Nation-Building in South Africa: Mandela and Mbeki Compared

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this assignment is my own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signature

Date

ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with nation-building in South Africa since 1994 with a view to finding out the direction taken by nation-building since then. This issue has been and it still is a controversial issue in South Africa.

The new dispensation in South Africa occasioned a need for the creation of new national institutions, leaders and policies for the nation. Hence, an inclusive/liberal nation-building programme was put in place. Since 1994 this programme has been carried out by two presidents, namely former president Mandela (1994-1999) and President Mbeki (1999-2002+) respectively.

Nevertheless, these two leaders do not only subscribe to different philosophies but also have two divergent approaches to nation-building. Although they are both individualists, Mandela is Charterist whereas Mbeki is an Africanist. Moreover, Mandela promoted nation-building through reconciliation and corporatism. Mbeki's approach to nation-building, on the contrary, emphasises transformation and empowerment through the market.

These approaches seem contradictory and thus mutually exclusive. This does not augur well for fragile democracy of South Africa. Therefore, an attempt will be made to find out whether this is true and thus finding out the direction taken by nation-building. This will be done by comparing the Mandela and Mbeki approaches to nation-building.

OPSOMMING

Hierdie werkstuk handel oor nasiebou in Suid-Afrika sedert 1994, met die doel om die tendense sedertdien te bepaal. Dit was en is steeds 'n kontroversiële kwessie in Suid-Afrika.

Die nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika het dit noodsaaklik gemaak dat nuwe instellings, leiers en beleide in die nasie tot stand sal kom. Daar is vervolgens op 'n inklusiewe/liberale nasiebou program besluit. Sedert 1994 was dit uitgevoer onder die leierskap van twee presidente, te wete Mandela (1994-1999) en Mbeki (1999-2002+) respektiewelik.

Dié twee leiers onderskryf verskillende filosofieë en het ook verskillende benaderings tot nasiebou. Beide is individualiste, en Mandela die Charteris terwyl Mbeki weer die Afrikanis is. Meer spesifiek, Mandela het nasiebou bevorder deur versoening en korporatisme te bevorder. Mbeki aan die ander kant, plaas weer klem op transformasie en bemagtiging deur die mark.

Hierdie benaderings skyn teenstrydig te wees. Daarom is 'n poging aangewend om te bepaal hoe insiggewend die verskille is en wat die tendense is. Moontlik spel dit niks goeds vir die nuwe demokrasie nie. Dit is gedoen deur Mandela en Mbeki sistematies te vergelyk.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my late mother (1950-2001), Mmasechaba Mokhesi, who, through her life, taught me that hard times never kill as they only make one stronger.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Statement

South Africa's transition from the apartheid rule to democracy in 1994 called perforce for the creation of new national institutions, leaders and policies for the nation. Before the new democratic dispensation, people were racially divided and some were discriminated against on the basis of race as the former government designed the policy of apartheid which protected the rights of the white minority and oppressed those of the black (Africans, coloureds and Indians) majority. Hence, the elected government since 1994, the African National Congress (ANC), embarked itself and the divided people of South Africa on the programme of nation-building with a view to "build[ing] a united and democratic South Africa" (Constitution of South Africa, 1996:1). This was not only in line with but also was an attempt to realise one of the South African Constitution's declarations/ideals: "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in [their] diversity" (Ibid)[1]. This nation in the making was described as the Rainbow Nation[2] by the former Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu.

The nation in new South Africa was envisaged as a non-racial, non-sexist and equal society. Thus, in order to bring about reconciliation among (divided) people of South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established. This was deemed necessary because, in the words of Desmond Tutu, South Africans "...are wounded people... [therefore they]... all stand in need of healing" (quoted in Wilson, 1997:12). It was a way of making peace with their past. The Commission for Gender Equality was also established with a view to attaining and protecting gender equality as required by the Constitution.

Equally important was an attempt to cultivate a new national identity. To square up to this challenge, some crucial sporting events such as the 1995 Rugby World Cup and 1996 African Nations Cup, which were both held in South Africa respectively, were somehow used to cultivate national identity and also to foster unity among South Africans of all racial groups. Nevertheless, the notion

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[1] The concept "South Africa belongs to all those who live in it" was first phrased in the ANC's Freedom Charter of 1955. Ever since, it was the creed of non-racialism.

[2] The term Rainbow Nation was coined by Jesse Jackson and adopted by Desmond Tutu who used it to refer to the new South African nation formed out of different people from diverse backgrounds

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of common national identity was rejected by conservative Afrikaners under the auspices of the Freedom Front. They saw it as a forced integration of a 'naturally divided humanity'. Hence, the Volkstaat Council was established as a temporary institution by the interim Constitution. Its purpose was to make recommendations regarding cultural self-determination and to explore the constitutional possibility of the establishment of an Afrikaner Volkstaat.

However, the Volkstaat Council was dissolved in March 1999. The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (now called Cultural Rights Commission) was formed so as to deal with these issues. The latter was to promote respect for all communities in South Africa in regard to culture, religion and language, as well as to build national unity among these communities. Moreover, all eleven languages were elevated to the status of official languages as demanded by the Constitution: "all... languages must enjoy parity of esteem and be treated equally" (Section 6 (4)). The roles of the traditional leaders were constitutionally recognized as well.

On the other hand, some measures were also taken to redress socio-economic inequalities inherited from apartheid. One such measure was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was later replaced by Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme (Ramutsindela, 2001). Against the legacy of racial inequality affirmative action was introduced so as to bring about equal opportunities in the work place (dating from Mandela's presidency) while the black economic empowerment was introduced by the Mbeki administration with the aim of enabling the black people to have access to control of targeted sector in the running of the economy.

O'Malley (in Rhoodie and Liebenberg, 1994:77) articulates that the idea of nation-building presupposes the existence within a given territorial unit of distinct ethnic communities who allegedly need to be build into a more cohesive and directed social formation, namely one nation. But as indicated before, there are many nation-building models and the nation-building discourse in South Africa has become one of the most controversial issues. This is also indicated by the fact that there is no consensus among the scholars as to its significance. That is, some see it as unnecessary or irrelevant in the case of South Africa, whereas others take it as critical. Degenaar (in Rhoodie and Liebenberg, 1994:25) argues that the debate about nation-building should come to an end and more focus should be put on the process of democratisation.

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On the other hand, Schreiner (1994:296) holds that nation-building in South Africa is inevitable because its task "is one of welding a nation out of a society fractured by the brutality and divisions of artificial racial barriers, cultural differences, class and economic divisions, ideological splits, the oppressive gender gap, religious diversity and wide social inequality and discrimination".

The racial inequalities of the apartheid system must therefore be redressed. But affirmative action is seen as a way of re-racialising the South African society. This complicates the problem. The advocates of this view, especially the opposition parties, hold that affirmative action discriminates against the minorities. The government states that affirmative action is a temporary measure for deracialisation and the creation of equal opportunities for those who were disadvantaged in the past (Adam, 1999:13).

It is held that ethnic nationalism or consciousness is resurfacing not only in South Africa but in other countries as well. Adam (1998:12) holds that South Africa, like other culturally heterogeneous societies, need to do away with ethnic nationalism and cultivate civic nationalism and/or patriotism, that is, loyalty to the land rather than to separate ethnicities. Civic nationalism is based on citizenship and equal rights of all citizens while patriotism results from pride in belonging to a common state in which citizens actively practice their civil rights in a democratic culture with equal opportunities. Carrim (1998:14) holds a different view as he states that ethnicity is not inherently irreconcilable with nation-building but is a building block. According to him, ethnicity can undermine nation-building only when it is used as a political and economic tool.

Adam (1998:13) argues that in order for the process of nation-building to be successful especially in getting rid of racism, the following points have to be taken into consideration:

- legal abolition of racism should not be put at par with the disappearance of its legacies.

- non-European sources of knowledge are not given due recognition, as a result people perceive European intellectual history as a cultural racism.

- economic racism still persists and manifests itself as the most significant indicator of an unaddressed past.

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South Africa is ranked as the third most unequal society in the world <http://www.idasa.org.sa/m_main.php?view=2&art_id=161> (09-09-2001). It has been indicated that about 16% of African people are poor vis-à-vis 1% of whites. Moreover, the latter form the majority (65%) of those in the top income quintile followed by the Indians with 45%, 17% of coloureds and 10% of Africans <ibid.>.

However, the inequalities have been redefined in a way that the intra-black inequality is now greater than the one between the whites and blacks. Thabo Mbeki, then deputy president and now president of South Africa, enunciated that South Africa was faced with increasing socio-economic inequalities. He argued that the white community was still in charge of the economy, media, and industry. He therefore concluded that South Africa was not a one rainbow nation but a country of two nations – one white and relatively prosperous and the other black and poor (Cullinan, 1998: 8).

It has also been indicated that some forms of racial intolerance and/or racism are still seen in South Africa. The Human Rights Commission's data indicate that the worst form of racism still manifests itself in especially four provinces namely, the Free State, Northern Cape, Northwest and Mpumalanga. In the northern Free State, a white employee tied his black employer by his legs and dragged his body for 5 km behind his pick-up van to his death. On the other hand, white farmers have been killed mostly by black men, and this is seen as another form of racism. In the light of the aforesaid the Home for All Campaign states "South Africa is not yet a home for all her sons and daughters [because] racist attitudes of white superiority and black inferiority continue to shape [their] lives, communities and institutions" <http://www.idasa.org.za/m_main.php?view=2&art=164>(15-03-2000).

On the other hand, although a very widespread, and strong sense of personal South African national identity have been noticed, the research by Idasa's Public Opinion Service (1997) indicates that there has been notable decline among white South Africans in pride in national citizenship. That is, unlike other racial groups, white South Africans are less ready to adopt common national identity. This is indicated by the fact that only 63.5% of white South Africans agree that it is desirable to create one united South Africa out of all the different groups who live in that country. Among other racial groups much higher percentages have been obtained, for example, 87% of Africans, together with 94.9% of coloureds and 94.6% of Indians are in favour of the creation of a one united South Africa <http://www.idasa.org.za/m_main.php?view=2&art_id=161> (01-09-2001).

The nation-building programme has been carried out under the auspices of two presidents since 1994, namely Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) and Thabo Mbeki (1999-2002+). Although they belong to the same political organization, their approaches to nation-building are, however, divergent. Former president Mandela cultivated political peace and was also aware of the socio-economic inequalities that needed to be addressed. Mandela had to lead South Africa through fragile democratic transition. Therefore, he promoted nation-building through reconciliation and corporatism (i.e. inclusivity in governance especially comprising government, business sector and labour unions). The Mandela approach propounded the philosophy of non-racialism. This is probably because he is a Charterist[3] <http//:www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm> (29/04/2002).

On the contrary, President Mbeki pursues economic peace, as it were. This is partly because, as Stols (2002:33) argues, Mbeki has been tasked with leading and managing a still fragile democracy in which expectations, especially those of the blacks, were growing and all eyes were on him to deliver. Thus, the nation-building programme is being orchestrated through transformation, market forces and black empowerment. This is also because Mbeki views South Africa as a country of two nations, one black and poor, and the other white and rich. He is also an Africanist, and thus wants to "Africanise" South Africa in a way. Moreover, he sees South Africa as part of the capitalist world.

President Mbeki, unlike his predecessor, Nelson Mandela, has seen great criticism leveled against him virtually from within and outside South Africa. He has been accused of reracialising the country especially through his "two-nations" thesis and affirmative action policies. Furthermore, his leadership skills have been challenged in issues such as HIV-AIDS and Zimbabwe policies. The commentators have argued that this phenomenon does not augur well for the future of the still fragile democracy of South Africa <http://www.mg.co.za/Content/13.jsp/a=59&o=7545> (22-08-2002).

South Africa is still a young democracy, and proponents of democracy argue that such democracies are likely to be influenced by the dominant personalities therein (Lodge,1999:110). Hence, both

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[3] The Charterists are those who subscribe to the philosophy of the Freedom Charter (check footnote number five). Among other things, they advocate non-racialism and view South Africa as a country which *belongs to all those who live in it, black and white* (Leatt et al, 1986:97)

Mandela and Mbeki, through their respective approaches to nation-building, have moulded South Africa in one way or another. This difference in approaches to nation-building between former president Mandela and President Mbeki is in itself a cause for concern. This is because there appear to be a contradiction, at least from the face value, between these approaches in the sense that they seem to take two different directions. This would mean that they are mutually exclusive. And if the latter is the case, that would further mean that either of the two has somehow derailed. Or are they complimentary, in the sense that although they are divergent they have one common objective which is the creation of a united and democratic South Africa? In a nutshell, which direction has nation-building taken since 1994? This is critical because, as Stols (2002:37) argues, Mandela left Mbeki with political peace, and therefore, [South Africans] stand or fall with the Mbeki presidency.

1.2 Purpose and Significance of Study

South Africa is not only in its second term of democracy but also under the second democratically elected president. Although South Africa is still in a transition period, its two democratically elected presidents espoused two divergent philosophies as to nation-building. The immediate purpose of the study is to see the direction taken by the nation-building programme. This will be done by comparing the Mandela's and Mbeki's approaches to nation-building focusing more especially on finding out the kind of nation envisaged by each of these presidents.

