“Deeper into a Hole?”
Borrowing and Lending in South Africa
by Deborah James

In South Africa, with upward mobility much aspired to but seldom attained, householders must spend money they have not yet earned. Borrowing both from formal institutions and smaller moneylenders (legal and illegal) positions them uneasily: in order to fulfill social requirements in one register, they acquire intensified obligations in another. Moneylending and money borrowing, owing much to the legacies of “credit apartheid,” involve an uneven mix. Embeddedness and community connection enable flexibility, juggling, and temporary escape from repayment obligations on the one hand, but systems of repayment and ever-newer technologies enable creditors to pursue debtors with inexorable swiftness on the other. Given that credit postapartheid has an increasingly formal, uniform, and financialized character, the second of these—which makes debtors get “deeper into a hole”—is becoming a predominant way of experiencing and representing the situation. The phrase, with its suggestion of entrapment, captures an important aspect of the deeply ambivalent feelings that borrowers experience in the face of debt.

The three elements of this special issue of *Current Anthropology*—crisis, value, and hope—are inextricably combined in the phenomenon that is the topic of this paper, that is, debt. In South Africa, the moment of democracy coincided with the extension of credit to many who were formerly unable to borrow. It held out the promise and expectation of inclusion to people formerly denied it. As elsewhere in the world but here beginning in a more precipitous manner, the supply of and demand for credit interacted in a complex relationship to facilitate the rapid growth of a new middle class as well as promise the fulfilment of aspiration to a far larger group of people (Servet and Saiag 2013). As prospective consumers enthusiastically embraced the possibility of borrowing in order to secure highly valued things, opportunities, and relationships, credit also started being “sold”—as happened elsewhere (see Villarreal 2014)—to prospective takers as necessary or inevitable, drawing yet further numbers into the net. Such credit was being used not simply for materialist consumerism but to satisfy the desire for what was felt necessary for a good life. When the lure of credit turned into unpayable debt, many of those initially offered hopes of advance— aspiring to possess those things formerly reserved for people wealthier than themselves—were threatened with further marginalization. Fearful of the unsustainable and crisis-like character of the situation, policy makers and analysts, several years before the “subprime” debacle in the United States, were devising a regulatory framework to tackle the problem.

Exploring the circumstances that gave rise to their alarm, this paper also gives attention to models used by local actors to assess and evaluate their present and future circumstances. Local ideas of worth may challenge the tendency to measure all value by—and demand repayment in—its universal equivalent, money (Hann and Hart 2011:49), and considering such ideas ought to help us contest analyses that seek to represent all economic matters by measuring them in purely contractual terms. Considering debt in this way potentially directs the emphasis away from uniform measures of value and toward diverse ones. But in settings such as South Africa where financialization is far advanced (Ardington et al. 2004; Barchiesi 2011; Daniels 2004; Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004; Schoombee 2004, 2009), the imperative to repay may become less easy to escape. Debt gives a particularly poignant and edgy character to hope. It also throws value into question by threatening impending future crisis. If there has been a proliferation of the things that are felt essential in order to actualize the kind of life aspired to, then buying them “on tick” (promise to pay) is often the only way forward. In doing so, the debtor can “borrow speculative resources from his/her own future and transform them into concrete resources to be used in the present” (Peebles 2010:226). The way debt links these two

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1. The South African economy rapidly liberalized in the late 1990s and early 2000s and became extensively financialized. This, in the absence of investment in manufacturing and production, has been seen as accounting for South Africa’s “jobless growth” during that period (Marais 2011:124–128, 132–139).
time frames together means that positive and negative ideas of worth may be forced into uncomfortable juxtaposition. The values associated with getting what one needs to live well may be unassailably desirable, and loans may make it possible to actualize that life in the here and now, but owing amounts that threaten to increase exponentially as one looks toward the future can also bring anxiety, opprobrium, and self-blame.

Conducting research on the sensitive topic of indebtedness as I did between 2007 and 2009 posed particular challenges given that people were reluctant to discuss personal finances or engage in conversation about the illegal moneylending that is pervasive in South Africa. Faced with such circumspection, I found circumspection to be the best remedy in turn. Stories about moneylenders, “scams” practiced by repossession agents, and the like were readily offered, and people were more willing to give insights into their own and their families’ histories of banking, spending, or saving money than to recount the details of their current financial situation. It also proved necessary to explore a variety of settings, locales, and types of actors. First, given that the ranks of those who aspire to join the new middle class far outnumber those included on the grounds of income and achievement and that they are to be found in both rural and urban settings, I undertook interview-based research and participant observation not only among medium to well-paid employees of the government but also in a low- to middle-income neighborhood of Soweto (Gauteng) and in Impalahoek village in Mpumalanga (figs. 1, 2). Second, given the need to move beyond specific locales and attend to policy issues and the pronouncements of agents in the state, the corporate sector, and the world of human rights and NGOs, I also interviewed employees in the banking sector and registered microlenders and was attentive to those who seek to regulate or curb their activities, in particular by talking to debt counselors and sitting in on sessions they held with their clients, in Pretoria and Midrand (Gauteng; fig. 2). For the project overall (James 2014), I worked with 73 recorded and transcribed interviews as well using field notes written during participant observation. While some infor-
Figure 2. Map of Gauteng.
mants sought anonymity, others were happy to be cited, and I have respected their wishes.

