A Comparative Analysis of Namibia's Peacemaking Role in the Southern African Development Community region:

The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola

(1996–2002)

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Declaration

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Date: December 2012

Abstract

Conflicts are a prevalent phenomenon in Africa. Of major wars after the Second World War, many occurred on the African continent. Families go to bed not sure of seeing one another on the following day. Conflicts and the lack of peace in Africa have been correctly identified as a major obstacle on the emancipation path that the African masses tread from poverty, underdevelopment and much want. Africa thus needs to take conflict resolution and the maintenance of peace on the continent seriously.

One cannot, in any way, attempt to solve something that one does not understand. Research is, thus, important in the search for a peaceful Africa. In expression of such sentiments, the current study was undertaken to gain an understanding of peacemaking in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. The study seeks to make a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in this region. Such was wanting or minimal in the literature on Namibia. The study considered two case studies, those of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola.

The study found that Namibia is not only an active participant in SADC peacemaking, but it has contributed to the return of peace and stability in the region; the country played an important role in peacemaking in both the DRC and Angola. It found various similarities and differences between the two case studies. It was established that Namibia takes a twofold approach to peacemaking for it engaged in both diplomatic and military actions. Additionally, the study found that Namibia's peacemaking role, in the cases considered, was conducted in a secretive manner. This is to say that the approach was somewhat secretive albeit becoming public knowledge later. While all cases are regarded as successful in terms of objectives vis-

à-vis results analysis, the study found that the Angolan peacemaking was more successful than the DRC.

This comparative analysis is, therefore, presented for those seeking to understand Namibia's peacemaking in the region and also as a basis for future studies.

Opsomming

Konflik is 'n algemene verskynsel in Afrika. Van die grootste oorloë sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het op die Afrikavasteland plaasgevind. Gesinne gaan saans bed toe sonder om te weet of hulle mekaar die volgende dag sal sien. Konflik en die gebrek aan vrede in Afrika word met reg bestempel as 'n groot struikelblok vir die Afrikamassas se bevryding van armoede, onderontwikkeling en uiterste gebrek. Afrika behoort dus erns te maak met konflikbeslegting en die handhawing van vrede op die vasteland.

Tog kan 'n mens nie eintlik iets probeer oplos indien jy dit nie volkome begryp nie. Navorsing is dus belangrik in die strewe na 'n vreedsame Afrika. Hierdie studie is derhalwe onderneem om 'n begrip te bied van vredestigting in die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap- (SAOG-)streek. Meer bepaald bied die ondersoek 'n vergelykende uiteensetting van Namibië se rol in vredestigting in die SAOG-streek – 'n onderwerp waaroor daar tot dusver weinig, indien enigiets, in literatuur oor Namibië te vinde was. Die studie ondersoek twee gevallestudies, naamlik die Demokratiese Republiek van die Kongo (DRK) en Angola.

Die navorsing bevind dat Namibië nie net 'n aktiewe deelnemer aan SAOG-vredestigting is nie, maar ook tot die herstel van vrede en stabiliteit in die streek bygedra het; die land het 'n belangrike rol in konflikbeslegting in sowel die DRK as Angola gespeel. Verskeie ooreenkomste en verkille tussen die twee gevallestudies het uit die navorsing na vore gekom. Dit blyk dat Namibië 'n tweeledige benadering tot vredestigting volg: Die land onderneem diplomatieke sowel as militêre optrede. Verder het die studie bevind dat Namibië sy rol as konflikbeslegter in die twee gevalle wat ondersoek is op 'n skugter manier vervul het. Dit is om te sê dat die benadering was ietwat geheimsinnig al is dit besig om openbare kennis later.

Hoewel alle gevalle as geslaagd beskou kan word aan die hand van die oogmerke en die uiteindelike uitkomste, het die studie bevind dat vredestigting in Angola geslaagder was as in die DRK.

Hierdie vergelykende uiteensetting word dus aangebied vir diegene wat Namibië se benadering tot vredestigting in die streek wil verstaan, en dien terselfdertyd as grondslag vir toekomstige studies.

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I must thank the living God for guiding me, protecting me and illumining the lamb of my heart through this journey. Indeed, I thank the ancestors for the guidance from the beginning to the present. The two important women in my life, Grandmother Teopolina Vanyenga Adolf and mother Aune-Luice Ashivudhi are responsible for who I am and what I have become, I thank them for everything.

Contents

List of Acronyms

AFDL   Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire

ANANGOLA   Association of Natives of Angola

ANC   African National Congress

BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation

CLM   Congolese Liberation Movement

COD   Congress of Democrats

DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo

FAA   Angolan Armed Forces

FNLA   National Front for the Liberation of Angola

FTA   Free Trade Area

ISDSC   Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

ISS   Institute for Security Studies

LDPT   Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

MoD   Ministry of Defence

MONUA   United Nations Observer Mission in Angola

MPLA   Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

MLC   Movement for Liberation of the Congo

NDF   Namibian Defence Force

NRA   National Resistance Army

OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RCD-ML	Rally for Congolese Democracy-Liberation Movement
RCD –N	Rally for Congolese Democracy – National
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US	United States
UNSCR	United Nation Security Council Resolution
USSR	Union Soviet Socialist Republic

Timeline of the important events with regards to the DRC case study

Date	Event
1884/5	Berlin Conference takes place; the DRC becomes a personal colony of King Leopold II.
1908	Belgian Government takes over, from Kind Leopold II, the Administration of the Congo.
January 1960	Belgium abruptly announced the granting of independence to the Congo.
30 June 1960	The Congo becomes independent with Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister.
24 November 1965	With Lumumba overthrown, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu comes to power via a coup d'état.
1994	Rwandan genocide takes place; the perpetrators flee into eastern Zaire.
17 May 1997	Colonel Mobutu is overthrown by Laurent Kabila assisted by Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila renames the country, from Zaire, to Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
1998	President Kabila orders the Rwandan and Ugandan forces and personnel to leave the country. Revolts and army mutiny occurs especially in eastern DRC. Various rebel groups are formed, to overthrow Kabila, with the support of Rwanda and Uganda.

	Rebel forces and their allies begin occupying various provinces and started heading towards Kinshasa.
August 1998	President Kabila appealed to SADC for assistance.
	SADC OPDS meeting on the DRC conflict takes place; establishes the verification committee to study the conflict and provide recommendations.
	Acting on recommendation of the verification committee; Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe send troops to assist President Kabila.
	Namibia provides a loan of N$ 25 Million and 20 tons of military supplies to the DRC.
13-14 September 1998	SADC Annual Summit takes place in Grand Baie, Mauritius.
	Preceded by major rift between SADC Chair, President Mandela and SADC OPDS Chair, President Mugabe on the intervention; SADC supports Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe's intervention in the DRC.
09 April 1999	Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe sign a mutual defence pact.
10 July 1999	The Lusaka peace agreement is signed between all parties to the conflict.

February 2000	UN deploys troops under MONUC to oversee the Lusaka peace agreement. Namibia fully withdraws her troops.
17 January 2001	President Kabila is assassinated, his son Joseph Kabila assumes the Presidency.
January 2001 – onwards	The Inter-Congolese Dialogue begins to take place.
16 April 2001	UN panel of experts publishes its report on the illegal exploitation of the resources of the DRC. Foreign countries on both sides are found guilty.
17 December 2002	The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement is signed.

Timeline of the important events with regards to the Angolan case study

Date	Event
1483	First Portuguese explorers arrive in Angola.
1575	Paulo Dias de Novais erects a colonial settlement in Luanda.
1961	The launch of the armed anti-colonial struggle.
1974	A coup occurs in Portugal. The new Portuguese regime abruptly announces the granting of independence to Angola.

January 1975	The Alvor Accord is signed between Portugal, the MPLA, FANLA and UNITA. Fighting for state control between the nationalist movements emerged.
August 1975	UNITA occupies southern Angola with the help of South Africa and the backing of the US. The Zairean Army of Mobutu invades northern Angola in support of FNLA.
October 1975	Cuba sends troops to Angola in support of the MPLA.
11 November 1975	Angolan Independence day. MPLA, having secured the capital, Luanda, proclaimed the 'people's republic.' Agostinho Neto becomes President.
1976	US support to UNITA halts with the passage of the Clark Amendment. South Africa withdrew its forces into northern Namibia.
July 1985	Clark Amendment is repealed; the US resumed its support to UNITA. Cuba thus maintained about 50 000

ground troops in Angola to support the MPLA government.

May 1991	UNITA and MPLA sign the Bicesse peace agreement. UNAVEM II is established.
September 1992	First elections are held, won by MPLA, and UNITA refuses to accept the results thus going back to war.
21 November 1994	UNITA and MPLA sign the Lusaka protocol. UN establishes UNAVEM III to oversee the protocol. Savimbi flouts the Lusaka protocol, goes back to war.
1996	Namibia forms part of UNAVEM III.
March 1997	Namibia sends a force, to Angola, to serve first in UN road verification and VIP escort and later as Rapid Reaction Force.
1999	NDF integrated its operational plans, in fighting UNITA, with FAA. NDF is deployed between Angola-Namibia borders. Namibia grants permission to FAA to

	come fight UNITA rebels inside Namibia and also to launch attacks from inside Namibia.
09 April 1999	Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe sign a mutual defence pact.
December 1999	MPLA congress takes place, president Dos Santos calls for the UN to withdraw its troops. He suspends the Lusaka peace process on Angola and directs the FAA to launch an onslaught against UNITA. NDF Chief of Staff, Major-General Martin Shalli acknowledges the NDF presence inside Angola fighting UNITA.
22 February 2002	Jonas Savimbi is assassinated.
4 April 2002	Surviving UNITA military leaders sign a peace agreement with the MPLA government.

CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background and orientation

Is peacemaking a subject of international relations (IR) or of political science? It features, at length, in the literature of both political science and IR. Be that as it may, this study engages not in wasteful epistemological or ontological debates between the two. The above merely acknowledges the existence of such a debate in the field. Brown and Ainley (2005:2), in discussing this debate, correctly conclude that there is hardly an area of social science where there is universal consensus that can be relied upon for a field definition. They further caution that:

> … conventional definitions in most of the social sciences tend to privilege an account of the world that reflects the interest of those who are dominant within a particular area.

Given that the study partakes not in the above epistemological and ontological debates of IR and political science, it suffices to state that the concern of this enquiry forms part of peace studies and peacemaking literature, whether one locates it under political science or IR.

Peacemaking is necessitated by conflict. The world today has accepted that conflict has become a word that is frequently located in most reports on contemporary challenges to the African continent. Such is, indeed, also the case for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Put differently, the SADC region is not immune to conflicts. The region has witnessed conflicts of the worst kind that have left negative footprints on the family and public life of its inhabitants. It is for the same reason that, when SADC, the successor of the Southern Africa Coordination Conference

(SADCC), was established, in 1992, peace promotion was one of the key considerations in the mandate formulation of this regional body (Nathan, 2006). Specifically, the SADC Treaty provides for the following under Article 4 (principles) and 5 (objectives):

> SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles: … (b) solidarity, peace and security … (e) peaceful settlement of disputes [and provided that the] … objectives of SADC shall be to: (c) promote and defend peace and security.

> (SADC Trade, 2011)

Peacemaking is fundamental in the maintenance of peace and security in the SADC region. Peacemaking is a necessity; it is a common good and, indeed, an ingredient in the maintenance, sustenance and guaranteeing of a security community (Nathan, 2004). It is a reactive measure that seeks to create an enabling environment for conflict settlement and post-conflict reconstruction (Du Pisani, 2010). Studies on contemporary peacemaking call for a need to rethink and to generate a proper understanding of peacemaking and peace processes, because peacemaking is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. Indeed, this means that peacemaking needs to be studied and researched if rethinking and addressing current challenges is the focus of concern. In discussing contemporary peacemaking, Darby and Mac Ginty (2008:5–6) challenge that:

> Contemporary peacemaking … is often a creature of the international community and their co-opted national elites and has limited connection with the bulk of citizens in the war-affected state … contemporary peacemaking … often reinforces power-holders and replicates exclusive patterns of social and political relations.

Darby and Mac Ginty's observation is corroborated by many peacemaking operations, including those that took place in the SADC region. In such conflicts, there have always been some direct or indirect foreign hands – before, during or after the active conflict.

The above debate regarding location and contextualisation of peacemaking as far as SADC is concerned assists in understanding the subject matter to be discussed in this study. It is concerned with the peacemaking that is undertaken in SADC by a particular country, Namibia, which itself had conflict experiences. Namibia suffered more than 100 years of brutal colonialism and apartheid. It is a post-conflict reconstruction society that must, therefore, be of interest to those concerned with issues of peace, conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. The researcher thus endeavours to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region, giving comparative analytical clarity as to its role in peacemaking in the DRC (between 1998 and 2002) and Angola (between 1996 and 2002). As is practice in the social sciences, academic enquiries of this nature are not conducted delinked from the existing literature. The practice in the social sciences had been and remains locating a study within a particular theoretical framework in the field. This study would also provide an overview of the theoretical and scholarly work done on peacemaking. To obtain a correct conceptual understanding of the concept peacemaking, this chapter, on conceptualization and Operationalization section, will define peacemaking in the context of the study.

1.2 Rationale of the study

Since obtaining independence on 21 March 1990, Namibia has been involved in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and – important to this study – peacemaking. Just two years after its independence, in 1992, this small state (in terms of both military and economic power) sent its troops to Cambodia as part of the United Nations (UN) peace

support operation; it was involved in Angola and the DRC (Ndaitwah, 2010). While a substantial amount of research has been undertaken into peacemaking in the SADC region by African researchers and others, there are generally very few studies focused on the role of Namibia. In the first analytical study of Namibia's foreign policy, Mushelenga (2008:9) – who is currently Namibia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – confirms the above, saying:

> very little research has been conducted on Namibia's foreign policy. A large part of the … literature on Namibia's foreign policy is found in the speeches of the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Government officials. Academic research on Namibia's foreign policy is limited to four publications which were all produced by the same author, Andre Du Pisani, Professor of Political Science at the University of Namibia, who, accordingly, admitted that.

As Mushelenga (2008) expounds above, the subject, peacemaking, is truly solely left to, and monopolised by, government bureaucrats and politicians in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Presidency. Politicians come and go; there is limitation to the transfer of institutional memory by word of mouth, hence a need for studies such as this to subject these political events to analytical and academic enquiry for a greater understanding of the country's peacemaking role. The study is thus undertaken for contributory purposes, being conducted to fill the gap exposed above. It is intended to add to the little research that there is and hopefully to encourage further research.

1.3 Literature review

1.3.1 SADC 'peace profile'

While the subject under consideration (the unit of analysis) for this study is Namibia, it is fitting to consider the SADC 'peace profile', for it is under the banner of SADC that some of Namibia's peacemaking activities in the region have been conducted. Additionally, SADC always features in regional conflict resolution in one way or the other. To understand peace in SADC, the study of SADC's institutional character is of paramount importance.

In 1992 states in the southern African region concluded the treaty that established SADC. Specifically, Article 4 of the SADC Treaty stated that the purpose of SADC, among many, was that of peaceful settlement of disputes. Such a declaration did not take place in a vacuum, as Meyns (2002) establishes, one is not to understand peace and security in SADC in isolation, for the ultimate responsibility of peace and security in Africa is with the African Union, while that for world peace and security rests on the shoulders of the UN. It is for the same reason that the preamble of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security recognises the UN Security Council and the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU's) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

It is, however, fitting to note that the above-mentioned Mechanism is no longer in existence, as is neither the OAU itself. The latter became the African Union (AU), which was launched in July 2002, while the former (Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution) was replaced by the AU Peace and Security Council, which entered into force on 26 December 2003 (AU, 2011; Mwanasali, 2009).

Following the establishment of SADC in 1992, up until April 1996, SADC was characterised by discussions pertaining to the establishment of the security structure aimed at dealing with security fractures in the region. The SADC 1993 Framework and Strategy document was very clear on this call, as it was on the key principles characterising the security order. It generated debates until 28 June 1996, when the summit of the heads of state and government convened in Gaborone (Botswana), where they finally established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS) (Nathan, 2006; SADC, 1992; 2003). In the years that followed, disagreement emerged among member states on the vision and approach that would constitute the politics of the SADC OPDS. Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania felt that the basis of the OPDS, in its quest for cooperation and peacemaking, must be political rather than military. In contrast, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia proposed a mutual defence pact that prioritised military cooperation as a way forward for the OPDS (Isaksen, 2002; Nathan, 2006). Meyns (2002:153) put it:

> The SADC Organ was initially established in 1996, but within a year a major dispute erupted between the Chairperson of the Organ, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, and the Chairperson of SADC, South Africa's President Nelson Mandela, as to how the Organ was to conduct its affairs in relation to the overall structures of SADC. The result was that the Organ remained dormant for several years …

As can be understood from the above, the organ caused major differences in the region. These differences became more profound when the conflict in the DRC reached its peak. This discussion is captured in chapter 3 in more details. Be it as it may, amidst such differences, the SADC heads of state and government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, at the gathering in Blantyre, Malawi, on 14 August 2001. The Protocol provided an institutional framework that would enable the member

states to coordinate politics, defence and security-related policies and activities (SADC, 2003).

From its inception, it was widely expected that SADC would promote peace and security and common political values. In conflict studies, there is a notion called 'path dependence' that is basically the idea that, once an event occurs, or is introduced, it is very difficult to reverse it, meaning that historical or past events are instrumental in the course of action that individuals/states may choose in the present. The term means that trigger events cannot be divorced from understanding present behavioural patterns (Pierson, 2000). It was, hence, widely expected that the path of peace pursued in the region after the end of the Cold War, the defeat of colonialism and apartheid would help sustain stability, peace, development and security in the region.

The emergence of conflicts in both the DRC and Angola was to change the dynamics in SADC, especially with regards to the Organ. The conflicts put such SADC objectives as the enhancement of common political values and the promotion of peace and security to the test. Apart from the testing of SADC and the Organ, the conflicts also presented a challenge in finding a common approach to conflict resolution in the region. The DRC continues to be a conflict prone area, while Angola has yet to benefit from peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (Isaksen & Tjønneland, 2001; Le Pere, 2004; Nathan, 2006).

This does not, however, mean that there has not been some positive progress in the two countries. It simply means that they are still recovering as post-conflict societies. There have been noteworthy achievements in both the DRC and Angola. Angola is adjusting extremely well economically, with its former belligerents now co-existing peacefully. By

2008, Angola was already the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, with oil production levels of more than 1.1 million barrels per day. All this was impossible in war time, when the government had control of only some regions, while the other regions remained in the hands of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels (Mills, 2009). The Lusaka Peace protocol of 1999, together with the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2001–2002) and the 2002 Pretoria Agreement are noteworthy successes as far as the DRC is concerned. The return to normality in the DRC cannot be downplayed in its importance as a success in itself, considering that it marked an end to the far-reaching conflict that claimed approximately 4 million lives (CCR, 2009).

