

Democratic Deconsolidation: An Analysis of South Africa's Democratic Regress during the Zuma Years

By

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Declaration

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Abstract

Studies of democracy have recently shown that not only are democracies globally experiencing signs of democratic deconsolidation, but evincing a regression towards authoritarianism. This is evident in a growing lack of support amongst citizens for democratic regimes, who are often opened to non-democratic alternatives. Deconsolidation has been particularly evident in contexts where poor governance has failed to deliver the economic and political goods expected by citizens in a democratic regime. South Africa, which is the case under analysis, has been manifesting such signs of deconsolidation. This is because civic society has, not only become disillusioned with the quality of governance amid growing scandals of corruption and nepotism under the Zuma administration, but increasingly open to radical populist ideas. While there are studies drawing on theories of democratic consolidation to analyse South Africa's democracy, there has been limited inquiry based on the analytical approach of democratic deconsolidation. Furthermore, few have applied a holistic approach in analysing the state of South Africa's current democracy. It is this deficit that the study addresses through an analysis of South Africa's democracy during the years of the Zuma administration.

The research questions motivating this study are whether South Africa's democracy deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration, and whether poor governance – understood as being partisan to personal or special relationships - facilitated the process of deconsolidation. In addressing the research problem, this study uses an analytical framework of democratic deconsolidation adopted from the work of Schedler (2001) and others such as Foa and Mounk (2017) to construct the conditions which are indicative of the deconsolidation process: poor governance (as an instigator), weak structures, negative attitudes and disruptive behaviour.

This study finds that South Africa's democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally – and that poor governance has been particularly instrumental in facilitating this process. The study shows that the overarching national project of the ANC – the National Democratic Revolution and its concomitant strategy of cadre deployment – served as a catalyst for the state capture project and the web of patronage under the Zuma administration. In deploying loyalists into key positions and being partisan to personal considerations, the Zuma administration undermined the impartial aspirations of the Constitution. The result is that, structurally, the web of patronage under Zuma has degenerated into a culture of disdain for constitutional governance, as typified in cases such as the Nkandla dispute. Moreover, it is

shown that the economic cost of poor governance has been dire, as indicated by the rising rates of unemployment, poverty and inequality amid ailing parastatals such as Eskom. This study shows that, attitudinally, poor government performance has eroded South Africans' faith in democracy and made former supporters of democracy receptive to non-democratic (populist) parties, such as the EFF. The openness to radicalism has also been accompanied by an upsurge in violent protest action as a response to the government's poor performance. While these conditions clearly point to South Africa's democracy deconsolidating, deconsolidation itself is not an end state but a process that can be reversed.

Opsomming

Studies van demokrasie het onlangs gewys dat nie net ondervind demokrasieë wêreldwyd tekens van demokratiese agteruitgang [dekonsolidasie] nie, maar neig dit ook om regressie te wys na outoriatisme. Dit is sigbaar in die groeiende verlies aan ondersteuning onder burgers van demokratiese regerings, wat meer oop is vir nie-demokratiese alternatiewe. Agteruitgang is veral sigbaar in die konteks waar swak regering misluk om te voorsien in die ekonomiese vooruitgang wat die burgers verwag van 'n demokratiese regering. Suid-Afrika, die gevallestudie onder analise, manifesteer sulke tekens van dekonsolidasie. Dit is omdat die burgerlike samelewing nie net ontnugter is deur die kwaliteit van demokratiese regering te midde van groeiende skandale van korrupsie en nepotisme onder die Zuma administrasie nie, maar ook toenemend oop is vir radikale populistiese idees. Terwyl daar studies is wat gevolgtrekkings maak oor teorieë van demokratiese konsolidasie om Suid-Afrika se demokrasie te analiseer, was daar beperkte ondersoek gebaseer op die analitiese benadering van demokratiese konsolidasie. Verder het baie min 'n holistiese benadering toegepas om die staat van Suid-Afrika se huidige demokrasie te analiseer. Dit is hierdie tekortkoming wat dié studie adresseer deur 'n analise van Suid-Afrika se demokrasie gedurende die jare van die Zuma administrasie.

Die navorsingsvrae wat hierdie studie motiveer is of Suid-Afrika se demokrasie struktureel, houdingsgewys en gedragsgewys agteruitgegaan het gedurende die Zuma administrasie, en of swak regering – verstaan as deel van persoonlike of spesiale verhoudings- die proses van agteruitgang gefasiliteer het. Die studie gebruik 'n analitiese raamwerk van demokratiese verval om die navorsingsprobleem aan te spreek, aangeleem van die werk van Schedler (2001) en andere soos Foa en Monk (2017) om die toestande te konstrueer wat aanwysend is van die proses van agteruitgang: swak regering [as 'n opstoker], swak strukture, negatiewe houdings en ontwrigtende gedrag.

Die studie bevind dat Suid-Afrika se demokrasie het struktureel, houdingsgewys, en gedragsgewys agteruitgegaan- en dat swak regering instrumenteel was om die proses te fasiliteer. Die studie wys ook dat die oorkoepelende nasionale projek van die ANC – die Nasionale Demokratiese Rewolusie en die samegaande strategie van kader ontplooiing – wat gedien het as katalisator vir die staatskaping projek en web van begunstiging– onder die Zuma administrasie. Deur die uitplasing van lojaliste in kernposisies en deur deel te vorm van persoonlike oorwegings., het die Zuma administrasie die onpartydige aspirasies van die

Grondwet ondermyn. Die gevolg was dat struktureel, die web van bevoorregting onder Zuma gedegenerer tot 'n kultuur van minagting vir konstitusionele regering, soos getipeer in die Nkandla geval. Verder wys dit die verskriklike koste van swak regering, soos aangedui deur die styging in werkloosheid, armoede, en ongelykheid te midde van sukkelende parastatal soos Eskom. Die studie wys dat houdings en swak regeringsvertoning Suid-Afrikaners se geloof weggevreet het en maak dit Suid-Afrikaanse voormalige ondersteuners ontvanklik is vir nie-demokratiese Partye soos die EFF. Die oop beleid van radikalisme word ook vergesel van 'n toename in gewelddadige protes as reaksie op die regering se swak vertoning. Terwyl die toestand duidelik die verval van Suid-Afrika se demokrasie uitwys, is agteruitgang nie 'n end staat nie, maar 'n proses wat omgedraai kan word.

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Abbreviations

Aids	Acquired Immunodeficiency syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
BBEE	Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment
Cosatu	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DoE	Department of Energy
DPE	Department of Public Enterprises
DPW	Department of Public Works
EDD	Economic Development Department
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Hawks	Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
NDP	National Development Plan
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NEC	National Executive Committee
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NPC	National Planning Commission
NWC	National Working Committee
PP	Public Protector
SAA	South African Airways
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation

SACP South African Communist Party

SAPS South African Police Service

SIU Special Investigative Unit

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Chapter I – Introduction to the Study

1.1 Background and Rationale

Democracy, as a form of government and regime type, has been the subject of a substantial and significant amount of inquiry. However, political scientists have yet to develop a comprehensive understanding of the regime's complexity, multidimensionality and metamorphosis. While democracy has demonstrated its appeal to peoples across the globe, and has been successfully consolidated in certain parts of the world, it has recently shown worrying signs of decay characterised by a lack of civic support for democracy and appeals to non-democratic (populist) alternatives in some contexts (Diamond, 2015:142; Plattner, 2016; Foa and Mounk, 2017). This period of democratic decay, like the study of democracy itself, has yet to be fully grasped and understood holistically.

Nonetheless, as Plattner (2016:1) suggests, a starting point for understanding democracy today must also take into consideration “the context of its global fortunes over the past two centuries”. Huntington (1991) has effectively chronicled the spread of democratisation and described it in terms of three waves. The first of these, began in early 1828 and slowly but steadily gathered pace until 1926. During this time democracy in its minimalist sense consisted of certain limited freedoms, an insistence on the rule of law and male suffrage; it was instituted in a dozen or so European and European settler countries as well as nations born from the former European empires (Plattner, 2016:3). This slow and gradual spread of democratic ideals was met with a reverse wave by the 1920s as many of these democracies broke down in the wake of the First World War. However, by the late 1940s to the 1960s a second democratic expansion ensued. This included transitions in countries defeated in World War II (including Germany, Japan and Italy) as well as newly independent (decolonised) states such as India, Jamaica and Israel (Plattner, 2016:3). According to Huntington (1991), there then followed a second reverse wave (1958-1975), when many newly decolonised states and regimes in certain Latin America countries broke down and reverted to forms of authoritarianism. However, Huntington (1991) observed a third wave of democratisation in the 1980s in which the regime was adopted in Latin America and reached all the way across parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa (Diamond, 2015; Plattner, 2016). During this time democracy experienced a remarkable global run as its spread was unprecedented. That is, until 2006, when the “expansion of freedom and democracy in the world came to a prolonged halt” (Diamond, 2015:142).

Since then, scholars have increasingly observed worrying trends in the development of new and established democratic regimes. Foa and Mounk (2016:6) observed that recently trust in liberal political institutions has declined; voter turnout and civic participation in the democratic process weakened; and most concerning is that there is an increasing appeal by citizens in democracies for non-democratic (authoritarian, populist) politics, which collectively constitute potential threats to democracy. Similarly, Howe (2017:15) notes that in the contemporary world far-right parties have made increasing electoral gains across many regimes previously considered consolidated democracies. In addition, scholars such as Haggard and Kaufman (1994), and Maeda (2010) indicate that the erosion of democracy stems not only from a lack of civic desire for, and commitment to, democratic principles and norms, but moreover that prolonged periods of poor governance and negative economic growth have drained democratic institutions of their democratic content, thereby resulting in poor political performance. These conditions have sparked increasing inquiry as to why democracies are experiencing this withdrawal. Consequently, the study of democratic deconsolidation has emerged and – despite still being in its infancy – it is beginning to expand.

South Africa, it is argued, has also been manifesting these ‘warning signs’ of democratic deconsolidation. This could be because South African civic society is observed to be increasingly “disillusioned and dissatisfied with the quality of [the] implementation” of democracy (Graham, 2013:ii). These trends in disillusionment are observed to have been proliferating amid growing scandals of corruption and nepotism implicating high-level ministers and the former president, Jacob Zuma in incidents of looting state resources. These scandals have even gone as far as prompting investigative reports by the former Public Protector – such as the *State of Capture* report¹ – and leading to several commissions of inquiry, including the state capture commission, the Mokogoro commission and the SARS commission, to mention a few. Often the scandals of corruption are publicized alongside dire economic conditions of rising rates of unemployment, poverty and inequality. As Graham (2013:5) observes:

Worrying problems that have existed since 1994 but have begun spiralling out of control in recent years (especially 1999/2000) are threatening [the]

¹ The State of Capture report is an investigative report into the “alleged improper and unethical conduct by [former] President [Zuma] and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and possibly corrupt award of state contracts” (Office of the Public Protector, 2016:4).

apparently successful democratic progress. Increasingly, reports of incidents of violent crime threatening the security of the individual; corruption in public and corporate life, so-called political favouritism where government members are seen to be above the law; intense xenophobic violence directed against immigrants and migrants; oft-bemoaned dysfunctional service delivery and increased [strike] activity; the crisis of power and leadership in the African National Congress (ANC) in 2008; the widening of the gap between black elites and poor blacks, a resurgent racialization in society; the lack of real progress on land reform and redistribution; and concerns over continued ANC party dominance and perceived threats to the Constitution have led to a growing perception that South Africa's quality of democracy is wavering.

More worrying is that in addition to the decline in civic support for democracy, there is a simultaneous increase in appeals for populist and non-democratic alternative regime types (Steenekamp, 2017:67; de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:12). In this regard, support for the self-proclaimed leftist radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has grown increasingly – with the EFF gaining 6.35% of the vote and 25 seats in the National Assembly in the 2014 national elections, and then 11% of the vote and 44 seats in the National Assembly after the 2019 national elections. Moreover, this support has come largely from the workers, the youth and the disenfranchised, who have become disillusioned with the performance and quality of democratic governance and have increasingly adopted radical dispositions towards politics (de Jager & Parkin, 2017:5). Nonetheless, while, the traction gained by the EFF remains marginal compared to the performance of the ruling, dominant party, the increasing support for the EFF speaks to a growing pool of citizens resorting to radical political action, which has the potential to threaten the stability and functioning of the democratic regime.

Despite these warning signs of democratic decay, there has been limited inquiry into the current state of South Africa's democracy. While there are studies proceeding from the theoretical standpoint of democratic consolidation to analyse South Africa's democracy, there has been limited inquiry on the basis of an approach founded on the notion of democratic deconsolidation. Additionally, with the exception of the work by Graham (2013), few commentators have applied a holistic or multidimensional approach in analysing the state of South Africa's democracy. Hence, the trends of civic disaffection and poor economic growth as well as the effects of poor governance contributing to democratic erosion have not been sufficiently studied in the South African context. This study therefore aims to use an analytical

framework derived from the literature on democratic deconsolidation (as well as consolidation) to analyse and assess whether South Africa's democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally as a result of poor governance under the Zuma administration (2008-2018).

1.2 Preliminary Literature Review: South Africa's Democratic Progress

South Africa's relatively peaceful negotiated transition from a racially oppressive apartheid regime (which encompassed deep and often violent polarization) to a vibrant multiracial constitutional democracy is widely regarded as a "miracle" (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:96; Steenekamp, 2017:59). Hence, monitoring the development and progress of democratization in South Africa makes for an interesting case study. However, it should be noted that most studies on democratic consolidation of South Africa took place in the early years of its transition and contemporary assessments have begun to emerge only recently. Furthermore, these assessments often focused on single-factor analysis, thereby lacking a holistic perspective on the prospects of democracy in South Africa.

Nonetheless, these studies are valuable for their indications of various factors such as electoral (party) dominance and disproportionate (often negative) socio-economic development outcomes, which are constitutive of potential threats that could impede the move towards South Africa consolidating its democracy. In this regard, there is a broad consensus in the literature that South Africa's democracy has yet to be confirmed as consolidated (Kotzé & Loubser, 2017:35).

In the early analyses of the South African case, many authors point to the issues of the incompatibility of a dominant party system in democratic regimes, the nature of the ruling (dominant) party, and the weakness of viable opposition as factors threatening democratic consolidation (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Habib & Taylor, 1999; Southall, 2003; Butler, 2009). Here, the ANC's electoral dominance (which is regarded as cemented in the future electoral landscape of the country because of its historical symbolic identity as a liberation movement) has raised concerns for democratic development in South Africa on the basis that it reflects a weakness of viable opposition (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999; Habib & Taylor, 1999; Southall, 2003). Jung and Shapiro (1995: 270) note that from the outset of the democratic transition in South Africa there was a lack of "a system of opposition institutions that any healthy democracy requires". Echoing this view, Giliomee and Simkins (1999:340) contend that the dominance of the ANC strips the state's

democratic character of “genuine competition and electoral uncertainty and replaces it with a process that is self-sustaining”, one in which the dominant party is nearly always guaranteed a win. This argument was founded on the basis of Huntington’s (1991) ‘two turnover test’, which theorizes that a democracy could only be considered as consolidated once there have been at least two alternations in power; if the conditions of this ‘test’ are not met, then the prospects of South Africa’s democracy succeeding are hampered by a lack of sites for counter-elites to form and vie for a position as a potential alternative government (Jung & Shapiro, 1995:272).

Furthermore, Giliomee and Simkins (1999:xx) contend that the challenge to establishing a strong viable opposition in South Africa lies in the racialized structure of South African society and politics. In other words, the racialized nature of political activities and the electoral preferences of South African citizens inhibit the possibility of the development of a viable alternative to the current government. Schrire (2001:141) contends that most opposition parties in South Africa do not vary greatly in terms of their centrist ideological approach to politics. Echoing this, Lipton (2014:5) suggests that the weakness of opposition is not the result of the demos voting along racial lines, but rather the result of the inability of the opposition to move away from racial politics towards a politics of interest. Hence political affiliation continues to centre on historical ties as opposed to class-based politics. Agreeing with Lipton (2014), Habib and Taylor (1999:263) contend that “the failure to develop a strong parliamentary opposition” reflects the inability of opposition leaders to diversify away from using the racial prism through which they approach (view) electoral strategies and move towards developing strategies that reflect interests. The majority of opposition parties in South Africa have been largely criticized on this basis for “failing to transcend identity politics” (Edigheji, 2004:16). Notwithstanding these varying explanations, most studies concede that the sustained electoral dominance of the ANC coupled with the lack of a viable opposition capable of creating a power turnover indicates the impediment of democratic consolidation in South Africa.

In addressing these arguments, de Jager and Meintjies (2013) propose an alternative position in relation to party dominance and the perceived weakness of opposition in South Africa. According to de Jager and Meintjies (2013:1), the absence of an alternation of power and a viable opposition is not reflective of ideological difficulties or racialised politics; rather it is the result of an uneven playing field created by a dominant party system. Drawing on the work by Levitsky and Way (2010), de Jager and Meintjies (2013:1) contend that the inability of opposition parties to organize effectively and bring about an alternation of power is the result of a playing field skewed by disparities of resources, media and state institutions created by a

dominance solidified by the ANC in these areas. For de Jager and Meintjies (2013:1) these disparities are the result of the way in which the ANC has dealt with the Public Funding of Representatives Political Parties Act 103 (1997), which empowers the executive, together with recommendations from Parliament, to allocate public funds according to the principle of proportionality and equality. In this regard, the ANC government has extensively given more weight to the principle of proportionality (90%) than to that of equality (10%). Therefore, the ANC has received the lion's share of public funding, which has left opposition parties with a lack of resources to organize effectively. Thus, it is less a weak opposition than a weakened opposition.

Furthermore, regarding electoral dominance and the nature of such dominance, many authors express the fear that the long-ruling ANC government will struggle to make the transition from a liberation movement to a political party that has to vie for power as it cannot rule indefinitely (Jung & Shapiro, 1995; Melber, 2002; Southall, 2003; Suttner, 2004). Here the self-proclaimed majoritarian character and identity of the ANC is seen as potentially hampering the process of democratic consolidation. In this regard Suttner (2006:7) argues that the ideology and rhetoric of the ANC, in which it expresses itself as constituting 'the nation', does not distinguish between acting as a liberation movement and as a political party. Suttner (2004:768) argues that becoming the dominant force in government implies that the ANC must enter into a process that necessitates different modalities in relation to its expected role, as well as in its relationship to its members. In this regard, where liberation movements were granted legitimacy (support) by way of their legacy of struggle, political parties must vie for support and cannot rule indefinitely (Melber, 2002:162). This implies that the approach to democratic governance by the ANC, which draws on its history (legacy) as a liberation movement, is likely to hinder the prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa. Hence, Suttner (2004:768) argues that for democratic consolidation to be realized in South Africa necessitates a shift away from the majoritarian character of the ANC towards an embrace of pluralism "in both the narrow constitutional and electoral sense of multiparty democracy".

Furthermore, du Toit and de Jager (2014:111), commenting on dominant party systems, suggest that there is a tendency within such systems, because of their extensive periods of governing, to conflate the state and its resources with those of the party. Du Toit and de Jager (2014:11) argue that the cadre deployment strategy of the ANC (which permits the appointment of ANC loyalists to public service) has established a huge patronage network that blurs state-party lines. The effect is that state (public) resources are often used to further party objectives. By

extension, this conflation of state and party lines diminishes the quality of governance as “the ANC becomes conflated with the state in the minds of those deriving benefit from political appointments [and] material resources” (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:93).

However, despite these shortcomings in South Africa’s democratic development, most studies agree that the state’s robust institutions and constitutionally guided democracy are indicative of favourable prospects for consolidation (Suttner, 2004; du Toit & de Jager, 2014; Lipton, 2014). Here du Toit and de Jager (2014:108) note that, despite the disregard of certain political representatives with certain institutional rulings, the Constitution remains “broadly respected and the judiciary [remains] robust and impartial in its rulings”. Additionally, regardless of the fear around the incompatibility of party dominance with South Africa’s developing democracy, most authors recognize that the ANC has achieved electoral success broadly through the rules of the game. Bratton and Mattes (2001:449) observe that in relation to the basic procedural requirement of a democracy – that of free and fair elections – South Africa’s democracy has stabilized. Almost 20 years later, the procedural elements remain in place; while these are fundamental, they are not sufficient for a consolidated democracy.

1.3 Problem Statement

Given the limited inquiry into the contemporary state of South Africa’s democracy, characterised by ailing support for democracy amid growing perceptions of poor governance, maladministration and economic performance, this study will analyse and assess whether South Africa’s democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration; a consideration is also given as to whether poor governance served as an instigator in the facilitation of the deconsolidation process. The period of the Zuma administration is of particular interest as several events – prime amongst them being state capture – have demonstrated the conflation of the ruling party and state. Furthermore, the events associated with state capture not only reflect poor governance but demonstrate a gross disdain for constitutional rules and values. This disdain consequently led not only to the erosion of the state’s bureaucracy, but to what could be increasingly linked to a proliferating disaffection amongst South African citizenry with democratic governance. This growing disaffection of South Africans with democratic government has been met with an increasing concurrent appeal for non-democratic forms of government that are perceived to be able to deliver economic freedom in a way that democratic rule could apparently not do.

Accordingly, this study claims that South Africa's democracy has deconsolidated, as continued poor governance and a tendency to subvert the rule of law by the Zuma administration resulted in dysfunctional intuitions and gross economic malaise; this in turn caused an erosion in support for democratic forms of governance, which is in turn increasingly associated with an openness towards non-democratic alternatives, as indicated by growing support for the EFF. Additionally, amid this growing radical disposition is a propensity to resort to violent political action in order to effect political action (change), which suggests that democracy in South Africa is in a process of deconsolidating.

The significance of this study lies in its aim of providing greater insight into the current state of South Africa's democracy using a holistic approach that considers attitudes, behaviours, structures and poor governance as collective conditions that potentially threaten South Africa's democracy. In addition, this study is significant in that it considers (poor) governance as an instigator in facilitating the deconsolidation process, as opposed to considering governance as a condition of democratic deconsolidation.

1.4 Research Questions

Given the global trend towards democratic regression and the current (2008-2018) dire socio-economic and political climate in South Africa, the central focus of this study is to determine, using the theoretical framework of democratic deconsolidation, whether South Africa's democracy deconsolidated during the Zuma administration. As such, the central question of this study is: Did South Africa's democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration? In addition to the central question, the following sub-question will be addressed: was poor governance a key instigating factor in facilitating this process of deconsolidation?

1.5 Research Design and Methodology

This study acknowledges that the notion of democratic deconsolidation is not only complex and multifaceted, but as yet relatively underdeveloped. Hence, by implication, any assessment on the basis of democratic deconsolidation will be a complex and tentative task. Therefore, this study adopts a normative analytical approach in an attempt to answer the research questions and provide an assessment of the state of South Africa's democracy. As such, the research design of this study includes the use of an analytical framework which is an adaptation of the framework on the foundations of democratic consolidation provided by Schedler (2001) and by Foa and Mounk's (2017) signs of democratic deconsolidation. While the broad foundations

of Schedler's (2001) work – behavioural, structural and attitudinal – will be used, the indicators that point to these foundations will be manipulated according to an inverse-looking focus on the prospects of regime consolidation. In other words, pessimistic theoretical deductions which indicate conditions that prevent democratic consolidation will be used to formulate the conditions of democratic deconsolidation within the analytical framework. This means that the analytical framework of democratic deconsolidation applied here will divert from Schedler (2001) by pointing to conditions that cause democratic regression or decay. Additionally, the indicators employed within these conditions will also divert slightly from Schedler (2001) as in his framework the subversion of the rule of law forms part of the behavioural component, while this section is a standalone feature of the structural component of the democratic deconsolidation framework.

Another noteworthy change is that, while Schedler (2001) provides thorough foundations for the factors that make up a consolidated democracy, an additional component will be added to the framework of democratic deconsolidation – poor governance. This is because poor governance as a theme in democratic discourse has often been associated with democratic regress; however, poor governance as an instigator of democratic deconsolidation has yet to be thoroughly investigated.

