


Changing World Order: The Republic of Turkey's Rise as a Middle Power

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Faculty of Arts and Social Science at Stellenbosch University*



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Declaration

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Abstract

Changes in *world order* have caused major shifts in the global positioning of states at the international level. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new power structure that shifted from a bipolar arrangement to a multipolar disposition. The emergence of this new world order allowed for emerging and developing states, such as Turkey, the opportunity to fill gaps left by the power vacuum created by the new multipolar power arrangement. This led the Turkish state on its path to become a middle power within the new world order.

To assess the impact of changing world orders in the promotion of Turkey as a middle power in the new order, this study uses Coxian Critical Theory and the *social relations of forces* framework to account for Turkey's middle power ascent. The framework developed by Robert Cox consists of three aspects, namely *world orders*, *forms of state* and the *social relations of production*. The change in *world order* both in the post-Cold War and post-2001 era has caused fundamental shifts within the Turkish state, both in terms of *forms of state* and in the *social relations of production*.

Changes in the *forms of state* of the Turkish Republic following the end of the Cold War allowed for the creation of more robust civil society organizations, and a state that was transformed by the spread of international norms that originated at the world order level. International norms at the world order level not only affected the *forms of state*, but also the *social relations of production* and the political economy of Turkey. As a result changes in the *forms of state* and *social relations of production* informed by changes at the *world order* level, influenced the creation and execution of a proactive autonomous and internationally geared Turkish foreign policy, which is indicative of a middle power.

Opsomming

Aanpassings in die wêreld orde het grootskaalse verskuiwings op internasionale vlak in die globale positionering van state te weeg gebring. Die einde van die Koue Oorlog het ontwikkel in 'n nuwe mag struktuur wat beweeg het van bipolêre magskikking tot multi-polêre ingesteldheid. Die opkoms van hierdie nuwe wêreld orde het vir opkomende en ontwikkelende state, soos Turkye, die geleentheid gebied om in rolle in te tree wat ontstaan het as gevolg van die magsleemte wat veroorsaak is deur die nuwe multi-polêre orde. Die faktore het daartoe bygedra dat Turkye 'n nuwe rol as 'n intermediere moonheid ('middle power') begin aanneem het.

Hierdie studie het die Kritiese Teorie van Robert Cox gebruik om te bepaal wat die impak is van die veranderende wêreld orde op die ontwikkeling van Turkye as 'n intermediere moonheid in die nuwe wêreld orde, asook die mag van sosiale verwantskappe ('social relations of forces') raamwerk om rekenskap te gee and Turkye se rol as intermediere moonheid. Die raamwerk wat deur Robert Cox ontwikkel is bestaan uit drie aspekte; die wêreld ordes, staatsvorme, en die sosiale verwantskappe van produksie. In beide die post-Koue Oorlog en die post-2001 era het die verandering in wêreld orde merkwaardige verskuiwings in die Turkse staat veroorsaak; beide in terme van die aard van die staat asook die sosiale verwantskappe van produksie

Teen die einde van die Koue Oorlog het die veranderinge in die aard van die staat van die Turkse Republiek toegelaat dat meer kragtige burgerlike samelewingsorganisasies kon bestaan, sowel as 'n staat wat omskep was deur die verspreiding van internasionale norme, wat ontstaan het op wêreld orde vlak. Hierdie internasionale norme het nie net die forms of state vorm of aard van die staat beïnvloed nie, maar ook die sosiale verwantskappe van produksie en die politieke ekonomie van Turkye. Uit die aard van die saak het veranderinge in die vorm van die staat en sosiale verwantskappe van produksie wat veroorsaak was deur die verandering op wêreld orde vlak, gelei tot die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van 'n pro-aktiewe, selfstandige en internasionaal gerigte Turkse buitelandse beleid. Die laasgenoemde dui aan op Turkye se ewolusie as 'n intermediere moonheid.

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List of Abbreviations

- AKP – Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
- ANAP - Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
- BSEC - Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization
- CSOs- Civil Society Organizations
- CCT - Coxian Critical Theory
- EC- European Council
- EU- European Union
- EOI - Export-orientated Industrialization
- FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
- FPA - Foreign Policy Activism
- G20 – Group of Twenty
- GDP – Gross Domestic Product
- GWOT - Global War on Terror Gross Domestic Product
- ISI - Import Substitution Industrialization
- MBK - The National Unity Committee
- MÜSIAD - Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği)
- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- OIC - Organization of the Islamic Conference
- RP - Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
- SME – Small and Medium Enterprises
- SRP – Social Relations of Production
- TANAP - Trans-Anatolian Pipeline
- THY - Turkish Airlines
- TAF - Turkish Armed Forces
- TÜSIAD - The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği)
- USA – United States of America
- WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction
- WWII – Second World War

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Background and Rationale

“Turkey as a regionally significant actor ... has tried to gain a central role in the dominant international system through its role as a middle power” (Yalçın, 2013: 195)

Turkey’s changing role within the international community has come at a time where emerging powers are able to have a greater influence on the organizations, policies and structures which govern the international community. The Turkish Republic occupies a strategic geo-political position between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which makes Turkey an important world player.



Map 1.1: Map indicating Turkey’s geographical position (FAO, 2013)

The map above gives a clear indication of the geographic location of Turkey in relation to its region. Due to Turkey's unique positioning, Turkey is an important state in the world energy market as it acts as a physical bridge between 'east' and 'west' in the transportation of natural gas and oil from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and international markets. In addition to this its proximity to Israel and the Palestinian People, its shared boarder with Syria, Iran and Iraq, and its relations with Cyprus make it an important regional and international actor.

Turkey's regional involvement includes the mediatory role it has been playing in regards to the current Syrian crisis and its joint diplomatic venture with Brazil in regards to the Iran issue. Turkey's involvement and inclusion in international forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20)¹ asserts the state's position as a confident regional and middle power within the international community.

The ongoing Syrian civil War has been escalating since March 2011 and as a regional actor, Turkey with "... specific political, cultural and geographical characteristics would like to serve as a mediation centre for various international issues" and this can be seen in its diplomatic relations and willingness to act a mediator between 'East' and 'West' in the Syrian Crisis (Šulík, 2012).

Turkey was involved in back-door diplomacy with the Assad regime seeking to persuade the government to implement immediate reform which would see the lifting of emergency laws, the release of political prisoners and the ability for political parties to form, operate and associate freely. In addition to seeking a diplomatic solution to the Syrian Crisis, Turkey's role in relation to the crisis is multifaceted. The state has taken sole responsibility for Syrian refugees within its borders and is still a key supporter of the opposition seeking an end to hostilities (Ilgit and Davis, 2013).

¹ Objectives of the G20:

- Policy coordination between its members in order to achieve global economic stability, sustainable growth;
- Promoting financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent future financial crises;
- Modernizing international financial architecture (G20, 2013).

As the Turkish Republic takes on a greater role in international mediation, "...the behind-the-scenes politics it has been playing with the opposition may be significant in determining who ascends to the top of post-Asad Syria" (Ilgit and Davis, 2013). Turkey's commitment to find a 'diplomatic' solution to the Syrian Crisis was highlighted by the state hosting the second Group of Friends of the Syrian People Meeting in Istanbul in 2012. The meeting was attended by over 70 nations and Turkey took a leading role with regards to the issue of ending hostilities within Syria (Šulík, 2012).

Another regional issue in which Turkey has taken a proactive role is Iran's enrichment of uranium. In 2010, Turkey and Brazil, both members of the United Nations Security Council at the time brokered a 'fuel-swap' deal with Tehran which would see the transfer of "...the uranium enriched at Iranian laboratories - initially to Turkey, then to France and Russia - in order for it to be processed for peaceful (specifically medical) purposes" (Augirre, 2010). The cycle of transfer of the enriched material would be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the deal came into effect on 24 May 2010. Although the issue of Iran's nuclear program is a regional matter of Turkey, the fact that it engaged in a diplomatic 'joint-venture' with another middle power, not only indicated the influence of middle powers in the international system, but also showcased the willingness of Turkey to seek multilateral solutions to regional and international problems. This is indicative of a middle power.

In addition to engaging in its regional community, Turkey has also been actively involved in various international forums and organizations. Turkey is a member of over 25 regional and international forums and organizations to date, which includes being a founding member of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization², and is a candidate member for accession into the European Union³. In

² Turkey has the second largest standing army in NATO with a combined military strength of over 1 million uniformed personnel

³ Turkey became a candidate member in 1999, and negotiations for admission commenced in 2005. Although membership to the EU would strengthen Turkey's middlepowermanship, this study pays particular attention to the states activities in the G20.

the global economic sphere, Turkey's inclusion in the inaugural G20⁴ forum in 1999 marked the beginning of international recognition of the Turkish Republic as a significant regional and international actor. The forum was founded by Canadian and US finance ministers Paul Martin and Lawrence Summers to be "... the premier forum for international cooperation on the most important issues of the global economic and financial agenda" (G20, 2013).

Turkey's membership of the G20 can be argued that the founders were not simply looking for the top two twenty economies⁵, but they were interested in having a representative organization that consisted of the biggest economies in the global area, but also relevant regional powers. As a result, some states such as Spain or the Netherlands were not invited to be part of the body, as they were already represented by states within their region, and states that were non-top twenty economies such as South Africa was invited to represent the African region (Lesage and Kaçar, 2010:125).

Therefore when one looks at Turkey's membership of the G20, it was included not only as a top-twenty world economy, but also because it was considered an important regional power and that it was seen as one of the most significant economies in the Muslim world, an aspect which became very important following the change in the post 9/11⁶ world. According to Dries Lesage and Yusuf Kaçar (2010: 126), "... they [the founders] wanted to build a forum to tackle political gridlocks on global issues" in addition to addressing global economic concerns. Therefore Turkey being compatible with Western G20 members and contributing to the political and cultural diversity of the group, Turkey could provide "... a bridging function between Europe and Asia, as well as between the advanced industrial economies and emerging markets" (Lesage and Kaçar, 2010:126).

Turkey's engagement within the international community has been aided by an autonomous proactive foreign policy that developed at the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, and saw its intensification beyond its immediate region in the 2000s. Ankara's

⁵ Turkey is the 16th largest Economy in the World (GDP at PPP)

⁶ The September 11, 2001 Terror Attacks which occurred in the United States of America.

reach goes as far as Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the East Asian context, Turkey became a signatory of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2010. In Central Asia Turkey established the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency, which provides technical assistance Central Asian Republics through foreign aid (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013a).

Turkey's diplomatic relations with the African continent started in 1998, and the state seeks to improve relations not only in terms of economic development, but also provide technical assistance to the continent in the fields of agricultural development, energy, education and the increased flow of humanitarian assistance. The first Turkey-Africa Summit was held in Istanbul in 1998 and saw 49 African nations in attendance. In addition Turkey hold observer status in the African Union since 2005, is a non-regional member of the African Development Bank since 2008 and Ankara's Embassy in Abuja is accredited to the Economic Community of West African States (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013b).

Turkey-Latin America relations saw resurgence with the creation of the "Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean" in September 1998. This agreement was seen as a road map for political and economic opening in the region. In addition to this agreement, Turkey is a permanent observer member of the Organization of American States and the Association of Caribbean states since 2001 and 2000 respectively (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013c).

Turkey's international role as a middle power has been greatly affected by changes that have occurred both within the international community and domestically. Turkey's outward looking foreign policy started in the late 1990s, but intensified in the 2000s, allowed for the state to play a more autonomous and proactive role within the international community. States foreign policy goals are not only determined by domestic affairs, but are also influenced by changes within the international community. Changes within the international community stems from changes at a world order level, therefore this study would like to assess if changes at a world order level influenced the rise of the Turkish Republic as a middle power.

1.2. Literature Review

A literature review accomplishes several important tasks according to Creswell (2003: 29-30), which includes relating a study to the "... ongoing dialogue in the literature about a topic, filling the gaps and extending prior studies" and "provides a framework for establishing the importance of [your] study as well as a benchmark for comparing the results of a study with other findings". This section highlights previous literature on the role of Turkey as a middle power within the international community and takes into account how their foreign policy has transitioned to one that is proactive, autonomous and far reaching.

Before one continues with the review of previous literature, it is important that a working definition of a middle power is established. As mentioned above middle powers prefer seeking multilateral solutions to international problems. The concept of middlepowermanship has been a contentious issue within academia. There exists three models⁷ of middle powers; however this study will be making use of the behavioural model⁸. This model makes use of the following definition of a middle power:

"... tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy" (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993:19).

⁷ The other two models are the functional and hierarchical models. The functional model asserts that for a state to be considered a middle power it should have three functional criteria, the extent to which it is involved in the international community, its interests and the ability of the state to contribute to the situation in question. The problem with this model of conceptualization rests in the fact that this allows small states the opportunity to identify themselves as middle powers, when in reality they remain small 'power' states (Chapnick, 1999: 74-75). The hierarchical model rests on the premise that states within the international system are differentiated upon based on the power that they wield. Therefore middle power states are those that are not small and not great, but occupy the space in between the two poles (Dewitt and Kirton, 1983:22).

⁸ The Behavioural model should not be confused with the behaviouralism of the 1960s as the theoretical framework draws on the work of Robert Cox.

The above definition of a middle power comes from the behavioral model of middle power literature. This model identifies states that actively seek to identify themselves as middle powers within the international community to achieve greater international status. In the case of Turkey, it is most certainly their behavior informed by the foreign policy that has allowed for Turkey to occupy the position of a middle power within the global system. It is for this reason that the above mentioned definition of a middle power will be used.

1.2.1. Turkey as a Middle Power

As seen above Turkey has been actively involved in its region and beyond, and more importantly it has done so in the manner of a middle power. Turkey's advancement to that of a middle power is not a notion that developed instantaneously, but started to see increased relevance following the end of the Cold War. According to Meltem Müftüler and Müberra Yüksel (1997: 184), "Turkey has the personnel, resources and entrepreneurial capacities to become an impressive mid-level power in the next decade". This comment by Müftüler and Yüksel came at a time where emerging powers began to play a more significant role within the international community, and the Turkish republic began to expand its foreign policy.

This characterization of Turkey as an emerging middle power in the latter part of the 1990s stems from the belief that "... in international politics, in times of crisis and uncertainty, the role of middle powers increase" and this can be seen in the section above, where Turkey continues to play a significant role in the Syrian Crisis, especially in regards to its mediation effort (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 184). The end of the Cold War and the change in world order from bipolarity to a more uncertain multipolar orientation not only highlighted the importance of emerging nations such as Turkey, but it also allowed these nations to fulfill gaps left by a multipolar power arrangement. Again this can be seen in Turkey's relations with its regional neighbors, especially in its ability to move towards a leadership role in its region. This was indicated by its involvement in NATO in the post-Cold War reconstruction effort and in the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Accord (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 190-192).

Hüseyin Bağcı (2011) asserts that Turkey is a key player and middle power in the G20 system. This stems from the realization that “Turkey adopted [a] “*360 degrees foreign policy*”, which means that Turkey should establish relations with states all around the world and intensify its visibility and presence in various multilateral platforms”. It must be asserted that for a state to be a middle power, they must first be a regional power. In the case of Turkey, its regional status has increased since the end of the Cold War, both politically and economically. The most dramatic change to its foreign policy stems from the increased attractiveness of Turkey’s soft power, especially in the Arab Middle East and its ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy. Economically, British Prime Minister David Cameron called Turkey the BRIC of Europe, stating “...Everyone is talking about ‘BRIC’ countries and the rapid growth in [the group’s] economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. We think that Turkey is a BRIC country of Europe” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2010). This confidence in Turkey as a regional power coupled with Ankara’s far reaching foreign policy, mentioned above, is what elevated Turkey to a middle power within the international community.

Turkey has been described as “an active, self-confident middle power” by David Lesage and Yusuf Kaçar (2010: 128). This can be attributed to a change in the states foreign policy from one that was passive and isolationist during the Cold War to that of a hyperactive “360 degrees foreign policy” mentioned above. The above mentioned authors believe that Turkey is going in a direction in which it is no longer obedient to one particular superpower, as was the case during the Cold War, but the state is carving out an autonomous path. Turkey’s strategic importance is heavily influenced by its geographical position, its far reaching economic, diplomatic and foreign policy (Lesage and Kaçar, 2010: 130-131).

1.2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy

As mentioned above Turkey’s current foreign policy is one that is described as a “360 degrees foreign policy” and to the Turkish regime this means its foreign policy is “... multi-dimensional, constructive, proactive, realistic and responsible foreign policy” and “... is one of the most important assets in realizing its national and international

goals” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013d). Turkish foreign policy has undergone a radical change from that of its creation in 1923. Turkish foreign policy can be divided into four periods between 1923 and 1990, namely the inter-war period (1923-1945), the period of Western alignment (1945-1960), period of increased autonomy (1960-1980) and lastly the second period of Western alignment and somewhat reduced autonomy (1980-1990) (The New Turkey, 2013).

From its creation in 1923, The Republic of Turkey’s foreign policy was guided by peace, sovereignty and national developed as its main principles and under the leadership of Atatürk⁹. Turkey continued to maintain an autonomous foreign policy until the end of World War II (WWII). The end of WWII marked a turning point in Turkish foreign policy, as the end of the war ushered in a bipolar international order. The new order dominated by the United States of America and the Soviet Union, resulted in Turkey forming an alliance with the West, due to its continued process of Westernization since 1923. This Western alignment proved to be detrimental to Turkish relations with Middle Eastern countries as they viewed Turkey as a ‘puppet’ of the West due to its NATO membership (The New Turkey, 2013).

Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s proved to be a period of increased autonomy for the country due to its disillusionment with the West and reduced Western dependency. One of the main factors was the Cyprus conflict and the diversion of ideas when it came to its solution. This caused a cooling of Turkish-American relations, and in the civil society sphere there was growing anti-American sentiment. This prompted Turkish officials to develop a foreign policy that was autonomous. The early 1980s saw developments in the region that increased the importance of Turkey’s NATO membership and Western alliances, namely the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the Iran-Iraq War. This coupled with expanding the domestic economy in line with global norms, namely the shift from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to export orientated

⁹ The creator and first President of the Turkish Republic. His birth name was Mustafa Kemal, however in 1934, the surname of Atatürk was granted to him by the Turkish Parliament meaning “Father of the Turks”, and this surname is forbidden to be used by any other person (Nüfus Hüviyet Cüzdanı, 2013).

industrialization (EOI), increased its growing ‘pull’ towards the West (The New Turkey, 2013).

