The Value of Online Citizen Journalism in Political Risk Analysis

A case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas

by

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**Declaration**

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March 2016
Abstract

The virtual sphere is quickly becoming one of the most resourceful platforms for obtaining information. This is due to information taking on a more dynamic role, in which it is more freely dispersed, debated and deconstructed by those engaging with it; whether as the audience or journalist. This has paved the way for citizens to distribute information as citizen journalists. It is within this context that this study aims to research the value of online citizen journalists in political risk analysis, by specifically researching the value it holds as a source of information in the compilation of political risk reports. This is the first study, as far as the researcher is aware, that attempts to research the potential value of online citizen journalism as a source of information for political risk reports compiled by political risk analysts.

The rationale for this study is based on the understanding that the advancement of technology has greatly evolved the manner in which the world is understood in terms of communication and media. Furthermore, this study emphasises that the adoption of new media technologies during risk management and crisis management can increase problem-solving capabilities and facilitate rational decision making. Political risk analysis presents the opportunity to mitigate the risks associated with the political sphere. By exploring and understanding new avenues of obtaining information in relation to technological changes in news reporting, the study of political risk analysis can advance to the degree that data can be more readily accessed from a perspective of active and engaged citizens who are familiar with the scope of the country’s political, economic and socio-economic climate.

This introductory study concludes that the value of online citizen journalism is feasible; however, this is only to a certain extent, as it is not as advanced as mainstream media. In order to express the extent to which online citizen journalism is feasible, this study used the case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014. This was demonstrated by a single qualitative case study observing the value of news reports by online citizen journalists, according to the three criteria of timeliness, accuracy and relevancy. This study found that there is value in online citizen journalism, although it would be better utilised alongside mainstream media in the form of a media partnership. This study includes an advisory section, presenting the potential for future studies to improve the value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk analysis.
**Opsomming**

Die virtuele sfeer is vinnig besig om een van die rykste bronne vir die opsporing van inligting te word. Dit is omdat inligting meer dinamies is en meer vryelik versprei, bespreek en gedekonstrueer word deur diegene wat daarmee omgaan – hetsy die gewone leser of die joernalis. Dit het onder meer die weg gebaan vir burgers om inligting as burgerlike joernaliste te versprei. Teen hierdie agtergrond ondersoek hierdie studie die waarde van aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek vir politieke risiko-ontleding deur bepaald te konsentreer op die waarde wat dit as ’n inligtingsbron vir die opstel van politieke risikoverslae inhou. So ver die navorser weet, is dit die eerste studie oor die moontlike waarde van aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek as ’n bron van inligting vir politieke risiko-ontleders se risikoverslae.

Die beweegrede vir hierdie studie is eerstens dat tegnologiese vooruitgang ’n omwenteling teweeggebring het in hoe die wêreld verstaan word wat kommunikasie en media betref. Voorts beklemton die studie dat die ingebruikneming van nuwe mediategnologieë gedurende krisisbestuur probleemoplossingsvermoëns kan verbeter en tot rasionele besluitneming kan lei. Politieke risiko-ontleding bied die geleentheid om die risiko’s in die politieke sfeer te temper. Deur nuwe maniere van inligtingsopsporing aan die hand van tegnologiese veranderinge in nuusverslaggewing te verken en te verstaan, kan die vakgebied van politieke risiko-ontleding baat vind by meer geredelik toeganklike data uit die oogpunt van aktiewe en betrokke burgers wat vertroud is met die land se politieke, ekonomiese en sosio-ekonomiese klimaat.

Hierdie inleidende studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek waardevol kan wees, dog slegs in ’n sekere mate aangesien dit nie so gevorderd soos hoofstroommedia is nie. Om te bepaal hoeveel waarde aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek inhou, maak hierdie navorser gebruik van ’n gevallestudie van polisiewreedheid in die krotbuurte van Brasilië in 2014. ’n Enkele kwalitatiewe gevallestudie ondersoek die waarde van aanlyn burgerlike joernaliste se nuusberigte aan die hand van die drie maatstawwe van aktualiteit, akkuraatheid en relevansie. Die studie bevind dat aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek wêl nut het, hoewel dit beter sou wees om dit in samehang met hoofstroommedia in die vorm van ’n mediavennootskap in te span. Die studie sluit ook ’n raadgewende afdeling in wat die moontlikhede uiteensit vir toekomstige studies om die waarde van aanlyn burgerlike joernalistiek op die gebied van politieke risiko-ontleding te verbeter.
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<tr>
<td>ABRAJI</td>
<td>Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>FIFA Confederations Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIPE</td>
<td>USP – Institute of Economic Research Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPL</td>
<td>Movimento Passe Livre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTST</td>
<td>Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem- Teto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>Unidades de Pronto Atendimento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPs</td>
<td>Pacifying Police Unit (English Translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPs</td>
<td>Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Portuguese translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The rise and increasing prominence of online citizen journalism has been described as a force that has shifted the relationship between news organisations and their audiences (Bruns 2010:1). The driving force for this rapid shift is aided by the increasing development of online social media and, more specifically, prominent online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, as well as blogs that have greatly evolved in their ability to readily access and distribute information (DeMers 2013). These online tools have broadened the opportunity for citizens to participate politically within the public sphere. Based on these developments, it has become possible for citizens to produce their own news content about issues that concern their respective communities through the gathering, writing, editing, producing and distributing of news and information (Wilson 2012: 2).

