haram insurgency as a regional security threat. It seems that the ECOWAS did not prioritise or regard the attacks by Boko Haram as a matter of urgency.

### **2.7.1. Efforts made by the African Union (AU) and its effectiveness**

The AU has also not done much to mitigate the terror attacks by Boko Haram. As a regional organisation the AU has a prerogative to maintain peace and order on the continent. It has abandoned the Organisation of African Unity's non-intervention policy and adopted an approach which allows intervention in member states in cases of human rights violations. The AU has been very reluctant to intervene in the Nigerian terror attack crisis. It took the abduction of the Chibok girls in 2014 for the AU to intervene, when the campaign of the abducted girls took centre stage in the media and which drew the attention of the International community to Boko Haram's threats. Abugbilla (2017:235) illustrated that members of the AU lacked the political will to fight to liberate

Nigeria from Boko Haram. In addition, it has been noted that the Peace and Security Council held a session exclusively devoted to Boko Haram for the first time on 23 May 2014 (PSC, 2014). For such an important continental body to take such a long time to intervene to mitigate the crisis, alone signifies a lack of commitment to assist member states. However, there are several challenges which are addressed in detail in chapter five when examining the intervention made by the regional and continental bodies.

## **2.8. Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview and conceptualisation of the term terrorism, introducing to the reader different definitions by various scholars. Exploring a wide range of meanings of terrorism was to indicate a lack of clarity or commonly agreed upon definitions of terrorism. Doing so indicated different trends and motives or drivers of extremism and terror attacks in Africa and globally, and also linked the theoretical conceptualisations with empirical events. This chapter has also familiarised the phenomenon of Boko Haram to the reader by citing a wide range of scholarly reviews about the emergence of Boko Haram. This has been done by providing information about the evolution of Boko Haram, its leadership structure, recruitment strategies, sources of finance, and major attacks from 2003 to 2019, as well as links with other International terrorist organisations. The chapter has also explored the link between state failure and relative deprivation and the connection between corruption and terrorism by providing a wide range of literature on how these concepts are inter-related in explaining the emergence of Boko Haram.

The following chapter deploys the theoretical framework of state failure and relative deprivation theory. It provides an in-depth analysis of these two theories and outlines their relevance to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

## **Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: state failure and relative deprivation**

### **3.1. Introduction**

The previous chapters explored the ways in which state failure and relative deprivation are inter-related and can help to explain terrorism in general and specifically the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The previous chapters also explored the concepts of domestic and international terrorism, defined Boko Haram, highlighted its leadership, recruitment processes, weaponry sources, its links to other terrorist organisations, and included a timeline of Boko Haram terror attacks. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of state failure and relative deprivation theory and familiarises the reader with its relevance in explaining terrorism. This chapter is used to link the analysis of the theoretical frameworks with the empirical evidence about the rise of Boko Haram and its terror attacks. The chapter gives a definition of the state, discusses state failure theory and discusses relative deprivation theory. This chapter also briefly explores the proponents of both state failure theory and relative deprivation theory justifies these two theories as relevant to explaining terrorism. Recall that the aim of this thesis is to analyse the origins of Boko Haram and assess its expansion from a small group to becoming the most dangerous terrorist organisation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, and to assess if the actions taken by the Nigerian state and regional organisations were effective, and, if appropriate, recommend possible alternatives in dealing with the recurring attacks.

### **3.2. Defining a state**

According to Peruzzotti (2015:1), the concept of the modern state refers to a specific institutional configuration that leads to the development of a sovereign structure of political authority within a territory. It involves a set of constitutionally regulated agencies, possessed by supreme jurisdiction over a certain territory and population (Peruzzotti, 2015:1). Similarly, Solomon and Okon (2004:53) defined the state as:

A geographically bounded and specified sovereign territory inhabited by a permanent population tied together by some form of socio-political cohesion and governed by a permanent population of the state. The state should also be recognized as a legally equal and independent member of the international community of states.

There are many definitions of states, but it is not the aim of this study to go deeply into defining the state. However, from the definitions provided above, both definitions note that a state has a “sovereign territory”, and that the state has broad economic and social responsibility. The second definition highlights that “the permanent population is tied together by some form of political cohesion” meaning that states have the duty to make sure that its population is unified by providing political, social, and economic opportunities. A state, as being a sovereign territory, has the autonomous authority of governing its territory and its inhabitants without them being coerced by any external authority. The following section briefly discusses the characteristics or functions of the state before explaining state failure theory.

### **3.3. Functions of a state**

Howard (2014:14) argues that it is the state's prerogative to make sure that its borders are safe, and its citizens are free from internal and external conflicts. He contends that the primary duty and goal of the state is to cater for the public good of security. Rotberg (2004:3) shares this view, illustrating that the state's prime function is to provide the political good of security, to make sure that there are no cross-border attacks and penetrations, to avoid any loss of territory, and abolish internal threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure. He adds that the state has to ensure that crime and related threats to domestic human security are prevented, while also ensuring that citizens are capable of resolving their differences with the state and their fellow citizens without the use of arms or physical force (Rotberg, 2004:3). In other words, the state has the sole responsibility of making sure that all services from the provision of basic goods to security are taken care of.

In support of the above, Patrick (2006:29) claims that the strength of the state can be measured by its ability and the will to provide the fundamental political goods associated with statehood, which entails physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Achonu and Damien (2014:4) argue that political goods include security, health, education, good governance, economic opportunity, law and order, as well as basic infrastructure. They assert that if the state is not capable of delivering these fundamental goods and services to its citizens, state failure can follow (Achon & Damien, 2014:4). In support of the above views on state, it is very important to note that the state has the responsibility of making sure that the day to day services of a given territory are being monitored and governed properly, providing security, including political, economic, and human security. According to Iro and Osumah (2012:855),

human security emphasises the preservation of the wellbeing of persons, involving the protection of their social, economic, political and environmental rights.

### **3.4. Characteristics of state failure**

The notion that failed and fragile states have threatened international security has been widely recognised. Failed and fragile states are often characterised by an inability to provide basic services and by serious conflicts internally (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007:114). Such conflicts can also destabilise neighbouring states and generate uncontrolled territories that are conducive for terrorist activities (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007:114). According to Newman (2007:466), state failure entails a government that is unable to uphold public services, institutions, authority, or might have lost its autonomy to control its territory. “A failed state” says Rotberg (2003:6) “is a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental jobs of a nation-state in the modern world”. Therefore, when a state is not supplying basic services or is unable to perform some of its functions, as mentioned previously, it will lead to that state to be determined as a failed state. On a different view, Solomon and Cone (2004:58) stress that state failure refers to instances where “less than complete collapse occurs”. This might be the situation where states, for instance, can only prioritise certain policies like focusing on education and military while ignoring health, social and economic development.

Also, some scholars define state failure under the umbrella of an inability or incapability to perform statehood responsibilities. These are some conditions which help to explain the characteristics of failing or failed states. For instance, Coggins (2015:461) lists some examples:

- (1) The government fails to provide basic public infrastructure and services leading to extreme deprivation within its population (human security); (2) the government fails to provide stable and reliable public institutions, offering only increasingly corrupt, exploitative, and or ineffective governance (state capacity); (3) the governing regime experiences fundamental political collapse or is so internally contested that political authority is ambiguous throughout significant portions of the territory (political collapse).

To paraphrase the above, state failure leads to the disillusionment of the citizens who rely on the services provided to them by the state. That deprivation will then cause havoc and generate chaos within a state. However, in the existing literature, it appears that there is no one all-encompassing

definition of state failure, but there is a consensus among scholars about certain characteristics of failed states. Rotberg (2003:5) states that:

Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and groups within the state.

By closely looking into the above scholarly reviews on definitions of state failure and its characteristics, it appears that state failure is a broad term that covers the inability of states to function properly and uphold the responsibilities of the state as a whole. There might be disagreements over whether state failure is directly linked to terrorism, but there is a wide consensus that failed or weak states are possessed with a wide range of problems that provide conducive environments for violent and terrorist activities. With the aid of some empirical evidence, the following section discusses the state failure argument and its links to terrorism.

### **3.4.1. State failure's link to terrorism**

Newman (2007:466) asserts that failed states have succumbed to violent conflicts, and that forced migration often leads to the spread of insurgents, threatens regional stability continuously and sometimes induces conflicts in neighbouring countries. For instance, the military coups that happened in Guinea-Bissau and Mali, and the insurgency in the Sahel region negatively impacted West African countries such as Mali, Niger, and Mauritania (Annan, 2014:5). Newman further indicates that failed states are often involved in open armed conflict and create an enabling environment for the trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons through porous borders (Newman, 2007:466). What makes failed states hotbeds for terrorism is the lack of security which makes its citizens vulnerable to many dangerous activities. For instance, failed and failing states like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan have regarded as producing terrorism by United States policymakers (Piazza, 2008:469). Newman (2007:466) further contends that illicit activities can be used to finance armed conflict and to generate sources of income for terrorist groups. Therefore, terrorists often exploit such situations to enhance their operations, since raising funds or smuggling weapons is achievable in failed states due to a lack of security.

As stated previously lack of security is one of the characteristics of state failure, and this security is not limited to human security because a state with limited security includes dangers to its

territory and its citizens. Security is an absence of those aspects which undermine the internal cohesion and corporate existence of the state and its capability to uphold significant institutions for enhancing its fundamental values and socio-political and economic objectives, and at the same time legitimately fulfil its people's aspirations (Onyepuemu, 2015:124). For instance, the failure to come up with a solution to the Palestinian crisis has been the root of deep frustration in the Arab or Islam world (Gupta, 2010:74). According to Onyepuemu (2015:124), the security of any country includes a set of orders or conditions suitable for keeping the functioning and reproduction of an existing state in the face of internal and external threats. Meaning that states have to provide security from threats within the state and threats from outside its territory. Supporting the above argument, Coggins (2015:464) claims that, due to social dislocation from economic refugees crossing borders and migrating to neighbouring countries, an increase in human insecurity can generate terrorism.

States with limited capacity may also create a conducive environment for international terrorism, as they do not support law and order, because corrupt officials can easily be bribed (Coggins, 2015:465). People who are forced to migrate because of human insecurity are vulnerable to join criminal or terrorist organisations because they can be easily manipulated by terrorists or violent organisation because they are often offered some source of living, such as money and food for survival. Therefore, it means that state failure is a broad concept to the extent that it covers all aspects of statehood, and failure to maintain the responsibilities of statehood leads to insecurity which then explains the link between state failure and terrorism due to vulnerabilities created by insecurity and weak institutions. For instance, Howard (2014:23) posits that Africa's most tragic failed states such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia are known to be sponsoring terrorism and have all been providing, at some time in their history, a conducive environment for dangerous terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda.

In addition, Ottaway and Mair (2004:1) argue that failed states are unable to provide security to their citizens and they cannot supply fundamental public goods to their citizens. Failed states succumb to violence because they cannot establish peace or stability for their citizens or control their territories. Brooks (2005:1159) also claimed that failed states are incapable of sustaining the growth of their economies and they cannot provide equal distributions of basic goods. He further asserts that failed states are overwhelmed by huge economic inequities, warlordism, and violent competition for resources (Brooks, 2005:1159). There is wide agreement by various scholars that failed states are characterised by violent extremism, political violence, and human insecurity which see terrorists and violent groups often take advantage of situations created by failing or

failed state. This strengthens the significance of using state failure theory in this research study. In support of this persistent argument, Howard (2014:20) states that:

[w]ith the recent attacks in Kenya and Somalia, and the failed bombing attempt on a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian national, it is becoming increasingly evident that internationally sponsored terrorist networks have found their base in sub-Saharan Africa and within the hearts and minds of its people, which poses significant challenges for the international community, given the region's patchwork of failed states, where terrorists can hide and thrive.

Furthermore, Patrick (2006:36) asserts that disgruntled groups are prone to adopt violence against repressive regimes and their perceived sponsors in the absence of peaceful avenues for political expression. He notes further that states that do not control borders or territories enhance the infiltration of terrorists and their operations. He contends that when states do not provide fundamental social needs this creates opportunities for charitable organisations or educational systems linked to radical networks to operate (Patrick, 2006:36). According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2016:5), armed terrorist groups in northern Mali – such as AQIM, Ansar Dine, with its affiliates such as Macina Liberation Front in central and Southern Mali and Al-Mourabitoun – operate in historically non-governed and under-governed spaces and this has enabled local alliances with rebel groups.

Therefore, state failure theory helps to explain terrorism. From the above, state failure creates an environment which is highly insecure, especially when the state is incapable of performing its security services. Rotberg (2003:6) shows that as failed states become characterised by increases in criminal violence, arms and drug trafficking will become prevalent, and ordinary police forces will not be effective. This situation will then cause citizens to seek support from warlords or any other prominent figures who show loyalty to ethnic or clan solidarity (Rotberg, 2003:6).

Apart from the aforesaid, other scholars argue that failed states generate nests for transnational terrorist activities. Coggins (2015:456) claims that the borders of failed states lack control and order, and instead enable trafficking of arms, drugs, money, and people regionally. In Sudan, because of the state's failure to contain internal violence, military groups ended up conducting violent raids across its border into Chad and attacking the refugee camps, thereby worsening the situation (Holmgren, 2008:16-17). The violence which has emerged from Nigeria has spilled over

to its neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger with grave terror attacks directed at government and civilians (Financial Action Task Force, 2015:5). Also, human security threats such as ecological degradation, refugee flows, contagious diseases, and famine worsen situations for foreign governments because failed states are unable to control their humanitarian crises (Coggins, 2015:456). When states fail to control their borders, the danger posed is the enhancement of all illegal activities by criminals, taking advantage of weak institutions and security apparatuses, which then enable terrorist activities. For instance, South Asia has turned into a dangerous zone of terrorist hotbeds, because terrorists have found a conducive environment due to the lawlessness of the Afghanistan state and the uncontrolled tribal regions of Pakistan (Howard, 2014:157).

It has been shown in the earlier sections that failed states are deeply corrupt. It is, therefore, important to further explore how corruption facilitates or creates a conducive environment for terrorist activities, illicit trading, and terror-related incidents. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017:1), terrorists and criminal organisations engage in broad activities that are facilitated by corruption. In order to raise money, al-Shabab in Somalia has opted to smuggle charcoal and sugar through the Kismayo port. Al-Shabab has been reportedly taxing the production and export of charcoal to the Gulf and facilitates sugar-smuggling imports (Izenman & Keatinge, 2020:13). It has been shown that Kenyan soldiers in Somalia are working with al-Shabab to enhance these smuggling channels (Izenman & Keatinge, 2020:13).

At the border point, criminals often bribe custom officials to smuggle prohibited goods unnoticeably. Corruption enables terrorists to finance their activities, smuggle equipment and secure their networks by defeating security and justice via bribing officials (OECD, 2010:7:3). If a state is functioning properly, upholding its responsibility to govern and keep the integrity of its institutions, corruption will not survive. In the absence of checks and balances, corruption exists, and it is that failure which then generates easy ways for criminal activities to take place. In addition to the above, Shelly (2018:6) notes that at border posts corruption enhances the entry of many forms of illicit trade that further weakens state stability. These illegal trades include drugs and arms, where terrorists often bribe corrupt officials and smuggle migrants easily (Shelly, 2018:6). Terrorists use weapons such as guns. If they can acquire as many guns as they want means that they can have the capability to counterattack militaries. State failure, therefore, does not only create conducive environments for terrorist activities but it also undermines states' abilities to deal with terror activities or violent extremism. For instance, according to the Organization for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017:2), one of the bombing suspects was reported to have paid a bribe to enter Thailand before the August 2015 Bangkok bombing.

Furthermore, terrorist or violent organisations might as well capitalise on the failure of the state to provide services to its citizens. For instance, in different regions of the world where states have been unable to provide services, terrorist and criminal groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, drug cartels, Hamas, or the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have stepped in as service providers, which often meant they obtained support from citizens (Shelly, 2018:6). Therefore, state failure explains and facilitates terrorism. The logic in this scenario is that when governments are unable to provide goods and services to their citizens, at some point it drives those who do not have options to become easily manipulated. Citizens will accept any means or source of living offered from any potential group, without taking into consideration the negative consequences, because what matters most is receiving basic services. In support of the above argument, Howard (2014:20) contends that because of continued state failure in the region, the people of sub-Saharan Africa are dissatisfied with their leaders and political institutions, which leaves them prone to the extremist ideologies of internationally sponsored terrorist groups who purport to offer economic advancement and political power.

Furthermore, Anaraki (2012:16) argues that the more corrupt governments are, the more likely the extremist groups in those countries to get involved in terrorist activities, meaning that corruption fuels terrorist activities. Adeniran (2019:25) is also of the view that various highly corrupt countries are full of terror acts, suggesting that corruption enables terrorism whether directly or indirectly. At borders or points of entry, officials who are corrupt can provide documents required by terrorists to conduct their operations, and corruption also enhances the smuggling of arms and drugs into countries, which impedes the competency of civil-militaries in curbing criminal acts (Adeniran, 2019:25). For example, in Beslan (in the North Caucasus of Russia) logistics were handled by a corrupt police official who accepted bribes from a terrorist who then conducted a terror attack at a school (Shelly, 2018:6). Owing to the availability of illegal arms in the hands of the wrong people, corruption not only promotes terrorism, but it further negatively impacts the capacities of states to control or to prevent criminal activities within their territories. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017:2), in the 2004 Domodevo Moscow airport bombing it might be that terrorists bribed security personnel to make bombs and weapons go unnoticed by the security systems.

Agang (2018:3) demonstrates that terrorist organisations often prey on disappointed youths who are affected economically as a result of few elites who are greedy and corrupt to such an extent that the youth are left with limited or absent economic opportunities. In other words, corruption undermines economic development because the resources that are supposed to be used for public benefit are used to benefit specific individuals. Lack of economic development leads to unemployment, which terrorists often take advantage of, and so those who are unemployed can easily end up as targets for terrorist recruitment. Further, Choi (2014:137) contends that when people are desperate, with no economic opportunities open to them, they can engage in terrorist activities as a way to express their demands. Therefore, state failure theory is very important in this study as it offers relevant explanations for terrorism.

### **3.5. Relative deprivation theory**

The previous section has explored the concept of state failure and indicated its links to terrorism. It was argued that state failure generates a host of problems including the emergence of violence and resentment which creates a conducive environment for terrorism and enables insurgencies. This section will explore the theory of relative deprivation to understand its relevance in explaining terrorism. There is strong evidence in the existing literature numerous scholars believe that relative deprivation theory does well to explain the origins of violence, protest, or terrorism. However, before delving into this theory, it is appropriate to first define relative deprivation theory. Thereafter its relevance in explaining terrorism is explored, and some examples are invoked to substantiate the analysis.