However, the two periods with which this study will be concerned when it comes to Turkish foreign policy is the end of the Cold War and post-2001 era¹⁰. The end of the Cold War saw Turkish foreign policy change from that of ‘passive’ to become more assertive and multi-dimensional. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the emergence of a number of new states in Central Asia which shared commonalities with Turkey¹¹. This broadened Turkey’s foreign policy outreach and allowed for Turkey to become a key regional actor. Changes on the international front also proved to be advantageous for Turkey and its foreign policy. The multipolar order that emerged at the end of the Cold War allowed for Turkey to pursue a foreign policy that was not limited by American military and economic strength. That being said, it also created an opportunity for emerging states to fill the gap left by the bipolar order and the collapse of the Soviet Union (The New Turkey, 2013).

The victory of the AK Party in 2002 ushered in a new era for Turkish politics, in that the Turkish people elected an Islamic in the national elections to represent the state, irrespective of the state’s secular traditions. The new foreign policy vision implemented by the AK Party rested on the “Strategic Depth Doctrine” developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs¹². The doctrine rests on two components, namely geographic and historical depth. The Doctrine refers to the historical connections between Turkey and the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus which date back to the Ottoman Empire, and the need for Turkey to “... refocus on its history in order to rediscover its capacity to bridge the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds” (The New Turkey, 2013). This became more relevant following the terror attacks in the U.S. which was carried out by Al-Qaeda in the name of Islam. This amplified Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations¹³ theory and saw anti-Western sentiment grow throughout the Muslim World.

¹⁰ The change in world order after the September, 11 2001 Terror attacks in the U.S.

¹¹ These commonalities included linguistic, religious, ethnic, historical and cultural ties

¹² Davutoğlu is considered to be the architect of Turkey’s latest foreign policy

¹³ The Clash of Civilizations theory by Samuel Huntington argues that “ people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world” (Princeton, 2013).

Turkey's foreign policy in the post-2001 era included the 'zero problems with neighbors' principle¹⁴, which was influenced the "Strategic Depth Doctrine" mentioned above. This saw increased relations between Turkey and its regional partners and saw Turkey take on a more international role within the international community. The outcomes of this new foreign policy activism can be seen in the section above. The change in world order in the post- Cold War era and the events of 2001 coincide with the most radical changes to occur in Turkish foreign policy since the states creation in 1923. Therefore it would be plausible to assume that changes in world order, *specifically in the context of the post-Cold War era and post-2001 era*, have had a significant effect on the promotion of Turkey as a middle power within the international system.

1.3. Research Question

Have changes in the nature of world order promoted Turkey's rise as a Middle Power?

As seen above the changes in the world order have led to the positions of states within the international system being shifted between being small, middle and great powers. In the case of Turkey, their rise as a middle power has come at a time of increased Turkish representation on issues that are beyond its immediate borders and a new Turkish foreign policy activism.

The literature above demonstrates that middle powers occupy a pivotal role within the international system and due to Turkey's unique geographical position, its rising economy and its far-reaching foreign policy; it certainly has a role to play.

The aims of the study can be summarised as:

- What changes in *world order*, *forms of state* and *production* have led to Turkey's changing role within the international community
- Can these changes account for Turkey's transition to a middle power

¹⁴ This is not the only principle that drives Turkish foreign policy, but for the purposes of this study it is seen as one of the more crucial principles.

1.4. Research Design and Methodology

The research design of this study is that of a **descriptive study**. Therefore this study assesses the world as it exists according to Bickman and Rog (1998), it is suggested that descriptive studies answer questions such as “what is” or “what was”. In the case of this study, the aims of the study clearly indicate that these types of questions will be encountered and addressed through the course of this study.

This study can also be considered an **explanatory study**. An explanatory study is defined as “... research with the primary aim of establishing causal relationships between variables” (Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee, 2006: 182). An explanatory study allows for the researcher to find reasons and explanations as to why changes in attitude or behaviour occur, and in the case of this study, it will allow for this study to explain if changes in world order promoted Turkey’s rise as middle power within the international community.

This study is making use of secondary data as the **data sources**. The secondary data used in this study includes, but is not limited to relevant publications such as peer review journal and books, and news media. Secondary sources are used as they are able to provide an overall picture of the Turkish Republic as access to information is relatively easy. Secondary data provides a wealth of information that is able to assist in fully and comprehensively answering the research question stated above. In addition secondary data allows for the researcher to find information and data that is relevant to the study, as opposed to encountering procedural problems associated with conducting primary research and data collection.

The main **theoretical perspective** for this study comes from the writings of Robert Cox, which is fully discussed in chapter two. Coxian Critical Theory rests on the premise that ideas, history and material relations are all interwoven to create new world orders and power structures. Cox in *Approaches to world order* by Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair asserts “... the notion of a framework for action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of forces” and these forces determine actions by imposing pressure and constraints on the other (Cox and

Sinclair, 1996: 97-98). The method of historical structures presented by Cox can also be identified as representing limited totalities, meaning that "... historical structure does not represent a whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its historically located totality" (Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 100).

As a result this method of historical structures can be applied to three spheres of activity, namely *production related to social forces*, *forms of state* derived from the state/society complex and *world orders* (Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 100). These three spheres are interrelated, in that changes in production can produce new social forces, which could then lead to changes in the structure of states; which then ultimately bring about a change in the world order. It is from this perspective that this study uses the framework of historical structures to account how changes at a world order level have promoted Turkey's rise as a Middle Power.

This study takes **ethical consideration** and practice into the highest regard when confronted with situations in which people and their opinions are involved. As this study will only make use of secondary data, the ethical risk involved is considered low.

1.5. Limitations and Delimitations

There exists an ambiguous conceptualisation of a middle power within academia and the international community. Therefore this study is only making use of one of the three distinctive models of middle powers, namely the behavioural model. This is the first limitation of this study as only one model and conceptualization of a middle power is used. Although the behavioural model is the most favoured within middle power literature, by only using this particular definition, it limits the overall understanding of what constitutes a middle power.

Due to the time constraints of this study, this thesis is only making use of secondary research. Secondary research allows for the study to obtain an overall view of the research question; however there are limitations with only using secondary research. The first is that some data might be out of date and too general for the purposes of this study. Secondly, data sources might not be accurate and therefore sufficient steps

need to be taken to evaluate the reliability and validity of data and information accessed. In addition to the time constraint, the length of the study is an additional limitation on this study. As a result certain issues such as the Kurdish Issue in relation to the Republic of Turkey, could not be adequately addressed.

The delimitation of this study is that Turkey is the only case study used to assess the effect of changes in world order and its impact on the repositioning of states within the international community. Turkey was chosen as the most appropriate state due to the rationale mentioned above, however other states occupying middle power position could also be used.

1.6. Overview

In order to answer the research questions provided, this section provides an overview of the chapters that are included in the study. This is followed by *figure 2* which shows a graphic representation of what is outlined below.

Chapter one sees the initial outline of the research problem and the background for its justification. In line with the study, the first section outlines the background and rationale for looking at the Turkish Republic, and changes in the international system have led to the rise of the state as a middle power. This is then followed by a survey of any previous literature that has looked at Turkey and its middle power role within the global community and how the state's foreign policy has transformed and informed its middle power activism. Thereafter the research question is outlined and, the research design and methodology that is used to answer the research question posed is discussed. Lastly the limitations and delimitations affecting the research and outcomes of the study are highlighted.

In order to assess how changes in world order has affected Turkey's rise as a middle power, it is important that the theoretical framework of Robert Cox be discussed. Therefore **chapter two** provides the rationale behind selecting Coxian Critical Theory and his dialectic of *social forces* to answer the research question posed by this study. In order for that to be achieved the chapter first provides justification for the selecting

Coxian Critical Theory, by highlighting the shortcomings of using Realism and Liberal Institutionalism in addressing the research question.

Chapter three provides an introduction to the Turkish state, discussing the origins and transformations that have occurred in the pre-Cold War era. In order to address the research question, it is important to place the Turkish state in the context of the post- Cold War era, and highlight the salient changes that have occurred since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Turkish history is extensive and rich in information; however for the purposes of this study, one only looks at the aspects relevant to this study. These elements include highlighting the interaction between secularism, democracy and political Islam, and how this has affected the transformation of the state. It is then followed by highlighting the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in the formation of the Turkish Republic. The armed forces in Turkey have played a central role in the history of the modern Turkish state acting as the guardians of secularism. This has had a profound impact on the consolidation of democracy and consequently shaping the state.

Chapter four sees the discussion of the first aspect of Cox's framework, *world orders*. This section accounts for how changes in the world order following the end of the Cold War and the 2001 terror attacks in the U.S. has influenced Turkey's promotion to that of a middle power. This is achieved by highlighting Turkey's new position in the new world order of the 1990s and how this allowed for Turkey to become a key regional player. This is then followed by emphasizing how the 2001 terror attacks changed the security architecture of the international system leading to the creation of a new world order, and how the strategic importance of Turkey was elevated.

Changes at a world order level can have a significant impact on *forms of state* and the *state-society complex* that exists within a country. **Chapter five** identifies how changes in the world order have affected the state-society complex in the Republic of Turkey in the post-Cold War and post-2001 eras. This is achieved by highlighting the rise of Islamism in the 1990s, and how this has led to the election of the country's first President with an Islamic Party background in 2002. This is followed by a discussion on the new role of the Turkish Armed Forces and how their role has

changed in the face of increased Islamic political representation and globalization. The crux of this chapter rests on the increasing importance and involvement of *civil society organizations*, and how they have played a paramount role in the transformation of the Turkish Republic, especially in the democratization of the state and the creation of Turkey's new pro-active foreign policy which has informed its middle power status.

Chapter six accounts for how changes at a world order level have affected changes in the *social relations of production*. In the context of the research question, this chapter will assess how changes in the global economy and production have shaped Turkey's foreign policy activism. This is highlighted by accounting for changes in Turkey's political economy, specifically the impact from the global shift from ISI to EOI, the 2001 Turkish economic crisis and the impact of economic liberalization on the class dynamics. The changes in class dynamics played a significant role in the formation of *civil society organizations*, such as industrial and business groups, and how these groups have impacted upon Turkey's *forms of state* and foreign policy. Lastly, this chapter emphasizes the link between production and increased Turkish foreign policy activism both regionally and internationally.

The last chapter of this study, **chapter seven**, provides a summary of the key findings as a result of the information provided in the preceding chapters. This allows for the study to reach a well formulated conclusion and reflect on how the framework selected was beneficial for answering the research question.




Figure 1.1. Graphical Overview of Study

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

The theoretical framework that is used to answer the research question is that of Coxian Critical Theory and the dialectic theory of historicism as illustrated by the movement of social forces. It is acknowledged that there are various other theories that could be used to assess the ‘middlepowermanship’ of the Turkish Republic, as a result this section will focus on providing a detailed explanation as to why Coxian Critical Theory will be used. In order for this to be achieved, one will explore both realism and liberal institutionalism as possible approaches. Realism is selected for its state-centric approach and its emphasis on material capabilities as a means to pursue power within the international system. Liberal institutionalism on the other hand is rooted in the notion of cooperation and progress as being the drivers within the international system. However, both of these approaches do not take into account changes within the international system and the world order.

2.2. Realism

Realists believe that “... power is the currency of international politics” and as a result international politics is defined by the attainment and pursuit of power within the international system (Mearshimer, 2007: 72). As with many other theories, there are differences among realists as to why states pursue power.

2.2.1. Classical Realism

Classical realist Hans Morgenthau (1973: 4) identifies six principles of political realism, of which the first three are the most crucial. The first is has its roots in human nature “... political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature”, thus human beings are inherently seeking to attain dominance and therefore power. This suggests that for realism, theory is based on determining facts and giving them meaning through reason, thus just as laws are absolute and logical, international politics is determined

by acting logically and with reason to ensure survival, which is human nature. This highlights his second principle, interest defined in terms of power.

The third principle asserts that interest defined as power is objectively defined and universally valid. This is grounded in the work of Max Weber (1920: 252), where he suggests "... interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men". Therefore classical realists see the pursuit, attainment and maintenance of power as being vital to their survival, which is rooted in the belief that it is logical to do so.

2.2.2. Structural Realism

According to realists power is considered the 'holy grail' within the international system as it is with power that one can guarantee the survival of one's state. Structural realists view states as black boxes, in that there is only one element that can distinguish between them, and that is the amount of power that each possesses (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72). Structural realists make use of five assumptions as to why states pursue power so vigorously.

The first assumption is that world politics takes place in an anarchical system. Anarchic in this context does not mean that the international system is chaotic, but that there is no ordering principle at work. This means that there is no overarching authority within the system, instead authority is distributed among states by the means of sovereignty, where each state is responsible for its actions or situation. In the face of no hierarchy, states must thus do what is in their best interests to survive (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 10).

Secondly, all states are in possession of some sort of offensive military capability. The type of weaponry a state possesses is the universal indicators of exactly how dangerous a state could be. However what structural realists take into account is that armaments are not the only type of weapons. States poses human capabilities, and therefore states could attack each other without the availability of weapons

(Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 10). This assumption is compounded by the third assumption, which is that states can never be certain of the intentions of other states.

The uncertainty involved in the intentions of other states is an important aspect of why states pursue power. It is impossible for states to know what the others intentions are, whether they will use their power to be revisionist states or simply maintain the status quo. Intentions cannot be empirically verified, but it is argued that intentions can be interpreted through either policy documents or speeches. However, the danger is that information contained in these two mediums might not be truthful or the true intentions are concealed. Thus it is not the information that is important, but how these states will use their power (Mearsheimer, 2007: 73).

Fourth, as mentioned above survival of the state is the key motivator for the acquisition of power, thus for states territorial integrity and political sovereignty means survival. States will pursue autonomy within their domestic political order, and pursue goals such as growth and development, however this will not be possible without the ability to survive (Mearsheimer, 2007: 74).

The last assumption of structural realism is that states operating under structural realism are rational actors; however there are times in which states can misjudge the intentions of other states as a result of imperfect information. As a result the pursuit of power is directly attributed to the uncertainty within an anarchical system (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 10). Individually these five assumptions will not prompt states to influence the balance of power; however combined they form a lethal combination of incentives for states to feverishly pursue power.

Great powers within the world order fear each other in that there is no central authority to protect one state from the other. Therefore states operate in a self-help world, in which each state is responsible for their own destiny. Structural realists pride themselves on the fact that their argument is based on simple logic, powerful states will "... look for opportunities to shift the balance of power in their favour" (Mearsheimer, 2007: 74). Structural realists amongst themselves disagree as to the amount of power a state should wield.

2.2.2.1. Defensive Realists

Firstly defensive realists believe that a state should have the appropriate amount of power to ensure its survival. This means that should a state pursue to have too much power, a system of balancing will naturally occur by other states either increasing their military capabilities or simply forming coalitions to mitigate the formation of a hegemon. The offensive-defensive balance is more times than non in favour of the defender and even if conquest is feasible it carries with it a great risk (Mearsheimer, 2007: 76).

2.2.2.2. Offensive Realists

Offensive realists believe that balancing power breed's inefficiency and as such it allows aggressor states the opportunity to take advantage of adversaries. In short the objective is to gain as much power as possible, which usually leads to hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2007: 76-77). In order to explain how the world works, defensive realists need to go beyond the structural realism and find additional theories as to why states sometimes act in illogical ways. On the other hand, offensive realists preach structural realism to describe the international system.

Taking the above into account, realism rests on the notion of power as the system in which states operate is devoid of any order/hierarchy. In terms of what constitutes power for realists are individual interests and the material capabilities that state's control. In order to determine the global positioning of a middle power, one cannot simply look at material capabilities but must take into account the ways in which states interact with one another. Based on the working definition of a middle power¹⁵ for this paper, middle power states have a tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems. The interaction between states and the structures in which international solutions are achieved usually take place within international or multilateral institutions. Thus the next section will discuss the potential use of liberal institutional theory to determine if Turkey is a middle power.

¹⁵ Definition: "... tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy" (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 19)

2.3. Liberal Institutionalism

The debate between realism and liberalism as a method to understand the international political system has been a contentious issue among academics and International Relations scholars. As where realism focuses on conflict and power, liberalism focuses on the possibility of progress and cooperation within the international system. Realism as seen above takes a rather pessimistic view of human nature, liberal philosophers such as John Locke believed that there are great potential for human progress. The evolution of liberal thought from Locke in the seventeenth century saw the modern liberal state coming to mean "... the greatest happiness for the greatest number" as coined by Jeremy Bentham (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 98).

Liberals have faith in human reason and just as realists believe that rational principles can be applied to international affairs. However, where the two differ is that liberals only acknowledge that self-interest and competition only exist to a certain point, thereafter "... individuals may share interests and can thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social action, domestically as well as internationally" (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 98). Ultimately human reason will trump the lust for power and the fear that uncertainty brings.

One of the core assumptions within liberalism is the belief in progress, more specifically progress for individual human beings. John Locke argues that the role of the state is to enable citizens to live their lives and pursue happiness without the interference of other people. In the same breath states are seen as a constitutional entity, which "... establishes and enforces the rule of law that respects the rights of citizens to life, liberty and property" (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 99). Thus in terms of the behavior of states within the international community, states will interact with each other under the auspices of mutual respect and tolerance. This stands in contrast to realism, in which the state is seen as an instrument and concentration of power (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 99).

Liberal institutionalism is a strand of liberalism, which speaks about the beneficial effects of international institutions in transforming the international system, where

regulated and peaceful cooperation replaces power politics. The introduction of this sphere of liberalism started with the founding of the League of Nations in 1919. Modern institutional liberals agree that institutions can make cooperation between states easier and more likely, however they do have some reservations when it comes to the total transformation of the international system. Two proponents of the merit of international institutions are Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, whom assert that institutions are needed for effective cooperation between states.

Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin argue that a realist perspective of world politics is redundant in that liberal international institutions now form the new phase of the international system. Central to Keohane and Martin's argument regarding international institutions is that they promote cooperation. It is then this cooperation that leads to states rejecting to maximize power in the short term, and therefore cause peace. Realists argue that international institutions cannot independently affect the behavior of the state and some even go as far as to say that institutions are not necessary. However this is where institutionalists assert that institutions are state constructions, therefore realists should not be questioning the significance of these organizations (Keohane & Martin, 1995: 40).

Institutions allow for reciprocity through cooperation in that unlike in a realist world where information is imperfect and commitments cannot be trusted, organizations allow for "... reduced transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination" and ultimately this minimizes the need for states to enter into conflict (Keohane & Martin, 1995: 42). It is from the perspective that institutionalist rhetoric claims to incorporate realism, in that within organizations power and self-interest do play a key role.