In recent years, technology has spurred a new wave of communication during times of crisis; this allows for a greater awareness of what is happening on the ground. A prominent example of this is the 2011 Arab Spring, a wave of protests which started in Tunisia and spread to Egypt. Citizens took to the streets protesting against poverty, government corruption, unemployment and autocratic state leaders. What made these protests significant was the use of technology, which increased the international community’s awareness of the current state of affairs in these countries (Sheedy 2011:32). The impact of technology reached such an extent that Egypt’s government attempted to shut down such communications in an effort to stop the protests. However, this led to Facebook and Twitter taking action by launching Speak2Tweet, a service that allowed Egyptian citizens to use their mobile phones to record messages which could be translated into tweets (Sheedy 2011:1).

These political events incorporated what is known as online citizen journalists which is citizens who play an active role in the public sphere. This makes them a useful tool in the field of political risk analysis, as they provide crisis-related information that can be utilised

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1 These online social media platforms differ, but are distinct in that they are used as an interactive source of communication via the internet.

2 The public sphere is understood as an important component of social political organisation which lies between state and society (Castells, 2008: 78- 79).
by response organisations to aid the analysis of potential political risks. This contributes to the formation and implementation of contingency plans to improve the awareness of the crisis at hand (Watson et al. 2014:294).

A study by Catherine O’Donnell (2011) found that social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. This was illustrated by the flow of messages through social media platforms, which increased expectations of success in this political uprising. People who shared an interest in democracy built and used social media networks to organise political action. Blogs were used as discussion platforms and foreshadowed a turn in public opinion in both Egypt and Tunisia, as presented by data compiled by the Project on Information Technology and Political Islam in Tunisia a month before the crisis. Special data on the structure of Egyptian political parties was also compiled a month prior to the crisis therein.

These forums and tweets preceded the mass protests through the discussion of liberty, democracy and revolution. The advantage of these platforms meant that discussion was no longer confined to state borders, but was able to spread to neighbouring countries and allow for dialogue across the region. Although social media was not the direct cause of these revolutions, it did present a channel through which change could occur in order for citizens to influence domestic politics (O’Donnell 2011). The Arab Spring events represent impact which citizens can have through the use of technology in the form of blogging, in order to voice their concerns about domestic issues and ultimately alter public opinion to incite change.

1.1.1 Research Problem
The efficacy of online social media as a method of analysing political risk is a relatively new field of study which opens it to many concerns; the most prominent is the reliability surrounding the distribution of information by citizen journalists. Online citizen journalism allow citizens the opportunity to speak out about matters of concern within their communities. However, citizen journalism has been dubbed a double-edged sword, as it can do as much harm as good when reported information is incorrect (De Mers2013). However, this may only be a concern from the perspective of professional journalists.

As mentioned before, social media provides the opportunity for freedom of expression which questions the point to which the information reported through online technologies by citizen journalists is accurate and based on fact, rather than the personal opinion of the writer. This
research will take these concerns into perspective when exploring the content of the literature, as well as the reports conducted by online citizen journalists.

1.1.2 Research Aim

The purpose of this study is to research the potential value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk analysis. In order to do this, the research will analyse the role of citizen journalists in the reporting of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas (shanty towns) in 2014. These reports will be compared to those conducted by the mainstream media, while taking into consideration the criteria of timeliness, relevance and accuracy of the information. The case study will observe the socio-economic concern of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. Reports of police brutality by both online citizen journalism and the mainstream media will be collected and compared in order to indicate the potential value of the former within the field of political risk analysis. The 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup in Brazil from 1 June to 5 July 2013 will provide contextual background in Chapter 3.

The aim of this descriptive study is to analyse secondary data in the form of news reports by both online citizen journalists and mainstream journalists. By such analysis, this study aims to understand the value of online citizen journalism, in order to illustrate how it can facilitate political risk analysis, while providing a better understanding of the nature of independent journalists and how they report. As far as the researcher is aware, this is the first academic study to theoretically integrate online citizen journalism into mainstream political risk analysis.

1.1.3 Rationale and Significance of the Study

The current age in which society functions is one of a disruptive nature, as there is a constant overflow of information. This has both positive and negative effects on civil society; on the one hand it allows the opportunity for the average person to be exposed to new sources of information concerning the current state of affairs at both a national and global level. However, it also opens the door to influence and manipulation based on the agenda of the source of the information distributed. This is not a new development, in the sense that it is not the first time that civil society is exposed to biased informational sources, as observed through the invention of the printing press (Shirky 2011:6).
Online citizen journalism aided by social media provides the opportunity for citizens to actively engage in politics through the reading or writing of articles. Citizens are now equipped with more information on which to base their decisions. The advancement of technology has greatly evolved the manner in which the world is understood in terms of communication and media.

Political risk analysis presents the opportunity to mitigate the risks associated with the political sphere. By exploring and understanding new avenues of obtaining information in relation to technological changes in the reporting of news, the study of political risk analysis is able to advance in order to broaden the scope and source of information.