Ultimately, by employing the macro components provided by Schedler (2001) – behavioural, structural and attitudinal – and adapting them through combining theories of consolidation and deconsolidation to provide a framework of democratic deconsolidation serves as both a flexible and multidimensional analytical tool for providing a holistic assessment the status of democratic regimes. See figure 1.1.

As the focus of this study is on South Africa, it will employ a qualitative case study research design. This design was chosen in that it allows for a wealth and depth of insights through a single-focus analysis. Utilising a single case enables a thorough analysis in attempting to answer the research questions. As such, this design allows this study to perform a more comprehensive and thorough analysis. As Neuman (2014:42) notes, a single case study design is advantageous for “identifying variables that are of the greatest interest and move towards their core or essential meaning in abstract theory”. Hence a single case study design allows for greater insight through an in-depth focus on specific mechanisms of the case study, which further enables this study to potentially build or expand theory (Lambrechts, 2014:252). Essentially the value of this design as it pertains to the research question is that it could provide insight into and detailed descriptions of specific cases.

Although a single case study design was considered most appropriate for this specific study, the researcher is aware that this design could present problems of inherent biases that could filter into the study (Lambrechts, 2014:252). The researcher is also aware that another disadvantage of this design is that generalisations as derived from research findings cannot be applied to broader contexts (Bertram & Christiansen, 2014:43). However, these disadvantages are thought to be overcome through using specific and narrow indicators of the conditions of democratic deconsolidation included in the analytical framework. Hence, by employing a flexible, multidimensional and multi-theoretical framework, the problem of biases and generalisations inherent in case study designs can be overcome.

1.5.1 Concepts and Analytical Framework of Democratic Deconsolidation

The outlined research design implies that the analytical framework will function as a data-reduction strategy by organising the data according to the analytical conditions as set out in figure 1.1.




Figure 1. 1: Potential Deconsolidation Path of South Africa's Democracy

1.5.1.1 Poor Governance

The condition of poor governance broadly concerns the functionality (or otherwise) of the regime's government. It is understood that for a democracy to survive it requires a government that governs impartially – meaning that it exercises its authority without consideration of personal or special relationships or preferences (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). In the absence of such impartiality, government institutions will be drained of their democratic content, eventually degenerating into the abuse of office by using state sources in the interests of personal gain. According to Jou (2016:601-603) a poor quality of governance – understood as a lack of impartiality, high corruption, a bias or compromised judiciary and an ineffective administration – has the greatest influence in precipitating democratic deconsolidation. This is because the more citizens, particularly in new democracies, perceive the quality of governance to be low the more likely these citizens will be to withdraw support for a democratic regime

and potentially grant support of non-democratic² alternatives. Similarly, Plattner (2016:64) contends that poor governance is considered the “first instance of the failure of many new democracies to build well-functioning and effective [institutions], which often leads to lagging economic growth, poor services, lack of personal security, and pervasive corruption”. As such, poor governance could be seen as the starting point of a deconsolidating democracy as it precipitates dysfunctional institutions, poor economic performance, lack of support for democracy (amongst citizens) and growing openness to non-democratic alternatives. Ultimately when democratic governments fail to govern impartially then the regime is likely to deconsolidate.

1.5.1.2. Structural Condition

The structural condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly concerns the structures – institutions and economy – that underpin a democratic regime. In relation to institutions, the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation posits that democracies are likely to deconsolidate when the rule of law is only partially applied and when political actors fail to be accountable. In relation to the economic development indicator, the structural condition generally purports that democracies with negative economic growth and a low gross domestic income per capita are more likely to deconsolidate (Schedler, 2001:81).

1.5.1.3. Attitudinal Condition

The attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation considers actors’ preferences for (desirability) and perceptions of democracy (Schedler, 2001:75). Studies show that when citizens value democracy instrumentally (as a means to an end) as opposed to intrinsically (for a process of legitimising government), then democracy is likely to deconsolidate (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013:126). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, these preferences and perceptions, whether intrinsic or instrumental, are highly subjective and often dependent on various conditions and factors. According to Diamond (1990:49), support for democracy, particularly in new democracies such as South Africa, is nurtured by effective government performance – that being government’s ability to deliver economic goods (jobs and basic social services) and political goods (civil liberties, equality before the law and human dignity). Jou (2016:603), while acknowledging the importance of governments economic performance, contends that ultimately in new democracies, quality of government – as it pertains to

² De Jager and Steenekamp (2019:11) define non-democratic as relating to dictatorship, technocracies, and military rule.

government being honest, effective and law-abiding – has the greatest influence in stimulating support for democracy. As mentioned, this is because the more citizens view governments as being corrupt, non-abiding to law and ineffective in driving economic performance, the more likely these citizens become to not only question the regime’s legitimacy but also to withdraw support of the regime; potentially granting support to non-democratic alternative regime types (Jou, 2016:605). When there is a consideration for non-democratic alternatives in the minds of the citizenry then democracy can no longer be regarded as ‘the only game in town’.

1.5.1.4. Behavioural Condition

The behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation largely relates to an adherence to (conforming with/abiding by) the rules of a democratic game – that is, an acceptance of the constitution, its principles and values. This adherence relates to both electoral rules and requirements as well as using democratic forms of political participation. Accordingly, democracies are seen to deconsolidate when political actors fail to accept electoral outcomes or use alternative anti-democratic measures to effect political change. In other words, when actors use violence to effect political change, then a democracy is likely to deconsolidate.

1.5.1.5 Democracy and Democratic Deconsolidation

The term democracy is a complex and multifaceted concept; however, it is impossible to discuss democratic deconsolidation without first providing a conceptualisation of democracy. In conceptualising democracy scholars have distinguished between thin (minimal) and thick (maximal) conception of the term. In terms of the former, definitions often centre on electoral competition and uncertainty. Schumpeter (1942:269) contends that democracy refers to an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. Conversely, thicker conceptions contend that procedural aspects of electoral competition are insufficient to declare a regime a democracy. Rather, maximal conceptions are more fully articulated and include a host of processes, conditions, and institutional arrangements including: judicial independence, local autonomy, majority rule, separation of powers, jury trials, socio-economic equality, public-spirited harmony, constitutionalism, good governance, government responsiveness, and the like (Graham, 2013:22-23).

However, du Toit and de Jager (2014:110) contend that democracy does not necessarily equate to good governance or elements of the rule of law as many democracies “languish in poverty and suffer human rights abuses under so-called democratic systems”. A distinction, therefore,

must be made between democracy and bureaucratic, institutional, governmental, civic, and other types of arrangements. Thus, this study maintains that democracy refers to the access to public authority on the basis of popular consensus (the occupying of government) which is separate from institutional arrangements (rule of law), good governance (impartiality), civic attitude (intrinsic support), and behavioural considerations (democratic behaviour) (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169).

Furthermore, this study draws on the inverse of Linz and Stepan's (1996:18) definition of democratic consolidation by contending that democracies deconsolidate when the regime is – by way of poor governance – unable to solve a set of problems and a minority of actors begin to appeal to non-democratic alternatives and these former supporters of democracy begin to behave undemocratically. This definition is useful in that it indicates the various phases of democratic deconsolidation: when poor governance erodes institutions capacity to function effectively, thereby being unable to facilitate the rules of the game, when citizens no longer grant their support to the regime, and when citizens behave undemocratically by using non-democratic means to effect political change, then democracies deconsolidate.

Data Sources and Collection

As this is a desk-top case study, the methodology employed, as influenced by the analytical framework, will involve the collection, review of, and reliance on secondary data sources. These sources will be gathered as follows:

I. Books and Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals

- Sourced from Stellenbosch University library databases
- Google scholar

II. Investigation Reports

- The *State of Capture* report sourced from the Office of the Public Protector's website
- *Secure in Comfort* report sourced from the Office of the Public Protector's website
- *Investigation Report, Prestige Project A: Security Measures, President's Private Residence* sourced from the Department of Public Works website
- Government Gazette (report on Nkandla) sourced from the Special Investigative Unit's website
- *Eskom Inquiry Reference Book* sourced from the Public Affairs Research Institute's website

- *Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa Is Being Stolen* report sourced from the Public Affairs Research Institute's website
- *Denton's Report* sourced from Denton's website
- Mokogoro Commission Report sourced from the Presidency's website.

III. Statistics & Statistical Reports

- Various reports measuring support for democracy and support for non-democratic alternatives in the South African context sourced from Afrobarometer website.
- Budget Review 2019 sourced from the National Treasury's website.
- Quarterly Labour Force Surveys 2017 and 2018 sourced from Statistics South Africa's website.
- Reports on South Africa's economic performance during the Zuma administration sourced from the South African Institute of International Affairs.
- Reports on voting behaviour in South Africa sourced from the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa's website.
- Reports measuring violent protest action sourced from the South African Institute of Race Relations and South African Institute of Security Studies.

IV. Final rulings on Nkandla-related cases sourced from the Constitutional Court's website

V. Other Media Sources

- Press statements from the website of the Presidency
- *Mail and Guardian* articles
- *City Press* articles

1.6 Delimitation and Limitations of the Study

This study is chronologically delimited to assess the state of South Africa's democracy during the Zuma administration, that is, between the ten years 2008 until 2018. Delimiting the study to cover this period not only allows for an in-depth and thorough analysis, but avoids the analysis being conflated with South Africa's immediate post-1994 to 2000 transition and reform period. Given that the theories within the theoretical framework are based on mature democracies implies that more appropriate assessment can be done within this ten-year period, as by 2007 South Africa's democracy had moved beyond its transition phase towards an entrenchment of democratic rule.

Additionally, this study recognises that the notion of democracy and by extension its assessment are complicated by virtue of their multidimensionality. Thus, while it is acknowledged that each condition within the chosen theoretical framework caters to a broader and often autonomous field of debate, but as this study is limited by space constraints, it will adapt elements of existing theoretical frameworks in an attempt to be as exacting as possible within the chosen theoretical framework. This study is also limited to what can be achieved during the research period of two years using secondary sources only.

1.7 Ethical Considerations

Ethical situations are a significant starting point for any research undertaking. Ethical considerations in the social sciences are not uncommon, even though they may perhaps be less dramatic and complex than those found in medical science, for example (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013:81). As this study was conducted at Stellenbosch University, it falls under the scope of the institution's *Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research at Stellenbosch University* (2009). Accordingly, because this study relies solely on research based on secondary sources accessible in the public domain and does not involve any engagement of further human participation, it was considered to be low risk in terms of ethical considerations. Consequently, this study was considered exempt from ethical review by the Research Ethics Committee (REC): Humanities under the project number POLSCI-2018-6993.

1.8 Chapter Outline

This chapter has outlined the study background, rational and methodology; the remainder of this thesis is described in the following chapter outline.

Chapter 2 consists of a review of the literature on democratic (de)consolidation, which will be organised systematically for the purposes of developing an analytical framework to be used to analyse the case of South Africa. The chapter serves as an analytical tool utilised in the subsequent chapters in order to offer a response to the research questions on democratic deconsolidation.

Chapter 3 builds on Chapter 2 by providing a contextualisation (of the inception and tenor of the Zuma administration) within which an analysis could be undertaken. After laying a contextual foundation, the chapter then proceeds to apply the first lens of analysis – poor governance. This is done in order to address the secondary research question by assessing the potential of poor governance as the instigator of the deconsolidation process in South Africa.

In keeping with the analysis started in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 applies the subsequent three conditions – structural, attitudinal and behavioural – of democratic deconsolidation during the Zuma administration (2008-2018). The central purpose of this chapter is to provide findings in response to the primary research question. As such, this chapter provides an assessment of whether South Africa's democracy deconsolidated under the Zuma Administration.

Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes and examines the findings of this research project. In addition, this chapter provides recommendations for future study within the field of this research.

Chapter II – Development of the Analytical Framework of Democratic Deconsolidation

2.1 Introduction

The first chapter established the research questions and rationale for the study. It was shown that, although the South African case has received much attention in the way of democratic consolidation analysis, there is limited inquiry using a holistic approach, and the theories and lenses of the proliferating field of democratic deconsolidation have not been applied. To bridge this gap, this chapter provides a review of the growing literature on conditions of democratic deconsolidation and organises it systematically through the development of an analytical framework which could be utilized to analyse the case of South Africa.

The field of democratic deconsolidation studies finds its roots in the field of democratic consolidation. This latter field predominantly occupies itself with conditions necessary for the entrenchment of (new and established) democracies, and which make these regimes more immune against the threat of authoritarian regression (Schedler, 1998:91). The scholarship on democratic consolidation falls into broadly two categories: authors who study democracies optimistically or pessimistically. In relation to the former, authors predominantly focus on conditions that are conducive to ensuring that a democracy becomes so deeply entrenched that it comes to constitute “the only game in town” (Linz & Stepan, 1996:15). In contrast, authors who study democratic survival pessimistically place more emphasis on conditions which prevent democratic entrenchment and consolidation (Schedler, 1998:92).

Alternatively stated, the study of democratic deconsolidation could be understood as a divergence model which adopts a more “backsliding-focused and pessimistic” outlook on the prospects of regime consolidation (Ágh, 2016:16). This is in contrast to democratic consolidation studies, which offers a convergence model which presupposes that, despite setbacks within the democratic process, democracies could overcome these and would be more likely to consolidate (Ágh, 2016:16).

The distinction between authors who side with either the convergent or divergent perspective is reflective of the way in which a democratic state progresses or regresses. In other words, a democratic state progresses according to a “continuum of democraticness” in which the regime could move forward by changing from authoritarianism into a semi-democratic dispensation

and then into a liberal democracy (Schedler, 1998:93).³ Alternatively, a democratic regime could regress from being an established liberal democracy to an unstable democracy, which is prone to deconsolidate and potentially fully erode to an authoritarian state (Schedler, 1998:93). It is this state of regression, demonstrated by many democracies in these last few decades, that has prompted a pessimistic outlook on the inquiry into the survival prospects of democracies.

This chapter will be divided into two broad sections. The first section provides a conceptualisation of democratic deconsolidation. The second section sets out the analytical framework which will be adopted from the work of Schedler (2001), who indicated three conditions of democratic (de)consolidation – structural, attitudinal and behavioural – which encompass indicators that could be used analytically to assess the prospects of democratic survival. These three conditions, which serve as the skeleton and organisational structure of the framework, will be supplemented with other theories on democratic (de)consolidation such as Foa and Mounk’s (2017) *Signs of Deconsolidation*, amongst others. Furthermore, as explained in the previous chapter, poor governance as a theme in democratic discourse has often been associated with democratic regress; however, poor governance as an instigator of democratic deconsolidation has yet to be thoroughly interrogated. This chapter will fill this gap by arguing for poor governance as an instigator to the process of democratic deconsolidation. Hence, this framework will include an instigator and three concomitant conditions of democratic deconsolidation: poor governance, structural, attitudinal and behavioural. It is acknowledged that there is fluidity between these conditions of democratic deconsolidation.

2.2 A Conceptualisation of Democratic Deconsolidation

As the literature on democratic deconsolidation has its roots in the literature on democratic consolidation, so too the conceptualisation of the former is derived from the latter. Various studies of democratic consolidation accept Linz and Stepan’s (1996:15) conception that a democratic regime is consolidated when it constitutes “the only game in town” (Diamond, 1997a; Schedler, 1998, 2001; O’Donnell, 1996, Foa & Mounk, 2017). In other words, a democracy is considered consolidated when democratic forms of state institutions, a vibrant civil society, elections, and democratic rules and principles become embedded within society (Carothers, 2002:7). Essentially, there is a broad consensus that democracies are consolidated when democratic values and principles become deeply internalised in the “social, institutional

³ Carothers (2002) argues that democracies should be analysed using standardised indicators (a democratic paradigm) as opposed to the specific context and nature of the regime.

and psychological” life and a sizeable majority of citizens commit themselves to the regime and accept it as the best form of government regardless of the economic, political and social perils it faces (Linz & Stepan, 1996:17; O’Donnell, 1996; Schedler, 1998, 2001; Carothers, 2002).

While a regime is consolidated when it is embraced as ‘the only game in town’, so too does a regime deconsolidate when it “ceases to be the only game in town” (Foa & Mounk, 2017:9). In other words, Foa and Mounk (2017:9) contend that democracies deconsolidate when “at some later point, a sizeable minority of citizens loses its belief in democratic values, becomes attracted to authoritarian alternatives and starts to flout or oppose constitutive elements of liberal democracy”. In other words, when political actors reject democratic norms and become disaffected by democratic mechanisms and processes while appealing to authoritarian regime types, then democracy is seen to deconsolidate.

However, a shift in support for the regime (change in attitudes) is not enough to consider a democracy as deconsolidated. Rather, a multitude of conditions precede a shift in attitudes that cause democracies to deconsolidate. Therefore, this study draws on the inverse of Linz and Stepan’s (1996:18) definition of democratic consolidation by contending that democracies deconsolidate when the regime is – by way of poor governance – unable to solve a set of problems and a minority of actors begin to appeal to non-democratic alternatives and these former supporters of democracy begin to behave undemocratically. This definition is useful in that it indicates the various phases of democratic deconsolidation: when poor governance erodes institutions capacity to function effectively, thereby being unable to facilitate the rules of the game, when citizens no longer grant their support to the regime, and when citizens behave undemocratically by using non-democratic means to effect political change, then democracies deconsolidate.

Before proceeding with the development of the analytical framework, it should be acknowledged that democratic deconsolidation is not the antithesis of democratic consolidation. In other words, democratic deconsolidation does not refer to a total reversion of the regime to authoritarianism, but rather denotes the process of democratic decline, backsliding and regression. These terms will be used to refer to the slow death of democracy in which a democratic regime gradually disintegrates and diverges from democratic ideals (according to the continuum) thereby moving closer to authoritarianism and further away from

liberal democracy (Schedler, 1998:94). In this study democratic deconsolidation refers to democratic regimes which are in a state of regression rather than completely broken-down.

2.3 Analytical Framework of Democratic Deconsolidation

2.3.1 Instigator - Poor Governance

Much of the recently observed trend of civic fatigue and disillusionment within democratic regimes is the consequence of poor governance (Plattner, 2016:4). Jou (2016:601-603) contends that a poor quality of governance – understood as high levels of corruption, a compromised judiciary and an ineffective bureaucracy – has the greatest influence in precipitating democratic deconsolidation. This is because the more citizens (particularly in newly established democracies where diffused support is not yet cultivated) perceive governments to be corrupt, non-abiding to law and ineffective, the more likely these citizens are to not only question the regime’s legitimacy but also to withdraw support of the regime; potentially offering support to non-democratic regime types (Jou, 2016:605). Similarly, Plattner (2016:64) contends that poor governance is considered the “first instance of the failure of many new democracies to build well-functioning and effective [institutions], which often leads to lagging economic growth, poor services, lack of personal security, and pervasive corruption”. Accordingly, poor governance could be seen as the starting point of a deconsolidating democracy as it leads to dysfunctional institutions, poor economic performance, lack of support for democracy (amongst citizens) and growing openness to non-democratic alternatives.

This means that an assessment of the state of a democracy on the basis of its longevity cannot be undertaken in isolation from questions of democratic governance (Diamond & Morlino, 2005:21). Rather, an assessment of democratic longevity necessitates a consideration of democratic governance as it relates to the procedures of a democratic regime, democratic action and extends to the results that democratic regimes produce (Diamond & Morlino, 2004:12; du Toit & de Jager, 2012:12).

Before defining governance, it should be acknowledged that it is not possible to equate democracy with good governance (du Toit & de Jager, 2012:111). Democratic regimes, while electorally institutionalising democratic principles, often lack the necessary good governance to consolidate. Du Toit and de Jager (2012:111) argue that “dysfunctional government institutions, even within democratic regimes”, often result in economic and social malaise, which could cause a democratic regime to deconsolidate.

Consequently, it is necessary to make a distinction between democracy and good governance. Rothstein and Teorell (2008:169) contend that while democracy refers to access to public authority (the occupying of government), good governance refers to the exercise of this authority (the practice of governing impartially). Alternatively stated, whereas political equality (equal opportunity to participate in the making of government) acts as a norm for legitimising the democratic regime, good governance (governing impartially and ensuring equal representation) acts as a norm for legitimising political authority within the regime. Good governance is thus understood as the procedural norm of impartiality exercised in government and state institutions (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). Impartiality is defined as acting without persuasion or consideration of personal (special) relationships or preferences (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). Sharma (2007:32) contends that good governance encompasses all aspects of the way a country is governed. Good governance relates to participatory, consensus-orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, inclusive and effective government (Sharma, 2007:32).

In line with this, du Toit and de Jager (2012:112) contend that an important aspect of good governance entails a separation or jurisdictional boundary that divides state and government. The state is expected to be a neutral arbiter, while the government temporarily exercises authority in the state. When there is a blurring of lines between the state and government, the principle of impartiality is undermined by a biased government – unrepresentative of the people – thereby subverting the component of broad representation that characterises democracy.

In this regard, du Toit and de Jager (2014:109) note that dominant party systems (such as South Africa's), because of one-party's prolonged period of being in government, are particularly at risk of conflating their identity with that of the state. Brooks (2004:3) remarks that when one party dominates and governs for an extensive period without the prospect of electoral defeat, concerns arise around the "possibility of declining government response to public opinion, loss of accountability and the overall erosion of democratic principles". Pempel (1990:7) states that when a dominant party in government can utilise state resources to suit its agenda to "reshape society in its own image; to reward its adherents and to deny such rewards to its opponents", then it has the potential power to exclude the interests of minorities within the citizenry.

For du Toit and de Jager (2014:109) the conflation of government and state can occur through a myriad of ways, including controlling ideology in an uncontested way; projecting an interpretation of history (especially an historical event from which the party's dominance was derived), setting policy and public agenda and, most significantly, assigning party loyalists to

positions within the state (thereby effectively capturing the state's bureaucracy). This issue of conflation could be understood as pertaining to the use and abuse of state resources for the purposes of augmenting personal aims. It is at this level of dominance where the quality of democracy is affected in that the autonomy of the state is eroded. When the state loses its autonomy, it also loses its neutrality, which further implies that the state cannot function in the interests of the public at large. When there is a blurring of state, party lines through a capturing of the state's resources, its structural framework and its institutions, then these resources can be used for partisan ends (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:111). Whereas a system of good governance that exercises authority impartially (separates government and state) is conducive to democratic consolidation, dominant systems that capture the state, its institutional framework and resources are likely to edge closer to democratic deconsolidation.

Essentially when it comes to democracies, poor governance - that centres on partisanship, corruption, non-abiding to law and ineffective bureaucracies - is highly likely to generate into democratic deconsolidation. This is not only because poor governance tends to drain democratic institutions of their democratic content and cause economic peril but moreover because when citizens perceive the quality of governance to be low, they become more inclined to withdraw their support for the regime and more receptive to granting support to non-democratic alternatives. When governments fail to govern impartially then democracies deconsolidate.

2.3.2 Structural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation

The structural condition of democratic deconsolidation largely concerns the institutions that underpin a democratic regime as well as the economic outcomes that a democracy produces. An assessment of the institutional component of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation requires a consideration of the lack of establishment of the rule of law, institutional capacity and accountability. This is because these structures set out the rules for the effective functioning of the democratic game. Furthermore, the economic component of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation concerns the poor performance of the economy. Accordingly, economic outcomes require an audit of the economic development and performance of the economy within the regime, as without material improvement the demos may become inclined to forgo political empowerment for the sake of economic freedom.

2.3.2.1 The Rule of Law, Institutional Capacity and Accountability

According to O'Donnell (2005:3), the rule of law is considered an essential pillar upon which any high-quality democracy rests. This is because the rule of law serves as a foundation upon which democratic rights, responsibilities and obligations are assigned to political actors and institutions for the purposes of organising their engagement and interaction according to democratic norms and principles.

