

# **Lula's Brazil in Africa: Extending its Middle Power Role?**

By

Gertruida Cornelia Jacoba Louw



Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International Studies) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University

Supervisor: Prof. J. van der Westhuizen

March 2016

## **Declaration**

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

March 2016

## Abstract

Brazil-Africa relations date back to the trans-Atlantic slave trade of the sixteenth and nineteenth century. Despite the early onset of relations, it was only since the turn of the millennium, with the onset of President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva’s administration (2003-2010) that Brazil’s expansion into Africa became noteworthy. This thesis sets out to analyse this period of unprecedented Brazilian expansion into the African continent. The research question that guides this study is: Do the reasons for Brazil’s expansion of its political-economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration reflect Brazil’s role as a neo-Gramscian middle power? The main objective of this thesis, as highlighted by the central research question, is thus to explain and describe the reasons behind Brazil’s increased footprint on the continent during Lula’s time in office and to describe how this expansion of Brazil into Africa does or does not reflect Brazil’s role as a neo-Gramscian middle power. I argue that Brazil’s involvement in Africa does indeed reflect its neo-Gramscian middle power role. This thesis thus makes use of neo-Gramscian middle power theory and a qualitative research methodology to guide research.

To answer the central research question, this thesis looks at domestic and international reasons for Brazil’s expansion of its political-economic interests in Africa by analysing the reasons for Brazil’s political and economic expansion separately. The domestic reasons for Brazil’s political expansion into Africa include, the overall positive and stable domestic (political-)economic context in Brazil during this period; the international-mindedness of the leftist ‘Partido dos Trabalhadores’ (PT); the interests of the Afro-Brazilian domestic voter base; and Lula’s personal interest in expanding to Africa. The international reasons include, the perception of Africa’s rising international importance; Africa’s strategic importance as a supporter base for Brazilian (inter)national interests; the changing world order; Brazil’s search for autonomy; and geopolitical security in the South Atlantic. The domestic motivations for Brazil’s expansion of its economic interests in Africa include, the necessity of a class compromise; Brazil’s foreign policy of economic internationalisation and its increased diplomatic relations with Africa; the private agencies promoting Brazil-Africa economic relations; the need to secure strategic natural resources; and Brazil’s domestic interest in promoting biofuels in Africa. The main international motivations for Brazil’s increased economic interests in Africa include, the perception of Africa as the final economic frontier; the need to gain access to international market for Brazilian goods and services; the comparative advantage Brazil has in Africa; and Brazil’s goal of establishing a new international trade geography. These reasons thus drove Brazil’s expansion into Africa and the central argument that I make in this thesis is that Brazil’s overarching motivation for expanding its relations with Africa lies within its need to increase its international status and that it used Africa as a stage from whence to display its strength and capability, thus fulfilling its international status-seeking ambition.

## Opsomming

Brasilië-Afrika verhoudinge strek terug na die trans-Atlantiese slawehandel van die sestiende en negentiende eeu. Ten spyte van die vroeë aanvang van verhoudinge, was dit eers sedert die administrasie van President Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva’s (2003-2010) dat Brasilië se uitbreiding na Afrika noemenswaardig geword het. Hierdie tesis onderneem om hierdie tydperk van ongekende Brasiliaanse uitbreiding na Afrika te analiseer. Die kern navorsingsvraag wat hierdie studie lei is: Reflekteer die redes vir Brasilië se uitbreiding van sy politiese-ekonomiese belangstellings in Afrika gedurende die Lula administrasie Brasilië se rol as a neo-Gramsciaanse intermediere moondheid (‘middle power’)? Die kern doel van die tesis, soos uiteengesit in die kern navorsingsvraag, is dus om die redes agter Brasilië se toenemende voetspoor op die kontinent gedurende Lula se presidentskap te verduidelik en te beskryf, asook om te beskryf of die uitbreiding Brasilië se rol as ’n neo-Gramsciaanse intermediere moondheid reflekteer, al dan nie. Ek argumenteer dat Brasilië se betrokkenheid in Afrika wel sy neo-Gramsciaanse intermediere moondheid rol reflekteer. Hierdie tesis maak dus gebruik van neo-Gramsciaanse intermediere moondheid teorie en ’n kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetodologie.

Om die kern navorsingsvraag te beantwoord, kyk hierdie tesis na binnelandse en internasionale redes vir Brasilië se uitbreiding van sy politiese-ekonomiese belangstellings in Afrika deur om die internasionale en binnelandse uitbreiding apart te bespreek. Die binnelandse redes vir Brasilië se politiese uitbreiding na Afrika sluit in: die stabiele en positiewe binnelandse ekonomiese konteks in Brasilië gedurende die Lula tydperk; die internasionale fokus van die linkse Brasiliaanse werkersparty (PT); die belange van die Afro-Brasiliaanse plaaslike stem; en Lula se persoonlike belangstelling om na Afrika uit te brei. Die internasionale redes sluit in: die persepsie van Afrika se stygende internasionale belangrikheid; Afrika se strategiese ondersteuningsbasis vir Brasiliaanse (inter)nasionale belange; die veranderende wêreld orde; Brasilië se soeke na autonomie; en die geopolitiese sekuriteitsbelange in die Suid Atlanties. Die binnelandse redes vir Brasilië se uitbreiding van sy ekonomiese belange in Afrika sluit in: die noodsaaklikheid van ’n kompromie tussen verskillende klasse in Brasilië; Brasilië se buitelandsebeleidsfokus op die internasionale uitbreiding van die ekonomie en Brasilië se toenemende diplomatieke verhoudinge met Afrika; die privaat agentskappe wat Brasilië-Afrika ekonomiese verhoudinge bevorder; die noodsaaklikheid om strategiese natuurlike hulpbronne te verseker; en Brasilië se nasionale belange in die bevordering van biobrandstof in Afrika. Die kern internasionale motiverings is: die idee van Afrika as die laaste ekonomiese hawe; die soeke na nuwe markte vir Brasiliaanse goedere; die vergelykende voordeel wat Brasilië in Afrika het; en Brasilië se doelwit om n nuwe internasionale handelsgeografie te stig. Hierdie redes het dus Brasilië se uitbreiding na Afrika gedryf en die sentrale argument wat ek in die tesis maak is dat Brasilië se oorhoofse motivering vir die uitbreiding na Afrika lê in sy soeke na internasionale status en dat Brasilië Afrika gebruik as ’n verhoog vanwaar hy sy vermoë tentoonstel.

## **Acknowledgments**

Eerstens wil ek baie dankie sê aan Prof. van der Westhuizen sonder wie se leiding en geduld hierdie tesis nooit volbring sou wees nie - baie dankie veral vir die moeite in die laaste paar maande voor inhandiging. Aan my man, baie dankie vir jou liefde, geduld, en ondersteuning - Stellenbosch sou nie dieselfde wees sonder jou nie. Aan my ouers, dankie dat julle nog altyd in my geglo het en my droom van universiteit en 'n meestersgraad moontlik gemaak het. Aan my broer, dankie vir jou ondersteuning en dat jy my ambisie so goed verstaan. Aan my Smidt gesin, baie dankie vir julle ondersteuning, veral in die inhandigingsproses. 'n Spesiale dankie aan my Stiller familie, my beste vriendin Maré, Leehandi, Naadirah, Berte, en Alex vir die belangrike rol wat elkeen van julle gespeel het. Aan al my vriende en familie, dankie vir julle aansporing deur al die jare. Laastens, dra ek hierdie tesis op aan my vriend Philip, wat my geleer het hoe belangrik dit is om jou drome te volg.

## List of Maps

Map 1	Geographical Position of Brazil and Africa	xiii
-------	--	------

## **List of Figures**

Figure 3.1	Brazilian Technical Development Cooperation in Africa by Segment during the Lula administration (2003-2010)	55
Figure 4.1	Traditional Brazilian private sector actors in Africa in 2010	74
Figure 4.2	Brazilian SMEs in Africa as at 2011	78

## **Lists of Tables**

Table 4.1	Brazil's exports to and imports from Africa [in millions of USD]	70
Table 4.2	Africa's percentage share in Brazil's foreign trade	70
Table 4.3	Brazil-Angola trade [in millions of USD]	72
Table 4.4	Brazil-South Africa trade [in millions of USD]	72
Table 4.5	Brazil-Nigeria trade [in millions of USD]	73
Table 4.6	Brazil-Algeria trade [in millions of USD]	73
Table 4.7	Brazil-Egypt trade [in millions of USD]	73



## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
APEX-Brasil	Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency
ASA	Africa-South America Summit
AU	African Union
BNDES	Brazilian Development Bank
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa grouping of countries
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMBRAPA	Brazilian Agriculture Research Cooperation
FAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIOCRUZ	Oswaldo Cruz Foundation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOs	International Organisations
IPE	International Political Economy
IPEA	Institute for Applied Economic Research
Itamaraty	Brazilian Ministry of External Relations
MDIC	Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NDB	BRICS' New Development Bank

NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PALOP	Portuguese-speaking African countries
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores or Brazilian Worker's Party
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SENAI	National Service for Industrial Training
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organisation

## Table of Contents

<b>1. Chapter I: Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Rationale and Significance	1
1.2.1 Rationale	1
1.2.2 Significance	2
1.3 Literature review	2
1.3.1 Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa: A focus on changing the World Order	3
1.3.2 Brazil as a middle power	4
1.3.3 Development cooperation	4
1.3.4 Brazil and Africa: a natural partnership based on commonalities	5
1.3.5 The changing image of Brazil in Africa: From exceptionalism to scepticism	5
1.3.6 Security in the South Atlantic	6
1.3.7 Brazil's economic expansion into Africa	6
1.3.8 Addressing the gap in the literature	7
1.4 The Research Question and conceptualisation thereof	7
1.5 Research Methodology and Design: A qualitative Study	8
1.5.1 Research Design	8
1.5.1.1 The unit of analysis, the level of analysis, and the time dimensions	8
1.5.1.2 Qualitative Case Study Research Design	9
1.5.2 Research Methodology	9
1.5.3 Professional ethics	10
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations	10
1.7 Overview of the thesis	12
<b>2 Chapter II: Theory and Conceptualisations</b>	<b>14</b>
2.1 Introduction	14
2.2 The Middle Power Concept: Origin and Conceptualisation	14
2.2.1 Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers	16
2.3 Brazil as a Middle Power in the Literature	18
2.4 The Different Approaches to Middle Power Theory	19
2.4.1 The Functional Approach	19
2.4.2 The Hierarchical or Structural Middle Power Approach	20
2.4.2.1 The Realist Input	21
2.4.2.2 Criticism	21
2.4.3 The Behavioural Approach	22
2.4.3.1 The Liberal branch	23
2.4.3.2 Strengths and weaknesses	24
2.4.4 The Neo-Gramscian combination approach to middle power theory	25
2.4.4.1 The Six Core Characteristics of Neo-Gramscian Middle Power Theory	26
2.4.4.1.1 Issues of State Capacity	26
2.4.4.1.2 Neo-Gramscian Middle Power Behaviour	27
2.4.4.1.3 The role of the middle power state-society complex and its domestic environment	28
2.4.4.1.4 Constructivist inclinations of Neo-Gramscian middle powers	28
2.4.4.1.5 Neo-Gramscian middle powers and the Current World Order and Hegemony	29

2.4.4.1.6	The importance of International Organisations and International Law	30
2.4.4.2	Criticism of the Neo-Gramscian approach	30
2.4.4.3	Strengths of the neo-Gramscian Middle Power Theoretical Approach	31
2.4.4.4	Operationalization of neo-Gramscian Middle power theory	31
2.4.4.4.1	Putnam and the Two Level Game	32
2.5	Conclusion	34
<b>3</b>	<b>Chapter III: Brazil's political expansion into Africa</b>	<b>36</b>
3.1	Introduction	36
3.2	The reasons motivating Brazil's political expansion into Africa during the Lula administration: An analysis	37
3.2.1	Domestic Reasons for the increase in Brazil-Africa political relations	37
3.2.1.1	Brazil's enabling domestic milieu of economic stability and continuity	37
3.2.1.2	Leftist ideology of the PT and solidarity politics	37
3.2.1.3	The Afro-Brazilian electoral base	39
3.2.1.4	The charismatic leadership of President Lula da Silva	40
3.2.2	International motivations for Brazil's political expansion into Africa	41
3.2.2.1	The perception of Africa's rising international importance	41
3.2.2.2	The changing world order: From US hegemony to a more multipolar world order	41
3.2.2.3	Africa as a support base for Brazilian international interests	41
3.2.2.4	Brazil's search for autonomy	43
3.2.2.5	Security and geopolitical importance	44
3.3	Brazil's unprecedented expansion of its political interest in Africa: A broad overview	44
3.3.1	Brazil-Africa political(-economic) relations before the Lula administration	45
3.3.2	The unparalleled foreign policy focus on Africa	46
3.3.3	The opening up of embassies across Africa	47
3.3.4	The main mechanisms of Brazilian political expansion into Africa	47
3.3.4.1	Extended bilateral relationships: Presidential and travel diplomacy	47
3.3.4.2	Increased multilateral diplomatic relations	48
3.3.4.2.1	Closer relations with South Africa: The BRICS Grouping and the IBSA dialogue forum	49
3.3.4.2.2	Closer relations with Lusophone Africa: The CPLP and PALOP	50
3.3.4.2.3	The Africa-South America Summit	50
3.3.4.3	South-South development cooperation diplomacy	51
3.3.4.3.1	What constitutes Brazilian development cooperation in Africa?	52
3.3.4.3.2	Defining Characteristics of Brazil-Africa Development Cooperation	53
3.3.4.3.3	The main players involved in Brazilian development cooperation in Africa	53
3.3.4.3.4	The main African countries where Brazil is involved in development cooperation	54
3.3.4.3.5	The main categories of Brazilian development Cooperation in Africa	54
3.4	Conclusion	56
<b>4</b>	<b>Chapter IV: Brazil's economic expansion into Africa</b>	<b>59</b>
4.1	Introduction	59
4.2	The reasons motivating Brazil's economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration: An analysis	60
4.2.1	Domestic reasons for the increase in Brazil-Africa economic relation	60
4.2.1.1	Stable economic situation at home and the international commodities boom	60
4.2.1.2	Class Compromise	60

4.2.1.3	Foreign policy and diplomacy as drivers of Brazil's economic expansion into Africa	61
4.2.1.4	Private agencies promoting Brazil-Africa trade and investment	64
4.2.1.5	Securing natural resources	64
4.2.1.5.1	Strategic energy Security	65
4.2.1.6	Biofuels promotion	65
4.2.2	International Motivations for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa	66
4.2.2.1	International perception of Africa as the final economic frontier	66
4.2.2.2	Gain access to new International markets for Brazilian goods and services	67
4.2.2.3	Brazil has a comparative advantage in Africa	67
4.2.2.4	New International trade geography	68
4.3	A broad overview of Brazil's unprecedented expansion of its economic interest in Africa	68
4.3.1	The extraordinary increase in Brazil-Africa trade (2003-2010)	69
4.3.1.1	Total trade between Brazil and Africa	69
4.3.1.2	The commodities traded between Brazil and Africa	70
4.3.1.3	Brazil's main trade partners in Africa	71
4.3.2	Brazil's unprecedented level of Foreign Direct Investment interest in Africa	73
4.3.2.1	Total Brazilian FDI in Africa	73
4.3.2.2	Brazil-Africa FDI: The main African states	74
4.3.2.3	The main sectors of Brazilian FDI in Africa and the main companies involved	75
4.3.2.3.1	Brazilian FDI in Africa's energy sector	75
4.3.2.3.2	Brazilian FDI in the mining sector in Africa	76
4.3.2.3.3	Brazil-Africa FDI in the Construction Sector	77
4.3.2.3.4	Brazilian SME involvement in a variety of Africa's economic sectors	77
4.4	Conclusion	78
<b>5</b>	<b>Chapter V: Conclusion</b>	<b>81</b>
5.1	Introduction	81
5.2	Summary of Brazil's expansion into Africa: The Lula years	81
5.3	Summary of the key findings	82
5.3.1	Domestic reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa	82
5.3.2	International reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa	83
5.4	Recommended areas for future research	85
5.5	Concluding remarks	85
<b>6</b>	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>87</b>

**Map 1 Geographical position of Brazil and Africa** (Adapted from World Bank & World Bank & IPEA, 2011)



## **1.1. Chapter I: Introduction**

### **1.1.1. Background**

Brazil's relations with the African continent date back to the sixteenth century when Brazil was an active participant in the trans-Atlantic slave trade and both Brazilian and African emissaries were sent across the Atlantic Ocean (World Bank & World Bank & IPEA, 2011:: 1). However, despite the early onset of relations, Brazil-Africa political-economic relations had been relatively limited until the early 2000s. In terms of diplomatic relations, the first time a Brazilian president ever visited the African continent was President Figueredo in 1983. Also, the first real economic interest that Brazil displayed in Africa was only during the 1970s and was in large part due to the international oil crises (Stuenkel, 2013: 29 and White, 2010: 222). Despite these slight surges of interest in Africa, Brazil's presence on the continent was rather limited. It was only since the turn of the millennium, with the onset of President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva's administration (2003-2010) that Brazil's expansion into Africa became noteworthy. Brazil entered a period of expanding relations with several countries throughout the world during this period, focusing on the developing states of the Global South; Brazil's desire (under Lula) to cultivate close relations with African states constituted one of the top priorities of the country's foreign policy agenda (Doelling, 2008: 5-6). Brazil's expanding global role in recent years warrants a closer analysis of the country's foreign policy and the motives behind its international relations (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 904). And is this endeavour that this thesis seeks to undertake, specifically in terms of Brazil's unprecedented expansion into the African continent during the Lula administration.

## **1.2. Rationale and Significance**

### **1.2.1. Rationale**

Undertaking this study was greatly motivated by the objective of understanding the phenomenon of Brazil's international insertion during the Lula administration and specifically understanding Brazil's role in Africa. Brazil's footprint in Africa is of interest because Brazil is a relatively new actor on the continent and may have something different to offer the continent compared to the international actors that have been involved in Africa in the past whose relations were characteristically exploitative. Moreover, Brazil's involvement in Africa was extensive, Brazilian influence on the continent increased politically, economically, and even socially (for example, through Brazilian 'telenovelas' on the television). Brazil's increased relations with Africa were thus unlikely to be the result of ad hoc, coincidental interests in the continent, and I sought to determine what the drivers of this intense and extensive expansion into Africa were. Finally, Brazil's international presence increased significantly during the Lula administration, not only in Africa but across the world, which meant that Brazil was on the rise. Studying this rise is interesting in itself, but focusing the study on Brazil's relations to a

specific geographical region, namely an area traditionally neglected by international actors and also the continent in which I live and study, proved to be most interesting.

### **1.2.2. Significance**

The significance of undertaking a thesis focused on Brazil's expansion into Africa lies in the contribution it makes in a research field that has not yet been extensively researched. There is a relative gap in the literature on Brazil-Africa relations in general and although there has been an increase in research on this topic since the Lula administration, it remains limited. Brazil's increasing presence in Africa has remained relatively unnoticed by both global media and those in academia, especially when compared to the involvement of other more recent actors, such as China, in Africa (Stolte, 2013: 63). Relatively little has been written of the engagements between Brazil and Africa and even less is understood about the reasons behind Brazil's political and economic drive toward the continent (White, 2010: 221). Undertaking this study could thus provide an overview of the unprecedented level of relations between Brazil and African states during the Lula administration and to an extent provide explanations as to why this occurred. The core significance of this thesis is thus attempting to fill the gap in the literature to some limited extent by contributing to the academic literature on Brazil-Africa relations with a sound theoretical basis.

### **1.3. Literature review**

This section seeks to highlight the existing body of literature on Brazil's expansion into Africa during the Lula era as well as give context to the issue areas this thesis will be addressing. Although the literature about Brazil's expansion into Africa is limited, it is sufficient to undertake a master's thesis. The World Bank and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA in the Portuguese acronym) released a report in 2011, which gives a comprehensive overview (yet without a theoretical basis) of Brazil's expansion into Africa, addressing the history of Brazil-Africa relations, the importance of development cooperation, especially technical cooperation in Brazil-Africa relations, understanding Brazil-Africa economic relations, and looking at Brazilian foreign policy and diplomacy to the continent. These thematic areas (with several debates within them) represent the core areas under discussion within the recent literature about Brazil's relations with Africa. I argue that there are seven main themes that stand out in the literature on Brazil-Africa relations during the Lula administration: Brazil's foreign policy towards Africa amidst a changing world order; Brazil's middle power status; Brazil-Africa development cooperation; Brazil's natural partnership on Africa based on commonalities; the changing opinions of Brazil's involvement in Africa (from exceptional to sceptical); Brazil-Africa strategic security relations within the South Atlantic; and Brazil's economic expansion into Africa.



### **1.3.1. Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa: A focus on changing the World Order**

A great deal of the literature looks at Brazilian foreign policy from 2003 to 2010 and highlights several key features of Brazil's foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. One point that seems to be widely agreed upon within the literature on Brazil's expansion into Africa is that it is nothing new (White, 2010; World Bank & World Bank & IPEA, 2011.; Doelling, 2008; Stuenkel, 2013 and others). Brazil has had an African focus for many years in its foreign policy; however the recent surge of relations with Africa under President da Silva illustrated an increase in substance and intensity and is therefore worth looking at (White, 2010: 221-222). Several authors argue that Brazil's expansion into Africa falls within the broader framework of Brazil's foreign policy during the Lula administration, which focused on orientating itself towards the Global South (a policy of 'autonomy through diversity'), and distancing itself from the Global North, specifically the USA. Brazil has a history of alternating between these two positions. (White, 2010: 223; Doelling, 2008: 6; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 910; Visentini and Da Silva, 2010: 56-57; Alves, 2013a: 37-38)

A core foreign policy objective that is also often pointed out is Brazil's ambitions for a more equitable world order and working toward changing this. Although this goal predates the Lula administration, since 2003, Brazil has emphasised its endeavours to attain a multi-polar world order with an unprecedented intensity through a balancing strategy (Doelling, 2008: 7; White, 2010: 238; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 906; Alves, 2013a: 39 and Seibert, 2011: 5). Brazil's ambitions to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is seen as a core objective in order to achieve these goals (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 100; Doelling, 2008: 8 and Alves, 2013a: 39). Herein, Africa represents a key constituency as it represents an important 'voters bloc' for Brazil to achieve its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) goals through votes within the UN General Assembly but also its ambitions in other multilateral organisations (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 100; Stuenkel, 2014c; and Visentini & Da Silva, 2010: 55). Multilateralism is also often cited as an important mechanism through which Brazil seeks to attain its foreign policy goals (Visentini and Da Silva, 2010: 54; White, 2010: 228; Alves, 2013a: 39). Brazil advocated that it is able to represent the interests of the African voting bloc, however as Stuenkel (2013: 31) points out, this is also controversial because Brazil's interests diverge from those of small developing countries. However, African votes have contributed to Brazil's Jose da Silva being elected the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation's (FAO) Director General in 2012. African votes will also be core for Brazil's ambitions for a permanent seat on the UNSC (Stuenkel, 2013: 31). Some scholars argue that a key goal of Brazil in the international arena is to gain status as a global player through its relations with especially developing countries, which includes Africa (White, 2010: 223; Stolte, 2013: 63; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 909-910; Cabral & Weinstock, 2010: 2).

### **1.3.2. Brazil as a middle power**

Within the literature on Brazil's expansion into Africa, scholars (Doelling, 2008: 5; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 906; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 15) use the concept of Brazil being a middle power (or other terms indicating the same concept such as intermediate power) and that the country uses a middle power foreign policy method to enhance its role and status in international arena. These scholars contend that Brazil's actions vis-à-vis Africa during the Lula administration form part of this greater drive by Brazil to promote its international status as a middle power. However, these referrals to Brazil's middle power capacity vis-à-vis Africa is not strongly embedded into middle power theory. Herein I find a gap in the literature; is Brazil's involvement in Africa truly reflective of a middle power agenda as these authors imply? Furthermore, the literature on Brazil as a middle power often refers to the fact that Brazil is or is not a middle power (as will be discussed in detail in the theory chapter, Chapter two), but there is a gap in the theoretical literature in terms of case studies showing that Brazil's foreign policy *in action* does indeed reflect that of a middle power.

### **1.3.3. Development cooperation**

In my opinion, the majority of the available literature on Brazil's expansion into Africa focuses on Brazilian development cooperation on the continent, and there are several studies that focus explicitly on this topic (see authors Shankland, Mlambo, Cabral, Barka, etc. for further reading). As this is not the sole focus on this thesis, below is only a partial summary of the topics addressed. Importantly, Africa is the major recipient of Brazilian development cooperation. Brazilian development cooperation is described as having important 'distinct' characteristics that distinguish it from traditional and other emerging donors (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 20). The ones most often cited refer to the fact that Brazilian development cooperation is demand-driven, and that it is not tied to certain terms and conditions (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 8, Magnoni, 2010: 6, and Sotero, 2009: 19). One prominent idea is that Brazilian development assistance is seen as a tool of Brazilian foreign policy; Brazilian development cooperation in Africa is seen as a means to an end (an end that serves Brazilian national interest and strategic objectives) (Stuenkel, 2013: 31; White, 2010: 229; and Cabral and Shankland, 2013: 17). Brazil's successful domestic 'development programme' also gives perceived legitimacy to Brazil's development rhetoric internationally (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 908; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5; and Alves, 2013b: 1). The not purely political nature of Brazilian development cooperation is also often cited, where authors empathise that there are several private entities (such as research organisations) involved in the process (White, 2010: 239; and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5).

### **1.3.4. Brazil and Africa: a natural partnership based on commonalities**

The literature cites the important social (historical and cultural) aspects that promoted Brazil's expansion into Africa (World Bank & IPEA, 2011; and White, 2010: 222). The World Bank and IPEA (2011: 1) argue that Brazil and Africa are 'natural partners' based on certain commonalities. White (2010: 222) emphasised that these historical links have enabled the establishment of a cultural and diplomatic foundation, but that tangible and economic development exchanges were absent until the Lula administration. It is possible that Lula was able to frame these long-existing commonalities in order to conjure support for his Africa policy. President Lula himself saw the strengthening of relations with Africa as Brazil's political, moral, and historical obligation (due to the 'moral debt' Brazil owes to Africa because of Brazil's participation of the trans-Atlantic slave trade) (Seibert, 2011: 5 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 40). Increased relations with Africa can also be understood as being part of President Lula's 2002 electoral commitment to Brazilian Afro-descendent population to give more attention to issues related to Brazil-Africa relations (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 40; and Visentini and Da Silva, 2010: 63). Cabral and Shankland (2013: 19) suggest however that these cultural and historical affinities are largely rhetorical and that in truth the economic, political, and social differences between the diverse African countries and Brazil are significant. These social reasons for possible expansion into Africa had been viable throughout history; however, it was during the Lula administration that they actively promoted Brazil's expansion into the continent due to the novel manner of framing this reality.

### **1.3.5. The changing image of Brazil in Africa: From exceptionalism to scepticism**

The initial perceptions of Brazil's involvement in Africa were described as exceptional, but as Brazil's involvement on the continent increased, analysts grew more sceptical of the nature of its involvement. The idea of Brazilian exceptionalism is a long-held belief in Brazil about itself, that it is an exceptional state-society complex within the international system. Brazilian exceptionalism includes both Brazil's ideas about itself domestically as well as its international insertion. For example, Brazil considers itself a multicultural society with limited racism (an idea highly criticised but beyond the scope of this thesis) and that it has historically been a developing country, but an exceptional one (Brazil took part in World War II, has an exceptional relationship with the USA etc.). Brazil is thus part of the Global South, but sees itself as standing out and being unique (Gillam, 2013: 2 and Wagner, 2011). Brazil's relations vis-à-vis Africa were thus initially also packaged within the rhetoric of Brazilian exceptionalism, which meant that Brazil was perceived in a more positive light on the continent in terms of its diplomatic, development cooperation and economic activities in Africa (White, 2010: 229; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 6; and Stuenkel, 2013: 35). White (2010) argued that Brazil was perceived to have a nuanced (exceptional) approach to the continent, different to the former colonial powers and other new players (such as China) (White, 2010). As Brazil's involvement

on the continent increased, the increasing (especially economic) involvement caused perceptions to become more sceptical. Stuenkel (2013) warned that with increasing economic activities of Brazil on the continent, perceptions could shift from negative to positive. Brazil's investment projects in Africa, for example, received criticism for disregarding human rights and for environmental degradation (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 3; and Lapper, 2010).

