

# The Politics of Food in Southern Africa:

## A food regime/movements framework

Elizabeth Johanna du Plessis

*Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts  
(International Studies) in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University*



Supervisor: Gerrie Swart

March 2016

## *Declaration*

By submitting this thesis/dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

March 2016

Copyright © 2016 Stellenbosch University

All rights reserved

## *Abstract*

This study seeks to uncover the prevailing food ideology of Southern Africa, by exploring South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe's approach to food security. The explorative discussion is aided by three supplementary research questions: 1) how does the Southern African context influence the region's ideologies around food?; 2) what is Southern Africa's institutional response to food insecurity?; and 3) how does the Southern African institutional response to food security differ from the actual orientation towards food and the economic model on which it is based? The theoretical framework employed is Holt-Giménez & Shattuck's food regime/food movements framework, which has its foundation in Freedman and McMichael's food regime analysis.

To contextualise the study, the development of the global food regime is traced as it manifested in three historical eras: the settler-colonial regime (1870-1914); the surplus-regime (1945-1973); and the corporate food regime. The transition between these regimes is explained by drawing on the Gramscian notion of hegemony; as Britain's dominance in the global political economy decreased, the United States came to influence food politics, subsequently resulting in the second food regime. Amidst globalisation, which saw a decrease in the power of nation states, the food regime was restructured once again as neoliberalism came to shape food production and distribution. However, the 2007-2008 food price crisis served as a turning point when this dominant food ideology came under threat, as indicated by widespread food riots in both the developed and developing world. Consequently the need for a new food regime arose.

The effects of the crisis were especially detrimental in Southern Africa which is characterised by low levels of food security. The socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in Southern Africa can largely be attributed to the role the region played throughout the development of the global food regime; each era having a lasting impact on the formation of political institutions, economic rationales, and social configurations in the region. As the marginalised position of Southern Africa within the global food regime became more apparent, and amidst the backdrop of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals, attempts to address food security manifested in an array of food security frameworks. South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe (the three dominant agricultural countries in Southern Africa) each adopted a different official approach to food security, and subsequently these countries offer great insights into both the challenges in the region, and more importantly, into how the state, private sector and international relations intersect to produce distinct food security ideologies.

## *Opsomming*

Hierdie studie poog om die heersende kos-ideologieë van Suider-Afrika te ontbloot, deur die verkenning van Suid-Afrika, Malawi, en Zimbabwe se benadering tot voedselsekuriteit. Die ondersoekende bespreking word aangehelp deur drie aanvullende navorsingsvrae: 1) hoe beïnvloed die Suider-Afrikaanse konteks die streek se ideologieë rondom kos?; 2) wat is Suider-Afrika se institusionele reaksie aangaande voedselonsekerheid?; en 3) hoe verskil die Suider-Afrikaanse institusionele reaksie op voedselsekuriteit van die werklike oriëntasie teenoor kos en die ekonomiese model waarop dit baseer is? Die teoretiese raamwerk maak gebruik van Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck se voedsel-regime/voedsel-bewegings raamwerk, wat sy wortels in Freedman en McMichael se voedsel-regime analise het.

Om die studie te kontekstualiseer, is die ontwikkeling van die globale voedsel-regime nagespoor soos dit gemanifesteer het in drie historiese eras: die setlaar-koloniale regime (1870-1914); die surplus-regime (1945-1973); en die korporatiewe voedsel-regime. Die oorgang tussen hierdie regimes word verduidelik deur gebruik te maak van die Gramsciese idee van hegemonie; namate Brittanje se oorheersing in die globale politieke ekonomie afgeneem het, het die Verenigde State van Amerika ingetree om voedsel-politiek te beïnvloed, wat sodoende na die tweede voedsel-regime gelei het. Te midde van globalisering, wat 'n afname in die mag van die nasie-staat tot gevolg gehad het, was die voedsel-regime weereens herstruktureer toe neoliberalisme prominensie verkry het deur die globale produksie en verspreiding van kos te bepaal. Die 2007-2008 voedselpryskrisis het egter gedien as 'n keerpunt waar hierdie dominante kos-ideologie bedreig geword het, soos aangedui deur wydverspreide voedsel-onluste in beide die ontwikkelde en ontwikkelende lande. Gevolglik het die behoefte aan 'n nuwe voedsel-regime ontstaan.

Die gevolge van die krisis was veral nadelig in Suider-Afrika wat gekenmerk word deur lae vlakke van voedselsekuriteit. Die sosio-ekonomiese ontwikkeling van voedselonsekerheid in Suider-Afrika kan grootliks toegeskryf word aan die rol wat die streek regdeur die ontwikkeling van die globale voedsel-regime gespeel het; elke era het 'n blywende impak op die vorming van politieke instellings, ekonomiese denke en sosiale konfigurasies in die streek gehad. Namte die gemarginaliseerde posisie van Suider-Afrika binne die globale voedsel-regime duideliker geword het, en te midde van die agtergrond van die Verenigde Nasies se Millennium Development Goals, het pogings om voedselsekuriteit aan te spreek, gemanifesteer in 'n verskeidenheid van voedselsekuriteit-raamwerke. Suid-Afrika, Malawi, en Zimbabwe (die drie dominante landbou lande in Suider-Afrika) het elk 'n

verskillende amptelike benadering tot voedselsekerheid, en daarom bied hierdie lande waardevolle insig omtrent beide die voedsel-uitdagings in die streek, maar ook oor hoe die staat, die private sektor en internasionale betrekkinge deurkruis om verskillende voedselsekureit-ideologieë te produseer.

# *Table of Contents*

Declaration .....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Opsomming .....	iii
List of tables and figures .....	ix
List of abbreviations and acronyms.....	x
Chapter One: Introduction .....	1
1.1. Introduction to the topic.....	1
1.2. Conceptualisation of food security .....	2
1.3. Food security in the 21st century: Spring of hope, Winter of despair.....	3
1.4. Food security in Southern Africa .....	5
1.5. The significance of the food price crisis .....	6
1.6. Problem statement .....	8
1.7. Research questions .....	8
1.8. Theoretical framework.....	9
1.9. Research design and methods .....	10
1.10. Limitations and scope of the study.....	10
1.11. Overview and chapter outline .....	12
1.12. Navigational scheme for the discussion.....	13
Chapter Two: Evolution of the food regime and the development of the 2007-2008 food price crisis .....	15
2.1. Introduction .....	15
2.2. Food regime analysis.....	15
2.2.1. The first regime: the settler-colonial regime (1870-1914).....	16
2.2.2. The second regime: the surplus regime (1945-1973).....	17
2.3. Hegemony and transition in food regimes.....	17
2.4. The third regime: the corporate food regime.....	19
2.4.1. Unravelling the 2007-2008 food price crisis.....	21

2.4.1.1. Indirect causes of the food price crisis.....	21
2.4.1.2. Direct causes of the food price crisis .....	25
2.5. Conclusion.....	29
<b>Chapter Three: The food regime/food movement framework .....</b>	<b>30</b>
3.1. Introduction .....	30
3.2. Towards altered perspectives on chronic hunger .....	30
3.2.1. The food crisis as turning point.....	30
3.2.2. The food crisis as part of the crisis of neoliberalism .....	31
3.2.3. Old versus emerging perspectives on food security.....	32
3.3. A food regime/food movements framework.....	33
3.3.1. Context-setting and outline .....	33
3.3.2. Critical theory as foundation of the framework .....	34
3.3.3.1. Neoliberal food politics.....	38
3.3.3.2. Reformist food politics.....	40
3.3.4. Food politics beyond the corporate food regime .....	42
3.3.4.1. Progressive food politics .....	43
3.3.4.2. Radical food politics .....	45
3.4. Conclusion.....	47
<b>Chapter four: Food politics in Southern Africa .....</b>	<b>48</b>
4.1. Introduction .....	48
4.2. The socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in Southern Africa .....	48
4.2.1. The scramble for Africa and the colonial era.....	49
4.2.2. The decolonilisation era .....	51
4.2.3. The post-independence era.....	53
4.3. Causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa.....	54
4.3.1. Economic inheritance and SAPs .....	55
4.3.2. Poverty (lack of entitlements).....	57
4.3.3. Adverse climate.....	58
4.3.4. Mismanagement and poor governance .....	58
4.3.5. HIV/AIDS .....	60

4.4. Southern Africa's approach to food security .....	61
4.4.1. South Africa .....	61
4.4.1.1. Context-setting .....	61
4.4.1.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents .....	65
4.4.1.3. Current actualities: orientation and model .....	67
4.4.2. Malawi .....	69
4.4.2.1. Context-setting .....	69
4.4.2.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents .....	72
4.4.2.3. Current actualities: orientation and model .....	74
4.4.3. Zimbabwe.....	76
4.4.3.1. Context-setting .....	76
4.4.3.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents .....	81
4.4.3.3. Current actualities: orientation and model .....	83
4.5. Conclusion.....	85
 Chapter Five: Key findings and concluding remarks.....	 86
5.1. Introduction .....	86
5.2. Reflecting on the research question: Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology.....	86
5.3. Other key findings .....	89
5.3.1. Applicability of the food regime/food movements framework to the case study.....	89
5.3.2. Considerations for future research .....	90
5.2.3.1. The transformative power of ideas.....	91
5.2.3.2. Call for transdisciplinary research .....	92
5.4. Conclusion.....	94
 Bibliography .....	 96
 <i>Appendix A: Conceptualisation of food security.....</i>	 <i>114</i>
A.1. Extension of the food security concept .....	114
A.1.1. The dimensions of food security .....	114
A.1.2. The levels of food security .....	116
A.1.3. The forms of food security.....	116



<i>Appendix B: Operationalisation of food security: FAO indicators per dimension of food security</i>	118
<i>Appendix C: Colonisation in African</i>	119
<i>Appendix D: The SADC's institutional framework for food security</i>	120
C.1. The formation of SADC	120
C.2. SADC's institutional food security framework	121
C.2.1. The Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme	121
C.2.2. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan	122
C.2.3. Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security	123
C.2.4. Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme	123
C.2.5. Regional Agricultural Policy	124
C.2.6. Summary of the SADC's food ideology	124
<i>Appendix E: Possible positive and negative effects of trade liberalisation on the dimensions of food security</i>	125

## *List of tables and figures*

### **Tables**

Table 1. Prevalence of undernourishment in the population for Southern African countries.....	6
Table 2. A food regime/food movements framework.....	36
Table 3. Decolonisation in Southern Africa.....	52

### **Figures**

Figure 1. Navigational scheme for the discussion.....	14
Figure 2. Map of Southern Africa, or SADC.....	49
Figure 3. Research topics within the complex field of food security.....	93

## *List of abbreviations and acronyms*

ADMARC	Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
ANC	African National Congress
AoA	Agreement on Agriculture
ASWAp	Agricultural Sector Wide Approach
AU	African Union
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CFA	Comprehensive Framework for Action
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FFSSA	Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa
FIAN	Foodfirst Information & Action Network
FNSP	Food Security and Nutrition Policy
FNSS	Food and Nutrition Security Strategy
FSAP	Food Security Action Plan
FSC	Food Sovereignty Campaign
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Reconstruction Plan
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
GNU	Government of National Unity
Goz	Government of Zimbabwe
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IFSS	Integrated Food Security Strategy
LARD	Land for Agricultural Development Programme
MAPP	Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme

MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MGDS	Malawi Growth Strategy and Development Strategy
MoAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
NDA	National Department of Agriculture
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NP	National Party
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAP	Regional Agricultural Policy
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UDI	Universal Declaration of Independence
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WDR	World Development Report
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
Zim Asset	Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation

# *Chapter One: Introduction*

## **1.1. Introduction to the topic**

In the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights the United Nations (UN) enshrined the right to food under Article 25(1) and since then the UN has come to acknowledge that food is vital for the enjoyment of other rights (UN, 1999). According to the United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP) hunger is the most pressing global health issue since more deaths per year can be attributed to hunger than HIV/AIDS<sup>1</sup>, malaria, and tuberculosis combined (WFP, 2009). Problems related to increasing food availability, feeding the population, improving their nutritional status, and reducing poverty continue to confront decision makers in developing and developed countries alike. Because of this, food issues are given high priority on the global development agenda.

The UN lists eradicating extreme poverty and hunger as the first of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved by the end of 2015 (UN, 2015a). One of the targets used to measure whether this goal has been met, is to halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger between 1990 and 2015. Although it is reported that this target is within reach, about an eighth of the world's population still experience chronic hunger. As part of their post-2015 development agenda the UN introduced the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that set out to transform the world by 2030. The second goal specifically addresses food security; it reads that the UN aspires to "[e]nd hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture" (UN, 2015b).

However, due to the complex web of interrelated factors that impact food security, ending chronic hunger is not a straightforward task. The main long-term challenges to achieve food security as identified by the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) are: the agriculture-hunger-poverty nexus, the global water crisis, land degradation, land deals, climatic change, agricultural diseases, biotechnology, dictatorship and kleptocracy, and women and children's skewed access to food (FAO, 2012). What is striking is that several of these challenges are entrenched in the current food system due to the nature of and the relations within the global political economy. In an era of food abundance food security has become an issue of *access* as opposed to one of *availability*. Contemporary hunger is thus about poverty instead of scarcity. Local problems can often be ascribed to political-economic decisions and the subsequent configurations of food production and

---

<sup>1</sup> This refers to a range of conditions caused by the infection of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) of which the later symptoms are referred to as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).

distribution. Consequently the real answer to food security depends on acknowledging the social, economic, and political dimensions of the global food system. The notion that "there is no such thing as an apolitical food problem" (Sen, 1982: 452) serves as a theoretical underpinning for further inquiry to the impact that the current food regime<sup>2</sup> has had on food security.

## 1.2. Conceptualisation of food security<sup>3</sup>

Although the phenomenon of hunger is timeless, the concept of food security is only 40 years old; it was first defined at the 1974 World Food Conference. At the time food security was defined at a national level and in economic terms: a situation where there is "*availability* at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices (emphasis added)" (UN, 1975). With its emphasis on availability, this definition solely focuses on the volume and stability of food supplies which reflects the institutional set of concerns at the time of the mid-1970s global food crisis.

During the 1980s there was a shift in the understanding of food security. Amartya Sen (1982: 451) proposed that there is something wrong with the Malthusian approach<sup>4</sup> to food security; since the food supply exceeds the population, chronic hunger cannot be deemed a problem of *availability*. As such Sen advanced the entitlements approach as a generalised way of understanding hunger in the midst of ample food availability. In short Clay (2002: 6) explains that "[e]ntitlement as a construct introduce[d] an ethical and human rights dimension into the discussion of food security". By understanding people's entitlement to food, the analytical focus shifts from food production (availability) to also addressing food distribution (access). An analysis of distribution involves focusing on the role of politics, economics, and the ideological context of the area in question. Pritchard (2012: 53) acknowledges that the entitlement approach was significantly influential in

---

<sup>2</sup> In brief, "food regime" refers to a "rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale" (Friedman, 1993: 30). The concept is discussed in great detail in Chapter Two.

<sup>3</sup> This section serves as a mere introduction to the concept of food security since there is an inherent difficulty in precisely defining the scope and nature of the concept. Ever since it has been coined, food security has become an operational concept that reflects the wider recognition of various complex issues involved (FAO, 2003: 25). More than 200 published definitions of food security further points to the term's flexible and evolutionary character (Maxwell, 1996: 156). Thus food security is a broad and multifaceted concept; there are numerous definitions, interpretations and permutations of the ideas involved depending on the reader. A conceptualisation of "food security" is provided in Appendix A with regards to the dimensions, levels, and forms of food security. A more specific understanding of "food security", as it is relevant for this study, is developed throughout the discussion in the main text

<sup>4</sup> At the turn of the 18th century Thomas Malthus, writing under the alias of Joseph Johnson, published *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) which presents population growth as exponential and the growth in the food supply as arithmetical. Consequently he foresaw that unchecked population growth would quickly lead to widespread chronic hunger. He proposed a series of population control measures to prevent this perceived catastrophe.

redefining food security in the 1990s. Since then the most common operational definition of food security is that of the FAO which reads that "[f]ood security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy lifestyle" (FAO, 1996).

In alignment with post-modern thinking, an important historical shift in food security debates saw the FAO and the World Bank placing more emphasis on the individual. Food security for both the FAO and World Bank evolved from an emphasis on assuring national food supply/availability in the 1970s, to a greater emphasis on food access in the 1980s, to increased recognition of food utilization issues in the 1990s (Koç, 2011; Hinrichs, 2013: 8). Thus although still regarded as an important dimension for ensuring food security, the question on how to achieve food security is no longer framed as a purely supply, or availability, problem. Along with the *availability* dimension, the FAO acknowledges that *access*, *utilisation*, and *stability* are of importance as well.

As inferred above, food *availability* refers to the quantity of food at disposal for consumption. This is determined by production, distribution, and exchange. Food *access* relates to the ability to purchase or produce sufficient food. Thus, even though a sufficient food supply might be available, access to food might be constrained by physical and financial barriers. Food *utilisation* refers to individuals' absorption of nutrients, and the dimension of *stability* addresses the inherent, impending or conditional risks that impact the availability, access and/or utilisation of food.

The stability dimension, which was initially excluded from the food security framework, is becoming more ingrained in the food security literature since the FAO's official definition of food security stipulates that to be food secure means to have access to adequate food "at all times" (FAO, 1996). By adding the time dimension it is recognised that food security conditions should not be regarded as fixed, highlighting that food security only exists when there is sufficient protection against chronic, temporal, and cyclic food insecurity via the availability, access, and utilisation dimensions.

### **1.3. Food security in the 21st century: Spring of hope, Winter of despair**

The famous opening lines of Charles Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities* (1859) portrays the matched struggle between the pursuit of prosperity and that of justice; the universal plight of societies till this day:

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of the Light, it

was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us...

Drawing on the comparison to Dickens' depiction of the two cities and with reference to food security, Allen (2013: 135) explains that the 21st century, with its record levels of inequality, can also be regarded as both the "best of times" for those with power and capital, and the "worst of times" for those marginalised within the food system.

Due to technological advances the human story of food has overall been a best-of-times narrative of constant improvement that resulted in not only a continued increase in food production but also advancements in food quality and food safety. It is frequently stated there is currently no *agricultural* reason for hunger since the global production of food has increased more rapidly than the population over the past 50 years. It is commonly cited that even despite the projected population growth, the world is not at risk of the so-called Malthusian trap since there is currently an abundance of food produced. In fact, this overproduction sometimes even compels developed countries to draw up policies to clear "mountains" and "lakes" of food and drink (Love, 2010).

Furthermore, the current food era can also be considered as the best-of-times because there is an unprecedented set of efforts to solve the food security problem; with several individuals, groups, and political bodies "working to improve ecological and social conditions [by] creating new modes of production, distribution, and consumption" (Allen, 2013: 135). The plethora of proposed strategies to address food security mirrors the explosion of interest in and discourse about the topic; never before has the global community been more equipped to address the challenge of food security<sup>5</sup>.

Nevertheless and alarmingly so, the current era can also be considered the worst-of-times because more people suffer from chronic hunger now than at any other point in human history. Following the 2008 financial crisis, which resulted in high food prices, the number of hungry people in the world was at a historic high, with 1.02 billion individuals considered to be undernourished (FAO, 2009). Now that the effects of the crisis have largely subsided, with national economies steadily recovering, the FAO estimates that the number of people suffering from chronic hunger is 842 million. Despite these recent gains which have pushed the figure below 1 billion, the United Nations' MDGs to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by the end of 2015 seems unachievable in

---

<sup>5</sup> In 2002 the FAO noted that, unlike ever before, the world is "well equipped with the financial and technical resources to ensure that all people have adequate access to food" (FAO, 2002).



many parts of the world. The MDG Report of 2015 estimates that the prevalence of chronic hunger has decreased from 23.3% in 1990-1992 to 12.9% in 2014-2016 (UN, 2015c: 21). Although the target of halving the *worldwide* hunger rate has almost been reached, it is important to note that sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the highest prevalence of chronic hunger, has showed limited progress.

#### **1.4. Food security in Southern Africa**

The impact of the food price crisis is of special concern for Africa. Since most African countries are net-food importing<sup>6</sup> the continent was hit hardest by the crisis. Sub-Saharan Africa in particular is the most food-insecure region in the world and is furthermore characterized by various factors that are associated with poverty such as: underdeveloped infrastructure and markets, low life expectancy, a high incidence of HIV/AIDS, and a large number of failed states (Lee, Berazneva & Ndulo, 2013: 2). Chang (2009: 482) stresses the irreversible long term effects of chronic hunger by stating that the impact food insecurity has on individuals not only influences those affected, but that there is also a human cost to pay in terms of the loss of the labour force. In this regard he further mentions that national food security should be an especially pressing matter when the country is at a low level of economic development. Food security should thus be a core concern for African countries. Furthermore, Holt-Giménez, Patel & Shattuck (2010: 130) point out that "[s]uccesses or failures in Africa reflect the potential or the limitations of the global food system to serve the interests of the world's poor majorities" which acknowledges that addressing food security in Southern Africa is of global interest for human development.

An over-arching and common pitfall for addressing food security in Sub-Saharan Africa is that the region is often presented as a single entity. Similarly, generalised comments are also made about the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, when one takes into account the degree to which politics plays a role in shaping food security discourse, it becomes apparent that African countries are not all similar: countries' history and the role of the state intersect to reflect different regimes and economic logics. As such an analysis of food politics in Southern Africa<sup>7</sup> can

---

<sup>6</sup> This refers to countries whose food imports are higher than their agricultural and food exports (FAO, 2011: vii). Despite its vast agricultural potential, many African countries do not produce enough food to feed its citizens. Consequently these countries have to import food from other countries.

<sup>7</sup> Throughout the discussion "Southern Africa" refers to the member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC): Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

offer great insights into both the challenges in the region but also how the state, the private sector and international relations shape the agricultural system.

The latest UN World Food Programme's Hunger Map (WFP, 2015) reveals exactly how different Southern African countries' prevalence of hunger is. The WFP rates hunger within each country based on the prevalence of undernourishment in the population<sup>8</sup>. Table 1 presents how each of the SADC countries' conditions of chronic hunger is rated by the WFP.

*Table 2. Prevalence of undernourishment in the population for Southern African countries*

<b>Very low (&lt;5%)</b>	<b>Moderately low (5-14.9%)</b>	<b>Moderately high (15%-24.9%)</b>	<b>High (25-34.9%)</b>	<b>Very high (35%&lt;)</b>
Mauritius South Africa	Angola Lesotho Seychelles	Botswana Malawi	Madagascar Mozambique Swaziland Tanzania Zimbabwe	Namibia Zambia

\*The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is excluded due to missing or insufficient data

This table shows that despite geographical similarities there is a large dispersion in the countries' hunger rate: the prevalence of hunger ranges from very low in Mauritius and South Africa, to very high in Namibia and Zambia. Furthermore, it is important to note for this discussion, that the arguably dominant agricultural countries of the region, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe and Malawi, each experience a different prevalence of undernourishment. Since these countries have a shared British colonial history, and are subjugated to largely similar environmental constraints, it is once again apparent that politics has a powerful role to play in human development issues such as chronic hunger.

### **1.5. The significance of the food price crisis**

The food price crisis of 2007-2008 served as a point of departure when the dominant food ideology came under threat. Prior to the crisis there was a general sense that, at a global scale, hunger was associated with environmental disaster or only to be found in conflict-ridden areas. Thus rather "than acknowledging a fundamental flaw in the global food system, the crisis was [initially] seen as

<sup>8</sup> Since food security is such a diverse concept (see footnote 3 and Appendix A), different research organisations employ different indicators to quantify food security. Appendix B presents a list of the indicators used to measure each of the dimensions of food security, as employed in the FAO (2015a) operationalisation of food security. To analyse and comment on the validity of these indicators, fall beyond the scope of this discussion.

a situation that could be alleviated without revising existing approaches to food security" (Rosin, Stock & Campbell, 2012: 4).

Recently the causes of the food price crisis<sup>9</sup> were reassessed by both the media and global food system experts. It became clear that the spike in food prices was a symptom of a food system already under stress. Years of skewed agricultural policies, unsustainable development, and inequitable trade have left the food regime lacking. Rosin *et al.*, (2012: 6) explain that "the dramatic changes ushered in through the violent reorganisation of geopolitics through two world wars, and numerous other conflicts and the upending of historical colonialism led to massive structural changes in the food system". Before this restructuring, countries and regions were for the most part food self-sufficient and historic food crises related more to catastrophic environmental events or despotic/colonial oppression. However, the causes of the 2007-2008 food price crisis were substantially different from previous crises. Currently corporate interests have a major presence in the global food system and although not solely responsible for the crisis, these parties still continued to accumulate wealth whilst over a sixth of the globe experienced massive hunger (Roisin *et al.*, 2012: 9).

As noted earlier, the food crisis cannot be attributed as a function of food production since the crisis occurred alongside record harvests of at least 1.5 times the food demand at the time (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 7). The contradiction of increasing hunger amidst abundance and wealth sparked a flurry of worldwide protests over food prices. The impact of the food price spikes were felt around the world. Civil unrest, including food riots and protests in support of lower prices and/or higher wages, occurred in at least 33 countries in late 2007-2008 (Lee *et al.*, 2013: 1). McMahon (2013: 9) cites the example of protesters in Tunisia facing down riot police with "nothing more than baguettes" as a symbol of how anger over food even helped sparked the Arab Spring. Numerous international actors urged for a rapid response to the crisis because of its potential to destabilise governments. The ongoing worldwide food protests, located not only in poor countries but also in resource-rich areas and the industrialised nations, signal that people are not merely rebelling against hunger but against the ideologies around food upheld by the corporate entities in the food system.

Furthermore, the reaction from civil society highlights how food security should not be regarded as a purely socio-economic problem; hunger should be framed as a political problem too. To view food as the most basic human need is to acknowledge that power relations determine the

---

<sup>9</sup> Both the indirect and direct causes of the food price crisis are discussed in section 2.4.1.

organisation thereof – just like other resources. Despite the fact that there is an abundance of food available, the inequality in access to food leaves 842 million people chronically undernourished; 2 billion people lacking in basic nutrients; and 1.3 billion people overweight (Dogliotti, Giller & van Ittersum, 2014: 299). All of which indicates that the pattern of food use is a function of political choices and economic disparities. With the abundance of food available it is clear that the issue is not about food per se but about the politics that determines how food is produced, distributed, and consumed.

### **1.6. Problem statement**

Food insecurity amidst food abundance highlights a fundamental flaw in the food regime. Consequently it is valuable to explore different ideologies around food in order to determine which is most suited to provide a viable model for addressing hunger. It is widely accepted that the most recent food crisis was an indication of the underlying malfunction of the food system. In response to the food crisis, the dominance of the ideologies perpetuated by the current food regime was challenged by other ideologies. However, given the hegemonic status of the current regime, alternative food models are often unintentionally overlooked or ideologically disregarded. In challenging the hegemony<sup>10</sup> of the current regime, the focus should be placed on those that are marginalised within the current system. With the highest prevalence of chronic hunger, sub-Saharan Africa remains marginalised within the current food regime despite the UN's MDG efforts. As such it is necessary to draw attention to the intricacies of this region.

### **1.7. Research questions<sup>11</sup>**

The main research question this study seeks to answer is:

*What is the prevailing food ideology in Southern Africa?*

In answering the above question a number of supplementary questions will be addressed:

Supplementary question 1: *How does the Southern African context influence the region's ideologies around food?*

The goal of this question is to gauge in which contextual factors the prevailing food ideology in Southern Africa is rooted, as well as to determine the extent to which these factors impact the region's approach to food security. In short, this question is aimed at uncovering the causes of food

---

<sup>10</sup> In this discussion the concept is employed in the Gramscian sense to refer to "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups" (Giddens, 1997: 583). See section 2.3 and 3.3.2 for a detailed explanation.

<sup>11</sup> Please see Appendix C for an important visual representation of the research questions' relation to the theoretical framework (section 1.8). This diagram can be useful for navigating the discussion.

insecurity in Southern Africa. This determines the socio-economic and political logic in which the region's response to the crisis is rooted.

Supplementary question 2: *What is Southern Africa's institutional response to food insecurity?*

Through this question the official food security policies of the region is explored in an attempt to root these policies in a particular food ideology.

Supplementary question 3: *How does the Southern African institutional response to food security differ from the actual orientation towards food and the economic model on which it is based?*

This question aids the investigation of the current actualities of food security in the region, as these might deviate from the institutional response to food security.

By uncovering the causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa (supplementary question 1) in which the official response geared at addressing this issue is rooted (supplementary question 2), as well as accounting for how this response might deviate from actual experiences (supplementary question 3), a contextualised and nuanced answer to the main research question can be provided.

### **1.8. Theoretical framework**

The theoretical framework used to guide and support this study is Holt-Giménez & Shattuck's (2011) food regimes/food movements framework<sup>12</sup>. Following the 2008 food price crisis this comparative analytical framework was introduced to display the "politics, production models and approaches to the food crisis" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 114). The framework itself is rooted in food regime theory which holds that beneath the apparent natural food order is a hegemonic food order that defines "the relations within which food is produced, and through which capitalism is produced and reproduced" (McMichael, 2009a: 281). As such the theoretical framework presents a distinction between responses from those who seek to stabilize the corporate food regime<sup>13</sup> and those that seek to transform the system thereby highlighting the workings of capitalism's so-called double movement of liberalism and reform. Accordingly Holt-Giménez &

---

<sup>12</sup> This framework is presented in full in Chapter 3. The theoretical underpinning of the framework is discussed with reference to Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) seminal work on food regime analysis which, as discussed below, is rooted in critical International Relations theory – following the likes of Marx, Wallerstein, Gramsci, and Polanyi. The chapter also presents a detailed discussion on each of the food ideologies of the Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011) framework.

<sup>13</sup> This concept will be clarified and discussed in detail in section 2.4.

Shattuck (2010) identifies four food ideologies: *neoliberal*; *reformist*; *progressive*; and *radical*. Each of these ideologies upholds a different narrative of present-day hunger and consequently proposes different ways in which it should be addressed. Their framework presents how each of these food ideologies differs in their discourse, model, orientation, and approach to the crisis. It also identifies the main institutions and guiding documents for each.

### **1.9. Research design and methods**

The study is primarily *exploratory* since it aims to uncover what the prevailing food ideology in Southern Africa is. Exploratory studies are of use since they provide a basic understanding of relatively new topics (Babbie & Mouton, 2002: 79). This is what this study aims to do given the emerging analysis of other food ideologies following the recent food crisis. Babbie & Mouton (2002: 80) also mentions that exploratory studies are "appropriate for persistent phenomena" – which undoubtedly include hunger – since it leads to greater insight and comprehension. Furthermore, exploratory studies are in determining "priorities for future research" (Babbie & Mouton, 2002: 81). This study, although limited to Southern Africa, is applicable to many other contexts and could thus guide future research of a similar nature. The study is further supported by *explanatory* research; particularly with regards to the discussion of causality in the historical development of the food regime and the build-up to the 2007-2008 food crisis.

This study makes use of *qualitative* research methods. Babbie & Mouton (2002: 278) explains that with qualitative methods the "emphasis is on studying human action in a natural setting [...] together with an emphasis on detailed description and understanding phenomena within the appropriate context". In this regard the study examines the structure and relations through which food is produced and distributed to determine the prevailing food ideology in Southern Africa. The study follows a *single case study* model with South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe discussed as representative of the Southern African case.

An inductive approach is used with the objective to gather more general knowledge on Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology following the food price crisis. Given the time constraint on the study the analysis will be based on *secondary sources* in the form of books, journal articles, newspaper articles, and government briefings, and policy papers.

### **1.10. Limitations and scope of the study**

The main limitations of this study primarily relate to the limitations of the qualitative method. Even though a qualitative approach is the most appropriate given the research design and aims, it is not as

measurable as quantitative data due to the nature thereof. The use of secondary sources also results in limited control of the data. A further limitation of this study arises due to its exploratory design. Exploratory research may deliver unprecedented findings, and seldom provide specific answers to research questions (Babbie & Mouton, 2002: 80). In an attempt to mitigate this limitation, Chapter Five thematically presents the findings of the study, while Chapter Six concludes the overall discussion by specifically addressing and reflecting upon the research questions.

This discussion assumes that the 2007-2008 food crisis was a turning point for food security analysis. As such, the framing of the crisis as a significant event presupposes that, following the crisis, there has been a rupture in how food security is viewed. In other words, the fact that the food crisis occurred, is taken as a sign that the food system had failed to "maintain and reinforce a particular set of power relations in global society" (Rosin *et al.*, 2012: 5). Consequently it is assumed that the failure of the food system, as signified by the crisis, necessarily created a platform for exploring alternative food systems. Relatedly, it should also be noted that the food regime/food movements framework of Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011), that depicts the various potential food systems, is not without its conceptual drawbacks. It can be argued that the framework is too simplistic since it "ignores the phenomenal diversity [...] within each of [the] categories (Young, 2012: 346).

A further limitation to the study relates to the scope thereof. Due to the restrictive level of analysis, not all dimensions of food security can be studied. Of importance for this study are the global food system (international level of analysis) and its influence on Southern Africa (state/society level of analysis<sup>14</sup>). The international and state/society level of analysis only accounts for the *availability*, *access*, and *stability* dimensions of food security. Consequently the *utilisation* dimension, linked to the individual level of analysis, is not addressed. It is acknowledged that this is a significant omission, especially given the poor nutritional status of the region's citizens<sup>15</sup>.

It should also be noted that food security is by nature a complex concept, and because of the scope of the study, it is not possible to account for all the interpretations and permutations thereof. The way in which the concept is defined determines how it is measured. It is acknowledged that different actors, with diverse agendas, define and measure food security in accordance with their

---

<sup>14</sup> Through the examples of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as representative of the Southern African case study.