Institutionalism is highly applicable to security issues as briefly mentioned above, in that imperfect information becomes partially more secure when carried through institutions and thus allows for maximisation of utility. Therefore by making secure information available war should be mitigated, as imperfect information is no longer an issue, so institutions do in fact matter (Keohane & Martin, 1995: 44). In order to obtain relative gain from cooperation, coordination mechanisms are essential and this is where institutions fill the gap. Organizations will fulfill the role of not only making

sure that ‘cheating’ from cooperation does not occur, but also that there are not unequal gains from states willing to enter into dialogue instead of pursuing all out war (Keohane & Martin, 1995: 46).

In line of the above it is clear that liberalism address the concerns this paper had with using realism to assess the middlepowermanship of Turkey, in that material capabilities are now not the only component of determining a state’s position within the state system. International organizations allow for small and weak states to create linkages within the international community, regardless of their lack of material capabilities (Keohane and Nye, 1993: 418). However, the aim of these international institutions apart from cooperation is to create stability within the international system, and as such reflect the power relations that are displayed by powerful states and influential state actors. As a result, if power is still reflected in these institutions, then these institutions will remain static and unchanged.

Middlepowermanship requires more than the ability to cooperate and material capabilities, it requires favorable conditions within the prevailing world order. Robert Cox asserts that “the middle power is a role in search of an actor”, thus middlepowermanship requires a set of conditions for a state achieve which is based on forms of state, social forces related to production and changes in world orders (1989: 827). The following section will highlight Coxian Critical Theory and his framework of historical structures.

2.4. Coxian Critical Theory

Many IR scholars regard Robert Cox as the father of critical theory. Initially Cox’s ideas received little recognition in the American School of IR, however since his seminal work in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* in 1981, critical theory has begun to embrace subfields such as International Political Economy. For Cox, social forces generated by a changing production process are the starting point for changing world orders. This means that Coxian ideas go beyond that of the political and military interactions between states, but that states are products and shapers of

societies, and it is these societies that have shape and have been shaped by a changing world order (Moolakkattu, 2009: 440).

Coxian Critical Theory (CTT) moves beyond the state being the sole acquirer of power or the singular determinant of how the global community is organised. It highlights the importance of intra-state relations determining the outcomes on a global scale. Thus critical theory assesses the actual framework within which positivist theories operate, it adopts a holistic approach to theorizing and takes into account how different actors have contributed to the transformation of the world order, "... critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts" (Cox & Sinclair, 1996: 89). Instead Cox focuses on forms of state and, how macro forces and pressures from civil society influence the ways in which states change.

Cox's use of world order and not International Relations allows for this version of critical theory to bridge the domestic with the global, he explains:

I deliberately avoid using a term like 'international relations' since it embodies certain assumptions about global power relations that need to be questioned. 'International relations' implies the Westphalian state system as its basic framework, and this may no longer be an entirely adequate basis since there are forms of power other than state power that enter into global relations. 'World order' is neutral as it regards the nature of the entities that constitute power; it designates an historically specific configuration of power of whatever kind (Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 494)

When it comes to competing theory, Cox views all theories as biased. Positivist theories are moulded by the framework of problem-solving theory, which has its roots in the rational enterprise in the liberal tradition. Problem-solving theory, which "... takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action" (Cox, 1981: 208). This means that these theories are used to advance the status quo and fix problems in a particular framework, for example viewing a problem for a neo-realist perspective.

Critical theory on the other hand goes beyond a limited framework and seeks to "... identify the origins and transformative or developmental potential of historical phenomena. It seeks out the sources of contradiction and conflict in these entities and evaluates their potential to change into different patterns" (Moolakkattu, 2009: 443). However, Cox recognizes that problem-solving theory and critical theory are not mutually exclusive and that "... the strength of one is the weakness of the other" and critical theory itself contains elements of problem-solving theory insofar that it is contained in the form of identifiable ideologies (1981: 209). The strength of critical theory is that it adopts a more holistic approach. Within the international system, power is not only based on material capabilities, but is a combination of the interaction of forms of state, social forces related to production and changing world orders.

Historicism is what separates CTT from other theories within IR. According to Cox and Sinclair "... historical materialism was to be understood as the relationship between mentalities and material conditions of existence", thus there exists a link between the materialist world and ideas (1996: 27). In the work '*the Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Fugitive or Guru?*' Anthony Leysens (2008: 44) describes the importance of history to critical theory eloquently by stating, "... history is not the 'record' of universal truths; it reflects the dynamics of the different manifestations between the human mind and institutions".

Cox believes that historical materialism corrects neo-realism in four key ways; firstly it is both dialectic and historical meaning that instead of viewing conflict as consequence of the structure of the system, it can be seen as an agent for change. Secondly, neo-realism only sees a horizontal dimension of power where it is obtained through structural means, at a state level. Historical materialism asserts that there is a vertical dimension to power, and example being the center-periphery perspective. Additionally, the notion of the state-centric system is expanded to include groups such as civil society that can play an important role in shaping the objectives of a state. Lastly historical materialism involves the connection between power in terms of production and power of the state within IR (Moolakkattu, 2009:447).




Figure 2.1: movement of hegemony

As seen above CTT sees historicism used as a tool to understand the composition and eventual changes that occur in the structure of the international system, thus CCT develops a dialectical theory of history. Cox maintains that within this structure there are three forces, which interact in this particular structure; material capabilities, ideas and institutions, which is illustrated by *figure 1* (Cox, 1981: 98). Material capabilities include military, productive and economic capabilities, which could be in the form of technology or accumulated resources. Ideas can be either intersubjective, meaning that people have shared practices and institutions which cut across social divides, or collective images of social order, which forms the foundation of the creation of an alternate structure.

Lastly institutions function as an indicator of the prevailing power conditions, thus perpetuating a particular order. It must be remembered that institutions can at some state acquire a degree of autonomy, and thus serve as agents for change. Production is a very important aspect of CTT in that production does not exclusively stop with material capabilities, but goes on to include the "... production of ideas, of intersubjective meanings, of norms, of institutions and social practices within the context of which production of material life takes place" (Cox, 1981: 48-49; Moolakkattu, 2009:447).

The notion of hegemony was developed by Antonio Gramsci and related to the national level, but CCT extends this to the international. CCT is adamant in its rejection of the notion that national interest is distinct from that of particular interests, but "... has no difficulty in accepting it if it is defined as representing hegemony – the concentration of social forces producing the national interest, which is being projected

as the general interest” (Cox and Sinclair, 1996: 56; Moolakkattu, 2009:449). As discussed above CTT of hegemony does not focus on the maintenance of social power relations (problem-solving), but directs attention to questioning the prevailing order of the world.

2.5. Relation of Social Forces: Social Relations of Production, Forms of State and World Orders

As discussed above, the reasoning for using CCT as the theoretical framework for this thesis is that accounts for more than material capabilities (structural realism) and interaction/cooperation between states (liberal institutionalism) as being the framework for which to assess Turkey’s possible middlepowermanship and positioning within the international system. What realism and liberal institutionalism fail to take into account is the importance of historicism and continual change in the world order.

It must be reasserted that middlepowermanship is as a result of a combination of (1) *social relations of production* (SRP), which encompasses the totality of social relations in material, institutional and broad forms that create particular social forces; (2) *forms of state* consisting of historically contingent state-civil society complexes; and (3) *world orders* which not only represent that the phases of stability and conflict that affect the international community, but also initiate the thinking about how alternate world orders might emerge (Cox, 1981: 101).




Figure 2.2: relation of forces

The relationship between these three forces is not unilinear and any of the three spheres could be used as a starting point. The main characteristics of the three spheres of activity illustrated in *figure 2* will be outlined below (Cox, 1981: 101).

2.5.1 The Social Relations of Production

CCT asserts that patterns of production are the starting point for analyzing the mechanisms and operation of hegemony, however it must be remembered that this does not propagate that everything can be reduced to production in an economic sense. Cox states that production must be understood in border terms and not just as the production of tangible goods, but it covers "... the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods" (1989: 39).

The reasoning for distinguishing between different modes of SRP is that it allows for the consideration of how altering production relations give rise to particular social forces. By outlining various modes of SRP one is also able to question what promotes the creation or emergence of particular modes of production and either how they combine or transform (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 89; Cox, 1987: 103).

It is paramount to remember that the reciprocal relationship between production and power is crucial in that, "... power in *social relations of production* may give rise to certain *social forces*, how these social forces may become the bases of power in *forms of state* and how these might shape the *world order*" (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 89).

2.5.2 Forms of State: State-Civil Society Complexes

As seen changes in the SRP can give rise to new configurations of *social forces* and state power rests on these configurations. Thus the state is not treated as a given or pre-constituted institutional category, but consideration is given to the historical construction of various forms of state and the social context of political struggle. CCT asserts that forms of state are distinguished by the characterization of their historical blocs, which is ultimately the configuration of social forces upon which state power

rests. Thus by considering different forms of state, one is able to analyze the social foundations of the state, and potentially assess the possibility of state transformation. Conventional IR that is state-centric does not give enough importance to social forces and how these forces influence the development of states (Cox, 1981: 128; Bieler and Morton, 2004: 90-91).

CCT highlights the state-society complex, in which the state is not simply limited to a government of functionaries, such as political parties or military; but is inclusive of the realm of civil society which could include church, media and education. Therefore it can be argued that "... the state in this conception is understood as a social relation" and "... through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed" (Gramsci, 1971: 258- 271; Bieler and Morton, 2004: 92). This means that a foreign capital for example is not considered an external force that is beyond the power of the state, but that it is represented by certain social groups (fractions or classes) that are within the constitution of the state (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 92).

2.5.3 World Orders

The creation of an historical bloc is unable to exist without a dominant (hegemonic) social class and is thus seen as a national phenomenon. Once internal/domestic hegemony is established, this hegemonic social order might extend this outward onto the international community and therefore the world order. In doing so social forces are allowed the opportunity to connect and a 'world hegemony' could be in its infancy (Cox, 1983: 171; Cox, 1987: 149-150; Bieler and Morton, 2004: 93). National and social movements, and organizations such as the Roman Catholic Church is an example of how it had an international character, but was still rooted in the state. CCT emphasized that "... social forces may thus achieve hegemony within a national social order as well as through world order by ensuring the promotion and expansion of a mode of production" (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 93).

2.6. Conclusion

It is clear that both Realism and Liberal Institutionalism has merit in terms of being used as a framework for the assessment of Turkey as a middle-power, however as discussed above both these approaches lack what the other needs to provide a holistic picture. CCT on the other hand is able to amalgamate both these approaches and add the most important aspect when it comes to a state becoming a middle power and that is a conducive world order for the state in question. Cox (1989: 825) eloquently states that the middle-power role is "... not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system". It is thus a combination of *social forces relating to production, forms of state and world order* that are useful tools to determine a middle-power role.

In order to successfully use CCT to determine if the Turkish Republic is indeed a middle power actor in the post-Cold War era, this thesis will make use of a different configuration of *figure 2* used above. One will first start with accounting for the change in Turkey's position within the international community as a result of the change in world order that occurred at the end of the Cold War and subsequently in the post-2001 world order. Changes in the world order at these two distinctive periods within the international system, had a direct influence on firstly the forms of state of the Turkish Republic, and secondly the political economy of Turkey and their social relations of production. However, before we can place Turkey in the context of the post-Cold War era in the 1990s, it is essential that a brief overview of the origins of the Turkish Republic and the transformation of the state since its creation in 1923 is given. The next chapter will seek to do this and provide a foundation for the chapters to follow.

Chapter 3: Introduction to the Turkish State: Origins and Transformation

3.1 Introduction

To answer the research question this study will be assessing the Turkish Republic in the context of the post-Cold War and post-2001 world orders. However in order to account for the behavior of the Turkish Republic in these periods, it is vital that one understand the development and transformation of Turkey since its creation in 1923. Turkish history is extensive and rich in information, however due to the limitations of this study; one will only highlight factors that are pursuant to answering the research question.

In light of this, the chapter will be looking at the relationship that exists between secularism, democracy and political Islam in Turkey, which will then be followed by assessing the role played by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the founding of the Republic. It is important that one understands the link between secularism, democracy and Political Islam and the effect that it has had on the global repositioning of Turkey, especially in the post-Cold War and post-2001 context. As Turkey is the only secular state in the Muslim world, the country is seen as having the ability to act as a bridge builder between the West and East. Secularism is what gives Turkey its appeal to the Western world and the fact that over 90 percent of the Turkish population is Muslim, makes it accessible to the Arab world. This interaction between secularism, democratization and political Islam allowed for Turkey to fulfill a middle power role in the changing world order in the 1990s, and in the early 2000s allowed for the Turkish state to pursue a proactive foreign policy.

There will always be tension between secularism and religion in the Turkish state due to the large Sunni Muslim population in the country, and the guardians of the Kemalist principles which inform this secularist tradition is the TAF. The TAF played a crucial role in the creation and maintenance of the early Republic which led to the politicization of the TAF, especially during one-party rule between 1923 and first multiparty national elections in 1950. The role of the TAF in the context of guarding

secularism in Turkey increased dramatically when the multiparty system came into effect in 1950. The resurgence of Islam and political parties informed by religion ushered in an era where the TAF orchestrated three coup'd etat's in the space of 20 years (1960, 1971 and 1980) in the pre-Cold War era. Intervention of the TAF in the domestic political sphere continued in the post-Cold War era, therefore the politicization of the TAF in 1923 played a hand in subsequent military intervention in the public sphere of Turkey, playing a role in transforming the Turkish state.

3.2 Secularism, Democracy & Political Islam

This section will examine the defining characteristics of Turkey's path towards secularisation and the process that has led to Islamisation, which is evident in the formation of both state and society. According to Karakas (2007: I) "... state, politics, and society in Turkey are largely secularized and have accepted the subordination of Islam to politics", this process was first launched by the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century and coincidentally took place under Islamic auspices and was endogenous in nature. The Kemalist policies and values put in place by Turkey's founder Atatürk made it easier to transform the Ottoman monarchy into a nation-state which was modeled on European examples (Karakas, 2007).

3.2.1 Secularism in Turkey: The Kemalist Tripod

The founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was heavily influenced by the diverging interpretations of secularism and laicism, which was found in Europe during this period. Through the course of the twentieth century the Western idea of secularism took a cue from the work of Max Weber and his sociology of religion. Weber saw secularization as a process of modernization that would include both state and society. The notion of secularism has been accepted as an integral part of the modern state (Karakas, 2007:6,8).

The term *laicism* in regards to the separation of state and religion refers to an anticlerical Weltanschauung and an ideology that is based on the secular process, i.e., the strict separation of political and religious authority within a state. In this regard,

the laicist state will keep completely out of all matters where religion is concerned. France and Portugal are the only constitutionally laicist states in Europe. In France it is seen as a prerequisite for the protection of the freedom of religions and the only manner to ensure equal status for all religions present in the country. This concept is further distinguished from secularism by the fact that there is no state support for religious groups (Karakas, 2007: 7-8).

Laicism is referred to in Turkey's constitution; however the practical objective, politically speaking, of Turkish laicism is secularism. The Turkish constitutional courts view that "... in a laicist order [...] religion is freed from politicization, is discarded as an instrument of power, and is assigned the proper and honorable place in the conscience of the citizens" (Karakas, 2007: 8). This indicates that Turkish laicism has at its core secularization and modernization of the state and society in an environment where religion is freed from politicization. The Turkish path of secularism is said to be a combination of religion, state and laicism, which is unique not only to the Islamic societies, but also to the world. This configuration of secularism is known as the *Kemalist tripod* (Karakas, 2007: 8).

The Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922) was the catalyst that spurred on the fusing of nation and religion, and the ultimate transformation from the Ottoman Empire into a European modeled nation-state. The unifying power of religion is what appealed to Turkish founder Atatürk and the role it can play in building a nation, such as the cases in Greece and Serbia. Therefore during this period, Atatürk received the support of the Anatolian people, the Sunnis, the Kurds and the Alevis. Each of these groups had different motivations for giving their loyalty to Atatürk; the Alevis were an interesting case in that these were the group of people that were persecuted in the Ottoman Empire, and as a result expected more rights in the new republic. On the other hand the Kurds were wishing for recognition as an autonomous ethnic group. However, upon the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the greatest fear for Atatürk was the fragmentation of a new Turkey on ethnic lines, thus after Turkey's founding in 1923, the Kemalist (cultural) revolution and dictatorship on education began, all with an end goal of Westernization (Karakas, 2007: 8-9; Seufert & Kubaseck, 2004: 148).

Westernization was an important aspect of the new republic and was seen as a prerequisite in order to assimilate to the world order of that period and to become a competitive and developed nation state. It was clear that the republic had to “catch up” with the West. There were two opinions which existed within the Ottoman Empire on how Westernization could be achieved. The first camp was that of the Islamists which sought to simply “... [appropriate] Western industry and technology” (Topark, 2005: 29). On the other hand Westernists saw value in adopting Western institutions and cultural reforms as, “... Western science, industry, and technology were closely related with institutional structures” (Topark, 2005: 29). The Westernists were able to convince the ‘builders’ of the new Turkish Republic that it was essential for Turkey to conform to Western institutions and cultural reforms, so that the country could adapt to the world order and global norms. Therefore Turkey upon its creation adopted a comprehensive program of Westernization and secularism.

The implementation of Kemalist policies started with the closure of all Koranic school, religious orders and educational institutions. Swiss civil law, German trade and commercial law, and Italian criminal law replaced Islamic law. The Gregorian one replaced the Islamic calendar and Arabic script gave way for Latin script. Compulsory education was introduced and regulations encouraging Western-style of dress were passed, but most importantly the display of religious symbols in enclosed public areas was banned. Although there was some form of unhappiness and opposition from the southeastern areas, which were predominantly Kurdish, there was no mass ‘protest’ movement from civil society and thus effectively the Kemalist project was not endangered in any way (Karakas, 2007: 9).

The adoption and implementation of European laws and reforms came from within the state, and since the Ottoman Empire was never colonized. Therefore the process of Europeanisation was not rebelled against by the population. This translated into the people of the early Republic believing that these reforms were not from foreign rule, but came from its own people.

However as over 90 percent of the Turkish population was Sunni Muslim, religion played a central role in the founding of the Republic. Thus ruling elites had to be considerate of religious sentiments. As a result, one year after the founding of the

Republic, the Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) was founded in 1924. The purpose of the Diyanet was to depoliticize Sunni Islam through “... a state takeover of certain religious functions and integrating it into the Kemalist state-building project” (Karakas, 2007: 10). In doing so the institution would ensure that it prevented non-state and anti-Kemalist actors or groups from using religion for political mobilization against the state.