### **1.3.6. Security in the South Atlantic**

Although the literature tends to focus on diplomatic, economic, and to an limited extent social relations between Brazil and Africa, some of the literature does address the issue of Brazil's expansion of security agreements with various African countries (Seibert, 2011; Stuenkel, 2013; Doelling, 2008; and Dauvergne & Farias, 2012). The security agreements focus on the security of the South Atlantic Ocean (Seibert, 2011: 2, 7 and Doelling, 2008: 8). Stuenkel (2013: 37-38) argues that the strategic importance of the South Atlantic is bound to increase, and that Brazil's interest will also increase in this area; but that Brazil lacks the naval capacity to maintain security within this area and is therefore seeking out partners in Africa (and the rest of the developing world) to do so. Stuenkel (2013: 37) argues that it is important to note that it is still unclear how Brazil will engage in military relations with Africa. Dauvergne and Farias (2012: 913) contend that Brazil linked development with security in its relations with Africa during the Lula administration.

### **1.3.7. Brazil's economic expansion into Africa**

An on-going debate within the literature on Brazil-Africa relations refers to what the main economic motivation for Brazil's expansion into the continent is. The first issue is related to whether or not Brazil replicates the colonial (or neo-colonial) model of resource extraction for the origin country's domestic development at the expense of African countries. The fact of the matter is that Brazil's trade with Africa is dominated by oil and other natural resources (White, 2010: 230; Alves, 2013a: 40; Stolte, 2013). White (2010: 225, 229) argues that Brazil's interests in Africa are strategic and explicitly linked to energy as Brazil seeks to reliable access to strategic resources. Stuenkel (2013: 30) takes a contrary view, namely that securing natural resource was not central to Brazil' drive to expand economic relations into Africa because Brazil is already resource secure, as it is a major oil exporter and is resource rich in its own right. Alves (2013a: 40) agrees with Stuenkel (2013) and argues that Brazilian resources Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are attracted to Africa by market and profit considerations, they do not pursue them in a (state-driven or otherwise) driven strategy to secure resources; Brazilian MNCs involved in natural resource sectors in Africa are not fully state-owned enterprises (like their Chinese counterparts, for example). Stolte (2013: 63) also argues that Brazil is not involved in Africa to secure resources. Several authors, however, contend that the core commercial interest of Lula's Brazil in Africa is not focused on natural resources but rather on Africa's potential as a consumer market (Stolte, 2013; and Seibert, 2011). Finally, Cabral and

Shankland (2013: 17) argue that both securing access to raw materials as well as accessing Africa's markets are both important economic reasons for Brazil's expansion into the continent.

### 1.3.8. Addressing the gap in the literature

As mentioned previously, the literature on Brazil's expansion into Africa during Lula's administration is limited. At the moment much of the literature is explorative and also descriptive, but not necessarily aiming to explain the relationship (some of the literature does address some possible factors that promoted Brazil's increased involvement on the continent). There is thus a gap in the literature that explains the reasoning behind Brazil's expansion into Africa (as a case study). Also, although the sources that do address Brazil-Africa relations during the Lula era fall within the discipline of International Relations and mainly make use of International Political Economy (IPE) explanations and reasoning, the literature is not embedded strongly within a specific theoretical framework. Moreover, although some of the literature does refer to Brazil's 'middle power' identity, the theory is not engaged with thoroughly in explaining Brazil's relations with Africa. When looking then at the literature on Brazil as a middle power, it becomes clear that there has not been a study that examines Brazil's relations with other countries or grouping of countries (as Robert Cox does in his seminal work on (neo-Gramscian) middle powers (1989) which will be analysed in detail in Chapter 2) as a case study example of middle power theory.

## 1.4. The Research Question and conceptualisation thereof

The research question that will thus be leading this study is: **Do the reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political-economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration reflect Brazil's role as a neo-Gramscian middle power?** The main objective of this thesis, as highlighted by the central research question, is thus to explain and describe the reasons behind Brazil's increased footprint on the continent during Lula's time in office and to describe how this expansion of Brazil into Africa does or does not reflect Brazil's role as a neo-Gramscian middle power (this thesis specifically makes use of the neo-Gramscian middle power framework as set out in section 2.4.4). I argue that Brazil's involvement in Africa does indeed reflect its neo-Gramscian middle power role.

In order to clarify the research question, one needs to conceptualise the various concepts within it. This thesis looks at the concept of the 'state-society complex', which refers to the state as an interaction between the state structure and the society within its borders (which includes social, political, and economic groupings or actors) (Cox, 1989). This thesis will thus focus on Brazil, as a state-society complex, and its relations with the state-society complexes in Africa. This thesis thus rejects the unitary and limited (realist) conceptualization of the state that ignores the societal elements that impact the actions of the state (as the institutions that govern a country). The concept of Africa represents a geographical bloc within the African *continent*; 'Africa' is not and should not be seen or

understood (as very often is within popular and even academic literature) as being a single entity or country; Africa is not a country. This thesis will also focus on the political-economic elements of Brazil's relations with Africa, and will use theory from the International Relations sub-discipline of Global Political Economy, specifically neo-Gramscian middle power theory. Focusing on the international relations between a country (Brazil) and a bloc of countries' (Africa's) political-economic relations highlights certain aspects of their relations while understating other elements of their relations, which is necessary due to the limited space.

## **1.5. Research Methodology and Design: A qualitative Study**

This thesis makes use of a qualitative approach to research. The research in this thesis is inductive rather than deductive in nature, which means that it aims to collect data, and analyse it in order to gain insight into the topic, which will produce (or add to the body of) theory. The inductive approach is thus hypothesis-generating and creates new ideas (Gray, 2014: 17-18). Moreover, qualitative research is mostly inductive in nature (Walliman, 2006: 36). A qualitative approach is applicable to this study because it allows for a constant interplay between collection of data and analysis, which in the end produces understanding (Walliman, 2006: 129). Qualitative research is inherently heuristic in nature, and requires clear thinking by the analyst in order to be useful (Walliman, 2006: 131). I prefer to use the qualitative method because it is more flexible and less structured and because it is a method that focuses on cases and contexts, it allows the detailed investigation of few cases and processes where the context gives meaning to the research. I prefer using qualitative research as epistemologically it rejects positivism and relies on the interpretation of social reality and because ontologically it sees social reality not as an objective fact but rather as a constantly shifting product of perception (Walliman, 2006: 36-37). These epistemological and ontological underpinnings of qualitative research resonate with my own understanding of reality.

### **1.5.1. Research Design**

Meeting the main objective of explaining the reasons behind a country's foreign relations with a continent requires a research design that is dynamic and can account for complexity but that also ensures valid and reliable research. Taking the objectives this thesis wishes to reach into consideration, the author makes use of a qualitative case study research design as it is the most appropriate design with which to effectively explore and explain the reasons behind Brazil's expansion into the African continent.

#### **1.5.1.1. The unit of analysis, the level of analysis, and the time dimension**

The main unit of analysis of this study is that of the state, or as understood in neo-Gramscian theory, the state-society complex. The Brazilian state-society complex and various African state-society complexes will constitute the units of analysis. This thesis looks at the macro-level of analysis, which

means it focuses on the relations between national entities within the international system. In terms of time dimension, the study focuses on a single time frame dimension, meaning the thesis does not compare Brazil's expansion into Africa across various time periods but rather looks at one specific period of Brazil-Africa relations (the Lula administration 2003-2010) as if taking a single snapshot of Brazil-Africa relations. This allows looking at a variety of cases (as will be the case as the thesis looks at Brazil's relations with a variety of African state-society complexes that represent different cases) as well drawing conclusions about certain patterns emerging within these cases.

### **1.5.1.2. Qualitative Case Study Research Design**

This thesis will make use of a qualitative multiple case study research design. I make use of the case study design, not only because it is a common research method in Political Science but it also serves as the best design to meet an explanatory research purpose, as it allows for an 'in-depth' study (Yin, 2009: 4). Adapted from Yin's (2009: 18) definition of a case study, I understand the case study to be an empirical, in-depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, where theory guides analysis. I agree with Flyvbjerg (2006: 21 cited in Simons, 2009: 164) when he argues that when studying human affairs, knowledge is very context-dependent. Case study research allows for demonstrating how our findings can be transferable to other contexts or used by other researchers (Simons, 2009:164). Case study research design also provides both validity and reliability (Yin, 2009: 41).

The case study research design is challenging and doing a good case study is difficult (Yin, 2009: 3, 16). Two of the most prominent pitfalls of case study research design are that of possible subjectivity and limited generalizability (Yin, 2009: 14). However, the use of theory allows for guidance and aids in drawing general conclusions of the case study (Yin, 2009: 40). Thus, although my case study focuses on a broad case, the neo-Gramscian middle power theory used throughout the thesis gives this study structure. In terms of generalizability, the case study research design is generalizable to theoretical propositions but not to universes, which means case studies provide analytic generalisation but not statistical generalisation (Yin, 2009: 15). The case study research design is thus able to provide an in-depth analysis, which is complemented further by a qualitative research methodology.

### **1.5.2. Research Methodology**

The qualitative method of data collection for this thesis will focus on two sources. The main sources of data will be in the form of documentation via a desktop study because doing research in any branch of social science requires collecting secondary data (Walliman, 2006: 83 and Yin, 2009: 101). This will be supplemented by a few sources of primary data obtained through elite interviews. An elite interview refers to an interview with a person or an expert who is chosen because of their knowledge about a specific topic, event, or process; it does not refer to the person's personal status but rather

their status as an elite in the field. The interviews are to be semi-structured and contain structured and unstructured questions and are to take on a conversational, interactive style (Simons, 2009: 44 and Walliman, 2006: 92). The interviews are not to be audio-recorded (however taking notes is to be allowed) so as to pay more attention to the conversation as it happens. This avoids the time consuming (and costly) process of transcribing the recorded interviews (Simons, 2009: 53). Yin (2009: 109) also suggests that audio-recording is not necessary if there is no specific plan for systematically listening or transcribing the interview for particular data analysis. Elite interviews provide rich, detailed answers to questions not directly addressed by the secondary sources.

I conducted two elite interviews, one with Oliver Stuenkel and one with Alexander Shankland. Oliver Stuenkel is an assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil. Stuenkel's research focuses on the rising powers of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa grouping of countries or BRICS, especially Brazil, and their impact on global governance and he has written several articles on Brazil's engagement with Africa (About Oliver Stuenkel, 2014). The interview with Stuenkel thus provided expert, nuanced knowledge on Brazil's expansion into Africa, specifically in terms of the changing world order. Due to his broad knowledge on the topic of Brazilian expansion, he also provided insight into the reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa during the Lula administration. Alexander Shankland is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom. His research includes, among other things, a focus on the role of Brazil in reshaping international development and has looked specifically at Brazil's development cooperation in African states (along with Brazil's broader expansion into Africa). His research also includes a focus on specifically how marginalised minorities engage with development (Alex Shankland - Research Fellow, 2014). The interview with Shankland thus provided in-depth insight into Brazil's development cooperation projects (and other engagements) in Africa and how these affected local communities.

### **1.5.3. Professional ethics**

The author regards professional ethics as a very important aspect of doing research and therefore wishes to include a brief ethical consideration for the thesis. The thesis primarily makes use of secondary data, which involves a minimal ethical risk. The thesis however also makes use of some primary data which was obtained by a few in-depth interviews with experts in Brazil-Africa international relations. I did go through the ethical clearance committee of Stellenbosch which gave clearance for these interviews. Overall the thesis involves a low ethical risk.

### **1.6. Limitations and Delimitations**

No research endeavour is without its challenges and in order to control for some of these, I present here the limitations and delimitations of my thesis. The space (length) and time constraints of a partial



master's thesis prevents going into extensive detail and forces the exclusion of certain sub-questions and sub-topics. Due to time restraints, the period of data collection is limited to articles published from September 2013 until March 2015. An important delimitation is that only sources published in English could be used (because the author does not understand Portuguese, Brazil's national language). This is limiting because it prohibits the author from using sources published in Brazil (in Portuguese) on the topic, which could have been informative.

The thesis takes an International Political Economy (IPE) approach that highlights political-economic aspects of Brazil-Africa relations. This pushes some other aspects, such as social, geopolitical, environmental, and security reasons to the background. I would argue that the broad focus on political and economic interests of the IPE approach however presents the reader with an adequate explanation for Brazil's role in Africa. The focus on IPE necessitates that the author not explicitly address Brazil-Africa social relations. The literature on this aspect of the relations is very limited, and often non-academic. However, some elements of social relations are part and parcel to political-economic relations according to the neo-Gramscian understanding of the state as being a state-society complex. Regarding Brazil's development cooperation expansion into Africa and the size of this specific theme, it cannot be addressed in its entirety within this thesis; therefore the thesis will provide only a very brief and general overview of Brazil's development cooperation in Africa

Another delimitation of this thesis pertains to the key objective of the thesis, which is that it seeks to provide a broad overview of Brazil's involvement across Africa. The nature of the thesis, although analysing the reasons behind Brazil's expansion into Africa (which narrows the broad topic), still takes on the form of a broad overview of Brazil's expansion into Africa (which covers the majority of a continent, and includes a multitude of countries, different types of state systems, and a multitude of other differences). This means that some of the nuances of doing a specific case study that looks at Brazil's relations with one country or two countries and then comparing them, get lost. The broad overview thus requires generalisations and the aggregation of information.

Furthermore, the thesis will focus on the period of Lula's administration (2003 until 2010) and thus excludes his successor's (Dilma Rousseff's) administration. The focus is on the Lula administration because it was during this period that Brazil's expansion into Africa increased to unprecedented levels and thus became most visible. The thesis excludes the Dilma administration (2011-) because the Dilma era is significantly different to the Lula era. Dilma has a limited interest in Brazil's foreign affairs and focuses more on domestic issues. Also, the domestic political and economic context under Lula represented a period of stability and economic growth, while the Dilma administration has been plagued by economic crisis (high inflation rates) and increasing political tensions (corruption scandals) (Stolte, 2013: 66; Alves, 2013b: 4; Cabral and Shankland, 2013: 5; and Stuenkel, 2014b). The contexts from the Dilma and the Lula administrations thus differ significantly, which means their

relations to Africa would presumably differ significantly and space and time limitations on this thesis would not allow an in-depth analysis of both periods. Importantly, there are also very limited academic analyses of this period due to its current nature. Thus, this thesis focuses its analysis on the Lula administration. An historical analysis would be ideal, as no event happens within a vacuum from its time and space, and understanding what preceded and followed the Lula administration would improve the quality of the research. However, due to space limitations, the author is unable to take a historical perspective in its full measure, but will aim to present arguments not in a vacuum but to locate them within their historical context.

## **1.7. Overview of the thesis**

Finally, this thesis will be divided into five main chapters. Chapter one serves as the introduction to the thesis as a whole. Chapter one provides the literature review and positions this research endeavour within the wider academic body of literature, and it outlines the research design and methodology. Importantly it also extrapolates the guiding research questions for the thesis as well as state the central argument.

Chapter two seeks to present and explain the relevant theory for the thesis. The chapter seeks to set the theoretical foundation of the study by adequately explaining the intricacies of neo-Gramscian middle power theory, while also exploring other varieties of middle power theory, and shows that Brazil is indeed a middle power. It also includes an operationalization of this theory for use within the thesis. Furthermore, chapter two includes a conceptualisation of all the key variables and concepts. It also situates Brazil within the theory.

Chapter three and four represent the core content chapters which will look at Brazil's political and economic relations with Africa respectively. Each chapter will address the variety of reasons behind Brazil's political and economic expansion to Africa by looking at the domestic reasons and the international reasons for the expansion separately within each chapter.

Chapter three looks at four main domestic motivations for Brazil's political expansion into Africa, namely Brazil's positive domestic period, the leftist ideology of the 'Partido dos Trabalhadores' (PT) or the Brazilian Worker's Party and its politics of solidarity, the Afro-Brazilian electoral base and the pressure it put on the Lula Government, and the charismatic leadership of President Lula da Silva. Chapter three also addresses the international motivations for Brazil's expansion of its political interests in Africa, and it focuses on six core issues, namely the perception of Africa's rising international importance, Brazil's commitment to multilateralism and considerations of gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, the changing world order during the early 2000s, Brazil's search for autonomy, security and geopolitical considerations, as well as Brazil's pursuit of international status.

Chapter four looks at five main domestic motivations for Brazil's expansion into Africa, which include Brazil's engagement in a class compromise to satisfy different classes within its multiclass society, the fact that Brazil-Africa political relations drove Brazil's economic expansion into Africa, private agencies promoting Brazil-Africa trade and investment, Brazil's need to secure natural resources, and Brazil's domestic interest in promoting the biofuels market internationally. Next, chapter four addresses the four main international motivations for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests into Africa. These include the international perception of Africa as the final economic frontier, Brazil's interests in gaining access to new international markets for Brazilian goods and services, the comparative advantage Brazil has in Africa as well as Brazil's interest in establishing a new international trade geography.

Chapter five serves as the conclusion chapter for the thesis, which will present the main findings that seek to answer what the reasons behind Brazil's expansion into Africa were as well as, importantly, indicates that Brazil does indeed act according to its (neo-Gramscian) middle power identity in its relations with Africa. **It will also emphasise the main argument of the thesis throughout, which is that Brazil used the African continent as a platform from whence to illustrate its international prowess and fulfil its international status-seeking ambitions.** Finally, chapter five will provide some areas for future research that have been identified through doing this research project before presenting final concluding remarks.

## **2. Chapter II: Theory and Conceptualisations**

### **2.1. Introduction**

Theory is an important element of any academic research endeavour, especially when doing case study research, however, when the primary research question involves the assessment of a specific theory, it is one of the most important aspects of the research. In order to address the central research question put forward in chapter one, ‘do the motivations for Brazil’s expansion across the African continent South of the Sahara reflect Brazil’s middle power status and agenda?’, thus necessitates a theoretical framework that looks at the ‘middle power’ concept as well as one that is able to find an explanation of Brazil’s actions vis-à-vis Africa. The main focus of this chapter is thus to analyse middle power theory and to devise a theoretical framework with which to address the core research question.

The middle power concept is however one of the more controversial ideas in International Relations and the study of foreign policy (Yalçin, 2012: 198). Despite this, the author recognises the analytical strength of this theory, especially the neo-Gramscian approach, in explaining Brazil’s increased involvement in Africa since the first Lula administration. Firstly, this chapter will introduce the middle power concept and highlight the distinction between the traditional and emerging middle power. Second, it will look at the literature on Brazil as a middle power. Third, the author will explain the different approaches to middle power theory and discuss their strengths and weaknesses; the categories include the functional approach, the (realist) hierarchical/structural approach, the (liberal) behavioural approach as well as the neo-Gramscian approach to middle power theory. Fourth, the author will expand on and analyse the Neo-Gramscian approach to middle power theory in more detail and present the reasons for recognising this approach as the most comprehensive and therefore most appropriate for this thesis. Finally, the author will discuss Putnam’s two-level game theory as a means of operationalizing neo-Gramscian middle power theory in order to present a comprehensive framework of analysis.

### **2.2. The Middle Power Concept: Origin and Conceptualisation**

This section will provide some of the background to the emergence of the middle power concept. Certain scholars argue that the first use of the phrase ‘middle power can be traced to the fifteenth century where the mayor of Milan divided the world into three types of states: empires (great or super powers), middle powers, and small powers. His definition of a middle power was simple; it was a state that had “sufficient strength and authority to stand on their own without the need of help from others” (Rudd, 2006 cited in Yalçin, 2012: 197). The origin of the middle power concept is most commonly understood as deriving from Canadian policymakers and scholars during the aftermath of

World War II (Yalçin, 2012: 197 and Huelsz, 2009: 12). Initially a Canadian conceptualisation of middle power involved being a smaller partner in larger alliances while being active in solving international disputes. Canada strived toward being a neutral force internationally, which acted as a 'soft power tool'. It deliberately supported smaller states in the UN, worked against the dominance of superpowers and based their foreign policy on humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts (Yalçin, 2012: 198). Policymakers and scholars from Canada as well as Australia have created middle power theories to establish specific images of their countries (Huelsz, 2009: 15). According to Dauvergne and Farias (2012: 904), Glazebrook was one of the first authors to cite Brazil as a 'middle power' in 1947, which is the same period that Canada and Australia's middle power international status became well-known. Thus, the middle power concept is not new to International Relations discourse and neither is its use in conjunction with Brazil.

The concept is however one of the most controversial concepts in International Relations and the study of foreign policy (Yalçin, 2012: 198). There exists some uncertainty and confusion regarding what the concept entails exactly. Yalçin (2012: 198) argues that at a fundamental level this is due to the controversial nature of the word "middle", as one has to define both great and small in order to establish what "middle" means. The ambiguity of the term middle power also lies in the fact that some states whose international role is defined by their functional capabilities and countries that display definitive middle power characteristics (like multilateralism and peacekeeping) are both designated as middle powers. States that are of medium size, has moderate international influence, which are perceived as neither great nor small, are also referred to as middle powers (Chapnick, 1999: 73). The fact that one country can be classified as both a small and middle power by different approaches obscures the concept and prevents it from being a robust analytical tool (Chapnick, 1999: 73). Finally, an important aspect of the confusion derives from the fact that different dominant paradigms within the discipline of International Relations approach the middle power concept from their understanding.

If there is no definite conceptualisation of the term middle power, how is it then possible that the middle power concept is used as an analytical tool in foreign policy analysis and International Relations? This is because despite the ambiguity mentioned above, many scholars recognise the presence of a general understanding of the term. A general definition does not necessitate an objective, quantitative understanding of the middle power concept but rather a qualitative understanding. The general understanding of a middle power is a state that is not great or small in international relations, that is in the middle of material capabilities and that has a certain foreign policy agenda that is a mixture of a moral role and one that favours national interest. Alden and Vieira (2005: 1079) define middle powers as the states that "are situated ideologically and materially within the dominant hegemonic paradigm but are limited (by both power and disposition) in their capacity to

act". Glazebrook's (cited in Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 904) middle power conceptualisation is: "countries which make no claim to the title of great power, but have been shown to be capable of exerting a degree of strength and influence not found in the small powers". Moreover, as Chapnick (1999: 79) argues, states may continue to campaign for the title of middle power (despite the ambiguities), as it elevates a state's status, which in can be used to one's advantage within the international arena (Chapnick, 1999: 79). There is thus no single definition of what is a middle power, rather, the concept becomes clearer as one continues to understand the various theoretical approaches.

### **2.2.1. Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers**

For many scholars, the fact that the middle power concept has been applied to a large varying spectrum of states that range from established democracies like Canada, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries to emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa is problematic. Some scholars such as Huelsz (2008: 14-15) and Burges (2013: 287) argue that emerging powers do not fit into the middle power concept because applying the concept to them highlights too many problems. In an attempt to 'save' the middle power concept from being stretched too far, certain scholars have tried to distinguish between 'traditional' and 'emerging' middle powers. Jordaan (2003) argues that traditional and emerging middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic, and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they are weak and ambivalent in regional orientation, contrasting identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers are however, semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian, and recently democratised states that behaviourally opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration, but seek to also construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region (Jordaan, 2003: 165-166, 175).

Schoeman (2000: 48) emphasises that the end of the Cold War and the eruption of civil wars and conflicts in the former Second and Third Worlds changed the definition, role, and function of middle powers. Emerging middle powers arose and were/are part of the developing world. She also emphasises the regional role of emerging middle powers and argues that traditional middle powers exercised their power globally but that emerging middle powers rather exert more pressure and influence regionally. However, Sennes (1998: 403 cited in Huelsz, 2009: 52) argues that an important characteristic for emerging middle powers is their capacity for straddling and inserting themselves into both the international and regional levels. Cooper (1997: 17-18) also makes a brief attempt at distinguishing between traditional and emerging middle powers by placing their foreign policy behaviour on two axes. The first axis is the intensity or style of diplomacy, which ranges from combative to accommodative. The other axis is the target or focus of diplomacy, which ranges from

multilateral (or rather 'global') to regional. The relational dimension, namely diplomatic intensity (or style) is argued to be best understood in terms of the emergent middle power's relations with the USA. He however also argues that the trend towards regionalism is one that is present not only in emergent middle powers but also in traditional middle powers (Cooper, 1997: 17-18).

Since Brazil is often referred to as an emerging middle power, it is important to take these authors' work into account in order to accurately look at Brazil's involvement in Africa. I do not, however, see the necessity of making rigid distinctions between 'traditional' and 'emerging' middle powers. For what purpose have these distinctions been made? Perhaps, it was to prevent the concept from being over-stretched, however distinguishing between the two 'different types' of middle powers only further complicates the concept in that it emphasises the few differences as being central and the similarities, which are ample (and will be addressed in detail in the following sections) to be of lesser importance. It also suggests that 'traditional' middle power status is something towards which 'emerging' middle powers must progress in order to be 'true' middle powers; traditional is thus superior to emerging middle powers, which I do not agree with. These distinctions focus on some of the differences between middle powers that became middle powers first and those that came after them. Any middle power that came after the 'original' middle powers such as Canada, Australia, and the like would thus consequently fall within the 'emerging' middle power concept. Although some of the characteristics and focal areas of so-called 'emerging' or rather 'new' middle powers are different from those of the 'traditional' middle powers, these countries do not need to be divided into two different categories or even 'classes' of middle power. Rather, these new middle powers that emerged internationally mostly act in similar ways to their 'traditional' counterparts. Where differences arise, these elements should be included into the middle power conceptualisation without warranting the division of the concept into two camps. In my opinion, this is especially unnecessary as the middle power concept is more qualitative than quantitative. Finally, the above-mentioned distinctions are not set in stone, and change as the international system changes.

The terms 'traditional' and 'emerging' middle powers are not indicative of distinct types of middle powers, but are rather an indication of the time in which these middle powers became such, with traditional middle powers being the first countries to become middle powers and emerging middle powers representing all the others that came afterwards. The term 'emerging' is also linked to the concept of emerging global players, in terms of political-economy such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and others such as Turkey etc. Also, as will be illustrated in the sections below, the neo-Gramscian approach to middle power theory encompasses a theoretical framework that is applicable to what is called 'emerging' and 'traditional' middle powers. The concepts of Brazil being an emerging power globally (which refers to its increasingly active role in the international arena and more specifically refers to it as an emerging *economy*) I do agree with.

Brazil is a middle power, with no distinction between traditional or emerging/new middle powers. For me, the notion of Brazil as an emerging middle power reflects this reality, and not Brazil falling into a specific (lesser) ‘class’ of middle power.

### **2.3. Brazil as a Middle Power in the Literature**

Before looking at the various approaches of middle power theory and before testing within this thesis whether or not Brazil fits the profile of a middle power in its relations vis-à-vis Africa, it is necessary to look at what others have argued on the point. The literature review in Chapter One of this thesis addressed the various authors who have written on Brazil’s expansion into Africa that have cited Brazil as being a middle power. This section looks at the literature beyond the limitation of Brazil-Africa relations and looks at any literature where it is contended that Brazil is a middle power. The majority of the literature argues that Brazil is indeed a ‘middle-sized country’, ‘intermediary state’, or middle power (de Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 61). The various conceptualisations of what constitutes a middle power evolved with time (as is illustrated in the section above), however despite the evolution in conceptualisations many scholars, classic and contemporary, categorised Brazil as a middle power (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 905; Yalçın, 2012: 198; Huelsz, 2009: 7; Flandes, 2003: 3; van der Westhuizen, 1998: 451; de Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 61). In brief, Brazil is mostly described as a middle power in relation to its foreign policy and distinct characteristics of its domestic ‘capacities’ (Huelsz, 2009: 33 and Yalçın, 2012: 198).