As mentioned above, the use of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis is a relatively new study, which leaves much room for improvement. This also presents a research gap in terms of discovering new insights to better assist the advancement of political risk analysis. The research in this study will therefore attempt to address this research gap by exploring the value of online citizen journalists in order to understand how the public sphere (in the form of online citizen journalists) may assist in the mitigation of political risk.

The value that this new study holds is derived from its ability to provide a better understanding of societies and the part that online citizen journalism plays through the accumulation and dissemination of information. The adoption of new media technologies during political crisis management has been met with enthusiasm, based on the enhancement of information gathered by citizen journalists, as it is believed to have the ability to increase problem-solving capabilities (Watson et al. 2014: 294).

1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The main theories in this study stem from the field of political risk analysis and political participation. Political risk analysis is a field in political science derived from the theoretical framework of Rational Choice Theory and Problem Solving Theory. Rational Choice is salient to political risk analysis as it demonstrates the requirement of political risk analysts to be rational when identifying political risk indicators and understanding the potential impact which these may have on a state or investment. Problem Solving Theory takes cognisance of

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3 As in the case of voting or deciding to mobilise a group for the purpose of protesting a certain cause of dissatisfaction.
the fact that political risk factors pose a threat which evidently needs to be solved in the form of contingency plans (Brink 2004: 30-31; Riker 1995:37).

Online citizen journalism is viewed within the context of this study as a form of political participation which is aimed at influencing political outcomes (Brady 1999:737). This study also acknowledges the fact that the internet has broadened the sphere of political participation by changing the dynamics in the voicing and spreading of a message. However, there is no academic consensus on which to formalise this understanding that creates room for interpretation (Anduiza et al., 2007:3).

1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Research Design

This study is a descriptive analysis consisting of a main methodological research question and a supplementary descriptive question. It will make use of qualitative data through a single case study in order to answer both the main and supplementary questions. The research will not only analyse the case study, but will provide contextual background in order to better understand the case study. The purpose of the case study is to compare the value of online citizen journalists to journalists reporting for mainstream news corporations. The purpose of this comparison is to research whether online citizen journalism can be of value to political risk analysis in terms of providing information when compiling political risk reports.

1.3.1.1 Research Question(s)

The main methodological question that this research aims to answer is:

**Main Research Question:** What value does online citizen journalism have for political risk analysis in the case of police brutality in Brazil?

This main research question is accompanied by a supplementary question in order to gain a greater understanding of the depth of this research as well as the purpose thereof. The main research question will be supplemented by the following question:

**Supplementary Question:** How can online citizen journalism in the reporting of police brutality in Brazil 2014, be influential in the gathering of information when compiling political risk reports?

The aim of the supplementary question is to provide contextual background for the methodology of the research, in order to gain greater insight into the role of online citizen journalism during this period of civil unrest. This study will use the protests at the 2013 FIFA
Confederations Cup as well as the case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas to better answer the main research question.

1.3.2 Units of Analysis
The main unit that will be analysed in this study is the influence of online citizen journalism during times of civil unrest which stem from socio-economic situations and, more specifically within Brazil. This study believes that by isolating the political risk factor of – civil unrest exhibited through protests, greater insight can be provided; this will depict the potential value that citizen journalism may have in the field of political risk analysis.

1.3.3 Levels of Analysis
In order to provide insight into the potential value of online citizen journalism to political risk analysis this study will make use of micro-level analysis. It will analyse the influence of citizen journalists during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests to provide contextualisation for the problem of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014. This is based on the Pacification Programme, which was one of the issues protested against during the 2013/2014 protests.

1.3.4 Time Dimension
This descriptive study will use a retrospective approach to highlight the significance of the case study analysed. It will analyse the impact of online citizen journalists during the Confederations Cup from 1 June to 5 July 2013, as well as the protests during the 2014 World Cup. This time-frame provides a better understanding of the value of online citizen journalists during this period, by studying the value of their work during these protests from a retrospective stance. The case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014 is viewed as an extension of the surge in protests during 2013 as it was one of the issues protested against.

1.4 CONCEPTUALISATION OF CORE TERMINOLOGY
In addition to the theoretical framework of this study are additional concepts which need to be clarified in order to understand the context of the findings presented. The purpose of this section is to clarify these concepts and define them accordingly. However, Chapter 2 will provide more detail on these concepts.

1.4.1 What is the ‘Value’
The main research question presented in this study is the potential value of online citizen journalism for political risk analysis, and thus the extent to which online citizen journalism
can present value in the field of political risk. In order to determine the value, this study will make use of three characteristics that will form the criteria by which value can be determined. The three criteria of value are *timeliness, accuracy* and *relevance*. These criteria will be determined according to the presentation of qualitative data in the form of news reports by online citizen journalists and the mainstream media. *Timeliness* indicates that the information presented is reported as soon as the event occurred, together with the volume of information reported within a specific timeframe. The criterion of *accuracy* is self-explanatory, in that it aims to establish how accurate the data is in terms of the facts presented. *Relevance* observes the type of information reported and, within the confines of this study, will observe whether the information reported is relevant to the field of political risk analysis.

1.4.2 Political Risk Analysis
The next concept is political risk analysis, which refers to the action of analysing political risk factors and proceeding to take action upon the decision makers in response to such risks (Kobrin 1978: 121). Within the context of this study, political risk analysts undergo the process of determining the potential impact on non-economic factors.