#### **3.5.1. Defining and conceptualising relative deprivation**

According to Onyepuemu (2015:125), relative deprivation is a classical theory that helps explain why people get involved in violence such as riots, rebellion, coups, and any other criminal activities. Onyepuemu (2015:125) conceives of relative deprivation as the difference between what people think they deserve and what they predict they can get. Pettigrew (2015:12) defines relative deprivation as a judgment that one or one's ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent and that this judgment generates feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement. He describes three fundamental components of relative deprivation. Those who experience relative deprivation do the following. First, they make cognitive comparisons. Second, they make cognitive appraisals and conclude that they themselves or their ingroup are disadvantaged. Third, they view these advantages as unfair, which then leads to anger and resentment (Pettigrew, 2015:12).

Similarly, Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin and Bialosiewicz (2015:2) posit that relative deprivation is the judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard, and that this judgement is accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment. The definitions above share the view that there is a sense or a feeling of anger or frustration, that these feelings derive from perceived relative deprivation, and that perceived relative deprivation is a result of people making either individual to individual or group to group comparisons. In general, people have expectations. And if those expectations are unmet, while at the same time they see other individuals or groups have those expectations met, they, the relatively deprived, become frustrated. That frustration can lead to violent actions either collectively or individually.

Relative deprivation is used by social scientists to predict a wide range of important outcomes, such as willingness to join protests, personal achievement, defiance, intergroup attitudes, and physical and mental health (*Smith et al.* 2015:2). For centuries relative deprivation theory has been used to explain links between frustration and political violence (Chassman, 2017:225). Relative deprivation theory illuminates connections between grievance, understandings of grievance, the mobilisation of individuals, and political violence (Chassman, 2017:225).

Furthermore, relative deprivation has been categorised into fraternal deprivation and egoistic deprivation. Chigozie (2016:2835) states that fraternal deprivation is the feeling that one's group is deprived of compared to another, while egoistic deprivation is the feeling that one individual is deprived in relation to another. Buttressing the point, he further argues that individuals and groups who do not fully get some goods, services, and stability are prone to organise jointly to enhance or defend their conditions (Chigozie, 2016:2853). According to Onyepuemu (2015:125), relative deprivation takes place when value anticipations exceed what one can reach. These expectations entail welfare, security, and self-actualisation, while value capabilities involve any legitimate ways of fulfilling expectations, such as employment, for example. For instance, a country with a high number of annual graduates, that has little to no employment prospects, may engender feelings of frustrations because, after graduation, graduates expect to be employed, and after years of unemployment they become frustrated (Onyepuemu, 2015:126). The following section will provide some examples to substantiate the above discussion.

### **3.5.2. Relative deprivation's link to terrorism**

In light of the previous argument, note that the Global Terrorism Index (2017:65) contends that recent studies have suggested that individuals who conduct terrorist attacks or who join terrorist groups are often motivated by relative deprivation. Those individuals whose social expectations

and economic welfare have been frustrated are at high risk for extremism. For instance, countries with high proportions of secondary educated populations who remain unemployed or underemployed often generate hotbeds for extremist ideology (Global Terrorism Index, 2017:65). Tunisia, for instance, has the highest number of citizens working as fighters for ISIL, of about 700,000 Tunisian job seekers in 2015, 200,000 were university graduates, who were competing for 79,000 largely low skill job vacancies. ISIL were at one point paying monthly salaries of up to \$2,000, and so many Tunisians were recruited due to economic desperation and poor economic and social conditions (Global Terrorism Index, 2017:67). Similarly, high rates of unemployment among graduates in Nigeria and accompanying disillusionment has led to Boko Haram recruitment (Aina, 2016:55).

According to Ige (2014:87), relative deprivation is linked to discrimination, feelings of injustice and subjective ill-being, and is used to interpret measures of inequality and income redistribution. He claims that relative deprivation clarifies notions of absolute poverty because relative deprivation is a significant factor in understanding objective and subjective impacts of inequality (Ige, 2014:88). As noted above relative deprivation is linked to discrimination, where discrimination can relate to ethnic, political, or economic dimensions. According to Saleh (2013:171), when ethnic groups inhabit the same political space while being treated differently politically, that can spur tensions that drive ethnic violence, terrorism, and civil war, and also present dangers to national unity, which in turn threaten the state's legitimacy and undermine its territorial integrity. Annan (2014:8) argues that within ten years of Samuel Doe's autocratic rule in Liberia, Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups received more favourable opportunities in comparison to other ethnic groups, which led to ethnic violence, which in turn stimulated an invasion by the Americano-Liberian Charles Taylor. This invasion led to a violent war which shattered Samuel Doe's autocratic government.

Onyepuemu (2015:126) argues that deprivation can also instigate competition for limited resources, which can lead to an armed conflict which in turn often causes atrocities and displacement. The view of Coggins (2015:464) closely supports the above; he argues that the decline in services leads to relative deprivation or stimulates societal groups to compete for scarce resources, and in this environment, terrorism might be used to target those closely associated with or favoured by the regime. Thus, deprived groups or societies might use violence or terror to express their grievances or challenge the legitimacy of their incompetent governments. Supporting this view further, Annan (2014:5) contends that bad governance and corruption have been the factors stimulating conflicts in Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote

d'Ivoire and other West African countries. Enaikele, Okekunle, Adebawole and Adeoye (2017:113) maintain that socio-economic deprivation, inequality, marginalisation and unequal access to opportunities presuppose relative deprivation. They contend that socio-economic and political deprivation culminates in violent and terrorist activities (Enaikele *et al.*, 2017:113). Other scholars insist that inequality fuels forms of deprivation which then generate social discontent and encourage collective actions that can lead to large scale political violence and wars (Ige, 2014:88). For instance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan conducted a jihad against the Uzbek government due to social injustice experiences (Oriola & Akinola, 2018:607).

In addition, Majeed (1979:140) maintains that:

Dissenting behaviour is based on political discontent and is an attempt to remove interference to goal achievement and, therefore, is indicative of frustration in the individual's feeling of his value expectation and value position. The former is the value people believe they are rightfully entitled to and the latter is the level of a value achieved. This discrepancy is known as relative deprivation, [which is] a cause for frustration and discontent [that] may easily lead to political instability and often, violence.

In relation to the above, Saleh (2013:166) mentioned that when the state is unable to meet people's needs (or their expectations) which they believe they are legitimately entitled to, those people will be frustrated and demonstrate their frustrations to the state. Saleh (2013:166) additionally claims that insecurity within society takes place when people within a certain geographically defined state have the assumption that their identity is threatened. The logic in this scenario is that the perceived threat might be because of a joint feeling of relative deprivation, which is either social, economic, political or cultural (Saleh, 2013:166). From the existing literature, what is agreed upon is that violent actions are generated by disillusionment and frustration emanating from relative deprivation. It is extremely important to acknowledge that the continued use of violence by elites to sustain their hegemony intensifies the cycle of violence and deprivation, deprivation which initially led groups to mobilise. The effects of deprivation feelings are salient in facilitating collective responses (Ige, 2014:89). There is a wide range of existing literature recognising that poverty fuels the emergence of terrorism, especially the fact that young men who are not employed might lack other avenues of employment other than those employment opportunities offered by terrorist groups (Plummer, 2012:418).

In addition, Hansen (2011:3) claims that terror might be high in particular states not because of the weakness in law enforcement and border control, but also because deprivation has driven the disgruntled population to entertain political violence and seek public goods from non-state actors. Supporting the above, and linking deprivation to frustrations, Olojo (2013:6) argues that individual and group grievances, like poverty, lack of employment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation can be utilised as mobilising tools by harmful groups to garner support and recruits for terrorist activities. Hence the significance of using the theory of relative deprivation in this research study. Furthermore, supporting the previous point, Pichette (2015:4), maintains that relative deprivation is a simple and widely recognised theory for explaining terrorism, contending that the core belief within relative deprivation is that those who do not fully attain their basic needs are prone to resort to violence. For instance, the United Liberation Front of Asom emerged in 1979 in north-east India as a result of poverty and relative deprivation from the Mokotos members of the community, whose land has been seized by the British during colonialism (Mitra, 2008:3).

Pichette (2015:4) advances poverty as a key factor in explaining terrorism in less developed parts of the world. As said earlier, when people do not get or reach what they expect to reach while seeing others doing so, they become angry and or frustrated. In the modern world, evidence exists that a wide range of people are denied livelihoods. Agang (2016:3) stresses that when the youth view their future being disrupted by those causing social, political and economic injustices, the result is frustration, and because of the painful and bad experiences, in this situation, they can feel they are left with no other avenues except to take arms against those who act against their prospects. Of significant importance with regards to this theory is that people who are frustrated and are not happy can be easily manipulated. Terrorists often prey on deprived youths (Okon, 2016:138).

Paying attention to the effect of frustration caused by relative deprivation and linking its significance to terrorism, Adeniran (2019:24) argues that protestors, rebels or violent groups who are dissatisfied with government policies and programs, and are competing with the state, either for power or from ideological motives, might also conduct terror attacks. Also, if a regime is not incapacitated, or too ignorant to stabilise the macroeconomic conditions, and its citizens are unable to make ends meet, there is a potential for violence against those causing such situations (Coggins, 2015:459). For example, between 1966 and 1994 terrorist activities in Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador were influenced by high inequality and poverty (Mitra, 2008:4). For instance, the Group of Popular Combatants in Ecuador is an existing terrorist group motivated to fight for the interests of the deprived and the poor, and who aim their protests at the government's

imperialist policies (Mitra, 2008:4). This further suggests that relative deprivation theory helps to explain terrorism.

Coggins (2015:459) emphasises that several studies have suggested that richer countries and their citizens can be targeted by transnational terrorist groups. He argues that this is evidence that terrorist groups target those deemed complicit in the poverty and suffering of their people (Coggins, 2015: 459). The issue of inequality is very crucial, particularly in its influence on and effectiveness in generating feelings of frustration. In relation to the foregoing argument, Krieger and Meierrieks (2016:4) broadly argue that:

Relative deprivation theory suggests that a country's level of income inequality is directly related to its level of terrorist activity. Income inequality breeds frustration due to feelings of relative deprivation; frustration, in turn, results in terrorism. Societies that see higher levels of economic inequality also see larger parts of society affected by relative deprivation. That is, more income inequality within a society coincides with a large pool of frustrated “have-nots” and thus a higher risk of terrorism. Terrorism is used by the frustrated “have-nots” to violently voice discontent, punish the “haves” and challenge (and possibly change in their favour) the distribution of economic resources. For one, this notion indeed matches the self-perception of terrorist groups which often portray themselves as fighting for the “poor” or “social justice”. For another, it also corresponds to the political goals and incentives often associated with terrorism.

There is a combination of inequities that drives individuals or groups to act violently because of frustration stemming from deprivation. Inequality is a transparent and consistent cause of relative deprivation and is not limited to social-economic or political issues. Inequality fosters not only frustrations but also poverty, which is an additional motive for frustration. Victoroff (2005:19) maintains that one possibility is that either absolute deprivation or economic disparity fuels terrorist sentiment, specifically within members of an oppressed underclass. There is empirical evidence of employment discrimination against Bengalis in eastern Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s, which generated frustrations (Dzuverovic, 2013:126). Hutus and Tutsis have fought over control of central state institutions in Rwanda and Burundi, and the Tamils in Sri Lanka have been aggrieved by linguistic and educational discrimination (Dzuverovic, 2013:126).

To support the argument further, Parida (2007:130-132) posits that the link between social inequalities and experiences of relative deprivation has been spotlighted as an explanation of high levels of violence and terrorist activities. Parida contends that before they achieve their national, regional or global stature, terrorist groups start locally and then later expand. Their expansion is in relation to their ideology and political aims. A desperate economic situation often drives poor and disadvantaged groups to violence and terrorism because they are convinced that they have nothing to lose. The poor and disenfranchised are susceptible to become domestic terrorists because of their feelings of anger, frustration and lack of other avenues to enhance their living standards (Choi, 2014:142). In Morocco, individuals who conducted suicide attacks have had histories of disillusionment and feelings of bitterness that were engendered by a lack of jobs, poverty, and social tensions (Chukwu & Chukwu, 2017:2020).

Relative deprivation, as indicated previously, emanates from a state's failure to govern its territory and an inability to provide or distribute goods and services equally amongst its people. In other words, when states are incapable of alleviating poverty and creating employment, the result is deprivation, which spurs feelings of frustration from the pain of suffering and hardships. Elu (2012: 348) maintains that what motivates minority groups to turn to violence is captured by relative deprivation theory. For instance, when their income is lower than expected or lower than what they believe they deserve (Elu, 2012:348). For terrorism to occur, there need to be factors that promote or facilitate it. And as shown above, deprivation is a result of a host of conditions that are not favourable either to individuals or groups. According to Mitra (2008:57) poverty, ignorance and lack of employment can also act as catalysts for terrorism since they generate a sense of hopelessness.

### **3.5.3. Criticism of relative deprivation theory in explaining terrorism**

Even though the theory of relative deprivation has been selected for explaining terrorism, some scholars have disputed this theory. For instance, Pichette (2015:4) argues that relative deprivation theory does not account for many impoverished people who do not use violence to resolve their grievances. Besides, other studies have tried to analyse terrorism based on individual behaviour. According to Okon (2016:9), their findings suggest that, on the individual level, violent activity is not linked with poor economic conditions or low levels of education. Some author claim that higher income and better education does not stop people from conducting terrorist activities (Okon, 2016:9). Victoroff (2005:20) argues that even though poverty might play a role in some political

violence, relative deprivation is neither necessary nor enough to explain revolutionary terrorism. He argues that right-wing extremism occurs independently of economic status.

Furthermore, another factor lacking in the theory of relative deprivation in explaining collective violence or its links to terrorism is the absence of clarity in explaining violence from the government's point of view. Brush (1996:536) notes that relative deprivation theory fails to address the role of government violence. State violence might be crucial in some cases. However, relative deprivation theory assumes that state violence, whether or not actively inflicted, is normal whilst the behaviour of dissidents is not legitimate or normal, and such requires more explanation. There has also been a lack of clarity about the link between relative deprivation and the extent of violence. Brush (1996:536) notes that a positive correlation between relative deprivation and an amount of violence does not prove that relative deprivation causes the full extent of the violence. Parida (2007:133) is of the view that even though poverty makes a population vulnerable to an extremist message in the Muslim world, it cannot be the only cause of terrorism because some individuals might engage in terrorism for personal reasons. Destroying property and killing innocent human beings cannot be characterised by poverty but only by anti-wealth and anti-life ideas (Parida, 2007:133).

Even though other scholars disputed the link between relative deprivation and poverty, noting that poverty does not necessarily lead to terrorism, recent studies have suggested that there is a link between inequality and terrorism. For instance, Choi (2014:138) discusses research that indicates that countries with minority groups who are economically alienated are more prone to domestic terrorism because those groups enduring economic hardship will resort to violence. This reinforces the significance of relative deprivation in explaining terrorism, which has been justified by citing empirical evidence in section 3.5.2 above. Evidence pertaining to relative deprivation in Nigeria will be presented in greater detail in chapter four.

Furthermore, supporting relative deprivation in explaining terrorism, recent empirical research by Krieger and Mierrieks (2016:3), offers empirical findings after conducting a sample of 114 countries from 1985 to 2012 which suggests that higher levels of income inequality result in more terrorist activity. They show that income inequality specifically enhances terrorism by spurring social frustration, directly because of relative deprivation, and indirectly by facilitating the decay of institutions, for example, by undermining the rule of law (Krieger & Mierrieks, 2016:3). This means that relative deprivation is still relevant and can be utilised to help explain terrorism and the above outcomes cannot be merely discarded. These recent studies which support the link

between relative deprivation and terrorism cement the significance of this theory particularly with relevance to the aims of this research study.

### **3.6. Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the theoretical framework of this research study, namely state failure theory and relative deprivation theory. The chapter first defined the concept of state and then articulated characteristics of the failed states to create a logical connection between states, characteristics of state failure and its links to terrorism. This has been done by citing a vast literature comprising different scholars who argue that terrorism is facilitated by the fact that governments are failing to maintain their statehood responsibilities. The literature also suggested that state failure creates a conducive environment for facilitating or enabling terrorists to conduct attacks. After exploring the state failure argument and its links to terrorism, chapter three also explored relative deprivation theory and offered a review of the literature to indicate the concept's significance in explaining terrorism in general. Relative deprivation was defined, there was a discussion of the factors which facilitate relative deprivation so as to familiarise the reader with why this theory is relevant in explaining terrorism. Chapter three indicated that several scholars support the view that relative deprivation has been used and is still being used by scientists to explain social movements, revolutions, political violence, coups, and terrorism.

It has briefly discussed some scholars who do not support this theory because of its inability to remedy individual interests and some terror acts that are conducted by people who are not poor. However, the disagreement has been remedied by providing evidence from different scholars who argue for relative deprivation as a significant theory to explain terrorism. There is a link between state failure and relative deprivation, which has made these two theories relevant in this research study. The findings of this chapter will be used in chapter four to empirically analyse the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

## **Chapter 4: To what extent have state failure and relative deprivation facilitated the expansion of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria?**

### **4.1. Introduction**

Recall that two of this thesis's supportive questions are: what is state failure theory and how can it explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria? And: what is relative deprivation theory and how can it explain Boko Haram's rise?

In order to respond to these supportive research questions, chapter four examines the factors that have led to the rise of Boko Haram. It does so by linking the understandings of state failure and relative deprivation provided in chapter three with the empirical evidence, namely a case study of Boko Haram. The nature and the extent of both state failure and relative deprivation, particularly in northern Nigeria, in which Boko Haram has found its roots are examined in this chapter. By doing so, chapter four addresses one of the main aims of this study, which is to analyse the origins of Boko Haram and assess its expansion from a small group to becoming the most dangerous terrorist organisation in Nigeria and Lake Chad Basin. An additional aim, also pursued in this research study, which is to assess whether actions taken by the Nigerian state and regional organisations were effective and if not recommend possible alternatives for dealing with the recurring terror attacks, will be addressed in chapter five and in chapter six.