The Rise and Regulation of Reckless Lending

In South Africa, circumstances have combined to place borrowers more inexorably in the grip of lenders than they have in some of the other settings discussed here (Guerin 2014; Villareal 2014). Soon after the transition from apartheid to democracy brought new promises of prosperity and upward mobility for those previously dispossessed, rates of borrowing and lending are reported to have increased exponentially as black consumers took advantage of the credit opportunities they had previously been denied while particular sectors of the white community started microlending businesses to cater to and exploit this new market. Demonstrating what was to become its characteristic combination of neoliberalism and regulatory tendencies, the state—whose policies during the 1990s had initially enabled such developments by liberalizing the economy and the provision of credit in one fell swoop—then sought during the 2000s to outlaw “reckless lending” and regulate the negative effects of this borrowing by passing new legislation, the National Credit Act (NCA) of 2007.

Resulting from these impulses that followed each other in short order and exhibiting varying degrees of legal formality, three distinct lending sectors were in evidence by the late 2000s. Each, supplementing or plugging gaps left by the other two, supplied this new market in its own way. Reflecting the ethnic and racial divisions of South Africa’s past and of its new dispensation, each has a linguistic/ethnic specificity (table 1).

1. The mainstream/formal financial sector was historically dominated by an “oligopoly” of British-owned banks and rooted in the English-speaking capitalist sector (Verhoef 2009:157, 181). Later, it was dominated by the “big four” banks—Absa, First National Bank, Nedbank, and Standard. Alongside the credit cards, housing loans, and vehicle finance they offer, this sector also provides retailers’ store cards for clothing and food, “hire purchase” (installment payments) for furniture and appliances, and the like. Black people, having had very restricted access to such loans before the 1990s under credit apartheid, were offered them in profusion thereafter.

2. The new microlending sector, offering mostly smaller and short-term loans, grew exponentially in the 1990s and was mostly run by Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants who invested their redundancy packages in these businesses. They did so after leaving state employ when the African National Congress became the ruling party. Initially free to charge “uncapped” interest rates and engaging in practices—such as the confiscation and use of borrowers’ ATM cards by way of loan security—that were later prohibited, many of these subsequently registered as microlenders under the NCA, which obliged them to charge monthly interest of no more than 44%. Some of the smaller microlenders consolidated to form larger enterprises, notably African Bank and Capitec, which have now taken their place alongside the “big four.”

3. Mashonisas, or neighborhood moneylenders, came to be defined by their contrast to their formal microlending counterpart 2: they were defined as loan sharks because they remained unregistered under the NCA. (Because borrowers are often ignorant of the regulations, some use the term, however, to refer to both registered and unregistered lenders.) The biggest operators among them use customers’ ATM cards to withdraw the money owed to them at month end before returning them to their owners and typically charge monthly interest of 50%, in excess of the new cap on the interest rate imposed by the NCA. In this classically financialized manner, taking advantage of efforts that had been made to bank the unbanked, some community moneylenders were ensuring repayment by using the ATM technique earlier deployed, but now outlawed for use, by those who were now registered (and hence considered “formal” and “regulated”).

What of the demand side? Overall, it is black consumers striving to overcome the imbalances of apartheid whose plight has underlain the attempted regulation. Analyses showed that salary- or wage-earning consumers were most likely to be overindebted. Echoing what happens in many other settings of stable salaries subjected to less than stable pressures (see Parry 2012), “these workers earn a regular salary” and therefore “qualify for credit, but binding expenditure constraints possibly places pressure on them to borrow at a level that is unsustainable” (Daniels 2004:842). Race here is not a defining feature. Indeed, by 2008 it became clear that white consumers owed more than black ones. But those whose “reckless borrowing” has been of most concern—not surprisingly, because its members have also had the greatest electoral and political influence since the advent of democracy—are the black recipients of state salaries (nurses, teachers, policemen) in the “new” black middle class where public-sector employment predominates (Crankshaw 2005; Schlemmer 2005; Southall 2004), middle- to low-wage black employees in state-owned enterprises, and a larger category, subjected to more “precarious” circumstances since democracy (Barchiesi 2011), that

2. I use “black” to denote the members of Bantu language groups, now often termed “indigenous,” who were at the bottom of the social ladder under apartheid. I do this in contrast with older South African practice, which terms them “African” but misleadingly suggests that other inhabitants of the country are “non-African.”

3. The Zulu word mashonisa relates to the verb stems (endings) -shona (to sink, become poor, die) and -shonisa (to impoverish, cause to become poor; Dent and Nyembezi 1969:481). It may be translated as “one who impoverishes” or who “takes and continues to take indefinitely” (Krige 2011:144). In popular parlance the plural is mashonisas (Krige 2011:151; Siyongwana 2004:851).

has similar aspirations but even fewer means to fulfill them. While I have written more fully about the new middle class elsewhere (James 2014), the principal case study on which the present paper centers—that of a security guard employed on a casual basis—hails from the ranks of this increasingly growing “precariat” (Standing 2011).