The rule of law is generally understood as providing legal guarantees which ensure that all citizens are equal before the law (this emphatically includes public officials) (Linz & Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, 2005:33). This not only relates to participatory rights and political freedom (by means of voting) but also includes the freedoms of expression, association and movement, and the like (O'Donnell, 2005:4). O'Donnell (2005:3) contends that for this to be achieved the rule of law must be premised on “political rights, civil liberties and mechanisms of accountability that affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power”. The rule of law, coupled with independent and impartial governing institutions and a judiciary that guards against the abuse of political authority and performs effectively, is paramount to ensuring the longevity of a democratic regime. In a liberal democracy this is exemplified through the implementation of a constitution that ensures transparency and accountability (Mottair, 2002). The rule of law could thus be seen to work intimately and inseparably with other aspects of a democratic dispensation (O'Donnell, 2005:3).

For Diamond and Morlino (2005:xiv) a consolidating democracy possesses “a strong, vigorous, diffuse, and self-sustaining rule of law in the following respects:

- The rule of law is equally enforced toward everyone, including state officials; no one is above the law;
- The legal state is supreme throughout the country, leaving no areas dominated by organised crime, local oligarch, or political bosses who are above the law;
- Corruption is minimised, detected, and punished, in the political administrative, and judicial branches of state;
- At all levels, the state bureaucracy applies the laws competently, efficiently, and universally, and assumes responsibility in the event of an error;
- The police force is professional, efficient, and respectful of individuals' legally guaranteed rights and freedoms, including rights of due process;

- Citizens have equal and unhindered access to the courts to defend their rights and to contest lawsuits between private citizens or between private citizens and public institutions;
- Criminal cases and civil and administrative lawsuits are heard and resolved expeditiously;
- The judiciary at all levels is neutral and independent from any political influence;
- Rulings of the courts are respected and enforced by other agencies of the state; and,
- The constitution is supreme and is interpreted and defended by a constitutional court.”

Collectively, these aspects serve to constitute the rules and framework within which civil society and political actors as well as institutions within a democratic regime functions and engages. Essentially, the rule of law could be seen to constitute the rules of the democratic game.

In the absence of a stringent rule of law and an independent judiciary, the rights, dignity and equality of citizens are not only at risk, but the rules of the democratic game also become vulnerable to manipulation of powerful political actors (O'Donnell, 2005:3). According to Diamond and Morlino (2005:xv), when the rule of law is weak and applied partially, then the participation of minority or marginalised actors in civil society is suppressed; individual rights become fleeting, access to power becomes skewed and available only to those who dominate, and corruption and abuse of power become rampant. Additionally, accountability is subverted, political competition distorted, and democratic institutions eroded (Diamond & Morlino, 2005:xv). Hence, when the rule of law fails to bolster and buttress these democratic components of equity and accountability, then the responsiveness of government to the needs and interests of the people cannot be achieved (O'Donnell, 2005:3). Ultimately, a rule of law that is partially applied allows for cheating the rules of the game, which can exacerbate and cause democratic deconsolidation.

However, the rule of law does not function in a vacuum. On the contrary, the institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law are of paramount importance as they function as a medium for cultivating democratic values and behaviour among elites as well as citizens (Diamond, 1997a:15). Studies such as those by Diamond (1997b), Weingst (1997), Adserà and

Boix (2008), among others, postulate that institutional structures are fundamental to democratic survival as they function to uphold the rules and constraints that shape human interactions by providing incentives for actors to either adhere to or disobey the rules of the game. When institutions are fragile, in that effective mechanisms for power-checking are absent, the benefits of subverting democratic rules are increased, which often prompts actors to resort to undemocratic behaviour in pursuing their political objectives (Adserà & Boix, 2008:3; Kapstein & Converse, 2008:62). Consequently, where political officials have a monopoly on decision-making power and have autonomous capacity to act on these decisions without any accountability, the problems of rigged elections, unconstitutional changes and corruption become more commonplace and jeopardise democratic survival (Johnston, 1992:11-12). Johnston (1992:30) warns that when actions such as corruption and election rigging become embedded within the democratic system, new undemocratic institutions and forms of participation could emerge that further embeds the process of democratic deconsolidation. Institutions play an essential role in the process of consolidation as they serve to orientate and habituate actors to the democratic behavioural dispositions of moderation and tolerance. However, where institutions are fragile and present incentives towards undemocratic dispositions and behaviours, democracy deconsolidates.

The rule of law in large part relates to the principle of impartiality as described in the governance condition of democratic deconsolidation. This is because the rule of law relates to “a set of stable political rules and rights impartially applied to all citizens” (Weingast, 1997:245). The rule of law embodies the principle of the application of equality equally applied to all. Independent and impartial institutions that exercise good governance by upholding the rule of law are essential in building a democracy because they foster public trust, legitimacy and positive economic outcomes (Jou, 2016:596). These elements are therefore not only necessary in ensuring democratic stability, but also essential in fostering public legitimacy so that a democracy can thrive (consolidate). Without these elements, democratic institutions become vulnerable to elite manipulation and abuse of power, and consequently they become drained of their democratic content.

Related to the abstract issue of the rule of law is the practical capacity of institutions of government to enforce and uphold it. Graham (2012:59) contends that if democracies are to function effectively, then institutions and the governing administration must ensure that there is high-quality legislation in place (that is effectively implemented), transparency in the policy-making process, and an impartial, accountable and efficient state bureaucracy.

Another element linked to the rule of law and effective institutions is elite accountability. Democracy, by virtue of entailing rule by the people, is distinguishable by its emphasis on accountability. Accountability in this context could be understood as “an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens” (Schmitter, 2004:47). Accountability is premised on the separation of powers between the three branches of government – the executive, legislature and judiciary – as well as regular free and fair elections and constitutionalism (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999:222). Diamond and Morlino (2005:8) argue that in democracies there are two forms of accountability: vertical accountability and horizontal accountability. The former relates to the obligation and responsibility that elected leaders have regarding their political decisions towards citizen-electors or constitutional bodies (Diamond & Morlino 2005:8). Horizontal accountability refers to the obligation of government to account to institutional actors that ensure the checks and balances remain in place – those who possess legal authority to control or sanction government behaviour (Diamond & Morlino, 2005:8). These conditions of accountability, whether vertical or horizontal, are important to the functioning of a consolidating democratic regime, for when the public or state institutions are unwilling to scrutinize and/or prosecute one another, then democratic regimes are vulnerable to democratic deconsolidation.

The rule of law, encompassing its various aspects of judicial independence, civil liberties, impartial governing institutions and accountability, essentially constitutes the rules of the democratic game that contextualise, shape, and legitimise the interaction between political actors within a democratic regime. When the rule of law is applied partially, judicial independence compromised and civil society fatigued, then the opportunity arises to cheat in the game by allowing power to become corrupt, participation to be skewed and performance to become ineffective. Hence, by implication, democratic regimes become vulnerable to democratic deconsolidation.

2.3.2.2 Economic Outcomes: Development and Performance

The ability of a democracy to secure and deliver basic social and economic goods to the public is necessary for it to remain a well-functioning and consolidating regime. Without economic development and growth, citizens may become inclined to forgo democratic freedom in exchange for economic freedom (further elaborated under the attitudinal condition). Therefore, the level of economic development and growth has a strong bearing on the durability of democracy. When there are high levels of economic development (affluence), democracy is

more likely to flourish, while conversely, low levels of economic development make the regime more likely to deconsolidate.

There is a broad consensus in which authors such as Cutright (1963), Olsen (1968), Bollen (1979), Huntington (1991) and Diamond (1993), to mention a few, agree with Lipset's (1959:75) famous dictum that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that [democracy] will [be] sustained". It should be recognised that Lipset (1959) suggests that economic growth is a necessary (prerequisite) condition for democratisation. Inglehart (2016:21) argues that economic development promotes democratisation and its durability by creating an enlarged educated and articulate middle class and, moreover, transforms social and cultural values that give priority to the freedom of political choice and freedom of expression. The prevailing idea is that wealthy nations promote the kinds of socio-economic development that serves democracy by producing cultural values that make citizens more demanding of and receptive to democratic norms.

Lipset (1959:72), in tracing indices of economic development such as the level of wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and education, postulates that the higher the level of income per capita and the greater the degree of modernisation, the more likely it would be that a democracy would consolidate. Przeworski, Alvarez, Chieub and Limongi (1996:41) operationalize this position, by arguing that rich democracies with a per capita income that exceeds 6 000 USD are "impregnable and can be expected to live forever". However, Meintjies (2011:34) recognises that this income figure is based on the constant purchasing power parity of the dollar in 1985 and thus adjusted this for inflation based on the 2010 United States Bureau of Labour Statistics. Meintjies (2011:34) therefore contends that democracies with a per capita income that exceeds 12 195.78 USD are more likely to consolidate.

Democracies, it seems, are more prone to backsliding when there are low levels of economic development. This notion is supported by various studies such as Lipset (1959), Przeworski, *et al.* (1996), Bernhard, Reenock and Nordshom (2003), to mention a few. Przeworski, *et al.* (1996:41) contend that democracies with an annual per capita income below 1 000 USD are extremely fragile. In the light of the adjusted figure, Meintjies (2011:34) contends that democracies with a per capita income of between 12 195 USD and 2 032 USD are fragile, while democracies with a per capita income lower than 2 032 USD are extremely fragile. Przeworski, *et al.* (1996:45) found that democracies confronted with a decline in income are three times more likely to deconsolidate than democracies which experience the opposite. Moreover, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000:109) found that there is a one in

135 chance that democracy will regress when incomes fail to grow during any three or more consecutive years. The argument prevails that democratic deaths follow a clear pattern and will be more commonplace when countries experience poor economic growth.

Authors also occupy themselves with the impact of a malfunctioning economy on regime instability (Diskin, Diskin & Hazan 2005:293). Commentators such as Haggard and Kaufmann (1994), Diamond (1999), Przeworski *et al.*, (2000), and Lindvall (2012), to mention a few, agree that democracies are extremely likely to deconsolidate when confronted with an economic crisis, which is often seen to undermine a democratic regime. Broad strands of the literature indicate that sluggish economic growth which manifests as an economic crisis also weakens the prospects for democratic durability and often causes democratic regression. Haggard and Kaufmann (1994:7) argue that countries dealing with prolonged periods of economic decline often experience democratic institutions being drained of their democratic content (legitimacy), thereby leading to deconsolidation. Haggard and Kaufmann (1994:7) indicate that prolonged periods of poor economic performance intensify political cynicism, whereby there is an erosion of faith in the capacity of democratic governments to manage the crisis, which is compounded by a failure to generate stable and representative ruling coalitions (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994:7). This results in knock-on effects such as increased crime, civil violence and organised revolutionary activity (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994:7). Consequently, democracies are undermined and become internally destabilised as internal civic violence, crime and riots erupt, thus speaking to its behavioural ramifications, as will be discussed shortly.

Authors such as Dahl (1983), Lamounier (1999), Przeworski *et al.* (2000), Nylen (2000) and Schedler (2001), to mention a few, agree that economic inequality tends to subvert democracy, often causing it to regress. Lamounier (1999:172) contends that high levels of socio-economic disparity have posed a constant challenge to democratic institutions. Dahl (1989:98) argues that economic destitution and inequality subvert the minimal conditions necessary to exercise democratic citizenship effectively. This could be related to the point made by Lipset (1959), who contended that it is only in a wealthy society with relatively low levels of poverty that citizens are sophisticated and educated enough to make effective political decisions. Robinson and Quinlan (1977) show that states with high levels of income inequality have a small and weak middle class, which implies that a democratic regime would not be sought after there. Hence, within a highly unequal economy, citizens from the lower strata of society would be

more prone to forfeit democratic values and political choice for a better distribution of economic benefits.

2.3.3 Attitudinal Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation

The attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation is largely concerned with the impact that actors' preferences and perceptions of the regime have on democratic durability (Schedler, 2001:75). This is because democracy could only be considered as 'the only game in town' when the citizenry endorses it as such – if they grant their support regardless of the socio-economic or political circumstances. However, where citizens' faith in democracy is not cemented and non-democratic alternatives are considered, then democracy is no longer seen as 'the only game in town' – causing the regime to edge closer towards democratic deconsolidation. The attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly anchors itself in the political attitudes of actors. The focus on political attitudes is to determine whether actors' attitudes diverge from "the stability requirements of democratic [regimes]" (Schedler, 2001:75).

It is well understood that actors' regime preferences matter for the survival of the regime (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012, 2013). However, this consensus is predicated on a debate centred on the nature of such preferences and these preferences concomitant impact on the prospects of regime durability (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012, 2013). Theoretical arguments generally range between diffuse and specific support. The former (diffuse support) is seen to consolidate a democratic regime, while the latter (specific support) precipitates democratic deconsolidation. Given this divergence, it is necessary to distinguish between the types of support in order to comprehend their respective impacts on regime durability.

According to Easton (1975:436), diffuse support relates to a favourable disposition towards the regime regardless of unfavourable outputs that the regime produces. As defined by Easton (1975:444), diffuse support "consists of a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants". In other words, while system outputs may vary (either being favourable or unfavourable) diffuse support remains constant. There remains a deep commitment to the regime regardless of whether system outputs are favourable or unfavourable.

Conversely, specific support is less durable than diffuse support in that it relates to “the satisfaction that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities” (Easton, 1975:437). Specific support hinges on whether system outputs and government performance satisfy the preferences (interests and expectations) of citizens with the regime. The performance of government has a deterministic effect in cultivating support for the system. As Easton (1975:437) notes, where perceived “decisions, policies, actions, utterances or general style of authorities” do not satisfy the interests (preferences) of citizens, this kind of support may not be generated, and the system will not endure.

Similarly, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012, 2013) distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental support. They contend that an intrinsic preference implies valuing a democratic regime for what it is (a process of conferring legitimacy) (2013:124). Bratton and Mattes (2001:448) argue that intrinsic support implies a commitment to the regime “for better or worse”. In other words, citizens maintain a belief that democracy is the best form of government despite any economic, political or social turbulence that may occur. This commitment to the regime is often expressed in actors’ willingness to accept unfavourable policy outcomes and even endure policies which hurt their interests (as demonstrative of their commitment). This is because these citizens deem the process through which those policies are formulated as legitimate (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013:126). Ultimately, an intrinsic preference for democracy implies valuing democracy as an end in itself (Anderson, 2009:215).

In contrast, instrumental support is considered conditional and may be granted or (easily) withdrawn depending on “the tempter of the times” (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:448). Depending on the tangible or intangible conditions that democracy brings, support will be granted or withheld. This is because instrumental support is largely premised on an appreciation of the regime as a means to an end. That being the case, an appreciation of the regime is based on the quality of governance and economic capacity (its ability to correct material socio-economic inequalities rather than on its legitimising capacity) (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:448). Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013:126) contend that support would easily be granted on the condition that policies suit actor preferences. However, where policies are viewed as unsuitable, citizens may “succumb to the siren song of populist leaders who argue that economic development requires the sacrifice of political liberties” (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:448). Ultimately, instrumental support for democracy suggests support that is elusive, making the regime vulnerable by

implication of citizen's willingness to consider democratic alternatives when the system encounters periods of economic or political peril.

However, despite these variations in support for democracy, it should be acknowledged that support itself is highly subjective (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007:638). This is because actors' attitudes toward the regime are derived from multiple sources (see Schedler, 2001:75; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007:638). Almond and Verba (1963:13) argue that attitudes towards the regime align with attitudes towards the role of the self within the regime. This perspective underscores the importance of considering subjective valuations of political attitudes within the regime.

Von Fintel and Ott (2017:80) note that "[the] subjective character is historically conditioned and shaped by the idiosyncrasies of the development of a given country and influences the congruency of a political culture [within] a political regime". Individual political attitudes are often influenced by their evaluation of the performance and quality of governance, which serves as reference points for assessing the preferability of the regime. Diamond (1990:49) notes that while democracy necessitates support by the people to legitimise the regime as the best form of government, this legitimacy develops over time and is partly nurtured by effective performance and quality of government. This performance and quality of the government relates to the government's ability to deliver both political and economic goods, where the former pertains to "civil liberties, political rights, human dignity and equality before the law [impartiality]" and the latter to "economic assets, jobs and an array of basic social services" (Bratton & Mattes, 2001:4). It should also be noted that both economic performance and support (legitimacy) are highly dependent on good governance (van Beek & de Jager, 2017:2; Jou, 2016:603). Plattner (2016:4) contends that it is citizen's disappointment with democratic governments' "failure to deliver" that accounts, in large part, for its vulnerability to breakdown. Similarly, Jou (2016:603) argues that a low quality of governance, as it pertains to officials failing to abide to law, corruption and ineffective bureaucracy, has the greatest influence in eroding support for democracy.

Jou (2016:596) suggests that it is particularly in newly established democracies, such as the case of South Africa, that subjective evaluations of the quality of governance have a decisive outcome on the durability of the regime. The underlying assumption is that citizens in newly established democracies tend to use the quality and performance of the democratic government (whether on the basis of political or socio-economic outcomes), as references for granting (or withdrawing) support for democracy because they have not yet garnered sufficient experience of a democratic regime to evaluate it as an end in itself. Jou (2016:596) contends that this

situation arises as newly established democracies, in comparison to their established (consolidated) counterparts, have not yet cultivated a political culture where democracy is intrinsically valued. This phenomenon in new democracies refers to the “democratic-authoritarian cleavage” – the supporters of the new regime versus the sceptics (Moreno quoted in Jou, 2016:593). Despite democracy allowing for a choice of change in government, citizens in newer democracies are seen as not having enough prior experience with the regime to evaluate it for what it is, and they therefore use their experience of the performance and quality of government as a reference to assess the suitability of the current regime (Jou, 2016:596).

Consequently, when new democracies encounter periods of economic or political peril, the regime becomes threatened by citizen’s dissatisfaction with the performance and quality of government and this tends to translate into an unwillingness to support the regime and a consideration of other regime types (de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:1). Diamond (1990:49) notes that citizens would not grant their support to democracy unless government performance effectively addresses socio-economic issues and achieves social order and justice better than an authoritarian regime. Similarly, Jou (2016:596) contends that appeals for democratic alternatives “may increase as a function of poor government performance.” This is because the more citizens view governments as being corrupt, non-abiding to law and ineffective in driving economic performance, the more likely these citizens become to not only question the regime’s legitimacy but also to withdraw support of the regime; potentially granting support to non-democratic alternative regime types (Jou, 2016:605). When there is a consideration for non-democratic alternatives in the minds of the citizenry then democracy can no longer be regarded as ‘the only game in town’.

It is this consideration of democratic alternatives fuelled by poor performance that presents an opportunity for radicalism or extremism to seep into the fabric of a political culture of a democratic regime, causing the regime itself to erode. Radicals could be understood as citizens who “identify with ideologies of the extreme left or right, and who are thus willing to consider other types of regimes besides democracy; they adhere to their beliefs in an uncompromising manner, as opposed to the moderates whose view are more flexible” (de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:2). When actors hold a radical policy preference, democracy is more likely to deconsolidate, as these preferences (whether extreme left or right) are so far removed from the preferences of other relevant actors that the consequence is polarisation (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2012).

Radicals are often threatening to the regime in that their political engagement often extends beyond the boundaries of democratic participation, including a propensity to resort to violent and other non-democratic measures (de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019:2). Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012) warn that it is particularly in situations of polarisation or unsatisfactory outcomes that radicals tend to seek to safeguard their interest through a subversion of the rule of law and a use of violence. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012) contend that when actors feel that their interests are threatened by the continuation of a competitive regime, the costs of tolerating the regime increase. The result is that democracies are considered more likely to deconsolidate as significant actors become more inclined to mobilise in opposition of the regime, thus speaking to the behavioural ramifications, as will be discussed shortly (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012). Foa and Mounk (2017:9) suggest that when citizens no longer commit themselves to democracy and no longer support it as the best form of government, while there is simultaneously an increasing appeal to anti-system (authoritarian) alternatives, then democracy deconsolidates.

Ultimately, when it comes to the attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation, it could be seen that a democratic regime is likely to deconsolidate when actors support the regime instrumentally – i.e. valuing the regime for only what it can deliver. In newly established democracies, where the assumption is that political attitudes are rooted in instrumental appreciation, the implication is citizens evaluate the regime with reference to the performance and quality of government in terms of delivering economic (jobs, security, decreased socio-economic disparities) and political (equality before the law, civil liberties, effective bureaucracy, impartial institutions) goods. Accordingly, when democratic governments are observed to perform poorly – that is, delivering unfavourable socio-economic and political outcomes – then citizens are likely to consider whether non-democratic alternative regime types would deliver more favourable outcomes. It is this consideration of non-democratic alternatives that allows radicalism, extremism and populism to enter the system – thereby no longer rendering democracy as the ‘only game in town’. The result is that democracies are potentially on a path to deconsolidation.

2.3.4 Behavioural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation

For a democracy to be liberal, behaviourally a political culture must prevail which values and fosters “political participation, discussion, and awareness on the part of the citizenry”, combined with tolerance of differing political beliefs (Diamond, Lipset and Linz, 1990:9). Hence, when it comes to the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation, the general

assessment is whether citizens' behaviour conforms to the rules of the game. In other words, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation requires a consideration of whether there is an adherence to a country's legal framework (Schedler, 2001:70). Behaviourally, a democratic regime will endure when there is widespread adherence to the rules of the game, namely compliance with the legal framework of the regime (usually constitutionally driven) (Diamond, 1997a:14). Conversely, democracies are more prone to deconsolidate when actors adopt antidemocratic behaviour – that is, they induce violence in the system (Schedler, 2001:70; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997a; Burnell, 2008).

Before discussing the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation, it should be noted that behaviours serve as a manifestation of attitudes. Behaviours do not manifest in a vacuum, but rather are understood to be physical expressions rooted in an attitude or disposition. Schedler (2001:69) argues that attitudes function as a prime mover of democratic behaviour – where behaviour (as influenced by the presiding attitude) serves as a proximate cause of the outcome of democratic longevity. There is a causal relationship between attitudes and behaviour, where the former serves to influence the latter. A lack of support for democracy (attitude) will likely be expressed through an unwillingness to comply with the rules of the game, usually leading to democratic deconsolidation.

According to Schedler (2001:70), the behavioural condition of any democracy refers, broadly, to three interrelated components – namely, the transgression of authority, non-acceptance of electoral outcomes, and the use of violence within a democratic regime. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the framework employed in this study diverts slightly from Schedler (2001) in that the transgression of authority component is largely covered under the category of the rule of law in the structural condition. Hence, this section will largely focus on the other two components: non-acceptance of electoral outcomes and the induction of violence.

2.3.4.1 Non-acceptance of Electoral Outcomes

Democracy in its minimalist and most procedural conception is defined as the ability of citizens to elect government through free, fair, competitive and regular elections (Schumpeter 1947:269). This definition necessitates that, behaviourally, political actors accept the core tenet of the regime, namely free, fair and competitive elections (Schedler, 2001:71). An acceptance of the rules of the democratic game means accepting electoral defeat (majority outcomes) and hoping for future winnings by democratic means (free and fair elections) (Mainwaring, 1989:15). Accordingly, elite democratic behaviour in which elites demonstrate their consensus

to the regime through an adherence to “peaceful competition for power based on the foundation of rule of law [and] tolerance” is fundamental to consolidating a democracy (Diamond, 1999:69). Schedler (2001:71) contends that when political actors deny competitors access to participation in democratic elections, fail to accept electoral defeat, and respond to electoral defeat through violent or unconstitutional means, then democracy ceases to be the only game in town. Similarly, Huntington (1996:8) contends that regime survival is often threatened by elites who win elections, thereby taking power and attempting to cling to it (beyond the constitutionally set terms) by undemocratic means (electoral manipulation or force). Ultimately, when public officials subvert democratic rules and procedures – particularly in relation to the holding of, and the outcomes of, democratic elections – then democracy regresses.