1.4.3 Political Participation
Political participation is a key concept within this study as online citizen journalism within the context of this study is a form of political participation. In terms of using online technologies to participate politically in the influencing of political outcomes (Brady 1999:737; Gustafsson 2012:1112), there is no formal academic consensus on the impact of digital technology on political participation which leaves it open to interpretation (Anduiza et al., 2007:3).

1.4.4 Online Citizen Journalism/ Non-traditional Media
Online citizen journalism is the foundation of this study and refers to a form of journalism which uses technology to engage with society as a medium of information (Calcutt & Hammond 2011; Jones & Salter 2012). Online citizen journalism takes place in what is referred to as the virtual sphere, which further adds to the dynamics of its contribution to political risk analysis. The power of the virtual sphere for online citizen journalists lies in its provision of a platform that is open in its communication process among citizens, thus furthering its reach by more rapidly disseminating information (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela: 2012: 321- 322; Papacharissi 2002:11). In addition, online citizen journalism bypasses journalistic organisations through the use of platforms such as blogs, social media, websites and various other digital platforms (Armoogum 2013; Macharashvilli 2012: 8).
1.4.5 Traditional Media/Mainstream Media

The term *traditional media* within the context of this study refers to mainstream media, and examines the parameters of traditional journalism, which is the concerted activity of reporting and commenting on human activity (Calcutt & Hammond 2011: 169). Traditional journalists and mainstream media corporations report information to an uninformed public and are educated in the culture of working for the public, whereas online citizen journalists collaborate with the public in common endeavours (Waisbord 2013: 116; Jones & Salter 2012: 29).

1.4.6 Social Media

Social media is the main platform on which online citizen journalists publish their reports or collaborate with the public. This study agrees that social media has the power to influence collective actions through its ability to easily mobilise information and news. In addition, social media has the ability to easily mobilize a group of people by disseminating a message across digital platforms (Valenzuela 2013: 920 – 921).

1.4.7 The Public Sphere

The public sphere within the context of this study refers to Jürgen Habermas’ view thereof (Kellner 2000:3). He perceives the public sphere as a space that emphasises communication among citizens through the encouragement of discursive interaction in a space that has traditionally held a very vertical and marginalised approach to the disseminating of information. Online citizen journalism is perceived to have transformed this space, as it has opened communication channels for the flow of information to minimise the ‘top down’ nature of the media, and instead encourages dialogue from all sectors of society, from the grass roots level (Fulya 2012:1; McQuil 2005: 150-151; Papacharissi 2002:12).

1.4.8 Police Brutality

In broad terms police brutality is defined as a civil rights violation that occurs when a police officer acts with unlawful excessive force –that is to say- more than is necessary against a civilian or suspect, thereby violating the rights of the individual (US Legal 2015; Grobler 2005:111).

1.5 LIMITATION OF SCOPE

The purpose of this study is to research the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. To assist the outcome of this study it is essential to research the various facets surrounding political risk and the use of online technologies as a means of facilitating the
process of analysing potential political risk factors. This study will research the dynamics surrounding political participation through online citizen journalism and how it can be used to provide information when compiling political risk reports. This allows for the documentation of those changes which technological advancement has made in the manner in which news is distributed.

It is evident that a limitation of this study is the relative newness of this field of research, which means that there will be gaps in the applicability of the methodology to the understanding of the theory. As such, this study can only investigate the progress that has been made thus far. A further limitation is that the utilised data will be sourced from Brazilian online journalists. This data is obtained from Portuguese sources, meaning that it will have to be translated in order to provide the necessary information for this research.

1.6 STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

In terms of the chapter overview of this research, Chapter 1 is the shortest chapter as it entails the research plan that will serve as a guiding tool as the research is conducted. The aim of this chapter is to provide a guideline for the research by providing the research question, research aim, research design, methodologies, as well as, a short overview of the concepts used and, lastly, the significance and scope of the research.

Chapter 2 aims to provide a more detailed description of the literature surrounding this study. It will include an in-depth analysis of literature already available for this research by comparing different views and studies. Due to the descriptive nature of this study, this chapter will provide a body of work that complements the goals and objectives of this research topic, as well as the methodological stances and conceptualisation of terms analysed, in order to understand the extent to which the significance of this research can be understood in both a practical and theoretical sense. As this is a relatively new field of study, this chapter will also aim to explore the research gaps existent within the literature, with the purpose of filling these gaps.

Chapter 3 will provide contextualisation for the case study of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests, as well as the protests that occurred during the 2014 World Cup. This chapter will enhance the purpose of the study, connecting the literature and theoretical framework to real political events in order to gain insight into the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. The case study, as mentioned previously, will present reports by online citizen journalists and mainstream journalists on the issue of police brutality in Brazil’s
favelas. This case study stems from the 2013/2014 protests as it was one of the causes protested against.

Chapter 4 will condense the crux of the previous chapters by describing the theoretical and methodological findings throughout the research in a conclusive manner. In a practical sense this chapter will demonstrate the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis, using the case study of police brutality in Brazil to elaborate on the findings of the research.

