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**The characteristics of contemporary revolutions in
Africa: a comparative analysis.**

Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the Degree of Master
of Arts at the University of Stellenbosch.

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Supervisor: Prof Willie Breytenbach

Declaration

I the undersigned hereby declare that the work contained in
this thesis is my own original work and has not previously in
its entirety or in part been submitted at any university for a
degree.

Date: ...19.1.91.....

Summary

The characteristics of African revolution are investigated in
this thesis, which is made up of five parts. The method used is
comparative and descriptive in nature.

In the first part problems regarding the definition of
revolution are examined. It is found that revolutions are
characterised by [a] mass participation and [b] the
transformation of the political and socio-economic orders. Thus,
five revolutions -- in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau and Zimbabwe -- are identified; they are studied here.

In the second part of the thesis the political and socio-
economic orders prior to the revolutions are studied. It is
found that in all the areas little or no political
representation of the local population; repression by the
rulers; and poor living conditions existed.

The manner in which the movements grew is examined in part
three. Four elements are central: good leadership; an ideology
that united the population; followers from more than one class
or group; and a good organisation.

Armed conflict between the ruler and the challenger is examined
in part four. Important aspects are the way in which the war was
waged; external support for both parties; and the manner in
which power was transferred to the revolutionary movement.

In the final part the transformation of the political and
socio-economic orders by the revolutionary movements are
analysed.

Opsomming

Die eienskappe van revolusie in Afrika is in hierdie tesis, wat
uit vyf dele bestaan, ondersoek. Die metode wat gebruik is, is
beskrywend en vergelykend van aard.

In die eerste deel is daar duidelikheid verkry oor die
definisie van revolusie. Daar is bevind dat revolusies gekenmerk
word deur [a] massa-deelname en [b] die transformasie van die
politieke en sosio-ekonomiese ordes. Daardeur is vyf revolusies
-- die in Algerië, Angola, Mosambiek, Guinee-Bissau en Zimbabwe
-- geïdentifiseer; dit is hierdie revolusies wat hier ontleed
word.

Die tweede deel van die tesis is afgestaan aan 'n beskrywing
van die politieke en sosio-ekonomiese ordes voor die revolusie.
Daar is gevind dat in al die gebiede was daar geen of weinig
politieke verteenwoordiging vir die plaaslike bevolking;
verdrukking deur die regeerders; en swak lewenstoestande.

Die wyse waarop die bewegings gegroei het, is in deel drie
beskryf. Vier elemente is sentraal: goeie leierskap; 'n
ideologie wat mense saamgebind het; volgelinge uit meer as een
klas of groep; en 'n goeie organisatoriese struktuur.

Gewapende konflik tussen die regeerder en die uitdager is in
deel vier ontleed. Belangrike aspekte is die wyse waarop die
oorlog gevoer is; buitelandse steun aan die strydende partye; en
die manier waarop die mag aan die bewegings oorgedra is.

In die laaste gedeelte is die bewegings se transformasie van
die politieke en sosio-ekonomiese ordes ondersoek.

Preface

A project of this nature cannot be completed successfully
without the assistance of a number of people and
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My supervisor, Prof Willie Breytenbach, was always available
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the shaping of this study.

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1.

Introduction

The aim of this study is to identify the characteristics of contemporary revolutions in Africa. This will be done by analysing revolutions in various African countries, and comparing the results of this analysis to identify characteristics of revolution.

It is, therefore, imperative that the approach used in the study allows for the comparison of similar phenomena. The first part of the thesis is made up of two chapters.

In Chapter One, the history of the concept "revolution" is traced, and violent collective action in general is looked at. Concepts related to revolution, for example, civil wars, <u>coups d'etats</u>, revolts, are analysed, to distinguish them from revolutions, with which they are often confused, and to assist in the construction of an analytical model of violent collective action.

In Chapter Two, a working definition of revolution is proposed. Well-known definitions of revolution are reviewed to identify pitfalls which should be avoided in the construction of a definition.

These pitfalls include definitions which are too broad in scope, and therefore include phenomena which are not revolutions. Another pitfall is excessive ideological bias. By applying the lessons learnt from the analysis of definitions of revolution, it is possible to construct a working definition which will be a precise tool for identifying revolutions in this study.

The definition has two major criteria to distinguish between revolutions and related concepts: the extent to which society is transformed, and the fact that this fundamental transformation is the result of the actions of a mass-based movement.

In the final section of Chapter Two, contemporary revolutions in Africa will be identified by using the working definition and analytical model, which was constructed in Chapter One. These revolutions will form the study area in an attempt to identify the characteristics of revolution.

The method used in this study is rooted in qualitative

instability analysis. It is a study based primarily on description[1]. The reason why this approach was chosen above a quantitative approach is primarily because statistics are hard to come by during a revolution, or may be biased in favour of the challenger or incumbent.

A qualitative approach allows the student to employ the vast amount of descriptive literature on the African revolutions in analysing the shared characteristics of these processes.

The approach in this study is thematic. A characteristic of contemporary African revolutions is identified and described in each of the chapters. Characteristics which form a logical unit (although all characteristics are interrelated, some are more than others) are grouped together in broader thematic streams.

The reason for the thematic approach is the inefficiency and sterility of an approach using rigid phases of revolution. Not only does this view rob revolution of one of its central characteristics -- the fact that it is a complex process, filled with interrelated events -- but it is also conceptually weak.

It is pointed out in this study that, to utilise the phases of the French or Russian Revolution in the African context, results in a sterile analysis. They are different types of revolution. In some revolutions, the capital city fell after the old government broke down. From there the revolution spread to the countryside. In other revolutions, on the other hand, the capital fell only after a long struggle in the countryside.

The capital was encircled by revolutionary villages in a process which usually took years. The thorough research of "western" revolutions, for example, by Crane Brinton[2], provides useful insight, but the phases identified in these works are frequently not appropriate for the study of African revolutions.
The phases identified for "eastern" revolutions by writers such as McCuen[3] leave much to be desired as well.

By identifying only organisation, terror, guerrilla warfare and conventional war as the stages of revolution, he fails to appreciate the wider picture of revolution. In order for a revolutionary movement to take root, unfavourable political and socio-economic conditions must exist and the regime's legitimacy will be low and living conditions poor. A group of

revolutionaries will fail if they simply start to organise a population which is not discontented -- witness Che Guevara in Bolivia[4].

Furthermore, McCuen's argument that terror precedes guerrilla warfare[5] is not borne out by events in African revolutions. Finally, a revolution does not end after "conventional war" -- the very important transformation of society usually starts after the fall of the old regime.

Notwithstanding the thematic approach of this study, attention is paid to stages of revolution.

For example, the stages identified by the supporters of the two-phase approach to revolution (national liberation followed by the transformation of society) are included. A primary stage often ignored by theorists -- the structural conditions prior to the war of independence -- is furthermore identified.

The political and economic order of the old regimes are analysed in Part Two to determine why revolutionary activity occurs. (It frequently occurred that place names were changed at some or stage of the revolutionary process in the African countries. Names applicable to a certain phase will be used: for example, Lourenco Marques will be used when Portuguese rule is analysed, and Maputo when the independent Mozambique is discussed. The same holds true for Cabora/Cahora Bassa.)

The presence of grievances is, however, not enough to ensure a revolution. The local population should actively challenge the rule of the incumbents. In Part Three the mobilisation of people around the revolutionary ideals is investigated.

No contemporary revolution can be successful without competent leadership. Different aspects of leadership, and characteristics of the leaders in particular, are looked at in Chapter Five.

The revolutionary leaders are the persons who supply the ideology of the revolutionary movements. Ideology plays a major role in the mobilisation of followers, because it points to a brighter future. It is analysed in Chapter Six.
A third aspect of mobilisation deals directly with the people who are mobilised. Who were the revolutionary followers in Africa, why did they join the movements, and how much support is needed for a movement to be successful? These are some of the questions to which answers are sought in Chapter Seven.

In Chapter Eight the final aspect of mobilisation in African revolutions is analysed. How were the movements organised? For Samuel Huntington, there can be no doubt about the importance of organisation: "Organisation is the road to political power...In the modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its politics"[6]. It is shown in Chapter Eight that all the African revolutionary movements studied here had a definite structure, which was the result of the establishment of a chain of command. This chain of command provided a framework of organisational discipline.

However, organisation can lead to autocratic tendencies within a movement. African revolutions were no exception, and it is shown that different wings competed for control of the movement, while the leaders usually did not tolerate dissent.

The nature of the conflict between the revolutionary movements and the incumbents, investigated in Chapter Nine, can be described as military-political, because it has two aims: to take on the government forces in (guerrilla) combat and to gain the support of the population and the international community.

The most important aspect in this chapter is the strategy followed by the movements: why did they opt for a drawn-out guerrilla struggle, and why did the movements resort to terror tactics against the people whose cause they were fighting for?

In Chapter Ten, the battle for international support is looked at. To reverse Clausewitz's dictum, this diplomatic battle between the challenger and incumbent can be seen as an alternative war. The support which the movements received -- non military and military, from governments and non-governmental bodies -- often proved to be crucial in the success of the revolutions.

The final chapter in Part Four deals with the most dramatic aspect of any revolution -- the process by which the old rulers are replaced by the revolutionary movement. In Chapter Eleven, different aspects of the revolutionary take-over will be examined.

These include the reasons for the success of the revolutionary movements, as well as the manner in which the transfer of power from the old regime to the revolutionary movement took place. This is very significant, because it plays a large role in determining the nature of the regime that is established by the revolutionary movement.

It is also interesting to note that in some of the movements
the revolutionary alliance broke up fter the initial goal --
political independence -- had been achieved.

The final section of this study, Part Five, can be seen as
the other side of the picture sketched in Part Two (the
political and socio-economic orders under the old regime). In
Chapters Twelve and Thirteen these orders, as transformed by
the new rulers, are investigated.

In the Conclusion, the characteristics of the African
revolutions studied here are presented together in order to
provide an overview. With the characteristics identified, it
is possible to speculate upon the probable causes of the
selected revolutions, and why they succeeded in transforming
society fundamentally.

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6.

Notes to Introduction

1. Andriole, S.J. & G.W. Hopple. 1984. Revolution and political instability -- applied research methods. London: Francis Pinter (Publishers). p19. This approach is used, according to the authors, by T. Skocpol in her 1979 work, States and social revolutions. Skocpol uses a structural approach based on qualitative instability analysis. She not only studied the characteristics of revolutions, but their causes as well (by comparing her case studies to unsuccessful revolutions). Thus, qualitative instability analysis can be used in an explanatory manner as well. In this study, no unsuccessful revolution is described, which makes it impossible to argue about causes of African revolutions. This aspect falls, furthermore, outside the scope of this study.
2. See Brinton, C. 1952. The anatomy of revolution. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. First published in 1938. See Skocpol, C. 1979. States and social revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp37-38 for a detailed criticism of this approach.
3. See Breytenbach, W.J. 1989. "Southern Africa within the African revolutionary context," in A.J. Venter (ed.), Challenge: Southern Africa within the African revolutionary context. Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Limited. p81. He discusses the danger of rigid periodisation with reference to McCuen's "phases" of revolution.
4. Greene, T.H. 1984. Comparative revolutionary movements -- search for theory and justice. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. p134.
5. Breytenbach, "Southern Africa," p81.
6. Huntington, S.P. 1968. Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. p461.

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Chapter One
Distinguishing between revolution and related concepts

1.1. Introduction

The word revolution is used very loosely -- many people think
that any uprising against a government is a "revolution". To
complicate conceptual clarification further, the word is not
only used in a political sense, but for example in the spheres
of the arts, agriculture, and science as well.
 Without a proper definition of revolution, it would be
impossible to identify this phenomenon, and the student of
contemporary Africa would wallow in a morass of facts
regarding political violence and change.
 Before a working definition of revolution (for use in this
study) is constructed in Chapter Two, uprisings against
authority in general are examined in this chapter. Some of the
characteristics of revolution become apparent from this
examination. These characteristics form the basis in the
construction of an analytical model which is used to
distinguish African revolutions from other types of violent
collective action.

 At this stage it will suffice to state that revolution is a
form of rebellion, which can be defined as "open or determined
defiance of, or resistance to, authority or controlling
power"[1]. Greene[2] agrees with this approach, i.e. to view
rebellion as the genus regarding uprising against authority.
Types of rebellion include civil wars, revolts, coups d'etat,
and revolutionary coups, which can be divided into sub-types[3].
It is important to note that the term rebellion, in all its
forms, implies the use of violence by the rebels, or at least
the threat of violence.
 Although a group of scholars, particularly Harry Eckstein[4],
advocates the use of the term "internal war" as the genus for
uprisings against authority, this study will use the well-
established "rebellion", because the use of "internal war"
poses certain conceptual problems: some types of uprising have
important "external" components -- for example, foreign
support for both challenger and incumbent in a war of
independence. It also neglects non-violent aspects of
rebellion, such as the role of ideology, mobilisation, and
international opinion.

 Rebellion has been part of political life since the earliest

times. In the first section of this chapter, the history of
the term revolution will be traced briefly. Despite centuries
of thought and research on different types of rebellion, there
is still no agreement on what exactly the characteristics of a
revolution are, nor is there a standard definition of the
phenomenon. Therefore, the second section of this chapter will
be an attempt to draw lines of distinction between revolutions
and related concepts such as coups d'etat, revolts, and civil
wars by means of an analytical model.

1.2. Short history of the term "revolution"

The ancient Egyptians showed a lively interest in rebellion in
approximately 3200 BC, when the northern and southern parts of
the kingdom were unified[5]. This unification led to a number of
rebellions, and the then newly-invented art of writing
chronicled these uprisings, just as video-images would record
rebellions more than five thousand years later.

In the Classical period, rebellion interested scholars such
as Aristotle and Plato, when uprisings and changes of
government were frequent events in the Greek city-states.

Following a decline in interest in rebellion during the
Middle Ages, the turbulent Italian states and cities provided
fertile ground for the study of rebellion, such as
Machiavelli's works on rebellion and political stability[6].

Rebellion, and the study of the phenomenon, was very much in
evidence during the Reformation, and culminated in not only
the fundamental transformation of English society in the
seventeenth century, but also in John Locke's principle that
society has the right to rise against illegitimate rulers[7].

The term revolution was first used in astronomy, and gained
importance through the work of Copernicus (1473-1543) in which
he used the word to describe the regular orbits of heavenly
bodies. Early philosophers borrowed the term to describe the
cyclical process -- and therefore the return to a preordained
order -- in human events[8]. Thus, "[n]othing could be farther
removed from the original meaning of the word 'revolution'
than the idea of which all revolutionary actors have been
possessed and obsessed, namely, that they are agents in a
process which spells the definite end of an old order and
brings about the birth of a new world"[9].

The term revolution first took on its present political
meaning during the French Revolution which started in 1789,
when the idea of a return to a preordained order was changed
in favour of "the need to embark upon an entirely new
enterprise"[10]. This quest for a new enterprise spread through
Europe during the nineteenth century, as evidenced by the

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series of rebellions in 1848 which toppled monarchies[11].

Interest in the study of rebellion, and more specifically revolution, was by now deeply embedded in Western political thought. This interest was heightened toward the end of the nineteenth century when Karl Marx, in collaboration with Friedrich Engels, constructed his dialectic materialistic world view, which views revolution as an essential part of history, as mankind struggles from one economic epoch to the next, culminating in not only a classless and stateless society, but a classless and stateless world[12].

In the twentieth century this doctrine provided the inspiration for the Russian and Chinese revolutions, and the majority of revolutions in the developing world. These revolutions, as well as Hitler's attempt to transform Germany (although inspired by a different ideology), led to a wealth of information on rebellion and revolution, so much so that currently, as Eckstein[13] states, "one finds not merely interest in social force and war, but obsession".

In order to distinguish between the numerous types of rebellion, it is necessary to construct an analytical scheme which will aid in the identification of African countries which experienced revolutions. In the following section, major types of rebellion are discussed. From this analysis a graphic analytical scheme will be constructed. This discussion and analytical scheme will allow for clearer distinction between revolution and other types of rebellion.

1.3. Concepts related to revolution

1.3.1. Coup d'etat

The French term coup d'etat literally means a blow of state; thus, it implies an unconstitutional seizure, or attempted seizure, of power by individuals within the government structure[14].

A coup d'etat is characterised by the following: "(a) it is the effort by a political coalition illegally to replace the existing governmental leaders by violence or the threat of violence; (b) the violence employed is usually small; (c) the number of people involved is small; (d) the participants already possess institutional bases of power within the political system"[15].

Furthermore, the action in a coup is "unexpected, sudden, decisive"[16]. The relative low death toll in a coup can be attributed to this decisive action, coupled with the small number of participants. The coup-makers usually attempt to

seize the state's symbols of authority, such as the office of the chief executive, and to neutralise the forces opposed to a coup[17]. Swiftness of execution is not only important to prevent counter-measures by the regime, but also aids the leaders of the coup to present the public with a fait accompli[18].

The armed forces of a modern nation are superbly suited to execute a coup d'etat. Not only are they already part of the state structure, but the nature of an army is to plan in secret and to execute swiftly, and as Zimmermann[19] points out, the armed forces possess the greatest coercive potential in a state. If a large segment of the army supports the coup (usually carried out by fellow-members of the army), the prospects of success are good[20].

It is important to note that coup-makers are mostly not interested in a fundamental transformation of a society -- the "stakes of the simple coup are generally power as an end in itself"[21]. The new ruling group may introduce changes in government, but these are generally not of a sweeping nature. In fact, coups are often executed to redress a threat, real or imagined, to the military as a corporate body, or when the armed forces are dissatisfied with the policies of the government. Examples are the security coup, reform coup, the new élite coup and the punitive coup, the typological terms employed being indicative of military disaffection with the present government[22]. Huntington[23] goes even further and states that coups not only serve to redress military grievances, but can act as the non-constitutional equivalent of electoral change.

Whichever way coups are viewed, it is important to note that the coup-makers do not attempt to fundamentally transform society[24]. This can be explained by the non-ideological orientation of the coup-makers, for it is an ideology which is one of the driving forces in mobilising people to alter the political, social and economic structures of society[25].

1.3.2. Revolutionary coup d'etat

The revolutionary coup is identical to the coup d'etat in that it is carried out by a small number of people who already hold positions in the government structure. They succeed in toppling the previous regime swiftly, but here the similarity between coups and revolutionary coups ends. Two broad, and diametrically opposed types of revolutionary coup d'etat can be identified.

The first type of revolutionary coup entails more than a mere change of personnel or minor reforms -- the stakes are much

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higher[26]. It can be seen as "the initiation of revolutionary
social change"[27]. This is particularly the case when the coup-
makers set about constructing new political and economic
structures, a process which may be characterised by more
violence than the toppling of a government[28].

Examples of revolutionary coups are Nasser's take-over in
1952 in Egypt and the toppling of Selassie in Ethiopia, which
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.

Although the leaders of a revolutionary coup are inspired by
an ideology, such ideology plays a smaller role in their
attempt to transform society than it would in a mass-based
revolutionary movement, which depends to a larger extent on
mass mobilisation and participation[29]. Revolutionary coups are
not mass based; indeed, they are élite-directed and élite-
executed seizures of power, followed by the fundamental
changing of society.

A second type of revolutionary coup is identified by
Brinton[30], who argues that an intensification in the
revolutionary process is initiated by a "decisive coup d'etat"
in which the extremists in the revolutionary movement oust the
moderates. Thus, Brinton argues that different phases in the
revolutionary process may be ushered in by a revolutionary
coup.

Both types of revolutionary coup are carried out by a small
and elitist group. No mass participation of the extent seen in
revolutions occurs. However, the coup-makers set out to change
society fundamentally, and often succeed. In this sense the
revolutionary coup differs profoundly from the coup d'etat.

1.3.3. Revolt

Revolt can be defined as an uprising "against established
authority, [an act] of open defiance and disobedience. But the
aim of such rebellions was not the challenge of authority or
the established order of things as such; it was always a
matter of exchanging the person who happened to be in
authority"[31].

It is important to note that these revolts -- which include
types such as jacquerries, peasant revolts, urban mobs,
messianism, revolts, nativistic revolts -- are all mass
based[32]. The violence is not, as in the case of coups or
revolutionary coups, restricted to a small élite. In fact, the
larger number of participants may result in more bloodshed
than in a coup and the violence being of a longer duration[33].

A rebel is, like a revolutionary, angered by the way society
operates, but rather than striving for the abolition of the
system that angers him, he strikes out against persons whom he

holds responsible for his current position[34]. In this sense, Wolf[35] defines modern peasant revolts as "reactions to major social dislocations". Johnson[36] describes this reactive nature of revolts as "an act of social surgery; it is intended to cut out one or more members who are offending against the joint commitments to maintain a particular social structure".

The spontaneous eruption of most revolts is added testimony to the fact that they are reactions to immediate situations[37]. This lowers the stakes of a revolt and places it diametrically opposite revolution, because it has no doctrine for fundamentally changing society in a deliberate and planned manner. The lower stakes of a revolt can be ascribed to the lack of ideology. For example, an urban mob, demanding the redress of an economic grievance, is "inspired by no specific ideology"[38]. In a revolution, the members of the revolutionary movement have an ideology, which acts as a guide to the creation of a "new world" and is a potent force for political mobilisation. Although a prolonged revolt may develop some semblance of ideology, the ideology is usually based on traditional beliefs and less clear-cut than that of a revolutionary movement[39]. When a revolt topples a regime, the new leaders, although they may be charismatic, often lack the direction which an ideology provides -- they become hesitant and vulnerable to counter-attack by supporters of the previous regime[40].

1.3.4. War of independence

A war of independence (also known as war of liberation, anti-colonial war, colonial secession, or secession) is another species of the genus rebellion, because it is an uprising against established authority.

Hagopian[41] defines secession as "the breaking off of one part of the state and the proclamation of its independence". Thus, the usual notion of secession centres around geography; for example, a certain region breaking its ties with the motherland. In the case of a war of independence, it is not necessarily a part of a state that wishes to proclaim its independence: it may be a geographic entity thousands of kilometers removed from the ruling country, or colonial power in the case of colonial secession.

Secession or a war of independence is more likely to occur in a country which is characterised by great regional heterogeneity, and is especially likely to occur in a region or colonial area that is particularly distinctive from the rest of the country or colonial power, in terms of its economy, religion or culture[42].

In a war of independence the masses play a larger role than in a coup d'etat. The word "war" implies that substantial numbers of a society are involved in the fighting. Rejai[43] states that a war of independence involves the "mass violent overthrow of a foreign (external) power".

While a coup d'etat is a calculated grab for power by an exclusive and elitist group and a revolt the spontaneous, mass-based uprising under charismatic leadership to redress immediate grievances, a war of independence falls somewhere in between. It is usually waged as a guerrilla war, which on the one hand presupposes an able military and political élite within the independence movement, and on the other hand relies on the support of the masses[44].

The extent to which the political, economic and social order of a society is altered varies from one war of independence to another. The war of liberation can be an early phase in a revolution if it leads not only to the fall of the old regime, but also to the fundamental alteration of the the political, economic and social order. It is argued in this project that the African revolutions studied here shared this tendency. Johnson[45] defines a war of independence as follows (he refers to this process as a militarised mass insurrection): "calculated, mass, revolutionary wars on the basis of guerrilla warfare and nationalistic ideologies". A war of independence can, in its most developed form, be "both a war and a revolution unfolding at the same time" if the movement implements drastic reforms prior to the fall of the government[46].

An important element in a war of independence is the degree of external support which the movement fighting for independence obtains[47]. To a greater extent than the coup, revolutionary coup, and revolt, the war of independence is characterised by the involvement of the international community.

1.3.5. Civil war

Civil war can be defined as a "violent conflict between two semi-autonomous political systems, each with its own regime, and in which each side enjoys considerable means of coercion in fairly distinct geographical regions. Also...separation or secession is a possible outcome of civil war"[48].

Tilly[49] argues that this type of collective violence is primarily the result of the attempts of one group to gain resources from the other group. These resources can be physical resources such as territory, or human resources, such as followers.

Zimmermann[50] indicates that in a civil war the resources of both sides have reached parity -- not only the

élite, but the masses (human resources) are split in their
support for the semi-autonomous political systems. A good
example of this is the situation in Beirut, where no clear
winner has emerged.

Oglesby[51] identifies another important feature of a civil
war: both parties are awarded belligerent rights. This feature
dates back to the American Civil War of 1861: the British
proclamation of neutrality "was the explicit form in which
belligerent recognition was extended"[52]. Belligerent
recognition exists "whenever a foreign state adopts an
attitude of complete impartiality as between the contending
parties and treats them, so far as the war is concerned, upon
a footing of entire equality"[53]. For example, if a coup aborts
and the situation escalates into a prolonged conflict,
belligerent recognition will exist if countries declare
themselves neutral with regard to both the challenger and
incumbent[54].

1.4. Constructing an analytical scheme to distinguish between revolution and related concepts

From the analysis of concepts related to revolution above it
is clear that two elements are central in rebellions: the
degree to which the political and socio-economic orders are
transformed, and the degree of popular participation.

For Skocpol[55], the above-mentioned transformation boils down
to the transformation of the state, which she defines as
"potentially autonomous organisations located at the interface
of class structures and international situations".

Thus, one of the yardsticks to distinguish between revolution
and related concepts (other types of rebellion) is the stakes
of the uprising -- the extent to which a movement aims to
transform, and actually transforms, the society fundamentally.

Hagopian[56] terms this the "latent aspect" of revolution:
"what is actually accomplished by the revolution regardless of
the wishes and the beliefs of its protagonists".

The second yardstick is the number of people who participate
in a revolution. Thus, it is important to determine whether
the uprising is mass-based, or more narrowly based.

From an analysis of this aspect other elements of revolution
-- such as the importance of organisation and the role of
ideology -- become clear, since they play an important role in
determining the number of people who participate in a
revolution. These "manifest aspects" of revolution also need
to be included in an analytical scheme to distinguish between
revolution and related concepts[57].

15.

By using these two central aspects, a graphic analytical scheme can be constructed to indicate whether a process is a revolution, or a coup d'etat, revolt, revolutionary coup, war of independence, revolutionary war of independence, or civil war. The following criteria are central in the scheme:

(i) the stakes of the uprising, which are reflected by the extent of the transformation of society (vertical axis); and

(ii) the degree to which the population is mobilised, and participates (horizontal axis).

X AXIS: POPULAR PARTICIPATION

Y AXIS: STAKES OF UPRISING

It is important to bear in mind that this classification cannot provide an entirely clear distinction between types of rebellion. Grey areas will occur when types overlap. The types of rebellion identified in the scheme can be subdivided further into, for example, different types of coups d'etat. However, for the purposes of this study the broad categories identified above will suffice.

Thus, as was argued in section 1.3., the coup d'etat is characterised by little popular participation as well as limited fundamental changes in the political, economic and social spheres of society. It is placed in the bottom left hand quarter. The revolutionary coup d'etat, on the other

hand, leads to more fundamental changes in society. In this sense it shares some characteristics with revolution. However, the revolutionary coup is carried out by a small group. It differs profoundly from revolution in this "manifest aspect".

Revolts involve a large number of the masses. In this sense they show similarities with revolutions. However, when the stakes of the uprising -- as reflected in the fundamental transformation of the political, economic and social order -- are examined, it is clear that revolt and revolution are opposites. Revolution is the transformation of society; revolt is the uprising against members of the ruling group who have angered the ruled. In a revolt, no change of society is envisaged. It is therefore placed at the the bottom right hand quarter.

Like a revolt, a war of independence involves a large number of people. In the war of independence, the stakes are higher than in a revolt, because the participants aim at changing the political sphere of their society -- they want to rule themselves. This means that the war of independence can be seen as an early phase of a revolution, from which the transformation of the socio-economic sphere can follow. For these reasons, the war of independence is placed in the top right hand quarter, but below the area allotted to revolution.

It was argued above that a civil war involves large numbers of the population, but the extent to which the belligerent parties transform society is often limited by the manner in which the civil war was conducted and concluded. Civil war is best classified as occupying the grey area between revolution, war of independence, and revolt.

1.5. Conclusion

At the end of this chapter, it has been established to a large extent what revolution is not -- <u>coup d'etat</u>, revolutionary <u>coup d'etat</u>, revolt, war of independence, civil war -- and to a lesser extent what revolution actually is (a process characterised by mass participation and the fundamental transformation of society).
Concepts related to revolution are characterised by the presence of only one of these criteria -- e.g. mass participation in revolts and wars of independence, and the transformation of society in the revolutionary coup.

In the following chapter these two central elements in the tentative definition of revolution will be analysed further in

order to construct a working definition of revolution. This definition, in conjunction with the analytical model discussed above, will then assist in identifying the African countries which experienced revolutions.

* *

18.

Notes to Chapter One

1. Kornhauser, W. 1959. The politics of mass society. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. p142. Kornhauser's argument that rebellion is the genus of violent collective action will form the basis of this chapter.

2. Greene, T.H. 1984. Comparative revolutionary movements -- search for theory and justice. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. First published in 1974. p14.

3. Kornhauser, Mass society, p142. This will be done at the discussion of these concepts below. It is important to note that other aspects of violent collective action, such as the use of terror, can occur in various types of rebellion.

4. Eckstein, H. 1964. "Introduction: toward the theoretical study of internal war," in H. Eckstein, ed., Internal war: problems and approaches. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. p1.

5. Calvert, P. 1970. Revolution. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. p16.

6. Friedrich, C.J. 1969. "An introductory note on revolution," in C.J. Friedrich (ed.), Revolution. New York: Atherton Press. p11.

7. Ibid.

8. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p15.

9. Arendt, H. 1986. On revolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. First published in 1964. p42.

10. Arendt, On revolution, p45.

11. Friedrich, "An introductory note," p13.

12. Macrides, R.C. 1983. Contemporary political ideologies -- movements and regimes. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. First published in 1979. p105.

13. Eckstein, "Introduction," p2.

14. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p140.

15. Huntington, S.P. 1968. Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. p218.

16. Rapoport, D.C. 1969. "Coup d'etat: the view of the men firing pistols," in C.J. Friedrich (ed.), Revolution. New York: Atherton Press. p60.

17. Leiden, C. and K.M. Schmitt. 1968. The politics of violence -- revolution in the modern world. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. p23.

18. Rapoport, "Coup d'etat," p62.

19. Zimmermann, E. 1983. Political violence, crises, and revolutions: theories and research. Boston: G.K. Hall & Co. p241.

20. Goodspeed, D.J. 1962. The conspirators: a study of the coup d'etat. New York: The Viking Press, Inc. p210.
21. Hagopian, M.N. 1974. The phenomenon of revolution. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. p4.
22. Baynham, S. 1985, "Coups d'etat in Africa," in African Insight, vol. 15, no.4, 280-281.
23. Huntington, S.P. 1962. Changing patterns of military politics. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. p40.
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25. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p141.
26. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p4.
27. Johnson, C. 1966. Revolutionary change. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. p151.
28. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p141.
29. Ibid.
30. Brinton, C. 1952. The anatomy of revolution. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. First published in 1938. p164.
31. Arendt, On revolution, p40.
32. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p13.
33. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p10.
34. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p11.
35. Wolf, E.R. 1969. Peasant wars of the twentieth century. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers. p295.
36. Johnson, Revolutionary change, p136.
37. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p15.
38. Hobsbawm, E.J. 1965. Primitive rebels. New York: W.W. Norton, p110.
39. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p12.
40. Ibid.
41. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p31.
42. Ibid.
43. Rejai, M. 1977. The comparative study of revolutionary strategy. New York: David McKay Company, Inc. p22.
44. Johnson, Revolutionary change, p161.
45. Johnson, C. 1964. Revolution and the social system. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, p24-30.
46. Rejai, The comparative study, p22.
47. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p154.
48. Russell, D.E.H. 1974. Rebellion, revolution, and armed force. New York: The Academic Press. p65.
49. Tilly, C. 1978. From mobilization to revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. p5.
50. Zimmermann, Political violence, p305.
51. Oglesby, R.R. 1971. Internal war and the search for normative order. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. p35.
52. Ibid.
53. Oglesby, Internal war, p36.

20.

54. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p4.
55. Skocpol, T. States and social revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p33. This aspect is of prime importance to her -- it should be placed at "the very centre of attention" when revolutions are investigated (p33). Not only are "the political crises that have launched social revolutions...direct expressions of contradictions centered in the structures of the old regime states. The political-conflict groups that have figured in social-revolutionary struggles...have formed as interests groups within and fought about the forms of the state structures...In sum, tne class upheavals and socio-economic transformations have been closely intertwined with the collapse of the state organisations of the old regimes and with the consolidation and functioning of the state organisations of the new regimes" (p29).
56. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p70.
57. Hagopian, The phenomenon, p71.
58. Adapted from: Zimmermann, Political violence, p304.

Chapter Two
Toward a definition of revolution

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter the concept "revolution" has been
identified in relation to other, related concepts which fall
under the genus rebellion. From this, the "outlines" of the
concept revolution became clear -- a mass-based process which
changes society fundamentally through violence. In this
chapter, the concept will be further refined.

This will be done by examining well-known definitions of
revolution as proposed by scholars. Two types of definition --
inclusive and exclusive -- will be examined. This analysis
will indicate some of the generally accepted characteristics
of revolution.

Before a working definition of revolution is constructed for
purposes of this study, it is prudent to examine a general
pitfall for the student, namely ideological bias found in
definitions of revolution. This will be done to avoid using a
working definition that has, implicitly or explicitly, an
ideological bent.

Finally, by applying the lessons learned from the analysis of
definitions of revolution, it is possible to construct a
working definition which will be a precise tool for
identifying revolutions in this study. In the final section of
this chapter, the working definition and analytical model will
be used to identify contemporary African revolutions. These
revolutions will form the study area used to identify their
characteristics.

2.2. A review of definitions of revolution

2.2.1. The scope of definitions

If one scholar of revolution, Barrington Moore, argues that
only four revolutions ever occurred, whilst another, Pitirim
Sorokin, claims that there were more than a thousand
revolutions, it is obvious that the scope of their definitions
of the concept differs radically[1].

Basically, two types of definition of revolution exist: those
with a broad scope (inclusive definitions) and those with a
narrow scope (exclusive definitions), both of which will be
examined below.

2.2.1.1. Inclusive definitions of revolutions

Definitions of revolution that stress political/legal change
in society as the major characteristic of the phenomenon are
the most common type of broad definition.[2].

Revolution is, according to Carl Friedrich[3], "a sudden and
violent overthrow of an established political order." Tanter
and Midlarsky[4] define revolution in much the same manner: they
argue that "insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal
roles within the structure of political authority." Kamenka[5]
states that "revolution is a sharp, sudden change in the
social location of political power." Paul Schrecker[6] states
that because a constitution establishes the conditions of
legality, revolution can be defined "as an illegal change in
the conditions of legality."

This group of theorists elevates changes in government
(political change) or in the constitution (legal changes) to
the criteria used to identify a revolution, "for it is the
failure of government which is at the core of the political
revolution"[7].

These definitions are inadequate for the purposes of this
study, because they award the status of "revolution" to any
event that topples the government violently, or disturbs
social patterns. Thus, any of the types of rebellion
identified in the previous chapter will be labelled as
revolutions by these schools of thought. So that justice be
done to the comparative nature of this study, a working
definition of revolution should distinguish revolution clearly
from related concepts such as coups d'etat, revolutionary
coups d'etat, civil wars, and revolts. If this is not the
case, the object of a comparative analysis will be defeated,
because different phenomena will then be compared.

2.2.1.2. Exclusive definitions of revolution

Theorists who use exclusive definitions of revolution argue
that very few events -- only the so-called Great Revolutions,
like the French Revolution -- do in fact change society so
fundamentally as to be termed a revolution.

These theorists specify various conditions which a process
must meet before it can be seen as a revolution[8]. These
conditions then form the key elements or characteristics of
revolution.

Samuel Huntington's definition will be used as a basis for
this discussion. He views revolution as "rapid, fundamental,
and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths

of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activities and policies"[9]. When the principles of the analytical scheme used in Chapter One are applied to Huntington's definition, the stakes of the uprising are reflected in fundamental changes in (a) the dominant values and myths of a society, (b) political institutions, (c) social structure, (d) leadership, and (e) government activities and policies. These changes are all latent aspects of revolution, because they refer to changes which are the result of revolution.

Manifest aspects of revolution -- such as the role of leadership, ideology, and organisation -- are only implied in Huntington's definition. It is evident (from Chapter One) that the fundamental changes associated with a revolution must be carried out by a movement with effective leadership and organisation, as well as a coherent ideology. However, because Huntington does not deal explicitly with these aspects, the distinction between, for example, revolution and revolutionary coup d'etat (with its lower level of mass participation) becomes blurred. To obtain clarity in this regard, it is accordingly imperative that manifest aspects of revolution should not only be implied, but explicitly stated.

Huntington identifies a further four key elements of revolution in his definition. He states that violence is a key element in bringing about the fundamental changes set out above. This is evident from the analytical model used in Chapter One, where it was stated that revolution is a type of rebellion, which has the implication of violence.

Secondly, the use of violence to topple the regime and transform the society means that revolution is a non-legal or illegal process, at least during the period leading to the fall of the old regime. Therefore, far-reaching and fundamental constitutional changes cannot be seen as a revolution, because society is then altered fundamentally by legally sanctioned means.

Thirdly, Huntington states that a revolution involves domestic change. The process should be carried out by the citizens of a country, not by an outside force. For example, the transformation of Eastern Europe after World War II cannot be seen as a revolution, because it was brought about by puppet governments under the influence of the Soviet Union.

Finally, Huntington argues that a revolution is a rapid process. This key element presents problems for the student of revolution because it is often difficult to determine when a revolution has started, or ended. Furthermore, it is unclear what time period qualifies as "rapid".

Rejai[10] attempts to accommodate this problem by stating that

revolutions are relatively abrupt, ranging from a couple of years to two or three decades. Greene[11] points out in this regard that revolution is a process, which by its very nature implies a relatively extensive period. It would follow that there may be several phases in this extended process.

Louis Gottschalk[12] identifies one manifest aspect of revolution -- the participation by a large section of the population -- when he defines the phenomenon as "a popular mass movement whereby a significant change in the structure of a nation or a society is effected." Andreski[13] also states that mass action is one of the key elements of revolution, while James Davies[14] emphasises that the group which topples the regime tends to have a "broader popular basis for support."