2.3.4.1 Use of Violence

When it comes to the use of violence, Foa and Mounk (2016:6) contend that democracies are safeguarded when political actors strive to obtain their political objectives within the system of democracy. Similarly, Diamond (1997a:14) emphasises that the behavioural demonstration of loyalty towards a regime occurs differently at elite and mass levels. Political elites (which include both incumbent parties and their opposition) must regard democracy as the only viable and legitimate framework through which their political interests could be advanced, while at the mass level there must be a broad consensus in which citizens commit themselves to democratic ideals, and use the democratic process to effect political change regardless of whether the system performs well or poorly (Diamond, 1997a:14-15).

This implies that when actors resort to means outside of the democratic system in pursuit of their political goals and begin to subvert the constitutionally prevailing rules, or resort to force to effect political change, democracy becomes increasingly destabilised (Schedler, 2001:70). Schedler (2001:71) indicates that when actors resort to the “assassination of political competitors” and attack “the liberty, physical integrity [or] property of political adversaries [and] [use] intimidation [against] voters and candidates [or] [resort] [to] ethnic and social cleansing”, then democracies are undoubtedly deconsolidated. Ultimately, the injection of violence, whatever the form, into the democratic system is an indication that the regime is prone to deconsolidation.

2.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has systematically presented the literature on the conditions of democratic deconsolidation according to a framework that could be used analytically to determine the prospects of a democracy's survival. Hence, when looking at signs of democratic deconsolidation, three conditions are likely: fragile structures (subverted rule of law and poor economic performance), negative attitudes and disruptive/violent behaviour. As mentioned, each of these conditions could be seen as precipitated by poor governance.

As shown in table 2.1, *poor governance* in terms of deconsolidation refers to the lack of impartiality – in which authority is exercised in the interests of special relationships and personal preferences (functioning with fear, favour or on the basis of partisanship); *structurally*, deconsolidation relates to a subversion of or challenge to the rule of law and further to poor socio-economic outcomes; *attitudinally*, democratic deconsolidation relates to actors who no longer deem the democratic regime as the best form of government and begin to express their appeal to authoritarian alternatives or anti-system populist politics thereby consequently withdrawing their support (Foa & Mounk, 2017:9). This withdrawal of support occurs most commonly when actors' value democracy only instrumentally (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012). Furthermore, *behaviourally* a democracy deconsolidates when actors flout the system and use non-democratic means to effect political change.

Table 2. 1: Operationalization of Analytical Framework: Indicators of The Conditions of Democratic Deconsolidation	
Conditions	Indicators
<i>Instigator – Poor Governance</i>	Lack of impartiality - exercising authority in the interests of special or personal relationships or interests
<i>Structural Condition</i> <i>1. Institutional</i> <i>2. Economic</i>	 1. Subversion of or disregard for the rule of law 2. Sluggish economic growth, increase in poverty, inequality and unemployment
<i>Attitudinal Condition</i>	Actors having an instrumental preference for the regime; actors tend to evaluate the quality and performance of government when deciding on whether to support the regime – when the performance and quality of government is poor, then there is an openness to anti-system, authoritarian/populist politics or regime types
<i>Behavioural Condition</i>	Non-acceptance of electoral outcomes and use of violence (actors using non-democratic means to effect political change)

As mentioned, the conditions of democratic deconsolidation postulate indicators based on robust assumptions that could be applied to various case studies. In this research this framework is applied to the case of South Africa – specially focusing on the period during the Zuma administration. This is done to determine whether, in terms of each condition and overall, the Zuma administration contributed to South Africa's democracy regressing closer to a state of deconsolidation.

Following this chapter, Chapter 3 offers a contextual foundation for the inception of the Zuma administration upon which the analysis of this study is conducted. In addition, Chapter 3 also begins the analysis of the case in terms of poor governance as this is considered an instigator

to the deconsolidation process. Chapter 4 will continue the analysis through the lenses of the consequent conditions of democratic deconsolidation (structural, attitudinal and behavioural).

Chapter III – Contextualisation & Analysis of the Zuma Administration

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter established an analytical framework for assessing whether South Africa's democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally as a result of poor governance. The conditions for and concomitant indicators adopted for this assessment were identified and explained. However, a comprehensive analysis is not possible without establishing a sound contextual foundation for it. The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual background against which an analysis of South Africa's democracy during the Zuma years can be achieved. The chapter is divided into two broad parts; the first contextualises the inception and tenure of the Zuma administration, and the second attempts to respond to the secondary research question by applying the lens of poor governance to the case of South Africa during the Zuma administration.

In laying the contextual groundwork, the first section of this chapter will discuss the accession of Jacob Zuma as President of the African National Congress (ANC) in 2007 and of South Africa in 2009. Although many perceived Zuma's rise to power as the ushering in of a new dawn – one that marked the end of a government isolated from its support base (both within the ANC as well as its wider support base) and signalled the beginning of a pluralist tripartite government committed to redressing the appalling conditions of the poor and disenfranchised – but much of this proved to be unfounded. On the contrary, the Zuma administration achieved little in the way of its initial purported pro-poor endeavours. Instead, the rise of the Zuma administration could largely be seen as a response to Mbeki's centralising of power in the Presidency and the factional infighting over the spoils derived from the overarching national project – the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) – which had placed a premium on the executive power.

Once in power, the Zuma administration largely focused on strengthening this overarching project – as underscored by the *Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics of the ANC*⁴ document – by allowing previously marginalised ANC factions into the patronage

⁴ The *Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* document was adopted at the 52nd ANC National Conference in 2007. The document derives from the overarching national policy – the National Democratic Revolution. The strategies and tactics document outlines the basic approach to strengthening the national policy by emphasising a proactive takeover by cadres in all spheres of government and society with the view to societal transformation.

fold. The national project has since served as the catalyst for the growth of an overextended administration governing in the interest of its own partisan ends and eventually culminating in the state capture project.⁵

Building on this, the chapter will address the secondary research question by focusing primarily on the issue of poor governance. In considering whether state institutions govern impartially – without persuasion or consideration of special/personal relationships – the analysis finds that a blurring of state-government-party lines through cadre deployment and the state capture project has severely eroded the autonomy of South African institutions to govern and function according to their constitutional mandate. This is perhaps most evidently demonstrated in the repurposing of the Department of Public Enterprises and its various parastatals, particularly South African Airways, Transnet and Eskom, for private ends.

In analysing poor governance as an instigator to the democratic deconsolidation process in South Africa, this chapter maintains that the Zuma administration has largely left behind a legacy characterized by a systematic undermining and hallowing out of state institutions which has overtly flouted the rule of law and subsequently crushed the spirit and principles of constitutional democracy. Consequently, South Africa's democracy finds itself in a place in which it is seen to be vulnerable to democratic deconsolidation.

3.2 A Contextualization of the Zuma Administration

3.2.1 The Election and Inception of Zuma's Government

In December 2007 former Deputy President Jacob Zuma succeeded former President Mbeki by a landslide vote (2 329 to 1 505) for the position of president of South Africa's dominant (ruling) party. By the time of the national elections in 2009, Zuma was set to become South Africa's third democratically elected president. For many that victory appeared to usher in a new dawn marked by a renewed emphasis on the plight of the disenfranchised and the poor, accompanied by a revival of the Tripartite Alliance – the ruling ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

However, much of the initial optimism proved to be largely unfounded. The inception of the Zuma administration could be seen as a response to the wave of dissatisfaction of those factions

⁵ According to Swilling (2017), the state capture project could be understood as the establishment of a well-organised network of companies and individuals who were strategically positioned – by Zuma and members of the Gupta family – to neutralise key state institutions in order to divert rents away from state coffers and into private hands.

(Cosatu and SACP) who were isolated from enjoying the spoils of office derived from the overarching national project – the NDR – due to Mbeki’s centralisation of the Presidency. Once in power, the Zuma administration largely focused on strengthening the NDR by allowing the previously marginalised Cosatu and SACP members’ access to NDR spoils into the fray. However, the Zuma administration’s emphasis on the NDR as a cornerstone of its governance strategy has not only allowed the growth of a bloated administration, but also created the opportunity for state capture.

The ANC and the NDR as a Backdrop to Zuma’s Rise to Power

Democratisation in 1994 brought with it the task of transforming South African society from an unjust and unequal one to a fairer democratic one. The ANC embarked on this task of transformation through its NDR policy – an overarching national project which has served to guide the party’s governance approach since winning its first national elections in 1994 (see de Jager, 2009; Filatova, 2011; du Toit & de Jager, 2014). The basic tenet of this policy, which is rooted in Soviet ideology, is the achievement of a racially demographically representative society through a system of cadre deployment in which the ANC assigns some of its members to strategic positions within the public service sector (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:98). The term ‘cadre’ here refers to party members trained and disciplined in the ideology of the party who are “expected to exhibit a high level of political commitment and doctrinal discipline” (Heywood, 2002:249).

According to the ANC (2007:4), a “national democratic society is a conscious construct, dependent on conscious action by politically advanced sections of society”. This conscious construct is primarily to be realised through “strengthening the hold of the democratic government on state power, and transforming state machinery to serve the cause of social change” (ANC, 1999). As such, the achievement of a national democratic society is seen to start with the ANC’s appointment of cadres in various positions of power. The ANC prioritised the appointment of cadres to various levels of state, including parliamentary legislators, trade union and student movements, and youth, women’s and other mass democratic organisations (Turok, 2011:246). This policy has served to justify ANC’s governance strategy of control and intervention in all areas of state and the economy.

The rationale for the NDR was that the best way to mitigate potential sabotage of the new government by the opposition would be to install loyal party members who could be trusted politically (Hartley, 2011). The ANC explained that ensuring that its policies and elected

manifestos would be implemented as intended across all spheres of state required the appointment of party loyalists to positions of power (Twala, 2014:161). Booysen (2011:397) notes that with the implementation of cadre deployment, the ANC had the opportunity to assign specific governance task to so-called trusted deployed members. As such, the NDR also allowed the capturing and manipulation of the state's resources and its structural framework.

It should also be noted that, while the intended aim of the NDR was to achieve a more equal and representative society, it unfortunately allowed for the establishment of a mass patronage network in which partisanship was prioritised above competence. Twala (2014:163) notes that cadre appointment and deployment are often based on the loyalty and connections that cadres have to senior leaders (of regions or provinces) so as to shield these senior members from criticism if the need arises. In cases where cadres have 'proven' their loyalty, they are rewarded with the spoils of office (which include use of state 'bonuses', transportation, promotions, to name a few). This dynamism of loyalty to those who appoint them has two broad implications: firstly, it implies that the cadres govern without accountability to the broad public. Twala (2014:163) contends that often the deployed cadres would regard themselves as appointees of the ANC rather than public servants, and therefore see themselves as accountable to no one other than the alliance deployment committee that appointed them. Quintal (2007:1) therefore contends that ANC cadres in positions of massive influence (in the executive, the legislatures and state institutions) have created a problem of 'social distance' between the cadres and ordinary members and supporters. Secondly, the dynamism of cadre loyalty to those who appointed them also implies that offers of positions and power become synonymous with access to the state and its resources (the so-called rewards of loyalty) (du Toit and de Jager, 2014:112). When governments can politically control the public bureaucracy and use state resources for partisan ends, then the state loses its autonomy, creating a zero-sum game.

Ultimately, the governance strategy of cadre deployment severely compromised the relationship between independent institutions, the elected party and the need for democratic representation. In addition, it brings the partisan policy of the NDR into contention with the aspirations of impartiality as endorsed in the Constitution. Nonetheless, despite the myriad of problems arising from the NDR, this policy served as the overarching governance strategy across the various administrations that have governed within the ANC.

Coalition of the Aggrieved and the Election of Zuma

The control of state resources, through the appointment and deployment of loyal cadres, has provided a fertile breeding ground for factional infighting. This was, perhaps, most evidently displayed in the Mbeki-Zuma succession struggle, which was largely informed by the ANC's reaction to Mbeki, who used "state power to govern over the ANC" (Booyesen, 2011:360). In other words, the ousting of Mbeki was largely due to his practising of 'big man politics', by using the power of control (derived from the NDR) to govern over the state and the party for purposes of strengthening his position in the Presidency.

Under Mbeki, the strategy of the NDR reflected a separation between the party and the state and a strengthening of the Presidency. This is because the NDR under Mbeki broadly focused on the development of state institutions to facilitate improved coordination of state business and policy implementation. According to Booyesen (2011:369), much of this development occurred at the top of the institutional hierarchy, with specific attention given to the Presidency. Here, top executive levels of power and bureaucratic executives were given vast responsibilities to coordinate and steer government work for the purpose of ensuring effective policy implementation (Booyesen, 2011:369). As a consequence of the emphasis on state institutions, much cadre deployment (and the accompanying spoils of office) became centralised at the top levels. For example, Mbeki's cabinet tended to largely dominate the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) meetings – disregarding the power capacity of this organ – effectively creating an inner sanctum which doubled as the NEC's National Working Committee (NWC) that ruled over the ANC (Booyesen, 2011:364).

In addition, Mbeki's administration was often hostile to the politics of the provinces and used national institutions as a vehicle to drive the authority of the Presidency (Butler, 2009:162). Southall (2009:323) notes that Mbeki isolated many important individuals within the alliance by insisting on appointing premiers and directors from the centre. While this strategy of vesting total power within the Presidency succeeded in coordinating government and reigning in the wayward tendencies of the provinces, it simultaneously led to the alienation of hungry provincial 'barons' (Southall, 2015:8). Mbeki's administration was therefore generally perceived as entailing the centralisation of state power under the Presidency, with the party itself 'playing second fiddle' (Southall, 2015:8). It was this alienation from the central office – with its spoils – and the increasing strengthening of the Presidency that led to Mbeki falling out of favour.

Furthermore, Mbeki's big man politics also earned him an unenviable reputation of "being out of touch with ordinary people" (Mattes, 2002:28). This 'out of touch' syndrome was most evidently demonstrated in Mbeki's Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (Aids) denialism, when he chose to stall the roll out antiretrovirals because he did not believe that HIV 'causes' Aids and therefore should be treated accordingly. Mattes (2002:28) observes that:

in the face of one of the highest HIV infection rates in the world, [Mbeki] [had] consistently chosen to fritter away the considerable symbolic authority of his office by questioning the causal link between HIV and AIDS, investing time and resources in a presidential commission evenly divided between mainstream-stream and 'dissident' scientists.

The decisions made by the Mbeki administration on the basis of his HIV/Aids denialism drew serious criticism; his policies and choices were seen as having exacerbated the spread of the disease. Mbeki's denialism was also seen reflective of his increasing power over party and state governance.

Beyond these social issues, the economic conditions at the time also contributed to the perception of Mbeki's isolation from ordinary people. This is because the Mbeki administration, despite having successfully grown the economy, did not manage to distribute its benefits equally. The positive economic growth derived from the technocratic policy of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution framework as well as the newly created black middle class (on the basis of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE)) stood in stark contrast with the rising figures of unemployment, crime and poverty (Southall, 2009:325; Vincent, 2011:2). As Gumede (2008:262) notes, there was "a disjuncture between the shining mirage of the economic boom in the suburbs and the reality of the rural township areas". For many ANC supporters this was perceived as democracy and its economic benefits serving only the interests of the white middle class and the new black middle class.

Consequently, Mbeki's leadership style and governance strategy, ultimately culminated in a humiliating defeat at the ANC's National Conference in 2007 in which many factions marginalised (particularly Cosatu and SACP members) by Mbeki's governance style threw their weight behind Zuma. Even with the party having lost all confidence in Mbeki, he was expected to remain state president for the duration of his tenure, which was to expire in June 2009 (Southall, 2009:317). However, seemingly in a bid to restore the balance of power back

to the party, the NEC (with majority of whom now supported Zuma) decided that Mbeki should be recalled. According to Southall (2009:318), the NEC followed the party line that it had ‘deployed’ Mbeki to the position of the presidency and thus has the right to recall him (although constitutionally only Parliament has the authority to end a president’s tenure). Booysen (2011:364) contends that “Mbeki’s downfall was that he underestimated the ANC’s hierarchical leadership culture and overestimated the reverence for his position at the top of the stack”. Ultimately, Mbeki, by mistaking the confidence that the top leadership structure had in him as signalling that he could go ahead to institute a supreme leadership style (including isolating central members of the party from the spoils of office), caused the downfall of his administration himself.

3.2.2 Zuma’s Government

After garnering mass support from a wide range of internal sources – including members from the SACP, Cosatu, the ANC Youth League, the ANC Women’s League, BBBEE oligarchs and ANC leaders under investigation for corruption (hoping that if Zuma’s case is squashed, theirs would be too), and external sources (the ANC’s traditional support base), Zuma became South Africa’s third democratically elected president in 2009 (Southall, 2009:323). Once in power, the Zuma administration largely concentrated on strengthening the overarching national project (NDR), which included dispersing power to those previously marginalised. This was particularly underscored by the *Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics of the ANC* document adopted at the 2007 conference. This document reemphasised that, for the ANC to exercise its vanguard role, the party must prioritise the involvement of all cadres in all centres of power (ANC, 2007:12). In addition, it reinforced the importance of the ANC retaining a hold on the state by advocating for greater activism in the “mass terrain of civil society structures”, particularly those that fell within the intellectual and ideological realms (ANC, 2007:12). Ceruti (2008:112) summarises the inception of the Zuma administration as simply entailing “old strategies persist[ing] in new conditions”.

The achievement of the aims set out by the strategy and tactics document brought high levels of change among incumbents in public institutions. In relation to the top leadership structure, it was imperative for Zuma to substitute Mbeki loyalists with Zuma devotees. This was not only to bring security to his position, but also to repay the debt of support given to Zuma in his ascension to power. However, as Booysen (2011:362) notes, “this process was moderated by the need to win” Mbeki supporters over (this was mainly achieved by assuring Mbeki loyalists job or income security).

Zuma managed to neatly blend many of the direct interfaces between party and state – with power more skewed to the party than to the state. The ANC’s Polokwane NEC was given high-level representation in the May 2009 cabinet, while eligible members of the NWC were also provided with representation in cabinet (Booyesen, 2011:366). Other significant changes included adding SACP representatives such as Blade Nzimande (Minister of Higher Education and Training), Jeremy Cronin (Deputy Minister of Transport), Cosatu representatives in the form of Ebrahim Patel (Minister of Economic Development), together with hard nationalists such as Jeff Radebe and Nathi Matthews, coupled together with soft nationalists (Tokyo Sexwale and Lindiwe Sisulu) as well as eight members of Mbeki’s last cabinet (Calland, 2009:59-60; Basson & du Toit, 2017:20).

The cost of Zuma’s political ‘debt repayment’ was an over-bloated government marked by a cabinet of 35 ministers (compared to Mbeki’s 2004 cabinet, which had 29 ministers, while Mandela’s 1994 cabinet had 25 ministers) (Calland, 2009:56). This inflation was also the result of the creation of six new ministries, for example economic development was split into national planning and performance monitoring, while education was divided into basic education and higher education and training.

Although these changes were made when Zuma initially took office, eventually allocating cabinet positions would become a key instrument in leveraging and wielding political power. This is because, unlike his predecessors who were loath to reshuffle their cabinets, unless necessary, Zuma reshuffled his cabinet on four separate occasions during his first term as president: October 2010 – two ministers were reassigned, seven replaced and 17 new deputy ministers appointed; 24 October 2011 – two ministers were removed, two were reassigned, two promoted to deputy minister and two were removed; 3 October 2012 – one minister was reassigned and one promoted; 9 July 2013 – three ministers removed, three appointed and one reassigned (Calland, 2013:60). Calland (2013:60) remarks that “in just three years, the character and personnel, as well as the ideological hue and political alchemy of the cabinet had changed dramatically, even though the same party was in power”. As de Jager and Steenekamp (2019:7) note, the expansion (and regular changes) of Zuma’s cabinet largely reflected the elements of partisanship that were a consequence of the NDR.

In addition to a new cabinet, Zuma brought other changes to government that allowed for a broader exercise of power over state institutions. These changes involved the dissolution of several bodies such as the Scorpions (an investigative unit which had vigorously investigated

Zuma's involvement in the arms deal⁶) and the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services, to mention just two (Basson & du Toit, 2017:18). They were subsequently replaced by the Hawks and a National Planning Commission (which was accompanied by an Economic Development Department [EDD]) respectively (Calland 2013:52). These latter bodies were created in part to appease the SACP and Cosatu in further assigning power as well as diffusing economic policy, planning and power away from Treasury. Initially, the diffusion of power away from Treasury was hoped to be achieved by breaking-up the line ministers into smaller ministries which would report to a super ministry (Calland, 2013:62). The EDD was to serve as a super ministry that would take over the macro-economic policy and strategy process, thereby dispersing economic policy-making power more widely across government and away from Treasury (Calland, 2013:62-3). However, despite these attempts to gain control of economic policy making, the EDD ultimately lacked the authority and overarching power to achieve its intended aims. Apart from driving the New Growth Path (an economic development framework devised by the Zuma administration), the EDD's role was largely confined to operating as a think tank within government (Basson & du Toit, 2017:19). Notwithstanding the various shortcomings of these departments, the Zuma administration's attempts at reconfiguring government, would eventually come to reflect one of the first attempts at decentralizing power away from Treasury. Beyond these institutional changes, the Zuma administration never fully realized the pro-poor agenda and policies that their campaign had so fervently advocated. On the contrary, the myriad socio-economic problems such as poverty, high unemployment and crime that had long plagued South Africa were increasingly exacerbated. Although Zuma, unlike his predecessor, welcomed dissent and created a space for open discussion on these issues (both in the policy process and in the public sphere), effective redress by government was ultimately stifled by Zuma's alliance with another partner – the Guptas – as well as his commitment to realizing the project of state capture.

⁶ Zuma was implicated during the trial of his financial advisor at the time, Schabir Shaik, in using his position to protect the arms company- Thint Holdings- handling the Strategic Defence Package, a multi-billion-rand military acquisition arms deal which aimed at modernizing the South African Defence Force (Basset & Clarke, 2008:789; Calland, 2013:3). Within this deal it was alleged that, Thint Holdings paid Zuma via his advisor R500 000 a year to prevent investigations of corruption relating to the agreement (Basset & Clarke, 2008:789).

3.3 Poor Governance as an Instigator of Democratic Deconsolidation

3.3.1 State Capture and Governance during the Zuma years




Figure 3. 1: Poor Governance as the Instigator of the Democratic Deconsolidation Process

As noted in the previous chapter, an understanding of poor governance broadly requires a consideration of the way in which democratic governance is exercised. To put this another way, a consideration of governance as an instigator of democratic deconsolidation requires an assessment of whether state institutions govern impartially; that is, do they exercise power without the persuasion of, or consideration of, special/personal relationships or preferences (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008:169). In the absence of impartiality, the state's autonomy and neutrality are eroded. Furthermore, when governments govern in the interests of partisanship, then structurally democratic institutions become drained of their democratic content, which causes skewed economic outcomes that further erode civic trust (Diamond, 1990:49; Jou, 2016:601-603). Collectively these conditions could cause democratic regression, if not complete breakdown.

In South Africa good governance centred on impartiality is enshrined in the Constitution and acts as an overarching authority for the functioning of all spheres and organs of government. The principle of impartiality, and by implication the principle of good governance, is specifically stipulated numerous times throughout the Constitution. For example, sections 165 and 96 prescribe that all arms of government, which include the executive, legislature and the judiciary, are required to act impartially (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Moreover, the requirement of impartiality as prescribed by the Constitution extends beyond the branches of government to include the principles that govern public administration. Sections 195 and 217 state that services rendered or procured by public enterprises and other organs of state must be done impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias (Republic of South Africa, 1996). In

addition, public enterprises are required according to section 195 to function efficiently and economically, and to use resources effectively by being development oriented (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Collectively, these principles and prescriptions set out by the Constitution are aimed at achieving good governance.