The secondary purpose of the study is to detect whether democracy has been compromised in the process. This will be done especially by looking at the way these two leaders made their policies. Finally, the study will also add to the body of knowledge in the field of nation-building particularly in South Africa.

1.3 Methodology

The study will be qualitative in approach as it will rely on the library work. That is, the data will be taken from the scholarly journals, textbooks, internet, newspapers and magazines. This is a single-country comparative study. Two divergent approaches to nation-building in South Africa since 1994 will be compared. The aim is to find out the direction taken by nation-building since 1994. In other words, an attempt will be made to put in perspective the nation-building process evolving in South Africa.

Comparative study is invaluable in various respects. As Landman (2000:4) has pointed out, there are four objectives for comparative study. Firstly, it gives a contextual description which add into the scientific body of knowledge and thus serves as a source of information for future research especially about countries less and/or not known. Second, comparative study simplifies the world of politics by creating classifications or 'data containers' into which countries and political systems with common features are placed. Third, the hypothesis-testing build more general theories by allowing the elimination of rival explanations about particular events, actors. Finally, comparative study allows prediction about the likely outcomes in other countries not included in the original comparison. Nevertheless, the last two objectives are not relevant to this study.

CHAPTER TWO

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a theoretical framework of the study. Different notions of the concepts nation and nationalism are dealt with. The concept nation is understood in both ethnic and political terms. That is, the former sees a nation as a natural entity whereas the latter views it as a constructed reality. Types of nationalisms especially those that have manifested themselves in South Africa are discussed. Moreover, nation-building programmes both before and after 1994 are tabled as well.

2.2 The Concepts of Nation and Nationalism

Defining the concept nation has never been an easy task. Chatterjee (in James, 1996:1) aware of this fact, argues that "...the nation remains the most untheorised concept of the modern world"(1). As a result, there is no consensus among scholars as to its meaning. Nevertheless, the English term nation originates from the Latin word(s) *natio/nasci* meaning "to be born"(Verdery, 1993:37; Heywood,1997:104). This term referred to people with common blood relations. Its Greek equivalent 'ethnos', which comes from another Greek word for custom, 'ethos', means people with shared customs (ibid). Thus, etymologically taken, the term nation did not have political connotations.

There are two schools of thought which have different views on what a nation is. One school of thought envisages a nation as a cultural/an ethnic entity. According to the latter a nation is "a group of people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry" (Kellas, 1991:4). This school of thought believes that "nations are natural or organic entities that can be traced back to ancient times and will, by the same token, continue to exist as long as human society survives" (Heywood, 1997:105).

Another school of thought understands a nation in political terms. It is represented by the likes of Benedict Anderson (1983) who argued that nations are but "imagined communit[ies]" together with Eric Hobsbawn (1983) who also stated that nations are "invented traditions". This school of thought defines a nation as "a group of people who are bound primarily by shared citizenship, regardless of cultural, ethnic and other loyalties" (Heywood, 1997:107).

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Degenaar comes up with another dimension of the concept of a nation which encompasses the views of the above two schools of thought. That is, it allows for the possibility that both multi-ethnic and uni-ethnic groups can seek political self-determination. Thus, Degenaar (1978:9) defines a nation as "a political concept [that] refers to a people in a state of consciousness of sovereignty as located in themselves, that is, they are aware of the value of the fact that the highest political authority resides in themselves, being the people who organise or endeavour to organise themselves in a state (nation-state)". He identifies two senses through which this concept can be understood. First, it is seen in a narrow sense, that is, as comprising only a homogenous group of people.

Finally, Degenaar (1978:9) holds that a nation can be understood also in a wide sense in which a nation is envisaged as a composite of different people. Applied in the South African situation before 1994 it could be said that the exclusive nationalists understood a nation in its narrow sense whereas the inclusive nationalists understood it in its wide sense, that is, as it comprises different people. In this study the definition that will be employed is that one of Degenaar taken in its wide sense.

Nationalism, like the concept of a nation, is difficult to define. Hall (1993:2) alludes to this point when he states that no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. He defines nationalism as "the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or constructed. There are various types of nationalism, namely, liberal/constitutional nationalism, conservative nationalism and expansionist nationalism. In the next item attention will be paid to different kinds of nationalism focusing more on the ones that have manifested themselves in South Africa.

Kellas (1991:3) contends that "the ideology of nationalism builds on people's awareness of a nation to give a set of attitudes and a programme of action". According to him, nationalism can be defined in terms of 'ethnic', 'social' or official' just like nation. He further argued that nationalism seeks to defend and promote the interests of the nation. The latter is in line with the definition of nationalism given by Minogue (in MacCormick, 1999:76) as "a political movement which seeks to attain and defend an objective which...may [be] call[ed] national integrity". On the other hand, Aronovitch (2000:485) defines it as "...sentiments or movements whereby people of a presumed common culture or some other such element of commonality seek on that basis to establish or maintain a state, or a lesser form of political autonomy, or at least a set of special rights". Kellas holds that nationalists, especially ethnic nationalists, may engage only in pressure groups with no territorial aim regarding home rule.

Two definitions of nation-building are given. First, Smith (1983:58) defines nation building as "creating a unified 'territorial nation' out of diverse ethnic groups and their homelands". Finally, it is also defined as "the integration of communally diverse and/or territorially discrete units into the institutional framework of a single state and the concomitant transfer of a sense of common political identity and loyalty to the symbolic community defined by the founding ideology of such a state"(Gagiano, 1990:32).

2.2.1. Expansionalist Nationalism

The expansionalist nationalism was first seen in the late nineteenth century when some of the western countries embarked on a colonial and imperial mission, that is, the scramble for Africa. It is held by some of the scholars that the two world wars were caused by this nationalism. At its heart lies an imperial project: a quest for expansion or a search for colonies (Heywood, 1997:113).

2.2.2 Exclusive, Ethnic and Conservative Nationalisms

The exclusive and ethnic nationalisms are not different in the sense that they both advocate racial or ethnic identities. In South Africa the two nationalisms are represented by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) on the black side, and on the white side by the Afrikaner nationalism. The PAC in particular renounces the very first clause of the Freedom Charter which, states that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white". It understood this clause as implying that the land did not belong to the Africans. Hence, it argued that "the African people have an inalienable claim on every inch of the African soil. In the memory of humanity as a whole this continent has been the homeland of the Africans.... Their migration in their fatherland does not annul their claim to the uninhabited parts of Africa.... The non-Africans are guests of the Africans...[and] have to adjust themselves to the interests of Africa, their new home" (Leatt et al, 1986:96). White ultra-rightwingers likewise believe that all land in South Africa, is white land. Nationalists, the Zulus and Afrikaners, are tied to specific regions instead.

The roots of the PAC can be traced to the Congress Youth League of the ANC which was Africanist in approach. The latter, under the leadership of Anton Lembede, had long criticised the ANC for its collaborationist policy. It was also against multi-racialism and held that the only way forward was

by consolidating the African base, and this, they held, required an exclusivist strategy. Hence, non-Africans could not form part of Africanism as understood by the PAC.

The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) was formed in 1967 under the leadership of Bantu Steve Biko. This manifested shortly after the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1963. Thus it filled the void in the black politics caused by the absence of the latter two organisations. Although its philosophy is South African in character, it was however influenced by the black political thought in the United States of America. The BCM sees its own existence as irrelevant and unnecessary in a non-racial, non-exploitative society. It stated that the black people are oppressed and exploited on the basis of their colour in South Africa. It understood South African conflict in terms of dialectic process. That is, "from the thesis of white racism and antithesis of black solidarity a synthesis will emerge: true humanity without regard to race or colour" (Leatt et al, 1986: 107). It regarded the strategies employed by both the ANC and PAC to fight against apartheid as premature. This is because, it held, "no man can wage a meaningful war of liberation unless and until he has effectively eradicated his 'slave-mentality' and his feeling of inadequacy" (ibid, 108). Hence, it came up with a new strategy of "conscientisation" of the black people of their plight, "black renaissance" or psychological emancipation of black people. It was thus seen as an attitude of mind, a way of life. In the words of Steve Biko, it "seeks to...produce at the output-end of the process real black people, who do no regard themselves as appendages to white society" (ibid). However, in the fight for liberation, black people have to "go it alone" (ibid).

Afrikaner nationalism gained its momentum in 1948 when the National Party came into power. It advocated for the self-determination of the Afrikaner people, and this was to be achieved through the realisation of the volk/nation. It used apartheid ideology as an instrument to achieve its goal. It promoted the idea of white supremacy and thus rejected racial intercourse. As a result other racial groups were segregated but also treated unequally in South Africa. This is because it believed that strength lay in ethnic unity and in separate cultural, religious and political institutions (Giliomee, 1983; Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989).

Zulu nationalism is also exclusive especially some policies advocated by the Inkatha Freedom Party. However, there is no consensus among social scientists as to whether Zulu nationalism's innate sense of national identity descended from the days of Shaka, the founder of the original Zulu state, or whether it was a response to apartheid or modern manifestation of national self-determination.

Zulu nationalism is more similar to Afrikaner nationalism in the sense that they both call for the self-determination of their respective ethnic groups. Nevertheless, nowadays some Afrikaner nationalists want to secede (volkstaat) whereas Inkatha Freedom Party opts for a federal state in which all the nine provinces of South Africa will be given more power <http://www.uni-ulm.de/~rturrell/antho3html> (01-05-2002).

2.2.3 Inclusive and Liberal Nationalism

The early forms of inclusive and liberal nationalism were first seen in 1688 during the English Revolution as people declared that "the supremacy of law over the king, the preponderance of Parliament in law-making, the impartiality of justice, the security of individual rights, the freedom of thought and press, and religious tolerance" (Degenaar, 1978:21). However, it realised its full being during the French Revolution in 1789. It is characterised by struggle for national independence with the demand for limited and constitutional government. Its goal is to construct a world of nation-states for it regards all nations as equal (Heywood, 1997:109).

In South Africa this nationalism is represented by the ANC and liberal parties. From its inception in 1912 the ANC has always embraced the principle of non-racial, non-sexist and equal South Africa. This is also seen in one of its declarations that "...all persons within the Union[4] shall be entitled to full and equal rights and privileges subject only to the to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens, without distinction of class, colour, or creed (Leatt et al,1986:90). When petitioning against the Native Land Act of 1913 which denied Africans ownership of land, the ANC stated that the "Africans were the common inheritors with the white race of the land of the Union of South Africa" (ibid, 91).

In 1956 the ANC endorsed the Freedom Charter[5]. The present Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is imbibed with the spirit of the Freedom Charter especially in the form of the latter's opening clause that states thus "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white"(Leatt et al,1986:97). Nevertheless, this clause occasioned the separation of the PAC from the ANC in the late fifties.

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[4] South Africa became a Union in 1910 up until 1961 when the National Party government under the leadership of H.F. Verwoerd (Prime Minister) declared it as a republic.

[5] Freedom Charter is a document adopted in 1955 by the Congress Alliance consisting of multi-racial organisations such as the ANC, the left-wing white Congress of Democrats, South African Indian Congress, in a Congress of the People (Leatt et al, 1986).

2.2.4. Strategies: Jacobin versus Plural

2.2.4.1 Jacobin Nation-Building by the State

The model of Jacobin nation-building is undertaken under the strong hand of the state. In this case the state becomes the convenor and repository of national ecstasies. It can also advocate for radical egalitarianism. The state has to assume what it still has to create, that is, the transfer of primary allegiance to the nation through a nation in the making. This form of nation-building was first seen in France after French Revolution and also in the USSR under Lenin.

Elazar in Schlemmer (1994:462) understands it as a "centralised majoritarianism whereby a single elite guides the state by interpreting the general will of its citizens as a matter of public opinion, simply expressed or manipulated". In 1996 Giliomee argued that the ANC led government's nation-building policy "was Jacobin and not a pluralist variant"(Cape Times, 21 February). However, James challenged this statement as for him a Jacobin is "someone who is a member of an extremist or radical political grouping; someone who especially advocates egalitarian democracy and is not averse to using terror to achieve his or her desired goals"(Cape Times, 4 April 1996). In elucidating his point, Giliomee replied that James had taken the term Jacobin literally and by so doing has misrepresented what he has said. He stated that by "Jacobin nation-builders" he was not referring to the violent and extreme measures of revolutionary France. Giliomee further argued by saying that, as Israeli scholar Benjamin Neuberger has noted, Jacobin nation-builders in Africa have been considerably less violent than their counterparts in Europe. However, like in the latter, Jacobin nation-building in Africa is meant to create a single national identity rapidly and through legal compulsion in all legal spheres. By contrast, the pluralist approach is to encourage the cultural autonomy of minorities and to promote their co-operation with other minorities and with the government under a multicultural roof (Cape Times, 18 April 1996).