The final chapter will elaborate on the findings of Chapter 4. In terms of structure, it will provide an overview of the research, which will subsequently be evaluated. It will also take into account the findings and present recommendations for the purpose of contributing to the advancement and success of this field of research.
Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and Contextualisation

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to introduce, discuss and conceptualise the ideas central to this study. This will assist in answering the above-mentioned research question. To reiterate, this research aims to question the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. There are two central points of conceptual reference in this chapter - the first is political risk analysis - the second is political participation. The first section of this chapter will discuss the two theoretical elements of political risk analysis by conceptualising ‘rational choice theory’ and ‘problem solving theory’. The second section will examine the different branches of political risk analysis by conceptualising ‘politics’, ‘risk’, ‘political risk’ and ‘political risk analysis’. This will be followed by a short conceptualisation of the methodology of this study. The fourth section will conceptualise the second central concept in this study: political participation. This section will discuss political participation through a Habermasian lens, by examining the significance of the public sphere. The fifth section will delve into the public and virtual spheres to understand the use of non-traditional media. The sixth section will provide a brief conceptualisation of media censorship in both traditional and non-traditional media. The next section will conceptualise online citizen journalism as a form of non-traditional media, with the following section discussing the online factor surrounding online citizen journalism. The second-last section will provide a brief conceptualisation of traditional media and the final section will discuss the value of online citizen journalism. In conclusion, this section will tie these different elements together to show the value of online citizen journalism based on literature that is already available.

2.2 POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS AS A STUDY

The study of political risk is grounded on an understanding of the conceptualisation surrounding it as a study, as well as various theoretical underpinnings. This section will conceptualise rational choice theory and problem solving theory to understand the foundation for the process of analysing political risk.

2.2.1 Rational Choice Theory

The conceptualisation of rational choice theory is wrought with the challenge of defining it. This is due to the concept being such a common component of the vocabulary of political science; as such there has been no conclusive effort to clearly define it. However, in simple terms, this is defined as the understanding of the behaviour of political actors when making
decisions (Downs 1957; Patrick 1988; Riker 1995; Ghandi 2005). In an attempt to define this concept, Patrick identifies three core elements. Firstly, he identifies instrumentalism, which is understood as the methodological decision to view various socio-political relations and institutions as dependable variables explained by their actions whether true or not by the individual self. The second element complements the first as individualism, viewed as an independent variable, and understood as the actions of the individual. This views the individual as a rational thinker, albeit self-interested, whose actions are understood through motivational theory. This can be understood as the action based on the motivations of the rational self within the context of making decisions to maximise efficacy. The last element is subjectivism, which unites the first two elements by expressing that individuals will make decisions according to their own preferences and the value they instil therein (Patrick 1988: 637-638).

Ghandi states that rational choice theory is more than strictly theory, as it attempts to understand the degree to which individuals are rational when making decisions – political decisions within this context which means that it cannot be bound to theory. This is because the crux of the matter rests on the dynamic and volatile nature of the individual, which makes it complex to understand in theory (2005:81). According to Downs, rationality within this context only refers to the rational means of achieving goals as opposed to “rational goals”. In this case, “the means to an end” is translated as maximising output for any given input or minimising input for any given output (1957:5). The difficulty in this understanding of rational choice theory is that individuals are not conditioned to be selfless, but rather self-interested; this is a factor that greatly affects political behaviour which leads to the actions of individuals being rational based on assumption⁴ (1957:22).

When applying rational choice theory to the field of political risk analysis, a connection is found in the action by which analysts use their own subjective thoughts and knowledge to trace and track the decisions of political actors⁵. It is their duty to analyse the actions of an individual’s political behaviour in order to facilitate the process of identifying indicators of risk. When taking into consideration the value of risk models within political risk analysis,

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⁴ By assuming that individuals are rational, their actions are able to be predicted and analysed (Down 1957: 4).
⁵ Within the context of this study, rational choice theory also bridges the gap between politics and economics by rejecting the idea that these two fields are separable (Ghandi 2005: 82).
rational choice theory enables this process by recognising the relationship between goals and outcomes in the category of events as portrayed in the conceptualisation of political risk analysis (Riker 1995:37). The purpose of rational choice theory is to reduce the risk to an acceptable level through the use of ideas by a rational agent. This allows the ideas to be tested, as these decisions are made under a high level of risk and uncertainty, mean that all potential problems have to be considered\(^6\) (Brink 2004: 31).

Rational Choice Theory has been perceived as controversial. These controversies are based on the fact that it harbours issues such as the way that it is conceptualised and translated. This is based on the fact that when using it within the context of political science, it is defined more by its subject matter than any specific methodology. According to Fiorini (2000) it is used to claim more than what it is capable of as well as being too social scientific. This is based on the lack of methodology used to conclude that which is claimed to be rational within the context of political issues. Rational Choice Theory is perceived to be too theoretical and without the framework of a model to equate its outcome to. In terms of the translation of Rational Choice Theory, it has been criticised for its heavy jargon and lack of clarity when communicating information and research based on models, as these models are not explicitly explained (Shapiro 2000).