<sup>15</sup> Malnutrition is widespread in Southern Africa due to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, and the region's overreliance on maize – see Chapter Four.

perspectives thereof. Throughout the discussion, unless clearly stated otherwise, it is assumed that analyses of food security are objective; that the findings do not serve to advance particular interests.

### **1.11. Overview and chapter outline**

*Chapter One: Introduction* – This chapter provides the outline of the research problem and the background for its justification. This chapter introduces the reader to the concept of food security and highlights the 2007-2008 food crisis as a turning point in the way in which food security is perceived. The research questions, design and methodology as well as the limitations of the research are also presented.

*Chapter Two: Evolution of the food regime and the development of the 2007-2008 food price crisis* – An historical overview of the various food regimes that led to the formation of the corporate food regime is given. The corporate food regime is discussed, and in particular how this regime led to the food crisis, with reference to the indirect and direct causes thereof. It is shown that these causes did not arise out of a vacuum but are in fact specifically linked to neoliberalism.

*Chapter Three: The food regime/food movements framework* – This chapter highlights the link between the food crisis and the greater crisis of neoliberalism as it manifested in the financial crisis. These crises are presented as turning point for food security analysis, and the differences between the old and emerging analysis of food security are pointed out. Holt-Giménez & Shattuck's (2011) food regime/food movement framework, which depicts the responses to the food crisis, is introduced as the theoretical foundation. The differences between *neoliberal*, *reformist*, *progressive*, and *radical* streams of food politics are discussed according to this framework.

*Chapter Four: Food politics in Southern Africa* – The case study is contextualised through an introductory discussion of the socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in the region, and subsequently providing an overview of the context-specific causes of food insecurity. Thereafter, Southern Africa's approach to food security is explored by presenting the institutional food security framework of SADC and South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. The food security orientation and model of each country is also presented along with commentary on how it deviates from the country's institutional framework.

*Chapter Five: Analysis and key findings* – This chapter reflects on the research question by summarising the findings on Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology. Other key findings of this



explorative study are also highlighted by considering the applicability of the theoretical framework, and discussing recommendations for future research.

### **1.12. Navigational scheme for the discussion**

The diagram on the following page provides the reader with an aid for navigating the discussion on Southern Africa's food politics, especially with regards to the research questions and the theoretical framework of the study.

With reference to Chapter Two, the diagram presents the chronological development of the food regime from the settler-colonial regime, to the surplus regime, and finally the corporate regime. The diagram also accounts for both the direct and indirect causes of the global food crisis and shows how this is embedded in the corporate food regime.

Following this causal logic, the effect of the crisis in turn spurred on developments in food politics. These responses correspond to those identified by Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011) in their food regime/food movements framework discussed in Chapter Three. The scheme shows the split between the food ideologies that seek to maintain the corporate regime (neoliberal and reformist) and those that aim to transcend it (progressive and radical). In accordance with the food regime/food movements framework, the discourse and orientation of each stream of food politics is also depicted in the diagram.

The diagram also highlights the relationship between the research questions and the development of the food regime and its subsequent influence on food politics, thereby anchoring this explorative study in a solid theoretical framework.




Figure 1. Navigational scheme for the discussion: research questions and theoretical framework of the study

## *Chapter Two: Evolution of the food regime and the development of the 2007-2008 food price crisis*

### **2.1. Introduction**

Throughout history food has been one of the core components around which societies evolved. In pre-capitalistic societies food was the principal factor around which material, cultural, and institutional structures were formed (Sodano, 2012: 375). The commodification of food increasingly integrated food-related activities into the economic sphere. Consequently the development of the food system closely followed the development of capitalism itself and food soon become governed at an international level through the workings of the global political economy.

The aim of this chapter is to provide context to the theoretical framework presented in the following chapter. This first part of this chapter briefly introduces food regime analysis as it was first developed by Friedmann and McMichael (1989) and subsequently highlights the development of the international food system along the lines of three food regimes: the settler-colonial regime; the surplus regime; and the corporate regime. The second part of the chapter presents the unravelling of the corporate food regime with reference to the 2007-2008 food price crisis. The indirect and direct causes of the crisis are discussed; highlighting that these causes are entrenched in neoliberalism<sup>16</sup>. The final section portrays the food crisis as a part of the greater crisis of capitalism.

### **2.2. Food regime analysis**

In 1989 Friedmann and McMichael published an essay that aimed to explore the role of agriculture in the development of the capitalist world economy. Subsequently this paper became regarded as the foundational work on food regime analysis. Influenced by Wallerstein's world-systems analysis (1983) they adopted a world-historical perspective that "links international relations of food production and consumption to forms of accumulation" (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989: 95) thereby distinguishing different periods of capitalist accumulation that they refer to as "food regimes". Friedmann (1993: 30) defines a food regime as a "rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale". An all-encompassing definition by Otero (2012: 283) terms a food regime as a "temporally specific dynamic in the global political economy of food [...]"

---

<sup>16</sup> Neoliberalism, as it relates to the food regime, is explained in section 2.4 when discussing the corporate food regime. The concept is further explained in section 3.3.2.1 when "neoliberal food politics" is discussed as one of the components of the food regime/food movements framework of Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011).

that is characterised by particular institutional structures, norms, and unwritten rules around agriculture and food that are geographically and historically specific".

McMichael (2009a: 289) explains that the food regime concept is not only historical, but also methodological since it can be used to interpret capitalist history; the relations through which food is produced is used as a lens for the transitions within the history of capitalism itself. In their seminal work Friedmann and McMichael (1989) identified two food regimes: the first spanning from 1870-1914 under British hegemony, and the second from 1945-1973 during United States (US) hegemony.

### **2.2.1. The first regime: the settler-colonial regime (1870-1914)**

The first food regime is characterised by "British 'outer-oriented development'" (McMichael, 2010: 610). During this historical period, Britain outsourced its staple food production to its settler-colonies. Specialised meat and grain production in Argentina, Canada, USA, Australia, and New Zealand supplied Britain's working class with cheap food (Bernstein, 2015: 3). A key innovation of the first food regime is the fully commercial American farm that relied on family labour (McMichael, 2009b: 144). Campbell (2012: 32) notes that "grain [flowed] in 'rivers' out of the American Mid-West to feed" Britain's rapidly increasing urban class<sup>17</sup>. Cheap settler labour produced cheap food imports which fuelled Britain's industrial growth.

This international division of labour was political in nature. As a political superpower Britain mediated international trade between European nations and settler states in accordance with the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage<sup>18</sup> (Bernstein, 2015: 4). Britain orchestrated product specialisation in its colonies by taking differences in climate and social organisation into account when implementing trade in bulk commodities like sugar, wheat, and coffee. In order to optimise the mass production of these food staples, Britain imposed a system of monocultural agriculture in colonial states which compromised their food systems and ecological resources (McMichael, 2009b: 141; Burch & Lawrence, 2009: 267). Sodano (2012: 376) notes that during the first food regime many regions in Africa and Latin America moved from food self-sufficiency to food

---

<sup>17</sup> Following the Industrial Revolution, Britain underwent a "tumultuous transformation" with a "rapid shift in [its] population from being almost entirely rural to being almost entirely urban" (Campbell, 2012: 31). Thus, through urbanisation, Britain's population became separated from easily available food.

<sup>18</sup> By employing simple mathematics, David Ricardo attempted to prove that when combined with industrial specialisation, international free trade is always beneficial (Southgate, Graham & Tweeten, 2007: 125). As such nations should concentrate their resources in their industries that offer the greatest scope for competitive edge and focus predominantly on developing those industries.

scarcity and famine because of its dependence on the trade of monocultures. The South's agricultural dependence paved the way for the second food regime.

### **2.2.2. The second regime: the surplus regime (1945-1973)**

The second food regime is characterised by "American 'inner-oriented development'" (McMichael, 2010: 610). After the Second World War the Bretton Woods system secured the United States' hegemony in world capitalism. The US' economic hegemony during this historical period clearly reflects the international division of trade that ensued during the second food regime. McMichael (2010: 611) explains that the second food regime had a "political anchoring in the US farm belt and its agro-industrial form [that was] exported first to Europe through the Marshall Plan and then to the Third World via the Green Revolution". Large-scale industrial farming in the US brought on issues of overproduction. This was addressed by combining agricultural policy with foreign policy, which resulted in the US transferring its agricultural surpluses in the form of food aid. In the First World the US disposed of grain surpluses under the pretext of facilitating post-war reconstruction (Bernstein, 2015: 7), and in the Third World the US encouraged selective industrialisation through food aid programmes that served to secure loyalty against communism during the Cold War by "clutching them in the grip of external debt" (Sodano, 2012: 376).

The US' nation-centred mode of development was further characterised by the industrialisation of agriculture which created a new pattern of transnational agribusiness. The global spread of industrial agriculture was carried out by the new technologies of the Green Revolution which involved the heavy use of subsidized fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and machinery, along with the introduction of high-yielding varieties of a few cereals in the Global South (McMichael, 2009b: 141). As such, the second food regime had very different effects in the North and South. Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 110) explain that the Green Revolution deepened class, gender and regional inequalities since "[t]he development of industrial agriculture oriented to the global market weakened peasant agriculture and increased the power of large landowners". The consolidation of farm land into the hands of a few, coupled with the mechanisation of agriculture, estranged peasants from the means to feed themselves, which is why the Green Revolution upon evaluation became viewed in a negative light.

### **2.3. Hegemony and transition in food regimes**

McMichael (2010: 610) explains that food regimes are "commonly associated with hegemonic moments" since these historical periods embody a specific ideology of political economy due to the

"geo-political relations and modes of capitalist development" at the time. Britain's hegemony during the first food regime was grounded in its influence as an imperial power, as well as the London-based gold standard. Harnessing the resources of its settler-colonies, Britain shaped the international division of labour by importing cheap food from its extensive empire for its urban population. Although reasons for the demise of the first regime have not been explored in depth (Bernstein, 2015: 6), its end has been clearly marked by Britain's loss in hegemony, which occurred in the aftermath of the global restructuring of the world economy due to the two World Wars and the Great Depression.

It is of note how the features that took shape during the first regime led to the formation of the second. The first food regime established a system of large-scale family farms in the US to provide Britain with cheap grain and meat. During the second food regime the agricultural successes of the family-farm model led to an overproduction of food in the US. At the time, the hegemonic status of the US resulted in a certain international division of trade: in Europe the US model of national regulation of agriculture was duplicated, and in the Third World the US dumped its surpluses in the form of food aid (Bernstein, 2015: 10). The outcome for the global food order was the second food regime which involved a new stage in the industrialisation of farming in the North and an entrenched dependence on imports in the South. As such the South became increasingly reliant on industrial agriculture and manufactured foods (Burch & Lawrence, 2009: 267).

Of importance is that the food regimes that came to be under these specific historical circumstances were not the result of the "direct expression of interest" (McMichael, 2009b: 143) by Britain or the US respectively. Friedmann (2005: 234) notes that "[e]ach of the past two food regimes was the combined outcome of social movements intersecting with state strategies and profit-seeking corporations". Food regimes are thus reflective of historical political and economic struggles since the development of the food system closely follows the development of capitalism itself. As such, hegemony in the food regime should be viewed as more than state dominance and rather as "an expression of broadly based ideas supported by material resources and institutions" (Morton, 2003: 156).

Drawing on the seminal work of Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (1944) Friedmann (2005: 231) remarks that a crisis within one food regime spurs on the transition to another regime. These transitions are characterised by Polanyi's so-called "double movement" of capitalism which alternates periods of liberalism with periods of reform. Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 112)

explain that the implications of the Polanyian thesis with regards to the food regime is that liberal food regimes can undergo regulatory change due to social pressure, and that "highly Keynesian or 'embedded liberal'" food regimes can succumb to liberal influences from society. So far the food regime narrative clearly resembles this "double movement". The first food regime's colonial-imperial development through free trade sparked working class unrest as the new frontier of farmers in settler-colonies feared that increased international trade would result in a collapse of their livelihood (Friedmann, 2005: 236). These concerns paved the way for the second food regime that adopted mercantilist sentiments under a nation-centred mode of development. Friedmann (2005: 236) explains that the second food regime was built on "agricultural support and protectionism programmes [that fuelled agro-industrialisation] behind tariff walls [only] breached by a public 'food aid' programme".

Similarly, a historical analysis of the second food regime shows that its mercantilism was countered with the neoliberal agenda embodied by Thatcherism and Reaganism. This was exemplified in the rolling back of the state, reduced public spending on social services, and a reduction in the scale and scope of public enterprises (Burch & Lawrence, 2009: 269) all of which led to the weakening of the role of the state in economics. Subsequently, the development of the hegemony concept entailed that the definition extends beyond state-centric terms (Morton, 2003: 157). Viewed in such a light, the loss of US hegemony – and ultimately the demise of the second food regime – can be attributed to the rise of neoliberalism. Previously the economic sphere was rooted in the social and political spheres, in what Harvey (2005) refers to as an "embedded liberalism", where the state intervenes to achieve its goals. However, with the rise of neoliberalism, the economic sphere became increasingly independent from the social and political one. The market was left to run rampant which laid the foundation for the configuration of the corporate food regime.

#### **2.4. The third regime: the corporate food regime<sup>19</sup>**

Sodano (2012: 377) explains that the "four credos of neoliberalism" namely deregulation, international trade liberalisation, reduction of public expenditure, and privatisation have produced a

---

<sup>19</sup> The notion of the "corporate food regime" adopted here is attributed to McMichael (2009b: 148). Although Friedmann and McMichael (1989), writing after the collapse of the second food regime, jointly identify key ideas and arguments concerning a third food regime, Friedmann (2005) has been more hesitant to elaborate on the dynamics of the third food regime and consequently only offers a tentative analysis of what she calls the "corporate-environmental food regime". As such the existence of the third food regime is contested in food regime literature. For an overview of this debate, see McMichael (2009b), Friedmann (2009), and Burch and Lawrence (2009). Despite their divergence in emphasis, both McMichael and Friedmann "acknowledge the interplay between neoliberal regulatory restructuring and social movements" (Pechlaner & Otero, 2010: 183). This forms the basis of the theoretical framework presented in the following chapter.

new food regime that is fundamentally different from the previous ones. Unlike the previous food regimes, which were governed by the empire or the state, the corporate food regime's organising principle is the market (McMichael, 2009a: 285), which in other words led to a shift from state food governance to private food governance. This shift occurred due to the knock-on effect of the end of the Bretton Woods system which weakened the US' hegemony in the global political economy. Weakened state sovereignty coupled with blind faith in the rational choice model contributed to the emergence of neoliberalism, which brought on "new strategies of internationalisation" (Sodano, 2012: 378); most notably in the form of the financialisation of the market and the construction of a global supply chain.

Under the hegemony of neoliberalism, supermarkets and other retailers, as prominent agents in this global supply chain, have become dominant in dictating the overall operation of the corporate food regime. Thus even though the third food regime is conditioned by the previous food regimes, it has its own unique set of features. Akram-Lodhi (2012: 132-133) discusses a number of aspects that contributes to the corporate food regime's distinctiveness. First he explains that this food system is unique because it offers both Fordist foods and post-Fordist foods. Fordist foods refers to food that is produced in bulk and has a low profit margin, consequently large volumes of Fordist foods have to be sold in order for retailers to turn a profit. In this regard, through the consolidation of agribusinesses – the strategic alliances between agribusiness, the chemical industry, and biotechnology – the neoliberal food regime continues to sustain the expansion of industrialised monoculture production associated with the previous regime (McMichael, 2009a: 287). However, the neoliberal food regime has also come to be based on the production of post-Fordist foods since retailers not only seek to capture the middle-class food-consuming groups but also the affluent ones. Akram-Lodhi (2012: 132) notes that over the past two decades there has been a massive increase in "globally sourced fresh fruit and vegetables, horticultural products, fresh fish and seafood, along with the introduction and expansion of culturally specific foods in the supermarkets of the global North". These post-Fordist foods have a higher profit margin which means fewer volumes have to be sold to uphold the agribusiness nexus. The production of post-Fordist foods distinguishes the third food regime from the previous ones which relied on Fordist foods.

Another distinct attribute of the corporate food regime is that it is more resource-intensive than the previous regimes. The increased industrialisation of agriculture for Fordist food production resulted in a "meatification" (Weis, 2007) of the middle-class' diet as meat became more affordable. Akram-



Lodhi (2012: 132) explains that this meatification coupled with large-scale monoculture production has deepened the industrial grain-livestock complex, which increased both the hydrocarbon intensity and water intensity of food production. A related unique aspect of the corporate food regime is the expansion of the industrial grain-livestock complex. This mass production of monocultures and cheap meat significantly contributes to green-house gas emissions and consequently to climate change. Noting another ecological unsustainable feature of the corporate food regime, Akram-Lodhi (2012: 133) mentions that this regime is unique because of its historically unparalleled cruelty to animals through morally questionable meat production.

The workings of the neoliberal forces behind this distinct set of attributes associated with the corporate food regime came under scrutiny during a series of high food prices during 2007-2011. This period was marked by record hunger present despite record harvest and record profits for major agribusinesses (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 111; Akram-Lodhi, 2012: 133) which brought to light the skewed distribution and unsustainable practices that is built into the corporate food regime. Following the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the hegemony of neoliberalism in the global political economy was further thrown into question. The remainder of the chapter outlines the contributing factors that led to the food price crisis.

#### **2.4.1. Unravelling the 2007-2008 food price crisis**

Rosin *et al.* (2012: 1) note that "[u]nderstanding the causes of the global food crisis has proved elusive, not for any lack of potential contributing factors, but for the absolute abundance of competing explanations". Despite the multitude of causes presented by different discourses in an attempt to narrate the development of the crisis, it is clear that the crisis was an evident product of the normal every-day working of the corporate food regime. This section presents the constructs and characteristics of the corporate food regime that caused it to be inherently unstable. Two sets of causes<sup>20</sup> are discussed: indirect causes of the crisis – causes which are rooted in the historical development of the food regime as a whole, and direct causes of the crisis – causes which are embedded in the neoliberal foundation of the corporate food regime.

##### **2.4.1.1. Indirect causes of the food price crisis**

The indirect causes of the crisis stem from the fact that the corporate food regime does not exist in isolation of the previous two food regimes, but rather is the product of the long term development of

---

<sup>20</sup> This outline is largely modelled off Holt-Giménez, Patel and Shattuck's deconstruction of the crisis as presented in *Food Rebellions!* (2010). Their outline distinguishes between "root causes" (as discussed in section 2.4.1.1 of this document) and "proximate causes" (section 2.4.1.2) of the crisis.

the food regime as a whole. Key components of the current regime's make-up can be attributed to be the result of what was deemed positive amendments to food relations in the previous regimes. As such the corporate food regime has its foundation in: overproduction and food aid; the Green Revolution; and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). These causes can be viewed as indirect causes of the food price crisis since they contributed to create the neoliberal climate in which the direct causes of the crisis are rooted. This section briefly discusses these causes' role in the food price crisis.

### ***Overproduction and food aid***

As discussed earlier, the second food regime saw the spread of new technologies like fertilizer, pesticides, and machinery that led to an overproduction of food in developed countries. Holt-Giménez *et al.* (2010: 24) explain that the overproduction in the North was used to open up markets in the global South through dumping food surpluses in developing countries under the guise of food aid. The US made strategic use of food aid by providing it to newly decolonialised countries in order to have an influence over their politics and economics amidst the perceived threat of communism during the Cold War. Food aid was branded as a form of benevolence to the Third World, when most of the developing countries in fact had quite a robust agricultural system based on small-scale sustenance farming and local trade. However, the Third World's supposed underdevelopment was framed as a problem resulting from a lack of technology, investment, and entrepreneurial culture, which the First World was eager to remediate by reconstructing Western capitalism in these states (Thomson, 2004: 178). Consequently the developed world set out to modernise agriculture in the developing world by introducing mechanical and technical production methods through what was later coined the Green Revolution.

### ***Development and the Green Revolution***

Broadly the Green Revolution can be understood as the "modernisation of agriculture based on the industrialisation of farm inputs" (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 24). The period spanning from the 1960s to the 1990s marked an era that involved the development of high-yielding varieties of cereal grains; the expansion of irrigation infrastructure; modernisation of management techniques; and the distribution of hybridized seeds, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides to farmers (Pimentel, 2014: 81).

The Green Revolution was supported through a well-financed global research campaign that led to dramatic increases in production with the global food availability per person rising with 11% from 1970 to 1990 (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 27). However, these gains did not transfer equally across

and within countries. A quantitative study by Freebairn (1995) reviewed more than 300 research reports published on the Green Revolution and showed that 80% of these reports found that inequality increased during this era. To make way for larger and more capital-efficient farms, poor people were forced to migrate to the cities. With the loss of their agrarian land, the poor could no longer be food self-sufficient. Furthermore, they did not possess the skills necessary to secure a job in the city and could thus not afford the food that was produced. Thus a major problem of the Green Revolution was that its positive gains to combat hunger through increased food *availability* was offset by a decrease in food *access* which arguably resulted in greater global hunger.

The socioeconomic impact of the Green Revolution and its forced development philosophy are widely criticised in food security literature. Rosin *et al.* (2012: 7) notes that during this era lives were lost due to the "diversion of food crops into cash crops, debt-driven poverty as farmers had to borrow to access more expensive technologies, farmer suicides in the Punjab, the lack of financial support into different kinds of agronomic research, vitamin A deficiency, and political instability". Furthermore, from an ecological perspective, the Green Revolution set off an increased consumption of water and energy resources, the spread of monocultures, the loss of food quality and safety in exchange for high production volumes, and an increase in chemical and biological pollution (IBON International, 2012: 36). Overall the Green Revolution created dependence on large-scale and technologically intensive food production. With the advent of neoliberal economics this method of production became entrenched in the food regime due to the increased commodification of food. The logics of neoliberalism called for a pure market system with minimal interference from the state; trade came to be upheld as the engine for growth. This development paradigm was enshrined in the Washington Consensus that was put in to practice through the structural adjustment policies during the 1980s (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 37).

### ***Structural adjustment programmes and the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture***

From 1989 onward, under the so-called Washington consensus, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank entrenched neoliberal globalisation by imposing structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs constituted a standard reform package for crisis-wracked developing countries to follow. The SAPs policy prescriptions maintained that the principles of market fundamentalism would pave the way towards equity and prosperity. Holt-Giménez *et al.* (2010: 37) notes that the IMF and the World Bank forced developing countries into opening up their economies "[u]nder the guise of macroeconomic stability". As such these policies of trade

liberation, foreign investment, deregulation, and privatisation aimed to push developing countries into the arena of international competition. This favoured developed countries and multinational corporations which, as opposed to developing countries, already established domestic industries on the free market doctrine. Under market liberalisation, trade inequalities between the developed and the developing world worsened since the latter was forced to allow cheap food imports and agricultural products to be dumped in local markets. As developing countries started to incur trade deficits, they began to look to international banks and financial institutions for loans. This aggravated the developing South's dependence on the North since developing countries' public funds had to be allocated to debt-servicing instead of supporting agriculture and development.

The formation of the WTO after the Uruguay Round further ensured the global integration of industrial agriculture. The WTO was founded as a "permanent negotiating forum for global trade policy" (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 48) but since it was built on the principles of market fundamentalism its orientation reflects those of developed countries. Essentially the WTO was established to reduce trade barriers which further restricted the rights of sovereign states to regulate their own food and agriculture (Fairbairn, 2010). Under the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) (1995) agriculture became incorporated into the core of the multilateral trading system, albeit not in the envisioned way of ensuring greater trade equality. The AoA institutionalised a set of binding obligations<sup>21</sup> on members to reduce the support provided for their agricultural sectors. The effects of these policies exposed developing countries to subsidised agricultural imports from the developed world and restricted their agri-exports to the developed world (Pritchard, 2012: 41). This undermined developing countries' local production and development, and ultimately led to what McMichael (2010: 614) refer to as an export-oriented "world farm", where food-secure Northern countries produce food staples and where food-insecure Southern countries are compelled to produce luxury high-value crops. As such the AoA sustained the trade inequalities enforced by SAPs since it "tied Southern food security to global markets dominated by multicultural agribusinesses from the industrial North instead of encouraging developing countries to increase self-sufficiency through local farm production" (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 25).

---

<sup>21</sup> The AoA rests on three pillars: domestic support, market access, and export subsidies (Pritchard, 2012:48-49). Under *domestic support* the WTO classified subsidies granted to farmers according to the extent that they distort the market – those subsidies that offers support for farmers to sell output at below-market prices have to be cut back on by local governments. *Market access* involves reduction in tariff barriers which results in imports being more competitive. Through *export subsidies* large scale dumping occur because it allows governments to offload surplus production on the world market by selling commodities at a price below the cost of production.

The world-historical conjunctures of overproduction, the Green Revolution, SAPs and the AoA institutionalised a neoliberal approach to food production and food relations which entrenched inequalities within the corporate food regime that ultimately gave way to the direct causes of the food price crisis.

#### **2.4.1.2. Direct causes of the food price crisis**

As Rosin *et al.* (2012: 4) explain, the food price crisis occurred due to the "compounding effects of coincidental factors" and as such it is difficult to pin point the exact causes thereof. Although high food prices are assigned the blame for the food crisis, it should be emphasised that the problem is not high food prices per se, but rather high food prices amidst poverty. Poverty prevents food access which leads to food insecurity. What is of note is how the corporate food regime with its neoliberal foundation continues to produce increasingly unequal outcomes for the developed-rich and the developing-poor, with the former's growth inherently linked to the exploitation of the latter.

The bedrock of neoliberal inequality provided a platform for the direct causes of the crisis to develop. Kotz (2009: 307) notes that neoliberalism set two important developments in motion: an increase in inequality within society; and an increase in the financial sector's involvement in speculative and risky activities – both of which contributed to encourage the direct causes of the food crisis. It is widely regarded that the volatile price of oil; investment in biofuels; rising meat consumption; an unfavourable climate; and food speculation are the most prominent causes of the crisis. The following section describes how these various factors contributed to rising food prices that eventually culminated in the 2007-2008 food price crisis.

#### ***The volatile price of oil***

Between January 2008 and July 2008 the price of oil per barrel rose from \$92 to \$147 which increased the price of agricultural inputs and consequently led to higher production costs and food prices (IMF, 2008). The corporate food regime, with its reliance on oil for large-scale production and distribution and its neoliberal financialisation of the commodity market, is heavily affected by changes in the oil price. The corporate food industry is significantly more oil-intensive than the previous regimes. Lucas, Jones & Hines (2007:13) illustrate this by noting that over the past 50 years the food system has undergone major changes that intensified the pressure on oil resources: the mechanisation of agriculture; a dramatic increase in global food trade; the entrenchment of the supply-chain and warehouse system; and the shift to highly processed and packaged food.

Interestingly, Holt-Giménez *et al.* (2010: 11) explain that a decrease in oil prices typically does not reflect in the food price; the difference is pocketed as profits by grain traders and retailers. Consequently high food prices tend to "stick" even after the price of oil drops thereby creating a new price level that will endure until the next spike in oil prices which will lead to a higher food price level. The implication for food security is that once certain consumers are excluded from the food market because of an increase in food prices, this restriction of food access is likely to endure thereby resulting in chronic food insecurity.

Aryeetey & Moyo (2013: 24) explain that high oil prices fuel increasing food prices via three ways. First higher oil prices make food production and distribution more costly: oil is not only used to transport food an average of 2400 kilometres, it is also used to manufacture inorganic fertilizers and pesticides, and to operate machinery (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 110). A second way higher oil prices contribute to higher food prices is via the increased incentive for investment in biofuels, and third the tight link between energy and agricultural commodity markets in the corporate food regime stimulates speculation in commodities. Both the effect of biofuel investment and speculation are discussed below.

### ***Investment in biofuels***

As mentioned above, the increase in the price of oil spurred on investment in biofuels. Dwindling oil reserves and climate change signalled a demand for grain to be used in biofuel production: the higher oil price created an incentive to invest in food crops as an alternative energy source whilst the developed world's commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions further led to increased interest in "oil from soil" (Havnevik, 2011: 23).

Windengård (2011: 51) notes that biofuels are presented as a win-win-win construct since it is promoted as an all-encompassing solution to energy security, environmental protection, and rural development. Similarly Holt-Giménez *et al.* (2010: 70) refer to biofuels as a perceived "industrial one-stop-shop" to solve agribusiness' problems. This is because the transformation of food to fuel creates a market for overproduced commodities to be turned into fuel, thereby inflating the value of those commodities in both the food and the fuel market, which ultimately combats agribusiness' falling rate of profit. The rising use of food crops for biofuels led to higher prices of grain which in turn contributed to the food price crisis (Aryeetey and Moyo, 2013: 22).

The increased investment in biofuels also had an impact on food security through the related issue of land grabbing. The increased investment in biofuels resulted in large-scale land acquisitions of

foreign land by companies, governments and individuals through land deals with the often corrupt host country. The most important impetus is for biofuel production, although some land is also being used for forestry plantations to offset carbon emissions of rich countries (Broughton, 2013: 25). Another reason for land grabbing is to ensure food security in the investing country often at the cost of the host country's food security (Young, 2012: 134). Land grabbing has been referred to as a neo-colonial practice that systemically exploits the economically marginalised world (Broughton, 2013: 25). People in the developing world are being forced off their land. Once in an urban setting, unemployment prevents former peasants access to the food market due to their lack of skills. Furthermore, following urban migration, their food access is restricted since they cannot live off the land like they were used to do – much like during the Green Revolution described earlier. McMichael (2009b: 142) notes that, like with most inventions of the corporate food regime, the "food/fuel agricultural complex is [thus] in tension with forms of localism" which has an adverse effect on food security.

### ***Increased consumption of meat***

Rapid population growth coupled with income growth in China and India has added pressure on the corporate food regime to produce more meat. As income rises, consumer demands shifts to a more Western diet with preference for high-value foods like meat and dairy (Lee *et al.*, 2013: 4). This meatification of global diets affects food security via different channels. First is its direct effect on food prices: meat production puts strain on the world's food supply since it takes seven to eight kilos of grain to produce on kilo of beef (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 14) and as such crops that could have been used for human consumption are used for feed<sup>22</sup>.

Second is the meatification of diets' adverse effect on food security through the expansion of industrialised agriculture. An overproduction by factory-farms has led to large parts of these surpluses being dumped in the markets of developing countries (Fritz, 2014: 15). The meatification of diets also "requires significantly more land per person to be cultivated than would be required on plant-based diets" (Weis, 2007: 42) which encourages land grabbing in developing countries. Dumping and land grabbing push local and less commercial producers out of business, which

---

<sup>22</sup> However, it has to be noted that there are different ways to produce meat. The link between increased meat consumption and higher food prices is the factory-farm production of meat in particular which has shown to be a highly inefficient production method. De Schutter (2009: 3) explains that "animals raised in industrialized countries consume more than 5 calories in feedstock for each calorie of meat or dairy food produced" but in countries like "Kenya, where animals are not fed grain but live off grass or agricultural by-products which humans cannot eat, livestock actually yield more calories than they consume". Thus it is not the meatification of diets per se that is problematic for food security, but rather the industrialisation of agriculture.

results in unemployment and ultimately restricts food access thereby leading to greater food insecurity.

A third channel through which increased meat consumption negatively impacts food security is via its effect on the environment. The degradation of soil due to overgrazing renders it unsuitable for future food production thereby driving up the food prices. Meat production is also one of the prime contributors to the emission of greenhouse gases: De Schutter (2009: 2) states that these "[u]nsustainable forms of agriculture [...] are accelerating the trend towards global warming".

### ***Climate change and the weather***

While agriculture is an obvious culprit of climate change, it is also a victim thereof. At the time of the crisis it was reported that an average of 500 weather-related disasters were taking place each year compared with 120 in the 1980s (Oxfam, 2007).

In the period leading up to the crisis, several distinct natural disasters that are associated with the effects of climate change have caused disruptions in crop production, with a drought in Australia being one of the most notable (Rosin *et al.*, 2012: 4). Reporting for *The New York Times*, Bradsher (2008) notes that Australia's rice crop was reduced by 98 percent which led to a doubling of rice prices over three months. Also, instead of producing its good-year quantity of 25 million tons of wheat, Australia's 2006 harvest only delivered 9.8 million tons (Bradsher, 2008) which put a significant strain on the supply thereby driving up the price. Poor harvests could also be attributed to the 2006 heat wave in California (Blakemore & Sandell, 2006); unseasonal rains in Kerala (*The Economic Times*, 2008); and multiple hurricanes in 2008 in Burma, Cuba, and Haiti (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 14). Furthermore, ongoing water depletion and soil erosion negatively impacts crop production which also contributed to higher prices in the era preceding the crisis.

### ***Speculation***

A main characteristic of the corporate food regime is the financialisation in the food system Epstein (2002: 3) defines financialisation as the "increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and international levels". Heightened financialisation in the food system thus has an effect on the distribution of power and influence over the governance of the food system. Clapp (2013: 2) explains that agri-food investments abstract food "from its physical form [by turning it] into highly complex agricultural commodity derivatives". She further explains that financialisation has brought about a "new kind of 'distancing' within the food system" by



increasing the number of actors involved in the global commodity chains. This has come to be associated with a lack of transparency and a constraint of information feedback within the system which makes it difficult to determine the true effect that investors' buying and selling of agricultural commodities have on the price of food. This lack of clarity can be strategically utilised by financial actors that seek to portray themselves as the providers of solutions instead as the root of the problems.