In this light, it indicates that the subordination of religion to that of politics has been met with broad approval by Turkish civil society, barring those that are orthodox Islamic¹⁶. This also reflected in the civil-military relationship that will be discussed below in this chapter. In this regard it would be remiss of this paper not to recognize that the Turkish Republic has successfully crafted its own brand of secularism, and thus transformed from a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire into a secular European nation-state.

3.2.2 Politicization of Religion

The transition to democracy and a multi-party system in 1946 started the phase of competition for votes and ushered in the “... exploitation and politicization of religion ‘from below’” (Karakas, 2007: 12). The Republican People’s Party (RPP)¹⁷, which had up until 1946 ruled for over two decades in a one-party regime, was confronted with the conservative, religious and rural majority of the Turkish population. Islam became an integral part of the program from all parties with some sort of religious affiliation. These parties could now count on financial and electoral support from religious interest groups.

In the 1950 electoral period, 7 of the 24 parties participating in the election were already advocating for a greater role for religion within the Turkish Republic. The Democratic Party (DP) won the elections, and considering that they were a conservative religious party, it ushered in a comprehensive return of religion and

¹⁶ In the last decade it was found that in a poll conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), 77% of all respondents answered ‘yes’ to the belief that the republican reforms had been advantageous for Turkey (TESEV, 2006)

¹⁷ The RPP is the oldest political party in Turkey and was founded in 1923 (CHP, 2013).

Islam into the public sphere. The victory of the party and Adnan Menderes was followed by an increase in the construction of mosques, state Koran classes and theological colleges. However in 1960, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) carried out a coup, with the justification of preventing a ‘civil war’. The RPP at this point had warned against the dangers of the ‘religious reaction’ and therefore called for a counter-movement, which was founded on Kemalist principles¹⁸ (Karakas, 2007: 12-13).

The first coup d’etat in Turkey since the creation of the Republic occurred in 1960 and represented a turning point for Turkish politics in the sense that the constitution was amended to establish the National Security Council, which acted as an advisory/controlling body vis-à-vis the government. The creation of Articles 35 and 85.1 of the TAF’s internal rules of conduct, granted the military license for future intervention into the functions and administration of the state, “... to protect and defend the principles of the Republic according to the constitution” and “... to defend the country against domestic and foreign threats, if necessary by force” (Karakas, 2007: 13).

In addition to the coup in 1960 the course of industrialization and modernization that occurred in the 1960s resulted in unemployment, hyperinflation and rural to urban migration. As a result this increased anti-Western sentiment and a re-evaluation of national identity for many Turkish people. In the late 1960s for the first time a political movement arose which saw its ideology rooted in Islamist principles and values. The founding of the National Order Party (MNP, Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, resulted in the party becoming the institutionalized branch of the Islamist movement. The party’s platform, apart from the protection of conservative moral values, focused on economic policy goals, which included state-led industrialization, the expansion of heavy industry, and the protection of small businesses (Karakas, 2007: 14).

This increase of religion in the political and public sphere resulted in the TAF orchestrating a second coup in 1971. This coup by the TAF occurred due to large

¹⁸ The main principle is to ensure that religion is free from politicization

scale student revolts in 1968 and conflict between the extreme left and right, resulted in the banning of political parties, Erbakan's MNP being one of the affected parties. However Erbakan's party reconstituted itself in the form of the National Salvation Party (MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi) in 1972. Although the party was monitored and had to keep to a pro-Kemalist line, the 1973 parliamentary elections saw the MSP become the third strongest party. As a result the coalition government of leftist nationalists and Islamists was formed and the MSP assumed the responsibilities of government from January to November 1974. Its accession to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as a full member can be seen as a direct consequence of anti-Western sentiment during that time and the leadership of Erbakan. What can be seen in terms of Islamism in Turkey is that it did not begin its foray into politics through an underground movement, but instead emerged from a democratic, parliamentary environment (Karakas, 2007: 15-16).

3.2.3 The Era of Turgut Özal & Islamic Interest Groups

The military coup of 1980 (third coup) proved to be another turning point in Turkish politics, where the state assigned Islam an important role in terms of both political and sociopolitical development. This new phase in Turkish politics came at the hand of Turgut Özal and the Motherland Party (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi), which won a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections in 1983. Özal was said to have "...fus[ed] progress and pragmatism with a commitment to religion and tradition", which opened up new possibilities and opportunities for the role of Islam and a positive Ottoman heritage (Karakas, 2007: 19). In short, Özal built new bridges between religion, state and society.

Apart from opening up new links between religion, state and society, the Özal era of governance was characterized by the opening-up of Turkish markets, both in terms of trade and investment. This led to an overwhelming amount of capital from the Arab region, which was called "green" or "Islamic" capital and was heavily invested in the banking and tourism sector. This inflow of capital from the Islamic world enabled Islamists to reorganize politically and become more economically active. An example of this can be seen in the increased freedom given to religious orders and

brotherhoods, which were now allowed to officially finance the construction of private educational institutions (Karakas, 2007: 20).

The economic policies under Özal included the turning away from import substitution industrialization (ISI) that was implemented in the 1960s and led to the increased promotion of small and medium sized companies. This led to many Turkish companies establishing themselves on the world market as producers, suppliers and exporting of goods in the fresh and non-perishable produce, textile, leather, construction and engineering industries. As a result of economic growth and development the new middle class, the Anatolian bourgeoisie, was created, who were deeply grounded in Islamic culture.

The backbone of the new bourgeoisie, also known as the “Anatolian tigers”, which consisted of Muslim academics, family run businesses, and small and medium enterprise companies, were the fastest growing class of entrepreneurs. The “tigers” were able to profess Islam, but at the same time did not negate Western values or the importance of achieving a liberal economy. What the group did promote was its belief that religion in this case was a motor for progress, “... the strengthening of Islamic identity can benefit the progress of the Turkish state and economy” and drew these parallels from Calvinism and the Protestant work ethic (Karakas, 2007: 20-21).

The influence of “Islamic capital” did not initially do much to build a close relationship between Muslim companies¹⁹ and the state apparatus, therefore the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSIAD, Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) was founded in 1990. The purpose of MÜSIAD is to represent small to medium-sized Islamic business to state authorities, and sees itself as a platform for such interaction and an interest group. In 2012 the organization represented over 15, 000 companies which contributes 15% of Turkey’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (MSONA, 2012).

¹⁹ Muslim companies represented the majority of small and medium enterprises in Turkey during this period.

The Özal era led to the official revaluation of Islam not only as part of Turkish identity but this combined with liberal economic policies led to the increased self-confidence and a new momentum for Islamic interest groups within civil society. These civil society groups, especially business and industrial groups such as MÜSIAD, played a crucial role in the formation and execution of Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and its renewed activism with the election of the AK Party in 2002. This renewed *foreign policy activism* has been extremely important in asserting Turkey's position as a middle power within the international system.

3.3. The Turkish Armed Forces: Role in the Founding of the Turkish Republic

As seen in the previous section of this chapter the TAF has played a significant role in the transformation of the state, especially in regards to their intervention in the political sphere of the country. In order to understand why the TAF has been instrumental in the changing Turkish political landscape it is important to understand how the TAF have become politicized. Therefore this section will provide a brief overview of the TAF in the Ottoman Empire, how it became politicized in the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, and how this has led to their continued involvement in the political sphere of Turkey.

3.3.1 The TAF in the Ottoman History

Once the Ottoman Empire started on its journey of dissolution, the Army lost its ability to protect its territories and effectively help the Sultan exercise his authority over the controlled territories. As the political control of the Sultan started to decrease, the military itself became more politicized and stopped subordinating itself to the Sultan's rule, which was in stark contradiction to the classical period of the Ottoman Empire. As an institution, the military was the first that experienced reform, and without a bourgeoisie like class the Army played a central role in the constitutional revolutions of 1876 and 1908 (Burak, 2011a: 147). It could be said that "... during the nineteenth century, the military had been both the subject and the

object of modernization”, and the Western-type education that the military received resulted in it questioning the power of political elites (Burak, 2011a: 147).

The constitutional revolution of 1876 was motivated by the military when some soldiers believed that limitations had to be placed on the authority of the Sultan, Abdülhamit II. During his reign, there emerged a new class of technocrats that caused discontent among military officers that had graduated from military academies. This discontent was caused by the protection being afforded to those military officers that had risen from the ranks. The ‘Young Turks’ in 1908, which were a group that consisted of modern and educated officers, in conjunction with bureaucrats had organized a constitutional revolution which sought to modernize and strengthen state and society. This was done on the basis of ideas that were positivist and nationalist (Zürcher, 1992:3; Burak, 2011a: 148).

However, one year later in 1909, a counter-revolution broke out, originating from conservative religious circles. Just as in the constitutional revolution the year before, the motivation for the counter-revolution were said to be low ranking military officers that sought to rebel against the upper command. The other significant civil-military relations of the second revolution was the movement of Saviour Officers (Halaskar Zabitan), this group of officers sought the renewal of the 1912 elections and demanded an unpoliticized army. However, military officers played a crucial role as leaders and organizers of the war of independence between 1919 and 1922, which led to the creation of Turkey in 1923.

3.3.2 Politicization of the TAF: Guardian of the Kemalist Republic

Leaders of the early Republic recognized the vital importance of a strong and loyal Army in ensuring the endurance of a young Republic, thus the Kemalist leaders saw the TAF as being one of the main pillars of the new regime. However, even they realized that the military’s involvement in politics worked against the unity and discipline within the TAF (Ahmad, 1969: 57, 55; Burak, 2011a: 148-149). Mustafa Kemal²⁰ addressed this when he came to power in 1923, he sought to not only isolate

²⁰ The creator and first President of the Turkish Republic

the military's involvement in the political sphere, but more specifically partisan politics (Burak, 2011a: 149; Burak, 2011b: 62). Although this was partially achieved by Kemal, and the TAF were isolated from partisan politics, there were two areas in which they remained an important force.

The first was that the military itself constituted a source of skills and facilities, especially during times of emergency where military officials took over from civilian functions. Secondly, the TAF was instrumental in economic development plans during the 1930s. Apart from these two functions and its non-involvement in partisan politics, the TAF was used as an instrument of one-party rule²¹, where the Republican People's Party (RPP) instrumentalized the TAF in combating reactionary forces opposed to the RPP. This was done under the assumption that these forces were seen as *internal threats*, and the military as the only protector of the new state (Burak, 2011a: 149).

3.3.3 TAF intervention during the Multi-party period (1950-1990)

As the multiparty system came into play in the 1950 election, it ushered in new era for civil-military relations started with the change in political rule in 1950. Unlike the RPP the Democratic Party (DP)²² was extremely different, especially in terms of their grassroots support, the DP was extensively liberal, in its economic policy, and its supporters were no longer happy with the single-party rule of the RPP. However once in power the type of policies advocated by the DP was autocratic, and this resulted in strong feelings of discontent among RPP leaders and military elites. As a result it started, "... losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the bureaucratic actors of the regime" and the regime began to employ authoritarian policies, such as establishing investigative committees (Burak, 2011a: 149). It was not only civil and military elites that were fervently against these policies, but the press, university personnel and

²¹ It was at this point that the TAF became politicized and as a result was able to play such an influential role within the Turkish political sphere, as seen by the TAF orchestrating numerous coups, all in an effort to protect the Kemalist principles

²² The Democratic Party was founded by Celal Bayar and was the first opposition to rise to power in Turkey following the national election in 1950, thus ending the country's one party era under the RPP. The DP also facilitated the revival of Islam at the popular level in the country (Turkish Weekly, 2013).

students began to feel increasingly unhappy towards the ruling regime. This resulted in large-scale student demonstrations, which crippled universities and resulted in confrontations with the police force, even the imposition of martial law could not reinstate order (Burak, 2011a: 149; Lombardi, 1997: 204).

The 27th May 1960 saw another military coup take place in Turkey, with one of the main justifications being that the Menderes government had lost its democratic legitimacy²³. One of the problems of the coup was that it was carried out in a non-hierarchical manner, which meant that there was no consensus as to when power should be returned to civilian rule. The day after the coup, the TAF appointed General Cemal Gürsel as the Head of State and Prime Minister of Turkey, although he had no hand in the military instigated coup.

Gürsel aimed to hand over political rule to civilians as soon as possible, however other lower ranking offers such as the Türkeş advocated for a longer period of time. The National Unity Committee (MBK)²⁴ under the leadership of Gürsel took over the role of the cabinet and acted as both the executive and legislative branches of government. In addition to changes in government bureaucrats, the constitution of 1924 was replaced with that of the constitution of 1961. This new constitution saw the introduction of a large number of civil liberties besides that of basic social rights, in addition the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council (NSC) were established (Burak, 2011a: 150-151).²⁵

The TAF governed the political scene until 1965²⁶, however in 1971 indirect military intervention took place, where the Demirel government²⁷ was forced to step down.

²³ The TAF were convinced that the Turkish people no longer wanted the Menderes regime in power

²⁴ The Council consisted of 38 members, with only six being high ranking officers.

²⁵ The NSC was seen as the second cabinet, with the inclusion of the Council of Ministers. The NSC became a powerful watchdog as its mandate and influence over governmental policies increased (Zürcher, 2003: 245).

²⁶ The 1965 multiparty general elections took place on the 10th October and resulted in the Justice Party claiming victory with 52.9 per cent of the votes (Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann, 2001: 272).

²⁷ Süleyman Demirel was elected as the Turkish Prime Minister in the 1969 general elections, under the Justice Party (Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann, 2001: 272).

The TAF demanded a new government that was a ‘strong and capable government’ that could quell the anarchic situation within the country, and if the Demirel regime could not secure this demand, then the military would take over the administration of the country. The 1970s saw Turkish politics characterized by the fragmentation and polarization, and a government that had no decisive authority, as such Turkey once again entered a period of crisis, which resulted in military intervention in 1980. The 1980 intervention by the TAF was as a result of various issues, which included civil violence, economic breakdown and challenges to secularism. One of the first orders of business by the TAF was to dissolve parliament and suspending all political parties and trade unions. The coup in 1980 was welcomed by the public, which they hoped would bring a sense of stability to the country (Burak, 2011a: 151).

However, the coup led to the state apparatus becoming more militarized in all aspects and made the TAF a law-making authority. One example of this was the establishment of the Higher Education Authority (YÖK), which centralized the control over universities within Turkey. In addition to this the 1982 Constitution limited the basic rights and liberties of society, it limited the scope of the civilian judiciary branch and strengthened the political autonomy of the military (Bayramoğlu, 2006: 82; Burak, 2011a: 152). However, in the post-Cold War era, the influence of the military on the domestic political sphere has been limited due to Turkey’s foreign policy goals, one of which is to be a member of the European Union, which will be discussed in chapter 5.

3.4. Conclusion

Since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the country has undergone significant transformations and developments. The nature of Turkish secularism is unique in the Muslim world and as a result has allowed Turkey to occupy a strategic role as a bridge-builder between East and West within the international community. This factor has in many ways informed and their foreign policy goals in the post-Cold War era and more specifically in the post-2001 period. The ability for Turkey to play a mediatory role between the West and East comes at a time where anti-western

sentiment is growing the Muslim world, and the continued conflict in the Middle East region.

The importance of Islam as a catalyst and starting point for the development of the Turkish economy, especially in the late 1980s and the role of Islamic civil society organizations such as MÜSIAD played an integral role in Turkey's later middle power aspirations (see chapter five). In addition, Islamic capital and the Anatolian Tigers played a crucial role in the reenergizing of Turkey's foreign policy.

The purpose of this chapter was to account for the innate factors of the Turkish Republic have enabled Turkey to play a middle power role within the international community in the post-Cold War era. As seen above, the interaction between secularism, democracy and political Islam, and the role of the TAF have significantly impacted the type of state Turkey has become. The next chapter will address the notion of world orders, and how shifts in world order can change the positioning of state within the international community, and how in the case of Turkey has promoted its rise to a middle power.

Chapter 4: Change in World Orders (Post-Cold War and Post-2001)

4.1. Introduction

Robert Cox (1989: 825) eloquently states that the middle-power role is "... not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system" and as a result the ability of a state to fulfill a middle power role rests on the context of world order. The Cold War era was a world order governed by a bipolar international system consisting of two power blocs, the Soviet Union and the West and its allies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of the international system from a bipolar disposition to that of a multipolar orientation, the opportunity arose for emerging states, such as Turkey to fulfill the gaps found in the international community during this period.

The 1990s marked a shift in the power structure of the global order, and saw the rise of emerging powers in the new multipolar world system. The character and importance of emerging powers should not only be seen in terms of risk and uncertainty in the new global system, but also in terms of "... the boundless opportunity that they offer economically, ... [and] could bring creative contributions towards improving global governance mechanisms" (Qobo, 2011: 5). The vacuum left by declining US leadership has been met by the growing appetite of emerging powers such as Turkey, to play a greater leadership role within the international system. The world order in which states currently find themselves in is eloquently described by Mzukisi Qobo (2011: 26), "... the world can no longer be understood in narrow terms of East versus West, as in the Cold War scenario. Much has changed, and interests are now more intertwined than in previous eras".

Taking the abovementioned into account, this chapter will assess Turkey's new role within the international community within the post-Cold War era and the change in the international security architecture following the 11th September 2001 Terror attacks in the USA. In addition to the increased value placed on the geopolitical position of Turkey, the changing world order also allowed for Turkey to explore a

more robust, autonomous pro-active foreign policy in its region. Regional relations between Turkey and its neighboring countries increased substantially, especially in security relations in the region following the Cold War, economic cooperation and the leadership role that Turkey plays in the Greater Black Sea Region. Regionally and internationally Turkey is a key player in world energy markets as a result of its location and interaction with resource rich states in its region.

In the post-2001 era Turkey's strategic importance increased as a result of the terror attacks in the U.S. and the subsequent Global War on Terror initiated by the U.S. and its 'coalition of the willing'. Turkey's reluctance to allow U.S. troops to use their state as a base of operations for the 2003 invasion of Iraq marked the beginning of a new era of autonomy for the Turkish Republic, which was reflected in their foreign policy.