If debt involves the obligation to repay the resources borrowed from one’s own future (Peebles 2010:226), the South African case is distinguished from others in its volume by a gradual shrinking of the options for temporarily evading such repayment of debt. The coexistence of multiple registers of wealth, partly overlapping and/or commensurable but partly remaining distinct, is a common topic in economic anthropology (Gudeman 2001; Parry and Bloch 1989). Villareal (2014) shows how Mexican women use “diverse frameworks of calculation and valuation,” and Guérin (2014) speaks of the “incommensurable, nonsubstitutable financial practices” that are commonly used to cope with tensions arising from “the multiple logics of debt.” In South Africa, similar arrangements have certainly been and still are engaged in, alternately to hinder and enable the flow of money, to enable saving and spending, but the possibilities for “juggling” various options (Guérin 2014; Servet and Saiag 2013) are fewer than they were. This is so despite the proliferation of new sources of credit since the end of apartheid. Choosing from among the three sectors identified above, a consumer is able to (1) borrow from many banks, use many credit cards, and hold store cards from an array of retailers as well as have access to microloans both (2) legal/formal and (3) illegal/informal (table 1). (Often, as with Guérin’s paper, they borrow from the latter in order to pay back the former). At the same time, the means by which these debts are collected has shrunk drastically. Considerable efforts made—with the help of the United Kingdom’s DfID-funded Finmark Trust—to “bank the unbanked” (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:89) have seen a deepening financialization of the economy (Arдинton et al. 2004; Krige 2012). Accompanying this, there are advanced IT systems rooted in apartheid’s preoccupation with surveillance, which envision, even if they have not yet achieved, a single high-tech system to be used for identification, cashing in social grants, buying, and banking (Breckenridge 2005:272–273). These technologies, enabling “data to flow from one contiguous database to another,” have opened up the commercial use of such data (Breckenridge 2005:281). What worries debtors most about these developments is their application in transforming what were distinct pockets of finance into one single flow.

By allowing lenders, formal and informal, to reach into borrowers’ bank accounts by the means mentioned earlier, their inclusion in this high-tech banking system leaves such borrowers, in effect, less place to hide. Sources of credit, then, have proliferated and become more diverse, but the technologies of collection have narrowed and become streamlined.

In the face of these developments, the NCA, although informed by a conviction that lenders should be held to account (see Graeber 2011; Shipton 2011:232), ended up more often being used to reform borrowers. The act admittedly achieved some small successes: curtailing mortgage credit well before, and hence preventing a South African occurrence of, the sub-prime crisis, and establishing a system of debt review. The act committed to creditors, allowing them to reschedule debts and make payments while preventing further indebtedness. The counselor identifies the client’s needs to identify the amount that they need to live, setting aside this amount before deciding on a realistic set of repayments to be offered to credit providers. The debtor, once officially under debt review, must be allowed 60 days’ grace from creditors’ demands before the final schedule of payments must be agreed and put into practice. For more detail on the regulation, see James (2013).

4. Debt review was aimed in particular at cases such as those described below involving amounts of less than R50,000, which were ineligible for the very expensive process of bankruptcy or sequestration (termed “insolvency” in South Africa). According to Boraine and Roestoff, if a debtor is “insolvent but he or she cannot put up the funds to apply for the proper relief in terms of the Insolvency Act” or cannot prove “advantage to creditors, a sequestration order that would eventually lead to a discharge of debt, would be out of reach of such a debtor” (2002:4). Debt review was intended to give debtors some respite from harassment by creditors, allowing them to reschedule debts and make payments while preventing further indebtedness. The counselor identifies the client’s needs to identify the amount that they need to live, setting aside this amount before deciding on a realistic set of repayments to be offered to credit providers. The debtor, once officially under debt review, must be allowed 60 days’ grace from creditors’ demands before the final schedule of payments must be agreed and put into practice. For more detail on the regulation, see James (2013).

5. Ambiguities that have dogged attempts to characterize, pigeonhole, and analyze the “black middle class” are too extensive to cover here in detail; see James (2014) for a longer discussion. For accounts of how the black middle class consolidated within the public sector in the 1990s, see Crankshaw (2005, 2008), Southall (2004:533, 2012), and Seekings and Nattrass (2005:312).

Table 1. Credit supply

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Lender</th>
<th>Type of loan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mainstream/formal financial sector</td>
<td>Bank loans; store cards for clothing and food; vehicle finance; furniture and appliances on installments; housing loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>New microlending sector</td>
<td>Smaller/short-term loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Informal microlending sector</td>
<td>Smaller/short-term loans neighborhood moneymakers</td>
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where an independently funded and skilled adviser was willing to commit much time and effort. In many other cases, debt counselors’ efforts—alongside those by other state and non-state actors—were directed toward the end of educating debtors and persuading them to be more frugal. Self-help books and self-styled financial advisers were aiming at getting consumers to “own” their finances, to partner up in a stable nuclear family, focus on the future achievements and needs of one’s own children, and repudiate the claims of kinsmen and neighbors, advising people, in classically neoliberal style, to refuse others’ demands (Ndumo 2011:195–196; see also Stack 2013).

Overall, lending and borrowing, at rates regarded as “reckless,” were continuing apace. When I was writing this in 2013, 6 years after the promulgation of the NCA, the media was reporting on the notorious case of the shooting of striking platinum mine workers at Marikana. It turned out that one important underlying cause of the strike had been the intensified onslaught lenders were making on borrowers’ bank accounts. The miners, not necessarily in the lowest pay bracket, had unsustainable levels of debt. An additional feature making this doubly burdensome, indeed intolerable, was the manner in which their numerous creditors were ensuring repayments. Miners’ pay, automatically transferred into their bank accounts at month’s end, was being transferred out of these again with equal ease by those to whom the miners owed money. These deductions were made in various ways. Lenders in sectors 1 and 2 (see table 1) used direct debits or “garnishee” or emoluments attachment orders. These are orders granted by a magistrate or clerk of the court and served on the employer of a defaulting debtor, enabling a creditor to take a monthly repayment directly from that debtor’s salary. Lenders in sector 3 did the equivalent by keeping borrowers’ ATM cards and using these to withdraw funds with interest from the ATM at month’s end. Shortly after payday, many of these miners simply had nothing left to live on. Despite regulation, then, the story told here is one of continuing, even deepening, indebtedness.