Hagopian[15], who also defines revolution in exclusive terms, adds two manifest elements to the concept when he argues that revolution "involves a purposive, élite-directed attempt" to reconstruct society. Thus, he hints at the importance of an ideology in a revolution, for it is an ideology that gives the revolutionary movement purpose and allows for the planning of the process of transformation. This planning is usually carried out by the leadership or élite in a revolutionary movement, i.e. the "élite-directed attempt" which Hagopian incorporates in his definition.

Furthermore, because mass action in a revolution is not spontaneous, but planned and calculated, the role of organisation is stressed by some theorists. Macrides[16] argues that a "revolution is an act of organized violence to bring about radical changes in the economic, social, and political relations within a given system." For Ted Gurr[17] internal war is characterised by "highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence".

Compared to inclusive definitions of revolution, exclusive definitions are more specific about the prerequisites a process must meet before it can be termed a revolution, and are accordingly more useful to the student of revolution.

2.2.2. Ideological bias

Every person has a value system which he or she employs to analyse events, be they in everyday life or in his academic discipline. It is not surprising that ideological (or more loosely, value system) bias manifests itself in definitions of revolution, and the student of revolution should guard against

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such a definition which obscures objectivity. In this section, attention will be focused on some of these approaches to revolution.

Tucker[18] states that Marxism is "inseparable from the idea of revolution." For Marx, revolution is caused by only one factor: the structural arrangement of society[19]. This structural arrangement leads to the formation of different classes in society -- one class that rules and the other that is ruled -- with the exploited class eventually toppling the ruling class[20]. Thus, the concept of "conflict is explained in terms of concrete and specific social relationships"[21].

For scholars employing this approach, the fundamental issue is that material (i.e. economic) factors are the basis of man's life, and therefore his society[22]. For Marx, "a social revolution is a change in the mode of production with consequent change in all subordinate elements of the social complex"[23]. Revolution is "necessary and unavoidable" as man progresses from one historical epoch to another, with the implied changes in mode of production and the establishment of a new ruling class in the dialectical movement to a classless society[24].

For Marx, there can only be a revolution if the old order has expanded to its limit -- there can be no socialist revolution unless the capitalist mode of production has reached its zenith[25].

For Marx, then, the central elements of revolution -- indeed, of human history -- are economic in nature, the focus being on the stratification of society into classes. It is precisely for this reason that his conception of revolution can be criticised.

Firstly, "[e]conomic stratification is emphasized to the point of neglecting or confusing the role of other forms of stratification"[26]. Although Marx's class analysis is a useful analytical tool, it fails to explain alliances which cut across class ties. Lenin and Mao attempted to rectify this when they adapted Marx's analysis to include coalitions between workers and peasants, led by members of the intelligentsia[27].

Secondly, Marx's argument that revolution will only occur if the productive forces have developed to their capacity is not supported in reality, with feudal Russia's movement toward a socialist society being the most evident example. Thus, Marx's approach to revolution with his emphasis on economic determinism, results in all other factors being neglected. Several non-Marxist scholars have attempted to overcome this bias in favour of economic factors in their definitions of revolution.

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However, some of these non-Marxist definitions of revolution also suffer from the problem of bias, although on a different level. An example is the definition of Hannah Arendt[28], who states that "violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution."

The normative aspect of Arendt's definition becomes apparent when she states that "the constitution of freedom" is a prerequisite for the use of the term revolution. In fact, she states that "the central idea of revolution...is the foundation of freedom, that is, the foundation of a body politic which guarantees the space where freedom can appear"[29]. Revolution is defined in terms of certain moral values, because freedom is understood as political participation in the liberal-democratic sense[30].

However, when a movement shifts its aims from "the foundation of freedom to the liberation of man from suffering" Arendt[31] is enmeshed in definitional problems. She argues that no revolution has ever succeeded in solving the social question of freeing man from misery and suffering: in its attempt to do so, a reign of terror is unleashed which leads the revolution to its unavoidable doom, because the terror halts political participation[32].

Thus, the French Revolution is not a revolution in Arendt's views, because it did not lead (initially) to the foundation of freedom, but rather to a reign of terror. This emphasis on moral politics weakens her arguments on revolution. Furthermore, moralistic concepts such as freedom are, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder, and open to a variety of interpretations.

Another view of revolution that is weakened by its ideological bias is that of Chalmers Johnson, who constructed the functionalist (or systems) approach to revolution.

Johnson[33] states that "[r]evolutionary change is a special kind of social change, one that involves the intrusion of violence into civil social relations. And revolution, both as a form of behaviour and as a concept, concerns the most basic level of man's communal existence -- its constitution, in the Aristotelian sense of the principles of distributive justice prevailing in a particular society."

To Johnson and the functionalists, the social system should be in equilibrium because society is regulated by a set of

shared values[34]. When the society is thrown out of its balance
-- primarily because the shared value system can no longer
account for changes in the environment -- a potential
revolutionary situation can be said to exist[35].

If the political élite is intransigent and refuses or neglects
to alter the existing values to be in step with the new
environment, more and more force will be needed to secure the
élite's position, which may lead to a loss of legitimacy, or
"power deflation"[36].

The functionalists attach undue importance to the role of the
élite in a revolution. "[I]f the élite is not intransigent,
simple change will occur, dysfunction will be relieved, and no
revolution will take place"[37]. Thus, the élite is viewed as
having total control over the outcome of a revolutionary
situation, while, as Smelser[38] points out, the options of an
élite in a revolutionary situation decrease as the revolution
nears its climax.

This bias in favour of moral politics -- with its emphasis on
concepts such as legitimacy and authority -- makes this approach
less useful. Revolutions are highly-charged and passionate
processes, and the analysis of these processes is more useful if
it is done with dispassionate analytical tools. In the following
section one of the main analytical tools of this study -- the
working definition of revolution that is to be used throughout
-- will be constructed.

2.3. Constructing a working definition of revolution

A working definition affects the work of a scholar of revolution
"from beginning to end"[39]. The foundation of the working
definition of revolution to be used in this study was laid in
Chapter One, when an analytical scheme was constructed which
differentiated between related concepts. The criteria used for
this differentiation centre around latent (stakes of uprising)
and manifest aspects (mass participation) of revolution, with
the use of violence being implied.

Latent aspects of revolution -- "what is actually accomplished
by the revolution regardless of the wishes and the beliefs of
its protagonists" -- will form the one pillar of the working
definition[40]. As was shown in the analytical scheme, this will
include the fundamental changing of society -- thus, the
political and socio-economic orders. It has furthermore
been pointed out that this fundamental change of

28.

society is a process, not a single dramatic event. If a revolution is approached as entailing only fundamental change in society, then any type of peaceful but fundamental change can be seen as a "revolution".

Skocpol's definition of what she calls "social revolutions" makes this point clearly: "Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below"[41].

It is also necessary to include manifest aspects of revolution -- the action of élites and masses -- in an effective working definition[42].

In this study, revolution will be defined as:
the fundamental transformation of the
political and socio-economic orders of a country
by an élite-directed, mass-based, and
ideologically-inspired organisation that employs
violence during one or all of the phases in this process.

This definition will be used to identify where revolutions have occurred in contemporary Africa. Furthermore, it provides the framework for the comparative analysis of contemporary African revolutions in this study.

This framework will incorporate: (a) the transformation of the political order; and the (b) socio-economic order; as well as the importance of (c) leadership; (d) a mass movement; (e) ideology; (f) organisation; (g) violence; and (h) external support.

2.4. Application of the working definition

2.4.1. The identification of African countries which experienced revolutions

Contemporary Africa has been characterised by conflict and political instability, with numerous coups d'etat, and some revolutionary coups, civil wars, wars of independence, revolts, and revolutions.

The majority of coups d'etat were of the first type described in Chapter One, in which members of the military seized power but did not transform society fundamentally. There are numerous examples of this type in Africa, to such an extent that Huntington's argument that coups take the place of elections appears to be validated.

A number of revolutionary coups d'etat did take place in
contemporary Africa, and are sometimes mistaken for
revolutions.

For example, the fall of Selassie and the transformation of
Ethiopian society is often referred to as a "revolution".
However, Selassie was toppled by his own armed forces (an
élite grouping)[43]. According to the analytical scheme, the
Ethiopian situation lacks one of the major criteria for it to
qualify as a revolution (mass participation), even though it
was successful with regard to the second criterium
(transformation of society). Ethiopia represents a
revolutionary coup d'etat, or in the words of Breytenbach[44],
"a coup that turned into a revolution".

Another example is the much vaunted revolution in Upper
Volta, which was renamed Burkina Faso ("Land of the
incorruptible men") under Thomans Sankara, who seized power in
a coup d'etat. The same is true of Egypt under Nasser. His
coup ended the reign of the monarchy, and transformed society
fundamentally, but it was a again an élite group which seized
power, and initiated revolutionary change from above. Benin
under Kerekou is another example of a military man snatching
power in a coup, and then transforming the country and -- as
Burkina Faso -- changing its name.

Apart from coups and revolutionary coups, Africa is often the
scene of other types of rebellion: for example, revolts in
Chad; a revolt "that developed into a civil war along the
lines of guerrilla warfare" in Uganda[45]; civil wars in the
Sudan, Biafra, Burundi and Zaire (after the Belgium
decolonisation -- there were strong elements of secession as
well, most notably the attempt to create Katanga); and wars of
independence in Cameroon and the Western Sahara. Namibia is a
good example of a war of independence which did not lead to
the fundamental transformation of society. Swapo's long armed
struggle led to independence for the country -- but the Nujoma
government's pragmatic course has left much of the old socio-
economic order intact.

It is often argued that the Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya was a
revolution. This is, however, incorrect. Breytenbach[46] points
out that despite the fact that the movement had its own armed
wing, the Land and Freedom Army, the Mau-Mau "was not an
insurgency, only an insurrection". Furthermore, the British
defeated the Mau-Mau -- one of the reasons for this was the
fact that the rebels did not enjoy much international support.
Because the British were victorious, they were able to act

from a position of strength, and made certain that the process of decolonisation in Kenya occurred peacefully and evolutionary.

Thus, despite the fact that Africa is characterised by violent collective action, only a few revolutions occurred, if the analytical scheme and working definition are employed to categorize events. There were revolutions in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Zimbabwe. Skocpol identified in 1979[47] that revolutions did take place in the first four countries. (The revolution in Zimbabwe took place after the publication of her work.) In all of these countries, the political and socio-economic orders were transformed through mass-based parties in processes that involved violence. Naturally the degree of transformation varied in each instance, but it was fundamental.

Finally, Namibia, which has seen a war of more than twenty years being concluded with independence, cannot be said to have experienced a revolution -- yet. The political order changed irreversibly when the country became independent, but the socio-economic order did not experience the same intensity of change.

2.5. Conclusion

Definitions of revolution are often fraught with problems. Inclusive definitions appear to be too widely formulated, with the result that the student of revolution is still left in the dark regarding the characteristics of the phenomenon. From a study of exclusive definitions of revolution, however, the prerequisites of revolution can be extracted. Coupled with the analytical scheme constructed in the previous chapter, a working definition of revolution was constructed for use in this study.

Thus, the major aim of Part One has been completed; namely, to construct a definition of revolution that can be used in conjunction with other analytical tools to distinguish between revolution and related types of rebellion.

By using these instruments, it is possible to decide exactly which processes are contemporary revolutions. These revolutions will be analysed and compared in the remainder of the study in order to arrive at a shared set of characteristics. The first area of comparison will be the period prior to the outbreak of armed conflict between the revolutionary movement and the government, with specific reference to the political and socio-economic orders of the old regime.

31.

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7. Friedrich, "An introductory note," p6.
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PART TWO: THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION

Chapter Three
The political order: the old regime

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter the political order prior to the revolution will
be investigated, in order to identify shared characteristics of
the ancien regimes that could have been causes of revolution.
 Firstly, the way the old regime introduced its political order
will be looked at. This process was harsh and repressive, and
the local population violently resisted the occupiers, thus
laying the foundation for a tradition of resistance against the
rulers that was to culminate in a war of independence.
 The resistance of the local population was crushed by the
superior fire power of the new rulers, who began to shape a new
political order. This order was European, or at least non-
African, in nature, its basic premise being white superiority.
The whites formed the élite and controlled political
institutions, with no intention to allow Muslims or Africans a
greater role in the administration of the countries.

 The local population protested against this state of affairs in
a number of ways. The manner of protest will be investigated to
determine which factors shaped a specific strategy. In the
Portuguese areas and Rhodesia, protest was muted, while the
French allowed slightly more criticism of their regime. However,
in the majority of countries these protests were met with
indifference or harsh repression.

3.2. How the political order was established

3.2.1. Occupation by colonial powers

All the African countries which experienced revolutions were
occupied by a foreign, colonialist power at some stage prior to
the revolution. These powers imposed a new political and socio-
economic order on the areas. In fact, the borders of the
majority of the countries were established by these colonialist
powers at the Congress of Berlin 1884/1885. However, the first
contact between these powers and Africa dates back much further
in history.

 The first Portuguese contact with sub-Saharan Africa took

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place in 1443, when coastal communities near the Guinea coast were raided for slaves[1]. The Portuguese presence was expanded to the Congo and northern Angola in 1482, and to Mozambique following da Gama's voyage to India in 1497-1499[2]. Toward the end of the sixteenth century Portugal had founded Luanda in Angola and built forts on Mozambique Island and at Sofala[3].

Portugal obtained, with British help, the "right of occupation" of what became present-day Angola and Mozambique at the Berlin Conference, but had to acknowledge the British rights in Northern and Southern Rhodesia[4]. Portugal officially gained another African colony, present-day Guinea-Bissau, after an agreement with France in 1886[5].

These colonies were 23 times the size of Portugal[6]. By 1970 they had a population of 13-14 million, of which half a million were civilian Portuguese or other Europeans[7].

The Portuguese were also responsible for the first European contact with present-day Namibia, when in 1485 navigator Diago Cao planted a stone cross north of present-day Swakopmund[8].

France had informal contact with the people of Algeria since the sixteenth century, but in 1830 French king Charles X decided to occupy Algeria to draw attention away from his internal problems[9]. As elegant French ladies watched from chartered boats, the navy bombarded Algiers, while an expeditionary force landed twenty miles from Algiers and captured the city on July 5, 1830[10]. In an age that did not protest against colonialism, and placed great importance on bourgeois civilisation, the French act was applauded, with Friedrich Engels stating: "(t)he conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation...the modern bourgeois, with civilisation, industry, order, and at least relative enlightenment following him, is preferable to the feudal lord or the marauding robber, with the barbarian state of society to which they belong"[11].

In December 1848 the French Second Republic declared Algeria part of France, thus drawing a distinction between Algeria and the other spheres of French interest, which remained colonies. Algeria was now formally a part of Metropolitan France[12].

Unlike France and Portugal, Zimbabwe (or Rhodesia, as it was known before black majority rule) was the "last state in history built by private enterprise and through the use of a private army"[13]. As indicated by the name "Rhodesia", the country was founded as a result of the imperial ambitions of Cecil John Rhodes, who wished to create a vast British empire in Southern Africa. In 1890 he used the British South Africa Company and the Pioneer Column, a private group of armed men, to secure Mashonaland and lay the foundations of the colonial

state[14]. By 1893 the Ndebele capital was destroyed, and in the middle of that decade the British South Africa Company had established claims over the area which became known as Southern Rhodesia[15].

Rhodesia, too, was not a colony in the strict sense of the word. By 1920 most settlers were unhappy with the rule by British Charter of the British South Africa Company. Britain did not want to bear the burden of administering the area, and gave the settlers a choice of joining the Union of South Africa, or becoming a self-governing colony under nominal British control[16]. In 1923, the settlers, as well as a small number of Indians and Africans who were allowed to vote, opted for the latter. Thirty years later, Southern Rhodesia joined Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in a federation, and for the next ten years this chunk of southern-central Africa was controlled jointly by whites in Salisbury and the British government[17]. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland broke up in 1963 -- with the independence of two members, present-day Malawi and Zambia -- Southern Rhodesia changed its name to Rhodesia and remained a self-governing colony. Fearful that the Labour government might alter this arrangement and push for black rule, Rhodesian leader Ian Smith issued his Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965[18].

3.2.2. Primary resistance

The colonialist powers had to face various forms of resistance from the local population. These ranged from banditry ("a form of criminality very widespread in agrarian class societies"[19]) to what Terence Ranger termed "primary resistance"[20]. This type of armed resistance occurred when the local population fought against colonialist expansion and can be seen as a fore-runner to the wars of independence.

In the Portuguese areas, this primary resistance ended only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. For example, the Portuguese fought ten "pacification" wars against different ethnic groups in Guinea-Bissau; the last one -- against the Bijagos -- ended only in 1936[21].

In Mozambique a large part of the nineteenth century was spent in an attempt to bring the area under Portuguese control, and the last instance of primary resistance -- the Barue revolt -- ended in 1917[22]. In Angola, where the largest concentration of Portuguese troops was to be found. the "Angolan Wars" started in 1575, lasted for nearly one hundred years, and can be compared to the penetration of the Dutch into South Africa[23]. The final war of pacification in Angola

ended in 1924[24].

The French, too, encountered fierce local resistance after
the fall of Algiers. Abd-el-Kader managed to unite Algerian
groups against the French, and waged a protracted guerrilla
war for seventeen years until his surrender in 1847. He had
about 15 000 fighters under his command, as opposed to the 90
000 French troops[25] . His revolt was centered in the rural
areas, because while the urban classes had adapted to French
rule, "[p]atriotism took refuge in the countryside"[26]. It is
interesting to note that unlike Tunisia and Morocco, Algerian
rural nationalism preceded the rise of urban nationalism[27].
The war against Abd-el-Kader was fought in a brutal manner,
and was a fore-runner to the merciless killings during the war
of independence, almost one hundred years later. French
colonel de Montagnac gave the following order to his troops in
1840: "This is how the war must be waged against the Arabs.
Kill all the men from the age of 15; seize all women and
children, ship them off to the Maquessa Islands or elsewhere;
in a word, wipe out all those who will not throw themselves at
our feet like dogs"[28].
About twenty years after the surrender of Abd-el-Kader,
another revolt occurred under the leadership of Mokrani in
1871 in the Kabyle region, which was also put down in a harsh
manner. About 500 000 hectares of land were confiscated as a
punitive measure and distributed amongst the increasing number
of French colonists[29].

In present-day Zimbabwe, a war broke out in 1896. Chimurenga
("the rising") was significant in the sense that it mobilised
support from both the large ethnic groups (the Ndebele and
Shona). Gann & Henriksen[30] estimate that about ten percent of
settlers died in the war. By the end of 1897 black resistance
was broken, and while social banditry continued for a number
of years, the settlers were in control of the country at the
start of the twentieth century[31].

3.3. The political order prior to the revolution

3.3.1. The prevalent myth and values

The prevalent myth and values form the cornerstones of a
society, for they have an influence on the shaping of
virtually every aspect of that society. This is recognised by
a number of scholars of revolution, who view the introduction
of a new myth and values as a sure sign that a revolution did
take place.
For example, Huntington[32] argues that a revolution involves

fundamental changes in the prevalent myth and values of society.
This aspect of Huntington's definition shows great similarity to
that of Neuman[33]. Thomas Kuhn[34] sees the prevalent myth as being
a reflection of the matrix within which behaviour is evaluated.
If two groups differ about this matrix, of which a constitution
forms an ingredient, a revolution may occur.

Sorokin[35] argues that behaviour in any social system is
governed by "law-norms" which control the natural instincts of
man, or at least teach man to balance his drives with the
environment. Sorokin believes that a revolution will occur if
the values (or his "law-norms") are unable to cope with the
environment. When this happens, man cannot balance his drives
with his environment. This may result in "the growth of
repression of the main instincts of the majority of the society,
and the impossibility of obtaining for those instincts the
necessary minimum of satisfaction"[36]. Frustration is a result,
and may eventually lead to violent collective action and
revolution in an attempt to alleviate the repression of these
instincts.

Chalmers Johnson claims that values, or definitional symbols,
are of great importance in establishing solidarity in society,
because they account for the political, economic, and social
environment[37]. A society is put under pressure when external or
internal pressures (such as war, famine, or a population
explosion) work in on either the values or the environment[38]
Thus, when the values can no longer account for changes in the
environment, or, conversely, when changes in the values do not
correspond with the existing environment, a country may face a
revolutionary situation[39].

In such a situation society is in disequilibrium, and what
Johnson calls multiple dysfunction exists[40]. The social system
will only return to a state of balance after the environment,
but more likely the values of society, have been altered --
either through reform or revolution[41].

3.3.1.1. European superiority

In the contemporary revolutions the prevalent myth of the old
order explicitly or implicitly declared the superiority of the
white minority group and the right to exploit the economic
resources of Africa. The values that stem from this prevalent
myth also reflected a pro-white (settler) bias in the laws of
these societies.

The following statement by Dr Oliveira Salazar, Portugal's
national-socialist ruler, describes elements of the myth

of Portuguese colonialism: "[W]e must revise and put into execution plans for public works that are indispensable within the moderate financial resources available and have a guarantee of an effective retur·; and, before everything, as the highest and noblest work of all, we must organise on the best possible lines measures for safeguarding the interests of those <u>inferior races</u> whose inclusion under the influence of Christianity is one of the greatest achievements of Portuguese colonialisation"[42].

This statement by Salazer identifies two of the three underlying principles of Portuguese colonialism -- economic exploitation and the "civilising mission" with the aid of the Catholic church[43].

Article 133 of the <u>Estado Novo</u> constitution described this myth in even greater detail: "It is of the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out the historic function of colonising the land of the Discoveries under its sovereignty, and to communicate and spread among the populations existing there the benefits of its civilisation"[44].

Isaacman & Isaacman[45] identify the third principle as a belief that the colonies were an extention of Portugal. Thus, the slogan "One state, one race, one faith, one civilisation" -- incorporated in the Portuguese constitution of 1933 -- summarised the belief that Portugal and its colonies were in effect a single state. The <u>Estado Novo</u> constitution stated that all the Portuguese possessions form part of a single nation, "and the mere suggestion of secession is therefore treasonable"[46].

In fact, the Portuguese believed that "the Africans in their colonies would rather be Portuguese than free"[47].

The prevalent myth of the Portuguese regime was clearly anti-democratic. Salazar based his <u>Estado Novo</u> on the Italian fascist system, and he made all parties but one illegal[48]. In an interview with <u>Le Figaro</u> in 1958, Salazar stated that he did not believe in universal suffrage, and that it was "dangerous to attribute to all the same political rights"[49].

It is interesting to note that Algeria was not ruled as a colony (like neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia), but as a province of metropolitan France. In December 1848, the French Second Republic declared Algeria an integral part of France. This was to compound the Algerian problem further, because it would be impossible to simply grant Algeria its independence, as was done in the case of its neighbours. This situation proved to be "a deadly trap from which they (the French) ·and find it well nigh impossible to escape"[50].

After the humiliating defeat in the Second World War, the French established their Fourth Republic, which claimed in its

constitution that it would "never employ its forces against
the liberty of any people" -- at the very time when it was
fighting the Viet-Minh in Indo-China[51].

The constitution stated that France and the overseas peoples
formed a union based upon equality -- but this union was
definitely French in nature, into which Algerians had to be
assimilated[52].

A number of educated Algerians supported assimilation, with
Ferhat Abbas (who was to become a FLN leader) stating in as
late as 1936: "Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would
be a nationalist and I would not blush as if I had committed a
crime...However, I will not die for the Algerian nation,
because it does not exist. I have not found it. I have
examined History, I questioned the living and the dead, I
visited cemeteries; nobody spoke to me about it. I then turned
to the Koran and I sought for one solitary verse forbidding a
Muslim from integrating himself with a non-Muslim nation. I
did not find that either. One cannot build on the wind"[53].

The Rhodesians never entertained any ideas of assimilating
even a small number of the local population, and their myth
was probably the most overtly racist. "I cannot see in my
lifetime that the Africans will be sufficiently mature and
reasonable to take over. If we ever have an African majority
[government] in this country we will have failed in our
policy, because our policy is one of trying to make a place
for the white man," said Ian Smith after becoming prime
minister[54]. Even more explicitly, Smith summed up the attitude
of his regime in a speech during the 1970 election campaign:
"Sixty years ago, Africans were uncivilized savages, walking
around in skins. They have made tremendous progress but they
have an awful long way to go"[55].

Thus, the prevalent myth of the ancien regimes centred around
European superiority -- stated explicitly by the Rhodesians;
euphemistically by the Portuguese with their "civilising
mission"; and more subtly by the French, who wanted to
assimilate Algerians into the French nation. The fact remains,
however, that the local populations were viewed as being
backward in their development and civilisation.

3.3.2. The nature of the political institutions

The third major element of a political order is found in its
political institutions. Moore[56] argues that a revolution
"engages a considerable portion of the population, and results
in a change in the structure of government". Thus, when the
structure of a government is altered in a revolution, the most

visible change is usually the introduction of new political institutions.

Samuel Huntington[57], who bases his theory of revolution primarily on the relationship between modernisation and political institutions, differentiates between what he terms "modern" and "traditional" societies. In traditional societies there is limited support for political institutions and a low level of institutionalisation (participation in institutions), which results in low legitimacy for the regime[58]. Modern societies with a high level of legitimacy, on the other hand, are characterised by a high level of institutionalisation and support for government institutions[59].

Huntington argues that economic and social change brought about by modernisation creates new groups, with new and different demands on the political institutions[60]. The political institutions should, therefore, be altered in the direction of those of a "modern" society. If the political institutions fail to modernise, or do not modernise fast enough, the political community is threatened and revolutionary potential heightened[61]. This aspect is of prime importance for Huntington[62], who argues that if the political institutions have no capacity to expand and "broaden participation within the system", a revolution will most likely occur, particularly if major groups in society are mobilised by a common ideology[63].

In a similar fashion, the first cause of revolution which Charles Tilley[64] identifies is the failure of the government to make provision for new groups to join the polity -- usually the result of inflexible political institutions. According to Tilley, a revolution is almost certain to occur if groups emerge which articulate claims that they should govern; if these claims are supported by a large segment of the population; and if the government either looses its ability or will to coerce[65].

3.3.2.1. Controlled by the white minorities

The administration of Algeria (which was treated as a province of France) was the responsibility of the Minister of the Interior, who was represented in the country by the governor-general. The governor-general, who was by tradition never a pied noir, was one of the most senior officials of the French Republic[66].

Under him fell the prefects of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine -- areas which were considered as departments of France and thus allowed to send senators and deputies to the National

Assembly in Paris. Initially only the pied noirs voted to decide who should represent these Algerian areas in Paris[67]. However, with the introduction of a second college (for Muslims), both groups could send representatives to Paris -- in 1946 each college could send eight senators and fifteen deputies[68]. The implication of this is obvious: the voting power of one million whites equalled that of eight million Muslims.

Furthermore, "laws specifically relating to Algeria were adapted or initiated by a 'regime of decrees' established in 1834"[69]. This meant that the administration could introduce laws without the support of the pied noir or Muslim assemblies.

The lower level political institutions evoked the most resentment, because they were the institutions the local population had to deal with in day-to-day life. Different institutions were used for the pieds noirs and the Muslims. In areas dominated by pieds noirs, the local political institution (called the communes de plein exercice) was based upon the metropolitan system of a mayor and an elected municipal council, in which 60 percent of the seats were reserved for colons[70].

In areas dominated by Muslims, the local institutions were known as the communes mixtes, and consisted of a white administrator, governing with the help of Muslim local officials or caids, who were often very corrupt[71]. The reform-minded governor-general Jacques Soustelle viewed the system of local government and administration as "the heart of the political problem" in Algeria[72].

In Lusophone Africa, the fascist policies of Salazar were also reflected in the political institutions. The Colonial Act of 1930 established the principles of Portuguese colonial rule which remained in force, with minor changes, until the independence of the areas[73]. Direct, centralised rule was one of the main political aims of this colonial policy[74]. Indeed, it would have been contrary to the idea of the unity between metropolis and colonies to allow any form of self-government for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau[75].

There was a minimal flow of ideas between Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau on the one hand, and Lisbon on the other. Instead, it was a one-way communication as Salazar replaced the high commissioners with governor-generals "who merely administered policies formulated by the Overseas Ministery"[76]. Within the fascist state, local institutions and even the Mozambican Provincial Assembly served only as a rubber stamp of these policies[77], because the government never "had any intention of sharing power with the settlers or of allowing

them any say in affairs"[78].

3.3.2.2. No fundamental reforms

The old regime generally failed to carry out incremental
reform to prevent revolutionary energy building up -- and when
they did announce reforms, these were seldom fully
implemented.

For example, after WWII the French announced reforms which
would give Europeans and Muslims their own parliamentary
house. Small as this concession was -- the French would still
control the country -- the administration decided to turn the
elections for the Muslim Assembly into "a masterpiece of
rigging"[79]. Only "loyal" Muslims were allowed to win seats
through blatant election fraud: at Djelfa the government
candidate received 800 votes, while only 500 voters were
registered[80]. The correspondent for Le Monde, usually
sympathetic to the government, wrote that "the rigging of the
elections of the Second College has become a byword in
Algeria. Today, even the most evolue of Algerian nationalists
will say to you: 'These elections are a farce. If you consider
us incapable of voting, then why not admit it openly?'"[81].

While the pieds noirs were elated by the fact that the
reforms were not implemented, more astute observers of the
Algerian scene were aware of brewing trouble. In 1931, a year
after France had celebrated a hundred years of presence in
Algeria, governor-general Maurice Violette warned
prophetically: "[B]efore twenty years are up we will know the
gravest of difficulties in North Africa"[82]. Another Frenchman,
Jacques Chevallier, warned that the present tactics of rigged
elections could encourage the Muslims "to attempt to unite
themselves in a kind of policy of the worst, and to push them
into compromising themselves in a desperate gesture"[83]. A year
before the outbreak of the Algerian war of independence,
Professor Charles-Andre Julien stated: "It is by closing the
normal paths of legality to a mass of eight million people
that one risks driving it back into the arms of the declared
adversaries of la presence francaise, who aim to solve the
Algerian problem by force"[84].

The Portuguese, on the other hand, administered their
possessions as colonies until 1951, when they termed them
"overseas provinces" and moved nominally away from the
dictatorial powers of the governors of the colonies in an
attempt to gain admission to the United Nations[85].

Still, the local populations found themselves in a situation
where they were not allowed a say in decisions that affected

their daily lives, their province, or even their country. Being a fascist one-party state with laws aimed at limiting participation by the local population, elections in the Lusophone colonies "were always a total sham"[86]. Munslow[87] states that by 1961 there were only 29 587 registered voters in Mozambique, while the population was about 6,7 million. In the 1973 election, only two percent of the population cast their vote because of the restrictions on voter registration[88].

While the French gave a limited vote to all the Muslims (and then rigged the elections), and the Portuguese placed extremely strict educational barriers in the way of the local population, the Rhodesians resorted to their economic power to prevent Africans from voting. Under the 1969 constitution, Africans obtained sixteen seats in the Rhodesian parliament, and the whites fifty.

These sixteen African seats would only be increased once the black population contributed 24 percent of the national revenue through direct income tax[89]. Smith described the constitution as a "world-beater" which "sounded the death knell of the notion of majority rule" and "would entrench government in the hands of civilised Rhodesians for all time"[90]. The reason was that in 1969 Africans had only contributed 0,5 percent in direct income tax, and at the rate at which their tax contributions increased, it would take 980 years before they would have the same amount of seats as whites[91].

The populations of the countries in which revolutions occurred found themselves in a situation in which the prevalent myth in their country was alien and political institutions were virtually closed to them. These institutions were administered by, and reflected the interests of, the white political élite.

3.3.3. The political élites

Several scholars place great importance on the role of the political élite in a revolutionary situation. According to Chalmers Johnson[92], a revolutionary situation will arise if the political élite is not responsive to pressures (or demands) on the political system. Conversely, "if the élite is not intransigent, simple change will occur, dysfunction will be relieved, and no revolution will take place[93].

For Johnson, an élite facing a revolutionary situation has two options: it can accommodate the pressures, or it can resist them[94]. If the political élite chooses the first

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option, and accommodates the pressures successfully (e.g. through a reform process), the potential for revolution diminishes because the pressures on the society are eased through the redressing of grievances.

3.3.3.1. Mainly whites

The Portuguese had a precise instrument to determine who were members of the political élite (in other words, who had access to, or were allowed to serve in, political institutions). The Regime do Indigenato was formalised in 1928, and divided Africans and mulattos into two groups[95]. A small number who were literate, gainfully employed, and who had rejected tribal custom, were classified as assimilados -- they then enjoyed the same privileges as Portuguese citizens[96]. The majority of the population, which did not meet these criteria, was classified as indigena and had to live outside European areas and fulfill labour requirements[97].

In Algeria, a similar system was in operation. In order to become a naturalised French citizen it was necessary for an Algerian Muslim to abandon his Koranic status (the legal rights which he enjoyed under Islamic law). Only those who were prepared to symbolically desert the Islamic community for the secular ideology of their conquerors were given the opportunity to become citizens in their own land[98].
In 1936 when the Popular Front government came to power in Paris, there were only 7 817 naturalised Arab or Berber Algerians who had benefited from the more liberal provisions of the law of 1919, passed in the aftermath of Algerian participation in the First World War[99]. The reason for this is primarily the very strict criteria laid down for assimilation.

In Rhodesia, the local population had no opportunity of becoming a member of the élite, as in the other countries. The Africans wielded no real power, and thus 4,5 percent of the population (the whites) were able, on 11 November 1965, to strike "a blow for the preservation of justice, civilisation and Christianity" by declaring Rhodesia independent[100].

The co-optation of members of the non-élite is often used as an anti-revolutionary strategy[101]. However, the ancien regimes allowed for no such a safety valve, and the revolutionary pressures continued to increase in the African countries.
It was shown above that the white groups, albeit small, held political power firmly in their hands. Their myths formed the basis of the laws of the colonies, they administered the political institutions and controlled access to them -- in

short, the whites were the political élites. The local
populations, although subdued by the wars of 'pacification",
could and would not accept this situation perpetually.

3.4. Reaction to the political order

3.4.1. Simmering discontent and nationalism

Maurice Viollette, former governor-general of Algeria, warned
the French in 1936 following the rejection of a bill allowing
for greater integration:

"When the Muslims protest, you are indignant; when they
approve, you are suspicious; when they keep quiet you are
fearful. Messieurs, these men have no political nation. They
do not even demand their religious nation. All they ask is to
be admitted into yours. If you refuse this, beware lest they
do not soon create one for themselves"[102].

Two strands of Algerian nationalism can be identified between
the two world wars: the religious movement, the Association
des Ulema of Sheikh Ben Badis, and the revolutionary movement
of Messali Hadj and his followers[103]. The liberal Ferhat
Abbas, who favoured assimilation, was later to change his
views and support independence.

After the crushing of Abd-el-Kader's revolt, the Muslim
religious leaders kept alive the nationalist ideal in Algeria.
Ben Badis' movement had a simple, yet revolutionary slogan:
"Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my
country[104].

In 1927 Messali Hadj formed the Etoile Nord-Africaine, an
organisation for Algerian workers in Paris. He argued for a
type of populist socialism, which included the redistribution
of land among the Algerian peasants, or fellahs. By 1933 he
was advocating a struggle for independence, universal
suffrage, "revolution" in Algeria, and the confiscation of
colon land[105]. Messali was jailed for several spells, and the
Etoile Nord-Africaine dissolved, only to emerge under
different names.

In Rhodesia no serious resistance to white rule occurred
after the crushing of the Chimurenga. However, in 1960 four
persons who were to play a major role in the struggle for
independence of Zimbabwe formed the National Democratic Party.
Joshua Nkomo, Ndabanigi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and Herbert
Chitepo hoped to pressurise the British into granting
independence by non-violent actions such as rallies and
marches[106]. Britain did not, and the NDP and its Youth Wing
were banned, but emerged in 1962 as the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU). A year later, Sithole broke away to

form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Sithole was supported by the Shona people, and Nkomo primarily by the Ndebele. Fierce fighting between supporters of the movements characterised the early existence of these movements.

The tight control over African protest in the Lusophone areas led to more subtle criticism.

In Angola, for example, Viriato da Cruz founded the magazine A Mensagem in 1950 in which the Salazar regime was criticised in poems and other literary works[107]. Da Cruz, an intellectual and founder-member of the MPLA of which he became the first secretary-general (1956-1962) was dismissed from his job in the administration when A Mensagem was banned after its second issue[108].

In Mozambique, the newspaper O Africano was established in 1908 for "the defense of the native population"[109]. Its successor, O Brado Africano (The African Voice) continued in this tradition, and published reports highlighting the discrimination against and exploitation of Africans.

3.4.2. Violent repression by the authorities

In all the countries, the old regimes did not hesitate to use violence in an effort to root out protest. The extent of the violence varied, the most brutal instances occurring in Algeria.

On 8 May, 1945 -- VE Day -- the Muslim inhabitants of Setif turned a march celebrating peace in Europe into a demonstration for independence. The police opened fire on some 8 000 nationalist demonstrators, mostly supporters of Messali Hadj. This sparked off brutal attacks on colons. Muslims fanned into the countryside, claiming that a jihad (holy war) had broken out, and killed 103 Europeans[110].

The European population formed armed bands, killing indiscriminately, while the French Army bombed forty villages with dive-bombers, and a cruiser of the Navy bombarded the Kerrata area. The reports on the number of Muslim deaths varied: the official Tubert commission placed the toll at between 1 020 and 1 300, while academic Robert Aron put the figure at 6 000, and Gordon[111] advanced a figure of 80 000. Algerian nationalists, and Cairo Radio, claimed that 45 000 people died[112].

Even if the most conservative figure is considered, the retaliation still amounted to overkill by a large factor. Thus, "[f]or all the general ignorance in metropolitan France of what happened at Setif, the impact on Algerians was incalculable, and ineradicable"[113].

47.

In a more or less similar event -- although on a smaller scale -- a number of Mozambicans staged a protest at Mueda. On 16 June 1960 troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing between 36[114] and 600[115]. However, like Setif, "[i]f any single day marks the end of an old and the beginning of a new era in the country's history, it was this"[116].

In Guinea-Bissau too, the Portuguese cracked down on protest. On 3 August 1959 the police opened fire on striking dock workers, killing more than fifty in what became known as the Pidjiguiti Massacre, and on 19 September 1959 the PAIGC opted for an armed struggle against the Portuguese[117].

3.5. Conclusion: lack of legitimacy

The central characteristic of all the political orders examined here is the fact that the populations did not acknowledge the moral right of the ancien regime to rule. The rulers had no legitimacy.