1.3.2   *Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding*

While the general definition of 'peacemaking' is taken, in the current thesis, as that which is provided by Nzimba (2002), in which he presents 'peacemaking' as having to do with arbitration and power mediation to control hostility, the UN, in its 2008 peacekeeping operations principles and guidelines document, defines 'peacemaking' as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement". One finds, in the analysis of the literature that the words 'peacemaking' and 'peacekeeping' are sometimes used interchangeably and are often discussed towards 'peacebuilding'. Put differently, 'peacemaking' and 'peacekeeping' are often seen as forerunners of 'peacebuilding', for the latter is unthinkable amidst violent and volatile conflicts. The UN, in the above-mentioned document, goes further to define 'peacekeeping' as an "action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers".

'Peacekeeping', according to Smith (2004), is understood in the context of the deployment of peace-keeping forces and the military, as well as of the police and civilian personnel. Following the definition of 'peacemaking' and 'peacekeeping', the UN document goes further to define 'peacebuilding' as "measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace". Jeong (2005) sees 'peacebuilding' as referring to a situation in which normal social activities can be resumed, after conflict has been contained, for the rebuilding of society. It is also understood, therein, as an action to identify and to support structures that tend to strengthen and to solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse of conflict. 'Peacebuilding' includes the consideration of issues of conflict origin, addressing issues pertaining to socio-economic foundations, political framework, and security, including reconciliation and justice (Jeong, 2005; Smith, 2004; UN, 2008). According to the UN, the gap between the three concepts is increasingly narrowing, as is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.

CONFLICT PREVENTION

Conflict

PEACEMAKING   **PEACE ENFORCEMENT**

Cease-fire

PEACEKEEPING

POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING AND PREVENTING RELAPSE TO CONFLICT

The Political Process

Figure 1.1 shows the UN illustration of how the "the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred" (UN: 2008, 19).

1.3.3   *Namibia in peacemaking*

Chapter 1, Article 1 (1) of the Namibian Constitution, on the establishment of the Republic of Namibia and the identification of its territory, defines Namibia as a secular, democratic and unitary state that is founded upon the principles of democracy, of the rule of law and of justice for all (Republic of Namibia, 1989). The country has a well-known history of both conflict and peacemaking. In discussing the rules and procedures for negotiated peacemaking in Namibia and South Africa, Du Toit (2008) considers Namibia as a very successful case of democratic transition, and, subsequently, of the peacemaking activities during the processes of gaining independence. He discusses peacemaking in Namibia in the context of post-Cold War transitions, arguing that such peacemaking in Namibia was a multilateral affair, for the conflict was extremely internationalised. This view is corroborated by the view expressed by the founding President, Sam Nujoma, in his inaugural speech made on 21 March 1990. On said occasion, President Nujoma remarked:

> … for the past 43 years or so, this land of our forbearers was a bone of contention between the Namibian people and the international community, on one hand, and South Africa, on the other. The Namibian problem was at the center of a bitter international dispute over the past four decades. The United Nations and other international bodies produced huge volumes of resolutions, in an attempt to resolve this intractable problem. However, it pleases me to state that we are gathered here today, not to pass yet another resolution, but to celebrate the dawn of a new era in this land …

> (//Gowaseb, 2010:284)

The international character of peacemaking in Namibia that chartered the way forward from independence has been instrumental in helping to shape the country's well-hailed liberal constitution. Five liberal democratic countries, namely France, Germany, Britain, Canada and the United States, had set the context for the new constitution with their influence on the constitution principles to inform the Constituent Assembly that drafted the Namibian Constitution (Geingob, 2004). As such, Chapter 11, Article 96 of the Namibian constitution (on Foreign Relations) states that Namibia is, among many other imperatives, to promote:

> International cooperation, peace and security; [to] foster(s) respect for international law and treaty obligations; [and to] encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

(Republic of Namibia, 1989:46–47)

Such principles were to prove decisive in the pattern of peacemaking and conflict resolution that was followed in post-independence Namibia. When the conflict between Namibia and Botswana over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island issue unfolded (Ashton, 2000), Namibia, guided by the constitutional provision on the "settlement of international disputes by peaceful means", opted not to wage war against Botswana, but rather to seek peaceful resolution of the conflict by taking the case before the International Court of Justice. Namibia subsequently lost the case, but continued to coexist with its neighbouring state, the winning party, peacefully. The country's continuous participation in various UN and African peacemaking/peacekeeping (see appendixes I, II and III) missions occurred in the same spirit, especially in regards to the provision on the respect of 'international law' and 'treaty obligations'. As Mushelenga (2008) has established, President Hifikepunye Pohamba (the successor of the first President who is

now the incumbent President), in his inaugural address of 21 March 2005, stated that the country would continue supporting conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa.

In supplementing the above discussions, Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005:222-231) find that:

> Namibia's first engagement in UN peacekeeping operations was the dispatch of a contingent of 43 soldiers and equipment to work as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC was established by UN Security Council Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992, to ensure the implementation of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. The NDF also contributed personnel to serve on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III in 1996. UN Security Council Resolution 976 of 8 February 1995 established the multidimensional UNAVEM III to assist the government and UNITA in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation against a fragile politico-military background.[In 2003] an NDF contingent of 855 personnel served with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). These included 844 troops, six civilian police, four staff officers and three military observers.

The authors further summarises Namibia's peacemaking role as follows:

> [Namibia] collaborated with the ANC in South Africa during the crucial period of the 1990s; spurned the military option and agreed to the International Court of   Justice arbitration in a potentially explosive incident with Botswana; continued to offer   its political and military support to Angola; was capable of dealing with a   potentially divisive internal security situation in the Caprivi Strip through military   and   active

diplomatic engagement with its neighbours; discharged its regional security obligations under SADC by deploying forces in the DRC; and created a   network   of security and defence protocols with all its neighbours while continuing to train,   equip and consolidate professionalism in the NDF.

Through Namibia's judicious use of the military, Southern Africa is host to a unique experience, the relevance of which is worth sharing with other regions of the world that are struggling to emerge from protracted conflict.

1.4   Aims and objectives of the study

The primary aim of the study is to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region with reference to the DRC and the Angolan conflict respectively. This comparative analysis is essential in establishing Namibia's peacemaking profile and effort in the region. In that context, the study's additional aims and objectives are that of asking questions examining and appraising the extent to which Namibia was actually engaged in effective peacemaking in the two cases under consideration? Said differently, the study will assess whether Namibia genuinely engaged in peacemaking.

The secondary aim of the study is to provide a descriptive account of Namibia's peacemaking role in the selected cases.

The study, in its comparative analysis, will determine the similarities and differences between the two cases under study. Furthermore, the study will determine which of the two cases was more outstanding and yielded successes and why?

1.5   Conceptualization and operationalization

What a researcher means when using certain concepts is very important in social science research of this kind. The way in which the researcher measures the concepts is

also of importance. The concepts that require explaining are key concepts used in formulating research questions. The definitions of concepts and how they are to be measured is called 'conceptualisation' and 'operationalisation'. Babbie (2010:157) defines conceptualisation as "the process of specifying observations and measurements that give concepts definite meaning for the purpose of a research study". He adds that operationalisation "is an extension of conceptualization that specifies the exact procedures that will be used to measure the attributes of variables".

This study adopts the UN conceptualisation of 'peacemaking' as the actions and measures taken to address a conflict that is already in motion (UN, 2008).

The UN, in its 2008 'Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines' document, explicitly defined peacemaking as generally including "measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement." The document further adds that "Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently " (UN, 2008).

Darby & Mac Ginty (2008:1), in their book, 'Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction,' followed the UN definition on the diversity of peacemakers and observe that "many international organizations, governments, militant groups, NGOs, and communities have gained vast experience of making, keeping, and building peace."

Ouellet (2003) discusses peacemaking in context of the UN Charter and writes that "peacemaking is the diplomatic effort intended to move a violent conflict into

nonviolent dialogue, where differences are settled through representative political institutions. The objective of peacemaking is thus to end the violence between the contending parties. Article 33 of the UN Charter specifies, "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, [and] resort to regional agencies or arrangements" as modes of peaceful intervention in violent conflicts. Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter also allow for sanctions, blockading, and violent intervention in order to restore the peace between warring states."

Conflict, in this study, is defined as a situation in which two parties have antagonistic views and goals as to what must constitute their present or their future. These conflicting views and goals subsequently result in the parties committing violent actions against each other. Each views the other as an obstacle in the path that they intend to travel to achieve their goals. To the antagonistic parties, the only way that they can see of attaining their goals is to destroy, to eliminate, or to remove each other from the occupied positions or from the status held.

In the light of the above conceptual definitions, 'peacemaking' can, therefore, be defined operationally in the given context as, for example, when one state sends military personnel to another country in order to halt a dispute between two antagonistic parties. The process can also operate at the diplomatic level, as opposed to taking the form of military action. When such is the case, one or more nation states send envoys to encourage the antagonistic parties to stop their belligerent and violent actions towards each other and to see how they can find common grounds and subsequent peace.

This study operationally views sending troops, including the diplomatic efforts made in this respect, to aid a legitimate government that is under attack by a foreign or domestic

aggressor(s) as 'peacemaking', for the ultimate aim of the help-seeking government is to avert the aggressor(s), so that peace prevails in that state.

1.6   Research Design

1.6.1   Unit of Analysis

The term 'unit of analysis' is defined as 'the what or whom being studied' or the 'unit, case, or part of social life that is under consideration' (Neuman, 2006, 58: Babbie, 2010, 98). For the purpose of this study, the unit of analysis is Namibia between 1996 and 2002. The study endeavors to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the cases considered.

1.6.2   Time Dimension

This is a longitudinal study, for it makes observations over an extended period of time. The study makes observations regarding peacemaking cases in which Namibia was involved between 1996, the year in which the first intervention occurred and 2002, the year in which the last conflict in the region ended. The time under study for the Angolan case study is 1996 to 2002 while for the DRC is 1998 to 2002.

1.6.3   Research Methodology

This study is in the form of what is called qualitative research, as opposed to quantitative research. The latter type of research is focused, organised and systematic, making use of a linear path to research. This is the type of research that is often used in the natural sciences, although it is also used in the social sciences. Qualitative research, in contrast, is a type of research that is less structured and more flexible, and which adopts a non-linear approach to research. Qualitative research examines the ideas, motives, themes, words, observations, and transcripts (Babbie & Mouton, 2008; Babbie,

2010; Neuman, 2006). In the words of Babbie and Mouton (2001:53), qualitative research refers:

> … to that generic research approach in social research according to which research takes its departure point as the insider perspective on social action … the emphasis, therefore, is on methods of observation and analysis that 'stay close' to the research subject. This would include observational methods such as structured interviewing, participant observation and use of personal documents. In the analysis of qualitative data, the emphasis is on grounded theory and other more inductive analytical strategies.

The stated qualitative research takes form of comparative analysis. Developed by the British philosopher and theorist John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873), comparative analysis is a research method that seeks to identify agreements and differences between cases being studied (Neuman: 2006). This method is understood, by Neuman (2006:471), as "a qualitative data analysis in which a researcher uses the method of agreement and the method of difference to discover causal factors that affect an outcome among a set of cases." Mills et al (2006: 621) view comparative analysis as a method whose goal is to:

> Search for similarity and variance…comparative research is used to separate patterns that are more general and isolate regularities from the context laden environment.

This method carries various advantages. As Mills et al (2006: 621) points out, "comparisons not only uncover differences between social entities, but reveal unique aspects of a particular entity that would be virtually impossible to detect otherwise." For Neuman (2006:472-473), the advantages of comparative analysis is its ability to allow "different causal factors to produce an outcome and considers highly complex outcomes that have qualitative difference." Mahoney & Rueschemeyer (2003:13)

consolidates the above in asserting that comparative analysis is "distinctive because its practitioners engage in systematic contextualized comparisons of similar and contrasting cases. While this approach does not directly aim for universally applicable knowledge, it represents a bargain in which significant advantages are gained. Above all, the approach makes possible a dialogue between the theory and evidence of an intensity that is rare in quantitative social research."

The above is the approach and manner in which the current study is conducted. This methodology would allow for a critical appraisal of Namibia's peacemaking role in the selected case studies. In others words, qualitative research is selected in conducting a study whose aims and objectives are for a comparative analysis of the selected cases.

1.6.3.1 Data gathering Methods

This study takes the form of 'desktop' research, based on both primary and secondary data. Primary sources such as legislations, constitutions, official documents such as UN, SADC and AU convections and protocols are used to collect data. It makes use of secondary data such as books, academic journals, newspaper articles, internet articles and reports. This is to say that this contribution to the body of knowledge in the field will be based on the existing literature in the field.

1.6.4   Anticipated problems

While peacemaking literature would often be in a common language that is understood by all parties, this does not mean that there would not be literature on an uncommon language that would be of benefit to the study. Due to the fact that the official language in all countries that form the selected cases, the DRC and Angola, is not English, there might be some literature that will be in the official languages of these countries, in

which the researcher is not, in any way, conversant. This might be an impediment. To address this possible impediment, the researcher secured the services and assistance of two fellow researchers, should such scenario unfold. Both are citizens of the countries under study, the DRC and Angola, and are fluent in the official languages and indigenous languages spoken in the countries.

1.7 Limitations of the study

The study will only be able to provide a descriptive account of the role of Namibia in peacemaking in the SADC region between 1996 and 2002, and not beyond. Put differently, the study will not be able to go beyond SADC, just as, in the same way, it is not able to explain the role of post-independence Namibia in peacemaking in the world, for that is not studied herein. The study focuses on peacemaking and cannot be used to describe patterns of peacebuilding, for the concepts, although closely related, are not the same.

1.8 Chapter outline

The study is organized into six (6) chapters in total. While the real analysis is to be carried out in chapter 5, the researcher wishes to point out that for each chapter concerning the case studies, there will be a brief look at the role of Namibia in peacemaking in that particular conflict.

Chapter one (1) introduces the study – A comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region - the case of the DRC and Angola (1996 - 2002). It concerns itself with methodological aspects of the study. It indicates aspects of what is studied, how it is studied, why is it studied and where is it studied. The chapter include what has already been said, literature survey, on the same topic in the field.

Chapter two (2) is the conceptual framework of the study. In this chapter, peacemaking is located in wider literature. The chapter will look at what has been written by scholars, at different levels, on peacemaking. Specific emphasis is placed on peacemaking in Africa.

Chapter three (3) is on the first case study – the DRC. The chapter looks at Namibia's peacemaking role in that conflict. It discusses how and why Namibia participated in peacemaking in this particular conflict and its actual participation. Emphasis is placed on the peacemaking role in this conflict. Given the controversy of this study, the chapter will contain a critical analysis of Namibia's involvement surrounding the question of the exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. In order to provide a good understanding, the chapter discusses the history of the DRC conflict, in brief, towards Namibia's involvement and subsequently the peace process culminating into the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in 2002.

Chapter four (4) discusses another case study, Angola. As is the case in the first case study, in chapter three, the Angolan conflict is discussed in its historical context and then Namibia's peacemaking role in it. The chapter carries the conflict until the assassination of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, marking the return of peace to Angola.

Chapter five (5) carries out a comparative analysis of the two cases. It looks at the similarities between the cases and also looks at the differences. Upon identifying the similarities and the differences, a summary is then given to put together a reflection of the comparative analysis.

Chapter six (6) concludes the study by unleashing the key findings of the study. It concludes by putting together all the chapters covered in the study in giving a final perspective of what was studied.

CHAPTER 2 – THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is aimed at a critical appraisal and evaluation of theoretical debates on the subject of peacemaking. The chapter is not a discussion of the cases for the study, although minor references are made, but an attempt to locate and capture the theoretical work of the topic. Such is done to orientate the reader with the wider literature on peace studies to which the study belongs.

The chapter looks at six conceptual debates; peacemaking internationally, peacemaking in Africa, the effectiveness of SADC peacemaking, the question of traditional and indigenous peacemaking approaches, the subject of gender and the inclusion of women in peacemaking and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

The section on 'Peacemaking internationally' looks at the UN as the organization with the mandate of ensuring world peace. It looks at UN peacemaking engagements in the countries selected as case studies and also looking at Namibia. Brief mention of the historicity of the UN failures and shortcomings is also made therein. The following section, peacemaking in Africa, firstly looks at the AU and its security structure. Scholars' analyses of the shortcomings of the AU are stated. The above is followed by an assessment of SADC peacemaking as to whether it is effective enough. Some scholars argue that current peacemaking, western inspired, is problematic and we should rather look at traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking. The theoretical debates on gender and the exclusion of women is covered under the section of gender and women in peacemaking followed by the discussion on what is known as the Responsibility to Protect concept.

2.2 Peacemaking Internationally

As already stated in chapter 1, the ultimate responsibility of world peace is shouldered on the UN. It is for that reason that this organization has been involved in various peacemaking activities worldwide. Article 1 of the UN charter explicitly states the purpose of the UN as to:

> maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

(UN, 2011)

Over the years, the UN has often managed to keep to the above charter provisions. The UN participated in peacemaking and peacekeeping in conflicts involving countries studied herein, including Namibia itself. It passed resolution 435, in 1978, which paved the way for the independence of Namibia. This resolution, implemented in the late 1980s, authorised the deployment of 6 150 UN forces to see through the transition from South African rule to self-determination. Under the stewardship of Marthi Ahtisaari, the UN fully implemented resolution 435; Namibia obtained Independence on 21 March 1990 (Gambari, 2003: Manning, 1989).

The UN also partook in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in Angola where UN missions such as MONUA and various UNAVEM missions were commissioned. Unlike in Namibia where the UN mission went somewhat smoothly, the UN missions in Angola faced major challenges such that it had to withdraw twice. The UN had intervened in the Congo, in 1960, during a brief rule of Patrice Lumumba with dismal

performances. Following the signing of the Lusaka peace accord in July 1999, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1279 that that gave birth to MONUC. MONUC entailed sending of 5 537 UN troops and observers to oversee the implementation of the Lusaka peace accord (Gambari, 2003: UN, 2011: MONUC, 2011).