Although the Constitution makes provision for good governance and impartiality, the exercise of power by the Zuma administration (and the ANC at large) showed strong elements of partisanship. This was demonstrated most clearly in the make-up of Zuma's 2009 cabinet, amongst others. Also, while Zuma (unlike Mbeki) ensured that his primary power base remained the party rather than the state, he also managed to successfully shift the locus of power towards satisfying his own interests (de Jager & Parkin, 2017:14). According to Southall (2015:8), Zuma appeased those members who had previously been marginalised by allowing ministers who were appointed to those ministries of little personal concern to him to "get on with their job". However, Zuma at the same time "retained strong personal control by appointing those loyal to him to ministries which pertained to his political and personal well-being" (Southall, 2015:8). This was evident in that "the boards and senior leadership of many parastatals (Eskom, South African Airways (SAA), SABC, PetroSA, [to mention a few]) and state institutions are often individuals with close ties to those in power" (de Jager & Parkin, 2017:14). Ultimately the power mechanisms that the NDR allowed served as a catalyst to develop the new locus of power – Zuma's state capture project.

The project of state capture could be understood as the establishment of a well-organized network of companies and individuals that was created strategically to hallow out key state institutions in order to divert rents away from state coffers and into private hands (Swilling, 2017:5). This project largely came to fruition through Zuma's alliance with the Gupta family.⁷ The former Public Protector's (PP) (2016) report titled *State of Capture* traces the many events which indicated the exertion of influence by the Guptas over Zuma when it came to the appointment and removal of cabinet ministers and directors of state-owned enterprises, resulting in the improper and potentially corrupt awarding of state contracts.

⁷ The Guptas (predominantly the brothers Atul, Ajay and Rajesh) are a wealthy Indian-born family who own a business empire that spans the computer, technology, mining and media industry- several branches of which have been established in South Africa since 1994 (Basson & du Toit, 2017:57). The Guptas and their various companies have been closely linked to the Zuma administration via Zuma's son, Duduzane Zuma, who owns shares in many of the Gupta's businesses.

Through the state capture project Zuma and the Guptas were able to capture key state organs such as the security cluster, including the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks) and the State Security Agency; and the finance agencies, including the South African Revenue Service, Treasury and the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) with its various parastatals. In maintaining the focus on analysing governance, only the DPE will be discussed here. Other organs of state, namely the NPA and the Hawks, which were central to state capture will be dealt with in Chapter 4 through an analysis of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation as it relates to the rule of law. This section will draw on the observations of the PP's (2016) *State of Capture* report to demonstrate the patterns of patronage and poor governance under the Zuma administration.

Ultimately, when applying the principle of impartiality and its concomitant prescripts enshrined in the Constitution to that of the Zuma administration, it can be seen that good governance was hardly achieved. On the contrary, poor governance under Zuma's administration has left behind a dysfunctional organization which has paralyzed state institutions, draining them of their capacity to operate equitably, fairly and impartially, and effectively hindering their capacity to fulfil their constitutional mandate (Basson & Du Toit, 2017:77). The legacy of Zuma's administration and arguably the hallmark of his governance has become encapsulated in the political project of state capture.

3.3.1.1 Capturing DPE and SAA

In terms of the capturing of DPE and its various parastatals, a clear pattern was unfolding in which the wielding of political power through strategic deployment and replacement by Jacob Zuma and his cabinet played a central role. Basson and du Toit (2017:96) note that former President Zuma "fires a minister, appoints a new minister [who] appoints a new board of directors who opens the doors of opportunity for the Gupta/Zuma empire". In this way, the strategies and tactics of the NDR served the aims of state capture.

A case in point is the capturing of SAA, in which the Guptas nearly overhauled the parastatal's board, undermined its constitutional mandate of operating impartially and cost effectively, and caused the government to lose millions in revenue. These events could be traced to October 2010, when then chair of Parliament's portfolio committee on public enterprises, Mabel Petronella Mentor, requested a meeting with the President to discuss her unhappiness at the closure of Pebble Bed Modular Reactor Company (Mentor, 2017:149). As Mentor recounted in her interview with former Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, she expected to meet with the

President in the Union Buildings, but was instead greeted by Ajay Gupta (Public Protector, 2016:80; Mentor, 2017:149; Pauw, 2017:302). He then said that the President was unavailable and proceeded to escort her to the Gupta compound in Saxonworld where, during their meeting, he asked her if she could leverage her position of influence on SAA to stop the airline from offering direct flights from Johannesburg to Mumbai (Public Protector, 2016:81; Mentor, 2017).

It was further alleged that in return Ajay promised Mentor a promotion to Minister of DPE, which was to take effect in the next (and at the time, imminent) cabinet reshuffle (Public Protector, 2016; Mentor, 2017). According to Mentor's recounts, after she rejected the offer by Ajay and questioned him about his knowledge on when a reshuffle would take place, Zuma entered the room (Mentor, 2017:149). Zuma then proceeded to escort Mentor back to her car without addressing what happened or reprimanding Ajay for acting on his official behalf. It was further alleged that after receiving this information, Mentor met with SAA's then chief executive officer, Siza Mzimela, to discuss the feasibility of cutting the direct Johannesburg-Mumbai route, to which Mzimela responded that it would be both unwise and unprofitable (Basson & du Toit, 2017:98).

Nonetheless, by 31 October 2010 former President Zuma, during his first cabinet reshuffle, fired then Minister of DPE, Barbara Hogan, and replaced her with a more compromised candidate, Malusi Gigaba. Hogan's departure was not only signalled during Mentor's meeting, but was indicated in June 2010 when she refused to meet with Jet Airways chief executive officer who had lobbied SAA for several months for the parastatal to drop its route (Umraw, 2018; Basson & du Toit, 2017:98). While, at the time, efforts at lobbying for SAA to drop its route yield no success, Jet Air established a direct route between Johannesburg and Mumbai, which was then SAA's most lucrative route (Umraw, 2018). In October 2012 SAA board chair at the time, Cheryl Carolus, resigned together with seven board members because of a break in their relationship with Gigaba (Basson & du Toit, 2017:100). Later, SAA chief executive officer and another two general managers stepped down.

By January 2013 Gigaba found a chairperson replacement in Dudu Myeni, who had long served as chair of the Jacob Zuma Foundation (Basson & du Toit, 2017: 98). In April of 2013, following several replacements and placement of key individuals, SAA and Jet Air announced the roll out of code-sharing agreement that would enable SAA customers to freely use Jet Air between Johannesburg and Mumbai, Delhi and Bangladesh (Umraw, 2018). However, this expansion supposedly driven by SAA was seemingly unsustainable, as by early 2015 the

parastatal announced that due to financial losses, it would remove the Mumbai-Johannesburg route (Basson & du Toit, 2017:99). In essence, the route, which in 2010 had been one of SAA's most profitable, had in five years become too costly to maintain.

As Basson and du Toit (2017:101) remark, "whether financial loss is the reason behind the closure of SAA's Johannesburg to Mumbai route or not, the fact remains that less than five years after Ajay offered Mentor a ministerial post in exchange for dropping the route, his wishes came true". More disconcerting is that the PP's (2016) report found that there were no measures taken by anyone in relation to the investigation of Mentor's allegations against Zuma. The PP (2016:345) concluded that if Zuma were guilty of allowing the Guptas to influence the appointment of ministers, then he would have contravened section 2.3(e) of the Executive Ethics Code ("which prohibits a member of the Executive from using information received in confidence in the course of their duties otherwise than in connection with the discharge of their duties"). Nonetheless, the events that unfolded at SAA indicate the way in which former president Zuma used his position and influence in making cabinet appointments to strategically place a person in the DPE to ensure the capturing of SAA.

3.3.1.2 Capturing Transnet

The pattern of deployment and replacement in the interest of benefiting personal and special relationships was repeated in one of Transnet's largest tender deals for the purchasing of 1 064 locomotives. As announced during Zuma's February 2012 State of the Nation Address, South Africa would embark on a massive infrastructure development drive (Republic of South Africa, 2012). This entailed, in part, addressing Transnet's market demand strategy, which required a R300 billion investment over seven years for capital infrastructure projects – the bulk of which would be dedicated to rail projects (Republic of South Africa, 2012).

However, prior to the announcement, several individuals were assigned to key positions to set the capture strategy in motion. This included Zuma's appointment of Gigaba as Minister of DPE in 2010, Gigaba's appointment of Iqbal Sharma to the position of Chair of Transnet's board of acquisitions and disposals committee, which was responsible for overseeing the awarding of large tenders (Sharma was a known Gupta associate, who had a stake in Gupta-owned steel manufacturing business VR-Laser); and the appointment of Anoj Singh in July 2012 as Transnet's chief financial officer (Basson & du Toit, 2017:105).

Following the infrastructure development announcement and several cadre appointments later, in July 2012 Transnet, as part of the development drive, advertised a tender worth R50 billion

for the acquisition of 599 electric and 465 diesel locomotives (Basson & du Toit, 2017:105). By March 2014 this tender was awarded to four different companies, which included a split between China South Rail (359) and Bombardier Transportation (240) for the supply of electric locomotives, as well as a split between China North Rail Rolling Stock (232) and General Electric Transportation (233) for the supply of diesel locomotives (Swilling, 2017). Three months later the *Mail and Guardian* published an article that implicated Iqbal Sharma (then chairperson of Transnet's board tender committee) in the locomotive deal and revealed Duduzane Zuma and Rajesh Gupta as key beneficiaries. According to the article, Sharma entered into negotiations to buy Zuma/Gupta-owned engineering firm VR Laser (Faull, Bhardwaj, Letsaolo, Sole and Brummer, 2014). While these negotiations were still ongoing, the four successful bidders all visited VR Lasers premises to "assess the profitability of subcontracting work to VR Laser" (Faull, Bhardwaj, Letsaolo, Sole and Brummer, 2014). Essentially, what had happened was that the person responsible for awarding the locomotives tender had used his position to profit personally from the deal through subcontracting. Additionally, the son of the President at the time as well as Rajesh Gupta also stood to gain.

When the article was published, these events were purely speculation; however, in 2017 a series of leaked emails, known as the Guptaleaks (which eventually revealed the extent of state capture) dispelled any notion that these events were speculative. According to the Guptaleaks, in December 2012, following Transnet's advertisement of the locomotive tender, the parastatal, under the stewardship of then chief executive officer Brian Molefe, appointed an advisory firm, McKinsey and its partners Regiments to oversee the financial transaction of the tender at a capped amount of R375 million (amaBhungane & Scorpio, 2017; Swilling, 2017; Public Protector, 2016:56). McKinsey and Regiments, as transaction advisors, then subcontracted large portions of its contract to Trillian Capital Partners (amaBhungane & Scorpio, 2017; Public Protector, 2016:56/7). In 2014 the Guptas made an offer to purchase Regiments, but this was rejected (Faull, Bhardwaj, Letsaolo, Sole and Brummer, 2014).

Subsequently, Eric Wood, a 32-percent shareholder in Regiments, led the company to form Trillian Capital with Salim Essa (a Gupta business associate) (Public Protector, 2016:56/7). According to Fundudzi Forensic investigations, it was found that McKinsey was given preferential treatment as its proposal was received after the application closing date of 10 June 2014 (Gous, 2018). Furthermore, investigative reports revealed that Singh (then chief financial officer of Transnet) told Molefe that Regiments advised the split of the locomotive deal between four service providers (Basson & du Toit, 2017:105). Ultimately, through a network

of key individuals and companies, the tender deal was assigned in such a way that the Guptas and several associates profited handsomely at the cost of the state's infrastructural development. Consequently, the rigging of the tender process and the subversion of the constitutional rule of impartiality in awarding state contracts not only resulted in inefficient service delivery (when the first batch of locomotives arrived they were plagued by technical problems), but also huge financial losses for the state (this will be dealt with in Chapter 4 through the economic performance lens of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation).

3.3.1.3 Capturing Eskom

Although the incidents with SAA and Transnet pointed to instances of strategic capturing and profiteering from state parastatals by Zuma and Gupta-owned companies and associates, none would be as blatant as the events that unfolded at Eskom, which resulted in several years of periodic load shedding, retrenchments as cost-cutting measures, and high tariff increases that inflated consumer costs and raised the overall cost of living in South Africa. In the case of Eskom, through strategic manoeuvring and leveraging political power, the Guptas were able to usurp an entire coal mine.

The attempts by the Guptas to gain control of Optimum (a mining company that supplied coal to Eskom through its Mpumalanga-based Brakfontein mine) started as early as 1993. It was in this year that Optimum, through its parent company Glencore, signed a contract with Eskom to supply its Hendrina power station with 5.5 million tons of coal over the next 15 years (Basson & du Toit, 2017:112). Although the deal was successfully processed, by 2013 Optimum triggered the hardship clause in its 1993 agreement, as the company had been operating at a financial loss (Capazorio, 2017). Subsequently, Eskom and Optimum entered into negotiations to establish an agreement that would keep the company afloat and allow it to continue to supply coal until December 2018 – the legal end of the 1993 contract (Capazorio, 2017).

However, during this negotiation period several significant shifts occurred. In December 2014 cabinet almost completely overhauled the Eskom board and nine new directors (5 of whom were directly linked to Salim Essa⁸) were appointed (Sole, McKune & Brummer, 2016). In addition, nine of Eskom's 13 directors were linked to the Guptas through family, friends or business connections. Furthermore, by mid-2015 Lynn Brown (who had replaced Malusi

⁸ Salim Essa is a well-known associate businessman to the Gupta family. Essa owns several shares in Gupta-owned enterprises including VR Laser and Trillian Holdings, to mention a few.

Gigaba as Minister of Public Enterprises) appointed Brian Molefe as chief executive officer of Eskom (Public Protector, 2016:118). Eventually, the Eskom board appointed in 2014 would be predominantly made up of individuals with direct or indirect business or personal relationships with Zuma's son and the Gupta family (Public Protector, 2016:119). As such, the Eskom board was considered to have been improperly constituted (Public Protector, 2016:347).

Nonetheless, by consequence of several structural shifts and the appointment of Molefe, the negotiated deal to assist Optimum in continuing operations was negated. In response, Optimum proposed a counteroffer to Eskom in which the parastatal would receive R300 per ton of the coal supplied by Optimum until December 2018. The PP (2016:23) report notes that at this point four significant things happened.

- 1) Eskom rejected the offer proposed by Optimum and imposed a R2.1 billion extraordinary fine for supplying substandard coal since 2012. (According to the PP (2016:23) report, Eskom refusing to sign the new deal of coal supply from its Hendrina Power Station meant that the parent company Glencore suffered from severe prejudice).
- 2) Optimum retrenches 380 workers to ease financial constraints.
- 3) KPMG, an audit firm, approaches Optimum with an anonymous offer to purchase the company for R2 billion.
- 4) By 31 July 2015, unable to cope with the financial strain, Optimum placed itself under business rescue.

Following these events, and just two years after he was fired from the position of mining minister by Zuma, Ngoako Ramatlhodi reportedly told amaBhugane that he was fired because he would not concede to pressure by Molefe to blackmail Optimum into selling by suspending its mining license pending the payment of the R2 billion fine (Swilling, 2017). According to Ramatlhodi, he refused to further exacerbate the load-shedding crisis which was already underway in South Africa (Swilling, 2017). Consequently, Ramatlhodi was perceived as a hinderance to the Gupta deal and was subsequently removed from his ministerial position.

The search for a new mining minister was easily settled in August of 2015, when a property consultant from the Free State emailed the curriculum vitae of a local teacher, Joseph Zwane, to Tony Gupta (Basson & du Toit, 2017:113). Zwane's curriculum vitae indicated that apart from teaching, he served as a Member of the Executive Council under Free State premier Ace Magashule (a long-time associate and benefactor of the Gupta's). As Basson and du Toit (2017:113) note, in hindsight, it is safe to conclude that Zwane was introduced to the Gupta's

by Magashule. By 2 September 2015 ANC Secretary General, Jesse Duarte, sent a letter to Parliament informing them that Zwane had been nominated to fill the vacancy of ANC Minister of Parliament (as the Gupta leaks would later show, this letter was forwarded to Tony Gupta on the same day) (Sole & Comrie, 2017). Only three weeks after Ramatlhodi was fired, Zwane was hired as new mining minister. With the appointment of Zwane, Tegeta⁹ could easily take over Optimum (which remained under business rescue).

During this time Eskom's executive group had been pressurising Optimum to find a more permanent solution to its financial hardship and weakened coal supply (Capazorio, 2017). By 29 November 2015 Zwane met with the chief executive officer of Glencore (Optimum's parent company), together with Tony Gupta and Salim Essa (Capazorio, 2017). According to investigative reports, Zwane admitted that this meeting was held to persuade Glencore's CEO to sell his shares to the Guptas (Basson & du Toit, 2017:117). Allegedly, the meeting ended with a deal settlement in which the CEO sold his shares to Tony Gupta (Basson & du Toit, 2017:117).

On 11 December 2015 it was announced that Tegeta had purchased two Optimum coal mines and an export allocation at Richards Bay coal terminal for R2.15 billion (Public Protector, 2016:184). Essentially, Zwane as mining minister had used his position of power to ensure that Gupta-owned Tegeta could take advantage of Optimum's dire financial status and successfully ensure a purchase transaction. Zwane's support for the deal implied that Tegeta had an unfair advantage over other interested potential buyers. Here the PP (2016) report concluded that it is unlawful for ministers to use their official position of authority to unfairly and unduly influence a contract for a friend. Zwane's bias in favouring Tegeta implied that he had contravened the principle of impartiality (as prescribed in sections 195 and 217 by the Constitution) when it comes to the contracting of goods and services carried out fairly, impartially and without bias (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Public Protector, 2016).

More worrying than the partisanship displayed in the procurement of Optimum and the supply of coal to Eskom are the various gaps in the procurement procedures that Eskom had followed. The Denton (2015) report – which investigated the status of the business and the challenges experienced by Eskom – showed that while there was a battery of policies and legislation on the procurement process of vendors to Eskom, contraventions in the implementation of these

⁹ Tegeta Exploration and Resources Pty Ltd was a Gupta-owned company that mines and produces precious metals.

policies, particularly as they pertain to the procurement process, continued. It was found that often “emerging miners do not comply with all coal supplier requirements, and that the decision to appoint a coal supplier vests in a single person who finally decides which supplier will receive a CSA [Coal Supply Agreement] and which supplier will be excluded” (Denton, 2015). In addition, it was also shown that often successful suppliers (who tend to lack specific requirements) are accommodated to bring them into compliance with policy requirements for suitable coal (other) vendors (Denton, 2015). Ultimately, these loopholes – which are only two amongst many – has allowed for nepotism and corruption to stifle effective functioning and power-generation capabilities of Eskom. Moreover, these gaps in the checks and balances have sparked major economic costs for the state, which will be further elaborated on in Chapter 4 under the economic component of the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation.

Considering the various kinds and levels of manipulation and manoeuvring that were experienced in each of the parastatals – SAA, Transnet and Eskom – it could be seen that the Zuma administration displayed signs of grossly poor governance. Appointing loyalists to key positions not only hindered service delivery, but also indicated that these institutions contravened the provisions of impartiality prescribed by the Constitution by acting to serve Zuma/Gupta self-interest (Public Protector, 2016:348). More concerning is that, despite the blatant ways in which Zuma, the Guptas and various other associates improperly benefited from state resources, there had been limited recourse to the law during the perpetration of these improper (and often illegal) acts (Public Protector, 2016:348). As such, when it comes to governance, it could be seen that South Africa’s democracy has suffered tremendously through draining state institutions of their democratic development and violating the principle of impartiality.

3.4 Concluding Remarks

In analysing the governance of the Zuma administration against the backdrop of the condition of governance of democratic deconsolidation, together with the prescriptions set out in the Constitution, this chapter has shown that the administration has largely left behind a legacy characterized by a systematic undermining and hollowing out of state institutions, dismissing the rule of law and crushing the spirit and principles of constitutional democracy. This was largely achieved through the political project of state capture in which Zuma and his personal allies – the Guptas – established a well-organized network of companies and individuals who were strategically positioned to neutralize key state institutions to divert rents away from state coffers and into private hands (Swilling, 2017).

These patterns were clearly demonstrated in the capture of SAA, whereby Zuma had strategically reshuffled cabinet in 2010 by appointing a new DPE minister who could use his position of power to negotiate and influence business operations in favour of Ajay Gupta's eagerness to have the airline drop its most lucrative route. This was again seen when Gigaba appointed Molefe together with several other individuals to key positions to ensure that the Guptas would profit from South Africa's major infrastructure development drive undertaken by Transnet. Here, through a network of key individuals and companies, the locomotive tender deal was assigned in such a way that the Guptas and several associates profited handsomely at the expense of state infrastructural development.

Consequently, the rigging of the tender process and the subversion of the constitutional rule of impartiality in awarding state contracts resulted in inefficient service delivery, which further eroded public trust in government promises and agendas. However, none of these schemes was more pervasive and destructive than the Gupta's usurping of Optimum and gaining control of Eskom, which resulted in periodic load-shedding since 2008 and severely stifled economic growth and significantly aggravated conditions of poverty. The poor governance of the Zuma administration has resulted in dysfunctional government that has paralyzed state institutions, draining them of their capacity to operate equitably, fairly and impartially, and effectively succeeding in hindering their capacity to fulfil their constitutional mandate.

Building on this analysis, Chapter 4 will turn to an account of South Africa's democracy during the Zuma years using the three lenses of the analytical framework of democratic deconsolidation: structural, attitudinal and behavioural. The structural condition will be examined in two sections, the first of which focuses on the institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law and the subversion of these institutions by the Zuma administration, while the second section focuses on economic regress and the socio-economic conditions that were exacerbated under Zuma's governance. The attitudinal condition will consider the effects of Zuma's governance on attitudes (support) for democratic governance. Finally, Chapter 4 will discuss the rise in anti-democratic behaviour in South Africa, which has largely been a response to the Zuma administration's disregard of the myriad of demands by the public for improved service delivery.

Chapter IV – Analysis of Democratic Regress during the Zuma Years

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 provided an analytical framework that lay out the conditions of democratic deconsolidation – weak structural elements (subversion of the rule of law and economic malaise), and negative attitudes and destructive behaviours – as caused by poor governance. Chapter 3 established the contextual foundation for an analysis of South Africa’s democratic regress during the Zuma years. In building on this foundation, Chapter 3 proceeded to answer the secondary research question guiding the analysis – was poor governance an instigator in facilitating the process of democratic deconsolidation in South Africa during the Zuma years? - by applying the first component – poor governance – of the analytical framework. By applying the lens of poor governance, it was shown that the principle of impartiality in governing institutions, particularly state-owned enterprises, was either damagingly compromised or seriously eroded.

This chapter will continue addressing the primary research question by proceeding with the analysis through applying the structural (rule of law and economic) condition, attitudinal condition and the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation to the case of South Africa during the Zuma administration. As such, this chapter will specially be geared towards offering a response to the primary component of the research question, that is: did South Africa’s democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma years?

In focusing on the primary question, this chapter shows that the predatory patterns established within various government networks and state parastatals could not have been achieved without undermining the rule of law. Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of Nkandla, which not only reflected the ruling party’s willingness to condone and conceal poor governance, but also tested the independence of the Constitution and its accompanying watch dogs – particularly that of the Public Protector (PP). The economic cost of the patterns of patronage woven into the African National Congress (ANC) under Zuma has been severe – with poverty, inequality and unemployment rates rocketing. These dire economic circumstances contrast sharply with the initial expectation of economic emancipation that the birth of democracy brought. In a context where many South Africans value democracy instrumentally, this mismatch between expectation and reality has consequently not only led to a citizenry whose support for democracy is waning, but whose appeal to non-democratic alternatives is

increasing. Ultimately an unresponsive government marred by state capture and cadre deployment amid rising discontent amongst its citizenry opened the way for corrupt demagogues and populist sentiments to seep into the fabric of South African society and be increasingly absorbed; this discontent is most evident in the recent upsurge in violent often militant public protest action. Collectively these trends in structures, attitudes and behaviours could be seen to place South Africa's regime closer to democratic deconsolidation.