Chapter four examines in detail how, inequality, poverty, insecurity, continued economic underdevelopment, institutional weaknesses such as lack of political accountability and legitimacy within political parties and elites, and lack of security within Nigerian borders created fertile grounds for terror attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. This chapter provides the latest evidence of the ongoing attacks orchestrated by Boko Haram in 2019, evidencing the continued existence of Boko Haram. Thereafter, it discusses Borno State and other north-east states in Nigeria. It highlights, by using maps, the hotspots of violence in northern Nigeria, which helps to demonstrate that state failure and relative deprivation helps to explain the rise of Boko Haram.


### **4.2. The ongoing attacks**

According to Human Rights Watch (2019)'s world report, regardless of state military advances, and despite the claim made by the government that it has curbed Boko Haram militants, Boko Haram remains a threat to security in the north-east region. The group is still active although not regularly as before. Of significant concern is the extent of trauma, fear, economic destruction,

insecurity, and uncertainty being caused, not just the extent of the present threat. As stipulated by Human Rights Watch (2019) in 2018, about 1,200 lives have been lost and approximately 200,000 people have been displaced by suicide bombings and abductions conducted by Boko Haram militants. For instance, 84 fatalities were reported in a double suicide bomb explosion orchestrated by Boko Haram terrorists at a Mosque in Mubi Adamawa State (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The attacks by Boko Haram have never fully been stopped; new attacks have been and are still being conducted. A recent CNN report stresses that about 65 people have been reported dead after attacks by suspected Boko Haram members in Nganzai District, near the Borno capital in Maiduguri (Busari *et al.* 2020). Also, on 15 August 2019, according to The Defense Post (2019), three soldiers were killed by Boko Haram militants in a village located on the outskirts of Borno State capital Maiduguri.

The economic impact of Boko Haram, according to World Bank (2015:3) amounts to \$9 billion throughout six north-east states, with two-thirds of the damages \$5.9 billion in Borno. Other affected states include Adamawa and Yobe, with damages amounting to \$1.6 billion in Adamawa and \$1.2 billion in Yobe. Three-quarters of the total damages have been on agriculture, \$3.5 billion, and housing, \$3.3 billion. The conflict has resulted in 400,000 destroyed housing units, of which 95% have been in Borno State (World Bank, 2015:3). The above indicates the extent of the damages caused and that the terror attacks have continued, which presents a worrisome situation. These recent attacks prove that the issue of security in Nigeria is still of great concern and should not be underestimated.

Deaths per state from May 2015 - Jan 2019



**Map 4.1 Numbers of death caused by conflict between Boko Haram, military, sectarian actors and state actors from May 2015 to January 2019**

(Source: Giles, 2019)

Map 4.1 highlights the extent of fatalities from 2015 to January 2019, with high rates being in Borno, followed by Yobe and Adamawa. About 9,154 deaths have been recorded in Borno State, followed by other states in the north-east. The next section briefly discusses Borno State and some states in the north-east to familiarise the reader with the high rates of poverty, lack of employment, inequality and bad governance in these states, and also empirically demonstrates that poverty caused by relative deprivation, which was born out of state failure, helps to explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

#### 4.3. Overview of Borno State and other north-eastern states in Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has its origins in Borno State, for this reason, it is important to briefly describe Borno State and other states in northern Nigeria. According to Johnson

(2018:181), Borno State is a traditionally Muslim region in the north-east of Nigeria, with its capital in Maiduguri being the largest of Nigeria's 36 states. It covers an area of 116.589 kilometres, and has a population of about 4.3 million people, of which 80% are Muslim. Borno State shares borders with Cameroon and Chad to the east and Niger to the North, and in which Kanuri, Babur and Shuwa Arabs are the major ethnic groups (Johnson, 2018:181). Furthermore, the infrastructure of Borno State is highly underdeveloped; there are about 2.449 kilometres of tarred roads and 755 kilometres of untarred seasonal roads. The city of Maiduguri, according to Johnson (2018:181), is connected to the rest of Nigeria and the outside world by an international airport. Electricity supply is only provisioned to urban areas, specifically to areas where offices of the local government are located (Johnson, 2018:181). The impact of poverty and low education prospects in northern Nigeria is remarkable. Only 2% of children under 25 months are vaccinated, while 83% of youths are illiterate, and 48% of children have never been to school (Agiboa, 2013a:20). This is a strong indication of state failure and the presence of the conditions which lead to relative deprivation.

Borno State had remained the hotspot of violence, over 60% of Boko Haram attacks in 2011 occurred there, and in terms of death, over 70% in 2013 and over 80% in 2014 have been reported in Borno State (Weeraratne, 2017:614). There are also other states in the northern part of Nigeria in which poverty is extremely high and those are places in which Boko Haram attacks have been acute. For instance, according to Osumah (2013:554), in Sokoto, at one point the poverty rate was 81.2%, with other states sitting above 70%. In terms of the north-east region, high poverty rates have been recorded. In Adamawa 74%, Bauchi 73%, Gombe 74% and Yobe 74%. In the north-west region, Jigawa 74%, Katsina 75%, Kebbi 72% and Zamfra 71%. The north-central Plateau State has 74% and Ebonyi 74% in the south (Osumah, 2013:554). These might not be the present poverty rates in these states. But these poverty rates empirically suggest that poverty has actually led to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, given the fact that the terrorist hotspots have emerged in the states in which poverty has been prevalent. See Map 4.2 below, which highlights the most troubled hotspots in Nigeria



**Map 4.2 Nigeria's terrorist hotspots**

(Source: Giles, 2019)

Most states highlighted as hotspots on Map 4.2 are the same states cited by various scholars as the nests for Boko Haram terrorist attacks. For instance, Weerarante (2017:614), Agiboa (2013a:20), Meagher (2014:2), Smith (2015:85), Bourne (2015:235), and others believe that poverty in the northern states has made the youth vulnerable to extremism and easy recruits for Boko Haram terrorist militants (Adelaja *et al.*, 2018:6). The following section examines the extent and the nature of state failure in northern Nigeria.

#### 4.4. Explaining how state failure has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram

In chapter three state failure theory was conceptualised together with the presentation of some empirical evidence from those states deemed to have failed or be failing and which have experienced or are still experiencing terrorism. In order to show that northern Nigeria comprises

a failed or weak state, it is crucial to highlight the characteristics of state failure explored in chapter three and then illustrate the nature and the extent of state failure in northern Nigeria. Chapter disclosed that state failure entails a government that is unable to maintain public services, institutions, or authority, or might have lost the autonomy to control its territory. Similarly, Coggins (2015:461) has argued that failing or failed states' dysfunction entails the following conditions. The government a) fails to provide basic public infrastructure and services, leading to extreme deprivation within its population, involving human insecurity. The government b) fails to provide stable and reliable public institutions, offering only increasingly corrupt, exploitative, and or ineffective governance. The state is incapacitated. The governing regime c) experiences fundamental political collapse or is so internally contested that political authority is ambiguous throughout significant portions of the territory. In this case there is political collapse.

Having highlighted some of the characteristics of state failure above, the following section will first examine the nature and the extent of corruption, lack of accountability and legitimacy amongst political elites and explain its impact in fuelling terrorism in northern Nigeria.

#### **4.4. Corruption and its impact in fuelling terrorism in Nigeria**

##### **4.4.1. Lack of accountability and legitimacy amongst political elites**

Chapter three argued that failed states can have officials so corrupt that they accept bribes from terrorists. It might not be fair to argue that Nigerian state as a whole is a failed or a failing state, but by paying particular attention to the nature and the extent of corruption in northern Nigeria and linking its impact to the rise of Boko Haram, it is evident that the northern part embodies the characteristics of state failure. In support of this view, Heim and McQuaid (2015:23) note that corruption in Nigeria is prevalent in political and economic life across the country, indicating that corruption is prevalent mostly in the north-east where there is a limited genuine or legal pathway to wealth. Government officials have been accused of receiving payments from Boko Haram (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:23). Human Rights Watch in 2012 discovered that the car bomb attack at the UN Offices in Abuja in August 2011 was enabled by a government security officer, who accepted a bribe at the checkpoints, within an 800 kilometres route from Maiduguri to Abuja (Anthony & Humphrey, 2017:649). Corrupt activities likely offered an opportunity for Boko Haram members to access important information which the group could have used to its advantage against the Nigerian government.

Aina (2016:54) contends that the failure of the Nigerian government to provide adequate jobs to most graduates, who spend time loitering in the streets seeking employment opportunities, helps to explain the rise of Boko Haram memberships. Onuoha (2010:62) argues that failure within the Nigerian leadership should be considered as worsening the crisis, in that political elites have failed to lawfully provide public resources to curtail prevalent human security vulnerabilities. Since poverty rates are high, and there is a lack of employment prospects for the youth, Boko Haram could offer the disgruntled youth an opportunity to fight against the system they believe is causing their sufferings (Onuoha, 2010:62). Corruption has negatively impacted the provision of necessities to Nigerian citizens. Some argue that the biggest factor that has hindered the Nigerian state from efficiently maintaining the distribution of fundamental service delivery to its people has been corruption (Mlambo, 2017:5).

Apart from failing to give people freedom and civil or political rights so that they can air their frustrations to the elites, the Nigerian state has also not been able to provide economic security to the Muslim north of the country (Pichette, 2015:6). If the state followed legal procedures and committed to resolving the national issues in a manner that exemplifies a legitimately functioning state, the rise of Boko Haram would have been limited to some extent. Suleiman and Karim (2015:5) contend that the prevalence of corruption by public officials in Nigeria has sustained the level of unemployment and poverty and has led to an unstable social environment. Heim and McQuaid (2015:15) stress that the northern politicians, and their counterparts at the federal level, have jointly failed to provision public goods and services, as well as public funds, and instead they have used extrajudicial means like illegal militias to kill those who do not support them, so that they can secure their political positions.

While Boko Haram is striving to implement Sharia law in Nigeria, continued corruption, extreme poverty and lack of employment for the youth continue to fuel the supporters of Boko Haram and its members (Agiboa, 2013b:148). Heim and McQuaid (2015:23) note that local clerics in the north have also accepted bribes from Boko Haram members, not because of personal monetary reasons but as a means to buy protection from the group, at the same time promising Boko Haram members powerful positions in the region. Therefore, because of the above scenario, it is coherent for one to argue that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been enhanced or motivated by corruption, emanating from state failure, where government institutions are fragile and not legitimately functioning. Osumah (2013:553) states:

Political patronage has essentially been the basis of dispensing benefits to a few of the citizenry while a large number without 'political connection' are still left uncared for. Thus, this situation has made the youth aware that the elites have no plans for them. Many young people have thus been tempted into involvement with Boko Haram in the northern part of the country.

From above scenario, it is clear that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been facilitated by a dysfunctional government. As a result of patronage and ignorance, those who are not themselves closely linked to political elites or prominent figures, have been struggling to find meaningful life prospects. The behaviour of political elites has driven the youths to sacrifice themselves to Boko Haram militants to make ends meet. According to Osumah (2013:553), most Boko Haram fighters are mostly youths who left rural areas for towns, and who were seeking for better opportunities.

Besides, Olojo (2013:5) echoes the view that other political elites in Borno State have been suspected to have been funding Boko Haram and the lifestyle of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf. These politicians could capitalise on the popular support which Yusuf would garner for them in for electoral victory during elections in 2003 and 2007 (Olojo, 2013:5).

In this situation, one cannot ignore the idea that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria has been exacerbated by corruption, and, to make matters worse, by the very political elites on whom people rely. Political elites have allowed Boko Haram members and their leaders to gain public credibility and exposure by allowing them to address the public. Having known that Boko Haram was a terror group, one questions why the state would have permitted them opportunities to freely address public gatherings. According to Maiangwa *et al.* (2012:29), Yusuf has held the belief that his group would prefer death over accepting the corrupt system in the country. The group had several clashes with state security forces over their refusal to accept a national law requiring motorcyclists to use helmets (Maiangwa *et al.*, 2012:29-30). Olojo (2013:5) further contends that Alhaji Buji Foi, an affiliate of Yusuf at that time, was appointed as the Commissioner of Religious Affairs in Borno State, and he was believed to have been sponsoring Boko Haram before he died in July 2009 in the hands of police.

Weerarante (2017:626) points out that prominent Borno politicians, like the former governor, Ali Modu Sheriff, former Commissioner, Alhaji Buji Foi, and Senator, Mohammed Ali Ndume have been accused of sponsoring Boko Haram with finance and logistics. The existence of this empirical evidence of political leaders having been accused of associating with and sponsoring

Boko Haram terrorists strengthens the view that corruption has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Indeed, this has made it easier for Boko Haram to manage their operations, purchase guns, food or other useful resources they might have required to launch their attacks. In the absence of financial support from political elites it would have been difficult for Boko Haram members to effectively continue to enact their terror activities. This also justifies the view that the northern part of Nigeria has characteristics of state failure. For example, in chapter three it has been stressed that when the governing regime experiences fundamental political collapse or is internally contested to the extent that political authority is ambiguous throughout significant portions of territory, this leads to a failing or a failed state (Coggins, 2015:461).

The connection between Boko Haram and local politicians is evident in the inauguration of both Fofi and Yusuf, who have held crucial positions in the government of Borno State (Akinola, 2015:9). High credibility for supporting Boko Haram has been gained by the image of Yusuf's link with popular politicians who allowed him to implement and spread Sharia law. Being able to push their agenda for a period of more than five years without being interrupted shows that Nigerian politicians were responsible for enhancing the rise of Boko Haram. The failure to fulfil the desire of Boko Haram leaders to fully implement Sharia law, according to Akinola (2015:9), has driven Yusuf to be disappointed and rally against his political allies. Akinola (2015:9) argues that Sheriff becoming the executive governor of Borno State from 2003 to 2007 was due to the support garnered from Boko Haram members and some local militias. The northern politicians created an image of hope, imagining that Boko Haram would become a useful tool in Nigeria but at the same time used brutality and turned against them after the 2003 elections. This, in other words, instilled anger and violent resentment in those who faced Boko Haram's brutality.

One wonders if the Nigerian state cares about or legitimately monitors the legality of political parties or individual politicians within its state. Allowing governors to associate with Boko Haram members to the extent of giving them crucial positions in some states indicates a great disaster within the Nigerian government. As Iyekekpolo (2018:8) state:

Sheriff's association with the fundamentalist Boko Haram group made it politically relevant in the state and therefore boldly made extreme demands which were unattainable in a secular Nigerian state. The uncompromising nature of these demands set Boko Haram against the state in violent confrontations which included the killing of Boko Haram members and subsequent revenge mission by a rejuvenated group bent on achievement its demand.

The behaviour of Nigerian political elites facilitated the rise of Boko Haram. What might have been most dangerous in this poor campaigning tactic was the fact that the public or even those who might have never heard about Boko Haram, could have perceived Boko Haram as a legitimate group because of its association with trusted people within the society. Thus, stimulating an environment in which people were not scared to associate themselves with Boko Haram terrorists saw the rise of the group and its ability to pose the greatest security threat to the state. Akinola (2015:9) contends that the political connection between politicians and militant groups in Nigeria exemplifies a lack of democratic politics in Nigeria. He asserts that politicians unlawfully use militants' groups to coerce citizens to support their political parties. Although these groups were usually neglected, they still possessed the arms and ammunition given to them by politicians, and the rise of militancy and Boko Haram before the 2003 elections is attributed to such behaviour (Akinola 2015:9). This implies that the state's failure to monitor campaigns democratically and the inability of the Nigerian state to obstruct the intimidation activities against civilians in a sovereign state justifies the impact of state failure in stimulating the rise of Boko Haram.

Anthony and Humphrey (2017:649) show that at some point northern politicians and traditional and religious leaders have been backing the Boko Haram insurgency to fulfil their agenda of promoting northern domination and the supremacy of the Muslim religion in the affairs of the Nigerian state. Furthermore, to get elected, politicians have been toying with Islamic concerns everywhere in the north since the end of military rule in 1999 (Montclos, 2014b:148). For instance, in 2001, Muhamad Buhari, by then, the opposition leader of the All Nigeria People's Party was reported to have announced that Sharia law must be introduced throughout the country. This approach was suddenly followed by the northern governors of the ruling People's Democratic Party. These acts by politicians, on which Boko Haram has preyed, in the context of leaders elected fraudulently, saw Boko Haram unafraid to pay private militia to destroy those who were against them (Montclos, 2014b:149). This links with the views of Chukwu and Chukwu (2017:2016) who assert that the structures of government were dysfunctional and holders of political offices unaccountable, and that campaigning candidates did not hesitate to kill to win elections and become rich overnight.

During their field research, Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018:134), remarked that, while responding to the survey, a former state security officer maintained that:

The cause of Boko Haram has much to do with economic crises in north-eastern Nigeria, aided by corrupt political leaders who initiated this insurgency by

making use of the group for self-political interests, after which they are now trying to curb it. Unfortunately, it is no longer within their control.

The above suggests that politicians in Nigeria have been unscrupulously using Boko Haram for their own ends without taking into consideration or recognising that they have been strengthening Boko Haram.

Walker (2012:9) argues that Boko Haram grew to such an extent that it acquired many state-like functions, like giving welfare handouts, job training, employment within small industries, provisioning resources for the community, and imposing moral police along the same lines as the Hisbah religious police in Kano. Boko Haram gained popularity by replacing the Nigerian state's prerogative to provide its citizens with basic human needs. People within certain communities could see the capability and the perceived ability of Boko Haram to change their lives.

According to Anthony and Humphrey (2017:649), because of the Nigerian government's inability to deal with social and economic issues, opportunities were granted to some radical Islamic clerics and other religious extremists, who preyed on state failure, and offered welfare handouts to the poor, which in turn saw the Boko Haram insurgency being buoyed by youth who assumed that Boko Haram could help to resolve the problems which came as a result of state failure.

Olojo (2013:5) argues that political actors who have been associated with Boko Haram members have done so because of the group's capacity to mobilise a large number of people. In turn, the group gained greater access to resources, such as access to tax, busses, and motorcycles. These motorcycles were then distributed to the unemployed youth who became Boko Haram recruits (Olojo, 2013:5). The fact that politicians allowed Boko Haram leaders access to resources illegally signifies how state failure facilitated the rise of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. The youth, having realised that Boko Haram was able to provide them with motorcycles and some economic relief, even volunteered to commit to Boko Haram and assist in terror attacks. For instance, Boko Haram have been reported to have been offering daily meals, organising affordable marriages, and giving credits for small commercial activities (Meagher, 2014:2). Derso (2017:8) shows that Yusuf has used resources acquired from Buji Foji to offer small loans to youth so they could buy weapons from Chad. Also, greed for positions as prominent politicians has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria.