Apter[118] defines legitimacy as being "related to a set of conceptions held by significant members of the polity about the rightness of a political pattern, which, in turn, provides the patterns with a set of properties. Legitimacy is thus a behavioural term referring to a set of limits on governmental action. It is with reference to legitimacy that right conduct in office is defined. When legitimacy is withdrawn, government is weakened"[119].

For Johnson[120] the limits that legitimacy places on government action is a natural consequence of the fact that the members of society "authorize the use of force" by a regime. Thus, a legitimate government has the right to use force through its institutions. However, when the regime finds itself in a position in which more and more force is required to contain social problems (or what Johnson terms pressures on the social system), the legitimacy of the regime will decline[121]. This is clearly illustrated in the African revolutions, where rulers with no moral authority to use force, had to use it more and more to repress protest.

Samuel Huntington[122] also argues that political stability is determined by legitimacy, or what he calls "political community" -- a general agreement by the population that the regime has a right to function, is functioning properly, and should continue to do so in future.

In all the African countries which experienced revolutions, this "political community" was restricted to the whites. The political community was based on the belief that the Europeans were superior, white values were reflected in the political

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institutions, which were dominated by the Europeans and failed to accommodate the local populations. In all the territories, the administration was clearly non-democratic. As the rulers remained intransigent and the local populations grew more adamant in their requests for reform, the divide between the groups continued to grow.

* *

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Chapter Four
The socio-economic order: poor living conditions add to grievances

4.1. Introduction

All the countries which experienced revolutions were not only
characterised by the concentration of political power in the
hands of a minority, but by inequality and exploitation in the
socio-economic order as well.

Before these aspects are examined, the demography of the
countries will be analysed, thus giving some idea of the size of
the different ethnic groups. This being done, attention will
then be paid to the control of the means of production. The
groups which control the economy can dictate the nature of the
economic order. The ruling élite, which represented the colonial
power directly or indirectly, controlled the means of production
in the African countries, and determined the economic order.

The economies of most of the African countries revolved around
the exploitation of primary resources. Agriculture in particular
played a large role. The Europeans, who gained control of large
areas of fertile land, played the leading role in this sector.
In the countries which had minerals, these were in the hands of
the élite as well.

The fact that the Europeans held the economic power in their
hands meant that they could to a large extent determine the
pattern of employment in the countries. Unemployment and
underemployment were frequent, further lessening the economic
power of the local populations, who found themselves drawn into
a western-type economy. In order to earn a wage, hundreds of
thousands became migrant workers.

A final aspect in the examination of the socio-economic order
is education and health care. Here again, glaring inequalities
between the education and health facilities for the local
populations and the Europeans were evident.

4.2. Demography of the countries

4.2.1. Number of whites

Immigration to the African countries increased after World War
One, but particularly after World War Two, and this would have
an effect on the structure of the population, as shown below.
Although they controlled the political and social orders of the

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African countries, the whites were numerically weak in comparison to the local populations.

Following the defeat of Abd-el-Kader and the integration of Algeria into France, immigration to Algeria was encouraged. In 1841 there were about 37 000 colonists, or pieds noirs, in Algeria and about three million Muslims[1].

Events in Europe provided a steady stream of immigrants -- refugees from the revolution of 1848 as well as the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. The pied noir population had risen to more than 200 000 by 1871[2]. Waves of Spanish, Italian, and Maltese immigrants further increased the numbers of the colons, so that at the end of World War One only one in five of the pieds noirs was of French origin.

The pieds noirs were not a monolithic block. The group included people of all shades of political opinion, and there was a huge gap between the rich land-owners and the poor petits blancs. Eighty per cent of pieds noirs were salary earners, and on average they earned only about half of what their colleagues in metropolitan France were earning[3].

At the start of armed hostilities in 1954 there were one million settlers -- the second largest white community (after South Africa) on the continent, as opposed to nine million Algerians. Algeria presented "the settler problem to end all settler problems"[4].

It is interesting to note the increase in numbers of whites in Angola. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were 9 000 whites in the country[5]. By 1940 this figure had risen to 40 000, and in 1950, after World War Two, it reached 79 000[6]. In the following five years, it increased to 140 000[7], and at the start of the war of independence in 1961 there were about 200 000 whites in Angola[8]. This increased to 290 000 in 1970, and to 335 000 in 1973[9].

In Mozambique, there were about 230 000 Portuguese at the start of the war of independence. They lived mainly in the south and close to the coastal lowlands; 80 percent of the whites were born in Europe, which clearly demonstrates their recent arrival in the country[10]. Newitt[11] indicates that there were only 48 200 whites in Mozambique in 1950, which provides some insight into the extent of immigration after World War Two.

Unlike Mozambique, Angola, and Algeria, a serious effort to establish a large white settler community in Guinea-Bissau was never made, partly because the Portuguese did not envisage the development of adequate economic opportunities in the disease-ridden colony[12]. In 1928 there were 983 whites in the country and by 1950 there were only 2263 -- mostly officials and traders[13].

In Lusophone Africa, the white settlers and administrators
were often overtly racist in belief and action; yet Portugal
liked to claim that it represented non-racialism in Africa --
and pointed to the mestiço population as proof of
intermarriage between black and white[14]. The reason for this
was that Portugal, when rebutting criticism on its colonial
policies, could point to her aim of assimilating and
civilising the local population. Thus, in her attempt to
convince the world of the reality of her mission to create a
multi-racial community, the Portuguese "were prepared to
totally ignore the prejudices of the local settlers who did
not have the power or influence to combat them"[15]. However,
despite the lack of laws to establish job reservation, or even
racial separation, the whites were the major force in the
Lusophone societies.

In 1978, Rhodesia had about 260 000 whites[16], who made up 4,5
percent of the total population[17]. Like in the other
countries, the white group increased dramatically after WWII
-- from 83 500 in 1946 to 138 000 in 1951[18]. Breytenbach
points out that they did not move to Rhodesia as a result of
encouragement by a colonising power, but in spite of it[19].
Generally, the whites did not have strong roots in the
country: at the time of the 1969 census, only 21 percent of
the people older than 21 years were born in the country[20].
This explains why "every crisis has generated a distinct
exodus", so that between 1961 and 1964 a total of 55 700
whites left the country, and one in two of the people who had
arrived in 1966 had left by March 1969[21].

4.2.2. Number of local population

Algeria had one of the highest birth rates in the world. When
the French conquered Algeria in 1830, the population was about
3 million, by 1906 it had risen to 4,5 million, and due to
modern medicine, which kept down the infant mortality rate,
the population had shot up to about nine million in 1954[22].
During the twenty years prior to the outbreak of the war, the
urban population of Algeria had doubled; it was estimated that
the Muslim population was growing ten times faster than the
colon population[23].
The Lusophone colonies were 23 times the size of Portugal[24].
By 1970 they had a population of 13-14 million, of which half
a million were civilian Portuguese or other Europeans[25].
Mozambique had an estimated population of eight million in
1970, with the population density increasing toward the south
of the country[26].
In Guinea-Bissau, the total population increased from an

estimated 502 457 in 1950 to 521 336 in 1960, and to 777 214 in 1970[27]. The majority of these people lived in rural areas; Bissau, the capital and largest urban area, had only 17 255 inhabitants in 1950[28].

4.2.2.1. Different ethnic groups

The oldest inhabitants of Algeria are the Berbers of the Aures and Kabylia, who comprised the largest proportion of the Muslims at the outbreak of the war in 1954[29]. However, less than a third retained their language and culture, and the rest were classified as Arabised Berbers. The Kabyles and Arabs had had their differences in the past, a factor which the French exploited in their administration of Algeria[30].

The Balantes form the largest ethnic group in Guinea-Bissau (in 1950, they numbered 160 000 out of a total population of 502 457). This anamist ethnic group lived in the coastal and southern areas, and their social system was egalitarian and decentralised, with each village under the leadership of a council of elders[31].

The Fulas and Manjacas were the second and third largest groups, and were Islamic and less egalitarian. Their society was divided into three groups -- chiefs, traders, and slaves[32].

Although the different ethnic groups of Guinea-Bissau speak different languages, there developed after colonisation a form of creole Portuguese which is now used as the lingua franca in the whole of the country[33].

In 1970, the Maka-Lomwe was the largest of the ten ethno-linguistic groups in Mozambique, with its three million members inhabiting the central plateau of the country[34]. This Islam-influenced group was in the past active in the slave trade, raiding amongst its northern neighbours, the Makonde and Yao (175 000 and 200 000 in 1970)[35].

The second largest group was in the south. The 1,8 million strong Thonga group was strongly represented amongst migrant workers on the South African mines[36].

4.2.2.2. Persons of mixed race

In the Portuguese colonies a sizable group of people of mixed race developed. Numerically they could not compare to either the white or the local populations, but they were to wield tremendous influence during the revolutions in Portuguese Africa.

Newitt[37] gives the following figures -- based on the census of 1950 -- for mestiços in Portuguese colonies: Angola 29 648;

Mozambique 25 149; Guinea-Bissau 4 568; and the Cape Verde Islands 103 251. With the exception of the Cape Verde Islands, the mestiços were small groups within the countries. The Portuguese claim that intermarriage was common in their colonies is contested by Parsons[38], who cites the small number of intermarriages in civil marriages during 1954 as proof. Of the 158 such marriages, 136 of the males married within their race group, while only 18 men married mestiços, and no marriages occurred between Africans and whites[39].

For Parsons[40], sexual liaisons between white men and the local population were "occasioned more by the absence of white women from the colonial scene than anything else" -- hence the term mulheres de necessidade for these encounters.

However, the mestiços wielded influence far greater than their small numbers would indicate. In 1960, about 13 000 of the 30 000 mestiços in Angola were concentrated in Luanda, where they held jobs in the administration, and "many had a level of education very much higher than that of the white immigrants"[41]. Thirty percent of all Mozambican mestiços lived in Lourenco Marques[42].

In this sense, the mestiços can be said to be marginal to the populations of Lusophone Africa. According to the theory of mass society (an attempt by amongst others Hannah Arendt and William Kornhauser to explain revolutions) an individual who differs markedly from the rest of the population, either through education or ethnicity, may experience "social atomization and extreme individualization"[43]. Within such a situation revolutionary mobilisation occurs more readily, because these atomised persons are anxious to establish new groups to belong to[44].

4.2.3. Assimilation

The Portuguese and French defended their rule in the African countries by stressing their policy of assimilation, through which it was possible for an African to become integrated into a European nation[45]. Only a small portion of the inhabitants of Lusophone Africa ever became assimilated, because of the stringent rules laid down for assimilation. The indígena had to be at least eighteen years old and be able to speak Portuguese correctly; had to earn sufficient income to support himself and his family; had to produce two testimonies stating that he was of good character; had to attain a sufficient level of education; had to submit a birth certificate and one stating that he was in good health; had to submit a declaration of loyalty; and had to have paid the necessary taxes and fees[46]. These obstacles proved to be nearly insurmountable for an indígena wishing to become an

assimilado, and the following figures appeared in the 1950 census for Lusophone Africa:

Angola: 30 089 assimilados out of a population of 4 006 598 (0,74%)

Mozambique: 25 149 assimilados out of a population of 5 646 957 (0,44%)

Guinea-Bissau: 1 478 assimilados out of a population of 502 457 (0,39%)[47].

According to Figueiredo[48], less than one percent of Angolans had, at the time of the outbreak of the war of independence, "qualified for citizenship status in their own country, and that as an administrative concession and not as a right".

In Algeria, 7 817 Muslims became French citizens between the two world wars[49]. The Muslims had to desert the Islamic community for the secular ideology of their conquerors in order to become "true Frenchmen"[50].

Thus, the Portuguese and French, although claiming that the local inhabitants had the opportunity to become assimilated with the European country, effectively prevented them from doing so.

4.3. Type of economic control

Many scholars view alterations in the economic order of a society as a characteristic of revolution. For example, Neuman[51] considers the alteration of the system of property control a vital element in the process of revolution.

The writer who made the greatest contribution in making the economic analysis of revolution (and indeed, of society) a law unto itself was Karl Marx. Marx saw a revolution as "a change in the mode of production with the consequent change in all subordinate elements of the social complex"[52]. The different economic orders, or epochs, in the history of man can be attributed to various types of ownership, because the owners of the mode of production determine the economic structure.

Marx's view of revolution is uni-causal: the type of ownership leads to specific social and class relations, and the tensions and contradictions created by these will eventually lead to revolution[53]. Some of these contradictions were visible in Africa as well, and can be seen as a cause of revolution.

4.3.1. Means of production under control of the whites

In Algeria, the colons soon dominated the agricultural-based economy, and most of the fertile land was owned by either the French government or by settlers. The pieds noirs became

owners in a number of ways.

Firstly, marshall Père Bugeaud, who led the French in the "pacification" of Abd-el-Kader's revolt, was instrumental in the seizure of Arab land by colonists. He advocated the following policy: "Wherever there is fresh water and fertile land, there one must locate colons, without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong"[54]. At the end of World War One, Muslims owned about 66 percent of farmland, which usually consisted of the less fertile areas[55].

The acquisition of land by the French was of such a nature that Wheatcroft[56] concludes that it overturned "the customary pattern of landholding on which the fabric of Islam social and economic relationships were based".

In Rhodesia, "land was the main instrument of social control in addition to being the main source of wealth"[57]. The whites set out to entrench their acquisition of land with the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 and the more rigid Land Tenure Act, which was passed by the Rhodesian Front government in 1969[58]. This gave the whites the best farmland at the expense of the more numerous rural blacks.

In Lusophone Africa, the fascist policies of Salazar were reflected in the economic order as well. Direct, centralised rule, and a balanced budget were the main political and economic aims of this colonial policy[59].

4.4. Dominance of primary sector

4.4.1. Agriculture

It was noted above that the French acquired a large amount of good farm land. Moreover, their superior and more scientific approach to agriculture helped them to turn previously infertile areas into rich farming areas (cultivated land increased from 2 000 square miles in 1830 to 27 000 in 1954) and they introduced new crops, of which vines became the most important[60].

Agriculture was the mainstay of the Algerian economy, but the local population found itself pushed to the less fertile lands by the French. By 1930, only an average of seven percent of land in fertile areas belonged to Muslims[61].

At the start of the Algerian war of independence, two percent of the agricultural population owned more than 25 percent of all farming land[62]. Furthermore, the number of pieds noirs who lived on farms declined from 200 000 after World War Two to 93 000 at the start of the war of independence (out of a population of about one million)[63]. However, they still controlled about seven million acres of the most fertile agricultural land in

Algeria[64]. This resulted in larger colon farms. In the Oran
district, 750 pieds noirs owned about 55 000 hectares, while
in Kabylia several Algerians often had joint ownership of a
solitary fig tree[65]. The difference between French and
Algerian farmers is clearly illustrated when the size of
farms, as well as approximate earnings, are considered. In
1954, colon farms comprised on average 123,7 hectares; Muslim
farms only 11,6, while their respective earnings were £2800
and £100[66]. Andrews[67] states that pied noir farmers owned 95
percent of all tractors in Algeria, which reveals the
difference between the two groups regarding the use of modern
implements.

The rise of the wine industry in Algeria did little to
benefit Muslims. The wine industry has a cyclical need for
labour and did not alleviate the unemployment problem. Wine
offended the religion of the Muslim and vines were planted on
land which was previously planted with staples[68]. This
increase in the production of vines furthermore led to the
decline of Muslim agricultural potential as more and more
peasant land was turned into French farms. The amount of
grazing land declined, as well as yield (coupled with a high
birth rate), which meant that while each Algerian had 21,5
bushels of grain per year in 1870, this figure had dropped to
7,2 by 1950[69].

The Rhodesian Land Apportionment Act and the Land Tenure Act
gave the whites, of which few were rural, the same amount of
land as the more numerous rural blacks. Both groups had 70 230
square miles, which resulted in a population density of 46,6
persons per square mile in the black Tribal Trust lands, and
3,7 persons per square mile in the white areas[70]. In 1974, 33
percent of all employed Africans (345 700 out of 909 000) were
working in the agricultural sector, where they earned an
average annual wage of £101, as opposed to the 4 700 (out of
118 600) whites in the same sector, who earned on average £2
257 per year[71].

4.4.2. Minerals

The mineral wealth of the countries varied, with Guinea-Bissau
and Mozambique having virtually no known reserves, while
Angola and Algeria were known to have huge reserves, some of
which were discovered prior or during the war of independence.
In Angola, the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang) was
formed in 1917 to mine diamonds which were discovered in the
Lunda area in 1912. The concession that the company held
covered large areas of the north-eastern part of the
country[72]. In effect, Diamang was the Portuguese arm of the De

Beers diamond conglomerate, although 40 percent of shares were at first in British or Belgium hands[73]. The colonial power held 5 percent, which later rose to 11,5 percent[74]. Between 1965 and 1970, mineral export doubled and amounted to 170 million pounds in 1970[75].

The extent of the Algerian oil reserves was not yet known at the start of the war of independence. However, once it became known, it hardened French resolve for Algerie francaise, while simultaneously increasing the motivation of the revolutionary movement[76].

4.5. Labour

4.5.1. Large-scale unemployment

Almost eighty percent of the pied noir labour force consisted of either salaried employees or merchants, with the remainder working in the agricultural sector[77]. The gap between the very rich and very poor was smaller in France than in Algeria with its grands colons tycoons; the gap between poor whites (petits blancs) and Muslims was often quite slender[78]. The average French worker earned less than half of his mainland counterpart's salary, but could obtain advantages, like domestic servants, unavailable in France[79].

The situation of the average Muslim worker was quite different.
Dunn[80] states that the majority of the population was "economically marginal to a degree to which no member of an industrial working class in employment could in principle become". Furthermore, the traditional support structures had disintegrated as a result of colonisation. The Algerian population was primarily a "vast lumpenproletariat"[81].

In 1955, the Maspétiol Report revealed that about one million Algerians were unemployed, with a further two million seriously underemployed -- out of a total population of nine million[82]. This meant that a farm labourer worked on average (if female labour is included) only thirty-five days per year, earning only 100 old francs ($0,22) per day[83]. Earnings for Muslims were much better in the cities. The national average for Muslims was 16 000 old francs per year, still thirty times less than the average pied noir income. Peasants moved to the cities in increasing numbers[84]. Algerian peasants furthermore suffered crop failures and successive famines. In 1945, Albert Camus found such dire poverty in Kabylia that children fought "with dogs for the content of a rubbish bin"[85].

Between 1936 and 1948 the population of Algiers increased by 42 percent, with most of the newcomers living in bidonvilles

(urban slums)[86]. The unemployment rate for Muslims in urban areas rose to 25 percent, and this led to great discontent[87].

4.5.2. Forced labour

Unlike the French, the Portuguese tried to extract the maximum labour from the inhabitants of the colonies. They did this primarily through forced labour.

Caetano, Salazar's successor, explained Portugal's view on African workers in a lecture at the University of Lisbon in 1954: "...the blacks of Africa are to be governed and organised by Europeans, but are indispensable as the latter's auxiliaries...The Africans are themselves incapable of developing the territories they have lived in for millennia: they have made no useful inventions, discovered no profitable technology, conquered nothing that counts in the evolution of humanity, nothing in the fields of culture and technology can be compared with the achievements of Europeans or even of Asiatics. The blacks of Africa are thus to be treated as productive elements organised or to be organised in an economy directed by whites"[88].

With the introduction of the Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indigenas in 1930, all able-bodied men, with the exception of assimilados (civilised blacks), were required to work for six months per year for a wage under contract with either a private employer or the state[89]. To enforce this law, Africans had to carry passbooks which recorded their last date of contract work, as well as their payment of taxes[90]. If the local police found an African not paying taxes, he was punished by having to work for no wage[91]. Over and above this, the Africans were drafted into groups to work on public projects[92]. This labour system, designed to extract the maximum amount of labour from the local population, led to numerous abuses of workers and their families[93].

Thus, for all but a tiny minority of the inhabitants of the colonies, life consisted of harsh Portuguese colonial rule. One of the most hated practices was the conscription of forced labour, ostensibly for public works, but frequently used in the private sector as well[94].

Up to the 1962 colonial reforms, authorities in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique conscripted forced labour, not only for public works, but also to work on private farms[95]. In the Huila region in Angola, where slavery had existed until 1875, this forced labour "was virtually a continuation of slavery"[96].

Despite the fact that it was outlawed in the 1962 Labour Code, forced labour remained a fact of life, particularly in

63.

the war zones of Mozambique[97].

4.5.3. Migrant labour

Algerian unemployed not only migrated to the cities, but also
across the Mediterranean to France, where they found
employment and higher wages[98].
The majority of these migrant workers came from Kabylia, a
densely populated but very poor area to the south-east of
Algiers. In the twelve years between 1912 and 1924, the number
of migrant workers who left for France increased from 5 000 to
100 000; this figure increased after WWII, and at the outbreak
of the war of independence there were 500 000 Algerian migrant
workers in France[99]. The wages they sent home were equal to a
third of all agricultural wages and provided an essential
income to 1,5 million dependants[100]. When this flow of wages
was cut off, as in WWII, the impact was shattering[101].

Migrant labour was important in the Lusophone colonies as
well. In Mozambique particularly, did the Portuguese exploit
this phenomenon. Antonio Enes, who laid down the early
colonial policy in Mozambique, said: "If we do not learn
how...to make the Negro work and cannot take advantage of his
work, within a short while we will be obliged to abandon
Africa to someone less sentimental and more
utilitarian..."[102].
Mozambique supplied migrant labourers to neighbouring South
Africa's gold mines. At the start of the twentieth century, 75
percent of the 54 000 Africans working on South African gold
mines were from outside the country[103]. Mozambique provided
the largest proportion of its labour for migrant work on the
mines, exporting annually between 25 and 33 percent of its
workforce to neighbouring countries[104]. From early this
century until 1975, between 80 000 and 115 000 Mozambican
migrants worked every year on South African mines[105].
Migrant labour was beneficial for both the South African
mining companies and the Portuguese. The mines did not need to
pay a migrant worker a wage large enough to acquire
accommodation, food, and education for his family; instead,
the women remaining in the rural areas provided these
necessities[106].
Portugal benefitted from the system of migrant workers in
Africa, not only because payments were made in gold, but the
workers had to pay taxes upon their return[107]. As a further
advantage, Portugal was assured that 50 percent of Transvaal
trade would pass through the port of Lourenço Marques[108].
Thus, for Munslow[109] "Portugal became little more than a
rentier state hiring out the labour force of its African

colony".

4.6. Education and health care

4.6.1. Education

The chapter so far has been a catalogue of social inequality, and education and health care were no exception. In the Lusophone colonies, there was little schooling or health care, while in Algeria and Rhodesia the whites received more funds than the Muslims or Africans for education and health care.

The French gave preference to the schooling of pied noir children. Thus, 2,5 million old francs were set aside for the schooling of white children in 1892; for the same year, 450 000 old francs were allocated to the education of the more numerous Muslim children[110]. At the end of World War Two, there were 200 000 white school children and 1400 white primary schools, as opposed to 1 250 000 Muslim children who had to be accommodated in 699 primary schools[111].

The Portuguese did not establish state schools on a large scale. In 1940 Salazar reached an agreement with the Vatican which placed the Catholic church in charge of the education of the indigenas in Guinea-Bissau, while only assimilados were allowed to attend state schools[112]. The level of education in Guinea-Bissau in particular was poor, and can to a certain extent explain the small number of assimilados. Only four per cent of Guinea-Bissau's revenues went to education: in 1951-'52 there were eleven state primary schools, with 27 teachers and 735 pupils, and only one state secondary school, in Bissau, with 78 pupils[113]. A further 1979 pupils received primary education in 55 missionary schools, and more than 5000 pupils attended Koranic schools[114]. It is not surprising that 99,7 percent of the mainland population of Guinea-Bissau was illiterate[115].
In the other Portuguese colonies, the situation was not much better. At the start of the 1960's, 8 percent of black children in Angola attended primary schools and 24 percent in Mozambique[116]. In Angola, 4 019 834 people (or 96,97 percent of the total population) were illiterate, as were 5 615 053 Mozambicans (97,84 percent of the population)[117].

4.6.2. Health care

The lack of education was reflected in the poor health care. In 1960 Guinea-Bissau had four hospitals, six health centres in rural areas, 17 rural maternity clinics, 25 doctors, 26

nurses and 73 auxiliaries[118].

The health service in the Lusophone areas was so poorly
financed that Angola had -- at the outbreak of the war -- one
hospital bed per 2250 Africans, but three priests for every
medical doctor[119].

The bad social conditions led to a migration of between five
and ten percent of the population (250 000 to 400 000) to Congo,
Northern Rhodesia, and South West Africa, in search of higher
wages and better living conditions[120].

4.7. Conclusion

It is apparent from this analysis that the socio-economic order
of the countries was characterised by inequality and
exploitation, although the Portuguese leader Salazar did not
think so: "We believe that there are decadent or -- if you
prefer -- backward races whom we feel we have a duty to lead to
civilisation: a task of educating human beings that must be
tackled in a humane way. That we do feel and act like this is
shown by the fact that there is no network of hatred and
subversive organisations (in our territories) whose aim is to
reject and displace the sovereignty of Portugal"[121].

However, Lloyd Garrison[122] of the New York Times wrote in 1963
that "after interviewing scores of Africans in Portuguese-held
Angola as well as in the rebel north," he had a "single
overwhelming impression that black and white in Angola are
separated by a gulf so deep and wide that it may never be
bridged".

For Dunn[123], the economic order established by the French in
Algeria was provocative, and led to resentment amongst Muslims
of all classes.

Furthermore, the economic crisis in Algeria not only increased
the potential for spontaneous action by the suffering masses
(such as the Sétif uprising), but raised their political
consciousness while further lowering the legitimacy of the
regime. The socio-economic problems should have alerted the
French authorities to the possibility of a revolution -- after
all, one of the accelerators of the French Revolution was the
poor harvest of 1788.

The combination of a repressive political order and an
exploitative socio-economic order characterised the period prior
to the revolutions in the African countries studied here. It is
shown in the following chapter that these revolutions were
furthermore characterised by leaders of revolutionary movements
whose aim was the transformation of the old order.

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Chapter Five
Leadership in African revolutions

5.1. Introduction

It is a characteristic of all major revolutions that they were
initiated and directed by competent leaders -- for example
Lenin and Trotsky in the Russian Revolution of 1917[1]. Rejai &
Phillips[2] argue that the structural conditions of a country
will determine the mental set and range of skills of
revolutionary leaders, because within the political and socio-
economic orders the potential revolutionary leader acquires
his motivation and skills.

It is, however, not within the scope of this project to
identify reasons why specific leaders emerged in the
revolutions studied here. What is important here is the fact
that the leaders shared a number of characteristics. As is
shown below, they were highly educated, and refused to be co-
opted by the ancien regime.

In order to arrive at the shared characteristics of
revolutionary leadership, the aspect is examined on a number
of levels. At the outset, objective criteria such as age,
education, social class, and ethnicity will be considered.
This will give a clear indication of the type of persons
involved. Attention will then turn to the subjective and more
hazy area of personality. Finally, because of the range of
factors determining a leadership personality, personality
clashes and power struggles characterised some movements.

5.2. Age profile of leadership

The political leaders in a stable society tend to be the older
members of society, primarily because political leadership is
often equated with age and status[3].
However, research by a number of scholars indicates that this
is not the case in revolutionary leadership.
Brinton[4], Schueller[5], Leiden & Schmitt[6], as well as North &
Pool[7] found in their studies of the English, French, American,
Russian and Chinese revolutions that the average age of the
revolutionary leaders varied between 27 years (China) and 41.8
years (France). Thomas Greene[8] furthermore notes that the

revolutionaries, being comparatively young, "are not
constrained in their revolutionary activity by family
responsibilities".

5.2.1. Thirtysomething

In the African revolutions, the leaders were of much the same
average age as the leaders of revolutions elsewhere. (For ease
of comparison, the age of the revolutionary leaders at the
outbreak of armed conflict in the respective countries will be
considered.)

Dr. Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA, was born on 17
September 1922, making him 39 years and nine months old at the
outbreak of the Luanda uprising in 1961. Other important
figures in the MPLA at that time were slightly younger: Mario
de Andrade was 32 and Viriato da Cruz 33 years of age[9].
In another Lusophone country, Amílcar Cabral, the
revolutionary leader from Guinea-Bissau, was born in 1924 and
aged 38 when armed hostilities broke out[10]. Dr. Eduardo
Mondlane, Frelimo's first leader, was slightly older at the
start of the movement's military campaign. He was born in 1920
in Gaza province, which made him 45 years of age[11]. One of his
deputies and later his successor, Samora Machel, was born on
September 29, 1933; the Mozambican armed struggle began in
1964 -- four days prior to Machel's 31st birthday[12].
The original leaders of the FLN in Algeria consisted on the
whole of younger persons: the average age of the nine founder
members of the FLN was 32 years[13]. The oldest member of the
group was Mohammed Khider (45), and the youngest Mourad
Didouche (27)[14], with FLN leader Ben Bella, aged 36[15].
In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, leader of Zanu, was born in 1924,
making him 42 years old at the start of the insurgency in
April 1966, while Joshua Nkomo, leader of Zapu, was somewhat
older at 48[16]. However, the leaders of Zanu's military forces,
Josiah Tongogara and his second-in-command and later
successor, Rex Nhongo, were aged only 26 and 21 respectively
at the outbreak of armed hostilities[17].

5.2.2. Effect of length of revolutionar   s on leadership profile

The wars of independence (as phases of revolution) in Africa
extended over a long period, with Breytenbach[18] indicating an
average of eighteen years. With the exception of Algeria
(eight years), all the guerrilla wars lasted more than ten
years, the longest being that of Swapo (23 years)[19].
The length of the wars of independence was to have a marked

effect on the leadership age profiles of the revolutionary
movements, because a leader who was in his thirties at the
start of the guerrilla war, would have been in his forties, or
even early fifties, at the end of the war -- when the
movements began to transform society.

Thus, MPLA leader Neto was 53 when Angola gained its
independence from Portugal[20], while Machel was 42 years of age
when Mozambique became independent[21]. In Zimbabwe, Robert
Mugabe was at 56 the oldest of the African revolutionary
leaders to take control of a new government[22]. Ben Bella was
44 when Algeria became an independent country[23].

An interesting aspect, which will be explored further in the
section dealing with leadership struggles, is the fact that
the long revolutionary processes experienced in Africa often
led to strife in the leadership. This time factor exposed
various tensions in the movements, which led to the murders of
Cabral and Mondlane by the authorities, who were aided by
members of the revolutionary movements.

5.3. Education and class origin of leaders

Studies of major revolutions show that the social background
and education of the leaders usually differ markedly from that
of their followers, and that in this regard a close
resemblance exists to the élite which the revolutionary
movement attempts to dispose[24].

Brinton[25] found that 66 percent of the French revolutionary
leadership was middle class, and that the leadership in the
English, American and Russian revolutions was similarly
dominated by the middle classes. In a study of "revolutionary
élites in modernizing societies", Kautsky[26] found that 93
percent of the leaders occupied middle or upper-middle class
positions in their societies.

The fact that these revolutionary leaders came from the
middle or upper-middle classes meant that they often had
access to educational institutions that were out of reach for
the lower classes.

This is borne out by research by Brinton[27], who found that
the leadership of the English, French, American and Russian
revolutions possessed excellent educational qualifications.
Similarly, Kautsky[28] found in his study of 32 revolutionary
leaders in the developing world that 88 percent had received
"an education appropriate to an industrialised country".

The education of revolutionary leaders is significant for a
number of reasons. For Eric Hoffer[29], all revolutionary
movements are "conceived not by men of action but by

faultfinding intellectuals". Greene[30] defines intellectuals as those "who are predisposed...to manipulate the symbolic rather than the material environment". This is echoed by North & Pool[31] when they state that the leaders in the early stages of a revolution are manipulators of symbols.

Brinton[32] places great emphasis on the fact that the early phases of a revolution are characterised by the "desertion of intellectuals", who lower the legitimacy of the regime when they withdraw their support for its policies.

It will be shown in the following section that the revolutionary movements studied here shared as a characteristic the fact there were large numbers of intellectuals in their leadership.

5.3.1. Intellectuals as revolutionary leaders

Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA, was the second child of a Methodist pastor[33]. He was a "very serious minded" child, who obtained good marks at school and became one of the few black students at the Portuguese liceu (high school) in Luanda[34]. In 1947, he received a Methodist scolarship, and went to Portugal to study medicine[35]. Having spent eleven years in Europe, Neto and his Portuguese wife, Lucillia, returned to Angola, where he was one of only 203 medical doctors[36].

Another senior MPLA leader, Mario de Andrade, studied philosophy at the University of Lisbon, the Sorbonne and the Ecole Practique des Hautes Etudes[37]. De Andrade, who contributed much to the intellectual image of the MPLA, was instrumental in the organisation of a 1957 conference of nationalist groups from the Portuguese African colonies, at which an umbrella organisation, the Movimento Anti-Colonialista, was formed. Deolinda de Almeida, a cousin of Neto, studied at the Luanda liceu, the University of Sao Paulo in Brazil, and the Drew University in the United States on Methodist scholarships before returning to Angola to organise the MPLA's women's section[39].

Amilcar Cabral was the mestico son of a Cape Verdean teacher and a shop owner[40]. Following the separation of his parents, he lived a poverty-stricken youth on the Cape Verde Islands, and left at age 21 for Portugal to study agronomy after being awarded a scholarship[41]. Cabral completed the five year course at the Instituto superior de agromia in 1951, where he was not only a brilliant student (even tutoring the Rector's

children), but "the extent to which he was assimilated into Portuguese life and culture impressed both his colleagues and professors"[42]. Like Neto, he married a Portuguese woman and fellow-student, Maria Helena Rodrigues[43]. In 1952, after an absence of seven years, Cabral returned to Guinea-Bissau to work as an agronomist for the colonial administration[44].

Eduardo Mondlane's father died before Mondlane was two years old. He lived the very ordinary life of a herdboy until his eleventh birthday, when his formal education began[45].
Mondlane studied in Lourenço Marques and at the University of the Witwatersrand (until his expulsion by South Africa). He then founded the National Union of Mozambican Students (UNEMO), was arrested and subsequently sent to study in Portugal to lessen his influence in Mozambique[46]. He left the University of Lisbon to study in the United States on a scholarship[47]. Mondlane obtained a BA degree from Oberlin College, and a MA and PhD degree at Northwestern University, working under the anthropologist Mellville J. Herskovits[48]. He became Mozambique's first PhD, and started working at the United Nations in New York[49], before lecturing at Syracuse University in New York[50]. Mondlane married a white American woman, Janet Rae Robinson, in 1956, and had spent seventeen years in urban settings before returning to Mozambique in 1961[51].

It was during their studies at overseas universities that the majority of the leaders of revolutionary movements in Lusophone Africa were politicised and developed a political philosophy[52]. Mondlane studied the works of major sociologists, and "began the search for a synergy that would unite Marx and Jefferson"[53]. Neto served as a member of the central committee of an anti-Salazar youth group, the Movimento de Unidade Democrática-Juvenil (MUD-Juvenil)[54], which was founded by, amongst others, Mario Soares[55]. Neto was arrested and jailed in 1952, and rusticated from February 1955 to June 1957 for his political protests and anti-Portuguese poetry[56].

Robert Mugabe, too, shows similarities to the three revolutionary leaders in Portuguese Africa. In 1960, at the age of 32, Mugabe gave up a teaching job in Ghana and, accompanied by his Ghanian wife, Sally, returned to Southern Rhodesia to join the National Democratic Party (the forerunner of Zapu) as its publicity secretary[57]. Today Mugabe holds six degrees, of which he obtained three during his eleven years in prison and detention[58].
Houari Boumedienne, one of the leaders of the FLN in the

Algerian war of independence and successor of Ben Bella, was one of the few FLN leaders who can be described as an intellectual in a movement not known for its intellectualism. Boumedienne studied at the well known Islamic university, El Azhar, in Cairo, and was noted for his "coldly searching intellect"[59].

This non-Western education put him apart from the other leaders, as well as from Ferhat Abbas, another FLN leader who attended Algiers University and also married a French woman[60].

5.3.2. Why intellectuals and members of the middle-class become leaders

As was argued earlier, a large percentage of people is moved to revolutionary action because of certain grievances with the existing dispensation. The leadership of contemporary African revolutions was no exception, and several types of grievances can be identified.

Firstly, the middle classes and educated groups might find themselves in a position in which their upward mobility is hampered by the ruling élite[61]. Horne[62] notes that a number of leading figures in the FLN, particularly Ferhat Abbas and Ben Khedda, were pharmacists because it was an occupation in which Muslims encountered few obstacles to advancement.

The frustration due to the obstruction of economic mobility was further strengthened by the fact that under the ancien regime the local population was treated as a second class citizenry. Ben Bella described how discrimination affected him, as follows: "At Tlemcen, the gulf between the French world and the Algerian world was obvious. Discrimination hit you in the face, even at school. At Tlemcen I felt, for the first time, that I belonged to a community which was considered inferior by the Europeans. For the first time I realised that I was a foreigner in my own country"[63].

Secondly, the highly educated group in African countries is "moved by a sense of responsibility as an educated élite in backward societies, motivated by nationalism in economically dependent countries"[64]. The intellectuals and educated group, particularly in developing countries, are also more likely to come into contact with "the progressive norms of more modern societies", making these groups "more acutely aware of the apparent backwardness of their own government"[65].

Thus, the students from Lusophone areas who studied in Portugal during the 1950's -- Mondlane, Neto, Cabral, Mario de Andrade, and Marcelino dos Santos -- realised that the situation in their countries was the result of Portuguese

rule, and discussed the prospects of a brighter future in an
African Studies society[66].

Thirdly, the lower classes and less educated groups often
lack specific skills, such as the ability to construct an
ideology and to organise a movement, which are vital for
revolutionary success[67]. During the early stages of a
revolution, the "men of words" who dominate the leadership are
usually intellectuals -- teachers, lawyers, journalists --
with above average education[68]. The peasants and unskilled
workers of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, and
Zimbabwe are accordingly much indebted to the communication
skills and academic standing of leaders such as Mondlane,
Cabral, Neto, Ben Bella and Mugabe for the attainment of
political independence of their countries.

It is obvious, then, that intellectuals are of great
importance in the shaping of a revolution. For Eric Hoffer[69],
they are indispensable: "Whenever we find a dispensation
enduring beyond its span of competence, there is either an
entire absence of an educated class or an intimate alliance
between those in power and the men of words". The ancien
regime, realising that intellectuals are capable of creating a
revolutionary ideology and leading the movement, may often try
to co-opt this group as an anti-revolutionary strategy[70].