Burch and Lawrence (2009: 271) note that, foregoing the crisis, the use of new and more intricate financial derivatives burgeoned, and that there has also been an increase in a variety of agri-food investments ranging from investment in farmland, agricultural inputs, and logistics to significant direct investments by Goldman Sachs. The addition of new types of agri-food derivatives provided a basis for increased speculation within the commodities market. As the combination of the increase in the oil price, investment in biofuels, and rising meat consumption signalled that food prices were on the rise, speculators rushed to the commodities market with the hope to benefit from rising prices. Holt-Giménez *et al.* (2010: 17) explain that the flooding of the commodities market by speculators drove up food prices even further, which amidst banking deregulation became beyond the control of the governments.

## **2.5. Conclusion**

Over the past century the development of capitalism inspired similar developments in the production and distribution of food. In accordance with capitalism's development, the food regime underwent eras of liberation and eras of reform that reflect the economic logics of the political hegemon at the time. Attempts at altering the food regime for the better resulted in the formation of new food regimes, with a transformation from the settler-colonial regime under British hegemony, to the surplus regime under US hegemony, which ultimately gave way to the corporate food regime under neoliberal hegemony. Since the food price crisis of 2007-2008, the corporate food regime has become characterised as unsustainable. It was shown that each of the causes that contributed to the food crisis is rooted in the neoliberal foundation of the corporate food regime. Consequently the crisis should not be regarded as a sudden event, but rather as one that has been years in the making. In this regard Holt-Giménez *et al.* (2011: 114) note that "disasters, be they sudden or gradual, can provide insights into politics and society" that can point to ways in which state and market functions can be replaced by alternative logic. The following chapter is devoted to map out the dominant and alternative logics of food politics that emerged in a response to the food crisis.

## *Chapter Three: The food regime/food movement framework*

### **3.1. Introduction**

It was established in the previous chapter that the food price crisis was the result of a combination of concurrent factors. Since these factors are all inherent to neoliberalism and subsequently to the corporate food regime, the crisis drew attention to the limitations of this system. In the discussion below it is shown that, following the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the food crisis also came to be understood as part of the greater crisis of neoliberalism. Amidst the backdrop of these crises, the general understanding of chronic hunger was called into question. This chapter first explains how the respective crises served as a turning point for food security analysis by highlighting the differences between old and emerging food security analysis. Second, the food regime/food movements framework of Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011) is presented in detail. The framework identifies four ideologies of food politics that represent the different voices in the ongoing debate on food security. It is argued that, due to the influence of Polanyi and Gramsci, the framework is grounded in critical theory, which is the dominant narrative within which the framework is constructed. After noting the framework's theoretical roots, the framework is presented by providing an overview of the ideologies of food politics: *neoliberal*, *reformist*, *progressive* and *radical*. Each of these ideologies has a distinct orientation that reflects its perspective of food security. The bulk of the chapter is spent to explain each of these ideologies. An overview of each ideology's *discourse* and the *main institutions* associated with the particular ideology are presented. A description of their divergent *orientations* and *models* are provided, and the *key documents* that enshrine each ideology are also discussed.

### **3.2. Towards altered perspectives on chronic hunger**

#### **3.2.1. The food crisis as turning point**

The 2007-2008 food price crisis once again highlighted the shortcomings of the corporate food regime. Drastic food price increases immobilised the poor that spend up to 80 per cent of their income on food, and who are particularly vulnerable (Aryeetey & Moyo, 2013: 23). Consequently, in the wake of these price increases, the amount of undernourished people in the world increased from 842 million in 2008 to 1.02 billion by the end of 2009 (FAO, 2009). The food crisis disturbed the complacency around global hunger. Previously the public perceived chronic hunger as the product of environmental or political shocks and as such food insecurity was deemed as a temporary situation in the developing world; a situation that can be reversed quickly by the provision of food

aid. However the effects of the food crisis were felt in the developed and developing world alike which brought to light a more accurate public perception of chronic hunger. Soon it became apparent that the crisis is indicative of a problem in the food regime as a whole.

At the height of the crisis civil unrest indicated "a growing global awareness of and discontent with the fact that the basic necessity of food is not reaching hundreds of millions of people around the world" (Schanbacher, 2010: vii). Numerous international experts pushed for a rapid response to the food crisis in order to prevent political instability. Importantly, it is only after political stability was threatened that the state of food security was referred to as a crisis. Prior to the unrest widespread chronic hunger was considered a "normal and acceptable" feature of market volatility despite the fact that up to 1.02 billion people were chronically hungry (Rosin *et al.*, 2012: 3). It is only when general public discontent surfaced with the potential to destabilise governments that these unprecedented level of hunger was framed as a crisis.

### **3.2.2. The food crisis as part of the crisis of neoliberalism**

Following on the heels of the food crisis was the global financial crisis. The conjunction of food, energy, and financial crises, or the "general accumulation crisis" (McMichael, 2012: 690) caused opinionated journalists, historians, economists, and political scientists to re-evaluate the structure of the interconnected economic system with its far-reaching effects. Since the food system does not operate in isolation the food crisis can be viewed as a signal of a greater systemic crisis. Shortly after the food crisis The Great Recession of 2008-09 affirmed the relevance of a renewed debate around the sustainability of neoliberal economic policies. Since its advent neoliberalism and its ideals have been widely criticized from different standpoints, but Gamble (2009: 69) is of opinion that this financial crash of 2008 finally "burst the ideological bubble of neoliberalism". The neoliberal ideology of limitless growth as upheld by faith in the market is fundamentally questioned by Thomas Friedman (2009) who hints at the crisis as a signal that "the whole growth model we created over the last fifty years is simply unsustainable, economically and ecologically". The root of this unsustainable growth is to be found in the fact that the neoliberal growth model subjugates nature and its resources to the free market. Vandana Shiva (2013: 18) points out that in *The Great Transformation* (1944) Polanyi already warned against the foreseeable adverse effects of a growth model based on the commodification and reduction of nature and society to the market. In the absence of governance and proper intervention, the current growth model has come to be associated with environmental decline and social inequality.

The Food Ethics Council (2010: 79) comments on the scale of the challenge by noting that social justice and sustainability problems are rooted in the structural features of the system and across all aspects of the production and consumption of food. Economic liberalisation has not proved to be the most appropriate strategy to advance sustainable solutions to food security, quite the contrary. The corporate food regime has failed society and the environment. This is highlighted by the crisis which brought to the forefront the food failures of current times thereby showcasing the contradictions and shortcomings of neoliberalism. Sodano (2012: 382) states that it was with the 2008 food crisis and the contemporary financial crisis that the "issues of food security and the fragility of the global food system were brought to the fore as hot topics". In the process of uncovering the causes of the global financial crisis it has been ascertained that the crisis did not represent a problem to be overcome but rather a system to be restructured.

### **3.2.3. Old versus emerging perspectives on food security**

The abovementioned crises served as a turning point for food security discourse since the way food security was understood before the crisis could not fully explain the onset thereof. Since the definition of food security is largely a definition of a *goal*, the concept can be interpreted most broadly. Windfuhr & Jonsén (2005: 23) note that the definition of food security does not automatically recommend a specific programme to achieve the goal thereof and consequently food security can be viewed from diverse perspectives which all attempt to achieve the same goal.

Lang and Barling (2012: 316-317) distinguish between two sets of perspectives that they label the "old" and "emerging" perspectives on food security. The old perspectives on food security deem under-production as the core problem. This productionist perspective holds that the increasing human population along with changing food preferences left the food system unable to keep up with demand. Food insecurity is thus framed as a supply-side problem that can be overcome by improving the efficiency of food production through technological innovations and managerial changes. Underlying this perspective is a positive vision of human ingenuity to ensure more efficient production. Consequently a great body of literature is devoted to issues of new productivism in an attempt to intensify production through precision agriculture, next generation genetic engineering and nanotechnology. A strong belief in consumer freedom and the workings of the market are also central to this production perspective.

However, after an assessment of the crises it became clearer that approaches to address hunger should be less production-focused since the crisis signalled that poverty and overproduction, as

opposed to scarcity and overpopulation, sit at the core of the food security dilemma. In 1982 Amartya Sen already distinguished between a "nature-focused" and "society-focused" approach to food security. The former involves technical and environmental solutions from the fields of natural sciences and engineering, whereas the latter focuses on political economy solutions rooted in the social sciences. At the time Sen (1982: 443) noted that the nature-focused approach to food security is the most dominant. Although it has since remained the prevailing approach, the crises highlighted the prominent role politics and economics have to play in addressing food security.

A greater understanding of food security has led Garnett (2013: 31-33) to identify additional perspectives on food security beyond that of the producer challenge. These emerging perspectives frame food security as a consumption challenge and/or socio-economic challenge. These views reflect the emerging perspectives on food security and emphasise the importance of sustainable food systems where the success thereof is not measured purely through production quantities but in environmental, health, social, cultural, ethical, economic, and political factors as well (Lang, 2010: 275). By framing food security as a consumption challenge, solutions are focused on demand restraint. This perspective stresses solutions that drive down the consumption of high-impact foods such as meat and dairy. Viewing food security as a socio-economic perspective highlights inequality as the core concern. The transformation of the food system through the development of local food systems, and fairer trade between nations are emphasised as solutions that would promote equality across and within countries.

Furthermore, in contrast with the old perspective on food security, the emerging perspective does not view food price crisis as a sudden event caused by external or market shocks. Instead the emerging food security analysis views this crisis as the exposure of a long-running failure; a symptom of a system already under stress. The core concern of emerging food security analysis is the mismatch of production, consumption, and policy. Subsequently it is advocated that the food system should be redesigned for social, environmental and economic sustainability (Lang & Barling, 2012: 317).

### **3.3. A food regime/food movements framework**

#### **3.3.1. Context-setting and outline**

In line with the emerging perspective on food security that views the crisis as product of the normal everyday workings of the system, the corporate food regime continues to be under scrutiny. Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 117-118) constructed a framework to distinguish between the main

ideological differences between proposed food security models. They recognize four distinct streams of food politics: *neoliberal*, *reformist*, *progressive*, and *radical*. Each of these streams harbours and reproduces a different discourse and subsequently has a particular orientation to solve chronic hunger. Accordingly specific institutions can be associated with each stream of food politics depending on the discourse they use and the orientation they adhere to. What further differentiate each stream of food politics are their different approaches to the food crisis. Each ideology advocates a different model to govern food and food-related resources like labour and land. The framework is presented as Table 2, and a discussion on each of these ideologies follows in the sections below.

Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 114) explain that the "diversity of approaches [...] reflects important class, race, and systemic divides". As such the framework is especially useful for understanding the agendas of a diverse range of groups and individuals. As Allen (2013: 135) points out, "how we define the problem, of course, makes some solutions seem obvious and others seem much less obvious". Thus focusing on the similarities and differences between these approaches is essential for mapping out an alternative food system that is both fair and sustainable.

### **3.3.2. Critical theory as foundation of the framework**

It is necessary to acknowledge that framework regime/food movements framework rests on critical theory. Within the context of International Relations<sup>23</sup> Robert Cox distinguishes between problem-solving theory and critical theory. Cox (1981: 128-130) explains that problem-solving theory "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action" whereas critical theory "does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing".

The food regime/food movements framework highlights that there is a definite ideological split between "those that seek to stabilise the corporate food regime, and those that want to change it" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 114). The framework above can thus be said to have its foundation in critical theory since it accounts for the fact that the corporate food regime is the construct of an inherent set of power relations which the *neoliberal* and *reformist* streams seek to maintain, as opposed to the *progressive* and *radical* streams that aim to deliberately adopt a critical approach in order to transcend the corporate food regime. By acknowledging food politics

---

<sup>23</sup> "International Relations" is used interchangeably with "International Relations Theory" to refer to the academic study field or discipline, whereas "international relations" (without capitals) is used to refer to the practice of world politics.

approaches that are rooted in critical theory, the framework itself can be viewed as a construct of critical theory.

Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 114) furthermore point out another ideological split in their framework, the one between the *neoliberal* stream and the *reformist* stream that respectively corresponds to the opposing forces of liberalisation and reform within Polanyi's "double movement of capitalism". According to Polanyi (1944: 76) one of capitalism's core characteristics is its cyclical nature that alternates periods of unregulated markets with periods of state intervention that seeks to address social concerns. This double movement of capitalism is kept in motion by contesting demands placed on the system. Political and social contestations within civil society culminate in a "range of political possibilities for social opposition and government reforms to liberalised markets" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 113). As such the double movement of capitalism is representative of a greater struggle within civil society which is consistent with the Gramscian depiction of civil society as an arena of struggle where the dominant class exercise power not only through the mechanism of the state institutions but also through ideological coercion.

The food regime/food movements framework is furthermore rooted in critical theory since it builds on Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) food regime theory<sup>24</sup>. Food regime theory also has a strong foundation in critical theory, especially in Gramscianism since it offers a historical account of the food system's development by drawing on the ideas, production relations, and institutions that contributed to form and maintain the hegemony within each of the food regimes. As discussed earlier, the concept of hegemony is central to food regime analysis in so much as each of the food regimes was the product of a particular hegemon with Britain setting tone during the first food regime, the US during the second, and neoliberalism in the third and current food regime. At this point it is necessary for the ensuing discussion to elaborate on the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Hegemony is more encompassing than a mere monopoly power on the state's institutions. Morton (2003: 156) explains that although a hegemon legitimises its power through the state, it establishes its ideological dominance through the institutions of civil society (churches, schools and universities, the media). As such the ideological standpoint of the hegemon becomes entrenched in society and ultimately viewed as the natural order of affairs. Hegemony is thus not an explicit dominance but rather one that is based on a blend of force and consent.

---

<sup>24</sup> See section 2.2.

Table 2. A food regime/food movements framework

	<b>Corporate Food Regime</b>		<b>Food Movements</b>	
Politics	Neoliberal	Reformist	Progressive	Radical
Discourse	Food Enterprise	Food Security	Food Justice	Food Sovereignty
Main institutions	International Financial Corporation (World Bank); IMF; WTO; Green Revolution; Cargill; Monsanto; ADM; Tyson; Carrefour; Tesco; Walmart Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	International Bank for Reconstruction & Development (World Bank); FAO; Slow Food Movement; some Food Policy Councils; most food banks & food aid programmes	Alternative fair trade and many Slow Food chapters; many organizations in the Community Food Security Movement; many Food Policy Councils and youth food and justice movements; many farmworker and labour organisations	Viá Campesina, International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty; many food justice and rights-based movements
Orientation	Corporate	Development	Empowerment	Entitlement
Model	Overproduction; corporate concentration; unregulated markets and monopolies; monocultures (including organic) GMOs; biofuels; mass global consumption of industrial food; phasing out of peasant and family agriculture in local retail	Mainstreaming/certification of niche markets (e.g. organic, fair, local, sustainable); maintaining northern agricultural subsidies; "sustainable" roundtables for soy, forest products, etc.; market-led land reform; microcredit	Agroecologically produced local food; investment in underserved communities; new business models and community benefit packages for production, processing, and retail; better wages for agricultural workers; solidarity economics; land & food access; regulated markets and supply	Dismantle corporate agri-foods monopoly; power; parity; redistributive land reform; community rights to water and seed; regionally based food systems; democratisation of food system; sustainable livelihoods; protection from dumping/overproduction; revival of agroecologically managed peasant agriculture to distribute wealth and cool planet; regulated markets and supply
Approach to the food crisis	Increased industrial production; unregulated corporate monopolies; land grabs; expansion of GMOs; public-private partnerships; liberal markets; international sourced food aid	Same as neoliberal but with increased medium farmer production and some locally sourced food aid; more agricultural aid but tied to GMOs and "bio-fortified/climate-resistant" crops	Right to food; better safety nets; sustainably produced locally-sourced food; agroecologically based agricultural development	Human right to food sovereignty; locally sourced, sustainably produced, culturally appropriate, democratically controlled focus on UN/FAO negotiations
Guiding document	World Bank 2009 Development Report	World Bank 2008 Development Report; Comprehensive Framework for Action	IAASTD	Declaration of Nyéléni; UN Declaration of Peasant Rights; IAASTD



It is along these lines that the hegemony of neoliberalism is constructed and upheld within a global class structure that benefits those who have capital at the cost of those who have not. True to hegemonic nature, the neoliberal ideology has become so embedded in civil society that it has become difficult to think outside of the framework of free market capitalism. Consequently it is equally difficult to fathom solutions to chronic hunger beyond the framework of neoliberalism. Even the concept of food security is a construct of neoliberalism!<sup>25</sup> Thus one of the key challenges to addressing chronic hunger "is to remove the structural barriers that are holding back all [the] promising alternatives" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 85). In this regard Allen (2013: 136) as well as Lang and Barling (2012: 317) highlight the importance of social sciences' role to illuminate and challenge the dominant epistemological frameworks that assign problem definitions and solutions.

The remainder of the chapter discusses the food regime/food movements framework, and illustrates the ideological divergence in the approaches that seek to maintain the current food regime and those that challenge the neoliberal hegemony. A detailed discussion of the neoliberal, reformist, progressive, and radical streams of food politics are presented below along with their corresponding discourses, orientations, models, and approaches. The main institutions and guiding documents for each stream are also described.

### **3.3.3. Food politics within the corporate food regime**

At one end of the food politics spectrum is the approaches rooted in the corporate food regime. These approaches seek to address chronic hunger by making adjustments to the current food system in order to still preserve the production and distribution patterns of the corporate food regime. Although the productionist policy paradigm that's associated with the corporate food regime is now widely challenged when presented as a solution to food security (Lang & Barling, 2012: 313) this perspective still dominates the debates on food security. Garnet (2013: 31) argues that the dominance of this perspective can be ascribed to the fact that it serves existing power structures

---

<sup>25</sup> The concept "food security" was first coined at the 1974 World Food Summit at the advent of neoliberalism and was initially rooted in the productionist paradigm. As such the first definition of the concept is exemplary of the *neoliberal* trend in food politics as discussed below. However, throughout the development of the current food regime, the concept has undergone significant changes. Currently it is associated with the *reformist* ideology, and to a lesser extent with the *progressive* one – see below. It should be noted that the way in which the concept is employed depends on the interactions of many political, social and economic considerations. For the purpose of this discussion the term is used in a depoliticised manner in the sense that it does not presuppose an allegiance with a particular ideology of food politics. Within this discussion food security simply refers to the absence of chronic hunger.

within the corporate food regime. Both the *neoliberal* and *reformist* approaches' orientation is based on the assumption that economic growth – albeit via different models – is the guiding force behind eliminating chronic hunger.

### **3.3.3.1. Neoliberal food politics**

#### ***Discourse and main institutions***

The discourse of neoliberal food politics is that of *food enterprise* which constitutes a global corporate and industrially-based food system with very few restrictions placed on business activities. Some of the most notable institutions that subscribe to neoliberal include Northern-dominated international finance and development institutions like the World Bank, WTO, and IMF<sup>26</sup>. Other major role-players include agri-food monopolies (like Cargill, Monsanto, ADM, Tyson, Carrefour, Tesco, and Walmart) and organisations of big philanthropy capital like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Holt-Giménez & Shattuck (2011: 119) note that the discourse of food enterprise is advocated by the ruling corporate classes. These institutions and actors propagate a certain vision of economic and social globalisation as reflected in their corporate orientation and industrial model. This approach currently dominates food politics since it relies on the established hegemony of neoliberalism within the current food regime. The dynamics of the corporate food regime, as detailed in the previous chapter, precisely reflects the food order that neoliberal food politics set out to maintain.

The advocates of neoliberal food politics draw on the fact that neoliberalism is the governing principle of the current regime to reproduce and further entrench neoliberalism. Morvaridi (2012: 243) explain that neoliberal actors use their economic capital to gain symbolic capital which they in turn use to reproduce economic capital. Symbolic capital can be understood as these actors' resource base of prestige, honour, or recognition that they receive from advocating neoliberal values within the climate of neoliberal hegemony. The legitimacy they gain from their symbolic capital is eventually used to deepen the discourse of food enterprise in order to create new economic opportunities for themselves within the framework of neoliberal food politics.

#### ***Orientation and model***

The resultant orientation for such free market economics is a *corporate* one based on an agricultural model of increased capitalisation. Thus, "rather than acknowledging a fundamental flaw in the

---

<sup>26</sup> For a historical analysis of these institutions' contribution to neoliberal food politics, see Schanbacher (2010: 35-49). Schanbacher accounts for specific policies and agreements of the World Bank, WTO, and IMF that secured the hegemony of neoliberalism by projecting this ideology on the world through these institutions.

global food system", proponents of neoliberal food politics viewed the food crisis as a "situation that could be alleviated without revising the existing approaches" (Rosin *et al.*, 2012: 5). As such they promote the idea of broad-based economic growth through a corporate orientation with the support of an industrial model that seeks to address complex issues like food security by the application of business solutions.

The corporate orientation to food security finds expression in what is called the New Green Revolution. Similar to the Green Revolution, the New Green Revolution is aimed at agrarian restructuring by increasing productivity in an attempt to reduce poverty and ensure greater food security. This industrial model focuses on investment against chronic hunger in the form of macroeconomic development – especially in the developing world. The understanding is that in these areas the development of the capitalism is incomplete which accounts for poverty and food insecurity. Consequently intergovernmental institutions and large agri-businesses aim to facilitate the commodification process in especially the rural areas of the developing world in order to expand the market economy (Morvaridi, 2012: 246). The expansion of the market economy is supported by increased productivity through free trade, innovation, new technology, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and investment in biofuels – as described with reference to the corporate food regime in the previous chapter.

### ***Guiding document***

The *food enterprise* discourse is enshrined in the *2009 World Development Report (WDR)* of the World Bank which serves as a guiding document for neoliberal food politics. The message of this report is that "economic growth is seldom balanced" and that "[e]fforts to spread it prematurely will jeopardise progress" (The World Bank, 2009: 5-6). Considering that the neoliberal ideology holds that economic growth is the key to address chronic hunger, the report essentially states that chronic hunger is an inevitable part of the market economy and that attempts to address this product of unequal development will be detrimental to growth in the North.

The report encourages governments not to work against the grain of the global economy, and subsequently the development of poor areas and communities should not be the policy goal. Instead economic growth as a whole should be targeted by incorporating the poor areas and communities into the market economy. In order to achieve this, the report calls on the so-called three Ds of development: density, distance, and division. With regards to density, the report cites the example of Singapore as both the densest and richest country thereby highlighting that increased density

increases production (The World Bank, 2009: 15). The discourse of *food enterprise* praises increased production since it is a sign of economic growth. In this view, the more than 1 billion people that live in slums in urban areas are not necessarily viewed as a social concern but rather as a positive sign for economic development. The logic goes that presence of slums is a signal that more individuals are in pursuit to take advantage of the economic opportunities that an urban setting has to offer, and by drawing on the upsurge of small businesses in slums, the report reiterates that increased density is to be encouraged. The message for policy makers is that these communities can be made into vibrant living economic communities. Following the same rationale, the report encourages a decrease in the distance within the global economy by encouraging and supporting the move of people from rural areas into the cities. It is highlighted that the issue of distance can also be addressed by reducing transaction cost through less government intervention in the form of less strict border control and taxes. With regards to division, the report refers to all man-made barriers that prevent transaction and especially note international borders, but also cultural divergence as divisions that restrict the free-flow of products and services. The report thus advises governments to further open up their economies and not to try and fight the forces of the free market.

### **3.3.3.2. Reformist food politics**

#### *Discourse and main institutions*

The discourse of reformist food politics is *food security*. The concept is employed broadly in the sense that it refers to the 1996 World Food Summit definition that encompasses food security to be a "a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy lifestyle" (FAO, 1996). This definition is an expansion on the concept as it was first defined at the 1974 World Food Conference at the advent of neoliberalism. Essentially "food security" is thus a neoliberal food politics concept. In line with neoliberal food politics, the initial definition focused solely on the volume and stability amidst fluctuations in production and prices (UN, 1975). However throughout the development of the corporate food regime, and through the double movement of capitalism, the term has been modified in order to reflect a focus on social concern instead of economic concern. As explained above, both the *neoliberal* and *reformist* streams of food politics are "structurally integral to the corporate food regime" since they reflect the two dimensions of capitalism's double movement of liberation and reform (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 123). It is through this process of liberalisation and reform that the concept of food security has been adjusted to account for social issues.

The main institutions of the corporate food regime also have both *neoliberal* and *reformist* projects. Key actors in reformist food politics include the intergovernmental institutions like the World Bank, and the UN's FAO, but also organisations like the corporate mainstreaming faction of Fair Trade, some chapters of the Slow Food Movement, along with most food banks and food aid programmes.

### ***Orientation and model***

Reformist food politics have become more influential since the food crisis. Ultimately it aims to lessen the social and environmental burden of the corporate food regime by making modifications to the current system. Although its goal is to mitigate the externalities of a corporate food regime, the position of reformist food politics is in effect identical to neoliberal politics: to reproduce the corporate food regime (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 115). Subsequently the reformist actors do not advocate drastically new policies; they rather focus on mainstreaming socially and environmentally sustainable alternatives into existing market structures.

The orientation of reformist food politics is that of *development*, and in particular state-led development. While this stream do not completely subscribe to a neo-Keynesian model, it does call on the state to support agricultural development, and to recognise the human right to food. Within the reformist model "governments have a legal obligation to ensure the food security of their citizens" although the means through which this is to be accomplished are not specified (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 122). Reformist food politics often manifests in the call for increased safety nets such as food stamps, food banks, and food aid to accommodate the social shortcomings of the market economy. Other approaches include industry self-regulation initiatives and civil society driven corporate responsibility to address the issues of inadequate sustainability and equity within the regime. In doing so, the reformist approach intends to modify both consumers' and industries' behaviour by setting new standards that focus on fair, sustainable, and local trade.

Importantly, the model of reformist food politics still upholds the corporate food regime through its support for neoliberal institutions and subsequently the increased application of technological solutions. Reformist food politics also encourage free market rhetoric, however it promotes to regulate the market for social re-stabilisation until the corporate food regime improves to such an extent that it addresses its shortcomings.

### ***Guiding documents***

The *2008 World Development Report* of the World Bank with its theme "Agriculture for Development" is a key document for reformist food politics. The report presents agriculture as a

tool to be utilised in order to achieve development. Agriculture is highlighted as a unique tool in this regard since it "contributes to development as an economic activity, as a livelihood, and as a provider of environmental services" (The World Bank, 2008: 2-3). This statement reflects the reformist sentiment in that it acknowledges the value of agriculture to prop up both economic growth and social and environmental advancements. In contrast with the *2009 World Development Report* discussed above, this one advocates promoting rural economies as opposed to supporting urban migration. The development role smallholder farming and peasants can play is highlighted, however still within the context of the corporate food regime as the report encourages increased productivity for smallholder farming through the use of technological solutions and market incentives (The World Bank, 2008: 10).

Another key document that reflects the reformist project is the UN High-level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis' Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) (2010) that builds on the *2008 WDR*. The CFA was "designed to encourage concerted responses to the food price crisis with actions that respond to the immediate needs of the vulnerable populations and contribute to longer-term resilience" (UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 2010: xi). With its so-called twin track approach that focuses on both the immediate and ongoing challenges of those that are particularly vulnerable, the CFA aims to address social and sustainability issues that relate to food security. This is also reflected in their strategies for improving food security which echoes the *2008 WDR*'s focus of utilising agriculture as a tool for development. Similar to the aims of the *2008 WDR*, the CFA strategies are targeted on improving "small-holder farming, pastoralism, and environmental sustainability" through the use of social protection from the government and through strengthening multilateral trading systems. As such the CFA is representative of the reformist approach since it calls for adjustment *within* the current system in the form of government intervention. However, it does not seek to transcend the corporate food regime since it also supports addressing food security through business-like approaches that focus on increasing productivity and incentives for trade.

#### **3.3.4. Food politics beyond the corporate food regime**

At the other end of the food politics spectrum is the food movement approaches. These approaches challenge the corporate food regime and ultimately seek to bring into existence a new food system that is more equitable and ecologically viable than the industrial model. Both the *progressive* and the *radical* stream are founded in activism and grassroots organisation and find expression in the

form of many heterogeneous food movements. In supporting the commonly-cited belief that solutions to chronic hunger should be more society-based, these food movements challenge neoliberal solutions that promote the globalisation and industrialisation of food production with alternative approaches that focus on the socio-political distinctness of local contexts. Both streams of food politics campaign for greater control over food production and consumption by people who have been marginalised in the corporate food regime. Although the two streams both seek to transcend the current food system, their forms of organisation differ: the progressive stream is represented by various scattered local food movements in the North, while the radical one represents a more militant and united international political network. As such their orientation and model to address hunger also differ, as discussed below.

#### **3.3.4.1. Progressive food politics**

##### ***Discourse and main institutions***

Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011: 124) explain that the progressive stream of food politics has its roots in 1920s US progressivism that advocated for government regulation of large corporations to ensure economic and social justice. The discourse this approach adopts is that of *food justice* which represents a transformation of the current system in order to account for disparities and inequities. The food justice movement is influenced by the racial justice and environmental justice movements. Subsequently they are especially concerned with ensuring access to healthy food for the marginalised. The progressive advocates are primarily based in northern countries and are made up of the middle and working classes, and also the urban and university youth. Community food security and environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that denounce racism and classism also forms part of the progressive movement.

##### ***Orientation and model***

The progressives are orientated towards *empowerment*. They seek to mobilise local and marginalised communities by drawing focus to the rhetoric of the right to food. The right to food "involves the subsequent demand that peoples and national governments have a real and efficacious ability to define their [own] agricultural and food policies" (Schanbacher, 2010: 77). Consequently progressives call for political reform in order to lessen individuals' dependency on capitalist inputs within the food system. The onus is placed on governments to serve the public interest through the protection of civic and environmental common goods that would enable communities to have better access to healthy food instead of being subjugated to industrial food put forth by corporate interests.

Recognising the key role that governments have to play, advocates of the progressive movement also campaign for deepening democracy in order to "make government more accountable and responsive to the needs of its citizens" (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 124). Importantly, without government accountability, the right to food rhetoric is at risk, as "it can be a mockery to tell someone they have the right to food when there is nobody with the duty to provide them with food" (O'Neill, 2002 as quoted in FAO, 2003).

The progressive food politics model is centred on localizing production and creating new business models in disadvantaged communities. With their strong focus on the local-national arena, the progressive food movement is not active transnationally and as such does not actively challenge the corporate food regime. Their approach is decentralised and local as illustrated by one farmer-activist outlook, "We are islands of good food and good community in a sea of bad news" (quoted in Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 125). In this regard, Holt-Giménez (2010: 4) importantly notes that the progressive movement has a pivotal role to play in steering the transformation of the food system. He explains that if the progressive movement were to take their cue from (and form alliances with) reformist institutions, the corporate food regime would remain intact with little scope for transformation. However, if the progressive movement align with the radical movement, the food movement will be united which could result in substantive changes in the status quo due to social pressure.

### ***Guiding documents***

Although there are several guiding documents for each of the individual progressive food movements, the *Global Report of the International Assessment on Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD)* (2009) serves as an overarching framework. The World Bank and FAO initiated the IAASTD in order to determine the impacts of historical and anticipated agricultural practices on the hunger rate, the standard of rural livelihoods, and socially and environmentally sustainable development. Unlike research organisations affiliated with the corporate food regime, the IAASTD employs "tools and models from different knowledge paradigms including local and traditional knowledge" in order to present decision and policy makers with different options rather than a set of recommendations (IAASTD, 2009: x). As such the social, economic, political, and ecological diversity of different contexts are acknowledged by subscribing to the belief that agricultural systems are distinct and should reflect the needs of the community it is serving.



### 3.3.4.2. Radical food politics

#### *Discourse and main institutions*

The radical food politics stream adopts the discourse of *food sovereignty*. Within the debate on food, the terms food justice and food sovereignty are often used interchangeably. Although both discourses are structured around alternative and local food movements, food sovereignty has come to be associated with the global South in their campaign for greater autonomy in structuring their food relations according to their own needs (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 127). The food justice discourse does not have as strong a political undercurrent, and focuses on pockets of transformation that would gradually transform the corporate food regime into a new system, as opposed to the food sovereignty discourse that demands an institutional overhaul.

Food sovereignty as a concept was first brought to light by Viá Campesina at the World Food Summit in 1996. This came as a response to the Agreement on Agriculture which coerced the developing world to open up their markets and adopt industrial agriculture. Although a multitude of definitions are operational, food sovereignty essentially can be defined as: the right of people and governments to choose the way food is produced and consumed. As such the concept is an extension on the right to food in so much as the right to food is interpreted as not only a right to the access thereof, but also the right to organise food in way that supports local livelihoods, reflects local needs, and is culturally appropriate (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 127). Food sovereignty is thus a political concept but also an alternative policy framework that challenges the mainstream solutions to chronic hunger as represented by the *neoliberal* and *reformist* projects.

Viá Campesina is still the most prominent actor within the radical stream of food politics. This transnational movement represents 160 farmer's organisations and around 200 million peasant families located in 79 countries (Viá Campesina, 2013). Initially radicals were primarily located in the global South and rural areas, but farmers and scholars in the North have become more drawn to the radical stream of food politics since the shortcomings of the corporate food regime became more apparent. Following the food crisis the international coordinator of Viá Campesina sent an open letter to the head of the FAO that highlighted the nature of the crisis as inherent to the neoliberal model, and re-affirmed the need for government regulation and food sovereignty. This created an advocacy space within the UN for the rights of peasants and others working in rural areas. Consequently some sentiments of the radical stream find expression within the UN. Many food justice and rights-based movements and NGOs also align with the radical stream of food politics.

### ***Orientation and model***

The radical project is geared at changing the regime in order to bring to fruition a more equitable and sustainable food system. The orientation of radical food politics is that of *entitlement* which is rooted in the entitlement approach to famine as developed by Amartya Sen. Sen (1981: 497) explains that entitlement refers to "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces", and goes on to identify four legal ways of acquiring food within the framework of entitlements. First, individuals can employ trade-based entitlements to sell something in order to buy food. Second, they can grow their own food in accordance with their production-based entitlement. Third, using labour-based entitlement, they can sell their skills or labour to enable them to purchase food. Fourth, through transfer-based entitlements, food can be acquired by transfer from one person to another, or from a group or the government to a specific person. Drawing on this framework of entitlements, Sen reiterates that the reason for chronic hunger is not a problem of availability but a problem of access, and in particular a problem of access to entitlements.