#### **4.4.2. Poor security apparatus and lack of intelligence to forecast the dangers of extremist groups**

Chapters two and three argued that failed states are also characterised by weak security apparatuses. Lack of proper security, emanating from the state's failure to maintain robust and strong security to protect its weapons also contributed to the rise of Boko Haram. Terrorists fight with weapons and ammunition. Smith (2015:13) stresses that Boko Haram members have managed to steal ammunition from the Nigerian military. This has made them able to conduct their violent attacks and grow in strength. In addition to state failure which has weakened the security apparatus of the Nigerian state, Azama (2015:56) shows that Boko Haram terrorists have managed to execute government officials, chiefs, and local Islamic leaders to instil fear within citizens and prove the government's weakness and its failure to guarantee security to its people. However, this scenario implies that the incapacity of Nigerian security has made people doubt the government and has likely driven them to believe in the superiority of Boko Haram. People thus join Boko Haram more easily, which expands their numbers, and further enables them to fight against the government forces.

The previous analysis also helps to support what has been explored in chapter three while showing how a state's failure is linked to terrorism. Absent security undermines internal cohesion and the functions of the state and its capacity to use its institutions for enhancing its fundamental values and socio-political-economic objectives and legitimately fulfil its people's aspirations (Onyepuemu, 2015:124). The incapacity of the security forces has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram.

In addition, Aina (2016:29) argues that the failure of the government's security apparatus to guarantee safety and security has been a matter of concern because the insurgents possess heavy weaponry. This weakness in security apparatuses has been a great advantage for terrorists who could then counter-attack the government forces. Another danger has been the ability of Boko Haram to control ammunition industries where bombs have been made illegally (Maingwa *et al.*, 2012:33). Niger's State Security Services raided a bomb-making factory in September 2011, in Chechnya village, in a remote part of the Tafa Local Government Area of Niger State, that had crucial links with Boko Haram. Another bomb-making industry was discovered in the Rafin Guza area of Kaduna state in April 2011 (Maingwa *et al.*, 2012:33). The fact that Boko Haram managed to have two bomb-making industries in a sovereign state demonstrates a lack of security and the required intelligence to identify such activities.

Another fact that has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram has been the weakness of the intelligence services and the incapability of the Nigerian security to identify, assess, and take precautions against containing the crisis before it reached climax level (Onuoha, 2010:61). The failure of the intelligence agencies and state security to predict the dangers caused by Boko Haram at an early stage permitted the group to expand its influence until it managed to start launching attacks against the government. For these reasons, the absence of solid security has played a role in facilitating the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:33) show that the Presidential Panel designated to investigate the dangers of Boko Haram reported that 'there was no effective and coordinated intelligence gathering to forestall crime' prior to the recent attacks by Boko Haram.

In addition, Solomon (2012:9) shows that high-ranking politicians have not been able to sufficiently arm their security services or give them enough resources to conduct long-term intelligence operations to investigate Islamist organisations within the state. Explaining this differently, poor intelligence has been blamed for not identifying the dangers of what was being planned by different Islamic organisations before they conducted attacks against the state. In this scenario, it appears that Boko Haram intelligence has been or is more advanced than the state's security intelligence. Therefore, in the case of the rise of Boko Haram, poor security explains and seems to prove that it has facilitated the crisis. Furthermore, Ofongo (2016:158) maintains that the destruction of strategic institutions and expertise indicates that prominent government officials have been involved in the continued attacks conducted by Boko Haram against the state. Due to weaknesses and a lack of honest, solid security systems, Boko Haram has managed to prey on the security defects in the Nigerian state.

Some Nigerian political elites, including two former military heads of state, and ex-civilian vice president from the north, were formally accused of collaborating with Boko Haram militants Aghedo and Osumah (2012:858). It has also been noted that some of the state security agencies' members were Boko Haram members who assisted Boko Haram with training (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012: 858). This explains the failure of the Nigerian state's security apparatus. The state lacked the internal security intelligence to assist the government in identifying or investigating official members believed to have been linked with Boko Haram militants. While these weaknesses were prevalent, it is germane to argue that the state's lack of proper security, which falls under the characteristics of state failure, helps to explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

#### **4.4.3. Nigeria's failure to fully govern its territories and the negligence to protect rural areas**

The failure of the state to fully govern its territory has been indicated as one of the characteristics of state failure. Looking into this perspective and relating its impact to the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, this section highlights incidences which support the view that the northern part of Nigeria is a failing or a failed state. According to Aina (2016:14), the existence and survival of Boko Haram has been sustained by the weakness of the central government in Nigeria. The failure of the Nigerian government to fully control its territory has made Boko Haram able to conduct its criminal activities, mostly in north-east and north-central Nigeria, where the government's sovereign authority is limited (Aina, 2016:15). In other words, if the Nigerian state managed to exercise its legitimacy and authority, by continuously governing its territory and maintaining order, the group would not have grabbed opportunities to conduct its criminal activities, and it would not have managed to intimidate villagers and recruit as many youths.

Several states were under control of Boko Haram militants by July 2013. Agiboa (2013b) contends that Marte, Mobbar, Guzama, Gubio, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala- Balge, and Gamboru local government areas in northern Borno have been under control of Boko Haram militants. This is an indication of how state failure has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. While Boko Haram militants were in total control of these states, the group garnered support and recruited people easily because, at that particular time, Boko Haram militants proved that the state was incapable of obstructing its influence. That states, who had a legitimate government, with the power to govern all their territories, that have been under the control of Boko Haram is a matter of concern.

Moreover, the inability to protect certain villages and rural areas has also been one of the factors that have allowed the group to survive and expand especially since 2014. According to Weeraratne (2017:618), about 3 million people in north-eastern Nigeria and the border regions of Cameroon were under Boko Haram's control in late September 2014. The fact that Boko Haram at some point has managed to have such a vast number of people under its control is a clear indication of the Nigerian government's inability to govern its territory. Indeed, this might not be the current situation, but the impact of the damages caused by poor state control cannot be reversed. Aghedo and Osumah (2012:863) show that Boko Haram has taken advantage of the weakness of the Nigerian security apparatuses, such as the police being poorly equipped for surveillance and information gathering.

The other aspect of insecurity is uncontrolled crime. Solomon (2012:9) has pointed out that armed gangs in northern Nigeria, some of whom are thousands in number, including groups like the Almajirai, Yan Tauri, Yan Daba, Yan Banga, and Yan Dauka Amariya, provide recruits to extremists, Boko Haram in particular. This indicates that the Nigerian government has been unable to deal with gang violence, and this weakness in security apparatuses is evidence of state failure. The above supports the view indicated in chapter three that failed states are characterised by an increase in criminal violence, arms, and drug trafficking, which becomes acute as ordinary police becomes more ineffective (Rotberg, 2003:6).

Reinforcing the above, Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:31) argue that the negligence of security officers, and a lack of freedom from injurious consequences, in the context of poverty, and a shortage of proper security are crucial factors that have accelerated Boko Haram terror attacks. The authors argue that there have been several warnings by the imams and reports to the police and the government about the anticipated dangers of Boko Haram, but unfortunately the government had a deaf and dumb response up until the escalation of violent attacks in July 2009 (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:33). The above argument indicates a lack of commitment by the Nigerian government to listen or to accept the views of society. The government only reacted when they realised that their interests were threatened and challenged by the group's ability to attack the state's security agents and premises. As a result of ignorance, Boko Haram had ample time to prepare and expand its influence on the state without being disturbed, which shows that state failure in Nigeria has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram.

In addition, Walker (2014:2) indicates that weaknesses within institutions of politics and security services have created a political situation in which threats to stability could not be resolved until violence occurred. The uses of violence to deal with the crisis of Boko Haram were created under such conditions. Supporting the above argument, lack of state functionality and political will to deal with these issues by using alternative solutions contributed heavily to the Boko Haram insurgency. Dersso (2017:8) has argued that the Boko Haram insurgency need not be generalised as the group's strength and tactics because the weakness of the institutions, norms, and systems of governance of the Nigerian state are also responsible for the crisis.

#### **4.4.4. Lack of proper security and porousness of Nigerian borders**

Another factor that has contributed to the rise of Boko is a lack of security at the Nigerian borders. Chapter three has noted that the borders of failed states lack control and order and they enable arms, drugs, money, and people to be smuggled without being noticed, and so intensify problems

for neighbouring countries (Coggins, 2015:456). Dersso (2017:8) argues that Boko Haram has been operating in the remote border regions of north-east Nigeria, where the government security forces have no or limited control, and thus the group's activities have spilled over into neighbouring states in Lake Chad basin, such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. With Nigerian borders being porous, and given that Cameroonians, Chadians, and Beninois could easily join each other in Nigeria, illicit trading can occur unnoticed. Porous borders combined with weak security has made it easy for weapons to be smuggled into Nigeria (Achumba *et al.*, 2013:82). It is therefore easy for Boko Haram to have access to weapons for its attacks. 70% of about 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa have been estimated to be in Nigeria (Achumba *et al.*, 2013:82). The same view is shared by Oluwaddare (2016:44) who argues that insecurity deepened because of the proliferation of SALW. It is the abundance of these uncontrolled weapons in the wrong hands that have negatively impacted on the security of the Lake Chad region, as a result of arms being smuggled illegally through unpoliced, porous borders, and which have been used to commit crimes against the state. The result is that Boko Haram has preyed on these weak securities within Nigeria and its neighbouring countries.

Boko Haram has extended its influence beyond Nigeria. As Warner (2017:638) notes, the group has attacked Nigeria's neighbours, Chad Niger, and Cameroon and has used spaces in these countries as safe havens for its operations, and as a result, the group has managed to expand tremendously. Maiangwa (2012:88) indicates that Boko Haram appears to have taken advantage of these shared borders to get memberships in Niger, Chad, and Mali, and claims that Boko Haram likely acquired weapons from these countries. Migrants from Nigeria's neighbouring countries has been enhanced by the porousness of the Nigerian borders, and these migrants, specifically the youth, have often turned to criminal syndicates (Achumba *et al.*, 2013:82).

According to Weerarante (2017:625), the increasingly porous boundaries between Nigeria and its neighbors Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have been a contributing factor to the growth of Boko Haram. The weakness of government capacity has enabled Boko Haram to evade security forces, and the constant flow of fighters moving back and forth facilitates cross-border hit-and-run attacks (Weerarante, 2017:625). The influx of migrants and arms to enhance the operations of Boko Haram militants were facilitated by Nigeria's porous borders (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012:863). This implies that the Nigerian state's failure to tighten security measures at its borders has paved an open and unobstructed path for Boko Haram to smuggle weapons easily. This would have been minimised if security at Nigerian borders was strong and strictly monitored.

## 4.5 Explaining how relative deprivation exacerbates the rise of Boko Haram

Chapter three argued that terrorist organisations often capitalise on disgruntled youths who are economically affected because of greedy and corrupt elites who leave youths with little to no economic prospects (Agang, 2016:3). Relative deprivation theory has been defined as the judgment that one is worse off compared to some standard accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment (Smith *et al.*, 2015:2). It has also been pointed out that socio-economic and political deprivation can lead to violence and terrorist activities (Enaikele *et al.*, 2017:113). This section examines the nature and extent of relative deprivation and links its impact to enabling terrorism in northern Nigeria.

### 4.5.1. Unemployment, poverty, and inequality

The nature and the extent of relative deprivation in the northern Nigeria is high compared to other regions. In north-east and north-west zones relative poverty rates are high, 76% and 78%, whereas in southeast and southwest zones poverty rates are lower, 67% and 59% (Duke *et al.*, 2017:7). This is evidence for why Boko Haram managed to manipulate those who have been suffering from poverty. The root causes of Boko Haram have been attributed to poverty caused by bad governance in the north (Duke *et al.*, 2017:6). Boko Haram has managed to take advantage of recruiting unemployed and uneducated street beggars commonly known as the Almajirai who have been neglected by governors and other incumbents (Duke *et al.*, 2017:6). Poverty in the north has driven the unemployed to be vulnerable and easily convinced by Boko Haram that it will ease their poverty.

Olojo (2013:7) argues that in Africa, specifically in Nigeria, the phenomenon of a “youth bulge” has intensified the availability of individuals who are economically deprived to be vulnerable to Boko Haram's recruitment. In other words, relative deprivation has facilitated the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The different levels of relative deprivation in Nigeria in the north and the south have been caused by bad governance induced by successive northern leaders and their constituencies (Olojo, 2013:7). This implies that bad governance has created feelings of deprivation, which then led most youth and the unemployed to be vulnerable and easily employed by Boko Haram. Also, Suleiman and Karim (2015:6) have pointed out that Boko Haram's strategic approach to recruitment, under the guise of social justice, has been useful. Those youths with no jobs easily join Boko Haram because of the elite's unfairness (Suleiman & Karim, 2015:6). This means that the elites were responsible for creating the environment in which the youth could realise that they were unequally treated, which has made them feel deprived. Besides, Smith

(2015:85) points out that in northern Nigeria, there have been allegations that most families are too poor to afford to take care of their children and send them to boarding schools, and so these children ended up begging on the streets. Thus, according to Smith (2015:85), the Almajiris might have contributed significantly to the rise of Boko Haram.

Akinola (2015:12) notes that Almajirai refers to impressionable Quranic students, consistently recognised as poor and vulnerable, who left rural areas to town centres to study the Quran with Islamic teachers known as Mallams. The burden or the torment of social and economic inequalities, marginalisation, and human insecurity has made these young men vulnerable to Boko Haram militants. In support of the foregoing argument, Osumah (2013:553) notes that the social context that incubates Boko Haram has been enabled by absolute poverty, lack of employment, a huge number of economically desperate people (Almajiris), poor social control, and crises within juridical systems. This is evidence that poverty has made it easy for Boko Haram to convince suffering populations with the logic that they can provide them with basic needs such as food and shelter. For instance, in chapter three, it was argued that poverty, ignorance, and the unavailability of jobs enhanced terrorism because such conditions create a sense of hopelessness (Mitra, 2008:57). And this has been the case in Nigeria, as indicated above, and as a result one can argue convincingly that relative deprivation has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

A report by Mercy Corps (2016:7) illustrates that continued grievances in the northern region, emanating from relative deprivation, explains the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to Mercy Corps (2016:7), over 76% of the population in the north-east lives under the poverty line compared to 59% in the Southwest. To add more, a report by Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme posits that opportunity inequalities can make youths more susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram (Mercy Corps, 2016:7). This scenario indicates that most of the youth in Nigeria were disillusioned by a continued lack of opportunities, which has made them deprived; a situation which has allowed Boko Haram to garner support by promising them employment opportunities.

As claimed by the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2019) in a report about poverty and inequality from September 2018 to October 2019, 52.1% of the rural population are poverty stricken, mostly in northern Nigeria. Chapter three conceptualised individual and group grievances, like poverty, lack of employment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation as being used to garner support and recruits for terrorists (Olojo, 2013:6). This has been the case in northern Nigeria, as a result, one can argue that relative deprivation has played a role enhancing the rise


of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The following section looks into the impact of inequalities in northern Nigeria.

#### **4.5.2. The impact of educational inequalities in facilitating the rise of Boko Haram**

High levels of inequality are apparent. For instance, less than 23% of women and 54% of men in the north-east Nigeria can read, whereas more than 79% of women and 90% of men in the south can read (Duke *et al.*, 2017:7). In terms of educational inequality as one of the factors facilitating the rise of Boko Haram, Bourne (2015:235) illustrates that educational deficiencies, mostly at primary and secondary levels in the north, are connected to lack of employment, and in turn to the rise of Boko Haram. This evidence of inequality and social disparities is clear evidence that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria is attributed to the state's inability to govern equally and provide the fundamental goods and services to its citizens, particularly in the north. Meagher (2014:2) claims that one in five adults in the Muslim north are illiterate, in comparison with 80% literacy rates in southern Nigeria, stating that even the educated youth in the north battle for employment opportunities, to such an extent that they compete for jobs in the informal sector. Hence the youth become desperate and disillusioned.

According to the World Bank (2015:21), financial mismanagement undermines the effectiveness of policy and the implementation of programs, which then blocks citizens' access to basic services. For instance, 40% of people surveyed in the north-east disclosed that they have to pay a bribe for their children to be enrolled at schools or access health facilities (World Bank, 2015:21). Johnson (2018:185) shows that Boko Haram's favoured recruits were those from impoverished backgrounds, with limited education or opportunities, who seem to be easily manipulated to Boko Haram's ideology of interpreting Islam radically. The previous analysis supports Okon's (2016:138) claim that terrorists often prey on disadvantaged youths, whom they recruit as militants.

Percentage primary and secondary school attendance



Source: Nigeria Bureau of Statistics

BBC

#### Map 4.3 Percentage of primary and secondary school attendance in Nigeria

(Source: Giles, 2019)

The above map indicates high rates of uneducated youths in Sokoto, Jigawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, and also in Adamawa, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and others. These are the areas in which Boko Haram attacks have been rampant. These are also areas which are hotspots of Boko Haram terrorist attacks. This highlights the nature and extent of inequality in northern states and its impact in facilitating the rise of Boko Haram. These areas are not only poverty-stricken, but they also have high levels of illiteracy. A report by Giles (2019) showed that about 10.5 million children between five and 14 are out of school, and 69% of them were in northern Nigeria. Bauchi had the highest concentration and then Katsina. The high percentage of uneducated youths indicated on the map above shows why most Boko Haram members are youth militias. The youths are miserable and Boko Haram purportedly offers them alternatives for better prospects.

#### 4.5.3. Continued underdevelopment and human insecurity inequalities

The experience of relative deprivation has been pinpointed as responsible for explaining high levels of violence and terrorist activities (Parida, 2007:130-132). In order to determine if this has been the case in northern Nigeria, it is important to illustrate the level of underdevelopment and human security inequalities. There is a stark difference in inequalities between the north-east and the south of Nigeria, and these inequalities include improper infrastructure. 24% of households in the north-eastern part of Nigeria have access to electricity, in contrast to 71% of southwest households (Duke *et al.*, 2017:7). Had it not been the fact that the Nigerian government was unable to provide the sufficient goods and services equally, it would have reduced feelings of deprivation, and more people might not have been frustrated or disappointed to the point of joining Boko Haram as recruits.

In line with this analysis, Smith (2015:13) notes that foot soldiers could be recruited as much as needed because of the availability of a high number of desperate young men exposed to extremist ideas, often lured by the support and money which Boko Haram members could provide to them. Inequality in the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, therefore, has played a role in the expansion of Boko Haram activities. With a high number of youths desperate and struggling for survival, and the government showing no interest in alleviating their social inequities, Boko Haram easily convinced the unemployed youth, grew their recruit numbers, and were able to fight against the state.