However, the intellectuals' actions may be resented by
elements within a revolutionary movement, or by opposition
groups. For example, rival Angolan nationalist leader Holden
Roberto (of the UPA and its successor, the FNLA) described the
leaders of the MPLA as "self-styled intellectuals"[71].

5.4. The relationship between ethnic group and leadership

Ethnicity played an important role in several major
revolutions, with some ethnic groups producing more
revolutionary leaders and followers than others. In Africa,
some ethnic groups were better represented than others in the
leadership of revolutionary movements.

In the Angolan revolution, the support of the major ethnic
groups varied during the anti-colonial war, as well as in the
ensuing civil war, and the leadership structure closely
reflected this support.

The majority of the MPLA leadership, and to a smaller extent,
of its followers, were either members of the Mbundu tribe, or
mestiços. Neto himself was born in Bengo (Catete) village, a
member of the Mbundu tribe, which was concentrated in and
around Luanda[72], while de Andrade and da Cruz were mestiços[73].

At the First National conference of the MPLA in December 1962 more than half of the Steering Committee (executive committee) were meticos[74]. The fact that some MPLA supporters were whites led to the decision by the 1968 party congress that whites born or resident in Angola could become members of the MPLA -- this included Neto's Portuguese wife[75].

Marcum[76] describes the MPLA leadership as being characterised by: "a preponderance of Mbundu and mulatto..., most of which had lived for some time in or about Luanda, and an intellectual orientation that stressed the importance of party doctrine (non-racism)".

The leaders of Frelimo and PAIGC were also from groups which traditionally lived close to the colonial capital. Furthermore, Neto, Mondlane, Machel, and Cabral moved to urban areas in their teens to become members of the educated élites of their respective countries.

Mondlane was born in the Gaza province of Mozambique and moved to Lourenço Marques to complete his early years of study[77]. A large number of senior Frelimo leaders came from the southern part of Mozambique, where the ethnic groups had the longest exposure to the excesses of Portuguese rule[78].

Cabral went to the Cape Verde Islands when he was ten, and finished his secondary schooling in the urban environment of Praia, the capital of the islands[79]. The leadership of the PAIGC was dominated by Cape Verdean mesticos[80]. This led to resentment in the large mainland Balante group, and can be seen as one of the reasons for the murder of Cabral by Balante members of the PAIGC, as well as the 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau, which toppled Cabral's brother, Luiz, and resulted in a government dominated by Balantes.

In Algeria, the leaders of the FLN were drawn from the two major ethnic groups, the Arab and the Kabyles, which would be the source of numerous and often bloody clashes within the organisation.

For example, at a meeting of the nine founder members of the FLN in April 1954 to plan the start of the armed struggle, Belkacem Krim, a Kabyle, refused to take orders from Arab leaders of the revolutionary movement[81]. To paper over the disagreements between the leaders of the different ethnic groups, it was decided that Kabylia should be an autonomous zone in the war of independence[82]. This simmering animosity between the Arabs and Kabyles, and the prospect of a sectarian split, was "the FLN's single greatest enemy"[83].

5.5. The revolutionary personality

Sidney Hook[84] differentiates between what he calls the eventful man and the event-making man in history. While the eventful man is primarily a medium for social forces, the event-making man is distinguished by his extraordinary character traits which he uses to overcome all opposition and introduce fundamental changes[85]. The leaders of African revolutions were, in varying degrees, event-making men, who overcame powerful colonial powers or white minority regimes and changed the face of the continent dramatically.

In an interesting work on mass movements, Eric Hoffer argues that each phase of a revolution requires leadership skills of a different kind[86]. "A movement is pioneered by men of words, materialized by fanatics and consolidated by men of action"[87].

This does not, however, mean that a single revolutionary leader cannot guide the movement throughout the revolutionary process, as was the case in for example, Angola, Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent in Algeria. Like Mao Zedong, these African revolutionary all-rounders were skilled men of words, successful applicators of violence, and men of action who consolidated the revolution. Hagopian[88] refers to such all-round leaders as "protean" revolutionaries.

5.5.1. Different phases of revolution require special character traits

Some scholars argue that often personal factors rather than economic or political factors influence a person in his decision to become a revolutionary -- which can result in a decision which goes against economic and political forces[89].

According to these scholars, an individual does not become a revolutionary by chance. As a result of his mental make-up, which may be strongly influenced by childhood experiences, the individual who becomes a revolutionary can be said to have a "revolutionary psychology"[90]. This revolutionary psychology has several characteristics, a number of which are evident in the personalities of the revolutionary leaders studied here.

Apart from the "men of words" -- intellectual leaders of revolutionary movements discussed above -- Hoffer identifies the other personality types as the "fanatics" and "men of action".

All revolutionary leaders, but particularly the fanatics, hold convictions with an exceptional intensity and inflexibility. "Whatever their convictions, they held them with a pathological intensity...Sane men do not carve women up with their swords or empty their revolvers into bodies already dead"[91].

FLN leader Ramdane Abane -- the brain behind the terror

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tactics against civilians -- held "an unwavering belief that,
just as France had conquered Algeria through violence, nothing
but violence would shake loose her grip. The sinister dictum,
'one corpse in a jacket is always worth more than twenty in
uniform,' was a favourite of Abane's, and representative of
his basic thinking"[92].

The fanatic revels in the chaotic atmosphere ... od during the
toppling of the old regime and is relentl... ...ursuing his
goals -- the total destruction of the pres... . For the
fanatic, "all that already exists is rubbish", and has to be
destroyed before there can be a new order[94]. Furthermore, the
fanatic knows how to use this chaos to mobilise vast numbers
for his movement. "He alone knows the craving of the masses in
action: the craving for communion"[95].
  Other writers acknowledge the existence of this type of
leader, although they use different labels: "radical"[96];
"organizational skill groups and masters of violence"[97]; and
"managers of violence"[98].
  However, this type of revolutionary leader, whose prime aim
...s to destroy the present, is not the most suitable
personality to consolidate the situation at the end of the war
of independence. For the fanatic, there is always another
order that must be overthrown, or, like Trotsky, a world to be
won over to the cause of the revolutionary movement. The
revolutionary leader in the last stages of a revolution is
usually more of an organiser, who strives to institutionalise
the revolution.

  Hoffer[99] calls his third type of revolutionary leader the
"man of action": a leader who establishes a new order and
saves "the movement from the suicidal dissensions and the
recklessness of the fanatics". Hopper[100] argues that these
leaders -- he calls them statesmen -- formulate a policy that
embodies the ideas and ideals of the revolutionary
prophets[101].
  Stability is of prime importance for the revolutionary leader
in the final stages of revolution. "The genuine man of action
is not a man of faith but a man of law"[102]. Although the men
of action may extol the virtues of the prophet's ideals and
implement some of them, they are primarily interested in
securing the compliance of the population -- established by
force, if necessary, with the result that a dictatorship is
often characteristic of the final stages of a revolution[103].
  For Hoffer[104] this should come as no surprise, because the
revolutionary leader in the final stages of revolution is not
too finicky about the methods employed to institutionalise the
revolution, and may even use techniques and methods associated

with the old order.

Houari Boumedienne is a rare example of a "man of action" in
African revolutions. He brought stability -- and direction --
to Algeria with his military-like plans for the transformation
of the country. As will be shown in Part Five, this
transformation was carried out in a pragmatic fashion, which
explains to some extent the success of the revolution led by
this deadly serious and "utterly unromantic revolutionary"[105].

5.6. Leadership struggles

All the African revolutionary movements experienced power
struggles prior to political independence. In some countries,
these struggles were the forerunners of even larger struggles
between different groups after independence. In other
countries the power struggles led to the untimely death of the
most able revolutionary leaders, who could have had a great
impact on the transformation of their societies.

The Angolan and Zimbabwean revolutions suffered the least
from leadership struggles, a probable reason for this being
the fact that there was more than one movement fighting the
war of independence. Different groups and classes supported
speci? nationalist movements, which minimised ethnic and
class differences within the movements.
However, the leadership of MPLA president Neto was challenged
at least two times before Angola became independent. In July
1963 senior MPLA member Viriato de Cruz tried to take control
of the movement, and ten years later there was an alleged
attempt by Daniel Chipenda, a member of the executive
committee, to assassinate Neto[106].
Although these struggles can to a certain extent be
attributed to personal ambition, they also reflected ethnic
discord between the mulattos and Mbundu leaders, on the one
hand, and Bunda, Luchazi and Chokwe and some Ovimbundu
followers -- the guerrillas in Eastern Angola -- on the other
hand[107].

The Algerian Revolution was characterised by leadership
struggles within the FLN. Ramdane Abane, the leading figure
behind the decision to establish the principle of the primacy
of the political leaders over the military leaders, criticised
the ambitions of the military, which, he alleged, wanted to
take control of the FLN[108]. When the military leaders obtained
the majority on the nine man revolutionary council, Abane was
furious. He told the colonels: "You are creating a power based
on the army. The maquis (guerrilla fighting) is one thing,

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politics is another, and it is not conducted either by
illiterates or ignoramuses!"[109]. The military leaders decided
to kill Abane. He was lured to Morocco, distrustfully ("I
sense there's a dirty trick ahead"), and strangled with a cord
on December 26, 1958[110].

The five military leaders, true to the FLN's rule of
collective leadership, accepted joint responsibility for
Abane's death, although his death was against the wishes of
Belkacem Krim, who was to die in a similar manner after
independence[111].

Cabral and Mondlane were also the victims of power struggles
within their movements. Mondlane was killed by a parcel-bomb
in Dar-es-Salaam in 1969, and Cabral was assassinated by
members of his organisation in Conakry in 1973. The Portuguese
secret police carried out the operation with the aid of
dissident Frelimo members, including the party secretary for
Cabo Delgado, Lazaro Nkavandame, and Silverio Nungu, another
senior member[112]. Mondlane, aware of the tensions in his
movement and the tactics of the Portuguese, told Shore[113] a
week before his death:
        "They are determined to kill me...I guess sooner or
later they will. But I am not worried anymore. We really do
have a collective leadership, a good leadership. Frelimo --
the Movement -- is greater than any one man. They don't
understand that...That Samora [Machel], they don't know him.
That man is brilliant. He understands. [Joachim] Chissano and
Marcelino [dos Santos], poet that he is, young Jorge Rebelo
and the others."

5.7. Conclusion

William Kornhauser[114] argues that the first members to join a
mass movement -- and, by implication, its founders -- will be
"marginal" members of society. A marginal man can be defined
as a "man who deviates from a substantial number of variety of
predominant attributes in his society"[115]. Marginal persons
would for example be literate people in an illiterate society
and people with exposure to the outside world in a backward
and isolated society.

This is clearly illustrated in an examination of the profiles
of leaders in African revolutions. Distinguishing features
were (a) their relative youth; (b) high level of education;
and (c) a middle class background. Ethnicity and personality
played a role in all the phases of African revolutions, and it

sometimes defined lines of conflict in the power struggles
which characterised some of the revolutions studied here.

Finally, it is important to note that the efforts of the
ancien regimes to silence the revolutionary leaders often
served to heighten their status as prophets of the coming
transformation of society[116]. The campaign for MPLA leader
Agostinho Neto's release (he was held in Portugal after the
1961 uprising) can be equalled to a similar campaign following
the arrest of Algerian leader Ben Bella[117]. Neto's stature as
revolutionary leader was further enhanced when the MPLA named
him "honorary president" while he was still in prison, thus
transforming Neto's "life into a political legend well before
he had the opportunity to exercise public political
leadership"[118]. The same is true for particularly Ben Bella
and Mugabe, while the murdered Mondlane and Cabral became
symbols of African revolutionaries.

* *

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Chapter Six
The role of ideology in mobilising support

6.1. Introduction

Both leaders and students of revolutions acknowledge the
importance of ideology. "There can be no revolutionary action
without a revolutionary theory," wrote Lenin[1] . This is echoed
by Greene[2], who states that without a strong ideology there
can be no political mobilisation, and therefore no successful
revolution.

 For political philosopher Hannah Arendt[3] "only the two-edged
compulsion of ideology and terror, one compelling men from
within and the other compelling them from without, can fully
explain the meekness with which revolutionists in all
countries...have gone to their doom".

 Ideology can be defined as "a set of closely related beliefs,
or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or even
of a community"[4]. A political ideology, therefore, will be
this " 'set of ideas and beliefs' that people hold about their
political regime and its institutions and about their own
position and role in it"[5]. In this sense, the prevalent
political ideology in a society has much in common, or can
indeed appear to be synonymous with, the society's political
culture or political tradition[6].

 A political ideology indicates the societal values and
incites people to become political actors in order to
transform or protect the present order. This makes an ideology
a powerful weapon -- even in the hands of a minority --
because people are only mobilised once they get the _idea_ that
organised action can transform society[7].

 Before the characteristics of revolutionary ideologies in
Africa are analysed, it may be fruitful to look at the
characteristics of any major political ideology.

 Macrides[10] lists four: coherence, pervasiveness,
extensiveness, and intensiveness.

 A coherent ideology should be complete, spelling out a set of
goals as well as the manner in which to bring about these
goals. The propositions about political, social and economic
life should be logical and structured. There should preferably
be only one (immediate) goal, with an organisation to bring
this about[11].

 An ideology is pervasive if it has been in existence for a
long time; and extensive if a large number of people share the

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same ideology. The more people that share the ideology, the stronger the ideology is likely to be. Intensiveness denotes the appeal the ideology has: whether the believers are willing to risk life and limb in their struggle for the new world propagated by their ideology[12].

In summary, it can be said that a revolutionary ideology not only dictates what the world should look like, but also encourages people to strive energetically for the creation of a new world. To be at its most effective, an ideology should be logically structured and be well known and shared by a large number of mobilised people who are intensely committed to these shared beliefs.

6.2. Emphasis on nationalism

Greene[13] states that an ideology based on nationalism is the most powerful means of mobilising revolutionary support, because nationalism has the greatest potential for cutting across the cleavages that exist in society. A revolutionary movement that preaches nationalism as well as major economic and social reform may be virtually invincible. Hoffer[14] echoes this statement; for him nationalism is the "most copious and durable source of mass enthusiasm". Huntington also stresses the importance of political mobilisation of various groups and classes against an alien élite and he sees nationalism as the most powerful mobilising agent[15].

Of all the African revolutionary ideologies, it is the FLN's in Algeria which relied most on nationalism. Nationalistic (or, at least, anti-French) feelings ran strong ever since the occupation of 1830, and it was logical that the FLN should capitalise on this, as illustrated by the message on Radio Cairo after the start of the armed struggle: "To the Algerian people...After decades of struggle, the National Movement reached its final phase of fulfilment"[16]. The message went on to state that the goal of the FLN was national independence and the restoration of the Algerian state by every means[17]. Dunn[18] points out that although the ideological affiliations of the FLN leaders were not known, the one thing that was clear was their determination to fight the French colonial regime.

The FLN, which was to experience great problems with intra-party tensions, found that "[o]nly the dynamic provided by anti-colonialism papered over the conflicts and lent the movement whatever cohesion it enjoyed"[19].

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) indicated that its most important revolutionary goal was the transformation of

the political order by ending white rule. "The main political objectives of our revolution are to create a free, democratic, independent...Zimbawe and remove the political domination of the foreign settler element"[20]. Every other goal should be subjected to these objectives, said Zanu's leader, Robert Mugabe[21]. (During the later stages of a revolution, the transformation of the socio-economic order increases in importance. Characteristics of this aspect -- such as whether the transformation should be fundamental and in the manner envisaged by the movement, or if it need only be fundamental -- are examined in Part Four.)

In Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC under Amílcar Cabral similarly strived to be a pragmatic nationalistic group with a lack of dogmatism or ideological rigidity. Thus, Cabral[22] stated that "[t]o speak of the struggle against imperialism does not work here. Instead, we used a simple language..." which meant a better life for the largely rural community in an independent Guinea-Bissau.

The MPLA's minimum plan[23] stressed (a) "The urgently needed creation of an Angolan liberation coalition...(b) the struggle, by all available means, for the liquidation of the Portuguese colonial domination in Angola".

Likewise, Frelimo's constitution[24] indicated that the movement's first aim was to end Portuguese colonialism.

Nationalism is, however, not the only aspect of an ideology. In fact, it may be useful to achieve national liberation, but is deemed insufficient to inspire the transformation of society. Frantz Fanon, the great political theorist of the Algerian Revolution, described it as follows: "Nationalism, that magnificent song that made the people rise against their oppressors, stops shorts, falters and dies away on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a program. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness"[25].

Social criticism and the aspiration to create a new world to take the place of the morally corrupt present, form another important element of an ideology. The revolutionary movements in Angola and Mozambique are particularly noted for this aspect of their ideologies. As will be pointed out in Part Five, this aspect of their ideologies featured more prominently after the war of independence -- when the focus shifted from political independence to the transformation of

the socio-economic order.

6.3. Social criticism

As Fanon eloquently argued above, the ideology of a
revolutionary movement should encompass more than nationalism.
The ideology should stress the introduction of new, radical
values[26]. Rejai[27] states that a revolutionary ideology attacks
the present regime on moral grounds, and articulates what the
believers of the ideology believe to be a superior social
order. To be most effective in mobilising the masses, this
superior order should best be summarised in one slogan -- for
example, the "Liberty, equality, fraternity" of the French
Revolution[28].

If an ideology is too utopian, it may lay the basis for its
own defeat by promising that which it cannot deliver[29].
However, "continued lip service to the original ideals of the
revolution can inspire commitment and sacrifice, even under
the same circumstances that earlier inspired revolutionary
activity"[30]. Hoffer[31] uses the term "religiofication" to
indicate the process through which practical aims become holy
causes. These holy causes, which include the transformation of
the political order during the early phases of the revolution,
are later centred around the transformation of the socio-
economic order.

6.3.1. Emphasis on transformation of socio-economic order

A number of the revolutionary movements have what is termed a
minimum and a maximum program. The minimum program aims to
unite as many groups and classes against the ancien regime. It
deals only with the replacement of the current political
system with a new order, and is nationalistic in nature.

The maximum program, on the other hand, refers to the phase
of the revolution after the fall of the old regime. The major
objective of the revolutionary movement is now the
transformation of the economic and social orders of society.

In Mozambique, Frelimo formulated several aspects of its
maximum program during the armed struggle. In 1966 the Central
Committee decided that racism, tribalism, and regionalism were
"enemies to be fought in the same way as colonialism"[32].
Frelimo's attempt to create a morally superior social order is
further reflected in the identification of "the enemy...as
'[w]hoever at a certain moment practices the exploitation of
man by man, whatever the methods and forms that exploitation
takes'"[33]. Thus, Frelimo articulated its social criticism of
the exploitative colonial system, and simultaneously declared

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its intent to create a new and morally just social order.
Machel said: "Our war is a war of national liberation against
Portuguese colonialism, against imperialism and against the
exploitation of man by man"[34].

The revolutionary ideologies are heavily indebted to Marxism
for their formulation of social criticism and directives for a
new order, but the leaders are careful not to appear as
communist puppets. Machel[35] denies that Marxism was
transplanted to Mozambique. "Marxism-Leninism did not appear
in our country as an imported product. Mark this well, we want
to combat this idea. Is it a policy foreign to our country? Is
it an imported product or merely the result of reading the
classics? No. Our country is not a study group of scientists
specialising in the reading and interpretation of Marx,
Engels, and Lenin.
 Our struggle, the class struggle of our working people, their
experiences of suffering enabled them to assume and
internalise the fundamentals of scientific socialism...In the
process of the struggle we synthesized our experiences and
heightened our theoretical knowledge...We think that, in the
final analysis, this has been the experience of every
socialist revolution." Although Machel attempted to play down
Frelimo's ideological indebtedness to Marxism, his argument
that Frelimo's ideology was a home-grown ideology is doubtful.
In a country with a 96 percent rural population and a small
and underdeveloped working class, scientific socialism could
hardly have been internalised by the local population. At the
very best the peasants rallied around the revolutionary
movement because it claimed to provide them with a better way
of life.
 According to Henriksen[36], Frelimo mobilised the population
around issues such as exploitative labour methods, low prices
for agricultural produce, and lack of health and education
facilities.

 In Algeria, Frantz Fanon argued that the deracines, the urban
and more particularly the rural lumpen-proletariat, would be
transformed by the supposedly creative and therapeutic
activity of violent destruction[37].
 Furthermore, Fanon argued that the armed struggle would lead
to profound economic and social changes in the country, such
as the abolition of numerous traditional values and
institutions and the establishment of a new role for women and
children[38].
 In contrast to Algeria, where nationalism was the touchstone
of the revolutionary movement, Amílcar Cabral's PAIGC
concentrated more on socio-economic conditions to mobilise

support, as shown in the following chapter[39].

In its maximum programme -- formulated during the Angolan war of independence -- the MPLA indicates that it favoured the "[c]reation and progressive development of state commercial and industrial enterprises"[40], as well as the nationalisation and "distribution of land to landless peasants"[41].

6.4. Powerful instrument for the mobilisation

6.4.1. Lending legitimacy to the movement

A political ideology can play an important role in lending legitimacy to the revolutionary movement, and, inversely, weakening that of the government.

Gaetano Mosca[42] argues that a regime claims legitimacy in terms of what he calls the political formula of the ruling class. This formula justifies the existence of a regime in terms of basic values, for example, a Divine Right or natural law. Thus, a revolutionary ideology attacks these basic values, decreasing the legitimacy of the regime, while enhancing the political formula of the revolutionary movement. This is particularly important if the movement has to use sustained violence in the process of revolution[43].

A final aspect regarding legitimacy which was of extreme importance in the African revolutions was the manner in which a movement's legitimacy was enhanced when it claimed continuity with traditional goals and values of society[44]. Examples of this were the fact that the revolutionaries in Rhodesia chose a name for their country which referred to an old African kingdom. The FLN in Algeria used the same flag which Abd-el-Kader used more than a century earlier during his rebellion against the French.

6.4.2. Cutting across class and ethnic cleavages

Samuel Huntington[45] states that two of the three factors that will determine whether a country experiences a revolution are associated with ideological mobilisation across cleavages. Firstly, key groups, like the urban middle-class and the peasants, should both be socially mobilised[46]. Secondly, these groups should act in concert, primarily through a common ideology that cuts across class differences and mobilises them against an alien or colonial élite. If these factors are present in a society, the chances of a revolution increase dramatically. For this reason, Greene[47] states that the building of cross-cutting alliances is the most important function of an ideology.

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To appeal to as many potential followers as possible, the ideology should be ambiguous, flexible and vague. "Ideological purism may prove fatal"[48]. The more diverse (ethnically and otherwise) a society is, the greater the danger of ideological purism, and the greater the challenge to create an ideology that has broad appeal[49].

Mao stressed the importance of communication between the leaders and followers of a revolutionary movement, which included the shaping of a revolutionary ideology[50]. Mao introduced the concept of the "mass line" to explain his idea. The mass line consists of four progressive stages: perception, summarisation, authorisation and implementation[51]. The ideas of the masses are crucial in the mass line: in the first stage they are perceived, in the second the leadership summarizes the ideas, in the third the leaders give authorization to go ahead with the ideas, and in the last stage these ideas are implemented. Thus, there is a constant interplay between the masses and the leaders with regard to revolutionary ideas[52].

In Algeria, only an ideology that relied heavily on nationalism succeeded in uniting Arab and Kabyle, peasant and proletariat[53].

6.4.3. Encourages political action

Rejai[54] states that a revolutionary ideology "embodies a statement of plans and programs intended to realize the alternative order". Thus, the ideology encourages political action on the part of the followers.

"Above all, ideology moves people into concerted action. Sometimes it moves a whole nation; sometimes it is a group, a class or a political party that unite behind certain principles to express their interests, demands, and beliefs"[55].

Hoffer[56] states that: "The men who rush into undertakings of vast change usually feel they are in possession of some irresistible power...Lenin and the Bolsheviks who plunged recklessly into the chaos of the creation of a new world had blind faith in the omnipotence of Marxist doctrine."

Furthermore, those who feel themselves in possession of this power, should also have "extravagant hope, (because) even when not backed by actual power, is likely to generate a most reckless daring...No faith is potent unless it is also faith in the future; unless it has a millennial component"[57].

In this sense, the ideologies of the revolutionary movements were successful, and this can be seen as one of the major reasons for the fact that people opted for the hardships of guerrilla warfare.

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6.5. Conclusion

The ideologies in contemporary revolutions shared a number of characteristics -- all of which have some bearing on the mobilisation of followers.

During the earlier phases of the revolution, and particularly during the war of independence, this ideology was heavily tinged with nationalism. The expulsion of the rulers, and the creation of a new, nationalist regime was the highest priority. This emphasis on nationalism aided the revolutionary movements in mobilising large numbers of followers, and inciting them to revolutionary action. The unifying goal of attacking the old regime made it possible for the revolutionary movement to attrack followers from all walks of life, young and old, and different ethnic groups.

In this sense the ideology lays the groundwork for different phases within a revolution. One such phase is the war of independence mentioned above. After the fall of the old regime, the revolutionary movement attempts to transform society fundamentally.

This later phase in the process of revolution is also mapped out by the revolutionary ideology, which embodies directives on how the "new society" should function.

These directives often differs sharply from the movement's "minimum program", which was an appeal for political independence and free elections. The "major program", as the ideological directives for the transformation of society were known, was usually based on Marxism-Leninism. The ideology now stated that there should be only one political party, which should be a vanguard party, to aid the masses in the transformation to socialism. Property should be nationalised and/or brought under state control.

Thus, the political ideology of the revolutionary movement often echoes the so-called two phases of revolution: the attack on the ancien regime, and directives to transform society fundamentally.

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Chapter Seven
The followers of the revolutionary movements

7.1. Introduction

If the advocates of revolution fail to mobilise a significant
section of the population around their ideals for a new world,
they are likely to remain armchair revolutionaries. Henriksen[1]
identifies the mobilisation of the population as the "science
of rural revolutions".

 In this chapter, three broad aspects regarding the followers
of a revolutionary movement are analysed. (It is important to
keep in mind that the term "followers" generally refers to
people involved with a broad idea-based movement, while
"supporters" refer to people who belong to a political party.)
 Firstly, the characteristics of the followers. How old are
they; what are their social and educational backgrounds; and
from which ethnic groups do they come? When these findings are
compared to the characteristics of the revolutionary leaders,
some of the similarities and differences between leaders and
followers in the revolutionary movements studied here become
apparent.
 Secondly, answers to questions regarding the motivation of
followers -- why did they throw their weight behind the
movement? -- will be sought. Aspects such as the level of
frustration with the old regime, the disintegration of
established groups, and economic incentives will, amongst
others, be looked at.
 The final section of this chapter is devoted to a discussion
of the fact that the revolutionary movements studied here
succeeded in varying degrees to mobilise people from different
classes and groups, and that these followers were intensely
committed to their cause.

7.2. Characteristics of followers

7.2.1. Age

The majority of the followers of revolutionary movements tends
to consist of young, single males[2]. The followers of African
revolutions were no exception.

 In Rhodesia, the guerrillas were known by the Shona word

vokumana ("the boys"), and more often than not the fighters were only teen-aged[3]. David Caute's account[4] of a meeting with Zipra guerrillas (from Zapu's military wing) stressed the youth of the fighters. "A moment later two young men walked through the door carrying AK47 rifles...this young guerrilla had been forced to leave school after Grade 7 [the last year of primary education], found no work, and soon crossed with two companions into Botswana [and] having declared their support for Nkomo, they were airlifted to Zambia, where they received their first military instruction".

Apart from the revolutionary fighters who actually fought in the guerrilla war, the revolutionary movements in Zimbabwe had a well-developed support system amongst the youth. These youths, known as mujibas, acted as scouts or messengers, and had a highly developed organisation that mirrored that of the revolutionary group, particularly that of Zanu. In 1979, Zanu claimed to have 50 000 mujibas; according to Moorcraft & McLaughlin[5], not an "unrealistic figure".

In Mozambique Frelimo tried to mobilise the youth in particular. "With 58 percent of the country's population below the age of twenty in 1970, it could not have been otherwise"[6]. Teenagers and men in their early twenties constituted the group which responded most enthusiastically to the revolutionary call and became the backbone of Frelimo's guerrilla army[7].

In another Portuguese colony, Amílcar Cabral started the PAIGC's guerrilla war for the independence of Guinea-Bissau with "a few dozen young recruits" who had fled the country[8]. The members of this group, which was to produce leaders such as Francisco Mendes and Joao Bernardo Vieira, were in their teens or early twenties[9].

In Algeria, the situation was much the same. Ali la Pointe, perhaps the best-known (urban) guerrilla during the war of independence, was 26 years of age at the time of his death[10]. La Pointe's nephew, "Petit Omar", was only twelve years old, but acted as a courier and died with La Pointe when the French blew up a partition in the house where they were hiding[11]. Pretty young Muslim girls, who could pass as French in order to avoid detection, were used to place bombs: in February 1957 ten people died and 45 were injured as a result of explosives placed by two girls, aged sixteen and seventeen[12].

Why did the call to revolution strike such a responsive chord amongst the youth?

Henriksen[13] cites the following reasons: the youths were not breadwinners with families to feed; they found the excitement

of guerrilla life enticing; they were mostly semi-schooled and not trained for professions; they saw a rapid social mobility for themselves once independence was attained; and the revolutionary movement offered egalitarianism within a society characterised by class, age and ethnic stratification.

The same would appear to apply to the large number of young people that joined Cabral's movement. Many had recently migrated to the urban areas to search in vain for jobs, and with no family commitments and prospects of a bleak life, they found it easy to leave Guinea-Bissau and join Cabral's movement[14].

Caute's[15] interview with a young Zimbabwean guerrilla illustrates the attitude of these youths. "But didn't it worry him, for the future of Zimbabwe, that so many children were now out of school," Caute asked (the guerrillas closed down schools). "This provoked his first display of real anger, a sudden coiling of his body. 'Did I ever get a school? Why should they sit in school while we are fighting, you tell me?'"[16].

7.2.2. Class and education

Greene[17] states that the bulk of followers of revolutionary movements are from the lower social classes of society, and have less education or social standing than their leaders. The majority of the followers will be "drawn from the more activist and political conscious sectors" of society[18]. Who formed these groups in African revolutions?

Some scholars argue that most revolutionary followers are not from the very poor groups. Hoffer sketches the attitude of these groups: "Those that are awed by their surroundings do not think of change, no matter how miserable their condition. When our mode of life is so precarious as to make it patent that we cannot control the circumstances of our existence, we tend to stick to the proven and the familiar...The abjectly poor...stand in awe of the world around them and are not hospitable to change"[19].

Whilst the leadership of revolutionary movements in Africa was drawn from the middle and upper-middle classes, followers of revolutionary movements were characteristically from lower social classes than the leaders, and were usually workers or peasants[20].

In Algeria, the followers were predominantly peasants, and in particular the middle level of peasants who owned a small area of land[21]. Chaliand[22] mentions the "very humble origins" of the early followers of the FLN, and adds that most of the

fighting in the war of independence was done by rural
peasants.

Franz Fanon, the FLN ideologue, was doubtful about the role
of the working class in an African revolution. For him, the
working classes are the "most favoured section of the
population, and represent the most comfortably off fraction of
the people"[23]. Rather, the peasantry will be the major force
in revolutions, because they are "a coherent people who go
living, as it were, statically, but who keep their moral
values and their devotion to the nation intact...a people that
is generous, ready to sacrifice themselves completely, an
impatient people with a stony pride"[24].

The first members of the population who left Guinea-Bissau
to join Cabral in Conakry were young people who had recently
moved to the cities, where they were either unemployed or
involved in petty trade[25]. However, the PAIGC found its
greatest support in the south-eastern area of the country,
which was inhabited by the Balante ethnic group[26].
Particularly the peasants and plantation workers provided the
bulk of PAIGC followers.

In Mozambique, with 96 percent of the population living in
rural areas, most followers were subsistence farmers, while
civil servants and members of the petit bourgeoisie remained
loyal to Portugal[27].

Josiah Tongogara, military leader of Zanu, was very clear
about the nature of the Zanu follower in Zimbabwe: "[O]ur
people are traditional farmers, but they have no land. So you
find most of them come up [joined] because they have no land
or because they are deprived of education"[28]. Ranger[29] found
that "most elements [of the population]...were moving into
radical opposition to the government over the question of land
-- the embittered peasants."

In Angola, the UPA, fore-runner of the FNLA, was "largely a
peasant party and its strength is confined to the northern
area of Angola, its ties with the people of these areas being
tribal rather than political"[30].

Another interesting characteristic is the fact that most of
the revolutionary movements made use of females, despite the
fact that revolutionary followers tended to be young males.
This was to provide the movements with a large support base
amongst the population.

In Mozambique, Frelimo made special efforts to mobilise
females for the revolution. At its First Congress, the
movement stressed the "social and cultural development of the
Mozambican women"[31]. The League of Mozambican Women (Lifemo)

was established to mobilise women, provide food and clothes to the guerrillas, and to serve generally in a back-up role[32].

Barbara Cornwall[33] who spent some time with guerrilla forces, estimated that in 1969 there were two hundred women Frelimo guerrillas. Females also proved to be good at mobilising the population, with Josina Machel, wife of Samora Machel, stating: "[I]t has been proved that we women can perform this task of mobilisation and education better than men"[34].

Students played a small and ambivalent role as revolutionary followers, primarily because of their small numbers. In Mozambique, some became top leaders, but others deserted the revolution to attain personal goals. For example, a Frelimo defector, Alves Muganga, indicated that only 2 out of 154 students studying with scholarships in the West returned for service in Frelimo[35]. Baron[36] found that 85 percent (51 out of 60) of Mozambican students remained in the United States after completion of studies.

However, not all members of the population joined the revolutionary movements. Some ethnic groups were more enthusiastic in joining, while others actively assisted and supported the ancien regime. In the following section this phenomenon will be investigated.

7.2.3. Ethnic group

Henriksen[37] warns that the student of revolution should not view the support of an ethnic group for a revolutionary movement or regime as monolithic, because inevitably some will join the opposite camp. However, broad patterns of ethnic support can be identified in nearly all the African revolutions.

In Mozambique, the Portuguese claimed that they faced an uprising by three ethnic groups: the Makonde, Nyanja, and Chewa[38]. The Portuguese argued that only ethnic groups which straddle borders (and would thus be prone to foreign influences, such as the groups mentioned above) would provide followers for revolutionary movements[39]. It can also be argued that the authorities had less control over groups living in remote border areas, as was the case with the three Mozambican groups mentioned. Frelimo had followers from other ethnic groups, although these three groups made up a large percentage of the movement's followers.

The Frelimo guerrilla groups in the northern area, particularly Cabo Delgado, were largely made up of Makondes,

whose heartland was in that province[40]. The Makonde was known
for his opposition to the Portuguese administration,
particularly after the introduction of large scale relocation
programs[41].

A fair number of followers came from the Nyanja group in the
Nyasa district, as well as from the Yao, the latter being
split between favouring the incumbents and the
revolutionaries[42]. Frelimo also had many followers amongst the
smaller Ngoni and Nyasa groups, and the Chewa in the border
area between Malawi and Zambia[43]. South of the Zambezi,
Frelimo resorted to terror tactics to boost mobilisation, but
Samora Machel contended that despite this, Frelimo obtained
its staunchest followers from the region's Shona-related
groups[44].

Because most of the leaders came from the south and the
majority of Frelimo guerrillas from the northern provinces, an
element of factional tension existed within the movement[45].

Furthermore, Frelimo was largely unsuccessful in mobilising
the Makua ethnic group, whose heartland was immediately south
of that of the Makonde[46]. Although a small number of Makua
from the cities of Nampula and Porto Amélia (Pemba) joined
Frelimo, political mobilisation did not make much headway,
particularly because the variety of Makua dialects made it
difficult for cadres to reach the rural and illiterate
population effectively[47]. Joachim Chissano, current leader of
Mozambique, said in a wartime interview in Tanzania that the
movement had overcome animosity between Makonde and Makua in
its own ranks, and that the same would occur in an independent
Mozambique[48].

In Guinea-Bissau, the Balante ethnic group in the south-east
was over-represented amongst the followers of the PAIGC --
even Cabral was taken aback[49]. Several interesting reasons are
advanced for this support.

The heartland of the Balantes was closest to the border with
Guinea, from where most cadres infiltrated[50]. Thus, the
argument goes, the Balante was more frequently exposed to the
political message of the PAIGC. It is also argued that the
PAIGC was very effective in its political mobilisation of this
particular ethnic group[51]. This is without doubt the case, but
it cannot be the sole reason for the successful mobilisation,
because prior to 1963 (when the loyalty of the Balante was
more or less assured) the PAIGC's political campaign was
"extremely limited"[52].

In his research on this phenomenon, Cunningham[53] found that
up to 50 percent of the members of the relevant age groups had
joined the guerrillas. He advances two explanations for this.
Firstly, the Balantes, who grew rice, had to deal with

exploitative Portuguese middle men. This economic restriction partly explains the Balante support for the PAIGC[54]. Secondly, the traditional socio-political system of the Balante aided the PAIGC in mobilising a large number of men. Political control was in the hands of the elders, and once this age group was won over to the nationalist cause, the mobilisation of members of younger age-groups was easier[55]. This age-group structure was so strong that military chains of command were initially modelled on it[56]. Finally, competition between members of the same age group served as an incentive for young males to show their worth in (guerrilla) combat[57].

Angola provides another example of mobilising along ethnic lines, with the MPLA drawing followers from the Mbundu and meticos, the FNLA from the Bakongo, and Unita from the Ovimbundu ethnic group of central Angola.
In Zimbabwe, too, the two major revolutionary movements where split along ethnic lines, with Zanu's followers made up of Shonas, and Zapu having a Ndebele power base.

7.3. Why did people become followers of the revolutionary movements?

It was shown above that the followers of revolutionary movements were from a specific age group, with more or less the same social background and education, and from specific ethnic groups. This leads to the questions: why did they decide to join the revolutionary movement? What motivated them?

Hannah Arendt[58] talks about the "two-edged compulsion of ideology and terror, one compelling men from within and the other compelling them from without" which mobilises people into revolutionary action. Aspects of this "inner compulsion" will now be analysed. (The role of terror in the mobilisation of followers -- for example, abduction, press-ganging etc. -- will be examined in Part Four.)

It is important to keep in mind that very little quantitative research has been done on motivations of followers in African revolutions. There is, however, a fair amount of descriptive and qualitative work, which can be used with some success to identify important factors which compelled people to join the revolutionary movement.

7.3.1. Frustration-aggression

For Eric Hoffer[59] the main characteristic of a revolutionary

follower is frustration. "To the frustrated a mass movement offers substitutes either for the whole self or for the elements which make life bearable and which they cannot evoke out of their individual resources"[60].