Following this logic, the radical movement aspires to restate vulnerable individuals and marginalised groups' set of entitlements by restoring their sovereignty over their food systems so that they can determine production, trade and employment relations, and the extent to which government can transfer food in the form of social protection. Radical food politics promote self-determination over local food systems by advocating that corporate agri-food monopolies should be dismantled, that food should be de-commodified, and that there should be a redistribution of wealth and power to democratise the food system (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011: 128-9). With its focus on food sovereignty, the radical movement does not recommend a particular agricultural model, but attempts to restructure the food system to such an extent that communities gain the entitlement to organise agriculture according to their unique local model.

### ***Guiding documents***

Similar to the progressive project, the radical one also supports agroecological and society-based solutions to the twin concerns of equity and sustainability as encouraged by the IAASTD *Global Report* (2009) discussed above. Other guiding documents for the radical stream of food politics include the Declaration of Nyéléni (2007) that reflects the sentiments of the first International Food Sovereignty Forum. The declaration outrightly states that the food sovereignty movement is fighting the "domination of our food and food producing systems by corporations that place profit before

people, health and the environment" (Forum for Food Sovereignty, 2007: 10) The declaration also condemns development models that displace people, food dumping, both the Green Revolution and the New Green Revolution, and food practices that damage the environment. The growing literature on food sovereignty rooted in Marxist political economy also serves as an influence for guiding the objectives of the radical food movement.

### **3.4. Conclusion**

This chapter identified the food and financial crises as a turning point in food security analysis. It was shown that, following the crises, there was a proliferation of emerging perspectives on food security that challenged the productionist paradigm of the old perspectives. The discussion highlighted that emerging perspectives on food security follows society-based approaches in order to address issues of food access, as opposed to the old perspectives that focus on improving food availability through increased production. The chapter presented the food regime/food movements framework as an overview of the major perspectives on food security within the corporate food regime. These perspectives culminate in four food-politics ideologies. It was pointed out that there is an ideological split within the framework between the ideologies that seek to maintain the corporate food regime and the ideologies that aim to structurally transform the regime in its entirety. The *neoliberal* and *reformist* projects were shown to correspond to the former agenda, whilst the *progressive* and *radical* ones were aligned with the latter. It was pointed out that, although the food regime approaches are distinct in their discourse and orientation, both the *neoliberal* and *reformist* stream largely advocate a model that corresponds to the productionist perspective. In contrast, the *progressive* and *radical* food movements' model reflects a society-based approach, and as such seeks to transcend the productionist one. Drawing on the work of Polanyi, it was noted that these contesting forces of liberalisation and reform within the food regime is representative of the double movement of capitalism at large. The discussion highlighted that the respective food movements challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism and that they aim to establish a food system that is equitable and sustainable. The overview on the different ideologies noted the distinctness of each stream of food politics by focusing on its particular discourse, orientation and model, and the main institutions and documents that support each ideology.

## *Chapter four: Food politics in Southern Africa*

### **4.1. Introduction**

This chapter introduces the case study of Southern Africa. The first section provides an overview of the socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in the region as marked by its political development through the scramble for Africa, the decolonisation era, and the post-independence era. Subsequently the causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa are discussed with specific reference to the region's economic inheritance and SAPs, poverty, adverse climate conditions, mismanagement and poor governance, and the impact of HIV/AIDS.

The bulk of the chapter is devoted to examining Southern Africa's approach to food security. The discussion centres on South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe as representative of the Southern African case. These agriculturally dominant countries in the region each experience a different prevalence of undernourishment. Since these countries have a shared British colonial history, and are subjugated to largely similar environmental constraints, it is once again apparent that politics has a powerful role to play in human development issues such as chronic hunger. Thus, for each of these countries, the national context that influences its food security policies is sketched prior to presenting their main institutional frameworks which guide their approaches to food security. Concluding the section on each country is an overview of the current actualities in the countries since the institutional framework is often not on par with the emergent food security model due to deliberate, strategic or misguided official representations of the country's food security approach.

Throughout the chapter, the influence of the global, regional, and local contexts in influencing Southern Africa's food security approach is emphasised.

### **4.2. The socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in Southern Africa**

As mentioned above, throughout this discussion "Southern Africa" refers to the states in the southernmost region of the African continent as indicated by their membership to the SADC<sup>27</sup>. Southern Africa thus consists of: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – see Figure 2 below.

Southern Africa spans 9.27 million km<sup>2</sup> and is home to an estimated 292 million people (SADC, 2012a). Southern Africa is a socio-economically and culturally diverse region, and is furthermore

---

<sup>27</sup> For notes on the formation of SADC see Appendix C.

varied in its geography, which includes forests, grasslands, and deserts. Climatic conditions in the region are not uniform, and consequently different crops are produced in different parts of Southern Africa. SADC (2012c) estimates that 70% of the region's population "depends on agriculture for food, income, and employment", and that the "performance of this sector [therefore] has a strong influence on food security, economic growth, and social stability".



*Figure 2. Map of Southern Africa*

Source: Berglee (2012: 484)

Food insecurity in Southern Africa became prominent when the region suffered two major food crises over a period of 10 years (1991-1992 and 2001-2003). The causes of chronic food insecurity in the region are provided in the following section, whereas this section maps out the socio-economic development of food insecurity in the region in the preceding eras.

#### **4.2.1. The scramble for Africa and the colonial era**

In the late nineteenth century, the discovery of mineral resources in Southern Africa was significant for setting in motion what has been termed the scramble of Africa; the partition of Africa among European imperial powers. The Berlin Conference of 1884 regulated European colonisation with the General Act of the Berlin Conference formalising the scramble of Africa. In the 20 years

following the Berlin Conference, the European powers partitioned the entire continent, with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia<sup>28</sup>.

Under British expansion, its vision to establish an empire from the "Cape to Cairo" proved dominant over other imperial efforts at regional dominance in Southern African. Britain's colonial policy, as it also manifested in Southern Africa, was based on its economic imperatives for state-led development. In seeking a positive balance of trade, Britain looked to the open market Africa has to offer. The fact that African countries would import more than they would export to Britain ensured that this colonial power would incur a trade surplus. The period between 1890 and the start of the First World War was marked with a dramatic increase in global trade. Without any industries of their own, African colonies imported a range of manufactured goods and fuels from Europe, to which it exported raw materials and food (Reed, 2002: 15).

Another inducement for colonisation arose from the investment opportunity African countries offered; cheap and abundant raw material and labour along with limited competition made capital investment especially profitable. Furthermore, Africa provided raw material that was unavailable in Europe and on which Britain had become dependent: rubber, palm oil, cacao, cotton, tea, and tin (Reed, 2002: 16; Thomson, 2004: 19). In the late-1800s the discovery of gold and diamonds in Southern Africa, and in particular in South Africa, also justified capital investment in the region. In order to ensure even greater international trade, Britain also considered Southern Africa a valuable stopover location *en route* to Asia.

The scramble for Africa occurred during the first food regime (1870-1914). As mentioned earlier, under Britain's hegemony during this regime, a settler-colonial system was established where staple foods were produced in Britain's colonies. Upholding the virtue of specialisation under the model of comparative advantage, Britain established monocrop economies in order to produce cash crops, that is, crops specifically grown for profitable export (Thomson, 2004: 29). However, agricultural development was secondary to mineral exploration and consequently food production was not a priority at national government level (Abdalla, 2007:3). Land, labour, and other resources were allocated to the mining industry which left the overall industrial development of African economies lacking. Thus, despite the unprecedented levels of growth experienced under British rule, the development of the colonies was not geared towards "the creation of a strong diversified economy" (Reed, 2002: 18) which left African economies vulnerable.

---

<sup>28</sup> See Appendix C for an overview of the imperial division of Africa.

#### 4.2.2. The decolonisation era

The era following the Second World War saw the most dynamic growth period for Southern Africa because the post-war reconstruction of Europe demanded an increase in the exports of raw materials and foodstuffs from the colonial world (Reed, 2002: 19). These new opportunities necessitated colonies to further develop their industrial infrastructure and services. However, this was met with resistance from the colonial powers that sought to protect their own industries, and consequently forced its colonies to continue their focus on the primary sectors of mining and agriculture. Eventually, conflicts "between the colonial policies and the developmental needs of the colonised gave rise to the struggles for national liberation" across Africa (Reed, 2002: 19). On a continental level, white minority rule in especially Southern Africa<sup>29</sup> served as the common focus of opposition<sup>30</sup> for colonies, which further fuelled the struggle for independence.

In 1957 Ghana set off the period of decolonisation when it gained independence from Britain. For the following 30 years Southern Africa politics came to be dominated with struggles for liberation. Nearly all francophone colonies, which are primarily located in Northern Africa, gained independence *en masse* in 1960, whereas Britain followed a more gradual approach to decolonisation (Thomson, 2004: 32) – as presented chronologically in Table 3 below. The decolonisation of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) was especially challenging since a minority settler-government contested the transition to majority rule, which eventually ensued in 1980 after a prolonged period of insurgency. Portugal desperately held onto its Southern African countries, which only gained independence after guerrilla wars in these colonies, and a military coup in Portugal itself (Thomson, 2004: 34).

Despite the end of colonial rule in Southern Africa by the 1980s, the colonial legacy had a lasting socio-economic impact on the region. Spatial configurations and arbitrary boundaries resulted in problems of scale for smaller countries, and problems of market access for landlocked ones. Other economic problems Southern Africa inherited from colonial rule is its disadvantage in the international economy due to its underdevelopment of human resources and its over-reliance on the primary sector and exports (Thomson, 2004: 22).

---

<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting that British (Southern Africa) and French (Northern Africa) colonisation ideologies were distinct in nature. In contrast with French settlers, which largely integrated with civil society, British settlers established themselves as absolute rulers over their colonies (Thomson, 2004: 32).

<sup>30</sup> An important development influencing decolonisation was the Pan-Africanism movement. The movement gained momentum on the continent after Africa's first independent president, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, invited African leaders from territories still under territorial rule to a conference "in order to coordinate independence endeavours" (Zajontz, 2013: 57-58).

*Table 3. Decolonisation in Southern Africa*

<b>Southern African country</b>	<b>Independence</b>	<b>Imperial Power</b>
South Africa	1910 <sup>31</sup>	Britain
DRC (Belgian Congo)	1960	Belgium
Madagascar	1960	France
Tanzania (Tanganyika)	1961	Britain
Malawi (Nyasaland)	1964	Britain
Zambia (Northern Rhodesia)	1964	Britain
Botswana (Bechuanaland)	1966	Britain
Lesotho (Basutoland)	1966	Britain
Mauritius	1968	Britain
Swaziland	1968	Britain
Angola	1975	Portugal
Mozambique	1975	Portugal
Seychelles	1976	Britain
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia)	1980 <sup>32</sup>	Britain
Namibia (South West Africa)	1990 <sup>33</sup>	German; then South African mandate

The decolonisation era in Southern Africa overlaps with the second food regime (1945-1973). As discussed above, this regime was characterised by the US' inner-oriented development that saw a dramatic increase in food production within the country. Following decolonisation, Africa exported \$1.3 billion's worth of food per year; today African countries import 25% of their food<sup>34</sup> (Holt-Giménez, 2008). According to Holt-Giménez (2008) "food deficits in the global South mirrors the rise of food surpluses and market expansion of the industrial North". During the surplus-system of the second food regime, the US strategically made use of its food surpluses to gain the favour of newly independent African states in the form of food aid. Decolonisation in Africa occurred during the Cold War, and consequently the US and the Soviet Union were in competition for ideological dominance over a continent where its countries still largely relied on the West for economic guidance (Farley, 2008: 17). The US furthermore influenced Southern Africa's food system by

<sup>31</sup> Although South Africa gained independence from Britain in 1910 when the Union of South Africa was established as a self-governing nation state, black majority rule only came to South Africa in 1994 with the end of apartheid (Parsons, 1982: 220).

<sup>32</sup> In 1965 the white settler-government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) unilaterally declared its independence from Britain. Although the settler-government has since considered Rhodesia as an independent state, their sovereignty was not acknowledged by Britain or the United Nations until 1980, when black majority rule came to power in Zimbabwe (Thomson, 2004: 34).

<sup>33</sup> South West Africa (Namibia) was a colony of Germany from 1884 until 1915. However, after the First World War the territory was taken over by the Union of South Africa under a League of Nations mandate (Parsons, 1982: 291). Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 1990.

<sup>34</sup> The amount of food imports varies per season since Southern Africa in particular is prone to floods and droughts which hampers food production – see section 4.3.3 below.



promoting the industrialisation of agriculture in this region through the Green Revolution. As explained above<sup>35</sup>, the Green Revolution has since become understood as disruptive to local food systems and detrimental to food security in Africa.

#### **4.2.3. The post-independence era<sup>36</sup>**

Even after the decolonisation, the effect of colonial policies is still apparent: most Southern African economies remain undiversified with a heavily reliance on one or two commodities for export (Reed, 2002: 33). This continued dependence on their natural resource wealth hampers economic development in Southern Africa, as Thomson (2004: 179) explains, "these countries [have] no other major sources of economic activity with which to generate additional income, or to act as a substitute should there be a bad harvest or a slump in that particular commodity market". These overtly specialised monocrop economies, established by colonial rule and exacerbated by the productivity incentives of the Green Revolution, left most Southern African economies vulnerable and dependent on exports.

Southern Africa's imperial inheritance continues to burden this region's development. In addition to their highly specialised export economies, most Southern African countries have a "minute manufacturing base, a lack of access to technology, and populations where few [are] trained in the way of modern business, social services or public administration (Thomson, 2004: 179). Yet, since the advent of neoliberalism, these countries were pressured to open up their economies to partake in competition on the global capitalist market. Since the underdevelopment in Southern Africa made it apparent that international free trade was to be conducted on an uneven playing field, Southern African governments made the decision to borrow from the West in order to invest in manufacturing and infrastructure in their countries. Although this was considered "relatively responsible borrowing" at the time, unanticipated external factors<sup>37</sup> transformed the situation into a debt crisis by the 1980s.

The World Bank and the IMF sought to relieve the developing world of its debt through SAPs aimed at economic reform. However, the SAPs only brought about modest improvements in some

---

<sup>35</sup> See section 2.4.1.1.

<sup>36</sup> This section merely serves to highlight the overarching regional developments during the era. Since independence, Southern African countries have had different development trajectories that correspond to their particular political and economic climate – this is illustrated through the discussion on South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe below.

<sup>37</sup> These include: the declining terms of trade due a drop in commodity prices, that hit cash crop economies hardest; a dramatic increase in the oil price during the 1970s; and, subsequent higher interest rates on loans to counter the economic shockwave of the oil crisis in the West (Thomson, 2004: 182)

countries, while the majority of countries continued to be economically unstable. As discussed above<sup>38</sup>, the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture also proved to be detrimental to the developing world, since it forced governments to cut back on agricultural subsidies whilst opening up their economies. The overall effect was that Southern African exports were less competitive on the world market, and since these are primarily export economies, their revenue dropped significantly.

The post-independence era coincides with the third food regime, which started with the advent of neoliberalism in the mid-1970s. Neoliberalism entrenched the industrialisation of food production and distribution in the food system. Increasingly so, the food system came to be governed by major agribusinesses which, in accordance with the neoliberal ideology, advocated increased industrial production, unregulated markets, and a greater incorporation of biofuels. The corporate food regime preserves the production of monocrops in Southern Africa. With the neoliberal ideal of overproduction, the widespread use of GMOs has become a prominent feature of the food system as well, especially with regards to food aid<sup>39</sup>, on which Southern African countries, like Zimbabwe and Malawi, are dependant. With regards to food security, most of Southern African countries are dependent on their capacity to import food. Only a few countries in the region, most notably South Africa, produce enough food to meet the needs of their citizens. Despite the fact that the majority of the region's poor work in agriculture, over the past 45 years, agricultural performance in Southern Africa "has ranked worst in the world according to most conventional measures" (Haggblade, Hazell & Gabre-Madhin, 2010: 3). Southern Africa's low agricultural productivity and its lack of infrastructure continue to be detrimental to the region since they are at a disadvantage to compete globally<sup>40</sup>, given the dominant framework of neoliberal economics.

### **4.3. Causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa**

Before Southern Africa's food security strategy can be analysed, it is necessary to take note of the causes of food insecurity in the region. As discussed above, on a global level, food insecurity is not a problem of scarcity since production levels far exceeds the dietary requirements of the population.

---

<sup>38</sup> See section 2.4.1.1.

<sup>39</sup> The WFP's food aid response to the 2001-2003 crisis had an unanticipated effect: several governments, most notably Zambia, rejected food aid because it was genetically modified. With regards to governments' response, Bennett (2003: 28) notes that "[i]t was difficult to distinguish political manipulation and obfuscation from genuine environmental, health and economic reasons". Regardless of their motivation, governments' rejection of food aid complicated the mitigation of food insecurity in an already-complex context.

<sup>40</sup> This has propelled the need for greater regional trade that would counter Southern Africa's dependence on the North. Subsequently the SADC was established as an intergovernmental organisation with the aim to facilitate socio-economic cooperation and integration in the region – see Appendix D.

Instead, food insecurity is attributed to poverty which means that although there is enough food available, people are going hungry because they cannot access the food given their set of entitlements. Despite an ample availability of food globally, at a national level most Southern African countries do not produce enough food to meet the needs of their citizens. Although poverty is also the main cause of food insecurity in Southern Africa, several other causes endemic to the region, exacerbates the situation (Drimie & Mini, 2003: 10). The causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa are: economic problems, population growth, mismanagement and poor governance, HIV/AIDS, and an adverse climate. However, the severity of these causes varies from country to country, as demonstrated in the following section through the examples of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, as representative of the Southern Africa case.

#### **4.3.1. Economic inheritance and SAPs**

Several of Southern Africa's economic problems can be traced to the colonial inheritance of the region which left countries with underdeveloped economies that are over-reliant on the primary sector. Over the past 40 years Southern African countries have struggled to develop their economies since they are disadvantaged in the global economy. The economic structure of the countries was designed around the specialised agriculture and mining production. In the 1980s over 75% of Malawi's total export earnings came from tobacco and tea (Brown, 1995; 28). This left Malawi exceptionally vulnerable to fluctuating commodity prices. South Africa and Zimbabwe entered the postcolonial era with more diversified export economies. However, both countries had to remediate their own colonial legacy, which primarily manifested in skewed land ownership and access, through extensive land reform policies aimed at redistributing land from the white minority to the black majority.

Due to underdevelopment, limited growth and undiversified economies, the 1980s marked the start of an economic reform era in Southern Africa. As explained above<sup>41</sup>, during the 1980s the World Bank and IMF devised Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) as a form of loan conditionality: in order for recipients to receive further loans they were required to make changes to their economic policies. Thus, nations indebted to these institutions had limited choice in terms of economic policy. Primarily this involved a significant reduction in government spending and enforced liberalisation. Southern Africa was especially affected by the introduction of SAPs since the region incurred

---

<sup>41</sup> See section 4.1.1.1.

massive amounts of external debts in financing their liberation struggles, and also in their attempt to diversify their economies by investing in the manufacturing sector and human resources.

SAPs are believed to have undermined agricultural development in Malawi and Zimbabwe (Reed, 2002: 26; Schanbacher, 2010: 15-16). The enforced liberalisation saw a decrease in support provided to farmers. This entailed "an end to [farm input] subsidies and stringent limitations on marketing boards [...] that provided farmers with guaranteed markets" (Van Riet, 2006: 38). Tariff barriers were also dropped. However, in developed countries, agricultural support and other forms of support to farmers remained in effect, which meant that these Southern African countries' agricultural products became uncompetitive both domestically and internationally. Consequently, food production in Malawi and Zimbabwe became partially substituted with food imports. This had a significant impact on the economic growth in these countries since they are dependent on agriculture as means of income<sup>42</sup>. The unfavourable international trade system affected food security in Malawi and Zimbabwe as they become increasingly dependent on food imports and aid. Although structural adjustment took place in South Africa in the form of macroeconomic reforms<sup>43</sup>, these "reform packages were 'home grown' in that donors were not involved in their design or implementation" (USAID, 1996: 32).

The verdict is still out on what the impact of increased trade liberalisation is on food security<sup>44</sup>. Despite possible positive effects on food security, Farley (2008: 31) notes that after the introduction of SAPs, all countries in the region (with the exception of South Africa) spent more money on debt servicing than on public services such as health and education – a trend still currently visible. This has severe implications for the socio-economic development of the region<sup>45</sup>, which in turn affects food security, especially through the *access* and *utilisation* dimension.

---

<sup>42</sup> During the 1980s, the time when SAPs were implemented in Malawi and Zimbabwe, agriculture contributed 44% and 37% to their respective gross domestic products (GDPs) (based on own calculations from data by The World Bank, 2015a). Currently agriculture contributes 33.3% to Malawi's GDP, and 13.6% to Zimbabwe's (The World Bank, 2015a).

<sup>43</sup> In 1994 these policy reforms were encapsulated in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which prioritised the inequality in income distribution in post-apartheid South Africa. In contrast with the liberalisation objectives of the IMF and World Bank, the "neo-Keynesian-tinged" RDP stipulated that government must play a significant role in the economy (Taylor, 2010: 4). However in 1996, with the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Reconstruction Plan (GEAR) - aimed at macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation, the opening up of the economy, and an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) - South Africa "undertook voluntary alignment with the Washington Consensus and global neoliberal hegemony" (Evans, 2010: 115).

<sup>44</sup> A recent FAO report acknowledges both the positive and negative effects thereof (FAO, 2015b). A summary of their findings is reproduced in Appendix E.

<sup>45</sup> Given that Southern Africa is already characterised by poor human development. According to Human Development Index (HDI) the countries are classified as follow (with the number in brackets representing their rank out of 187

### 4.3.2. Poverty (lack of entitlements)

The main cause of food insecurity in Southern Africa is poverty. Poverty's connection to food insecurity is best explained by employing the entitlement approach of Sen (1981) as outlined above<sup>46</sup>. Production-based and labour-based entitlements are especially hampered in Southern Africa. More often than not, land reform<sup>47</sup> negatively impacts production-based entitlement: when individuals are displaced from land that they used to cultivate, they become disconnected from their livelihoods. Often food insecurity is framed as a predominantly rural problem. However, given that Southern Africa has the highest urbanisation rate in the world, this perspective of food security is declared as a "rural bias" (Crush & Frayne, 2010: 8). Schlein and Krüger (2006) note that "it is a myth that urban populations are healthier, more literate or more prosperous than people living in the countryside" since "slum dwellers are more likely to die earlier, experience more hunger and disease, attain less education and have fewer chances of employment". According to the *State of African Cities Report* for 2014, a large proportion of Southern Africa's urban population live in slums<sup>48</sup>. The result of which is increased food insecurity. Slum-dwellers typically do not have access to land to produce food. Furthermore, their labour-based entitlement is also compromised due to high employment associated with slum-dwellers. Consequently their access to food is distorted, despite the fact that there is enough food available in urban areas. Unemployment remains a major cause of lack of food entitlement in Southern Africa. The region's official unemployment rate is 21% however; there is a "huge discrepancy between official employment figures and those produced by independent organisations" (SADC, 2011: 18).

Without secure production-based or labour-based entitlements, the food insecure in Southern Africa is left with trade-based entitlements and transfer-based entitlements as the only legal way to gain access to food. The latter takes the form of food aid which, as it has recently been reported, a record 27.4 million people in the SADC<sup>49</sup> are in need of, in what has been called a "humanitarian crisis" by

---

countries): high human development in Mauritius (63), and Seychelles (71); medium human development in Botswana (109), South Africa (118), Namibia (127), and Zambia (141); low human development in Swaziland (148), Angola (149), Madagascar (155), Zimbabwe (156), Tanzania (159), Lesotho (162), Malawi (174), Mozambique (178), and DRC (186) (HDI, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> See section 1.2. and "orientation and model" in section 3.3.4.2.

<sup>47</sup> The nature, extent, and impact of land reform policies differs for each Southern African country as illustrated in below through the examples of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>48</sup> The countries in the region with the highest proportion of slum-dwellers (as a percentage of the urban population) are: Mozambique (94%), Madagascar (93%), Tanzania (84%), Malawi (83%), Namibia (66%), Zambia (58%), and South Africa (31%) (UN-Habitat, 2014).

<sup>49</sup> The countries that are the affected the worst are Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (Bloomberg, 2015).

the SADC's Director of Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (Bloomberg, 2015). The looming crisis has been largely attributed to the weather conditions of the past year.

#### **4.3.3. Adverse climate**

As a region, Southern Africa is prone to droughts and floods which hinders food production. Following the harsh drought of 1992, Zimbabwe (that was known as the "bread basket of Southern Africa" at the time) was transformed from a food surplus position to a net food importer (Maphosa, 1994: 53). Rainfall variability affects the region especially because it is overly dependent on rainfed agriculture. Up to 95% of Malawi's cultivated land relies on rainfed agriculture (Abdalla, 2007: 23); consequently adverse weather conditions results in poor crop yields and sometimes even total crop failure. Floods in the region have also created food distribution problems since it has washed away railway lines and bridges. Over the past 30 years, extreme weather conditions resulted in substantial loss of harvests in Lesotho, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi (van Riet, 2006: 44) that culminated in two food crises in 1991-1992 and 2001-2003 respectively. The 1991-1992 season was labelled as the "worst drought of the century in Southern Africa", with 20 million people seriously affected by the drought through displacement and loss of livelihood (Abdalla, 2007: 21; see Thompson, 1993). After this crisis, it was expected that the reforms under SAPs would serve as a buffer against food insecurity, however, as evidenced by the 2001-2003 crisis, greater market liberalisation could not sufficiently counter the effect of adverse climate. The aforementioned crisis indicated that food insecurity in the region is the result of not only the lack of *access* to food, but also the result of a lack of *availability* (FFSSA, 2004: 16). Thus, in this regard, food insecurity in Southern Africa, unlike food insecurity at a global level, also represents a problem of inadequate availability.

#### **4.3.4. Mismanagement and poor governance**

However, the blame of Southern Africa's food insecurity should not solely fall on the region's adverse climate. Despite an unfavourable climate and low soil fertility, the semi-arid country of Botswana is considered more food secure than several of its favourable- climate counterparts in the region (Yu, You & Fan, 2010: 12). This can be attributed to the fact that Botswana is trade secure, that is, for the most part it successfully achieves food security through importing food. Botswana is furthermore considered to be the most politically stable and democratic country in the region, and also ranks highest on the Human Development Index (HDI). In contrast, although the DRC has a favourable climate, it performs below its food provision capability due to poor governance and

political instability (Yu *et al.*, 2010: 12). This correlation highlights the effect of politics on food security in the region.

Also with regards to politics, Reed (2006: 36) illustrates the connection between natural resource wealth and rent-seeking in the region. He explains that, in Southern Africa, the distinction between public and private resources are distorted due to large state monopolies. Since agriculture is a major source of income for most Southern African countries, natural resource wealth is a greater corruption incentive than in other countries, with the "corruption channel being an important explanation for the slow growth of resource-rich economies" (Leite & Weidmann, 1999: 31). As such, the root cause of politics' detrimental effect on food security in Southern Africa has been identified as the neopatrimonial state (FFSSA, 2004: 19-22). The neopatrimonial state can best be described as a state where "the *de facto* system of rule [differs] from the *de jure* state structures and processes" in so far that a "system of patronage co-exists with the facade of constitutionalism"<sup>50</sup> (du Plessis, 2012: 5-6). The neopatrimonial state distributes resources unequally based on discrimination to those that do not form part of the leaders' client-network. In Zimbabwe, where the prices of grain are regulated by the state-run Grain Marketing Board (GMB), food was only made available to ZANU-PF<sup>51</sup> supporters at times of food shortages in the past (van Riet, 2006: 43). Consequently those that did not support the ruling party were forced to buy food at inflated prices or on the black market.

Mismanagement's effect on food security in Zimbabwe also manifested through the government's fast-track land reform programme, which at one point culminated in less than half of the country's agricultural land being utilised (Wiggins, 2005: 11). The programme displaced thousands of workers thereby leading to unemployment, and ultimately to a decrease in food security. Van Riet (2006: 41) illustrates that government capacity is a key issue in ensuring food security by drawing parallels between Zimbabwe's GMB and Malawi's parastatal Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). He points out that there have been incidences of corruption within these organisations, and that they do not provide a sufficient incentive for farmers to invest in agriculture.

---

<sup>50</sup> Neo-patrimonialism is ascribed to colonialism's influence since settlers deliberately failed to fully invest in the legal-rational structure of the state. Settlers exploited the widespread system of patronage in Africa 'to maintain a fragmented society in order to avoid the mass mobilisation for an anti-colonial struggle' (du Plessis, 2012: 5). As such they only implemented "partial and extremely skewed representations of Europe[']s civil apparatus]" (Berman, 1998: 313).

<sup>51</sup> The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF).

The existence of state elites, weak links between civil society and the state, along with weak political institutions in Southern Africa, offer insight as to why food availability and food access are distorted in the region.

#### 4.3.5. HIV/AIDS

Southern Africa has the highest prevalence of HIV infections in the world. Nine out of the fifteen Southern African countries have adult (aged 15 to 29) infection rates of more than 10%<sup>52</sup> (UNICEF, 2014). The Joint Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS estimates that 18.6% of South Africans in the same age bracket are infected, and that the prevalence rate is 10% in Malawi, and 16.7% in Zimbabwe (respectively UNAIDS, 2014a; UNAIDS, 2014b; and UNAIDS, 2014c).

HIV/AIDS affect food security via the *availability*, *access*, and *utilisation* dimensions. HIV/AIDS has a detrimental effect on food availability because of a decrease in production that occurs due to absenteeism/death of workers. Productivity is also lost when family members divert their time to care-giving instead of farming. In both cases there is a loss of farming knowledge, which in turn also decreases productivity. The FAO (2011: 45) estimates that "by 2020 HIV will have claimed the lives of one-fifth or more of all those working in agriculture in many Southern African countries"<sup>53</sup>. In this regard, HIV/AIDS is not only detrimental to food production but also in households' *access* to food since there is a decline in income. The economic decline of households results in less-labour intensive crops being produced, along with less livestock production and less crop variety, which results in a less nutritious diet for those that are dependent on sustenance farming for food. Consequently HIV/AIDS also affects food *utilisation* even for those that are not infected.

De Waal & Whiteside (2003) have premised that there is such a dynamic interaction between HIV/AIDS and food insecurity that it necessitates to be known as a New Variant Famine (NVF). The NVF hypothesis highlights the increased vulnerability of households amidst the HIV/AIDS epidemic. They demonstrate that the traditional famine coping mechanism of food rationing is compromised with the prevalence of HIV/AIDS since those infected cannot skimp on nutrition. They also highlight that the premature death of adults, leads to children being the head of households, and that children are often not equipped with the skills of farming and/or meal planning. Van Riet (2006: 22) adds that due to the loss in the transfer of knowledge, and a lack of

---

<sup>52</sup> These countries are: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>53</sup> The projected loss in the worst-affected countries in the region is: Namibia (26%), Botswana (23%), Zimbabwe (23%), Mozambique (20%), South Africa (20%), Malawi (14%), and Tanzania (13%).



skills and kinship networks, "an increasing number of young women [engage] in commercial sex, which in turn potentially increases HIV transmission".

#### **4.4. Southern Africa's approach to food security<sup>54</sup>**

The approach adopted by Southern Africa towards food security is heavily influenced by the evolution of food insecurity throughout the region's development as well as the context-specific causes of food insecurity in the region. Despite similar colonial histories, each country has a unique pattern of development according to how the national food system has been embedded in the global food regime. As such Southern Africa's approach to food security is not an isolated response but rooted in the socio-economic evolution of food politics in the region – as highlighted by the representative cases of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe below. The food security approach of these countries is discussed in conjunction with the food regime/food movements framework presented in the previous chapter by deconstructing the guiding document and the orientation and model for each country.

##### **4.4.1. South Africa**

###### **4.4.1.1. Context-setting**

Given the importance of gold in the political economy during British hegemony, the discovery of gold in South Africa ignited industrialisation in the country. Since its integration in the global economy, the subsequent agricultural development of South Africa closely followed the development of the second food regime<sup>55</sup>. The Natives Land Act of 1913 also played an important role in shaping the food security context of South Africa "in terms of the character, composition and contribution of the agricultural sector" (Hendriks, 2014: 2). Institutionalising racism, the Act decreed that only certain areas could be owned by non-whites; at most it totalled 13% of the entire land mass of the Union (Collins & Burns, 2007: 346). The Act shaped the approach to the agricultural policy that was followed for the next 70 years: to increase the support to white commercial farmers and to decrease the opportunities for black farmers (Kirsten, Edwards & Vink: 2010: 147). As such the Act had significant socio-economic repercussions for South Africa's development, and ultimately created a dualistic agricultural economy: "a well-developed

---

<sup>54</sup> For an overview of the SADC's official approach to food security see Appendix C. This institutional framework is relevant for the food security approaches of the region, since Southern Africa often takes its cue from this intergovernmental organisation's framework

<sup>55</sup> As demonstrated through the "construction of a livestock-grain complex at the centre of a national production system, the creation of a national research and development infrastructure, and heavy reliance on imported chemicals and capital equipment to increase yields and facilitate capital accumulation" (Greenberg, 2013: 4).

commercial farming sector coexists with a small-scale farming sector [...] based on subsistence farming" (van der Merwe, 2011: 3).