2.2.4.2 Plural/Liberal Nation-Building by the State

This model of nation-building is pluralistic in character. It opens a room in which all different people would be accommodated. Hence, the nation to Liberals is a house of many dwellings. Thus, it assumes enough social cement to keep the political community intact while its parts compete for the rewards of, and try to escape from, the burdens of society (Gagiano, 1990:26).

The pluralistic thinking owes its origin to the early liberal political philosophy, especially the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu. However, it was systematically developed by James Madison. The latter stated that majoritarianism could be detrimental to individual rights. He therefore highlighted the importance of multiplicity of interests and groups in society and postulated that each group be endowed with political voice so as to ensure stability and order. According to pluralistic thinking, a democratic society should have the following characteristics:

- "There should be a wide dispersal of political power amongst competing groups" (Heywood, 1997:77).

- "There should be high degrees of internal responsiveness, with group leaders being accountable to members" (ibid.).

- "There should also be a neutral governmental machine that is sufficiently fragmented to offer groups a number of points of access" (ibid.).

Although it acknowledges that power is not distributed equally, it firmly holds that no ruling or permanent elite is able to dominate the entire political process.

2.3 Nation-Building in South Africa

2.3.1 Nation-Building in South Africa: Plural/Liberal Nation-Building Model

South Africa is a multi-ethnic society. The model that can do justice to all South African ethnic groups is plural/liberal nation-building. This model promotes the idea of unity in diversity (Gagiano, 1990:25). Thus, it is in accordance with the Constitution of South Africa. The latter states, "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, *united in [their] diversity*".[6] It guarantees that the individual rights will be respected, second generation, "group rights", such as workers rights, as well. That is, in a pluralistic society in which both individual's and group's rights are constitutionally recognised.

2.3.2 Before 1994

The nation-building prior to 1994 was somehow similar to the ethnic nation-building but on the basis of separation. As the latter calls for 'one nation and one state', the former governments adopted

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[6] This emphasis was made for clarification purposes by the author.

a policy of separate development. The different racial groups were to live in separate areas. This was carried out via the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts. Hence, there were demarcated areas for whites, Africans, Indians and coloureds. The situation was turned into "grand apartheid" in 1948 when the National Party came into power. This government introduced the policy of apartheid, group areas and homelands which could become self-governing. The interests of the white people were viewed as paramount by the then government. In 1983, however, the government of National Party introduced a tricameral parliament which included whites, coloureds and Indians. The Africans were excluded from the new parliament, while attention was given to mainly the problems of the urban black people of South Africa (Leatt et al,1986:66,68).

Nevertheless, this kind of nation-building was met with fierce resistance from the Blacks[7]. Thus, organisations such as the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO), ANC, PAC, BCM, and many others were formed with a view to bringing an end to apartheid rule. Although these organisations had different views (and still have) as to the nature of the "new South Africa", their converging point was the fact that they all wanted to liberate South Africa from the white minority rule. In their fight against apartheid, these organisations were assisted by the international community. As a result South Africa was excluded from the international arena (Leatt, et al 1986:68).

The joint action against apartheid saw the end of apartheid in 1990 with F.W de Klerk's initiatives of 1990. Many political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, were released, the state of emergency lifted and the ANC, SACP and PAC were unbanned. Hence, the negotiations were held between the National Party government and ANC and other organisations. Consequently, the first democratic elections were held in 1994 on the 27th of April.

2.3.2. After 1994

The programme of nation-building since 1994 has been carried out under two different presidents, namely former president Nelson Mandela (1994-1999) and President Thabo Mbeki (1999-2002+). The two leaders do not only have two diverse philosophies but they also differ in their approaches. That is, Mandela is an individualist, a charterist , and he opted for a Government of National Unity (GNU) <http://www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm> (29/04/2002). Moreover, he brought about corporatism in the form of the National Economic Development and Labour Council

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[7] Blacks herein refer to Africans, Indians and coloureds.

(Nedlac) which is inclusive of government, business sector and labour unions. Mandela also emphasised reconciliation.

On the other hand, although Mbeki is also an individualist , he is however more Africanist in approach <ibid.>. The latter becomes evident in his project of the African Renaissance and black economic empowerment. Where Mandela emphasised reconciliation, Mbeki emphasises transformation. But Mbeki is also a liberalist as this is reflected by government's macro-economic policy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) which he helped to come into being. Therefore what he has in mind is transformation through capitalism.

2.5 Assessment

It has been indicated that nation as a concept is difficult to define. However, it can be understood either as a political entity or cultural/ethnic entity. Politically understood, nation is taken as an "imagined community" and thus defined as a "group of people who are bound primarily by shared citizenship, regardless of cultural, ethnic and other loyalties" (Heywood, 1997:107). As an ethnic entity, it is seen as "real" and viewed as a "community bound together by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry" (Kellas, 1991:4).

The exclusive nationalists understand nation in its ethnic sense whereas the inclusive/liberal nationalists envisage it as a political entity. The exclusive nationalism in South Africa is represented by the Zulu and conservative Afrikaner nationalists, together with the PAC and AZAPO. The inclusive/liberal nationalism, on other hand, is represented by the ANC and other liberal parties.

The nation-building programme in South, before and after 1994, has been informed by and reflected the different views on nation and nationalism. Before 1994, nation-building in South Africa was informed by the exclusive nationalism and its concept of a nation. The policy of apartheid was adopted to carry out this kind of nation-building. After 1994 a nation-building programme informed by inclusive/liberal nationalism was adopted. This was seen as relevant as South Africa is a multi-ethnic country. South Africa was seen as a country 'which belongs to all who live in it'.

CHAPTER THREE

3. THE MANDELA APPROACH

3.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of five parts namely, charterism and non-racialism, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Government of National Unity (GNU) and Corporatism –National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac), and assessment. In the first part it is shown that the Mandela approach to nation-building was informed largely by the philosophy of the Freedom Charter as it advocated inter alia non-racialism. In the second part the RDP, a socio-economic programme of the Mandela approach, is dealt with. Through the RDP the Mandela approach promised a better life for all. The third part, the TRC, deals with reconciliation. The latter is one of the defining features of the Mandela approach. In the fourth part, the study deals with the GNU. Finally, the study embarks on the question of corporatism with specific reference to Nedlac.

3.2. Charterism and Non-racialism

The Mandela approach to nation-building was informed, to a large extent, by the philosophy of the Freedom Charter. Non-racialism and reconciliation are at the heart of this venture. Thus, South Africa is envisaged as a country which "belongs to all who live in it, black and white" (Polley, 1988:134). This point is alluded to in a statement made by former President Mandela (1996) that "[i]n centuries of struggle against racial domination South Africans of *all colours* and backgrounds proclaimed freedom as their unquenchable aspiration. They pledged loyalty to *a country which belongs to all who live in it*...Out of such experience was born a vision of a free South Africa, a nation united in diversity..."(Ramutsindela, 2001:74). Moreover, the above statement is also indicative of Mandela's desire to not only make every South African, irrespective of race, feel as part of the "Rainbow Nation" but also as a contributor to its realization.

Through his individualism <http//:www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm> (29/04/2002), combined well with moral influence, Mandela managed to change the views of both the Afrikaner and Zulu nationalists. They wanted South Africa to be a federal state. Therefore, some Afrikaner nationalists wanted to have their own state – volkstaat, and many Zulu nationalists were eager to have a Zulu kingdom. Mandela also soothed the fears of the whites about, *inter alia*, the

black 'militant youth', 'African National Congress radicalism', a threat of 'civil war' especially by making them feel as part of the new South Africa (Butler, 2000: 195). He did this by assuring whites (especially the Afrikaners) that they are "an inextricable part of [the] Rainbow Nation, reflecting the rich diversity which is its strength" (Cape Times, 1997, 16 April).

In line with the spirit of the Freedom Charter, different peoples were to be given adequate cultural expression in the new South Africa. Nevertheless, some people expressed their doubts about this enterprise especially as to the practical part of it. Thus Vali Moosa, then minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, posed a question as to "how South Africans, while honouring and respecting their diversity could unite as people around common national aspirations and a common identity" (Midaba, 1996:63). Freedom of cultural expression, according to Mandela approach, however, was seen not as a way of petrifying ethnic and racial identities with a view to creating a form of multi-culturalism in which each community largely populates its own separate cultural universe. It was rather taken as a way of enhancing non-racialism with a view to a new South African national identity (Carrim, 1998:15).

Moreover, some sporting events such as the Rugby World Cup (1995) and Africa Nations Cup (soccer)(1996) were used to forge a new national identity. Nevertheless, sport in South Africa had been used to both unify and divide different racial groups. Nauright (1997:1) asserts that this is because it has been closely interwoven with the broader South African society and has been at the forefront of social and political change. For instance, sport served to divide because soccer had always been associated with black South Africans whereas rugby and cricket with white South Africans. Moreover, during the apartheid era the "Afrikaner nationalists appropriated rugby in their promotion of a particular ethnocentric national identity" (Ibid, 12). Consequently, a broad non-racial national identification through sport remained a pipe dream.

Mandela, on the other hand, envisaged sport "as one of the key areas of reconciliation in the 'New South Africa', and as perhaps the best cultural activity through which to promote or generate a new national identity" (Nauright, 1997:1). Thus, to this effect Mandela supported the South African Rugby team in 1995 at the Rugby World Cup held in South Africa. This was so even though rugby had been perceived as a sport exclusive for Afrikaners. It is held that Mandela's support "allowed the Rugby World Cup (1995) to be marketed across all areas of South African society and the Springboks to be transformed into the 'One team, one country' slogan" (Nauright, 1997:177).

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Mandela advocated a philosophy of non-racialism against racism. Non-racialism means "an individual's citizenship, legal rights, economic entitlements and life-chances should not be decided on the basis of racial ascription" (Marks in Ramutsindela, 2001:73).) A similar point was also made by former President F.W.de Klerk that in the new South Africa all people will enjoy equal rights, treatment and opportunity in every sphere of life (Ibid, 72).

However, different meanings have been attached to non-racialism. That is, the opposition parties view it differently from the government in power. The conservative (white) understands it in terms of 'cultural and territorial self-determination'. The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) takes it as meaning the removal of 'blackness' and 'whiteness' and thus making way for 'African-ness'. Both the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) understand it as referring to a community of 'individuals' and not 'race'. On the other hand, Mandela government conceives non-racialism in economic terms as it holds that non-racialism can and will be achieved only when the socio-economic inequalities have been addressed. To this effect the Mandela government adopted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)(Cullinan, 1998:9-10).

3.3 The Reconstruction Development Programme (RDP)

The RDP is "an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework...[which]...seeks to mobilise all [the] people and [the] country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future" <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/rdp/rdp1.html> (18-06-2002). The RDP was originally drafted by the ANC-led alliance (in tandem with other key organisations) as a policy document to guide the movement into the 1994 elections and beyond. Thereafter it was adopted by the government of national unity as its economic policy framework.

Jay Naidoo was appointed as a minister responsible for the implementation of the RDP. Its office was in the office of the Deputy President. About twenty-two presidential lead programs were identified and designed not only for rapid delivery but also with a view to building a learning process into the implementation (Lundahl, 1999). Through the Reconstruction and Development Programme the Mandela government promised *a better life for all.* However, Ramutsindela (2001:75) holds that although the government of national unity claimed that the RDP seeks to achieve *a better life for all*, the previously disadvantaged people are the intended beneficiaries of

the programme. However, the latter is also clearly stipulated in the RDP document itself which states that attention would be focused on "the most poor and marginalized sections of" (Ramutsindela, 2001:75) the society.

The RDP has six basic principles which are thus:

- ❑ The programme had to be integrated and sustainable.

- ❑ It was to promote active involvement and empowerment of the people.

- ❑ It would ensure peace and security for all.

- ❑ It was to promote 'unity in diversity'.

- ❑ It would improve infrastructure and extend modern and effective services.

- ❑ The RDP would enable people to participate in the decision-making as this is a *sine qua non* for democracy (Deegan, 2001:115,117).

The following were the major goals of the RDP:

- ❑ To eliminate poverty and inequalities generated by decades of apartheid

- ❑ To raise living standards and develop human resource capacity

- ❑ To address the imbalances and structural problems in the economy and labour markets

- ❑ To end discrimination in business

- ❑ To establish a living wage (Cheru, 2001:507)

- ❑ To address the imbalances of the Southern Africa and develop a prosperous and balanced regional economy (Cheru, 2001:507).

The redistribution and satisfaction of basic needs comprise cornerstones of the RDP. Five issues form major areas of focus, (1) meeting the basic needs, (2) developing human resource, (3) building the economy, (4) democratizing the state and society, and (5) implementing the RDP (Lundahl, 1999:93). One million houses were to be built for all (that is, previously disadvantaged) by the year 2000 and 2.5 million jobs to be created. The RDP was to supply electricity to 2.5 million homes, including schools and clinics by the year 2000. It was to provide portable water and sewage systems to one million homes. Moreover, 30% of arable agricultural land was to be redistributed to black farmers within five years.