Gambari (2003) discusses various shortcomings and peacemaking failures of the UN in Africa. He points to difficulties the UN faced in Sierra Leone with UNAMSIL in May 2000 when the UN peacekeepers where scandalously disarmed and kidnapped. Another debacle was witnessed in the DRC with MONUC when it had to deploy more peacekeepers. The UN also struggled in Western Sahara. Like it did in Angola, the UN was weakened during United Nations Operation In Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in mid 1990s. In April 1994, during United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the ill-equipped UN force saw the devastating Rwandan genocide. Faced with seemingly evident dismal failure of the UN in maintaining world peace, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, commissioned a panel of experts, in early 2000, to make an appraisal of existing UN system of dealing with peace and security issues. The panel in its report, known as The Brahimi report, made recommendations such as strengthening "UN capacity to undertake future peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding operations...[it also emphasized] the necessity for clear and realistic mandates for UN peacekeeping operations, and clear robust doctrines and means with which to undertake such missions…[it additionally called for] strengthening the capacity of the UN to develop peacebuilding strategies and to implement programs in support of these strategies" (Gambari: 2003,261).

Apart from the clarity provided by the UN 2008 document described earlier, Article 51 of the UN charter provides for situation under which peacemaking can occur not under the authorization or sanctioning of the Security Council. It states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(UN, 2011)

As will be discussed later in the study, this provision has been cited by SADC allied forces when they intervened in the DRC conflict. It can arguably be the motivation behind states signing mutual defence pacts. In summary; at the international level, peacemaking mainly takes place under the custodianship of the UN Security Council while it can also take place on initiation of individual states as provided for above.

Faced with the prevalence of devastating conflicts in Africa; the UN expressed the need to strengthen the capacity of the AU in preventing and managing conflict. The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a letter, dated 11 December 2006, addressed to the President of the General Assembly, writes:

I wish to apprise you of the Secretariat's efforts relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 60/1 (2005 World Summit Outcome), in which Member States broadly addressed themselves to meeting the special , needs of Africa and agreed to the development and implementation of a 10-year plan for capacity- '   building with the African Union. In furtherance of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and I signed in Addis Ababa, on 16 November 2006, a Declaration entitled "Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union". The Declaration ... reflects the common commitment of the United Nations and

the African Union to maintaining peace and human security, promoting human rights and post-conflict reconstruction and advancing Africa's   development and regional integration. Finally, it provides a holistic framework for   United Nations system-wide support to the capacity-building efforts of the AU   Commission   and   African subregional organizations (the regional economic   communities).

(UN, 2006)

2.3 Peacemaking in Africa

As is the responsibility of the UN to ensure world peace, the responsibility of ensuring peace in Africa is with the AU. Compared to the UN structure, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the counterpart of the UN Security Council. Coming into effect on 26 December 2003, the 15 member states body is the authoritative structure that deals with peace and security matters on the continent (AU: 2011). While there has been some notable successes of the AU in peacemaking and conflict resolution in cases such as Sudan, Somalia (albeit debatable due to continuous conflict), Burundi and others, scholars have identified several weaknesses of the AU (Anning, 2005). Sharamo (2006) points to various shortcomings and constraints of the AU. To this scholar, the AU is a young organization that lacks institutional experience and capacity. He adds that the organization is constrained by serious financial and logistical challenges in handling and preventing violent conflicts. He finds AU member states as not genuine in solving African conflicts and further alleges that security policies of the AU are dominated by international interest. Due to the above factors, the AU is often made and reduced to a spectator in continental conflicts. ACCORD (2011), on its peacemaking unit, consolidates:

An analysis of conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2010 shows a considerable decline in conflicts on the continent. This is due to many reasons, among them peacemaking interventions and advances in non-military forms of conflict resolution. Nonetheless, Africa today is still affected by armed conflicts that undermine efforts to bring about much needed sustainable socio-economic development that is required for the continent to effectively compete in the international arena. Peace and security is therefore a prerequisite for sustainable development on the continent.

African peacemaking is faced with a number of challenges. One of the challenges is socioeconomic inequalities and equitable wealth distribution while others is HIV/AIDS. Africa is faced with serious socioeconomic inequalities and skewed distribution of wealth. Scholars such as Reno (2000), Zartman (2005), Collier (2000), Kaldor (2007) and Jackson (2006) all recognise that conflict in Africa is brought about by grievances and discontentment with socioeconomic inequalities and skewed distribution of wealth. For Du Rand (2008), greed and the desire of wealth accumulation is also a contributing factor to conflict. Tripodi and Patel (2002) write on the impacts of HIV/AIDS on peace support operations. They find that one of the challenges to African peacemaking is HIV/AIDS. They capture the debate at the UN level on how to prevent soldiers on peace operations from spreading HIV/AIDS from and to places of missions deployed. They make reference to the 1998 UNAIDS report that found that military personnel and camps of peace operation forces attract sex workers thus increasing the chances of the spread of HIV/AIDS. They observe:

As peacekeepers are among the most mobile populations in the world, they can easily become a vector for the spread of HIV both in the region where they are deployed and back home once the mission is completed…in Africa HIV remains a major concern for regional security. Largely because of its slow and protracted features the consequences of HIV progressively affect human beings, economic systems, society and political organizations.

(Tripodi & Patel: 2002, 52-56).

Williams (2009:3-4) argues that as of 30 June 2009, about 70% of UN deployment of peacekeepers have gone to the African continent. The author qualifies the above in that "As of 30 June 2009, the African continent is home to 10 military peace operations. Six of these are United Nations (UN) missions – in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Chad/Central African Republic (CAR) (MINURCAT), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS) and Western Sahara (MINURSO). One mission is a hybrid UN-African Union (AU) operation in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID). The other three missions are the AU operation in Somalia (AMISOM); the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) operation in CAR (MICOPAX); and the Special Task Force in Burundi, run by South Africa. These operations involve over 73 000 uniformed peacekeepers."

He identifies seven challenges facing peace operations in Africa. The first challenge is that of the complex nature of African conflicts. This is in reference to the fact that African conflicts are often cross-border conflicts while peacekeepers are deployed into a specific country. Peacekeepers face a challenge in implementing their mandates because often peace agreements leave out some of the belligerents who thus continue the war. The second challenge is 'multiple Peacekeepers.' African conflicts have witnessed various peacekeepers; some are from the UN, some from the AU and others from specific countries. These various actors make coordination difficult. Another challenge is that these various peacekeepers have been exposed to 'different doctrine and training and use distinct equipment.' The third challenge is that there are not enough soldiers to deploy on peace operations. This has been experienced with various UN missions which either failed to deploy on time or deployed a lower number than authorised. The author indentifies 'not having enough western soldiers' as the fourth challenge. It is

argued that in the 21ˢᵗ century, western countries only sent less than 300 uniformed personnel to UN peace operations on the African continent. Western soldiers, the author argues, are required for their ability to conduct 'high-end military tasks' due to their technical and logistical capacity. The fifth challenge is the lack of enough police that are needed to support peacekeeping soldiers. The author identifies 'complex mandates' as the sixth challenge facing peace operations in Africa. He argues that peace operation covers various aspects which make it difficult to implement; mandates sometimes lack clarity and ambiguity. Meaning and interpretation thus differs from various peacekeepers involved. The last challenge is what is referred to as 'Too many bad peacekeepers.' This is in reference to actions of peacekeepers in territories they are to keep the peace. Peacekeepers have been involved in cases of corruption and in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse (Williams: 2009, 3-10).

Williams (2009:9-10) boldly concludes that "peacekeepers are clearly not going to change the nature of African wars any time soon." He argues that solutions to these challenges must be addressed for successful peace operations in Africa to occur. He also cautions that "no single organisation will be able to handle the full spectrum of conflict management challenges facing the continent. For the time being, the most crucial relationship to get right is the trilateral one between the UN, the AU and the EU. "

2.4 SADC Peacemaking, effective enough?

The AU has various regional groupings of which SADC is one of them. These regional groupings have their own security structures. The security structure of SADC is the OPDS. As will be established later, it was under this body that SADC allies participated in the DRC conflict. Formed on 28 June 1996, Francis (2006) argues, the OPDS is designed to address multidimensional security issues in the region. He adds

that the OPDS is led based on what SADC call the Troika. The Troika includes the incumbent chair of the OPDS, the incoming and out-going chair.

Apart from the OPDS, the regional body has what is called the SADC Standby Brigade, often referred to as the SADCBRIG. This does not imply an automatic link between the two apart from being structures in SADC. The genesis of the SADGBRIG is provided by Baker & Maeresera (2009:107) in that "pursuant to article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Within the framework of article 13 of the PSC Protocol the AU Commission is mandated to establish an African Standby Force (ASF) which will consists of five standby brigades in each of the five regions in Africa. It is within this arrangement that the SADC Interstate, Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) set up a technical team comprised of military planners, which saw the establishment of the Planning Element (PLANEM) in Gaborone, Botswana, in April and May 2005. An MOU was signed between member states to regulate the establishment of the standby brigade."

Following the above, the main purpose of the SADCBRIG is thus partaking in AU mission as outlined in article 13 of the PSC, supplemented by articles such as 4 (h and j) of the AU Constitutive Act. Article 13 of the PSC and article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act spells out how intervention is to take place in order to restore peace and security in a war situation. Specifically, the brigade can also intervene as permitted by SADC (Baker & Maeresera: 2009). The authors caution the challenge the brigade may face and argues that "the absence of common national interests and common values among member states inhibits the development of trust, institutional cohesion, common policies and unified responses to crises. Member states are generally reluctant to surrender sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules, and resist

ceding decision-making power on security issues to regional organizations… The initial decisions to intervene in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 revealed significant and divisive policy positions among member states. It is reasonable, therefore, to ask whether in future SADC member states will be able to achieve sufficient consensus to enable the rapid deployment of the standby brigade to any conflict situation, particularly one involving a SADC member country, and even more so when that country does not invite the intervention…While we welcome the emergence of the SADCBRIG, and indeed the other components of the African Standby Force, we have written this short article as a caution against undue optimism regarding the potential utility of the SADCBRIG as a tool to intervene rapidly in a SADC member state in order to restore peace and security" (Baker & Maeresera:2009, 108-110).

 Burgess (2011) assesses the practical challenges of the SADCBRIG and writes "The SADC brigade (SADCBRIG) has only partially met the total of 5,000 troops standing by. The shortfalls in the SADCBRIG are due to delays in implementation as much as a shortage of resources... Interoperable communications are a work in progress, and intelligence capabilities are in the process of development...the civilian component for multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding is underdeveloped. Donors still play a role in sustaining relevant SADC organs and the SADCBRIG."

The challenge presented above is exactly what inhibits SADC from becoming an effective security community. A Security Community is defined by Ngoma (2003:18) as "a community that transcends international boundaries in which the settlement of disputes by anything other than peaceful means is unthinkable." The author goes further to indicate that the Security Community involves three key concepts; 'integration', 'sense of security' and 'peaceful change'. The author explains that a "security community is a group of people, which has become "integrated". By

integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a *"sense of security"* and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of *"peaceful change"* among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief…that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change." Van Nieuwkerk (2008) also sees the challenges of security community in SADC. In discussing security co-operation in southern Africa, he finds three possible scenarios of "A 'mature SADC' – a favourable socio-economic environment and wise leadership allows for institutional governance, reflecting deeper and mutually beneficial integration. SADC follows a holistic (integrated and comprehensive) approach to trade, economic, and security integration, accompanied by a negotiated road-map with realistic time lines and implementation capacity; A 'fragile SADC' – uneven development and poor leadership aggravate a polarized relationship between the region and a domineering South Africa. SADC follows a two-level, variable-speed approach to integration: fast-tracking trade and economic integration among a core group of countries, with sporadic security co-operation, accompanied by separate RISDP and SIPO implementation plans; A 'disintegrating SADC' – unfavourable socio-economic conditions and visionless leaders allow for a regression in the nature of the relationships among countries in Southern Africa – driven by narrowly defined national interests, unregulated markets, or a combination of both. Co-operation is replaced by competition, resulting in conflict and, in the longer run, violent disagreements" (Van Nieuwkerk: 2008, 94).

In 2003, SADC member states signed a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) which is a mechanism of common security approach to conflict. Baker & Maeresera (2009) are very critical of the MDP. They argue that the "SADC Mutual Defence Pact is regarded as a collective defence strategy. It is far from clear, however, that 'collective defence' (as, for example, articulated in article 6(1), which views 'an armed attack on a state within the

sub region as an attack against all') provides adequate justification for 'intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances'. Van Nieuwkerk points out that, while in essence the MDP allows for collective self-defence and collective action – stating that 'an armed attack against a state party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate action' – the text of the pact also states that parties have the option of choosing how to respond to a call for immediate action…This is likely to result in a scenario in which a section of member states would remain 'hawks' (preferring military solutions), others being 'doves' (opting for more peaceful approach and diplomatic initiatives or other nonmilitary means), while others still would position themselves as 'penguins', not opting for any particular position but instead remaining 'outside' the problem whilst they publicly appear determined to solve them" (Baker & Maeresera: 2009, 110).

Ngoma (2003:25-26) is more optimistic and adds; "Notwithstanding some of the articles viewed as retrogressive to the attainment of a security community, the SADC Pact continually stresses some factors that point towards a peaceful collaborative arrangement. The Pact continues to make states and people its dominant units. It also takes cognizance of collective defence and the preservation of peace and stability as well as other provisions on defence co-operation. Together with other aspects…the Pact reflects an unmistakable intention by its members to establish a security community."

In analysing the effectiveness of regional peacemaking in Southern Africa, Ancas (2011:141) finds various specific 'limitations that hinder the partnership it has with the AU and UN in carrying out effective peacemaking.' She argues that:

> SADC solidarity politics, and the liberation legacy's taboo on making censure or disagreement publicly known, bog down the organisation and create serious obstacles to

progressive SADC leadership in peacemaking. SADC has established strong protocols on security cooperation and safeguards on democracy and human rights, but continues to operate on the pillars of absolute sovereignty and solidarity. There is even an understanding that member states have kept the SADC secretariat weak in order to avoid the creation of an interventionist bureaucracy that could interfere in their sensitive security issues.

She further qualifies cases where these limitations have occurred:

SADC has remained united enough to largely keep the UN and other international players out of the recent conflict in Zimbabwe, where South Africa has taken a lead in peacemaking and tried to prevent much external interference, painting it as a Western anti-Zimbabwean crusade... The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security had been, by some accounts, manipulated to justify the aims of Zimbabwe in the DRC and later, to legitimise South Africa's intervention in Lesotho.

Ancas (2011- 142-143)

Nathan (2004:91-93) corroborates the above in summarising that " the SADC region remained wracked by a high level of conflict that included civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Angola, as well as violence and state repression in other countries [such as Zimbabwe]. SADC was largely ineffectual in these situations, distinguished less by its peacemaking efforts than by its fractious internal quarrels... SADC does not have a record of successful peacemaking. In many intra-state conflicts it has refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. In the case of state repression and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe, on the other hand, SADC has repeatedly expressed solidarity with the government. The absence of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high-intensity conflict has contributed to

collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions of doubtful legality, and a confused mixture of peacemaking and peace enforcement. Most of these problems were evident in SADC's response to the crises in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998."

In another critique of SADC peacemaking, Nathan (2010) argued that "despite the existence of the Organ, SADC has a woeful record of peacemaking. In most of the crises that beset the region it refrained from diplomatic engagement and critical comment. It played no meaningful role in relation to the Angolan civil war and was deeply divided over the DRC rebellion. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia responded to the rebellion by deploying troops in support of the Congo government while South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania pursued a diplomatic solution. The divergent strategies generated acute animosity within SADC and crippled the Organ. The Lusaka Accord of 1999, brokered by Zambia on behalf of SADC, achieved a partial ceasefire and provided the framework for inter-Congolese negotiations, but it also shifted the locus of peacemaking from SADC to the UN and the OAU/AU. In the case of Madagascar, mediation efforts by the UN, the AU and SADC have been unsuccessful."

Neethling (2000) takes a moderate approach in discussing SADC peacemaking role in the conflict in the DRC. He concludes that:

> One cannot disagree with the chief of the SANDF, General Siphiwe Nyanda, that the military objectives defined in the mandate were accomplished, despite the fact that certain tactical errors were made and the degree of armed resistance that was encountered, was greater than had been anticipated. It would be fair to state from a purely military viewpoint that Operation Boleas had been successfully conducted, as it did succeed in stabilising the security situation in Lesotho, which allowed the political

parties to resume negotiations around the issue of governance. In addition, it safeguarded South Africa's interests in Lesotho and succeeded in securing strategic installations from being taken over or destroyed by the mutinous forces. However, the operation did not succeed in preventing and controlling the destruction and looting of property in central Maseru. From a political perspective, it has yet to be seen whether the operation has paved the way for fresh elections in pursuit of a medium and longterm political goal and settlement.

To the politicians, SADC peacemaking is successful and effective. In a speech delivered at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 27 February 2002, former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano finds SADC peacemaking successful. He argues that:

[SADC training in peacekeeping operations] were successful and have led to the decision of creation of a SADC peacekeeping brigade...The Extended Troika is leading the process of restoration of the democratic legality in Lesotho, after the events of 1998, when the Opposition did not accept the results of the elections and resorted to violence... We are aware that the challenge of consolidating stability in Southern Africa is depending on the strengthening of strategies for peace building in our own countries. These strategies include the participation of a vast range of state and non-state actors and their success depends on the co-ordination and implementation by national governments and SADC as a whole... Southern Africa is a region with a history of political violence and deep suffering of the populations. Now we are building peace and stability.

(Chissano, 2002)

In a study titled 'Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Role and Potential of the Southern African Development Community (SADC),' Bekoe (2002:1) focuses little on

the successes and failure of SADC peacemaking. Instead, upon studying DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho, she proposes four recommendations to SADC:

> First, developing strategies to strengthen SADC as an institution; second, moving from unanimity to either majority or weighted decision-making; third, developing closer interaction with civil society, in order to promote greater legitimacy, public accountability, and transparency; and fourth, undertaking, as a matter of priority, a close examination of how SADC can contribute to the promotion of democratization and economic development in Southern Africa as envisioned by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

2.5 Towards traditional and Indigenous peacemaking?

Current peacemaking approaches to many conflicts can be largely regarded as 'western type of peacemaking'. Mac Ginty (2008) discusses this fact and points to an increasing interest and look towards traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking. Pointing to common failure of peace processes and peace accords, Mac Ginty (2008) finds that the western approach to peacemaking is often top-down, costly, technocratic and unable to deal with things such as trust, reconciliation and intergroup perceptions. Western peacemaking often excludes people by resulting only on handshakes of the elites leading belligerent forces (Mac Ginty: 2008).