**Local Models of Indebtedness**

The outline above, by emphasizing the crisis-like character of borrowing and lending, gives a South African take on a familiar story. But how do borrower informants—including those newly indebted—experience the situation? A review of the small and incremental ways they save, invest, and husband resources or convert by choice between different registers of value complements the narrow view, through the lens of deferred payment with interest, taken by economists, regulators, and policy makers (Ardington et al. 2004; Daniels 2004). Informants’ models provide a more local, “house”-centered, or “human” view (Gudeman 2001, 2010; Hart, Laville, and Cat-tani 2010). They yield a view of mutual obligations between persons, families, and generations that is akin to “entrustment” (Shipton 2007), in which wealth is held and managed on behalf of others, and that also aligns with ideas outlined by Narotzky and Besnier (2014).

In post-1994 South Africa, such ideas articulate “market” and “community” models (Gudeman 2001), reflecting a long history of proletarianization and commodification on the one hand and custom-based social solidarity on the other. Embodying the former, sekholotó (from the Afrikaans skuld [debt]) has negative connotations of perpetual enslavement that hark back to rural cultivators’ experiences of owing money to trading stores and, more recently, refer to their sense of entrapment in hire-purchase arrangements. Embodying the latter, lobola captures the idea of long-term obligation and reciprocity between families (James 2012:22–23; Kuper 1982). In classic Maussian style, it includes the payment of bride wealth from a groom’s to a bride’s family, gifts from the bride’s to the groom’s family in return, and trousseau-type items given by parents to a daughter on the occasion of marriage: a model that is tenacious and resilient in the contemporary mind (Krige 2012; White 2004). Combined with this, and with similar tenacity, a further aspect of local social solidarity centers on saving. People club together in stokvels with relatives or neighbors to husband their resources (Bähr 2007; Verhoef 2009)—circumscribing these to prevent their everyday use—often by investing money in particular goods. The two models, rather than remaining discrete, have over the years been forced into articulation when slender means make it necessary to “borrow speculative resources . . . from [the] future” (Peebles 2010:226). The resulting attitude is one of deep ambivalence: it conjoins the alienation and enslavement of commodified indebtedness with the close bonds of obligation and reciprocity entailed in “entrustment” (Shipton 2007).

An example illustrates the difficulties arising from the jux-
tapsiation of these divergent spheres of value. The story of Richard Madihlaba—a Sepedi-speaking rural based migrant employed as a security guard in Pretoria and whose home is in GaNchabeleng, Limpopo Province (fig. 1)—exemplifies the situation of those who qualify for credit by earning a regular income (if, in his case, a precarious one) and whose aspirations to a decent lifestyle far outstrip their earnings. When I met him in 2008, he was being given debt counseling by Mareesa Erasmus of the University of Pretoria Law Clinic. As I listened, a tale unfolded of almost unimaginable exposure to consumer credit for one with so few resources. Coming under pressure from his mother “to pay lobola before she died” for the mother of his three children, he borrowed “more than R5,000” from African Bank,13 which he was still paying off. Because such marriage payments are thought to entail long-term owing in and of themselves, borrowing money in order to make them is considered undesirable, but grooms, faced with demands from in-laws or their own families, will nonetheless do so when pressed. Further demonstrating his commitment to long-term conjugal relations and to the local solidarity economy, Richard and his cohort of home-based migrant men formed a savings club, Rekgönne (We Can), with the aim of paying for the substantial costs of a wedding, above and beyond the lobola itself, for each member in turn. Members’ cash contributions are R100 monthly, with a larger amount of R1,000 payable on the occasion of each member’s celebration.

These various commitments have both necessitated and are accumulating on top of others (table 2).14 In his case, as in many others, it was his conscientious repayment of initial loans that led to his being offered further credit. After he repaid his initial loan to Jet, the retailer extended him a second, larger loan. But his debts eventually caught up with him. The final loan, from microlender SA Loans, taken out in order to repay the other loans, involved “borrowing money from someone—SA Loans—who charges 360% interest to pay back someone—RCS—who charges 100%,” so Richard is getting “much deeper into a hole,” as Mareesa put it.

Richard showed characteristic ambivalence about the effect of his many loans, and the investments for which they were intended, on the long-term relationships that lie at their heart. It was in order to procure the basis of household stability that he had borrowed money to pay lobola, to further his own and his children’s education, and to buy clothes and material goods for the household. He had also sent money home for building supplies, hoping to start building his own house on his residential stand in his home village. His actions were the very essence of frugality and thrift—the opposite of the “prolific consumer” of which much has been written in the media (see Krige 2011:294 passim). But broader conditions were restricting the success of his venture. His wife was spending the money he remitted on things other than those he had envisaged, and she had absented herself, leaving the children to be cared for by her mother, who he felt was neglecting them. What he termed his “financial situation” had a bearing on these conjugal disturbances: “I once brought her my bank statement, telling her ‘I have a problem. People are debiting the money from my account. That is why I am not getting that much money. I have been working in security. And I have to pay some of the accounts, like Jet, and those accounts that I have to pay by hand.’ . . . Maybe she [my wife] was expecting me to be a rich man, buying her expensive clothes.”