The health system was to be shifted from curative services to primary health care, with free medical services at state facilities for children under six years and pregnant women The RPD was to provide ten years of compulsory, free education. The school curriculum was to be revised and class sizes to be reduced. The RDP was to institute adult education and training programmes. Finally, it was to democratise and restructurise state institutions to reflect the racial class and gender composition of the South African society (Cheru, 2001:508).

In order to finance the RDP the government reallocated its resources from the regular departments. In the first fiscal year (1994/95) about R2.5 million was set aside for the RDP and was to increase gradually until reaching R12.5 billion in 1998/99. It was also to use interest revenue on the fund, sales of state assets, and from lotteries and gambling. Moreover, foreign aid was also required to carry out this project (Lundahl, 1999:95). The economic growth would be stimulated by a new strategy for industry and trade which includes, inter alia, liberalisation of imports, increased competition, support to small and medium-sized enterprises, and technological developments aimed at greater productivity <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol34n2/houston.htm>(29/04/ 2002).

The RDP accomplished a number of things. That is, 1.3 million homes were supplied with electricity by the year 1996. In 1997 193 000 houses were built compared with the 40 000 built in 1996. A primary feeding scheme to combat malnutrition among children was operating in 123 000 schools. Free medical care was available to pregnant women and children younger than six years. In rural areas 297 new primary health care clinics were built. Almost 500 public works programmes were launched, providing temporary employment for 30 000 people while several hundred municipal upgrading projects were started in townships (Cheru, 2001:507).

3.4 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

George Sentayana admonishes that "those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it" (quoted in Tutu, 1999:1). This was more pertinent to South Africa especially because her past (i.e. apartheid) had been defined as a crime against humanity by the United Nations in 1973. Hence, in 1995 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (Deegan, 2001:137).

The TRC was to take South Africa through a process of 'remembrance' of her past. This is viewed as important as Rotgerg argues that "…if societies are to prevent recurrences of the past atrocities and to cleanse themselves of the corrosive enduring effects of massive injuries to individuals and whole groups, societies must understand – at the deepest possible level – what occurred and why" (2000:3). In the light of this Deegan argues that South Africa had to 'remember' her past in order to realise her ideal, that is, a non-sexist and non-racial democratic society as enshrined in her constitution (2001:137). The aim was to reconcile the South African nation with itself – unity in diversity.

As an official Commission of Inquiry, the TRC was to investigate actions of gross human rights violation from 1960 to 1994 (Du Toit, 2001:32). It was tasked with establishing the truth about the past by analysing and describing the cause, nature and extent of gross human rights violations; to make recommendations about how to prevent a recurrence of such acts in the future; to recommend actions aimed at the restorations for such victims; to recommend the granting of amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights violations (Du Toit, 2001:32). It was also mandated to establish and underpin a new equality of all before the law (Asmal, 1996;10), and was to pursue national unity (Bizos, 2000:153).

In its findings the TRC found that virtually all major role players were to blame vis-à-vis gross violations of human rights. This included, inter alia, the following:

- The State and its security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

- Groups or institutions affiliated to the State such as homelands governments and their securities.

- Liberation movements and organisations which sought to effect change through armed struggle and which operated outside South Africa and by covert and underground means inside the country (Du Toit, 2001:42-43).

Central to the TRC mission was the establishment of 'truth'[8] as the latter was believed to be a sine qua non of reconciliation. The TRC rendered four kinds of truth. The first one is factual or forensic truth which is empirically based. Second, personal or narrative truth is a truth as seen by an individual through narrating of her or his story. Thirdly, social truth is about motives and perspectives of the various participants. Finally, restorative truth is about public acknowledgement depositions of the events pertinent to the depositions of individual contributors (Du Toit, 2001:32).

Factual truth played a major role in the reconciliation process by decreasing the number of lies and misrepresentations about the history (ibid,161-162). Therefore, it gave a true picture of the history of South Africa. Through the narrative truth, the TRC made reconciliation possible by rendering itself (TRC) as a platform where the previously voiceless victims or silenced narrated 'their side of story' (Du Toit, 2001:162).

Knowledge of the truth about the past also plays a major role in the act of forgiving. This was alluded to in a statement made by one of the victims that they wanted to forgive but they did not know whom to forgive (Tutu, 1999:115). However, forgiveness is but a step to reconciliation and not identical with it (ibid).

Truth is also said to bring about closure. This view is supported by former president Nelson Mandela as he has argued that "only truth can put the past to rest" (cited in Bizos, 1998:1). That is to say, people could now know the whereabouts of their loved ones who disappeared during the time of apartheid, after a very long period of time (Tutu, 1999:109). It also reintegrates an individual or family into the community. This was seen in a case of the late Maki Skhosana who was killed because she was wrongly accused of being a sell-out. As a result, her family was ostracised by the community. Moreover, her family had to live with a stigma of having had a daughter who was a sell-out. However, truth came out through the confessions made by perpetrators and it was revealed that their daughter was not a sell-out. The knowledge of truth, therefore, did not only make this family happy as it realised that Maki was not a sell-out, but also reintegrated it into the community. And the community accepted them back as it were (Tutu,1999: 108).

The information used by the TRC to arrive at 'truth' came from two sources, namely, 21 298 statements made by victims, witnesses, perpetrators and various printed records (Du Toit, 2001:32).

Conditional amnesty was to be given under the following conditions:

- ❑ Action had to have occurred between 1960 and 1994.

- ❑ Crime committed had to be politically motivated.

- ❑ The applicant had to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to the offence for which amnesty was being sought.

- ❑ The rule of proportionality had to be observed, in that the means were proportional to the objective (Tutu, 1999:47).

However, the victims and their sympathisers viewed the granting of amnesty to perpetrators of gross violation of human rights as tantamount to injustice. Thus, they argued that "reconciliation that is not based on justice can never work" (cited in Gutmann & Thompson, 2000:22). This point is clearly evinced in a national panel survey conducted in 1996&1997 in South Africa. The study found that South Africans of all racial groups disapproved of the granting of amnesty and forgiving of the perpetrators of gross violation of human rights. They held that the perpetrators need to be punished (Du Toit, 2001:164).

Gutmann and Thompson hold that commissions of this nature sacrifice, by the terms of their charters, the pursuit of justice as usually understood for the sake of other purposes, such as historical truth and social reconciliation (Ibid.). The TRC deals with restorative justice which is defined as rehabilitating perpetrators and victims and (re)establishing relationships based on equal concern and respect. In Tutu's words, this kind of justice is more concerned with the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships (1999:51). Furthermore, Tutu argues that it gives both perpetrator and victim the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community (Ibid.). The restorative justice is vividly seen in the words of Marietta Jaegar who forgave the killer of her daughter. She said, "…I had finally come to believe that real justice is not punishment but restoration, not necessarily to how things used to be, but to how they really should be…" (Tutu, 1999:121).

In its interim[9] report, the TRC warned the government that "without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing and reconciliation, either at an individual or a community level.… In addition… reparation is essential to counterbalance amnesty. The granting of

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[9] The final report was handed to President Thabo Mbeki on the 6th of September 2001.

amnesty denies victims the right to institute civil claims against perpetrators. The government should thus accept responsibility for reparation (Ibid.55). The TRC proposed R3 billion for reparation in its interim report <http://www.mg.co.za/Content/13.jsp?a=59&o=7545> (16/08/2002).

Furthermore, the TRC and non-governmental organizations fear that the final reparations regime will largely comprise a single monetary award. They strongly favour the appointment of a commissioner of victims in the presidency to oversee a long-term process: arranging symbolic reparations, such as memorials; attending to victims' health and educational needs; and continuing to seek clarity on those who disappeared under the apartheid regime <ibid>.

3.5 Government of National Unity (GNU)

South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy was a product of a negotiated settlement. Hence, sharing of power in the form of government of national unity was deemed salient to a peaceful transition. As Sampson in Deegan (2001:92) has argued, it was seen as necessary for "keeping the country together and defusing the threat of civil war". In addition, it was also meant to reassure many of those who were still anxious about majority rule (ibid.). It was also meant to enable those who supported the former government to make a dignified exit from power (ibid.).

The proportional representation electoral system was to be used. Therefore, parties were to be represented in parliament in direct proportion to their overall electoral strength. That is, the number of seats each party was to get would equal the number of votes it receive (Heywood, 1997:220). The Constitution of 1993 made provision to that effect. As a result any party that gained at least twenty seats in the National Assembly were allowed to proportionate seats in the cabinet. The cabinet would consist of the President, two Executive Deputy Presidents and no more than twenty-seven ministers to be appointed by the president (Deegan, 2001:92). The Inkatha Freedom Party and National Party (now the New National Party)[10] entered into this coalition government in tandem with the African National Congress as a majority party. The Government of National Unity was to be in existence for a period of five years.

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[10] Nevertheless, the New National Party withdrew from the Government of National Unity in June 29 1996.

Although most of the MPs did not have direct parliamentary experience, the new cabinet of the Government of National Unity, in the words of former president F.W.de Klerk, 'functioned surprisingly smoothly' (Deegan, 2001:114). It focused its attention on nation-building and reconciliation and this created a climate of co-operative law-making despite party differences (ibid.). In addition, parliament performed well in terms of the quantity of laws it passed: 108 bills per session over the first three parliamentary sessions (Deegan, 2001:115).

The Government of National Unity in June 1994 implemented free health-care for children under six and for pregnant mothers. The provision of services improved as 250 000 houses had been built by December 1997. Moreover, 1.4 million households had recieved electricity connections, and 1020 water projects were underway, which, on completion, would provide some 8.9 million people with access to a water supply (Du Toit, 2001: 123-124). There were also changes in relation to the racial distribution of income as Africans' income, amongst others, increased. However, the increase of income was not accompanied by an overall increase in living standards. That is, [b]etween 1980 and 1990 real personal disposable income per head dropped by 7.1 per cent, and declined even further by another 2.6 per cent between 1990 and 1996 (Du Toit, 2001:123-124). The most pressing concerns, however, has been the problem of unemployment, arguably the most tangible indicator of an economic peace dividends. Official figures released in 1998 showed that about 500 000 jobs were lost between 1994 and 1997. The official unemployment rate raised from 20.0 per cent in 1994 to 22.9% in 1997 (Ibid, 125).

3.6 Corporatism:Nedlac

It is held that there has been a growing need for consultation and bargaining between government, business and labour sectors. This occasioned the emergence of institutional mechanisms aimed at facilitating the latter (Heywood, 1997: 257). This is corporatism and it leads to a form of tripartitism that links government to business and organized labour. Corporatism is defined as "a social theory that emphasizes the privileged position that certain groups enjoy in relation to government, enabling them to influence the formulation of policy"(ibid, 257). This phenomenon came about as "groups seek insider status because it gives them access to policy formulation, which enables them better to defend the interests of their members. Government, on the other hand, needs groups, both as a source of knowledge and information, and because the compliance of major interests is essential if policy is to be workable (Ibid.).

In order for a corporatist or multivariate approach to decision-making to be compatible with democracy, it must be shown to be "… capable of generating policies that are in the public interest rather than the interest of some 'faction' of community, …impartial as among the interest present or potential in the community, and … supplemental to the process of direct popular representation and not a substitute for it" <http://www.up.ac.za/academia/soba. SAAPAM/vol34n2> (Houston 29/04/'02).

Corporatism can manifest itself in two forms, first as in state corporatism, which is the incorporation and subordination of business and/or labour in a bipartite or tripartite arrangement. The second is social corporatism, which is a strong form of participatory and democratic bipartism/tripartism in which the labour market partners play a significant role in policy-making on important social and economic issues <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol34n2/Houston.htm> (29/04/2002).

Spence (quoted in Fukula, 2001:20) argues that former Nelson Mandela during his tenure did not only recognise but acknowledged the existence of multiplicity of interests and groups and the fact that unless each group possessed a political voice, stability and order would be impossible. Due to his corporatist decision-making style, organised interest groups of the civil society were brought into the government's decisional structures. This was seen in the form of inter alia, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac).

Since corporatism (Nedlac) is a form of consensus government among powerful stakeholders, namely government, business and labour, former president Nelson Mandela has, albeit indirectly as "the distant CEO who has kept a watchful eye over government" (Stols, 2002:34), transformed the antagonistic labour relations between big business and big unions into a working marriage. The two were not on good terms during the apartheid era. In this way, corporatism served the purposes of reconciliation and nation-building <http://www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm> (29-04-2001).

In South Africa policy-making has been transformed into a process based on transparency, accountability and a broadening of participation. The transformation of the South African polity provides ample justification for examining and evaluating new policy-making institutions and

processes. One such institutional arrangement in South Africa is the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). Therefore, NEDLAC is one of South Africa's key policy-making bodies and establishes the principle of tripartism and the practice of corporatism at a national level (ibid.). It was established in 1995 after a merger between the National Manpower Commission (NMC) and the National Economic Forum (NEF) (Bernstein (ed), 1999:40).