In 1951 the creation of Bantu homelands<sup>56</sup> resulted in further skewed access to land and other resources as the mobility of black people were reduced when they were confined to predominantly rural areas. Agricultural development and productivity in these areas was very poor which led to household food insecurity. Hendriks (2014: 3) notes that, before the country's democratic transition in 1994, South Africa's "agricultural policy focused on self-sufficiency through commercial production" especially in the 1980s era of international sanctions. For South Africa, food security was equated with large-scale commercial farming which was, and still is, dominated by white farmers. During this era over 80 Acts of Parliament were passed that provided support to the commercial farming sector<sup>57</sup> (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 1998: 2). However, towards the end of the 1980s, the state tried to align itself with the emerging neoliberal order, and subsequently direct government support for agriculture declined (Marais, 2011: 47). Consequently South Africa's food system also underwent the shifts associated with the third food regime, as marked by an altered balance of power "towards corporate retailers and brand owners and away from agricultural producers" (Greenberg, 2010: 5).

Following the 1994 democratic transition, the neoliberal process continued. South Africa automatically became a signatory to the AoA by becoming a member of the newly established WTO in 1995. As part of this agreement, South Africa reduced its tariffs on imported food and subsequently the market became flooded by cheap subsidised products from the North. The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act No. 47 of 1996 further opened up the agricultural markets which eventually led to many smaller farmers selling off their land to large-scale agribusinesses since their products were no longer competitive following deregulation (Haysom, 2014: 131; Jacobs, 2012: 192).

With the creation of a more market-driven agricultural sector, the 1990s saw the removal of institutional barriers between black and white farmers (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs,

---

<sup>56</sup> The Bantu Authorities Act allocated land to South Africa's diverse black population based on their ethnicity thereby creating a legal basis for self determination in what came to be known as a system of "separate development" (Marais, 2011: 9).

<sup>57</sup> Assistance was in particular rendered in marketing with the creation of the Agricultural Credit Board (ACB) that granted loans to farmers that was not considered creditworthy by commercial institutions (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 1998: 2). Support to white farmers was also provided in the form of "subsidies, grants and other aid for fencing, dams, houses, veterinary and horticultural advice, as well as subsidies rail rates, special credit facilities and tax relief" Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 1998: 3).

1998: 4). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), released at the time of the first democratic elections, was the newly-elected African National Congress' (ANC) growth plan which identified food insecurity as "a legacy of the apartheid socio-economic and political order" (Hendriks, 2014: 3). In order to remediate the situation, increased social spending was introduced along with land reform<sup>58</sup> to address the racially-skewed distribution of access. However, it is important to note that land reform was motivated by political rather than economic imperatives. The ANC sought economic continuity which meant that they bought into the neoliberal restructuring process initiated by the former-ruling National Party (NP). Greenberg (2013: 1) notes that the divergent objectives of economic continuity and the redress of past injustices "produced contradictions in land and agricultural policy". Following the neoliberal framework, the land reform programme retained the integrity of private property, and was subsequently conducted on a willing-buyer/willing-seller principle – generally following the approach recommended by the World Bank (Kirsten *et al.*, 2010: 159). As such the "redistributive and justice elements of land reform [became] subordinated to the logic of capital and its economic imperatives" (Greenberg, 2013: 1). Emerging black farmers who could afford land could not compete with large-scale white farmers since the former received no assistance from the state whilst the latter still benefitted from subsidies received during the apartheid era (Hattingh, 2008). The effectiveness of redistributive land reform has been minimal with approximately 8% land distributed since 1994; despite a goal of 30% by 2015<sup>59</sup> (Guinn & Hamrick, 2015: 26).

The view held was that land redistribution would not only bring about socio-economic justice, but it would also propel the previously disadvantaged to produce food which would lead to greater food

---

<sup>58</sup> Since 1994 South Africa went through three broad phases of land reform (Greenberg, 2013). The first phase (1994-1999) followed the market-based approach which involved that willing sellers sold commercial farms to groups of individuals that pooled their social grants in order to buy the land. These transfers were market with a decrease in land productivity since the new landowners often lacked the resources and skills necessary for commercial farming. In the second phase (1999-2007) attempts were made to address the productivity loss associated with redistributed land. The vision was to "create a black commercial farming class that could compete with large-scale commercial white farmers" which subsequently saw a shift from welfare-based land reform to land reform focused on commercial production (Greenberg, 2013: 2). This was encapsulated in the Land for Agricultural Development Programme (LARD) which emphasised the role of individual beneficiaries that were capable of co-financing the redistribution process. This was during the era of narrow-based black economic empowerment (BEE) which was contested since it, *inter alia*, created a small black elite class instead of providing opportunities for broad economic democratisation. Thus the third phase of land reform (2007 onwards) saw a renewed focus placed on small-scale agriculture which coincided with the reformist vision of the 2008 *World Bank Development Report* described above.

<sup>59</sup> Death (2011: 33) notes that "less than 7% of the land has been redistributed so far, and the ANC government has pushed back their target of redistributing one third of the land from 2014 to 2025" (Death, 2011: 33).

security<sup>60</sup>. Although reports state that South Africa is largely food secure, it is important to take into account that this is quite misleading since food security is measured at a national level and with regards to the stability of maize availability<sup>61</sup> (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013: 220). It thus overlooks household and individual food security, and the important food security dimensions of access and utilisation. Although, similar to other developing countries, "there are no precise figures on household food security status in South Africa due to the lack of a national monitoring programme" (Schönfeldt, Gibson & Vermeulen, 2013: 212).

Since South Africa experiences food insecurity at a household level, it should be emphasised that cash is the primary source of food security in South Africa. Crush & Frayne (2010: 17) explain that "the contribution of agriculture to household welfare and food security is particularly low" in South Africa. Thus most South Africans do not grow their staple foods themselves; they buy it from commercial suppliers instead. Therefore food prices are an important determinant of food security in the country. Although South Africa is a middle income country and a net food exporter (FAO, 2011: 16) it has extremely high levels of poverty, and consequently small changes in food prices have a significant impact on food security. South Africa is the most urbanised country in the region, with around 65% of the population living in urban areas (Crush & Frayne, 2010: 21). In terms of food security, the urban poor are worse off than the rural poor since they do not have access to land to grow food as a fall-back plan to procure food during price spikes. Instead, urban households adopt different coping strategies<sup>62</sup> that involve food rationing, skipping out on meals, and cutting back on the consumption of meat, fruit, and vegetables (Cohen & Garrett, 2009: 13). These strategies might enable households to survive, but does not empower them to transcend the circumstances that caused them to be food insecure in the first place. As such, food insecurity is

---

<sup>60</sup> Hendriks (2014: 4) notes that since 1994 "food security programmes have focused almost exclusively on subsistence and smallholder agriculture" in order to address household level food insecurity. However, as Hendriks, Kirsten and Vink (2006) point out, household food insecurity in South Africa does not depend on household food production but rather on household income. Thus, the approach to address food insecurity via redistributive land reform aimed at increased food availability is misguided. In addition, Marais (2011: 218) highlights that land reform in South Africa has also proved to be an "ineffective remedy for poverty and joblessness". This highlights that, within this context, land reform does not contribute to increased food access either.

<sup>61</sup> Maize is considered a staple food in South Africa because of the volumes the country produces and because "mealie meal" forms an important part of South Africans' diet (Amusan & Kgotleng, 2015).

<sup>62</sup> Marais (2011: 222) explains that the coping-strategy dogma fits well within South Africa's neoliberal approach to development since it emphasises the "resilience, perseverance and ingenuity" of households and communities. Coupled with the South African ethos of *ubuntu* (humanist philosophy that highlights that one exist through one's fellow human beings) communalism and mutual obligation are "encoded in many social practices and arrangements" (Marias, 2011: 223).

"not an exceptional short-term event but a chronic threat for a large proportion of South Africa's population" (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013: 220).

In the last two decades South Africa has experienced three food crises which took place in 1992, 2002-2003, and 2007-2008 – all of which can be attributed to food prices shocks (Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012: 44). The 1992 crisis was caused by drought and saw a 30% increase in food prices whilst the 2002-2003 crisis reflected a more complex regional crisis, exacerbated by exchange rate shocks, ultimately leading to a 16% increase in food prices (Vink & Kirsten, 2002: 14). As Africa's largest economy at the time<sup>63</sup>, South Africa was hardest hit by the global commodity price shock characterised with the 2007-2008 food crisis with a 20% increase in food prices (Schönfeldt *et al.*, 2013: 220).

#### **4.4.1.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents**

Hendriks (2014: 1) notes that South Africa's interpretation of food security changed in accordance with the social and political developments discussed above, and as such it was interpreted differently by different ruling governments. The right to food is explicitly recognised in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). Section 27 reads that "[e]veryone has the right to have access to [...] sufficient food and water" and that the "state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights" (Government of South Africa, 1996: 13).

As discussed earlier, under the RDP food security was framed as a product of the apartheid regime. It was addressed through attempts to restructure the economy through land reform and increased social spending. However, due to "the unsatisfactory situation that was occasioned by the implementation of many food security programmes by different government departments", it became necessary to "formulate a national food security strategy that would streamline, harmonise and integrate the diverse food security programmes" (NDA, 2002: 5). This programme is known as the Integrated Food Security Strategy (IFSS).

The IFSS' goal is linked to that of the MDGs<sup>64</sup>, and it follows the "development approach" (NDA, 2002: 6). Koch (2011: 5) explains that by following the development approach, as opposed to a strictly agricultural approach, the IFSS acknowledges household food insecurity amidst national

---

<sup>63</sup> Since 2014, Nigeria has surpassed South Africa in terms of nominal GDP and is currently Africa's biggest economy (The Economist, 2014).

<sup>64</sup> In particular to MDG 1 that aims to "eradicate extreme poverty and hungry" (UN, 2015a).

food security. The IFSS is a multidimensional strategy that spans various government departments. The strategy identifies five pillars: (a) household production and trading; (b) income generation and job creation opportunities; (c) nutrition and food safety; (d) safety nets and food emergency; and (e) food information system management (NDA, 2002: 6-7). Thus the IFSS focuses on increasing market access through household production and job creation, whilst it aims to provide a buffer to food insecurity in terms of social protection.

The IFSS has been criticised because its institutional arrangements do not acknowledge the reality of food insecurity in South Africa, and as such present barriers to meaningful implementation. McLaren, Moyo and Jeffrey (2015: 39) mention that, although the IFSS states that it targets household food security, it has been driven in practice by a focus on availability rather than access, largely because the responsibility of food security is placed within the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) with the support of the Department of Trade and Industry. As explained above, South Africa's food insecurity does not stem from a problem of availability since the country produces enough food to feed its citizens. Food security in South Africa is problem of access instead; due to entrenched poverty South Africans do not have the set of entitlements to secure food. Lack of income, due to the country's widespread unemployment, causes household food insecurity within the country as South Africans cannot afford food. Drimie and Ruysenaar (2010: 324) also note that the IFSS overlooks the complexity of food security, especially with regards to urban food security; the strategy is nationally-driven and has a rural production-oriented focus. Furthermore, they point out that response strategy as advocated by the IFSS is "inadequate to engage this complexity" since there were not mechanisms in place to hold the various government departments involved accountable for not reaching their goals. Thus despite the broad development approach stated by the IFSS, the strategy was not realised because of a disjuncture in the institutional framework and the reality of implementation.

The proposed replacement for the IFSS was approved by Cabinet in September 2013, and subsequently South Africa's first National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security saw the light in the following year (Hendriks, 2014: 8). The five pillars the strategic goals of this National Policy rest on are: (a) improved nutritional safety nets; (b) nutrition education; (c) investment in agriculture towards development, especially in rural areas; (d) market participation through public-private partnerships; and (e) risk management with regards to the production challenges of climate change and bio-energy (DAFF, 2014: 7). In comparison to the IFSS, the National Policy does not provide a

strategy to stimulate job creation. Increased employment is considered a vital component of an effective food security strategy; increase in income will improve the access to food. Although the National Policy does situate food insecurity within the context of poverty, it does not provide details on how this will be addressed. The National Policy mirrors the IFSS in that it also focuses on social development and improving safety nets, whilst ensuring production stability. Overall, the National Policy still has a rural bias which neglects the high level of urbanisation in the country. Although the National Policy (DAFF, 2014: 4) "seeks to provide an overarching guiding framework to maximise synergy between the different strategies and programmes of civil society", it has been developed without public consultation (McLaren *et al.*, 2015: 40). The implementation plan of the National Policy is still unfinished, and it is hoped that civil society will have the opportunity to influence its approach once a draft is finalised ((McLaren *et al.*, 2015: 41).

#### **4.4.1.3. Current actualities: orientation and model**

Although government has initiated many social and structural policy initiatives aimed at increasing food access, these programmes have had limited success. Despite the country's moderate economic growth and strong agriculture industry, estimates suggest that over half the country experience food insecurity at a household level (Labadarios, Mchiza, Steyn, Gericke, Maunder, Davids & Parker, 2011: 897). This situation can be partly ascribed to the legacy of apartheid, but it is also due to the fact that South Africa adopted neoliberalism which resulted in the deregulation of the agriculture sector. As explained above, the effects of increased economic liberalisation have been detrimental to emerging black farmers since they were exposed to international competition, commodity speculation and the withdrawal of state support<sup>65</sup>. Over the past 30 years, South Africa's food system has undergone substantial commodification as reflected by the rise of massive food retailers, GMO monopolies<sup>66</sup> and fast food chains (Moyo, 2015). This neoliberal restructuring has also caused the agribusiness sector to gravitate towards the urban areas. Consequently the rural areas were deprived of an important source of economic activity as wealth was redistributed away from smaller producers towards commercial producers and speculators (Kirsten *et al.*, 2010: 153-154). Tsheola (2014: 659) asserts that "South Africa's domestic agri-industry has now been firmly locked

---

<sup>65</sup> A decade into South Africa's deregulation, Vink and Kirsten (2002: vi) noted that both "[c]ommercial and small-scale farmers in South Africa receive less support from the state than their counterparts in every other industrial country in the world with the exception of New Zealand".

<sup>66</sup> Moyo (2015) reports that South Africans are "the subjects of one of history's largest, most unregulated scientific experiments" since its citizens are "the first people in the world to consume a genetically modified food as a staple" with more than 75% of the country's white maize genetically modified.

with the global agr-food systems and networks". Currently South Africa reflects "one of the most assertive and enthusiastic embracing of the third food regime processes" (Haysom, 2014: 122). Instead of the original intention of creating a freer and more transparent agricultural economy, the liberalisation of agriculture resulted in significant consolidation and effectively shut out any new entrants to the market. The food model adhered to in South Africa is one of globalised accumulation; indicative of the corporate food regime, "a small number of corporations determine the availability, price, quantity and nutritional value of all food consumed" (Cock, 2015; see also Greenberg, 2010). Thus, rather than land reform, the trajectory of agrarian change saw "the consolidation of the hegemony of large-scale commercial farming and corporate agri-business in agricultural value chains" (Hall & Cousins, 2015: 4).

Traub and Meyer (2010: 291-293) illustrates this consolidation by providing an overview of the grain subsector. They explain that, all along the value chain – from producers via storage, traders, processors, and retailers, to the consumers – the firms involved are vertically integrated in the market and have considerable bargaining power. For example, 70% of the storage capacity within South Africa is owned by three companies; two multinationals, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, dominate the trading/brokering market; the top four companies account for 73% of all maize milled within the country; and four major companies dominate at least 60% of the formal food retail sector (Traub & Meyer, 2010: 292; and Jacobs (2012: 194). Cock (2015) explains that these corporations show "a total disregard for their pursuit of profit" and cites the example of price-fixing "at almost every point in the wheat-to-bread chain"<sup>67</sup>. Furthermore, amidst South Africa's most recent food crisis, the financial performance of South Africa's four big supermarkets for the years 2008-2009 show that, in comparison to the previous financial year, these companies benefitted handsomely from inflated food prices<sup>68</sup>.

The corporate dominance in South Africa's belies the country's official *development* approach to food security which leads Jacobs (2012: 193) to conclude that policies are "set out to consolidate an agro-food sector for agribusiness profitability rather than for food security". Although the National Food and Nutrition Policy acknowledges that the emerging agricultural sector is in need of

---

<sup>67</sup> In 2007, the Competition Commission found Tiger Brands guilty of price-fixing after it admitted to have colluded with its rivals to raise the price of bread (Jacobs, 2012: 194). Other examples of collusive behaviour in the agri-foods industry includes Sasol's 2009 fine for fixing fertiliser prices; and the anticompetitive behaviour of the dairy industry (Cock, 2015).

<sup>68</sup> Jacobs (2012: 195) cites that Woolworths and Pick-and-Pay reported a 13% and 18% in profits respectively, whilst Spar increased its profits with 22% and the Checkers-Shoprite group with early 30%.



assistance, it does not confront the role of big business within the South Africa's food system as a deterrent to its development goals. Consequently the National Policy was recently criticised by the Food Sovereignty Campaign (FSC) which called for the "deep transformation of our food system by breaking control of food corporations, repositioning the state to realise the constitutional right to food as part of creating the conditions and space for the emergence of food alternatives from below" (FSC, 2015).

## **4.4.2. Malawi**

### **4.4.2.1. Context-setting**

In Malawi agriculture forms a central part of the economy contributing to approximately 30% of the country's GDP (The World Bank, 2015a). Livelihood strategies in Malawi are mainly centred on agricultural activities since 80% of the country's workforce is employed in agriculture (Feed the Future, 2015). Due to the key role agriculture plays in Malawi, agricultural development policies have dominated the policy arena since independence in 1964. Despite regime change and successive change in leadership, food security has been a major goal pursued by government – largely through self-sufficiency in food production, especially maize.

For the first 15 years following independence, Malawi was able to produce enough food to feed its citizens (Chirwa, 2010: 253). However, economic reforms under the Banda administration pushed Malawi out of a situation of food self-sufficiency and into one of increased dependence on food imports and even food aid. During Banda's reign, Malawi was ruled by one of the most oppressive regimes in Africa which was characterized by autocratic leadership and brutal violations of human rights (Sarelin, 2013: 148; Silungwe, 2009: 40). Following decolonisation, government did little to alter the colonial patterns of power; essentially the modern nation state "was a superstructure erected over a patrimonial system" (Sahley, Groelsema, Marchione & Nelson, 2005: 13). In short, government implemented policies that exploited the welfare of the majority of the population in order to favour political elites. This most notably manifested in the country's land policy. Malawi has a dual agricultural system where commercial estates coexist with smallholder farms. The former produces tobacco, tea, sugar, and other cash crops, whilst the latter is mainly used for subsistence farming. During Banda's time in office, more than one million hectares of communal land was transferred to the state and estate owners which created a new class of landless people (GRAIN, 2012: 80). Furthermore, at the time Malawi's agricultural policy favoured the estate farmers by prohibiting smallholder farmers to cultivate cash crops. As such the estate farmers "had access to

favourable prices of the global commodity markets" whereas "the smallholder farmers was only exposed to commodity markets run by the state agro-based corporation, the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), which [...] bought the smallholders' produce at prices below those available on the global market" (Silungwe, 2009: 41). Malawi's land reform thus resulted in smallholder farmers persistently experiencing a lack of economic opportunity; they were deprived of land that had been used to produce their own food, and if they did have access to land, their access to the market was restricted.

As mentioned above, structural adjustment by the World Bank and IMF during the 1980s saw a decrease in government support for agricultural inputs. In Malawi, the poor performance of ADMARC and other parastatal "provided a strong basis for advocating for the liberalisation of the agricultural sector" (Chinsinga, 2011a: 7). Without subsidies for fertiliser and seed, estate farmers were exposed to a volatile market, and smallholder farmers were disadvantaged through the withdrawal of ADMARC<sup>69</sup>. Consequently less food was produced and food became more expensive which led to widespread food insecurity in the country.

In the early 1990s pressure groups in Malawi campaigned for a multi-party system, and following a referendum which saw an end to autocratic rule, democratic elections were held in 1994 (Sarelin, 2013: 148-149). Since, the country was ruled by the United Democratic Front from 1994-2004, and by the break-away Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) since 2005. Over the past two decades, the issue of food insecurity was prominently addressed by presidential candidates during their election campaigns. In 1998 the newly-elected UDF re-established seed and fertiliser input programmes in a clear violation of the World Bank's loan conditionality (Sahley *et al.*, 2005: 14). The argument was that, despite the implementation of SAPs, the Malawian government can "never completely abandon state intervention because it frequently ha[s] to react to recurring natural disasters" (GRAIN, 2012: 81). Since the country is heavily reliant on rain-fed agriculture, the droughts of 1991 and 1993 saw a significant decrease in food production.

It is important to note that, in Malawi, food security is often equated with maize security since it is the country's staple food. Malawi has the highest per capita maize consumption in Africa (GRAIN, 2012: 8) and the desire for maize self-sufficiency has formed an integral part of the country's

---

<sup>69</sup> In years of surplus production, ADMARC would buy excess produce and store it in reserves in order to sell it in years of poor harvests (GRAIN, 2012: 80). Thus farmers were guaranteed an income and access to food in times of insufficient production. This is especially true for farmers located in remote areas that do not have access to private traders since ADMARC would collect produce from these farmers' holdings.

approach to food security<sup>70</sup>. In the early 2000s, Malawi suffered a severe shortage of maize in what became known as the Strategic Grain Reserve Scandal. Following the advice of the IMF, Malawi liquidated reserves that had built up due to a bumper harvest in 1999 (Sahley *et al.*, 2005: 46). The logic was that it was too expensive to maintain high reserve levels, and that losses would be incurred as stocks age. Consequently maize reserves were sold to Kenya and Mozambique (FIAN, 2006: 50). However, the Ministry of Agriculture overestimated the amount to be sold which, combined with the harsh drought of 2002, led to a severe maize shortage.

The backdrop of the 2001-2003 food crisis – the worst experienced in 50 years – set the stage for the food security to become a highly charged political issue in the May 2004 elections. All major political parties made commitments to address food shortages and chronic food insecurity (Chinsinga, 2012a: 3). Ever since the 2001-2003 food crisis, the question of food security has "appeared in the platforms of politicians, on the agendas of policy makers, in the programmes of public bureaucracies, among the duties of village chiefs, and on the pages of national newspapers and it is thoroughly researched and debated" (Sahley *et al.*, 2005: 6). The 2004 election established Bingu wa Mutharika as president. Sarelin (2013: 150) notes that from the start of his incumbency, Mutharika made a formal commitment to human rights<sup>71</sup>. Mutharika prioritised food security and put policies in place that increased government support for smallholder farmers.

The Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) launched in the 2005-2006 growing season, enabled smallholder farmers to have access to subsidised fertiliser and seed. The FISP originally targeted maize and tobacco farmers since these crops are Malawi's most important ones<sup>72</sup>, but later expanded to also accommodate cotton, coffee, and tea growers (Curtis, Marcatto & Narayan, 2011: 16). The introduction of the FISP was hugely beneficial for food security in Malawi; it brought to an end

---

<sup>70</sup> Sarelin (2013: 17) notes that Malawians do not value other staple foods such as rice, cassava, and sweet potatoes. Her field notes documents diminishing sentiments by educated Malawians that label their country's citizens as "spoiled" because they insist on eating maize-based meals three times a day. After conducting interviews with Malawian, Sarelin (2013: 17) also reports that at times of maize shortages, they would "complain" that they do not have food even though they have access to other staples. Malawi's cultural dependence on maize as a staple food has resulted in an over-dependence on this grain which has been recognised by government through subsequent attempts made to promote the cultivation of diverse crops (see following section).

<sup>71</sup> This is clearly expressed in Mutharika's decision to break away from the UDF, which under previous leadership became associated with upholding the socio-economic structures of neo-patrimonialism and accused of unconstitutional practices by civil society. Despite being hand-picked by President Muluzi to take over his position in office, Mutharika distanced himself from the UDF and formed the DPP once he held office (Sarelin, 2013: 150).

<sup>72</sup> As explained above, maize is Malawians' staple food that they are reluctant to substitute for another staple. As for tobacco, Malawi is the biggest producer of burley tobacco. This industry makes up 10% of the country's GDP and accounts for up to 80% of the country's income (GRAIN, 2012: 86).

almost two decades of severe food shortages and chronic hunger. Malawi was even able to export food surpluses to Zimbabwe (Magdoff, 2008: 7). The success of Malawi's FISP "has attracted considerable international attention and quickly [became] endorsed as a potential model for the rest of the African continent to emulate" (Chinsinga, 2012a: 14). What is especially noteworthy about the "miracle of Malawi"<sup>73</sup> is that it reopened the debate on the effect of liberalisation on the agricultural sector. Despite recommendations to further deregulate this sector, Malawi reversed the course of liberalisation and reintroduced subsidies instead. On the one hand, those that advocate for the New Green Revolution in Africa, have ascribed Malawi's success to the fact that the government followed the "Green Revolution model", and subsequently Malawi's story became a marketing tool for further promoting the New Green Revolution (GRAIN, 2012: 80). On the other hand, those that advocate for food sovereignty, have praised Malawi for deliberately "defying its foreign donors [by] giving direct support to small farmers" – as opposed to promoting commercial production through free market principles. Despite successes experienced, many Malawians still require food assistance especially following the 2007-2008 food crisis that left an additional 10% of the population vulnerable to food insecurity (Curtis *et al.*, 2011: 16).

#### **4.4.2.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents**

Since the agricultural sector plays such a vital role in the performance of Malawi's economy, national development policies particularly target the growth of this sector. The importance of the agriculture sector is further emphasised since Malawians hold the belief that "more agriculture equals more food security"<sup>74</sup> (Chipeta, 2014: 2). As mentioned above, agriculture is also the main economic activity for most of the countries' citizens with up to 80% of the population employed in this sector (Feed the Future, 2015). The focus on agriculture is thus prominent in all of Malawi's growth strategies.

In 2005 the Malawian government announced its Food Security and Nutrition Policy (FNSP) that was modelled off the Malawi Growth Strategy and Development Strategy (MGDS)<sup>75</sup>. The main

---

<sup>73</sup> It has been argued that the success of the FISP has been exaggerated: the years following the introduction of the FISP was marked with good weather which contributed to production surpluses, and reports also indicate that production estimates were overestimated for political reasons (GRAIN, 2012: 83).

<sup>74</sup> Interestingly, Chipeta (2014: 2) points out that, on a global-level, "the more agriculture-dependent a country is, the less food secure it tends to be". There is thus an inverse relationship to the proportion of the population involved in agriculture and the level of food security. This can be ascribed to the fact that food security comprises more than just the *availability* of food; a stable income and the subsequent food-purchasing power is important to ensure *access* to food.

<sup>75</sup> The MGDS replaced the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Last-mentioned was introduced by the World Bank and IMF as a condition for debt relief in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) under. Like the PRSP,

themes of the MGDS are: sustainable economic growth; social protection of the most vulnerable; social development; infrastructure development; and improving governance (FIAN, 2006: 28). The FNSP was split into a Food Security Policy administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) and a Nutrition Policy to be carried out by the Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS<sup>76</sup> (MoAFS, 2006: 17).

In 2008 the MoAFS launched the Food Security Action Plan (FSAP) "to ensure systemic, coordinated and harmonised operationalisation" of the Food Security Policy (MoAFS, 2008: 7). The FSAP identified seven strategies to be followed: (a) promotion of contract farming; (b) encouragement of domestic production of high quality improved varieties; (c) promoting the integration of livestock in smallholder farming; (d) creation of an enabling environment for private sector investment and local community participation; (e) promotion of environment, land and water management for sustainable development; (f) promotion of off-farm employment opportunities through economic empowerment; and (g) supporting the establishment of community grain banks (MoAFS, 2008: 7). Although the FSAP is a top-down policy, Mutharika emphasised that it should be decentralised with the implementation activities focused on establishing local support networks between farmers, and training opportunities to educate farmers about fertilisers, pest control, timely harvesting, compost-making, and the de-worming of animals. This entitlement orientation is further expressed through on-site demonstrations for farmers in the construction of dams and drainage systems. The FSAP is also rooted in the pass-on-the-gift principle, which entails that farmers with skills and knowledge should play an active role in community development by training other farmers (MoAFS, 2008: 55). Although the MoAFS also seeks to improve market access by fostering private-public partnerships, the FSAP is clear on the fact that this should be done in

---

the MGDS is aimed at poverty reduction, however, in contrast to the PRSP, the MGDS is "home-based, country-owned" as the Malawian government formulated the strategy independent of donor requirements (FIAN, 2006: 28). Since 2011, the MDGS has been replaced by the MDGS II which represents "a policy shift from social consumption to sustainable economic growth and infrastructure development" (MoAFS, 2011: 3).

<sup>76</sup> Meerman (2008: 6-7) notes that "from a policy perspective, this split is noteworthy in its recognition that food security and nutrition, while closely related, are not interchangeable and should not be conflated". This split between food security and nutrition security is useful for planning specific programmes to address these two issues. Although often a concurrent problem, with food security actually encompassing nutrition security, the specific focus on nutrition security as a separate goal is valuable. Nutrition security is severely compromised in most Southern African countries since the rural and/or poor population do not have access to a wide range of food resources. Consequently they are deprived of micronutrients. The widespread prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the region also deters nutrition security since individuals' poor state of health compromise food access and food utilisation as explained above (see section 4.3.5.). While food security and nutrition security are equally important, the level of analysis and limited scope of this discussion (see section 1.10.) do not allow for nutrition security to be discussed as a distinct goal.

accordance with the needs of local contexts and that the community should be involved in determining when and how corporate stakeholders are involved.

The FSAP was also designed to be in line with the strategic objectives of Malawi's Agricultural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). The ASWAp was developed for the period 2008-2015 in order to advance the goals of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)<sup>77</sup> (MoAFS, 2011: i; Chinsinga, 2012b: 7). The CAADP requires countries to allocate 10% of their national budget to agriculture by 2008 and to aim to achieve an agricultural growth target of 6% by 2015 (NEPAD, 2003). The ASWAp is thus a "priority investment programme" targeted at agricultural growth and development through better coordination and harmonisation between donors and the government (MoAFS, 2011: i). Malawi has continuously met the CAADP commitment of allocating 10% of the annual budget to agriculture. This has been largely attributed to the success of the FISP (Chipeta, 2014: 3; Greenwell, Sibusiso & Pius, 2014: 156).

#### **4.4.2.3. Current actualities: orientation and model**

Over the past decade Malawi has experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 5.8%<sup>78</sup>. The Global Hunger Index<sup>79</sup> reports that, over the same period, hunger in Malawi has decreased by 11.8 points – from a severity of "alarming" hunger to a severity of "serious" hunger. However, Verduzco-Gallo, Ecker and Pauw (2014: 20) note that, due to the advances made in economic growth, this period actually reflects "a poor translation in economic growth into a reduction in extreme poverty and improved food and nutrition security". They ascribe this situation to a rapid increase in inequality: economic growth benefitted the urban rich at the expense of the extreme poor in both the urban and rural areas.

Several studies highlight the actuality of rent-seeking and neo-patrimonialism that is characteristic of the Malawian context (Mkwara & Marsh, 2011: 7-8; Chinsinga, 2011b: 66; Chinsinga, 2012a: 14; Chinsinga, 2012b: 20; GRAIN, 2012: 87). The main argument advanced by these studies is that the agricultural reforms implemented in Malawi were all conducted on the basis of political gain. An example of this is how the FISP has been employed for rapid wealth generation as opposed to broadening farmers' market access. As such the FISP has become an instrument of patronage

---

<sup>77</sup> See detailed discussion in Appendix D.

<sup>78</sup> Based on own calculations from the data of The World Bank (2015b).

<sup>79</sup> The Global Hunger Index calculates national-level hunger according to four indicators: the proportion of the population that is undernourished; the prevalence of wasting in children under five years; the prevalence of stunting in children under the age of five; and the mortality rate of children under five years (IFPRI, 2015).

employed by elites to further their own security and political enhancement (Chinsinga, 2011a: 18). As such, policies have been tailored, not according to technical soundness and feasibility, but rather to whether it will deliver a fortunate political outcome for incumbents. Chinsinga and Poulton (2014: 145) explain that "food security lies at the heart of the social contract between government and citizens in Malawi" and thus serves as a political tool to secure support. Even after the country's democratic transition, there have been reports of mismanagement and corruption under Muluzi's rule, as well as that of the Mutharika and subsequent Joyce Banda administrations (Kerr & Patel, 2014: 213). The distribution of subsidised fertilisers is "spatially selective based on political influence and affiliation" (Mkwara & Marsh, 2011: 7). Consequently, despite the official model that aims to democratise the food system, access to production inputs is skewed in favour of smallholders that have social or political ties to government members. This situation is exacerbated by Malawi's political culture that "promotes subservience and obedience to authority without question"

Another major challenge to the democratisation of the food system is Malawi's weak policy environment which "various actors have, in different ways, exploited [it] to advance their own selfish interests" (Chinsinga, 2011b: 66). Since 2006, the private sector became involved in the distribution of seed and fertiliser and currently multinationals dominate these sectors. All of Malawi's chemical fertilisers are imported from the international market which leaves the country susceptible to "currency and commodity price fluctuations as well as profit-taking by the few multinational corporations that dominate the global fertiliser industry" (GRAIN, 2012: 86-87). Similarly the international seed giant, Monsanto, holds more than 50% of the hybrid seed market in Malawi (GRAIN, 2012: 84). Malawi's dependence on these corporations undermines its focus on promoting self-sufficiency through local production: rising international prices of seeds and fertiliser affect the affordability of government to continue with the input subsidy programme. Along with the financial cost associated with the dependence on chemical fertiliser, the effect on the environment has also been detrimental on soil fertility and water systems<sup>80</sup>.