### 2.2.2 Problem-Solving Theory

Problem solving theory complements rational choice theory by allowing for the solution of potential problems in the management of political risk in a rational and effective manner. In this context, the term ‘problem’ refers to a discrepancy between the current existing situation and the desired state of affairs, as defined by Kaufmann (1991) in Brink (2004:31). Brink describes this within the context of political risk analysis, where the decision maker, or individual conducting the analysis, will present the investor with a report that makes him or her aware of the problems that could infringe making a profit on the investment (2004:30). The identification of these problems allows the necessary steps to be taken to solve the identified ‘problem’. Within the context of political risk analysis, it is evident that Problem Solving Theory is related to Rational Choice Theory. This is based on the fact that in order to

\(^6\) This also emphasizes the implementation of measures taken to address the problem in question (Brink 2004: 31).
solve a problem, one has to rationally observe those factors that present a problem and use it to formulate mitigation plans to address it.

The study of political risk analysis is understood as the utilisation of information to manage and mitigate potential risk; this concept will be elaborated further in this chapter. Political risk analysis identifies problems and, in guiding towards the addressing thereof, provides ideas and mitigation. This conceptualisation proposes that it is essential to conduct problem solving with a thorough information base, a rational mind and a full understanding of the environment in which the investment takes place. This also includes the understanding of ‘reality’ and the incorporation of risk models that allow monitoring and the revision of all decisions (Brink 2004: 30). The key to effective problem solving is illustrated by Schön (1982) as the practice of relating past experiences with new ones and thereby maintaining the distinctiveness of the current situation at hand. This avoids a one-size-fits-all approach to problem solving, by balancing the art of past experiences with the current situation (Brink 2004:32).

2.2.3 Risk and Political Risk

In terms of conceptualising ‘political risk’, there are various understandings of the concept but a consensual lack on the precise meaning of the term (Fitzpatrick 1983; Kobrin 1979; Simon 1982). Instead, political risk has been defined according to the understanding that it holds within different sectors, as well as the roles it plays in the business environment and the academic field of political science.

In order to understand this term, the conceptualisation of political risk will be broken down into separate parts. Starting at the most basic element of this concept is the term ‘politics’. Politics is defined according to Easton (1953) and Lasswell et al. (1950) in terms of power or authority that is exercised within relationships in society. It is the structure that governs these relationships in society, known as the citizens and the government or rulers. This definition also differentiates between politics and economics as, according to Gilpin (1975), these two concepts are interrelated. In brief, politics creates and determines the framework in which economic activities function (Kobrin 1979: 69).

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7 As indicated in the literature on international business (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249).
The conceptualisation of ‘risk’ within the term ‘political risk’ deals with the forces that constitute a risk to another party. Within this context, risk is defined as potential harm to a business operation arising from political behaviour (McKellar 2010:3). It can also be understood as a manifestation of doubt with regard to undesirable events. In this case, risk management would act as the buffer between the possibility of a risk and the strategies and plans implemented in order to maintain a tolerable level of risk, especially when associated with an investment (Brink 2004:18). Swaney defines risk analysis as the study of the likelihood of an agent or hazard that may produce unwelcome events or outcomes, with risk being the process of measuring the probability and outcome thereof. Risk analysis is not only the identification thereof, but also the process of identifying the outcome of the event (1995:575-576).

As mentioned before, there is a lack of theoretical consensus in the understanding and interpretation of the concept of political risk. The most common of these definitions refer to actions by the government that are perceived as interference, bringing forth unwanted consequences (Fitzpatrick 1983:249). However, this definition is disputed by Kobrin, who states that an emphasis on these negative consequences of government intervention or changes in the status quo involve an implicit normative assumption that may not be universally valid (1979:69). This definition is too simplistic, which can be accredited to the fact that it was termed in the late 70s. The evolution of society indicates that the decisions and actions of different actors, such as international markets, impact on the political situation of a country. This presents new avenues for political risk and new problems that impact on the ability of governments to enforce decisions. Ian Bremmer elaborates on this definition by stating that political risk measures the stability of individual countries based on factors grounded in government, society, security and the economy. Governments are greatly affected by the actions of other sources; this adds to the idea that other sources such as society and economics can also serve as forms of interference (2005:53).

Other authors refer to political risk within the political realm through the manifestation of political events or restrictions imposed on a specific industry or firm level. These political events are brought about by alterations that range from changes in government or heads of state to political bombings or protests and riots (Fitzpatrick 1983:249). This definition is
cause for concern, as the distinction between events occurring in the political and business environment is ambiguous (Fitzpatrick 1983:251). Challenges arise from this definition when decision makers are unable to identify ‘uncertainty’ in relation to the risk itself\(^8\), and thus whether it is objective or subjective to the identified risk. Kobrin follows up by providing an understanding of the relationship between political risk and the political event. He states that if the uncertainty is objective, the contribution of the particular event to the business risk is a function of only the event in itself. However, if uncertainty is subjective, the contribution to the business risk is a function of both the event and the decision maker’s perceptions (1979:71). This illustrates that the perception of the decision maker concerning the political event plays a major part in the understanding of the point to which it poses a risk or non-risk. This is a challenge in itself, as the field of politics is determined by political behaviour, something that is subjective in nature.