NEDLAC is a tripartite policy body consisting of representatives of government, business and organized labour. The 1995 Act establishing NEDLAC stipulates its functions thus:

- ❑ "It strives to promote the goals of economic growth, participation in economic decision-making, and social equity";

- ❑ "It seeks to reach consensus and conclude agreements pertaining to economic and social equity;

- ❑ "It considers all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market policy before it is introduced in parliament;

- ❑ "It considers all significant changes to social and economic policy before it is tabled before parliament;

- ❑ "It encourages and promotes the formulation of co-ordinated policy on social and economic matters" (Bernstein, 1999:40-41).

NEDLAC is divided into four chambers, namely, development, labour market, trade and industry, and public finance and monetary policy. Its highest decision-making body is the executive council whose function is to conclude agreements reached in the chambers and sends them to parliament. It also has a management committee, which coordinates all aspects of Nedlac's work, and finally the secretariat, which arranges meetings and other administrative matters (Bernstein, 1999:41).

The Council is different from other corporatist models in the sense that besides government, business and labour sectors, it also incorporates the community in one of its bargaining forums. This is done with a view to expanding democratic participation in the policy-making process. Organised labour is represented by the Congress of South African Union (COSATU), the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) that directly represents more than two million workers. Business sector is represented by

Business South Africa (BSA) and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc). The government is represented by ministers, deputy ministers and director-generals from several ministries and derailments. The community is represented by the South African Civic Organisation (Sanco), the National Women's Coalition (NWC), the National Youth Council (NYC), the National Rural Development Forum (NRDF), and the Federal Council for the Disabled <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol34n2/Houston.htm.29/04/22002>.

Nedlac has dealt with quite a number of critical issues that bear on economic, labour and social policy. Through the Labour Market, Nedlac has negotiated agreements on significant labour legislation such as the Labour Relations Bill (now Act), the skills development strategy and the Employment and occupational equity. Nedlac's Public Finance and Monetary policy chamber has made a submission on the medium-term expenditure framework. Moreover, the Development Chamber has negotiated a housing policy, the Masakhane Campaign. Finally, the Trade and Industry Chamber has served as a forum for South African trade negotiators to consult with business and labour on issues around the European Union (EU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) trade protocol (Bernstein, 1999:43).

There are two divergent views about the role of the corporatist bodies in economic growth. The first one argues that corporatist or tripartite arrangements are essential for economic growth. The other asserts, with the benefit of hindsight that the history of corporatist or tripartite arrangements have not demonstrated that they contribute to economic growth. The former Minister of Labour, Tito Mboweni, made a more or less similar point to the latter that Nedlac couldn't directly ensure high rates of growth and economic development. Nevertheless, it can contribute indirectly to the growing confidence in the South African economy. This growth in confidence is seen as critical in order to get high rates of investment <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol34n2/Houston.htm> (29/04/2002).

Nedlac is faced with a number of challenges in the economic arena such as unemployment, low growth, low investment, low productivity, low savings, and poverty. To this effect Nedlac has made significant agreements that bear on economic and social development. These agreements include, inter alia, the National Public Works Programme and the National Small Business Enabling Bill. It has also developed a common strategy for growth and job creation at the Presidential Job Summit (1998). The social partners agreed to act in concert to create jobs, stable and fair industrial relations,

respect for worker rights and sustainable growth and development. Moreover, agreements were made on industrial policy measures and programmes that will directly address the question of employment and increased investment <ibid.>.

Nedlac is charged to promote equity in the community and workplace. This point is evidently seen its founding declaration which states that South Africa "…is characterized by severe inequalities in incomes, skills, economic power, ownership and a skewed pattern to social development" <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol134no2/Houston.htm> (29-04-2002). Therefore, Nedlac is to "ensure that the large scale inequalities are adequately addressed, and that society provides, at least, for all the basic needs of its people" <ibid. >.

The Development Chamber of Nedlac has worked closely with various ministries, such as Housing, Welfare, Public Works and Health, with a view to bringing about social equity. The Skills Development Bill is meant to provide for integrated workplace education and training, eradicating the high levels of functional illiteracy among black workers, aligning education and training to social and economic needs, and addressing the urgent need for jobs. Nedlac has created the conditions for employment equity programmes to address the legacies of the past. To this effect the Employment Equity Bill was tabled and its two objectives aim to implement measures to eliminate discrimination in employment and to provide guidelines for companies to promote occupational equity by encouraging the equal representation of blacks, women and disabled <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol34n2/Houston.htm> (29-04-2002).

3.7 Assessment

The Mandela approach to nation-building has been hailed from within and outside the country especially for its emphasis on reconciliation and national unity. This is partly because he has made himself a symbol of reconciliation. Deegan (2001:200) emphasises this point he argues that "it is impossible to separate the qualities of Nelson Mandela from South Africa's transition to democracy". Nash does not only supports the latter point but even goes further by saying that "[t]he new South Africa ... is, to a greater extent than is often realised, what [Mandela] has made it" (2002:253).

It is held that despite Mandela's attempts to bring about positive change elements of racism and discrimination are still surfacing in South Africa. The latter point was confirmed by Mandela himself when he said "[t]oday in some ways, the old fault lines in [the] society are showing more sharply" (Cape Times, 1997:16 April). This happens even though South Africa has one of the most liberal constitutions in the world and has also enacted comprehensive legislation to promote equality and prevent discrimination.

Some sections of the South African population were not at home with the Mandela approach. The dissatisfaction was based on the view that the government favoured the 'African nation' and not the 'rainbow nation' it promised to build. This was especially in relation to the RDP which was envisaged by these sections as a form of 'economic ethnic cleansing' (Ramutsindela, 2001:76). Consequently, as Nauright in Ramutsindela put it, "a significant proportion of the coloured population also feels a sense of nostalgia, if not for the 'good old days' of apartheid, at least for the days when they were in a middle position in society. Some feel that they have gone from being second to third class citizens in the new South Africa" (Ibid.).

The RDP was also criticized for encompassing two mutually opposing principles. That is, it committed itself to meet the basic needs of the people via state intervention and redistribution of resources while on the other hand it avowed the free market system (Deegan, 2001:118-119). Sean Jacobs argues that while the Mandela approach to nation-building saved the country from potential civil war it however, legitimated the wealth concentrated in white hands. As a result, whites achieved material victory while the blacks achieved moral victory over apartheid <http://www.idasa.org.za.2000-09-01>. In other words, the material inequalities had not been addressed accordingly.

The National Economic Development and Labour Council has been criticized for undermining the sovereignty of parliament. However, the former executive of Nedlac, Naidoo, said that the situation is exacerbated by two reasons. First, there are no procedures for dialogue between negotiations in Nedlac and the standing committees of Parliament. Finally, there is no demarcation of the significant areas of policy that are relevant to social partners, and those that are properly left to Parliament and government <http://www.up.ac.za/academic/soba/SAAPAM/vol34n2/Houston.htm> (29-04-2002).

It is held that the labour and business organisations represented in Nedlac do not represent all business people or all workers. That is to say, groups such as consumers, people working in the informal sector and the unemployed are not represented. That being the case, Schreider (2002) argues that participation can be extended to include the unrepresented by putting "… greater emphasis on seeking to enhance the capacity of the weakest and most marginalized interest groups to impact on the processes of state policy formulation … guaranteeing representation of these groups (as an incentive to organise), and offering them material resources to orgnise and participate in these processes"<Ibid>.

Moreover, Mandela's corporatism was elitist and its extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary nature compromised public accountability of the institutions of popular sovereignty. It is also viewed as a threat to democracy as it favours an elite coalition of "insiders" above "outsiders", and threatens to subvert electoral or parliamentary process because it marginalises the role of an elected parliament <http://www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm>(29-04-2002).

Many people found the TRC's findings wanting. They held that the commission did not grasp the complexities and historical realities of the past. Therefore, the motives and perspectives of the perpetrators had not been fully recognised. The white people in general and their leaders in particular, were not in favour of the commission as they envisaged it as engaged in a witch-hunt mission. However, the TRC's report implicated those who fought against apartheid in atrocities together with the perpetrators. As a result, they did not want the report to be published. Furthermore, the ANC, one of the liberation movements, had two divergent views on this issue. Thabo Mbeki and his group did not want the report to be published whereas Mandela wanted it to be published. The latter stated that "[t]he ANC was fighting a just war, but in the course of fighting the just war, it committed the gross violations of human rights. Nobody can deny that, because some people died in [the] camps and that's what the TRC said" (quoted in Deegan, 2001:158).

CHAPTER FOUR

4. THE MBEKI APPROACH

4.1 Introduction

The Mbeki approach deals with the 'two-nation' thesis of Thabo Mbeki through which he describes South Africa as a country of two nations, one black and poor, and the other white and rich. It envisages president Mbeki as an African. It also embarks on the African Renaissance and the role played by Mbeki therein. This chapter also deals with transformation and empowerment as understood and implemented by Mbeki. It also deals with Mbeki as a capitalist as this is reflected in the macro-economic policy of South Africa, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the Informal Advisory Council and International Investment Council. The study also deals with Mbeki as a policy-maker.

4.2 The 'Two-Nations' Thesis

Fundamental to the Mbeki approach to nation-building is as it were transformation-cum-empowerment. Stols (2002:35) captured this well when he said that Mandela has made reconciliation his crusade; Mbeki, while not denying the need for South Africans to come together, talks more about transformation[and empowerment].

President Mbeki argues that "a major component part of the issue of reconciliation and nation-building is defined by and derived from the material conditions in [the] society which have divided [the] country into two nations, the one black and the other white" (quoted in Ramutsindela, 2001:75). This is because, in the words of Pallo Jordan, "[n]ational oppression ... found expression in the palpable form of a number of economic, social and developmental indicators – such as poverty and underdevelopment, the low levels of literacy and numeracy among the oppressed communities, their low access to clean water, the non–availability of electricity, their low food consumption, their invariably low incomes, the poor state of their health, their low skills, the generally unsafe environment in which these communities lived ..."(quoted in Ramutsindela, 2001:75).

Mbeki enunciates that the white nation is "relatively prosperous, regardless of gender and geographical dispersal. It has access to a developed economic, educational, communication and

other infrastructure". The black nation is larger and poor "with the worst-affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and disabled" (cited in Nattrass and Seekings, 2001:45). Of the same view is Heribert Adam (1998:13) who argues that the effects of the past such as job reservation, differential property rights, the continuing residential segregation of the majority of the population, labour coercion and educational decline of township schools have accumulated to create one of the most unequal societies in the world.

Mbeki argues that as a result of the conditions the black nation is living under the latter's right to equal opportunity is theoretical (cited in Nattrass and Seekings, 2001:45). Mbeki has further called for a new patriotism to help built a non-racial country, and asked what affluent white South Africans were contributing to the gross disparities in standard of living and quality of life of poorer citizens (Bernstein, 1999:142).

The research demonstrates that racial inequality does exist in South Africa, that is 61% of Africans are poor compared to 1% of whites. [Moreover], [t]he largest proportion of those in the top income quintile are whites (i.e. 65% of households) followed by Indians with 45%. However, only 17% of coloureds and ten percent of Africans earn incomes sufficient to put them into that category <http://www.idasa.org.za/m_main.php?view=2&art_id=161> (22-07-2001).

The 'two-nations' thesis has been used before by other people such as Benjamin Disraeli. This former prime minister of Britain employed this concept in his 1845 novel 'Sybil, or The Two Nations'. Disraeli was referring to the rich and the poor of nineteenth – century England. In describing the extent of the disparity between these two nations he argued that "there is no intercourse and no sympathy; [they] are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; [they] are formed of different breeding, are fed by different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws" (quoted in Nattrass and Seekings, 2001:46).

In the early 1990s the 'two nations' thesis was employed by one of the popular political scientists of the United States of America, Andrew Hacker in his book 'Two Nations, Black and White: Separate, Hostile and Unequal (1992). In this book Hacker deals with interracial inequalities in the United States of America. He surveyed the scope of the interracial inequalities in late-twentieth century

America across issues as varied as divorce rates, percentages of children born to unmarried parents, earnings and incomes, unemployment, educational achievement, and crime (Ibid.47).

The usage of the 'two nations' thesis by Mbeki and the two authors is similar since they all want to draw attention to injustice. Nevertheless, they do have some differences as Disraeli's point of focus is class and Mbeki's is race and class. On the other hand, Hacker does not seem to suggest that all white Americans are rich and all black Americans are poor (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001).

Nattrass and Seekings challenge Mbeki's application of the 'two nations' in South Africa. They contend that race is no longer a determining factor in the new South Africa. They ascribe the inequality to two income gaps: between an increasingly multiracial upper class and everyone else; and between a middle class of mostly urban, industrial, or white-collar workers and marginalised class of black unemployed and rural poor (Ibid.47). Nattrass and Seeking hold that this has resulted in a scenario whereby the intraracial inequality has increased and interracial inequality decreased (Nattrass and Seekings,2001:49). That is, between 1975 and 1996, the share of total income received by black people rose from 20 to 36 percent, while the share received by white people fell from 71 to 52 percent (Ibid.49). Furthermore, it is held that unemployment, and not race, is now a major determinant of poverty and inequality (Bernstein (ed), 1999:143).