"For men to plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by the possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader or some new technique they have access to a source of irresistible power. They must also have an extravagant conception of the prospects and potentialities of the future. Finally, they must be wholly ignorant of the difficulties involved in their vast undertaking"[61].

The frustrated are indeed more susceptible to mobilisation as followers to bring about a new world, because "to the frustrated the present is irremediably spoiled...No real content or comfort can ever arise in their minds but from hope" (for a new world)[62].

Dunn[63] claims that the frustrations of the colonial system induced the population to join the revolutionary movements out of "a largely reflex character". A good example of this is provided by the Algerian poet Kateb Yacine, when he describes his feelings after the repression at Sétif: "(M)y sense of humanity was affronted for the first time by the most atrocious sights. I was sixteen years old. The shock which I felt at the pitiless butchery that caused the deaths of thousands of Muslims, I have never forgotten. From that moment my nationalism took definite form"[64].

7.3.2. Economic incentives

Followers will be "less likely than their leaders to think in terms of sweeping principles related to morality, the social order, and political organization"[65]. Gurr[66] argues that the follower will most likely view the revolutionary situation from the angle of how it will affect his material position.

Realising this, Amílcar Cabral[67] told mobilising cadres within the PAIGC: "Always remember that the people are not fighting for ideas, nor for what is in men's minds. The people fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in order to gain material advantages, to live better and in peace, to benefit from progress, and for the better future of their children. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, the construction of peace, progress and independence are hollow words devoid of any significance unless they can be translated into a real improvement of

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living conditions."

In order to mobilise followers, Frelimo's message was aimed at the rural population, which comprised 96 percent of the total population. Thus, economic issues such as exploitative labour methods, low prices for agricultural produce, as well as lack of health and education opportunities were raised against the backdrop of previous resistance to colonial injustices[68].

Algeria experienced extreme poverty prior to the start of the war of independence. Apart from the general shortages that were the result of the war, Algeria suffered crop failures in two consecutive years. On the other hand, the Swiss-owned Compagnie Genovoise -- which held 15 000 hectares of prime farmland -- was reaping good harvests[69].

Waring[70], a supporter of Portuguese rule in Africa, stressed the economic factor as a reason for the March 1961 uprising in northern Angola. He claims that the rebels were "paid, and apparently quite well. Cheques made out from Leopoldville banks have been taken from prisoners-of-war and dead bodies".
A rebel told Waring[71] why he joined the uprising: "First we must kill all the white men or drive them into the sea, then we take over their houses, their plantations, their women, their cars and their banks. After that we will never need to work again and everybody will have all they could want".

Young people often joined Frelimo because their situation improved less rapidly than they expected, argues Henriksen[72]. The youths did not only feel anger about economic and social injustices, but also felt that their upward mobility was not as fast as it should have been[73].

7.3.3. Breakdown of traditional ties

Hoffer[74] argues that the rise and spread of mass movements can be counteracted if "any arrangement which...discourages atomistic individualism" is made. Hoffer refers to a social condition known as "mass society". Arendt[75] defines this phenomenon as the "social atomization and extreme individualization" of the individual", which is experienced when group, class, ethnic and other allegiances have broken down, and society is in a flux. Another scholar of mass society, William Kornhauser[76] states that in such a situation élites and non-élites are more accessible to influence from one another. People are, therefore, more easily mobilised around new ideologies or groups.

The revolutionary leader realises what the society in flux needs: "He alone knows the craving of the masses in action: the craving for communion"[77]. The revolutionary movement supplies this communion because, as Rejai[78] puts it in a similar religious metaphor, an ideology "gives the revolutionaries a sense of unity, solidarity, and cohesion; it instills revolutionary zeal, commitment, devotion, and sacrifice". Less stridently, Macrides[79] argues that within the revolutionary movement the revolutionary follower usually finds everything that life outside the movement cannot offer: a feeling of equality, personal relationships, responsibility, as well as status mobility by means of promotion[80].

In the Algerian war of independence, the French resettled almost half of the Algerian rural population as a counter-insurgency tactic, thereby completing the disruption of Algerian rural society[81]. According to Chaliand[82], Algerian society was broken down to an exent virtually unparalleled by other colonial areas, and this proved to be important in the conception and growth of the FLN. In the disrupted Algerian society, the struggle against the French provided this sense of unity. A sense of national identity developed rapidly prior to the start of the war of independence, particularly after the repression at Setif, in which thousands of Muslims were killed.

Furthermore, Messali's Etoille was formed by migrant labourers in Paris, where the Algerians most probably suffered from the "extreme individualisation" that Arendt mentions above.

7.4. "Critical mass"

The revolutionary movements studied here succeeded in varying degrees to draw support from different classes and groups. This characteristic of the selected African revolutions is described below. A further characteristic of the selected revolutions is the fact that the movements did not necessarily enjoy the support of the majority of the people, but of a smaller group which supported its cause frantically.

7.4.1. Cross-cutting alliances

Greene[83] states that revolutionary movements "succeed only where a critical mass of most or all of the major classes in society is mobilized in the revolutionary process. The dustbin of history is filled with revolutionary leaders who thought only in terms of the parochial interests of their clienteles".

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Two of the three preconditions for revolution that Huntington
identifies centre around the nature of the revolutionary
followers.

Firstly, key groups, like the urban middle-class and the
peasants, should both be mobilised[84]. Secondly, these groups
should act in concert, primarily through a common ideology
that cuts across class differences and mobilises them against
an alien or colonial élite[85].

It is, however, not necessary that all the classes of a
society support the revolutionists: the support of a class may
often be tacit, "or the revolution may succeed simply by
neutralizing the large majority of the society's non-
revolutionary classes"[86]. Jacques Soustelle, French governor-
general in Algeria, realised that the FLN had largely achieved
this aim, mainly through terror, by 1955: "The population as a
whole, without throwing in its lot with the rebels...remained
frightened and non-committal"[87].

7.4.2. Followers as a percentage of the population

The success or failure of a revolutionary movement is to a
large extent determined by its ability to effect cross-cutting
alliances between different classes and groups[88].

However, this alliance between like-minded persons of
different classes will always involve a small percentage of
the population. "A revolution involves minorities fighting
minorities"[89]. If the revolutionaries do not enjoy a numerical
superiority, they at least have the advantage of intense
commitment to their cause[90]. This is particularly the case in
African revolutions, where the anti-colonial feelings of the
population were intense. This "intense commitment to
revolution is their most valuable resource"[91].

Finally, the number of followers needed to achieve critical
mass in a revolutionary movement will depend amongst others on
the strength of the regime, the power of the ideology, the
organisation of the movement, and the techniques employed[92].

It is also interesting to note that the ancien regime managed
to mobilise a large number of followers. Dunn[93] states that
"(t)here were during the Algerian war of national
liberation...at least as many of the indigenous population
fighting with the French colours on a voluntary basis, as
there were fighting against the French".

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7.5. Conclusion

In the African revolutions the followers were particularly young.

 The youth, with little education and few prospects of a good life, joined movements which they thought would create a more equal and prosperous society. The fact that the movements drew more followers from some ethnic groups than others makes a simple class-analysis of African revolutions dangerous. It is, therefore, important to look at factors such as the disruption of traditional society together with economic questions when investigating the motivation of revolutionary followers.

 The revolutionary movement which draws support from the youth, and offers members from different ethnic groups the prospect of a better life, seems to have a good prospect of successfully transforming society. In Angola, the Mbundu-based MPLA did not have followers from other major ethnic groups, which did not only led to a war of independence being fought by three squabling groups, but to a civil war after independence. Only a small number of MPLA followers during the war of independence became supporters of the vanguard party which was formed after independence. (The transformation of followers of revolutionary movements into members and supporters of political parties is examined in Part Five.)

 Finally, revolutions are the result of the actions of minorities. The silent majority, frightened and divided, is seldom a factor in the process of revolution. Once a revolutionary movement is supported by a fairly large percentage (but not necessarily the majority) of the population, and once it represents various classes and groups, it can be proposed that the chances of success for the revolutionary movement is high.

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Chapter Eight
The organisation of the revolutionary movements

8.1. Introduction

It was argued in Part One that the organisation of a movement
forms part of the criteria to distinguish between different
types of collective action. For example, revolts were said to
be spontaneous uprisings, characterised by a lack of
organisation[1].

A revolution, on the other hand, is a process in which a
movement, through an effort of will, and organisation,
transforms society[2]. Samuel Huntington[3] states the importance
of organisation to a revolutionary movement very explicitly:
"Organisation is the road to political power...In the
modernizing world he controls the future who organizes its
politics". Dunn[4] supports this argument when he states that a
war of independence (as a phase in a revolution) requires less
political appeal than it does effective organisation.

It has already been noted in Chapter Five that the
leaderships of the FLN, MPLA, PAIGC, Frelimo, Zanu-PF were
very small and elitist. However, in order to gain political
power, the revolutionary idea cannot remain the sole property
of this elitist group. It has to reach the masses, who have to
be mobilised for political action -- and this is one of the
major reasons why a revolutionary movement must be efficiently
organised[5].

In this chapter, the organisation of the revolutionary
movements will be analysed along the following lines. Firstly,
it will be shown that all the African revolutionary movements
had a definite structure, which was the result of the
establishment of a chain of command. This chain of command
provided a framework of organisational discipline.

However, organisation leads to autocratic tendencies within a
movement. This aspect of African revolutionary movements will
be examined, and the relationship between the nature of their
pre-independence organisation and the current political order
will be investigated.

Furthermore, there were different groups -- for example, the
military and the politicians -- within the movement's chain of
command. In all the African revolutions one finds that tension
existed between these groups, which sometimes led to violent

clashes. In this chapter this phenomenon will be examined, and probable explanations for its existence in African revolutionary movements forwarded.

Finally, all revolutionary movements tried to challenge the government by establishing organisational structures which opposed those of the government by levying taxes. dispensing justice, and even marrying couples. The success of these alternative structures will be examined as well.

As will be shown below, good organisation in a revolutionary movement is of particular importance when the present regime is very effective in its repression, and the revolutionary process is drawn out[6]. Under these circumstances -- which characterised the African revolutions -- the organisation of the movement has to remain strong if it wants to keep on fighting the government.

8.2. Provides structure to the movement

Lenin[7] is very outspoken about the importance of organisation: "The proletariat can become and inevitably will become a dominant force only because its intellectual unity created by the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organisation which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class". This welding of followers into a powerful movement cannot take place unless the movement has a clear-cut structure through which the ideology can be converted into political action[8].

8.2.1. Creates a chain of command

An effective revolutionary organisation has a well established and clearly defined chain of command running from the leader to the peasant in a remote village[9]. Such a chain of command serves a number of functions. Firstly, it is the most direct manifestation of the structure of the revolutionary movement. Followers and leaders alike know their position in the movement.
The chain of command of a movement should preferably follow closely the traditional organisation of society, such as Mao's and Ho Chi Minh's organisational systems[10].

Frelimo laid down its chain of command at its First Congress in September 1962. It was to be organised on the following levels: nation, province, district, area (locality), and cell[11]. Each area, district, and province was to have an assembly, which elected an executive committee, while a

congress was the supreme national organ, from which the
Central Committee was elected[12]. The MPLA was organised along
more or less the same lines: nation, zone, district, and
locality[13].

In the Frelimo hierarchy, every level was held responsible by
the higher level for the implementation of policy. The
introduction of this hierarchy sometimes took a number of
years: in eastern Nyasa this organisational structure only
commenced operating in 1968, although the guerilla war had
started in 1964[14].

This initial structure of Frelimo was based on that of the
nationalist movements in the British colonies (even the word
"chairman" was used[15]). Many traditional chiefs were
incorporated in the structure, particularly in the early part
of the armed struggle, which helped to integrate the
revolutionary movement with the (traditional) society. In
Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC also relied heavily on the homen
grande (chiefs) in mobilising followers and taking up
positions in the hierarchy of the movement[16].

In the Zimbabwean revolution, Zanu divided the country into
provinces, which were sub-divided into sectors[17]. The sectors
were sub-divided in districts, branches, and villages. The
committee at each level of the organisation was responsible to
the next level[18].

The FLN too borrowed heavily from others in the establishment
of a revolutionary structure. From Messali's MTLD it borrowed
the five provinces, or wilayas, into which the country was
divided[19]. The wilayas were divided further into zones,
regions, sectors, douars, and fractions[20]. The structures of
douars (made up of two or three Arab villages with inhabitants
from the same tribe) and fractions were taken over from the
French colonial administration[21]. Unlike the movements in
particularly Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, which stressed the
importance of peoples' committees and elections, a colonel was
the supreme authority within a wilaya, with no differentiation
between military and political authority[22]. The FLN borrowed
its military organisation from the French as well, which is
not surprising, as a number of its leaders served in the
French army[23]. It is also interesting to note that the
organisation of the FLN was influenced by the cell system used
by the French Resistance of WWII[24].

Most of the revolutionary movements in Africa did incorporate
a feedback system in the chain of command, so that it was
possible for the rank-and-file to make suggestions to, and
sometimes even criticise, the leadership.

Frelimo's structure allowed room for self-criticism within a collective spirit from its inception[25]. However, at the Second Congress, held in 1968 in the "liberated" Nyasa province, it emerged that communication between leaders and followers, let alone self-criticism, left much to be desired in a movement which described itself as "popular"[26]. The PAIGC members had wide-ranging discussions[27], but after the Cassaca Congress -- where Cabral cracked down on the military wing -- the feedback system was watered down as authority became centralised[28].

The scope for self-criticism within the MPLA was apparent at its conference in December 1962, where not only the leadership, ideology, and structure came under scrutiny, but the lack of a forum for self-criticism was lamented by delegates[29].

In the FLN, however, there was little room for this type of criticism. In fact, the colonels -- as leaders of the different wilayas -- "tended to act as provincial warlords"[30]. In a revolutionary movement, where power often came from the barrel of a gun, it was inevitable that members of the military would view themselves as the strongest section of the movement. Nearly all the movements had to contend at one stage or another with different groups that attempted to take control of the movements.

8.3. Different power groups within the organisation

8.3.1. The military versus the politicians

Within the chain of command of a revolutionary movement, there are some leaders and followers who represent the military wing, while others represent the political wing of the movement. This is representative of the manner in which Mao organised the Chinese Communist Party[31]. Although Mao argued for the superiority of the political leaders over the military leaders, it was not always the case in African revolutions.

In Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Zimbabwe the political group kept the control of the revolutionary movement, while in Mozambique and Algeria the military leaders managed to oust the politicians. As will be illustrated below, conflict between the sections occurred in nearly every revolution and can be seen as a characteristic of the revolutionary process.

In Guinea-Bissau, the Cassaca Congress, which also took place in a "liberated area" in 1964, was a turning point for the PAIGC's organisation and policies[32]. An armed struggle was launched a year earlier, and militaristic tendencies had made the movement "already sick", according to Cabral[33].

The military commanders killed local chiefs -- whom Cabral

thought were important for mobilising the rural population --
and abused the local population, thus alienating the very
people that Cabral wished to mobilise for his movement[34]. The
situation was so serious that, according to Cabral's brother,
Luiz, "the whole struggle was in jeopardy because of these
combatants' military power...people began to flee from the
liberated areas"[35].

Amílcar Cabral acted firmly. He called the Cassaca Congress,
reaffirmed his control, and had the rebel military leaders
executed at the congress in order to retain the primacy of the
political leaders in the PAIGC[36].

In a document written after the congress, Cabral noted that
the militaristic attitudes had appeared because of a lack of
political work in the military wing. Consequently, he set out
to reconstruct the movement to prevent another surge in
militarism. He brought the military and management of the
liberated areas under more direct and central control under
his brother, Luiz Cabral, and Aristides Pereira[37]. The
structure of the organisation was expanded to allow for more
political committees at middle level, which controlled the
military at that level. These committees aided Cabral to
establish control by the politicians. The most direct
manifestation of this is the formation of the conselho de
guerra (council of war) to control the armed struggle, with
Cabral as its chairman[38].

Zanu's military wing, the Zimbabwe African National
Liberation Army (Zanla), remained under the control of the
political leaders, because it was the "Party which commanded
the gun"[39]. This is not to say that the military leaders did
not wield considerable power. For example, at the Lancaster
House negotiations the power of Joshia Tongogara, leader of
the Zanla High Command and member of the revolutionary council
of Zanu, was acknowledged by Lord Carrington, and even
Mugabe[40].

At its December 1962 congress, the MPLA reiterated the
importance of the separation of the political and military
wings, with the primacy of the former over the latter.
Political power lay with the ten-member Steering Committee,
nominated by the National Political Council[41]. The military
wing was controlled by the Politico-Military Committee, which
consisted of six members from the Steering Committee[42].
Because this committee was dominated by the political leaders,
they dominated the leadership of the military wing as well.

However, the MPLA was not without tensions between the
military and political groups. Agostinho Neto acknowledged
these tensions when he said in Dar-es-Salaam, shortly before

the 1974 coup: "the worst thing the Portuguese did to us was to oblige us to wage a liberation struggle from abroad"[43].

In Algeria and Mozambique, the political leaders did not retain control over the revolutionary movements, and the military wing increased its power. In Mozambique the military faction became ascendant, ironically, by winning a political battle after Mondlane's death, but in Algeria the struggle was characterised by violence and death.

The French had erected an electric barrier along the border with Tunisia[44]. This led to a rift between the political leadership of the FLN in Tunis and Cairo, and the harried guerrillas in the wilayas, because the guerrillas felt that they had to bear the brunt of the fighting. To complicate matters further, an Army of the Frontiers was organised under Boumedienne in Tunisia, who could not relieve the internal guerrillas, but became extremely powerful within the revolutionary movement. Although the FLN decided at the Soummam Conference (held in 1956 in Algeria) to establish the principle of the primacy of the political leaders over the military leaders, the latter became more powerful[45]. They murdered Ramdane Abane, one of the political leaders, and from then the primacy of the military in Algerian politics was assured. This supremacy manifested itself in Boumedienne's role as king maker in the case of Ben Bella (when the army intervened on his side), and Boumedienne's coup. Dunn[46] suggests that the rising of the military was inevitable, given the situation the FLN faced: a colonial power that was unpopular and a population that could be mobilised. What was of utmost importance in the second phase of the Algerian revolution was "organizational effectiveness from a purely military point of view"[47].

Frelimo's structure was initially divided into the Department of Interior Organisation (DOI), which united the political structures, and the Department of Defence, which organised the guerrillas[48]. The military wing was the junior partner, and no political role was ascribed to the guerrillas[49].
After the ascendancy of Machel in the leadership struggle of May 1972, there occurred a merging of the two groups with the creation of a Political Military Co-ordinating Committee, which consisted of the president (Machel), vice-president, political commissar, chiefs of security, defence, and organisation, as well as the secretaries of the provinces[50].
Munslow[51] states that under this system, all cadres had to participate in the armed struggle, "as this was the only way to end colonial rule", but these guerrillas now had the

additional task of politically mobilising the population. All
cadres of Frelimo received political-military training at the
Nachingwea camp in Tanzania to prepare them for their dual
role[52].

8.4. The iron law of oligarchy

Rejai[53] argues that the revolutionary party is usually
centralised and closely controlled -- it tends to be
authoritarian, with little tolerance of dissenting views --
even if it preaches the opposite. Michels[54] states that there
is an "iron law of oligarchy" in every political organisation.
  Leiden & Schmitt[55] point out that most revolutionary leaders
are so convinced of the rightness of their struggle that they
"assume dictatorial control when their revolutions or coups
are successful no matter what their previous political
philosophy may have been".

  It often happens, as was the case in Angola and Mozambique,
that the revolutionary movement -- which was a broad front
during the war of independence -- becomes an elitist "vanguard
party".
  In Mozambique, this change was effected shortly after
independence. Samora Machel said in his Independence Day
address: "In establishing our development strategy, we must
attach special value to what is our chief strength, the
mobilisation and organisation of the people"[56].
  The movement implemented this strategy by establishing grupos
dinamizadores (dynamising groups, also known as g.d.s.) as a
transitional measure to mobilise and organise the Mozambican
population as a whole[57]. A typical g.d. would consist of a
secretary, assistant secretary, and a responsavel (literally
translated, a responsible, but here it refers to a leader who
serves the people) with assistants for mobilisation and
organisation; information and propaganda; education and
culture (which started a literacy campaign); women; social
affairs; production; and commerce and finance[58]. The g.d.s.,
which were publicly elected[59], served as administrative
structures after independence, and can be described as the
"earliest structural forms of poder popular, people's power,
stretching throughout the nation"[60]. They also served as a
transition to the formation of a vanguard party, because in
them were combined elements of popular democracy and a
vanguard party[61].

  However, the most important change in the organisation of
Frelimo came at the Third Congress that was held in 1977,
during which the movement took on a Marxist-Leninist character

and decided to proceed to the Popular Democratic (socialist)
phase of the Mozambican Revolution[62]. Here the front for
national liberation was changed into a vanguard party, because
it was deemed that a party which represented the working
classes was required to lead the transition to socialism[63].
This vanguard party was characterised by democratic
centralism, although Machel stressed the importance of the
democratic aspect of this concept[64]. After it became a
vanguard party, Frelimo changed its criteria for membership:
no longer being a mass-based movement, only selected
individuals who passed stringent requirements were now allowed
into the party[65].

8.5. Makes "dual government" possible

When the revolutionary process is extended through time, it is
important that the revolutionary movement should transform
itself into an organisation that equals the administration of
the government -- counter-government, or "dual power", as
Trotsky referred to the soviets established by the Bolshevists
to oppose the tsar's government[66]. This is particularly
important in the areas which the revolutionary movement has
"liberated" -- usually areas in which it is active and
receives the support of the population.

At the start of its armed struggle in Mozambique, Frelimo
allowed the Portuguese political and administrative structures
to be replaced by the traditional structures, simply because
the chiefs were best equipped for these tasks[67].

It could levy taxes, provide services, "and the likelihood of
success increases as the movement is able to develop
institutions that actually function as agencies of
government"[68].

8.6. Conclusion

"If the success of the national libe   tio. struggle had to be
explained in as few words as   , chese would have to be
that Frelimo knew how to mob   ¡ organise the
population"[69].

This is not only true of Freli   all the revolutionary
movements were, as Huntington points out, able to determine
what the future of their countries would look like because
they consisted of the most able organisers of the population.

Neto said, in a speech on 20 March 1975 in Benguela, that
political organisation would sustain the Angolan revolution.
"It is by popular organisation that we are going to defend our

movement. We who have defended our organisation since its
foundation in 1956, we have some experience, and it is not by
arms that political struggle is won. What we need to know is
how to satisfy the dearest wishes of the people, and organise
so that the people will defend their own interests"[70].

It is true that good organisation is to the advantage of a
revolutionary movement. However, it can lead to the
concentration of power in the hands of a few and may result in
clashes between different groups within the movements. African
revolutions were no exception. The military wing often tried
-- and in the case of Algeria and Mozambique succeeded -- in
gaining control over the revolutionary movements.
In the African revolutions, the "iron law of oligarchy"
manifested itself further after political independence, when
the former revolutionary movements in Angola, Mozambique,
Guinea-Bissau and Algeria became in varying degrees elitist
vanguard parties. The revolutionary movements which fought for
freedom often became examples of the worst kind of
concentration of power -- a small ruling group in a single-
party state.

This study of the characteristics of African revolutions has
thus far concentrated on the structural causes of revolution,
as well as the manner in which the population was mobilised
around the ideals to transform the old regime fundamentally.
In Part Four the attention will turn to the most dramatic and
highly publicised phase of these revolutions: armed conflict
between the revolutionary challengers and the incumbents.

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Notes to Chapter Eight

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9. Greene, Revolutionary movements, p115.

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26. Munslow, Mozambique, p108.
27. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p65.
28. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p82.
29. Marcum, J. 1978. The Angolan Revolution (vol.II) -- exile politics and guerrilla warfare (1962-1976). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p29.
30. Heggoy, Insurgency, p117.
31. Rejai, The comparative study, p40.
32. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p74.
33. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p77.
34. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p78.
35. Ibid.
36. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p79.
37. Chabal, Amilcar Cabral, p82.
38. Ibid.
39. Pandya, Mao Tse-tung, p63.
40. Pandya, Mao Tse-tung, p73.
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49. Ibid.
50. Munslow, Mozambique, pp117-118.
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PART FOUR: THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

Chapter Nine
Armed conflict between the revolutionary movement and the ancien regime

9.1. Introduction

All the selected African revolutionary movements -- faced with structural causes of revolution and possessing the ability to mobilise a large following -- resorted to violence against the ancien regime. Revolutionary violence can be termed a military-political conflict, because the violence has two aims: to take on the government forces in (guerrilla) combat and to gain the support of the population and the international community.

A large group of scholars of revolution views the use of violence as an integral part of revolution. Greene[1] defines violence as "those actions by individuals or groups that endanger the physical security of people or property". He identifies the threat or use of violence, and its justification by an ideology, as one of the clearest indicators of a movement's revolutionary intent[2].

Dunn[3] states that "revolutions are a form of massive, violent and rapid social change". Violence is a central element in Samuel Huntington's[4] definition as well. Calvert[5] uses it when he defines revolution very broadly as "a form of governmental change through violence".

Mao Zedong[6] maintained that violence gives revolution its specific characteristics: "A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another".

Finally, it has to be kept in mind that if a revolution is defined only in terms of violence, the process of revolution is limited to the period in which a society experiences political violence, thus ignoring the subsequent transformation of society[7]. Although the use of violence plays a central role in the fall of the ancien regime during the revolutionary process, the revolution does not end there, but continues with the transformation of society[8].

9.2. Decision to abandon non-violent strategies

The armed struggles in all the African revolutions were preceded by decades of non-violent protest to effect gradual change in the political and socio-economic orders. As was

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shown in Part Two, this approach was ineffective against intransigent ancien regimes and led to no fundamental changes. This frustration is eloquently stated by Ferhat Abbas, the former Algerian liberal leader who became FLN president: "The methods that I have upheld for the last fifteen years -- co-operation, discussion, persuasion -- have shown themselves to be ineffective; this I recognise...."[9].

In a similar vein, French expert Germainne Tillion believes that if meaningful political reform and free elections in Algeria had taken place by November 1954, "they probably would have spared us a long and cruel war"[10].

Shortly after the Setif massacre, a number of frustrated Algerian ex-soldiers formed a splinter group, the Organisation Spéciale (OS), within Messali's party[11]. They decided to fight the French "by all means", thus becoming the first Algerian nationalist movement "dedicated to preparing for armed confrontation with France -- now considered inevitable -- and thereby it became the immediate predecessor of the FLN"[12]. After the French cracked down on the OS, former leading figures met in Paris in March 1954 and decided to create a "third force", which would have as its objective an armed insurrection[13]. Nine leaders, including Ben Bella, were appointed under the system of collective leadership[14].

On 10 October 1954 the new revolutionary movement named itself the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). A date was set for the outbreak of the insurrection in Algeria: 00:01 hours on 1 November 1954 -- All Saints' Day.

The Algerian events were closely mirrored by those in the other countries. For example, Eduardo Mondlane[15] described Frelimo's decision to abandon non-violence as follows: "Two conclusions were obvious. First, Portugal would not admit the principle of self-determination and independence, or allow for any extension of democracy under her own rule...Secondly, moderate political action such as strikes, demonstrations and petitions, would result only in the destruction of those who took part in them. We were therefore left with these alternatives: to continue indefinitely living under a repressive imperial rule, or to find a means of using force against Portugal which would be effective enough to hurt Portugal without resulting in our own ruin".

At its First Congress, held in September 1962, the newly-formed Frelimo had not yet decided whether to opt for armed conflict against the Portuguese[16]. This was partly because of different views in the leadership: some members thought that international pressure alone would be sufficient to end

colonialism, while others emphasised Portuguese intransigence, which led to the Mueda massacre in which hundreds of civilians died[17]. Furthermore, between 1961-1962, military forces in Mozambique were increased from 3 000 to 12 000, which Frelimo saw as further proof of Portugal's willingness to stamp out protest[18].

Portugal's rejection of talks on the future of Mozambique tipped the scales in favour of armed conflict, and although the training began shortly after the First Congress, fighting broke out only in September 1964[19].

The example of revolutionary movements taking up weapons against the rulers often spurred other movements on to abandon non-violence.

In February 1961, violence broke out in Luanda, followed by a massive insurrection in northern Angola[20]. This was followed at the end of 1962 by the start of armed resistance in Guinea-Bissau, when Portuguese patrols were ambushed[21]. With these movements, Frelimo formed the third member of the Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colo.iias Portuquesas (CONCP, an alliance of liberation movements in Portuguese colonies). Frelimo actually came into being when CONCP urged two Mozambican movements to "come together"[22]. The fact that the MPLA and PAIGC were already engaged in fighting against the Portuguese must have served as a "demonstration effect" for Frelimo, compounding the effects of pressure from Algerian instructors and competition from a rival movement which had begun armed actions[23].

At Zanu's Inaugural Congress in August 1963, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, the movement's first leader, noted the almost natural progression from non-violent to violent policies. "As a rule, human beings everywhere first try the method of non-violence, but if circumstances are such that non-violence cannot work, the same human beings have not hesitated to use violence to achieve certain practical ends which would be denied to them if they persued only the path of non-violence"[24]. The banning of Zanu and the People's Caretaker Council (Zapu) on 26 August 1964 proved to be decisive, and on 28 April 1966 Zanu fighters engaged the Rhodesian security forces at Sinoia[25].

9.3. Rural guerrilla warfare

In the African revolutions the ancien regimes were not easily toppled, as was the case in what Huntington terms "Western" revolutions, such as the French Revolution[26]. The wars of independence in African revolutions show a close resemblance

to what Huntington describes as "Eastern" revolutions (like
the Chinese Revolution), when the regime is toppled at the end
of a long struggle[27]. African revolutions also tend to follow
the "Eastern" pattern in regard to the status of the capital:
in a "Western" revolution the fall of the capital marks the
beginning of the revolution, while in the "Eastern" revolution
it is the final objective of a strategy of consolidating the
urban base and encircling the major urban centers[28]. This
encircling is done through guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare has been practised since the earliest
times. Greene[29], cites the actions of the Hebrews and Gauls
against the Roman rulers as examples of resistance against a
regime which is militarily superior to the guerrillas. The
word "guerrilla" dates back to the Spanish resistance against
the invading armies of Napoleon in 1808 -- the term is derived
from the Spanish word for war, guerra[30].
Although the basic premise of guerrilla warfare -- do not
confront the enemy in a pitched battle when your forces are
weak -- has remained unchanged since the resistance against
the Romans, the strategy has been refined over the centuries
by a number of guerrilla strategists, the most noticeable
being Mao Zedong[31]. His writings were so influential that they
made a "rural-based revolution a supreme law unto itself"[32],
and his teachings affected the conflict in African revolutions
profoundly.
For Mao, the central element of guerrilla warfare is the fact
that it is a protracted struggle in which the enemy is not
defeated in a few military confrontations, but through
attrition: to wear down the enemy, the guerrillas should
attack only when they are in a good tactical position, and
above all, they should remain mobile and avoid positional
warfare.
At the start of a guerrilla struggle, the revolutionary
movement will be on the defensive. It should only go on the
offensive if the population supports the guerrillas, the
terrain is favourable to the guerrillas, and the government
forces -- their weak spots now visible -- have been
demoralised and are making mistakes[33].

9.3.1. An inconspicious start

In an analysis of guerrilla warfare in the African
revolutions, it is of interest to note that only a small
number of combatants started wars that were to last years,
take hundreds of thousands of lives, disrupt the lives of
millions, and humiliate the ancien regimes.

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The French Minister of the Interior (and, therefore, responsible for Algeria) was François Mitterrand, and in June 1954 he felt armed conflict brewing: "I sense something...the situation [in Algeria] is unhealthy"[34]. And then, on 1 November 1954, the war of independence broke out -- in the Aurès, Kabylia, Algiers, Blida, and Oran. No more than 500 men took part, the 300 men in the Aurès being armed with only about 50 shotguns[35].

Characterised by lack of discipline, most of the planned attacks aborted. However, telephone poles were felled, communications cut, property of land barons set alight, the Algiers gasworks attacked, and firearms seized in attacks on military barracks[36].

The FLN announced in a radio message (broadcasted by Cairo Radio) that "a true revolutionary struggle at the side of the Moroccan and Tunisian brothers" had started, having as its goal "national independence...by every means until the realisation of our goal"[37]. The first winter of the war of independence was difficult for the FLN: in Kabylia the FLN fighters were held up in the icy mountains and the local population -- with little food for itself -- was not too willing to aid the fighters[38]. In the Aurès, which Ben Bella envisaged as Algeria's "principal revolutionary stronghold"[39], the situation was even worse, with several of the leaders killed or imprisoned. In Algiers, the movement was broken up within ten days after the attacks on 1 November, and the leaders were imprisoned[40].

"At that time [1954] the idea that the petty brigand attacks in the Aures meant the beginning of a national movement which would lead France to the brink of civil war and force it to decide to abandon its substantial European colonial population in Algeria, would have seemed extravagantly far-fetched"[41].

The armed struggle in Mozambique started on 25 September 1964 with even fewer fighters than in Algeria. Three groups of insurgents -- 24 in total -- attacked administrative posts and small military targets in Cabo Delgado with little success[42]. One of the groups was led by Joaquim Chipanda, a former schoolteacher who was to become minister of defense in the independent Mozambique[43].

The start of the war of independence in Angola is more difficult to determine. What is known is that in 1961 two violent confrontations between members of the local population and the regime took place. On 4 February 1961 the Luanda prison was attacked by a group of MPLA supporters to free political prisoners; the attack failed, and more than 3 000 Africans were killed in reprisal[44].

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Between 14 and 16 March another uprising took place in
northern Angola, when about 60 000 Bakongo rebels took part in
the brutal murder of more than a hundred Portuguese and about
6 000 Ovimbundu coffee workers[45]. "It was the [single] biggest
slaughter of Europeans which has taken place in Africa this
century"[46]. Portuguese repression was brutal: more than 60 000
Africans died, and 100 000 fled to the Congo[47]. Chilcote[48]
claims 20 000 Angolan deaths.

"The initial outbreak at Primavera appears to have been
spontaneous", but Roberto's UPA (fore-runner of the FNLA)
claimed responsibility for the uprising[49].

In December of 1961, these uprisings turned into wars of
independence, with UPA fighters being trained in Algeria, and
the MPLA declaring that it, too, was ready for an offensive[50].

The small scale of the clashes between the guerrillas and the
government troops should come as no surprise. Particularly in
the early stages of the conflict, "guerrilla warfare is above
all an endurance test of forced marches in difficult terrain
rather than a series of military engagements, which in fact
should be avoided rather than sought"[51].

9.3.2. Effectiveness of the revolutionary movement

9.3.2.1. Strategies

Mao argues that revolutionary success is practically ensured
if a two-pronged strategy is employed. Firstly, violence is
needed to wear the enemy down[52]. Secondly, violence should not
be used against the members of the population who support the
cause of the revolutionary movement. Rather, the peasants in
the rural areas must be educated and aided by the example set
by the cadres[53]. For Mao, guerrilla warfare combines carefully
planned military operations with efforts to gain the support
of the population.

All the revolutionary movements in Africa tried to employ the
Maoist approach to guerrilla warfare, as opposed to the
approach favoured by Guevara and Debray.

As called for in Mao's doctrine, the guerrilla fighters did
not achieve big military victories -- but the government
troops could not destroy the guerrillas. Crane Brinton[54]
states that in the first phase of revolution the government
meets the illegal acts of the revolutionaries with military or
political force, "but in each case with a striking lack of
success". The rulers were unable to make "adequate use of
force"[55]. This was true in some of the African revolutions as
well, particularly in Algeria and Guinea-Bissau.

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Throughout 1955 the Algerian insurrection spread, with the fighters better organised and equipped, and the country divided into six wilayas, whereby the FLN took on the colonial structure as a whole[56]. On 1 April 1955 governor-general Soustelle declared a state of emergency.

The scene was now set for a long period of repression, but the French encountered serious initial problems. Firstly, apart from the police force, the French had only 3 500 fighting troops, the rest of the 57 000 troops being either garrison troops, or units in transit[57]. The fighting units were not trained in counter-insurgency warfare, and were inadequately equipped. They resorted to the clumsy rattisage, literally "raking over"[58], in which large areas of the countryside would be patrolled in the hope of finding guerrilla fighters, while villages were occasionally bombarded, and Algerians indiscriminately arrested, leading to an increase in the number of people who joined the FLN[59].

The Algerian war of independence was primarily characterised by its brutality. The FLN employed revolutionary terror against both the colons and the Muslims and the French army applied the principle of collective responsibility (punishing the group for the crimes of individuals) ruthlessly, and used torture extensively[60]. This had only one effect, as Soustelle's advisor, Germaine Tillion stated: "the cycle of repression getting even tougher, and the rebellion ever stronger"[61].

Two years after the outbreak of the insurrection, the French had more than 200 000 troops combatting the 8 500 FLN fighters, plus 21 000 auxiliaries[62]. During 1956 and 1957 the war further increased in intensity and brutality, with the FLN reaching its military high point in early 1957[63]. From September 1957, with the completion of the Morice Line, the nationalist rural guerrilla war started to wane. The Morice Line, a 200 mile long system of electric fences and minefields along the Tunisian border guarded by 80 000 troops, proved very difficult for FLN fighters (from base camps in Tunisa) to breach. Amirouche, a senior FLN leader, tried to lead 1 200 men across the line in 1958 -- only ten got through[64].

The FLN was to end the war with the vast majority of its fighters holed up in Tunisian camps and a small number of fighters being pursued relentlessly by the about 450 000 French troops in Algeria[65].

In Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC's armed struggle was perhaps the most successful of all the revolutionary movements. The war of independence increased in intensity throughout 1962, and on 18

July 1963 the Portuguese defense minister, general Manuel
Gomes de Araujo, admitted that "well-armed groups...have
infiltrated our Guiné territory over about fifteen per cent of
its surface"[66].

New York Times correspondent Lloyd Garrison[67] describes how
the PAIGC had pinned the Portuguese forces down in their
fortified towns. Catio, which he visited in August 1963 "was a
prison in which the Portuguese had sought shelter...No one
moves outside the town during the day without a weapon. After
dark the barbed wire gates are closed and floodlights
illuminate the hostile jungle...soldiers based in Catio live
in continual tension."

As the revolutionary movements succeeded in keeping the
regime under pressure with their armed struggle, they began to
gain more support from the local population.