4.2. Post-Cold War Era: Turkey in the New Order

The international system has gone through a tumultuous period of change since 1989 and the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the undoing of the Communist system of Eastern Europe, the international system has moved from a 'stable structure' of bipolarity to that of a multipolar and uncertain disposition. The breakdown of the post-1945 structure has led to states reevaluating their foreign policy and diplomatic positions in the context of this new world order. As a result, Meltem Müftüler and Müberra Yüksel assert that in the post-Cold War era, "... international attention is increasingly directed to regional politics and to the role of middle powers in their respective regions" (1997: 184).

As stated in chapter one, in times of uncertainty and crisis, the role of middle powers increase and as such not only in a regional context, but they tend to favour integration and relations based on "... multilateral cooperation for managing international problems, respect for international law, participation in international organizations and relative autonomy from the influence of great powers" (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 185). In the case of the Turkish Republic, its foreign policy and interaction with members of the international community in the post-Cold War era has been based on

these characteristics and as such as enjoyed considerable diplomatic influence as a state.

During the Cold War period, the relational power and influence of a middle power depended heavily on its distance from that of great powers and the position they occupied in the political spectrum, aligned to one power bloc or the other. As Turkey was and still is a member of NATO, during this period, Turkey was considered a conformist state as its foreign policy was in accordance with bloc policies. However, in the post-Cold War era, the Turkish Republic began to make independent policy decisions, most notably in the Bosnian crisis and in the post-9/11 era. The power vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union caused turmoil in the former Soviet Union, which presented not only the region, but also the international system and community with new challenges (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 185-186).

It has been argued that the capabilities and vulnerabilities of states, that are considered to be middle powers, is contingent on their historical context. As seen in chapters one and two, the Coxian definition of ‘middlepowermanship’ heavily rests on the historical context in which states find themselves within a particular world order. In the case of Turkey, its ascendancy within the international community came at a time in which the international-political arena was transitioning from one world order to another, from a bipolar order to that of a multipolar orientation. As such, these states can use their relational power and foreign policy agendas to promote regional and international political and economic cooperation. It will be seen through the course of this and subsequent chapters, that Turkey could fit both the definition of a regional²⁸ and middle power (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 187).

As a result of interstate relations and the interplay of domestic, regional and global conditions, it is advantageous for emerging regional powers to have a strong bond with one of the superpowers, and within this context, Turkey’s relations with the United States of America in the post-WWII and Cold War contexts have played a

²⁸ By definition a regional power has “... the potential to balance forces, maintain codes of conduct, stabilize sphere of influences and police unruly states” (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 187-188; Neumann, 1992: 7).

significant role in shaping Turkey's regional influence and power. In addition to having the support of a superpower in the post-Cold War era, Turkey's repositioning as a regional and potential middle power can be assessed on three factors according to Meltem Müftüler and Müberra Yüksel, being (i) geographic location; (ii) Gross National Product (GNP); and (iii) membership of International Organizations.

In regards to the geographic location of a state, "... a country's power and position in the international political system depend on its locational attributes" (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 188). As a result, when one assesses the role of Turkey in the international political system, its geographic location is an important factor to consider. This is reflected not only in its diplomatic relations between European, Asian and Middle Eastern states, but historically during the first few years of the WWII, being the only Islamic country with a secular democratically elected government. As a result Turkey was viewed as a 'buttress' against Soviet ideology in the Middle East region (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 188; Kuniholm, 1991: 34). The significance of the Turkish Republics geo-political position will be addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

The second criterion is that of a state's Gross National Product (GNP)²⁹, which serves as an objective assessment of a country's comparative economic performance³⁰. This aspect is elaborated upon in chapter 6, which highlights the social relations of production in the case of Turkey over the last decade. The third criterion is that of the size of a state's army and its military expenditures. There is no generally agreed upon index to assess this, however when one looks at Turkey's military capabilities, it has the second largest standing army in NATO alliance after the USA and plays host to 90 B61 nuclear bombs as part of the Nuclear Sharing Policy of the alliance (Kristensen, 2005: 8).

²⁹ GNP includes "... population, area, strategic location, institutional organization, alliances and trading areas simultaneously; therefore, it captures aggregate economic power along with potential military power" (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 188)

³⁰ See Appendix I

The last criterion is that of being a member of international organizations³¹. This criterion reflects one aspect of the working definition of a middle power³² outlined in chapter one and highlights Turkey's multilateral relations. The Republic of Turkey was a member of the League of Nations from 1932 and subsequently one of the founding members of the United Nations in 1945. It then continued to join NATO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe in 1952, 1948 and 1949 respectively. As a result of Turkey's memberships to these various organizations it became possible for the state to act as a bridge builder between various parts of the world and various organizations (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 189).

When one looks at the working definition of a middle power of this thesis and that of the three aspects above, Turkey's regional and international involvement immediately after the Cold War conforms to all of these aspects. During the period of transition created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rebuilding of Eastern Europe, Turkey's role intensified within the region. This is reflected in the (i) security concerns during this period, (ii) economic cooperation and, (iii) the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization (BSEC) in 1990.

4.2.1. Regional Relations

4.2.1.1. Security Concerns post-Cold War

As a member of NATO, Turkey has over the course of the Cold War played an important strategic role for the alliance, in that if the Soviet Union sought to launch an attack on Western allies, Turkey was one of two countries into which the Soviet Union could march upon. In addition, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Turkey was used as a listening post and an intelligence center for NATO and the USA. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Turkey's functions as a strategic important member of the alliance has not ended. The

³¹ A complete list of organizational memberships can be found in Appendix I.

³² Definition "... tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy" (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993:19).

geographic area in which Turkey is situated is prone to conflict, as could be seen with the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the War in Iraq in 2003 and the present situation in Syria (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 190-192).

4.2.1.2. Economic Cooperation

Apart from the importance of Turkey in terms of security relations in its region and NATO, Turkey played an important role in economic cooperation policies, which developed in the post-Cold War era. The advantage that Turkey had in this era, was its associate membership of the European Community since 1963, and as a result it worked with the EU towards the realization of a full customs union. Economic cooperation throughout the 1990s and 2000s played a significant role in repositioning the Turkish Republic within its region and the international community (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 192). It will be seen in subsequent chapters that the role of production, in terms of economic cooperation and integration, and that of civil society organizations significantly contributed to the reorientation of Turkey as a middle power in the new world order.

4.2.1.3. Influence in the Greater Black Sea Region

Immediately following the end of the Cold War, one of the most significant organizations the Turkish Republic was involved in was the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992, which took place under Turkish leadership. BSEC was established to enhance the image of Turkey as a significant power in the new world order, and the reemergence of Turkey after the Cold War (Müftüler and Yüksel, 1997: 193-194).

BSEC has a total of twelve countries³³ and seeks to promote economic cooperation and development between countries and in the Greater Black Sea Region. BSEC has become institutionalized with a permanent secretariat, a parliamentary assembly, a

³³ Republic of Albania, Republic of Armenia, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, Hellenic Republic, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Turkey and Ukraine (BSEC, 2013).

trade and development bank, a business council and numerous working groups (Winrow, 2005). There are nineteen areas of cooperation between member states, which includes agriculture, combating crime, energy, tourism and institutional renewal and good governance (BSEC, 2013).

However, in terms of strategic orientation, Turkey has moved beyond the period of redefining its post-Cold War role, and has "... graduated to a more sophisticated recognition of its strategic significance" both in terms of a regional and potential middle power (Giragosian, 2007: 35). This can be seen in its strategic importance within the world energy markets.

4.2.2. World Energy Markets

In the preceding decade Turkey has become a strategic and important energy hub for world energy markets, and its location has made it a key player in the USA and European efforts to establish a pipeline for natural gas transit originating from different sources. In late 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan reached an agreement, which will see the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey, by the creation of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which should see gas flow in 2018. In the figure below, it can be seen that Turkey's importance as a 'middle man' for world energy markets will continue and most likely increase in future. This will play a significant role in the strengthening not only of its soft power in its region, but also its political and economic clout (Zanotti, 2013: 16-18).




Figure 3.1. Major Pipelines Traversing Turkey and Possible Nuclear Power Plants

(Zanotti, 2013: 18)

Beyond Turkey's importance in the energy market, the country's foreign policy, (which will be discussed in chapter six) has seen a renewed Eastern shift towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia as highlighted in chapter one. This renewed interest beyond its borders is a dramatic departure from its aggressive bid to join the EU, due to the country's frustration with the delayed accession process and the recognition that within a multipolar world order, the emerging economies are playing an increasingly significant political and economic role.

However, before this is addressed in the remainder of this chapter and it must be asserted that the recognition of Turkey's increasing relevance within in the international community came to the fore following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001. As a result Turkey's strategic value was highlighted and in the context of this paper, led Turkey on its path to become a middle power. The following section will address the strategic importance of Turkey in light of the change in world order that occurred as a result of the 2001 terror attacks in the U.S.

4.3. The War on Terror: The Strategic Importance of Turkey in a ‘Security Orientated’ World Order

The 11 September 2001 terror attacks which took place in Washington and New York marked the creation of a new world order that returned to the security orientated world order which existed during the Cold War period. The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a world order, which sought to enlarge the scope of freedom in the world and a multipolar international system. However as a result of the 9/11 attacks the international community moved towards increasing their security based on “... worse-case real politic perceptions”, with the United States being the foremost and most important example (Yalçın, 2012: 206). Due to the changing security architecture of the international community in this period, the strategic and geographic importance of Turkey came to the fore.

This section will be highlighting the increased awareness of Turkey as a strategically important power in the post-2001 world order. This will be achieved by first accounting for how the 2001 terror attacks in the U.S. led to a ‘security orientated’ world order. It will then be followed by looking at Turkey’s geographic significance in the new world order and how this change in world order influenced in the creation of an autonomous Turkish foreign policy by looking at the country’s response to the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent war. Lastly, the spillover effects of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), specifically in the Black Sea Region will be assessed.

4.3.1. Security Explanation

The increased awareness of Turkey as a strategically important power and state can be attributed to a security-based explanation. The problem with exclusively using this explanation to address the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy is that it is only one-dimensional and does not take into account changes in the world economy or social changes that occur both globally and domestically. It is for this reason, that this paper makes use of CCT and the role of social forces, in assessing Turkey’s middle power role. These additional aspects will be discussed in the chapters to follow, however for

the purposes of explaining Turkey's significance in a changing world order context, a security-based explanation becomes very important.

This approach can be attributed to the emergence of a multi-polar world after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the changes in the Middle East and the Balkans over the last two decades, which caused a power vacuum and shift in Turkey's surrounding region. Thus the Turkish Republic has had to formulate a "... pro-active multi-dimensional and constructive foreign policy to adapt itself to the changing security conjuncture of the new era" (Kutlay, 2011: 68). This new era is itself characterized by the power shift that that occurred at the end of the Cold War and the events that occurred in post-2001 context.

4.3.2. Turkey's geopolitical significance

As discussed in chapters one and three Turkey's geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, not only gives it access to these strategically significant regions, but also allows it to act as a bridge between these regions. In the last decade Turkish foreign policy has undergone significant changes, driven not only by its productive capabilities, but also by its state-societal relations (discussed in chapters four and five). As a result of this unique geographic location, Turkey was the 'perfect' state to bridge the divide between East and West, and in the context of the post-9/11 world served as an important ally for the USA in the GWOT.

The events of the 2001 terror attacks in the USA led to the creation of the GWOT and laid the foundation for the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq on the grounds of the Hussein regime harboring terrorists, having concealed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and humanitarian protection for Iraqi civilians. In relation to the GWOT Turkey was an important ally and supported renewed international efforts to root out terrorism.

The Turkish Republic since the 1970s has been engaged in the fight against terrorism both domestically and regionally, and its first encounter with terrorist activities on the Turkish state came in the form of political assassinations against Turkish diplomats abroad. Domestically in the last two decades the Kurdish issue and terrorist activities of the PKK became internationalized as the conflict spilled over into neighbouring

countries. As a result, the new security architecture that was created post-9/11 was advantageous for Turkey and their fight against terrorism, as now the GWOT extended beyond terrorist activities taking place in the Middle East, but expanded towards Africa and the Far-East (Bagci and Kardas, 2003: 19-21).

Turkey is an adamant supporter of the GWOT, however, when the GWOT targeted an invasion of Iraq in 2003, it faced strong opposition domestically in Turkey. This was as a result of renewed solidarity in the Islamic world, which will be discussed in chapter 5. The matter was referred to the Turkish Parliament and it was decided that the Turkish Republic would not allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory as a base for the Iraqi invasion. This caused deterioration in Turkish-US relations and indicated to the U.S. that "...in its strategic relationship with Turkey, it could no longer rely solely on past legacies of cooperation and its close ties with the Turkish military" (Zanotti, 2013: 30).

As discussed above, Turkey and the USA have had diplomatic relations pre- and post-Cold War. During the Cold War the USA heavily invested in Turkey's defense and military capabilities as part of NATO and the alliances security concerns regarding the Soviet Union. However, as previously noted the regional and global environment has significantly changed since the end of the Cold War and yet again after the 2001 terror attacks in the USA. During these periods of transition and change within the world order, Turkey has decreased its dependence on the USA for material support³⁴ and has become an increasingly assertive foreign policy actor. This assertive and autonomous foreign policy was shown in the case of Turkey's response to the Iraq War.

4.3.3. Turkish Response to Iraq War (2003)

Turkey's decision to deny U.S. troops the right to use its territory not only shocked the U.S. and its allies, but it reasserted Turkey's independent pro-active foreign policy. Part of this pro-active foreign policy was the goal to build sustainable and manageable relations with neighbors. As a result, the idea of 'zero-problem'

³⁴ Turkish dependence on U.S. material support is due to the rapid economic growth Turkey experienced in the late 1990s and after the 2001 Turkish economic crisis

diplomacy was introduced by the Turkish state. This form of diplomacy was based in the belief that "... building interdependence in the economic sector that is expected to decrease the number of problems in the region" (Yalçın, 2012: 205; Renda, 2011). The purpose of this policy is to direct Turkish capabilities towards broader issues and not just conflict within the region. Therefore Turkey sought a diplomatic solution to the GWOT and as a result engaged in "niche diplomacy"³⁵ which saw Turkey become the initiator of the Regional Initiative or the Neighbouring Countries Initiative (NCI).

The NCI was established by Ankara due to the belief that a war in Iraq could have severe implications for regional security. Then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül visited Syria, Iran, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in January 2003, which saw these nations issue a declaration to the Iraqi government to comply with UN Security Council resolutions, while the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq was still respected. As a result of this initiative, there were regular meetings between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria and Saudi Arabia to discuss regional security (Winrow, 2005).

In the context of the post-2001 security architecture and pro-active Turkish foreign policy, it became clear that Turkey was beginning to fulfill the functions of a middle power³⁶ as outlined in chapter 1. It can be argued that if Turkey was not in the process of defining itself as a middle power and "... seeking an autonomous position, it could well have followed a policy in favour of American expectations" (Yalçın, 2012: 209; Taşpınar, 2011).

³⁵ Niche Diplomacy refers to states "... concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field" (Cooper, 1997: 5)

³⁶ Chapter 1 definition: "...tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide diplomacy" (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993:19).

4.3.4. Regional spillover of the GWOT (Greater Black Sea Region)

One of the major spillover effects the Iraq War had for the middle power aspirations of Turkey came in the form of its relations with the Greater Black Sea Region (GBSR). As seen above, BSEC was founded under Turkish leadership under the auspices to improve economic cooperation between the members of the accord. The GWOT led to the Bush administration's use of the Black Sea as an air corridor for its operations against Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a result the GBSR is no longer excluded from European security concerns. Apart from being an important energy and transport hub, the GBSR has become a passageway for the trafficking of weapons and people and the movement of terrorists and weapons (Winrow, 2005).

Turkey was instrumental in launching the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) in 2001, in which the six Black Sea states would cooperate in search and rescue missions, mine-clearing operations and environmental protection. In 2004, the mandate of BLACKSEAFOR was expanded to include cooperation against terrorism and actions to prevent the spread WMDs in the region (Winrow, 2005).

4.4. Conclusion

The shifts in *world order* described above have allowed for Turkey to play a more activist role in the international system through fulfilling a middle power role. As seen above the strategic importance of Turkey has increased significantly in the post-2001 era. In addition to the changes in the security architecture due to the GWOT, Turkey has been able to assert an independent foreign policy that is in line with the prevailing characteristics of a middle power³⁷. As asserted by Robert Cox (1989: 827), "... the middle power is a role in search of an actor" and in the case of Turkey, it has most certainly fulfilled the gaps left in the international system following the end of the Cold War, especially in its region.

³⁷ See chapter one for the definition of a middle power

However, changes within the world order and the international community alone cannot account for Turkey's new foreign policy activism both within its region or internationally. Domestic conditions within a state play a significant role in influencing a country's middlepowermanship. As such, the following chapter will highlight the *forms of State* within Turkey and how the state-society complex transformed the Turkish Republic in the post-Cold War era. This transformation was heavily influenced by civil society organizations, and in particular the Anatolian tigers and Islamic groups.

Chapter 5: Forms of State and the State-Society Complex

5.1. Introduction

Social forces such as civil society organizations (CSOs) play a significant role in the function and development of a modern nation state, and the Turkish Republic is no exception to this notion. As seen in chapter three, the Turkish state has undergone various stages of transformation, from its inception in 1923 to a multiparty democracy in 1950. The end of the Cold War marked a world order that shifted from an inward looking security-based system, to that of the spread of liberalism, both politically and economically. The transformation of Turkey into the 16th largest economy in the world is not a feat that took place in a short period of time, but one that was built upon the transformation of the state and the shift in world order that occurred in the post-Cold War and post-2001 eras.

This chapter will explore the nature of the state-society complex in Turkey and how CSOs have played a crucial role in the transformation of the state. This will be achieved building on the background of the Turkish state given in chapter three, and how changes in *world order* (chapter four) have influenced the state. The first section of this chapter will explore the rise of Islam in the Turkish political system and how religion has played a crucial role in the development of the economic sphere. The rise and subsequent fall of the Islamic Welfare party and the resurgence of Islam with the election victory for the AKP in 2002 marked a shift which saw religion reenter the political area. As mentioned in chapter three, the TAF have played a significant role in the transformation of the state. The role of the TAF in the 1990s was informed by their guardianship of secularism and Kermalist principles, especially in an era which saw a wave of democratization in the international sphere. However, since Turkey sought to join the EU, the role of the TAF has decreased significantly in the 2000s.

Civil society and CSOs have played a crucial role in the transformation of the Turkish state, especially in the area of democratization. The influence of civil society has increased in the post-Cold War era, with globalization and liberalization that followed

shift in the world order. CSOs, especially business groups such as TÜSIAD and MÜSIAD have had a profound impact on the economic sphere of the Turkish state, but have also impacted upon the foreign policy of the state.