However, Jacobs argues that the emergence of the black bourgeoisie does not in any way significantly alter entrenched patterns of inequality. The reason he put forward is that when it comes to the standards of living in South Africa black people are still substantively unequal to white people   <http://www.idasa.org.za/m_main.php?view=2&art_id=161>   (22/07/2001).   Suttner (2002:11) states that Nattrass and Seekings are right in indicating that the [black] intraracial gap is growing faster than the interracial one. However, this does not detract from the overall validity of the 'two nations' concept. But it does point to a problematic new development where concepts of black economic empowerment are seen as leading to the enrichment of small sections within the black community, while there is growing impoverishment in the communities as a whole.

4.2.1. Thabo Mbeki: an Africanist?

In the African National Congress there are three different schools of thought, namely nationalism, socialism and Africanism (Chothia, Business Day, 11 July 2000). Many observers put Thabo Mbeki

in the latter one. This came as a result of his speech "I am an African" in 1996 on the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution of South Africa and his project of "African Renaissance". The ANC Africanism, however, is inclusive as opposed to an exclusive one espoused by the Pan Africanist Congress. Nevertheless, the fact that Mbeki is an Africanist has brought about fear in some sections of the South African population especially among the minorities. This is probably because the latter envisage Africanism in its exclusive sense. Mbeki argues that he does not anything wrong with being an Africanist as long as it is about addressing the problems that face the African continent. But he contends that there would be a problem with Africanism if it means that only African South Africans' interests and needs should be addressed, as this would be tantamount to racism (Bernstein, 1999:136).

Maphai (in Bernstein 1999:135) asserts that there is "a malicious intent in calling him an Africanist-its racism in reverse. He is an Africanist in the fundamental sense that he's a fan of Africa; he's determined it should get its act together. He's uncompromising in that sense of Africanism and in proving the Afro-pessimists wrong". Maphai further states that there is subtle message from the English media that except for Madiba all African ministers are a disaster, but that the non-African ministers are doing very well.

Other observers hold that Mbeki may be playing the Africanist card as a counter to the impatient "socialism" of the SACP/COSATU <http://www.sundaytimes.co.za>(30-03-1999). Mbeki's pan-African orientation is seen as informing his 'soft' stance on the land redistribution issue in Zimbabwe. Moreover, he seems to extend governance to all major political parties but Pan Africanist Congress. He appointed Mosibudi Mangena, who was the sole member of Azanian People Organisation (AZAPO) in Parliament, as a deputy minister of education. Another member of AZAPO, Advocate Mojanku Gumbi, is a legal adviser to the President's Office. It is also held that the leverage of Mbeki's strong pan-Africanist orientation prevails in the coalition government in KwaZulu-Natal between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is also in the fact that the latter is 'co-opted' in the cabinet. This 'move' by Mbeki is envisaged as an attempt to create a kind of patriotic front <http://www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm>(29-04-2001). Cothia (2002:13) argues that Mbeki's Africanism may be rooted in the fact that he spent much of his political life in exile. Africanism tended to be more dominant in exile than on Robben Island or inside the country. Though there was always an Africanist wing inside the country, the nationalists, in tandem with socialists, remained dominant within the United Democratic Front and COSATU.

4.2.1.1 Mbeki and African Renaissance

President Mbeki's call for an African renaissance emanates from his strong pan-Africanist orientation which is racially inclusive (Ryklief, 2002:114). In his speech "I am an African"[11] in 1996 he alluded to an African renaissance as he stated that "Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes" (Mbeki, 1998:36). In the same speech Mbeki also indicated the kind of Africanist philosophy that was to inform his African renaissance. That is, "he drew strands of [South Africa's] many histories together" (Vale & Maseko, 1998:271). Moreover, he defined himself as a child "of the peoples of continent of Africa" (1998:35) and thus was locating South Africa in an African context (Ryklief, 2002:114).

However, Mbeki's first public reference to an African renaissance was in April 1997 when addressing the Corporate Council on Africa's Attracting Capital to Africa Summit. He told the audience that the African renaissance was underway (Mbeki, 1998:200). Two months later in June 1997 in South Africa he reminded the members of Parliament of the obligation to join hands in rebuilding of the African continent with a view to achieving an African renaissance (Lodge, 1999:96-97).

The idea of African renaissance, however, is not the product of Mbeki's making. There had been discussion about it in sundry forms, by different people, since the colonisation of Africa. Some commentators argue that it owes its origin to pan Africanism. The latter was, from its inception in the diaspora, a reaction to slavery and colonialism and sought to reassert African dignity and humanity (Ajulu, 2001:30-31).

In South Africa Pixley ka Isaka Seme (1906) called for 'African Regeneration' (Ramose, 2000:50) and Anton Lembede (1940s) spoke about a reborn of African nation (Van Vuuren, 2000:63). Their vision of African revival was, however, informed by exclusive Africanism (ibid.). Another South African, Gilbert Coka, also spoke of African regeneration albeit his was informed by an inclusive Africanist philosophy. His vision of liberation included equal democratic rights for South Africans irrespective of colour, creed, or race (Ramose, 2000:51). Outside South Africa Edward Wilmont Blyden (1850) called for regeneration of Africa and Nkwame Nkrumah spoke of a new African

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[11] It was delivered on the 08th of May 1996 on the occasion of the adoption of the new constitution of South Africa.

renaissance (ibid.). He focused more of his attention on political independence and thus employed *'seek ye first political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you'* (ibid, 53) dictum.

It has been indicated above that the idea of African renaissance is not new. However, Mbeki's African renaissance is made unique by the context in which is taking place. Some characteristics of this context are thus:

- ❑ Period of re-democratisation in Africa

- ❑ The end of cold war

- ❑ The emergence of the 'market' as the central organising principle of global economy

- ❑ An accelerated process of globalisation (Ajulu, 2001:27-28).

The African renaissance is seen as necessary because Africa remains in a shaky position due to, inter alia, bad governance by some of African political leaders, negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes and of globalisation (Ibid, 28,30). Mbeki argues that African renaissance is about "... the establishment of genuine and stable democracies, in which the system of governance will flourish because they derive their authority and legitimacy from the will of the people..."(quoted in Ajulu, 2001:34). His former political adviser when he was Deputy President, Mavimbela, argues that African renaissance is about "...the need to empower African people to deliver themselves from the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism and to situate themselves on the global stage as beneficiaries of all the achievement of human civilisation (ibid.).

Mbeki's African renaissance view Africa as part of global village, and thus affected by globalisation. He understands the latter as "an objective outcome of the development of the productive forces that create wealth, including their continuous improvement and expansion through the impact on them of advances in science, technology and engineering"(quoted in Bond, 2001:419). Ajulu identifies the following as Mbeki's African renaissance three pillars:

- ❑ The mobilisation of the African people to take their destiny in their own hands and fight against kleptocratic regimes.

- ❑ The establishment of political democracy on the continent, respect for human rights and good governance

- ❑ A clear programme of economic regeneration (Ajulu, 2001:35).

Mbeki argues that the process of globalisation has negative impact on Africa and other parts of the developing world. Mbeki states that this process "...ineluctably results in the reduction of the sovereignty of states, with the weakest being [the developing world], being the biggest losers-those who are already the worst off, suffer losses of the first order as a result of a marginal adjustment by another..."(quoted in Ajulu, 2001:35).

Therefore, Mbeki's African renaissance calls for a new world order. However, this reform is not to be undertaken outside the process of globalisation. Instead, Mbeki advocates "a conscious and deliberate intervention in the process of globalisation ... to produce the results of ethics, equity, inclusion, human security and sustainable development". Addressing the 35th Ordinary Session of the Organisation of the African Unity's Assembly (now African Union) in Algiers (1999), he urged the audience "...to develop [their] own sovereign and continental capacity to participate in the global processes aimed at producing a framework of rules, institutions and established practices to promote [their] own interest..." (Ajulu, 2001:36).

The African renaissance is also to embark on addressing issues such as debt, negotiations at the World Trade Organisation, post-Lome negotiations, restructuring and re-orientating the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, sales of gold by the latter, among others (Ajulu, 2001:36). The African renaissance also calls for an end to war ravaging the African continent. Mbeki said that "the time has come that [Africans] say enough and no more [to war and thus] remak[ing] themselves as the midwives of the African renaissance" (Mbeki, 1998:277).

The renewal of Africa is also aimed at rebelling against the tyrants and the dictators "...who seek to corrupt [African] societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people. [People] must rebel against the ordinary criminals who murder, rape and rob. People are also to conduct war against poverty, ignorance and the backwardness of the children of Africa" (ibid, 300).

4.2.1.2 South Africa and African Renaissance

From late 1996 onwards, South African thinking on its African policy began to coalesce around the notion of an African renaissance (Vale & Maseko, 1998:273). Thus Mavimbela argues that South Africa has made the African renaissance the cornerstone of its interaction with the world, especially within the continent (quoted in Ajulu, 2001:40).

Lodge (1999:105) has argued that in South Africa an African renaissance is understood as a process of political, economic and cultural re-engagement with the rest of the continent, as well as a process of recognition of South Africa's identity as Africans. Vale and Maseko (1998:278) have identified two divergent interpretations of an African renaissance in South Africa, namely, the globalist and Africanist interpretations. The Africanist interpretation seeks to use the African renaissance to construct a new African history, identity and culture and to reassert the notion of Africanness. On the other hand, the globalist interpretation emphasises Africa's economic and political regeneration as part and parcel of globalising world economy (ibid; Ajulu, 2001:33).

The Africanist interpretation has been focused around the concept of *ubuntu,* the idea of humanness, that people realise their humanity through their interaction with others (Lodge, 1999:99). It also refers to the heritage and legacy which would humanise and Africanise the impersonal forces of modern bureaucracies, international markets and electronic technology. According to Jordan Ngubane, *ubuntu* means the common foundation of all African cultures; in essence it involves a consciousness of belonging together (ibid, 100).

The globalist interpretation holds that the African renaissance is something that is going to be brought about by means of fibre-optic cables, liberal democracy and market economics (ibid, 97). This view enjoys the support of businessmen (from across the racial spectrum) in South Africa. They understand modernisation in terms of the generation of wealth, and who look towards a world in which trade and global competitiveness are as important as political dimensions of diplomacy (Vale & Maseko, 1998:279). Ajulu argues that the globalist interpretation is not simply an elite plot, a vital lie to recruit the masses into neo-liberal politics (ibid, 2001:33).

South African companies such as Engen oil company advanced the same vision in their project of enabling system called 'The African Dream (Lodge, 1999:98). Moreover, South Africa's direct investment in Africa has increased from R3.7 billion before the 1994 election to about R13 billion thereafter, while trade during 1994-5 has increased by 52.6 per cent to R16, 771 billion. Business confidence in Africa's globalisation has been reflected on the financial markets, where South African companies trading in Africa have shown impressive growth (Vale & Maseko, 1998:279).

4.2.2. Mbeki and Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)

Of utmost importance to Mbeki's government is leveling of the South African socio-economic and political inequality through transformation and market-oriented empowerment policies and programmes. It is held that this can only be done by adopting and applying specific policies and programmes such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment also in the private sector (Ramutsindela, 2001:76). In line with the latter, President Mbeki argues that the objective of transformation is the establishment of a society characterised by the quality of the national groups by a proper racial balance or representativity throughout all its sectors, classes and status (Hudson, 2000:96).

Transformation through affirmative action in the civil service not only seeks to develop that sector into an efficient and effective instrument capable of delivering equitable services, but is also an effective means to bring hitherto marginalised communities to the administrative heart of the government (Ramutsindela, 2001:76). Mbeki alludes to this point when he states that "[a]mong other things this [transformation] must mean the creation of possibilities for that majority to obtain such education and training as would give them the capacity to compete for jobs as directors-general in the public service, as university professors, as judges, as financial managers in large corporations, as general in the National Defense Force and so on" (quoted in Bernstein, 1999:141).

Some argue that affirmative action is also necessary for utilitarian reasons. The advocates of this view such as Wiseman Nkuhlu (quoted in Charlton & Van Niekerk, 1994:13) argue that future prosperity depends on economic productivity, management and technological capability of blacks. They further contend that the demands of qualified people will exceed the supply of traditional resources of employment (Bayat & Meyer in Mello, 2000:33).

Affirmative action in South Africa operates under the Employment Equity Act (EEA). This Act was passed in 1998 but came into effect in 1999 <http://www.isiswomen.org/pub/wia/wiawcar.affirmative.htm>(01-05-2002). The EEA is to achieve equity in the workplace by:

- ❏ promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination, and

- ❏

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- implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in empowerment experienced by designated groups, to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace <http://www.isiwomen.org/pub/wia/wia/wiawcar/affirmative.htm> (01-05-2001).

The measures of affirmative action include the following:

- the identification and elimination of barriers with an adverse impact on designated groups;

- the promotion of diversity

- making reasonable accommodation for people from designated groups

- retention, development and framing of designated groups

- preferential treatment and numerical goals to ensure equitable representation.