In revolutions, the war of independence is "a war in which
the civil population is both the prize that is at stake and
the plaything of the opposing forces, a war without a front
line or without frontiers, a war in which the enemy is
everywhere and nowhere, in which neutrality, or the adoption
of a wait-and-see policy or a policy of indifference, are
practically impossible, in which the army charged with
repressing the revolt finds itself besieged and surrounded and
inevitably distressed by the collective conspiracy with which
it is confronted"[68].

A revolutionary movement is usually very successful in
mobilising support, because it is "...an armed and disciplined
organisation to recruit revolutionaries, keep alive their
fervour and commitment, engage in military operations whose
eventual aim is the seizure and consolidation of political
power"[69].

The capture of local support gives the revolutionary movement
two distinct advantages: firstly, the "kinship network that is
consequently made available to the movement: each peasant
guerrilla operating in his own village or province can take
advantage of acquaintances as well as relatives for the
purposes of refuge, recruitment, and information"[70].

Debray[71] stressed the "importance of raising the political
consciousness of peasants by ensuring their daily contact with
the guerrillas, who must share the peasants' living
conditions, work by their side, and help them with the
concrete tasks that improve the material circumstances of
peasant life".

Debray and Guevara[72] argued that the actions of the

guerrillas will create an "insurrectional focus (foco)" in
which the inspired population will rise up against the
government. However, armed struggle alone cannot inspire
people to rise against a regime, and in October 1967 in
Bolivia Guevara -- who believed "that all that is needed for a
peasant-based revolution is the presence of armed men
preaching liberation from oppression" -- was killed because
the oppressed did not take to his message[73]. In the African
revolutions all the movements tended to follow Mao's strategy
instead of Guevara's -- the painstaking building of popular
support for the movement was a central element of their
strategy.

It is important to remember that a large number of the local
population did not join the revolutionary movement and that
some fought for the rulers. Dunn[74] states that more Algerians
were voluntarily fighting for the French than for the FLN.
About 142 000 members of the Portuguese armed forces of 179
000 were deployed in the Lusophone territories: "but the
interesting point is that by 1971 well over 40 per cent of the
force was black...this is increasingly a war of African
against African"[75].

9.3.2.1. Liberated areas

The clearest indication of success in a guerrilla war is the
establishment of a liberated area, which is a "geographic base
necessary for extending...military and political operations"
by the revolutionary movement[76]. This base, or liberated zone,
should be in rugged terrain that impedes the government
troops; it should be close to a friendly country for
sanctuary; it should provide the guerrillas with economic
self-sufficiency, and the opportunity to demonstrate their new
system to the friendly locals, thus winning even more
support[77].

The PAIGC's control over the country increased during 1963,
and in January 1964 it defeated the Portuguese in a struggle
that closely resembled conventional warfare. More than 3 000
Portuguese soldiers tried to take the strategic island Como,
but had to withdraw after 75 days of fighting[78]. According to
Cabral, this "was the worst defeat for the Portuguese in their
record of colonialism. We calculated the enemy's losses at
about 650 men"[79].
In February 1964, the PAIGC held a congress in Guinea-Bissau,
at Cassaca. Thereafter, the intensity of the war of
independence increased further, so that by July 1965 the
movement claimed control over about 40 percent of the

country[80].

The PAIGC's war effort was acknowledged by the official Lisbon newspaper, Diário de Notícias in early 1966: "The enemy whom the Portuguese must destroy is a worthy adversary. Its commanders are well-trained in guerrilla warfare...and well-armed...They have shown clear signs of intelligence and a sense of initiative; unless our troops compel them, they never attack forces larger than their own, and they use to the best advantage a difficult terrain which they know like the back of their hands"[81].

In Mozambique, reporter Lord Kilbracken[82] found that close to lake Nyasa and up to forty miles from the borders of Tanzania and Malawi, "in three thousand terrorised square miles the Portuguese, both civil and military, are confined to five small garrisons...Not one white settler dares stay in the area...The Frelimo are a though and elusive enemy ..at home in the jungle and bush, where they live off the country, striking silently by night, withdrawing swiftly into the dense cover if the Portuguese reply in strength."

9.4. A terror campaign

Terror was first used in the service of a secular ideology in the French Revolution; since then, it has remained a very potent -- and gruesome -- weapon in the hands of revolutionaries.

9.4.1. A rationale for the use of terror

Hutchinson[83] identifies four essential components of terror that can be used in defining the phenomenon: terror is the systematic and purposeful application of "extraordinary and intolerable violence", which is characterised by the symbolic selection of targets, having a profound psychological effect on the population.

This is echoed by Thornton[84], who identifies four of the five objectives of terror as being psychological in nature. Apart from the elimination of opposition forces -- its physical nature -- terror is intended to strengthen the revolutionary movement's morale; to advertise the revolutionary movement; to destroy the authority figures and thus destabilise communities; and to psychologically isolate people who fear the actions of both incumbent and challenger[85].

However, terror does not only have psychological effects. It can change the political order of a country in the short term. Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighela[86] describes this

phenomenon when he highlights the paradoxical technique of terrorising the population, in order to evoke indiscriminate repression by the regime. This repression then induces the population -- the target of terror attacks -- to join the very movement that perpetrated these acts.

"It is necessary to turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation [...] thus making the life of its citizens harder than ever; homes will be broken into, police searches organised, innocent people arrested and communications broken; police terror will become the order of the day, and there will be more and more political murders -- in short a massive political persecution. The population will refuse to collaborate with the authorities, so that the latter will find the only solution to their problems lies in having recourse to the actual physical liquidation of their opponents. The political situation of the country will become a military situation [...] That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things."[87].

9.4.2. Terror against the ruling group

In the African revolutions, the use of terror against the ruling group varied. It was an important strategy for the FLN in Algeria, whilst Amílcar Cabral[88] of the PAIGC was as a point of principle against the use of terror, and stated in 1969: "[W]e want to have a political resistance that will serve our people. We do not want a bloodthirsty people, shedding blood for the sake of it." The use of terror in Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe varied between these extremes.

Frelimo restrained its actions against Portuguese civilians, and about 150 were killed from the start of the war in 1964 until the coup of 1974 -- an average of fifteen civilians per year[89]. This low casualty figure can be ascribed to the following: Frelimo was wary of charges of "black racism" and fighting a racial war; most whites stayed in towns, where little activity occurred; white farmers left their homestead when they felt it became unsafe, and migrated to the towns; and, if they stayed, reached some sort of compromise with the insurgents[90]. Only after the fall of Caetano did violence against settlers increase, and this led to the white so which by May 1975 had reached 1 000 per week[91].

In the Zimbabwean revolution, the two revolutionary movements

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made extensive use of terror against the ruling group, and far
more whites were attacked than in Mozambique[92]. This can be
ascribed to the fact that the whites in Rhodesia lived
throughout the country, and were not concentrated in the
towns[93]. Furthermore, Zanu and Zapu fought against a regime
that did not represent a colonial power thousands of
kilometers away -- the "guerrillas' main enemy dwelled right
at their doorstep"[94].

However, from the start of the war in 1966 until December
1972 only two deadly assaults on white families occurred[95]. In
December 1972 Rex Nhongo, who was later to become head of
Zapu's military wing, Zanla, ordered an attack on the Altena
farm in the Centenary district. Thereafter, terror attacks on
white farms became frequent. Moorcraft[96] estimates that 294
white civilians died in terror attacks during the war of
independence.

Missionaries -- who were soft targets -- were often singled
out for attack, as was the case with the killing of seven
missionaries at Msumai[97]. The revolutionary movements also
tried their hand at urban terror, killing eleven people when a
bomb exploded in a department store in the capital[98] and
blowing up an oil dump in Salisbury on 11 December 1978[99].

The best example of terror against the ruling group was the
shooting down of two Viscount passenger airplanes. On 3
September 1978 guerrillas from Zapu's military wing shot down
a Viscount with a Sam-7 missile. Eighteen of the 53 passengers
survived the crash, but were then attacked by the guerrillas,
who killed ten[100]. Less than six months later, the guerrillas
shot down another Viscount in the same area and all 59 people
on board were killed[101]. The psychological effect on the
ruling group was evident: "A feeling of sullen, resigned anger
pervaded the white community"[102].

Despite this spectacular Zimbabwean example of terror against
the ruling group, "Algeria was a classic case of revolutionary
nationalist terrorism against a colonial power"[103].

The use of terror was advocated by the FLN in no uncertain
terms, with ideologue Frantz Fanon claiming that the violence
against the oppressor that goes with terror will have a
therapeutic effect on the population.

"Violence alone, violence committed by the people,
violence educated and organised by its leaders makes it
possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives
the key to them...at the level of individuals violence is a
cleansing force...[it] frees the native from his inferiority
complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him
fearless and restores his self respect"[104].

One of the best examples of terror against the French

occurred on 20 August 1955 when an FLN planned attack on
Philippeville left 123 people dead, 71 of them European
civilians, including babies who were clubbed to death[105].

The French reprisal out-matched the brutality of the FLN
attacks, with casualty figures ranging between 1 273 (French
figure) to 1 000 (FLN figure)[106]. The French applied their
policy of collective responsibility. If one inhabitant of a
village was found to be involved with the FLN, all the members
of the village were punished and sent to a protected camp[107].
In other cases, Arabs were indiscriminately mowed down with
machine guns, or taken prisoner and then shot in a manner
reminiscent of Nazi atrocities. "At six o'clock next morning,
all the l.m.g.s. [light machine-guns] and machine-guns were
lined up in front of the crowd of prisoners, who immediately
began to yell. But we opened fire; ten minutes later, it was
practically over. There were so many of them that they had to
be buried with bulldozers," was how a soldier recounted the
repression[108].
    This led to a large number of people joining the FLN, and
recruitment picked up sharply -- by October 1955 Wilaya II had
1 400 regular fighting men, the highest of any wilaya[109].
    Algeria was now in a position of no return, for between the
French and the Muslims "there had been well and truly dug an
abyss through which flowed a river of blood"[110].

    The FLN further decided to take terror to the big cities,
particularly Algiers. The espousal of terrorism at the Soummam
conference, attended by the majority of the revolutionary
leaders, paved the way for an urban bombing campaign[111].
    The campaign started on 30 September 1956, when two bombs
(planted by beautiful young Muslim girls) exploded in popular
cafés, killing three and injuring fifty, mostly teenagers[112].
This was followed by the assassination of a pied noir mayor,
and on 7 January 1957 the authorities handed over control of
the city to general Massu. The military had to restore order,
and Massu's parachute division set about this task
ferociously: a general strike that was planned to last for
eight days (coinciding with the UN debate on Algeria on 28
January 1957) was broken within 48 hours by heavy handed
methods that included the firing of a tank shell into a closed
shop[113]. The bombing campaign continued: two days before the
strike, three cafes were bombed, killing five and wounding
sixty, and fifteen days later ten people died when two sport
stadiums were bombed, the devices again placed by young
girls[114].

    On 25 February Massu's paras captured Ben M'Hidi, political

leader of the FLN in Algiers. With their organisation in
tatters, the remaining FLN members planted a number of bombs
in June, killing nine in one explosion[115]. On 24 September
1957, almost a year after the first explosion had started the
Battle of Algiers, Saadi Yacef, leader of the bombers, was
caught in the Algiers Casbah[116]. The battle was over, and
(militarily, at least) a victory for the French.

The Battle of Algiers was a lesson for the FLN to restrict
its armed activities to the country-side, or accept that its
fighters in the city are "terrorists" rather than
"guerrillas"[117].
Greene[118] gives the following reasons for this analysis: the
mobility of the revolutionaries being extremely limited, it is
impossible for them to concentrate and move in groups of armed
men; furthermore, they have no opportunity to establish a
fixed base and liberated zone for revolutionary operations and
government -- at the most they can strike terror into the
hearts of the population. The Battle of Algiers "demonstrated
how completely a well-trained and ruthless military force
could contain urban violence in a way which was impossible in
the countryside"[119].
The French repression of the insurrection in Algeria's cities
-- especially during the Battle of Algiers -- induced some 4
000 FLN militants to head for the country-side, while the
leadership went abroad, notably to Tunis[120].

9.4.3. The use of terror against the local population

Hannah Arendt[121] argues that "only the two-edged compulsion of
ideology and terror, one compelling men from within and the
other compelling them from without, can fully explain the
meekness with which revolutionists in all countries...have
gone to their doom". The importance of ideology was discussed
in Part Three. The use of terror against the local populations
was to assure, ironically, their support for the movement that
acted against them. This was done by killing local leaders, as
well as by indiscriminate terror against the population.

In Algeria, amid the wild killings at Philippeville, one
murder was carefully planned and executed. The nephew of the
liberal leader Ferhat Abbas, who had criticised the FLN, was
murdered, sending a clear signal to all moderate politicians
to either join the movement, or die[122]. This was to become a
strategy of the FLN, as embodied in a directive sent by Ben
Bella in 1955, after Philippeville: "Liquidate all
personalities who want to play the role of interlocuteur
valable [mediator]"[123]. In January the following year, Abbas

joined the FLN and was elected as member of the movement's governing body in August 1956[124]. Thus, in the words of Ben Bella: "The 'moderate nationalists' so dear to Soustelle thereupon [after the terror at Philippeville] reached the desired conclusions"[125].

FLN terror was not only directed at the leaders, but also at any Algerian who collaborated with the French. Thus, a further order of the revolutionary movement read: "Kill the caids [local officials]...Take their children and kill them. Kill all those who pay taxes"[126].

The extent of these terror killings was such that during the first two and a half years of the Algerian war, 6 352 Muslims were killed in attacks on civilians, as opposed to the 1 035 Europeans[127]. The casualty figures from terror attacks remained extremely high throughout the war. After suffering heavy losses against the forces of general Challe in 1958, the FLN launched a new wave of terror attacks in 1959, with 184 civilians killed in incidents in January of that year, and 143 in December[128].

The Kabyle smile, as the French soldiers referred to the terror victims with their throats slit, became commonplace in one of the most cruel wars ever fought[129].

The terror had the effect of psychologically isolating members of the population. This is illustrated by a quote from the diary of Mouloud Ferraoun, a Kabyle schoolteacher who was to become a victim of (pied noir) terrorism in 1962: "Nobody is sure of anything, it is truly terror. Terror of the soldiers, terror of the outlaw. Terror which rules mysterious and inexplicable"[130].

Governor-general Soustelle[131] realised this as well: "Terror had taken hold. No one spoke. The population as a whole, without throwing in its lot with the rebels...remained frightened and non-committal."

In Mozambique, terror was also employed by Frelimo, although not of the same intensity as the FLN's terror campaign in Algeria. "Frelimo selectively assassinated and abducted to complement its mobilisation"[132]. From the start of the war in 1964 until mid-1973, nine hundred traditional leaders were murdered[133].

However, Frelimo did not only operate against colonial leadership figures, but against the local population as well. Portuguese spokesmen claimed that for every soldier killed by the guerrillas, one hundred civilians died at Frelimo's hands, which led to the psychological isolation of large numbers of villagers[134]. These actions against the civilian population

were not always aimed at gaining support for Frelimo, but
sometimes at cutting off support for the colonial
authority[135]. For example, by shelling aldeamentos (protected
villages), Frelimo hoped to prove to the villagers that the
Portuguese could not guarantee their safety, and therefore did
not deserve the support of the civilian population. In
Mozambique, "[t]he aldeamentos provided health, social and
educational facilities which had been lacking before"[136].

Henriksen[137], quoting official Portuguese figures, states
that from 1964 to 1973 the guerrillas killed 689 civilians,
wounded 1 625, and abducted 6 500. An example was the attack
on Nhacambo village, in which seventeen civilians died.
Portugal accused Frelimo of the attack, but the revolutionary
movement denied the charges.

The use of terror in Mozambique increased with Frelimo's
campaign to "Bust Cabora Bassa", because the movement did not
enjoy solid support in the surrounding part of Mozambique[138].
By provoking Portuguese retaliation with acts of terror, the
civilian population became the object of collective Portuguese
repression, and eventually the local population supported
Frelimo[139].

9.5. Conclusion

Three central elements can be identified in the armed struggle
between African revolutionary movements and the ancien
regimes: the length of the phase characterised by rural
guerrilla warfare, the strategy which the movements used, and
the role of terror in the armed struggle.

It was seen in this chapter that the conflict between the
revolutionary movement and the old regime took the form of
lengthy wars of independence. Bringing the old regime to a
fall took 8 years in Algeria; 13 years in Mozambique; 18 years
in Guinea-Bissau; 13 years in Angola; and 13 years in
Rhodesia[140]. On a global scale, only the revolutions in China
(22 years), South Vietnam (21 years), and Malaya (12 years)
can compare with the African revolutions studied here as far
as duration is concerned[141].

The initial low level of violence at the start of guerrilla
wars led to a fatal under-estimation by the governments of the
revolutionaries' power. They did not feel compelled to
negotiate with the revolutionaries. French Interior Minister
Francois Mitterrand (who was responsible for Algeria) said at
the outbreak of the war of independence: "The only possible
negotiation is war"[142].

The humble start of the armed struggle formed part of the

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strategy followed by the revolutionary movements. They applied
Mao's rules of guerrilla warfare, and took on the opposition
only if they had a good chance of a victory. The guerrillas
cultivated support amongst the peasants, and were eventually
able to establish "liberated areas" in outlying areas of
Mozambique. Large areas of Guinea-Bissau were under guerrilla
control. In these areas, the guerrillas acted as the de facto
government, and concentrated on politicising the inhabitants
of these areas.

 Any armed struggle frightens the civilians population.
However, in the African revolutions terror was used as a
calculated tactic to force the local population to support the
revolutionary movement. In Algeria, this tactic led to extreme
brutality, not only from the guerrillas, but also from
government troops in their attempts to prevent terror attacks.
The government violence not only drew people to the
revolutionary movement, but also played an important role in
internationalising the African revolutions -- an aspect which
is examined in the following chapter.

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Chapter Ten
The role of international support in a revolution

10.1. Introduction

When a revolution occurs, it is not only the local population
that tends to side with either the incumbents or the
revolutionaries. In an era of instant communications,
revolutions in distant continents become events played out in
the living rooms of people all over the world. Not only do
people take an interest in the revolutionary process, but
organisations, governments, and international bodies pursue
definite policies with regard to support of the
revolutionaries. Governments often see a potential ally in a
movement, or an actual ally in the regime, and decide to come
to assistance. This may lead to an increase in violence, and
if both parties are supported by foreign governments, they may
be less inclined to reach a compromise[1].

  Thus, decisions made in New York, Washington, or Moscow can
affect the revolutionary process more profoundly than several
battles in the bush.

  Furthermore, the groundwork for external support is already
laid with the existence of forums such as the General Assembly
of the United Nations, and -- more importantly -- the
(nowadays blurred) division of the world into ideological
camps. In fact, "the external environment influences by simply
existing"[2].

  Mao Zedong stated in 1935 that "[i]nternational support is
necessary for the revolutionary struggle today in any country
or nation"[3]. Mao's statement is echoed by Greene[4], as well as
Leiden & Schmitt[5], when they identify external support as a
determining factor in the revolutionary process.

  External support as a determining factor becomes more
important when the struggle is drawn out in time, highly
ideologised and has mobilised large numbers of people[6]. As was
shown earlier, African revolutions were long, ideologised
affairs, and it is therefore not surprising that external
support played an important role.

  External support can take many forms. Some countries may aid
the revolutionaries, others the regime, while events in other
countries may have inspired the revolutionary movement in the
first place. Varying degrees of support are found: non-lethal
moral support and humanitarian aid on the one end, and direct

military assistance on the other[7].

In this chapter, external support will be divided into two sections: non-military support, and support for a military struggle. These categories are not mutually exclusive -- for example, a country that supported a movement on the diplomatic scene may also have provided military support, but the categories will at least provide some distinction between different types of external support. Although the focus will be on external support for the revolutionary movements, international support for the _ancien regimes_ will be looked at as well.

Note must be taken of the fact that the support analysed here was given during the war of independence. Military and non-military aid after independence has as its aim the transformation of society, and will therefore be discussed in Chapters Twelve and Thirteen.

10.2. Non-military support

Non-military support for the revolutionary movement serves several purposes, one of the most important being the lowering of the legitimacy of the _ancien regime_ and promoting that of the revolutionary movement. It will be examined on two levels: state level, with special attention being given to the role of the United Nations and member countries of this global forum; and, secondly, non-state level, which includes the actions of non-governmental bodies, such as churches, institutions, and various groups.

10.2.1. Non-military support on state level

Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, the former Syracuse university lecturer and leader of Frelimo, soon realised that the "international campaign for recognition and aid was an extension of the internal conflict"[8]. Thus, Frelimo went to great lengths to publicise itself: tracts and bulletins were distributed, journalists were taken into "liberated areas", prisoners exchanged through the International Red Cross, foreign states were visited and their leaders lobbied, and appeals were made through the United Nations for the end of Portuguese colonialism[9].

The UN, particularly its General Assembly dominated by the Non-Aligned countries, served as an international forum from which the colonial regimes were criticised. The UN (where Mondlane had worked as a researcher) acknowledged Frelimo as the sole representative of the Mozambican people, granted the revolutionary movement observer status, supported the justness

of its armed struggle, and condemned Portuguese colonialism[10].
 Recognition by the world community is of extreme importance
to the revolutionary movement, not only during the conflict
with the ancien regime, but also after it seizes power.
According to "the requirements of international law...every
unusual change in governmental arrangements, be it caused by a
coup, revolt, or revolution, must be recognized by other
members of the international community"[11]. This is of such
importance that "the lack of recognition spelled the
extinction of Moise Tshombe's independent Katanga in 1963"[12].

 Recognition of a movement and the justness of its actions,
furthermore strengthen the moral and legal standing of the
movement and serve as a basis for increased material support.
For example, Henriksen[13] argues that the depiction of Portugal
as a colonial country, ruled by fascists, policed by a
Gestapo-like secret police (PIDE) and a SS-like para-military
organisation (Legiao Portuguesa) was instrumental in lessening
governments' support for Portugal, particularly in
Scandinavia. For example, in 1972 Sweden allocated $150 000 to
the Mozambique Institute (an educational centre), and in the
following two years gave $3 million to Frelimo, the MPLA and
PAIGC for "civilian activities"[14]. In 1973 Norway and Denmark
allocated $2 million and $1,3 million respectively for
"victims of apartheid and colonialism"[15].

 Frelimo did not only receive support in the UN, but also from
the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation for African
Unity. For example, the African Liberation Committee (a
subcommittee of the OAU founded in 1963) has as its aim the
destruction of the colonial regimes, as well as white rule in
South Africa[16]. This group not only supports the movements by
non-military means, but provides the movements with sanctuary
and hardware as well.
 The rise of the Non-Aligned Movement played a further role in
the shaping of international opinion. The FLN in Algeria can
be said to have grown with the NAM, and "with the rise in the
diplomatic status and organisational effectiveness of the non-
aligned powers, it was to improve still further"[17].

 For a long time, the official French view was that the FLN is
the product of outside forces, particularly Egypt. Jacques
Soustelle, French governor-general in Algeria during the most
violent years of the war of independence, believed this until
his death in 1990. "Don't forget that the FLN...was
practically created by Nasser"[18].
 In September 1957, the FLN scored a major breakthrough in
the battle for international recognition when senator John F.

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Kennedy came out strongly in favour of Algerian independence. The American policy of aiding France in its war against the Muslims, said the man who was to lead the US into the Vietnam quagmire, was "a retreat from the principles of independence and anticolonialism"[19]. Following this speech, America was to change its stance in the Security Council, abstaining instead of supporting her Nato ally.

Occurrences like this were, according to governor-general Soustelle, "worth more than a convoy of arms" to the FLN[20].

This support by governments and international organisations led to a diminishing of support, both military and non-military, for the ancien regimes, and left them with little moral standing in the international community. France, and particularly Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa found themselves very alone in the world.

10.2.2. Non-military support on non-state level

The revolutionary movements did not only receive support from governments and the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, but also from smaller organisations and churches.

Frelimo, for example, was aided by a large number of organisations. These ranged from the American Ford foundation, which until 1965 supplied Frelimo with $100 000 for educational projects, to Finnish students who supplied a printing press[21].

Apart from the UN, various churches served as sources of non-military external support. Contrary to the actions of Zimbabwean guerrillas, who conducted attacks on missionaries, Frelimo cultivated the support of the churches[22]. This paid off in a number of ways: the missionaries aided wounded guerrillas; they exposed malpractices of the Portuguese armed forces, such as the Wiriyamu massacre; and they introduced the revolutionary leaders to their church groups in Europe or America. The most spectacular pay-off came in June 1970, when Pope Paul VI accorded an audience to Marcelino dos Santos of Frelimo, as well as the leaders of the MPLA and PAIGC[23]. In reaction, Portugal recalled its envoy from the Vatican.

10.3. Military support during the revolution

All the revolutionary movements in Africa started their armed struggle with very few weapons, and virtually no external military support. However, as the movements started to prove themselves on the battlefield and the diplomatic scene,

support increased, sometimes rapidly. In this section,
military support will be examined by looking at two aspects:
military training and arms supplies; and the use of
sanctuaries by the revolutionary movement. (The Cuban support
of the MPLA -- which characterised Angola after independence
-- will be analysed in Chapter Twelve, because this external
support was more instrumental in aiding the MPLA in the civil
war, and aiding the movement in its attempt to transform the
political and socio-economic orders.)

10.3.1: The supply of arms and training to the movements

After the outbreak of violence in Algeria, the international
community was slow to supply the FLN with arms and training.
Senior FLN leader Rabah Bitat claims that the movement did not
receive such support until 1956 -- nearly two years after the
first shots were fired[24].

Mozambique received a limited supply of weapons from Arab
countries such as Egypt, and particularly Algeria. Algeria
"assumed the international status of a revolutionary mecca"
under Ben Bella, and trained about 250 Frelimo members --
including Samora Machel -- at Tlemcen in 1963[25]. It is
interesting to note that Nelson Mandela confirmed during his
visit to Algeria in May 1990 that he too received guerrilla
training from the FLN -- and that the experience in 1961 had
made him a man[26].

Soviet support for Frelimo in Mozambique apparently preceded
Chinese support: in 1977 (at the signing of a twenty year
Cooperation and Friendship Treaty) president Machel stated
that the USSR had supported "Frelimo from the very beginning
of its existence"[27]. The same is true for the MPLA in Angola,
which had received Soviet support from its formation in
1956[28].
Standard weapons used in African guerrilla wars were Soviet
or Chinese-made AK47 or AK50 assault rifles; the Soviet RPD
light machine gun; heavier anti-aircraft machine guns; 82mm
mortars; Soviet and Chinese 122mm rockets (used after 1972 in
Mozambique); the RPG2 and RPG7 rockets; and some SAM7 anti-
aircraft missiles[29].

The training of PAIGC guerrillas took place in the USSR,
China, Cuba, Algeria, Senegal, Ghana under Nkrumah, and
particularly Guinea, where the Kindia training camp was first
staffed by Soviets, who were replaced in 1965 by Algerians[30].
The training of Frelimo guerrillas was to a large extent
carried out by the Soviets and Chinese. There were about one

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hundred Chinese instructors in the sanctuary camps in southern
Tanzania, who gave basic instructions in the handling of small
arms and explosives, while advanced training was offered at
the Nanking Military College, at Harbin, and other centres in
north-east China[31].

This aid had an important influence on the movements,
particularly in regard to the crystallisation of its political
program, and as a result the movements moved steadily to the
left of the political spectrum. "[T]he most compelling
exposure to Marxist programs arose in the course of the
desperate midnight of war when Soviet and Chinese advice and
literature offered a direction and solution to waging rural-
based revolution in an uneven transitional society. The
culmination of this evolutionary path crystallised after
decolonisation at the Third Congress in February 1977 when
Frelimo redefined itself as a 'Marxist-Leninist vanguard
party'"[32]. This does not imply that, had Frelimo received
extensive Western support, the movement would not have changed
its political program. In communist doctrines the movement
found a blueprint for gaining power and the fundamental
alteration of society, while the West could offer no drastic
remedy for the problems of colonialism and underdevelopment[33].

Mozambique, unlike Angola, received very little external
support from Cuba. This can be ascribed to the clash between
Frelimo officials and Che Guevara during the latter's visit in
1965 to Frelimo headquarters. Guevara favoured the Latin-
American foco model, in which armed guerrilla bands are
considered to be the most important tool in the revolution.
Frelimo, on the other hand, favoured an approach based on mass
mobilisation of the population[34].

Mozambique was the only country of the three Lusophone states
that received constant support from both the communist
superpowers over a long period of time. Frelimo did not side
openly with either the Soviet Union or Red China during the
war of independence, and accepted aid from both. China
provided not only instructors, but a revolutionary doctrine
and strategy based on the power of a peasant-based protracted
guerrilla war as well. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
allowed Frelimo to use its African embassies as communication
channels, and most importantly, supplied most of Frelimo's
arms[35]. "Although there can be no firm estimate of the amount
of communist patronage, this much is certain: the assistance
was crucial"[36].

Portugal and France cited this aid as an example of communist

control over revolutionary organisations. However, as Marshall Philippe Leclerc -- the French commander in Indo-China -- stated, "[a]nti-communism will remain a useless tool in the hands of the West until the problem of nationalism is resolved"[37]. Furthermore, although the revolutionary movements subscribed to a left-leaning ideology and non-alignment, once independent they did not become communist colonies, as will be pointed out in Part Five.

10.3.2. The importance of sanctuaries

Apart from weapons and training, the availability of sanctuaries is the greatest external factor in a guerrilla war. Amilcar Cabral realised this. When Guinea-Bissau's neighbour, the Republic of Guinée, became independent (and could, therefore, provide sanctuary to the PAIGC), Amílcar Cabral said to his wife: "That's it! Now I have my country!"[38].

Sanctuaries in neighbouring countries provide a revolutionary movement with the opportunity to rest and replenish its fighters, train new recruits and establish a safe base from which to conduct its campaign.

The fact that the FLN enjoyed the support of states contiguous to Algeria was one of its trump cards. Tunisia and Morocco became sanctuaries for thousands of fighters[39]. France did not attempt regular cross-border raids. When it did attack, for example when the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef was bombed, it was internationally condemned for the killing of civilians[40].

The sanctuaries were of extreme importance to the FLN. "(B)ut for the aid and protection afforded it by Tunisia and Morocco, the rebellion would have been circumscribed and perhaps crushed before the end of 1957....it is singularly difficult to destroy an enemy enjoying the sanctuary of an inviolable frontier"[41].

The same can be said of all the other African wars of independence.

At the investiture of the transition government in Mozambique on 20 September 1974, Samora Machel thanked Tanzania and Zambia for their "role of strategic rear...(which) therefore made our victory possible"[42]. Guerrillas were trained at the camp at Nachigwea in Tanzania, while Dar es Salaam was the political and diplomatic center of the movement, and the site of the Mozambique Institute, while Mtwara was the port through which aid for Frelimo entered the country[43].

Both Tanzania and Zambia allowed Frelimo the use of radio

stations to broadcast their appeals to Mozambique[44]. The PAIGC
had a radio station, Radio Libertacao, in Conakry[45].

In the case of the Zimbabwean war of independence, Zanu and
Zapu received sanctuary in Tanzania, Zambia, and particularly
Mozambique[46]. Zimbabwean guerrillas started to operate out of
Tete province from as early as 1972, when the country was
still under Portuguese rule[47]. The fact that the Shona people
of southern Mozambique shared a language and culture with the
Shonas of Zimbabwe made Mozambique the ideal sanctuary[48]. This
was the case in Angola (where the Bakongo straddled the border
with Zaire); Algeria (Arabs live in Morocco and Tunisia);
Mozambique (the Makonde also live in southern Tanzania) and in
the Namibian war of independence, where the Ovambo are to be
found in southern Angola as well.

Unlike the cross-border raids, or even sometimes the
occupation of areas of the host countries by the South
Africans and Rhodesians, the Portuguese and the French
refrained from large-scale attacks in the sanctuary-granting
states.
Portugal's view that cross-border raids would whip up the
international opinion against the country was the reason for
its more cautious attitude in dealing with sanctuary-granting
states. "Being insecure in its international position, Lisbon
hesitated and lost the military gains of preemptive raids"[49].

10.4. Support for the ancien regime

It is not only the revolutionary movement which receives
external support. The present government may also receive
military and non-military support, which brings another
dimension to this characteristic of (African) revolutions.

Greene[50] states that "where the existing government has been
unable to marshal external support in the face of a strong
revolutionary movement, the government's defeat is usually a
question only of time". This is, to a large extent, true of
all the African revolutions, but particularly of the
Zimbabwean revolution. When the country's only ally, South
Africa, forced the Smith regime to negotiate with the
revolutionary movements, it had no choice but to comply.

Foreign support for the revolutionaries will most likely lead
to support for the regime, particularly if it is a guerrilla
war characterised by high ideological intensity[51]. Africa
proved to be no exception. The reason for this was that the
fundamental transformation of society, as advocated by a

revolutionary movement, led -- in a world that was
particularly sharply divided by ideology in the 1960's, 1970's
and 1980's -- to international concern by the ideological
groups which felt their views opposed by the revolutionary
movement.

In Algeria, France was supported to varying degrees by
European countries and America, her allies in Nato. This aid
included diplomatic aid, as well as military support.

This fact was exploited by the FLN and countries which
supported its cause. The following report sent from Algeria by
Yugoslav resistance hero Zdarko Petchar in March 1959 serves
as an example: "The bombing had continued for an hour when the
first napalm bombs fell. There was a high burst of fierce
flame and the fire spread with terrifying rapidity through the
wooded hills...From all sides angry cries rang out 'America!
America!'"[52].

Between 1950 and 1960 France received 4,3 billion dollars in
military aid from the United States, which is twice as much as
any other country, yet most of France's defence spending went
to the funding of the Algerian war[53].

Portugal received support from a number of Western countries,
as well as Rhodesia and South Africa. These Western countries
supported Portugal for three reasons: its colonies had rich
resources which offered good investment possibilities; Angola
and Mozambique were strategically located along the Cape oil
sea route; and they feared that should Portuguese rule
collapse, the scope for greater communist penetration would be
extensive[54].

Furthermore, Portugal possessed the Azore and Cape Verde
Islands, on which important Nato bases were located. This
explains why, from 1949 to 1968, America provided $202 million
worth of economic aid -- $120 million in the last six years of
that period[55]. In renegotiating the Azore base agreement, the
Nixon Administration agreed to supply Portugal with $30
million, as well as the option of borrowing up to $400
million[56].

West Germany supplied a large quantity of arms, while France,
after it had left Nato, became the biggest exporter of arms to
Portugal in the 1970's[57]. The French also provided Portugal
with techniques on counter-revolutionary warfare, learned in
Indo-China and Algeria, and the Portuguese adopted a number of

these strategies, such as the use of helicopter units, élite
units and pscyho-social groups.

However, Western countries, in general, were sensitive to
African aspirations and ideals, and Portuguese colonialism was
not considered very favourably. Given the unpopularity of
Portuguese rule, military support by these countries was
limited[58].

The governments of South Africa and Rhodesia thought
otherwise on the issue of rendering military support to the
Portuguese.

They had one thing in common: a wish to retain a political
system that repulsed the international community and repressed
a large portion of its populations. If the Portuguese fell, so
the argument ran, it would lead to a domino effect, as one
revolutionary movement after another would triumph over white
minority regimes.

South Africa kept its military aid at a low profile. Military
equipment like Jeeps, radio transmitters, horses, and food
were flown into Mozambique[59]. In 1968 the country sent two to
three hundred paramilitary policemen to the southern bank of
the Zambezi river, near the site where the Cabora Bassa dam
was being constructed[60].
Already the target of a UN boycott, Rhodesia had little to
loose in its desperate fight to prevent a black government
from coming to power.

Because the Zanu guerrillas used Mozambique as a sanctuary,
Rhodesia had an agreement with Portuguese commander general
Arriaga to cross the border at will in order to pursue these
guerrillas[61]. The Rhodesian actions did not stop at operations
against Zanu. They conducted counter-insurgency operations --
against Zanu and Frelimo targets -- in the Vila Pery (Chimoio)
area, and turned "western Tete...into a Rhodesian
battleground"[62].

10.5. Conclusion

The contemporary revolutions in Africa were characterised by
large-scale international interest. The levels of support
varied from non-military support given by non-state
organisations, such as churches and committees, to the supply
of armaments and sanctuary, and even fighting on behalf of one

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of the parties in the war of independence.

Regimes that were sensitive to international opinion were more easily influenced than countries which were isolated, either morally or through economic sanctions. This is not to say that a country which does not heed international opinion will be more effective in its counter-insurgency. The example of Rhodesia illustrates this point. It was a rebel state, cut off by sanctions, and when its principal backers -- the South Africans -- withdrew their support, the Smith government was put under pressure to negotiate with Zanu and Zapu[63]. Thus, it can be proposed that the Smith government decided to negotiate because -- in the idiom of Skocpol[64] -- of a crisis in the old state which was to a certain extent brought on by external support for the revolutionary movement.

Despite the efforts of the ancien regime state to influence international opinion and cut off support for the revolutionary movements, it failed to do so.

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Chapter Eleven
The revolutionary movement becomes the new ruler

11.1. Introduction

The most dramatic aspect of any revolution is when the old
rulers are replaced by the revolutionary movement. This
usually marks the end of one phase of revolution (fighting
against the ancien regime), and the beginning of another phase
(the transformation of society).
In the African revolutions, the actual transfer of power from
the old regime to the revolutionary movement was often brief,
but the manner in which it occurred had an effect for years.
This is one of the central themes of this chapter.

The transfer of power is analysed on three levels: how did
the ancien regime lose the battle against the revolutionary
movements studied here; how power was transferred from the
government to the revolutionary movement; and the
characteristics of the state after the transfer of power.

It is shown in this chapter that the struggle between the
ancien regime and the revolutionary movements studied here was
characterised by ineffective and costly counter-insurgency
warfare by the rulers and lack of support for the old regime
-- internally and in the international community. In short, it
touches upon most of the characteristics of revolution
discussed in Chapters Three to Ten.

The actual transfer of power to the revolutionary movements
showed interesting characteristics as well. In some of the
revolutions, the transfer was virtually dictated by the
revolutionary movement, because the old regime had become --
for various reasons -- too weak to enter into real give-and-
take negotiations with the movement. In others, the movements
had to make concessions in order to become the new rulers.
This question is central to the manner in which the transfer
takes place, and is investigated in the second part of this
chapter.

In the final part of this chapter, the outcome of this
transfer of power will be investigated. How did members of the
ruling group react to the fact that they faced an uncertain

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future under a government made up of former "terrorists"? The whites' reaction varied from mass exodus and violent resistance to accommodation, and the manner of the transfer played a large role in determining this reaction.