Anthony and Humphrey (2017:649), posit that frustrations mostly in the northern states, have been induced by the unavailability of jobs and economic opportunities, and a lack of justice in the distribution of wealth. Boko Haram has, therefore, preyed on the prolonged poverty and deprivation caused by consistent corruption at all governmental levels, social inequalities, and the absence of jobs, and used these factors to validate its violent extremism (Antony & Humphrey, 2017:649). Suicide bombers are more frequent in communities where misery and joblessness are prevalent than in communities in which basic needs such as food, education, health, housing, and sanitation are provided to the majority of the people. Some people might have not wanted to join Boko Haram but they did not have any alternative means of survival, and so they could take the risk of serving Boko Haram.


Aghedo and Osumah (2012:861) show that Boko Haram members consist of those who are not educated, including school dropouts, unemployed youths, political thugs, and those students with low socio-economic prospects. Boko Haram's membership consists of those with strong feelings

about socio-economic injustice and who have been looked down upon (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012:861). Heim and McQuaid (2015:22) further posit that poverty and the absence of services affecting the northern Muslims has generated rejections of the political status quo and has accelerated extremist ideologies. There have not been holistic solutions to address the deep economic differences between the north and the south. No implementations or infrastructural projects have been designated to resolve the insufficient social services required by the local population (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:23).

Supporting this point further, Iyekekpolo (2018:2-3) asserts that the weak economy of Nigeria, which can be seen in the level of poverty, illiteracy, lack of jobs and economic under-development, has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram. The discrepancy between high expectations and the inability of the Nigerian government to foster economic prospects has ignited feelings of relative deprivation, which has led to disillusionment aggression, as evidenced by the insurgency (Iyekekpolo, 2018:3). Also, Suleiman and Karim (2015:7) argue that people with resentment feelings, caused by the unchanging corrupt behaviour of elites, can be easily recruited to act against the system. In addition, unemployment in the north has been worsened by the destruction of infrastructure, a shortage of energy, and high volumes of imported products, which has led many factories to shut down (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:17). The result has been frustration and disaffection for many youths, and Boko Haram has been reported to have paid those poor and vulnerable youth to bomb schools or to spy on those believed to have been collaborating with the government (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:18).

Strengthening this argument further, the World Bank (2015:21) shows that limited government support, poor management, and limited access to new technologies has led to the destruction of rural livelihoods in agriculture, pastoralism, and fishing. The absence of jobs and a better means of survival, mostly among young people, has been the driving factor of frustration and discontent, which in turn leads to violence (World Bank 2015:21). It cannot be disputed that continued underdevelopment has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, given all the evidence about poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and social injustices in the northern part of Nigeria.

Percentage of working age unemployed



Source: Nigeria Bureau of Statistics

BBC

#### Map 4.4 Percentage of unemployed working age people in Nigeria

(Source: Giles, 2019)

Map 4.4 indicates the different percentages of people who are at working ages but do not have jobs. High rates of unemployment in areas like Katsina, Bauchi, Adamawa, Taraba, and Zamfara (1 - 9.9%) followed by Gombe, Kano, Jigawa, Niger, Sokoto and other states, correlate with Map 4.2's hotspots for Boko Haram activities. It also correlates with the indication of high number of uneducated youths highlighted on Map 4.3. This evidence spotlights the fact that the northern region is marked by inequality and relative deprivation. Many northern citizens are disillusioned due to a lack of opportunities, which then drives them to join Boko Haram.

According to Mercy Corps (2016:8), the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria is attributed to grievances generated by an inadequate provision of basic services and abuses orchestrated by the state. For Boko Haram to fight it needs members, and without difficulties in recruiting its members, the group has expanded to the extent of being able to fight against the state. Amaru (2015:37) notes that the recruitment of Boko Haram members has been motivated by poverty, lack of employment and continued strikes, which has led youths to abandon school and join the sect. The government

has not been able to provide enough security, roads, water, health care, education or sustainable energy. There have been allegations that the Kanuri ethnic group, where many Boko Haram members come from, have been unfairly treated by the national government in the distribution of resources, and are generally economically marginalised (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:15).

The previous argument concurs with the theoretical discussions explored in chapter three. Namely, when ethnic groups are in a same political space, but are not being treated the same politically, tensions that cause ethnic violence, terrorism, and civil war can be generated, and as such can threaten the state's legitimacy and its territorial integrity (Saleh, 2013:171). The ignorance of the government and poor service delivery throughout the north-east regions are factors that caused communities to support Boko Haram (Brechenmacher, 2019:10).

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

This chapter has responded to the main research question and the theoretical frameworks conceptualised in chapter three by empirically exploring the nature and extent of state failure and relative deprivation in northern Nigeria. In order to show how these theories help explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, examples, and statistics have been cited. Chapter four first offered a brief overview of Borno State and other north-eastern states in Nigeria. It linked the evidence of state failure and social inequities in north-east Nigeria and cited a vast literature, with examples of how poverty, inequality, unemployment, corruption, and bad governance have accelerated Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. Evidence has been provided in the form of maps, showing all sorts of problems, such as social, economic, political deprivations, and insecurity, which emanate from state failure and lead to relative deprivation.

In terms of corruption, examples have shown politicians being incompetent and being accused of sponsoring Boko Haram and giving them important information and access to resources so that they could secure state positions or win elections. Chapter four also showed how northern Nigeria's poor security has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram. It did so by citing empirical evidence, for instance that Boko Haram had a base to manufacture bombs, was able to steal weapons at military bases, and smuggle weapons and foreign recruits, all because of a lack of security at the border posts of Nigeria. It has also argued that state failure has allowed Boko Haram to at some point control more than 10 states. This control gave the group credibility, garnered support, and enabled them to manipulate thousands of people. This in turn expanded Boko Haram's membership. Chapter five examines counter-insurgency attacks. It critically

scrutinises the methods used to deal with the crisis at state, regional and continental levels, and assesses the effectiveness of these responses.

## **Chapter 5: Counterterrorism in Nigeria (state level, regional level, and continental level)**

### **5.1. Introduction**

From 2009 to 2020 a year did not go by in Nigeria without a terror attack from Boko Haram militants. Whether the attack was big or small does not matter. What matters is the insecurity of the Nigerian citizens in the north-east and in neighbouring countries. Their lives are insecure although not always on a regular basis. In 2020, according to CNN News (Busari *et al.*, 2019) Boko Haram militants ambushed top Nigerian military officials in the Kaga local government Nigeria, including major general Olusegun Adeniyi. Mitigating Boko Haram terror attacks in Nigeria is thus still a profound challenge. One might be very concerned about how Boko Haram militants knew where the top military officials were. ACLED data from 15 December 2019 to 4 January 2020 shows that there have been clashes between Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram militants in north-east states of Nigeria, namely, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe; 30 Boko Haram ISIS affiliates are reported to have been killed in Yobe state the capital of Damaturu (Lay, 2020:1). It has also been stated that 23 civilians have been killed by Boko Haram terrorists, as well as 11 Christians who have been held in captivity (Lay, 2020:1). This indicates that a lot still needs to be done to fully mitigate the Boko Haram crisis.

This chapter provides an analysis of responses to Boko Haram. It analyses the actions taken by the Nigerian government to mitigate the crisis. These are negotiations, military intervention, and civilian-military operations. Thereafter, it evaluates the counterterrorism intervention at the regional level (ECOWAS) and the continental level (AU), assessing the effectiveness of the responses and the challenges encountered. In so doing, this chapter responds to the final supportive questions. These are: how has the Boko Haram insurgency been dealt with on a state level and how has the regional organisation (ECOWAS) and continental organisation (AU) reacted to mitigate the crisis? And: Has this regional response been effective, and, if not, what are possible alternative means of countering Boko Haram's terrorist activities? By responding to the above research questions, the chapter offers recommendations. This chapter uses critical approaches to studies of terrorism. However, before getting into detail, the following section will briefly define counterterrorism and describe the scope of anticipated actions when responding to terrorism.

## 5.2. Defining counterterrorism

According to Onapajo (2017:62), counterterrorism approaches entail the measures taken by states and intergovernmental organisations to “protect or mitigate future terrorist attacks” and the “proactive actions designed to retaliate against or forestall terrorist actions”. This means that there should be pre-outlined strategies when responding to terrorist actions. However, these strategies also depend on the nature and the extent of the attacks. Explaining responses to terrorism, Aghedo and Osumah (2014:209) metaphorically highlight two strategies as the ‘carrot’ and the ‘stick’. The former signifies the military approach, such as the war on terror by the United States, whereas, the latter entails a soft approach, such as conciliatory strategies that involve dialogue and co-optation to deal with conflicts (Aghedo & Osumah, 2014:209).

However, fighting terrorism through military action has often been the approach of many countries, such as the US’s war on terror, where the result was the creation of a terrorist zone in Iraq with thousands of innocent people being killed. In Nigeria, the military approach has had many negative consequences and has proved ineffective. The following section briefly discusses the critical approach and outlines its significance for mitigating terrorism.

## 5.3. Critical Terrorism Studies approach

The Critical Terrorism Studies approach consists of a body of work specifically developed as a critique of Traditional Terrorism Studies (Onapajo, 2017:64). The critical approach argues that the counterterrorism practiced in orthodox terrorism approaches provides only “a short term” and “immediate assessment” provided by the state elites without considering the wider “social and historical context...or questioning to what extent the state or the status quo have contributed to the threat of terrorism” (Onapajo, 2017:64). In other words, critical theory condemns the state centric approach to counterterrorism, which involves the use of military force while ignoring the broader context of the root causes of the problem and side-lining the concerns of citizens. Onapajo (2017:64) stresses that the critical approach views terrorism as a social fact, linked to historical contexts and social circumstances, and argues that a good approach to counterterrorism has to principally address the root causes of the problem, which would lead to a long-term solution. The approach favours negotiation and dialogue and involves many strategies like grassroots development, disarmament, democratic representations, and other non-violent

means, which is capable of changing violence to sustainable peaceful outcomes (Onapajo, 2017:64).

Critical theory has placed much emphasis on perpetual threats to democracy, disregard for human rights, harmful security practices, and all illegitimate military activities that have been mobilised under the umbrella of the war on terror (McGowan, 2016:13). Critical theory contributes to our understating of inequality, suffering, and extrajudicial deployments of state power, which relates to victimisation (McGowan, 2016:13). However, the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram terror attacks appears to have favoured the traditional approach, and has heavily focused on military intervention and extrajudicial killings, which exacerbate tensions (Oriola & Akinola 2018:608). Grievances over injustices against Boko Haram have emanated from structural issues of socio-economic injustices and killings conducted by state agents. Furthermore, the other reason the critical approach could be favoured is that the emergence and rise of Boko Haram has been as a result of state failure. Eji (2016:209) argues that the domestic nature of terrorism in Nigeria needs a people-centered counterterrorism plan, which embodies economic and social transformations, democracy, and the observance of human rights. Eji (2016:209) further states that:

[i]n religious, ideological, and socio-economic grievance-driven cases of terrorism such as Nigeria appears to have had and is still experiencing, winning the hearts and minds of the citizens as well as those of the terrorists and their sympathizers [is] significant. Measures aimed at national orientation, winning the confidence of the populace, and social re-engineering including granting concessions to the terrorists could arguably in such situations better contain terrorism than the traditional hard approach.

Because of the above assertion, this study argues that the counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria needs to be well balanced and evaluated properly, ensuring that it is not only state-centric but also considers the root causes of the problem, and tries to engage all parties involved to find the best alternative solutions to mitigate the crisis. Supporting the argument further, Heim and McQuaid (2015:61) contend that the government approach to Boko Haram has been nonconservative with its heavy military action intended only to capture and kill the group's members. Most Nigerians also believed that the government has not been able to construct a solid strategy for mitigating the conflict because it did not make any concerted efforts to address the root causes of the conflict (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:61). As a result, this study favours a Critical

Terrorism Studies approach as opposed to the heavy-handed military approach. The following section explains and analyses the methods used to respond to the crisis and their effectiveness.

#### **5.4. Counterterrorism methods taken by the Nigerian state**

##### **5.4.1. Military intervention (The Joint Task Force)**

Since Boko Haram terror attacks have never been fully curbed, it is important to analyse the effectiveness of the responses taken to mitigate the crisis and highlight weaknesses. This helps to understand the reasons the attacks continue regardless of efforts to mitigate the crisis. There have been condemnations from a wide range of scholars over the repressive measures used by the Nigerian security forces to counter-attack Boko Haram militants. Military intervention has been the first strategy deployed by the Nigerian government. However, it is important to introduce to the reader to what comprises the Joint Task Force and then analyse its actions. According to Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:73), the Joint Task Force was established with the motive to restore law and order in north-east Nigeria and Borno State. The Joint Task Force involves different security organs, such as personnel from the Nigerian Armed Forces, Nigerian Police Force, the Department of State Security, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Services, and the Defence Intelligence Agency (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:73). Having seen that the Joint Task Force was a combination of all special security agencies of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, one would have expected highly organised strategies to deal with the crisis, however, this has not been the case.

##### **5.4.2. Brutality and human rights violations by the military and the Joint Task Force**

Human rights violations have been one of the biggest crimes committed by the Nigerian Army and the Joint Task Force (JTF) while attempting to deal with the crisis. Instead of engaging smoothly with the civilians to get information about the whereabouts of Boko Haram members, the military itself have been terrorising the civilians. As noted by Smith (2015:17), in some incidents residents were caught between the continuous attacks and the heavy-handed response of the soldiers, and soldiers were often accused of rounding up young men and arresting them, setting fire to homes, and executing civilians. This indicates a poor response and recklessness from the Nigerian security agencies. Blanchard (2016:13) argues that human rights abuses by the military in parts of the country, mostly in the north-east, has been one of the reasons that has limited support from donors and collaboration. For instance, donors might have been discouraged

to strengthen their security cooperation due to military raids conducted against the Shia Muslim community in the northern city of Zaria in December 2015, during which over 300 people are estimated to have been killed (Blanchard, 2016:13). Pichette (2015:7) argued that the Nigerian government has failed to handle Boko Haram from the beginning, by ignoring the early warnings about the rise of Boko Haram, and that they have worsened the situation by deploying the Joint Security Force in 2005 whose response was brutal. The government security forces have caused severe property damages, killed citizens, have conducted extra-judicial killings without trial by jury, committed torture, and arrested people at checkpoints (Pichette, 2015:7).

Properties have been destroyed by government forces, and access to basic commodities such as maize and beans have been affected, implying that the government security agencies have worsened poverty and living conditions in north-east Nigeria. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:75) show that about 4,000 houses were razed by fire in areas like Bulabulin, Bayan, Tasha, Panpan Gajagaja, Adam Kolo and Bagadaza, and property valued at millions of Naira has been destroyed by the blazes burning about 30 vehicles, 57 motorcycles and about 100 bags of maize and beans. This suggests powerfully that a critical approach would have been preferable to the military approach that was deployed by the Nigerian security. Despite being able to have known that poverty and poor living conditions have been cited as factors that gave Boko Haram militants access to more recruits, the JTF further increased the rate of poverty, anger, and frustration. The government has failed to resolve the crisis and worsened it by side-lining the civilians even more, thus deviating from the counterterrorism approach which demands local support to help plot the elimination of Boko Haram assets (Pichette, 2015:8). Osumah (2013:545) shows that the military operations of the Joint Task Force ended up arresting and killing several non-Boko Haram members in different areas. So, this might have silenced informants or blocked a platform for dialogue. Therefore, in this scenario, it is evident that the military approach was not well strategised or designed to target only the Boko Haram militants.

According to Solomon (2012:9), the Joint Task Force raided homes in Maiduguri on July 9 2011; security forces were shooting people, beating women and children, burning houses, and men and boys were subsequently reported missing. These actions by the security forces worsened the situation and made it harder to mitigate the crisis in Nigeria. Beating women and innocent children is a clear indication of ruthlessness by the military, which indicates a lack of human respect, which could also fuel frustrations among people, who in turn might join Boko Haram to fight against state security forces. Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:70) argue that the JTF counter-insurgency actions have not only exacerbated Boko Haram's attacks but heavily violated human rights. Therefore,

the JTF has been responsible for failing to deal with the crisis and enhancing Boko Haram's activities. In the above ways, the JTF counter-insurgency operations have not been effective.

Meagher (2014:3) maintains that continued abuses like arrests of Boko Harams' family members, destroying homes, and the execution of young men during security raids in northern states has obstructed coordination with the military and has enhanced radicalisation and anger directed against the state. The Nigerian securities have been responsible for fuelling the crisis in Nigeria, it would have been very difficult for those who have lost homes they have built after hard work to trust the same government security forces, and Boko Haram can take advantage of this. Also, Mbah and Nwangwu (2014:68) illustrate that the repressive acts of the JTF have made it seem plausible that Boko Haram militants have been against the government's cruelty. They further assert that the JTF's brutality has often made those who have been deprived of their rights refuse to give important information about the militants, and this has further obstructed the effectiveness of the response (Mbah & Nwangwu, 2014:68).

Weeraratne (2017:624) argues that the brutal repression by the military in response to the terror attacks has further intensified the violent extremism of the group. At some point, about 600 people suspected to be Boko Haram fighters were guillotined without trial after the Giwa barracks attacks in March 2014 in Maiduguri (Weeraratne, 2017:624). The military's activities in Nigeria seem to be causing problems rather than bringing the crisis to an end. Military responses have managed to drive Boko Haram from some parts of the region but have intensified anger, poverty, and poor living conditions. It has also been suggested that the inability of the army to curb the crisis indicates an unwillingness to fulfil their mission (Weber, 2015:28).

To support the above analysis, Botha and Abdile (2019:510) quote a former Boko Haram member who states that "they kill innocent people that are not members, so people join the group to fight the military." The level of brutality has made people angry and so people have joined Boko Haram even though they did not have other motives to join the militant group. This means that if the military were not so brutal and irrational, Boko Haram would have struggled to garner support, and this would have helped the state to deal with fewer militants. In addition, the local governor of Jos City has been reported to have ordered the police and the army to shoot suspected protestors during November 2008 disturbances (Forest, 2012:91). It appears that counterterrorist strategy of using heavy force has been unorganised, and extremely inhuman. In this way, because they feared execution, it was very difficult for ordinary citizens to voluntarily share or disclose information concerning the whereabouts of Boko Haram militants. The extent of brutality

was unacceptable. For instance, there have been reports from locals that the army burned homes and randomly shot unarmed civilians while responding to Boko Haram militants who killed two soldiers while on patrol in Maiduguri on July 2011 (Forest, 2012:91). Given the fact that the JTF comprised security agencies at the highest state level, and the way it has been violating human rights, it is very clear that the Nigerian government has been and is responsible for the continued existence of Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria.