Traditional and indigenous peacemaking is therefore preferred because, unlike western peacemaking, it seen as inclusive, culturally relevant, not costly and sustainable. Unlike western peacemaking, traditional and indigenous peacemaking takes local needs and cultural sensitivities into consideration. Protagonists of traditional and indigenous peacemaking champion this approach as human and community-centric rather than

state and institution-centric (Mac Ginty: 2008). Various traditional and indigenous peacemaking types such as *Mato-Oput, Kgotla, Nahe Biti, and* the *Miss* are discussed to illustrate this view. The *Mato-Oput* is a Ugandan "clan-based reconciliation ceremony involving an admission of wrong doing, an offer of recompense and the sharing of a symbolic drink between disputants." The *Kgotla* is a Batswana approach that "takes the form of a community meeting in which everyone has a right to uninterrupted speech and decisions are reached on a consensus bases." The *Miss* is a Kenyan traditional dispute resolution technique that "place strong emphasis on ritual performed by elders (with the slaughter of livestock and burying of weapons), community members have a practical input through donating food, livestock, and weapons for the peace ceremony." The *Nahe Biti* is a customary mediation process in East Timor that "involves the 'victim' bringing a complaint to a traditional leader who facilitates a meeting between the disputants. Following an opening ritual, the disputants present their cases and the traditional leader makes a judgement, imposing a penalty or offering advice where appropriate. The ceremony may end with a statement by the 'guilty party and a ritual in which the disputants share food and drink" *(*Mac Ginty, 2008: 121-127).

Similarly, Murithi (2006:25) an African traditional and indigenous approach to peacemaking, *Ubuntu*, utilised by Archbishop Desmond Tutu during his leadership of the South African Truth and Reconciliation. Defining *Ubuntu* as " a cultural world-view that tries to capture the essence of what it means to be human," he adds that *Ubuntu* peacemaking process includes five stages such as "acknowledgement of guilt, showing remorse and repenting, asking for and giving forgiveness, and paying compensation or reparation as a prelude to reconciliation." He concludes that "Potential lessons for peace and reconciliation efforts are highlighted with the premise that the Ubuntu approach to the building of human relationships can offer an example to the world."

While the relevance of traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking is evident, Mac Ginty (2008) points to several shortcomings of this approach to peacemaking. He argues that traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking cannot be regarded as an antidote to all challenges faced by conventional western peacemaking. Conflicts have evolved and changed in type. Modern warfare has a rapid devastating impact than it was, centuries ago, during traditional small-scale conflicts. He contends that "…the dislocation associated with civil war has often made traditional and indigenous social patterns unsustainable… some traditional and indigenous practices can be deeply conservative and exclusionary. For example, they may only be open to men or may emphasize social conformity and the importance of power remaining in the hands of chiefly classes… leading states and international organizations, attracted by the apparent advantages offered by traditional and indigenous approaches to peacemaking, are funding and facilitating it. This leads to a fundamental question: can such methods be regarded as 'traditional' or 'indigenous' anymore if they have been co-opted by international organizations?" (Mac Ginty: 2008, 120-121). He concludes by pointing out the usefulness of both traditional and indigenous approaches and that of western peacemaking. All of them can efficiently work in within their specific context and type of conflict. Therefore the two approaches to peacemaking can be complementary (Mac Ginty: 2008).

2.6 Gender and the exclusion of women in peacemaking

Some scholars argue that peacemaking and its processes fails and becomes unsustainable because of the systematic exclusion of women. Potter (2008) launches an argument that the gender question and women exclusion is not at the level of debate on the importance of addressing women exclusion in peacemaking. For her, there has been

an acknowledgement of the need to include women in peacemaking. What is lacking is the move from acknowledgement to the real action of including women in peace processes. She argues that "…the process and substance of peace negotiations and agreements would be richer, subtler, stronger, and more firmly rooted in the societies whose problems they aim to solve with increased participation of women and the issues which are important to them…the basic but forgotten fact [is that] gender is a concept which embraces both women and men, and exhorts more men to swell the ranks of those working at all levels of peacemaking…perhaps, then, one of the factors that could make a real difference to building peace processes which produce sustainable, equitable results would be to see more men among the ranks of activist, strategists, programmers, and implementers for equality and gendered perspectives in peace and security issues " (Potter:2008, 105-116).

Pillay (2009) extends the argument further to indicate that the problem goes beyond women participation in the process of peacemaking. What women experience during the conflict is in addition to what already existed in society. In other words, stereotypical notions of women and their stratification, existing in society even before a conflict, forms a basis of how they will experience the conflict. This is to say that women participation in peacemaking does not translate, practically, into changes in social thinking, attitudes and behaviour towards women.

Discussing gender in analysis of the TRC of South Africa, Meintjes (2009: 111) also points to how women can still be subordinated even when they are part of the process. She argues that "despite the pressure put on TRCs from gender activists and gender consultants in every case, a single chapter has been devoted to delineating the experience of gender. Gender thus continues to be used as a synonym for women. The single chapter on women reproduces a flawed view that gender is simply the experience of women. So the most important recommendation…was ignored. The

consequence of this outcome was that the real nature of 'truth', the gendered truth, was elided and collapsed into women's experience alone. So – in truth – we miss the way life under apartheid, or under any other kind of patriarchal regime, was systematically gendered."

For Ndlovu (2009), fighting for gender equality and the inclusion of women in peacemaking is accompanied by a heavy cost in patriarchal societies. She points to a case of a social justice group in Zimbabwe known as WOZA. Formed in 2003, WOZA is a 70 000 member organization that encourages women to stand up and seek redress on the gender question and other aspects of women interest in Zimbabwe. She points out that "as a result of their practice of civil disobedience, embracing a policy of strategic non-violence, they have been frequently subject to abuse by the police, including being beaten, arrested, incarcerated, tortured and insulted. As women of the grassroots, they are also victims of the economic effects of misrule, the destruction of homes and livelihoods, the collapsed economy, and the lack of food and social services. Most members of the organisation are struggling to survive, and as women, they bear the brunt of the daily search for food to feed children, for medicines, for school fees" (Ndlovu: 2009, 113-114).

Women suffer the most when a conflict erupts. They actually suffer double compared to men. Apart for the obvious violence brought by conflict, women suffer from sexual and gender-based violence such as gang rapes, sexual slavery and reproductive violence. Peacemaking and peace processes led by those that suffer minimally is not only flawed but also short-sighted (Nabukeera-Musoke: 2009).

It is important that existing peacemaking mechanisms are analysed to determine the effectiveness of such mechanisms. It is through such analysis that issues such as gender

and the exclusion of women in peacemaking surfaces. Other analysis focus on what is already in place. The following section discusses a peacemaking mechanism called 'The Responsibility to Protect.'

2.7 The Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect, popularly known as the R2P, has received much attention in peacemaking, especially at the beginning of the 21st century. Between 1999 and 2000, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed to the international community to find ways of how events such as the Rwandan genocide and other systematic human right violations can be avoided and handled in the future. In response, the Canadian government announced, to the 2000 UN General Assembly, that it had established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to take up that responsibility and subsequently produce a report to the UN Secretary General (ICISS, 2001). This report, titled The Responsibility To Protect, made the following recommendations to the General Assembly, Security Council and Secretary-General:

> That the General Assembly adopt a draft declaratory resolution embodying the basic principles of the responsibility to protect, and containing four basic elements: an affirmation of the idea of sovereignty as responsibility; an assertion of the threefold responsibility of the international community of states – to prevent, to react and to rebuild – when faced with human protection claims in states that are either unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibility to protect; … That the members of the Security Council should consider and seek to reach agreement on a set of guidelines, embracing the "Principles for Military Intervention" summarized in the Synopsis, to govern their responses to claims for military intervention for human protection purposes…The Commission recommends to the Secretary-General: That the Secretary-General give consideration, and consult as appropriate with the President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly, as to how the substance and action

recommendations of this report can best be advanced in those two bodies, and by his own further action.

<div align="right">(ICISS, 2001, 74-75)</div>

In an interview with UN News centre on August 01 2011, the special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, Edward Luck, discusses the genesis of the R2P. He argues that the R2P is a concept "agreed to by all the heads of state and government at the World Summit in 2005. They pledged that they would prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity for all the populations on their territory and that they would also prevent the incitement of those crimes… And if the state fails, in a manifest way, to protect populations, then the international community is to take timely and decisive action in response to try to offer protection to the threatened populations" (UN News Centre, 2011). The R2P is the same concept rallied upon by western countries in mobilising the UN to intervene in Libya. As Edward Luck corroborates:

> I think it was quite an important precedent, both in resolution 1970 that talked about sanctions and referring [Libyan leader Muammar] al-Qadhafi and some of his people to the International Criminal Court and then in resolution 1973, that talked about all necessary measures to protect populations – both of those invoked the responsibility to protect.

<div align="right">(UN News Centre, 2011)</div>

The R2P does not only exist at the level of the UN. According to the 2008 report of the Institute for Global Policy's *Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society* project, the responsibility to protect is also upheld by the AU's PSC and SADC's OPDS. The report consolidates that:

The African Union Peace and Security architecture has the following components that relate to R2P three elements of prevention, reaction and rebuilding: 1. Continental Early Warning System 2. Peace and Security Council; supported by quiet diplomacy of the AU chairperson; 3. Panel of the Wise: composed of 5 highly respected personalities, devoted to prevention, supposedly free of political pressure; 4. Stand-by force to intervene if the above fails 5. Post-conflict reconstruction unit within Peace and Security Council…The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a relevant Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security which allows the Organ to intervene in situations of intra/inter state conflicts.

(Institute for Global Policy, 2008)

Like any report in the social sciences, the ICISS report and the R2P doctrine has been subjected to various criticisms. Downes (2004) argues that the report avoided questions on how to differentiate interventions that are genuinely humanitarian inspired and those that are termed humanitarian for mere military offensives to achieve the goals of the big powers. For Welsh, Thielking & MacFarlane (2002:511-512):

The significance of the Commission's report lies more in the realm of advocacy than analysis. Its treatment of a broad range of issues related to the responsibility to protect (prevention, criteria for intervention, mandates, command, rebuilding) reflects international politics as the commissioners think it should be rather than as it is. The ICISS does not fully recognise that international politics remains a web of contending normative principles and contingent political interests. Taking the desirability of protection as given, what we need now is a better sense of how to get from where we are to where we want to be.

Falk (2000), like Downes (2004), argues that the R2P and its humanitarian language would fit to be a justification and a tool, by big powers in the UN Security Council, to achieve foreign policy goals while Mamdani (2009) adds that while the responsibility to

protect might appear as an act by the international community sanctioned by the UN through the Security Council, it is merely a reinforcement and justification of wars by the permanent members of the Security council that are the great powers.

2.8 Conclusion

There is, indeed, large body of literature on peacemaking. As this chapter has shown, peacemaking tends to be a theme that relies heavily on the established institutions and practices. It is from these institutions and practices that peacemaking scholarship is based. The theoretical work varies in peacemaking, as this chapter has demonstrated.

The UN was established to assume the responsibility of ensuring world peace. It does this through its Security Council. There have been various successes and failure of the UN. While it restored peace in some parts of the world, it witnessed genocide in others.

The AU has the responsibility of ensuring peace on the African continent. There have been various challenges with few successes as well. In the AU institutional architecture, it is the Peace and Security Council that deals with issues of peace and conflict on the continent. The AU is assisted in this responsibility by various regional bodies of which the SADC is one of them. For its part, SADC has established the OPDS to deal with security matters in the region. The region witnessed a number of conflict including those to be discussed in this study, that of the DRC and Angola respectively. Scholars argue that the region has achieved very little in peacemaking, citing reasons such a solidarity politics and self-interest as factors inhibiting effective peacemaking in the region.

Faced with the challenge of the prevalence of war and conflict in the world, scholars proposed various solutions to ensure world peace and to avoid conflict. Among the suggestions include traditional and indigenous peacemaking approaches, inclusion of women in peacemaking and the responsibility to protect doctrine. As a result of the critique of each of these, it emerged clear that each has its own strengths and limitations.

CHAPTER THREE – NAMIBIA IN THE DRC CONFLICT, ALTRUISM OR ECONOMIC EXPEDIENCY?

3.1 Introduction

With the recent partitioning of the Sudan into North and South, the DRC became the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa, for it used to be the second largest, after Sudan. This largest central African state has not, as has been widely acknowledged, really enjoyed peace since King Leopold II pocketed it as his colony, in the 1880s, up until the successes of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The lack of peace for more than a century has not only led to the loss of millions of lives, but has also robbed the DRC of its potential to become a prosperous nation, for it is one of the most, resource-rich countries on the face of the earth, if it is, indeed, not the most.

This chapter discusses the DRC conflict in which Namibia participated. First, the history of the DRC is described, briefly, from the 1880s through to the period after the coup of Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu, who ruled the country with an 'iron fist', until the 1997 capturing of Kinshasa by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire (AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila. The rationale of a brief overview of the history of the DRC provides an understanding that the DRC conflict has historical roots, for one event has led to another.

The following section discusses the brief period of Kabila's presidency, leading up to the 1998 conflict, which is the concern of the chapter. The conflict is discussed in terms of its genesis, and in terms of how it has played out. Specific emphasis is placed on Namibia's intervention locating the debates surrounding Namibia's motive(s) of joining the war on both a domestic and international level. Before discussing the role of Namibia in the conflict, the chapter looks at the peace process that finally led to the

resolution of the conflict. Namibia played a rather interesting role in this conflict. This will be examined in more details in this chapter.

3.2 The DRC before 1965

At the famous Berlin conference in the 1880s, at which European countries met to partition Africa into economic spheres of interest, the DRC was allocated to King Leopold II. As was agreed in the Berlin Treaty, Leopold created an administration in the DRC ostensibly to facilitate international trade (Kabemba, 2009). Leopold II, as is characteristic of imperial policy, ran the DRC as an enterprise by means of which to amass personal wealth. As Kabemba (2009:101) observes:

> Leopold accumulated a vast personal fortune from ivory, rubber and precious commodities by using Congolese slave labour. It is estimated that ten million people died from forced labour, starvation, and outright extermination during his rule. The Congo was the only European colony to run at a profit almost from its inception. In fifteen years, the king, who publicly claimed a cumulative loss of $5 million on his Congo enterprises, actually earned $25 million in profit.

In 1908, the Belgian government took over, from King Leopold II, the administration of the DRC. Not much changed as far as the maintenance of the Belgians' grip on, and control of, the DRC was concerned. The Belgium colonial government administered the DRC from Brussels in alliance with the Catholic Church and mining multinational corporations. Both Leopold II and the colonial government administered the vast DRC in a way that not only failed to strengthen state institutions, but that effectively failed to build a cohesive society. The colonial government strengthened the exploitative tendencies of the King's administration, for it "practiced exploitation in more regulated

forms. It systematized the use of forced labour and cash cropping, and used coercive taxation to transform the Congolese peasantry into a wage labour force working for Belgian-owned mining and agricultural firms" (Kabemba, 2009:102).

Encouraged by other African countries that were waging and winning their struggles for self-determination and independence, the Congolese were soon to pose a challenge to the Belgium colonial establishment with their demand for independence. After riots and bloody repressions, Belgium finally conceded to the reality of the demand to grant the Congolese self-determination. As such, the Belgians announced, in January 1960, that they would grant independence to the DRC within six months, with 30 June 1960 being the day on which independence was declared (Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Lemarchand, 1964).

The self-determination that was so abruptly granted to the Congolese had its own consequences. As has been established before, the colonial project failed to build a cohesive state and strong institutions, due, at least in part, to the native Congolese hardly being ready to take over from their colonial masters. As Iyenda (2005:11) explains:

> At independence, the country had fewer than 10 university graduates. The Congolese army, the Force Publique, was more like a police force, to maintain internal law and order among the local people.

Kabemba (2009:102) explains many deficits of the colonial project and the problems presented or inherited by the independent state. Just as Iyenda states above, the challenges of the independent state ranged from those relating to education and the military to a lack of national cohesion. He argues:

The instability that plagued the new state from the eve of independence was a direct consequence of colonial policies and a lack of preparedness for independence … the Congo was expected to build modern state institutions from scratch … for the first years of its independence, the Congo remained a country without a single, effective political authority to govern it, a situation exacerbated by the lack of trained personnel to run a country. At Independence there were less than a dozen Congolese university graduates. In addition the newly independent state was under threat from tribal and ethnic conflict, and was built on laws which were not adapted to Congolese realities.

The lack of preparedness presented the newly independent DRC with an overwhelming number of challenges. Colonial power in the DRC did not end at independence. What largely happened was solely a transfer of political power, with the economy remaining in the hands of the colonialists. At independence, Patrice Lumumba, from the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) party, had entered into a political alliance with the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) party. Joseph Kasavubu became the ceremonial President of the DRC, while Lumumba became the first Prime Minister of the country. The country was renamed the République du Congo i.e. Republic of the Congo (Kisiangani, 2009). When Lumumba attempted to chart a new course towards taking economic power, he was overthrown and assassinated, after having been only a few months in office. In short, the colonial masters were not prepared to let go economically. A Belgian commander is said to have stated that "after independence equals before independence" (Kabemba, 2009:103). Roberts (1965:5) diagnosed what contributed to Lumumba's fallout with the Belgians, and his subsequent overthrow and assassination. He states:

… no sooner had Lumumba been elected … [than] Belgium began to take steps to weaken his government. The Belgians had forced the Congolese to allow them to maintain an army

and air bases in the Congo, ostensibly for 'mutual cooperation.' A week after independence, when Congolese soldiers demonstrated against their Belgian officers with a demand for pay and rank raises, the Belgian troops fired on demonstrators. Lumumba, in turn, removed the Belgian officers, and appointed Joseph Kasavubu Commander-in-Chief. The Belgians quickly exploited the situation they had provoked … they rushed in new troops, and separated Katanga from the Congo Republic – using Moise Tshombe, a wealthy plantation owner and businessman as their Katanga front man.

With Lumumba overthrown and assassinated, Kasavubu took over the running of the country and managed, with the help of the United States and the UN, to reincorporate the Katanga province that had broken away. Be that as it may, the Kasavubu government was not free of political instability. The years that followed were marked by political instability, thus providing an enabling environment for the new chapter to be launched in 1965 (Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Kisiangani, 2009; Lemarchand, 1964).