In contrast, there are those that argue that Brazil is more than a middle power. Some have hinted at the possibility that Brazil is in the transition between being a middle power and a great power (Özdamar, 2011: 2). Tranbanco (2009) also argued that due to Brazil’s important role within its (South-American) region that it has the potential of becoming a ‘great power’. Burges (2013) presents the strongest case for the notion that Brazil is more than a middle power, as he argues that it is a mistake to consider Brazil as such. He argues that Brazil does not conduct itself as a middle power despite superficial appearances of it doing so, and that Brazil does not consider itself to be a middle power but rather sees itself as a major power (Burges, 2013: 286, 290). Although Brazil does display middle power characteristic in terms of its state capacity, the manner in which it acts is at odds with what a traditional (distinction made by Burges) middle power does (Burges, 2013: 291). Also, because Brazil seeks ‘greatness’ and because of the notion in Brazil’s foreign policy of “Brasil Grandesa” or a grand Brazil that wishes to take its seat at the head table of important international organisations, it cannot be considered a middle power (Burges, 2013: 294). For these authors, Brazil is seen as more than a middle power because its ambitions go beyond the ambitions of a middle power.

The arguments these scholars put forward are important, however there is a difference between what is and what is aspired to. If Brazil does indeed act in a way that is ‘more than a middle power’ but



does not qualify as a great power, then in my opinion it is still a middle power. Yet, it could be an indicator of future aspirations. This questioning of Brazil's status as a middle power is important, because it shows the significance of this study; it is exactly this notion of Brazil being considered a middle power in the majority of the literature on the subject that this thesis seeks to analyse by focusing on whether the motivations of Brazil's expansion into the continent are reflective of a middle power agenda or not or only partially. It is thus important to consider that perhaps Brazil could act in Africa outside the perimeters of middle power theory and that one must be attentive to these aspects in order to conclude whether Brazil does act in Africa like a middle power or not.

## **2.4. The Different Approaches to Middle Power Theory**

There are various approaches to middle power theory which can be divided into four different groupings and sub-groupings. Because middle power theory falls within the discipline of International Relations, these groupings reflect some of the dominant paradigms within the discipline. The four approaches discussed in this section are: the functional approach, the hierarchical or structural approach, the behavioural approach, and the neo-Gramscian approach, which shows a combination or a mixture of characteristics from the other approaches, in addition to several distinct features. The categorisation should not take away from the importance of interrelatedness of the various approaches but serves as a means of understanding the vast literature on the middle power concept. The divisions of the approaches are synthetic and do often overlap in practical understandings of the middle power concept. A single author may employ different middle power approaches, while others prefer to stick to a specific model of middle power theory. I consider the neo-Gramscian approach as the best method of analysis because it combines elements from various categories.

### **2.4.1. The Functional Approach**

The functional middle power model according to Chapnick (1999: 74) is linked to the original conception of functionalism, which entailed a conception of world government in which smaller states are delegated influence based on their relative capabilities. Heulsh (2009: 30) argues that Gleber (1946) was the first to link functionalism to middle powers in academic literature. The functional middle power approach thus focuses on the link between functional capabilities and middle power status, so even if a state is not a major power, it can influence international politics in specific instances, especially in functional issues that great powers often ignore. Middle powers were influential international policy makers that demanded to be distinguished from lesser powers and were looked upon differently by great powers. The strength of the functional approach to 'middlepowerhood' includes the fact that it identifies states that are able to exert influence in international affairs in specific interests, which differentiates them from the rest. Great powers are those states that have international influence regardless of circumstance (which the author thinks is

only true to an extent) such as Germany and small powers are those incapable of exercising any real influence such as Mauritius (Chapnick, 1999: 74).

Some of the considered limitations of this model include the fact that the functional model only actually recognises two tiers of states, great powers and the rest. Chapnick (1999: 74) also argues that the functional model is imprecise as status (political and economic capabilities) is limited by time and circumstance, which causes the influence of middle powers to fluctuate, while that of great powers persists. The author does not, however, agree that the greatness of great powers does not fluctuate; it does, as can be seen in the decline of hegemony (in the neo-Gramscian sense), nor does the author see the fluctuation over time and context as a limitation, but rather as an important consideration that small, middle, and great powers' influence internationally change over time and space. Chapnick (1999: 75) further argues that middle powers are small powers with temporary elevated stature and that the limitation of objectively differentiating small powers that will never qualify and those that will. This argument however limits the dynamism of the middle power concept, it has to include a capacity for change. Furthermore, Chapnick argues that the use of the functional approach is popular because smaller states appear relatively strong in given situations and this perception is then perpetuated. Strength in the global order at a specific time and context can thus be artificially perpetuated (Chapnick, 1999: 75-76). The functional model is based on a hierarchical view of the international system, yet many authors that have attempted to distinguish between the different middle power approaches, recognise a distinction between the 'functional middle power approach' and the 'hierarchical or systemic-structural middle power approach' discussed next (Huelsz, 2009: 32).

#### **2.4.2. The Hierarchical or Structural Middle Power Approach**

Chapnick (1999: 76) argues that the origin of the middle power concept lies in the hierarchical approach. The author does not, however, agree that this is a separate approach to middle power theorising, but that it is inherently included in the other middle power approaches. Looking at this approach separately does, however, emphasise the importance of the recognition and consideration of hierarchy internationally in order to make sense of the middle power concept. Middle power is a relational concept that is defined in terms of other classes of the system, especially great powers (Holbraad 1984 cited in Chapnick, 1999: 76). Middle powers stem from the hierarchical nature of the international system, which can be divided into three tiers. This approach recognises the importance of national interest, which is different to the idealistic conceptualisation of the middle power as the moral and responsible international citizen (liberal behavioural approach that is explained in the next section) (Neufeld, 1995: 9).

### **2.4.2.1. The Realist Input**

The clear Realist assumptions and input into the hierarchical approach cannot be ignored. The hierarchical approach can also be described as the “systemic-structural approach” (Huelsz, 2009: 32). The realist school includes authors such as Holbraad, Wight and Bull (1978). This approach is essentially based on the idea of an anarchic international order characterised by a natural organisation of balance of power, where relative material capabilities define a state’s economic and political power (Huelsz, 2009: 33 and Yalçin, 2012: 199-200). Holbraad (1971: 82 cited in Chapnick, 1999: 76-77), as an important contributor the Realist hierarchical middle power approach, argues that distinguishing between middle, small, and great powers ought to be done based on the strength they have and the power they exert. States that are neither great nor small in terms of the criteria are recognised as middle powers (Yalçin, 2012: 199-200). The indicators of power are arbitrary but many authors define middle powers in terms of geographical size, military capability, and economic size (Huelsz, 2009: 33).

A method often employed in order to distinguish between great, small, and middle powers is one where great powers are those that hold exceptional powers in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), small powers are those with no special rights, and middle powers are those with lesser but still distinct powers in the UNSC, through getting favoured in the selection of non-permanent members (Chapnick, 1999: 76-77). This is linked to the notion of the importance of middle powers developing a larger than usual role in a specific institution; Brazil has for example been on the UNSC many times in comparison to other countries (Hurrell, 2000: 3). Related to this is the importance of the relative positioning of different powers (great, small, and middle) to international hegemon (as defined in a Realist sense) - the positioning of states vis-à-vis the USA is also important consideration for the realist hierarchical middle power approach. Moreover, the hierarchical model is considered important as it presents, to an extent, an objective definition of a middle power by defining all powers as states and it distinguishes between small and great powers and represents middle powers in relation to that, while having a set capabilities criteria against which to measure the concept (Chapnick, 1999: 78).

### **2.4.2.2. Criticism**

However, there are numerous problems with the hierarchical or realist middle power approach. The problem of measuring where in the hierarchy a state would fall is brought forward and criticised as not being possible to measure a middle power entirely objectively. Chapnick (1999: 79) argues that the hierarchical model tends to attach political significance to middle power in order to make it more than just a tool for classification of states. He argues that states promote their positions as middle powers to gain more international attention (i.e. use it as a political tool) but that is not what a middle power ought to do (Chapnick, 1999: 79). The author does not, however, criticise the propensity of

middle powers to wield their hierarchical power, especially as part of the hierarchical approach, where this is seen as an essential part of it. The combination of which statistical indicators different authors use causes ambiguities regarding which states are seen as middle powers or not. Agreeing on a specific set of variables that can be used for a 'scientific' approach to determine structural positions of different countries as well as determining where a middle power exactly falls in this categorisation, is extremely difficult if not impossible (Huelsz, 2009: 34-35). The realist approach can be criticised for its negligence of incorporating factors beyond material capabilities, such as soft power capabilities (as the liberals would argue) (Yalçin, 2012: 199-200).

A neo-Gramscian criticism of the *Realist* middle power approach is that it dismisses the importance of the role played by social forces and societal structures in determining state action and that it is not only external capabilities that determine a state as a middle power (Neufeld, 1995: 9-10). The notion of national interest presented as an essential part of the hierarchical approach is important but incomplete, as it does not explain who are benefitted through the national interest, who represents the nation; Neufeld (1995: 10) argues that it serves the individuals and groups in the dominant classes in society better than others. Finally, Neufeld (1995: 10-11) criticises the realist approach because it merely describes what a middle power is, but does not explain it (as the critical theory of neo-Gramscian middle power would). The author has an additional criticism of this approach, in that the emphasis of a (Realist hierarchical) middle power theory is on quantitative aspects, while the author argues that the qualitative considerations, which are recognised in the different behavioural approaches of the middle power concept, greatly enhance its meaning.

### **2.4.3. The Behavioural Approach**

Chapnick (1999: 75) argues that the behavioural model is one of the more often used middle power models. Cooper, Higgot and Nossal's book *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (1993) is often seen as the work in which the behavioural approach was developed into an accepted model (Huelsz, 2009: 38). Their emphasis on multilateralism, conflict management and moral power through being so-called 'Boy Scout' international citizens is seen as representing a synthesis of much of the behavioural literature (Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal, 1993: 19 cited in Chapnick, 1999: 75). The emphasis on supporting international multilateral activity through action in international organisations and acting as mediators is also emphasised by other authors on middle power such as G. P. Glazebrook and Lester Pearson (1947: 308 and 1966: 204 cited in Chapnick, 1999: 75 and Huelsz, 2009: 41). Chapnick (1999: 75) also includes Holbraad (1971) and Robert Cox (1989) into the behavioural category, and although both the works of these authors have behavioural aspects, the author finds that they fit better under other approaches. Bernard Wood's characterisation of middle powers as regional leaders, conflict managers, multilateral moral powers

and status seekers is also included into the behavioural model (Wood, 1988: 19-20 cited in Chapnick, 1999: 76).

The behavioural approach emphasises the idea that middle powers have a strong normative bias, with policies and strategies that entail a high sense of ethical and moral responsibility towards the international community (Huelsz, 2009: 41-42). These states may opt for soft power areas of influence, but it does however not mean that states do not act in their own self-interest. Important to remember in this regard is that a state is not only a ‘humanless mothership’ but an institution run by people, who get elected by citizens, who then act in a certain manner. The conceptualisation of the “state-society complex” as advocated by Cox is important when considering the role middle power states take on and why. It is important that middle powers consider acting in the interest of the international community as maintaining the prevailing order that works in their advantage; seemingly selfless international relations may indeed serve selfish purposes for the middle power according to the behavioural approach (Huelsz, 2009: 43).

#### **2.4.3.1. The Liberal branch**

Yalçın (2012: 200) argues that the liberal branch to middle power theory is included in the behavioural approach. The occurrence of middle powers being defined in terms of their technical and entrepreneurial capacities and not their material capabilities. The liberal approach makes use of an inductive method that entails the interpretation of certain demonstrated behaviour (Yalçın, 2012: 200-201). The liberal approach emphasises the structural limitations that prevent middle powers from acting across the policy spectrum, but that this leads to their focus on a limited number of policy issues that affect the international political economy or international relations. Middle powers are thus not defined by their structural capabilities but by their ability and ambition to take initiative in multilateral forums and use diplomatic capabilities to find solutions to common problems, while emphasising being good international citizens who act ethically and morally internationally (Huelsz, 2009: 39).

Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal (1993) are considered important liberal behavioural middle power approach writers. The work by Cooper (1997) is especially informative. Cooper (1997: 5-6) highlights the fact that middle powers do ‘niche diplomacy’, meaning they direct their attention to the domains where they hold high degree of resources and reputational qualifications. Middle powers are believed to be good multilateralists or international citizens and that they have the national will and capability to act in this responsible way. Cooper (1997: 8) argues that the ends of middle power foreign policy, that of stability, have remained relatively constant over time but that the way stability is achieved has changed, which allows for the dynamism Cox (explained in the next section) advocates in his article.

Cooper (1997: 9) goes on to describe middle power behaviour as displaying a specific pattern of statecraft, where all emphasise coalition-building and cooperation-building, all demonstrate entrepreneurial or technical leadership and all have adapted the roles of catalyst and facilitator. A catalyst is defined by its capacity to generate political energy around a particular issue, and a facilitator is one that hosts and plans meetings, setting priorities for future activity and drawing up rhetorical declarations and manifestos. All middle powers engage in some form of niche building on an issue specific basis, there are however profound differences in the form and scope thereof. The form of the operating procedure ranges from heroic to routine, and the scope of activity from discrete to diffuse. The heroic form entails an attendant degree of public diplomacy, personal diplomacy, and risk-taking where the stakes are high, contrasted with a routine form entailing quiet diplomacy, which applies a low-key, consensus-orientated style to international issues. A discrete scope of activity entails a focus on a small number of issues, while a diffuse scope indicates activities that are focused on a broader range of issues (Cooper, 1997: 9-11).

Cooper (1997) also argues that the difference between middle powers' type and scope of foreign policy can be explained by three factors. First, it is greatly influenced by a personality or individuals in a leadership position, such as the president. Second, the nature of the ideological or partisan divide in different countries, with the political left often being initiators of high profile international niche diplomacy. Finally, the question of external alignment comes into play, i.e. whether a specific middle power wishes to align or distinguish themselves from great, super, small or even other middle powers (Cooper, 1997: 12-13). Cooper (1997: 15) explains that Brazil is a middle power that emerged with the advent of the non-aligned movement and the rise of assertiveness in the global South, and was a critic rather than supporter of the norms and apparatus of international system together with other rising middle powers.

#### **2.4.3.2. Strengths and weaknesses**

The strengths of the behavioural approach lies in its extension of the definition of middle power to a specific behaviour or role that is fulfilled and it moves beyond the realist/hierarchical attributes of power like material capabilities and geopolitical position and emphasises the soft power of middle powers (Huelsz, 2009: 38, 40). The behavioural model also reduces the emphasis on (realist) hegemonic power as a distinctive principle in international politics (Huelsz, 2009: 40). Firstly, Chapnick (1999: 76) criticises the behavioural model for not satisfying the basic requirements of an objective, middle power definition, in that it is possible for any state to behave like a middle power, even if it might not be a middle power (by hierarchical standards). He criticises the behavioural model further because the list of middle power behavioural characteristics do not correlate across the literature and because it is not measurable (Chapnick, 1999: 76). These criticisms stem from a hierarchical/Realist middle power approach.

The most important criticism towards this approach however involves the problem of tautology, which occurs because the approach works backwards, examining the international activities of a state and then defining middle power behaviour by these same actions. Scholars argue that this defines the independent variable according to the dependent variable, which leaves the conclusion of “middle powers are middle powers since middle powers are middle powers”. This for many renders the behavioural liberal approach obsolete as an analytical tool (Yalçin, 2012: 200-201 and Chapnick, 1999: 76). An important reason why the approach is seen as a tautology is because the list of characteristics that determine a (behavioural model) middle power are based on the characteristics of states that behavioural scholars have already assumed to be middle powers. The author however argues that in essence, the biggest criticism is not that of tautology but stems from the fact that the (liberal) behavioural model overemphasises agency and then takes assumptions about the structural context in which middle powers are situated as a given (Huelsz, 2009: 41). By not acknowledging that they (liberal behavioural middle power authors) do incorporate some structural power considerations, it seems as a tautology, however if these (basic) structural (hierarchical) considerations were to be explicitly acknowledged, such as is being done by several ‘mixed approach’ authors, it would dismiss the central, crippling criticism of the behavioural middle power approach. This chapter will now turn to the best-equipped approach to analyse the international relations of a middle power, namely the mixed or combination approach.

#### **2.4.4. The Neo-Gramscian combination approach to middle power theory**

The final approach to middle power theory is the mixed, neo-Gramscian approach, which emphasises the inclusion of a combination of hierarchical and behavioural methods of thinking, but approaches it through a neo-Gramscian theoretical perspective, which is heavily influenced by the writings of Robert W. Cox. The neo-Gramscian approach is not the only model that suggests (albeit implicitly) a mixed middle power approach, but it is the most important one, as it has been successfully developed and has been applied to case studies, as is what this thesis seeks to do (Cox, 1989 applied it to Japan, and van der Westhuizen, 1998 applied it to South Africa). The neo-Gramscian (mixed) approach also addresses the core criticism against the aforementioned middle power approaches, which Huelsz (2009: 27), explains as the “artificial division between structure and agency”. She argues that structural (hierarchical) middle power approaches by definition do not focus on agency, which leaves out the possibility of recognising agential forms of power. She also argues that the behavioural middle power approaches consider structure as irrelevant for the analysis of agency but that it actually assumes certain structural or hierarchical features and contexts, which sanction middle powers to behave in a certain way. She sees the problem as stemming from an understanding that power needs to be either material or ideational but that it cannot be both (Huelsz, 2009: 27-28).

As a solution to this core criticism Yalçin (2012: 201) suggests synthesising the (liberal) behavioural approach and the (realist) hierarchical approach to a point where they do not conflict with each other, as he interprets it as two sides of the same coin. According to Yalçin (2012: 201), the hierarchical approach tries to answer the question of what is a middle power, and the liberal approach tries to point towards middle power activism and activities. The liberal approach is related to the willingness of the state to follow middle power policies (does it identify itself to be a middle power), while the realist approach looks at the real power status of any state (can the state even be considered a middle power). Focusing on only one aspect of middle power theory will not provide all the necessary information to understand a country's middle power foreign policy or be able to explain what forms of power exists in the global political economy (Yalçin, 2012: 202 and Huelsz, 2009: 28). The neo-Gramscian approach is able to address some of the criticisms other middle power approaches face and can thus be considered to be a mixed or combination approach.

#### **2.4.4.1. The Six Core Characteristics of Neo-Gramscian Middle Power Theory**

The author now turns to the question of what the Neo-Gramscian Approach is and what it entails. Cox's 1989 article 'Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order' is the pioneering work on the neo-Gramscian middle power approach, with authors such as Neufeld (1995), Schoeman (2000) and Jordaan (2003) adding to the literature, by reacting to Cox's seminal work. This section will firstly look at the main characteristics of the neo-Gramscian approach and then address some of the criticism of this approach. Finally, this section will illustrate why the neo-Gramscian approach is the most encompassing approach to middle power theory and therefore also the most applicable to use in the analysis of Brazil's expansion across African countries and the reasoning behind it.

##### ***2.4.4.1.1. Issues of State Capacity***

The neo-Gramscian middle power approach recognises the importance of considerations of state capacity and this forms the first point of the neo-Gramscian framework (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). The main consideration is that middle powers are in the middle rank of material capabilities (Cox, 1989: 827), which include military and economic capabilities. Middle powers have a sufficient degree of autonomy in relation to the major powers; however, a middle power's relations with the hegemon remain informative. Middle powers are centres of moderate power, each having no ambition for political-military dominance but rather for independence from powerful states (Cox, 1989: 825-827, 389). Cox emphasises that middle powers generally have a developed civil society in relation to government. This inspires a political culture that is built from the bottom up, which consists of citizens' movements concerned with global problems (such as ecology, inequality, and economic exploitation) and these problems must in some way manifest locally in order for middle powers to act globally (Cox, 1989: 859). Thus, possessing middle-range (military and economic) capability is a necessary condition of the ability to be a middle power, however other states with similar features to



those of middle powers may not necessarily play the role of middle power (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). The capacity of the state-society complex together with its intention to accept that role shapes the motivations behind a middle power foreign policy. In addition to considerations of state capacity, the neo-Gramscian middle power approach also stresses the importance middle power *behaviour* in making sense of the middle power concept.

#### **2.4.4.1.2. Neo-Gramscian Middle Power Behaviour**

The second point of reference for the neo-Gramscian middle power approach emphasises the importance of certain aspects of a middle power's behaviour. Their material capabilities form the base from which to choose whether they accept to take up the middle power role (Schoeman, 2000: 48). Cox (1989: 827) emphasises the behaviour of a middle power greatly, which is evident in the statement "the middle power is a role in search of an actor". Middle powers have an ability to stand at a distance from direct involvement in major conflicts. They stand in the middle in situations of conflict by not getting directly involved in major conflicts but they do try to pre-empt, contain and resolve conflicts (Jordaan, 2003: 168-169 and Cox, 1989: 825-827). Middle powers are generally part of the solutions to international problems, whether political, economic or social (or a combination) and tend to go about it in a multilateral approach (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). They thus do play a 'moral' role; it is not, however, one that compromises but rather incorporates their national interests (Schoeman, 2000: 48 and Neufeld, 1995: 21). An important aspect that Jordaan (2003: 166-167) recognises is the shift from the traditional focus of middle powers on security issues to a greater focus on political economic issues since the end of the Cold War. The neo-Gramscian approach also focuses on issues of political-economy through a historical analysis (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167 and Cox, 1989: 859). This middle power approach thus focuses mainly on international relations of a political-economic nature and less on issues of security (although these are still considered).

Cox (1989: 838) emphasises a very important behavioural aspect of middle powers, which only the neo-Gramscian approach includes; middle powers are involved with developing countries (in Cox's words in 1989 "Third World countries") through aid, development assistance and debt relief is essential for a state to assert itself as a middle power. Jordaan (2003: 168-169) also points to the importance of middle powers being aid donors. Interestingly, Cox (1989: 844) points to the external relations characteristics specific to middle powers, which have some counter-hegemonic world order ambitions, of which Brazil can be seen as a mild example focusing on reforming the world order. The behaviour of such middle powers include a more equal orientation to all parts of the world, not just a focus on the hegemon and great powers, a strong commitment to multilateralism, capital exports designed to moderate the unevenness of world development and a readiness to act as a lender and consumer of last resort for Third World (developing) countries. Cox (1989: 844-845) however emphasises the fact that whether a middle power behaves as such by adopting these kind of external

policies depends on the conditions of the domestic society within the middle power and the interactions within the state-society complex. Thus, certain visible middle power actions and behaviour are explained by international and domestic motivations.

#### ***2.4.4.1.3. The role of the middle power state-society complex and its domestic environment***

The neo-Gramscian middle power approach emphasises the importance of the domestic environment and the state-society complex of the middle power in determining the nature of a middle power's foreign policy, which constitutes the third point within the neo-Gramscian middle power framework. As mentioned above, Cox puts emphasis on the domestic political base, together with the importance of civil society in determining whether or not a state with middle power capacity will act as such (Cox, 1989: 844-845). Within a state-society complex, there are various actors involved in determining whether a middle power takes up its role, including the inputs of the dominant, capital owning classes (Capital), the subordinate classes' input (Labour), the foreign policy makers and other key individuals within the state, as well as civil society. The importance of what these various actors think and prefer are thus also part of a middle power's foreign policy making process (Cox, 1989: 859, Neufeld, 1995: 10-12 and Jordaan, 2003: 166). The neo-Gramscian approach thus recognises the important roles various domestic actors play in shaping and determining a country's political (foreign policy) agenda and whether a state exerts itself as a middle power or not. Outside recognition alone thus does not determine a state's middle power identity but also that a state-society complex needs to perceive itself as a middle power as well.

#### ***2.4.4.1.4. Constructivist inclinations of Neo-Gramscian middle powers***

The fourth characteristic of the neo-Gramscian approach to middle power theory is the implicit constructivist influences in the neo-Gramscian middle power approach. I think that the inclusion of some constructivist elements strengthens the neo-Gramscian approach by explicitly recognising something, which the approach already acknowledges implicitly. The phrase "the middle power is an actor in search of a role" (Cox, 1989: 827) emphasises the behavioural aspects of the neo-Gramscian approach, while also pointing to the fact that the actor itself recognises that it is a middle power and then seeks to fulfil this role.

An important aspect to consider regarding the middle power concept is the constructivist 'self-identification' aspect. Hurrell (2000: 1-2) argues that the constructivist route may be the missing link in the strength of the middle power concept in general and I would argue especially for neo-Gramscian middle power theory. This approach does not see the middle power as a category defined by a set of objective attributes or capabilities, but emphasises the importance of it being a self-created identity seeking a self-created ideology. 'Middlepowermanship' thus becomes an embedded concept, where a certain ideology of a state vis-à-vis the international community can be traced historically and can be related to broader trends of tendencies in the domestic politics of a country. The constructivist

conception of the term middle power thus includes considerations regarding the hierarchical position of the state internationally as well as its own perceptions regarding its identity, roles and functions in its international relations (Leith & Pretorius, 2009: 364). Moreover, the constructivist approach to middle power theory entails examining the ideas and ideologies that motivate the state involved (to be a middle power) (Hurrell, 2000: 2-3). Of course, it is not only domestic self-perception that make a middle power what it is, one must also recognise the importance of the hierarchical position and outside recognition of a middle power through its place in the world order.

#### ***2.4.4.1.5. Neo-Gramscian middle powers and the Current World Order and Hegemony***

The neo-Gramscian middle power approach renders hierarchical or global structural positioning important; its emphasis on world order and the related concept of hegemony is central to the approach and forms the fifth point of reference (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). An important consideration to make is that the way neo-Gramscian middle power theory considers hierarchical positioning and hegemony differs from the realist approach. Firstly, it is necessary to state that the neo-Gramscian middle power approach is based on the assumption that there is a hierarchical order of states (or rather state-society complexes) and that their rank internationally also plays a role in their ability to exert middle power behaviour (Schoeman, 2000: 48 and Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). Secondly, one has to understand the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation of hegemony to understand this aspect of the neo-Gramscian middle power approach (Neufeld, 1995: 12). When powers strive for dominance globally by not focusing only on their superior force but rather on establishing certain rules, practices, and ideologies that are in their own interests but that provide lesser powers with a measure of satisfaction and security (which gives them legitimacy in return), and this world order is successfully established, it is called hegemony. Such a hegemonic order is in the interests of the (dominant classes within the) dominant power, yet appears to be a universal natural order of how things ought to be (Cox, 1989: 825-826 and Neufeld, 1995: 13). The creation of hegemony necessitates the creation of an effective historic bloc, which involves the dominant classes gaining the consent of subordinate classes, which then legitimises their rule (Cox & Sinclair, 1996: 131-133, 136 and Leysens, 2012: 9-10).

According to the neo-Gramscians middle power approach, the most central aspect regarding middle powers is the fact that they play a supporting role in such a hegemonic world order, and act as stabilisers and legitimisers of the world order even in non-hegemonic periods (Jordaan, 2003: 167 and Cox, 1989: 826). Middle powers are committed to orderliness and security in interstate relations and facilitate orderly change in world system (Cox, 1989: 825-827). Middle power initiatives towards a new world order (post WWII) entail normative goals for a post-hegemonic world, which include greater social equity and a greater diffusion of power, but these goals are pursued in an orderly, incremental, non-revolutionary manner. The middle power role is to affirm the principle of adherence

to acceptable rules of conduct by all powers. Middle powers promote such a stable world order through international organisations.

#### ***2.4.4.1.6. The importance of International Organisations and International Law***

The central concept of world order is thus closely linked to another important characteristic of the neo-Gramscian middle power approach, namely the role and importance of international organisations and the related international law, which constitute the sixth and final point in the neo-Gramscian framework of reference. International institutions are the vehicles through which the middle powers support the world order and through which they attempt to change certain aspects about the world order (yet not in such a way as to jeopardise stability). Juggling past conditions and the future it tries to assert is part of the central struggle faced by many institutions, as they tend to preserve the status quo (Cox, 1989: 834-835). The middle power role is linked to the development of international organisation (as a process not a finality) and international law is one of the most important products thereof. Middle powers support this process of international institutions/organisations in contexts of hegemonic order or even without it, as it serves their own national interests (of a stable and orderly environment) (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Schoeman, 2000: 48). Middle powers thus operate through international organisations and the related production of international law because it sees it as the best way through which it can exert its international role and influence, yet does not divert from maintaining a stable international order, which is central to their national interest as they benefit from such an order. Middle powers generally opt for multilateralism through international organisations (Jordaan, 2003: 168-169).