Authors have noted that it is essential to clearly distinguish between risk and uncertainty (Kobrin 1979; Root 1972; Haendel and West; 1975). Adding to Kobrin’s definition, Root defines these two concepts by separating the political form of risk from economic risk by affirming that uncertainty is political if it relates to a potential act by the government or general instability in the political or social system (1976:4). Haendel and West, on the other hand, distinguish these two terms by surveying the probability of an undesired political event coupled with uncertainty manifested by inadequate information regarding the occurrence of such an event. Their definition is different to those of other authors, as they place a greater amount of emphasis on the accumulation of information which, in this regard, is perceived as a means of bridging the gap in converting uncertainty to risk with the potential to measure, insure and avoid it (1975:44-46).

Also included in the distinction between uncertainty and risk is the difference between political uncertainty and political instability, where the latter refers to unforeseen and unexpected changes within a country in the form of changes in leadership through succession or government policy. The differentiation of these concepts means that there should be an understanding of the impact of the risk in both an internal and external capacity (Brink 2004:19). An example includes surveying the impact of internal sources of risk occurring

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\(^8\) It should be noted that the terms political uncertainty and political instability are distinct from political risk analysis (Brink 2002:26).
domestically that may impact on businesses and investors in the host country itself, such as riots, protests and dissatisfaction with the government. External sources of risks are those risks that do not occur within the host state but nevertheless impact on investments made in other countries; in other words, the actions and consequences of occurrences that happen outside of the state but which have the ability to affect investments in other states.

A practical example of political uncertainty was demonstrated by the uncertainty surrounding the United Kingdom (UK) May 2015 elections polls. In the past, elections were contested between the two major parties namely the Conservative and Labour parties. However, there was a fragmentation of British politics which made the May 2015 election the most unpredictable general election to date. Other players rose to the mark, greatly impacting on the dominance of the Conservative and Labour parties. These parties included Nigel Farage’s populist anti-Brussels and anti-immigration UK Independence Party, as well as the Scottish National Party, which had the potential to erode the support of the Conservatives and Labour Party (Parker 2015).

The uncertainty of the election stemmed from the expectation that neither of the two main parties would win an outright majority vote, resulting in the potential prospect of a multi-party coalition government that included the Scottish National Party, the Greens and the UK Independence party. According to the Financial Time’s Annual Survey of predictions for the year, the outcome of the political uncertainty surrounding the May 2015 election would have the potential to impact on not only the country's political landscape as a whole, but also the confidence of businesses and consumers, greatly affecting the real economy. The issue of uncertainty in this regard is not so much about which majority party wins, but more about the potential for harm in an untidy coalition. Thus, according to Steve Hughes, the head of economic and social policy at the Policy Exchange, a minority government in this instance would have the potential to lead to months of wrangling and a lack of a clear legislative agenda (Cadman & Giles 2015).

Furthermore, political instability was demonstrated in Venezuela. The country faced political instability and needed international financing due to the sharp fall of oil prices, which heavily impacted its economy, as its oil sector provided over 96 percent of Venezuela's export revenues and half of its fiscal revenues. In addition, support for President Nicolás Maduro was wavering; this declined from 50.4 percent to 24.5 percent in the span of a year. This was further coupled with an increase in protests against power blackouts, gas and water shortages, as well as basic product scarcities. Despite Maduro’s wavering support, the opposition
remained weak and was unlikely to make a difference in the near term. The decline of international oil prices and the underlying political instability had the potential to deteriorate the country’s economy further, as well as negatively affect Venezuela's business environment, with companies potentially facing increased tax, auditing, non-payment sanctions and contract frustration risks (IHS Jane's Intelligence Review 2014).

Political risk is also defined as the act of observing actions or possibilities that may occur as a result of decisions made within different environments – be it political or economic – and how they subsequently affect other environments. Robock states that political risk should not be studied as an isolated concept, but rather as part of an integrated system where actions have the ability to affect more than just one environment. This definition illustrates that political risk in businesses exists when discontinuities, which are hard to anticipate, exist in the business environment as an outcome of political change (1971:7). However, this only poses a risk in the event that it should affect the profit or goals of an enterprise (Fitzpatrick 1983:250). This definition requires a thorough assessment of the political environment and how the environment is initiated by the political event. Nonetheless, this process has the distinct problem of being more reactive than active, as well as systematic, with actions being the exception rather than the rule. The problem with this definition lies in the lack of a clear and established relationship between environmental processes and decision maker’s perceptions. Environmental processes here refer to continuous versus discontinuous change, as well as decision maker’s perceptions when alluding to the issue of uncertainty versus risk. This is further emphasized by countries being classified as either safe or unsafe without complete understanding of the implications of the political environment, leading to decision makers’ perceptions being founded on internal sources that lean towards general conclusions based on subjective opinions (Fitzpatrick 1983:251-252; Bremmer 2005:58).

In order for this definition to promote more validity, it requires a greater evaluation of the political environment in relation to the international business firm. As a whole, the literature does not provide sufficient information in explaining the impact of the political environment

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9 Therefore, changes in the political environment that do not change the business environment are not considered political risks and, as such, not a part of this definition (Fitzpatrick 1983:250).
10 These aspects are a concern when attempting to incorporate them into an investment decision model (Fitzpatrick 1983: 251).
on the firm, or existing models that are able to provide empirical evaluation\textsuperscript{11}. This leads to a redundant inability to present credible arguments for the process of political risk assessment in the decision making process (Fitzpatrick 193:253). Adding to this, Robock illustrates that the political environment is a dynamic space with changes that are both gradual and progressive, which do not necessarily constitute a political risk. He further elaborates that it is necessary to be able to distinguish between political instability and political risk\textsuperscript{12} (Kobrin 1979: 68).