In some of the countries serious splits developed within the revolutionary movement after it became the new ruler. This characteristic is analysed in section 11.4.2.

11.2. Characteristics of the struggle between the revolutionary movements and the ancien regime states

It was argued in Chapter Nine that the conflict between the incumbent and the revolutionary challenger is not restricted to the military sphere. Indeed, events in the diplomatic and political sphere can often eclipse victories in the bush.

11.2.1. Ineffective and costly counter-insurgency warfare

The French found it difficult to pin down the Algerian guerrillas. During the first two years of the Algerian war of independence, the guerrillas, known as the Army of National Liberation (ALN), fought from the desert and mountains, where it was difficult for the French to engage in combat[1].

In 1956, the French expanded their army and changed their tactics. It soon proved to be successful, with mobile soldiers from élite units combing the vast bled, or outback. By 1958-'59, with the Challe Plan, the battle was won by the French troops[2]. The ALN's fighters withdrew to the sanctuaries of Morocco and Tunisia. The Morice Line, a 200 mile long system of electric fences and minefields along the Tunisian border guarded by 80 000 troops, proved very difficult for FLN fighters (from base camps in Tunisia) to breach.

When the Evian peace accord was signed in 1962, only a few thousand men were still holding out, barely managing to survive[3]. However, by this time other aspects -- such as the political situation in France -- had become so prominent that they determined the course of the war.

The Portuguese had mixed fortunes. They lost the war in Guinea-Bissau, but the guerrilla wars in Angola and Mozambique

ended in a stalemate with the Portuguese neither victorious nor
defeated.

In Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC's control over the country
increased gradually. In January 1964 it defeated the Portuguese
in a conflict which can be described as conventional warfare[4].
More than 3 000 Portuguese soldiers tried to take the strategic
island Como, but had to withdraw after 75 days of fighting[5].
According to Cabral, this "was the worst defeat for the
Portuguese in their record of colonialism. We calculated the
enemy's losses at about 650 men"[6]. In 1971 the PAIGC claimed to
have control over 80 percent of the country, the capital Bissau
being the major exception[7].

Towards the end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique, the control
of the government forces had diminished to such an extent that
Zanu guerrillas were actually using bases in Tete province[8].
This angered the Rhodesians, and in October 1972 Smith held
talks with Caetano about the apparent lack of success by the
Portuguese in their counter-insurgency efforts. Caetano
dismissed Rhodesian criticism: "Some of our neighbours with
less experience do not conceal their fears and, in this way,
play the enemy's game. They have been told more than once that
there is no reason for their great fright"[9].

Al J. Venter found the Portuguese "troops reluctant to attack,
inept in the handling of weapons under fire and...often content
to sit tight and stay out of trouble"[10]. However, the
Portuguese military headquarters in Nampula and the Cabora
Bassa (now known as Cahora Bassa) dam were never under serious
attack from the guerrillas. The failure of Portuguese counter-
insurgency warfare cannot be attributed only to the individual
soldier. The military high command had no comprehensive
strategy, rivalry existed between different groups in the
military, as well as between career and conscripts officers,
and the military had a defensive mindset[11].

Counter-insurgency warfare is very expensive, because of the
large number of troops required, as well as the fact that it
encompasses projects aimed at uplifting the local population.
By 1971 Portugal was spending about 40 percent of its national
budget on its army, with 90 percent of its resources being used
for counter-insurgency warfare[12]. To give an idea of the size
of the Portuguese forces in Africa -- and the effect on an
already weak economy -- one publication states that when
compared to the size of their populations, the United States
would have had a proportionally equal force in Vietnam to the
Portuguese in Africa if American forces were increased seven

times[13].

At the height of the Algerian war, the French had 450 000
troops in the country -- outnumbering the guerrilla forces by
at least sixteen to one[14].

Rhodesia's operating budget for its counter-insurgency war
for the year 1978-'79, amounted to US$ 242 million[15]. Although
supported by South Africa, this proved to be a very heavy
burden on the economy.

Counter-insurgency warfare which failed to defeat the
guerrilla fighters is one of the characteristics of the
African revolutions studied here. The Portuguese armed forces
were inefficient and revolutionary movements were therefore
able to control large areas of the country. These "liberated
areas" were used for extensive mobilisation of the local
population, as well as for propaganda purposes.

The French and the Rhodesians were more efficient in
combatting the revolutionary fighters. In these countries the
high cost of the war did play a role in paving the way for a
victory by the challengers. However, the lack of support for
the old regime amongst its former supporters, the local
population, and the international community proved to be of
greater consequence.

11.2.2. Lack of support for the old regime

Greene[16] states that counter-insurgency warfare is ``primarily
a struggle by the government for the minds and sympathies of
the native population. It is true that massive repression can
succeed, at least temporarily, in curtailing guerrilla
activities....But the lasting success of counterinsurgency
warfare depends on inducement, not coercion. The minds and
sympathies of the people are won by convincing them that their
life is likely to be better under the existing government". In
this respect the counter-insurgency efforts of all the ancien
regimes failed, because they could not mobilise sufficient
support among the local population.

A major reason for lack of local support was the manner in
which the counter-insurgency war was fought. All the old
regimes based their strategy on the notion that the
"revolutionary fish" should be deprived of the "friendly sea"
in which it operated. To do this, the French, Portuguese and
Rhodesians adopted different systems of protected villages,
where the population would be protected from the guerrilla
fighters while at the same time offering a better social and
economic environment.

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The success of the Portuguese aldeamentos -- like the
Rhodesian protected villages or the French regroupement
centres -- depended on two factors: that the local population
should be willing to enter these places, and that the
authorities should be in a position to provide adequate
services to the inhabitants[17].

In practice, the peasants were often forcibly removed and
taken to villages far removed from their ancestral lands.
Because of the number of people concentrated in the villages,
some peasants had to walk long distances to reach their
fields. The facilities in the villages were often horrific[18].
In one Algerian regroupment centre, food was so scarce that
the inhabitants ate grass[19]. The centres often accommodated
more people than they were designed for. For example, in the
Algerian Kabyle area 15 000 people were crammed into a village
designed for 3 000[20]. Malnutrition and disease were the order
of the day. Finally, the villages were constructed in a
military fashion to protect the people against guerrilla
attacks. Huts were built in neat rows, and barbed wire and
floodlights surrounded these living places designed to win the
hearts and minds of the local population[21].

In Algeria more than one million Muslims (out of a population
of nine million) were living in these centres[22]; in Rhodesia
300 000 blacks (out of a population of four million) were
living in the protected villages, or PV's[23], and 440 000
people were living in the Mozambican aldeamentos[24]. Instead of
winning these people over to the old regime, the squalid
living conditions in these centres assured -- ironically --
solid support for the revolutionaries.

11.3. The nature of the transfer of power

It was pointed out above that the manner in which political
power was transferred from the ancien regime to the
revolutionary movement can have an effect for years to come.
In the African revolutions, broad types of transfer are
identified: firstly, instances in which the old regime
collapsed and transferred power fairly rapidly, such as in the
Lusophone colonies; secondly, a transition structured over an
extensive period and characterised by extended give-and-take
negotiations. Of the five revolutions studied here, only
Zimbabwe saw a meaningful negotiated settlement.
Algeria, on the other hand, occupies a position between

the Lusophone areas and Zimbabwe -- negotiations did take place, but the French had to bow to the demands of the Algerians. It is interesting to note that transfers which characterised the decolonisation of most of Africa were often of the first type mentioned above -- for example, the sudden withdrawal of Belgium from the Congo, which led to a violent power struggle.

11.3.1. Rapid transfer of power

The fall of the Estado Novo regime in Portugal, which led to the transfer of power to the revolutionary movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, is the best African example of sudden transition.

On 25 April 1974 senior military officers -- disillusioned by the African wars and the political situation inside Portugal -- overthrew the Caetano regime and exiled its leaders to Brazil[25]. A few months later, on 7 September 1974, Portugal agreed to the independence of Mozambique[26]. In Angola, order broke down as the three liberation movements fought pitched battles to ensure that they would lead an independent Angola. This conflict led to the involvement of numerous external powers, amongst them South Africa, the USA and USSR[27].

In the case of France, it was not so much a matter of a weakened old regime which had to negotiate with the revolutionary movement. It is true that in May 1958 the pieds noirs, aided by some elements within the French Army, rose against the Fourth Republic and asked general Charles de Gaulle to assume power[28]. However, the end of the Fourth Republic did not mean that the French hold on Algeria grew feeble. The counter-insurgency war proved to be very successful, particularly through the Challe Plan of 1958-'59.

De Gaulle, ever his own man and not the champion of algerie francaise as the French of Algeria had thought, started secret negotiations with the movement which he sought to destroy on the battlefield[29]. Why did de Gaulle negotiate, and why was the transfer so rapid?

Former governor-general Jacques Soustelle -- who clashed with de Gaulle over Algerian independence -- said that with the Challe Plan, "the military problem was solved"[30]. He believed that de Gaulle negotiated "because he was feeling he was becoming old. He wanted to be amongst the four or five of the more important leaders of nations of the world"[31], and France could not become a powerful nation if it still had to fight the drawn-out war in Algeria. De Gaulle admitted this much during his television broadcast on 29 January 1960, in which

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he discussed the attempted coup by members of the élite forces: "It is obvious that the unity, progress and prestige of the French people are at stake, and that the future of this people is blocked as long as the Algerian problem remains unsolved"[32] .

De Gaulle had come to realise that France could not hold onto Algeria in an era characterised by the winds of change. "Africa is done for, and Algeria with it"[33].

Gaulle then tried to resolve the situation as soon as possible, and the French conceded to all the demands of the FLN. Soustelle describes the peace negotiations at Evian in Switzerland as follows: "We found oil [in Algeria]...and at the last moment de Gaulle decided not to relinquish the Sahara at any price. He said 'to hell with Algeria, but we keep the Sahara'. Unfortunately the French negotiators let it appear that they had to get a solution without a delay so that the most astute of all the Arab negotiators, Krim Belkacem said: 'What about the Sahara?' And of course the French negotiators said we do not relinquish the Sahara. 'Oh, then nothing doing.' And so Joxe, he was the father of the present day minister, called de Gaulle on the telephone and said: 'what about that?' and de Gaulle said: 'Oh, to hell with the Sahara also.'[34]"

On 25 June 1975 the transitional government handed the rule of Mozambique over to Frelimo, and Alberto Chipande, who had fired the first shot in the war of independence, hoisted the Mozambican flag, while Samora Machel looked on[35].

The murder of Cabral in 1973 had thrown the PAIGC into disarray, and when Guinea-Bissau's independence was acknowledged on 10 September 1974, the party was characterised by an autocratic leadership racked by internal conflict, and out of touch with its peasant followers[36].

11.3.2. Protracted, negotiated transfer

Unlike the Lusophone and Algerian revolutions, where the negotiations with the ancien regime dealt only with how power was to be transferred to the revolutionary movement, the Zimbabwean revolutionary movements gained power after a series of negotiations which involved concessions on all sides. (The negotiations to end the war of independence in Namibia shared many characteristics with that of Zimbabwe -- international supervision and peace keeping forces.)

In Zimbabwe, the first, and major concession, was made by Ian Smith. In 1976 South African prime minister John Vorster had been applying pressure on the Smith to accept majority rule -- even holding up landlocked Rhodesia's imports and exports[37].

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On 19 September of the same year, Smith had a meeting with
Vorster and American Secretary of State Henry Kissenger in
Pretoria.

Kissinger told Smith: "Your reputation as a devious and lying
twister is even worse than mine. But let me warn you not to
try any funny stuff with me because this time you will have
met your match"[38]. He said that the Rhodesians could only hold
out for a couple of months, and offered a deal in which the
Smith government agreed to majority rule within two years[39].
"Smith looked around the room and said: 'You want me to sign
my own suicide note'. There was only silence. Kissenger later
recalled that it was the most painful moment in his life.
'Smith made it worse by acting like a gentleman'"[40].

It was not Smith's suicide note, but definitely that of UDI
Rhodesia. Further negotiations followed and culminated in the
Lancaster House agreement between the Rhodesian government and
the revolutionary movements.

11.4. The outcome of the transfer of power

The reasons for, and manner of, the transition from the old
regime to the revolutionary government play an important role
in the shaping of a new society. Three major factors were
relevant in the African countries during the time of the
transfer of power: the reaction of the whites; power struggles
within the revolutionary alliance; and the socio-economic
condition.

11.4.1. Reaction of the whites

The reaction of the whites -- who were in a privileged
position -- was to a large extent determined by the manner of
the transfer. In the countries where the transfer was quick,
with no alternative government system agreed upon with the
revolutionaries, panic and frustration were common. Some
whites adopted violent methods. In the countries where a new
constitution was guaranteed through negotiations, whites were
still uneasy, but hopeful of continuing to live in the
countries.

11.4.1.1. Violent resistance

Algeria had the largest white population of all the countries,
both numerically and proportionally. When they realised that
they had no power to stop the transfer of power to the FLN,
the whites unleashed a bloody campaign of right-wing terror.
The pied noir terror movement, the Organisation de l'Armée
Secrète (OAS), indulged in an orgy of violence against

Muslims, thus scuttling any hope for them to stay on in an independent Algeria[41]. Hocine Djibran, a Kabyle, believed "that until May 1958 the pieds noirs believed they could co-exist with us and make integration work. When they started to kill Arabs indiscriminately, the petits blancs were intoxicated...they no longer thought straight"[42].

After the coup of 25 April 1974 that toppled Caetano, Frelimo signed an agreement with the Armed Forces Movement and an interim government consisting of six Frelimo members and four Portuguese, and led by Joachim Chissano, was appointed on 20 September 1974[43]. A Portuguese settler movement called Fico ("I stay"), and élite commando soldiers, tried to stage a coup the following day, but it was crushed after three days by Frelimo and Portuguese soldiers[44].

11.4.1.2. Mass exodus

After the Evian agreement was signed, ninety percent of all pieds noirs left Algeria[45].
They had burned all bridges of conciliation with the local population, and "[o]ne of the biggest mass migrations in post-World War II history...[took]...place out of the Algerian ports"[46]. On passenger liners, aircraft, cattle boats, trawlers and tugs the pieds noirs crammed, taking what they could carry, and left for a country that many of them had never seen. On some days up to 15 000 persons left, and six months after the Evian agreement more than 400 000 people had left[47]. "Some drove off stiff and proud, heads held high, convinced of their innate superiority to the Arabs, as had been their ancestors upon arriving in the harsh, broiling Algerian hinterland; others left heartbroken, miserable and in a panic, their goods stored in their homes awaiting the inevitable looters[48].

Breytenbach[49] cites fear of the following as reasons for the mass white exodus seen in Algeria and the Lusophone areas: drastic suffering, declining law and order, loss of status, expendability (being replaced by Afri...) eve.ge. Furthermore, the whites were "unwil...   ...elinquish control and privilege" -- but above all, re   ion between white and black seemed impossible, partic   .cer long and brutal wars of independence[50].
The mass exodus of whites -- termed "Euroflight" by Breytenbach[51] -- was of a scale seldom seen after WWII: 800 000 French left for France, leaving only 30 000 colons behind, 570 000 Portuguese fled Angola, 220 000 returned from Mozambique, and 190 000 whites left Zimbabwe[52]. As is shown

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below, the effect of this loss of skilled manpower was disasterous for the newly independent countries.

11.4.2. Rifts within the revolutionary alliance

The revolutionary movements quickly found that ruling a country is a different ball game from challenging an unpopular government. The period after the fall of the old regime was often characterised by turbulence: splits within the revolutionary alliance, banditry, civil war, and the settling of scores with opponents of the revolutionary movement.

In Angola, the sudden departure of the Portuguese left a power vacuum which not one, but three, movements tried to fill. The MPLA and the FNLA under Holden Roberto had a history of earlier clashes, while there was hostility between Savimbi's Unita and the two other movements as well[53]. As was pointed out earlier, none of the movements could claim that they operated throughout the country; in fact, their support tended to correlate with the distribution of their ethnic support base. The fact that different ethnic groups supported different revolutionary movements (thus reinforcing the cleavages of society), with a wide range of ideologies, and foreign aid and intervention playing a large role, widened the scope for an internal fight for political power.

At first, the FNLA and Unita attempted to negotiate separately with the new military government in Portugal, but eventually on 15 January 1975 the three movements agreed to a transitional government in which all three movements would be represented until independence on 11 November 1975[54]. The transitional government broke down for all practical purposes when Roberto's FNLA -- with the aid of up to 1500 soldiers from Zaire -- tried to drive the MPLA from Luanda[55]. However, by early August the MPLA had managed to repulse the attack, and had driven the FNLA and Unita, as well as members of the Bakongo and Ovimbundu ethnic groups (traditional supporters of the two movements) from Luanda[56]. By now the situation had become thoroughly internationalised, with Cuban military aid starting to build up, and on 23 October 1975 the South Africans launched a raid that ended short of Luanda[57]. The Cuban forces of between 15 000 and 20 000 were, by Neto's own admission, responsible for the stopping of the South African invasion[58], as well as the defeat of another FNLA drive toward Luanda prior to independence in November[59]. On 11 November 1975 Angola became independent, and the MPLA, in control of the capital but still enmeshed in fighting the FNLA and Unita, took control of the country.

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In Algeria, the FLN had managed to unite Algerians around the ideal of independence. Once this was attained, this unity came under severe pressure. One writer attributes the power struggle which broke out to the fact that the Algerians were not a nation prior to the French occupation[60].

Other reasons for the fighting amongst the FLN after independence include the fact that communication was difficult between external and internal groups, as well as personal ambition[61].

Furthermore, Ben Khedda, in an interview with le Monde[62], stated that the wilaya system (which allowed for decentralised decision making during war time) was another reason, because it led to provincialism during peace time. The separation between the external and internal wings led to different approaches -- the external group did not realise the extent of popular support for the revolution, and wanted to impose military rule of the South American type. Finally, because they had lost touch with the local situation, personalities had become more important than principles.

The French writer Jean Daniel argues that the FLN was from its start a broad front, with different factions and leaders, that was held together by a negative goal -- the toppling of the French rule. When that goal fell away, fighting broke out in the ranks of the FLN[63]. "It may be said that by 1 July 1962 the FLN was already dead. The real power now lay with the former army of the exterior, because it was well-organised and professional; the bureaucracy which gradually strengthened its position; and the workers unions, which were quickly brought under government control"[64].

The FLN split into various factions at the time of independence, with Ben Bella (released after being imprisoned since 1957) opposing the group under Ben Khedda, and the internal guerrilla leaders forming yet another faction. The country was close to civil war (and it has to be kept in mind that most males were still bearing arms as members of the FLN's external or internal army), but demonstrations by the masses prevented its outbreak. Still, about 15 000 Algerians died in the fighting[65].

In Algeria the intensity of retribution against members of the local population, who had supported the ancien regime, was severe. In purges, Algerians loyal to France -- particularly the harkis who fought under the French flag against the FLN -- were killed in large numbers, with estimates ranging between 30 000 and 150 000[66]. Jacques Soustelle claims that "there were 200 000 Muslims who fought for France". The fact that France had deserted them by not allowing them to move to

France was for Soustelle "most shameful"[67].

Algeria is an exception with regard to the intensity of retribution against members of the local population who had supported the ancien regime. A number of ethnic groups in Mozambique refused to join Frelimo, or even actively supported the Portuguese, but they were not wiped out on the same scale as in Algeria.

Mozambique did not experience power struggles at first. This was to change, however, when the Rhodesian, and later South African, sponsored movement Renamo started to operate in the country. Zimbabwe was, with the exception of attacks on whites in the south-western areas, free of power struggles or retribution.

11.4.3. Socio-economic situation

The end of the old regime found the revolutionary movements in different stages of readiness to govern a country. The Algerian revolutionaries, as well as the MPLA, were the least prepared to take control of the countries. This is one of the reasons for the armed conflicts that appeared at the end of the old regime. In the other two Lusophone colonies, the movements were better prepared, but independence came with the movements not quite ready for it[68]. The Zimbabwean revolutionary movements, as well as Swapo in Namibia, were much better prepared for their future roles.

Angolan food production declined sharply because the Portuguese abandoned 6 250 farms, which produced not only cash crops, but food as well[69]. Angola had to import only 10 percent of its food before independence; after independence this figure shot up to 50 percent of all staples[70].

Only oil revenues prevented the GNP of declining more than the 20 percent which it did after independence ($1,8 billion in 1976)[71]. Industrial production dropped with 75 percent between 1975 and 1976; coffee production from 200 000 tons before independence to 72 000 tons in 1976; the mining of iron ore ground to a halt; diamond production was down by 66 percent; the livestock industry nearly destroyed; and the fishing industry severely disrupted[72].

Guinea-Bissau, which had a small white population, and Zimbabwe -- where a negotiated settlement made more whites stay on -- did not experience this level of disruption.

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11.5. Conclusion

All the revolutionary movements studied here emerged
victorious despite the fact that they could not match the
firepower of the governments. Their victories were
characterised by a guerrilla strategy which made it difficult
for government troops to pin their opponents down. Thousands
of soldiers were tied down in the struggle, which further
increased the cost of this (ineffective) counter-insurgency
warfare. A second characteristic of the victory of the
revolutionary movements studied here is the little support for
the _ancien regime_ amongst the local population. In the
international arena as well, the revolutionary movement was
seen as the underdog fighting a powerful and morally corrupt
ruler, and former allies deserted the authorities.

The most important element of the transfer of power to the
revolutionaries is the manner in which it was done. In the
case of the Portuguese territories, the transfer was swift
because the old regime had collapsed. Algeria showed
similarities. This collapse of the regime led to the exodus of
the white groups, which plunged the economies of the countries
into chaos. A negotiated settlement -- like the one in
Zimbabwe and Namibia -- on the other hand assured a more
stable socio-economic and political order after the transfer
of power.
It was stated in Chapter Eight that different groups within
the revolutionary movement were frequently involved in power
struggles. After the toppling of the old regime, antagonisms,
which had been papered over by the goal of defeating the
government troops, broke into the open. Power struggles
between the political and military wings characterised the
Algerian revolution throughout the war of independence -- and
nearly resulted in a civil war after the end of French rule.

The fall of the old regime meant that the revolutionary
movements had succeeded -- against large odds -- in their
struggles against political and socio-economic orders which
they felt were unjust. In the following, and final, section of
this study the attempts of the movements to construct a "new
society" are examined.

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PART FIVE: TRANSFORMING SOCIETY

Chapter Twelve
The fundamental alteration of the political order

12.1. Introduction

After the fall of the old regime, the revolutionary movement
finds itself in a position to transform society. This attempt
takes places on two levels: the political and the economic.

In this chapter, the transformation of the political order in
contemporary African revolutions is examined. To simplify
comparisons between the political order under the old and new
regimes, a similar approach to the one adopted in Chapter Three
is used. Thus, the prevalent myth, political institutions and
the political élite form the three broad areas of investigation.

The new myth and values reflect the ideology of the
revolutionary movement: aspects such as national unity and
egalitarianism feature strongly.

It will be shown in section 12.3. that the establishment of new
political institutions is characteristic of the revolutionary
regimes. These institutions revolve around the popular front
which was created to topple the old regime, and which was
eventually transformed into a vanguard party, usually within a
one-party state.

The former leaders of the guerrilla and diplomatic struggle
against the old regime find themselves as dominant figures
within the new state. Is the new élite more representative of
the population, and is it more responsive to the needs of
citizens? These aspects are examined in section 12.4.

On the other hand -- does the population support the new
rulers? The extent of support for the revolutionary regime
varies. The movement may either have the support of a large
majority of the people, or a civil war may break out, in which
certain groups oppose the new regime.

Even if a revolutionary government is initially supported by a
large number of the population, this support usually dwindles
after a couple of years. This change marks a lowering of
revolutionary fervor and energy -- a process known as Thermidor,
named after the similar occurrence in the French Revolution.
Contemporary African revolutions experienced a similar
phenomenon -- in the case of some revolutions, a Thermidorian
reaction is still taking place, as is pointed out in section
12.6.

12.2. Introducing a new myth and values

It is very difficult to immediately transform a society during a revolution. A revolutionary movement cannot, however, leave the impression that traces of the old order still exist, because there can be no new beginning if elements of the hated past are still apparent.

One of its first acts, after the fall of the old regime, is to introduce a new constitution, or basic law, which embodies the revolutionary ideals. It was pointed out in Chapter Three that a constitution reflects the prevalent myth and values in a society. Such a new constitution can then be seen as the cornerstone of the transformation of society, because it supplies a new myth and set of values for the new political order[1]. The myth of the new African revolutionary regimes, as reflected in their constitutions, stressed the importance of national independence and unity, as well as the ideal of an egalitarian and classless society.

12.2.1. An attempt to create political unity

After the coup of 25 April 1974 which toppled Caetano, Frelimo -- whose strategy called for the expansion of liberated areas -- found itself with no such areas south of the Zambezi, and with little political mobilisation done in these areas which were previously controlled by the Portuguese[2].

Thus, Frelimo decided that national unity was a prerequisite for tackling Mozambique's vast economic problems. In his Independence Day address, Samora Machel said: "In establishing our development strategy, we must attach special value to what is our chief strength, the mobilisation and organisation of the people"[3]. The Frelimo leadership believed that every member of the population should be educated politically, and organised in such a way that the population is united behind the ideals of the Mozambican revolution. Political unity will serve, amongst others, as a safeguard for the revolution: "[T]he main defence must be to popularise the revolutionary aims", Marcelino dos Santos told Joe Slovo in an interview[4]. The task of creating political unity was entrusted to the grupos dinamizadores [dinamising groups], which operated throughout the country[5].

The attempt to create political unity was furthermore aimed against the influence of tribalism and the traditional rulers, who [as was pointed out in Part Three] initially played a part in the organisation of the revolutionary movement.

"We do not recognise tribes, regions, race or religious beliefs. We only recognise Mozambicans who are equally

exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution", was how Machel summed up Frelimo's feelings toward national unity[6].

The media stressed the importance of unity, with the slogan "from the Rovuma to Maputo we are all Mozambicans" being repeated often in newspapers and on the radio[7].

12.2.2. Egalitarianism and a classless society

Samora Machel's statement on the equality of Mozambicans is incorporated in Article 18 of the Mozambican Constitution: "In the People's Republic of Mozambique, women and men have equal rights and duties, this equality extending to the political, economic, social and cultural spheres"[8].

Similarly, the Angolan constitution allows every member of the population -- with the exception of people unfit to do so -- to participate in the political process -- although there is only one political party. According to Article 3 of the Angolan constitution, "the masses shall be guaranteed broad, effective participation in the exercise of political power"[9].

At independence, Neto indicated how the MPLA sought to solve the problem of inequality. "The People's Republic of Angola will, under the guidance of the MPLA, gradually advance towards a people's democracy state, with an alliance between workers and peasants as its nucleus"[10]. This was further highlighted at the first plenary meeting of the MPLA's central committee in October 1976, where people's democracy was described as a phase in the struggle of the MPLA, with "socialism as the highest aim of our revolution. We must arm all militants with the doctrine of scientific socialism -- Marxism-Leninism"[11].

12.3. Establishing new political institutions

Another element of the new political order is the establishment of political institutions that are meant to replace those of the ancien regime. While the revolutionary movement could be characterised as a broad, popular front during the war of independence, this often changed after the toppling of the old regime. The popular fronts were, in several cases in Africa, replaced by elitist vanguard parties in the Marxist-Leninist mould.

12.3.1. From popular front to a single, vanguard party

After the end of Portuguese rule in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the revolutionary movements -- as the newly

installed governments -- tried to forge national unity in countries which were torn apart by years of warfare. They opted for the strategy which they knew well: the mobilisation and organisation of the population within the tried and tested framework of a popular front, as used in the wars of independence[12].

After independence, the Frelimo government in Mozambique introduced the grupos dinamizadores, consisting of youthful party members, whose task it was to mobilise the population and forge unity between different groups -- ethnic, rural/urban, young/old, and worker/peasant[13].

This phase lasted from independence on 25 June 1975 until Frelimo's Third Party Congress in February 1977, when it was decided to transform the populist anti-colonial front into a party with a "structure and ideology of the classic Marxist-Leninist type"[14].

Although most movements claimed that they were fighting for democracy, they were quite candid about their views on multi-party systems after independence. "I must admit that we never even considered the possibility of allowing a crop of political parties to mature in Algeria, once we were in power. In actual fact, after the Declaration of Independence, we purposely excluded this possibility in the Tripoli programme, as to us it seemed like a 'luxury' which an underdeveloped country could not permit itself", Ben Bella said[15].

The leaders of the FLN, Frelimo, MPLA and PAIGC did not only outlaw any other political movement, but also changed the nature of the revolutionary movements. The broad fronts from the days of the independence wars were discarded in favour of smaller, élite organisations -- the vanguard parties. Less than a year after Algerian independence, Ben Bella declared: "I do not believe in the idea of a mass party that accepts the participation of the most conscious Algerians and those who are less conscious. I believe in the idea of a vanguard party"[16]. According to him, such a party should only include those "who are the most dynamic and who should be examples to follow...In Algeria, we need between 100 000 and 150 000 [members of a vanguard party]"[17].

In Mozambique, the introduction of the concept of a vanguard party occurred at the Third Party Congress of Frelimo, which was held in February 1977[18]. In December that year the MPLA's transformation was initiated at its First Ordinary Congress, where Agostinho Neto said: "The MPLA, after heroically leading two national liberation wars and having started the process of

laying the material foundations for building socialism, has now fulfilled its historic mission as a national liberation movement. The laying down of People's Democracy and Socialism as goals to be attained implies qualitative leaps in the politico-ideological and organisational sphere, so that the vanguard organisation may play its full role in the leadership of society...That instrument, organised and structured in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles, which will lead the revolutionary classes, will be the Vanguard Party of the Working Class"[19].

Thus, a broad anti-government front was changed into an organisation dedicated to transform society. In 1972, Neto had denied in an interview that the MPLA was communist, because "for a party it is possible [to identify its ideology] but when a movement consists of people who are different politically and ideologically, it is not possible to say that this is, for example, a communist movement"[20].

After independence, however, the MPLA changed from a movement to a party, and it was able to clearly state its goals and the manner in which the movement sought to achieve these. In the case of the MPLA, the influence of its Marxist-orientated ideology can be clearly seen.

One informed observer states that the importance which the MPLA attached to a vanguard party was modelled on Lenin's Preliminary Draft Resolution of the Tenth Congress, which he wrote for the Communist Party Congress of 1921[21]. Lenin wrote that "only the political party of the working class...is capable of uniting, training and organising a vanguard of the proletariat and of the whole mass of the working people that alone will be capable of withstanding the inevitable petit-bourgeois vascillations of this mass"[22].

For example, the MPLA Central Committee stated that the alliance between worker and peasant would, through the vanguard party, "exercise a Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship over internal and external reaction, creating the conditions for the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the stage of building socialism"[23]. This statement reflects the same idiom as Lenin's Two tactics of social democracy in the democratic revolution, in which he refers to the "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry"[24].

The change to a vanguard party meant that only the most politically conscious citizens should be members of the party. In the transition from a mass-based front to an elitist vanguard party, membership of the revolutionary movements

accordingly declined drastically.

Following the MPLA's decision to establish a vanguard party, there followed a series of purges and "rectification campaigns". At the time of the First Congress there were 110 000 members of the MPLA[25]. Thus, it was decided to weed the party out, with the central committee stating that: "a vast rectification movement will be launched at all levels in order to correct errors, improve methods of work, cleanse the organisations of harmful elements and unite all militants behind the party's goal. The rectification movement will be the guarantee of unity within the party and of the ideological firmness of its militants"[26].

By the time Eduardo dos Santos took over the leadership of the MPLA after the death of Neto in 1979, the rectification campaign was over, and the membership of the MPLA reduced to only 16 583[27]. By 1982, the membership had grown to 30 000[28].

It was shown in this section that a one-party state is usually the result of extensive mobilisation of the population by the revolutionary movement before the fall of the ancien regime[29]. A one-party state ruled by a respected leader associated with the struggle for independence is usually characterised by the stabilising, and centralising, role of the party[30]. Generally, the loyalty of the citizens is directed at this leader instead of the [single] party, and if he is replaced, the loyalty may decline[31].

12.4. New political élites

Moskos[32] states "that an initial radical revolutionary élite is characterized by a membership which is intellectual, Western exposed and marginal in its ethnicity, and that the second generation of the radical revolutionary élite witnesses a rise in heartland born, less educated and non-Western exposed individuals".

This also appeared to be the case in the African revolutions, where second-generation leaders like Boumedienne had a different outlook on life than the intellectuals like Ferhat Abbas.

On the other hand, unlike the argument of the mass society theorists that marginal men become leaders because they are socially "uprooted and unattached"[33], it may simply be the result of "the general trend in which power passes from high-status agitators to lower-status administrators"[34]. Whatever the reasons, definite shifts in the leadership of the movements occurred in all the revolutions.

What is clear, is that the leadership of all the movements

was more representative of the population than the leaders of
the old regime. The new élite was drawn from different groups
or classes[35]. In all the revolutions, the "second class
citizens" became the new rulers.

Davies[36] incorporates this aspect when he defines revolutions
as "violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of
one ruling group by another that has a broader popular basis
for support". For Lasswell[37] a revolution is characterised by
"a shift in the class composition of élites". This was indeed
the case in all the African revolutions.
Dunn[38] makes the statement that a revolution entails much
more than the alteration of the élite: the new élite should be
able to solve the problems of a society with more ease than
the previous regime, and it should not "turn out that the only
problem which they were capable of handling more deftly than
those they replace is the single problem of social control".

12.5. Varied support for the new rulers and their policies

Social control proved to be important -- and often took up
most of the time of the leaders. This is especially so in the
case of Angola and Mozambique, where the governments are still
-- despite attempts at peace -- locked in battle with opposing
groups.

In the case of Angola, the MPLA regime does not have the
support of large numbers of the population, particularly the
large Ovimbundu ethnic group. Unita, organised around this
group, has now opposed the Luanda government for sixteen
years, and there is still no end in sight of the civil war
which has all but destroyed the agriculture of this country.
In fact, despite peace talks between the Angolan government
and Unita, the rebel movement has since the departure of Cuban
troops "thrown a noose" around Luanda[39]. Jonas Savimbi's
movement could thus negotiate from a position of strength at
the first official talks between the protagonists on 24 and 25
April 1990 in Evora, Portugal[40]. The role which the
independence of Namibia played in the worsening of the MPLA's
fortunes is important. Not only did tens of thousands of Cuban
troops leave the country, but Nujoma refused the Angolans
permission to use Namibia as a springboard for operations
against Unita in southern Angola. "The Luanda government
considers this refusal an act of monstrous ingratitude. Of all
the former Front Line States, Angola made the heaviest
sacrifices for Namibia's independence. Experts estimate at $10
000 million the cost of war damage suffered by Angola."[41]

Like the MPLA, Frelimo is currently negotiating with the Renamo movement in order to agree to a cease-fire which will end the hostilities of fifteen years Renamo, or the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, was originally supported by South Africa and Rhodesia, but South Africa officially discontinued its aid when it signed the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1984[42]. Nine countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, are involved in the effort to end the war which has left more than 600 000 people dead[43]. Nearly 1,5 million people have fled the country, two million have been displaced from their homes, and 4,3 million are affected by hunger as a result of the war[44].

In Algeria, the government of Chadli Benjedid is under pressure from Muslim fundamentalists, as well as the movement of former president Ben Bella, who returned to the country last year after 25 years of imprisonment and exile. He denounced the government as a "system of bandits and thieves". "I don't believe that men who distinguished themselves by more than two decades of authoritarianism can suddenly transform themselves into great democrats", Ben Bella (73) said of the FLN's move toward political reform and democratisation[45].

12.6. Thermidor -- toward a post-revolutionary society

Brinton[46] calls the "slow and uneven return to quiter, less heroic times" Thermidor, because it was in this month (July) of the revolutionary French calender that Robespierre's fall led to a decline in revolutionary fervour.

The countries which experienced revolutions are all to varying degrees encountering their own "Thermidor" and are moving toward a society which is no longer characterised by revolutionary fervour.
The former Lusophone areas -- whose governments had embraced Marxism -- are moving toward democracy. "We are writing new and important chapters in our common history", was how Guinea-Bissau president Joao Bernardo Vieira described the democratisation moves[47]. In Mozambique, a new constitution was introduced in December last year to allow for a multi-party democracy, while the MPLA has pledged that it too would allow other political parties in the first quarter of 1991[48].

12.7. Conclusion

It was shown in this chapter that the revolutionary movements introduced a new myth, which revolved around egalitarianism.

Another characteristic of the African revolutions was the manner in which the former anti-colonial front changed after independence. It was replaced by a vanguard party made up of ideologically literate people. This group became the new élite, taking leadership positions. However, tensions which existed during the war of independence continued, and often led to power struggles within the new governments.

The new regimes were not popular with all of the people. In Angola a civil war is still raging between supporters of Unita and the government, while the bandit movement Renamo is fighting Frelimo in Mozambique. Peace talks are currently under way -- these talks signify the waning of the revolutionary energy in these countries, and are an attempt of an idealistic movement to become more pragmatic in the face of a hostile world. This is borne out by their attempts to reform the former one-party states into multi-party democracies.

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Chapter Thirteen
Transforming the socio-economic order

13.1. Introduction

It was argued in Part One that a process cannot be described
as a revolution if there is, apart from other criteria posted,
no transformation of the socio-economic order.

In this chapter the alterations in the socio-economic orders
of the African countries which experienced revolutions will be
examined. The extent of the transformation varied from country
to country, but it can safely be said that the socio-economic
order under the new regime differed vastly from that under the
old regime.

The approach will be the same as in the examination of the
old order in Chapter Four, save that aspects of the demography
of the new states and their economies directly after the fall
of the old regime were already discussed in Chapter Eleven.
However, other central elements of the socio-economic order
of the countries form the basis for the analysis of the
transformation which occurred in these contemporary African
countries.

13.2. Type of ownership

It was shown in Chapter Six that the revolutionary movements
had a clear idea about how the socio-economic order was to be
transformed.

For example, Frelimo decided at its Second Congress in July
1968 that an independent Mozambique should be aligned on the
side of the world class struggle, and that the movement should
aim -- primarily through collectivised agriculture -- to
construct "a new society free from exploitation of man by
man"[1]. Likewise, in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and
Zimbabwe the ideological map for the socio-economic
transformation was drawn long before the fall of the old
regime.