A major hindrance in the democratisation of Malawi's food system has been its dualistic nature of agriculture: the co-existence of the estate system with smallholder farming (Chirwa & Matita, 2015: 1). This system prevents the redistribution of land which consequently undermines true agrarian

---

<sup>80</sup> Chemical fertilisers leave the soil acidic and if nitrogen leaks into rivers and lakes it has the potential to destroy the associated ecosystems (GRAIN, 2012: 87).

reform. Without access to enough land to feed their families, "all the fertilisers and seeds in the world cannot make much difference for the great mass of farmers in Malawi" (GRAIN, 2012: 85). Smallholders' access to land is also compromised through land grabs<sup>81</sup> which deprives local communities of their land as it is transferred to foreign nationals.

The institutional framework's focus on community development through entitlement is also contested by the loss of traditional knowledge within Malawi's food system. Due to the dual agriculture system of the country, there is a "social stigma associate with certain traditional ways" (Kamwendo & Kamwendo, 2014: 97). Decreasing soil fertility was traditionally managed by leaving the land uncultivated for a few years (GRAIN, 2012: 87). However, Malawi's socio-economic context does not allow for this system, since the country's high population growth has left little room for shifting cultivation. Furthermore, Malawi's cash crop system established during the colonial era and continued under Banda after liberalisation, has led to a decrease in the variety of crops produced as it became more profitable to focus on tobacco production. The traditional practice of intercropping, which "mitigates the risks of disease, market fluctuation and weather disaster", (GRAIN, 2012: 87) thus became replaced by the cultivation of monocrops. Indigenous storage and preservation techniques<sup>82</sup> have also been phased out with the advent of modern agriculture.

Behind the "miracle" of Malawi's New Green Revolution lies the current actuality of a dualistic food security that manifests in increasing inequality between estate farmers and smallholder farmers since the latter do not have sufficient access to land to be self-sufficient in their subsistence farming.

### **4.4.3. Zimbabwe**

#### **4.4.3.1. Context-setting**

Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the country enjoyed the benefits of its thriving agriculture-based economy. At the time Zimbabwe was referred to as the "bread-basket" of Southern Africa since it was well-established as a net exporter of grain. Mukherjee (2002: 9) asserts

---

<sup>81</sup> Examples include a 55,000ha deal with the Government of Djibouti, negotiations with China for a similar-sized operation, and deals with UK-based companies (Cru Investment Management, Lonhro, and Associated British Foods) (GRAIN, 2012: 84).

<sup>82</sup> Kamwendo and Kamwendo (2014: 99) describe several of these techniques that have previously been widely-employed by subsistence farmers. They explain how a variety of crops were stored in a table-like structure right above the kitchen's fireplace; the smoke would protect the food from pests. This was a costless and safe practice as opposed to the current system which relies on pesticides. Food was also preserved in a trench dug behind the kitchen, underneath the overlay of the roof. Potatoes could last for over a year in this hole, provided it was stored according to specific methods (see Kamwendo and Kamwendo, 2014: 100).



that the performance of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector "has always been crucial to the overall economic performance" of the country.

The colonial legacy of Zimbabwe is an important determinant of how the economy came to be structured. Under British rule, the settlers "deliberately created a dualistic system of agriculture" (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 205). This involved that the most arable land were exclusively allocated to European farmers whereas African farmers were confined to areas that were not as suited for agriculture<sup>83</sup>. Characteristic of the second food regime, the European farmers also received support and assistance from the state in order to promote the industrialisation of production. African farmers were subordinate to this large-scale agricultural production since they did not receive equal support. As such African farmers could not compete with their European counterparts; their agricultural production merely served the purpose of communal subsistence (Maposa, Gamira & Hlongwana, 2010: 195). Consequently there was a marked decrease in production by Africans. Furthermore, in the process, indigenous agricultural knowledge<sup>84</sup> was lost which came to negatively impact food security in the subsequent eras when the food security situation in Zimbabwe became dire.

The racially skewed land ownership pattern became a central focus of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. The restoration of land ownership was one of the main aspirations of independence<sup>85</sup>; it was argued that reclaiming land expropriated by the colonialists would establish Africans' sovereignty. Land was thus framed as an important material and symbolic resource (Sachikonye, 2003:228) in the sense that it would not only economically empower Africans, but that it would also reinstate their identity<sup>86</sup>. However, after independence the land reform process was slow to take off. Reed (2002: 97-98) explains that the government sought to balance two contradictory forces, namely: to uphold the economic structure dominated by the white minority, and to empower the black majority through the politics of national unity. Consequently land reform was (initially) rooted in the government's policy of national reconciliation which entailed that it was conducted on

---

<sup>83</sup> The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 (superseded by the Land Tenure Act of 1969) provided the legal foundation for this divide. Maposa *et al.* (2010: 196) cites Moyana (2002) who states that the white European minority was allocated 51% of the total arable land whereas the African majority owned only 22%.

<sup>84</sup> See Chirimuuta and Mapolisa's discussion (2011) on local communities' agricultural practices that ensured soil fertility, and provided mechanisms for strategic grain storage.

<sup>85</sup> Sachikonye (2003: 228) even goes as far as to argue that the liberation struggle "was not primarily about building 'democracy' and the institutions and values which sustain it" since land reform was the main driving force. He elaborates on this argument by highlighting that Robert Mugabe's authoritarian rule following independence was not contested since democracy was not the main goal of the liberation struggle.

<sup>86</sup> In accordance with the Pan-Africanism described above.

a willing-buyer/willing-seller approach as required by the restrictive Lancaster House Agreement<sup>87</sup> (Zikhali & Chilonda, 2012: 147). However, even after the Lancaster House Agreement expired in 1990, land reform still proceeded slowly. During the 1990s, government paid little attention to resolve the land question. The official explanation for this delay was that the willing-seller/willing-buyer approach "limited the scope of spatially matching land supply with demand for resettlement" (Sachikonye, 2003: 231).

The neoliberal model employed for land reform, was also extended to agriculture as a whole with increased liberalisation in this sector. In the previous era of rule, following the internationally unrecognised UDI, the country experienced trade and investment sanctions and consequently had a closed economy. Because of import substitution, this period stimulated rapid agricultural growth in the country (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 206). However, following independence, growth in the Zimbabwean economy depended on "accessing new markets, acquiring new technology, and putting the economy on a more competitive foundation" (Reed, 2002: 98). Since land reform would disrupt this process, it was back-burnered by government which prioritised the attending to the needs of the white-dominated economy instead. As consolation to the black majority, the ZANU-PF<sup>88</sup> government launched a programme extending social services to the African population through providing education and health services.

Zimbabwe first entrenched its economic liberalisation through the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990 with the overall goal to integrate the industrial, agricultural and mining sectors into the global economy. The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) launched in 1996 marked the second phase of the reform process which "reinforced plans to open the economy to world markets" (Reed, 2002: 108). Economic liberalisation altered the structure of the agricultural sector through the creation of export incentives as well as the free-flow of foreign capital. Land use, in particular, was altered with large-scale commercial farms shifting to the increased horticultural production and the cultivation of cash

---

<sup>87</sup> The Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 internationally legitimated Zimbabwe's independence following the former Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 which was not recognised by Britain or the UN (Thomson, 2004: 34). With regards to land reform, this agreement entailed that the willing-seller/willing-buyer approach should be followed, and that compensation should be according to market prices – to be paid in a currency of the seller's choice (Logan, 2007: 204; Moyo, 2012: 132).

<sup>88</sup> ZANU-PF was formed in 1988 following a merger between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Farley (2008: 76) explains that the merger introduced a "degree of apparent quietism" into Zimbabwean politics as it diminished the size and strength of the opposition. As such this merger paved the way for the country's one-party system and the authoritarian leadership of Robert Mugabe, both of which only became challenged at the turn of the century with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

crops<sup>89</sup>. The emphasis placed on export-oriented agriculture undermined food security since it created an incentive for cultivating for profit instead of food.

Since embarking on these reforms, Zimbabwe's economic performance deteriorated; at the end of the 20th century the country was on the brink of collapse due to political and economic setbacks. This was met with discontent for the government of Robert Mugabe, which the latter sought to address by reprioritising the land-ownership issue (Farley, 2008: 77). The political base of ZANU-PF was mainly confined to the rural poor whose land demands had not been addressed since the first period of land reform<sup>90</sup> only benefited the black elite who could acquire land through market mechanisms. Sadomba (2013: 88) points out that, in the midst of increased grievances from the rural poor and war veterans<sup>91</sup>, Mugabe "decided to 'hijack' the land movement in a bid to use its cultural capital" to further his monopoly on political power. As such, a second period of land reform was initiated in 1997. This period was rooted in a radical approach and rested on "extensive compulsory land acquisition and redistribution" (Zikhali & Chilonda, 2012: 147) as granted by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992<sup>92</sup>. From 1998 onward, there was a "gradual retreat of Western investment capital and the construction of an elaborate sanctions regime" as the US and European Union (EU) expressed its discontent with the radical approach to land reform (Moyo, 2012: 141).

The radical phase of land reform intensified after Mugabe's defeat in the referendum of 2000<sup>93</sup>. He resorted to "arbitrary and extra-constitutional tactics" in a scramble to maintain in power (Farley, 2008: 79). With regards to land reform, this involved that Mugabe let it be known that war veterans can forcibly occupy white farmlands without fear of intervention by the police authorities. Furthermore, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and his supporters were actively harassed by members of the ZANU-PF, and the Zimbabwean media was also censored by the state in an effort to intimidate those opposing the government (Farley, 2008:

---

<sup>89</sup> This brought on the return to tobacco exports, of which the production had to be curtailed during the sanctions of the UDI period (Ndelela & Robinson, 2010: 206).

<sup>90</sup> It should be noted that different scholars split up Zimbabwean land reform in different phases. For example, Moyo (2001) identified four phases from 1980 till 2000, while Sadomba (2013) recognises two main periods (1998 to 2002, and thereafter).

<sup>91</sup> Guerrilla fighters of the liberation war of Zimbabwe; mostly comprised of the former military youth (Sadomba, 2013: 79).

<sup>92</sup> Under this Act the State could claim five categories of land for redistribution: "derelict land, under-utilised land, multiple-owned land, foreign-owned land, and private farm properties adjacent to communal areas" (Logan, 2007: 205).

<sup>93</sup> The referendum proposed a new constitution of Zimbabwe to replace the one drawn up under the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. It was during the era preceding the referendum that the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed to mobilise civil society against the government (Zondi, 2012: 18)

79). In this highly politicised environment, white farmlands were expropriated *en masse* and subsequently the large-scale commercial sector shrank from 39% in 2000 to 8% in 2002 (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 207). The ZANU-PF described the widespread land reform as an "agrarian revolution"; according to official estimates, when this process drew to a close in October 2002, 11 million hectares had been transformed from white commercial farmers to 300,000 smallholder black farmers (Sachikonye, 2003: 227).

This "fast-track" land reform programme had a severe impact on the agricultural sector. Prior to the second period of land reforms, commercial agriculture upheld Zimbabwe's socio-economic stability by "assuring food security, foreign exchange, employment, and government revenues to invest in social services" (Besada & LaChapelle, 2012: 5). However, land reform transferred skilled and well-equipped farmers to smallholders that lacked the necessary skills and capital to sustain investments in industrial agriculture (Ndlela & Robinson, 2010: 207). Farley (2008: 82) highlights that, although government had a policy for land reform, it did not have a policy on how to train new land owners in agricultural techniques. Consequently there was a dramatic decrease in agricultural productivity which led to the rapid deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy. Robertson (2012: 85) ascribes the unanticipated effects of the fast-track land reform programme to government's error in judgement about the nature and role of the agricultural sector. Before the second period of land reform, this sector was one of Southern Africa's most advanced and robust; heralded as a great success story in the region.

Zimbabwe's "human-made crisis" (Grant, 2007: 178) gave rise to widespread unemployment, poverty, and food insecurity. Ignowski (2012: 9) notes that most Zimbabweans' are involved in agriculture and consequently dependent on a good harvest to ensure food security. The impact of land reform, coupled with "the longest dry spell in 20 years" led government to declare a state of disaster in 2002 (Mukherjee, 2002: 8). During 2003-2004 Zimbabwe, previously able to sufficiently feed its citizens throughout the postcolonial era, was the biggest recipient of emergency food aid<sup>94</sup> in Southern Africa (Grant, 2007: 159). However, food aid itself also became a strategic political tool in the Zimbabwean narrative. The ZANU-PF insisted on taking responsibility for the distribution of food aid. Tension between the ZANU-PF and the MDC was especially high during this period following the 2002 presidential election, that Mugabe won under questionable

---

<sup>94</sup> Adding further complexity to the situation, was that Zimbabwe demanded GMO-free products (Khumalo, 2007: 218) which re requirement that maize (the country's staple food) must be milled prior to its distribution in the country out of concern that GMOs would contaminate indigenous crops (Grant, 2007: 185).

circumstances of "voter coercion and intimidation of political opponents" (Mukherjee, 2002: 5). Subsequently, under a system of excessive patronage, the government channelled food aid to areas supportive of the ZANU-PF, whilst the areas supportive of the MDC were deprived thereof (Farley, 2008: 82; Sachikonye, 2003: 239). Since the MDC's support base is mainly located in the urban areas, food insecurity in cities was deliberately undermined through the politically skewed distribution of food.

The period from 2003-2008 was marked with hyperinflation which culminated in Zimbabwe suspending its own currency<sup>95</sup>. When inflation peaked between July and October 2008, it was at the height of the global food crisis, and subsequently the price of food increased threefold within a single day (Tawodzera, Zanamwe & Crush, 2012: 22). In 2008 Zimbabwe also experienced a "huge maize shortfall following the worst harvest for 15 years" (Chikuhwa, 2013: 146) and like elsewhere in the world, these food shortages spurred on strikes and unrest in the country (Zvavahera & Chigora, 2015: 68). Like before, MDC supporters were denied food supplies and had to adopt other strategies<sup>96</sup> to access food.

However, the year 2008 also marked the first step in rebuilding Zimbabwe's political system. A power-sharing agreement was signed by ZANU-PF, the MDC and an MDC splinter group (Besada & LaChapelle, 2012: 1). The Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed in the following year, and since then the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe started to improve.

#### **4.4.3.2. Institutional framework: main guiding documents**

In summarising Zimbabwe's land, agricultural, and food security policies, Anseeuw, Kapuya and Saruchera (2012: 20) note that the country had no official food security policy since its independence in 1980. Its approach to food security articulated in ensuring food self-sufficiency through the parastatal Grain Marketing Board (GMB) which rigidly controlled the trade in maize and wheat till it was liberalised in 2009. The government has also been accused of haphazardly formulating one agricultural policy after another without any implementation which led to the "mystification" of the policy context (Zvavahera & Chigora, 2015: 60).

---

<sup>95</sup> Zimbabwe's suffered major budget deficits through: government's increase of war veterans' pensions; its intervention against the invasion of the DRC from 1998 to 2002; and international sanctions that resulted in a decrease in FDI (Moyo, 2012: 140).

<sup>96</sup> Tawodzera *et al.* (2012: 24) explain that the urban population (read MDC supporters) had to resort to the informal market to acquire food since supermarkets were closed or understocked. The urban population was thus reliant on non-market channels to access food, and subsequently resorted to urban agriculture, rural-urban food transfers and households' increased dependence on their social networks (Ignowski, 2012: 49).

In 2012 the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) announced its Country Programme Framework that it drafted together with the FAO. The policy identifies three priority areas: (a) to establish policy frameworks; (b) to improve sustainable agricultural productivity and competitiveness; and (c) to improve disaster risk and reduction management (GoZ, 2012: 17-18). The policy is not particularly prescriptive on how the policy frameworks and disaster management priority areas should be developed. However, with regards to the second priority area, the policy's outcomes are to strengthen national agricultural institutions, increase the commercialisation of the smallholder sector, and improve rural and urban production and marketing infrastructures (GoZ, 2012: 17-18).

In contrast to this neoliberal framework, the Food and Nutrition Security Policy announced by government in 2013, is predominantly rooted in radical principles. The main policy goal is to "promote and ensure adequate food and nutrition security for all people at all times in Zimbabwe, particularly amongst the most vulnerable and in line with our cultural norms and values and the concept of rebuilding and maintaining family dignity" (GoZ, 2014: 1). The policy is described as "holistic" and "multi-sectoral", and it is underpinned by the right-to-food rhetoric.

Zimbabwe's most recent economic policy, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Zim Asset) highlights "Food Security and Nutrition" as one of four strategic clusters<sup>97</sup> "that will enable Zimbabwe to achieve economic growth and reposition the country as one of the strongest economies in the region" (GoZ, 2013: 6). The Food Security and Nutrition cluster is informed by the CAADP<sup>98</sup> and thus reflects the notion that investment in the agricultural sector would lead to economic growth. Crop production and marketing, livestock production and development, infrastructure development, environmental management, and protection and conservation form the key areas of the Food Security and Nutrition cluster. The approach government adopts to the development of production is unmistakably neoliberal as reflected in this selection of strategies that aims to "establish agro-dealer networks", "facilitate establishment of agricultural commodities market", "train agro-dealers in business management", "establish livestock breeding and multiplication centres", "support the production of feeds and chemicals" (GoZ, 2013: 52-56). The focus on the industrialisation of agriculture is also mirrored in the strategies advanced for infrastructure development. The Zim Asset (GoZ, 2013: 56) aims to increase mechanised agriculture and improve storage facilities. The approach towards environmental management is also

---

<sup>97</sup> Along with the Food Security and Nutrition cluster, the other clusters identified in the Zim Asset are: Social Services and Poverty Reduction, Value Addition and Beneficiation, and Infrastructure and Utilities (GoZ, 2013).

<sup>98</sup> See the discussion thereof in Appendix D.

tinged with neoliberalism as this strategy entails "improved natural resources management" arguably for the generation of income in the form of FDI (GoZ, 2013: 57). However the focus on climate change and ecosystem preservation reflects a more progressive ideology.

A National Nutrition Strategy<sup>99</sup> (Goz, 2014) was launched in 2014 in which the Food and Nutrition Policy's radical focus on the right to food is reflected.

#### **4.4.3.3. Current actualities: orientation and model**

It has been widely recognised that the socio-economic difficulties of Zimbabwe can be traced back to the decisions made by government – especially since 1997 (Robertson, 2012: 83; Moyo, 2012: 131; Ndulovu-Gatsheni, 2014: 9). One study even concludes that "it is just rhetoric by the government to say that Zim Asset is going to grow the economy" since there is no political will to support the programme (Zvavahera & Chigora, 2015: 68). However, in the absence of sufficient follow-through by government on its agricultural policies, other stakeholders' actions have shaped the food model of the country.

Amidst reduced government spending, the private sector has become more actively involved in Zimbabwean agriculture. Through agreements between agribusinesses and smallholder farmers, contract farming has gained prominence within the country. Contract farming involves that process or marketing firms provide support for smallholder farmers by providing agricultural inputs, financial assistance or by guaranteeing markets for their products (Duma, 2007: 19). This assurance creates an incentive for smallholder farmers to increase production.

The increased presence of the private sector is also apparent in their agro-investments in land. Matondi (2011: 135) notes that the private sector has "partnered with the state to benefit economically from land that ideally would have been intended for public resettlement". Although foreign land investment in the country is not a new phenomenon, the radical land reform's nature of forced land takeovers should have deterred investment by agribusinesses. However, in the absence of well-developed property rights, large-scale land deals are lucrative for the government since it can sell off land as it pleases. Zimbabwean officials have also welcomed and even encouraged commercial investments since it offers the prospect to develop the underutilised agriculture sector, to increase national food supply, and to create employment (Matondi, 2011: 148).

---

<sup>99</sup> As mentioned before, an analysis of nutrition security and its subsequent policies is beyond the scope of this discussion due to the restrictive level of analysis that does not allow for an investigation on the status of individuals' food security.

Thondhlana (2014: 2) discusses the how agro-investments for biofuel development in particular has been pitched as a scheme that will "foster rural development and enable energy sufficiency and security". However, by analysis the methods of the Chisumbanje bio-ethanol plant<sup>100</sup>, Thondhlana (2014: 8) concludes that rural development has in fact been compromised since the project was launched. The project was characterised by the forced removal of rural households and the disruption of communal farming as food and cash crops that were almost ready for harvesting were ploughed down. Since, there has been a delay by farmers to invest in food production due to uncertainty over the private investors' actions.

Thus, despite the potential of agro-investments in land to unlock Zimbabwe's agricultural potential, current agro-investments are "not informed by local needs and interests which creates a situation whereby a few elites seem to benefit" from the deals at the expense local people's land rights (Matondi, 2011: 135). The overall winners are the political elite and private investors, whilst the local communities are deprived from land and food availability.

Agro-investments in lands are entirely inconsistent with the model of radical land reform and right to food discourse advanced by government with the fast-track land reform policy. A growing body of literature has come to praise the fast-track land reform policy as the only example of radical land redistribution since the end of the Cold War (Moyo and Chambati, 2012: 1). Despite the adverse effects on the Zimbabwean economy, fast-track land reform has been elevated as "a gradual process of black emancipation" (Duma, 2007: 69), that dismantled "white-owned farms and agribusiness land" (Jacobs, 2013: 4) in the true spirit of radical reform. It has also been argued that Zimbabwean land reform has been viewed out of context due to the negative Western media attention it received (Hendricks, 2013: 27), and that "getting to grips with the realities on the ground is essential" to challenge the myths that agricultural production collapsed and that food insecurity is rife (Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Murimbarimba, Mahenehene & Sukume, 2010; see also Death, 2011: 33). It is argued that agrarian reform has resulted in a livelihood transition with the "the emergence of a significant and successful 'middle farmer' group, reliant on 'accumulation from below'" (Scoones *et al.*, 2012: 35).

However, despite the promising food sovereignty platform created by the Zimbabwe's reformed agrarian structure, the greater economic model did not break from the neoliberal framework, which causes contradictions in the country's approach to food security.

---

<sup>100</sup> The project started in 2009 and claims to be the largest of its kind in Africa (Thondhlana, 2014: 8).



#### **4.5. Conclusion**

This chapter presented the food security approaches of Southern Africa as depicted through the representative cases of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. The discussion highlighted the importance of the socio-economic evolution of food security in the region as it developed from the colonial era to the post-independence era, and the context-specific causes of Southern African food insecurity. It was also shown how diverse national contexts gave rise to specific challenges in each of the countries discussed, and how these challenges in turn shaped the food security framework in each country. The way in which the official approaches to food security deviates from the actual experiences was also emphasised by providing an overview of the emergent food security orientation and model in each country.

## *Chapter Five: Key findings and concluding remarks*

### **5.1. Introduction**

This chapter concludes the discussion on the politics of food in Southern Africa. First, Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology is discussed, thereby reflecting on the research question of the study. Second, other key findings of the study are presented. This section include commentary on the food regime/food movements framework's (Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011)<sup>101</sup> applicability to the Southern African case, and considerations for future research. The latter section emphasises the transformative power of ideas with specific reference to critical theory, and advances the expansion of transdisciplinary research by highlighting its uses for complex subjects such as food security. The final section of the chapter provides concluding remarks on the overall discussion by summarising the study's most important themes.

### **5.2. Reflecting on the research question: Southern Africa's prevailing food ideology**

As the previous chapter has shown, Southern Africa's approach to food security is sub-regionally nuanced by national conditions and policies. Despite facing similar food security challenges<sup>102</sup>, South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe's food ideologies are rooted in different economic and political narratives.

Through employing food regime analysis, it was highlighted how the region's socio-economic evolution of food insecurity is embedded in the development of the global food system. During the first food regime of British expansionism, Southern African countries – which were for the most part food secure at the time – were subjugated to the implementation of monocrops which subsequently transformed these countries to export economies. The second food regime coincided with decolonisation in Southern Africa. The US surplus-model became engrained in the region; large-scale industrialisation of agriculture was promoted. This was disruptive to the local food system since it further entrenched Southern Africa's dependence on monocrop systems. This decline in diversification had a lasting impact on the region's food system. Production shifted from the cultivation of food crops to that of cash crops, which compromised Southern Africa's ability to feed its citizens. Through monocrop production, the region's dietary patterns were also altered as noted in the case of Malawi where there's a cultural bias against substituting maize. Similarly,

---

<sup>101</sup> The main theoretical framework of this study – as discussed in section 3.3.

<sup>102</sup> As discussed in section 4.3: economic inheritance and SAPs, poverty (lack of entitlements), adverse climate, mismanagement and poor governance, and HIV/AIDS.

Zimbabweans are also overly-reliant on maize for both consumption and export income. During the third food regime, liberalisation worsened Southern Africa's food security since the ideals of free trade were advanced on an uneven playing field which resulted in Southern African agricultural exports being less competitive. Thus, throughout the development of the global food regime, Southern Africa's food system was restructured in order to serve hegemonic interests, and without consideration for the local context's needs.

Because Southern Africa's food systems and natural resources "have been relentlessly appropriated by foreign capital" since colonial times (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 132), there are parallels to be drawn between the region's historical movement for independence and its current struggles to govern their own food system. Consequently this results in an "annoying combination of progressive and neo-liberal objectives" (Bond, 2005: 21) since the region's empowerment discourse promotes the right to food without acknowledging its embeddedness in and dependence on the global food regime. As such, the official approach to food security largely reflects an unquestioning endorsement of the neoliberal framework as illustrated through production-orientated policies.

This is most apparent in South Africa's institutional framework. Unlike, the other two countries studied, South Africa does produce enough food to feed its citizens. Yet, the food model advanced in the country primarily focuses on improving and increasing production to alleviate food insecurity. This is clearly reflected through the fact that the institutional responsibility for food security rests with Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and the Department of Trade and Industry – as opposed to a specific food and nutrition security department. Consequently, although the IFSS<sup>103</sup> follows a *development* orientation, the *food security* discourse is overshadowed by that of *food enterprise*; overproduction, public-private partnerships and market integration are promoted as strategies to address chronic hunger in the country. When also taking into account the corporate presence in South Africa, it is clear that the country's food ideology is undeniably *neoliberal*.

It should be noted, that as a regional hegemon, South Africa had a strong presence in shaping the SADC's agenda. South Africa remains an economic giant in Southern and consequently it plays a key role in influencing the organisation's approach to food security<sup>104</sup>. Thus, even in Malawi the neoliberal food ideology is promoted by the country's adherence to the SADC food security

---

<sup>103</sup> The Integrated Food Security Strategy - as discussed in section 4.4.1.2

<sup>104</sup> SADC's institutional food security strategy is discussed in Appendix D.

framework even though Malawi has a fundamentally different agricultural profile than South Africa<sup>105</sup>. By following the SADC's advice for agricultural growth in the region<sup>106</sup>, Malawi committed to allocate 10% of its budget to agriculture. However, the ways in which the budget is allocated does not subscribe to the *neoliberal* ideology of food. Instead, through the FSAP<sup>107</sup>, Malawi adopts an *entitlement* orientation with its strong focus on community development and agricultural training. As discussed above, this increased support to smallholder farmers have been interpreted differently by different actors. Some see it as Malawi embracing the New Green Revolution (thus essentially subscribing to the *neoliberal* food ideology), whereas others view it as clear sign that Malawi promotes *food sovereignty* (thus follows a *radical* approach to food security). The discussion on the current actualities of Malawi also highlighted that this tension between top-down and bottom-up food security approaches can be ascribed to official discourses masking the "less altruistic political or commercial agendas" (Holt-Giménez *et al.*, 2010: 133) of the ruling elite. This is reflected by agricultural rent-seeking and Malawi neopatrimonial system, as well as the dual system of estate famers and smallholder farmers, where the latter's access to land is undermined by the former's ownership.

Similarly, access to land is a major food security issue in Zimbabwe – apparent in the aftermath of the country's notorious fast-track land reform programme. As discussed above, Zimbabwe's *radical* land redistribution policy has been elevated as a clear sign of the country's commitment to the human right to *food sovereignty* but true agrarian reform and rural development have been compromised by mismanagement and poor governance. The institutional approach to food security is largely rhetorical since policies are not sufficiently developed or backed by political will. Consequently *neoliberal* interests have come to shape the Zimbabwean model as reflected by the increased presence of the private sector in agriculture through contract-farming, land deals, and biofuel production. As highlighted above, Zimbabwean officials have welcomed these commercial investments, especially since they – through corruption – directly benefit from aligning with this *corporate* orientation.

---

<sup>105</sup> As discussed in the previous chapter, agriculture contributes 30% to Malawi's GDP – compared to 3% in South Africa (The World Bank, 2015a). Furthermore, with the absence of a manufacturing sector, the majority of Malawians are employed in agriculture; specifically the cultivation of maize and tobacco. This is also in contrast with the Southern African case which has a strong manufacturing sector, and has a diversified agricultural sector.

<sup>106</sup> As rooted in the CAADP - see Appendix D.

<sup>107</sup> The Food Security Action Plan (FSAP) is Malawi's institutional food security strategy – as discussed in section 4.4.2.2.

Thus, despite the development orientation and the entitlement one being advanced by the South African, and Malawian and Zimbabwean governments respectively, Southern Africa's overall food ideology subscribes to that of neoliberalism. The state, for a variety of reasons, some less clear, has continued to support the liberalisation of agriculture. However, the espoused goal of attracting foreign investment is in on-going tension with food sovereignty, redistribution, and land reform goals. It can thus be concluded that, despite the 2007-2008 being a clear signal of the failure of the corporate food system, the hegemony of neoliberalism is still intact to the extent that it determines Southern Africa's approach to food security without consideration for the context-specific needs of region.

### **5.3. Other key findings**

#### **5.3.1. Applicability of the food regime/food movements framework to the case study**

To the extent that shifting politics and regional dynamics play a role in Southern Africa, the three countries studied above offer great insights into both the food security challenges in the region, and more importantly, to how the state and society, the private sector, and international relations all play a role in the countries' agricultural system.

As anticipated in the section on the limitations and scope of the study<sup>108</sup>, the food regime/food movements framework<sup>109</sup> has proved to be too simplistic, especially for the Southern African context. The different ideologies (*neoliberal, reformist, progressive, and radical*), although well-developed within the framework<sup>110</sup>, is too restrictive to properly account for the variability of Southern Africa's food ideology. As explained above, since independence the region's interpretation of food security has changed in accordance with the social and political developments. Consequently countries' official approach to food security is marked with often-contradictory policies as it seeks to mitigate past injustices but also attempts to integrate its economy in the global economy. Furthermore, policies are not well-developed or properly implemented, and subsequently these countries' *guiding documents* largely belies their actual food *orientation* and *model*.

However, of special note is the consideration that the food regime/food movements framework is lacking in its applicability to the Southern African case since the region has a dissimilar political culture to other regions. Southern Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa as on whole, is characterised by a

---

<sup>108</sup> See section 1.10.

<sup>109</sup> As constructed by Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011) – see section 3.3.

<sup>110</sup> Through the extrapolation of their corresponding *discourse, main institutions, orientation, model, approach to the food crisis, and guiding document*.

distinct form of democracy where the *de facto* system of rule differs from the *de jure* state structures and practises. As such, Southern African harbours warped democracies where political authority, in the absence of a strong civil society, largely goes unchallenged. A key component of the food regime/food movements framework is the onus that is placed on civil society to challenge the dominant food regime – in accordance with the Polanyian thesis of the double movement of liberalisation and reform<sup>111</sup>. However, in Southern Africa, the political culture inhibits civil society from questioning political authority. As explained above, political authority in itself is often upheld by patronage and corruption. Consequently approaches to food security, just like the economic model, are designed to serve the interests of the elite – largely at the expense of and the detriment to the most vulnerable members in society. In this light, it can be argued that the only way to transform Southern African food systems to be more equitable, would pre-necessitate the development of healthy democracies in the region, since informed public debate and institutional transparency and accountability are foundational requirements for mobilising civil society.

### **5.3.2. Considerations for future research**

In each of the countries studied above – arguably the dominant agricultural countries in the region – history and the role of the state intersect to reflect different international relations, different socio-economic logics, and ultimately nuanced food systems. Thus, whilst often presented as a single entity, Southern Africa is in fact very diverse. As such, it can be argued that the model advanced by the New Green Revolution<sup>112</sup> is not suited for transforming the food system; the diverse regional context implies that "no single magic 'technological bullet' is available for radically improving [Southern] African agriculture" (InterAcademy Council, 2004: 9).

As shown through the discussion on the causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa<sup>113</sup>, food insecurity is not a production challenge to be overcome, but rather a socio-economic condition to be regulated and managed: the factors that impede food security can largely be mitigated through apt governance. Drimie and Mini (2003: 20) also assert that increased food production alone will not lift Southern Africa out of poverty, and that to prescribe this model is to equate food security with food production. As highlighted throughout the discussion and illustrated through the example of Southern Africa, food security goes beyond the mere availability of food. For example, South Africa produces enough food to feed its citizens, yet food insecurity is persistent due to citizens'

---

<sup>111</sup> See section 2.3.

<sup>112</sup> Essentially, this entails boosting development through the industrialisation of agriculture – see section

<sup>113</sup> See section 4.3.

lack of entitlements; due to widespread unemployment they do not earn an income with which they can access food. Thus reports of low levels of food insecurity in South Africa, is only reflective of the national condition and as such does not account for household food insecurity. As discussed above, households adopt coping strategies<sup>114</sup> to alleviate chronic hunger, and since it is subsequently perceived that household food security is "under control", the causes thereof are not sufficiently addressed. Furthermore, with South Africa's official approach to food security geared at developing rural livelihoods, the issue of urban food insecurity is not addressed by government either. Marias (2011: 217) notes that "it is generally assumed that a [food security programme] that promotes and supports smallholder production is a potent anti-poverty strategy", when in fact this strategy does not acknowledge urban food insecurity, which in a rapidly urbanising context is becoming a problem of great magnitude.