#### **2.4.4.2. Criticism of the Neo-Gramscian approach**

Huelsz (2009: 45-46) criticises the neo-Gramscian approach on the grounds that it focuses too much on the role (or the behaviour) of a middle power as a defining characteristic of middlepowermanship. The other main characteristics of the neo-Gramscian approach illustrates that it is not too limited. Another criticism is that the normative approach to defining the behaviour of the middle power is problematic if applied to emerging middle powers, in that they may not have the material capability and technical expertise to fulfil these roles. Regarding this criticism, arguably even emerging powers have the material capability and expertise to fulfil the middle power criteria, which is illustrated by Brazil being an aid donor and a lender of technical expertise (White, 2010: 221). Even emerging powers with limited material capabilities are able to fulfil the middle power criteria. Furthermore, Huelsz (2009) argues that even the case study onto which Cox applied the neo-Gramscian middle power approach, namely Japan, did not fulfil certain behavioural criteria, such as providing capital exports and acting as the lender of last resort in order to reduce inequality between states. I recognise this criticism by Huelsz (2009: 45-46), in that aspects of the neo-Gramscian middle power criteria

borders on idealistic goals, nevertheless these criteria should not be disregarded, as they might be fulfilled partially or will be fulfilled by middle powers in future.

#### **2.4.4.3. Strengths of the neo-Gramscian Middle Power Theoretical Approach**

Having discussed the main features of the neo-Gramscian middle power approach as well as having addressed some of the criticisms, the section now focuses on why I chose this specific approach to middle power theory above the other approaches mentioned. Firstly, the neo-Gramscian approach is part of critical theory, which not only describes certain events (as positivist theory does) but moves beyond that and aims to explain and understand the world. The neo-Gramscian approach allows for change and is not static; it is not ahistorical but rather takes a historical (material) approach in order to make sense of certain occurrences and phenomena. Neo-Gramscian theory does not merely support the status quo (Neufeld, 1995: 10). Furthermore, the neo-Gramscian middle power approach also asks the critical question of ‘in whose interest’ does the middle power state-society complex act. The approach also includes various angles with which one can analyse a middle power’s relations with the world or with certain countries, or regions. It includes domestic as well as global criteria for analysing a middle power, allows behavioural as well as structural considerations, and includes asking what, how, and why questions related to middle powers. The neo-Gramscian middle power approach moves beyond a limited behavioural approach, which only looks at what a middle power does without asking further critical questions but it also primarily focuses on the actions of middle powers as evidence of a state’s middle power orientation, while not forgetting what lies behind such actions, who enacts them, for what purpose, for whom etc.

#### **2.4.4.4. Operationalization of neo-Gramscian Middle power theory**

The six-point neo-Gramscian middle power theoretical framework focuses on listing/exploring what core elements constitute a middle power. The theory thus enables the user thereof to determine whether or not a state-society complex is or is not a middle power in its relations with another state-society complex or state-society complexes within the international arena. Cox applies this theory to the case of Japan, and uses the case study to illustrate ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘why’ of Japan’s international relations as a middle power. Neo-Gramscian middle power theory (and middle power theory in general) seems most obvious to use in the context of answering explanatory and descriptive research questions. This aspect of neo-Gramscian middle power theory addresses one aspect of the core research question, namely the part that seeks to find out whether Brazil’s motivations for expanding across Africa fits the perceived middle power status of Brazil or not. The other aspect of the core research question, namely the part that seeks to find out what these motivations for expanding across Africa are in the first place, is, however, explanatory in nature. Neo-Gramscian middle power theory also points towards how it can be applied to answer questions that seek to explain the actions of a country perceived to be a middle power (which is what Brazil is perceived as) vis-à-vis other

countries, namely that certain visible middle power actions and behaviour can be explained by looking at the international as well as domestic levels for answers.

This notion of the importance of both the domestic and international levels of analysis is a core part of the underlying neo-Gramscian theory (or also called Coxian Critical Theory because of his important role in developing it) within neo-Gramscian middle power theory. In short, neo-Gramscian theory operates on the assumption that, as is indicated in the definition of the state-society complex, that the theory does not consider a unitary definition of the state (as realists do, for example). Rather, neo-Gramscian theory dictates that there is an interplay between the institutions of the state, the economic capacity of the state (called material capabilities), and the ideas of society within the state in a triangular relationship where all of these mutually influence each other; all within the domestic level or context (Cox, 1981: 136). This domestic level/context triangle, which can be understood *as* the state-society complex relates with other forces at the international level/context also in a triangular configuration; this mutually influential, triangular relationship consists of social forces, world orders (which can be hegemonic or non-hegemonic), and forms of states (Cox, 1981: 136, 138). There is thus a clear understanding within Coxian (neo-Gramscian) Critical Theory that forces within the domestic context and the international context not only interact within their own contexts but that these interact with one another. Therefore, in order to enhance the explanatory elements within neo-Gramscian middle power theory as well as to present a method of operationalizing which elements to take into consideration when seeking to answer the core research question, one could incorporate ideas from Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory.

#### ***2.4.4.4.1. Putnam and the Two Level Game***

This thesis does not seek to apply the technicality of Putnam's two level game, yet wishes to take elements thereof that can contribute to operationalizing neo-Gramscian middle power theory by contributing to the inherent notion within neo-Gramscian middle power theory that looking at both the domestic and the international actions and decisions of the middle power presents a method of understanding why it acts the way it does. Putnam (1988: 427) developed a theory that seeks to understand the fact that domestic politics and international relations are mutually influential as well as illustrate how these factors impact one another (Putnam, 1988: 433). "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign" (Putnam, 1988: 434). This core observation emphasises the fact that in order to understand a country's international relations, one has to understand its domestic context, and in order to understand

domestic politics, one has to understand the international context. This central idea is also reflected within neo-Gramscian middle power theory, although is not explicitly mentioned.

Putnam goes into detail of *how* the decisions that prompt certain political actions are made and argues that at one level (what he calls Level I), bargaining occurs between negotiators or (political) actors, which leads to a tentative agreement. At the other level (one level 'down' or Level II), separate discussions are held within their constituencies about whether to ratify or approve (either formally or informally) this agreement (Putnam, 1988: 436). Thus, any agreement (or international relations action) requires the approval (in varying degrees of intensity) of the domestic constituency; Brazil's international relations are thus defined by international and domestic considerations. For the purposes of this thesis, this illustrates that all the decisions to expand into Africa, whether political or economic, by Brazil contained negotiations and considerations at both the domestic and international level. If applied to this research endeavour, the larger the consensus and approval at the domestic level in Brazil of its international actions, the more successful its international relations will be. The more successful its international actions are, the more success and approval they will gain within Brazil (Putnam, 1988: 436-438). The two-level approach thus recognises the idea that there are conflicting ideas within the domestic sphere about what constitutes the 'national interest' and that the main decision-makers seek to reconcile domestic and international interests and requirements simultaneously (Putnam, 1988: 460). Putnam's two-level game thus emphasises that it is important to consider domestic and international reasons for Brazil's expansion of influence across Africa.

By incorporating the central ideas behind Putnam's two-level game theory into neo-Gramscian middle power theory firstly emphasises the fact that in order to explain Brazil's core political and economic reasons for expanding across Africa requires looking at both the domestic and international level for potential motivations and secondly allows for the operationalization of this thesis by simplifying how to apply neo-Gramscian middle power theory to this case study. This thesis will thus look at Brazil's domestic and international *economic* reasons for expanding into Africa, as well as Brazil's domestic and international *political* reasons for expanding its involvement into the continent, while using neo-Gramscian middle power theory as a guideline as to which elements of their relations to take into consideration to demonstrate that the reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa do in fact reflect Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power status. My central argument in this thesis is that the motivations behind Brazil's expansion into Africa since the Lula administration confirm Brazil's status as a neo-Gramscian middle power state-society complex and that the overarching reason for Brazil's expansion into Africa is that Brazil is seeking international status and is working toward consolidating its international status as a middle power and Africa represents an important stage from whence to promote this identity.

## 2.5. Conclusion

As the theoretical chapter, chapter two sought to give an overview of the middle power concept and the different approaches to it, as well as give a detailed explanation of the neo-Gramscian middle power approach. The chapter covered background information to the middle power concept by looking at the origin of the concept and its controversial nature. It also looked at the distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers and concluded that the distinction provides more confusion than reorientation and that Brazil is conceptualised as an emerging (economic) power that is also a middle power; thus making way for the emerging middle power Brazil. The chapter delved into the functional approach, which argues that smaller and middle range states are delegated their influence based on their relative capabilities and its criticisms. It also expanded the structural or hierarchical middle power approach which argues that middle powers stem from the hierarchical nature of the international system and it also recognised the realist influences in this approach, which emphasises that relative material capabilities define a state's economic and political power. After which, it took closer look at the behavioural approach, which is one of the more often used middle power models and its focus on international morality, multilateralism and conflict management. Then, it discussed the liberal branch of the behavioural approach, which argues that middle powers are defined in terms of their technical and entrepreneurial capacities and not their material capabilities as well as addressing the criticisms to this approach.

Finally, the chapter addressed the neo-Gramscian approach, which I recognise as the most applicable and important approach to middle power theory. The chapter addressed the six core characteristics of the neo-Gramscian approach to middle power theory and addressed the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. The first point includes considerations of state-capacity, which looks at the neo-Gramscian middle power's autonomy from great powers, its material capabilities, and the strength of its civil society. The second point involves looking at neo-Gramscian middle power behaviour, which focuses on issues of conflict resolution, involvement in aid donation, development assistance and debt relief in developing countries, and orienting itself towards a more equal world order. The third point entails looking at the role of neo-Gramscian middle power state-society complexes and their domestic environment and the role different actors play in promoting a neo-Gramscian middle power agenda. The fourth point considers the importance of the middle power recognising itself as a neo-Gramscian middle power and thus fulfilling its role as one. The fifth point refers to the supporting role a neo-Gramscian middle power plays in the world order and that it promotes goals of equity and equality in an orderly manner so as to not overturn the status quo as this is in the neo-Gramscian middle power's interest. Finally, the sixth point entails looking at how neo-Gramscian middle powers utilise international organisations and international law in their international relations to their benefit.



In order to enhance the explanatory capability of the theory, the chapter discussed how neo-Gramscian theory in general and neo-Gramscian middle power theory, specifically, emphasise the importance of taking both the international and domestic levels of analysis into consideration. In order to operationalize this study, I incorporated Putnam's two-level game theory which emphasises that in order to understand the international relations of a state, one has to examine the domestic and international contexts. This thesis will therefore seek to answer the core research question in the two chapters to follow by looking at the domestic and international political and domestic and international economic reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa, whilst arguing that these motivations behind Brazil's increased footprint on the continent are characteristic of Brazil's *neo-Gramscian* middle power role and that Africa serves as the main stage for Brazil's international project of status-seeking.

### 3. Chapter III: Brazil's political expansion into Africa

#### 3.1. Introduction

This thesis seeks to determine the reasons behind Brazil's political-economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration and whether these motivations reflect Brazil's middle power role. The division between Brazil's political and Brazil's economic expansion into Africa into two distinct chapters is for analytical purposes only; the nature of Global Political Economy is the realisation that the political and economic elements of any international relation work in tandem and are mutually influential. There may thus be economic motivations that form part of the Brazil's political expansion into Africa, and some political motivations behind the expansion of economic relations between Brazil and Africa. Hence, this chapter, chapter three, seeks to address the expansion of Brazil's political interests into Africa during the Lula administration while seeking to determine the reasons behind this expansion and whether it reflected Brazil's role as a middle power. I maintain the argument that Brazil's political expansion into Africa does indeed reflect Brazil's middle power role and that the main, overarching motivation for Brazil's expansion into Africa lies in Brazil's goal of seeking international status (Captain, 2010: 195; De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 72; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 909-910; White, 2010: 225 and Alves, 2013a: 37) and using Africa as a stage on which to play out this objective.

The first part of this chapter addresses the international and domestic reasons for Brazil's political expansion into Africa. There are four core domestic reasons and five core international reasons for Brazil's increased political interests in Africa during the Lula administration. The domestic reasons include, first, the overall positive and stable domestic (political-)economic context in Brazil during this period; second, the international-mindedness of the leftist 'Partido dos Trabalhadores' (PT); third, the interests of the Afro-Brazilian domestic voter base; and fourth, Lula's personal interest in expanding to Africa. The international reasons include, first, the perception of Africa's rising international importance; second, Africa's strategic importance as a supporter base for Brazilian (inter)national interests; third, the changing world order; fourth, Brazil's search for autonomy; and finally, geopolitical security in the South Atlantic.

The second part of this chapter addresses the results of this increased political interest in Africa and provides a broad overview of Brazil's unprecedented expansion of its political relations in Africa. The second part of the thesis thus provides a summary of Brazil-Africa political(-economic) relations before the onset of the Lula administration to establish how limited relations were before 2003. Next, the chapter looks at Brazilian foreign policy during the Lula administration and shows how it reflected an unparalleled focus on Africa. The chapter also indicates how this unparalleled foreign policy focus translated into an unprecedented level of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Africa, which first

became visible through the great number of embassies opened across Africa. This chapter then discusses the three main mechanisms through which Brazil expanded its political relations with Africa, namely bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and South-South development cooperation diplomacy. Finally, this chapter presents some conclusions regarding Brazil's expansion of its political interests in Africa.

## **3.2. The reasons motivating Brazil's political expansion into Africa during the Lula administration: An analysis**

### **3.2.1. Domestic Reasons for the increase in Brazil-Africa political relations**

#### **3.2.1.1. Brazil's enabling domestic milieu of economic stability and continuity**

To a great extent one of the main reasons why Brazil was able to extend its political relations to Africa as much as it did during the Lula administration was because of the overall positive and stable domestic (political-)economic context within Brazil. The fact that the Cardoso administration (Lula's predecessor) was able to stabilise Brazil's macroeconomic policy through (unpopular yet necessary) structural adjustments, especially significant was the stabilisation of Brazil's hyperinflation with the Real Plan, which enabled Brazil to expand its relations to the Global South in general and Africa specifically. Brazil's domestic growth wealth enabled increased political relations with Africa because it gave Brazil a more secure fiscal base with which to conduct its domestic *and* foreign policy, especially allowing it to engage in development cooperation (an endeavour not possible without an increase in domestic wealth) (White, 2010: 225 and White, 2012). Brazil's stable domestic setting reflected the necessary conditions of state capacity for Brazil to take up its middle power role internationally (and thus also in Africa), without these necessary elements Brazil would not have been able to be outward-looking or devise a foreign policy focused on Africa (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Jordaan, 2003: 166-167). The initiation of a leftist workers party into government could have resulted in an unstable domestic political setting; however, due to the Lula administration's pragmatism, Brazil was able to maintain political stability through incorporating the monetary orthodoxy of the Cardoso administration and ignoring several socialist economic ideas of the PT. The seamless transition from Cardoso to Lula in terms of economic policy instilled international faith in the Brazilian economy and led to a stable Brazilian political-economic situation (White, 2012). Brazil still focused on other important aspects of the leftist agenda (financed by these conservative economic policies) which also motivated its expansion into Africa (Brazil's presidential elections, 2010).

#### **3.2.1.2. Leftist ideology of the PT and solidarity politics**

The political programme and ideology of the left-wing 'Partido dos Trabalhadores' (PT) and its leader, Lula da Silva, were core domestic drivers of Brazil's political expansion into Africa (Captain, 2010: 184). The PT and Lula hold a leftist ideology, and although the PT as a whole is considered to

be a moderately leftist party, the socialist ideology did prove to be formative in its expansion into Africa. This is because characteristically, leftist governments tend to be more outward and internationally focused than more nationalistic or conservative governments. This could lie in the international nature of the worker's movement, the international plight of the worker and the poor, which is embodied in the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The international-mindedness of the PT led to the great expansion of relations with many new states, many of which were in Africa. Also, the political ideals of solidarity, rectifying inequality, and decreasing absolute poverty did not only impact Brazil's domestic politics under the PT (which was the base of social welfare programmes such as 'Bolsa Família' and others) but these ideas also impacted how Brazil conducted its international relations. These leftist ideas shaped the foreign policy and diplomatic relations with Africa in that what Brazil sought to do in terms of development domestically, it sought to do internationally, through South-South development cooperation, which was focused in Africa.

During the Lula era, Brazil sought to decrease inequality and poverty internationally through solidarity; which caused it to increase relations with the Global South, and Africa in particular. Also, Africa remains the poorest region internationally and the one with the least power in the international system; it follows that Africa should be the core focus for a leftist foreign policy aimed at decreasing inequality and poverty. The leftist ideological influences in the PT majority government during the Lula administrations is thus one of the motivations of why Brazil's relations increased in such a rapid manner with Africa during this period. South-South solidarity, especially towards Africa, is an international reflection of the solidarity principle core to the PT government under Lula.

Brazil's expansion strategy into Africa was criticised for being an "overly ideological-driven" due to the Lula government's emphasis of Brazilian solidarity towards Africa, which had been dismissively called "solidarity diplomacy" (Alves, 2013a: 42 and Chagas, 2013). Brazil's zeal toward Africa as the key element of Brazil's South-South solidarity is ideological but it is not the only motivation that shaped Brazil's expansion into Africa. To a great extent, Brazil's foreign policy and diplomatic agenda towards Africa was not only shaped by ideology but by pragmatism (Visentini & Da Silva, 2010: 68). It could be argued that this mix of pragmatism with ideological motivations is the reason why the agenda to expand relations with Africa was later accepted by the political mainstream; Brazil's domestic and international politics were not criticised as much as other countries within the region (such as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela) (Captain, 2010: 195 and Stuenkel, 2013: 30). Despite the moderate nature of Brazil's leftist ideology or way of thinking, it formed a core reason for Brazil's expansion of its political relations with Africa. Getting involved in solving international problems, as the leftist government promoted in Africa through development cooperation, and focusing more on the African continent through South-South solidarity indicates having a more equal orientation to all

parts of the world, which are illustrations of Brazil taking up its middle power role during the Lula administration vis-à-vis Africa (Aguilar, 2013: 60; Jordaan, 2003: 166-167 and Cox, 1989: 844).

### **3.2.1.3. The Afro-Brazilian electoral base**

The nature of the electoral base that voted the PT and Lula into power during the 2002 elections and again in 2006 informed a very important reason for Brazil's political expansion into Africa: Brazil needed to represent the interests of the Afro-Brazilian vote, which sparked closer relations to Africa. The PT has evolved over time to become more moderate party, yet maintained its alternative (leftist) identity. This allowed it to access a broader electoral base, which eventually led to its victory in 2002 (and 2006) (Hunter, 2010: 140-141). PT supporters were initially (1989) from the wealthier more industrialised South and South-West regions but by 2002 PT carried a majority of voters in the less developed North and North-East. The 2002 election also saw Lula gaining support from people in the lowest education and income brackets, which in numbers is a large group in the country (Hunter, 2010: 141). Already historically leaning toward the PT, poor, black, and working-class Brazilians became Lula's most ardent supporters in 2006 as a result of the success of the 'Bolsa Família' social grant programme, the rise in the minimum wage, and pensions. Due to Brazil's history of slavery, complex race politics and inequality, a great percentage of the electoral base that voted Lula and the PT into power are Brazilians of African descent. As a state-society complex, Brazil inherited the race relations that developed during slavery, even after it was abolished, and this became reflected in Brazil's social classes (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 29).

The Afro-Brazilian population thus became a key constituency that gave Lula and the PT their victories, so Lula had an electoral commitment to Brazilian Afro-descendent population to give more attention to issues related to Brazil-Africa relations (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 40). Also, the Brazilian civil society organisation 'Movimento Negro', an Afro-Brazilian emancipation movement, put further demands on the Lula government to address issues of race domestically in Brazil but also to reach out to Brazilians' African roots (Seibert, 2011: 6). The pressures put on the Lula government 'Movimento Negro' as well as the indirect pressure put on them by the large Afro-Brazilian voter base caused Brazil to reach out to Africa in an unprecedented manner (Seibert, 2011: 6).

It is important to state that domestic race relations during the Lula's administration were not unproblematic. The limited amount of black representation in Brazil's political elite starkly contrasts with Brazil's reputation as a colour-blind society (Stuenkel, 2013: 34 and Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 19). The racism and social inequality defined by racial lines within Brazil's domestic political context may undermine Brazil's attempts to have stronger ties with African countries in the future (Stuenkel, 2013: 34). The fact that race is a distinct highlighter of socio-economic status in Brazil, with primarily black people being at the lowest end of the socio-economic spectrum in Brazil, will undermine

Brazil's attempts to have stronger ties with African countries (Stuenkel, 2013: 34). However, one cannot question that Brazil's connection with Africa was emphasised by the increased political power that the Afro-Brazilian community experienced from 2003 onwards due to their representation as a key constituency of Lula and the PT's victory. The Afro-Brazilian population's core role in electing Lula and the PT influenced them, once in government, to increase relations with Africa. Thus, one of the core reasons for Brazil's increased political interest in Africa is based on the domestic issue of (long-overdue) racial equality for Afro-Brazilians (Captain, 2010: 194). Afro-Brazilian equality became central in domestic politics during the Lula administration and that transcended into Africa becoming an important factor in Brazil's international politics (Captain, 2010: 195). The fact that Brazil's Afro-Brazilian community was able to put pressure on the government to extend relations with the African continent is illustrative of Brazil taking up its middle power role vis-à-vis Africa because neo-Gramscian middle powers (like great powers) tend to act globally only as a result of domestic pressure groups pressuring them to do so (Cox, 1989: 859).

#### **3.2.1.4. The charismatic leadership of President Lula da Silva**

The strong personal convictions and leadership role of President Lula were core drivers of Brazil's political expansion into Africa (Captain, 2010: 184 and White, 2010: 225). Lula was leftist, charismatic, pragmatic, a good public speaker, a great negotiator (due to his history in the trade unions), and an advocate of poor Brazilians (Visentini, 2012: 23-24 and Brazil's presidential election, 2010). Although other reasons, domestic and international, influenced Lula to have interests in expanding into Africa, he had the political will to promote Brazil's closer relations with Africa; he was undoubtedly an active *driver* of Brazil's expansion into Africa. I would argue that without the political personality that was Lula da Silva and his charismatic and magnetic character that became famous for 'selling brand Brazil' internationally (Brazil's presidential election, 2010), Brazil's relations with Africa would not have expanded at the rate that it did. The best demonstration of the importance Brazil played in promoting Brazil's relations with Africa is that in 2009, the African Union (AU) invited President Lula to attend the thirteenth AU Summit in Libya to honour him for his efforts in strengthening cooperation and relations between Africa and South America; Lula was the only non-African head of state attending (Seibert, 2011: 7). Neo-Gramscian middle power theory emphasises that key individuals can play an important role in whether a state-society complex takes up its role as a middle power, and arguably, Lula's emphasis on Africa together with the broader middle power foreign policy agenda of Brazil illustrate Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis Africa during this period (Cox, 1989: 859 and Jordaan, 2003: 166).

## **3.2.2. International motivations for Brazil's political expansion into Africa**

### **3.2.2.1. The perception of Africa's rising international importance**

Africa's political-economic milieu during the Lula administration and the consequent perception of the international community of the rising importance of Africa motivated Brazil's expansion of its political interests into Africa. With the turn of the millennium Africa entered a period coined 'the African renaissance', a period where Africa emerged onto the Global Arena after the 1990s' lost decade. During this period the Organisation for African Unity changed to the African Union, which illustrated a move towards becoming a stronger multilateral forum advocating for African interests internationally. There was an 'all eyes on Africa' atmosphere in international affairs, due greatly to the drastic increase of China's presence on the continent. Brazil, under the Lula administration duly tried to 'keep up with the Li's' (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 71). Africa thus became an important stage in the international system for those states (like Brazil) seeking to increase their status internationally. The international attention Africa was getting was thus an important motivation for Brazil's expansion into the continent in terms of political relations but especially also in terms of economic relations (discussed in Chapter 4).

### **3.2.2.2. The changing world order: From US hegemony to a more multipolar world order**

During the 2000s, the USA, as the global hegemon, experienced a relative decline in prominence due to the international financial crisis as well as its unitary action in invading Iraq, which gave it less credibility within the international system – a key element of neo-Gramscian hegemony (Cox, 1989: 825-826 and Neufeld, 1995: 13). This caused the world order to shift toward a more multipolar (but not yet entirely multipolar) world order which allowed for emerging economies such as Brazil (and the other BRICS) to increase their position within the international hierarchy of states. This put Brazil in an international position from which to increase its international relations in general. Its increased relations with Africa were also due to Brazil's increased manoeuvre room and status within the international system (Lieber, 2014: 137-138). Brazil's rise as a neo-Gramscian middle power in a more multipolar world order did not however destabilise the international system but rather contributed to maintain a stable world order, even if it was not in a clearly hegemonic period (Jordaan, 2003: 167 and Cox, 1989: 826). Brazil's increased relations with Africa thus resulted from a more multipolar world order that emerged during the time Lula was in office.

### **3.2.2.3. Africa as a support base for Brazilian international interests**

One of the key factors that drove Brazil's political expansion into Africa is related to Brazil's need for Africa to be a strategic support base for two key Brazilian international interests, namely Brazil's objective to establish a multipolar world order through multilateralism, and the related aspiration for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Brazil's interest to establish a more multipolar world order (in itself)

also motivated Brazil's expansion into Africa because Africa represented a large constituency of the Global South, with which Brazil needed to have increased relations with in order to establish a more multipolar world order. Brazilian foreign policy and diplomatic actions reflect a long-standing interest in working toward achieving a more equitable world order, however, the mission to realise this goal regained new vigour during the Lula administration. The Lula administration focused on the need to democratise international relations, to simulate multipolarity and to therefore avoid hegemonies (Visentini and Da Silva, 2010: 55; Alves, 2013a: 37; and Seibert, 2011: 5).

Brazil sought to attain this goal of a more equitable, multipolar world order through multilateral means, historically and also during the Lula administration (Captain 2010: 190). Brazil sought to bring about this new world order through working through a variety of multilateral International Organisations (IOs). Thus, Brazil's self-interested goal of being recognised as an important power internationally, which has a permanent seat on the UNSC as well as representations in several other international organisations, that works towards bringing about a more equitable and multipolar world order, motivated Brazil to increase its relations with Africa primarily because Africa represents a "natural vote bank" that would aid Brazil in attaining these international political goals (De Freitas Barbosa et al., 2009: 66; Leahy, 2011 and Stuenkel, 2013: 31). Brazil's expansion into Africa was thus driven by Brazil's international ambitions, which necessitated Brazil making friends with everyone and especially African countries, as the African continent had fifty-three (as at 2010) developing countries that represent votes in key international organisations, which could benefit Brazil's ambitions (Stolte, 2013: 66). Brazil then bought African friendship and African votes that would allow Brazil to enter leadership positions in these IOs through promising to represent African interests in these IOs in return for votes (Magnoni, 2010: 13-14; White, 2010: 229; Lustig, 2010; and Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 906).

For example, Brazil is a strong negotiator at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Brazil thus represents the needs of African countries at the IMF and WTO in return for their support (Visentini and Da Silva, 2010: 59; Cabral & Weinstock, 2010: 10; and Cicalo, 2012: 8). Brazil has promoted itself as being an advocate for African interest in multilateral organisations of the international system, such as the FAO, the United Nations General Assembly, the UN Security Council (when Brazil has been there as a non-permanent member) and several others (Visentini and Da Silva, 2010: 55 and Stuenkel, 2013: 31). Brazil has also used the FAO as a platform from which to increase political relations with African countries by advocating their interests, and in return African votes played a contributing role to Brazil's Jose da Silva being elected the FAO's Director General in 2012. Brazil's position as host of the 2014 Soccer World Cup is also due to African support (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 100). The fact that African countries played a core role in securing Brazil's position in important international organisations reflect the



importance of African votes in Brazil's international ambitions and thus illustrates how this is a driver of Brazil's political expansion into Africa.