5.2. Rise of Islamism in the Turkish Political System

The rise of Islam in the Turkish political system is an important aspect to highlight when one looks at the forms of state following the Cold War. As seen in chapter three there is a constant tussle between different actors within the state, especially between the ruling government, the TAF and CSOs such as business organizations. Islam played a crucial role in the development of the economic sphere of the state, especially in relation to attracting Islamic capital from neighboring countries. In addition Islamic business groups have been key actors in spreading international norms such as democracy and liberalization within the state.

5.2.1. The Rise and Fall of the Islamic Welfare Party (RP)

The 1990s saw Islamism in Turkey experience an upswing that exceeded that of the 1970s and was led by Necmettin Erbakan. The Anatolian bourgeois had turned its back on the ANAP when Özal's successor Mesut Yılmaz was said to have no flair for religious topics and instead stayed clear of contentious religious issues. The rise of the RP came after they launched an indirect attack on the Kemalist model of state, society and economy, saying that this led to economic and social inequalities, corruption, and moral decline. On the economic front the RP postulated a "Just Economic Order" which was seen as a "third way" between capitalism and socialism. The neoliberal era that came at the end of the Cold War, translated into Turkish society through the liberalization of Turkish markets, and with any new economic policy there is an adjustment period. However, in the case of Turkey, the neoliberal economic policies which were implemented led to an economic crisis and a balance of payment crisis in the early 1990s. This not only contributed to the rise of the RP, but also had a tangible link to the coup in February 1997 (Karakas, 2001: 22-24).

The unexpected death of Özal in 1993 weakened the ANAP, but at the same time created a vacuum in the conservative religious camp. This coupled with a worsening economic situation led to a decline in government confidence, which manifested in the RP receiving 19.1 percent of the vote in the 1994 local elections, 21.4 percent in the parliamentary elections a year later³⁸ (Karakas, 2001: 22-24). In addition to the weakened economy, the RP was also able to benefit from the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, by promising in its party program to solve the “Kurdish problem” in the spirit of “Muslim brotherliness”, to lift the state of emergency and grant state aid to displaced persons. In addition, there was a great deal of support from female voters who were mobilized through a woman’s commission, who became a hallmark of and public relations success for the RP (Karakas, 2007: 23-24; Schüler, 1998: 249; Arat, 1999).

The rise of the RP and increased Islamism within the political system of Turkey was a historic turning point in the history of the state, in that it was the first time that the country was ruled by an Islamist politician, Erbakan who was elected by parliament in 1996. The turning point was more psychological in nature in that it called into question the Kemalist values of the state and also how the states resources were going to be distributed. Upon this inauguration, Erbakan emphasized that he would operate within the parameters of the democratic order and would respect Turkey’s laicist path (Karakas, 2007: 25). The victory of the RP increased the self-confidence of religious supporters and effectively led to the politicization of religion.

However, the RP’s decline came just a few months after its ascent to power, in the summer of 1996. The Welfare Party at this point attracted accusations of bigotry and Prime Minister Erbakan was criticized for not translating his campaign promises into action. Thus to placate the religious wing of his party, Erbakan presented a bill that would liberalize the wearing of headscarves in enclosed public areas, and open officer

³⁸ The Turkish electoral system:

“The President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year term. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President. In the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) 550 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms” (Election Guide, 2013)

careers to religious soldiers. In response the TAF started a public campaign called the “secular front”, which organized weekly demonstrations and had the support of TÜSIAD, the Turkish President and civil society, including some areas of the media, unions and women’s organizations. This led to the resignation of Erbakan and his government after just one year in office in 1997 and the RP was banned by the Turkish constitutional court for “... contempt of the constitutional rule of separation of state and religion” (Karakas, 2007: 26-27).

The Erbakan era did not essentially lead to the transformation of Turkey back into an Islamic state, but the party did move within the parameters of Turkish democracy. It did however witness the Islamization of the public sphere and the politicization of religion, especially in regards to the wearing of headscarves, which ultimately led to tensions within the public sphere.

5.2.2. The Justice and Development Party (AKP)

The era of Islamic movements ended in 2001, when the Virtue Party³⁹ was banned. This acted as a catalyst in the splitting of the Islamic movement; those that followed Erbakan’s views combined with traditionalists and formed the Felicity Party (SP, Saadet Partisi) and the reformers founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The ideological change in the AKP was evident in its party program, in that the AKP promoted their respect for the principles of democracy and laicism. However, their interpretation of Laicism was not a form of state control, but instead as the state’s neutrality vis-à-vis all religions. The party advocated free entrepreneurship and a market economy that would also take into account the interests of the middle class (AKP, 2013).

In the 2002 early parliamentary elections, the AKP won 34.3 percent of the vote, and received 363 out of the 550 seats in parliament. The rise of the AKP did not just occur as a result of its new objectives, but must be considered in the context of the largest

³⁹ The Virtue Party or *Fazilet Partisi* was established in December 1998 and was an Islamist political party. It was banned in June 2001 for violating the secularist articles of the Turkish Constitution (Atacan, 2005).

economic and financial crisis to hit Turkey in its history⁴⁰. The 2001 crisis coupled with the consequences of the 1999 earthquake in Istanbul played a central role in the victory of the AKP. Prime Minister Erdoğan represented himself as a ‘reformed’ Islamist and when his government took over power, the AKP represented itself as a new force of reform (Karakas, 2007: 29-31). During the period from December 2002 to March 2003 the AKP was able to push through more than 54 constitutional and statutory amendments in the course of preparing Turkey for accession to the European Union.

The AKP’s political image benefited from its successful economic policy, which came in the heels of a global shift (post-Cold War) towards neo-liberal economic markets and increased global trade and investment, and the Erdoğan government had been consistent in implementing the IMF stabilization program following the 1994 financial crisis mentioned above. The government was able to achieve rapid economic growth and more than double the annual per-capita income, and inflation sank below 10 percent in 2004, which was the first time in more than 30 years (Öniş, 2010: 48).

The AKP’s policies according to Cemal Karakas (2007: 32), “... are orientated towards the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law, despite its occasional Islamist rhetoric” and this within the Turkish context represents a milestone in the continuation of the pro-Islamic political movement. The pro-Islamic political movement within Turkey has always been a part of the Turkish Republic’s political system and having a population that is 99.8% Muslim, religion will always play an active role in the future transformation of the state (CIA World Factbook, 2013). The modern Turkish state finds its foundation in its own brand of secularism and the belief that religion has no place in the functioning of the state and state affairs. The actor within the Turkish state that is said to protect these values is the TAF, and their involvement within the political affairs of the state is indicative of this. The next section of this chapter will highlight the role the TAF has played in the post-Cold War era and how their influence within the structures of the new world order (liberalization and democratic consolidation and principles) has declined over the last decade.

⁴⁰ See chapter 6, page

5.3. Civil-Military Relations

The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have played a key role in the formation of the modern Turkish state, according to İsmail Hakkı Karadayı: “The Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor of the Republic in Turkey, which is a secular, social, and lawful state” (Burak, 2011a: 143). Unlike traditional armed forces of most states, the TAF have a considerable amount of political and institutional autonomy which is informed in-part by the words of Karadayı, but the true autonomy of the TAF stems from the notion that it is their role to guard the state from external and *internal enemies*. In the same breath, the role of civilians, level of economic development, legal regulations, socio-cultural structure and the political culture of Turkey all too some extent affect the role of the TAF and their intervention in functions of the state.

Although today Turkey is considered an electoral democracy, in order to truly understand the modernization of the state, one must explore the dynamic and seemingly complex relationship between the civil and military elites. As mentioned above, the most important function of the TAF is to guard the Turkish Republic and its Kernalist principles. The TAF is the only institution that has survived through the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the forming of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and its multi-party period, and is still a key role player in the modern Turkish state (Freedom House, 2013; Burak, 2011a: 144-146).

5.3.1. TAF-State Relations (1990s)

Under the leadership of Özal⁴¹, the country went through considerable degree of democratization. Issues of *internal security* such as Kurdish nationalism⁴² were

⁴¹ Turgut Özal from the Motherland Party (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi), won a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections in 1983. This ushered in an era which increased the opportunities for the role of Islam within state and political life. *See page [insert page]*

⁴² The Republic of Turkey is home to a sizeable Kurdish minority, and for a long time the Kurds within Turkey have accused the Turkish government of trying to destroy their identity. Therefore the Kurds

discussed in numerous civil circles, which up until then was very unfamiliar to the Turkish public. This was one step in the path towards civilianization of the TAF, which saw Özal appoint members to official positions, which he supported and not necessarily generals from the TAF. By doing this he underlined civilian supremacy and in his foreign policy decisions, "... it would not be wrong to say that Özal behaved independently from the military" (Burak, 2011a: 152; Birad & Yalçın, 2001: 307-316).

As the democratic regime of Erbakan seemed to be unable to cope with the separatist terrorist threat and the rise of political Islam. This led to the 1997 coup. The coup came as a result of the strengthening of Islamic actors in both the economic and political sphere as a result of policies. The Welfare Party (WP)⁴³, in 1995, emerged triumphant in the general elections, which caused increased tension between military and civilian circles and actors (Burak, 2011a: 153). It was believed that the WP did not believe in secularism and democracy being the driving force of the regime in power.

The military intervention in 1997 was not a case of the TAF overthrowing the democratic mechanisms that existed, but rather having these mechanisms functioning under military guidance. In addition to what the TAF sought to achieve, which was to alarm civil society about the perceived threat against Kemalist policies, the Turkish media⁴⁴ played a tremendous role in informing the public of this perception. Military elites instead of advocating for the use of guns, opted to instead use briefings, public declarations and conferences to put their views across. This was great departure from the tactic used during the previous two coups (Çağlar, 2012: 29; Burak, 2011a: 153; Yavuz, 2004: 330).

are seeking their independence to create an independent Kurdistan, or to have autonomy within Turkey. This has translated into violent clashes between the Turkish Armed forces and Kurdish belligerents (BBC News, 2013).

⁴³ The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was an Islamist political party and was founded in 1983 by Ali Türkmen, Ahmet Tekdal and Necmettin Erbakan. (U.S. Library of Congress, 2013)

⁴⁴ Those news agencies that were committed to the Kemalist principles

The February 28 Process of 1997, which is another name given to the coup, was not carried out like the coups of 1960 and 1980, but the "...trademark of the February 28 military intervention was its realization through civil society" (Çağlar, 2012: 29). The chief civil society organizations that participated in the coup with the military were universities, trade associations and unions, judicial organs, the media and bureaucracy. In a sense the other justification for this intervention by the military was based on the fact that it was coordinated and conducted without the traditional military apparatus and tools (Burak, 2011a: 153; Çağlar, 2012: 29).

During the February 28 Process, there were a number of legal regulations that were carried out which would increase the capabilities of the TAF in both the political and administrative realm. One of the regulations, which would see the TAF deprive the Turkish Parliament of any authority during times of crisis, was the Public Act of The Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (Başbakanlık Kriz Yönetim Merkezi Yönetmeliği) (İnsel, 1997: 115; Sevinç, 2000: 64; Burak, 2011a: 154). These types of policies, coupled with enabling the democratically-elected government of Erdogan, an Islamist, to lose office, the TAF "... played a key role in reformulating the identity-related policies of the state as a zero-sum game" (Burak, 2011a: 154). This means that the TAF would not allow for Islam to enter the political area, thus it was either a regime that was completely devoid of any religious affiliations, or the TAF would intervene to ensure that this was the case.

However, with the onset of liberalization and a push for global democratization following the Cold War period, it was no longer possible for the TAF to play such a prominent role within the political arena. As the Turkish Republic would like to join the EU⁴⁵, the TAF can no longer continue to play such a prominent role within the political affairs of the state.

5.3.2. Civil-Military Relations from the 2000s Onwards

The 1990s into the 2000s saw a great deal of democratization take place within Turkey's political system, and especially with regards to civil-military relations. As a

⁴⁵ Accession talks officially started at the Helsinki Summit in 1999

result the TAF started placing a greater role on its duty to protect the basic principles of the Turkish state. As mentioned above, Turkey would like to become a member of the European Union (EU), the accession process requires various conditions to be met as prescribe in the Copenhagen Criteria, which was agreed upon in the 1993 meeting of the European Council (EC) (Cizre, 2004: 109; Burak, 2011a: 161; Republic of Turkey: Ministry for EU Affairs, 2013). This criterion requires institutional stability, freedom of justice, and respect of minority rights, as some aspects. Although the criteria did not state this explicitly, but it did hint that there should be some form of restructure of the military.

The EU has asserted that integration into the EU would require a strict separation between military and civil authorities. In a 2004 EU Commission report it was stated that "... The Armed Forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of informal channels" and uses indirect and these informal mechanisms to exercise superiority over Turkish civilians (EC, 2004: 15). The influence that the TAF has in the political sphere could be seen in 2007 and its submission of an e-memorandum.

5.3.2.1. E-memorandum of 2007

The e-memorandum came into being due to the relationship between the AKP and the TAF. During the AKP's early stage in office, they employed the approach of confrontation avoidance when it came to relations with the military, and at times would avoid policies or measures that would be strongly opposed by the TAF. On the other hand, the AKP did pay special attention to the military and their input when it came to their area of expertise. However, these measures did not stop the TAF from undermining the ruling government (Cizre, 2008: 134, 143; Heper, 2005: 223; Burak, 2011a: 163).

The e-memorandum was not only related to the TAF wanting to guard the Kemalist policies of Turkey, but also related to the presidential elections. Traditionally the presidency in Turkey is seen as a symbol of Atatürk's legacy and was elected from retired generals that have served in the TAF, until the election of Özal in 1989. Thus when Abdullah Gül came to the fore for the presidency of Turkey, with a strong Islamic background a wife that openly wears a headscarf, the TAF was alarmed that

this would affect the states Kemalist legacy and issued the e-memorandum (Warhola & Bezci, 2010: 10; Burak, 2011a: 164).

This indicated that the military would not abandon its role to protect the secularist values of the country and it was also the first time that in Turkish politics that a democratically elected government, the AKP, would stand against the TAF's threats of intervention in civil politics. In an era where Turkey is pushing to join the EU, the TAF will be a point of contention if this should become a reality.

As a result of the TAF, Turkey is an anomaly within the international system in that it not only has a relatively strong civil society, but an equally powerful military presence within the state. Although this thesis cannot address this issue in its entirety, it is an aspect of literature on the Turkish Republic that needs to be expanded upon.

5.4. Civil Society in Democratizing Turkey

As mentioned above, CSOs have played a significant role in the transformation of the Turkish Republic, both domestically and internationally by influencing Turkey's foreign policy and as a result the country's positioning within the international system. The following section will highlight the role of CSOs within the Turkish context and the impact they have had on the transformation of the state in the post-Cold War and post-2001 era. Since Turkey was accepted as a candidate for membership to the European Union in 1999, Turkish civil society has become an active actor in the process of accession and an object for examining the state of the country's political, economic, social and cultural transformation, all of which are necessary for Turkey to be accepted into the EU. Turkey's civil society has traditionally been portrayed as weak, passive and controlled by the state through corporatist structures. However, in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit, the European Council proclaimed, "... Turkish state and society have been transformed by the political avalanche of democratization" and the general consensus is that Turkey's civil society and the process of democratization has come a long way, but still has a long way to go (Solo, 2010: 75-75; Kubicek, 2005: 363).

5.4.1 Milestones for Turkey's Civil Society

As mentioned above Turkey is the only democratic secular state among the Muslim countries with a dynamic civil society; however the modern Turkish state inherited a strong state tradition from the Ottoman Empire that has created obstacles for free association within civil society. It was not until the multi-party system in 1946 that civil society and NGOs began to play an active role within the confines of the state. It must be recognized that the period between 1950 and 1980 was tumultuous as a result of the three coups, the military trying to de-politicize society and the 1982 constitution, which restricted the formation of civil society organizations (Sener, 2009; Solo, 2010: 76-77).

The 1990s and the era of globalization ushered in an era of liberalization and individualism which had a profound impact on civil society and democracy within Turkey. The elimination of the law banning private radio and television stations in 1993 and the growth of the media were important as the media was now seen as a mechanism that would make government and civil services more transparent and accountable to citizens. This period also included two important milestones for civil society, namely the Marmara Earthquake and the Helsinki Summit.

5.4.1.1. *Marmara Earthquake*⁴⁶

The political disaster that accompanied the earthquake broke the traditional image of the state, in that civil society organizations and citizens filled the void that the government left in terms of providing the necessary services and disaster relief. Groups such as the Civil Coordination Center and the Search and Rescue Association, "... became media stars, and their heroics stood in stark contrast to the performance of stage organs" (Kubicek, 2002: 38; Solo, 2010: 77).

⁴⁶ The Marmara earthquake took place in 1999 and had a magnitude of 7.5 on the Richter scale. The Marmara region is the most industrial and densely populated region in Turkey and over 17,400 people were killed, with an additional 600,000 left homeless. The quake lasted for 45 seconds and damaged over 285,000 buildings (Hurriyet Dailey News, 2013).

5.4.1.2. The Helsinki Summit⁴⁷

The 1999 Helsinki Summit gave Turkish civil society organizations and democracy a partnership with the EU, which to date has resulted in wide scale changes. It would be remiss not to mention that, while the Turkish government has been somewhat reluctant its pursuit of democratization throughout its history, "... Turkish CSOs have filled that void by providing the support from below that is essential for consolidating reform" (Solo, 2010: 77). One of the most important civil society groups in Turkey is the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, and how their interaction with the state has led to a shift in the functioning and expectations of CSOs.

5.4.2 TÜSIAD (The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association)

TÜSIAD is a voluntary interest association, which represents big business and large conglomerates in Turkey, and has been described as "... the most vocal force within civil society and possibly the polity at large to push in the direction of the extension of civil and human rights as well as the establishment of a transparent and accountable state" (Sener, 2009: 4). One would expect an organization such as TÜSIAD to shift in the direction of authoritarian governance in order to achieve some sort of stability in times of crisis, however, the organization has been actively pro-democratization and expresses a collective concern for the social, economic and political problems of Turkey (Onis and Turem, 2002: 439; Solo, 2010: 78). This stems not only from a concern for business related profit, but also from a profound need for the Turkish State to stable and conform to global norms (post- Cold War era), especially at a time where the Turkish economy is experiencing extraordinary growth.