#### **5.2.3.1. The transformative power of ideas**

At this point, the power of ideas cannot be emphasised enough: how we define the problem of food security make some solutions seem obvious whilst other solutions go unnoticed. In assessing food security at a national level, or by framing it as a primarily rural challenge, the scope of possible solutions is severely restricted. In order to adequately address food security, the rationale for policy reform at regional and national levels should be driven and informed by the needs of those that are marginalised within the specific system. In this regard, the discussion again necessitates a reference to the distinction made by Cox between problem-solving theory and critical theory<sup>115</sup>. When attempting to construct solutions to food security, it is essential to scrutinise the system as a whole; that is to employ critical theory. This is required because problem-solving theory simply "takes the world as it finds it, with its prevailing social and power relationships and institutions to which they are organised, as the given framework for action" (Cox, 1981: 128-129), thereby limiting the range of solutions. In contrast, critical theory can be described as utopian since it offers a holistic perspective on the shortcomings of the system in order to transcend the current system and establish a more equitable and sustainable order. With regards to food security, Murisa (2013: 195) asserts that "the resolution of the crisis cannot be limited to discrete in-country agrarian reforms: it requires a comprehensive overhaul of global agricultural institutions, policies and programmes" – thus a fundamental change in the structure of the food regime.

---

<sup>114</sup> See section 4.4.1.1.

<sup>115</sup> See section 3.3.2.

By employing critical theory, perspectives on how to achieve food security can be altered by, for example, adopting a constructivist approach<sup>116</sup> to food security. As such, for instance, the concept of "development" can be scrutinised with regards to how it perpetuates the idea that Southern Africa is in need of development as defined by the Western conceptualisation of industrialisation, macroeconomic stability, and democracy. A critical approach to food security allows for rethinking perspectives on "development" – to perhaps account for the development of Southern Africa's indigenous agricultural knowledge<sup>117</sup>. Similarly, a better understanding of food security can be achieved by reframing food security; for example: as a health issue (given that chronic hunger compromises the proper functioning of the human body) or as a legal issue (given the state's obligation to be held accountable for its citizens' right to food).

### **5.2.3.2. Call for transdisciplinary research**

Relatedly, when taking into account that food is where many socio-economic and environmental issues converge, one cannot not emphasise the importance of transdisciplinary research for addressing food security. It is of importance to distinguish "transdisciplinary" from "interdisciplinary" research; whereas the latter constitutes research between different academic disciplines, the former is more encompassing since it entails cross-departmental research whilst also acknowledging knowledge beyond the sphere of academia. Thus, transdisciplinary approaches recognise that "not only [...] scientific knowledge [is] relevant for the resolution of persistent societal problems [...] but that social knowledge or experiential knowledge is also important" (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013: 219). As such, transdisciplinary research is a powerful tool that can be used to engage civil society in order to produce socially relevant as well as new scientific knowledge and insight. When accounting for the fact that civil society is often demobilised by oppressive political systems, as illustrated through the case of Southern Africa, transdisciplinary research should be viewed as especially important in empowering civil society to contribute to redefining the concept of food security in order to promote to a more equitable and sustainable food system. The usefulness of a transdisciplinary approach is apparent when the complex nature of food security is taken into account; food security consists of a weave of inter-linkages between its

---

<sup>116</sup> Constructivism seeks to "denaturalise the social world" (Hopf, 1998: 179) by showing that it is the product of "human invention that is based on a particular, yet arbitrary set of norms" (du Plessis, 2013: 1). As such, constructivism can serve a transformative role by uncovering the dominant set of ideas and norms, in order to ultimately transcend thinking within these boundaries.

<sup>117</sup> See footnote 82 for the indigenous storage and preservation techniques employed by Malawi before liberalisation, and Chirimuuta and Mapolisa's discussion (2011) on Zimbabwean communities' agricultural practices that ensured soil fertility, and provided mechanisms for strategic grain storage.



economic, social, and environmental aspects. Complex systems operate in a "non-linear and unpredictable manner and can therefore affect a diverse range of stakeholders and interest groups in different ways" (TSAMA Hub, 2013). The diagram below provides an overview of possible research topics within food security literature<sup>118</sup>; illustrating that food security, albeit comprised of different entities, is connected in a social-ecological system.




Figure 3. Possible research topics within the complex field of food security

This range of topics relevant to food security highlights that social sciences, economic and management sciences, agricultural and natural sciences, and health sciences all have a role to play in constructing food security solutions. However, as Bernard (2015: 223) aptly points out, "the scientific community has created many boundaries<sup>119</sup> that work against the effective implementation of transdisciplinary approaches" to the extent that "the economic theories that have been identified as perpetuating social and environmental problems are frequently being taught at the same tertiary institutions which are training social scientists to criticise them". Thus, addressing food security not only necessitates a reframing of its conceptualisation, but also rethinking the dominant research paradigm that restricts transdisciplinary design and methods.

<sup>118</sup> As discovered through this explorative study.

<sup>119</sup> Bernard (2015: 223) explains that these include boundaries "between disciplines, institutions, sectors, cultures, as well as between knowledge-producers (e.g. researchers) and knowledge users (e.g. policy-makers)".

## 5.4. Conclusion

This study explored the politics of food in Southern Africa by employing the food regime/food movements framework of Holt-Giménez and Shattuck (2011). Food regime analysis was explained by tracing the historical development of the food system as it manifested in three food regimes: the settler-colonial regime, the surplus regime, and the corporate food regime. The concept of hegemony was emphasised in explaining how each of these regimes were upheld by Britain, the United States, and neoliberalism, respectively. It was explained how the transition from one regime to the next occurred due to a loss of the hegemon's dominance; ultimately the corporate food regime came to be due to the rise of neoliberalism which subsequently was characterised by the loss of nation states' power in the global political economy. However, the discussion emphasised, that – following the 2007-2008 food crisis – neoliberalism became viewed in an increasingly negative light. It was explained how the causes of the food crisis, which left 1.02 billion individuals undernourished (FAO, 2009), are rooted within neoliberalism, and as such, are embedded in the design and workings of the corporate food regime.

Amidst what has been referred to as a crisis of neoliberalism, renewed focus was placed on food politics. The food regime/food movements framework identifies four ideologies around food: *neoliberal*, *reformist*, *progressive*, and *radical*. Each of these ideologies was discussed with reference to the core components of their make-up, namely, their discourse and main institutions, orientation and model, and guiding documents. It was emphasised that there is an ideological split between neoliberal and reformist food politics and progressive and radical food politics. Whereas the former fundamentally seeks to maintain the corporate food regime, the latter is rooted in the belief that a complete overhaul of the corporate food regime should occur in order to establish a system that is equitable and sustainable. This ideological divergence is attributed to the double movement of capitalism, which is, alternating periods of liberalisation and reform in the system. The role of civil society in bringing about this reform was also addressed.

It was found, that in the absence of a strong civil society, Southern Africa's approaches to food closely resembles the neoliberal model. Although national frameworks targeted at food security, reflect reformist, progressive, and even radical sentiments, the actual model of food politics mirrors that of the corporate the corporate food regime. It was shown that, throughout the evolution of the global food regime, Southern Africans' food security had been compromised by the respective hegemonic orders. Consequently, the socio-economic evolution of food insecurity in the region can

largely be attributed to the lasting impact of Southern Africa's continued marginalised position within the global food regime. It was also explained that food insecurity in Southern Africa is exacerbated by widespread poverty, adverse climate, mismanagement and poor governance, and HIV/AIDS.

Throughout the discussion, it was also emphasised that, although Southern Africa, is often presented as a single entity, the cases of South Africa, Malawi, and Zimbabwe illustrates that national politics has a major impact on food availability, access, and stability. As such, the food system lens allowed insight into how history, the role of the state, and international relations intersect to produce diverse outcomes. Relatedly, Chang (2009: 512) notes that such an historical analysis "frees our policy imagination by showing us the range of policies and institutions" are "much wider than any particular ideological model". Consequently in order to address food security in Southern Africa, the rigid food regime/food movements framework should not serve as a guideline for possible food models. Instead, by accounting for the complexity of food security, and by engaging civil society to participate in constructing context-specific solutions, transdisciplinary research should guide the exploration of alternative food security models that are both equitable and sustainable.

## *Bibliography*

- Abdalla, Y.I. 2007. Causes of Food Insecurity in Southern Africa: An Assessment. Unpublished Master's thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Akokpari, J. 2008. Africa's Quest for Long-Term Development: Does NEPAD Provide the Necessary Policy Framework? *African Journal of International Affairs*, 11(1): 32-54.
- Akram-Lodhi, A.H. 2012. Contextualising Land Grabbing: Contemporary Land Deals, the Global Subsistence Crisis and the World Food System. *Canadian Journal of Development*, 33(2): 119-142.
- Allen, P. 2013. Facing food security. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 29: 135-138.
- Amusan, L. & Kgotleng, M. 2015. South Africa's Food Security Development in the Era of Globalisation, Affirmative Action and Land Reform. Unpublished paper delivered at North-West University. 19 June, Mafikeng.
- Anseeuw, W., Kapuya, T. & Saruchera, D. 2012. Zimbabwe's Agricultural Reconstruction: Present State, Ongoing Projects and Prospects for Reinvestment. Development Bank of Southern Africa Working Paper.
- Aryeetey, E. & Moyo, N. 2013. The Global Food and Financial Crises and the Poor in Africa, in Lee, D.R. & Ndulo, M.B. (eds.). *The Food and Financial Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, Impacts and Policy Implications*. Oxfordshire: CABI. 22-47.
- Babbie, E. & Mouton, J. 2002. *The Practice of Social Research*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Bennett, J. 2003. Food Aid Logistics and the Southern Africa Emergency. *Forced Migration Review*, 18(5): 28-31.
- Berglee, R. 2012. *World Regional Geography: People, Places, and Globalisation* [Online]. Available: <http://www.saylor.org/site/textbooks/World%20Regional%20Geography.pdf> [2015, September 11].
- Berman, B.J. 1998. Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism. *African Affairs*, 97(388): 305-341.
- Bernard, T. 2015. A Critical Analysis of Corporate Reports that Articulate Corporate Social Responsibility. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.

- Bernstein, H. 2015. *Food Regimes and Food Regime Analysis: A Selective Survey*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research\\_and\\_projects/Research\\_networks/LDPI/CMCP\\_1-\\_Bernstein.pdf](http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/LDPI/CMCP_1-_Bernstein.pdf) [2015, July 25].
- Besada, H. & LaChapelle, J. 2012. Zimbabwe's Recovery Path: A Conceptual Framework, in Besada, H. (ed.). *Zimbabwe: Picking up the Pieces*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 1-11.
- Birmingham, D. 1999. *Portugal and Africa*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Blakemore, B. & Sandell, C. 2006. *Global Warming Could Slam Food Supply*. [Online]. Available: <http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/GlobalWarming/Story?id=2277893&page=1> [2015, August 16].
- Bloomberg. 2015. *Record Numbers of Southern Africans Need Food Aid, SADC says*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-12/record-numbers-of-southern-africans-need-food-aid-sadc-says> [2015, August 12].
- Bond, P. 2005. *Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*. Asmara: Africa World Press Inc.
- Bradsher, K. *A Drought in Australia, a Global Shortage of Rice*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/business/worldbusiness/17warm.html?n=Top/News/Science/Topics/Global%20Warming&r=1> [2015, August 16].
- Broughton, A. 2013. Land Grabbing: A New Colonialism. *Green Social Thought*, 61: 25-29.
- Brown, M.B. 1992. *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank*. London: Penguin.
- Burch, D. & Lawrence, G. 2009. Towards a Third Food Regime: Behind the Transformation. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 26: 267-279.
- Campbell, H. 2012. Let Us Eat Cake? Historically Reframing the Problem of World Hunger and its Purported Solutions, in Rosin, C., Stock, P. & Campbell, H. (eds.). *Food Systems Failure: The Global Food Crisis and the Future of Agriculture*. New York: Earthscan. 30-45.
- Chang, H. 2009. Rethinking Public Policy in Agriculture: Lessons from History, Distant and Recent. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(3): 447-515.
- Chikuhwa, J.W. 2013. *Zimbabwe: The End of the First Republic*. Bloomington: AuthorHouse.
- Chinsinga, B. & Poulton, C. 2014. Beyond Technocratic Debates: The Significance and Transience of Political Incentives in the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme. *Development Policy Review*, 32(2):123-150.
- Chinsinga, B. 2012a. *Deconstructing the Success Myth: A Case of the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme*. Maputo: IESE.

- Chinsinga, B. 2012b. The Political Economy of Agricultural Policy Processes in Malawi: A Case Study of the Fertilizer Subsidy Programme. FAC Working Paper 39. Brighton.
- Chinsinga, B. 2011a. Agro-dealers, Subsidies and Rural Market Development in Malawi: A Political Economy Enquiry. FAC Working Paper 31. Brighton.
- Chinsinga, B. 2011b. Seeds and Subsidies: The Political Economy of Input Programmes in Malawi. *IDS Bulletin*, 42(4): 59-68.
- Chipeta, M.E. 2014. Long-term Perspective on Food Security and Appropriate Policy Responses. Speech delivered at the National FISP Symposium. 14-15 July, Lilongwe.
- Chirumuuta, C. & Mapolisa, T. 2011. Centering the Peripheries Systems: Zimbabwean Indigenous Knowledge Systems for Food Security. *Zimbabwe International Journal of Open & Distance Learning*, 1(2): 52-56
- Chirwa, E.W. & Matita, M. 2015. Space, Markets and Employment in Agricultural Development: Malawi. PLAAS Policy Brief 36. Bellville.
- Chirwa, E.W. 2010. Assessment of Maize Trade and Market Policy Interventions in Malawi, in Sarris, A. & Morrison, J. (eds.). *Food Security in Africa: Market and Trade Policy for Staple Foods in Eastern and Southern Africa*. Northampton: Edward Elgar. 252-283.
- Clapp, J. 2013. Developing Countries and the WTO Agriculture Negotiations. The Centre for International Governance Innovation. Working Paper 6. Waterloo.
- Clay, E. 2002. *Food Security: Concepts and Measurements*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.ieham.org/html/docs/food\\_security\\_concepts\\_and\\_measurement.pdf](http://www.ieham.org/html/docs/food_security_concepts_and_measurement.pdf) [2015, May 12].
- Cock, J. 2015. *The Political Economy of Food in South Africa*. [Online]. Available: <http://amandla.org.za/the-political-economy-of-food-in-south-africa/> [2015, September 23].
- Cohen, M.J. & Garrett, J.L. 2009. *The Food Price Crisis and Urban Food In(security)*. *Human Settlements*. London: International Institute for Economic Development.
- Collins, R.O. & Burns, J.M. 2007. *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, R.W. 1981. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. *Millennium*, 10(2): 126-155.
- Crush, J. & Frayne, B. 2010. *The Invisible Crisis: Urban Food Security in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: AFSUN.

- Curtis, M., Marcatto, C. & Narayan, S. 2011. *Success in Reducing Hunger: Lessons from India, Malawi and Brazil*. Bangladesh: IFSN.
- DAFF. 2014. *National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.daff.gov.za/docs/media/NATIONAL%20POLICYon%20food%20and%20nutrition%20security.pdf> [2015, September 19].
- De Schutter, O. 2009. The Meatification of Diets and Global Food Security. European Parliament, December 3.
- De Waal, A. & Whiteside, A. 2003. New Variant Famine: AIDS and Food Crisis in Southern Africa. *Lancet*, 362(9391): 1234-1237.
- Death, C. 2011. Food Security: Issues and Trends in International Politics. *IBERS: Knowledge-Based Innovations*, 4: 32-37.
- Dickens, C. 1859. *A Tale of Two Cities*. London: Chapman & Hall.
- Dogliotti, S., Giller, K.E. & van Ittersum, M.K. 2014. Achieving Global Food Security whilst Reconciling Demands on the Environment: Report of the First International Conference on Global Food Security. *Food Security*, 6(2): 299-302.
- Drimie, S. & McLachlan, M. 2013. Food Security in South Africa: First Steps Toward a Transdisciplinary Approach. *Food Security*, 5(2): 217-226.
- Drimie, S. & Mini, S. 2003. *Food Security and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council
- Drimie, S. & Ruysenaar, S. 2010. The Integrated Food Security Strategy of South Africa: an Institutional Analysis. *Agrekon*, 49(3): 316-335.
- Du Plessis, E.J. 2013. The Agreements and Disagreements between Conventional and Critical Constructivists. Unpublished term paper. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Du Plessis, E.J. 2012. Attempting to Untangle the Causes of Conflict in Africa. Unpublished term paper. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Duma, M. 2007. Contract Farming as a Tool for the Development of Smallholder Farmers in Zimbabwe. Unpublished research report. Bellville: University of Stellenbosch Business School.
- Epstein, G. 2002. Financialisation, Rentier Interests and Central Bank Policy. Political Economy Research Institute Conference on Financialisation in the World Economy. Amherst, December 7-8.
- Evans, J. 2010. The Neoliberal Turn in the SADC: Regional Integration and Disintegration. *Nokoko*, 1: 101-129.

- Fairbairn, M. 2010. Framing Resistance: International Food Regimes and the Roots of Food Sovereignty, in Wittman, H., Desmarais, A. & Wiebe, N. (eds.). *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*. Halifax: Fernwood. 15-32.
- FAO. 2015a. Food Security Indicators. [Online]. Available: <http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.VjLbwbcRKUk> [2015, June 19].
- FAO. 2015b. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015*. Rome: FAO.
- FAO. 2012. *The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012*. Rome: FAO.
- FAO. 2011. *Why Has Africa Become a Net Food Importer? Explaining Africa Agricultural and Food Trade Deficits*. Rome: FAO.
- FAO. 2009. *FAO and the Eight Millennium Development Goals: Goal One*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/mdg/doc/mdg1\\_en.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/mdg/doc/mdg1_en.pdf) [2014, July 9].
- FAO. 2003. *Trade Reforms and Food Security: Conceptualising the Linkages*. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations: Rome.
- FAO. 2002. *Multi Stakeholder Dialogue: Food, Security, Justice and Peace*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsummit/msd/y6808e.htm> [2015, October 11].
- FAO. 1996. *Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action*. Rome. Rome: FAO.
- Farley, J. 2008. *Southern Africa*. London: Routledge.
- Feed the Future. 2015. *Malawi Country Profile*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.feedthefuture.gov/country/malawi> [2015, October 19].
- FFSSA. 2004. *Achieving Food Security in Southern Africa: Policy Issues and Options*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5589.pdf> [2015, October 6].
- FIAN. 2006. *The Human Right to Food in Malawi: Report of an International Fact-Finding Mission*. Heidelberg: FIAN International.
- Forum for Food Sovereignty. 2007. *Declaration of Nyéléni*. [Online]. Available: [http://nyeleni.org/DOWNLOADS/Nyelni\\_EN.pdf](http://nyeleni.org/DOWNLOADS/Nyelni_EN.pdf) [2015, September 3].
- Freebairn, D.K. 1995. Did the Green Revolution concentrate incomes? A Quantitative Study of Research Reports. *World Development*, 23(2):265-279.
- Friedmann, H. 2009. Moving Food Regimes Forward: Reflections on Symposium Essays. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 26(4): 355-344.



- Friedmann, H. 2005. From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social movements and Emergence of Food Regimes, in Buttel, F.H. & McMichael, P. (eds.). *New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development*. Amsterdam: Elsevier: 227-264.
- Friedmann, H. 1993. The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis. *New Left Review*, 197: 29-57.
- Friedmann, H. & McMichael, P. 1989. Agriculture and the State System: the Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present. *Sociologica Ruralis*, 29(2): 93-117.
- Friedman, T.L. 2009. The Inflection is Near? *The New York Times*, March 7: 5.
- Fritz, T. 2014. *The Illusionary Promise of the Livestock Revolution: Meatification of Diets, Industrial Animal Farms and Global Food Security*. [Online]. Available: [http://fdcl-berlin.de/fileadmin/fdcl/Publikationen/Fleisch\\_macht\\_Hunger/The\\_illusory\\_promise\\_of\\_the\\_livestock\\_revolution\\_web\\_kl.pdf](http://fdcl-berlin.de/fileadmin/fdcl/Publikationen/Fleisch_macht_Hunger/The_illusory_promise_of_the_livestock_revolution_web_kl.pdf) [2015, August 19].
- FSC. 2015. *Declaration of the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign and Alliance*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.copac.org.za/files/Food%20Sovereignty%20Assembly%20Declaration> [2015, September 22].
- Gamble, A. 2009. *The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Garnet, T. 2013. Food Sustainability: Problems, Perspectives and Solutions. *Proceedings of the Nutrition Society*, 72(1): 29-39
- Gibb, R. 2009. Regional Integration and Africa's Development Trajectory: Meta-theories, Expectations and Reality. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(4): 702-721.
- Gibson, M. 2011. *The Use of Conceptual Frameworks in Understanding Food Security*. Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University.
- Giddens, A. 1997. *Sociology*. 3rd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Godsäter, A. 2011. Southern African Development Community, in Finizio, G., Levi, L. & Vallinoto, N. (eds.). *The Democratization of International Organizations*. Moncalieri: Centre for Studies on Federalism.
- Government of South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: Bill of Rights.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2014. *Zimbabwe National Nutrition Strategy, 2014-2018*. [Online]. Available:

- <https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/sites/default/files/ZWE%202014%20National%20Nutrition%20Strategy.pdf> [2015, October 18].
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2013. *Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation: Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy, 2013-2018*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.herald.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Zim-Asset.pdf> [2015, October 19].
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2012. *Country Programme Framework, 2012-2015*. [Online]. Available: [ftp://ftp.fao.org/TC/CPF/Countries/Zimbabwe/CPF\\_ZIM\\_2012-2015.pdf](ftp://ftp.fao.org/TC/CPF/Countries/Zimbabwe/CPF_ZIM_2012-2015.pdf) [2015, October 6].
- GRAIN. 2012. *The Great Food Robbery: How Corporations Control Food, Grab Land and Destroy the Climate*. Cape Town: Pambazuka Press.
- Greenberg, S. 2013. The Disjunctures of Land and Agricultural Reform in South Africa: Implications for the Agri-Food System. PLAAS Working Paper 26. Bellville.
- Greenberg, S. 2010. *Contesting the Food System in South Africa: Issues and Opportunities*. Bellville: PLAAS.
- Grant, C. 2007. Food Aid: A Regional Study of Southern Africa, in Draper, P. & Khumalo, N. (eds.). *Trade in Genetically Modified Foods: Decoding Southern African Regulatory Approaches*. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 151-197.
- Greenwell, M., Sibusiso, N. & Pius, C. 2014. Agricultural Sector Performance in Malawi. *Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies*, 14(2): 141-156.
- Guinn, A. & Hamrick, D. 2015. *Changing Food Systems and Inequality: Implications for Food Security and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Haggblade, S., Hazell, P.B.R. & Gabre-Madhin E. 2010. Challenges for African Agriculture, in Haggblade, S. & Hazell, P.B.R (eds.). *Successes in African Agriculture: Lessons for the Future*. Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute. 1-26.
- Hall, R. & Cousins, B. 2015. Commercial Farming and Agribusiness in South Africa and their Changing Roles in Africa's Agro-Food System. Chiang Mai University Conference. Chang Mai, 5-6 June.
- Harvey, D. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hattingh, S. 2008. *Food and Neoliberalism in South Africa: Entrenching the Legacy of Apartheid*. [Online]. Available: <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2008/hattingh230808.html> [2015, June 19].

- Havnevik, K. 2011. Grabbing of African Lands for Energy and Food: Implications for Land Rights, Food Security and Smallholders, in Matondi, P.B., Havnevik, K. & Beyene, A. (eds.). *Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food Security in Africa*. London: Zed Books. pp. 20-43.
- Haysom, G. 2014. Food System Governance for Urban Sustainability in the Global South. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.
- HDI. 2014. *HDI Indicators by Country 2014*. [Online]. Available: <https://data.undp.org/dataset/HDI-Indicators-By-Country-2014/5tuc-d2a9> [2015, October 4].
- Hendricks, 2013. Rhetoric and Reality in Restitution and Redistribution Ongoing Land and Agrarian Questions in South Africa, in Hendricks, F., Ntsebeza, L. & Helliker, K. (eds.). *The Promise of Land: Undoing a Century of Dispossession in South Africa*. Sunnyside: Jacana Media. 27-53.
- Hendriks, S. 2014. Food Security in South Africa: Status Quo and Policy Imperatives. *Agrekon*, 52(2): 1-24.
- Hendriks, S., Kirsten, J. & Vink, N. 2006. The Effect of Institutions and Policies on Food Security and Rural Development in South Africa. *Journal of Development Perspectives*, 2(1): 86-102.
- Hinrichs, C.C. 2013. Regionalising food security? Imperatives, intersections and contestations in a post-9/11 world. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 29: 7-18.
- Holt-Giménez, E. & Shattuck, A. 2011. Food crises, food regimes and food movements: rumblings of reform or tides of transformation? *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(1): 109-144.
- Holt-Giménez, E. 2010. Food Security, Food Justice, or Food Sovereignty? *Food First*, 16(4): 1-4.
- Holt-Giménez, E. 2008. The World Food Crisis: What is Behind it and What Can We Do. [Online]. Available: <http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/09/editorials/holt-gimenez.htm> [2015, September 30].
- Holt-Giménez, E., Patel, R. & Shattuck, A. 2010. *Food Rebellions! Crisis and the Hunger for Justice*. Pambazuka Press: Cape Town.
- Hopf, T. 1998. The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 23(1): 171-200.
- IBON International. 2012. *IBON Primer on Food Sovereignty and the Food Crisis*. Quezon City: IBON International
- IFPRI. 2015. *Global Hunger Index Methodology*. [Online]. Available: <http://ghi.ifpri.org/methodology/> [2015, October 24].

- Ignowski, E.A. Two Essays on Food Security in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Master's thesis. Urban: University of Illinois.
- IMF. 2008. *Food and Fuel Prices: recent developments, macroeconomic impact, and policy responses*. [Online]. Available: <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/063008.pdf> [2015, August 19].
- InterAcademy Council. 2004. *Realising the Promise and Potential of African Agriculture*. Amsterdam: InterAcademy Council
- Jacobs, P.T. 2012. Agro-food Market Policy and Food Security in South Africa, in Cohen, M.J. & Smale, M. (eds.). *Global Food-Price Shocks and Poor People: Themes and Case Studies*. London: Routledge.188-197.
- Jacobs, R. 2013. *The Radicalisation of the Struggles of the Food Sovereignty Movement in Africa*. [Online]. Available: <http://viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/openbooks/EN-11.pdf> [2015, October 5].
- Kamwendo, G. & Kamwendo, J. 2014. Indigenous Knowledge-Systems and Food Security: Some Examples from Malawi. *Journal of Human Ecology*, 48(1):97-101.
- Kerr, R.B. & Patel, R. 2014. Food Security in Malawi, in Nagothu, U.S. (ed.). *Food Security and Development: Country Case Studies*. London: Routledge. 205-229.
- Khumalo, N. 2007. Survey of South African Stakeholders' Perceptions of Production of and Trade in Genetically Modified Foods, in Draper, P. & Khumalo, N. (eds.). *Trade in Genetically Modified Foods: Decoding Southern African Regulatory Approaches*. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 198-220.
- Kirsten, J., Edwards, L. & Vink, N. 2010. South Africa, in Anderson, K. & Masters, W.A. (eds.). *Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa*. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 147-174.
- Koç, M. 2011. Hyphenated alternatives: Discourses of Food Security. Unpublished paper delivered at the Joint Annual Meetings of Agriculture. 9-11 June, Montana.
- Koch, J. 2011. *The Food Security Policy Context in South Africa*. Brasilia: International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth.
- Kotz, D. M. 2009. The Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008: A Systemic Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Summer: 305-317.

- Labadarios, D., Mchiza, Z.J., Steyn, N.P., Gericke, G., Maunder, E.M.W., Davids, Y.D, & Parker, W. 2011. Food security in South Africa: A Review of National Surveys. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 89: 891-899.
- Lang, T. 2010. Conclusion: Big Choices about the Food System, in Lawrence, G., Lyons, K. & Wallington, T. (eds.). *Food Security, Nutrition and Sustainability*. Earthscan: London. 253-285.
- Lang, T. & Barling, D. 2012. Food Security and Food Sustainability: Reformulating the Debate. *The Geographical Journal*, 178(4): 313-326.
- Lee, D.R., Berazneva, J. & Ndulo, M. 2013. Africa's Dual Crises: the Food and Financial Crises and their Effects in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Lee, D.R. & Ndulo, M. (eds.). *The Food and Financial Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, Impacts and Policy Implications*. Oxfordshire: CABI.
- Leite, C. & Weidmann, J. 1999. *Does Mother Nature Corrupt: Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth*. Washington: IMF.
- Logan, B.I. 2007. Land Reform, Ideology and Urban Food Security: Zimbabwe's Third Chimurenga. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 98(2):202-224.
- Louis, W.M. 1967. Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919, in Gifford, P., Louis, W.M. & Smith, A. (eds.). *Britain and Germany in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 28-67.
- Love, P. 2010. *Hunger is a problem of poverty, not scarcity*. [Online]. Available: <http://oecdinsights.org/2010/02/23/hunger-is-a-problem-of-poverty-not-scarcity/> [2015, May 12].
- Lucas, C., Jones, A. & Hines, C. 2007. Fuelling a Food Crisis: The impact of peak oil on food security. *Pacific Ecologist*, Winter: 12-17
- Magdoff, F. 2008. The World Food Crisis: Sources and Solutions. *Monthly Review*, 60 (1): 1-15.
- Maphosa, B. 1994. Lessons from the 1992 Drought in Zimbabwe: The Quest for Alternative Food Policies. *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 3(1): 53-58.
- Maposa, R.S., Gamira, D. & Hlongwana, J. 2010. Land as Sacrificial Lamb: A Critical Reflection on the Effects of Colonial and Post-Independent Land Management Policies in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 12(6): 192-207.
- Marais, H. 2011. *South Africa Pushed to the Limit*. Cape Town: UCT Press.

- Matondi, P.B. 2011. Agro-investments in Zimbabwe at a Time of Redistributive Land Reforms, in Matondi, P.B., Havnevik, K. & Beyene, A. (eds.). *Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food Security in Africa*. London: Zed Books. 134-158.
- Maxwell, S. 1996. Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective. *Food Policy*, 21(2): 155-170.
- McLaren, D., Moyo, B. & Jeffrey, J. 2015. The Right to Food in South Africa: An Analysis of the Content, Policy Effort, Resource Allocation and Enjoyment of the Constitutional Right to Food. Studies in Poverty and Inequality Institute Working Paper. [Online]. Available: <http://www.spii.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SPII-Working-Paper-11-The-Right-to-Food-in-South-Africa-2015.pdf> [2015, September 12].
- McMahon, P. 2013. *Feeding Frenzy: The New Politics of Food*. London: Profile Books.
- McMichael, P. 2012. The Land Grab and Corporate Food Regime Restructuring. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 39(3-4): 681-701.
- McMichael, P. 2010. Agrofuels in the Food Regime. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37(4): 609-629.
- McMichael, P. 2009a. A Food Regime Analysis of the 'World Food Crisis'. *Agriculture and Human Values*, 26: 281-295.
- McMichael, P. 2009b. A Food Regime Genealogy. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(1): 139-
- Meerman, J. 2008. *Making Nutrition a National Priority: Review of Policy Processes in Developing Countries and a Case-Study of Malawi*. Rome: FAO.
- Mhone, G. 1992. *The Political Economy of Malawi: An Overview*, in Mhone, G. (ed.). *Malawi at Crossroads: The Postcolonial Political Economy*. Harare: SAPES Trust.
- Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs. 1998. *Agricultural Policy in South Africa: A Discussion Document*. Pretoria: National Department of Agriculture
- Mkandawire, P., Nyantakyi-Frimpong, H., Armah, F. & Akru, G. 2014. Regionalism, Food Security and Economic Development. Occasional Paper No. 23. The African Capacity Building Foundation. Harare.
- Mkwara, B. & Marsh, D. 2011. Effects of Maize Fertilizer Subsidies on Food Security in Malawi. Unpublished Working Paper. Hamilton: University of Waikato.
- MoAFS. 2011. *Malawi Agricultural Sector Wide Approach: A Prioritised and Harmonised Agricultural Development Agenda, 2011-2015*. Lilongwe: MoAFS.

- MoAFS. 2008. *Food Security Action Plan*. [Online]. Available: <https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/sites/default/files/MWI%202008%20Food%20security%20action%20plan.pdf> [2015, October 17].
- MoAFS. 2006. *Food Security Policy*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.fanrpan.org/documents/d00172/Food\\_Security\\_Policy\\_Malawi\\_Aug2006.pdf](http://www.fanrpan.org/documents/d00172/Food_Security_Policy_Malawi_Aug2006.pdf) [2015, October 17].
- Morton, A.M. 2003. Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations. *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture and Society*, 15(2): 153-179.
- Morvaridi, B. 2012. Capitalist Philanthropy and the New Green Revolution. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 19(2): 243-256.
- Moyana, V.H. 2002. *The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe*. Gweru: Mambo Press.
- Moyo, B. 2015. *South Africa's Fight for the Right for Food*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.health24.com/Diet-and-nutrition/Food-security/The-fight-for-the-right-for-food-20150316> [2015, October 9].
- Moyo, S. & Chambati, W. 2012. Introduction: Roots of the Fast Track Land Reform, in Moyo, S. & Chambati, W. (eds). *Land and Agrarian Reform in Former Settler Colonial Zimbabwe*. Dakar: CODESRIA. 1-28.
- Moyo, S. 2012. Agrarian Reform and Prospects for Recovery, in Besada, H. (ed). *Zimbabwe: Picking up the Pieces*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 129-156.
- Moyo, S. 2001. The Land Movement and democratisation in Zimbabwe: contradictions of neo-liberalism. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 30(2): 311-330
- Mukherjee, S. 2002. *Blame the Rulers, Not the Rain: Democracy and Food Security in Zambia and Zimbabwe*. Johannesburg: SAIIA.
- Murisa, T. 2013. Prospects for Smallholder Agriculture in Southern Africa, in Hendricks, F., Ntsebeza, L. & Helliker, K. (eds.). *The Promise of Land: Undoing a Century of Dispossession in South Africa*. Sunnyside: Jacana Media. 185-213.
- Mutamba, M., Dlamini, M., Ngepah, N. & Simelane, M. 2015. *Beyond Good Intentions: Agricultural Policy in the SADC Region*. Oxford: Oxfam International.
- NDA. 2002. *The Integrated Food Security Strategy for South Africa*. Pretoria: National Department of Agriculture.