3.3 The DRC between 1965 and 1997

By 1965, the Cold War was already at its pinnacle in Africa, with Zaire being no exception. Under such conditions, on 24 November 1965, Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu came to power through a coup, with the assistance of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The Americans could not allow the DRC to fall to communism, for it is strategically located. The fall of the DRC to communism could have meant its further advance into central and southern Africa (Kabemba, 2009). Consequently, Mobutu was supported, in order to ensure that the country did not lapse into communism, but more profoundly to secure the West's economic strategic interests. As Kisiangani (2009:40) explains:

Although the justification for support of Mobutu by Western countries is often found in the Cold War argument – that the Soviet influence in Africa needed to be checked – it had much to do with competition for access to the Congo's mineral wealth. It is argued that Western support for Mobutu was related to his willingness to allow the US and other Western multinational corporations access to the Congo's resources.

Mobutu ruled Zaire DRC similarly to how King Leopold II had ruled it previously. Both men treated the state as an instrument to deliver and to facilitate the accumulation of personal wealth. At the time of his rule, almost forty per cent of the DRC national revenue was 'pocketed' by him and his associates. Life expectancy, by 1994, had fallen to 53 years (CCR, 2011; Kabemba, 2009).

Mobutu consolidated power by eliminating the opposition and institutionalizing kleptocracy and dictatorship. In the early 1970s, he nationalised much of the economy and changed the name of the country to Zaire – and his own to Mobuto Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga … During Mobutu's long presidency, Zaire became notorious for cronyism and sustained periods of institutionalized corruption and misappropriation of state resources. Large proportions of the revenues from state-owned companies were diverted to Mobutu and his closest allies.

(Kisiangani, 2009:40)

While busy plundering national resources and safeguarding the interests of the West that had helped to install him to the helm of looting, Mobutu did not foresee the change that awaited him in the near future. However, the early 1990s brought with them an important event in the history of the politics of the 20th century – the fall of the Berlin Wall (which marked the end of communism) and the spread of liberal democratic ideas. Thus, international politics changed in most profound ways. Francis Fukuyama labelled

the period 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992). Mobutu lost his usefulness for the United States and its allies, who were now interested in the democratic project and in liberal institutionalism. As Kabemba (2009:104) corroborates:

> With Communism defeated, the strategy of the US changed. An earlier generation of African dictators was abandoned in favour of a new generation of leaders who accepted the new creed of globalization. Mobutu who had been applauded for nationalizing mining companies when he took power in 1965, was asked to embrace economic liberalization and privatization. He failed to read the signs of the times and was so reluctant to democratize and privatise companies that his allies started to consider bringing about a change of regime.

Mobutu was finally overthrown, in May 1997, by AFDL's Laurent Kabila. Kabila was supported by the West and by such neighbouring countries as Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, which had national security interests in the DRC (Kisiangani, 2009).

3.4 The DRC conflict (1997–2002)

3.4.1 The origins of the conflict

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 features profoundly as one of the contributors to the DRC conflict. After the genocide, the perpetrators left Rwanda for exile in eastern DRC, where they were housed in United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) camps. The 'Interahamwe', as they were known, started reorganising themselves in order to launch new attacks on Rwanda, using the refugee camps as incursion bases. The Rwandan government then began arming the group called the Banyamulenge, who were also in the eastern DRC, to counter the planned attacks of the Interahamwe

(Kabemba, 2009). As was the case with Rwanda, Uganda was also concerned with the DRC-based rebels who were causing instability in northern Uganda. The Congo under Mobutu thus became a concern to Uganda and Rwanda. Further, the Rwandan government sent in troops to counter the planned attacks. This angered Mobutu, who, in response, ordered them to leave Zaire. Mobutu's order intensified hostilities and increased the anti-Mobutu sentiments in the country. These sentiments led to the formation of the AFDL, with the support of Uganda and Rwanda, under the leadership of Laurent Kabila. Uganda and Rwanda preferred Laurent Kabila, because, among many other reasons, he was associated with Yoweri Museveni (the Ugandan President), through them both having been university students and due to his marriage to a Tutsi women (from the tribe of Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda) (Baregu, 2002; Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Mwaniki, 2009; Prunier, 2009).

In addition, Angola also harboured anti-Mobutu sentiments. The Angolan Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government considered the DRC under Mobutu as a serious threat to its continued existence, because the Katanga province of the DRC served as the training ground for UNITA rebels fighting the Angolan government. The AFDL, with the assistance of Rwanda and Uganda, started organising themselves to topple the Mobutu government. They then started taking over towns and cities, such as Kisangani and Lubumbashi, until they finally captured the capital city, Kinshasa, on 17 May 1997. After overthrowing Mobutu, Kabila changed the name of the country from Zaire (which it had been named by Mobutu) to the DRC. While charting his way to Kinshasa, Kabila had made several concessions to various multinational mining companies, including Anglo-American, Texaf, George Forest International, American Mineral Fields, and others. Once in power, Kabila had given influential governmental positions to Rwandese nationals, including James Kabarebe (Chief of Staff of the Congolese Armed Forces), Bizima Karaha (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Deo

Bugera (Minister of State and Secretary-General of the AFDL), Moise Nyarugabo (Chief Executive Officer of the Acquired Goods Office), and Michael Rudatenguha (Financial Director in the President's Office). Such deals and decisions, as well as his failure to fulfil his democratisation promise, led to dissent and disappointment with his government (Baregu, 2002; Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Mwaniki, 2009; Prunier: 2009).

In 1998, on suspicion that the Rwandese he appointed were planning to overthrow him, and seemingly in an attempt to appease the Congolese, Kabila ordered the Rwandese and Ugandan forces and personnel to leave the country. This order, which was harshly accepted by those on the receiving end, led to mutinies in the army, particularly in Kinshasa and in the eastern province of Kivu. Whereas the mutiny in Kinshasa was halted, the one in the eastern province continued, culminating in a drive to topple the government. In the same eastern province, the Banyamulenge formed the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and swiftly gained control of such towns as Bukavu and Uvira, and many of the eastern provinces. The RCD based their operation in the city of Goma. By that time, Kabila's relation with the allies that had brought him to power had already soured. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda retaliated by occupying parts of the eastern and north-eastern parts of the DRC. At the same time, Uganda 'engineered' a rebel group, called the Movement for Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Seeing that the anti-Kabila rebel forces were advancing towards Kinshasa, President Kabila appealed for assistance from SADC. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to aid the Kabila government. By August 1998, the conflict had culminated in outright war, involving more than seven African countries. This war had been referred to by many as 'Africa's First World War' (Baregu, 2002; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2009; Iyenda, 2005; Kabemba, 2009; Kisiangani, 2009; Mwaniki, 2009; Naidoo, 2000).

3.4.2 Namibian intervention in the conflict

As was already stated, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe joined the war in the DRC after the Rwandan and Ugandan supported rebel forces captured most of the towns and headed towards Kinshasa. Kabila appealed to these countries in the name of SADC. On 7 and 8 August 1998, President Mugabe, the then chairman of the OPDS, convened a meeting in Victoria Falls to discuss the DRC conflict. The meeting was attended by Namibia, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, the DRC and Zimbabwe. The meeting agreed to set up a verification committee of Foreign Ministers of Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The committee was tasked with investigating the nature of the conflict, and thereafter proposing peace recommendations (Meyns, 2002). President Mugabe called for a follow-up meeting, which was held in Harare on 18 August 1998. This meeting was a special meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) Defence Ministers, which was held to consider the findings of the verification committee. Following the findings of the verification committee, the meeting resolved that those SADC members that were able to, had to give assistance to President Kabila, for it was found that Uganda and Rwanda had violated the sovereignty of the DRC. SADC allies' intervention was also found legitimate in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for a state's individual or collective self-defence, should such a scenario manifest itself (Meyns, 2002; Punungwe, 1999).

3.4.2.1 Joining the war – economic motives or defending DRC sovereignty?

There is a vast amount of literature on the exploitation of the resources of the DRC by the parties involved in that particular conflict. Many argue that all the external forces (Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe) had ulterior motives to that of coming to the aid of the Kabila government (specifically with reference to the

SADC allies). Such clandestine motives have largely been documented as being of an economic nature. The official version of Namibia's motive was provided by the Namibian Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF), President Nujoma, as quoted in Orogun (2002:36–37), qualifying Namibia's intervention as follows:

> Our troops are there to safeguard Namibia's future security. We should not behave like children and delude ourselves in thinking that the peace and stability that we are enjoying today will remain forever. As the Commander-in Chief, I took the necessary action to come to the aid of an aggressed neighbour and fellow member of SADC. I did so conscious of the inherent dangers and problems including the death of our troops. It is an honourable act of enlightened self-interests. The very worst was in store for us.

Lumb (1999) adds that:

> The NDF envisaged the DRC campaign to be a short to medium term operation comprised of two phases. The objective of phase one was to protect the Kabila government in Kinshasa and prevent it from being overthrown by rebel forces, as well as to secure the western economic corridor, Kinshasa's vital link to the Atlantic Ocean … Phase two's objective was to contain the rebel forces in the eastern region of the DRC and prevent them capturing towns and other strategic areas.

The internationalisation of the DRC conflict also meant that the UN and the Security Council would also intervene in the conflict. One of the UN interventions was the establishment of a panel of experts to investigate the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC. The panel was known as The Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On

16 April 2001, the Panel published its report, which identified those that had been involved in plundering the resources of the DRC.

According to Iyenda (2002:15–16), it was also found that:

… foreign forces allied with the Congolese government, namely Angola, Namibia and especially Zimbabwe, were also profiting from the conflict through economic deals and agreements, exploitation of mines and one-sided contracts on several goods and merchandises."

The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1998:8) states:

… some observers suggest that Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia each has its own reasons for intervening. Zimbabwe and Namibia have economic interests in the DRC that they wish to defend, safeguard and promote.

According to Taylor and Williams (2001:276):

Namibia's $25 million trade deal with Kabila, which stands to benefit key players associated with the Nujoma regime, similarly played a role in Windhoek's decision to enter and remain involved in the war.

Orogun (2002:36) believes that Namibia's intervention in the DRC is based on "political and core economic expediency rather than sheer altruism". He argues that Namibia, much of which is a dry country, was interested in using the Congo River as a water resource. As such, the intervention could "secure economic and vital resource benefits". Orogun's (2002) observation corresponds with what President Nujoma had to say,

especially in regards to Namibian troops being there "to safeguard Namibia's future security" and also that the intervention was "an honourable act of enlightened self-interests".

The argument as to the motives of Namibia is neither here nor there. It is, indeed, possible that Namibia partook, and was interested, in plundering the resources of the DRC, and that the intervention was an act of "enlightened self-interest". There seems to be evidence on both sides. It is very clear that both Angola and Zimbabwe were involved in plundering the DRC's resources. The UN Panel, for example, provided details of the specific involvement of the two countries, and the shares held, as well as in which sector and industry. Compared to the available information on Angola and Zimbabwe, there is little precise information available on Namibia's looting and plundering of the DRC resources. However, it is interesting to note the '$25 million trade deal' that Namibia had with Kabila, as covered by Taylor and Williams (2001). The possibility also exists that the money involved is that which is referred to in the following: "during the time when Namibia became involved in the DRC conflict in 1998, Namibia granted DRC a loan of N$ 25 million" (Mushelenga, 2008:131).

According to the International Crisis Group (1999:10),

> … there are few reasons for the continued military involvement of Namibia in the DRC. The Namibian involvement can only be explained in terms of the warm relationship between Namibian President Sam Nujoma, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Kabila. The friendship between Nujoma and Mugabe started in their early days as freedom fighters against white minority rule in their countries. Nujoma and Kabila used to belong to informal Marxist discussion groups in Dar Es Salaam, where they were exiled in 1960's.

In addition, Prunier (2009:265) states: "Windhoek had joined [the DRC conflict] only because [of] the SADC big boy pressure."

In the light of the above, De Carvalho (2010:38) summarises the situation as being one in which

> … the international community has not slated the former [Namibia] over the plunder of Congolese resources, as was the case with Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The riches gained by Namibia from the DRC were granted by the DRC government in compensation for Namibian spending in the conflict. Therefore, with or without the business issue, Namibia was already inclined to support Kabila.

3.4.2.2 Joining the war – the domestic debate

Joining the war in the DRC was a contested phenomenon not only in SADC, but also inside Namibia. This contention was especially profound in the National Assembly, Namibia's legislative body. Mushelenga (2008:131) captures this debate as follows:

> [Namibia's] involvement in the DRC … has created controversy in foreign policy-making. The manner in which information on Namibia's involvement in the DRC conflict was communicated to the public does not augur well for foreign policy-making. When the issue came, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theo-Ben Gurirab, denied that Namibia has sent troops to the DRC, only for President Nujoma to confirm this state of affairs within two days. Accordingly, an opposition politician, Moses Katjiuongua questioned the granting to the DRC, during the conflict, of a loan of N\$ 25 million. This issue … has created a controversy in Namibia's foreign policy-making.

Other arguments that were advanced by the opposition and the media were that President Nujoma had bypassed Parliament and had acted alone in sending troops to the DRC. The resultant confusion even created the belief, in some lawmakers, that a violation of the Namibian Constitution had taken place. Of these, Elizabeth Amukugo, a member of the main opposition party at the time, the Congress of Democrats (CoD), was quoted in Mushelenga (2008) stating that the:

> … involvement in the DRC conflict and Angola was not consistent with the policy of non-alignment or international settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. Since the fighting in the DRC was not a secret war, it was beyond our comprehension that the decision was taken to get involved secretly without informing Parliament or even informing the public whose tax money had to be spent without their authorization.

> (Mushelenga, 2008:128)

However, Lumb (1999) clarifies this matter as follows:

> Section 29 of the Defence Amendment Act (No. 114 of 1990) stipulates the circumstances in which members of the NDF can be deployed on foreign soil, but the Constitution is silent as to who has the authority to make such a decision. In reality this means that the President has the discretion to declare war and send soldiers to another country without consulting the legislature prior to the decision. As a consequence of this Constitutional provision, President Nujoma circumvented the National Assembly when he made the decision to deploy troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Mushelenga (2008:128–129) also corroborates this view, stating that:

… members of the opposition parties misunderstood constitutional provisions regarding Parliament's approval of martial laws. The relevance of the opposition arguments in this respect is applicable only when martial laws and state of emergency are applied in case of civil war or threat to constitutional order, peace and stability … Article 27 of the Namibian Constitution requires the President to consult the National Assembly only when declaring the public emergency, state of national defence and martial law, in the event of threat to national defence and security due to either civil war or threat by another state … The Namibian Constitution is silent on the issue of deploying the NDF to defend another state from aggression.

It is very important to note the words of the President, as a principal foreign policy maker, as quoted earlier. That considered it would appear that Namibia went to the DRC to respond to President Kabila's plea. However, this does not mean that it was blind of the economic and strategic self interest as stated by the President. Chapter 5 will carry out a more lucid analysis on this issue.

3.4.2.3 The role of Namibia in the conflict in the DRC

The role played by Namibia in the DRC was twofold: firstly, a military role, and secondly, a diplomatic role. The military role refers to the actions and results brought about by military intervention in the conflict, whereas the diplomatic role refers to the actions and results of Namibian political leaders' efforts to have the conflict resolved.

3.4.2.3.1 The military role

Namibia sent about 2 000 troops and about 20 tons of military weapons and other supplies to the DRC. The NDF, with the support of the allies, managed to secure

Kinshasa, and prevented it from being captured by the rebels. According to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1998:8), "without the intervention of…Namibia, Kinshasa would have been captured by the rebels". Specifically, it was also the responsibility of the NDF to provide for the personal security of President Kabila. In addition to safeguarding the city and its airport, the NDF also managed to secure the DRC's strategic link to the Atlantic Ocean, the western economic corridor. The force also controlled the western part of the DRC, causing the rebels to withdraw, and to cross the Congo River into Congo-Brazzaville. As a result, Namibia and its allies brought about a stalemate, which can arguably be said to have decreased the number of war mortalities (Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Lumb, 1999; Orogun, 2002).

3.4.2.3.2 The diplomatic role

The other significant role that was played by Namibia was of a diplomatic nature. Before the military intervention, Namibia was already involved in diplomatic attempts to find a solution to the conflict. Namibia was chosen, together with Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia, to be part of the verification committee tasked with assessing the disposition of the conflict and with thereafter making recommendations for its peaceful resolution. This verification committee was established by the SADC OPDS meeting that took place on 7 and 8 August 1998 (Meyns, 2002; Punungwe, 1999).

Even after joining the war, Namibia remained committed to the diplomatic resolution of the conflict. As Lumb (1999) validates:

By late-March 1999, President Nujoma readily admitted that this war could not be won militarily, and favoured a negotiated settlement instead … By September, after several months of intensive diplomatic bargaining, a cease-fire agreement [the Lusaka peace

agreement] was eventually signed by most of the important parties. This cease-fire agreement stipulates that all foreign troops, including the approximately 2 000 NDF soldiers, must withdraw from DRC territory by February 2000.

The allies' intervention caused a stir in SADC, adding on to the already existing differences between President Mugabe (Chair of SADC OPDS) and President Mandela (Chair of SADC) at the time. It appeared that there were differences and conflicting views on how best the conflict could be resolved, although there was consensus that President Kabila was the legitimate authority in the DRC whose territorial integrity and sovereignty was to be respected. The allies, led by SADC OPDS's Chair, felt that providing military aid to fellow SADC members whose sovereignty was being violated by foreign aggressors was apt; while the SADC Chair saw peaceful means, rather than military intervention, as the way forward (Meyns, 2002).

In the light of the above, President Nujoma played an enormous role in reconciling these divergent views and in shaping the direction of events, based not on condemning the allies, but on supporting their intervention as a basis of the roadmap. Specifically, President Nujoma managed to convince President Mandela, the SADC Chair, to support the allies' intervention in the DRC. President Mandela was quoted in Cornwell & Potgieter (1998) as stating:

"It is quite reasonable when the legitimate head of a government of a country says: 'I have been invaded by a foreign force. Come and help me defend my country ...…' for the neighbouring country to respond positively …… There was some confusion before. But once Sam Nujoma gave me this explanation and he repeated it in the summit, we unanimously supported that initiative and expressly acknowledged President Kabila as the legitimate

head of that government. There is no difference whatsoever on this point now that explanations have been given."

(Cornwell & Potgieter: 1998,78).

As such, it is no surprise that the SADC Annual Summit, which was held in Grand Baie from 13 to 14 September 1998 gave its blessing to the intervention of the allies. The summit statement read:

"The Summit welcomed initiatives by SADC and its Member States intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security and stability in DRC, in particular the Victoria Falls and Pretoria initiatives. In that regard, the Summit reaffirmed its call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timorously providing troops to assist the Government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by rebels and their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other strategic areas."