This chapter will be divided into three broad sections; the first focuses on the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation, while the second and third sections focuses on the attitudinal and behavioural conditions respectively. Under the structural condition, the chapter will deal with the subversion of the rule of law (particularly drawing on the case of Nkandla) and the unravelling of the security sector (with reference to the Hawks and National Prosecuting Authority) as well as the economic costs of poor governance – increasing rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment. The chapter will then examine the subsequent two conditions: the attitudinal and behavioural conditions of democratic deconsolidation by highlighting the way that the expectation of economic emancipation and the reality of poor economic performance amid poor governance have eroded South Africans' support for democracy – drawing them increasingly to non-democratic alternatives and providing fertile ground for violent protest and populist parties to be increasingly absorbed into the South African political landscape.

4.2 Structural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation




Figure 4. 1: Structural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation

As discussed in Chapter 2, the structural condition of democratic deconsolidation broadly concerns itself with the structures that underpin a democratic regime. This relates to both institutions and the economy. In relation to institutions, democratic deconsolidation largely requires an assessment of the establishment of the rule of law, institutional capacity and

accountability. This is because these structures set out the rules for the effective functioning of the democratic process.

The economic aspect of democratic deconsolidation requires an audit of the economic development and performance of the economy within the regime. This is because without material improvement the demos, particularly in newly established democracies like South Africa, may become inclined to forgo political empowerment for economic freedom.

4.2.1 Rule of Law in South Africa – Accountability Subverted

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the patterns of patronage within state parastatals and government bureaucracy at large could not have been achieved without compromising on the principles of good governance enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, an assessment of democratic regress in South Africa requires consideration of whether the rule of law was broadly respected, institutions were independent and robust, and political officials held to account. As set out in the analytical framework in Chapter 2, the rule of law serves as a fundamental framework not only for setting out the rules of the game, but also for shaping engagement between political actors. The rule of law encompasses independent and impartial governing institutions (judiciary) that can provide the checks and balances necessary for ensuring that the rules of the game are obeyed (accountability). Typically, these rules and their associated institutions are exemplified through a constitution which reigns supreme and ensures transparency and accountability (Mottair, 2002). In the absence of a stringent rule of law and an independent judiciary, the rights, dignity and equality of citizens are not only at risk, but the rules of the democratic game become vulnerable to the manipulation of powerful political actors (O'Donnell, 2005:3).

However, the rule of law does not function on its own, but rather requires “an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens” (Schmitter, 2004:47). In other words, the participation of elites in terms of holding one another accountable and being accountable to relevant institutions that ensure checks in the system is necessary for the realization of a robust democracy premised on the rule of law. Two types of accountability are essential for a well-functioning democracy: vertical accountability (the responsibility that elected leaders acquire for their political decisions affecting citizen-electors) and horizontal accountability (the obligation of government to account to institutional actors that ensure checks and balance). When state institutions and elected representatives are unwilling to

scrutinize one another and be scrutinized, then democratic regimes are vulnerable to democratic deconsolidation.

The Zuma Years: Accountability Subverted

These conditions of democratic deconsolidation, particularly as they pertain to vertical and horizontal accountability and the unwillingness of elected leaders to account to institutional actors, were frequently manifested during the Zuma administration. Events such as the arms deal (mentioned in Chapter 3) and the landing of a Gupta-charted private jet at Waterkloof Airforce Base – one of South Africa’s National Key Points – in 2013, not only speak to the tendency towards poor governance, but also demonstrate a willingness to disregard constitutional obligations in terms of the protection of state resources, offices and functionaries. Graham (2013) observes that the Zuma era saw a shift towards a blatant disrespect for constitutional values and their watchdog institutions.

This disrespect was not only been demonstrated by Zuma and the elites within his network, but increasingly reflected a broader antagonism of the ANC towards the Constitution. Du Toit and de Jager (2014:108) explain this antagonism as relating to a perception of entitlement by the ruling party whereby it believes it should have “more power to do as it sees fit, with fewer checks and balances, and that the Constitution is a hinderance to this aim” (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:108). These disquieting attitudes reflect a growing disregard for constitutionally binding decisions and institutions, and a growing preference for the authority of party power (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:108). Considering the antagonistic attitudes of the ANC towards the Constitution and a growing tendency to disregard the rule of law, there is not much reassurance that South Africa is heading in the right direction. On the contrary, when it came to the rule of law, the Zuma administration showed its willingness to thoroughly test the boundaries of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.

Perhaps, the most pervasive example of this test was the matter of the security upgrades to Nkandla (the private homestead of Jacob Zuma), where Zuma was accused of using state funds amounting to R203 million from the Department of Public Works (DPW) to modify and upgrade his private home. The Nkandla saga prompted several investigations and led the way to a campaign by several members of the ANC of attacks on the office of the PP. This not only demonstrated a disdain for constitutional mechanisms of checks and balances (as evidenced by the growing militancy in Parliament), but also provided the opportunity for the rise of populist

sentiments by opposition candidates to claim victory by insisting that Zuma ‘pay back the money’.

The Nkandla saga came to the fore through an investigation undertaken by a journalist, Mandy Rossouw, who was initially interested in how Nkandla changed once a local resident became president (Gqubule, 2017:89). Whilst visiting the area for research, Rossouw discovered that massive upgrades were being done to Zuma’s private homestead and that these upgrades coincided with other works done in the area by the DPW (Gqubule, 2017:89). These upgrades became the new focus of Rossouw’s article which, when published on 4 December 2009, revealed that the then President was expanding his home to include security features – which included a cattle kraal, fire pool, amphitheatre and visitors centre, amongst others – to the cost of R65 million and the tax payer is “footing the largest chunk of the bill” (Rossouw, 2009). But prior to the publication of this article the Presidency issued a statement saying that the information included in the investigation undertaken by Rossouw was misinterpreted – the upgrades to Zuma’s private home were funded exclusively with private money of the Zuma family and that the DPW was not involved in this construction work (The Presidency, 2009).

While these events were merely speculation at the time, in 2012 a letter leaked by a whistleblower to the *City Press* revealed communication between Kenneth Khanyile (then Manager of DPW) and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde (then Minister of DPW) indicating that the cost of “prestige project A” between the state and principal amounted to R203 million (R200m splurge on Zuma homestead, 2012). This article, as well as several others, led to a public outcry and mounting political pressure from opposition parties. On 15 November 2012 Zuma addressed Parliament on the topic – he assured members that the upgrades were privately funded and that the homestead had a bond for which he continues to pay (Gqubule, 2017:92). Zuma went on to explain that the only part of his residence for which the DPW was liable were the security features (Gqubule, 2017:92). But this statement by Zuma was undermined on 17 November 2012, when *City Press* reported that no bond was registered by Zuma for the Nkandla property (Gqubule, 2017:92). By 20 November the Presidency again attempted to quell the mounting pressure by validating the claim that there was an existing bond owned by Zuma and that proof of this would be provided, but only to an authorised agency or institution empowered by the Constitution (Hansard, 2012).

This culture of secrecy and non-accountability within the ANC government came to a head on 12 February 2015, when the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) disrupted the parliamentary procedure during the State of The Nation Address and demanded en bloc that Zuma “pay back

the money”. In response, Baleka Mbete (speaker of the National Assembly) authorised the arrival of the police in the chamber to remove the disruptive EFF members (Calland & Pienaar, 2016:65). By making Parliament more militant the ANC not only demonstrated the extent of its willingness to conceal poor governance and promote undemocratic behaviour, but also to compromise the constitutional rules of the game.

However, this willingness in turn provided opposition groups and other members of civil society with fertile ground to rally together and opened the way for a mass social activist campaign demanding accountability to chants of “pay back the money”. Additionally, it also provided opposition parties with the opportunity to promote populist sentiments into the minds of an already receptive population, thus speaking to its attitudinal ramifications as will be discussed shortly.

Other individuals, such as Professor Pierre de Vos, exercised their constitutional rights by asking the PP to “probe whether Zuma had breached the executive ethics code by lying to Parliament” (Gqubule, 2017:93). This request was followed by a similar one from the Democratic Alliance, who were amongst the first political parties to join the fray. Accordingly, the PP, in keeping with the constitutional mandate of the office, undertook an investigation into Nkandla. On 19 March 2014 the PP released her report titled “*Secure in Comfort*” in which the main findings of the report concluded that:

- The Zuma family unduly benefitted from the security upgrades and was therefore liable to repay the taxpayers’ money;
- The implementation of the security measures implemented at Zuma’s homestead failed to comply with the parameters of the National Key Points Act of 2010¹⁰ and the Cabinet Policy of 2003¹¹;
- “The organs of state involved in the Nkandla Project failed dismally to follow Supply Chain Management prescripts” in respect of the procurement of goods and services for the Nkandla project – this failure constituted improper conduct and maladministration;
- Zuma contravened the Executive Ethics Code¹² and the Constitution by not taking reasonable steps to prevent irregular spending of state funds for personal gain;

¹⁰ The National Key Points Act of 2010 provides for the protection of sites of national strategic importance against sabotage as determined by the Minister of Police.

¹¹ Cabinet Policy of 2003 is a policy instrument that regulates security installations at state properties.

¹² Executive Ethics Code provides ethical guidelines governing the conduct of members of the Cabinet, Deputy Ministers and members of provisional Executive Councils.

- No tender process was followed in procuring an architect and therefore the usage of Zuma's private architect for work done by the DPW pointed to the possibility of cross-subsidisation;
- The upgrades, which included a fire pool, amphitheatre, visitors centre and cattle kraal, did not constitute security upgrades;
- The whole project failed to comply with procurement procedures and legislation, therefore runaway costs could be incurred leading to large-scale looting (Public Protector, 2016).

However, prior to its release, several attempts to prevent the publication of the PP's report were made by members of ANC. Thulas Nxesi (then Minister of DPW), Jeff Radebe, Nkesinami Nhleko, Mathole Motshekga and Siyabinga Cwele were instrumental in instigating what can be regarded as a concerted campaign of intimidation against the PP. Nxesi, Cwele and Mthethwa established an inter-ministerial task team (made up of employees from the DPW and state security) to investigate the Nkandla matter (this was done during the same time as the investigations by the PP) (Department of Public Works, 2013). The focus of this report was on detailing the scope and procurement of the upgrades. On 27 January 2013 Nxesi revealed the main findings of the investigation – that Zuma was not guilty of abusing state funds for private gain and that the core of the Nkandla debacle lay in the lack of due diligence by members involved in the process of awarding contractors' contracts (Department of Public Works, 2013). Furthermore, their investigation did not include mention of the letter by Khanyile to the Minister regarding the costs of 'prestige project A'. Ultimately, the findings of the reports of the internal task team constituted an extreme antithesis of the findings of the report by the PP.

Further seeking to undermine the PP, and to conceal poor governance in the Nkandla matter, Nxesi, Mthethwa and Cwele, amongst others, applied to the North Gauteng High Court for an interdict to stop the PP from releasing her report (Gqirana, 2016). This was done on the basis that the report by the PP would compromise the security of the president and that the DPW needed more time to respond to the PP's findings (Gqirana, 2016). In response, the PP filed an opposing affidavit in which she detailed how the ANC ministers were non-compliant in her investigations and had pressured her to drop the investigation (Basson & du Toit, 2017:46). The ministers subsequently withdrew the application before the application could be heard in court.

However, the debacle did not end there. By late 2013 Zuma signed a proclamation for the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) – despite it being secondary in authority to the PP – to investigate irregular expenditure and unlawful conduct by civil servants and companies involved in Nkandla (Republic of South Africa, 2013). The need for the proclamation was based on what Zuma considered an extreme anomaly between the findings of the reports by the DPW and the PP (Basson & du Toit, 2017:49). In taking this position, Zuma ultimately gave equal weight to all three reports – disregarding the constitutional independence and authority of the PP as a Chapter 9 institution.¹³ Nonetheless, the SIU report focused on the misdemeanours of public officials and contractors. The report by the SIU, despite agreeing that the Zuma family benefited from the upgrades, made no adverse findings against the then president (Republic of South Africa, 2013). The SIU report also did not raise the possibility of cross-subsidisation, but instead blamed the perceived looting on the wastage of funds by the architect.

By August 2015, in considering the three reports, the Parliamentary Committee established to address the Nkandla matter adopted Nxesi's report and effectively declared the Nkandla matter closed. However, after several attacks and attempted subversion and undermining of the constitutionally vested authority of the PP, the Nkandla matter culminated in a hearing by the Constitutional Court (initiated by opposition parties). On 31 March 2016 Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng ruled that:

- Zuma neither paid for the non-security features nor reprimanded the relevant Ministers and functionaries in their implementation of the upgrades;
- Zuma failed to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the land by disregarding the report and subsequent remedial action suggested by the PP in terms of her constitutional powers. In addition, Zuma was found to have been in breach of his constitutional obligation to comply, assist and protect the PP to ensure her independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness;
- The power of the PP to suggest remedial action has legal effect and is binding; therefore, neither the executive nor the National Assembly is entitled to respond to this suggestion unless the remedial action has been set aside through proper judicial process.

¹³ While the Public Protector, Special Investigative Unit and the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation all have a mandate to investigate offences relating to corruption and often function in a collaborative manner, their degree of authority varies – where the Public Protector sits at the apex. The authority of the Public Protector supersedes the SIU and Hawks in that its decision making is constitutional binding.

- The National Assembly's resolution (which was based on Minister Nxesi's report) was inconsistent with the Constitution and considered wholly unlawful;
- The National Treasury had to determine a reasonable amount for five non-security features to be paid by Zuma 45 days after the ruling (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2016).

Before this judgement was handed down, Advocate Jeremy Gauntlett, on behalf of Zuma, conceded that the PP's findings were binding and that Zuma will pay back a portion of the money to the state (Gqubule, 2017:192). Gauntlett further expressed the view that the perceived undermining of the PP was due to poor legal advice, but that Zuma wished to correct this by abiding by the PP's recommendations and put an end to the matter (Gqubule, 2017:131). After a lengthy period of assertive campaigns to conceal poor governance and looting of state funds, there was recourse to the law.

Ultimately, the Nkandla matter not only speaks to the kind of protection provided by partisanship, but it also reflects a concerted strategy to disregard the constitutional rules of checks and balances. This was clearly demonstrated by the unwillingness of elected officials not only to be accountable, but to hold one another to account. This unwillingness to account and eagerness to undermine the constitutional rules of the game effectively jeopardises democratic stability and places the regime at risk of deconsolidating. Without the exercise of power on the part of the public, the opposition parties, the PP and most notably the Constitutional Court in driving recourse to law, South Africa's democracy would have deconsolidated.

Unravelling of the Security Justice Sectors

In addition to the Nkandla saga and undermining the rule of law, the destabilisation of South Africa's security justice sectors by the myriad of patronage networks could also be observed during the Zuma administration. It could be seen that since the inception of the Zuma administration the Hawks, National Prosecuting Authority and South Africa Police Service (SAPS), to mention a few relevant institutions, have been in flux and unable to maintain their top leadership structures for longer than five years. This has primarily been the result of a series of bad appointments of compromised individuals through political interference. In the light of this, the effective prosecution of crimes in order to ensure a well-functioning society has come into question. More broadly, it brings into question the stability of a democratic society where the rule of law is ill-fully practiced.

With regard to the Hawks, several cases, including the Nkandla investigation, led to the disbanding of the leadership structure. Anwar Dramat (who was appointed as the Head of the Hawks in 2009 and dealt with the Nkandla investigation), was suspended on the basis of the claim that he, along with other members of the Hawks, had assisted in transferring Zimbabwean criminals back over the border to be murdered (SAPA, 2015). These charges were part of several smear campaigns by members vying to replace Dramat in his position. Chief amongst people seeking to replace Dramat was Berning Ntlemeza,¹⁴ who went as far as lying in court about a key witness and denying claims that exonerated Dramat and his associates. These charges against Dramat were later overturned by the North Gauteng High Court and his suspension found to be unconstitutional (Basson & du Toit, 2017:91).

Similar strategies of political wheeling and dealing also resulted in the destabilisation of the office of the National Prosecuting Authority. The Mokgoro Commission of Inquiry¹⁵ found that advocates Nomgcobo Jiba (Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions) and Lawrence Mrwebi (Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions and former head of the Specialised Commercial Crimes Unit) were unfit to hold the office of the NPA because they acted under political influence and personal biases in their decisions regarding the prosecution (and non-prosecution) of criminal cases. This political influence, referred to in the commission's findings, related to, amongst many cases, attempts by Jiba and Mrwebi to prevent the prosecution of crime intelligence boss Richard Mdluli on charges of fraud and corruption (he was accused of utilising funds from the Secret Service Account for his own benefit) and murder and kidnapping (The Presidency, 2019).

The decision to not prosecute Mdluli was the result of Mdluli's personal relationship to Zuma and to Jiba – after his suspension from the crime intelligence division of the police, Mdluli told Zuma that he would help him preserve his position of ANC leadership at the 2012 elections; Mdluli also assisted Jiba during her suspension from the NPA by providing her with copies of intercepted calls and reports that further allowed her to interfere in several NPA cases instead of recusing herself (Basson & du Toit, 2017:81). As a consequence of this relationship, Jiba and Mrwebi withdrew all charges relating to Mdluli before they were brought to court (Grootes, 2016). After the Commission had completed its investigation - and in accordance with the

¹⁴ Berning Ntlemeza was appointed as head of the Hawks in 2015 following the suspension of Anwar Dramat.

¹⁵ The Mokgoro Commission of Inquiry was set up in 2018 to establish whether Advocate Nomgcobo Jiba and Advocate Lawrence Mrwebi were fit to hold office within the National Prosecuting Authority, following allegations that their offices had been compromised as they had falsely prosecuted several individuals.

ruling by the Pretoria High Court in 2013 - it was found that both advocates had acted in contravention of the principles of impartiality prescribed by the Constitution. These instances of political influence exerted over institutions of the judicial system are indicative of an eroding democracy.

Ultimately, when it comes to the rule of law, the Zuma administration showed itself willing to compromise the rules and principles of democracy in favour of the desire to conceal poor governance and avoid accountability. These acts by the members of the ruling party and the former executive, in cases such as Nkandla, are reflective of a gross disdain for the principles of impartiality, transparency and accountable governance set out in the Constitution. They further speak to the vulnerability of democracy in the hands of a dominant party without sufficient accountability. However, notwithstanding the attempted subversion of the Constitution, the rules of the game remain in place and various players, including opposition parties, the PP and the Constitutional Court, have shown themselves as guardians of South Africa's democracy dispensation.

4.2.2 Economic Malaise during the Zuma Years

When it comes to the prospects of regime survival on the basis of the economy, there is a broad consensus that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that [democracy] will [be] sustained” (Lipset, 1959:75). By the same token, as set out in Chapter 2, democracies edge closer towards deconsolidation when they fail to achieve good economic performance (see Haggard & Kaufmann, 1994; Diamond, 1999; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000; Lindvall, 2012). This is because positive economic outcomes are not only essential for addressing structural barriers of poverty, (income) inequality and unemployment, but also essential for ensuring legitimacy. This is because when citizens believe that the regime delivers material benefits, the more inclined they will be to approve of, and support, the regime – this is particularly the case in newly established democracies.

Conversely, when democratic regimes perform poorly economically and there is limited improvement in the material life of the citizenry, citizens may be inclined to forgo the regime in favour of an improved economic disposition – consequently democracies are seen to deconsolidate. Poor economic performance relates to indicators such as low economic growth (democracies with a per capita income of between 12,195 USD and 2,032 USD), and high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment (Meintjies, 2011:34). When democracies

experience prolonged periods of poor economic performance, the democratic regime is likely to deconsolidate.

The legacy of apartheid in which the predominantly white population were the main participants in, and beneficiaries of, the economy continues to sustain structural barriers in democratic South Africa. This is particularly the case in terms of sustained socio-economic disparities, high unemployment and sluggish economic growth, all of which impede democratic consolidation. Despite these being longstanding issues and partly a consequence of the country's political history, poor governance and the increasingly predatory nature of the ruling party of the Zuma administration significantly stifled the country's economic ability to overcome these challenges. Contemporary South Africa continues to deal with a fiscal crisis of a weakening rand, poor service delivery by its parastatals and overall low productivity – all of which could be seen as consequences of the patterns of patronage, looting, deployment and subversion of the rule of law. As a measure to address this poor economic performance, the Zuma administration increasingly resorted to “further exploitation of mineral and energy reserves and combining this with a commitment to foreign-backed nuclear power” as a means to ignite economic opportunity whilst simultaneously satisfying its predatory interests (Southall, 2015:2). The result is that South Africa continues to fall short of the ability to make a marked and sustained material improvement in the lives of its citizenry and further legitimise the regime as the only game in town.

Economic Performance

The Zuma administration was inaugurated at a time when the South African economy had been expanding, relatively speaking – with a rising rate of employment, capital formation and a real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 5 percent per annum since 2004 (The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, 2008). However, this expansion came to a halt in 2008 with the onset of the global financial crisis, coinciding with a decline in Chinese demand for South African minerals and raw material resources (Southall, 2015:8). Since then, few gains have been made economically. On the contrary, it may be observed that almost all financial metrics in South Africa experienced a dramatic decline during the Zuma years – propelling the economy into its first post-apartheid recession.

South Africa's growth rate since 2009 barely rose above 1.5% per annum to the end of 2017 (The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, 2019). In 2017 alone, South Africa's GDP growth slowed from 1.3% to an estimated 0.7% in 2018 (The National Treasury of the

Republic of South Africa, 2019). In addition to this bleak image of poor economic performance, the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP widened to 3.8% in the first three quarters of 2018 in comparison to the 2.3% deficit over the same period in 2017 (The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, 2019). Apart from a slow-growing economy, the rand-dollar exchange rate suffered dramatically during the Zuma years; at the inception of Zuma's presidency the rand was R7.22 to the dollar and by the end of his presidency the rand was R13.31 to the dollar, an 84% depreciation over a ten-year period (Schreuder, 2018). Adding to this, 12 cabinet reshuffles under the Zuma administration contributed to a capital flight of R500 billion in 2017 alone (SAIIA, 2017). These factors – collectively and separately – have resulted in S&P Global Ratings and Fitch reducing South Africa's credit rating to below the investment grade (junk status) in the first quarter of 2017 – thereby cementing the unfavourable economic climate and further decreasing investor confidence (SAIIA, 2017). This lack of investor confidence has been exacerbated by large-scale capital flight, where corporate leaders are increasingly investing their money outside the country because of a belief that government is unable to manage the economy (Southall, 2015:9). In addition, “business moans about a rising regulatory burden imposed” by such policies as the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and equity employment; “it despairs of limited electricity supply; it rails against government incapacities, inclusive of a marked failure to pay its bills on time (if at all)” (Southall, 2015:9).

Furthermore, the gains of increased social spending were curiously accompanied by rising costs in civil service remuneration. Rossouw, Joubert and Breytenbach (2014:145) found that while social grants increased from 12.6% to 14.2% of total government revenue between 2008 and 2012, civil service remuneration increased from 31.7% to 42.2% during the same period. In addition, total state employment increased by 13% and the remuneration bill increased by 76% during the financial period 2012/13 (Rossouw *et al.*, 2014:145). Rossouw *et al.* (2014:145) contend that should these spending patterns continue, they would likely absorb government revenue by 2026 – creating a fiscal cliff – where government income would not be able to sustain growing government expenditure. This fiscal cliff was seen to be increasingly closer in 2018 as company income taxes were 6.6% lower than in 2017, while personal income tax (as a percentage of GDP) amounted to 9.81% (What South Africa lost in the ‘9 wasted years’ under Zuma, 2019). This picture illustrates the severe strain on the South African economy.