Brazil's ambitions to create a multipolar, more equitable world order through multilateral institutions incorporates Brazil's involvement in the multilateral IOs mentioned above, but it is Brazil's long-standing and important goal of a permanent seat on the UNSC that most required African support during the Lula administration and beyond. This goal has played an important role in Brazilian foreign policy since the onset of the United Nations, represented a core multilateral institution through which Brazil could promote its self-interests (Russo & Shankland, 2013: 267). Brazil's seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC reflects Brazil's interest of reforming the UNSC to be more equitable and representative of the international system as it currently is (instead of reflecting the power dynamics of the end of WWII). Brazil's interest in a permanent seat in the UNSC also reflects its objective of increasing its international status, as the five permanent members of the UNSC obtain great international status (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 72). Also, Brazil's rising international status was also perceived as an important manner in which Brazil could achieve the establishment of a multipolar world order (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 909-910).

Brazil's increased engagements with Africa reflect Brazil's commitment to a more equal orientation to all parts of the world, its goals of establishing a multipolar world order, and its commitment to multilateralism are clear illustrations of Brazil's neo-Gramscian character towards Africa (Cox, 1989: 844). Moreover, Brazil's commitment to working through international institutions reflects its interest in reforming rather than transforming the international system, which is also reflective of Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power agenda (Jordaan, 2003: 165-166, 175 and Cooper, 1997: 17-18). Brazil's goals of working toward a new, less hegemonic, more multipolar world order and its objective of attaining key leadership positions in IOs as well as working toward a permanent seat on the UNSC, by using African support to attain these goals, during the Lula administration clearly illustrated Brazil's programme of international status-seeking and using Africa as a platform to do so.

#### **3.2.2.4. Brazil's search for autonomy**

Closely linked to Brazil's interests in promoting a multipolar world order was Brazil's search for autonomy. This search for autonomy is one of the core reasons why Brazil expanded its political relations with Africa, as an important part of the Global South. Brazil's search for autonomy in its political agenda waxed and waned throughout its various administrations. However during the Lula administration, Brazil's search for international autonomy also became a reason for expanding its political interests in Africa. Africa would allow Brazil more diversified partners and thus decrease its focus on the USA. Under the Lula government, Brazil sought a diversification of partners (beyond the Global North and especially beyond the USA), which caused the deepening of relations with fellow BRICS members as well as African countries (Aguilar, 2013: 61). During the Lula administration

Brazil's focus on a more equal orientation to the world through focusing on extending relations with Africa and having a sufficient degree of political autonomy in relation to major powers in its relations with African countries, confirmed Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis Africa (Cox, 1989: 825, 844 and Jordaan, 2003: 166-167).

#### **3.2.2.5. Security and geopolitical importance**

There are also strategic geopolitical reasons that motivated Brazil's political expansion into Africa (Doelling, 2008: 5). Brazil was in need of Southern allies to maintain the peace and security of the South Atlantic (Matos, 2010 cited in Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 4-5). Brazil's need of Southern Allies in Africa, especially on the West Coast of Africa, is not for immediate reasons of defence of Brazilian territory but rather for preventative security in the light of changing international context in the long term. Brazil's security interests in the South Atlantic are also shaped by the need to protect natural resources within these waters (specifically the deep-sea PreSalt oil deposits found off the coast of Brazil and Southern Africa) as well as to protect the routes for Brazilian trade conducted through the Atlantic. Brazilian security interests thus moved beyond the Brazilian territorial waters and include the Atlantic Coast of Africa, thus causing an increase in political and security collaboration between Brazil and Africa (Aguilar, 2013: 62). In the interview with Shankland (2014), he emphasised the fact that Brazilian security expansion into Africa was characterised by the signing of several development cooperation agreements in military cooperation, specifically in naval cooperation to secure the "Atlantic lake" between Brazil and Africa. Although Brazil is involved in relations based on security and defence, the reason for expanding in this manner shows that Brazil has no ambition for political-military dominance in Africa and great power status, which is illustrative of Brazil's middle power role (Cox, 1989: 825-827, 389).

### **3.3. Brazil's unprecedented expansion of its political interest in Africa: A broad overview**

The first part of this thesis analysed the domestic and international reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political interests in Africa. The second part of this thesis will discuss the resultant outcomes of these domestic and international motivations. This section will thus seek to present a broad overview of Brazil-Africa political relations during the Lula administration, while underlining the unprecedented intensity of these relations. Brazil's increased political expansion into Africa is characterised by an unparalleled Brazilian foreign policy focus on Africa that manifested in diplomatic action. This section will thus explore the main three methods of Brazilian political expansion during the Lula era: extended bilateral relationships, increased multilateral engagements, and South-South development cooperation. In order to illustrate how Brazil's political interest in Africa has increased significantly, this section will also present a brief summary of Brazil-Africa political relations before the Lula era.

### 3.3.1. Brazil-Africa political(-economic) relations before the Lula administration

Before the Lula administration, Brazil's focus on Africa was greatly limited. Brazil's relations with the African continent date back to the trans-Atlantic slave trade (sixteenth to late nineteenth century). However, despite the early onset of relations, Brazil-Africa relations have been significantly limited until the beginning of Lula's administration in 2003. After the first African countries started gaining independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, President Quadros (1961) established somewhat stronger ties with Africa (Stuenkel, 2013: 29). Brazil's relations with African states were limited because they were not independent entities and the economic and political relations of African states were almost exclusively focused on their colonialists. General Castelo Branco (military coup leader, ruling Brazil during the military dictatorship 1964-1967) placed little attention on Africa, aside from interpreting it as part of the communist threat (Stuenkel, 2013: 29). The military regime was conservative and thus tended to focus more on domestic issues than on foreign relations, except for its focus on the Global North, especially the USA.

During the early 1970s (due in large part to the oil shocks), Brazil-Africa relations improved, as Brazilian investments in Angola and Nigeria surged and the number of embassies reached sixteen. Brazil recognised Angola's independence in 1975 and consequently ended its traditional alignment with Portugal; this was a momentous occasion in Brazil-Africa relations. The first Brazilian head of state to ever visit Africa (since Brazil's independence in 1822), was President Figuerdo (1979-1985, still military rule) in 1983 (Stuenkel, 2013: 29 and White, 2010: 222). President Sarney (1985-1990) only visited Angola once in 1989, and further did not prioritise Africa. President Collor de Mello visited four African countries<sup>1</sup> in 1991. The new slightly increased interest in Africa however thawed during the 1990s, as president Collor (1990-1992) focused primarily on strengthening relations with the USA. President Itamar Franco (1992-1995) made no visits to Africa (Seibert, 2011: 3, 6). The 1990s was a period often referred to as 'the lost decade' in Africa due to the total lack of importance that the international community, not only Brazil, put on Africa during the aftermath of the Cold War (Elliot, 2003). Brazil's relations with Africa thus saw a restricted strengthening during the 1970s and a considerable weakening during the 1980s and 1990s (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 83). Importantly, the ebb and flow of Brazil's political-economic interest in Africa reflects Brazil's increased and decreased foreign policy focus on the Global North (especially the USA).

Historical links between Brazil and Africa, specifically the trans-Atlantic slave trade and sharing a history of (Portuguese) colonialism with some African countries, enabled the establishment of a cultural foundation of interaction, and a degree of diplomatic interaction; yet deepened foreign policy and diplomatic relations as well as tangible economic and development exchanges that had been absent until the past decade (White, 2010: 222). Although Lula's predecessor, President Cardoso's

---

<sup>1</sup> These are Angola, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia (Seibert, 2011: 6).

administration (1995-2003) also did not prioritise Africa in the post-Cold War scenario (he only visited Angola and South Africa in 1996), there was a slight change in the discourse that focused more on the Global South, which set the foundation for the Lula administration's insertion into Africa (Seibert, 2011: 6; and Stuenkel, 2013: 29; Visentini, 2012: 23-24; and De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 64-65). Thus, although Brazil's relations with Africa are not entirely novel and can be traced as far back as the sixteenth century, it was only during the Lula administration that Brazil-Africa relations became truly noteworthy for the first time (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 84). Brazil's political-economic involvement in Africa until the Lula administration was thus considerably limited.

### **3.3.2. The unparalleled foreign policy focus on Africa**

Brazil's diplomatic relations in Africa expanded significantly and in an unprecedented intensity during Lula's administration due to the growth of governmental interest in Africa in the form of a characteristically middle power foreign policy (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 41 and De Mello e Souza, 2014). Brazil's foreign policy to Africa during the Lula administration changed from a position where there was almost no Africa policy to where Brazilian foreign policy explicitly highlighted Africa as forming an essential part of its global aspirations (Doelling, 2008: 5; White, 2010: 228, 238; Captain, 2010: 190, 195 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 26). South-South Cooperation pre-Lula administration focused primarily on closer relations with South-America specifically. However, since the Lula administration, Africa became another very important region of Brazil's commitment to the Global South while not rejecting the importance of South America (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 59, 65).

Brazil's significant foreign policy interest in Africa was prominent in the political rhetoric of the Lula administration. During this period, Brazil often sketched an image of its relations as being special with Africa. Lula would emphasise Brazil's cultural (especially the African heritage in Brazilian culture) and historical links to Africa (through slavery and a shared colonial history) and would often cite that Brazil has the largest black population in the world outside of Africa (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 65, 72) in an attempt to illustrate Brazil and Africa's 'natural partnership' based on commonalities. The Lula administration, for the first time, highlighted the "historical debt" Brazil has towards Africa, which meant that Brazil has a sense of moral duty and obligation towards Africa. Recognising Brazil's role and responsibility towards Africa due to slavery had not been a common utterance for top officials in Brazil until the Lula administration. This indicated a paradigm shift in the importance put on Africa during the Lula administration (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 72; Matos, 2010 cited in Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 4-5 and Captain 2010: 190). Brazil's emphasis on political action based on morality is also characteristic of Brazil taking up its neo-Gramscian middle power role vis-à-vis Africa (Schoeman, 2000: 48 and Neufeld, 1995: 21). Brazil's unparalleled foreign

policy interest in Africa consequently translated into unprecedented diplomatic relations between Brazil and Africa.

### **3.3.3. The opening up of embassies across Africa**

During the Lula administration, Brazil opened and reopened several embassies across Africa. According to Stuenkel (2013: 28) this is the best symbolic representation of Brazil's growing political presence on the continent. Moreover, the opening of embassies greatly strengthened Brazil's political relations with Africa (Freemantle & Stevens, 2009 cited in Magnoni, 2010: 8; and Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 14). During Lula's administration, seventeen embassies were opened (or reopened) in Africa. The embassies increased from eighteen in 2003 to thirty-seven in 2010, which means Brazil had official representation in thirty-seven of the fifty-three African countries (as at 2010) (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 41 and Kermeliotis, 2012). The number of African embassies in Brasília also more than doubled during Lula's term in office (from sixteen to thirty-four). Brasília thus houses the largest amount of African embassies in the Western Hemisphere except Washington D.C. (USA) (De Mello e Souza, 2014). The opening up of new Brazilian embassies in Africa by Brazil and vice-versa, during the Lula administration was the product of deliberate and active diplomatic effort (Chagas, 2013). The thesis therefore now turns to the increased diplomatic relations between Brazil and Africa during the Lula administration.

### **3.3.4. The main mechanisms of Brazilian political expansion into Africa**

#### **3.3.4.1. Extended bilateral relationships: Presidential and travel diplomacy**

Brazil expanded its political relations with African states during the Lula administration, by increasing its bilateral diplomatic relations through so-called "travel diplomacy" and "presidential diplomacy" (Stolte, 2013: 63 and Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 8). Travel diplomacy refers to the large role of official state-to-state visits by the president himself (hence the term "presidential diplomacy") and other Brazilian officials have made to Africa during the Lula era. President Lula visited Africa twelve times, visiting twenty-one countries during his eight years in office, which is substantially more than any of his predecessors and can be described as a "quantum leap forward" (Alves, 2013a: 38; Stuenkel, 2013: 30 and Kermeliotis, 2012). There are no other heads of government that have visited Africa as often as Lula (Stolte, 2013: 63). President Lula thus played a prominent role in forging, expanding, negotiating, and promoting diplomatic relations in Africa through an active and deliberate diplomatic effort (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 8). Other advisers and diplomats also made several high-end visits to Africa during the Lula administration; Celso Amorim, the Minister of Foreign Relations, made sixty-seven official visits to thirty-four African countries. Celso Amorim also played a significant role in Brazil-Africa relations, seeing and promoting Brazil's role internationally and on the continent. African heads of state and diplomats also reciprocated Lula's

visits by travelling to Brazil more often than during previous administrations; Brazil received forty-seven visits of African leaders from twenty-seven nations during Lula's presidency (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 15, 41 and De Mello e Souza, 2014).

During these state visits, President Lula advocated development cooperation, especially technical cooperation among states. Lula put such an emphasis on the importance of development cooperation that some analysts referred to it as 'generosity diplomacy (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 5 and Leahy, 2011). Brazilian bilateral diplomacy to Africa also involved an encouragement of trade and business relations between them, evident in the fact that President Lula was almost always accompanied by Brazilian business leaders on his trips to Africa (Doelling, 2008: 7). Brazil's increased diplomatic involvement in Africa during the Lula administration thus reflected Brazil's economic self-interests while simultaneously promoting development cooperation, which confirms Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis Africa in that middle power relations include elements of morality and working toward solving international problems through development cooperation that also incorporates Brazil's own national self-interest (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167; Schoeman, 2000: 48 and Neufeld, 1995: 21). Brazil was thus able to gain political influence in Africa through the increase in bilateral diplomatic relations, especially in Southern Africa and Portuguese-speaking African states (areas that were prioritised by the Brazilian government) (Seibert, 2011: 7 and Leahy, 2011).

#### **3.3.4.2. Increased multilateral diplomatic relations**

In addition to Brazil increasing its diplomatic relations with Africa through bilateral diplomacy, Brazil also actively made use of multilateral means to expand its relations with Africa by working through multilateral institutions such as International Organisations (IOs) and international summits. Multilateral IOs play a prominent role in Brazil's strengthening of political relations with Africa; Brazil's political diplomacy vis-à-vis Africa thus has a strong multilateral character (White, 2010: 228 and Visentini & Da Silva, 2010: 55). The emphasis on multilateralism and making use of multilateral IOs in its political expansion into Africa is a clear illustration of Brazil's middle power role in Africa (Jordaan, 2003: 168-169 and Cox, 1989: 844-845) and is characteristic of Brazil's international relations, not only to Africa but also to the rest of the world (especially regarding the Global South). Thus, there are multiple possible multilateral institutions through which Brazil could have increased its relations with Africa. I would however argue that Brazil's involvement in the following IOs and international summits was most prominent in its political expansion into Africa: BRICS, the India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum (IBSA), the community of Portuguese speaking countries (CPLP in the Portuguese acronym), Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) and the Africa-South America (ASA) Summit (Alves, 2013a: 39; Magnoni, 2010: 13; and Visentini & Da Silva, 2010: 56-57).

### **3.3.4.2.1. Closer relations with South Africa: The BRICS Grouping and the IBSA dialogue forum**

Brazil's involvement in two multilateral IOs, namely BRICS and IBSA, promoted an increase in multilateral diplomatic relations with Africa, especially through increasing close relations with South Africa. BRICS is a prominent IO through which Brazil has expanded its diplomatic relations with Africa. The BRICS term was coined by analyst Jim O'Neill at Goldman Sachs in 2001 to refer to the four most important growing economies internationally, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa became part of the BRICS after it accepted China's invitation to be part of the grouping in 2010 (Visentini, 2012: 28 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 15). Despite the international interest in studying the BRICS, the academic literature on their actions and especially their expansion into Africa as a collective is very limited because academics tend to be reluctant to speculate on such recent phenomena and would rather wait until tangible evidence is present (Harmer *et al.*, 2013: 16, 22 and Stuenkel, 2014a: 2).

Each of the individual BRICS countries have several interests in Africa, yet as a *collective* their actions on the continent is limited; a trend that may change in the following years due to increasing development projects in Africa, coordinated by BRICS and funded by the BRICS's New Development Bank (NDB) (New BRICS bank, 2015). If one focuses on how Brazil used the BRICS forum to expand its diplomatic relations into Africa during the Lula administration, the focus would be on Brazil's increased relations with one specific African country; South Africa, which is part of the BRICS grouping itself (Doelling, 2008: 6). Beyond expanding its relations with South Africa specifically, wider expansion of Brazilian involvement in Africa through BRICS has been limited. Perhaps, closer relations with South Africa through BRICS during Lula's administration enabled Brazil to increase its relations with other African countries by proxy; South Africa is considered to represent the 'gateway into Africa' for the other BRICS members (The Gateway to Africa, 2012).

Although criticised as simply being a 'talk shop', Brazil expanded its multilateral diplomatic relations with Africa through the IBSA dialogue forum, especially in the promotion of development cooperation. IBSA was formed in 2003 as an alliance of democracies from the developing world that focus on global governance, market integration and inter-sectorial cooperation (White, 2010: 235). IBSA, as a collective, has undertaken several development projects in various African countries during the Lula administration through the IBSA Facility for Development Fund and thus increased its presence in Africa. Within IBSA, South Africa and Brazil also collaborated closely on several projects (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 10 and Marques, 2012: 15). IBSA's relative influence is still limited internationally. I would therefore argue that IBSA, similar to BRICS, perhaps enabled Brazil to further expand its relations with other African countries through its close relations with South Africa, where South Africa acts as the gateway into the continent.

### 3.3.4.2.2. *Closer relations with Lusophone Africa: The CPLP and PALOP*

Brazil also increased its diplomatic relations with specifically Lusophone Africa during the Lula administration through two multilateral IOs, namely the CPLP and PALOP. Brazil is a founding member of the CPLP and was one of the main drivers behind its creation in 1996<sup>2</sup> (Marques, 2012: 3). The CPLP was established to promote and defend the Portuguese language, to promote economic and technical cooperation, and to encourage political and diplomatic coordination (Marques, 2012: 8). During the Lula administration, Brazil's expansion of relations through the CPLP into Africa was mostly focused on technical development cooperation and cultural exchanges and even though, in theory the CPLP ought to have been the preferred forum for political cooperation among the Lusophone world, it is not (Marques, 2012: 14-16). In terms of economic and technical cooperation, smaller and less affluent members of the CPLP (several of which are in Africa) have experienced early benefits of membership from Brazil transferring many of its tried and tested social development knowledge to these countries (Marques, 2012: 9). The best illustration of the increased focus on Africa by Brazil via the CPLP is that São Tomé and Príncipe, the sole CPLP country where Brazil did not have an embassy was the first African country in which Brazil opened an embassy when Lula came into power in 2003 (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 72-73).

Brazil's relations and cooperation with the five official PALOP<sup>3</sup>, which was established 1989, has also significantly increased since the establishment of the CPLP (Marques, 2012: 10 and Seibert, 2011: 3-4). Brazil's political relations with Africa were focused on the PALOP countries before Lula, and this focus continued under the Lula administration (although Brazil's relations with Africa also diversified away from PALOP during the Lula era) (Seibert, 2011: 3). Still, PALOP countries received more than half of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa (Marques, 2012: 10). Thus, both the CPLP and PALOP represent multilateral organisations through which Brazil has extended its diplomatic relations into Africa, through mainly signing multilateral development cooperation agreements.

### 3.3.4.2.3. *The Africa-South America Summit*

The expansion of Brazil's multilateral diplomatic relations with Africa during Lula's time in office also involved cooperation among South American and African regional organisations. The Brazilian government under Lula promoted regional multilateral cooperation between Mercosul or the Common Market of the South (which is an economic bloc in South America) and regional organizations in Africa through the Africa-South America (ASA) Summit. The ASA summit was used to improve relations between the two regions on topics such as trade negotiations, investment, energy security,

---

<sup>2</sup>The other founding members are: Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Guinea Bissau. Timor Leste became a full member in 2002 and the three associate observers include Senegal, Mauritius, and Equatorial Guinea (Marques, 2012: 8 and Seibert, 2011: 4).

<sup>3</sup>The PALOP countries are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe (PALOP, 2007).



UN security reform, and international development cooperation (Magnoni, 2010: 7-8). There were also several cooperation agreements that linked Brazil and regional African multilateral organisations. Brazil engaged in cooperation agreements with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Union (AU) (Stolte, 2013: 63). In light of the global financial crisis, differing ideological, political and cultural perspectives in the two regions, and the destabilisation of North Africa, it remains to be seen how the ASA arrangement will evolve and unfold (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 111). Brazil thus increased its diplomatic relations with several African countries through a variety of multilateral forums, where much of the increased diplomatic relations involved an element of development cooperation.

#### **3.3.4.3. South-South development cooperation diplomacy**

South-South development cooperation represented one of the most effective (if not *the* most effective) mechanism through which Brazil increased its diplomatic relations with Africa during the Lula administration. South-South development cooperation forms part of the broader concept of South-South Cooperation, which has its roots in the Cold War era and is essentially a foreign policy objective that focuses on mutually beneficial cooperation for the common development of the Global South (UNCTAD, 2010: 10; Rampa *et al.*, 2012: 249, 256 and Captain, 2010: 186). South-South Cooperation also focuses on increasing the voices arguing for larger inclusion of the Global South into international relations and importantly, Brazil prioritised Africa in its South-South coalition strategy from early on (Captain, 2010: 195 and Stolte, 2013: 66). South-South *development* cooperation thus presented the most important modality of South-South Cooperation, visible in Africa (Leite *et al.*, 2013: 1).

Brazil has been involved in South-South Cooperation for around forty years, however it started to become increasingly important under the Lula administration, during which Brazil went from being mainly a recipient of development aid to being a net provider of development cooperation (Frayssinet, 2011). Brazilian development cooperation increased significantly in both resources available and geographical reach after Lula became president and it was only during Lula's administration that it became pillar of Brazilian foreign policy and a key means of extending diplomatic relations to Africa (Leite *et al.*, 2013: 2; De Mello e Souza, 2014 and Stuenkel, 2013: 31). In our interview, Stuenkel (2014c) greatly emphasised the idea that during the Lula administration South-South development cooperation was used as a key tool of foreign policy, which meant that it greatly reflected Brazil's national self-interests. Also, the blatant presence of Brazilian national self-interest in development cooperation diverges from the official rhetoric (Stuenkel, 2014b). However, this is part of the neo-Gramscian middle power role, doing the moral thing (aid), fixing global problems (through aid) yet including the state's own self-interest (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167; Schoeman, 2000: 48; and Neufeld,

1995: 21). Development cooperation with African countries also increased Brazil's international and regional visibility, thus increasing its international status (Magnoni, 2010: 7 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 3). Brazil's involvement in development cooperation in Africa is perhaps the key element defining its neo-Gramscian middle power role; neo-Gramscian middle powers are involved in developing countries through development assistance in order to assert itself as such (Cox, 1989: 838 and Jordaan, 2003: 168-169). Brazil's involvement in development cooperation was a key mechanism through which Brazil increased its international status during the Lula era by becoming part of the elite and exclusive club of donor countries.

Brazil's commitment to providing development cooperation to Africa, even when it still has its own domestic development challenges, is the most prominent example of the middle power role Brazil takes on vis-à-vis Africa as the provision of aid, development assistance and/or debt relief to developing countries is characteristic of a neo-Gramscian middle power. Through engaging in development cooperation in Africa, Brazil has actively sought to increase its international status through becoming part of the select few states in the international system which are providers of development cooperation. As Brazil was until the Lula administration a recipient of development cooperation, transitioning to becoming a provider reflects a substantial gain of status within the international community by using Africa as a stage for this status-seeking.

#### **3.3.4.3.1. What constitutes *Brazilian development cooperation in Africa*?**

South-South development cooperation takes on different forms, such as technical cooperation, scholarships, peace keeping and humanitarian missions, contributions to international, multilateral development organisations, debt cancellation programmes, concessional export credits, and other types of loan facilities (Marques, 2012: 13; Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 3-4; and Africa in Debt to Brazil, 2013). Africa constitutes the primary focus of Brazil's overall development cooperation programme, surpassing even Latin America (Stuenkel, 2013: 31-32). Also, technical cooperation is the main modality of development cooperation Brazil makes use of in Africa. Technical cooperation is not the same as developmental assistance or foreign aid, as it deals with exchange of knowledge, technology and practices and not only monetary transfers (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 909; Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 5-6; and Alves, 2013b: 2).

Although in existence before Lula's presidential term started, technical cooperation grew remarkably since 2003 (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 909). Despite its relatively small size in monetary terms and in comparison to other donors' involvement in Africa, technical development cooperation had large visibility and political significance for Brazil as it represented a means through which to execute Brazil's foreign policy objectives. Brazil's development cooperation and self-interested political goals were thus strategically linked (Russo *et al.*, 2013: 2 and Magnoni, 2010: 4). Brazil stimulated its bilateral relations in Africa most successfully through technical cooperation agreements (Cabral &

Shankland, 2013: 5-6 and Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 909). Technical assistance to African countries shows Brazil's willingness and ability to make a contribution to the solving of global problems by getting involved directly (Stolte, 2012: 18), which is a clear indication of Brazil's middle power behaviour and involvement in Africa (Jordaan, 2003: 166-167).

#### ***3.3.4.3.2. Defining Characteristics of Brazil-Africa Development Cooperation***

South-South development Cooperation, as Brazil's main method of expanding its diplomatic relations with Africa, has several defining characteristics. These defining characteristics correspond with the broader principles of South-South Cooperation. Thus, Brazilian development cooperation ought to be demand-driven, mutually-beneficial, horizontal, no-strings-attached, non-interfering, and not associated with commercial (for-profit) interests (ABC, [ca. 2010]: 6). An important aspect of Brazilian development cooperation, which is in stark contrast to traditional and newer actors in Africa is the lack of tied aid, where various conditionalities, whether political (often the case with traditional partners) or economic (often the case with rising powers in Africa) need to be met in order for the country to gain benefits from aid. Moreover, the non-conditionality principle indicates that Brazil sees Africa as an equal partner in development (Magnoni, 2010: 6; White, 2010: 239; and Sotero, 2009: 19). Brazilian development cooperation in Africa does not have a pre-set agenda promoting Brazil's interests and Brazil treats each case of development cooperation as it requested by African countries, albeit requests can only be made within areas where Brazil has experience and a positive domestic track record such as health, education and training, agriculture, energy, and social programmes (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 4; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 4 and Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 15).

#### ***3.3.4.3.3. The main players involved in Brazilian development cooperation in Africa***

There were various actors involved in Brazilian development cooperation during the Lula era. Brazilian development cooperation as a means of diplomacy was headed by Itamaraty but was run by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC in the Portuguese acronym), which was without financial or political autonomy (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 7-8). The ABC was mainly the technical 'arm' of Itamaraty, as it was created in 1987 to organise the technical cooperation Brazil received, but its mandate was expanded to oversee the entire process of South-South Cooperation projects provided by Brazil from conception and negotiation through approval to execution and monitoring, all in strict accordance with Brazilian foreign policy objectives as laid out by Itamaraty (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010: 3, Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 7, World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 37-38 and Marques, 2012: 14).

The ABC worked primarily with governmental partners within Brazil, such as the various ministries involved in the different sectors of cooperation (such as agriculture, trade, health, etc.). The ABC also worked closely with two other institutions, namely the Brazilian Agriculture Research Cooperation or EMBRAPA in the Portuguese acronym (a research corporation that promotes technological development in agriculture and is considered the face of Brazilian technical cooperation in

agriculture) in agricultural cooperation and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation or FIOCRUZ in the Portuguese acronym (a research corporation that focuses on research in health) in health cooperation (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 12 and Alves, 2013b: 2). Responsibilities for cooperation modalities other than technical cooperation (such as debt relief, concessional lending and emergency relief) were executed by different Brazilian state institutions (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 8).


#### ***3.3.4.3.4. The main African countries where Brazil is involved in development cooperation***

Technical cooperation spread out across the continent from its historical concentration in Lusophone countries to the rest of Africa during Lula's administration. Africa receives slightly more than half of Brazilian development cooperation, of which Lusophone Africa receives more than seventy percent (Pino, 2010: 6 cited in Marques, 2012: 14; and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 3). Due to historical and cultural links, the five Lusophone countries in Africa have been the largest recipients of Brazilian technical cooperation, with Mozambique being the largest beneficiary (De Mello e Souza, 2014). Importantly, Brazil began to diversify its development partners across Africa due to diplomatic actions (inspired by foreign policy) on the continent. Brazil had a technical cooperation presence in the majority of states in Africa (Alves, 2013b: 3; Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 9; and Stuenkel, 2013: 32). In 2010 Brazil had technical cooperation projects in forty-two African countries (Brazilian Technical Cooperation, ca. 2011). Brazil's footprint in Africa during the Lula administration was most vividly indicated by its technical development cooperation presence on the continent.