(SADC,: 1998)

3.4.3 The DRC conflict resolution process

Before the intervention of the allies in the DRC, there was considerable propensity to resolve the DRC conflict, as evidenced by the meeting that was held at an early stage in Victoria Falls involving the belligerents. SADC continued with efforts to resolve the conflict. With the passage of time, this protracted international conflict became of greater concern to the international community than it had been earlier on. It is for this reason that both the OAU and the UN were involved at the highest level.

In 1999, SADC tasked the late Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, with facilitating dialogue between the warring parties. This culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement between Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Angola, and the DRC on 10 July 1999. In addition, the Agreement was also signed by the RCD and the MLC, being the two rebel formations, two months later. The Lusaka Peace Agreement called, amongst others, for a ceasefire in the DRC; the establishment of a unified army and joint military commission to tackle disarmaments of armed groups; the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC; the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force to safeguard the implementation of the agreement; and an all-inclusive political dialogue – the Inter-Congolese Dialogue – to bring about a new political dispensation in the DRC. The Dialogue was to be initiated by a neutral facilitator chosen, in consultation with the belligerents, by the OAU (of which the former President of Botswana, Sir Katumile Masire, subsequently became the facilitator).

All did not go according to plan, for there was still divergent interest and mistrust among parties, although they had signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement. Fighting started again in the DRC, prompting the UN, in February 2000, to deploy more than 5 000 troops to monitor the ceasefire. President Kabila was also said to be indifferent to the facilitator, President Masire. On 17 January 2001, President Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, was unanimously elected by Parliament to be his father's successor. The young Kabila showed considerable inclination to peace and resolution of the conflict in his country, with the peace talks beginning to take shape in the early 2000s.

The Inter-Congolese Dialogue involved lengthy talks, including agreements, disagreements, protests, deals and boycotts. This was the most important part of peacemaking in the DRC. The facilitator tried to hold a meeting between the parties in

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but the talks failed when the participants could not agree on the inclusion and exclusion of delegates. Between February and April 2002, About 360 delegates later converged on Sun City, South Africa, as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The Sun City Talks led to the signing of a peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC on 30 July 2002, which called for the withdrawal of Rwandan soldiers from the DRC and the dismantling of the Rwanda-supported rebel forces.

A month later, on 6 September 2002, the Luanda peace agreement was signed between the DRC and Uganda. The agreement directed Uganda to withdraw her troops from the DRC, while calling for improved relations between the two countries. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue finally made a breakthrough on 17 December 2002, when the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was signed by all the parties that had been present at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, including the DRC national government, the MLC, the RCD, the Rally for Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Rally for Congolese Democracy – National (RCD-N), opposition parties, civil society organisations, and the Mai Mai. The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement outlined the path for the future which included, amongst others, the establishment of a transitional government and legislative and Presidential elections (Apuuli, 2004; Iyenda, 2005; Kisiangani, 2009; Meyns, 2002).

There is little mention of the role of Namibia during the conflict resolution process although the country took part in SADC efforts to resolve the conflict. It must be noted, however, that the then Namibian Ambassador to the UN, Martin Andjaba, did form part of the MONUC team sent to the DRC by the Security Council (UN, 2000). Namibia's main contribution to this conflict resolution process appears to be the withdrawal of troops from the DRC, according to the schedule of the Lusaka Agreement, to allow for the Inter Congolese Dialogue to take effect. In discussing the

importance of the Inter Congolese Dialogue in one of the sessions of the Security Council, Jamaican Ambassador, Curtis Ward, thanked Namibia for withdrawing, by the end of August, from the DRC (ReliefWeb, 2001). The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan was also reported to have "applauded the withdrawal of Namibian troops last month from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a positive sign for the peace process after three years of conflict" (IRIN , 2001).

Namibia's 'laid back' approach during the conflict resolution process can be best understood in the words of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya, who then remarked that "with the Rwanda and Uganda aggression blunted and their hegemonic ambitions checked, it was now possible for other parties, such as the UN and South Africa, to step forth with proposals for peacekeeping and national reconciliation " (Dzinesa & Rupiya: 2005,225). From the above, it appears clear that Namibia regarded conflict resolutions and post-conflict reconstruction as the business of others such as South Africa.

3.5 Conclusion

The ending of the DRC conflict finally closed the devastating century-old chapter in the history of the DRC. From the plundering, exploitation and underdevelopment of King Leopold, Mobutu and the likes, the DRC can now look forward, with determination and focus, to the humane development of its people. This, however, does not mean that we can forget the history of 'peace-less' DRC.

The current chapter provided a descriptive account of the role of Namibia in a highly internationalised conflict that saw about eight African countries fighting one another on African soil. While Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and their rebel creations were fighting to

topple the Kabila government, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe fought to prevent the overthrow of the Kabila government. Chad and Sudan are said to have been part of the conflict as well. It is the above phenomenon that led scholars to describe this event as 'Africa's First World War'. With the efforts of the UN, OAU and SADC in particular, the conflict was finally resolved, even though it was a lengthy process that required diligence and commitment from those tasked with the responsibility of bringing the belligerent forces together.

There is a large body of literature providing evidence that the war had a dimension of looting the DRC resources by those involved. The UN constituted a panel of experts to investigate the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. The findings of the panel, which were released in 2001, affirm that plundering of natural resources from the Congo did, indeed, take place. The panel report and scholars in the field found Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda mostly guilty of having plundered the resources of the DRC. Namibia is mentioned as being part of the group, but there was little mention of specific looting and plundering activities, as was the case with her allies. The study does not, however, conclude that Namibia did not take part in the plundering of the DRC resources – it is possible that Namibia did take part in the plundering of the resources – but that there is little specific and lucid indication of such.

Namibia, which played a crucial role in the DRC conflict, and her allies swiftly moved into the DRC and managed to secure Kinshasa, which was about to be captured by the rebel forces. There is wide consensus that, if it had not been for the SADC allies coming to Kabila's aid, Kinshasa would have been captured by the rebels and the Kabila government overthrown (Lumb, 1999). Namibia also gave 20 tons of weapons and other supplies, and a loan of N$25 million, to the DRC government at the time of war.

Apart from the military role that Namibia played, it also played an important role at the diplomatic level. Before deploying its troops, Namibia partook in SADC discussions aimed at resolving the DRC conflict. Namibia's Foreign Minister served on the verification committee set up to study the nature of the DRC conflict, and to make recommendations to the OPDS. The talks and efforts paved the way for the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, which not only called for a cessation of hostilities, but also called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces to oversee the agreement. There were differences among SADC members with regard to the intervention. President Nujoma played a crucial role in reconciling the views, until SADC endorsed the allies' intervention in mapping the way towards the negotiated settlement of the conflict, culminating in the signing of the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement by all domestic political forces in the DRC.

CHAPTER FOUR – NAMIBIA IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT, COMBATING THE COMMON ENEMY?

4.1 Introduction

Found on the Atlantic coast of south-west Africa, Angola is a natural-resources-endowed southern African country that occupies approximately 1 246 700 square kilometres. Populated with more than 14 million people, Angola was a former colony of Portugal. The Portuguese explorers first came to Angola in 1483. Their conquest and exploitation became concrete when Paulo Dias de Novais erected a colonial settlement in Luanda in 1575. By the time that the 1880s Berlin conference apportioned Angola to Portugal, the Portuguese had already established themselves in Angola. They made sure that they not only destroyed the kingdoms existing there at the time, as a basis of the social, political and economic organisation of Angolan society, but they pitted various kingdoms against one another too. The indigenous groups launched brave resistance against the Portuguese from the 1500s to the 1900s, with the Portuguese finally gaining full military control of the whole of Angola, thus effectively imposing and enforcing their colonial policy on those living in the country (Birmingham, 1966; De Andrede, 1982; Heywood, 1987; Malaquias, 2007; Pitcher, 1991).

This chapter discusses the Angolan conflict which caused more than 700 000 war-related deaths and was responsible for more than 400 000 Angolans having to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The same conflict caused tremendous damage to the Angolan rural life, thus leading to one of the highest urbanisation rates to be experienced in Africa (Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007). The conflict started as a battle to capture state power, after Portugal granted independence to Angola in 1975. The nationalist movements were largely distinct as well as antagonistic from and towards

one another respectively. The protracted conflict came to an end in February 2002, when the UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, was assassinated.

In this chapter, particular attention is directed to the role that Namibia played in the conflict, after discussing the conflict itself. The role of Namibia cannot be fully understood without understanding the conflict, both in its historicity and during the period when post-independence Namibia became involved in it.

4.2 The Angolan conflict

4.2.1 The bloody race towards 11 November and the 1991 Bicesse Accord

As is characteristic of colonialism, exploitation, subjugation, segregation and assimilation characterised Portuguese colonial policy. By the 1930s to the 1940s most Angolans were already socially and politically engaged in the colonial exploitative question and the associated way forward. Such engagement was more profound in the urban areas of the country. As such, several social, sports and cultural groups started coordinating regarding the need for, and manner of, spearheading the anti-colonial resistance. Of these, the African National League (LNA) and the Association of Natives of Angola (ANANGOLA) were chiefly instrumental in facilitating the anti-colonial resistance discourses. By the late 1950s, the groups had emerged with a political and nationalist character, which, subsequently, led to the start of the armed anti-colonial struggle in 1961. In 1974, fortunately for the nationalists concerned, a coup occurred in Portugal that saw the custodianship of the colonial project in Angola overthrown. The new regime that took control of the country was not committed to the project. Consequently, colonialism and anti-colonial resistance came to an end in Angola (Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007).

In Portugal, January 1975, the MPLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and UNITA signed the Alvor Accord, which provided a transitional roadmap towards the independence date of 11 November 1975. Due to the antagonistic factors, which are elaborated below, the Alvor Accord lost its meaning, for those who were involved in the nationalist movement all went their separate ways, with the intensions all aiming at capturing power come 11 November 1975. The antagonistic factors were the root cause of the conflict. The Angolan nationalist movements were largely fragmented, and could not agree on who should take over state power in post-colonial Angola. The movements developed as distinct, sharing neither a joint perspective nor identities; they all had differing ethnic origins and foreign backers, and saw one another as obstacles that must be removed for each to assume power (Comerford, 2005; Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009). Hodges (2001) explains how distinctive the nationalist movements were:

[The] MPLA was founded in Luanda in 1956 and drew its support mainly from the Mbundu, the country's second largest ethnic group. [It] was heavily influenced by Marxist ideas … [and] received arms and diplomatic assistance from the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] and other soviet bloc countries from the 1960s. FNLA [drew its support from] the Bakongo – populated extreme north-west … The Bakongo are Angola's third largest ethnic group and also constitute a large part of the population of neighbouring Congo and Democratic Republic of Congo … FNLA waged a low-key guerrilla war in north-western Angola, backed up from its bases in Zaire, where it enjoyed the support of the former dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko … UNITA came into being in 1966. It had very little external support and concentrated on building up an underground political movement among the Ovimbundu, who, despite constituting Angola's largest ethnic group, had not been mobilized to any significant extent by either MPLA or FNLA.

(Hodges: 2001,89)

It was for the above different interests, that when 11 November arrived, the country was largely divided up, with each of the movements controlling their part of the country. Hodges (2001:10) effectively captures the race towards 11 November between the Angola nationalist movements and their respective allies in the following description:

South Africa, which pursued a classic 'divide-and-rule' strategy by forging an alliance with UNITA and the FNLA, invaded southern Angola in August 1975 and, by October, had advanced more than half way up to the Angolan coast to within 200 km of Luanda. The Zairean army invaded in the north, in support of the FNLA. The United States meanwhile provided covert support to both UNITA and the FNLA, to counter-balance soviet military assistance to the MPLA. In response to South African invasion, Cuba sent troops to Angola, from October 1975. This ensured that, when independence was formally declared in November, the MPLA was in control of the capital, where it proclaimed a 'people's republic' and appointed its leader Agostino Neto, as President. Over the following few months, the Cuban helped the MPLA to secure control over the whole country. The US intervention halted, following the passage of Clark Amendment, which barred support for any of the Angolan factions … This left the South African government in the lurch, forcing it to withdraw its forces back across the border into northern Namibia in 1976.

Malaquias (2007) corroborates what Hodges (2001) has to say, stating:

At independence Angola had essentially three governments: MPLA backed by Cuban troops controlled Luanda, the capital, and little else; UNITA controlled Huambo, the second largest city and several southern provinces with South African help while FNLA, supported by Zairean troops, held the northern provinces.

(Malaquias, 2007:39)

The fighting did not end after the weakening of UNITA, the withdrawal of South Africa or the Clark Amendment that barred the United States supporting any Angolan belligerents. FNLA was virtually destroyed in the bloody race towards 11 November, thereafter, UNITA begun to reorganise. UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, managed to establish good relations with Zaire, for the latter allowed UNITA to establish bases for its guerrilla activities. South Africa renewed its support of UNITA, as well as actively taking part in the military offensives. The apartheid regime launched numerous military operations in Angola; all stemming from what it termed a 'total strategy' that was the regime's response to what it perceived as a 'communist onslaught' in the region. It launched such operations as 'Operation Skeptic', 'Operation Protea' and 'Operation Daisy', which all included support for UNITA and an attack on the 'communists' (South West African People's Organisation [SWAPO], the African National Congress [ANC] and the MPLA, keeping in mind that the ANC and SWAPO had a presence in Angola). The repeal of the Clark Amendment, in July 1985, also saw the United States resuming its support of UNITA. As happened in the race towards November 11, the Soviets and the Cubans came to the aid of the MPLA. Cuba thus maintained about 50 000 ground troops in the country. What followed subsequently was protracted fighting (Grobbelaar, Mills & Sidiropoulos, 2003; Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009).

The MPLA and its allies (Cuba, the ANC and SWAPO) met, at the confrontational decisive battle of Cuito Cuanavale, against UNITA and the South African forces. After the battle, the belligerent forces agreed to the cessation of fighting and allowed for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435, which led to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and paved the way for Namibia's independence. As a result, UNITA and the ruling MPLA signed the Bicesse peace agreement in 1991

(Anstee, 1996; Comerford, 2005; Grobbelaar et al., 2003; Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009; Prunier, 2009).

4.2.2   *The 1990s abortive peace deals*

The late 1980s and the early 1990s were to be decisive in the political dynamics of the conflict. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and apartheid to follow suit, there was a greater propensity towards peace and negotiations to end the Angolan conflict. As such, negotiations took place between the MPLA government and UNITA in Portugal, which led to the signing in May 1991, of the Bicesse Accord between the two antagonists. The Bicesse Accord provided for a ceasefire; the quartering of UNITA troops; the establishment of unified armed forces; surplus troop demobilisation; the restoration of government administration in the UNITA stronghold; and multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections.

This process was to be overseen by the joint politico-military commission, with the support of the UN through UNAVEM II. As expected, the United States, Portugal and the USSR played a role in the process, due to their linkages to the conflict (with Portugal as the former coloniser, the USSR as the supporter of the MPLA, and the United States as the forerunner of the peace deal and the former backer of UNITA). The election, which was held in September 1992, were won by the MPLA, and declared by the UN to have been free and fair. When UNITA refused to accept the election results, Angola was launched into war once again (Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007).

When UNITA returned to war after the 1992 elections, it no longer enjoyed the support of its former allies, apart from Zaire. UNITA, however, managed to fund its war from the returns that it earned from the diamonds in the areas under its grip. Several UN

sanctions left Jonas Savimbi with no choice but to agree to the new peace deal – the Lusaka Protocol. This peace agreement embodied the attributes of the Bicesse Accord, but also included new measures such as power-sharing and the prioritisation of the military settlement before elections. The agreement was signed on 21 November 1994. As a result, the UN deployed about 7 000 troops under UNAVEM III. However, since UNITA totally flouted the Lusaka Protocol, it was never implemented. After several years of fighting, President dos Santos, after the December 1999 MPLA congress, terminated the Lusaka peace process, called for UN withdrawal, and directed the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to launch a total offensive against UNITA (Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007). UNITA, without its allies and together with the sanctions that were imposed on it, could no longer resist the FAA offensive. UNITA's leader, Savimbi, was subsequently assassinated, marking the resumption of peace, national reconciliation and reconstruction, and development.

Grobbelaar et al. (2003:8) summarise their overview of this period as follows:

> Jonas Savimbi's death on 22 February 2002 provided the decisive factor that ended the conflict. It resulted in the signing of a truce between the surviving military leaders of UNITA and the MPLA government on 4 April 2002 in Luanda. The pace of political change and military demobilization since then has been breathtaking. By early August 2002, the process of quartering UNITA soldiers and their families had officially been concluded, with more than 80 000 soldiers (35 000 more than initially expected) and around 260 000 family members involved.

4.2.3 The role of Namibia

The war in Angola was not only a national security concern to Namibia, but it had a history behind it, the Namibian ruling party, SWAPO, had historical links with the MPLA, having fought together against the same opponent (UNITA) before Namibia gained independence. The conflict in Angolan can be regarded as somewhat of an unfinished business for the ruling SWAPO and the MPLA. The two parties fought against UNITA before Namibia's Independence (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005). This study does not trace the historic role of Namibia before independence, but concerns the role of post-independence Namibia in the Angolan conflict between 1994 and 2002.

4.2.3.1 Role under the UN

The first role of Namibia was part of various UN missions in the region, starting in the mid-1990s.

> [Namibia] participated in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) in 1996 and has been rotated two times since its deployment there. Although the UN Plan called for the withdrawal of all military contingents by the end of February 1997, the Namibian contingent was requested by the UN to stay on up to August 1997. The government accepted the UN request and a replacement force was selected, prepared and dispatched in March 1997. [The] mission with UNAVEM III has been changed from road verification and VIP escort to that of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The contingent continued to serve with the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) at the request of the UN after UNAVEM III was terminated. Its duty in Angola ended in February 1999.

(MoD, 2000)

The above is corroborated by Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005:222) who present that " the NDF also contributed personnel to serve on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III in 1996. UN Security Council Resolution 976 of 8 February 1995 established the multidimensional UNAVEM III to assist the government and UNITA in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation against a fragile politico-military background. Initially assigned road verification and VIP escort duties, the UNAVEM Namibian contingent was later asked to act as a Rapid Reaction Force. The NDF contingent continued to serve with the smaller United Nations Observer Mission for Angola (MONUA), which replaced UNAVEM III on 30 June 1997."