However, this excludes quotas <http://www.isiswomen.org/pub/wia/wiawcar/affirmative.htm> (01-05-2002). Furthermore, the Act stipulates that employers are not required to take steps that may constitute an absolute barrier to people from non-designated groups. Employers of 50 or more workers, or with an annual turnover greater than R4 million are required to draw up an Equity Plan and submit it to the Employment Equity Commission <ibid.>.

Black economic empowerment is seen as necessary for South Africa's development. Joel Netshitenzhe, the head of government's information and communication services, argues that "...[a]ll [South Africa] long-term security depends on the active, sufficient, meaningful participation by the black people in the economy..."(Financial Mail, 2002:25). Moreover, it is also argued that effective participation of black people in the economy would help it grow (ibid).

Nevertheless, Jacobs (2002:54) contends that the creation of the black middle class was deemed as necessary by the Mbeki government for the following reasons:

- to ensure stability

- to get a stake in a deracialised capitalist system

- to act as a shock absorber between the black masses and the regime, as well as a political base for reforms it would embark on.

Marais (quoted in Jacobs, 2002:57) alluded to the aforesaid as he stated that the advancement of the African elite carries strong symbolic meaning: the achievement of a few kindle the acquisitive hopes of many more, even if the scale of their success is structurally destined to be minor.

Black economic empowerment has been envisaged as instrumental for achieving the ideals of the RDP (Lewis, 2002:4) one of which "is to deracialise business ownership and control completely..."(RDP, New Agenda, 2002:57). It is held that this "will not only extend the resources available for economic growth, ...but also address pressing concerns of racial and spacial equity" (Lewis, 2002:4).

The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and some small corporations were targeted. As a result, a number of black-controlled groups and several black owned stockbroking firms have emerged since 1994 such as the JCI and Johnic from Anglo-American and Zenex Oil from the Zenex Trust. Moreover, some high profile black personalities were appointed to senior positions both in parastatal organisations and the corporate world (Jacobs, 2002:56). Other state-owned enterprises have also been actively assisting BEE. Eskom spent R3.9 billion in its procurement budget on black-owned businesses over the last financial year. R1.1 billion of which went on a major black empowerment coal colliery, Eyesizwe Coal (Lewis, 2002:5).

In its first five years BEE has not been a success. Mbeki refered to this point when he said that "[f]ive years after the arrival of the democratic order, [they] have not made much progress and may well be marching backward with regard to the deracialisation of the productive property. Clearly something is not right" (cited in New Agenda, 2002:57). By the end of 1999, the BEE stake on the JSE had dropped to about 1% - down from R20 billion to a mere R5 billion. Instead of creating jobs, black empowerment has tended to shed them (Jacobs, 2002:54).

The failure was due to an absence of a co-ordinated and targeted approach that integrates all those efforts and measures their impact on advancing the levels of black participation in economic activities (ANC BEE Policy Statement, New Agenda, 2002:57). Moreover, it was argued that the carrying out BEE have had negative effect on government's attempts to attract investment and implement the macroeconomic reforms strategy (Lewis, 2002:4).

A new BEE strategy framework was put in place under the auspices of President Mbeki (Lewis, 2002:4). Moreover, BEE Council was established with a view to monitoring its policy implementation. This council was mandated to monitor BEE in regard to ownership, control and influence, recruitment and training, employment equity and income (Lewis, 2002:4) Consequently, a new law, Black Empowerment Act, has been drafted by the Department of Trade and Industry. It will be a facilitating Act that sets certain targets, defines empowerment and allows for the setting of codes of practice. It also provides for BEE advisory council which is to champion black empowerment and to advice cabinet and the president on empowerment (Financial Mail, 2002, August 9 p24).

The new law has set 2014 as he target date for effective participation of black people in the economy, in terms of ownership, control and skilled occupations (Financial Mail, 2002,August 9 p24). According to the new law each industry will be required to draw up charters on empowerment through a voluntary process. Some charters that already in operation are the following:

- liquid fuels charter; and 25% is planned to be in the hands of blacks by 2010(ibid, 25).

- the mining charter 26% over the next ten years; and progress towards target will be assessed in five years time (Business Day, 10 October 2002).

- a charter for financial services sector which is being negotiated by Nedlac (Financial Mail, 2002, August 9 p24).

Black participation in the economy is also promoted by the department of trade and industry through other policy intiatives using governemnt's finacial resources. These include:

- the annual R120 billion state procurement budget

- licensing, including mining and telecommunications

- its own financial institutions, including the Industrial Development Corp, small business promoters Khula and Ntsiki, the National Empowerment Fund and the Development Bank (Financial Mail, 2002 9 August 25).

However, the new law is also going to ensure that government- driven BEE should not benefit only big empowerment players like Cyril Ramaphosa and Mvelaphanda's Tokyo Sexwale. Hence, the

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capacity of the black chamber movement has been increased so that small and medium sized enterprises can benefit (ibid, 25).

4.3 Mbeki the Capitalist?

In 1984 President Mbeki, then head of ANC international affairs, declared that "the ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one. It will not become one by decree for the purpose of pleasing its 'left' critics"(quoted in Saul, 2002:43-44). In addition he later cancelled his South African Communist Party membership. On the basis of the aforesaid it can safely albeit tentatively be concluded that he has distanced himself and/or the ANC from socialism.

Furthermore, this move by Mbeki also heralded his espousal of the capitalist philosophy which has been enjoying hegemony since the end of Cold War. The latter portrays Mbeki as a capitalist. This is corroborated by the policies and programmes that are being pursuit by Mbeki such as GEAR, NEPAD, and the informal advisory council and International Investment Council. Gear and Nepad subsume both political reform and socio-economic development targets under neo-liberal economic targets, and advocates the creation of appropriate conditions to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) as the main developmental solution to African countries (Ryklief, 2002:116).

4.3.1 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)

In 1996 the ANC led government replaced the RDP with GEAR. The former was people-centred in its approach whereas the latter is based on the neoliberal principles (Ryklief, 2002:112). Moreover, RDP was a product of a joint venture between the ANC alliance and other stakeholders. On the contrary, the ANC junior alliance partners, COSATU and SACP, were only consulted few days before GEAR was announced. In addition, the minister of finance, Trevor Manuel, declared it as 'non-negotiable' (Marais, 1998:160).

GEAR was seen by some as a response to the RDP shortcomings such as 'falling rates of return', 'isolation from the world economy', 'excessive protection', 'primary product expert dependence', 'low exports and high import propensity' (ibid, 2002:86). Thus, part of the reason given by government for adopting GEAR was that the RDP functioned not as a development framework, but as an aggregation of social policies designed to alleviate poverty without affecting the complex of economic policies and practices that reproduces poverty and inequality (Cheru, 2001:507).

Moreover, the ANC led government was made to change its policy due to, the devaluation of the rand in March-April 1996, foreign perceptions and pressure from foreign investors, World Bank and others (Bernstein, 1999:83).

GEAR promised to increase annual growth by an average of 4,2%, create 1,35 million new jobs by the year 2000. About 833 000 of these jobs would be created through GEAR adjustments, 308 000 through higher economic growth, 325 000 through changes in the flexibility of labour markets and 200 000 through government-induced employment. It would boost exports by average 8,4 percent per annum through an array of supply-side measures, and drastically improve social infrastructure (Marais, 1998:161,168).

Gear is a neoliberal macroeconomic policy. Hence it is distinguished by three features: reliance on market mechanism wherever possible, rather than government intervening in and regulating the growth process; maintenance of fiscal and monetary policy restraint; and opening up the economy to international competitive forces (Bernstein, 1999:84). Gear was hailed by the corporate sector as 'investor friendly' and was also praised for the way it addresses the concerns expressed by business (Marais, 1998:162).

Moreover, as a neoliberal macroeconomic policy, GEAR was to create economic growth by creating an investor-friendly environment. This was to be undertaken by the liberalisation of exchange controls that prohibit the movement of capital; tax cuts and wage freezes aimed at encouraging investments and maximising profits; fiscal austerity and rapid reductions in budget deficits, by means of cuts in state expenditure; and the sale of profitable assets to the private sector (Ryklief, 2002:111).

Although Trevor Manuel, the minister of finance, has defended GEAR, President Mbeki is seen as the one who brought it to where it is today - the current economic orthodoxy within the ANC (Ryklief, 2002:112). Moreover, former president Mandela was not involved in the formulation of GEAR unlike Mbeki who has played a key role in introducing GEAR and defending it (Ryklief, 2002:113). Mbeki stated that GEAR "... is the central compass which will guide all other sectoral growth and development pogrammes aimed at achieving the objectives of the RDP (quoted in Marais, 1998:161).

4.3.2 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

President Mbeki is viewed as the principal architect of Nepad (Mkhondo, 2002:50). Moreover, since 2000 he has emerged as the developing countries single most important voice in the world economy due to his recent interventions (Nel & Taylor, 2002:164). According to Masland and King he is also seen as "Washington's favourite African leader-urbane and brainy, the west's best hope for a continent mired in poverty, corruption and disease" (quoted in Jacobs and Calland, 2002:5).

The New Partnership for Africa's Development was born on the 23rd October 2001, in Abuja, Nigeria (Kanbur, 2002:87). It originates from an earlier document entitled 'A New African Initiative (NAI). The latter was a merger of two parent documents – 'The Millenium Partnership for the African Recovery' which was sponsored by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria, and the 'Omega Plan' which was supported by President Wade (ibid, 88).

The leaders of the five initiating states, namely, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, were mandated to prepare Nepad policy framework document by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union). It was formally adopted at the 37th Summit of the OAU in July 2001 and thus became the official working document on Nepad for the AU <http://www.nepad.org >.

Nepad is a holistic, comprehensive and integrated sustainable development initiative for the economic and social revival of Africa <http://www.nepad.org >. It is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic (Nepad, 2001:1).

Nepad has the following as its primary objectives:

- ❑ eradication of poverty

- ❑ placing of African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development

- ❑ bringing to an end the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process

- ❑ accelerating the empowerment of women

- ❑ full integration of Africa into the global economy <ibid>

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Mbeki's faith in capitalism is also reflected in Nepad. As Wiseman Nkuhlu, Chairman of Nepad's Steering Committee and special economic advisor to President Mbeki, has argued, Nepad will avoid dogma and stick to clear economic vision based on a free market system. Moreover, for Nepad to have a desired impact on poverty and growth, Africa needs annual investments of about $64 billion and growth of seven per cent. That is why the African leaders have been bargaining with the G8 leaders (Mkhondo, 2002:51).

Mbeki, via Nepad, is intending to establish a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations-one that is sufficiently 'radical' to lift African gross domestic product (GDP) growth to 7 per cent a year (Bond, 2002:53). The African leaders in turn are to have a break with their past record of dictatorship, misrule and economic mismanagement, in favour of a collective commitment to democracy, good governance, rule of law and economic growth (Mkhondo, 2002:54; Nel and Taylor, 2002:165).

Nevertheless, Nel and Taylor (2002:164) argue that the African leaders have been given heed by the G8 leaders simply because the message communicated fits neoliberal discourse. It is for this reason that the following five priority areas are to be undertaken in the short term:

- capacity building for peace and security

- economic and corporate governance

- infrastructure and information and communications technology

- central bank and financial standards

- agriculture and market access (Mkhondo, 2002:51).

4.3.3 The Informal Advisory Council and International Investment Council

Mbeki's faith in capitalism is also demonstrated by his informal advisory council and International Investment Council (IIC). He established the latter early in 2000. In the world where 'perceptions are reality' (Kotze, 2001) image becomes a critical issue and so does marketing. This is true to South Africa as has been penalised because of a "bad neighbourhood" perception. Hence, President Mbeki set up the council after realising South Africa needed to break decisively through the prejudice, and to influence actively and positively decision-making by industrialists and investors (The Sunday Independent, 13 October 2002).

Moreover, the IIC led to the founding of International Marketing Council (IMC). The latter is to 'brand' South Africa (The Sunday Independent, 13 0ctober 2002) as this is believed will boost growth and make that country more attractive to investors (Business Day, 10 October 2002). Nel and Taylor (2002) argue that Mbeki is on a marketing mission for his economic plans for South Africa and the continent.

Since its founding, the council has convened four times at various locations in South Africa. It is to draw on insight of distinguished international leaders who firmly believe in the success of South Africa, the better to market it. (The Sunday Independent, 2002 13 October p5). It is composed of inter alia, Jurgen Schrempp (DaimlerChrysler, Germany), Sam Jonah (Ashanti Goldsfields, Ghana), Percy Barnevik (formerly of ABB, Switzerland) and Niall Fitzgerald (Unilever,UK) (Business Day, October 10 2002).

4.4 Mbeki the Policy-Maker

The unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) made it possible for its three different groups of leaders, namely the exiles, Robben Islanders and UDF members, to come together. However, the three groups have different approaches when it comes to policy-making and decision-making. The first two groups believe in top-down and secretive model of decision-making. It is held that the latter was occasioned by a need to for loyalty to the ANC during the struggle against apartheid.   On the other hand, the UDF leaders have been used to democratic and consultative model of decision-making.