Industrialists and Businessmen established TÜSIAD in 1971 directly after the coup of 1971 as a response to the alarming economic and political problems at the time. The organization challenged state traditions that were brought from the Ottoman Empire in which caused the state to dominate over business within the domestic economy.

⁴⁷ The 1999 European Council Meeting (Helsinki Summit) took place in Helsinki, Finland, and the Council recognized Turkey as a candidate country for inclusion in the EU (Solo, 2010: 77).

The primary focus of TÜSIAD during the 1970s was economic considerations and providing solutions for the blatant economic problems of the state.

The 1990s saw a shift in TÜSIADs interests, where globalization helped shaped the idea that economic benefits of globalization would only be available on a large scale if democratic norms were applied in the political sphere. As a result the organization was "... dedicated to checking the power of the state and rendering it accountable and transparent" (Solo, 2010: 79). This is done through closely monitoring the executive and legislative processes in the government and parliament. The organization also utilizes the media, and allies itself with academics, researchers, and experts when it does decide to take on issues. TÜSIAD is said to be carrying out the crucial function of "... social diplomacy, which provides transparency to the official diplomacy to the state" (Solo, 2010: 79).

5.4.3. MÜSIAD: Islamic Business Association

In addition to TÜSIAD, another CSO that has had a crucial impact in transforming the Turkish State was MÜSIAD (*Münih MÜSTAKİL SANAYİCİ ve İŞADAMLARI DERNEĞİ'nin*), an Islamic business organization that promotes economic relations with Muslim countries, and is said to be more aggressive (with regards to trade and investment) internationally. The importance of MÜSIAD becomes very apparent in the newly formed proactive foreign policy of the Turkish Republic since the AKP came to power and the post- 2001 era.

MÜSIAD additionally played a crucial role in the transformation of the economic landscape of Turkey. The growth of entrepreneurialism energized by Islam not only accelerated the rate of capital accumulation and export-led growth, but also facilitated the rise of indigenous Anatolian entrepreneurs. This translated into a transformation of Big Business in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s, especially during the implementation of neoliberal export-orientated policies. The pressure for Turkey to conform to global norms within the international community during the post-Cold War era through liberalization and democratization, especially in relation to economic considerations, increased the relative influence of CSOs like MÜSIAD in not only

pushing for a more liberal and democratic state, but also attracting Arab Capital and investment (to be discussed in chapter 6).

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the crucial role that CSOs have played in the transformation of the Turkish Republic in the post-Cold War era. It is important to note that the political transformation of the political arena in the Turkish Republic was heavily influenced by changes that occurred at the world order level. The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of neoliberalism and democratization that was seen through states implementing new economic policies that would advance the development and growth of their economies. In Turkey, these policies not only resulted in economic growth in Turkey (see chapter six) but also allowed for Islamic orientated political parties to come to the fore through them advocating for greater foreign trade and investment. Business Associations in Turkey not only pushed the process of transformation in an economic sense, but it will also be seen the following chapter that these Associations influenced the foreign policy of the state.

The TAF will always play a significant role in the context of the Turkish State. However with the robust proactive foreign policy put forth by the AKP government, that is directed towards regional integration especially with Arab countries and the increase in Islamic capital flows in and out of Turkey, their influence is not as strong as it was in the 1950s-1980s. The need for Turkey to liberalize and diversify is a common formula for emerging economies within the international system, this coupled with the change in world order created a political opening for Turkey to play a significant leadership role not only within its region, but also beyond its immediate borders.

The following chapter will address the last factor within Cox's dialectic, that of the social relations of production and, how changes at the world order level and domestically (CSOs) have propelled Turkey's position within the international community from that of a regional power to a middle power.

Chapter 6: Social Relations of Production and Turkish Foreign Policy

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to address how shifts in world order created an opening for Turkey to emerge as a middle power in the new order. In order for that to be achieved, one cannot exclusively look at a state's domestic political situation and changes in world order, it is also essential to address the social relations of production, or in the case of this chapter Turkey's political economy within the new world order. As discussed in chapter five, CSOs have had a dramatic and important impact on the form of state that exists within the Turkish republic. Whereas chapters three and five have mainly focused on the political changes that have taken place in Turkey since the formation of the Turkish Republic 1923, the following chapter will address the political economy of modern Turkey.

In order to do so, this chapter must first address the issue of a shift within the global economy from import substitution industrialization (ISI) to export-orientated industrialization (EOI) in the post-Cold War period. This had a significant impact on the transformation of the political economy of Turkey and will be highlighted in this chapter. One of the most significant changes in the Turkish economy came on the heels of the 2001 Turkish financial crisis, the worst crisis of its kind within Turkish history. Significant policy changes implemented at this juncture has allowed for extraordinary growth and development of the Turkish economy. However, the foundation of the modern Turkish economy was built upon economic liberalization that occurred in the 1980s, coupled with the emergence of a new Islamic business class that has driven Turkish economy towards success. It is a combination of the factors above that have contributed to a proactive Turkish foreign policy agenda.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to synthesize how the *forms of state*, specifically CSOs and the *social relations of production* within a new world order have shaped Turkey's position within the international economic community, and its activist foreign policy.

6.2. Change in Turkey's Political Economy

The section below will account for changes in Turkey's political economy. The most significant changes is the shift from ISI to EOI, the 2001 Turkish economic crisis and the creation of the 'new' middle class, the Anatolian Tigers.

6.2.1. Policy Phases and Transformation: ISI to EOI

Although this thesis is concerned with the transformation of the Turkish Republic from the post- Cold War era, it is important to bring the economic sphere of Turkey into context with the changing world order. Thus it is important to address significant economic policy changes that occurred at a world order level, a shift from ISI to EOI growth strategies, and how this impacted the Turkish domestic market.

External actors play an important role in the changing political and economic landscape of a state, and these changes are expressed and advocated for by leading or hegemonic power/s within the international community. One such hegemon is the United States and as a result played a crucial role in the transformation of late developing countries after the Second World War. In this world order, the US was able to exert its economic influence through military and economic assistance, but also through "...through key international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the WTO and so on-institutions over which it can exercise a disproportionate degree of influence" (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 5). In addition this makes it possible for the global hegemon to influence the developmental trajectories of individual states through the development of ideas such as using ISI to promote domestic economic growth (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 6). Although the U.S. did not impose ISI itself, its influence on international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund helped institutionalize the idea. Therefore changes at a world order level can have a significant influence on the growth and development of a state, and Turkey was no exception.

6.2.1.1. ISI era (1960s – 1970s)

The experience of the Turkish Republic in the 1960s was characterized as a delayed encounter with the Keynesian Revolution taking place in the West. External influences from the World Bank played a significant role in exporting ideas of planned development and protectionism as a means of fostering rapid economic growth. In relation to the global context of the world order at the time, the US needed to increase the pace of development in the periphery of the world economy, which at the time was "... firmly rooted in the logic of Cold War rivalry, with the threat of the spread of communism creating an important impetus for the tolerance of more interventionist strategies in the emerging states of the developing world" (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 15-16). Therefore the 'world' turned towards ISI-style development strategies.

In the case of Turkey, it was at this time that a national development coalition⁴⁸ formed which favored ISI and was strengthened by the Turkey's its new Constitution⁴⁹, which placed a great deal of emphasis on the idea of planned economic development. This new approach was based on the basic premise to industrialize as quickly as possible, without undermining the states balance of payments equilibrium. This strategy worked well during the period of 1963-1977, and resulted in high rates of economic growth and structural change in Turkey. It is also important to mention that both private and state economic enterprises played a significant and complementary role. Turkey's economic policy during the ISI period was in line with that of a 'reactive state'⁵⁰, and once again when the global community shifted from ISI to EOI (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 16-17).

⁴⁸ The coalition included a group of bureaucratic elite which were marginalized during the Menderes era and organized labour (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 16)

⁴⁹ The Constitution of 1961

⁵⁰ Reactive states follow the rout of the majority within the international community (Önis and Şenses, 2007:17)

6.2.1.2. Shift towards EOI

The late 1970s within the international economic order was marked by the disillusionment of the Keynesian Consensus in the North and the identification of difficulties associated with ISI in the global South. In addition to the 1980s saw the rise of neo-liberalism as a significant set of ideas in the global sphere. Key neo-liberal principles included market liberalization and privatization as a means of sustained economic growth and development. International institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD which promoted these ideas played a collective role in restructuring Turkey's economic policies and their restructuring process (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 18).

In Turkey, the collapse of ISI was replaced with a export-orientated policy, and was supported by components of the business community, especially big business, which were able to "... make the transition from domestic markets to exports" and elements of the new bureaucracy which implemented the new policies (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 19). This period was characterized by a boom-bust cycle again showed Turkey's reactionist stance to the world order.

As neo-liberal globalization expanded in the post-Cold War era and Turkish economic policy followed during the 1990s, small and medium sized businesses grew creating the Anatolian bourgeoisie, also known as the "Anatolian tigers" which consisted of Muslim owned small and medium enterprise companies whom were the fastest growing class of entrepreneurs (Karakas, 2007: 20; Öniş, 2010: 48). As seen in the previous chapter, the Anatolian tigers and the influence of "Islamic capital" within the state led to the establishment of MÜSIAD in 1990, and since then the organization represents over 15,000 companies which contributed 15% of Turkey's GDP in 2012 (MSONA, 2012).

In addition to the spread of neo-liberal globalization, the post-Cold War era also raised various concerns with regards to the Washington Consensus⁵¹. This included its

⁵¹ The Washington Consensus is "... the set of 10 policies that the US government and the international financial institutions based in the US capital believed were necessary elements of "first stage policy reform" that all countries should adopt to increase economic growth. At its heart is an

poor performance in dealing with global poverty, and the various economic crises that that occurred in the emerging markets in the 1990s. This was particularly highlight with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, with one of the ramifications being, "... the IMF has faced a serious identity crisis" and a shift of emphasis in the "... direction of strengthening institutions and the regulatory arm of the state" (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 20). The 2001 Turkish financial crisis is said to have played an instrumental role in ending Washington Consensus policies within the country and included the restructuring and strengthening of regulatory institutions and process, such as in the banking and finance sectors (Önis and Şenses, 2007: 20).

The shift in global economic policies at the world order level highlights not only the intrinsic link between politics and economics, which will be fully, discussed below, but in terms of CCT the interaction between the social relations of production and state-civil society complexes. As mentioned in chapter two, the social relation of production does not solely refer to the tangible good produced within a state, but also the creation of knowledge and institutions that aid in the physical production of goods. It was the production of ideas stemming from international institutions that not only influenced and changed the domestic landscape of Turkish economic and political sphere, but it was also these ideas that influenced the development of a proactive foreign policy.

The link between political changes that occurred in Turkey as a result of the Özal era, such as the official revaluation of Islam as part of Turkish identity combined with changes at a world order level, liberal economic policies, led to the increased self-confidence and a new momentum for Islamic interest groups within civil society. This allowed for the creation of the Anatolian bourgeoisie and organizations such as MÜSIAD, which inadvertently helped strengthen the Turkish economy during 1980 and 2001, but also laid the foundations for the development of Turkish big business and their role in the state's new foreign policy activism and global repositioning.

emphasis on the importance of macroeconomic stability and integration into the international economy - in other words a neo-liberal view of globalization" (WTO, 2013).

6.2.2. 2001 Turkish Economic Crisis

The 2001 financial crisis became an important milestone in the transformation of the Turkish state, not just in an economic sense, but also politically. Radical political and economic reforms were made under the single-party system in 2002, which a decade later resulted in accelerated economic growth and development for the state, and formed the basis for Turkey's international ambitions.

The root causes for the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey started to emerge in 2000, when a serious liquidity crisis⁵² in the financial sector occurred in November, which "... discredited Turkey in the eyes of the foreign investors, and then domestic ones" (Turkish Review, 2012). The banking sector was the most affected by the crisis, some banks were seized by the state, and some bank owners were arrested on accounts of embezzlement, however it has been said that the crisis was an effective factor in "... executing reforms, removal of poorly functioning banks from the system and the making of essential decisions to face the main economic problems" (Turkish Review, 2012).

The decade following the 2001 financial, reforms that were put into place by the government contributed to economic growth in all spheres of the economy, from the automotive industry to the residential sector. The identity created by the Turkish economic structure was one based on crisis, but built and implemented through political stability. As a result Turkey was able to weather the 2008 financial crisis with minimal economic damage, both socially and economically (Turkish Review, 2012). European Union officials have declared Turkey a "proper functioning market economy" following the implementation of a well-balanced stabilization program that was implemented in 2002. This resulted in an average growth rate that exceeded 6 percent, which is the highest it has been in comparison in any other decade in Turkish

⁵² Liquidity crisis definition: "A situation where depositors demand larger withdrawals than normal and banks are forced to borrow funds at an elevated interest rate" (Financial Times LEXICON, 2013). In the case of Turkey, its liquidity crisis stemmed from a large amount of foreign exchange outflow and high interest rates, "...during the November 20-December 5 2000 period only, US\$6.4 billion net foreign exchange outflow took place and the overnight inter-bank interest rates soared to 1,700% on December 1 (Alper, 2001: 51).

history (Görmez and Yiğit, 2012: 20-21). While Europe was under strain from the 2008 global financial crisis, Turkey was coping relatively well, which increased its foreign policy strength.

The stabilization program implemented by the Turkish Republic had two main pillars, namely inflation targeting and floating exchange rate regime. The independence of the Central Bank of Turkey and the incorporation of it into the Law, including “... a ban on the purchase and sale of Treasury bonds and bills in the primary market” strengthened the Turkish financial market, and also conformed to the post-Washington Consensus economic policies⁵³ mentioned above (Görmez and Yiğit, 2012: 21). This coupled with the establishment of a Monetary Policy Committee, which included the task of setting interest rates, allowed for the credibility and transparency of the Central Bank to be guaranteed.

Turkey as a candidate country and economy to the EU has since 2002 implemented reforms that have had the country declared a market economy and has set the foundation for its transition to adapt to the productivity and efficiency levels of EU member countries. The Turkish financial crisis as mentioned above has led Turkey on a path, which saw it become one of the fastest growing economies. Dani Rodik of Harvard University concluded that the country’s productivity record improved remarkably in the decade following 2000, where the average growth rate was between 3 and 3.5% in GDP per person, per worker and industrial output per worker. Income within the country (per head) has tripled in less than a decade. This coupled with the attractiveness of Turkey’s geographic location has set the country on a course, which has not only sparked real economic and political interest in Turkey but has set-it-up to fulfill the role of a middle power (Görmez and Yiğit, 2012: 29; *The Economist*, 2012).

6.2.3. Economic Liberalization and Class Dynamics

The growth of new capitalist classes since the late 1980s has not only transformed social relations and multi-party politics, but also the international political orientation

⁵³ Increased regulation of markets

of Turkey. New business groups and organizations energized by Islam facilitated class mobility, but more dramatically the new capitalist classes that emerged have "... redefined the allocation of markets and the distribution of assets while they have increased opportunities for their affiliated groups at home and in foreign markets" (Özcan and Turanç, 2011: 63). The "Anatolisation of industrial capital" was the foundation for domestic and foreign economic growth, and played a central role in the foreign policy of Turkey.

6.2.3.1. Emergence of the Post-1980 Social Stratification

The building blocks of the modern Turkish Republic traditionally rested on the top-down state tradition by the state elite in the civil service, army and politics. As a result the state was the major investor in heavy industries, energy and infrastructure, it additionally managed these sectors with an extensive bureaucracy. In terms of the market, state run enterprises were accompanied by a small group of large private business conglomerates, which controlled the major sectors of the economy (Özcan and Turanç, 2011: 64).

State procurement at a local and national level assisted private business and gave momentum to the growth of the first wave of entrepreneurs and urban bourgeoisie in Anatolian towns. During this period there was no inter-regional or international trade outside of state owned enterprises, and local economic depended on artisanship, commerce and agriculture. As the Turkish population grew and the state urbanized, social dynamics began to change rapidly. By the 1980s the urban population Turkey overtook the rural population and rural migrants moved from the margins to the center of local governmental politics (Özcan and Turanç, 2011: 65).

Economic liberalization in the 1980s (shift from EOI to ISI) saw a host of changes occur within the Turkish political economy, one of which was that within less than a decade; predominantly left wing urban voters transferred their alliance to the center-right. The ANAP was seen as a patchwork of "... center right, liberals, Islamists, and secularists while promoting an ideology of right wing neo-liberalism" (Insight Turkey, 2011a). As neo-liberalism and entrepreneurialism stimulated urban growth

and industrialization in Turkey, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) emerged as a solution for economic re-structuring and privatization. However, throughout the early years of liberalization, SMEs virtually had no access to affordable financial capital, export markets and new technologies. As a result (seen in chapter five), Islamist politics emerged as a powerful new political and economic force. This was done through the expansion of Islamic brotherhoods and business networks (Özcan and Turanç, 2011: 66-67). These Islamic business associations were also instrumental in driving Turkey's foreign policy agenda.

6.2.3.2. New Entrepreneurship Energized by Islam: MÜSIAD

The growth of entrepreneurialism energized by Islam not only accelerated the rate of capital accumulation and export-led growth (EOI) in the 1980s, but also facilitated the rise of indigenous Anatolian entrepreneurs. As a result a new pattern of wealth and capital accumulation led to a change in the outlook of Anatolian towns and the growth of a new middle classes. The continued spread of Islamic brotherhoods led to the creation of successful alliances with SME owners. As Islamic groups continued to launch new business development models and capital formations, they also built alternative routes to avoid state institutions and strengthen their networks in the 1990s (Özcan and Turanç, 2011: 71-72).

As the number of SMEs increased this in turn led to the emergence of new industrial centers and fuelled business diversity and competition. The first Islamic business association MÜSIAD, became a major representative body within a matter of a decade. MÜSIAD is said to be more aggressive internationally than their counterpart TÜSIAD, with representatives in 40 countries. MÜSIAD promotes economic relations with Muslim countries and it was the combination of economic liberalization and changes in class dynamics that led to the success of the Anatolian tigers and the influence they had on the Turkish political economy (Özcan and Turanç, 2011: 74-75). Their increased economic relations with neighboring countries have had a significant impact upon the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic.

6.3. Business Groups and their Implications on Turkey's Foreign Policy

Turkish foreign policy activism (FPA) during the last decade has seen a dramatic departure from the pre-2001 era. The “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy and the rising influence of Turkey as a regional power in the Middle East and Central Asia can mostly be attributed to the AKP and their style of governance. Since the AKP era, Turkey has had “... a more independent and assertive foreign policy strategy in its region” (Kutlay, 2011: 67). *This new foreign policy activism can be attributed to changes that have occurred at the world order level, which has influenced domestic policies both politically and economically* (see chapters four to six).