Unemployment

Compounding the problem of a strained economy is rising rates of unemployment. The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa (2019) found that the rate of unemployment averaged 27.1% in 2018. This figure represented a marginal decline from the 27.5% average in 2017; however, this decline was for the most part attributable to a 16.8% growth in the number of discouraged work seekers, who are excluded from the unemployment definition used (The National Treasury of the Republic of South, 2019). One of the biggest challenges to unemployment is youth unemployment. According to StatsSA (2017), the youth unemployment figure for the second quarter of 2017 stood at 32.2%. By 2018 of the same quarter this figure stood at 38.8% and by the fourth quarter of the same year youth unemployment reached 54.7% (StatsSA, 2018b). This situation constitutes a serious threat to the prospects of democratic longevity as it not only speaks to the large numbers of youths struggling to find employment, but also in that it presents a serious risk to the promotion of an inclusive economy and society.

The Zuma administration made attempts to address the rising rates of unemployment through employment-driven initiatives like the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP),¹⁶ creating 941,593 work opportunities for the financial year 2012/13 (The Presidency, 2018). However, the majority of these opportunities were temporary, with only 273,938 employees finding full-time employment (The Presidency, 2018). While the EPWP assists in alleviating the problem for the short term, there is no long-term solution. As Hlatshwayo (2017:1) notes, many of the employees of the EPWP have no job security, they earn low wages and have no benefits (such as medical aid or pension fund). Furthermore, the skills developed through this programme have had no tangible benefit beyond the term of employment (Hlatshwayo, 2017:1). Hence, despite the achievement of the government in creating employment opportunities, the issue of unemployment persists.

Poverty and Inequality

Under the banner of the National Development Plan (NDP) (macroeconomic policy around which government programmes pivoted) the Zuma administration achieved notable gains such

¹⁶ Although initially introduced in 2003 as part of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the Expanded Public Works Programme has served as a vital government strategy to create employment opportunities and alleviate poverty (Hlatshwayo, 2017:2). Under the Zuma administration the EPWP formed a key part of fulfilling the National Development Plan's vision of improving living conditions and creating a more equitable society by 2030 (South African Government, 2012:29).

as lowering the overall poverty levels since democratisation in 1994. However, poverty itself continues to constitute a significant challenge to the contemporary economic landscape. To address this, the objective of the NDP is improvement in living standards through increasing employment, incomes and productivity with the simultaneous reduction of poverty and inequality (StatsSA, 2018a). It was thought this could be achieved through the development of human capital with a simultaneous emphasis on private sector-led growth and job creation (Kotze & Loubser, 2017:46).

However, while this approach has its merits and the collaboration between state and large-scale capital remains in place, this partnership has experienced a degree of strain. The ruling party has often accused private sector participants of investment strike – referring to the accumulation of financial capital reserves hoarded in corporate accounts (Southall, 2015:5). In turn, the corporate sector has expressed dissatisfaction with labour regulation in terms of the BBBEE Act, limited electricity supply, and the influence of trade unionism on business operations (Southall, 2015:5). Moreover, while this approach contributed to making a dent in terms of poverty and inequality, real eradication remains a distant prospect.

StatsSA's (2018a) report on poverty and inequality in South Africa showed that, according to the upper-bound national poverty line, which is based on households whose food expenditure is very close to the poverty line of R992,00 per person, nearly half of the population was considered chronically poor in 2015. A second segment of the population had an above average chance of falling into poverty and a third segment (the non-poor but vulnerable) faced an above average risk of slipping into poverty, even though their basic needs are currently being met (StatsSA, 2018a). The StatsSA (2018a) report also revealed that South Africa's poverty rate is higher than that of other upper-middle-income countries and higher than that of other countries with a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) less than that of South Africa. In focusing on the period between 2011 and 2015, StatsSA (2018a) showed that at least three million people slipped into poverty during this period, consequently raising the poverty rate from 36% to 40%.

Moreover, Chitiga-Mabugu, Mupela, Ngwenya, and Zikhali (2016:200) argue that inequality reduction has seen even more meagre gains by comparison of poverty reduction. According to the consumption expenditure data for 2014/5, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world – where inequality has consistently increased since 1994 and by 2015 measured 0.63 (StatsSA, 2018a). In addition, StatsSA (2018a) found that wealth inequality is high and has been growing over time (2008-2015). The data captured indicated that the top percentile of households had 70.9% of the wealth and the bottom 60% had 7.0% – indicating that the

disparity between richer households is almost 10 times that of smaller households (StatsSA, 2018a).

Ailing State Parastatals

Beyond these structural issues, predatory governance by the Zuma ruling party resulted in stark failures of state parastatals which contributed to the economic malaise. Southall (2015:4) remarks that “virtually all [parastatals] appear to be confronting a crisis of performance”, all of which could be attributed to the various patterns of patronage and poor governance outlined in Chapter 3. The country’s economy has borne the brunt in terms of years of load shedding as a result of the incapacity of Eskom to meet demand. The commissioning of new power stations - such as Medupi, Kusile and Ingula - to increase capacity has been hampered by a reluctance of government to concede to Eskom’s demands for higher prices, in turn resulting in lack of adequate investment – prospects which have been further impeded by a junk bond status rating (*Business Day*, 2015). In addition, the commissioning of new power stations has faced serious delays because of underperformance of contractors and labour disputes, the financial consequence of which was doubling the cost of their initial budgets (Denton, 2015; Eberhard & Godinho, 2017). As noted in Chapter 3, one of the biggest financial problems within Eskom has been its operating expenditure, with specific reference to coal procurement – in which average coal costs rose to R400 per ton up from R190 per ton in 2011 (Eberhard & Godinho, 2017). Burgeoning costs have translated into higher electricity tariffs, up by more than 400% over the past decade (Eberhard & Godinho, 2017; Denton, 2015). Furthermore, maintenance failures at existing power stations have resulted in rolling blackouts and periodic load shedding likely to continue indefinitely.

However, Eskom is but one of many South African parastatals stymied by debt and mismanagement. Issues of performance have also been replicated at South African Airways (SAA), which continues to function at huge losses, requiring perpetual bailouts by Treasury (Southall, 2015:5). In the period between 2016 and 2017 SAA reported a loss of R4.5 billion, a figure that is significantly higher than the R1.7 billion it estimated in September 2016 (Steenekamp, 2017:74). Furthermore, the lack of due diligence, irregular and illegal awarding of tender contracts by members of the Transnet board for the supply of 1 064 locomotives not only cost the state approximately R54.4 billion as the locomotives did not fit the specifications of South Africa’s existing railway system, but also has left infrastructure severely underdeveloped (Ncana, 2018). Consequently, the burgeoning costs generated by each of these ailing parastatals places an ever-greater burden on the fiscus (Southall, 2015:5). Kane-Berman

(2014) comments that the irony of the parastatals weakened by predatory governance and their consequent dependence on Treasury makes it ever more likely that there will be calls for privatisation, contradicting the ANC preference of state-owned enterprises driving the developmental state.

Remedy – A Search for Resource Extraction, Exploitation and Patronage

To avoid heading towards a ‘fiscal cliff’, the Zuma administration sought numerous remedies to stimulate a more reciprocal revenue stream in government income and expenditure, prime amongst which was the exploration to find new sources of energy resources (Southall, 2015:7). The Zuma administration engaged in talks with major international oil giants for the prospect of tapping into offshore oil and gas reserves. In October 2014 Zuma announced at the launch of Operation Phakisa (Sesotho for ‘hurry up’) that resources found beneath the ocean floor could contribute R177 billion to GDP in 20 years (Southall, 2015:7).

In addition to this approach to resource exploitation, the Zuma administration, with the Department of Energy (DoE) and Eskom, also fervently advocated for a shift towards nuclear energy. In June 2008 the DoE promulgated a Nuclear Energy Policy (Southall, 2015:7). It had insisted on this approach despite several warnings by the National Planning Commission (NPC) and former finance Minister Pravin Gordhan that a nuclear strategy would be financially unaffordable. While the DoE was persuaded to revisit the Integrated Energy Plan – a plan that served as the overarching guide to the country’s energy future – Zuma assumed a personal role in attempting to implement the nuclear policy (Basson & du Toit, 2017:70).

By October 2014 a Russian nuclear company, Rosatom, and the South African government announced the start of an intergovernmental agreement which included the procurement and development of a large-scale nuclear power plant with Russian VVER reactors with a total installed capacity of up to 9.6 GW (Hunter & Faull, 2014). It was speculated that during the BRICS summit in July 2014 Zuma and Vladimir Putin were in private talks to spearhead the deal. Given the myriad of scandals that implicated Zuma in predatory business deals, this deal “aroused further suspicions about the [former] president’s probity” (Southall, 2015:7). However, a more concerning factor was that this deal was expected to be ‘vendor-financed’ by a loan of R1 trillion from Russia to South Africa, which would be repaid by revenue generated from the sale of nuclear energy. The expectation was that in the long-term nuclear energy would alleviate the prevailing issues that plagued Eskom’s stretched resources and further generate massive income for the government.

However, opponents of this approach immediately pointed out that “cost overruns for the building of nuclear power stations are generally between 50 and 200%”, this would potentially hugely increase the price of electricity for consumers in the future (Southall, 2015:8). Gottschalk (2015:38) put forward a similar argument, stating that the global atomic industry generally advises against fixed costs contracts, implying that as inflation rises so the cost to the taxpayer will rise simultaneously. In addition, a loan of R1 trillion would raise national debt incrementally and put electricity even further out of reach of the poor – ultimately crippling South Africa’s already weakened economy.

Furthermore, Gottschalk (2015:35) points out that while the pursuit of nuclear energy is wholly unfeasible for a country like South Africa, other sources of energy exist and are comparatively more economically viable. Gottschalk (2015:35), pointing to the Eskom-Shanduka contract, argues that the construction and sourcing of gas-generated power stations is more viable in that there are vast gas reserves in Mozambique, Kenya and Tanzania that can be easily sourced by South Africa. Moreover, Gottschalk (2015:35) notes that these gas-fired stations are fast to build and can easily be plugged into South Africa’s national grid. In the light of these alternatives to nuclear energy, Gottschalk (2015) contends that the insistence by the Zuma administration rested exclusively on political motivations and the prospect of further opportunities to loot funds.

The early economic gains made by democratic governance were largely overshadowed by subsequent economic ills. South Africa’s economy continues to be plagued, to this day, by inherent disparities in terms of unemployment, poverty, and income equality. These issues were compounded by the predatory politics of the Zuma administration, which increasingly sought new strategies that would create opportunities for them to capitalise on in their own interests. In the light of this, it could hardly be concluded that South Africa has achieved the kind of economic capacity that it requires to consolidate. On the contrary, the present economic landscape represents a drift closer to democratic deconsolidation – where citizens’ faith in the ability of the regime to make a marked improvement in the lives of the citizenry has not yet been realised.

4.3 Attitudinal Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation




Figure 4. 2: Attitudinal Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation


As the prevailing framework for the assessment undertaken by this study suggests, a democratic regime cannot edge closer to consolidation without the support of the people. In other words, an enduring democratic regime does not depend only on good governance, robust institutions or economic progress alone, but also needs its citizens to affirm it as the “only game in town” – both by an expressed embrace of the mechanisms that the system provides in the making of government and through a rejection of all alternative non-democratic forms of government (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2012, 2013). Without the citizenry affirming the regime as the most appropriate system of government, democracy becomes vulnerable to deconsolidate. Also, as acknowledged in the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2, in newly established democracies, where citizens have no prior experience of democratic government, preference for the regime is often influenced by an evaluation of the performance and quality of government both in terms of its ability to deliver desired political and economic goods, suggesting an instrumental understanding of democracy (Jou, 2016:596). This means that where democratic governments are considered to have failed to deliver on the desired performance, citizens will be more open to non-democratic alternatives and adopt radical dispositions, which move democracies closer to deconsolidation. This theoretical observation is perhaps nowhere more significant than in South Africa, where citizens’ support for democracy is observed to be weaning amid growing appeals for non-democratic alternatives for better performance.

4.3.1 Support for Democracy in South Africa: An Instrumental Appreciation

In terms of support for a democratic regime, there has been a gradual decline in recent years compared to the initial very high post-1994 levels of support for democracy. Using the data from the study by de Jager and Steenekamp (2019:12), which was based on the last four waves

of the World Values Survey and measured support for democratic and non-democratic regime types (ranging from dictatorship, technocracy and military rule) between 1995 and 2013, Figure 4.3 shows that support for democracy was high in the early transitional years – peaking at 90.2% in 2006. However, since 2006 South Africans’ support has steadily declined, reaching its lowest level – 72.0% in 2013 – since the transition from authoritarian rule. More concerning is that during the same period in which support for democracy declined, support for non-democratic alternative regime types increasingly increased. Where less than a third of South Africans supported non-democratic regimes in 1995 and 2001, this was followed by incremental increases “of 12.7% in 2006 and 18.6% increase between 2006 and 2013”. As de Jager and Steenekamp (2019:12) note, “for the first time since the transition, the majority of South Africans (61.0%) indicated that they support various forms of non-democratic rule”.

Figure 4. 3: Levels of Support for Democratic and Non-Democratic Rule in South Africa, 1995-2013




Source: de Jager, N. & Steenekamp, C. 2019. Political radicalism: Responding to the legitimacy gap in South Africa, in U. van Beek (ed.). *Democracy Under Threat: A Crisis of Legitimacy*. Stellenbosch: Palgrave Macmillan.

A possible explanation for these opposing trends of support could be found in the type of support generated by the South African citizenry. Many scholars note that South Africans indicate an instrumental appreciation of democracy – where citizens value democracy for the goods it can deliver (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Steenekamp, 2017; Mattes, 2019). This is because, under the apartheid regime, “the majority of South Africans were excluded from participation in the formal economy, disparities were racially divided, and the delivery of political and economic goods disproportionately favoured white South Africans” (von Fintel

& Ott, 2017:78). It is in this context of the political and associated socio-economic disparities that characterised the expectations of most South Africans that the shift to democracy or attainment of political freedom would also rectifying the manifold layers of inequality – particularly economic inequality (von Fintel & Ott, 2017:78). This perception was further cemented through the liberation rhetoric of promises by the ANC to deliver a better standard of living and equal access to amenities (Melber, 2018:2-3). Consequently, South Africans tend to value and define democracy mainly in terms of what economic goods it can deliver, and the ANC is seen to be a facilitator of this process (von Fintel & Ott, 2017:78). In this regard, South African's support for democracy is not only utilitarian but also rooted in performance evaluations.

4.3.2 Perceptions and Evaluations of the Performance of Zuma's Government

In the light of this and the prevailing discussion of the contemporary socio-economic landscape (characterised by persistent poverty, unemployment and inequality) it could be argued that the performance of the ANC under the Zuma administration has been negatively evaluated by South African citizens. This could be because the promise of a better standard of living “and the ensuing expectation thereof stands in stark contrast to the socio-economic reality in which income remains highly polarized and South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world” (StatsSA, 2018a:xiv). The data on the performance of the Zuma administration taken from Afrobarometer presented in Figure 4.4 indicates the low levels of faith South Africans had in the Zuma administration's ability to handle key performance areas. While the Zuma administration was as seen as performing “fairly well” or “very well” in areas such as distributing welfare payments (84%) and addressing educational needs (60%), fewer than one-third (22%) believed that the administration effectively narrowed the gap between the rich and the poor, while even fewer (20%) felt the government was tackling corruption effectively. The study by Lekalake and Nkomo (2016) found that eight out of 10 South Africans (83%) saw corruption as having increased between 2014 and 2015. Additionally, for the duration of Zuma's tenure, his administration was perceived to have performed especially badly in reducing crime, managing immigration and the economy, and fighting corruption.

Figure 4. 4: Government Performance under the Zuma Administration, 2009-2018


Source: *Report card: The Zuma era in South Africa, 2009-2018*. 2018. [Online]. Available: <https://www.afrobarometer.org/press/report-card-zuma-era-south-africa-2009-2018>

Accordingly, it can be seen that the initial pro-poor stance adopted by the Zuma administration hardly generated material gains (Steenekamp, 2017:71). On the contrary, achievements of many of these intended aims was overshadowed by the myriad of scandals reported by the media, implicating many political officials within the ANC in the misuse of state funds and the improper awarding of state contracts to benefit cronies.

A further consequence of this perception of poor government performance amid growing corruption and nepotism is that public faith in government institutions – even those tasked with ensuring checks and balances – has also been severely eroded. The data by Afrobarometer presented in Figure 4.5 indicates that since 2006 the levels of trust in state institutions have declined across all institutions, except for the office of the PP. The sharpest declines in confidence (13%) were related to Parliament and occurred during Zuma's tenure 2008-2015.

Figure 4.5 shows that while the PP enjoys the highest level of trust (58%), the courts (56%) and Parliament (41%) are among the least trusted institutions.

Figure 4. 5: Levels of Trust in Institutions in South Africa, 2000-2015



Source: Lekalake, R. & Nkomo, S. 2016. South Africans Demand Government Accountability amid Perceptions of Growing Corruption [Online]. Available: <https://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad126-south-africans-demand-government-accountability-amid-perceptions-of-growing-corruption>


Amid growing distrust of state institutions there is a growing perception that public officials guilty of crime often go unpunished. Lekalake and Nkomo (2016) found that more than two thirds (68%) of citizens believe that officials who commit crimes pertaining to corruption or otherwise ‘always’ or ‘often’ go unpunished (Lekalake and Nkomo, 2016). Similarly, Kotze and Loubser (2017:48) found that “public confidence in state institutions largely mirrors its perceptions of widespread corruption in South Africa” – where the institutions believed to be the most corrupt (Parliament and the civil service) enjoyed the least confidence (43% and 32% respectively). These findings are worrisome in that they not only indicate a culture of dishonesty and greed by the perceived undemocratic behaviour of officials, but also reflect a citizenry whose faith in government institutions to function according to just democratic principles has been broken.

4.3.3 Support for Non-Democratic Alternatives

The consequences of this evaluation of the poor performance of the Zuma administration have had a marked effect on the way South Africans express support for democracy; an increasing proportion of citizens are willing to give up democratic multiparty elections in favour of better service delivery. The data by Afrobarometer, presented in figure 4.6, showed that despite South Africans indicating a preference for elections, the majority are open to forgoing elections in return for good service delivery by the government. In addition, 62% said they are “willing” or “very willing” to forgo elections if a non-elected leader or government were able to provide housing, jobs, and impose law and order. These positions not only speak to the depth of South Africans’ dissatisfaction with the quality of democratic government, but are also indicative of an increasing openness to radical non-democratic dispositions.

This increasing openness to forgo democratic government in favour of a strong government that can perform better has provided fertile ground for radical populist parties to exert influence. The populist militant party, the EFF, has increasingly found favour amongst the youth, the workers and the disenfranchised by persuading the body politic to trade certain political liberties for the prospect of greater economic freedom (Steenekamp, 2017:72-73). These types of radical populist sentiments have already gained traction within the political landscape of South Africa, where the EFF managed to win 6.35% of the national vote in the 2014 election and secured a 11% share of the national vote in 2019. While this level of support is relatively far below the numbers achieved by the ANC, the EFF has succeeded not only in promoting a combative and hostile politics, but also in establishing itself as an antagonistic force to the ruling ANC.

Figure 4. 6: South Africans Willingness to Forgo Elections in Exchange for Security, Housing and Jobs in 2018



Source: Felton, J. 2018. *Increasingly non-partisan, South Africans willing to trade elections for security, housing, jobs* [Online]. Available: <http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/ad248-increasingly-non-partisan-south-africans-willing-trade-elections-security-housing>

Ultimately, there are several disconcerting trends when it comes to the attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation applied to South Africa. The failure to deliver the expected economic (improved standard of living) and political goods (officials internalising and upholding democratic principles) could be observed to result in South Africans' loss of faith in democracy (Steenekamp, 2017:72). Hence, a waning support for democracy and a growing appeal for non-democratic alternatives largely reflects a mismatch between citizens' expectation that democracy delivers an improved quality of economic life through its political liberty, and the stark reality of socio-economic ills that are exacerbated by predatory politics. Mattes (2019) observed that South Africans' support democracy, while at the same time being discontented with its achievements in terms of its performance outcomes. The governance of the ANC, which reflects a culture of repudiation of the rule of law, a political elite driven by the material rewards of public office, a weakening of key institutions through a blurring of state-party lines in everyday practices alongside the structural conditions of extreme economic inequality and poverty all contribute towards citizens' growing distaste for democratic government and regime types.

4.4 Behavioural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation




Figure 4. 7: Behavioural Condition of Democratic Deconsolidation

As outlined in Chapter 2, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation largely requires a consideration of whether actors abide by the rules of the game (Schedler, 2001:70). In other words, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation requires an assessment of whether actors are tolerant of and adhere to the country's legal framework, namely the Constitution. Accordingly, the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation implies that when actors subvert the rules of the game and adopt antidemocratic behaviours (inducing violence in the system), then democracies are likely to deconsolidate (Schedler, 2001:70; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond, 1997b; Burnell, 2008).

It should be acknowledged that while antidemocratic behaviours play a constitutive role in causing the regime to deconsolidate, these behaviours themselves do not operate independently but serve as a manifestation of attitudes. In other words, behaviours are informed by attitudes – with the latter driving the outcomes of the former.

Nonetheless, the behavioural condition of any democracy refers, broadly, to two components; non-acceptance of electoral outcomes and the use of violence. In relation to the former, democracies are likely to deconsolidate when actors prohibit the participation of opposition parties in the political process or negate electoral outcomes, while according to the latter, democracies are likely to deconsolidate when actors use violence instead of the democratic process to affect electoral change.

4.4.1 Non-acceptance of Electoral Outcomes

When it comes to accepting electoral outcomes, it could be seen that, despite the existence of a dominant party which has governed since the dawn of democratisation in the country, South Africa has succeeded in establishing a culture which embraces electoral politics. This is because South Africa has held six national elections which have largely been deemed free and

fair by most accounts, “especially in their adjudication by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC)” (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:106). Despite the ANC’s dominance, South Africa’s political landscape has included a wide range of opposition groups, with at least 29 parties competing in the national elections in 2014 alone (IEC, 2014). This element of electoral politics is in large part attributable to the proportional representation electoral system, which has encouraged the participation of the opposition in the political process (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:97).

Furthermore, while there has not been a turnover in terms of an exchange of parties governing at a national level, there have been successful exchanges of power both within the ANC at national as well as provincial and local government levels. In relation to the national level, the ANC has demonstrated a culture of leadership change; between 1994 and 2016 South Africa has had five different presidents – this includes interim presidents (du Toit & de Jager, 2014:106). Additionally, at provincial level the ANC has shown an acceptance of electoral outcomes; in the 2016 watershed provincial elections in which the overall support base of the ANC declined, the party lost control of three major metros – Tshwane, Johannesburg and Nelson Mandela Bay – to the official opposition and did not contest this outcome (de Jager & Parkin, 2017:8). This indicates that South Africa has succeeded in achieving a political playing field in which the political parties and participants adhere to the rules of the game.

However, it should be acknowledged that while the ANC has accepted electoral defeat and has not overtly attempted to challenge electoral outcomes, it has always maintained a sceptical, often antagonistic, perception of opposition (both in terms of political parties and civil society at large). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution (NDR) has largely resulted in the conflation of the party and project of transformation, in which the former is perceived as being the sole agent of transformation and anything outside of this is considered as representing the forces opposed to transformation. This was largely underscored at the ANC’s 52nd National Conference in 2007 in which the ANC maintained that mainstream media constituted “a major ideological offensive” through being controlled by supposed predominantly white institutions that continue to adopt an agenda to “retain old apartheid economic and social relations” by casting the moves of the ruling party in a negative light (ANC, 2007:44). According to the ANC (2007), the media should instead contribute to the transformation of South Africa by supporting the NDR rather than resisting it; in this regard the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was considered as particularly important to the NDR.

De Jager (2009:281) contends that “by insisting that supposedly predominantly white institutions, such as businesses and the media, are merely products of apartheid and are more motivated by racism, the ANC is able to undermine institutions that provide a check on its power”. Hence, by casting opposition forces as anti-transformative agents of apartheid, the ANC is able to discredit criticism of poor governance and simultaneously justify its over-extension on the state. Again, this speaks to the overall tension that exists between the centralised and partisan nature of ANC governance and the presiding rule of law.