President Mbeki allegedly belongs to the group that advocate top-down and secretive model of decision-making. This is evidently seen in the manner in which he has orchestrated the making of HIV/AIDS policy, GEAR and NEPAD.

4.4.1 Thabo Mbeki: a Democrat or an Autocrat?

In South African politics there has never been a political character as elusive as Thabo Mbeki. He has been more often than not described as an enigma. This is evinced by the divergent views regarding his fundamental values, beliefs, style, abilities and/or character. Some have described him as a pragmatist since he has, argues Tom Lodge (1999:122), "a deft rhetorical capacity for steering a middle course between what he has dismissively called 'the paradigms of ideological dogma'".

The supporters of Mbeki describe this capacity of his as 'pragmatism' whereas his opponents, especially Tony Leon, describe it as 'traveling on both sides of the road' (ibid.). This view is also supported by the fact that his "allies range from liberals to Africanists, from active Marxists to anti-communist members of the newly affluent black elite" <http://www.sundaytimes.co.za> (30-03-1999).

Thabo Mbeki is also described as a skilled diplomat, albeit he prefers personal diplomacy rather than working through intermediaries. That is to say, although he does consult his entourage on issues, he makes his own decisions (Kotze, 2001:114). In addition, his political style has been described, on the one hand, as 'inclusive and consultative' and, on the other, as 'Machiavellian' (ibid.). Mbeki has also been viewed as a skilled negotiator and strategist. This view might have been occasioned by his role in facilitating negotiations between the apartheid government and the African National Congress shortly before the new dispensation. This was also seen in the role he played, albeit as a back-room operator, in bringing about peace in KwaZulu-Natal after 1994 (Bernstein, 1999;Kotze, 2001). However, in other circles he is seen as duplicitous, oversensitive to criticism and even high-handed (Bernstein, 1999).

Butler describes Mbeki as a political manager and not as a charismatic populist. This is because his office is much more executive or centralised than Mandela's (2000) although this was done with a view to rendering policy co-ordination and implementation more efficient. As a result of this a cabinet secretariat was established. Moreover, Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services Unit were created, and five clusters of ministers in this Unit filter and design policies. All new directors of state departments sign their service and performance contracts with the President and the latter also appoint all the premiers of ANC-governed provinces. Mbeki also spends 'considerable time micro-managing' the work of his cabinet colleagues (Kotze, 2001:114-115).

4.4.2 How Mbeki made Gear and Nepad

It has been held that Mbeki as a policy maker has not been democratic. This is indicated by the manner in which he helped create both Gear and Nepad. In the case of Gear, the Tripartite Alliance was only consulted shortly before its publication (Marais, 1998:160). National Executive Committee (NEC) was not consulted before Gear's publication. The latter is supported by Mandela at the sixth COSATU congress that "...[e]ven the ANC learned about Gear when it was almost complete..." (quoted in Lodge, 1999:24).

President Mbeki employs a top-down policy-making model. This is because his Office functions typically on elitist principles. That is, insiders selected for managerial rather than populist credentials control and implement the policy-making process <http://www.geocities.com/groep63/breyten_presidency.htm> (29-04-2002). Hence, the Tripartite Alliance, which once boosted a participatory and even democratic policy-making, plays no significant role in influencing government's policies as this can be seen in its failure to change government's neoliberal policies [Gear](Lodge, 1999:29).

In creating Nepad, Mbeki (and co-authors) applied the top-down policy-making model as the masses were not informed. Instead, it was visualized by economists close to South African business. He later summoned presidents of Nigeria and Algeria for a political support (Jacobs and Calland, 2002:267). Moreover, most of the African leaders supporting Nepad come from countries that regard neoliberal underpinnings of the global market as sacrosanct (Nel and Taylor, 2002:169).

Mbeki and Nepad effectively exclude alliances with those international social, labour, and environmental movements that, in their struggles for socio-environmental and economic justice, are the main agents of progressive global change (Bond, 2002:54-55). Mbeki has instead collaborated with industrialised countries, transnational corporations and multilateral forces (ibid, 53).

4.4.3 HIV-AIDS Policy

The Mbeki government policy on HIV/AIDS had been marked by controversy. This was due to government refusal to provide inter alia HIV-positive pregnant women with antiretroviral drugs. Initiatially government claimed that it could not make this drug available due to financial constraints. However, Mbeki later announced in Parliament that AZT might be a health danger. This was based on a report of the United States Centers for Disease Control which had highlighted unforeseen toxicities in Antiretroviral. Mbeki held this view despite the fact that a number of studies have indicated that the drug can cut HIV mother-to-child transmission by 50% <http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/553.cfm> (28 October 2002). Moreover, the minister of health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang argued that government's main strategy was prevention because AZT does not cure (Coleman, 2002:1).

The situation was aggravated by Mbeki's stance on HIV and AIDS. He questioned the link between HIV and AIDS. He further stated that the virus could not be the only cause of AIDS. Consequently, he established a Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel which consisted of both the 'dissident' scientists and orthodox scientists. This was aimed at making recommendations to Mbeki's government in terms of HIV-AIDS policy.

Mbeki's views on the HIV/AIDS were criticised by people from within and outside South Africa. Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu argued that Mbeki and his government were making South Africa a laughing stock of the world. Former president Mandela criticised the government's policy by calling for nationwide distribution of Nevirapine. Mbeki was also criticised by (orthodox) scientists and other heads of state (Coleman, 2002:1).

Nevertheless, earlier this year (2002) Mbeki retreated from his stance on HIV-AIDS. This was followed by government's announcement that it was going to put in place a plan for a universal roll-out of antiretroviral drugs to HIV-positive pregnant women from January 2003. It also agreed to avail the drugs to rape survivors and people infected through needlestick injuries (ibid)

4.5. Assessment

Mbeki's approach to nation-building shifted from reconciliation and national unity to transformation and empowerment (through the market system). Moreover, his international outlook also informed his globalist approach. That is, Mbeki envisages South Africa not only as part of Africa but also of the capitalist world. Therefore, transformation and development of and in South Africa depend also on this relationship.

Mbeki's thesis of 'two-nations' has not been received well by some scholars. Nattrass & Seekings argue that black and white are no longer synonymous with rich and poor in South Africa. They hold that inequality is occasioned by two income gaps. This is between an increasingly multiracial upper class and everyone else, and between a middle class of mostly urban, industrial, or white-collar workers and marginalized class of black unemployed and rural poor. They further contend that rising income among better-off black households has widened intraracial inequality but reduced interracial inequality (2001:47). The latter view is supported by Bernstein (1999: 143) who states that unemployment, and not race, is now a major determinant of poverty and inequality. Moreover,

in the political circles, the New National Party (NNP) and Democratic Alliance (DA) accused Mbeki of reracialising the South African society.

Thabo Mbeki's quite diplomacy in Zimbabwe has been challenged by the Western and local leaders. As a result it is argued that South Africa lacks commitment to the democratic principles. Moreover, as Jacobs and Calland argue, Mbeki has not only underestimated the need to reaffirm his own commitment to good governance and the rule of law but has also threatened to undermine the African Renaissance and Nepad (2002). The leader of the official opposition in South Africa, Tony Leon, argued that quite diplomacy was in support of Mugabe and thus renouncing principles of Nepad <http://. www.sundaytimes.co.za/zones/sundaytimes/newsst/newsst1031548300.asp> (09/09/2002).

Although Mbeki's African renaissance has been a move in a right direction, some scholars are not at ease with the term 'renaissance'. Ramose argues that the usage of this term implies a denial of Africa's right to choose from her experience terms and concepts that can be utilised to understand and interpret African reality (2000:50). He further contends that even if this term was to be accepted, the period of African 'renaissance' has passed. Now it is a time of a new day, a new life symbolised by cock-crow, which according to African culture, proclaims the passage from darkness to light (ibid, 56).

The Africanist interpretation of African renaissance is viewed as less important than economic development. Ndebele in Ajulu (2001:33) argues that "the call for African roots has less effect than the provision of water and sanitation, electricity, telephones, houses, clinics, transport, schools and jobs..." Lodge (1999:102)holds the same view and further argues against globalist interpretation of African renaissance. He states that the weakness of this view is the assumption that technology and markets are not ideologically informed.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development has been envisaged as a great effort ever taken by the African leaders. It is also seen as a concretisation of African renaissance. However, Taylor and Nel (2002:177) argues that its adoption of a reformist approach has deprived it of the opportunity to transform the global relations. Consequently, this will have little impact, if any, in the process of poverty reduction. Other commentators view Nepad as a product of a political elite that has

excluded the views of other social structures (Tribune, 2002:52). It is also criticised for making alliances with global elites and not with the oppressed (Bond, 2002:54).

Mbeki has also made the creation of black middle class his priority. He is determined to see the black people in the forefront in the running of the economy in the not too distant future. This is meant to ensure stability and stake in the deracialised capitalist system for the new political elite, and act as a shock absorber between the black masses and the regime (Jacobs and Calland, 2002:259).

However, it is argued that although the poor and disadvantaged were supposed to be the beneficiaries of affirmative action, the latter has benefited only the few (Bernstein, 1999:141). Affirmative action has also been viewed as apartheid in reverse by the (predominantly white) opposition parties. In 1998 the New National Party stated that "the ANC's unbalanced application of their representation of the policy of affirmative action ... in practice, means nothing more than reverse apartheid" (cited in Ramutsindela, 2001:77). The Democratic Party (now Democratic Alliance) the same year stated that "it is both immoral and impractical to try to redress racial imbalances by taking steps which will entrench race consciousness" (ibid.).

GEAR has been accepted by the business community as necessary for economic growth in South Africa. Nevertheless, it has been criticised by the junior partners of the ANC led alliance. COSATU and SACP hold that privatisation has detrimental effects on the life of the poor. Mbeki earlier stance on HIV-AIDS is said to have impacted negatively not only on his image but also on South Africa's.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION

The South African transition to democracy occasioned a need for the creation of new national fundamentals for the nation. This was thus followed by the adoption of the new Constitution (1996) which declares that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in [their] diversity". Hence the government embarked on the programme of nation-building with a view to "build[ing] a united and democratic South Africa" (Constitution of South Africa, 1996:6).

Since 1994 South Africa has adopted a liberal or inclusive nation-building. However, since then two divergent approaches to nation-building have been put in place by former president Mandela (1994-1999) and President Mbeki (1999-2002+). These approaches seemed to contradict each other in the sense that their respective proponents had different "nations" in mind, at least from the surface. This would mean that nation-building since 1994 has taken two different directions. Moreover, this would further mean that they are mutually exclusive, at least by implication.

Mandela (1994-1999) promoted nation-building through reconciliation and corporatism. He envisaged South Africa as a non-racial and Rainbow nation. In addition, his was a hands-off approach characteristic of a laissez-faire leadership style. On the contrary, President Mbeki promotes nation-building through transformation, market forces and black empowerment. Mbeki envisions South Africa not as a non-racial and Rainbow nation, but as a country of two nations, one black and poor, and the other white and rich. Mbeki also wants to "Africanise" the South African nation and at the same time wants to see Africa playing a major role in the arena of nations. Therefore, he called for African Renaissance with a view to rebuilding the continent, and together with some other African leaders, initiated the New Partnership for Africa's Development to achieve this goal. However, this process has to take place within the globalist world. Moreover, Mbeki's is the hands-on approach characteristic of a transactional leadership style.

Although the Mandela's and Mbeki's approaches to nation-building are divergent and also seem to be contradictory or mutually exclusive, Stols (2002) argues that they have to be viewed in their proper contexts. That is, the 1994-1999 period called not only for a leader of Mandela's caliber, but also for the kind of nation-building approach similar to the one adopted by Mandela.

Therefore, reconciliation, corporatism and government of national unity became the fundamentals of the Mandela approach to nation-building. Mandela believed in reconciliation to the extent that he is still seen as a living symbol of reconciliation.

It has been indicated that Mandela left Mbeki with political peace. Thus the 1999-2002+ period is seen by many, especially the poor, as a period of delivery. This point is succinctly put by Stols (2002:33) as he argues that Mbeki has been tasked with leading and managing a still feeble democracy in which expectations were growing and all eyes were on him to deliver. In other words, Mbekis's has to preach an economic peace. Therefore, transformation and black empowerment through market forces have become the trademark of his approach to nation-building.

Viewed from this perspective, these two approaches are neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive. Although they are divergent, they are complimentary instead. That being the case, it can be assumed that the Mandela approach served as a foundation for the Mbeki's. This is partly because there was a need for political peace, and the Mandela approach proffered the latter.

Moreover, Mbeki complimented his lack of 'Madiba magic' with "Tony Blair" or management component of his approach. Therefore, nation-building has not taken two different directions but it is still on the direction set out by Mandela.

The Mandela approach was more locally based in the sense that it emphasised reconciliation and national unity more than anything else. On the contrary, the Mbeki approach has an international outlook in both political and economic terms. That is, he takes South Africa as part and parcel of Africa and the globalist world. Therefore, South African (and African) problems are to be solved through the capitalist mechanisms. Thus, Mbeki believes that both South Africa and Africa have a crucial role to play in the international arena.

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