#### ***3.3.4.3.5. The main categories of Brazilian development Cooperation in Africa***

Brazil-Africa technical development cooperation during the Lula administration focused on a few key areas. Figure 3.1 clearly indicates the main areas of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa for the period 2003-2010. Technical cooperation in agriculture constitutes the largest area of cooperation at twenty-six percent, followed by health (twenty-two percent), education and vocational training (fourteen percent), energy (five percent) and environment (five percent) (ABC, 2010 cited in Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 10). Furthermore, Brazil prides itself on presenting plausible development 'solutions' to 'African problems' through South-South Cooperation because they promote development cooperation in their areas of expertise, which corresponds with many areas of great importance in the global South's development process, notably agriculture (research), health (HIV/AIDS treatment) and social protection (cash transfer programmes akin to 'Bolsa Família') (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 4). Also, the main areas where African countries have requested cooperation from Brazil include agriculture, health, education and training, energy and social protection (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 4). The 'supply' and 'demand' of technical cooperation between Brazil and Africa is thus complementary.

**Figure 3.1 Brazilian Technical Development Cooperation in Africa by Segment during the Lula administration (2003-2010)** (Adapted from ABC, 2010 cited in Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 10)



The main segments of Brazilian technical development cooperation in Africa featured important projects in different African countries. Brazilian technical cooperation in agriculture was the most prominent segment of Brazilian technical cooperation globally, as well as in Africa (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 9-10). The most significant technical cooperation in agriculture in Africa during the Lula administration was the ProSavana project in Mozambique, which aimed to foster agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique's savannah by replicating the Brazilian experience of transforming the Brazilian cerrado into highly productive fertile agricultural land (Alves, 2013b: 3 and Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 10, 15). As the second most prominent segment, Brazilian technical development cooperation in Africa in the health sector focused mainly on prevention of HIV and tropical diseases, maternal health, medicine production, and training. Brazil's most ambitious and significant development cooperation project in Africa (in health sector and overall) was the building of an antiretroviral drug production plant in Mozambique (Russo & Shankland, 2013: 268; Alves, 2013b: 2 and Russo *et al.*, 2013: 3, 5).

Brazilian development cooperation in education and vocational training focused mainly on capacity building in African countries, where the National Service for Industrial Training (SENAI in the Portuguese acronym) played a central role in the skills development of Africans. It also had a smaller component of cooperation in higher education (Alves, 2013b: 2 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5,

76). Brazilian development cooperation regarding the energy sector in Africa focused mainly on development of renewable energy (especially biofuels) and was often accompanied by the involvement of the Brazilian private sector (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 4) (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5 and Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 913). Brazilian development cooperation in Africa within the environmental sector was limited in that Brazil was involved in small projects throughout Africa (Technical Cooperation Visit, 2008). Finally, Brazilian development cooperation in terms of social protection gained relative international visibility. It focused mostly on food security and social transfer programmes akin to the 'Bolsa Família' of Brazil, such as the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty programme that was established in Ghana in 2007 (Leite *et al.*, 2013: 13 and Sotero, 2009: 19).

South-South technical cooperation in security and defence formed a small part of the seven percent 'other' category of Brazilian technical cooperation with its partner across the South Atlantic, yet is noteworthy because an emphasis on security relations is not typically part of a middle power's foreign relations. However, I established in section 3.3.1 that despite Brazil's security involvement in Africa did not negate its middle power presence. Brazil's security relations with Africa focused on the security of the South Atlantic region as a strategic priority in Brazilian international relations because it represented an important channel for Brazil's international insertion. Brazil engaged in security and defence relations with African countries (especially those on the West Coast of Africa) that were based on South-South cooperation agreements *in security*. Thus, Brazilian South-South development cooperation in Africa during the Lula era took place in the field of not only economic, political, and technological areas but also defence and security (Aguilar, 2013: 47). Although Brazil's cooperation in terms of security and defence predates the Lula administration, the signing of strategic *development* agreements were significant during the Lula administration (Aguilar, 2013: 55, 57). These agreements focused on preventative security or rather maintaining peace in the South Atlantic and did not represent an active military expansion programme (Aguilar, 2013: 56; 61-62). Brazilian South-South development cooperation was thus a vital manner in which Brazil increased its political interests in Africa during the Lula administration.

### **3.4. Conclusion**

This chapter set out to investigate the reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political interests into Africa and to determine whether these reasons reflected Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power character. I argued throughout that Brazil's political expansion into Africa did reflect Brazil's middle power role and that the main, all-encompassing reason for Brazil's expansion into Africa was its ambition to use the continent as a platform from whence to project its international status as a neo-Gramscian middle power. The chapter addressed the main international and domestic reasons for Brazil's political expansion into Africa during the Lula administration and provided an overview of

the results of these motivations, namely Brazil's unprecedented foreign policy focus on Africa and the resultant increase in Brazil's bilateral, multilateral and South-South development cooperation diplomatic relations with the continent.

The domestic reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa included Brazil's positive and stable domestic milieu of economic stability and continuity during the Lula administration allowed for Brazil's political expansion into Africa. The international mindedness and the focus on solidarity, development and the reduction of international inequality of the leftist PT was another key reason that led to Brazil's unprecedented political footprint on the continent. The electoral base that voted Lula and the PT into power included a great contingency of people of African descent, which brought the topic of racism (racial politics) and African heritage to the forefront of Brazil's domestic political agenda, and this transcended into Brazil's foreign relations agenda, which led to a great focus on Africa. Finally, the charismatic leadership of President Lula da Silva was a key driver of Brazil's increased diplomatic focus on Africa. These domestic reasons for increased political relations between Brazil and Africa were confirmative of Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis Africa in that they represented the necessary conditions for middle power state capacity, they illustrated a commitment to more equal orientation to all parts of the world, the presence of domestic pressure groups promoted global action and key individuals made sure Brazil took up its middle power role. The domestic reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political interests in Africa do not directly reflect Brazil's main goal of seeking status in the international arena but rather provides the domestic foundation on which it can build and expand its international ambitions.

The international reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political interests in Africa are reflective of Brazil's main goal of establishing itself as an important power in the international arena through using Africa as a stage from where to project its status as a neo-Gramscian middle power. The resurgence of Africa in the international community sparked Brazil's interest and resulted in Brazil's increased political relations with the region. The occurrence of a more multipolar world order due to the slight decline of US dominance internationally allowed for Brazil to increase its international position and international engagements. Brazil's goal of bringing about a multi-polar, non-hegemonic, equitable world order through multilateral international organisations such as the UNSC caused Brazil was a core reason for Brazil's expansion into Africa as Brazil needed their international support in order to attain its goals. Brazil also expanded its political relations with Africa because of security motivations related to maintaining a zone of peace in the South Atlantic in order to protect Brazilian strategic resources that necessitated the assistance of African countries, especially those on the West Coast. The international reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa also confirmed Brazil's middle role vis-à-vis Africa in that they focused on achieving a multipolar world order through multilateralism, a program of reforming rather than transforming the international system, and a focus on a more equal

orientation to all parts of the world and illustrated no ambition for military dominance in Africa. Thus, the domestic and international reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political interests in Africa reflect Brazil's role as a middle power and its goal of international status-seeking.



## **4. Chapter IV: Brazil's economic expansion into Africa**

### **4.1. Introduction**

Brazil's increased presence on the African continent during the Lula administration did not only manifest itself in increased political relations but was also visible in the unprecedented economic interest Brazil showed on the continent during this period. This chapter seeks to analyse the reasons for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration. I argue that Brazil's political interests in Africa (as discussed in Chapter 3) drove the increase in Brazil's economic interests in the continent and that through the expansion of economic relations with Africa, Brazil was seeking to increase its status within the international system, by using Africa as a key region through which to increase its economic (hard) power through profit-seeking actions. Moreover, Brazil's economic expansion into Africa (and the motivations behind this drive) reflect Brazil's middle power role on the continent.

The first part of this chapter addresses the international and domestic reasons for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa. The main domestic motivations for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa include, first, the necessary class compromise in a fragmented, multicultural society such as Brazil; second, Brazil's foreign policy of economic internationalisation and its increased diplomatic relations with Africa; third, the private agencies promoting Brazil-Africa economic relations; fourth, the need to secure strategic natural resources; and fifth, Brazil's domestic interest in promoting biofuels in Africa. The main international motivations for Brazil's increased economic interests in Africa include, first, the perception of Africa as the final economic frontier; second, the need to gain access to international market for Brazilian goods and services; third, the comparative advantage Brazil has in Africa; and fourth Brazil's goal of establishing a new international trade geography.

The second part addresses the manifestation or the results of this increased economic interest in Africa and provides a broad overview of Brazil's unprecedented expansion of its economic relations in Africa by looking at the rapid increase in trade relations and the increase in Brazilian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) with Africa during the Lula administration. The section on trade relations looks at the statistics of Brazil's overall trade with Africa, what is being traded, and with which African states. The section on FDI looks at the overall statistics on Brazilian FDI in Africa, the main sectors of Brazilian FDI and the main Brazilian companies involved in them, and the main African destinations for Brazilian FDI. Finally, this chapter provides conclusions regarding Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa.

## **4.2. The reasons motivating Brazil's economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration: An analysis**

### **4.2.1. Domestic reasons for the increase in Brazil-Africa economic relations**

#### **4.2.1.1. Stable economic situation at home and the international commodities boom**

Brazil's stable economic situation during the Lula administration did not only lead to an increase in political relations, specifically development cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1.1), but also drove Brazil's economic expansion across the globe and also into Africa (White, 2012). It was not only the economic policy continuity from the Cardoso to Lula administration that led to the positive economic situation in Brazil during the Lula administration. The international commodities boom of the 2000s combined with the growth of the Brazilian middle class were also important contributors to Brazil's GDP growth. During Lula's time in office, Brazil ranked around seventh place in the world GDP rankings, with a GDP less than the major economies but also far greater than the small economies. Brazil experienced a rapid economic growth during Lula's time in office, which was driven by a boom in international demand (specifically from China) for Brazilian commodities. This economic expansion was then reinforced by the domestic consumption from Brazil's fast-growing middle class. However, as international commodity prices began to fall during the end of Lula's presidency, economic growth also started to slow down (Meyer, 2014: 8). The political-economic stability and flourishing and stable economic situation domestically in Brazil consequently encouraged trade and foreign direct investments in Africa, because it provided the essential capital necessary for economic growth (White, 2012). The domestic growth in wealth also enabled the Brazilian government to fund investment project in Africa through increasing the amount of money available through BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) (White, 2010: 231). Brazil's stable domestic economic setting and its middle ranking (internationally) of its economic power reflected the necessary conditions of state capacity for Brazil to take up its middle power role internationally (and thus also in Africa) (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Jordaan, 2003: 166-167).

#### **4.2.1.2. Class Compromise**

Another important domestic motivation for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa is based on the need of the Lula administration to keep various, contradictory domestic interests appeased through what van der Westhuizen (2013: 80) calls the 'class compromise'. Brazil is a fragmented multiclass state-society complex, and in such state-society complexes, class compromise often emerges as intermediate contradictory demands emanating from fragile political coalitions. This means the government in power often takes up a middle power role and needs to appease constituencies favouring economic liberalism on the one side with those calling for redistribution on the other (van der Westhuizen, 2013: 80 and Kohli, 2009: 217). As soon as the PT and Lula were elected into government, the PT needed to address the inherent problem of the fragmented, multiclass

state-society complex by means of the class compromise (van der Westhuizen, 2013: 80). After the PT won the presidential vote, the party needed to create coalitions in order to form an effective government. In 2002, the PT formed a coalition government with the Liberal Party, which was supported by evangelical pastors and wealthy businessmen (read: conservatives pressuring for economic liberalism) (Van der Westhuizen, 2013: 85). In order to keep all parties happy within this coalition government, which reflected the two contradictory sides of the fragmented multiclass state-society complex, a class compromise emerged. The class compromise manifested domestically with an array of policies that reflected the liberal contingency on the one hand (with conservative macroeconomic policies) and on the, redistributive contingency on the other hand (with social welfare policies such as 'Bolsa Família').

In terms of foreign policies, the Lula administration also had to go about a class compromise. The Lula administration's foreign policy focused on closer relations with the Global South and increased its relations with Africa to unprecedented levels, and even participated in the development of the continent through development cooperation to appease the groups calling for redistribution (Chapter 3). And in order to appease the liberal contingency regarding Brazilian foreign relations, the Lula administration adopted an economic foreign policy that focused heavily on the internationalisation of Brazilian companies as a means to keep Capital happy. The class compromise strategy continued throughout Lula's second term in office (van der Westhuizen, 2013: 88). I thus argue that the nature of the fragmented multiclass society, and because of the leftist PT government that had to appease its own redistributive ideology and voter base, with the Brazilian middle class and economic elite (which it had to focus on not to alienate) is an important reason why Brazil so drastically increased its economic relations with the African continent, especially since Africa was already considered an important political partner to Brazil.

#### **4.2.1.3. Foreign policy and diplomacy as drivers of Brazil's economic expansion into Africa**

Brazil's expansion of its economic relations with Africa was driven by Brazil's political interests in the continent; Brazilian foreign policy, diplomacy and state-backed structures are the key motivations behind Brazil's increased economic activity on the continent. During the Lula administration, Brazilian foreign policy shifted from a focus on economic development nationally (through promoting the Brazilian private sector domestically and attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for Brazilian private sector growth) towards encouraging economic development beyond Brazilian borders through promoting Brazilian international insertion (Marques, 2012: 10; Alves, 2013a: 37; and Visentini & Da Silva, 2010: 57). Brazil put a great emphasis on the African continent as an area of priority in the realisation of these economic foreign policy objectives. The internationalisation of Brazilian companies and the seeking of new markets became a foreign policy priority in Africa.

Brazilian economic foreign policy was thus a driver of increasing the private sector relations between Brazil and Africa (Cabral & Shankland, 2013 and White, 2010).

The economic foreign policy focus on Africa translated into diplomatic action which deliberately sought to drive the economic expansion of Brazil into Africa. The Lula government's high interest and numerous diplomatic efforts in Africa sought to pave the way for Brazilian companies to get involved in the continent through investment and trade (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 4). Most of Lula's presidential visits to the African continent were accompanied by businesspeople. During these visits, Lula encouraged these business leaders to take advantage of political agreements signed between Brazil and African states and to then make economic agreements with these states. This would result in the signing of various bilateral (and also multilateral) trade agreements (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 1; Lapper, 2010 and Stolte, 2012: 9-10). Diplomatic actions drove Brazilian multinational corporations (MNCs) to move into African countries that Brazil had not accessed and motivated those who had presence in Africa to diversify their interests away from traditional partners (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 17). The inclusion profit considerations within Brazil's foreign policy agenda continues to reflect Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power role re Africa, as neo-Gramscian middle powers incorporate their national interests into the rest of their middle power agenda (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Schoeman, 2000: 48). The best example of the intensity of the diplomatic push for the expansion of economic relations into Africa was when President Lula criticised Brazilian companies for their slow and timorous involvement in Africa in comparison to Chinese firms (White, 2010: 231).

The centre-left Lula administration was a bigger driver of the intensification of economic ties between Brazil and Africa than Brazilian Business itself (Stolte, 2012: 9). Importantly, Lula administration's foreign policy and diplomatic focus on Africa was criticised by many for being too ideological due to perceptions that Africa was not an important economic partner at the time (Stolte, 2012: 9; Stolte, 2013: 66 and Stuenkel, 2013: 30). Thus, when considering business and industry interests in Africa (due to the Brazilian private sector's recognition of the potential of Africa), one must recognise that the initial rapprochement with Africa was driven by the Lula government at a time when Brazilian economic actors showed little economic interest in Africa (Stolte, 2013: 66; De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 60 and Stolte, 2012: 9-10).

A 2012 survey by the Don Cabral Foundation also found that forty-four percent of the companies surveyed agreed that the Brazilian government's foreign policy during Lula's presidency was a key driver in the internationalisation and expansion of Brazilian firm into Africa (Africa in Debt to Brazil, 2013). De Freitas Barbosa *et al.* (2009: 60, 75, 84), however, argue that Brazilian economic foreign policy and diplomatic action alone cannot be considered as effective drivers of Brazil's economic expansion into Africa due to the lack of sufficient supportive mechanism to motivate firms to operate in Africa (de Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 84). I do not agree because even though the state-backed

funding for the expansion of Brazilian economic relations into Africa is limited, combined with the foreign policy and diplomatic effort they are key drivers of Brazil's expansion of its economic relations into Africa, even if it does not reach the level of other states involved in Africa such as China.

There are two main state-backed supporting structures that promote the expansion of Brazil-Africa economic relations, namely the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX-Brasil). The role of the Brazilian Development Bank is central to Brasília's drive of expanding Brazilian trade and investment in Africa and thus ensuring the internationalisation of Brazilian firms (White, 2010: 231). The National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES in the Portuguese acronym), which has been rebranded as the Brazilian Development Bank, is a federal government-owned company and is the main funding agency for goods and services exported to Africa and investment projects on the continent. BNDES is the largest provider of capital investment funding in Brazil (White, 2010: 231; World Bank & IPEA, 2011:79-80 and De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 75). Importantly, BNDES has increased its incentives and disbursements to Africa significantly since 2003 (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 79).

BNDES has extended loans in the form of credit lines to Brazilian companies (mainly MNCs) that want to invest in Africa (especially since 2007). The figures on the exact worth of these credit lines vary greatly. Some of the figures suggest that credit lines from Brazil to Africa went up from USD 149 million in 2007 to between 446.2 million and USD 1.75 billion in 2011 (Stolte, 2012: 7; Stolte, 2013: 65 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5). The data on the exact amount of the credit lines may be problematic due to the existence of special credit lines to specific countries in addition to these general credit lines,. Brazil has extended special credit lines to Angola (USD 3.2 billion), Mozambique (USD 80 million), and South Africa (USD 35 million) to further the export of Brazilian goods and services (Stolte, 2012: 7; Stolte, 2013: 65 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2). Brazilian credit lines to African countries mainly target infrastructure development, which is tied to procurement of services and equipment in Brazil (this is similar to China) (Alves, 2013a: 41). Supplying loans and credit to Africa, as part of the developing world is an important illustration of Brazil taking up its neo-Gramscian middle power role in Africa Cox (1989: 844).

In addition to BNDES, which is a credit-providing facility, the Lula administration devised a special trade promotion strategy together with the Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (APEX-Brasil) which "promotes Brazilian products and services abroad and attracts foreign investments to strategic sectors of the Brazilian economy" (APEXBrasil, [n.d.]). APEX-Brasil is not a provider of credit but rather provides complete sets of data (country profiles and publication series) to businesses and entrepreneurs who wish to extend their economic relations to the continent. Also, APEX-Brasil, in association with the Brazilian government, promoted gatherings of Brazilian and

African business leaders at different events and fairs that promote Brazilian goods and services (Stolte, 2012: 9-10). For example in 2009, around seven Brazilian entrepreneurs represented 150 Brazilian firms in a business trip organised by the Brazilian state (together with APEX-Brasil) to Angola, which resulted in the signing of USD 26 million in business contracts (Biancalana, 2010: 13). APEX-Brasil thus clearly promotes Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa.

#### **4.2.1.4. Private agencies promoting Brazil-Africa trade and investment**

In addition to government-backed entities that promoted Brazil's economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration, there were also private agencies that promoted Brazil's economic expansion into Africa. Arguably these private entities only started this drive to expand to Africa after they bought into the Lula government's idea of Africa being a viable economic destination for Brazilian private sector relations. The Brazilian Agency of Franchising is one such private initiative that promotes Brazilian brands in Africa, especially in Angola. The agency organises meetings that highlight the investment benefits of individual African states and identifies niches for investment to prospective investors. For example, in 2007 at the 24<sup>th</sup> International Fair of Luanda, which is the main business fair of southwest Africa, more than 3000 contracts were signed with forty-one Brazilian companies that were represented by the Brazilian Agency of Franchising (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 82).

#### **4.2.1.5. Securing natural resources**

Brazil's interest to extract and secure strategic natural resources is one of the core drivers behind Brazil's economic expansion into Africa (Brazil in Africa, 2012 and White, 2010: 225, 229). Brazil's interest in Africa's natural resources, however, is not characterised by a strategy of securing natural resources out of national strategic interests promoted and supported by the Brazilian government for the growth of Brazil's domestic economy, such as is the case with China. Arguably, the Brazilian private sector's interest in Africa's resources is defined by Brazilian MNCs' (working in the natural resources industry) attraction to Africa due to profit considerations and because it is their area of expertise; these companies do not pursue African resources in a (state- or otherwise) driven strategy to secure resources (Alves, 2013a: 40 and Stolte, 2012: 6). This characteristic is proven by the fact that the resources that are extracted are not only destined for Brazil (for its own growth and development) but are exported to other areas of the world as well as by the fact that Brazil is not dependent on Africa for its resources because it is rich in its own (domestic) natural resources and a resources exporter in its own right (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2; Brazil's Big Five, 2013: 92 and Brazil in Africa, 2012). Brazil's interest in Africa's natural resources sector, although focused on further exporting these commodities and not so much on using them to fuel its domestic economic development, is still focused on maximising profit through resource extraction; a relationship that looks very similar to China's despite not having the exact same motivations. Brazil's profit interests in Africa's natural

resources, is also characterised by the encompassing goal of increasing Brazil's international economic standing. National interests are however part and parcel of a neo-Gramscian middle power role, which confirms Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power role vis-à-vis Africa (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Schoeman, 2000: 48). Brazil's interest in Africa's natural resources is thus a driver for the expansion of Brazil-Africa economic relations.

#### **4.2.1.5.1. Strategic energy Security**

Brazil's interest in African natural resources includes Brazil's interest in Africa's energy resources specifically, which constitute the most important natural resource driving Brazil's economic expansion into Africa. Brazil's interest in Africa's energy resources date back to the OPEC oil crises of the 1970s, when Brazil had to secure its oil needs in alternative markets. This strategic interest however declined during the Lula administration as Brazil discovered its own oil reserves (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2). Brazil is a resource-rich country itself and is not dependent on raw materials for fuel production (it has ample bio, hydro, and petroleum based energy) and Brazil is a future major oil exporter; it is not pursuing a strategy to secure energy resources (Kermeliotis, 2012 and Stolte, 2013: 64). Since the Lula administration, Brazil's interest in Africa's energy resources are defined more by profit considerations than by a shortage of energy resources in Brazil (as is the case with China for example). Lewis (2011: 3) argues that Petrobras is involved in Africa not to bring oil from Africa to Brazil but to grow the company in other markets. Arguably, Brazil interests in natural resources overall and energy commodities specifically is because it is the main commodity that African countries have to offer for trade.

#### **4.2.1.6. Biofuels promotion**

Another fuel-related reason for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa, this time not to secure fuel resources but rather to expand Brazil's own interest in the biofuels industry internationally. Brazil's interest regarding the biofuels industry in Africa is not in the securing of biofuels on the continent, but as part of Brazil's strategy to promote the Brazilian biofuels industry (in which Brazil is an expert) internationally. Brazil promoted the worldwide use of biofuels, especially ethanol, through multilateral and bilateral actions during the Lula era (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 913). Africa is thus of strategic importance to Brazil as far as biofuels are concerned. The Brazilian government considered Africa as an important biofuels frontier (De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 73). Brazil's economic expansion in Africa is thus motivated by Brazil's interest to export its biofuels knowledge and technology to Africa and to popularise the use of biofuels internationally by shaping an international biofuels market (which would benefit Brazil in that it would increase the international demand for biofuels, which Brazil is already an expert in). Furthermore, Brazil seeks to become an international leader in biofuels and through that gain international status, while also addressing the problem of the world energy crisis by presenting biofuels as a potential solution (De Freitas Barbosa

*et al.*, 2009: 73; Dauvergne & Farias, 2012: 913 and Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 3-4). Africa. Brazil's export of capital goods to biofuels projects illustrate Brazil's middle power role in that it sought to moderate the unevenness of world development through capital exports to Africa (Cox, 1989: 844. Brazil's interest in creating an international biofuels market by increasing the size of the biofuels market in Africa, illustrates not only Brazil's neo-Gramscian character of solving international problems (i.e. the global energy crisis) but also illustrates Brazil's self-interested goal of economic gains or profit, which according to the neo-Gramscian framework of reference is part and parcel of a middle power's actions; Brazil's biofuels involvement in Africa thus confirms Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis the continent (Schoeman, 2000: 48, Neufeld, 1995: 21; and Jordaan, 2003: 166-167).

## **4.2.2. International Motivations for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa**

### **4.2.2.1. International perception of Africa as the final economic frontier**

The international perception of Africa during the Lula administration was that it represented "one of the world economy's last frontiers", and this perception was a key reason for Brazil's increased economic interest in the continent (Stuenkel, 2013: 31; Cabral and Shankland, 2013: 17 and Brazil in Africa, 2012). Africa, considered the final frontier of global capitalism at the time, was perceived as the most attractive destination for investment and trade, especially for emerging economies (Stuenkel, 2013: 31 and De Freitas Barbosa *et al.*, 2009: 71). Emerging market investors, such as Brazil, perceived Africa's economy as more attractive and were generally more positive about Africa than were developed market investors (Rampa *et al.*, 2012: 247). The concept of Africa as the final economic frontier refers to the remarkable economic growth seen on the continent during this period. Real GDP in Africa increased by 4.9 percent a year for the period 2000 to 2008, which is more than double the pace of the 1980s and 1990s. The African continent during this period was among the world's most rapidly growing economic regions. Importantly this spike in growth was not only due to the boom in commodity price. Key factors promoting the growth include as a series of policy and institutional reforms, government actions to promote peace and stability, to improve macroeconomic conditions as well as microeconomic reforms, which created a better climate for doing business on the continent and thus it became a driving factor for attracting Brazil's economic interests on the continent (Leke *et al.*, 2010 and Kermeliotis, 2012). By securing its place in the final economic frontier, Brazil is able to secure a manner of increasing its economic (hard) power through profit gains and its international status thus reflecting its middle power role vis-à-vis Africa (Cox, 1989: 825-827 and Schoeman, 2000: 48), as a result of the increase in hard power but also because Brazil also has a presence in a strategic international economic region where other big and middle powers enjoy a presence.



#### **4.2.2.2. Gain access to new international markets for Brazilian goods and services**

Once Brazilian businesses realised the potential of Africa as an economic destination (due to the Lula administration's push), gaining access to these markets became a major motivator for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa (Kermeliotis, 2012; Chagas, 2013 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 20). Stuenkel (2014c) also strongly emphasised this point during our interview. Due to Africa increasingly featuring as an important market for growth, Brazilian companies became eager to cater for the growing African middle class, which would become the consumers of the goods and services produced in Brazil (similar to what had happened in Brazil) (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2 and Brazil in Africa, 2012). Importantly, Brazil was actively seeking potential markets abroad to which it could export its manufactured products because Brazil had experienced a decline in the manufacturing share of its GDP in the last decades and started to fear deindustrialisation and started to face the dilemma of the 'middle income trap' (Stolte, 2013: 65). Arguably, Brazil's objective to gain access to new consumer market in Africa for Brazilian goods and services represents the *main* reason overall for Brazil's expansion of its economic relations with the continent (Stolte, 2013: 64).

#### **4.2.2.3. Brazil has a comparative advantage in Africa**

During the Lula administration, Brazilian firms had (many still have) a comparative advantage in African economies, which motivated Brazil's expansion of its economic relations with the continent. Brazil's comparative advantage in Africa was based on language and cultural similarities (with the ex-Portuguese colonies), having expertise in areas where Africa lacked it, and being more at ease with risks related to doing business on the continent. These comparative advantages were not new to the Lula administration, and had been used by Brazilian firms involved in the continent before the turn of the millennium, yet coinciding with the government's strong promotion of expanding economic relations to the continent, these comparative advantages became important drivers for Brazilian firms to expand to the continent.