#### **5.4.3. Government's efforts to negotiate with Boko Haram**

The Nigerian government has also attempted to negotiate with members of Boko Haram as a strategy to resolve the crisis. For instance, under the leadership of Goodluck Jonathan, in April 2013 the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the north was created as an attempt to prepare negotiations with Boko Haram militants (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:62). However, the negotiation efforts were fruitless for various reasons. Boko Haram refused to negotiate with the government by the time when it was given the chance, (Akpan *et al.*, 2014:153). Besides, the demands of Boko Haram militants were unacceptable. These included demands such as dividing Nigeria into two states, fully establishing an Islamic state, involving separate Christian areas, and the demand that Goodluck Jonathan had to convert to Islam. And so many Nigerians doubted the negotiation channels (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:62). Additionally, there were quarrels within Boko Haram, and there were reports that the group murdered some of its members after an attempt to negotiate with the government between 2011 and 2012 (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:62). Under such circumstances, it would have been too difficult to achieve dialogue.

Boko Haram is believed to be linked to and receive support from extremely dangerous international terrorist organisations such as ISIL. So, it would have also been difficult for the government to trust the group, and often the group's dynamics and tactics unpredictable. It would have been difficult to trust Boko Haram in negotiations. The group's leaders reportedly meet with AQIM and send their members for military training in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania, and Algeria. Algeria and its leaders have once stated that their fighters have also been trained by the Somali militant group al-Shabab (Solomon, 2012:08). The above-mentioned terrorist groups are extremely dangerous and violent and this might have made the Nigerian government doubt the possibilities for dialogue. However, given the fact that evidence by various scholars indicated that the group emerged due to the social injustices, poverty, inequality, and

unemployment in the north-east part of Nigeria, and that there was no violence up until police brutality started, it is fair to claim that the root causes of the conflict had to be addressed first, and perhaps doing so would have made a big difference. Military intervention might have been an option only when totally necessary and in a way that could save and protect the ordinary citizens.

#### **5.4.4. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)**

Due to the fact that the government was not able to provide enough security in the north-east states, ordinary civilians formed their own groups so that they could defend themselves from Boko Haram. Weerarante (2017:124) note that the CJTF initially appeared to be instrumental in chasing Boko Haram fighters out of Maiduguri, but their efforts were weakened by their inability to acquire the right weapons and because Boko Haram members could flee to deep rural areas in Borno and then retaliate heavily. Human rights violations have also been a matter of concern. Meagher (2014:3) stressed that the establishment of the CJTF assisted in weakening the militants in the capital city of Maiduguri as a result of civilians seeking to protect themselves from the military by handing over suspected Boko Haram militants. Due to a shortage and the occasional recklessness of regular troops in the north-east, with the support of the Emir of Kano, local self-defence groups emerged to defend their towns (Bourne, 2015:256). This indicates the Nigerian state's ineffectiveness in actively mitigating Boko Haram's terror attacks.

Meagher (2014:3) maintains that due to a lack of proper training, human rights' abuses, the difficulties of re-integrating the CTJF members into society, and the dangers of them being captured by local politicians during the election campaign in 2015, the CTJF introduced new challenges and problems. This has been dangerous for the many civilians who have been engaged in this operation. Some of the officials attempted to apply soft approaches by attempting to engage communities via economic activities but there has been lack of support from the federal government. A few officials noted that a more solid approach could include the demands of the population to defeat Boko Haram and also to limit the population's support for anti-government groups in north-east Nigeria (Heim & McQuaid 2015:62). The government did nothing to address the root causes of terrorism in northern Nigerian and even those officials who tried to enhance education and create employment opportunities have not been assisted by the federal government (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:62).

## **5.5. Challenges, and reasons the responses have been ineffective**

### **5.5.1. The nature, tactics, and extent of Boko Haram terror attacks**

Another major challenge regarding curbing Boko Haram attacks is that group used highly sophisticated weaponry, which the Nigerian security agencies were not initially aware of, and thus did not anticipate. For instance, under Shekau, Boko Haram shifted to using assault rifles, improvised roadside explosive devices, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers (Eji, 2016:203). This means that the group was heavily armed and could exchange attacks with the Nigerian security forces. According to Eji (2016:2013), the capacity of the security agencies and other institutions that were involved in the Nigerian government's counterterrorism effort has been hindered by Boko Haram's level of complexity and sophistication, in particular because their coordination and cooperation was inadequate. In addition there have also been unexpected relapses of the militant activities in the Niger Delta. The emergence of groups like the Niger Delta Avengers, who started bombing oil installations, actually enabled further terrorist activities, which disrupted the government's counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram (Eji, 2016:204).

Apart from that, the Boko Haram militants were also using highly advanced ammunition. Solomon (2012:8) shows that the quality of explosives used by Boko Haram evidenced the group's sophistication; powerful explosives like pentaerythritol tetranitrate and triacetin triperoxide, often used in shaped charges, and which magnify the impact of explosions, were used for the UN headquarters attack on 26 August 2011. This has made it difficult for the state to counter-attack the militants. The state did not expect Boko Haram to be in possession of such dangerous weapons. Another reason the state has also not been able to deal with the attacks has been the use of suicide bombers, which they did not expect. For instance, according to Willard (2015:36), Boko Haram uses female suicide bombers, mostly young girls aged between seven and 17, with two thirds of them were being deployed against soft targets. This method has made the militants able to attack often and unexpectedly because security agencies and personnel did not suspect girls of those ages to conduct such horrific attacks.

### **5.5.2. The loopholes within the Nigerian Terrorism Act and the abusive nature of some sections of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria**

In order to understand why the police forces or the military at some point could have violated human rights while attempting to deal with the Boko Haram crisis and in doing so worsened the

crisis, it is crucial to examine some loopholes within the Nigerian constitution and the Nigerian Terrorism Act of 2013. Some sections of the constitution automatically deny people's rights to life, which enables security forces to abuse their power. For instance, Section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) states that:

(1) Every person has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offense of which he has been found guilty in Nigeria.

(2) A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this section, if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably necessary [:]

(a) for the defence of any person from unlawful violence or for the defence of property

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; or

(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny.

Observing the above, it is clear that the constitution itself has been designed in a way that infringes on rights to life and this might be a reason that counterterrorism efforts to weaken Boko Haram have been widely associated with human rights violations by the military and police. This is likely the reason perpetrators of such abuses are not arrested and prosecuted. There appear to be constitutional justifications for abuses of power by the government. What makes matters worse is that those families who have lost their loved ones as a result of police brutality and unlawful arrest will not be able to report such wrongs or seek justice because the constitution favours the security forces. The government has given power to the security forces to kill people without evidence or trial, and that is why the security forces could kill or burn the houses of suspected Boko Haram members in Nigeria. The absence of justice has rendered the efforts to curb the Boko Haram crisis less effective.

In addition, Akujobi (2018:34) notes that there have been concerns about the Principal Terrorism Act in 2011 (amended in 2013) regarding the violations of fundamental rights stipulated in chapter four of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Akujobi (2018:34) posits that the Act empowered security and intelligence officers to act outside of judicial procedures. With no warrant of arrest, section 25 (a-e) granted the National Security Advisor or the Inspector General of Police to enter or search any suspected place or vehicle, and permits the officer to do such things based

on a suspicion that a person might have committed or might commit a crime (Akujobi, 2018:35). This means that the constitution does not stipulate proper legal channels for arrest. Arrests have been common during the efforts to mitigate Boko Haram crisis. And so, efforts have not been effective but rather a recipe for frustration and anger which have aggravated tensions in north-east Nigeria. Willard (2015:57) has argues that the behaviour of Nigerian security personnel does not comply with the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2013. For instance, section 1 (2) (a) of the Act says that there is a “conformity of Nigeria's counterterrorism laws and policies with international standards and United Nations’ convention on terrorism” (Willard, 2015:57). However, in light of the wide condemnations of human rights abuse and extrajudicial killings described previously, Nigeria is far away from complying with international standards, particularly with respect to reports of arbitrary arrest and torture.

### **5.5.3. Corruption as a challenge to effective counterterrorism in Nigeria**

Corruption in the Nigerian armed forces have made the fight against Boko Haram terrorism largely ineffective, and by extension has linked the state to the insecurity of lives and property (Duke *et al.*, 2017:5). Smith (2015:15) argues that the reason the insurgency could not be curbed efficiently is because of the decline of the Nigerian army, which is often due to corruption. The military has focused more on engaging in corrupt activities than committing themselves to holistically dealing with the terror crisis. In addition, an absence of faith both in the government and the military, has remained one of the reasons Boko Haram terror attacks have not been effectively prevented (Smith, 2015:15). Pate (2015:30), after interviewing some informants, noted that the informants stressed that Boko Haram had penetrated the military and was collaborating with military commanders. The informants noted that military leaders could use \$9 of \$10 from the defence budget campaign; they also indicated that Boko Haram has gained support from the military and other security forces (Pate, 2015:30). Corruption is a profound challenge in Nigeria, and perhaps the biggest challenge. Corruption benefits many officials, and if corruption is not addressed, it will be extremely difficult to fully curb Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria.

There has been criticism from both local and international agencies about the effectiveness of the Nigerian government and its military and security agencies in fighting against Boko Haram terror attacks (Adelaja *et al.*, 2018:36). Transparency International has reported that because of corruption within the defence sector, coupled with an insufficient supply of equipment and materials, the Nigerian army struggles to counter-attack Boko Haram insurgents (Adelaja *et al.*, 2018:36). It is very clear that corruption contributes to strengthening Boko Haram in its fight

against the Nigerian military. Thus, corruption in Nigeria not only causes poverty but has also made it difficult for the military to counter-attack Boko Haram. However, the military comprises the state's main response to Boko Haram. An International Transparency report contends that at times the Nigerian military has retreated during Boko Haram attacks because of a shortage of weapons and fuel, which corrupt officials had withheld (Adelaja *et al.*, 2018:36). This enabled Boko Haram to overpower the Nigerian security forces. This shows that corruption in Nigeria is a great concern. In order to win the battle against Boko Haram terror attacks, corruption in the military and security forces has to be addressed.

For instance, Blanchard (2016:10) has noted that Jonathan's former Chief of Defence has been accused of stealing \$20 million from the air force, and as of late March 2016, some 300 individuals, including army officers, were implicated in fraudulent or bloated defence contracts. This poses a dangerous security risk because it shows that corruption occurs at the highest level of state security, and is perpetrated by those who understand the significance of state security, and are responsible for protecting the country. This makes it difficult to manage or curb Boko Haram terror attacks. In such a context of corruption, Boko Haram has an advantageous ability to counterattack the Nigerian military because the latter are under-equipped due to insufficient resources or weakened by corrupt officials.

Also, the Nigerian State Department terrorism report released in early 2015, upon Buhari taking office, contends that the absence of coordination and cooperation between security agencies, corruption, misallocation of resources, limited relevant databases, the slow pace of judicial systems, and a lack of sufficient prosecutors and judges to implement anti-terrorism laws were factors that limited Nigeria's response to Boko Haram terror attacks (Blanchard, 2016:13). Importantly, it appears that the same factors that contributed to the rise of Boko Haram have weakened the Nigerian state's ability to deal with Boko Haram.

The above evidence is an indication that the Nigerian security apparatuses have not been dealing with Boko Haram issues logically or through proper consultations and investigations. Supporting the argument further, Walker (2012:12) argues that the Nigerian government's security agencies' tactics to curb Boko Haram attacks have been brutal and unproductive, and that the use of extrajudicial executions for the problem in Nigeria not only helped to create Boko Haram but also enabled its expansion. Walker (2012:12-13) pointed out that:

[t]he main technique currently used to fight Boko Haram is mass arrest at the site of the attack, often long after gunmen or bombers have fled. Instead of questioning

these people, they are intimidated, and money is extorted from them. Any information about Boko Haram hideouts they do receive is acted on in a very heavy-handed way. The police and army descend on the supposed hideout, all guns blazing, with innocent passers-by often caught and killed in the line of fire.

This shows why the state's response to Boko Haram terror attacks has not been efficient and effective. In other words, corruption and poor investigation methods including intimidation and arresting innocent people, has worsened the situation. People may also have been driven to join Boko Haram have their imprisoned but innocent families not released. Heim and McQuaid (2015:63) share this view, indicating that a lot of people have disappeared and are believed to have been executed by the police, and roadblocks have been used to obtain bribes instead of preventing the movement of terrorists. With little to no evidence, the properties of suspects have also been seized by the government. This has led several observers to claim that the government has intensified the crisis and alienated the population, whereas the population could have provided important information about the enemy (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:64).

#### **5.5.4. Insufficient resources and poor security intelligence systems**

Another challenge is that the Nigerian Securities were poorly equipped to face heavily armed Boko Haram members, and these members are believed to have been trained by other dangerous terrorist groups. According to Solomon (2012:8), General Owoye Andrew Azazi, a National Security Advisor to President Jonathan, conceded that the state's security infrastructure was insufficiently equipped to contain Boko Haram terror attacks. This implies that state failure has been responsible not only for the emergence and the rise of Boko Haram but also for hindering the effectiveness of curbing the attacks. Funds that were allocated to the defence budget from 2010 to 2014 were not utilised properly. For instance, according to Pate (2015:26), the Nigerian state extended its military budget from \$625 million in 2010 to \$6 billion in 2011. From 2012 to 2014 the budget was extended to \$1 trillion. However, there was still a shortage of equipment, and even a lack of food parcels for soldiers. These funds could have been used to support economic reforms in the north-east and for programs to alleviate poverty so that Boko Haram would not have been able to easily recruit impoverished and unemployed youths.

Pate (2015:26) has argued that the military has been the dominant department for confronting Boko Haram attacks, but that there are many others which could assist, including: the

Presidency; the Nigerian National Assembly; the Department of State Services; the Office of the National Security Advisor; the Nigerian Police Force; the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps; and, the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency. With the option of using all these groups but only using the military indicates a lack of coordination within the security apparatuses, which hinders effectively curbing Boko Haram attacks.

According to the Congressional Research Service, the absence of coordination and cooperation amongst Nigerian security institutions, limited database use, delays within the judicial process when dealing with criminals, and insufficient training of prosecutors and judges for implementing anti-terrorism regulations are factors that have obstructed responses for resolving the crisis (Blanchard & Husted, 2019:9). A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment report (2015:17) indicates that difficulties in coordination, a lack of coherence, and the absence of operational specifications and responsibilities within several agencies tasked to respond to the crisis have been the challenges for the state's military response.

For instance, soldiers on the frontlines raised complained that they were not receiving adequate logistical support, and that their payments were delayed, which made them lose confidence in the military (Heim & McQuaid, 2015:63). They were also unable to track the group using technology. Drones bought from Israel in 2006 were not functioning, and intelligence gathering was so poor that soldiers in the north-east shot their commander after 12 of their members were killed in an ambush by Boko Haram militants (Heim & McQuaid 2015:64). This scenario indicates that intelligence gathering is an issue in Nigeria. In light of a 2020 ambush in north-east Nigeria, it appears that the issue of intelligence gathering has not yet been addressed. This means that the Nigerian government still has a long way to go towards upgrading its security apparatuses so that it can foresee or capture militants before attacks.

Montclos (2014a:24) also notes that security officials have been bribed during roadblocks, and that vehicles are able to pass without being checked. Boko Haram militants have also pretended to be soldiers, wearing camouflage stolen from soldiers or sold to them by destitute soldiers; militants then insist that they are members of the Red Cross (Montclos, 2014b:24). The literature shows that the Nigerian military has been abusive, and lacks professionalism and respect for human rights. This has blocked them from receiving ammunitions from potential donors. For instance, Bourne (2015:256) shows that the United States refused to sell arms to Nigeria, at the time when Boko haram terror attacks reached their peak, in protest of human

rights abuses orchestrated by the Nigerian army. Human rights training was lacking, and the soldiers were ill-equipped (Bourne, 2015:256). As a result of human rights abuses and a shortage of troops, one can see that the state's response to Boko Haram has been marred by a lack of commitment by the state itself.

Intelligence gathering has been another factor that has hindered a successful counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria. This has been limited by an absence of cooperation with local populations. Force (2012:90) argues that high levels of distrust among Muslims in the north has disrupted the extraction of intelligence, which may have supported the government's counterterrorism efforts. Lack of trust has been caused by the way the military and the police responded to the crisis, which has threatened the legitimacy of the already fragile government (Force, 2012:90). Another reason the state's response to the group has been ineffective is a lack of intelligence-gathering capacity in the Nigerian security apparatuses. According to Azama (2015:64), Boko Haram has managed to forge links with civilians in high places, including politicians, government officials, and security agents who were later believed to have been cooperating with Boko Haram. This situation might have helped Boko Haram members to access significant information about the state's plans, which could be helpful for counter-attacking government forces.

Furthermore, Chinwoku (2013:269) has pointed out that, after a sample of an imported cache of guns and ammunition were discovered at Apapa Wharf in 2010, American experts concluded that the Nigerian military lacked the expertise to deal with terrorism. Boko Haram was able to counter-attack the Nigerian military on some occasions because the latter did not have the knowledge and skills to fight against Boko Haram. One researcher has shown that the Nigerian security agency is capable of taking fingerprints of arrested criminals but unable to conduct forensic DNA investigations (Chinwoku, 2013:269). This means that, due to a lack of forensic technology, they only conduct basic investigations. Hence the inability of the Nigerian state to contain the Boko Haram crisis.

#### **5.5.5. Police brutality and incompetence**

Police brutality is another factor that has fuelled the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Boko Haram acted violently in July 2009 in retaliation to the Nigerian security forces after these forces executed Boko Haram members on 11 July 2009; thirteen Boko Haram members are believed to have been be killed. Boko Haram then launched attacks on the Dutsen Tanshi police station between July

26 and July 27, and thereafter attacks spread to Kano, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, and Katsina, resulting in more than 500 fatalities. Nigerian police brutality was blamed for fuelling the anger of Boko Haram, and enabled by a lack of proper security, the sect managed to attack many police stations (Duke *et al.*, 2017:7). If the Nigerian police were not so brutal, perhaps the sect would have not sought revenge by attacking more police stations.