While marrying and paying lobola, alongside group-based savings also oriented toward marriage, were thus crucial to Richard’s inserting himself securely within the local solidarity economy, these things required the incurring of so much debt (sekolotó) that they were threatening to undermine that very security and indeed the house-based arrangements on which it was supposed to be based. Local views of indebtedness thus combine two aspects. The positive character of house-centered aspirations to save and to fulfill long-term social obligations, on the one hand, articulate uneasily with negative experiences of the financialized arrangements these necessitate, and without which they would prove impossible, and with being hounded by creditors, taking out further loans, and being driven “deeper into a hole” on the other.

Credit, Banking, and Moneylending: The Longer View

Behind the bank accounts and overdrafts Richard Madihlaba used—and the microloans and array of goods for whose purchase he had got himself into debt—lies a longer history of constraint. “Credit apartheid,” or the “dual economy of credit,” are the terms that have been used to characterize the forms of exclusion suffered by people like him. For the past half century, black people’s access to credit, tenuous from the beginning, had become even further restricted. Principal among the factors underpinning this was a “dual economy” of land ownership, with opportunities for buying and selling real estate (and the procuring of mortgages) and chances of borrowing for business and enterprise, severely restricted or nonexistent (James 2014; Krige 2011).15 The primary form of credit that had been available was that offered by furniture and appliance retailers via the system of hire purchase (Kaplan 1986:168) alongside a smaller element of clothing purchased on credit by wealthier and more upwardly mobile blacks from the 1950s onward (Kaplan 1986:270). Practices of borderline legality that had been habitually used by such retailers in their dealings with black clients were themselves further evidence of “credit apartheid.” (Indeed, it was anxiety about these consumer credit practices that had prompted the investigations that eventually led to the passing of the NCA [DTI 2002, 2004].) As Richard’s story shows, some aspects of this ha-

13. At the time of research, R8 (South African rand) = US$1.
14. For exchange rate, see footnote 13.
bituated system were beginning to change. In his credit “portfolio,” overdrafts, store cards, and microloans predominated over hire-purchase agreements. This apparent shift in technology and formal terminology, however, obscures that the lender was ultimately the same. Large retail firms, both clothing and furniture based, had started diversifying into the lucrative microlending market in the 1990s. Richard had borrowed from one of these, RCS, part of the Foschini clothing empire, to buy his DVD player (table 2). If the variety of financial strategies was gradually narrowing down to become more uniform for the borrower, on the side of the lender, the divisions between distinct retail products was blurred. A uniform measure of “debts” to be recouped through bank accounts was replacing these.

Furniture and Hire Purchase

Investing in items of furniture and appliances, both to embellish houses and as an investment in a fixed asset where other forms of property were disallowed, was a key aspect of the black South African experience, especially from the 1950s onward. Pioneered in urban areas by town dwellers seeking respectability (Krige 2011:138, 172), the practice readily spread to rural areas. Where migrants had initially taken a conservative approach to investment in property and the purchase of material goods, often consolidating the wealth of the homestead by buying cattle (Ferguson 1992), those migrating more recently have tended to favor the purchase on credit of household furnishings. A bride’s parents often provided an item of furniture as part of her trousseau, later investing in further items, paying each off in turn, with the eventual aim of equipping all rooms in the house. Although interest rates were and remain high (Schreiner et al. 1997), typically more than doubling the price, many householders have kept up their repayments in a prudent fashion. Furniture purchase thus contributed to a ritualized life course as well as involving aspirations to sophistication and modernity. It exposed householders to gradually increasing expenditure and expanding credit access over time. Providing a means of “saving” money by making it unavailable for other things, it could also, however, when unregulated, lead to unsustainable levels of debt.

The high price and the two-year period of time between delivery of the goods and the final repayment gave this credit system its mixture of different styles. There was meticulous record keeping and mailing out of invoices in brown envelopes to remind purchasers of what they still owed, but trust was also important: the social and geographical distance between retailers and their customers in villages made the business reliant on intermediaries and lent it a personalized dimension. Considerable profits could be made by targeting low-paid black migrants, but relying on these buyers, with their low earnings and in some cases reluctance to keep up repayments, also exposed smaller retailers to financial risk. The high costs of hire purchase compensated for defaults and helped pay for repossession operations. Success in making money in this sector (despite these problems) attracted much competition (Tlali 1979:26, 30, 116), which made business owners increasingly determined to increase their profit margins over those of their rivals while simultaneously reducing what they paid to employees and agents.

Customers who might have fallen on hard times, when handed reminders of payment due, often threw them away or hid them under the bed only to endure the shame of having items repossessed. The alternative—showing that “trust” was often honored more in the breach than the observance—was that some clients entered into collusion with agents or paid them bribes to depart (Cohen 2004:42–46; Tlali 1979:82–83). From the customers’ perspective, this was one way to escape the high interest rates charged. But such efforts did not necessarily make matters easier for customers. One such agent in a Mpumalanga village, despite having been fired by the retailer for crooked practice, continued to travel around to prospective customers taking advantage of villagers’ ignorance of his dismissal and continuing to pocket the deposits they were paying in expectation that their furniture would be delivered. The errant agent later left the area to go into hiding in order to escape their wrath once villagers discovered his trickery (James 2014).