Brazilian firms initially focused on Lusophone Africa, especially Angola, with whom it had historical economic (and political) ties and Mozambique where it capitalised on linguistic and cultural similarities to gain footing. However, as time passed during the Lula administration and due to the political push to increase economic relations, more MNCs moved beyond former Portuguese colonies, which ushered in a new era of commercial relations between Brazil and Africa (White, 2010: 229 and Brazil in Africa, 2012). Brazil and Africa are good partners in terms of investment because of the comparative advantage Brazil has; the main areas where Africa requires investment overlaps with some of Brazil's commercial focus points (and largest MNCs) (White, 2010: 229). Africa needs infrastructure and Brazil has several large multinational firms specialising in construction. Africa has an abundance of natural resources, including energy sources like oil; and Brazil has firms that are able to utilise and extract these resources. Africa is still in need of its 'agricultural revolution' and Brazil

has many agribusiness giants that are interested in developing that aspect of African economy (Brazil in Africa, 2012 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 22). Finally, Brazilian companies were more at ease with the high degrees of risk and uncertainty in operating in African countries, as Brazil has gone through its own history of economic volatility (Leahy, 2011). These factors give Brazil a comparative advantage over other states interested in the final economic frontier, but these advantages also gave Brazilian firms courage to expand into Africa, which is why it is an important reason for the expansion of Brazil-Africa economic relations.

#### **4.2.2.4. New international trade geography**

Brazil's ambitions towards shaping a new international trade geography of the Global South was an important motivations for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration (Stolte, 2013: 66). During Lula's administration, President Lula actively promoted the idea of a new geography of trade (as well as investment) emerging and reshaping the global economic landscape, where the Global South was moving from the periphery to the centre of global trade. The new trade geography was characterised by the growing importance of the Global South as a producer, trader, and consumer in global markets. Also, a strategy of South-South cooperation focused on consolidating and expanding the transformation that was taking place in South-South trade, investment, and overall economic cooperation arose (UNCTAD Secretariat, 2004: 1-5). Thus, South-South cooperation between Brazil and Africa was not limited to development cooperation or political cooperation but also involved private sector relations (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 1). The establishment of a new trade geography served Brazil's political goal of establishing a multi-polar *economic* international order, which clearly reflects Brazil's middle power role as well as its ambition to increased Brazil's international status (White, 2010: 238 and Jordaan, 2003: 167 and Cox, 1989: 826, 844).

### **4.3. A broad overview of Brazil's unprecedented expansion of its economic interest in Africa**

The first part of this thesis analysed the domestic and international reasons for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests in Africa. The second part of this thesis discusses the manifestation of Brazil's economic expansion into Africa as was caused by these domestic and international motivations by presenting a broad overview of these relations during the Lula administration. It seeks to illustrate how the Lula era represents an unprecedented increase in Brazil-Africa economic relations. This second main section of the thesis will discuss Brazil-Africa trade as well as Brazilian foreign direct investment in the continent. The section investigates Brazil-Africa trade and investment statistics, it looks at which African states form key economic partners and also looks at what are the main commodities being traded and in which sectors the most FDI occurs on the continent.

### **4.3.1. The extraordinary increase in Brazil-Africa trade (2003-2010)**

#### **4.3.1.1. Total trade between Brazil and Africa**

Trade between Brazil and Africa increased dramatically during the Lula's time in office and this section seeks to present evidence of this phenomenon by looking at Brazil's overall trade, its exports and imports, as well as which African countries represent Brazil's main trade partners. I also argue that Brazil's economic expansion into Africa through trade relations is an important mechanism through which Brazil sought to increase its standing in the international system through increasing its economic hard power. Brazil's total trade with Africa increased significantly during Lula's presidency (2003-2010) due to the political prioritisation of the continent (Seibert, 2011: 1; Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 1 and White, 2010: 230). Brazil-Africa trade increased more than six-fold from 2000 to 2008, from USD 4.2 billion to USD 25.9 billion. Brazil-Africa trade saw a decrease in 2008-2009, which was however a reflection of wider global trends due to the global financial and economic crisis. In 2010 trade between Brazil and Africa showed an upward trend to USD 20 billion (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 1-2 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 1; Kermeliotis, 2012 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5). Compared to other newer trade partners in Africa (such as India and China), Brazil still lags behind in terms of trade volume (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 4). However, Alves (2013a: 40) argues that Brazil-Africa trade will inevitably increase in years to come, as Brazil continues to expand into the continent politically and economically.

During the Lula administration Brazil-Africa overall trade increased as a result of an increase in both Brazilian imports from Africa and Brazilian exports to Africa (De Freitas Barbosa et al., 2009: 78). Brazil's exports to Africa increased from USD 2.862 billion in 2003 to USD 9.262 billion in 2010. There is also a clear increase in Brazil's imports from Africa, increasing from USD 3.291 billion in 2003 to USD 11.302 billion in 2010. Brazil's exports and imports are illustrated in table 5.1 (Seibert, 2011: 11). Africa's percentage share in Brazil's foreign exports and foreign imports showed an overall upward trend for the period 2003 to 2010, as is illustrated in table 5.2 (Seibert, 2011: 12). Brazil-African trade only saw a downward trend in 2009, which was due to external factors, predominantly the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. Brazil-Africa trade however started to recover again in 2010.

Brazil-Africa trade thus shows an increase in absolute volumes as well as in Africa's percentage share of total Brazilian foreign trade, which means that there has been a clear increase in total Brazilian trade with Africa during the Lula administration. However, considering that Brazilian percentage of trade with the world more than trebled since between 2000 and 2010, Brazil-Africa trade makes up less than ten percent of that amount (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 88-89). This indicates Africa's relatively low level of importance in terms of trade to Brazil in comparison to other countries in the

world, however, Brazil-Africa trade was dismally low when Lula came to power, and thus any increase is noteworthy, even when it is much smaller than the rest of the world, comparatively.

**Table 4.1 Brazil's exports to and imports from Africa [in millions of USD] (Seibert, 2011: 11)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Export	1347	1989	2363	2862	4247	5981	7456	8578	10170	8692	9262
Import	2907	3331	2676	3291	6183	6657	8111	11347	15761	8465	11302
Balance	-1560	-1342	-312	-429	-1936	-675	-656	-2769	-5592	+228	-2041

**Table 4.2 Africa's percentage share in Brazil's foreign trade (Seibert, 2011: 12)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Export	2.4	3.4	3.9	3.9	4.4	5.0	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.7	4.6
Import	5.2	6.0	5.7	6.8	9.8	9.0	8.9	9.4	9.1	6.6	6.2

#### 4.3.1.2. The commodities traded between Brazil and Africa

In order to better understand the trade relationship between Brazil and Africa, one has to take issues of trade balance into consideration, as well as investigate what was exported and imported between Brazil and Africa during Lula's presidency. During the Lula era, the trade balance between Brazil and Africa went from a positive trade balance (Brazilian imports from Africa were less than its exports to Africa) to a negative trade balance (Brazilian imports from Africa were more than its exports to Africa). The negative trade balance or trade deficit, which was in slight favour of Africa, can greatly be explained by Brazil's heavy oil imports from Nigeria. Brazil, however, had a trade surplus with most other individual African states, which means that Brazil exports more to the majority of African states than it imports from them (Alves, 2013a: 40).

Brazilian imports from Africa during Lula's presidency consisted mainly of primary products (and to a lesser extent, low-and medium technology products), which indicates that Brazil's imports from Africa were highly concentrated in natural resources (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 93). Data suggest that more than eighty percent of Brazil's imports from Africa were mineral products and crude materials such as oil and gas (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2). Of this eighty percent (which represents the percentage share natural resources have in Brazil's total imports from Africa), sixty-six percent were fuels, such as oil and natural gas and thirty-four percent constituted other raw materials (Alves, 2013a: 40). A key characteristic of Brazil's imports from Africa (as well as its total trade with Africa) was that it was dominated by oil (White, 2010: 230). Brazil also imports an increased amount of natural

resources from Brazilian companies operating in these African states. These resources were destined for both Brazil's domestic market and other markets (Brazil's Big Five, 2013: 92).

On the other hand, Brazilian exports to Africa were more diversified. Brazilian exports to Africa consisted mainly of primary products (thirty-one percent), manufactured goods (forty-two percent) and semi-manufactured goods, which includes resource-intensive manufactured goods (twenty-seven percent) (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 90 and Alves, 2013a: 40). Several Brazilian business representatives contended that the biggest potential for Brazilian business relations in Africa laid in the export of machinery (even nuclear reactors), technical equipment, construction materials, vehicles and vehicle parts, aircrafts, together with food, beverages, and agricultural products. Agricultural exports account for forty-four percent of trade between Brazil and African countries (these agricultural exports were often used as inputs in agricultural development cooperation projects as well) (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2 and Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2). Other promising markets for Brazilian goods include fashion, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals (Stolte, 2012: 8 and Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2). Brazil also saw a special potential in African markets in terms of technological products. Brazilian technology had a comparative advantage regarding products from high technology countries, as it was adaptable to tropical conditions, being so-called 'tropicalised technology' (Stolte, 2012: 9). During Lula's presidency, Africa became the third largest export region of Brazilian manufactured goods, after South America and the Caribbean, and the USA; Africa thus became a key consumer of Brazilian manufactured goods (Stolte, 2012 and Stolte, 2013: 65). In our interview, Shankland (2014) emphasised the fact that this relationship, of Brazil importing mainly primary products from Africa and Brazil exporting mostly manufactured goods to Africa, illustrated clearly the colonial pattern of extraction and dependency, which could prove to be very problematic in future. Nevertheless, African states became profitable economic partners to Brazil, thus increasing Brazil's international economic status.

#### **4.3.1.3. Brazil's main trade partners in Africa**

Brazil's trade partners in Africa expanded greatly during the Lula administration, to a point where by the end of his presidency Brazil traded with the majority of African countries; there were however a few states that make up Brazil's main trade partners on the continent. Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Algeria and Egypt represent the countries most cited for being Brazil's most important trade partners in Africa. By the end of Lula's administration (2010) they represented sixty-six percent of Brazilian exports to Africa and about eighty-five percent of Brazilian imports from Africa, (Seibert, 2011: 11; Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2; Stolte, 2013: 64 and Alves, 2013a: 40). Libya and Morocco are also (yet less frequently) cited as the most important trade partners to Brazil in Africa (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 1-2). Brazil's largest imports partners were the oil producing countries of Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria, from whom it imported mostly oil (Seibert, 2011: 11; White, 2010:

230 and Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2). Brazil also imported coal and ores from South Africa (Seibert, 2011: 11). Brazil's largest export partners and also the biggest consumers of Brazilian goods were Egypt, South Africa, Algeria, and Angola (Seibert, 2011: 11 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2). Angola (and to a lesser extent Algeria) could thus be regarded as the most important Brazilian trade partners, as they are important export and import partners for Brazil.

Brazil's main trade partner states in Africa did not however become Brazil's main trade partners during the Lula administration; Brazil's trade with them predated the Lula administration, which means that their status as Brazil's main trade partners in Africa alone, did not indicate the unprecedented increase in Brazil-Africa trade from 2003 to 2010. However, when taking a closer look at the figures in tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7, which show Brazil's trade with Angola, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt, it becomes clear that there was a rapid and steep increase in trade between Brazil and these countries since the start of the Lula administration (Seibert, 2011: 11-12). In addition to these states, Lusophone countries in Africa are also regarded as important Brazilian trade partners. Brazil's trade with Portuguese-speaking states in Africa increased significantly during Lula's administration; however, Brazil-Angola trade represents the largest percentage of trade (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 2 and Seibert, 2011: 11). Lusophone African countries (the PALOP countries), with the exception of Angola, were however less important partners than non-Lusophone African states, in terms of trade. This can be explained by the fact that most of these were small states with smaller economies, which prevented them from significant trade with Brazil. Also, perhaps trade with these countries was limited because energy resources trade was not prominent (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 96; Leahy, 2011, Seibert, 2011; and The New Scramble for Africa, 2011).

**Table 4.3 Brazil-Angola trade [in millions of USD] (Seibert, 2011: 12)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Export	106.3	142.0	199.6	235.5	357.2	521.3	837.8	1,218.2	1,974.6	1,333.0	947.1
Import	31.4	174.8	11.6	7.6	3.8	0.1	459.5	946.3	2,236.4	137.7	500.7

**Table 4.4 Brazil-South Africa trade [in millions of USD] (Seibert, 2011: 12)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Export	302.2	424.1	478.2	734.0	1,037.2	1,371.1	1,462.7	1,757.9	1,754.8	1,259.7	1,310.0
Import	227.8	286.0	181.7	202.2	268.1	341.5	434.9	522.3	722.9	433.2	753.3

**Table 4.5 Brazil-Nigeria trade [in millions of USD] (Seibert, 2011: 12)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ext	246.9	416.9	507.6	469.7	505.2	953.2	1,373.6	1,512.4	1,535.6	1,066.5	862.5
Imp	733.6	1,376.2	1,094.6	1,521.7	3,501.0	2,643.0	3,918.3	5,281.1	6,703.3	4,760.6	5,919.7

**Table 4.6 Brazil-Algeria trade [in millions of USD] (Seibert, 2011: 13)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ext	41.4	44.8	86.9	153.7	348.5	384.3	456.7	501.2	632.5	714.2	838.9
Imp	1,508.5	1,097.8	998.9	1,123.0	1,944.5	2,831.2	1,970.7	2,236.4	2,501.4	1,381.7	2,361.3

**Table 4.7 Brazil-Egypt trade [in millions of USD] (Seibert, 2011: 13)**

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ext	298.8	424.6	386.1	462.1	623.6	868.2	1,349.5	1,238.4	1,408.6	1,444.0	1,967.5
Imp	35.8	47.0	24.8	34.6	33.5	31.1	37.8	52.8	217.9	87.8	168.8

### 4.3.2. Brazil's unprecedented level of Foreign Direct Investment interest in Africa


#### 4.3.2.1. Total Brazilian FDI in Africa

Brazilian FDI in Africa increased significantly during the Lula administration, yet not at the same pace as Brazil-Africa trade. Brazil only started to become a noteworthy source of FDI during Lula's presidency. It was only in 2006 that Brazil became a net foreign investor (as opposed to being mainly a recipient of FDI) while continuing to attract significant inward investment flows (Xiaomei, 2011 and Alves, 2013a: 40). Brazil's total FDI stock expanded from USD 50 billion in 2001 to USD 157 billion in 2009 and to USD 181 billion in 2010 (Alves, 2013a: 40 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2). Brazilian investment in Africa grew steadily during Lula's presidency and reached the USD 10 billion mark in 2009 and USD 12 billion in 2010. This is only a fraction of Brazil's total, global FDI (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2 and White, 2010: 230). Brazilian FDI in Africa had increased much less than Brazil-Africa trade has in the same period (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 96). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the modest amount of Brazilian FDI was perhaps not the most important aspect, but rather the type of investment, which was direct, long-term investment (White, 2010: 230). Thus, although Brazil-Africa FDI grew only marginally as much as Brazil-Africa trade during the period 2003-2010, it is important to consider that Brazilian FDI in Africa had high impact due to its long-term and stable nature (as opposed to the volatile nature of portfolio investment for example).

#### 4.3.2.2. Brazil-Africa FDI: The main African states

Brazilian FDI expanded across Africa during the Lula administration but remained focused in certain states and was done by a limited amount of companies. Since 2003, Brazil invested primarily in Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique and focused on the energy, mining, and construction sectors (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2). Angola, South Africa, and Nigeria have been the recipients of 40 percent of Brazil-Africa FDI. South Africa and Angola however host the largest concentration of FDI in Africa, with Angola being Brazil's main destination for FDI and franchising on the continent (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 20, 82 and Stolte, 2012: 5). The fact that Brazilian companies started to move investments beyond Portuguese-speaking African countries to become increasingly involved in non-Lusophone countries during the Lula administration was unprecedented (Alves, 2013a: 41 and World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 5-6). Figure 4.1 illustrates the dispersion of the so-called 'traditional Brazilian private actors' (Vale, Petrobras, Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa, and Queiroz Galvão) investments in Africa in the final year of Lula's presidency (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 84 and Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2).

**Figure 4.1 Traditional Brazilian private sector actors in Africa in 2010** (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 84)





### **4.3.2.3. The main sectors of Brazilian FDI in Africa and the main companies involved**

The three main sectors of Brazilian FDI in Africa during the Lula administration were the mining sector, the energy sector, the construction sector, and the various sectors in which Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) operated.

#### ***4.3.2.3.1. Brazilian FDI in Africa's energy sector***

Brazil's investment in Africa's energy sector during the Lula administration was focused mainly on oil and gas exploration and production as well as establishing a biofuels sector in Africa. As mentioned before, Brazil (specifically Brazil's state-controlled petroleum company, Petrobras) has been involved in oil and gas exploration in Africa since the oil crises of the 1970s (White, 2010: 225). Petrobras has been involved in the Angolan (since 1979) and Nigerian oil industries for a long time; since before Lula came into power (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 5). However, since Lula came into power, Petrobras has increased its efforts in finding and exploring oil reserves in several other African countries, namely Benin, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Namibia (Brazil in Africa, 2012 and Petrobras Global Presence, 2014). By the end of the Lula administration, Petrobras had assets in over twenty-five African countries. Petrobras' oil production in Africa is about twenty-four percent of its total international production and together with BTG Pactual (through a joint venture) was pursuing not only oil but also gas projects throughout Africa (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 5; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 85 and Brazil's Big Five, 2013: 92). The significant expansion of Brazilian investments in the oil and gas industries in several Africa countries (by mainly Petrobras) is a clear reflection of Brazil's internationalisation strategy under Lula (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 2).

Brazil's establishment of a biofuels sector in Africa during the Lula administration is a clear indication of how Brazilian FDI expanded to Africa due to Brazil's interests under the Lula administration in promoting an international biofuels industry. The largest biofuels investment Brazil made was in Angola; Brazil invested USD 220 million in sugarcane plantations for the production of ethanol (Jover *et al.*, 2012: 63; White, 2010: 237; Stolte, 2012: 16; World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 72; and Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 4). Importantly, Brazil's involvement in the biofuels industry in Africa was not only part of Brazil's economic expansion into Africa but also of Brazil's political collaboration with Africa, as Brazil also does technical development cooperation in biofuels (Stolte, 2012: 16). Brazil has signed several bilateral biofuel cooperation agreements with African countries, which allows them to develop their own biofuel industries, and thus reduce their dependence on oil while increasing economic growth (Stolte, 2012: 16). The lines between political interests in Africa (through technical development cooperation) and economic interests in Africa are thus blurred when considering the biofuels industry. Brazilian FDI in the biofuels industry is not without its criticism, however; scholars argue that the biofuels industry in Africa disregards human rights, promotes land

grabbing, promotes displacement, and leads to deforestation (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 3; and Lewis, 2011: 6).

#### **4.3.2.3.2. Brazilian FDI in the mining sector in Africa**

Brazil has significantly increased its investments in Africa's mining sector during the Lula administration and the lion's share of the investments was made by Vale, the second biggest mining company in the world (and the largest in the iron ore industry). Vale's investment interests grew rapidly across Africa since it became involved in the mining sector in 2004 (Brazil's Big Five, 2013: 92 and White, 2010: 231). This means that Vale only became involved in Africa after Lula became president in 2003, which makes it a good example of how Brazilian companies have increased their investment in Africa due to Lula's Africa drive. Vale has been involved in mostly iron ore and/or copper exploration and mining in several African countries, which include Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 5).

The Moatize coal mine in Mozambique is Vale's biggest operation outside Brazil and is the company's most significant project in Africa to date (White, 2010: 231 and Brazil in Africa, 2012). Vale's investment in the Moatize coal mine followed Lula's 'economic diplomacy' to the Mozambican government to award Vale the coal mining concession as well as the cancellation of ninety-five percent of Mozambique's debt by the Lula administration (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 1). The investment also allowed more than twenty Brazilian firms the opportunity to get involved in the project, while turning Mozambique into the second largest coal producer in Africa and creating around 3 000 jobs. The Moatize coal mine in Mozambique is thus a clear example of how institutional efforts by Lula through presidential (economic) diplomacy caused the expansion of Brazil's economic relations in Africa (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 4). The coal mine is part of a much larger 'coal project' in Mozambique, where Vale is constructing a 900 km railway between Moatize and the deep-water port of Nacala, where it is also building a new coal terminal (Konijn & Lenfant, 2013: 1 and Brazil in Africa, 2012).

In our interview, Stuenkel (2014c) highlighted that even though Brazilian FDI involvement in Africa was initially perceived in a positive light by Africans, that there had been growing criticism with various examples of negative commentaries on Brazil's expansion into Africa. These negative perceptions re Brazil's economic activity on the continent could spill over and affect Brazil's overall presence on the continent. A case in point would be the backlash of the Mozambican people against Vale because of the Moatize mine project. Vale has been criticised for the resettlement of over 1 000 families to clear the way for the coal mine in Moatize, most people were relocated to a new village forty kilometres away. Locals complained about increased cost of living, less fertile agricultural land, and poorly Brazilian built housing. This resulted in protests by the villagers (Brazil in Africa, 2012).

Considering the scandals that have emerged during the Rousseff administration regarding several large Brazilian MNCs and government officials' corruption charges, these criticisms may prove to be the tip of the iceberg.

#### **4.3.2.3.3. *Brazil-Africa FDI in the Construction Sector***


Brazil had been involved in Africa's construction sector long before the Lula administration, and therefore had been involved in several African countries and had involved a variety of companies, unlike other economic sectors of Brazilian involvement in Africa that are dominated by only one company. However, the amount of projects and investments by Brazilian companies increased dramatically during Lula's administration and the countries in which Brazil had operations diversified further (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 83). Even though there are a variety of Brazilian construction companies involved in Africa, Odebrecht has been the leading Brazilian construction company involved in a variety of states in Africa, in terms of FDI (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 6). Odebrecht is a mega-construction and engineering conglomerate that has been involved in Africa since 1982 (White, 2010: 225, 230 and Jover *et al.*, 2012: 57). Odebrecht is the Brazilian construction company with the largest number of projects in Africa and focused mainly on infrastructure projects, especially in Angola (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 83; Jover *et al.*, 2012: 57-58 and Stolte, 2012: 6). The African continent accounted for USD 2.42 billion in revenues for Odebrecht in 2009, which is about ten percent of its total earnings (Barka & Mlambo, 2011: 6). In addition to Odebrecht, there are three other leading construction companies invested in Africa, namely, Camargo Corrêa, Andrade Gutierrez, and Queirez Galvão, which have investments across Africa and have also been involved since the 1980s in mainly infrastructure and housing projects (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 83-85).

#### **4.3.2.3.4. *Brazilian SME involvement in a variety of Africa's economic sectors***

The expanding presence and investments of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in Africa is the best illustrates Brazil's increased FDI in Africa, since SMEs were almost non-existent on the continent before 2003. Brazilian SMEs' footprint is slowly increasing in Africa although it is still very small (Alves, 2013a: 41). The Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC in the Portuguese acronym) estimates that every Brazilian MNC provides for the establishment of around ten SMEs (Cabral & Shankland, 2013: 9). MDIC also states that SMEs often act as suppliers or subcontractors for the bigger companies in Africa or there are those (entrepreneurs) that have seized the opportunity to invest in African states by opening small businesses that sell Brazilian consumer products (Stolte, 2012: 9). SMEs were more reluctant to invest in Africa than large NMCs at first, due to the lack of funding to expand businesses in Africa (BNDES credit lines are not accessible to SMEs) (Alves, 2013a: 41 and Stolte, 2012: 7). The sectors in which these enterprises are involved include the food and beverages, clothing and footwear, automotive, electronics, housing and construction, as well as cosmetics sectors, and others (World Bank & IPEA, 2011: 7). Brazilian SMEs also became involved in the service sector in Africa, such as hairdressing and beauty chains (Cabral &

Shankland, 2013: 9). Figure 4.2 illustrates in which African countries Brazilian SMEs are involved in and also shows how many Brazilian SMEs were present in each of these countries in 2011. If one considers the relatively new presence of these SMEs in Africa, and that they were present in more than ten African countries in 2011, it shows that Brazil's economic footprint in Africa has expanded significantly since 2003.

**Figure 4.2 Brazilian SMEs in Africa as at 2011**(World Bank, 2011: 86)



#### 4.4. Conclusion

This chapter set out to investigate the domestic and international reasons for Brazil's expansion of its economic interests into Africa during Lula's time in office and to determine whether these interests reflected Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power role. I argued that Brazil's political interests on the continent was the main driver of its economic expansion and that Brazil's expansion into Africa reflected Brazil's overall motivation of seeking international status, through increasing its international economic hard power and using Africa to do it. Furthermore, I argued throughout that Brazil's economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration did indeed reflect its neo-Gramscian middle power character, primarily because of the fact that the neo-Gramscian middle power framework clearly reiterates that although a middle power acts in a moral capacity towards

other states within the international system, it does not mean that they are international Samaritans; national, strategic self-interests such as economic gains form part of their neo-Gramscian middle power role. Taking this into consideration, it is clear how Lula's Brazil's economic expansion into Africa clearly reflected its middle power role.

The five main domestic motivations for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa reflected a domestic setting which was focused on looking outward for profit and economic growth. Brazil's fragmented, multiclass state-society complex required Brasília to engage in a class compromise between its redistributive and its liberal economic constituencies in its foreign relations; the Lula administration's attempt to please Brazilian Capital caused it to increase economic relations with other states, especially those in Africa, as Africa was already considered an important political partner. Brazil's economic foreign policy and diplomatic action promoting the internationalisation of Brazilian firms converged during the Lula administration to become the most important driver and reason for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa. In addition to government-backed agencies that promoted Brazilian firms' expansion into Africa, several private agencies were also important motivators for Brazil's economic expansion into the continent. Brazil's strategic interest to secure natural resources, especially energy resources also promoted its expansion into resource-rich Africa but not because Brazil is resource dependent but as a means to increase profit as well as to strategically secure energy resources. Brazil's domestic biofuels industry emphasised the internationalisation of the biofuels industry globally, which caused Brazil to expand its (biofuels) economic relations into Africa (which was considered a prime location for developing a biofuels industry).

The international reasons for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration clearly reflect Brazil's ambition to increase its international status through increasing its economic power through trade and investment in Africa. Brazil's economic expansion into Africa was motivated greatly by the international perception of Africa being the final economic frontier for investment and trade (which Brazil bought in to). Arguably the main consideration for the expansion of Brazil's economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration can be prescribed by Brazil's objective to gain access to new international markets for its goods and services, where Africa presented itself as an important trade destination (due greatly to the political promotion of the continent). Brazil's comparative advantage in Africa compared to other countries interested in investing and trading with African states, was also a motivation for Brazil to increase its economic relations with that particular part of the world. Finally, Brazil's commitment under the Lula administration to establish a new, international trade geography through South-South (economic) cooperation was an important reason for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa. Importantly, encompassed within each of these motivations for Brazil's economic expansion into Africa is the motivation of increasing profit margins that would increase Brazil's economic growth through

increasing its Gross National Product, and therefore increase its international hard power and its international status, confirming Brazil's use of Africa as a platform from whence to increase its international status.

These international and domestic factors caused an increase in Brazil's economic interests in Africa, which manifested in increased trade with African states and increased investment on the continent. Brazil-Africa trade increased to unprecedented levels during the Lula administration. Brazil's negative trade balance with Africa illustrates important features of their trade relations; Brazil imports more from Africa than it exports to Africa, and Brazil's exports to Africa are much more diversified than Brazil's imports from Africa, which are heavily concentrated in natural resources, especially oil. This problematically resembled the old colonial pattern of imports and exports in Africa. During Lula's time in office, Brazilian foreign direct investment in Africa also intensified, albeit much more limitedly than Brazil-Africa trade. Brazilian FDI in Africa is mainly focused in the natural resources sectors, especially energy and mining, the construction sector, and other sectors dominated by Small to Medium Enterprises. Brazil's 'traditional big players' however dominate the investment scene on the continent. Brazilian investment endeavours in Africa was increasingly criticised for a variety of human rights and environmental transgressions as time went on; a situation expected to continue to increase. The main African countries with whom Brazil trades with *and* invests in are Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa; with Angola being Brazil's main economic partner in terms of the diversity of economic relations. These states had historical economic links with Brazil and consequently became prominent partners; nevertheless, they experienced a rapid increase of Brazilian economic relations for the period 2003 to 2010. The Lula administration thus clearly ushered in a period of unprecedented expansion of Brazil's economic interests in Africa.