Bala and Ibrahim (2018:9) note that police credibility has deteriorated due to using force instead of conducting thorough investigations and abiding by the law. They show that 150,000 police officers out of 400,000 were designated to protect VIPs as well as those who ordinarily could not qualify for police protection (Bala & Ibrahim, 2018:9). This is a clear indication that ordinary citizens were ignored and remained unprotected. Crime is common whenever security is absent. Rasheed Akintude, Inspector General of police in Benon city in southern Nigeria reported that only 20% of police officers are engaged to protect the lives of people and maintain peace while 80% are designated to provide personal security to prominent people (Bala & Ibrahim, 2018:9). It therefore appears that security in Nigeria has been arranged for a few individuals, and the percentage of the police designated to ensure peace is unreasonable, which allows crime syndicates to operate freely. The above supports the view that there was and is an absence of commitment from governmental security services, whose prerogative is to ensure the safety of its citizens.

## **5.6. Efforts by the regional and continental organisations to mitigate the crisis and its effectiveness**

### **5.6.1. Efforts by ECOWAS: effectiveness, and challenges encountered**

Strides have been made by ECOWAS, who have tried to bring to an end to the crises caused by Boko Haram militants. As briefly highlighted in chapter two, in 2013 the ECOWAS adopted a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism as a regional counterterrorism strategy to assist member states in stopping terrorism (Onuoha, 2014). In its plan the ECOWAS developed three strategies for dealing with counterterrorism: a) to prevent terrorism, b) to pursue perpetrators, and, c) reconstruction after terrorist attacks (Salihu, 2015). However, the most important question is whether the ECOWAS had an approach to counterterrorism that was holistic. For instance, the pillar of preventing terrorism involves various actions such as monitoring political, social, economic and cultural activities in order to isolate enabling situations for terrorism (Salihu, 2015). In contrast to efforts made by ECOWAS, there have not been specific efforts to address the root causes of the conflict.

The ECOWAS like Nigeria followed the military approach, and with limited success. The fact that the ECOWAS also did not take into consideration the social, political and economic issues that have been affecting north-east Nigeria has hindered its effectiveness as a regional organisation designated to combat terrorism and monitor the social, political and economic activities in the region. It appears that there was a lack of evaluation and analysis. Analysis would have shown that to overcome terrorism one has to know why Boko Haram was able to recruit members so easily. In addition, many of ECOWAS plans have been more theoretical than practical. For instance, in 2014 the ECOWAS regarded the proliferation of SALW as the main cause of the threats posed by Boko Haram militants, and noted the need for integrative efforts to mitigate terrorism in Lake Chad region (Goyei, 2018:121). But little to nothing was or is being done to stop the smuggling of small light weapons in the Lake Chad region. Therefore, a lack of action has made the ECOWAS efforts ineffective in dealing with the Boko Haram crisis. Furthermore, the ECOWAS's findings that the root cause of insecurity caused by Boko Haram is the proliferation of SALW, proves that the ECOWAS did not deeply investigate poor economic conditions, including unemployment and absent economic prospects, in north-east Nigeria. Had they done proper analysis they would have recognised the role of these factors in driving the expansion of Boko Haram. Their solution could then have related to the actual causes of the crisis, as opposed to symptoms, namely Boko Haram's acquisition of light arms and weapons.

Brenya and Kuffour (2015:88) argue that ECOWAS has failed to address the Boko Haram issue, even though the activities of the insurgent groups serve as a great security threat to the region. It has been identified that compliance and implementation of the ECOWAS normative frameworks were encompassed with insufficient financial resources, absence of political will and lack of coordination among member states. According to Salihu (2015), the dependency of external funding to regionally implement goals tends to affect that regardless of having holistic initiatives, a shortage of funds has been a heavy blow for the ECOWAS and its member states to fully execute its goals of curbing the terror attacks.

Onuoha (2014:10) argues that the ECOWAS lacks both intelligence architecture and an operational standby force it could use in counterterrorism operations. Since Boko Haram is also operating to the countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, and does not belong to the regional organization, the ECOWAS could not effectively ring-fence Nigeria to curb Boko Haram's transnational operations. Tejpar and Albuquerque (2015) contend that the ECOWAS has not been involved in the fight against Boko Haram, for the fact that the violence has spread to neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, partly outside the ECOWAS. This means that

there were no proper risk assessments as to note that the crisis did not need to be attended based on country borders but the impact of the crisis to the region.

### **5.6.2. Efforts made by the AU and its effectiveness**

For various reasons, the AU has not received much credit for its attempts to combat the Boko Haram crisis. Around the time when the AU Peace and Security Council had its first meeting on Boko Haram in 2014, regional coordination was poor, and was mainly marked by *ad hoc* bilateral arrangements between Nigeria and its neighbors. At the same time regional bodies including the ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States and AU considered Boko Haram as an internal issue (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017:26). Reluctance, and regional bodies' perception that Nigeria could tackle the crisis alone hindered the effectiveness of the regional bodies to curtail Boko Haram insurgency. And so, the crisis could not be mitigated. However, the Nigerian government played a role in this failure. The Nigerian government framed conflicts within its borders, including Boko Haram activities, as local conflicts that ought to be resolved internally (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017:26). The Peace and Security Council (2014) argues that until 2014, the continental body did not have any major responses, and did not mobilise political support or coordinate the response of member states and regional organisations. In 2014 the AU decided to revive the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), initially set up by Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1989.

There was a glimmer of hope on 29 January 2015 when a decision was made by the Peace and Security Council to meet relevant heads of states, who then authorised the deployment of the MNJTF, consisting of up to 7,500 military and non-military staff for an initial period of 12 months, which could be renewed. Zamfir (2015:2) shows that the mission was to establish a conducive environment for cooperation, restore state authority, and facilitate humanitarian assistance in affected areas. Human Rights Watch has argued that one remaining challenge is that while the AU and the UN strongly urged that the fight against Boko Haram considers humanitarian law, this has not always been the case (Brubacher *et al.*, 2017:294). The problem with the AU is its overgeneralised view that the Nigerian state is taking the fight to the terrorists and that with the help of training and with the assistance of legislative frameworks, this will curb the crisis, which is not the case (Solomon, 2015). The AU has also lacked commitment, and has not taken on a responsibility to urgently intervene in the Nigerian Crisis, which has made it ineffective as a continental body tasked to ensure peace and stability.

According to Abugbilla (2017:237), analysts believe that capacity issues, such as limited human capital and financial resources, are preventing the AU from dealing with terrorism. Another factor that has led the AU to be less effective in dealing with terrorism is its non-implementation of initiatives. For instance, there have been many human rights violations perpetrated by Boko Haram, the Nigerian police force, and the Nigerian military. The Peace and Security Council of the AU have motivated to establish an Africa-wide arrest warrant for persons including Boko Haram members involved in terrorism (Abugbilla, 2017:236). However, no actual plans have been executed to convict police and military personnel who have violated human rights.

### **5.6.3. Efforts made by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)**

There have been several attempts made by the Lake Chad Basin states to curb the terror attacks launched by Boko Haram militants. This was done as an effort for regional cooperation because Boko Haram extended their threats to the Lake Chad region as a whole. But the operations of the MNJTF have been limited to managing cross border crimes at the border posts in the Lake Chad region (Brubacher *et al.*, 2017:292). When the MNJTF expanded its scope in 2015 to involve counterterrorism operations, the MNJTF operations were ineffective due to logistical problems, and Boko Haram preyed on that weakness and successfully attacked the MNJTF headquarters in Borno State on January 3, 2015 (Brubacher *et al.*, 2017:293). The attack led to the death of thousands of people, and as a result Chad has pulled back from the MNJTF and instead opted to integrate Cameroonian soldiers, which has not been very effective because Boko Haram has managed to counter-attack *both* forces in Fotokol, Cameroon (Brubacher *et al.*, 2017:293).

There have been signs that Boko Haram is militarily strong and is able to fight the MNJTF. But despite the evidence, the Nigerian government remained adamant about consulting the AU so that military capacity could be enlarged. It took about five years to consider the threats posed by Boko Haram, which raises the issue of a lack of clarity in regional collaboration and integration. Dersso (2017:8) argues that the quality of interventions by national security forces, and coordination between Nigeria and neighbouring countries, are major institutional factors affecting the balance of power in Boko Haram's favour.

Lack of commitment is a serious issue affecting the effectiveness of regional integration and this will make it difficult to curb continued attacks by Boko Haram militants. For instance, it has recently been reported that Chadian forces of about 1,200 soldiers pulled back their military support in north-east Nigeria, claiming that their mission was completed (France 24, 2020). This creates a security vacuum for the north-east civilians, who are left without any protection, and declaring

victory in the media can foster new attacks by the Boko Haram militants, who know that there is no military presence. According to the Guardian (2020), even though the Nigerian Defence Headquarters denies that the Chadian forces pulled out of the MNJTF counterterrorism efforts, saying they only withdrew forces from Nigeria, there is great danger in the move because the joint task force numbers have been reduced, and if Nigeria delays action the militants will use this to their advantage. It has also been reported that the withdrawal will likely weaken the Nigerian soldiers (Guardian, 2020).

## 5.7. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an analysis of the responses of the government of Nigeria, the regional organisation, the ECOWAS, and the continental organisation, the AU, to curb the Boko Haram crisis. All steps that have been taken at the state level, including military intervention, limited negotiations, the Joint Task Force operations, and the efforts made by the CJTF have relied heavily on military intervention. The nature and extent of the interventions has been examined, and evidence has indicated that military and police brutality has been acute, and as such has worsened the crisis in Nigeria, even though to some extent terrorist have been driven away from areas of operations. By analysing the methods used to deal with the crisis in Nigeria, from all parties involved, chapter five has responded to the first part of the last question. This question is: has the regional response been effective? The other part of the last question is: and if not, what are the possible alternative means of countering Boko Haram's impact? This is addressed in chapter six.

To fully respond to the above research question, chapter five cited the recent 2020 attacks to prove that Boko Haram attacks have not yet been fully curbed, which shows the relevance of the topic and question. Chapter five has also defined counterterrorism to familiarise the reader with the expected actions involved in attempts to mitigate the crisis. The root causes of the emergence and rise of Boko Haram have been shown in previous chapters to be dire social, political and economic conditions. But Nigeria's approach was state-centric and militaristic. The regional and continental organisations also placed great emphasis on military intervention. Chapter five introduced to the reader the significance of critical approaches when dealing with terrorism because they focus on addressing root causes of the problem and denounce the heavy-handed military approaches. The regional and continental approaches were shown to incorporate no efforts to address socio-economic conditions, corruption, and human rights abuses. The approaches did not address the root causes of Boko Haram activities.

This chapter has indicated the weakness of such approaches, and shown why the efforts were not effective. Challenges indicated included brutality from state security forces, corruption in the military and police, bribery, the military engaging with and sometimes incorporating Boko Haram members, a lack of resources and poor intelligence, and a lack of cooperation and coordination by the parties involved.

Chapter six reflects on the major and supportive research questions, ensuring that the problem statement and the aims of the study have been responded to. Chapter six provides alternative and practical actions regarding what should be done in the long run in order to win the hearts and the minds of the people in the Lake Chad region so that the situation can be stabilised. Finally, chapter six summarises the key findings, and provides recommendations for further research.

## **Chapter 6: Reflections on the major and supportive research questions, alternative solutions, summarising key findings, and recommendations for further research**

### **6.1. Introduction**

Chapter five scrutinised and evaluated actions taken on the state level, regional level, and continental level to resolve the Boko Haram crisis and terrorist attacks. Chapter five indicated several reasons the approaches taken have been less than effective. It argued that the heavy-handed military approach, abuse of power, human rights violations, corruption, poor security mechanisms and an absence of common will to address the root causes of the problem are factors that have hindered and still hinder the effectiveness of mitigating the continued Boko Haram terror attacks. Chapter six reflects on the major and supportive research questions, ensuring that the problem statement and all the research questions outlined in chapter one have been responded to. To achieve this, chapter six provides a summary of what has been analysed from chapters two to five to indicate that the theories applied connect to the research questions and that the problem statement and aims of the study have been addressed. Chapter six offers alternative practical actions that can be taken and monitored regularly to counter the impact of Boko Haram. Chapter six also seals the study and provides recommendations for further research. The following section briefly summarises the literature review provided in chapter two.

### **6.2. Reflecting on the literature review**

In order to provide clarity and indicate the logic of this research study, the literature review in chapter two overviewed the whole study. First, the chapter familiarised the reader with the term terrorism. Several definitions of terrorism were provided. There remains a lack of clarity on terrorism's definition because, as others have argued, many definitions do not have a broad enough scope to cover the context of the present day's insurgency, given its transnational nature, and political, economic and social dimensions (section 2.2). Chapter two also argued that defining terrorism remains difficult because some states do not want to include state sponsored violence when defining terrorism.

The literature review also showed that fanatical groups who are not satisfied with government policies and programs can also conduct terrorist activities to fight the state for power or to impose their ideological beliefs. This can make terrorism a psychological weapon hidden behind

ideological objectives (political, economic, or religious). The purpose of conceptualising terrorism was to make the subject clear and to be able to understand the theoretical frameworks.

Chapter two also differentiated domestic terrorism and international terrorism. The concept of international terrorism was explored in order to balance the analysis of Boko Haram's extended attacks in neighbouring countries. The literature review described Boko Haram in section 2.3, and in section 2.3.2., it indicated the group's recruitment strategies and sources of weaponry. Sources of finance were explored in table 2.1. Chapter two showed that kidnapping for ransom, taxation, extortion, looting, bank robberies, smuggling and trafficking, donations, commercial agriculture, and external assistance have been sources of finance that have sustained the survival of the group. This is part of a response to the problem statement.

The literature review explored the group's links to other terrorist organisations, and examined the group's impact on neighbouring countries in Lake Chad Basin. To evaluate the extent of Boko Haram attacks, Chapter two table 2.2. provided a timeline of Boko Haram's major attacks from 2003 to 2018, and the most recent attacks were described in other chapters. The final part of the literature review outlined factors responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram, which were then utilised in chapter three and chapter four, where empirical evidence was supplied to respond to the research questions and the problem statement. This is discussed in the following section.

### **6.3. Responding to the problem statement**

Boko Haram terrorists persist with terrorist attacks, and, although not regular occurrences, the attacks indicate that peace and security in Nigeria are still at risk. Since corruption, inequality, lack of employment, and poverty have been argued by various scholars to be the key causes of concern, state failure theory and relative deprivation theory were deployed to examine the emergence of Boko Haram and to evaluate state, regional, and continental responses to Boko Haram. The following section reflects on the main research question and the supportive research questions. It summarises how the research questions have been addressed, and so responds to the problem statement to fulfil the aims of the study.

#### **6.3.1. A reflection of the major and supportive research questions**

The study's major research question is: How does state failure theory and relative deprivation theory explain the emergence of Boko Haram? Five supportive research questions were

articulated to fully respond to the main research question. The first supportive research question is: what is state failure theory and how can it explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria? State failure was defined before exploring how it explains Boko Haram's rise in chapters three and four.

Chapter three defined the state, examined its functions, explored the characteristics of state failure, and then scrutinised the connection between state failure and terrorism in general. Chapter four provided examples of how state failure in Nigeria is linked to the rise of Boko Haram. Chapter four noted that the strength of the state can be determined by its will and ability to provide fundamental political goods, such as physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Security, health, education, good governance, economic opportunity, law, order, and basic infrastructure were regarded as political goods. This was done to examine whether the Nigerian government has or can provide political goods to its citizens. Chapter four thus responded to the other part of the first supportive research question, namely, 'how can state failure explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria?'.

Chapter three described characteristics of state failure and linked these to empirical evidence of terrorism in chapter four. Chapter three, section 3.4., explored the characteristics of a failed state. Chapter four, section 4.3., examined how Borno State, the epicentre of Boko Haram operations, is poorly developed and where about 60% of Boko Haram attacks occurred in 2011, 70% in 2013, and 80% in 2014. In 2020 there have been more than five attacks in north-east Nigeria. Chapter four, section 4.4.1., discussed how corruption enhanced Boko Haram activities. Section 4.4.3. has explored the ways in which other security deficiencies have been responsible for the rise of the militant group. Finally, section 4.4.4. indicated that porous borders, which is a feature of failed states, has further facilitated the rise of Boko Haram. The conceptualisation of relative deprivation theory and state failure theory in chapter three, and the empirical evidence of these theories as presented in chapter four, served the purpose of responding to the major research question as well as the first and second supportive research questions.

The second supportive research question is: what is relative deprivation theory and how can it explain the rise of Boko Haram? Chapter three, sections 3.5.1. to 3.5.2., responded to the second research question. The chapter illustrated that relative deprivation is the judgment that one is worse off in relation to some standards, and is accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment. Chapter three responded to the second research question by exploring the link between relative deprivation and terrorism in general, in order to justify its significance in responding to the aims of the study. For instance, section 3.5.2. showed that Tunisia, marked by high numbers of qualified

work seekers and very few vacancies, has been a major recruitment area for the ISIL. Unemployed youths in Nigeria were also more easily recruited by Boko Haram. This demonstrated that relative deprivation is linked to terrorism.

Chapter three also responded to the second supportive question by arguing that relative deprivation is connected to discrimination and injustice. It showed that discrimination might be ethnic, political or economic. Discrimination then generates tensions, violence, and terrorism, which in turn threatens state sovereignty. The following section reflects on the last part of the second supportive research question, which is: how can relative deprivation explain the rise of Boko Haram?

Chapter four cited a wide range of empirical evidence from north-east Nigeria, which illustrated how unemployment, poverty, and inequality enhanced the rise of Boko Haram. Chapter four linked the theoretical frameworks with the empirical evidence. For instance, section 4.5.1 indicated that north-east Nigeria has high rates of poverty. High rates of illiteracy and unemployment aided Boko Haram, as explored in chapter four, section 4.5.2.

Chapter four responded to the second supportive research question with the aid of maps. For example, Map 4.3 showed high rates of uneducated youths in north-east Nigeria, where Boko Haram often launches its attacks. Ongoing underdevelopment and the human security inequalities, as well as a lack of infrastructural development were highlighted. For instance, only 24% of the households in north-east Nigeria have access to electricity, compared to 71% in south-west households. Relative deprivation suggests that political, economic or social alienation drives people to violence or rebellion.