Namibia also took part in various diplomatic regional meetings on the conflict. As Jere (2001) reported, "Presidents Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Frederick Chiluba of Zambia held a one-day mini-summit to discuss the security situation along their shared borders and concluded that Savimbi was blocking the end of Angola's civil war…The heads of state condemned UNITA ... for its intransigence and failure to implement the obligations it freely subscribed to and embodied in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol," said a communique issued after several hours of talks… The three leaders Tuesday called upon the international community, and in particular African countries, "to abide by and enhance" existing UN Security Council sanctions against UNITA, which ban its trade in diamonds and limit travel by its leaders.[the three head of state had earlier] agreed to set up the body mainly to address Luanda's fears that Angolan UNITA rebels could launch attacks from neighboring states." At one point, the then UN Secretary General Special Envoy to Angola, Issa Diallo, who was scheduled to meet Savimbi, was reported to have "paid a courtesy call on President Sam Nujoma in Windhoek to seek advice on the critical situation in Angola" for he believed that doing so was "a positive step towards the peace process" (PANA, 1998).

4.2.3.2 Military role

Apart from its role under the UN banner, the NDF was an integral part of the conflict. Namibia treated the Angolan conflict as its own, for UNITA had been involved in the killings of several Namibians in the northern part of the country. The two ruling parties, the MPLA and SWAPO, had close historic ties. The state of affairs thus caused Windhoek to become actively involved in the conflict. As Prunier (2009:192) explains:

> UNITA infiltrations in the north [of Namibia] forced the Namibian Defence Force to integrate its operational plans with those of the FAA and to operate as far as north as Mavinga, five hundred kilometres into Angola, to protect its border.

The above is authenticated by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report of 17 December 1999, in which the NDF Chief of Staff, Major-General Martin Shalli, is said to have acknowledged that Namibian forces had crossed the border into Angola, in support of the FAA (BBC, 1999).

Apart from the physical participation in the war inside Angola, Namibia had also granted permission to the FAA to come into Namibia in pursuit of the UNITA rebels who, at the time, had retreated as far south as northern Namibia. The permission also included the launching of attacks against UNITA from Namibian soil (BBC, 1999; Grobbelaar et al., 2003; Prunier, 2009).

Boksenbaum (1999) explains Namibia's military intervention in the Angolan conflict, stating:

> Namibia's unannounced involvement in the fighting should not have come as a surprise. On April 9 [1999] the southwest African country signed a mutual defence pact with Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe. The pact, signed by defence ministers in Luanda, provides for mutual military support should any of the signatory countries face 'internal or external aggression'. It outlined support for Kabila's war against rebels and the Angolan government's drawn-out battle with UNITA.

Apart from integrating its troops with the FAA, allowing the FAA to enter Namibia in search of UNITA forces, and allowing the FAA to launch attacks on UNITA from Namibian soil, Namibia deployed the NDF at its borders with Angola in response to the destabilisation that was caused when UNITA forces started fleeing into northern Namibia (ISS, 2011).

President Nujoma summarises as quoted in Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005:227) stating that "the Army launched hot pursuit operations that minimised UNITA atrocities in Namibia. In the process, these hot pursuit operations into Angola destroyed UNITA bases and many tons of war materiel were captured. The Army contributed greatly to the reduction of UNITA terrorists' morale and subsequently their effectiveness, which resulted in their annihilation, and the elimination of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002."

4.3 Conclusion

As a Portuguese colony, Angola was administered as a province of Portugal. Before the formal declaration of Angola as a province of Portugal and, indeed, before the Berlin conference offered Angola as a Portuguese economic sphere of interest, the Portuguese had already established their presence in Angola as far back as the 1500s. The Portuguese exploitation of the Angolan natives caused a political awakening, leading to the formulation of social discourses on anti-colonial resistance. In 1961, the Angolan nationalist movements launched an armed anti-colonial resistance. While the anti-colonial struggle was going on, a coup occurred in Lisbon, in 1974, which would usher in a new era in Angolan history, one of colonialism and anti-colonial resistance. The new regime that took over after independence was not interested in the continuity of the colonial project. As such, it agreed, together with the nationalist movements, that 11 November 1975 would see the birth of Angola's independence, which transpired as had been planned.

Unfortunately, the nationalist movements could not forge a common perspective for the future of Angola. They thus started fighting one another in their attempts to capture state power, come 11 November 1975. Due to the political climate in international politics at the time, which was dominated by the Cold War, the Angolan conflict was to take on an international dimension. Cuba and the Soviet Union supported the MPLA, whereas the United States and apartheid South Africa supported UNITA, while Zaire supported the FNLA. Ferocious fighting surfaced as a result. The MPLA managed to win the first part of the war, especially that which was waged between 1974 and 1976. With the assistance of Cuba, the MPLA managed to seize control of Luanda, forming a new government on 11 November 1975.

UNITA and its allies reorganised, and, with the FNLA seemingly having been destroyed, new fighting arose. UNITA again took control of some provinces, specifically those in the rural parts of Angola. During this period, UNITA enjoyed the financial and military support of the United States and of apartheid South Africa. The latter actively took part in military offensives in Angola, for it had security interests in the area, since the ANC and SWAPO had bases within Angola. The ANC and SWAPO were fighting against the apartheid government in Namibia and South Africa at the time. In response, Cuba increased the number of her troops in Angola, thus taking on, with its allies, UNITA and its allies. When the international community realised that the war could not be concluded militarily, and especially with the end of the Cold War, peace processes to resolve the conflict were started.

The first peace processes saw the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and the granting of independence to Namibia. The Bicesse Accord was finally signed by the MPLA. UNITA called for a ceasefire and set out the roadmap towards the September 1992 elections, supervised by the UN. The elections took place and the MPLA emerged victorious. Although the UN declared the elections to have been both free and fair, UNITA rejected the results, and went to war once more. This time, UNITA had to rely on the revenue raised from the sale of diamonds from the seized mines to finance its war, since its allies were no longer supporting it. The Lusaka peace talks resumed, culminating in the signing of the Lusaka Protocol. This protocol contained the provisions of the Bicesse Accord, as well as new provisions. UNITA flouted this agreement, and again went to war. This led to the MPLA suspending the peace talks, calling for the UN to withdraw, and directing the FAA to launch a full-scale attack on UNITA. This led to the assassination of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, which was a decisive moment that saw the ushering of an era of real peace in Angola.

Namibia formed part of the various UN missions to Angola from 1996 to 1999, which was during the time of UNAVEM III and MONUA. Namibia also took part in various military operations in Angola. The operational plans of the NDF were integrated with those of the FAA in the fight against UNITA. Namibia allowed the FAA into Namibia to launch attacks against UNITA, and also to search for UNITA troops in Namibia. The NDF was also deployed at Namibia's border to avoid the influx of UNITA into Namibia.

CHAPTER FIVE – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

There are various similarities and differences in Namibia's peacemaking role in the two conflicts under study. Indeed, similarities and differences exist in terms of the nature of these two SADC conflicts and the peacemaking role played by Namibia. Below follows a comparative analysis of the two case studies.

5.1 Similarities

Both conflicts have the same origin. They were all invoked by the abrupt granting of independence by the respective colonial masters. In January 1960, Belgians abruptly announced that they will grant independence to the DRC. The then Belgian colonial administration had not build a cohesive state nor did it invest in education to empower the natives to take over the governance of the state. As a result, the new state was soon characterized by instabilities which subsequently, after several coups, ended in a civil war. The same happened in Angola in 1974, when the coup occurred in Portugal with the new regime suddenly announcing that it will grant Independence to Angola on 11 November 1975. Like in the DRC, the new Angolan state was characterized by instabilities which culminated into a civil war.

In Angola and the DRC, the rebel forces fighting the government were backed by foreign nations. In the DRC, various rebel forces were supported by Rwanda and Uganda. In Angola, UNITA was supported by South Africa, DRC and United States. The two conflicts thus involved various countries. In Angola, the conflict involved Cuba, South Africa, United States, DRC and Namibia. The DRC conflict involved Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Chad and Sudan. Both conflicts corroborate Darby & Mac Ginty (2008) assertion, as stated in chapter 1, that contemporary peacemaking is often a creature of foreign nations. The UN was involved

in the Angola Conflict through MONUA and various UNAVEM missions. In the DRC, the UN was also involved mainly through MONUC.

Namibia played an active military role in both Angola and in the DRC. In the DRC, Namibia sent about 2 000 troops and 20 tons of military weapons and other supplies to aid the Kabila government. The NDF, and the SADC allied forces, secured Kinshasa and the airport. The NDF provided for the personal security for President Kabila and secured the DRC's strategic link to the Atlantic Ocean. In Angola, the NDF was integrated with the FAA in pursuit of UNITA. Namibia allowed FAA to come into Namibia in search of UNITA rebels. While the NDF was deployed at Angola-Namibian border, the FAA was granted permission to launch attacks, on UNITA, from the Namibian soil. UNITA had retreated into northern Namibia thus causing instability in that part of Namibia.

Namibia's peacemaking role in both the DRC and Angola took a diplomatic path as well. Namibia was part of earlier diplomatic efforts by the SADC OPDS to resolve the DRC conflict. It participated in the peace talks that culminated in the signing, by Namibia and all parties involved in the conflict, of the Lusaka peace agreement. In Angola, Namibia took part in MONUA and various UNAVEM missions. Moreover, Namibian forces were also tasked with the responsibility of UN VIP escort and part of the UN Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

The involvement of Namibia in the DRC and Angola was conducted in a secretive manner. In both the DRC and the Angolan conflict, Namibia's involvement was known by a few; politicians and officials publicly denied the country's involvement in both the conflicts at the onset, despite it later becoming public knowledge with the passage of time.

When news spread and entered the public domain that Namibia had sent troops to the DRC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Theo Ben Gurirab, publicly denied such an occurrence. Scandalously, President Nujoma confirmed that such had, in fact, been the case. It is said that many at the time had truly not been aware of the intervention (Amupadhi, 2004; Mushelenga, 2008).The Angolan conflict was similar to the above, in that, although it later became public knowledge that Namibia had, indeed, sent troops into Angola and had merged with the FAA in pursuit of UNITA, the NDF officials concerned, as had done the Foreign Minister during the DRC conflict, disputed the existence of such a state of affairs. When the then NDF spokesperson, Vincent Mwange, was approached by the media to comment on the matter, he 'rubbished' such a state of affairs as 'baseless, 'malicious' and 'void of any truth' (Maletsky, 1999). Scandalously again, the Chief of Staff, Major-General Martin Shalli, was interviewed, and quoted by the BBC on 17 December 1999 as acknowledging the sending of Namibian troops into Angola (BBC, 1999; Boksenbaum, 1999; Prunier, 2009).

The other similarity between the two cases is that Namibia's intervention has been on the side of the government and not on the sides of the rebel forces. In the DRC, Namibia supported the government of President Kabila in fighting rebel forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda. In the Angolan conflict, Namibia was supporting the MPLA government in its fight against UNITA rebels. Namibia's involvement in the two conflicts was part of the process that returned peace to the region. The timely withdrawal of Namibian troops enabled the peace negotiations to take place. As has been established before, in chapter 3, even the UN applauded Namibia for its timely withdrawal as a contributing factor to the peace negotiations. NDF/FAA successful onslaught and the subsequent killing of Jonas Savimbi enabled the return of peace in Angola.

5.2 Differences

While there are various similarities between the two case studies, there are equally differences between the two cases. Below, therefore, follows an analysis of the differences between the case studies.

The conflict in the DRC was preceded by various coups. The first coup was the one of Colonel Mobutu; he was overthrown, in yet another coup, by Laurent Kabila. On the other hand, no single coup preceded the Angolan conflict. The DRC conflict was solved with the assistance of outsiders to a larger extent. The DRC conflict was solved after protracted negotiations facilitated by SADC. The Angolan conflict was solved by the Angolans themselves, albeit with considerable assistance from Namibia, when the MPLA government managed to assassinate the UNITA rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi. Angola, to a large extent, only had one rebel formation, UNITA, while the DRC conflict had more than five rebel formations.

During the Angolan conflict, the NDF was integrated with the FAA in its pursuit of UNITA rebels. This meant that the two forces operated, militarily, together as opposed to each doing its separate operations. This was not the case in the DRC where the NDF went with a specific mission, of not integration, but of securing Kinshasa to prevent the toppling of the Kabila government by the rebel forces and their allies, Uganda and Rwanda.

Namibia was the first country to withdraw all her troops from the DRC. As discussed earlier by Lumb (1999), in chapter 3, President Nujoma was reported to have opted to withdraw his troops in support of the negotiated settlement of the conflict. This was not

possible with regards to the Angolan conflict for the NDF/FAA alliance remained intact until the killing of Savimbi in 2002.

There was wide opposition to Namibia's participation in the DRC conflict both domestically and internationally. The opposition political parties in the National Assembly went as far as suggesting that President Nujoma violated the constitution in singlehandedly sending troops to the DRC. This event caused confusion in the foreign policy making of Namibia. In SADC, there was no consensus between the then chairperson of SADC, President Nelson Mandela, and the then chairperson of the SADC OPDS, President Robert Mugabe. There was, however, little opposition, if any, on Namibia's involvement in the Angolan conflict. At the level of SADC, Savimbi was defined a war criminal by the entire region (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005).

The motives of Namibia's involvement in the DRC was indicated by President Nujoma as an act of coming to aid a SADC member whose sovereignty was violated by foreign aggressors. Scholars argued that there is a possibility that Namibia had self-interest economic motives, like other allied SADC states, for coming to aid the Kabila government. On the other hand, the motive of the Angolan conflict was regarded as that of national security for UNITA had destabilized northern Namibia, including killing a number of Namibians. Namibia's peacemaking role in the DRC was regarded as the SADC initiative on the request of a fellow SADC member while the Angolan intervention was not, in any way, sanctioned by SADC but a situation of national security or a matter of bilateral relations between the two countries. In other words; although disputed, only the DRC intervention can be said to have taken place under the SADC banner.

While the UN was involved in both conflicts, there was a difference between the two conflicts. Namibia was part of the composition of the UN missions to Angola. The same did not happen with regards to the DRC UN missions. While Namibia participated militarily in both conflicts, she gave about 20 tons of military weapons and other supplies to the DRC government. The Kabila government, additionally, received a loan to the value of N$ 25 Million which was not yet repaid by 2008 (Mushelenga, 2008). There was no loan granted to Angola as was the case during the DRC conflict.

The DRC conflict took place only in the DRC, not in Namibia. The Angolan conflict on the other hand took place in both Namibia and Angola. UNITA had entered Namibia thus destabilising the country and causing several deaths. In response, Namibia granted Angola permission to enter the country in search of UNITA rebels and to launch attack from inside Namibia. Namibia participated more in peace negotiation processes of the DRC conflict compared to that of Angola. Namibia was part of earlier efforts by the SADC OPDS to find peaceful solution to the DRC conflict. It signed the Lusaka peace agreement that charted the way for the negotiation processes that would bring about peace in the DRC with the signing of the Global All Inclusive agreement of 2002.

5.3 Summary

The DRC conflict, which involved about eight different African countries, destabilized the region, resulting in it becoming referred to by many as 'Africa's First World War'. Others refer to it as the most devastating war to have occurred since the Second World War, as about 6 million people died in the conflict. The Angolan conflict was also another devastating conflict that, too, caused regional instability, leading to more than 700 000 thousand deaths. Both conflicts also led to a serious refugee situation in the region (Baregu, 2002; Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Hodges, 2001; Malaquias, 2007; Prunier, 2009).

During the two conflicts, extensive resources of nation states were allocated to warfare, instead of being channelled towards more productive and life-saving welfare and poverty alleviation programmes. For example, the UN estimates that the war in the DRC cost Namibia about N$ 700 Million (Dzinesa & Rupiya, 2005). Many people left their homes and families, fleeing war zones. Students had to drop out of school, and societies were uprooted by the fighting in these nation states. Namibia's peacemaking role, as discussed earlier, must also be viewed from the perspective of having attained regional peace and stability and of also having returned war zones to normality. The intervention of Namibia and its allies in the DRC, which culminated in the stalemate leading to the peace process, must be viewed from that perspective too. Although not fully at peace, the restoration of peace and stability in the DRC cannot be compared to the past situation where the lost of innocent lives was the order of the day. Children could return to school, and normal societal activities could resume. Budgetary allocations could then be channelled towards sustaining the welfare of citizens rather than to warfare. Development could thus take place, while the number of the Congolese crossing the borders as refugees was minimized. The NDF and FAA onslaught of UNITA and the subsequent killing of Jonas Savimbi also meant that peace and stability had returned to the region. At the time of the current study, Angola was doing well economically, and was considered to be one of the largest and fastest growing economies in Africa.

It is widely considered that there can be no development without peace. The end of the two major conflicts and the attaining of regional peace and stability meant that SADC, as a region, could actively engage in a collective development agenda that had not been possible in wartime. As such, in the 2000s, SADC launched a Free Trade Area (FTA) that was intended to bring about regional integration and to promote trade and investment in the region. The FTA aimed at removing tariffs on some products by 2008,

while the year 2012 was earmarked to realise full trade liberalisation, all of which would not have been possible under a prevailing situation of conflict and protracted war (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002; SADC Trade, 2011).

Namibian's peacemaking, in cases considered, was twofold, taking both diplomatic and military approaches. Such peacemaking can said to have originated during the country's struggle for independence. During the struggle for independence, the ruling SWAPO party had engaged in similar endeavours. While it conducted an armed liberation struggle, it also engaged in such diplomatic activities as the petitioning of UN offices in various parts of the world, and maintained an observer status at the OAU (Katjavivi, 1988).

Namibia was first involved in earlier diplomatic efforts, conducted by the SADC OPDS, to resolve the conflict in the DRC. It attended the first meeting, in Victoria Falls, where all the belligerents were brought together, and a committee was set up to consider the nature of the conflict and to propose recommendations to the OPDS. Namibia formed part of the committee. While such diplomatic engagements were taking place at the level of SADC, Namibia, together with Angola and Zimbabwe, sent troops to the DRC to defend the Kabila government. While its troops were in the DRC, the country continued to take part in SADC diplomatic engagements to resolve the conflict. Of particular importance is the fact that Namibia signed the Lusaka Peace Agreement which culminated in its withdrawal by 2000, it was the first country to withdraw its troops from the DRC (Lumb, 1999; Meyns, 2002; Prunier, 2009). As such, Namibia's peacemaking takes a twofold character.

Namibia also engaged in twofold peacemaking during the Angolan conflict. At the beginning of the conflict, Namibia formed part of the UN missions to Angola,

participating in UNAVEM II, III and MONUA (MoD, 2011). The country was also actively involved in military activities in Angola, conducting joint operations with the FAA against UNITA, and allowing the FAA to enter Namibia in search of UNITA rebel forces and to use Namibia's territory to launch attacks on UNITA. Namibia also deployed its NDF at the border, leading to several armed confrontations with UNITA (BBC, 1999; ISS, 2011; Prunier, 2009).