## 5. Chapter V: Conclusion

### 5.1. Introduction

During the Lula administration in Brazil, a state-society complex that has traditionally been characterised as following a middle power agenda entered a phase of uncharacteristic and unprecedented international activism that focused especially on the Global South and the African continent in particular. The literature on the topic of Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis other states in the international system was limited, and so were explanations for Brazil's expansion of its international relations, especially its expansion into Africa. Thus, this thesis (as stated in Chapter one) set out to address these core issues by asking the central research question, **“Do the reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political-economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration reflect Brazil's role as a neo-Gramscian middle power?”** In order to analyse the different elements of the Brazil's relationship with Africa, the political and economic elements of Brazil's *political-economic* expansion into Africa were separated in the thesis. Brazil's expansion into Africa featured areas where these elements overlapped, were mutually influential, and could not be separated in reality. This final chapter will give a brief summary of Brazil's political-economic expansion into Africa. The chapter will also present the main findings regarding the key domestic and international reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political-economic interests in Africa during the Lula administration in relation to the neo-Gramscian middle power framework. Before presenting my final concluding remarks, the chapter will highlight areas for future research on the topic of Brazil's African (and wider international) insertion.

### 5.2. Summary of Brazil's expansion into Africa: The Lula years

The thesis provided an overview of Brazil's political-economic expansion into Africa in order to give the reader an introduction to how Brazil's footprint spread across the continent during the Lula administration. Brazil used a foreign policy focused on the global South and extensive diplomatic actions, most notably presidential travel diplomacy and South-South technical development cooperation, to increase its political relations with the continent. Brazil then used this increased political clout it started to gain in Africa to expand its economic relations with the continent through trade, where Brazil mainly exported Brazilian consumer goods and imported African natural resources, especially energy resources (a relationship which resembles the dependency relationship of European colonial times) and investment, where Brazil invested mainly in infrastructure and natural resources, specifically energy sectors (which received increasing criticisms and backlashes from scholars and local peoples for malpractices). The political-economic expansion was not only characterised by political factors influencing Brazil's expansion of its economic relations (although I argue this link is the strongest) but economic considerations also influenced Brazil's expansion of its

political interests in Africa, most notable were the blurred lines between political and economic considerations in Brazil-Africa technical development cooperation (especially in biofuels and agriculture), where political and economic considerations constantly overlapped, despite the fact that the values of South-South cooperation focused on technical cooperation and tried to prevent any economic involvement.

### **5.3. Summary of the key findings**

The central research question, which has two core elements, seeks to discover the central reasons for Brazil's expansion of its political economic interests in Africa and to establish whether these reasons reflect Brazil's middle power role. Throughout this thesis I argued that Brazil's expansion into Africa does reflect Brazil's middle power role and that the main, overarching driver behind Brazil's expansion into Africa relates to Brazil's pursuit of gaining international status. This section will present a synthesised summary of the main findings of the thesis, as related to the guiding research question, as well as seek to relate these core findings with the neo-Gramscian middle power theoretical framework presented in Chapter two.

#### **5.3.1. Domestic reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa**

The domestic reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa during the Lula administration illustrate how interlinked Brazil's political-economic interests are on the continent. Brazil's stable domestic political-economic context acted as a motivator of Brazil's strong outward focus on Africa, reflects Brazil's middle power role in that the domestic environment and the state-society complex of the middle power determines whether it has a middle power foreign policy agenda.

Due to the fragmented, multiclass nature of the state-society complex of Brazil, the Lula government had to engage in a class compromise between the leftist ideology of the PT and the interests of the economic elite and middle class, which resulted in a focus on Africa as the ideal platform for an expansion of solidarity politics (through development cooperation) and economic relations. The class compromise meant that various actors (Capital, Labour, foreign policy makers and key individuals, such as the president) determined that Brazil did take up its middle power role vis-à-vis Africa. One of the key findings of this thesis is the importance that the President himself was an active driver of Brazil's political expansion into Africa in a middle power manner. In my opinion, even if the PT got elected into office, without the charismatic personality, the working class background, and the leadership by someone that considers that everything is on the negotiation table, as was the case with Lula, Brazil's expansion into Africa would not have been on the same level as it was. A case possibly illustrated by the limitations Lula's successor, Dilma Rousseff, has had based on perceptions of her personality and her lack of strong rhetoric skills (all other external and internal factors aside such as



the stabilisation in growth rates for emerging markets and the political scandals faced by the PT-led Government).

The pressure by the Afro-Brazilian electoral base that voted Lula and the PT into party, and the Lula administration's South-South focused foreign policy drove diplomatic expansion into Africa, which in return (together with private agencies) drove Brazil's economic expansion into the continent. Brazil's more equal orientation to the Global South and the fact that the Afro-Brazilian consciousness, which was present domestically increased Brazil's engagement with these issues internationally, are examples of Brazil's neo-Gramscian middle power role vis-à-vis its expansion into Africa. Also, Brazil's South-South focused foreign policy not only reflected Brazil's goal of achieving autonomy from the major powers but also that the Lula administration decided to take up the middle power role vis-à-vis Africa, by self-identifying as a middle power. Brazil's national strategic interest in securing natural resources in Africa, especially energy resources promoted Brazil's economic as well as development cooperation interests in these areas on the continent. Finally, Brazil's domestic interests in promoting the international development of biofuels led to an expansion of development cooperation in biofuels as well as investments in the sector, thus expanding Brazil's political-economic interests in Africa. Brazil's export of capital goods to the biofuels and other agriculture projects illustrate Brazil's middle power role in that it sought to moderate the unevenness of world development. These domestic motivations for Brazil's expansion into Africa also channel into Brazil's main objective of increasing its international status as a state-society complex within the international system.

### **5.3.2. International reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa**

Similar to the domestic reasons for Brazil's expansion into Africa during the Lula administration, the international reasons also reflect the inter-relatedness of Brazil's political-economic interests on the continent. The positive international perception of Africa as being an important player in the international political-economic system during the 2000s as well as the comparative advantage Brazil enjoyed in its relations with African states caused an increase in Brazil-Africa political-economic relations.

The world order started to change during the 2000s, as the USA, the hegemon, started to decline in prominence, and the world order shifted to a more multipolar (but not yet entirely multipolar) world order which allowed for middle powers such as Brazil to increase their position within the international hierarchy of states. The change in world order allowed leeway for Brazil's interest in increasing its international status through multilateral organisations in order to establish an international, multipolar world order that reflects a new international trade geography and a more autonomous Brazilian presence in international relations represented. All of which represented

important international motivations for Brazil's expansion of its political-economic interests in Africa; especially because Brazil recognised the role Africa could play in helping it to reach its goals of leadership positions in International Organisations (in particular serving Brazil's ambitions for a permanent seat on the UNSC as a voting bloc but also because it presented fifty-three developing states (as at 2010) that could help equalise the international system through their increased presence in multilateral forums. Brazil's reformist, and somewhat counter-hegemonic world order ambitions that focused on establishing a new world order that focused on greater social equity and greater diffusion of power through non-revolutionary, incremental change (a commitment to multilateralism and working with International Organisations to bring about change), is a prominent example of Brazil's middle power role in its relations with Africa.

Development cooperation is one of the key mechanisms through which Brazil was able to garner international status by becoming part of the elite international club of development cooperation providers, which motivated its expansion into Africa, a region greatly in need of development. Brazil's involvement in development cooperation in Africa (a 'Third World country') through technical cooperation and debt relief is one of the most important examples of Brazil's middle power role on the continent. Brazil's involvement in Africa through development cooperation reflects Brazil's moral (middle power) role yet also serves several of Brazil's national self-interests, which the neo-Gramscian middle power framework condones; middle powers perform a moral function in the international system without forgoing their own national self-interests.

Brazil's objective to increase its international hard power (economic and security) power also motivated Brazil's expansion into Africa, as Africa presented a strategic partner that presented access to new international markets for Brazilian goods and services as well as partners in military security within the South Atlantic strategic area. The presence of Brazil's security interests in Africa could be criticised for illustrating ambitions that stretch beyond middle power ambitions within the international system, resembling Brazil's position as transitioning between a middle and a great power. However, according to the neo-Gramscian middle power framework, middle powers do engage in international security issues, albeit indirectly and peacefully. Brazil's military engagements in Africa form part of development cooperation and does not seem to resemble an ambition for political-military dominance in the South Atlantic Ocean, but illustrates Brazil's independence from other powerful states within its security relations; which are characteristic of a the middle power agenda. The international and domestic reasons for Brazil's political-economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration thus illustrated how Brazil used the African continent as a platform from whence to demonstrate its international prowess and fulfil its international status-seeking ambitions.

#### **5.4. Recommended areas for future research**

A few questions arose during the course of the study that I was not able to address in this thesis and I would therefore suggest as areas for future research. A study that focuses on the Lula administration's relations to various blocs within the Global South such as the Middle East, the East, and South America that also seeks to uncover the motivations for Brazil's expansion into these regions and to establish whether Brazil's relations to these regional blocs also resembled a neo-Gramscian middle power role is greatly needed. Doing such a study would allow for a comparative study, which could highlight nuances within the reasoning behind Brazil's international insertion during the Lula administration, specifically. Also, a study specifically focused on Brazil's South-South development cooperation involvement in Africa during the Lula administration that looks particularly at how and to what extent this increased Brazil's status internationally. Finally, an analysis of Brazil-Africa relations during Dilma Rousseff's terms in office that makes use of a similar research question, the same methodology, and the same theoretical framework of this thesis would be informative. Such a study would be able to determine the continuity and change between the two PT administrations, under two different Presidents and very different international and domestic settings. It could be interesting to see which of the motivations that drove Lula to expand to Africa continued to keep Brazil's presence on the continent and which ones did not, as well as whether Brazil-Africa relations continue to reflect a middle power role.

#### **5.5. Concluding remarks**

The Lula administration ushered in an unprecedented level of political-economic engagements between the Brazilian state-society complex and the multiple state-society complexes of Africa, a geographic region historically neglected by state actors in the international system, including Brazil. In my opinion, in Brazil's political-economic expansion into Africa during the Lula administration, Brazilian South-South (technical) development cooperation with Africa constituted the most important aspect of their relationship. This is because Brazil-Africa development cooperation was the most visible manner in which Brazil increased its footprint on the continent; it provided Brazil with the most effective means of increasing its international status from the African platform; and, most importantly, Brazil's engagement in development cooperation with Africa, as a collection of state-society complexes from the developing world, is the best confirmation of Brazil's middle power role vis-à-vis the continent.

With Dilma's second term in office in progress and the completely different political-economic milieu Brazil faces domestically and internationally in comparison to the Lula era, it raises the question, 'will Africa fall back into the position of obscurity on Brazil's list of priorities it had before Lula?' I would argue that even if Brazil-Africa relations decrease in the administrations succeeding Lula, an inevitability due to non-replicable favourable political-economic context of the Lula era and the

charismatic leadership of Lula himself, Brazil-Africa political-economic relations will not revert back to the way it was before 2003 and that Brazil will continue its middle power agenda vis-à-vis Africa. The Lula administration represents a watershed moment in the magnitude and the nature of Brazil-Africa relations.

## 6. Bibliography

*About Oliver Stuenkel*. 2014. Available: <http://www.postwesternworld.com/about-2/>. [28 November 2014].

*Africa in debt to Brazil: forgiveness isn't always free*. 2013. [Online]. Available: <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/africa-debt-brazil-forgiveness-isn-t-always-free>. [6 December 2013].

Aguilar, S. L. C. 2013. South Atlantic: Brazil-Africa Relations in the Field of Security and Defense, *Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, (2)4: 47-68.

Alden, C. & Vieira, M. A. 2005. The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(7): 1077-1095.

*Alex Shankland - Research Fellow*. 2014. [Online]. Available: <https://www.ids.ac.uk/person/alex-shankland>. [28 November 2014].

Alves, A. C. 2013a. Brazil in Africa: Achievements and Challenges. *Emerging powers in Africa, London: London School of Economics*: 37-44. [Online]. Available: [http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ana\\_Alves5/publication/251571557\\_Brazil\\_in\\_Africa\\_Achievements\\_and\\_Challenges/links/0deec51f0ef183de2b000000.pdf](http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ana_Alves5/publication/251571557_Brazil_in_Africa_Achievements_and_Challenges/links/0deec51f0ef183de2b000000.pdf). [1 March 2014].

Alves, A. C. 2013b. *Brazil–Africa Technical Co-operation: Structure, Achievements and Challenges*. SAIIA Policy Brief no. 69. [Online]. Available: [http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33988/1/saia\\_spb\\_%2069\\_alves\\_20130806.pdf?1](http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33988/1/saia_spb_%2069_alves_20130806.pdf?1). [20 February 2014].

ApexBrasil: Who are we. [n.d.]. [Online]. Available: <http://www.apexbrasil.com.br/en/who-we-are>. [25 June 2014].

Barka, H. B. & Mlambo, K. 2011. Brazil's Economic Engagement with Africa. *Africa Economic Brief*, (2)5: 1-11. [Online]. Available: [http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brazil's\\_Economic\\_Engagement\\_with\\_Africa\\_rev.pdf](http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brazil's_Economic_Engagement_with_Africa_rev.pdf). [20 September 2013].

Biancalana, M. 2010. *Brazil: A Partner for Development of Angola and Mozambique*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ipris.org/php/download.php?fid=50>. [12 September 2013].

*Brazil in Africa: a new Atlantic alliance*. 2012. <http://www.economist.com/news/21566019-brazilian-companies-are-heading-africa-laden-capital-and-expertise-new-atlantic-alliance>. [Online]. Available: [9 November 2013].

*Brazil's Big Five in Africa*. 2013. [Online]. Available: <http://www.exacteditions.com/read/african-business/november-2013-37306/92/2/>. [23 March 2014].

Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). [ca. 2010]. *Brazilian Technical Cooperation*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.oecd.org/swac/events/49257793.pdf>. [12 September 2013].

*Brazilian Technical Cooperation*. ca. 2011. [Online]. Available: <http://www.oecd.org/swac/events/49257793.pdf>. [13 October 2013].

*Brazil's presidential election: Lula's legacy*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.economist.com/node/17147828>. [19 January 2015].

Burges, S. 2013. Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power, *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research*. (19)2: 286-302.

Cabral, L. & Shankland, A. 2013. *Narratives of Brazil Africa Cooperation for Agricultural Development: New Paradigms?*. China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) Working Paper no. 51. [Online]. Available: [http://www.brazil-works.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/FAC\\_Working\\_Paper\\_051.pdf](http://www.brazil-works.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/FAC_Working_Paper_051.pdf). [20 March 2014].

Cabral, L. & Weinstock, J. 2010. *Brazilian technical cooperation for development: Drivers, mechanics and future prospects*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6137.pdf>. [15 March 2014].

Captain, Y. 2010. The Global South. *Special Issue: Latin America in a Global Age*, 4(1): 183-198.

Chagas, C. 2013. *Brazil's rising interest in science ties to Africa*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.scidev.net/global/cooperation/feature/brazil-s-rising-interest-in-science-ties-to-africa.html>. [29 November 2013].

Chapnick, A. 1999. The Middle Power. *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, (7)2: 73-82.

Cicalo, A. 2012. *Brazil and its African Mirror: Discussing 'Black' Approximations in the South Atlantic*. Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America Working Paper No. 24. [Online]. Available: [http://www.desigualdades.net/bilder/Working\\_Paper/WP\\_24\\_Cicalo\\_ONLINE.pdf](http://www.desigualdades.net/bilder/Working_Paper/WP_24_Cicalo_ONLINE.pdf). [22 March 2014].

- Cooper, A. F. 1997. Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview. In Cooper, A. F. ed. *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press LTD: 1-24.
- Cox, R. W. & Sinclair, T. J. 1996. *Approaches to World Order*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, R. W. 1981. Social Forces, States and world Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium-Journal of international Studies*, (10)1: 126-155.
- Cox, R. W. 1989. Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order. *International Journal*, (44)4: 823-862.
- Dauvergne, P. & Farias, D. B. L. 2012. The Rise of Brazil as a Global Development Power. *Third World Quarterly*, 33(5): 903-917.
- De Freitas Barbosa, A., Narciso, T. & Biancalana, M. 2009. Brazil in Africa: Another Emerging Power in the Continent?. *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, 36(1): 59-86.
- De Mello e Souza, A. 2014. Brazil's Development Cooperation in Africa: A New Model. In Bawa, A., Bohler-Muller, N., Fikeni, S., Zondi, S. & Naidu, S. eds. *BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, integration and industrialisation*. Pretoria: DIRCO: 94-107.
- Doelling, R. 2008. Brazil's Contemporary Foreign Policy towards Africa. *Journal of International Relations*, (10)1: 5-11.
- Elliot, L. 2003. *The lost decade*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/09/population.aids>. [28 October 2014].
- Flemes, D. 2007. *Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum*. GIGA Working Paper No. 57. [Online]. Available: [http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1617/pdf/wp57\\_flemes.pdf](http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1617/pdf/wp57_flemes.pdf). [13 September 2013].
- Gillam, R. 2013. (En)countering Exceptionalism: Afro-Brazilian Responses to the Rise of Obama in São Paulo, Brazil. *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*, (8)3: 1-13.
- Gray, D. E. 2014. *Doing Research in the Real World*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. London: Sage Publications.
- Harmer, A., Xiao, Y., Missoni, E., & Tediosi, F. 2013. BRICS without straw'? A systematic literature review of newly emerging economies' influence in global health. *Global Health*, (9)1: 15-26.
- Huelsz, C. 2009. Middle Power Theories and Emerging Powers in International Political Economy: A Case Study of Brazil. PhD Thesis, University of Manchester.

Hunter, W. 2010. *The Transformation of the Worker's Party in Brazil, 1989-2009*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hurrell, A. 2000. Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers in International Institutions. In Hurrell, A., Cooper, A. F., González, G. G., Sennes, R. U. & Sitaraman, S. (eds.) *Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States*, Latin American Program, No. 244, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: 23-41.

Jordaan, E. 2003. The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies*, (30)1: 165-181.

Jover, E., Lopes Pintos, A., & Marchand, A. 2012. *Angola Private Sector Country Profile*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports/Angola%20-%20Private%20Sector%20Country%20Profile.pdf>. [20 March 2014].

Kermeliotis, T. 2012. *Brazil competes with China, India to invest in Africa*. [Online]. Available: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/07/business/brazil-africa-business/>. [3 February 2014].

Kohli, A. 2009. States and Economic Development. *Brazilian Journal of Political Economy*, (29)2: 212-227.

Konijn, P. & Lenfant, F. 2013. *Brazil-Africa: Booming business across the Atlantic*. [Online]. Available: <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/20878/ASC-075287668-3309-01.pdf?sequence=2>. [20 March 2014].

Lapper, R. 2010. *Brazil enters fray for African resources*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb7fb012-14da-11df-8f1d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2O5iX2qJU>. [21 September 2013].

Leahy, J. 2011. *Brazil seeks to triumph in new Great Game for Africa*. [Online]. Available: <http://go.galegroup.com.ez.sun.ac.za/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA254710777&v=2.1&u=27uos&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w>. [23 October 2013].

Leite, I. C., Suyama, B., & Pomeroy, M. 2013. Africa-Brazil co-operation in social protection: Drivers, lessons and shifts in the engagement of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development. WIDER Working Paper No. 022. [Online]. Available: <https://ideas.repec.org/p/unu/wpaper/wp2013-022.html>. [20 October 2014].

Leith, R. & Pretorius, J. 2009. Eroding the Middle Ground: The Shift in Foreign Policy Underpinning South African Nuclear Diplomacy. *Politikon*, (36)3: 345–361.



Leke, A., Lund, S., Roxburgh, C., and van Wamelen, A. 2010. *What's driving Africa's growth*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic\\_studies/whats\\_driving\\_africas\\_growth](http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/whats_driving_africas_growth). [3 July 2014].

Lewis, D. 2011. In Africa, Brazil takes a different track: China's fondness for using its own workers in Africa has met increasing resistance. Can Brazil compete by employing a softer sell?. [Online]. Available: [graphics.thomsonreuters.com/specials/Brazil%20in%20Africa.pdf](http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/specials/Brazil%20in%20Africa.pdf). [13 November 2013].

Leysens, A. 2012. *From GEAR to the "New Growth Path" and the National Development Plan: Altering the State Form in South Africa?*, Prepared for presentation at the British International Studies Association-International Studies Association Conference in Edinburgh (United Kingdom) 20-22 June 2012.

Lieber R.J. 2014. The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy. *International Politics*, (51)2: 137-154.

Lustig, R. 2010. *Brazil emerges as a leading exponent of 'soft power'*. [Online]. Available: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8580560.stm>. [15 August 2014].

Magnoni, S. 2010. *Brazil and its African "neighbours": the old aid system for new global ambitions*. Development Series, Working Paper no. 2. [Online]. Available: [http://www.ke-srl.com/Knowledge\\_Srl/Research\\_files/Brazil%20and%20its%20African%20neighbours\\_Development\\_2.pdf](http://www.ke-srl.com/Knowledge_Srl/Research_files/Brazil%20and%20its%20African%20neighbours_Development_2.pdf). [21 September 2013].

Marques, J. C. 2012. *International Relations in Portuguese: Brazil and the CPLP*. Prepared for presentation at the Brazilian Studies Association Conference in Champaign-Urbana (United States of America) 6-9 September 2012.

Meyer, P. J. 2014. Brazil: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations. *Current Politics and Economics of South and Central America*, (7)1: 1-38.

Neufeld, M. 1995. Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power. *Studies in Political Economy*, (48)1: 7-29.

*New BRICS bank to change world's financial system*. 2015. [Online]. Available: [http://english.pravda.ru/business/finance/12-03-2015/130027-brics\\_bank-0/](http://english.pravda.ru/business/finance/12-03-2015/130027-brics_bank-0/). [25 March 2015].

Özdamar, O. *Brazil and Turkey: Transition from Middle to Great Power?*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.academia.edu/688874/Brazil\\_and\\_Turkey\\_Transition\\_from\\_Middle\\_to\\_Great\\_Power](http://www.academia.edu/688874/Brazil_and_Turkey_Transition_from_Middle_to_Great_Power). [4 March 2015].

*Petrobras Global Presence*. 2014. [Online]. Available: <http://www.petrobras.com/en/about-us/global-presence/>. [19 August 2014].

*Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP)*. 2007. [Online]. Available: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-07-1659\\_en.htm?locale=en](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1659_en.htm?locale=en). [25 June 2014].

Putnam, R. D. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, (42)3: 427-460.

Rampa, F., Bilal, S. & Sidiropoulos, E. 2012. Leveraging South–South cooperation for Africa's development. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 19(2): 247-269.

Russo, G., & Shankland, A. 2014. Brazil's engagement in health co-operation: what can it contribute to the global health debate?. *Health policy and planning*, (29)2: 266-270.

Russo, G., Cabral, L. & Ferrinho, P. 2013. Brazil-Africa technical cooperation in health: what's its relevance to the post-Busan debate on 'aid effectiveness'?. *Globalization and Health*, (9)2: 1-8.

Schoeman, M. 2000. South Africa as an emerging middle power. *African Security Review*, (9)3: 47-58.

Seibert, G. 2011. *Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector*. Lisbon: Instituto Universitario de Lisboa, Centro de Estudos Africanos.

Shankland, A. 2014. *Personal Interview over Skype*. 15 August 2014.

Simons, H. 2009. *Case Study Research in Practice*. London: Sage.

Sotero, P. 2009. *Brazil as an Emerging Donor: Huge potential and growing pains*. Development Outreach Special Report. Washington: The World Bank Institute. [Online]. Available: [http://elibrary.worldbank.org.ez.sun.ac.za/doi/pdf/10.1596/1020-797X-11\\_1\\_18](http://elibrary.worldbank.org.ez.sun.ac.za/doi/pdf/10.1596/1020-797X-11_1_18). [15 November 2013].

Stolte, C. 2012. *Brazil in Africa: Just Another BRICS Country Seeking Resources?*. [Online]. Available: [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/1112bp\\_brazilafrika.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/1112bp_brazilafrika.pdf). [5 March 2014].

Stolte, C. 2013. Brazil in Africa: Seeking International Status, Not Resources. *Harvard International Review*, (34)4: 63-67.

Stuenkel, O. 2013. Brazil in Africa: Bridging the Atlantic. *KAS International Reports: Africa and the Emerging Economies*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin: 28-39. [Online]. Available: [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_33516-544-2-30.pdf?130218102618](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_33516-544-2-30.pdf?130218102618). [22 November 2013].

Stuenkel, O. 2014a. *The BRICS' African Safari: It's not just China; the BRICS are all active in Africa and taking divergent paths*. [Online]. Available: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-brics-african-safari/?allpages=yes&print=yes>. [5 March 2014].

Stuenkel, O. 2014b. *Brazilian foreign policy: Game over?*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.postwesternworld.com/2014/01/28/brazilian-foreign-policy/>. [22 February 2015].

Stuenkel, O. 2014c. *Personal Interview over Skype*. 18 August 2014.

Technical Cooperation Visit: Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM) and the Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA) of Brazil. 2008. [Online]. Available: [http://iwlearn.net/abt\\_iwlearn/history-of-iw-learn/pns/learning/learning-exchange-report-permanent-okavango-river-basin-water-commission-okacom-and-the-agencia-nacional-de-aguas-ana-of-brazil](http://iwlearn.net/abt_iwlearn/history-of-iw-learn/pns/learning/learning-exchange-report-permanent-okavango-river-basin-water-commission-okacom-and-the-agencia-nacional-de-aguas-ana-of-brazil). [2 December 2013].

*The gateway to Africa?: South Africa's business pre-eminence is being challenged*. 2012. [Online]. Available: <http://www.economist.com/node/21556300>. [4 February 2014].

*The New Scramble For Africa: Emerging Powers on the Emerging Continent*. 2011. [Online]. Available: <http://www.thebeijingaxis.com/tca/editions/the-china-analyst-sep-2011/91>. [22 September 2013].

Tranbanco, J. M. A. 2009. *Brazil Does Have the Potential to be a Great Power*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/brazil-does-have-the-potential-to-be-a-great-power/12165>. [4 March 2015].

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Secretariat. 2004. *The New Geography of International Economic Relations*. [Online]. Available: [unctad.org/en/Docs/tdb51d6\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/Docs/tdb51d6_en.pdf). [19 February 2015].

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2010. *Economic Development in Africa Report: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New Forms of Development Partnership*. [Online]. Available: [http://unctad.org/en/docs/aldafrica2010\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/docs/aldafrica2010_en.pdf). [1 March 2014].

Van Der Westhuizen, J. 1998. South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power. *Third World Quarterly*, (19)3: 435-455.

Van der Westhuizen, J. 2013. Class Compromise as Middle Power Activism? Comparing Brazil and South Africa, in *Government and Opposition*, (48)1: 80-100.

Visentini, P. F. 2012. The Brazil of Lula: A Global and Affirmative Diplomacy (2003-2010). *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, (1)1: 23-35.

Visentini, P. G. F. & Da Silva, A. L. R. 2010. Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years (2003-2010). *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, (53)(special addition): 54-72.

Wagner, D. 2011. *The Folly of Brazil's Exceptionalism*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/the-folly-of-brazils-exce\\_b\\_675572.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/the-folly-of-brazils-exce_b_675572.html). [4 August 2013].

Walliman, N. 2006. *Social research methods*. London: Sage Publications.

White, L. 2010. Understanding Brazil's new drive for Africa. *Southern African Journal of International Affairs*, 17(2): 221-242.

White, L. 2012. *Development: We need a Brazil process, not a Lula moment*. [Online]. Available: <http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-23-00-development-we-need-a-brazil-process-not-a-lula-moment>. [19 February 2014].

World Bank & IPEA. 2011. *Bridging the Atlantic: Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa*. [Online]. Available: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf>. [2 September 2013].

Xiaomei, T. 2011. *Emerging Actors in Development Finance: A Closer Look at Chinese and Brazilian Overseas Investments*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/06/emerging-actors-development-finance-closer-look-chinese-and-brazilian-overseas-inves>. [19 September 2013].

Yalçın, H. B. 2012. The Concept of “Middle Power” and the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy Activism. *Afro Eurasian Studies*, (1)1: 195-213.

Yin, R. K. 2009. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage Publications.