One of the central elements of these maps was the ideal that
control over the economy should not be in the hands of a small
number of people. For most of the revolutionary movements, the
way to ensure a more equal distribution of wealth was state
ownership of, and thus control over, the means of production.
Shortly after the fall of the old regime, the majority of the
revolutionary movements set out on this path.

13.2.1. Nationalisation

The African countries which experienced the mass exodus of the previous ruling groups -- Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau -- were "bound to fall into some form of socialism very quickly", because numerous enterprises were abandoned, and the state had to intervene to start production again[2].

In Angola, the guidelines regarding nationalisation were issued in March 1976: the properties of "saboteurs", "traitors", members of the FNLA and Unita, as well as those absent from the country for longer than 45 days "without justification" were nationalised, and the owners received no compensation[3].

Furthermore, the MPLA set itself a goal of nationalising 80 percent of the 500 "heavy" industries before 1980[4]. When the First Congress was held in December 1977, the state already had total control over textile, sugar, metal, and plywood production enterprises, as well as 50 percent control over diamond, dockyard, footware, matches, and margarine production enterprises[5]. The nationalisation of hundreds of abandoned Portuguese properties in 1979 meant that the MPLA was close to its goal of owning 80 percent of the major industries[6].

In Algeria, the peasants occupied the deserted colon farms at independence, while workers did likewise at former pied noir industries. Ben Bella's government had -- short of removing the peasants and workers -- little choice but to nationalise these enterprises by promulgating the March Decrees, and at the end of 1963 more than five million acres, as well as 450 industrial firms, were under state control[7]. The March Decrees meant, according to Ben Bella, that "(t)he land had come back to the people who cultivated it and Algeria had taken a decisive step on the road to socialism"[8].

Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau experienced large-scale nationalisation as well, but Zimbabwe did not nationalise on a vast scale. In Namibia no nationalisation was effected.

13.2.2. The nature of state-owned enterprises

The means of production that were nationalised were run by the new government. How successful were the revolutionary movements?

At first, the FLN under Ben Bella followed a path which allowed workers a large amount of control. Nationalised farms

were under the management of the workers themselves (a system
called autogestion), and Ben Bella referred to this system as
the "most precious achievement of the Revolution"[9]. However,
after the coup d'etat in which Boumedienne toppled Ben Bella,
the nature of Algeria's transformation to socialism changed.

While Ben Bella had tried to transform the FLN into a quasi-
Marxist vanguard party, Boumedienne advocated the opposite
approach to establishing socialism. He depended mainly on the
state to carry out the transformation of society, and
relegated the party to play a minor role[10]. One of his first
intentions after the coup was to establish a "state which will
be able to outlive men and events"[11]. In fact, "(n)owhere in
Africa has there been such a glorification of the state as in
Algeria under Boumedienne"[12].

The Algerian regime did not place as much importance on
ideology as did some other revolutionary regimes. It was no
wonder, then, that the ideological document on socialist
development, the Charte Nationale, which appeared only in 1976
but reflected earlier strategies as well, rejected "all rigid
dogmas" and thus, by implication, Marxism[13]. However, the
Algerians followed the Soviet model of economic transformation
much closer than several other revolutionary regimes, and
their policies differed markedly from the strategies of the
"African socialist" countries. Economic transformation should
be the result of "overall and harmonious development on the
basis of planning which is scientific in its origin,
democratic in its formulation, and imperative in its
application"[14].

The central theme of the Charte Nationale was that Algeria
would only be truly independent if it had control over its
resources, and had a developed industrial base that could
sustain economic growth, i.e. if the country was able to
exploit its resources and operate its industries without being
dependent on foreign assistance[15].

At Boumedienne's death in 1978, his statist brand of
socialism "seemed to have been permanently etched across the
face of the country"[16]. The economic order of the Algerian
state had been transformed from a colonial economic order to a
socialist order, in which revenues from hydrocarbons were used
to finance investments in public projects and "industrialising
industries", aimed at generating further development[17]. The
importance placed on the secondary (manufacturing) sector
stands in stark contrast to the economic orders of the
majority of the other countries. The Algerian economic order
was, however, plagued by the lack of attention given to the
troubled agricultural sector[18].

In Angola, the question of whether the state enterprises should be run collectively, with the workers playing a managerial role, or by state-appointed managers, caused controversy. In the March Decree of 1976, which authorised the nationalisation of properties, provision was made for the participation of workers in the management of these enterprises[19]. However, in October 1976, this decision was reversed by the Central Committee which declared that it was necessary to replace "the present form of collective leadership with personal leadership", a principle which was confirmed at the First Congress[20]. Thus, in a manner reminiscent of the different approaches of Ben Bella and Boumedienne, the MPLA curtailed workers participation; in fact, it "effectively killed the self-management movement"[21].

13.3. Primary sector dominant, but in decline

In all the countries agriculture remained one of the most important elements within the primary sector; in Guinea-Bissau, for example, it virtually dominated the economic order. In other countries such as Algeria and Angola, the exploitation of minerals proved to be very important.

13.3.1. Poor agricultural production

In Angola at independence, about 1,2 million peasant families had less than two hectares of land, on which they produced for their own consumption; a further 150 000 African farmers were producing cash crops (accounting for 14 percent of these exports) and 140 000 Ovimbundu were working as migrant labourers in the coffee plantations[22].

The MPLA moved very cautiously in transforming the agricultural sector. The MPLA did not nationalise peasant land, as was done in Mozambique, but only abandoned Portuguese farms. Neto realised that the transformation of the economic order "is long, complex and difficult", and that the nationalisation of peasant land would alienate the population[23]. "If now in the name of socialism we were to begin to expropriate the peasants, our people would at once feel they were being sacrificed to our socialist option"[24] .

The 6 250 abandoned Portuguese farms were nationalised and consolidated into state farms, which were very large: 450 farms were regrouped into 58 state farms which employed 175 000 workers, while four "agri-businesses" employed a further 150 000 workers[25]. The co-operative movement, started in 1976, proved to be a failure, with only 300 formed. Because little collective farming took place, it was decided to launch an education campaign prior to another co-operative movement.

Dinamisadores ("dinamising agents") were sent to the countryside to educate the population, and to convince them of the advantages of collective farming[26].

Thus, the MPLA chose a pragmatic rather than a strictly ideological strategy for the transformation of the economy, concentrating more on production than doctrinal prescriptions. For example, after a failed Cuban-assisted attempt to run the abandoned Portuguese coffee plantations in northern Angola as state farms, former Ovimbundu workers were resettled, but this time as small owners -- and despite creating a kulak class prohibited by the MPLA communist ideology -- and their productivity was higher than that of the failed state enterprise[27].

However, the agricultural sector remained very weak: coffee production was 26 000 tons in 1978 as opposed to the 210 000 in 1973; pineapple production was 4 400 as opposed to 55 000 tons; cotton 1 000 and 79 000; sisal 15 000 and 60 000 tons; sugar 39 000 in 1978 and 82 000 in 1973[28]. Furthermore, Angola still had to import more than half of staple foods sold on the market, and there were frequent food shortages in the urban areas[29].

On 21 May 1977 (six days before a coup attempt), Neto said in Luanda: "the problem of food supplies is serious. There is no cassava, no potatoes, no groundnuts, no palm oil. There is nothing on the market...this situation pleases no one"[30].

The Economic and Social Directives adopted at Frelimo's Third Congress in February 1977 set out the first coherent economic policy for Mozambique, and laid down a strategy for economic development[31]. According to this strategy, Mozambique was in a phase of building a popular democracy during which time the foundations for a Socialist Revolution were to be laid with "agriculture as the basis and industry as the dynamic and decisive factor"[32].

Two principles were laid down for the development of agriculture: firstly, the concentration of the population in villages where social services would be available; and, secondly, the modernisation of the rural areas by means of state farms and co-operatives[33]. The principles were interrelated in the sense that the villages should provide the labour for the state farms[34].

The agricultural sector in Mozambique employs 80 percent of the active population of the country, and between 1980-1986 contributed between 40 and 45 percent of the gross value of total production in the country[35].

Agricultural output declined during the course of the 1980's; the market production had remained at the same level since 1983, with the production of 1986 being less than half of that of 1981[36]. Furthermore, the marketing of cash crops planted by peasants (such as cashew nuts) was in 1986 only 40 percent of the 1981 level[37]. While the production of vegetables for urban consumption had increased fivefold from 1981 to 1986, the agricultural production on the state farms and co-operatives was only 45 percent of the 1981 levels[38].

This situation was clearly disastrous for Mozambique, not only in its attempt to transform the economic order, but also in the daily human suffering that these figures implied. Several reasons are given, of which the severe drought and the Renamo banditry are the most important[39]. These factors, amongst others, forced more than two million Mozambicans off their land, and affected a further two million who decided to stay on their farms[40].

It is ironic that the PAIGC -- which under Cabral had been perhaps the closest to the peasants of all the revolutionary movements -- kept some exploitative Estado Novo agricultural policies intact, and refused to spend money on the development of these rural members of the population.

The agricultural market in Guinea-Bissau formed a monopoly under the Salazar regime, and this did not change much under the PAIGC. About 230 state outlets (the nationalised Sociedade Comercial Ultramarina) collected produce from the peasants, but because of the low rates paid, most peasants chose to smuggle their produce to neighbouring states, where it could be sold for much higher prices[41]. Thus, while an estimated 80 000 tons of rice were produced in 1981, only 1 547 tons were sold to the state, and of the estimated 30 000 tons of groundnuts produced in the same year, only 6 475 tons were sold to state officials[42].

This, for a country that was primarily dependent upon its agriculture, was disastrous. The import of rice (the staple) increased from 14 000 tons in 1975 to 43 000 tons in 1982[43]. This led to a sharp increase in loans and requests for economic aid.

The peasants were critised for this state of affairs, not only by the government but also by the World Bank and donor organisations. They were dismissed as being the 85 percent of the population who only consumed and contributed little to the GDP[44]. However, no mention was made of the fact that the disadvantaged peasantry, struggling under monopolistic laws, chose not to support an overblown bureaucracy, and resorted instead to cross-border traffic[45].

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Algeria, in its quest for industrial development neglected its state-controlled agricultural sector. The Three-year Development Plan (1967-1969) made provision for only 16,9 percent of investments to go to agriculture, with the two following Four-year Plans (1970-1973 and 1974-1977) also characterised by a low level of investment in agriculture[46].

This neglect of agriculture is surprising, especially if Algeria's climate and lack of fertile land (as well as the rapid increase in population) is taken into account. Prior to the war of independence, Germain Tillion estimated that the country could only feed three million people, and the population at that stage was already nine million[47]. The official response by the regime (which had pledged large-scale agrarian reform during the war) was that agricultural production can only be expanded through the use of fertilizer and mechanisation, both of which could only be produced after industrial development[48]. This neglect was to cost Algeria dearly.

Between 1973 and 1977 more than a million tons of wheat were imported annually at a cost of about $700 million per year[49].

In 1971, an attempt was made to improve agriculture with the promulgation of the Charter of the Agrarian Revolution, which entailed land reform and collective farming. State and nationalised land were distributed amongst needy peasants; at the end of 1978, more than 100 000 peasants had each received a portion of land after the distribution of 3,1 million acres[50].

Furthermore, more than 6 500 farming co-operatives were established, but only about 200 "socialist villages" were formed, and the concept proved to be largely unsuccessful[51].

Finally, agriculture under the new Algerian economic order was regulated by "an army of rural bureaucrats", who were in charge of the distribution of land and the running of the co-operatives and villages[52]. Thus, the statist nature of Algerian socialism manifested itself in agriculture.

13.3.2. Minerals

The sudden increase in the price of oil in 1974 changed the nature of Algerian socialism as suddenly not millions, but billions of dollars were available for investment in economic projects[53].

In 1978, Algeria had a GDP of $24,6 billion and a per capita income of $1 374[54]. Thus, the exploitation of its hydrocarbon resources was the mainstay of Algerian economic development, as reflected in the slogan "to plant oil so as to reap industry"[55]. A large share of revenue from hydrocarbons was invested in Algerian industries.

During the First and Second Four-year Plans, 37 percent of all the investments in industry went to the extraction of oil and gas, with a further 40 percent being invested in petrochemical and steel industries[56]. The extent of these investments becomes evident if it is taken into account that total investments during the Second Four-year Plan (1974-1977) amounted to $27 billion[57]. Nearly 80 percent of all investments, or about $22 billion, went to the oil, gas, petrochemical, and steel industries.

Thus, Algeria had pinned its hope for economic development on one of its few natural resources, with the aim of investing the revenues to build up an industrial base.

Oil was discovered in the mid-1960's in Angola's Cabinda province and was responsible for a GNP of $474 million, the second highest in Africa south of the Sahara[58]. Angola copied the Algerian approach to the exploitation of its mineral resources, set up its own state oil company, Sonangol, and entered into a number of agreements with multi-nationals[59]. The negotiations were carried out by the same American consultant, Arthur D. Little, who acted for the Algerians[60]. The first of these agreements was signed in December 1978 with Gulf Oil, and resulted in the transfer of 51 percent of shares, management, and production to Sonangol[61]. In September 1979, an agreement was signed with Texaco, whereby Sonangol obtained complete ownership of the company's concessions, but Texaco was to operate the oil field off Cabinda in return for 60 percent of the expected 50 000 barrels per day[62]. By 1980, the Gulf-Sonangol agreement provided the regime with annual revenues of about $1 billion, which formed between 60 and 80 percent of its total revenues. It was estimated that with the addition of the Texaco field the revenues could double by 1983[63].

The same approach was employed in the diamond mining sector, where production had fallen to 15 percent of pre-independence levels[64]. In August 1977, the regime took control of 61 percent of the assets of Diamang, while the consortium would continue to be responsible for the marketing of the gems[65].

13.3.3. Weak or non-existent industrial sector

It was pointed out earlier that of all the revolutionary regimes, it was only Algeria whose strategy for the transformation of the economic order depended on large-scale industrialisation. This industrial development will now be juxtaposed to the relative lack of development in the other countries.

Boumedienne's statist socialist development program relied extensively on hydrocarbons; not only for their revenue, but for the creation of secondary industries in this field, which in turn would lead to the establishment of other industries. Over 360 para-statal industries, primarily in the oil, gas, petrochemical and steel fields were created to serve as the engine for economic transformation[66].

The Three-year Development Plan (1967-1969) led to the spending of 48,7 percent of all investments in these sectors, with similar spending in the First and Second Four-year Plans (1970-1973 and 1974-1977)[67].

This high level of investment, fuelled by high revenues as a result of a rising oil price, paid handsomely for Algeria during the 1970's. Real economic growth was estimated to be 10,4 percent in 1976, and 7,8 and 9 percent in the following two years[68].

However, the new industrial plants were producing far below their capacity. The following reasons are cited by Ottaway[69]: technical and managerial inadequacies; a low demand for the produce inside Algeria; and little success in selling these produce on the European market. Thus, these industries were in effect subsidised by the oil revenues. The Algerian regime appeared willing to continue this practice, because the industries were established to make the country independent from the industrialised Western countries[70]. Furthermore, without this industrial base Algeria would never really advance technologically, as Boumedienne himself realised: "The essential goals of a policy of industrialisation are not manifested only through the creation of more jobs. They go beyond that. They include the need to foster, through the development of our natural forces of production, a process of internal accumulation of our material and human resources, essential for us to emerge into the technological era"[71].

At independence, the secondary sector of Angola's economy was responsible for 18 to 20 percent of the GDP, and the colony had 500 industries classified as heavy[72]. Between 5 000 and 10 000 workers were in the fishing industry, 20 000 to 40 000 in the construction industry; 55 000 in transportation; and 70 000 in the service sector[73].

13.4. Trade balance

13.4.1. Dominance of former colonial power and industrialised countries

Whereas most of Angola's trade was with Portugal prior to independence (see Part Two), the country now has ties with the

Soviet Union and Eastern European countries (former socialist bloc members), the Nordic states, Brazil, the United States and the European Community[74]. The trade links are, however, still the strongest with the Western countries, primarily because of the colonial legacy. After ten years of independence and moving toward socialism, more than 70 percent of Angola's trade is still with western capitalist countries[75].

While exports to the industrialised countries, Asia and Africa rose from $889,3 million in 1978 to $2 257,7 million in 1984, imports rose from $665,7 million to $1 003,1 million in the same period[76]. The United States, despite the fact that it did not recognise the MPLA government, dominated this import/export trade, with $957,7 million (nearly 50 percent of all exports) going to the US in 1984; while Angola imported $113,4 million worth of goods from the United States in the same year[77].

Prior to independence, 92 percent of Guinea-Bissau's exports went to Portugal, but by 1981 this figure was down to 20 percent[78].

13.4.2. Foreign aid

It is difficult to establish exactly how much aid Angola receives, because few official figures on aid are released, and there is a lack of statistical services[79].

However, the country has received substantial aid from the Soviet Union, which pledged $2 billion for the period 1984 to 1990[80]. The Soviets supplied $17 million during the reconstruction period of 1976 to 1978[81], and between 1975 and 1982 the Soviet Union supplied aid worth $40 million to Angola[82]. The Soviets also undertook to participate in a hydro-electric scheme and in a joint fishing scheme[83].

With regard to Western aid, Angola received in 1983 the sum of $30,5 million from France, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy[84].

Furthermore, as a member of the Lomé Convention, Angola will be able to boost its trade with the European Community[85].

The economic aid that Guinea-Bissau received is to a large extent similar to that of Angola. Immediately before and after independence, the PAIGC was almost exclusively supported by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. For the period 1976 to 1978, they supplied 26 percent of Guinea-Bissau's foreign aid, but in the following year this was down to only 9 percent[86].

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13.4.3. The debt crisis

With its overblown bureaucracy and diminishing agricultural base, Guinea-Bissau was forced to apply for foreign loans -- between 1977 and 1981 the credit supplied to the state increased annually by 43 percent[87].

These loans were used for the following: consumer goods (38 percent); capital goods (28 percent); technical assistance (13 percent); training (2,4 percent); and 5,7 percent for other expenses. The government never spent more than 10 percent of its budget on rural development; in 1983 the Ministry of Rural Development received 3 percent of the budget -- and this in a country with 85 percent of its population being rural peasants[88].

On the other hand, 56 percent of the budget was used for government salaries: the government employed 15 000 workers (61 percent of all salaried persons), and 83 percent of these government workers lived in the capital, Bissau[89]. This was surely an untenable situation, and Guinea-Bissau paid a heavy price for this policy.

13.5. Education and health

13.5.1. Changing the education system

The Frelimo government inherited one of the worst colonial education systems: it was highly centralised, Portuguese-orientated, and designed to give Africans a rudimentary education in order to integrate them into the colonial economy[90]. Furthermore, the proportion of children actually attending school was smaller than elsewhere in Africa[91].

The alteration of the educational system was high on Frelimo's list of priorities, as a means not only to ensure that production would be enhanced (through an educated work force), but also under the new regime to mobilise the (young) masses[92]. Thus, education under the new regime had to "intensify revolutionary political and ideological training of teachers and pupils, in order to ensure that teachers are active agents in the revolutionary process"[93].

Frelimo gained control over education by nationalising all private educational facilities, and integrated these with state schools[94]. Immediately after independence, the government had to replace large numbers of secondary school teachers (mainly Portuguese who had left the country) and introduce new, non-Portuguese orientated textbooks[95].

The education program had mixed success, partly because of the activities of Renamo. Primary school enrollment increased from 672 000 in 1975 to 1 311 000 in 1985; the number of secondary pupils increased from 26 000 to 135 000 over the same period[96]. The illiteracy rate o 93 percent at independence was reduced to 72 percent in 1980; this was not sufficient, however, and "acute shortages of skilled manpower persisted in all sectors"[97].

The activities of Renamo led to the closure of 2 629 primary and 22 secondary schools, leaving about 500 000 pupils without educational facilities[98].

The former University of Maputo, which had only 40 Mozambican students and 2 500 Portuguese students at independence, was renamed the Eduardo Mondlane University and had 1800 students in 1981[99]. Teacher-training centres were established and two institutes for vocational teachers opened in Nampula and Umbeluzi respectively[100].

Finally, the Frelimo government undertook a literacy drive within its armed forces and under industrial and agricultural workers, in which an estimated one million people participated[101].

13.5.2. Fighting disease and ill health

The population of Mozambique was not only neglected educationally, but physically as well.

Life expectancy in Mozambique is forty years, the mortality rate is 19 percent, with 45 percent of all deaths being children, under five years of age, and women of reproductive age[102].

This state of affairs is largely the result of poor hygiene and nutrition[103]. About 75 percent of all disease is caused by infections and parasites, with malaria being particularly rife: in Sofala province, 80 percent of children between 2 and 9 years suffer from malaria[104].

The Frelimo government increased the budget for health from $15,1 million in 1974 to $54,6 million in 1980, and concentrated on preventive medical care with vaccination campaigns and family planning centres being prominent[105].

The number of medical doctors dropped from 519 before independence to 86 in 1975, but increased to 317 doctors and 3 800 health workers in 1985[106]. Health posts and centres -- a cornerstone of the government's health policy -- increased from 426 to 1 178 for the same period[107]. However, this still

meant that there was one doctor for 44 000 people, and one
health post for 12 000[108]. Furthermore, the activities of
Renamo led to the closure or destruction of 30 percent of the
health network, leaving about 2 million people without health
care[109]. Torp, quoting the EIU[110] states that $34 million is
necessary to rebuild the health network, and a further $36
million is required to keep health care in the year 2000 at
the level of that of 1986[111].

The health system has 993 units (hospitals and health posts)
with 12 836 beds -- an average of one bed per 1 000 people[112].
This average represents the situation in both urban and rural
areas. In the towns and cities, the 17,5 percent of the
population living there have access to 90 percent of all
doctors and 66 percent of the total medical staff[113]. On the
other hand, the rural 82,5 percent of the population have
theoretically a single doctor for 321 200 people[114].

Attempts are made to rectify this situation. A total of 110
students had enrolled by 1979 for the six-year medicine course
at the Eduardo Mondlane University, and it was planned to
admit fifty medical students per year[115]. Furthermore, four
health training centres were established in Maputo, Beira,
Quelimane and Nampula in order to train nurses and midwives
(45 percent of all trainees), and to provide training in
nutrition and child care for general medical workers[116]. These
workers would, in turn, teach the Organisation of Mozambican
Women courses in health and nutrition, in order to reach as
many of the population as possible[117].

All the countries are -- apart from ill health, under-
nourishment and disease -- faced with the Aids crisis. In
Zimbabwe, about 25 percent of all Aids carriers are children
under five years of age[118]. Most of the 4 000 children
contracted the deadly disease from their mothers.

13.6. Position of women and children

In most of the African countries, women were often at the
lowest rung of the social ladder. Traditions and customs such
as forced marriage, polygamy, the ease of male divorce, bride
price, and fertility requirements characterised, and were
partly responsible for, the low status of women within the
African societies[119].
To also transform the social order on this level, the role of
women in African society had to be altered by the movement.
Samora Machel recognised this: "The participation of
Mozambican women in all sectors is an essential condition for

the triumph of our Revolution. It is the essential condition
for the advancement of the new society which we wish to
create"[120].

 After independence, the Organisation of Mozambican Women
(OMM), acting in concert with both rural and urban dinamising
groups, launched a campaign to alter the political
consciousness of both women and men, and formed branches of
the OMM all over the country[121]. Men who objected and those
who continued with practices such as bride price and polygamy,
were disciplined and barred from holding political
positions[122].

 Despite the opposition to the change of women's roles,
particularly in the rural areas, and the fact that the
Portuguese system of family law -- which does not protect the
rights of women -- is still in force, 28 percent of all
deputies elected to local assemblies are women[123].

 In Algeria, the largest women's rights organisation has 400
members -- and this in a country with 26 million people[124].
Under the Islamic tradition few women are allowed to venture
out of the home: of the country's work force of eight million,
only 380 000 are female[125]. Men can divorce their wives by
simply telling them that the marriage is over -- and they are
allowed to cast their wives' votes[126].

13.7. Toward reconstruction and a post-revolutionary society

After independence, Frelimo and the other revolutionary
regimes were "faced with the prospect of attempting to do two
potentially contradictory things at once: to sustain something
of its inherited structure in order to avoid economic collapse
while beginning to search out openings toward an economy very
differently structured"[127]. The manner in which the economic
order should be structured was pointed out at the Third
Congress as being "the destruction of capitalism and the
construction of socialism"[128].

 However, the economic realities, such as poor agricultural
production, wide-spread hunger and escalating foreign debt,
forced Frelimo to backtrack after only seven years. In October
1990, the government altered its constitution not only to
allow other political parties, but also to introduce free
market mechanisms in the economic sphere. Article 37, clause
one emphasises the following aspects: "[A]ppreciation of
labour, market forces, initiative of economic agents,
participation of all types of ownership, and action by the
state as the regulator and promoter of economic and social
growth and development"[129].

In a similar fashion, Algeria, Angola and Guinea-Bissau are currently restructuring their economies on systems based less on dogma and more on pragmatism.

13.8. Conclusion

This chapter described a prominent characteristic of the African revolutions studied here. To varying degrees, the revolutionary governments failed to transform the economies into healthy and expanding systems.

After the fall of the old regime, a process of nationalisation began in all the countries, except Zimbabwe (and newly-independent Namibia). The state-owned enterprises were not effective, and continuing war and conflict meant that agricultural production could not be increased sufficiently to supply in the demands of a growing population.
Angola and Algeria were fortunate in that they could depend on revenue created by their oil industries, but when the oil price slumped these economies suffered as well.

Ali Mazrui[130] argued that African countries could be "modernising without westernizing" and had to strive toward high levels of knowledge, innovation and social sympathy. The African revolutionaries tried to do so, but -- with the possible exception of Algeria -- very little modernisation took place. In fact, the rigid economic policies followed by the revolutionary governments led to little economic growth, no foreign investments, and therefore no "wealth" to redistribute. The countries had to borrow on a vast scale -- particularly from western countries -- in order to feed their populations. However, the liberalisation processes taking place in most of the countries are having an effect in the economic sphere as well. It is possible that with the introduction of freer markets, as well as extensive foreign aid, the countries may achieve a higher standard of living.

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Chapter Fourteen
Conclusion

Africa has seen numerous types of collective political
violence. Various types of revolts existed through the
centuries, and were recorded by historians from the time of
ancient Egypt onward.

Revolution is a relatively "modern" concept -- its current
meaning evolved at the end of the eighteenth century, during
the French Revolution. Whereas concepts such as revolt
indicate the replacement of rulers, revolution goes further:
it deals with the transformation of the old order and the
creation of a "new world". It is this aspect of the concept
which formed one of the central elements of the analytical
model used in this study to distinguish between revolution and
other violent collective action in Africa.

To identify contemporary African revolutions, another element
was added to the analytical model. Popular participation in
the process of transforming society is considered by the
majority of experts on revolutions as indispensable. The
analytical model was further refined by identifying different
elements of the two central aspects of revolution.

Thus, the transformation aspect deals with the political and
socio-economic order, while the participation of the
population is reflected in the leadership, ideology, followers
and organisation of the revolutionary movement.

A third element of revolution is evident from the fact that
revolution is classified as belonging to the genus
"rebellion". Rebellion means, explicitly or implicitly, the
use of violence against authority. There can be no revolution
without violence, and the African revolutions were
characterised by extreme violence.

Finally, revolution is not a sudden event, nor an overnight
change as, for example, a coup d'etat. It is a drawn out
process, often characterised by several phases.

These four major aspects were included in the definition of
revolution used in this study. The phenomenon was identified
as the fundamental transformation of the political and socio-
economic orders of a country by an élite-directed, mass-based,
and ideologically-inspired organisation that employs violence
during one or all of the phases in this process.

The analytical tools constructed in Part One of this study

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were then employed to firstly identify the African countries
which had experienced revolutions. Five countries were
identified -- Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and
Zimbabwe. These countries experienced the transformation of
society by a mass movement. Other African countries such as
Ethiopia or Burkina Faso were extensively transformed, but the
aspect of popular participation in any of the stages of the
transformation was absent. On the other hand, in countries
where the government was toppled by a mass movement (for
example, Milton Obote in Uganda, and Namibia after its war of
independence), the new rulers did not attempt to fundamentally
transform society.

What were the characteristics of the revolutions in these
five African countries?

The revolutionary movements did not set out with a plan or
strategy (usually supplied by external powers) to topple a
regime that was inherently good and efficient, as governments
often painted the picture. In fact, the very existence of the
movements meant that the incumbents were out of touch with the
population.
In all of the African countries, the ancien regime was
established through violence. European powers colonised
African land, fought off primary resistance, and imposed their
rule on the local population. The rulers could therefore not
count on support from the population, who viewed their rule as
illegitimate. European superiority was the cornerstone of this
rule. Political institutions were controlled by whites, who
made up the political élite as well. This made the old
political order vulnerable, because the leaders of the local
population could not be co-opted into the élite and government
structures. Resentful of their inferior status, the local
population tried various types of peaceful resistance, which
was usually met with violent repression by the government
forces. The death of thousands of people in this manner proved
to be one of the major causes of revolution, because it led to
the establishment of movements dedicated to gaining political
power through any means.

The selected African revolutions were characterised by the
fact that the population had to endure repression and
discrimination for a long time. Furthermore, from the
description of the socio-economic conditions prior to the
revolution it is evident that the living conditions in the
selected countries were poor.
The intricate relationship between socio-economic conditions
and revolutionary potential was examined. All the countries

had a small, but very influential white community. The largest
white group was established in Algeria, were the one million
pieds noirs comprised 10 percent of the population. The whites
controlled the economies of the countries, while the local
populations -- mostly rural peasants -- were engaged in
subsistence farming, or small-scale cash crop agriculture.

The whites were involved in agriculture as well, but in an
organised and scientific manner. They pushed the local
population off fertile lands, adding to their resentment. The
fact that the whites controlled the means of production meant
that they controlled labour as well. In the Portuguese areas,
strict labour regulations were enforced. The local population
had to work on state projects such as the building of roads --
a major grievance in these areas. In Algeria, where large
numbers of peasants had been pushed off the land, there
developed a large lumpen-proletariat -- jobless, unskilled
peasants. This group was to support the FLN in large numbers,
primarily because they anticipated a better future under a
Muslim government.

Another grievance of the local population was the fact that
the whites received much better medical care and education. In
1960, for example, Guinea-Bissau had only four hospitals. The
French provided far better medical services, but had to
contend with a rapidly growing Muslim population.

It can be speculated that the ancien regimes, by giving the
local population no political voice and doing little to
improve their living conditions, were in themselves a cause of
the revolutions described in this study. The people had
numerous grievances, and the "men of words" -- the future
leaders of the revolutionary movements -- advocated that the
current order should be transformed.

The people who established the revolutionary movements were
characterised by the fact that they were intellectuals who had
exposure to the western world. Most were males in their
twenties or thirties. They had special character traits, of
which the most important was the firmness of their
convictions. Against nearly insurmountable odds they proceeded
to take on mighty governments. The men endured detention and
many died for the cause they so fervently believed in.

Another characteristic of contemporary African revolutions is
the fact that the leaders were inspired by an ideology which
preached the radical transformation of society. This aspect of
the ideology (its social criticism) went hand in hand with
another aspect, nationalism, which usually received more
prominence prior to the fall of the old regime. With its
emphasis on the independence of the territory, nationalism was

able to cut across class and ethnic ties, and proved to be
instrumental in uniting the people of the country in a broad
anti-government front. The ideology did not only unite people.
It encouraged political action, or praxis. People who believed
fervently in the ideology of the revolutionary movement not
only supported its cause, but also took up weapons against the
enemy.

The revolutionary followers were characterised by their
youth. With little education and few prospects of a good life,
they joined movements which they thought would create a more
equal and prosperous society.

All the revolutionary movements placed great importance on
organisation. Samora Machel traced Frelimo's victory to its
ability to mobilise and organise the population. In fact, all
the revolutionary movements were to a large extent able to
determine what the future of their countries would look like
because they had the most competent organisations.

These organisations provided a chain of command, which eased
communication within the movement, and instilled discipline as
well. Two inherent problems of organisation -- friction
between powerful groups in the chain of command, and a
tendency toward authoritarianism -- were evident in the
African revolutions.

It is of little use if a movement succeeds in mobilising an
unhappy population around ideals of a better future, but does
not challenge the rulers. In Part Four, this conflict between
the revolutionary challengers and the incumbents was analysed.

All of the revolutionary movements were at first committed to
peaceful protest against the political and socio-economic
conditions. However, when it became clear that this approach
was not successful, the movements decided on an armed struggle
against the ancien regime.

At first this struggle had a low intensity, but following
Mao's strategy on guerrilla warfare, the movements gained the
support of the population and increased their military
operations. In the Portuguese areas in particular, the
revolutionary movements were so successful in taking on the
government troops that liberated areas were established. In
these areas, which were controlled by the revolutionary
movement, the guerrillas could rest, replenish their supplies,
and politicise the local population.

The guerrilla forces did not only use Mao's guerrilla
strategy of winning local support through persuasion and
example. Particularly in Algeria, terror became an instrument
of the revolutionary movement. The FLN employed terror against

the local population -- forcing peasants to co-operate -- and
against the French as well. The terror campaign in the cities,
primarily Algiers, caused considerable loss of life and the
destruction of property. In the final analysis, however, it
was a major setback for the FLN, because the French destroyed
its whole urban network.

The violent and protracted conflict between the challenger
and incumbent in Africa did not escape the notice of a world
in the grip of the Cold War. Countries took sides: the Soviet
Union and the East Bloc supported the revolutionary movements
in their struggle against colonialism and imperialism, while
the West aided its Nato allies in their battle against the
insurgents. Support was not restricted to state level. Several
groups -- for example churches and student movements --
supported the parties in the conflict.
All the revolutionary movements studied here received
external support. The guerrillas received modern weapons and
training which they needed desperately to continue their fight
against the old regime. Diplomatic support, particularly in
the United Nations (which reflected the power of Third World
countries) proved to be almost as important as victories in
the bush.

On the other hand, some of the allies of the incumbents
decided to withdraw their support. The decision of the United
States not to support France any longer in the UN's Security
Council was a major victory for the revolutionary movement. In
Rhodesia, Ian Smith was practically forced to hand power to
the blacks after South Africa threatened to cut off its
support.

The combination of military success and diplomatic pressure
was employed by all the movements studied here.
Despite their numerical superiority, the government troops
were often ineffective in their counter-insurgency operations.
Although the strategic thinkers knew that the battle was
primarily for the hearts and minds of the population, the
troops acted in such a way as to make popular support for the
regime impossible. Peasants were herded into "protected
villages" where the living conditions were poor -- instead of
winning the people over, the government alienated them.
Furthermore, the cost of military operations was high: before
the fall of the Caetano regime Portugal was using 40 percent
of its budget for its African wars.

Two types of transfer of power characterised African
revolutions. On the one hand there was the sudden transfer,

which was usually the result of the sudden fall of the old
regime. The Portuguese colonies are a prime example, while
Algeria shows several elements of this type of transfer as
well. The outcome of such transfers was traumatic: the whites,
feeling betrayed, resorted to large-scale violence. Right-wing
terror groups sprang up in a brief reign of terror. When the
whites saw that they could not prevent the transfer, there
occurred what can only be described as a mass exodus.

In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, real give-and-take
negotiations took place. The position of the whites -- and
some of their privileges as well -- were guaranteed at the
Lancaster House conference. Despite their trepidation,
accommodation was reached. A number of whites left the
country, but the frenzied evacuation which crippled the
economies of the other countries did not take place.

In Part Five, the final aspect of African revolutions -- the
transformation of society -- was analysed.

Characteristic of all the revolutions was the attempt to
create political unity in countries deeply divided by the wars
of independence. This was attempted through the introduction
of a new myth (usually embodied in the constitution) which
stressed egalitarianism.

New political institutions developed. With the exception of
Zimbabwe all the countries became single-party states. In
Angola and Mozambique, the ruling parties were changed from a
broad front into vanguard parties. However, the revolutionary
movements did not enjoy the support of the whole population.
In Angola, a civil war rages fifteen years after independence,
while in Mozambique Frelimo battles the bandit movement
Renamo. Peace negotiations between the two governments and
their opponents are currently taking place. This marks a
relaxation of revolutionary fervor -- Thermidor, as it is
called after a similar occurrence in the French Revolution.

All the revolutions showed, or are now showing, signs of
Thermidor. The movements are less doctrinaire and more
pragmatic, with the former vanguard parties agreeing -- in
theory, at least -- to multi-party systems.

A further characteristic of the revolutions studied here is
the difficulties which the movements encountered in their
attempt to transform the economic order.

The exodus of whites led to the nationalisation of property
(as called for in the ideologies of the movements) and the
establishment of state-owned enterprises. Mozambique and
Guinea-Bissau depended upon agriculture, while Angola and
Algeria derived most of their income from oil. When the price
of oil fell, their economies -- and the population --

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suffered. Their attempts to redistribute wealth without economic growth proved disasterous in most cases, particularly in the former Lusophone colonies.

Today, nearly 37 years after the outbreak of hostilities in Algeria, the populations of the African countries which experienced revolutions are faced with bleak economic prospects, civil war, rampant disease, and governments which cling cynically to power. The "winds of change" are, however, blowing again through Africa: this time it is not political independence which is the rallying cry, but democratic reforms and a move toward free-market economies. Former "one-party states" such as Angola, Algeria and Mozambique are opening up not only their political orders, but are moving away from central planning and nationalisation in the economic sphere. Even doctrinaire revolutionaries have to live in the real world.

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
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
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Mozambique

TANZANIA

ZAMBIA

M A L A W I

Lilongwe

N I A S S A

C A B O
D E L G A D O

Pemba

Nacala

N A M P U L A

Nampula   Lumbo

Zomba

T E T E

Cabora Bassa Dam

Benga

Z A M B É Z I A

Harare

Z I M B A B W E

M A N I C A

S O F A L A

Beira

MOZAMBIQUE

CHANNEL

INHAMBANE

GAZA

Inhambane

SOUTH
AFRICA

Lourenco Marques

Mbabane

SWAZILAND

N

Guinea-Bissau

Angola

Algeria

Map of Rhodesia showing Mashonaland, Matabeleland, Eastern Highlands and neighbouring countries Zambia, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique. Cities and towns shown include Lusaka, Chirundu, Lake Kariba, Karoi, Centenery, Mt. Darwin, Tete, Sinoia, Salisbury, Rusape, Inyanga, Umtali, Gwelo, Fort Victoria, Melsetter, Chipinga, Beira, Bulawayo, Plumtree, Francistown, Beitbridge, Maputu, Wankie, Kazungula. Rivers shown: R. Zambezi, R. Limpopo.