Taking CCT into account and Cox's dialectic in relation to Turkey, the interaction between the *forms of state* (state-society complex) and the *social relations of production* was an important determinant in the manner in which Turkish economic growth occurred pre- and post-2001. When one looks at the role of CSOs and the impact that they have had on the changing economic fabric of the Turkish Republic, it seems that these actors also influenced changes in the political economy of Turkey and the country's new activist foreign policy.

6.3.1. The Economy and Turkish Foreign Policy Activism

The restructuring of Turkish political economy following the 2001 financial crisis caused a power shift in domestic financial capital, which underpinned an active foreign policy by the Turkish government. As a result of the abovementioned transformation, financial firms in Turkey were able to consolidate their position in the economy, but also acted as change agents in regards to the transformation of industrial capital.

Changes in the state-society and state-capital relations, led to economic elites placing pressure on the government for new policy formulations, not only in domestic affairs, but also in terms of foreign policy. This can be seen through Turkey's integration into the global economy and the EU process, which ultimately forced Turkish business groups to adapt to the new world political economy. In addition to the EU

membership process, Turkish business gave vocal support to the country's foreign policy approach towards neighboring countries. The AKPs 'zero problems' policy is based Turkey's multidimensional foreign policy (Davutoglu, 2008: 78). In terms of this chapter, one argues that the major driving factor of Turkey's soft power and its foreign policy activism is its economy and trade links with neighboring states and beyond its region. This will be addressed by looking at the material interests that exist between Turkish firms and neighboring states, and how a change in perceptions of the Turkish Republic has aided Turkey's foreign policy.

6.3.1.1. Material Interests

The material interests that exist between Turkish firms and neighboring states underpin the first mechanism of the country's new foreign policy activism. The increased interaction and interdependence between Turkish businessmen and their foreign counterparts can be seen as one of the drivers of Turkish diplomacy. An example of this can be seen with Turkish Airlines (THY), which has increased its destinations from 70 to more than 120 destinations in 80 countries. This comes as a result of the increased demands of Turkish businessmen, according to THY's CEO. The total annual turnover for the Turkish airline industry in 2009 increased to more than US\$8 billion from US\$2.2 billion in 2002. In addition other industries such as construction has seen Turkish construction firms, most of which are owned by Anatolian tigers, have invested more than US\$20 billion in Russia and approximately US\$35.5 billion throughout the Middle East between 2001 and 2012 (Babacan, 2010: 14; Kutlay, 2011: 77).

The material links that exist between the Turkish economy and the economies of neighboring countries have not only drawn the attention of policy-makers, but it has placed an emphasis on how the demands of business circles cannot be ignored by the Turkish government. Firstly, neighboring countries have morphed into major trade partners for Turkey since 2001. Turkey's foreign trade has increased to US\$ 333 billion in 2008 from US\$ 72 billion in 2001, and total trade with Middle Eastern and Asian partners has exceeded US\$ 130 billion from US\$ 18.7 billion during the same period. Secondly, Turkey's visibility in foreign affairs has been improved as a result

of not only increased trade, but also the country's changing outward foreign direct investment (FDI) dynamics. Between 2002 and 2009, outward FDI stock reached US\$ 11.2 billion, of which US\$ 3.1 billion was directed towards Asian countries (Kutlay, 2011: 78).

In addition to its immediate region, Turkish foreign policy activism has extended as far as Latin America⁵⁴. Three functional axes of connection that explains the increase in relations between Turkey and Latin American countries, firstly political-strategic, secondly the economic-commercial and lastly, the symbolic-cultural. For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is on the economic-commercial links⁵⁵ between Turkey and the Latin American region (Levaggi, 2011).

Economic and commercial activity between Turkey and Latin America has grown steadily over the last two decades, the volume of trade between Latin America and Turkey has increased from US\$ 600 million in 1995 to US\$ 6 billion in 2009 with Brazil, Mexico and Argentina as the main trading partners. In 2009 Chile and Brazil signed a Free Trade Agreement, which became official in March 2011, which provides that 98% of trade be free from duties (Levaggi, 2011).

Apart from Latin America, Turkey has also increased political and economic relations with the African continent⁵⁶. Turkish businessmen have increased investment and trade with Africa from approximately US\$ 2 billion in 2002 to more than US\$ 17 billion in 2012. Turkish business organizations such as MÜSIAD have established strong economic ties with various African countries. THY flies to more than 30 cities in over 20 African countries and as seen above, the increase in THY's global footprint is largely due to increased business between Turkish businessmen and their foreign counterparts (Kalin, 2012).

⁵⁴ See chapter one, page 4

⁵⁵ The political-strategic connection is discussed in chapter four

⁵⁶ See chapter one, page 5

6.3.1.2. *Changing Perceptions*

It can be argued that perceptions have been the most persistent problem that has deterred relations between Turkey and its neighbors⁵⁷, specifically during the 1990s. According to Meliha Benli Altuniski, "... throughout most of the 1990s, Turkey was seen as largely irrelevant to debate in the Arab world and mutual perceptions of threat and distrust characterized the relations" (2010: 8). However, Arab perceptions of Turkey began to change during the early 2000s. In 2009 75% of the Arab population⁵⁸ either had very positive or positive views of Turkey (Altunisik, 2010: 11). This can be attributed to changes not only in Turkey and the Arab world, but more importantly power shifts in world politics and the world order, which were discussed in chapter four.

In light of the changing perceptions of Turkey, many argue that it was intensified by the events after the 9/11 terror attacks in the US. The GWOT coupled with anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East has led to Arab states seeking alternate trade and investment partners. This change can be attributed to an identity-based explanation⁵⁹, in which the ruling AKP government has caused Turkey to develop an identity-based foreign policy towards Muslim countries in its region and beyond. Turkish foreign policy following the election of the AKP transformed to an autonomous outward looking foreign policy that was informed by its 'zero problems with neighbors' policy and the belief that its foreign policy "... is one of the most important assets in realizing its national and international goals" (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013d)

⁵⁷ One of the prevailing perceptions of the Turkish Republic was that it acted as a 'puppet' of the West in its region. There is some basis to the argument, as Turkey did have strong alliance with the U.S. during the Cold War and in the 1990s. The change in perception of Turkey came in the 2000s, and was influenced by the Turkish government's refusal to let U.S. troops use its territory during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

⁵⁸ In the Middle East

⁵⁹ Levels of cooperation and interaction between Arab nations and Turkey have reached unprecedented levels. The notion of 'neo-Ottomanism' is seen as having a major influence in this regard as it inherently prioritizes Islamic solidarity. Another version of this explanation lends itself to the view that Turkey is now a country less obsessed in preserving its Western identity, especially in relation to their interactions with the international community (Kutlay, 2011: 68).

6.4. Conclusion

The link that exists between changes in world order and domestic economic and political policies has been explored in this chapter, and it can be seen that economic changes that were made at world order level played a significant role in the development of the Turkish economy. The shift from ISI to EOI within Turkey saw neoliberalism policies have a profound impact on the political economy of the country. The growth of the new capitalist class, the Anatolian Tigers in the late 1980 had a significant impact on domestic economic growth for the country, but also played a central role in the foreign policy of Turkey.

The ramifications of changes made at a world order level were felt in the political sphere of the state, especially in terms of the increased influence and activism of business associations such as MÜSIAD, and the impact they had on the transformation of Turkey. In addition, changes in Turkey's foreign policy from one of hard power engagement with its neighbors to that of "zero-problems-with-neighbors" was heavily influenced by the liberalization of the global market in the 1980s, and was pushed by these business associations. In this regard, the economy is one of the drivers of Turkish foreign policy activism within its region.

Turkish foreign policy underwent a dramatic change to one that can be described as a '360 degrees foreign policy' that is multidimensional and far-reaching. This cannot only be seen in its regional relations, but also with its increased diplomatic relations with Asia, Latin America and Africa. Turkey's foreign policy agenda has come at a time where emerging and regional powers are playing an increasing role in the maintenance of international economic and political security.

Changes in the power arrangement within the international community shifted substantially following the Cold War and the events of 2001 in the US. Changes at the world order level have sufficiently influenced the *forms of state* and *social relations of production* of the Turkish state to classify it as a middle power within the international system.

Chapter 7: Summary of Key Findings and Conclusion

7.1. Introduction

This concluding chapter will include a summary of the key findings of this study. Turkey's activist foreign policy⁶⁰ agenda has come at a time where emerging and regional powers are playing an important role in the maintenance of international economic and political security.

7.2. Summary of Key Findings

The framework by Robert Cox has allowed this study to answer the research question presented in chapter one. The interaction between *world orders, forms of state and the social relations of production* do not occur in a linear manner and are interrelated meaning that a shift in world orders can have an impact on both the forms of state and the social relations of production. As seen through the course of this study changes in world order have had a profound impact on the domestic relations within Turkish Republic, both in terms of democratization, the political economy and the foreign policy of the country. The theory has aided in understanding how these dynamics are influenced by the development of ideas and decisions made at a world order level.

A changing *world order* has caused major shifts in the global positioning of states, both within the international community and in their domestic spheres. The end of the Cold War ushered in an era that saw a multipolar power structure replace that of the bipolar power arrangement, that saw the US and USSR as hegemonic states. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new world order allowed emerging and developing states the opportunity to fill the gaps left during this shift at the world order level. As a result of this change at world order level, and the vacuum left by declining US leadership allowed for emerging states such as Turkey to play a greater leadership role within the international system.

⁶⁰ Activist foreign policy refers to the '360 degrees foreign policy' implemented by the Turkish state.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused turmoil in the surrounding region, as a result this allowed for Turkey to fulfill a leadership role in its immediate area. As a member of NATO, Turkey will always be of strategic significance, as that region of the world is prone to conflict. The change in world order allowed for Turkey to spearhead the creation of various regional organizations, one of the most significant being BSEC organization in 1992. This display of multilateral dialogue and the willingness of Turkey to find multilateral solutions to regional problems conform to the ideas of a regional power and that of a middle power. This willingness to engage in multilateral diplomacy became crucial when the world order changed again following the 2001 terror attacks in the US.

The 2001 terror attacks in the US caused another change in the world order, in that although the terror attacks took place on US soil, the international community saw it as an armed attack and threat to international peace and security. The world order changed from that of wanting to promote liberalism within the multipolar order, towards a security orientated outlook that dominated the pre-Cold War era. It was this change in the global security architecture that elevated Turkey's positioning and importance within the international community. Although Turkey was of great geopolitical significance during the Cold War and an ally of the West, the multipolar order that emerged at the end of the Cold War, allowed for Turkey to have a more robust foreign policy agenda. However, it was not until the events of 9/11 and the change in the governing regime in Turkey that the state started to pursue an autonomous proactive foreign policy.

One of the major consequences of the 9/11 attacks was the GWOT, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US and its allies. As a result of the geographical positioning of Turkey and their friendly relations with the US, Turkey was requested to allow for US troops to use the state as a base of operations. However, the Turkish State, although a supporter of the GWOT, did not allow for this, but instead pursued a diplomatic solution that would keep the sovereignty of Iraq intact. Therefore Turkey once again engaged in multilateral diplomacy by initiating the NCI to address the regional security concerns of the Iraq War. Although this initiative was created in response to the Iraq War, these groups of countries are still meeting on a regular basis to address regional security concerns. In addition Turkey

has played an active role in the current Syrian crisis in a mediatory role. These actions by Turkey do not only conform to the definition of a regional power outlined in chapter four, but also to that of a middle power. It must be reiterated that middle powers are regional powers first, but middlepowermanship extends beyond that of a state's region, and that can be seen in Turkey's foreign policy interests in Latin America and Africa.

It can be seen that a change in world order played a significant role in increasing the importance of Turkey within the international community following the end of the Cold War and the 2001 terror attacks. However, in order for Turkish foreign policy to become as autonomous, multidimensional and proactive as it is, there must have been a fundamental shift within the Turkish state.

A change in the *forms of state* of the Turkish Republic following the end of the Cold War allowed for the creation of more robust civil society organizations and a state that was transformed by the spread of liberalism, both politically and economically. One of the most fundamental changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War was the rise in Islamism in Turkey and its link to neo-liberal policies that governed global economic growth and development strategies. In order for neo-liberalism to become anchored within the Turkish state, fundamental changes were made to the economic and political policies of the State. The first was the liberalization of Turkish markets, which in an era of globalization saw it affect change within the political sphere of the state. The rise to power of the AKP in 2002 was heavily influenced by its economic policies, and for the first time in Turkish history a president with an Islamic Party background represented the state. In the context of the post-2001 world order, this proved to be beneficial for Turkey, in that following the GWOT there was a resurgence of Arab solidarity within the region, and this translated into increased trade and investment between traditionally Muslim states.

The state although transformed by international norms, such as liberalization and democratization, civil society groups, especially business groups such as MÜSIAD, within the state played a crucial role in elevating the economic positioning of Turkey within the international community, just as a change in world order created by a terror attack influenced the political importance of the Turkish state. The Turkish state is

said have been reluctant to pursue democratization, however civil society groups such as business organizations have played a significant role not only in regards to democratic consolidation, but also in supporting a more activist Turkish foreign policy as these suited their own business interests. Business Associations such as TÜSIAD during the global shift from ISI to EOI played a significant domestic role in seeing this shift take place.

TÜSIAD and other business organizations fervently supported the spread of neo-liberalism under the EOI era and in the 1980s and 1990s, in that the opening of Turkish markets to foreign trade and investment was beneficial to Turkish Industry. In addition to the economic benefit that would be gained from market liberalization and democratization, the willingness of the Turkish state to implement these policies would aid in its bid to become part of the EU. The change in world order as a result of the end of the Cold War and the spread of international political and economic norms, allowed for these business associations to not only begin to influence domestic political affairs, but also the formation and execution of Turkish foreign policy.

The *social relations of production* was the last aspect of Cox's dialectic framework to be addressed in this study. The social relations of production in this study was interpreted as the political economy of the Turkish state and how changes at the world order level affected not only the domestic sphere of the country, but also the political economy of the state. Production in terms of the framework used in this study does not only account for the tangible goods and services that can be produced, but also include the creation of ideas. At a world order level, the collapse of the Soviet Union saw a renewed shift towards neo-liberalist ideas, EOI and the Washington Consensus. The shift from ISI to EOI and the Washington Consensus, came from the US whom at the time was the hegemonic power within the international system, and therefore international economic institutions such as the WTO, OECD and the World Bank strongly promoted the implementation of these policies in Turkey.

The transformation of the Turkish economy in the EOI era was supported by business organizations as mentioned above and domestic changes that occurred in Turkey lead to the creation of new entrepreneurial class, the Anatolian Tigers, and the CSO MÜSIAD. The "Anatolisation of industrial capital" was seen as the foundation for

domestic and foreign economic growth. The growth of entrepreneurialism energized by Islam not only accelerated the rate of capital accumulation and EOI, but played a central role in the foreign policy of Turkey following the election of the AKP in 2002. The 2001 economic crisis in Turkey led to the implementation of key economic reforms, and this coupled with increased economic relations with neighbouring countries, especially Muslim countries through their increased interaction with MÜSIAD in the post-2001 era, had a significant impact on the foreign policy of Turkey.

Turkish foreign policy, following the 2001 Turkish economic crisis, the 9/11 terror attacks and the election of a pro-Islamic regime, transformed dramatically. Changes in the state-society and state-capital relations, led to economic elites placing pressure on the government for new policy formulations, not only in domestic affairs, but also in terms of foreign policy. Therefore Turkish foreign policy shifted from that of a reactionist regionally orientated to one that was autonomous, proactive and internationally orientated, which is very indicative of a middle power.

This foreign policy activism could be seen in the AKPs 'zero problems' policy towards its neighbors and its multidimensional approach due to Turkey's unique geographical position. Turkey's total trade with its Middle Eastern and Asian partners exceeded US\$130 billion in 2008, from US\$18.7 billion in 2001. The significant change in these figures comes not only as a result of a change in economic policies, but also from increased political relations with the Middle East and Asia, as a result of its foreign policy and economic connections. In relation to the African continent, Turkish business organizations such as MÜSIAD have established strong economic ties with various African countries. This not only shows that Turkey has political and economic interests in its immediate region, but that the state's foreign policy is far reaching. This is indicative of a middle power within the international community and conforms to the definition of a middle power discussed in chapter one.

Turkey's inclusion in the G20 in 1999 marked the recognition of Turkey as an emerging middle power within the international community. Its position as the 16th largest economy in the world and its ability to act as a bridge-builder, between the West and East, was seen as the main factors for its inclusion in the organization.

However, following the 9/11 terror attacks in the US and the subsequent change in the world order, the Turkish Republic cannot only be seen as conforming to the view that its main purpose is to act as a bridge-builder. The post-2001 world order allowed for the Turkish Republic to pursue a more autonomous, proactive and internationally geared foreign policy. Therefore in the post-2001 era, Turkey established itself as a middle power within the interactional community through its foreign policy activism and its pursuit of seeking multilateral solutions to regional and international problems. Therefore changes at the world order level have sufficiently influenced the forms of state and social relations of production of the Turkish state to account for Turkey's rise as a middle power within the international community.

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Appendix

List of Turkey's Organization Participation (until and including January 2013)

- African Union
- BLACKSEAFOR
- CICA
- BESCA
- Council of Europe
- D8
- ECO
- NATO
- CGIAR
- OIC
- OSEC
- OECD
- UN
- UNESCO
- The Cooperation of Turkic Speaking States
- TURKSOY
- ICARDA
- OAS
- OPEC
- APEC
- ITF
- ACS
- AMU
- ASEAN
- BIPM

Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013

[<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?7cafe2ef-78bd-4d88-b326-3916451364f3>]

Population, Area and GDP of states in the Near East

	Population <i>(mill. 2013)</i>	Area <i>(thou. sq. km)</i>	GDP [PPP] <i>(bill. \$)</i>	GDP per head [PPP] (\$)
Turkey	80.6	784	794.5	15, 200
Greece	10.7	132	281.4	24, 900
Iraq	31.8	438	242.5	7, 200
Iran	79.8	1, 648	1, 016	13, 300
Israel	7.7	21	252.8	32, 800
Azerbaijan	9.5	87	98.3	10, 700
Armenia	2.9	30	19.9	5, 900
Russia	142.5	17, 098	2, 555	18, 000

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2013 [<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>]