By the early 2000s, despite banks’ efforts to abolish credit apartheid by extending financial formalization to all sectors of society, journalist and author David Cohen maintained that the “traditional business model” of selling furniture on credit still remained in place to some degree in contrast with the more familiar worldwide scenario in which “all risk of non-payment is transferred to the credit card companies” (Cohen 2004:18). The case of Richard Madihla suggests, however, that it was becoming more prevalent to get into hock to

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Table 2. Richard Madihla’s loan portfolio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Lender</th>
<th>Amount/purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Standard Bank account with overdraft facility</td>
<td>R5,000 for lobola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Bank</td>
<td>R6,000 for children’s clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jet</td>
<td>R2,800 for family’s DVD player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retail Credit Solutions (RCS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Onecorps</td>
<td>R2,800 for own DVD player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA loans</td>
<td>To pay back other loans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* African Bank started as an enterprise in sector 2, grew exponentially, and can now be considered part of the mainstream.
clothing retailers via store cards and to microlenders (in his case to buy an electrical appliance) than by buying furniture from retailers on hire purchase. Many such retailers—such as members of the JD group—had recently branched out into financial services and microlending as an equally or more profitable aspect of the business. Throughout, lending was becoming increasingly financialized, and customers’ being banked meant less risk to creditors than under the traditional business model.

Money Enclaves

It was the numerous phone calls Richard received from RCS “to say ‘when are you coming to pay us?’” that drove him to borrow from the further microlender, SA Loans, “to get money to pay them” (table 2). The almost universal spread of mobile phones makes it unnecessary to send out “brown envelopes” and makes borrowers easier to target by lenders and advertisers of all sorts. What makes his experience of the financial sector quintessentially modern, then, is creditors’ ready access to him: either recouping repayment by direct debit or, in the case of some of the smaller lenders, by telephoning him to remind him of his debts.

This case reveals how the attempted undoing of credit apartheid involved a concerted effort by various agencies, including financial institutions themselves, to “bank the unbanked.” Expanding business so as to include both “those at the bottom of the pyramid” (Prahalad 2004) and those who, even if not as poor, had been politically disenfranchised, it was claimed that access to financial products would benefit them (Krige 2011:142; Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:4–6). Attempting more effectively to reach prospective clients, South Africa’s banking sector intensified its efforts during the late 1980s and early 1990s to reach those parts of the market heretofore reluctant to use its services. While this initially involved various banks competing with each other in search of greater profit, the state later intervened, requiring all banks in the early 2000s to sign the Financial Sector Charter and to provide a basic savings and transmission account, known as Mzansi, intended for the poorest, including even those without a regular income. After market research concluded that banks seemed to be intimidating and that tellers were unable to speak any language other than English or Afrikaans, new branches were set up in urban townships and later in rural areas. It was done at relatively low cost, in part by switching all money transfers to ATMs, hiring staff to show new customers how to use these, and abolishing the uniquely South African fee for exchanging it for cash. It did not necessarily prevent black people from opening bank accounts. Households were using separate monies and had complex portfolios and multiple strategies (Collins 2008; see also Zelizer 1995). Opening an account was commonplace, especially for men of an older generation who worked on the mines or in industry. Later, they were joined by a younger generation of women. Some holders of the new Mzansi account have simply added this to their existing portfolio of bank accounts that they had opened several years or even decades earlier.

But bank accounts were often used for saving in a manner that hindered rather than enabled an easy flow of money. The opening and closing of successive accounts often paralleled other time-specific patterns or reflected spatial disjunctions. Such discontinuities went hand in hand with the stops and starts in an uneven history of employment, paralleled the geographical distances of South Africa’s migrant system, accompanied the switch from one spouse to another, or reflected the domestic distrust that went along with more stable albeit conflicted relationships. Bank accounts were, in effect, single rather than multiple use, and it was often for the way they blocked rather than enabled the ready flow of money that they were specifically deployed.

Their use was combined with other arrangements, often intricate and requiring considerable skill and powers of recall to manipulate and manage. People with commitments to kin or spouses made their money inaccessible by putting it in fixed deposits, by arranging with their employers to help them commit to enforced savings practices (Krige 2011:137; Zelizer 1995), by putting money aside with a retailer in the “lay-by” (on layaway) system—making a deposit on an item in the expectation of paying the rest of the price within a set time period or forfeiting the deposit (Roth 2004:72), or indeed by paying installment payments for furniture on hire purchase. A racially based male migrant of an older generation than Richard Madihlab, Ace Ubisi, worked in the mines, where at month end he would receive a pay slip to submit to the “time office,” exchanging it for cash. He deposited some in a building society account in order to put it aside, later drawing this out to buy telegraph orders that he sent home and that his wife redeemed at the local post office. When he later separated from his wife and fathered children with a new partner, he opened up a different account with Standard Bank that he used to send money back.

Although the experience of urban informants resident in


17. While this and other similar practices by retailers have been decried for their exploitative character, such criticisms have not taken into consideration the canny manner in which they are often used: householders have shown a strategic awareness of the advantages to be gained from economic formality (Krige 2011:137).
Soweto (fig. 2) is characterized by fewer extremes of geographical distance, similar discontinuities are nonetheless evident. Bank accounts were opened when jobs were secured, later becoming dormant when they were lost. The conflicting demands on the income of men and women and associated disagreements about household responsibilities sometimes necessitated the fencing off of wealth stores. Dinah Zulu’s mother, for example, kept an account separate from that of her father. He, a truck driver, was the family’s principal wage earner, with his wages being paid into his Sambiaou account, but he was described by Dinah as prone to drunkenness and as failing to meet his obligations. Frequently unable to gain access to his wages, his wife, like many women of her age and generation, earned a peripatetic living beyond the wage sector (Bozzoli and Nkotsoe 1991), making ready cash by selling cooked food to punters at the racecourse. Her bank account with Standard served a dual purpose: it allowed her to deposit her earnings so as to save part of them, and it enabled her to pay the installments on the various items of furniture that she bought, successively, on hire purchase and paid off one by one over the course of her working life.