4.4.2 Use of Violence

When it comes to political participation, worrying trends are observed. Amid growing dissatisfaction with the performance of government under the Zuma administration, there was an increasing propensity to resort to demonstrations of a violent nature when it came to political participation in South Africa. While demonstrations and active political participation are widely regarded as constructive and conventional in a democratic state, the use of violence as a concomitant component violates the rules of the game. The right to assemble and publicly demonstrate is entrenched in section 17 of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996). Hence, the right to demonstrate is lawful. However, the scope around which the Constitution permits public demonstration is limited, in that demonstrations must not infringe on the rights and property of others (Republic of South Africa, 1996). It is here that the recent upsurge in protest action becomes worrisome, as it is observed to be becoming increasingly violent in nature.

Figure 4.8, which is based on data from the Institute of Security Studies and indicates that the percentage of events that turned violent (relating to unlawful and unintentional acts such as faction fighting, rioting, violent resistance to the police by a mob and forcible coercion of other workers by strikers) increased significantly from 44% in 2013 to 63% in 2015 (Lancaster, 2016).

Figure 4. 8: Types of Peaceful and Violent Events in South Africa, 2013 to 2015

Main motivation	Number	Percent- age	% peaceful	% violent
Labour-related strikes and marches	641	22%	70%	30%
Anti-crime/policing-related protests	342	12%	71%	29%
Education-related protests	265	9%	47%	53%
Unspecified 'service delivery' protests	262	9%	22%	78%
Vigilantism	196	7%	3%	97%
Housing-related protests	181	6%	30%	70%
Election-related protests	146	5%	29%	71%
Transport-related protests	129	4%	54%	46%
Foreigner/xenophobic incidents	120	4%	16%	84%
Party-political protests/attacks	118	4%	35%	65%
Electricity-related protests	65	2%	29%	71%
International causes	57	2%	93%	7%
Water-related protests	46	2%	28%	72%
Business practice (private sector)	44	2%	68%	32%
National causes (e.g. rights issues)	41	1%	90%	10%
Land issues	37	1%	35%	65%
Corruption-related protests	32	1%	47%	53%
Sanitation/refuse-related protests	31	1%	32%	68%
Environmental-related protests	29	1%	90%	10%
Healthcare	26	1%	73%	27%
Demarcation	23	1%	13%	87%
Other	49	2%	31%	69%
	2 880	100%	47%	53%

Source: Lancaster, L. 2016. *At the Heart of Discontent: Measuring Public Violence in South Africa*. ISS Paper 292.

The data in Figure 4.8 also indicates that the highest percentages of violent protest that included vandalization of private property, unintentional injury to another person or clashes with police were related to socio-economic issues, labour (22%), anti-crime/policing (12%) and education (9%) (Lancaster, 2016:11). Similarly, Cronje (2014:1) using data from the South African police, showed that in 2014 alone South Africa averaged around four or five violent anti-government protests a day. This is significant, as these protests are not only indicative of a response to the performance of government in relation to the respective areas, but also indicate that several government agencies other than those at local government level were targets of protests – the police, the Department of Human Settlements and the Departments of Basic and Higher Education (Lancaster, 2016:8).

Education-related protests, such as the #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall protests, which focused on the quality of and accessibility to higher education, were particularly significant under the Zuma administration. Despite the majority (53%) of education-related protests being marked by some degree of violence, they largely succeeded in placing the issue on the government's agenda. The government has increasingly taken to prioritising a budget that subsidises higher education. In his 2017 budget speech the finance minister at the time, Malusi Gigaba, announced that R57 billion would be allocated to fund free education for students who came from poor working-class families (with a combined income of R350 000) for the next three years (Tshwane, 2018). Cronje (2014:4) warns that while a government responsive to the demands of the people is positive for democracy, the danger is that these responses are often seen as the rewards in response to demands by means of violent protest. In other words, government's compliance to the demands of violent protests is seen as encouraging that kind of combative political participation to ensure government accountability.

De Jager and Parkin (2017:9) found that beyond the vandalization of property, another feature of violent protest in South Africa (and often a product of cadre deployment) is "the targeting of local councillors who hold and benefit from political power". A case in point could be seen when large, often disruptive and violent, demonstrations broke out in Tshwane prior to the 2016 local government elections in response to the ANC's councillor candidates' selection process and nominations (Segodi, 2016). The decision (by a special National Executive Council) to select Thoko Didiza as ANC's mayoral candidate in Tshwane, whilst rejecting three other candidates put forward by local Tshwane leaders, sparked a major uproar amongst those who opposed the decision and those who supported the incumbent at the time. According to de Jager and Parkin (2017:9), violence directed at these local councillors (who are often ANC members) is often the result of cadre deployment, which privileges the selection of candidates on the basis of partisanship.

This upsurge in violent demonstrations has not occurred in isolation from other trends in the political behaviour of South African's citizenry. In fact, the rise in protest is seen to occur alongside declining voter turnout. The national and provincial election report by the IEC (2014) indicated that voter turnout in the last four national elections had decreased systematically; in 1999 there was an 89.3% voter turnout, in 2004 there was a 76.73% turnout, in 2009 there was a 77.3% turnout, while in 2014 there was a 73.48% turnout. The report also indicated that during the same period the number of people registered to vote and those who cast their votes also declined (IEC, 2014). These trends in voter turnout and participation is worrying in itself

as it is symptomatic of voter fatigue; however, when considering this in relation to the increasing tendency to use violent protest as a means to prompt government responsiveness, it is even more disconcerting as it points to an eroding democratic culture. Steenekamp (2017:75) warns that the danger in the upsurge in protest action (particularly of a violent nature) is that, while the protests signify a vigorous democracy, the propensity for violent protest “runs the risk of becoming the dominant political resource used by citizens to mobilize public opinion and influence policy makers”.

Ultimately, South Africa is seen as exhibiting worrying trends when it comes to the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation. While the country has succeeded in entrenching a culture of electoral politics and has consolidated in terms of the basic requirements of democracy – peaceful exchanges of power made through popular decisions – it is seen to increasingly fall short of an adherence to the democratic rules of the game. The recent upsurge in violent protest and the success of this kind of participation in prompting a quicker response from government constitutes a significant threat to the sustainability of South Africa’s democratic system.

4.5 Concluding Remarks

In analysing the South African case using the structural, attitudinal and behavioural conditions of democratic deconsolidation, it can hardly be concluded that the regime is in the clear. On the contrary, there were several developments under the Zuma administration which propelled the regime closer to deconsolidating. Persistent and pervasive poor governance has not only led to the looting of state resources, but has, also severely undermined key institutional actors that ensure checks and balances - as demonstrated by the administration’s wiliness to disregard or evade the rules of the game. Unaccountable governance as exemplified in cases like Nkandla has demonstrated the protective power of partisanship and cadrism, and their capacity to undermine the Constitution – a red flag warning of a degenerating democracy. However, despite this, cases like Nkandla also demonstrate the strength of the constitutional watchdogs and opposition parties to secure justice and ensure that the rules of democracy are not compromised.

While this is considered a win, several trends remain disconcerting. The economic cost of predatory governance has been weak economic growth, with staggering rates of poverty, unemployment and inequality. These problems of the South African economy, while being

addressed, have not been completely eradicated. In addition, they stand in stark contrast to the accumulating riches of political officials involved in nepotism and state capture.

This situation becomes even more worrisome when examining the support for democracy, which is observed to be inherently instrumental and persistently waning. Considering the perceived failures of democratic governance under the Zuma administration, it could be concluded that there is a mismatch between citizen expectations at the inception of liberation and the progress of more recent years. In addition, this dissatisfaction has placed the regime in a vulnerable position, where citizens are not only increasingly vulnerable to populist sentiments in terms of policy preferences, but also willing to adopt militant dispositions in their political participation. This in turn indicates that the increasing use of non-democratic participation by South Africans as a means to effect political change not only violates the rules of the game, but increasingly threatens the sustainability of the regime. It would therefore be safe to conclude that South Africa's democracy is at risk of deconsolidating as a sizeable minority becomes open to democratic alternatives and adopts non-democratic mechanisms to effect political change.

Chapter V – Conclusion to the Study

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 of this study made the point that globally democracies are experiencing a decline characterised by a growing lack of support amongst citizens for democratic governments as well as democratic norms and values. It was also acknowledged that democratic governments are increasingly seen as falling short of delivering the expected economic progress and good governance. Furthermore, this decline in desire for democratic regimes, their institutions and their functioning has increasingly been met with an openness to anti-democratic regime types. The contention is that these markers of decline are indicative of democratic deconsolidation – denoting a slow death of democracy in which a democratic regime gradually disintegrates by moving closer to authoritarianism (Schedler, 1998:94).

It is this observation of democratic deconsolidation in conjunction with reflection on contemporary South Africa – which is increasingly characterised by a lack of civic attraction to democracy, an increase in violent protests and the growing appeal of populism amid scandals of corruption and poor governance stemming from the Zuma administration – that provided the backdrop for the research problem. It was noted that while inquiries into the progress of South Africa's democracy have been abundant, these investigations did not give enough attention to the upsurge in poor governance under the Zuma administration and its legacy of an increasing trend of disaffection with democracy amongst South Africans. Moreover, while there are studies on the progress of democratisation in South Africa, they often lack a holistic approach.

This study, therefore, proposes a holistic approach provided by a framework to encapsulate democratic deconsolidation consisting of poor governance, structural, attitudinal and behavioural conditions applied analytically to the case of South Africa's democracy under the Zuma administration. Accordingly, the guiding research question was posed: Did South Africa's democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration? With a secondary question being: was poor governance a key instigating factor in this process of deconsolidation?

In this concluding chapter, each of the study's constituent parts will be summarised and presented as a response to these two research questions. Furthermore, after offering a response to the research questions, this chapter will offer a brief discussion on the insights garnered from

this study and their implications on the existing field of democratisation studies of South Africa. Finally, this chapter will conclude by providing suggestions for future research.

5.2 Summary of Research Findings

In addressing the main research question, Chapter 2 provided a definition of democratic deconsolidation and an accompanying analytical framework to undertake an analysis of South Africa's democracy during the Zuma administration. The chapter was divided into two overarching sections. In the first part of the chapter it was noted that the study of democratic deconsolidation has its roots in the burgeoning field of democratic consolidation. Hence, much of the definition and the literature incorporated into the framework are derived from an inverse interpretation of the literature of democratic consolidation. By implication of being the inverse of democratic consolidation - which is defined as the point at which democracy is considered 'the only game in town' - democratic deconsolidation is defined as the point at which democracy is no longer considered the only game in town. This means that a democracy is considered deconsolidated when the regime is unable to solve a set of problems to which a minority of actors begin to appeal to authoritarian alternative and these former democratic supporters begin to behave undemocratically.

The second part of Chapter 2 systematically organised the literature on the conditions of democratic deconsolidation according to a framework that was used analytically to determine the state of South Africa's democracy under the Zuma administration. This section of the chapter was sub-divided into four parts: the first part deals with poor governance as an instigator of the deconsolidation process, while the remaining three parts dealt with the structural (rule of law and economic development), attitudinal and behavioural conditions of democratic deconsolidation.

In terms of *poor governance*, it was noted that democracies are likely to deconsolidate when governments fail to govern impartially and blur the lines between state and party or person. It was shown that when the government exercises the authority of its office in the interests of personal or special relationships, then democratic institutions become drained of their democratic content, economic outcomes become skewed by corruption, and trust in the government's ability to deliver services effectively slowly erodes. Consequently, poor governance is seen to instigate democratic deconsolidation.

The *structural condition* of democratic deconsolidation broadly concerns the structures that underpin a democratic regime - including the rule of law and economic development. It was

shown that in the absence of a stringent rule of law, along with an independent judiciary, the rights, dignity and equality of citizens are not only at risk, but the rules of the democratic game become vulnerable to the manipulation of powerful political actors. It was also shown that while the rule of law is essential in providing the rules of the game, it is not enforced in a vacuum but rather requires “an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens” (Schmitter, 2004:47). Without a willingness of state officials and institutions to hold one another to account and to be accountable to institutional actors that ensures checks and balances, democracy ceases to function. The economic element of the structural condition indicated that improved economic welfare is essential to sustain the legitimacy of the regime. Democracy is seen to earn its legitimacy by improving the economic performance of the country and allowing these benefits to reach previously marginalised groups. It was shown that without a well-functioning economy that can improve the material welfare of the citizenry, democracy is vulnerable to collapse by having the effect of prompting a preference for alternative, even authoritarian, regime types that can better deliver economically.

In the light of the *attitudinal condition* of democratic deconsolidation, it was shown that democracies are vulnerable in cases where citizens value democracy exclusively instrumentally – that is, as a means to an end. In these cases, typically found in newly established democracies, there is an increasing willingness among the citizenry to forgo democracy in favour of non-democratic alternatives, particularly when the quality of governance and the performance of government is perceived as being low. It was noted that this openness of citizens to non-democratic alternatives allows the opportunity for radicalism, populism and extremism not only to infiltrate, but increasingly absorb, the fabric of democracy.

Lastly, the *behavioural condition* indicated that democracies are most vulnerable to regress when political actors pursue their goals through violent means. This relates both to the adherence to democratic processes such as electoral outcomes as well as the concomitant democratic behaviour that democracy requires. When actors flout or oppose the rules of the game or choose non-democratic (violent) means to effect political change, then a democracy deconsolidates.

With this analytical framework established in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 then proceeded to address the research questions by firstly providing a contextualisation of the inception of the Zuma administration and, secondly, by applying the first component of the analytical framework – poor governance – to the South African case under the Zuma administration. In the

contextualisation section of the chapter it was noted that the patterns of patronage have deep roots in the African National Congress (ANC) through the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) (an overarching ideologically-based approach that seeks to transform state and society through the appointment of party loyalists to public and private office) and its concomitant strategy of cadre deployment. It is this strategy, which allows access to state resources, that has provided a fertile breeding ground for factionalism within the ANC. The Mbeki-Zuma succession struggle serves as a prime case in point; Zuma's ascent to power and Mbeki's downfall largely revolved around a response by those ANC factions who were marginalised from enjoying the spoils of office under Mbeki. Hence, once Zuma took office, his administration focused strongly on rewarding his supporters through cadre appointments and deployments, and increasingly on strengthening the hold of the party on the state. It was noted that this ultimately served as a catalyst for state capture.

In building on this understanding, Chapter 3 then offered a response to the secondary research question by analysing South Africa's democracy during the Zuma years against the backdrop of poor governance in relation to the prescriptions set out in the Constitution. It showed that the Zuma administration increasingly used cadre deployment as a vehicle to retain strong personal control of key ministries pertinent to Zuma's personal interests by appointing loyalists to these positions. This was done not only to augment Zuma's personal wealth, but also to promote the project of state capture in which Zuma and his personal allies – the Guptas – exerted their influence across key institutions of state to divert rents away from state coffers and into private hands.

It was noted that parastatals – South African Airways (SAA), Transnet and Eskom – most clearly demonstrated the nature of poor governance during the Zuma years. In relation to SAA, it was seen that Zuma strategically reshuffled his cabinet in 2010, thereby appointing a new Minister of Public Enterprises, who could use their position of power to negotiate and influence business operations in favour of Ajay Gupta's scheme to have the airline drop its most lucrative route – the Johannesburg-Mumbai route – thereby stripping the state of a key economic resource. This was again seen when then Minister of Public Enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, appointed Brian Molefe, together with several other individuals, to key positions to ensure that the Guptas gained the lion's share in profits from South Africa's major infrastructure development drive – the supply of new locomotives – undertaken by Transnet. Through a network of key individuals and companies, a locomotive tender deal was assigned in such a

way that the Guptas and several associates profited by approximately R647 million at the expense of state infrastructural development.

Consequently, the rigging of the tender process and the subversion of the constitutional rule of impartiality in awarding state contracts resulted in inefficient service delivery, which further eroded public trust in government promises and agendas. However, the most extensive example of poor governance was perhaps the periodic radical changes of the Eskom board in which all, but two non-executive members were replaced in 2011, and six out of eight appointees in 2014 were in some or other way connected to the Guptas. The chapter showed that all these appointments and replacements were intended to ensure the Guptas could take over Optimum (a coal-supplying company) and gain control of Eskom, which led to periodic load-shedding since 2008 – which not only cost the country billions each year but has left the parastatal in complete disarray to this day.

Building on the analysis of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 then applied the three subsequent conditions of democratic deconsolidation, namely structural (the rule of law and economic development), attitudinal and behavioural.

In relation to the structural condition, it was found that when it comes to the rule of law, the Zuma administration showed itself willing to ignore the rules of the game in favour of the will to conceal bad governance and avoid accountability. These acts, evinced by the members of the ruling party and the former executive president, in cases like Nkandla (where Zuma was accused of using state funds amounting to R203 million from the Department of Public Works (DPW) to modify and upgrade his private home) are reflective of a gross disregard for the principles of impartiality, transparency and accountable governance set out in the Constitution. However, it was also acknowledged that despite the attempted subversion of the Constitution, the rules of the game remained in place and various players, including opposition parties, the Public Protector, and the Constitutional Court, revealed themselves to be guardians of the constitutional principles.

While counter-measures to confront corrupt practices were considered a win in the course of democratic consolidation, several trends remained disconcerting when it came to the application of the economic lens of the structural condition. It was seen that the economic cost of predatory governance was persistently weak economic growth, with staggering rates of poverty, unemployment and inequality. These problems to the South African economy, while they are being addressed, have not been completely eradicated. On the contrary, the economic

malaise of parastatals such as SAA, Transnet and Eskom have weakened the government's and Treasury's capacity to respond effectively to the overarching socio-economic needs of the state. The Zuma administration's preoccupation with looting parastatals and the expanding riches of political officials involved in nepotism and state capture contrast sharply with the under-development of the state and the dire socio-economic climate.

Chapter 4 then focused on the attitudinal condition of democratic deconsolidation by pointing to the problem of contrasting the initial expectation of improved economic welfare with the rising rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment, precisely in a context where many South Africans value democracy instrumentally for the benefits it can provide. Consequently, it was noted that the majority of South African's support for democracy is on the wane, while their attraction to non-democratic alternatives has simultaneously been rising. As noted in Chapter 4, the increasing openness among South Africans to non-democratic alternatives is worrying in that it has allowed for populism and radicalism to enter the political spectrum, as demonstrative by the rising support of the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Allowing radical authoritarian positions in the democratic political arena places democracy at risk.

Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with an analysis of South Africa's democracy using the behavioural condition of democratic deconsolidation. It was shown that while South Africa has largely embraced a culture of electoral politics, it has also increasingly absorbed violence as a means of effective political participation. The upsurge in violent protests, which have risen from 44% in 2013 to 63% in 2015, threatens democratic progress (Lancaster, 2016). It was also noted that despite these events being violent in some ways, they succeeded in placing the issues at the top of the government's agenda. The danger is that while protest action might signify a healthy and functioning democracy, the propensity for violent protest runs the risk of becoming a normalised mechanism for achieving political change in non-democratic ways. Ultimately, it was recognised that while violence is being normalised as an expression of protest behaviour, it has not completely consumed political behaviour in South Africa.

5.3 Responding to the Research Questions

In offering a response to the primary research question - Did South Africa's democracy deconsolidate structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally during the Zuma administration? - it is necessary to reflect on the meaning and denotation of democratic deconsolidation. As noted in Chapter 2, democratic deconsolidation is not the extreme antithesis of democratic consolidation. Democratic deconsolidation does not refer to a regime which has reverted to

authoritarian rule. On the contrary, as shown in figure 5.1, democratic deconsolidation in large part refers to the process of a democracy in regression edging closer to authoritarian rule. Accordingly, democratic deconsolidation is conceptualised as occurring when a regime is unable to solve a set of problems, and a minority of actors begin to appeal to authoritarian alternative and these former democratic supporters begin to behave undemocratically.




Figure 5. 1: Potential Deconsolidation Path of South Africa's Democracy

In the light of this, and in considering the analytical deductions made in the preceding chapters, this study affirms that South Africa's democracy has deconsolidated structurally, attitudinally and behaviourally. This analysis has noted several conditions that support this stance. As mentioned, structurally, cases such as Nkandla exposed the culture of disdain for constitutional governance and revealed the economic cost of this by reflecting on the rising rates of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Attitudinally, this analysis noted the impact of poor governance on support for democracy, where citizens are increasingly willing to forgo support for democracy in favour of non-democratic rule that can yield improved economic and political goods. Finally, the behavioural analysis showed a growing tendency towards violent political behaviour which intensified during the Zuma years. These conditions are clearly reflective of democracy in regression.

In responding to the second component of the research question – was poor governance an instigating factor in the deconsolidation process? – this study contends that the root of this regression could be seen as stemming from poor governance under the Zuma administration. This is because the overarching national policy approach – the NDR - and its proposed governance strategy of cadre deployment – acted as a catalyst for the state capture project. This is because this policy has encouraged the appointment of loyalists to key state positions. Through partisanship, the Zuma administration has been able to capture key state institutions and individuals which has severely undermined and negated the constitutional rules of the game.

Moreover, poor governance has not only cost the country billions in infrastructural development and economic progress, but has instead contributed to the rising rates of poverty, inequality and unemployment that continue to plague South Africa. This image of a government preoccupied with looting state resources and the dire economic problems that continue to proliferate contrasts sharply with the initial expectation of an improved economic dispensation that South Africans thought democracy would bring to the majority of the population. As such, government performance has severely eroded south Africans' faith in democracy and made these previous supporters of democracy receptive to non-democratic (populist) alternatives, such as the EFF. The openness to radicalism has also been accompanied by an upsurge in violent protest action as a response to the government's poor performance. Accordingly, the increasing tendency to adopt non-democratic means to effect political change is seen as being precipitated by poor governance. On this basis, this study reaffirms that South Africa's democracy deconsolidated under the Zuma administration.

5.4 Contributions of the Study

The contributions of this study are three-fold. Firstly, this study is the first to assess the contemporary state of South Africa's democracy in terms of the consequences of the Zuma administration, its strong alliance with the Gupta-family and its highly publicized involvement in the state capture project. While these events have been widely reported on, their effects have not yet been thoroughly explored in the academic arena. Focusing on the Zuma administration allowed a deeper insight into the effects of state capture on the state of South Africa's democracy.

Secondly, this study is amongst a few to employ a holistic approach by using the analytical framework of democratic deconsolidation. While the literature on democratic deconsolidation as a perspective on democracy remains relatively under-explored, this approach – when combined with the backsliding-focused and pessimistic outlook on the prospects of regime consolidation – is able to provide a holistic approach towards investigating democratic regimes and the risks they face.

Thirdly, this study has contributed to the discussion on the role of poor governance as an instigating factor in the democratic deconsolidation process in the context of South Africa. This has been done by indicating the various ways in which poor governance tends to drain democratic institutions of their democratic content, erode civic faith in democracy and increasingly make citizens receptive to radical ideas or dispositions. Accordingly, this study

largely concurs with similar studies such as the works by Jou (2016) and Foa and Mounk (2017), which indicate the various ways in which poor governance instigates the deconsolidation process.

5.5 Suggestions for Future Research

On the basis of the evidence and findings of the preceding chapters of this study, various possibilities for future research can be identified. One of the glaring research gaps could be a consideration of the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology as underpinning the NDR and its concomitant strategy of cadre deployment on the quality of democracy in South Africa during the Zuma years. An investigation of this topic would be being particularly useful in informing government policy on state-society transformation and delivering a more democratic state.

Another research avenue suggested by this study is that of the impact of different leadership styles on the quality of democracy. Here a comparative study of the leadership styles of Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma could yield deeper insights into the type of leadership most conducive to, or most destructive of, a democratic regime.

A recurring theme in this study is that of dominant party systems and the ability of dominant parties to skew the democratic process. A potential research avenue could therefore be to investigate whether dominant party systems make it more likely for democracies to deconsolidate, or not.

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