The second to last supportive research question is: how has the Boko Haram insurgency been dealt with on a state level and how have the regional organisations such as the ECOWAS and the AU reacted to mitigate the crisis? The final supportive research question is: have regional responses been effective and, if not, what are the possible alternative means of countering Boko Haram's impact? These questions informed chapter five. Chapter five explored and criticised the methods chosen and actions taken by states and by regional and continental organisations. The chapter also highlighted Boko Haram's January 2020 attacks to indicate that Boko Haram remains a significant security threat.

The challenges around and the effectiveness of state-level responses were critiqued in chapter five from sections 5.5.1. to 5.5.5 Efforts by the regional and continental organisations were

explored in sections 5.6.1. to section 5.6.3. The last research question – what are the alternative means of countering Boko Haram’s impact? – guides the following part of chapter six from sections 6.4.1 to section 6.4.9. These sections suggest practical alternatives to previous strategies. Section 6.5. summarises the key findings, and 6.6 offers recommendations for further research.

## **6.4. Alternatives and practical actions that need to be taken and monitored regularly to counter the impact of Boko Haram**

### **6.4.1. Alleviating unemployment and poverty in north-east Nigeria**

As long as the vast majority of the population in north-east Nigeria remain in poverty, it will be very difficult to fully mitigate the crisis of Boko Haram in the long run. The Nigerian government must initiate and implement projects that will create employment in north-east Nigeria to reduce the number of vulnerable youths. Chapter four indicated that the weak economy – evidenced by high levels of poverty, illiteracy, unavailability of jobs, and economic underdevelopment – has enhanced the rise of Boko Haram (Iyekekpolo, 2018:2-3). Economic reconstruction should be prioritised in north-east Nigeria. This will help to reduce the number of those who might support the militant group, not because they have terroristic motives but because they are seeking means for survival.

More food aid programs must be launched by the government to support north-east citizens. Clashes between the government and Boko Haram militants have killed cattle and goats on which most of the humans depend for survival. If the government continues to be ignorant about supporting the north-east citizens with basic commodities, the opportunities for Boko Haram militants to gain support will remain widespread. The Nigerian government must act on its responsibility to cater to the needs of the public. For instance, chapter four argued that one of the reasons Boko Haram has managed to recruit many youths is that it replaced the state by providing daily meals, and by organising affordable marriages and loans for small commercial activities. To avoid this, the state has to come up with projects which support the north-east citizens so that they can have confidence in the government. Salihu (2015) argued that a huge amount of money was injected into the Nigerian defence budget, \$2.4 billion in 2013 and \$2.3 billion in 2014, which could have been used to develop the north-east Nigeria. This also indicates that Nigeria does have resources to alleviate poverty in north-east but lacks the will and commitment to allocate funds for development and projects that create employment opportunities.

#### **6.4.2. Boosting education in north-east Nigeria**

Lack of education and illiteracy have been major reasons why Boko Haram militants have managed to manipulate so many youths into joining them. The north-east region is populated with uneducated people due to educational inequalities. There is a need for the Nigerian government to begin treating the north-east just like Lagos or Abuja. The state needs to balance the extreme educational inequalities. The number of uneducated youths in north-east Nigeria is due to a lack of commitment by the federal government to making education a priority throughout the whole country. For instance, Giles (2019), mentioned that about 10.5 million youth in Nigeria between five and 14 were out of school, of which 69% reside in north-east Nigeria. More educational support is needed so that the youth will be empowered, and can learn about the dangers of joining militant groups and how in the long run these groups will harm them.

#### **6.4.3. Restoring law, order, and security in north-east Nigeria to boost trade**

There are widespread human rights infringements in north-east Nigeria. The government has to train its security personnel to avoid violating human rights. Conflict has instilled fear in thousands of people who might have abandoned their businesses to move to safer places. Some educated people have also migrated to other places and they have left a big economic gap. Without law, order and security, it will be very difficult for businesses to flourish. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the Nigerian government restores law, order, and security to boost the confidence of those who are willing to make a change. The north-east will battle to have exchanges of goods and services unless security restored and people are guaranteed that their properties are safe and secure. A lack of security has caused many markets to close, and as long as the fear of insecurity exists, it will be very difficult to improve the economic conditions. Suppliers and traders will remain unwilling to risk their lives or goods and services due to a lack of security.

#### **6.4.4. Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission in north-east Nigeria**

A truth and reconciliation commission should be established. Many innocent people have been executed without trial. Properties and homes that have been destroyed by police and soldiers. People have been killed after merely being accused of being linked to Boko Haram militants. People require justice so that they can feel relieved. There is much anger and despair caused by the destruction of properties and the loss of innocent family members. In the long run, a well-established program of reconciliation in the north-east is needed so that people can forgive each other, and those who deserve compensation can be justly compensated. This will also not just

relieve those who have been victimised but will in the long run restore confidence and trust in the government. According to Meyerstein (2003:468), truth commissions serve to address the injustice endured by survivors; they are aimed at identifying victims and integrating them back into the public after they have been violently alienated and victimised.

Chapter two argued that local populations affected by the crisis were not in favour of interacting with former Boko Haram members after the government established Operation Safe Corridor for repentant Boko Haram fighters in February 2018 (Ani & Mahmood, 2018:21). The Nigerian government should make sure that relief programs are set up and monitored regularly so that people can interact with those who have repented. Failure to maintain truth and reconciliation will in the long run risk further escalations of violence. Further, if repentant militants are not welcomed back into society and supported by the government there is a high risk of them re-joining the group to protect themselves.

#### **6.4.5. Abolishing bureaucratic corruption and brutality from the police and military through regular training and human rights workshops**

Corruption has been identified as one of the main problems that has enabled the rise of Boko Haram and has hindered the effectiveness of combating the terror attacks. The Nigerian government has to first eradicate corruption from all public officials, this will end the abuse of power and the security risks caused by corrupt officials. The abolition of corruption will help because resources and fund can then be utilised for the benefit of the public. For instance, Figure 2.2 in chapter two has indicated the perceived corruption of public officials in 2017; 43% of respondents thought the president and officials in his office were corrupt and 69% thought the police were corrupt (Afrobarometer, 2019).

There is a need for checks and balances within several departments of the government to ensure transparency and accountability. Dealing with corrupt officials will be useful for development and boosting the economy. Funds looted by the corrupt officials can be used to construct schools in north-east Nigeria and give handouts to impoverished citizens. Chapter two noted that between 2015 to 2016 \$4.6 billion was taken by the officials via bribes. Corruption has also been responsible for creating poverty and unemployment. As a result, there is a great need to address the root causes of the problem so that the solutions will be effective in the long run. More training is needed for officials dealing with a crisis. At times, guns used by terrorists were smuggled with the help of police. This means that there is much educational training required to restore the integrity of the police. For instance, in chapter four, it was shown that a successful car bomb

attack on the UN offices 2011 was enabled by an official who accepted a bribe at a checkpoint (Antony & Humphrey, 2017:649). Therefore, it is strongly recommended that strict laws are enforced to avoid future insecurity being enabled by those who are supposed to prevent it.

The military department also needs to be revived. There is a need to ensure that the military is provided with sufficient resources when sent to fight against terrorism. At times the military has exchanged guns for food from terrorists, which has exacerbated the crisis. Corruption within the military has to be addressed from the top to the bottom. Concerted efforts are required, including efforts from those overseeing the defence budget and those making sure that arms are serviced, and that funds are spent responsibly and appropriately. Nigeria risks its army being the weakest on the continent if corruption within the defence department is left uncontrolled. The military will be ineffective against militant terrorists if corruption is not maintained.

There is also a need to train all security agencies to consider human rights when responding to the crisis. The government has to set up workshops regularly to alert and remind the police and the military to respect human rights, and to refrain from brutality. Otherwise these security institutions will continue to create enemies. Human rights training can also prevent a situation in which the people seek security from the militants.

Duke *et al.* (2017:5) contend that there is a need to strengthen the military by ensuring sufficient funds, ensuring the professionalisation of military personnel, specifically in non-conventional warfare, and in line with international best practices, boosting recruitment and morale, and increasing arms and ammunition, food, and medicine, while ramping up logistics capabilities. It, therefore, means that the Nigerian state has to prioritise the issue of security so that it is able to deal with terror attacks. Training military personnel will also enable them to perform their duties well. The availability of food and medicine will help to reduce the rate at which the military being bribed or corrupted by their enemies.

#### **6.4.6. Strengthening security at the borders; search, detect, and dismantling explosives**

One of the most challenging factors is the issue of insecurity at Nigeria's borders. Boko Haram militants have used different types of weapons, including explosives and bombs, to attack the government's security systems. The question whether there has been a thorough search of dangerous zones to detect the bombs and dismantle them remains. This has not happened at the border between Nigeria and Cameroon. For instance, according to DW News (2020), in January 2020 over 30 people were killed after a bomb explosion at a market near the border which links

the Nigerian town Gambouri and Cameroon's Fotokol. A young man mistakenly picked a bomb, thinking it was an iron. This is a clear indication that the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments have to enhance their security systems or develop bomb and explosives detection machines and then clear the explosives from such areas.

Due to the porousness of borders, weapons have been smuggled unnoticed, and fighters have also been smuggled into Nigeria from neighbouring countries. To avoid these challenges, security at all Nigerian borders has to be effectively tightened. This demands cooperation and coordination among all Lake Chad basin countries. As long as the borders remain unsecured, there is a great danger that Boko Haram will continue exploiting the weakness of these borders, meaning that mitigating the crisis will remain a challenge in the long run. Tightening security also requires not just the availability of the security forces at the border posts but also advanced technology capable of detecting explosives and all sorts of ammunition in order to reduce the easy flow of weapons to Nigeria. Smuggling of weapons and human beings will only be stopped by tightening the security at the border entry points. This effort requires integration and cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries and should be strictly monitored on a regular basis.

#### **6.4.7. Advancing intelligence gathering mechanisms**

Intelligence gathering has to be extensively developed in north-east Nigeria. Boko Haram militants are continuously attacking important buildings and Nigerian security personnel are still unable to predict these threats. According to the Defence Post (2020), Boko Haram militants have fired grenades into a compound in which the aid agencies assisting in the region were staying. Busses transporting civilians have been ambushed in the presence of the military (Defence Post, 2020). Therefore, much security intelligence is required in north-east Nigeria. Recent attacks signify continued characteristics of failed or failing states in north-east Nigeria. Those who are willing to assist, but are vulnerable due to poor security, might make things worse because they may discontinue their efforts.

In January 2020 there were more than three attacks in the north-east region, which is a clear indication of a continued threat. According to Crisis24 (2020), Boko Haram militants launched attacks at Kombun district in Plateau State and 12 people were reported dead between 8 and 9 January 2020. In Borno State on 6 January 2020, two military officials were wounded after Boko Haram ambushed a military convoy, and on 2 January 2020 Boko Haram militants attacked the city of Adamawa in north-east Nigeria (Crisis24, 2020a, 2020b). The Nigerian government has to ensure that its intelligence agencies are revamped so that they can identify dangers before Boko

Haram strikes. The military is one of the most significant organs of the Nigerian state. The continued attacks on the military shows a great weakness in the Nigerian intelligence systems and is a vivid indication that more effort is needed to strengthen the Nigerian security mechanisms.

#### **6.4.8. Reinforcing regional synergy and coordination**

An absence of coordination and collaboration is one of the weaknesses hindering the effectiveness of regional organisations. Regional organisations have to be synergistic and work together to curb the ongoing crisis. Regional organisations must also take into consideration the root causes of the problem, and then allocate budgets for development, and embrace more social-economic projects, rather than injecting all the money into military operations alone. More has to be done to integrate and address the social, political and economic problems in the troubled region. The exclusively military-based approach from the organisations involved in attempts to curb Boko Haram has been correctly condemned because of concomitant human rights violations and a lack of attention to primary causes of terrorism.

The regional organisations should be adequately prepared and have sufficient resources available for when militants attack. Peace and security architecture should be enhanced to anticipate violent events on the continent. Both the ECOWAS and the AU should work together to address the root causes of the problem and keep their support teams in conflict zones until stability is guaranteed. The regional organisations should shift away from their comfort zone of having regular meetings and conferences without practically executing initiatives. They should also regularly monitor the movement of people and goods across Lake Chad Basin borders. Tight security is required to prevent the flow of weapons and human trafficking. This can be achieved by setting up long-term projects to enhance security.

The regional and continental organisations should also get their financial budgets in order and stop relying on donor funding. They should also consider that delays in logistics and supplies give the enemy a great advantage. The above indicated challenges prevent these organisations from effectively weakening Boko Haram.

#### **6.4.9. Turning forests into industries**

The Nigerian government should use remote or dense areas for projects so that terrorists will not be able to hide in those areas. Maintaining security in forests and the bush will always be

challenging because it is not possible for soldiers or security agencies to be always in the forests and the bush. As long as those areas remain unprotected or uncleared, Boko Haram members will keep on using those forests to prepare and launch attacks. There is a need for long-term plans as opposed to driving out terrorists from forests and then claiming victory. The main reason Boko Haram in the north-east is capable of ambushing the military is due to the fact they have enough space for hide. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the Nigerian government make use of all ungoverned spaces, by creating projects in those areas. Land clearing might not be the best option but in the case of Nigeria using those areas for agricultural projects makes sense because terrorists will not be able to operate from within them.

### **6.5. Summarising key findings**

This research study assessed the factors that determined the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, explored Boko Haram's development, and evaluated the actions taken to mitigate the crisis and their effectiveness. The study argued that corruption and bad governance are the primary factors that help to explain the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The study argued that Nigeria as a whole cannot be described as a failed or failing state but the north-east part of Nigeria, in which Boko Haram's attacks have been rampant and continue, possess the characteristics of a failed or a failing state. If the Nigerian government did not ignore the grievances of the north-east citizens, if it exercised good governance and political accountability, ensured the rule of law, and possessed the will to alleviate poverty and unemployment in north-east Nigeria, Boko Haram might still have emerged but it would not have been as powerful or impactful.

Since Boko Haram has garnered much of its support from the disgruntled unemployed and impoverished youths, the study recommends more efforts to alleviate poverty and unemployment.

Corruption was shown to have penetrated the military and the police. Thus, the study argued the government has to make concerted efforts to strengthen its intelligence-gathering mechanisms, subpoena leaders for misconduct, and apply checks and balances within the security agencies. Failure to do so weakens the possibility of fully curbing Boko Haram crisis. The study suggested that abolishing organised corruption via regular training and human rights violations workshops would make a significant difference towards resolving the crisis.

The presence of education deficiencies in north-east Nigeria was identified as extremely pronounced. This helped to explain the emergence and rise of Boko Haram. This study argues

that the Nigerian government must boost education opportunities in north-east Nigeria, to improve their market and economic prospects, and win the hearts and minds of the youth, including giving them insights into the dangers of joining terrorist organisations. Promoting recreational and sporting activities to the disgruntled youth and organising competitions with other youths in Nigeria can help to make them feel more at home.

The study argued that state failure has not only been responsible for the emergence and rise of Boko Haram but also for hindering the effectiveness of responses. To be able to resolve the crisis, in the long run, a critical approach, to address the root causes of the problem was suggested as preferable. The heavy-handed military approach was critiqued because of its serious human rights violations. It is important for the government to prioritise the rule of law and revive its constitution to serve the interest of the citizens, so that people will not join the terrorist group to get revenge against government brutality or to air out grievances. The critical approach also aims to allow long-term solutions based on assessing inequalities, sufferings, and abuses of power by the state. It aims to produce long-term solutions which Nigeria and all the parties involved should execute. Thus, the study argued that a truth and reconciliation commission should be established. This would create a context in which people can forgive each other and those who deserve to be compensated can be compensated. It should be based on the idea that realised justice can heal wounds and reduce anger against the state and the repentant.

Besides efforts to drive terrorist from some areas, the study argued that there should be efforts to conduct a thorough search for explosives in all hot spot areas and at Nigeria's borders.

Taking into consideration the efforts made by the regional and continental organisations, the study argued that both organisations lacked the capacity, resources and the common will to fully commit to resolving the Nigerian crisis. To be able to curb Boko Haram crisis in the long run, the study argued that more needs to be done to enhance regional synergy and cooperation, and that regional organisations should monitor human rights violations and continue supporting the troubled area until safety is guaranteed. The study contended that organisations should engage in determining the root causes of the crisis and try to implement soft approaches, as opposed to near exclusively resorting to military action. Working on tightening security at Lake Chad Basin borders has also been suggested as a way to stop the smuggling of small and light weapons and human trafficking, which can prevent terrorists or criminals from easily accessing weapons and resources in the longer term.

Dense forest areas cannot be sustainably monitored for terrorist networks. To reduce terrorist hiding-spots and prevent them from using dense forests to prepare for ambushes or launching attacks, the study suggested that deforestation would help. Those areas could be used for agricultural activities, which would limit the coverage of the militants.

## **6.6. Recommendations for further research**

The military approaches deployed by the Nigerian state, the regional organisation, and the continental organisation have been marred by human rights violations with little efforts to use soft approaches. The study thus recommends more analysis and research regarding the application of a critical approach that is focused on root causes and long-term solutions. Furthermore, case studies based on field research, which examine the legitimacy of democratic practices in Nigeria by comparing democratic processes in south-west Nigeria, north-east Nigeria, and other parts of Nigeria are recommended.

This might help to understand whether the Nigerian government is only considering the north-east region as part of its nation based on a territorial interpretation but not as part of its nation in terms of actual governance and service delivery. Such case studies could lead to the development of new initiatives to change the situation in north-east Nigeria.

Furthermore, with regards to the many people who have lost their innocent families and the belongings they have worked for, a field study to practically engage with such people could be done by a group of social workers, human rights lawyers, experts, and regional and continental representatives to gather relevant information about their experiences and how they consider that their grievances could be resolved.

The findings could be used by relevant stake holders and Nigerian government's relevant departments to ensure that the state draws on the findings and respects the demands and experiences of the victims. This would demand serious political will and commitment by Nigerian elites and the government.

Finally, in light of the humanitarian crisis caused by the Boko Haram attacks, a field study could be conducted whereby Nigerian government officials interact with those who have been displaced. This could help to think well about the 2.3 million people living as refugees in the Lake Chad Basin region, and enable active engagement with them, so that work can be done towards re-integrating them back into their families and communities.

This might help in the long run to avoid or reduce the escalation of tensions or the logic of revenge. A revenge mentality might cause disaffected people to join militant groups, which would only exacerbate the crisis. Nigeria should use its abundant resources to fund practical programs for repatriating and reintegrating those who have fallen victim to Boko Haram.

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