While the case of Dinah’s parents reveals how marriage partners, concerned about each other’s reliability, used bank accounts to “ring-fence” (isolate) earnings in the 1970s, her own story illustrates that couples even under less discordant circumstances—as they do anywhere—kept their finances separate. Her husband, a policeman, earned a monthly salary paid into his bank account. Dinah had no formal job but earned a separate income as an informal tailor. Like many non-wage-earning women, she used a stokvel/savings club as a means to save, store, gain intermittent access to, and distribute money. Under the new dispensation, she acknowledged, “the banks do allow you to have an account—the Mzansi account is for people who are not working,” but she told me, “I did once open an Mzansi account, but I don’t have money to put in it.”

Migrant laborers and low-paid wage earners were thus using the banks in ways that reflected a variety of relational, marital, spatial, and educational discontinuities. Countering the patchy unevenness of these arrangements, increasing numbers of employers during the 1990s had started to pay wages or salaries into bank accounts, with civil servants in particular being paid via the state payroll system, Persal (Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004:77, 81). In the course of the 1990s, the Department of Social Welfare, in an effort to enable regularity of payment, similarly encouraged those receiving pensions and social welfare grants to open accounts (Breckenridge 2005; Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004:50–53). Where banking had previously been used to keep income streams separate and strategically to avoid certain social obligations while fulfilling others, it increasingly began to enable the unimpeded flow of money—from salary or social grant—into the account at month end and out of it again. Wages paid directly into employees’ bank accounts enable employees, in effect, to “borrow without collateral” or “use their expected wages as a collateral substitute” (Roth 2004:78). What were wealth stores have gradually become wealth conduits, enabling creditors of all kinds to take what is owed to them using the techniques and technologies outlined earlier.

Informal Moneylending

The one kind of debt that does not feature in Richard Mandhlab’s account is that to informal moneylenders. He may have been too cautious to take out such a loan at the prevailing interest rate of 50% per month, but it is equally possible that he had done so but concealed it from his debt counselor. It is borrowing from mashonisas that evokes some of the ambiguities of debt most poignantly. The term sekólóhó (debt) denotes a labor contract with no end, a form of enslavement. But borrowers, rather than holding moneylenders responsible for their misery, often lay the responsibility squarely on their own shoulders for having been unable to curb their own consumption. “You are a beggar,” says one, pointing to the flexible terms and reasonable interest rates when compared, for example, with that charged by furniture stores for hire purchase and to the speed with which a loan can be procured. “You have asked for help so you can’t argue.” However, people eventually come to resent their own enslavement or denounce the weakness of relatives for allowing themselves to enter into such long-term dependencies. The initial self-blame can turn to anger.

Becoming widespread in the 1980s and particularly from the mid-1990s onward when credit apartheid was coming to an end (Siyongwana 2004), this kind of moneylending with interest acquired financialized techniques, aping those being used in the new microlending sector (tables 1, 2), which were to be outlawed at the end of that decade. What have here become habituated arrangements involve a combination of willing engagement and resentment by borrowers. Lenders ask them for their ATM cards as loan security. After withdrawing the money owed to them on payday, lenders return these to their owners. Whereas banks and regulated lenders require a “pay slip” before agreeing to offer credit, informal lenders do the equivalent after the event by taking the borrower’s card and withdrawing the money owed to them directly from the bank. Typically, borrowers, shorter of money than previously, then borrow again, once again voluntarily yielding up their ATM cards. When borrowers nonetheless tried to escape by canceling their ATM cards at the bank and applying for new ones, lenders, aware that it is impossible to get a new ATM card without an ID (identity) book, retaliated by asking to keep borrowers’ ID books as well.

My fieldwork in Impalahoek (see fig. 1) revealed a local account of these developments. Initiated by a white farmer

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in the late 1980s, moneylending in and around the village began when farm employees started approaching their employer—not directly but, as paternalistic custom dictates, via the farm foreman (induna)—to lend them money from their wages in advance of payday. The induna, advising his employer to charge interest at the rate of 20% per month—by then the going rate in township communities—later inserted himself as an agent and charged for the service. “At first they used to pay R20 interest for R100 but when time went on they paid R50 . . . the other R30 was for the agent.” The rate of interest thus rose to 50% per month, which is where it remains for larger moneylenders. The agent/induna pocketed the difference, using the proceeds to lend money in his own right, eventually quitting his farm job to become the preeminent moneylender in the area and using the ATM technique to secure his loans. The middleman/agent in this account, initially with little financial muscle of his own, thus used his wily knowledge of township practice and his intermediary status to set up business on his own account.

When such agents became moneylenders, they in turn acquired new agents who themselves set up independently. A local air force employee, who borrowed from this lender to pay for a family funeral, took 6 years to pay off the loan of R10,000, during which time he was “working for” the lender who kept his ATM card throughout. At the end of this period he “worked for” the mashonisa in a different capacity, becoming an agent who, unknown to his “employer,” colluded with customers in order to make greater profits for himself. After this was discovered and he was “dismissed,” he set up as a mashonisa on his own. The business was so successful that it enabled him to leave the air force, buy a car, build a well-appointed house, and send his children to private schools. “He started as a borrower, now he is a lender,” said Ace Ubisi, who told me this story. Several lenders were, like him, in state employ and were effectively “reinvesting” their state salaries (James 2012).