In order to determine which of the cases was successful, one would need to establish what the objectives were. Going into the DRC, President Nujoma stated that Namibia was acting to aid a fellow SADC member whose sovereignty was violated by foreign aggressors with the aim of toppling that government. Namibia, and the SADC allies, thus went to the DRC to aid President Kabila and prevent the overthrow of his government. In objectives vis-à-vis results analysis, it can be considered that the DRC case was successful for it met its objectives. Namibia and the SADC allies managed to prevent the overthrow the of the Kabila government. The objective in Angola was the ultimate defeat of UNITA considered to be a threat to Namibia's national security. UNITA was defeated with the killing of its leader, Jonas Savimbi, in 2002. Again, in objectives vis-à-vis results analysis, it can be considered that the Angolan case was also successful.

The question that follows then is which of the two, when compared, was more successful? Following this question, it will be prudent to consider which of the two genuinely contributed to peace. In pursuant to the answers to these questions, the current study arrived at a conclusion that Angola was the most successful. When the NDF withdrew its troops from the DRC, the conflict was not over. The fighting continued – the DRC remained 'peace-less'. The 'aggressors that violated the DRC's sovereignty' had not fully withdrawn from the DRC at the time Namibia withdrew her

troops. President Kabila was assassinated a few months after Namibia had withdrawn. When the NDF left Angola, the conflict had ended with the killing of Savimbi. Said differently, Angola, unlike the DRC, returned to peace with the killing of the UNITA leader. As President Nujoma consolidates; "the Army launched hot pursuit operations that minimised UNITA atrocities in Namibia. In the process, these hot pursuit operations into Angola destroyed UNITA bases and many tons of war materiel were captured. The Army contributed greatly to the reduction of UNITA terrorists' morale and subsequently their effectiveness, which resulted in their annihilation, and the elimination of Jonas Savimbi on 22 February 2002" (Dzinesa & Rupiya: 2005, 227). The Angola peacemaking mission thus achieved peace in totality.

The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hidipo Hamutenya, in mid-2001, recognises the fact that Namibia's withdrawal from the DRC, unlike in Angola, had not achieved peace in its totality. He was quoted stating that "with the Rwanda and Uganda aggression blunted and their hegemonic ambitions checked, it was now possible for other parties, such as the UN and South Africa, to step forth with proposals for peacekeeping and national reconciliation. The deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Forces is now being stepped up. Also, talks are going on between the government of the DRC and the various groups in that country in an effort to find a formula for the setting up of a transitional government of national reconciliation. These talks are taking place on the basis of the Pretoria Agreement, which is the latest attempt aimed at achieving national reconciliation in that country" (Dzinesa & Rupiya: 2005, 225).

The Angolan conflict was more costly than the DRC. Prunier (2009) suggests that Namibia withdrew from the DRC conflict in order to concentrate on the Angolan war. The defeat of UNITA meant that lives of ordinary Namibians would no longer be lost

on UNITA's making. It is for the above reason that this study concludes that Namibia's peacemaking role in the Angola was more successful than that of the DRC.

Additionally, another qualm with Namibia's peacemaking role in the DRC is one that relates to the motives. Scholars question whether it can be genuinely be regarded as a contribution to peace. In other words, it is questionable whether Namibia's peacemaking role in this country was a case of sheer altruism or it had concealed motives.

Accounts of scholars discussed in this study (in chapter 3) make it difficult to declare Namibia's peacemaking role in the DRC as free of ulterior motives. For example, the study of Orogun (2002:36–37) quotes President Nujoma stating that Namibian troops are in the DRC to "safeguard Namibia's future security... It is an honourable act of enlightened self-interests." The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1998), Iyenda (2002), Taylor and Williams (2001) and others points to how political and economic expediency, rather than sheer altruism, had played a role in driving Namibia to intervene in the DRC. In an interview with New Era Newspaper, 9 September 2011, Ambassador Tuliameni Kalomoh, the former Assistant UN Secretary-General, head of the Namibian Delegation to peace talks on the DRC in Lusaka (1998-1999), Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister (1996-1998) who is currently the Special Advisor on foreign Affairs to the office of the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs corroborated the above stating that:

> In those cases, like we have seen in Angola in the late 1990s and early 2000s that affected us directly on our northern and north-eastern borders, we were obliged to provide security assistance to Angola, to protect our own national interest, including the lives of Namibian people. When our strategic interest was involved in the Congo, when Congo

was invaded by neighboring countries, Rwanda and Uganda, and Congo requested assistance from friendly countries, Namibia responded positively.

(New Era, 2011)

Strikingly, Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005, 226) summarises:

Namibia, however, aimed to build on its military involvement to strengthen bilateral relations with the DRC for mutual economic and social benefit. Remarkably, the assassinated DRC President Laurent Kabila reportedly offered diamond concessions to Namibia as payment for military assistance. A mine—consisting of two blocks of about 25 km² along the Kasai River, 40 km from Tshikapa—was granted as a five-year concession. A feasibility study on the mine recommended negotiations with the DRC government, but the continued tenuous security situation and peace negotiations meant that by 2002 no prospecting had begun. The gift was then converted to a five-year business transaction, at no cost, and exploration activities were embarked upon by the Namibian company *26 August*. SWAPO has established a company with this name in recognition of the first attack mounted in the war in South West Africa during the 1970s.

The current study, therefore, concludes that Namibia's peacemaking role in the DRC, clouded with the above economic and political expediency, and did not genuinely contribute to peace in the DRC. Its peacemaking role, accompanied with economic motives, was a contribution to successful peace processes to follow in the future. This was acknowledged by the then former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as quoted earlier that Namibia's intervention allowed South Africa and others to move in with peacekeeping proposals. It is on that basis, as is of other discussed earlier, that Namibia's peacemaking role in Angola was not only successful but also genuinely contributed to peace, unlike in the DRC.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

The current study, which offers a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region, with regards to the case of the DRC and Angola, has taken the form of what is known as qualitative research. The 'desktop' research that it entailed was based on both primary and secondary data. This method of research was preferred, because it was not possible to conduct, for example, interviews, due to limitations of both time and resources. The contribution of this study stems from the existing literature that was available on the subject in the field. The study made use of books, academic journals, newspaper articles and reports, pictures, internet articles, official documents and statements, speeches, legislations, constitutions, and working papers. The methodology used was successful, especially considering that there was little scholarly work already existing on the subject (Namibia's peacemaking). The researcher found that engaging with the various kinds and forms of sources used was not only stimulating, but also largely interesting, for finding solutions to problems encountered brought great joy and inspiration. The study anticipated that having to deal with sources in another language could have been a barrier to the successful progress of the study, but fortunately that did not prove to be the case.

To present a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in SADC, the study was organized into six chapters. Chapter 1 presented the methodology of the study, indicating what was studied, as well as how and why. The chapter provided that the study would take the form of qualitative research, based on primary and secondary data.

Chapter 2 concerned the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. Various concepts, in peacemaking scholarship, were discussed to orientate the reader with wider literature to which the study belongs. The discussion on peacemaking internationally focused on the nature of peacemaking and the institutions safeguarding peacemaking at that level. The UN was identified as that organization with responsibility of ensuring world peace. Its failures and successes were discussed as done by other scholars. To link to the study, a brief look at the work of this body on countries selected as case studied was provided. The chapter looked at peacemaking in Africa with specific focus on the AU and its security structure, the PSC. SADC security structure was also discussed in this chapter. It was done to assess how effective is SADC peacemaking. The chapter hosted critiques of traditional and indigenous peacemaking and the responsibility to protect concept. Moreover, the chapter looked at gender and the exclusion of women in peacemaking.

Chapter 3 was dedicated to the DRC conflict. It was important to discuss the origin of the conflict first, in order to clarify Namibia's peacemaking role in the conflict. In discussing the conflict, in consideration to the history of the DRC, it was found that the problems experienced in the DRC had come a long way, for the country did not enjoy peace from since the DRC was proclaimed a personal colony of King Leopold II until the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was concluded on 17 December 2002. Namibia intervened in the DRC conflict in 1998 together with Angola and Zimbabwe. It managed to prevent the overthrow of Kabila's government and secured Kinshasa that had been about to be captured, at the time, by the rebels. There is a large body of literature that indicates that there was large-scale plundering of the natural resources from the DRC by Namibia and her allies and the allies of the opposing rebels. The chapter outlined the peacemaking role played by Namibia in this conflict, and then in the peace process towards the resolution of this particular conflict.

Chapter 4 focussed on the Angolan conflict, its origin and its processes. Angola, like the DRC, had known very little of peace. This is said whether one views peace as the absence of war or beyond the absence of war, between 1975 and 2002 (Galtung, 1969). The chapter discussed the historicity of the Angolan conflict and, importantly, provided insights into the peacemaking role of Namibia at both the diplomatic (UN) and the military level in that conflict. The chapter then followed the conflict until the assassination of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, which has opened a new chapter for peace in Angola since 1975.

Chapter 5 carried out a comparative analysis of the case studies. There were various similarities and differences found and exposed in that chapter. The chapter indicated the important role played by Namibia and its contribution to the return of peace and stability in the region. The chapter analyzed Namibia's peacemaking role as regards to the two cases and found that Namibia's peacemaking takes place at both diplomatic and military front. It was also found that Namibia's peacemaking, in cases considered, was carried out in a clandestine manner. Namibia's peacemaking role in Angola was found more successful and a genuine contribution to peace compared to the DRC.

The current chapter, Chapter 6, concludes the study. It begins with a recollection of arguments presented in previous chapters before presenting the results of Namibia's peacemaking role in the DRC and Angola. This section will then be followed by a final conclusion of the study.

6.2 Results of Namibia's Peacemaking in the DRC and Angola

This study finds that Namibia was an active participant in regional peacemaking. Out of 15 SADC member states, only three countries came to aid Kabila's government in

response to a call he made to SADC, pleading for assistance with fighting against the rebels supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Namibia was one of the three countries. As an active participant in regional peacemaking, Namibia was the only country that gave permission to the FAA to use its territory to search for, and to launch attacks on UNITA rebels during the Angolan conflict. The two cases, therefore, indicate that Namibia is, indeed, an active participant in regional peacemaking. It is important to note, as the current study has explained, that being an active participant in peacemaking is not synonymous to genuine contribution to peace.

Namibia managed to attain its key objectives in the DRC conflict which was preventing the fall of Kabila's government. There is wider consensus that, had it not been for the intervention of Namibia and SADC allies, the Kabila government could have been toppled by the rebels. However, the NDF managed to secure the capital, Kinshasa, and the western economic corridor, which was the strategic link to the Atlantic ocean (Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1998; Lumb, 1999; Orogun, 2002). The DRC conflict also caused major rifts within SADC, which Namibia's President, Sam Nujoma, was instrumental in reconciling until the regional block unanimously agreed to support the intervention. Namibia also played a role in the early efforts made to obtain a peaceful settlement of the conflict prior to the intervention (Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998; Lumb, 1999; Meyns, 2002; Punungwe, 1999; SADC, 1998).

As a result of its intervention in the DRC conflict, Namibia secured itself a Mutual Defence Pact, which was signed in Luanda on 9 April 1999 with Zimbabwe and Angola. The pact provides for military support should any of the signatory states face internal or external aggression. SADC also followed the allies with its own Mutual Defence Pact

that was signed, four years later, by the member states on 26 August 2003 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Boksenbaum, 1999; IRIN News, 1999; Melber, 2011; SADC, 2003).

In the arena of domestic politics, the clandestine involvement of Namibia in the DRC and Angolan conflict has opened up serious questions regarding who has the power to send troops beyond the Namibian borders to partake in foreign wars. Specifically, the DRC conflict gave rise to serious debates in Namibia. Some, especially lawmakers in the National Assembly, felt that Parliament should be consulted in such matters and that President Nujoma acted single-handedly in sending troops to the DRC (this debate was discussed at length in Chapter 3). However, on close inspection, it was found that no legislation compelled the President to consult Parliament, or anyone else for that matter, in acting as commander-in-chief of the NDF in deploying troops outside the country. Whereas the Constitution, in Article 27, requires the President to consult Parliament in declaring a threat to national defence and security, a public emergency or a state of national defence and martial law, the Constitution contains no provision that requires the President to consult the legislature when deploying the NDF on foreign soil (Lumb, 1999; Mushelenga, 2008).

The silence of the Constitution on the subject is what the current study refers to as the 'grey area' in legislation. The researcher, upon discovering such a grey area, investigated as to what had been done about it. The result of the investigation is regarded as emerging from 'grey area' to lucid legislation. As a clear result of the furious debates surrounding the DRC conflict, the National Assembly committed to putting an end to the 'grey area' by passing the Defence Act No. 1 of 2002 (dated 7 June 2002). The legislation provides clear guidelines as to how the members of the NDF are to be deployed on foreign soil and who has the power to direct such deployment. There

is, thus, a need to quote the relevant legislation, consisting of section 32 (Service outside Namibia), at length, as follows:

(2) The President may, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, deploy members of the Defence Force outside Namibia-(a) in compliance with a resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations or the African Union or the Southern African Development Community; or (b) in the execution of an obligation arising from a bilateral or multilateral agreement to which Namibia is a party, for the purpose of maintaining, bringing about or restoring peace, security and stability in a country other than Namibia. (3) The President must as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after a deployment was ordered under subsection (2), inform the National Assembly of the deployment.

(4) If a deployment contemplated in subsection (2) is ordered at a time when the National Assembly is not in session, the President must forthwith summon the National Assembly to meet as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the deployment was ordered. (5) Upon being informed in terms of subsection (3) of a deployment referred to in that subsection, the National Assembly may by resolution, proposed by at least one third of all the members of the National Assembly and passed by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Assembly, disapprove of the President's decision to deploy members of the Defence Force. (6) In the event of a disapproval under subsection (5), the President is obliged to withdraw the members of the Defence Force not later than 30 days from the date of such disapproval.

(Defence Act, 2002)

One of the main achievements of Namibia, in the Angolan conflict, was attaining the national goal of security, for UNITA had not only terrorised and destabilised northern Namibia, but the belligerent had also been responsible for several attacks in the

northern part of the country, which had involved killing numerous Namibians (Prunier, 2009). The killing of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002, meant the return of stability to the northern part of Namibia and the stoppage of frequent attacks and killings. The military role in the Angolan conflict was profound. The NDF joined forces with the FAA in its pursuit of UNITA, operating as far north as northern Angola. The NDF was also deployed at the Namibian border with Angola in causing various UNITA casualties and in restoring stability to the land. Namibia also granted permission to the FAA to enter the country in search of UNITA rebels and also to launch attacks on UNITA from Namibian soil. Namibia also formed part of various UN missions, such as UNAVEM III, RRF and MONUA, to Angola (BBC, 1999: Boksenbaum, 1999: Grobbelaar et al., 2003; ISS, 2011; MoD, 2000: Ndaitwah, 2010).

6.3 Conclusion

The rationale of the current study, as established at the onset, was to ensure that a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region exists. The study, from the onset, found the fact that very few studies existed on the subject matter problematical. The rationale was, therefore, to fill the gap in the literature. The primary aim of the study was to provide a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region with reference to the DRC and the Angolan conflict respectively. The secondary aim of the study is to provide a descriptive account of Namibia's peacemaking role in the selected cases. The study was to determine the similarities and differences between the two cases. Furthermore, the study was to determine which of the two cases yielded more successes and why.

Consequently, the study provided a comparative analysis of Namibia's peacemaking in the SADC region. It found that Namibia is an active participant in peacemaking in the SADC region, taking a twofold approach in its peacemaking.

There are various similarities and differences between the two cases. The conflicts in the two cases trace their origins from abrupt granting of independence. The UN was involved in both conflicts. Namibia's participation, in both conflicts, was in support of the governments, not rebel formations. All Namibia's peacemaking in the cases concerned where conducted in a clandestine manner. Although all case studies were in terms of objectives vis-à-vis results, Angola was more successful than the DRC. Angolan conflict presented more serious national security threats to Namibia compared to the DRC. Namibia withdrew from the DRC before the end of the conflict. President Kabila, whose government Namibia went to protect, was assassinated in the process. The NDF stayed in Angola until the defeat of UNITA marked by the assassination of its leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. Political and economic expediency informed Namibia's peacemaking role in the DRC. This is to say that Namibia had ulterior motives than sheer altruism, for its involvement in the DRC. The study thus considers its involvement in the DRC as not a genuine contribution to peace in that country compared to the case of Angola.

Consequent to its involvement in the DRC, Namibia managed to score itself military allies with the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact, in April 1999, with Angola and Zimbabwe, which also saw the whole of SADC signing a Mutual Defence Pact in August 2003. Much can be said about Namibia's peacemaking profile and efforts in the SADC region. Namibia has conducted peacemaking in a secretive manner, as was shown in the case of Angola and the DRC. Seemingly, in the cases studied, only the top military executives and politicians were aware of the decisions taken to go to war in a

foreign country. Namibian peacemaking can be seen to take on the form of a twofold peacemaking, for it engages in both diplomatic and military efforts. The Namibian legislature has learned a lesson from the silence of its constitution on who has the power to send the NDF to war on foreign territory. It thus passed legislation (i.e. Defence Act No. 1 of 2002) that provides clarity on how peacemaking is to be conducted in future.

Namibia's participation in the two conflicts was, indeed, important, for it led to events that brought about peace in the respective countries, and thus peace and stability in the region in general. The conflicts concerned had destabilised the region, not only in terms of warfare but also in terms of the results of war, such as by causing refugee-related problems. As a result, collective regional development could not take place. The ending of conflict in the region is, thus, commendable and the participants in that process, including Namibia, are to be commended.

The current study was not about predicting the future, but about providing a comparative analysis (primarily) and descriptive account (secondarily) of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region. The study is, therefore, presented as the basis for future studies, including those studies that are concerned with possible future predictions and pronouncements of Namibia's pattern not only of peacemaking, but also of war and peace.

In terms of occurrences in which researchers express an interest regarding their understanding of Namibia's peacemaking role in the SADC region, the current comparative analysis should prove helpful in facilitating the gaining of such an understanding, as part of other research conducted into the subject

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Appendix I

Appendix I shows the Namibian soldiers forming part of the SADC Brigade. The SADC Brigade is a SADC standby force established to participate in missions as articulated in Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (MoD, 2011).

Appendix II

Appendix II shows Namibian soldiers receiving accolades on UN peacekeeping missions (MoD, 2011).

Appendix III

Appendix III shows Namibian soldiers returning from a UN peacekeeping mission (MoD, 2011).