- Ndlela, D. & Robinson, P. 2010. Zimbabwe, in Anderson, K. & Masters, W.A. (eds.). *Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Africa*. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 205-228.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2014. The Zimbabwe National Question Post-July 31, 2013 Electoral Outcome. *Zimbabwe Journal of Political Economy*, 1(1): 8-31.
- NEPAD. 2014. *CAADP Country Process*. [Online]. Available: <http://nepad-caadp.net/caadp-country-process> [2015, October 8].
- NEPAD. 2003. *Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme*. Midrand: NEPAD.
- Niemann, M. 2000. *A Spatial Approach to Regionalisms in the Global Economy*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- O'Neill, O. 2002. Answer to question following the Second Reith Lecture, BBC Radio 4, April 10.
- Otero, G. 2012. The Neoliberal Food Regime in Latin America: State, Agribusiness Transnational Corporations and Biotechnology. *Canadian Journal of Development*, 33(3): 282-294.
- Oxfam. 2007. *Climate Alarm: Disasters Increase as Climate Change Bites*. [Online]. <https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/climate%20alarm.pdf> [2014, December 3].
- Parsons, C. 1982. *A New History of Southern Africa*. London: Macmillan.
- Pechlaner, G. & Otero, G. 2010. Neoliberalism and food vulnerability: the stakes for the South, in Lawrence, G., Lyons, K. & Wallington, T. (eds.). *Food Security, Nutrition and Sustainability*. Earthscan: London. 79-96.
- Pechlaner, G. & Otero, G. 2010. The Neoliberal Regime: Neoregulation and the New Division of Labour in North America. *Rural Sociology*, 75(2): 179-208.
- Pereira, L.M. & Ruysenaar, S. 2012. Moving from Traditional Government to New Adaptive Governance: the Changing Face of Food Security Responses in South Africa. *Food Security*, 4: 41-58.
- Pimentel, D. 2014. Implications for the Economy and Environment of Alternatives to Fossil-Fuel Energy, in Gates, J.E., Trauger, D.L. & Czech, B. (eds.). *Peak Oil, Economic Growth, and Wildlife Conservation*. New York: Springer. 63-82.
- Polanyi, K. 1944. *The Great Transformation*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.
- Pritchard, B. 2012. Trading into Hunger? Trading Out of Hunger? in Rosin, C., Stock, P. & Campbell, H. (eds.). *Food Systems Failure: The Global Food Crisis and the Future of Agriculture*. New York: Earthscan. 17-29.
- Reed, D. 2002. *The Political Economy of Resource Wealth*. London: Earthscan.



- Robertson, J. 2012. A Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Economic Stabilisation in Zimbabwe, in Besada, H. (ed.). *Zimbabwe: Picking up the Pieces*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 83-106.
- Rosin, C., Stock, P. & Campbell, H. 2010. Introduction: shocking the global food system, in Rosin, C., Stock, P., & Campbell, H. (eds.). *Food Systems Failure: The Global Food Crisis and the Future of Agriculture*. Earthscan: London. 1-14.
- Sachikonye, L.M. 2003. From "Growth with Equity" to "Fast-Track" Reform: Zimbabwe's Land Question. *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(96): 227-240.
- SADC. 2014. *Food and Nutrition Security Strategy: 2015-2025*. Gaborone: SADC.
- SADC. 2013. *Regional Agricultural Policy*. Gaborone: SADC.
- SADC. 2012a. *SADC Facts & Figures*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/> [2015, September 28].
- SADC. 2012b. *History and Treaty*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/> [2015, September 28].
- SADC. 2012c. *Agriculture and Food Security in SADC*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.sadc.int/themes/agriculture-food-security/> [2015, October 7].
- SADC. 2011. *Integrated Paper on Recent Economic Developments in SADC*. [Online]. Available: <https://www.sadcbankers.org/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/141/RED%20Sept2011%20DOCUMENT%20FINAL.pdf> [2015, October 4].
- SADC. 2008. *SADC Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme*. Gaborone: SADC.
- SADC. 2004. Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in the SADC Region.
- SADC. 2003. *Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan*. Gaborone: SADC.
- Sadomba, Z.W. 2013. A Decade of Zimbabwe's Land Revolution: The Politics of the War Veteran Vanguard, in Moyo, S. & Chambati, W. (eds.). *Land and Agrarian Reform in Former Settler Colonial Zimbabwe*. Dakar: CODESRIA. 79-122.
- Sahley, C., Groelsema, B., Marchione, T. & Nelson, D. 2005. *The Governance Dimensions of Food Security in Malawi*. Washington: USAID.
- Sarelin, A. 2013. *Exploring the Role and Transformative Potential of Human Rights in Development Practice and Food Security: A Case Study from Malawi*. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press.
- Schanbacher, W.D. 2010. *The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict between Food Security and Food Sovereignty*. Santa Barbara: Praeger.

- Schlein, L. & Krüger, S. 2006. *Urban Poor Worse Off than Rural Poor but Good Policies Can Reduce Slums*. [Online]. Available: [http://www.citymayors.com/society/urban\\_poor.html](http://www.citymayors.com/society/urban_poor.html) [2015, October, 4].
- Schönfeldt, H.C., Gibson, N. & Vermeulen, H. 2013. The Likely Impacts of Food Price Increases on Nutritionally Vulnerable Households in South Africa, in Lee, D.R. & Ndulo, M.B. (eds.). *The Food and Financial Crises in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, Impacts and Policy Implications*. Oxfordshire: CABI. 211-232.
- Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Murimbarimba, F., Mahenehene, J. & Sukume, C. 2012. Livelihoods after Lander Reform in Zimbabwe: Understanding Processes of Rural Differentiation. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 12(4): 503-527.
- Sen, A. 1982. The Food Problem: Theory and Policy. *Third World Quarterly*, 4(3): 447-459.
- Sen, A. 1981. *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Shiva, V. 2013. *Making Peace with the Earth: Beyond Resource, Land & Food Wars*. Sunnyside: Jacana Press.
- Silungwe, C.M. 2009. The Rhetoric and Practice in Land Reform in Malawi: A Contextualised Governmentality Analysis. *Malawi Law Journal*, 3(1): 26-54.
- Sodano, V. 2012. Food Policy Beyond Neo-liberalism, in Erasga, D. (ed.). *Sociological Landscape: Theories, Realities and Trends*. 375-402.
- Söderbaum, F. 2004. *The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Southgate, D., Graham, D.H. & Tweeten, L. 2007. *The World Food Economy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Tawodzera, G., Zanamwe, L. & Crush, J. 2012. *The State of Food Insecurity in Harare, Zimbabwe*. Cape Town: AFSUN.
- Taylor, I. 2011. South African "Imperialism" in a Region Lacking Regionalism: A Critique. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(7): 1233-1253.
- Taylor, I. 2004. A House Built Upon Sand: South African "Imperialism" in a Region without Regionalism. *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 32(2): 1-16.
- The Economic Times. 2008. *R.s 393.33cr in Crops Lost due to Kerala Rains*. [Online]. Available: [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-04-08/news/28439839\\_1\\_unseasonal-rains-paddy-production-crops](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-04-08/news/28439839_1_unseasonal-rains-paddy-production-crops) [2015, Augustus 16].

- The Economist. 2014. *Africa's New Number One*. [Online]. Available: <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21600685-nigerias-suddenly-supersized-economy-indeed-wonder-so-are-its-still-huge> [2015, October 17].
- The World Bank. 2015a. *Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 1980-2014*. [Online]. Available: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS> [2015, October 3].
- The World Bank. 2015b. *GDP Growth (annual %)*. [Online]. Available: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG> [2015, October 12].
- The World Bank. 2009. *World Development Report: Reshaping Economic Geography*. Washington: The World Bank.
- The World Bank. 2008. *World Development Report: Agriculture for Development*. Washington: The World Bank.
- Thompson, C.B. 1993. *Drought Management Strategies in Southern Africa: From Relief through Rehabilitation to Vulnerability Reduction*. Harare: SADC.
- Thomson, A. 2004. *An Introduction to African Politics*. 2nd edition. New York: Routledge.
- Thondhlana, G. 2014. *The Local Livelihood Implications of Biofuel Development and Land Acquisitions in Zimbabwe*. Waterloo: CIGI.
- Traub, L.N. & Meyer, F. 2010. Alternative Staple Food Trade and Market Policy Interventions: Country-Level Assessment of South Africa, in Sarris, A. & Morrison, J. (eds.). *Food Security in Africa: Market and Trade Policy for Staple Foods in Eastern and Southern Africa*. Northampton: Edward Elgar. 284-316.
- Tsama Hub. 2013. Complexity and Transdisciplinarity: Theories and Methods. [Online]. Available: <http://www.tsama.org.za/index.php/joomla-pages-iii/categories-list/8-research-framework#> [2015, September 22].
- Tsheola, J. 2014. Global Agro-Food Governance, Supermarket Chain Expansionism and Household Food Insecurity in Rural South Africa. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(8): 656-665.
- UN. 2015a. *Post-2015 Development Agenda*. [Online]. Available: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015> [2015, July 5].
- UN. 2015b. Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals. [Online]. Available: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/15SDGs%20Proposal.pdf> [2015, July 5].
- UN. 2015c. *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015*. New York: UN.

- UN. 1999. *The Right to Adequate Food*. [Online]. Available:  
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/3d02758c707031d58025677f003b73b9> [2015, July 5].
- UN. 1975. *Report of the World Food Conference: 5-16 November 1974, Rome*. New York: United Nations.
- UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis. 2010. *Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action*. New York: FAO.
- UNAIDS. 2014a. *South Africa: HIV and AIDS Estimates*. [Online]. Available:  
<http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/southafrica/> [2015, October 7].
- UNAIDS. 2014b. *Malawi: HIV and AIDS Estimates*. [Online]. Available:  
<http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/malawi/> [2015, October 7].
- UNAIDS. 2014c. *Zimbabwe: HIV and AIDS Estimates*. [Online]. Available:  
<http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/zimbabwe/> [2015, October 7].
- UN-Habitat. 2014. *State of African Cities: Re-Imagining Sustainable Urban Transitions*. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.
- UNICEF. 2014. *Overview of HIV and AIDS in Eastern and Southern Africa*. [Online]. Available:  
[http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5482\\_HIV\\_AIDS.html](http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5482_HIV_AIDS.html) [2015, October 7].
- USAID. 1996. *Comparative Analysis of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Southern Africa: With Emphasis on Agriculture and Trade*. Washington: USAID.
- Van der Merwe, C. 2011. *Key Challenges for Ensuring Food Security in South Africa's Inner Cities*. Africa Institute of South Africa, Policy Brief No. 36. Johannesburg: Africa Institute of South Africa.
- Van Riet, G. 2006. *HIV/AIDS and Climate in Food Security Crises: A Study of Southern Africa, 2001-2005*. Unpublished Master's thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Verduzco-Gallo, I., Ecker, O. & Pauw, K. 2014. *Malawi Strategy Support Programme*. IFPRI Working Paper 6. Lilongwe.
- Viá Campesina. 2013. *Sustainable Peasant's Agriculture*. [Online]. Available:  
<http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/sustainable-peasants-agriculture-mainmenu-42/1523-a-year-for-agricultural-policy-to-radically-support-small-scale-family-and-peasant-farming> [2015, September 3].
- Vink, N. & Kirsten, J. 2002. *Pricing Behaviour in the South African Food and Agricultural Sector: a Report to the National Treasury*. Pretoria: National Treasury.
- Wallerstein, I. 1983. *Historical Capitalism*. London: Verso.

- Weis, T. 2007. *The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future of the Farming*. London: Zed Books.
- WFP. 2009. WFP says hunger kills more than AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis combined. [Online]. <http://www.wfp.org/content/wfp-says-hunger-kills-more-aids-malaria-tuberculosis-combined> [2015, April 27].
- WFP. 2015. *Hunger Map 2015*. [Online]. Available: <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp275057.pdf> [2015, April 14].
- Wiggins, S. 2005. Southern Africa's Food and Humanitarian Crisis of 2001-04: Causes and Lessons. Discussion paper for Agricultural and Economic Society Conference, Nottingham, 4-6 April.
- Windengård, M. 2011. Biofuel Governance: A Matter of Discursive and Actor Intermesh, in Matondi, P.B., Havnevik, K. & Beyene, A. (eds.). *Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food Security in Africa*. London: Zed Books. 44-59.
- Windfuhr, M. & Jonsén, J. 2005. *Food Sovereignty: Towards democracy in localised food systems*. Warwickshire: ITDG
- Young, E.M. 2012. *Food and Development*. New York: Routledge.
- Yu, B., You, L. & Fan, S. 2010. Toward a Typology of Food Security in Developing Countries. IFPRI Discussion Paper. [Online]. Available: <http://cdm15738.contentdm.oclc.org/utis/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/305/filename/306.pdf> [2015, September 12]
- Zajontz, A.T. 2013. Regionalism in Theory and Practice: The Transformative power of Civil Society in Southern Africa. Unpublished Master's thesis. Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch.
- Zikhali, P. & Chilonda, P. 2012. Explaining Productivity Differences between Beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's Fast Track Land Reform Programme and Communal Farmers. *Agrekon*, 51(4):144-166.
- Zondi, P. 2012. ZANU-PF and MDC Power-Sharing: Zimbabwe Still at a Crossroads?, in Besada, H. (ed.). *Zimbabwe: Picking up the Pieces*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 13-36.
- Zvavahera, P. & Chigora, F. 2015. Food and Nutrition Promotion: Feasibility of the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation. *Business and Management Horizons*, 3(1): 58-71.

## *Appendix A: Conceptualisation of food security*

### **A.1. Extension of the food security concept**

Along with the evolution of the definition of food security to recognise the different dimensions thereof, the concept was further developed to account for different levels and forms of food security. An outline of the forms and the levels of food security are discussed below by drawing on Gibson's *The Use of Conceptual Frameworks in Understanding Food Security* (2011) that first contextualises the dimensions of food security.

#### **A.1.1. The dimensions of food security**


As noted in the section on the conceptualisation of food security<sup>120</sup>, food security comprises of *availability, access, utilisation, and stability*. Gibson (2011) presents a comprehensive model that illustrates the various determinants of these food security dimensions. The Gibson Framework of food security is reproduced on the following page. The framework gives a detailed account of many variables to provide a deeper and more holistic sense of understanding of the food security concept (Gibson, 2012: 529). It shows that *availability* is determined by production and demand. *Access* to food is shown to be dependent on wealth/poverty, natural resources, social capital, human capital, and physical elements. The model restates that *utilisation* corresponds to the health and nutritional portfolio of individuals, and that the stability of food security is shaped at the contextual level.

The model is also useful since it contextualises the different dimensions' status as products of the interplay between governance, sustainability, and the environment and natural resources. Within each of these spheres different information domains are identified in order to aid a better assessment of food security. This depiction is enlightening since it schematically portrays the complexities of attaining food security. By highlighting that governance, sustainability, and the environment and natural resources are of equal importance, the model infers the usefulness of adopting a wider perspective to address food security. In food security literature recent calls for interdisciplinary research (Allen, 2013: 13; Havnevik, 2011: 35) also support this notion that a larger level of analysis is required in order to analyse the functioning of the system and the forces behind it<sup>121</sup>.

---

<sup>120</sup> See section 1.2.

<sup>121</sup> See "The call for transdisciplinary research – section 5.2.3.2.



### **A.1.2. The levels of food security**

It is also crucial to draw a distinction between different levels of food security since the approach to analyse and consequently address food security at those levels will not necessarily be similar. A distinction can be made between the following levels: individual, household, national/regional, and context/underlying situations<sup>122</sup>.

Food *availability* is assessed at the national/regional level since production and trade is typically coordinated at this level. The context level is also of importance for food availability since demographic, economic, environmental, political and social conditions affect the status of food availability. Food *access* is associated with both the household and national/regional level. The factors of care and feeding practices, household characteristics, and health and sanitation are at play at the household level (Gibson, 2011: 10). Policies implemented at a national/regional level can also affect food access. Food *utilisation* refers to individuals' absorption of nutrients which is determined by food safety, the food's nutritional value, and individuals' health status. It follows intuitively that the utilisation dimension is assessed purely at the individual level. The *stability* dimension relates to the national/regional and context levels since it is affected by war/conflict, human rights and institutional infrastructure, political and financial stability, and shocks/natural disasters (Gibson, 2011: 11). By adding the time dimension it is recognised that food security conditions should not be regarded as fixed. The *stability* dimension of food security is primarily associated with the context level and national/regional level since stability at these levels facilitates stability at the other levels. In order to gauge and respond to the vulnerabilities within the dimensions of availability, access, and utilisation it is necessary that food security is stable. However, as noted before, the state of food security is not permanent.

### **A.1.3. The forms of food security**

The changeable nature of food security calls for identifying different forms of food security based on the nature of the specific case. This distinction separates cases of endemic or structural insecurity from those that are more transient as a result of unexpected shocks that are often associated with the

---

<sup>122</sup> It is important to note that individual food security is reliant on household food security, which in turn is underpinned by national/regional food security. Contextual factors form the basis that determines whether nations/regions are food secure. However, due to an unequal distribution of wealth and resources, individuals and households might be food insecure even though food security at the national level is intact and *vice versa*. Nevertheless, there is a significant interplay between the different levels of food security. Thus achieving individual and household food security when the national/regional conditions are not favourable proves to be difficult.



sudden onset of emergencies. The different forms of food insecurity as acknowledged by the FAO (2000: 10) are chronic (continuous); temporal (temporary or transitory); and cyclic (seasonal).

Chronic food insecurity refers to instances where the insecurity is endemic or structural in nature and occurs when people are unable to meet their food requirements over an extended period of time. These situations are usually associated with poverty and low income and consequently chronic food insecurity can be foreseen or predicted. Temporal food insecurity on the other hand is not predictable since this form of food insecurity is caused by unforeseen shocks to the food system. Conflict, natural disasters, floods and droughts, production shortfalls, economic collapse, as well as prices changes can all be considered as factors that contribute to add pressure on the access and the availability of food requirements. Cyclic food insecurity can be regarded to sit between or alongside the other two forms since cyclic food security is both chronic and predictable. This is because cyclic food insecurity is associated with seasonal fluctuations and is thus inherent to existing patterns of endemic hunger.

Thus a situation of food security only exists when there is sufficient protection against all forms of food insecurity (chronic, temporal, cyclic) via all dimensions (availability, access, utilisation, stability) and at each level thereof (spanning from the individual to the contextual level).

## *Appendix B: Operationalisation of food security: FAO indicators per dimension of food security*

<b>Availability</b>
Average dietary energy supply adequacy (%) (3-year average)
Average value of food production (constant I\$ per person) (3-year average)
Share of dietary energy supply derived from cereals, roots and tubers (%) (3-year average)
Average protein supply (g/capita/day) (3-year average)
Average supply of protein of animal origin (g/capita/day) (3-year average)
<b>Access</b>
Percentage of paved roads over total roads (%)
Road density (per 100 square km of land area)
Rail-lines density (per 100 square km of land area)
Domestic food price index (index)
Gross domestic product per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international \$)
Prevalence of undernourishment (%) (3-year average)
Share of food expenditure of the poor (%)
Depth of the food deficit (kcal/capita/day) (3-year average)
Prevalence of food inadequacy (%) (3-year average)
<b>Stability</b>
Cereal import dependency ratio (%) (3-year average)
Percentage of arable land equipped for irrigation (%) (3-year average)
Value of food imports over total merchandise exports (%) (3-year average)
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (index)
Domestic food price volatility (index)
Per capita food production variability (I\$ per person constant 2004-06)
Per capita food supply variability (kcal/capita/day)
<b>Utilization</b>
Access to improved water sources (%)
Access to improved sanitation facilities (%)
Percentage of children under 5 years of age affected by wasting (%)
Percentage of children under 5 years of age who are stunted (%)
Percentage of children under 5 years of age who are underweight (%)
Percentage of adults who are underweight (%)
Prevalence of anaemia among children under 5 years of age (%)
Prevalence of anemia among pregnant women (%)
Prevalence of vitamin A deficiency in the population (%)
Prevalence of iodine deficiency (%)

Source: FAO (2015)

## Appendix C: Colonisation in African

The contesting colonial powers each had a distinct strategic vision on how to expand its empire in Africa. Britain envisioned an empire that spans from "Cape to Cairo". Portugal harboured the notion of a "Rose Coloured Map" that would link "Mozambique to Angola through the Zambezi basin" (Birmingham, 1999: 114). Germany entertained the idea of "*Mittelafrika*" as "a central African German empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean" (Louis, 1967: 35 as cited in Zajontz, 2013: 55). However, Britain became the imperial power in almost all Southern African countries, which left little room for other countries to fulfil their strategic visions.



Source: Berglee (2012: 481)

## *Appendix D: The SADC's institutional framework for food security*

### **C.1. The formation of SADC**

The roots of the SADC can be traced back to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) formed in April 1980. SADCC, which comprised of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, was formed with the main objective to advance national political liberation in Southern Africa by reducing the region's dependence, particularly, but not only, on apartheid South Africa (SADC, 2012b). This objective was targeted through the "effective coordination and utilisation of the specific characteristics and strengths of each country and its resources" (SADC, 2012b) aimed at promoting basic development and regional integration.

However, SADCC's had limited success in promoting development that was independent from South Africa in the region. Niemann (2000: 11) explains that during colonial times "the entire region had been constructed around South Africa with the peripheral states tightly integrated into the core". As the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa neared an end, the SADC Treaty was signed to establish SADC as the successor to the SADCC. The Treaty was signed in August 1992 by the SADCC founder members as well as Namibia, and it sets out to promote economic integration in Southern Africa. SADC (2012b) states that its main objectives are: "to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, [and] enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa". These objectives are pursued through promoting regional integration, democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development. Furthermore, SADC supports the sovereignty of its member states and stands for upholding human rights and the rule of law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Although SADCC and SADC share a commitment to development integration in Southern Africa, the approach followed by SADC differed starkly from that of its predecessor. Söderbaum (2004: 70) notes that this involved a "pragmatic shift from introverted towards more open and market-orientated regionalism". In contrast to SADC's laissez-faire approach to regional integration, SADCC "opted for a functionalist process of project cooperation and development coordination" with an approach to trade that is not based on "orthodox trade liberation strategies" (Zajontz, 2013: 60). SADCC rejected the ideal of market integration since it upheld that regional development

should precede such integration. This opposes the SADC approach that views market integration as a precursor for regional development. As such SADC subscribes to the neoliberal notion that greater market integration would bring about redistribution, poverty alleviation, and development through growth. Subsequently SADC has pushed its members "to meet certain macroeconomic benchmarks such as low inflation, fiscal deficit and current account of the balance of payments, in order to be competitive on the regional and global markets" (Godsäter, 2011: 44).

Gibb (2009: 712-713) explains that the SADC's market integration approach reflects the influence of Western donors that provide the majority of the organisation's funds. Consequently the SADC agenda reflects the neoliberal values and practices that have become hegemonic in most global institutions (Taylor, 2011: 1240; Godsäter, 2011: 13) instead of allowing the distinct Southern African to guide its agenda. SADC's market integration approach does not take into account the economic realities of Southern Africa<sup>123</sup> which is cumbersome since the organisation is influential in shaping its members' approach to food security.

## **C.2. SADC's institutional food security framework**

Overall SADC's approach to food security is that it is to be attained through increased regional integration, especially in agricultural trade. This is captured in their Food and Nutrition Security Strategy (FNSS) that adopts a multi-sectoral perspective in an aim to holistically address food and nutrition security. The goal of the FNSS is "to significantly reduce food and nutrition insecurity in the Region by 2025" (SADC, 2014: 1). The strategy has its roots in several other strategy documents that subsequently influence the approach thereof<sup>124</sup>.

### **C.2.1. The Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme**

Setting the tone at a continental level is the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) of the African Union's (AU) New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The CAADP was released in 2003 and is underpinned by the core belief that agriculture has a key role to play in the economic growth of African countries. The programme identifies four pillars for investment: (a) extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water

---

<sup>123</sup> First, Southern African economies, with the exception of South Africa, are "highly dependent on primary production and lack tradable manufactured goods and services" (Zajontz, 2013: 63). Second, Southern Africa is not yet successfully integrated into the world economy due to "disadvantageous terms of trade between African economies and the industrialised North" (Gibb, 2009: 712). Third, since colonists only focused on developing infrastructure in order to support exports from Southern Africa, the region face "severe structural inadequacies in transport, services, banking, labour skills and competitiveness" (Gibb, 2009: 713).

<sup>124</sup> The FNSS states that it specifically implements "the food and nutrition aspects of the SADC Regional Agricultural Policy" (SADC, 2014: 2) – described below.

control systems; (b) improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access; (c) increasing food supply and reducing hunger by increasing small farmer productivity levels, use of irrigation, and support services and complementing production-related investments with targeted safety nets; and (d) agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption (NEPAD, 2003). African countries are asked to incorporate these objectives in their development policies; by signing the CAADP compact<sup>125</sup>, countries indicated their commitment to invest in agriculture<sup>126</sup>.

Bond (2005: 21) notes that NEPAD has "an annoying combination of progressive and neo-liberal objectives". On the one hand, NEPAD's progressive sentiments are illustrated by its focus on sustainability, small-holder farming, increased safety nets, and the priority placed on research. The CAADP's focus on "fostering equitable distribution of wealth for rural populations as well as environmentally sound agricultural production and management of natural resources" (Mkandawire, Nyantakyi-Frimpong, Armah & Akru, 2014: 10) encapsulates this progressive agenda. On the other hand, NEPAD's unquestioning endorsement of the neoliberal framework is evident in its focus on increased production, trade, and technology, which subscribes to the New Green Revolution model<sup>127</sup>. As explained above, this arguably assigns a subordinate role to African economies in the food system.

### **C.2.2. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan**

By coordinating its agricultural development strategies with that of the CAADP, the SADC also follows a production-orientated approach to its food security agenda. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) drafted in 2003 served as a blueprint for SADC's emergent food security strategy. The RISDP's is meant to promote regional integration through sectoral cooperation and integration in four intervention areas of which "sustainable food security" is one<sup>128</sup>. With regards to food security, the RISDP has an undoubtedly neoliberal rhetoric as indicated by these selections in its strategy: "intensification of agricultural production systems"; "adoption of technologies"; "encouraging the involvement of commercial or large-scale farmers in food crop

---

<sup>125</sup> The Southern African countries that have yet to sign the Compact are South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana (NEPAD, 2014).

<sup>126</sup> Heads of state "pledged to allocate 10% of their national budget to agriculture by 2008", and to aim to achieve an agricultural growth target of 6% by 2015 (NEPAD, 2003).

<sup>127</sup> Akokpari (2008: 43) analyses whether NEPAD's policy framework is suited for the African context, and notes that it is patterned along "textbook economics are not written for economies in decline such as those in Africa, which defy basic neo-classical logic".

<sup>128</sup> The other intervention areas are: trade/economic liberalisation and development; infrastructure support for regional integration and poverty eradication; human and social development; and sustainable food security (SADC, 2003).

production"; "removing trade barriers"; "encouraging private investments in agriculture" (SADP, 2003: 71). However, similar to the CAADP, the RISDP also has a progressive tinge in that it seeks to, for example: "empower women and small-scale farmers", "strengthen farmer support services and farmers associations"; and "protect the environment and promote sustainable use and management of natural resources" (SADP, 2003: 71).

### **C.2.3. Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security**

In 2004 all the SADC member states signed the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security to signify their commitment to "promote agriculture as a pillar in national and regional development strategies and programmes" (SADC, 2004). This declaration has a strong focus on establishing support for vulnerable groups through its "provision of key agricultural inputs" for smallholder farmers, its focus on gender equality through "repealing discriminatory laws", and its aim to enhance the "mitigation of HIV and AIDS and other Chronic Diseases" (SADC, 2004: 3; SADC, 2004:7; and SADC, 2004: 7). Along with its empowerment orientation, indicative of progressive ideology, the declaration also has a corporate orientation as reflected through its aim to strengthen the private sector's involvement in agriculture (SADC, 2004: 7). The declaration also aims to improve market access "in accordance with WTO provisions on domestic support for agriculture" which further indicates its alignment with the neoliberal ideology.

### **C.2.4. Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme**

To bring to fruition the intentions of the RISDP and the Dar es Salaam Declaration, SADC initiated the Multi-Country Agricultural Productivity Programme (MAPP). In accordance with pillar 4 of the CAADP, the MAPP sets out a plan to increase the agricultural capacity of the region through technology, and research and development. The underlying belief of the MAPP is that research and development, along with technology dissemination and adoption, will foster agricultural transformation in order to achieve food security, economic growth, and poverty reduction (SADC, 2008: 12). It is worth noting that the financial support for the preparation of the MAPP was provided by a grant administered by The World Bank, which highlights this organisation's influence in the programme. The MAPP's focus on technological advancement for increased productivity reflects the neoliberal model. However, the MAPP does deviate from the neoliberal model since some of the prominent objectives are to make Southern Africa less dependent on international food aid, and to empower smallholders. The ideology of the MAPP thus closely follows that of its guiding documents in that it is predominantly neoliberal, albeit with strong progressive sentiments.

### **C.2.5. Regional Agricultural Policy**

In 2013 SADC developed its Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP) to provide a framework for the harmonisation of all SADC agricultural policies. The RAP's policy strategies are to: (a) enhance sustainable agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness; (b) improve regional and international trade and access to markets of agricultural products; (c) improve private and public sector engagement and investment in the agricultural value-chains; and (d) enhance disaster preparedness for food security (SADC, 2013). As such the RAP emphasises improving regional and international trade through reducing tariffs and other market access barriers. The RAP also includes strategies for transforming Southern Africa's agricultural sector "from being mainly subsistence-based to being more commercially orientated" (Mutamba, Dlamini, Ngepah & Simelane, 2015: 5). This model of unregulated markets and the phasing out of the peasant agriculture is quintessential of the neoliberal ideology. Although the RAP does echo the progressive sentiments of the other policy documents insofar as it seeks to empower smallholder farmers and marginalised groups, it "lacks specifics on programme design, implementation and budgetary imperatives" (Mutamba *et al.*, 2015: 5). Consequently, without the necessary institutional support in place, these more progressive objectives will not be easily attainable.

### **C.2.6. Summary of the SADC's food ideology**

Overall the SADC's food security initiatives and efforts predominantly subscribe to the neoliberal ideology. Through acknowledging the special needs of smallholders and women, the SADC's approach can also be viewed as representative of the progressive ideology. However, the model advised to attain food security is neoliberal since the focus is on increasing agricultural productivity (through technology) and economic growth (through trade). The progressive objectives of human development are thus believed to be attained through the trickle-down effect that results from increased agricultural capacity.



## *Appendix E: Possible positive and negative effects of trade liberalisation on the dimensions of food security*

	<b>Possible positive effects</b>	<b>Possible negative effects</b>
<b>Availability</b>	<p>Trade boosts imports and increases both the quantity and variety of food available.</p> <p>Dynamic effects on domestic production: Greater competition from abroad may trigger improvements in productivity through greater investment, R&amp;D, technology spillover.</p>	<p>For net food-exporting countries, higher prices in international markets can divert part of production previously available for domestic consumption to exports, potentially reducing domestic availability of staple foods.</p> <p>For net food-importing countries, domestic producers unable to compete with imports are likely to curtail production, reducing domestic supplies and foregoing important multiplier effects of agricultural activities in rural economies.</p>
<b>Access</b>	<p>For net food-importing countries, food prices typically decrease when border protection is reduced.</p> <p>In the competitive sectors, incomes are likely to increase as the result of greater market access for exports.</p> <p>Input prices are likely to decrease.</p> <p>The macroeconomic benefits of trade openness, such as export growth and the inflow of foreign direct investment, support growth and employment, which in turn boosts incomes</p>	<p>For net food-exporting countries, the domestic prices of exportable products may increase.</p> <p>Employment and incomes in sensitive, import-competing sectors may decline.</p>
<b>Utilisation</b>	<p>A greater variety of available foods may promote more balanced diets and accommodate different preferences and tastes.</p> <p>Food safety and quality may improve if exporters have more advanced national control systems in place or if international standards are applied more rigorously.</p>	<p>Greater reliance on imported foods has been associated with increased consumption of cheaper and more readily available highcalorie/low-nutritional-value foods.</p> <p>Prioritization of commodity exports can divert land and resources from traditional indigenous foods that are often superior from a nutrition point of view.</p>
<b>Stability</b>	<p>Imports reduce the seasonal effect on food availability and consumer prices.</p> <p>Imports mitigate local production risks.</p> <p>Global markets are less prone to policy- or weather-related shocks.</p>	<p>For net food-importing countries, relying primarily on global markets for food supplies and open trade policies reduces the policy space to deal with shocks.</p> <p>Net food-importing countries may be vulnerable to changes in trade policy by exporters, such as export bans.</p> <p>Sectors at earlier stages of development may become more susceptible to price shocks and/or import surges.</p>