Informal moneylending has, however, been practiced in South African rural villages and township areas alike for at least 50 years. Several accounts of this practice take a sympathetic view of the lender and acknowledge the interdependence and mutually reinforcing character of borrowing and lending (Krige 2011; Roth 2004; Siyongwana 2004). While acknowledging that structural factors limit householders’ options to borrow from the formal sector at reasonable rates, thus driving them toward illegal moneylenders instead, these accounts also show that such loans may be cheaper than those available from the formal sector, especially given that the administrative costs and the risks of nonpayment are considerable (Roth 2004:52). Small-scale and neighborhood lenders’ connections to borrowers also serve to cap the interest rate. Given that loans are intended to be repaid at month end, no escalation will be calculated even in the case of default: doing so would make repayment increasingly difficult, give the lender a reputation for unfairness, and increase the chances that violence be used against him and prompt complaints to the authorities. Community mindedness thus converges neatly with careful calculation in these lending arrangements (Krige 2011:154–158). The local mashonisa has an embeddedness in community arrangements that, alongside her desire to stay in business, controls the terms under which repayment is sought.

While moneylending of this kind has long been pervasive in urban townships and small-town settings in the former homelands (James 2012; Krige 2011:136–181; Roth 2004), and while borrowers and lenders cannot be easily separated because people may do both at once (Guérin 2014; James 2012; Servet and Saiag 2013), the rise of the more professional and big-time moneylenders has given pause to analysts and economists. In 2004 it was estimated that 30,000 such lenders were active and that black lenders were borrowing more from them, at injurious rates, than they were from formal institutions (Ardington et al. 2004:619).

Conclusion

Under South Africa’s new democracy, stringent efforts were and are being made to incorporate those previously politically disenfranchised and to create a single economic framework from a dual one. In such a setting, debt has complex meanings. For those better off and more aspirational than Richard Maphilaba, among them the new swathe of civil servants and state employees who constitute South Africa’s “new middle class” (Southall 2004), the obligation to invest in social and conjugal relations brought with it proportional expenditure as well as further commitments entailed in novel visions of value. Expectations and hopes, of higher education for children, and of support for less well-off relatives (Stauffer 2010), have increased, exponentially and out of proportion to the incomes that are supposed to underpin them. If responding to these aspirations entailed borrowing “speculative resources” from “the future,” this need not necessarily, however, be seen as leading to unsustainable crisis. After all, it was credit—the “good” meaning of debt (Peebles 2010:226)—that, at least in part, enabled the very growth of this new middle class. The positive social consequences, at least in some cases, were outweighing or at least counterbalancing the negative ones.19

Even for borrowers like Richard, indebtedness was the result of prudence rather than either impoverishment or profligacy, and it was leveraged as a strategy for individual self-actualization in a setting of extensive communal obligations rather than irrational consumption. But the negative consequences of the debts that took him to the counselor seemed to be outweighing whatever social worth they might have been taken out to achieve. Indebtedness, here, had a potential to

19. I am grateful to Detlev Krige for encouraging me to pursue this line of investigation.
produce new forms of oppression and disenfranchisement in place of the older ones it had replaced.

The onset of borrowing possibilities that were unleashed by South Africa’s credit/debt revolution produced a peculiarly mediated kind of capitalism. Many of those who lend money to others are also lenders. This paper has shown some of the underpinnings and contradictory aspects of the situation, illustrating how difficult it is to separate bad from good protagonists or perpetrators from victims. The broader backdrop is one in which the sometimes contradictory forces of state and market have intertwined to create a redistributive neoliberalism in which people at all levels attempt to make “money from nothing” (James 2014). As the banks did with the poor housing purchasers in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, so a far wider spectrum of lenders does to a wider spectrum of borrowers in this setting: gaining access to the money—however small the amount—of the widest possible range of people is essential to generating profit in a system based more on consumption and rent seeking than production.

But the fact that so many intermediaries have a stake in the existing system does not simply mean business as usual. Banking with and borrowing from banks, buying appliances on the “never-never” (long-term credit), and asking neighborhood lenders for loans are present-day practices set against the longer-term arrangements that were institutionalized by credit apartheid, arrangements that have left an indelible stamp on their later versions. Householders, intermediaries, repossession agents, and moneylenders all play roles premised on these older models. In its earlier incarnation, this peculiarly South African version of finance, while formally excluding people, simultaneously left open a variety of possibilities. Borrowers might “juggle” various options, using enforced methods of saving such as stokvels or hire purchase to escape obligations in one register while fulfilling those in another. Many of these options were mediated through the highly personalized relationships that were struck up between clients on the one hand and repossession agents, fly-by-night “scammers,” or informal moneylenders’ apprentices on the other. All were ready to collude with customers against the big operators, banks, and companies that were gradually extending greater access—but always on prejudicial terms.

Although produced within the severe constraints of credit apartheid, these forms of collusion, alongside the community embeddedness of credit relationships, had earlier given debtors some flexibility about repayment and even allowed some temporarily to escape their obligations. In credit postapartheid, increasingly financialized technologies, albeit combined with informalized relationships, have begun enabling creditors to pursue debtors with greater ease than previously. Credit postapartheid, while retaining some features associated with its forerunner, credit apartheid, has a more uniform and streamlined character. Getting “deeper into a hole” may represent things from this negative perspective alone and thus show only one side of the picture. But it does encompass an important aspect of the deeply ambivalent feelings about entrapment that black South Africans, or certain among their number, experience in the face of debt.

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