When examining the theory accumulated over time retrospectively, Sethi and Luther (1986) and Oseghale (1993) remark rather bluntly that, in the past, the scope of political risk was too narrow, leading to inappropriate conceptualisations, wrong selection of data, improper choice of analytical tools, as well as misinterpretation of the results. Alternatively, newer understanding of the conceptualisation of political risk praises Fitzpatrick (1983) for his definition of political risk, which suggests that it should be viewed as a process that changes over time rather than placing emphasis only on the actions of government and political events. According to Alon and Martin, this distracts the analyst from other causes of political risk which, as mentioned before, may be internal, external, social, or governmental (pp. 10-11).

Recent studies of political risk have been brought into the spotlight by a wave of new international concerns. Jarvis and Griffiths (2007) elaborate by using the example of the five-fold increase in private foreign capital flows from developed to developing countries between 1990 and 1997. An example thereof was the exposure of private investors to the global unpredictability of managed hedge funds and currency instabilities that were experienced in the Asian financial crisis. Risk in the 1990s therefore centred on the problems of exposure to countries whose institutional capacity and regulatory structures proved to be unclear and unstable. This meant that it became clear for investors that the absence of transparency and lack of governance structures created obstacles for market participants to measure the risk environment in which they operated (p. 9).

\textsuperscript{11} Most models only describe functional relationships that are accepted on the basis of intuition (Fitzpatrick 1983: 253).

\textsuperscript{12} Political instability within this instance is viewed as a separate phenomenon to political risk (Kobrin 1979:68).
The most recent significant interest in political risk is demonstrated by Nigeria’s Islamist group, Boko Haram, pledging to join the Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). This pledge was made on 7 March 2015 by Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, in an audio message. Therein, the organisation expressed its support for ISIS. Although the thought of this action is daunting, it is believed that not much will come of it. Boko Haram praises ISIS’ actions, although these two organisations have their own respective localities. It is also unlikely that ISIS will arm Boko Haram with fighters or weaponry, as Boko Haram has been critical of ‘Arab’ involvement in its activities in Nigeria. Boko Haram is also specific in its history, ethnic participatory and geographical confinement to northeast Nigeria. These two groups are invested in their own wills and this is not to say that Boko Haram will submit to the will of ISIS, follow orders from Bagdadi or view itself as a brand of ISIS. Only time will tell if any true action comes from this pledge; however, it is currently viewed as a public relations stunt (Ostebo 2015).

In political risk analysis, there is currently an amplification of risk through global communications and international media which, as Jarvis and Griffiths (2007) explain, is a by-product of globalisation. This is due to the political-strategic-commercial interdependence of national economies, thereby providing a medium in which isolated risk events are experienced in different geographic localities, but which have global consequences. This is a factor that makes the emerging risk environment so different and unique from that which was previously experienced (pp. 9-10). The international community is now understood to be a sphere where the actions of one party may affect the interests of another. Political risk is ubiquitous within today’s society, as it can be viewed as a useful mechanism to anticipate how changes in the world may affect one’s state or investment.

2.2.4 Political Risk Analysis: Theory and Practice

Political risk analysis (also referred to as political risk assessment) has become a fast-growing sector within international business studies. The functions exercised by such analysts include the identification, analysis, management and reduction of socio-political risks on foreign investments (Simon 1984:123). Whereas the initial writings on political risk appeared in the
1960s\(^{13}\) (Simon 1982:62), it was only in the 1970s towards the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis that political risk analysis became a recognised field of interest and practice. However, it recognisably lost its drive towards the end of the Cold War. The multidisciplinary structure of this field has led it to become more complex, requiring a more thoroughly defined theoretical base, which is presently lacking. This is not to say that change has not been a driving force within this field, as demonstrated by the shift from conceptually oriented studies to quantitative studies in the 1970s; this will be further elaborated below (Simon 1982:65; Brink 2004:3).

It is clear that there has been an evolution of the various frameworks of political risk analysis over time. The Catalogue School was the dominant praxis application of political risk analysis. This framework views political risk as a consequence of the actions from host governments, government agencies and political actors within the host country that impact on the operations, value or profitability of multinational enterprises (Jarvis 2008:19). The System-Event School differed from The Catalogue School by understanding the constitutive nature of political systems and markets by taking into consideration that economic growth and political modernization are interdependent. This recognizes that an an impact or absence of one will affect the other (Jarvis 2008: 25). What followed this framework was the questioning of method versus theory. This indicates a greater emphasis on the method of political risk analysis as opposed to the theory thereof. The Dephi Method demonstrates the forecasting of political risk through the use of scenarios which relate to country risk as well as political risks that are attributed to specific problems found within the host country (Jarvis 2008: 49- 50).

The evolution of political risk through the various frameworks has allowed for a greater scope on how to approach political risk. The move from a theoretical approach, to a practical one has allowed for a far greater scope within the field of political risk analysis as it provides context for risk factors and how they can potentially be mitigated within a practical sense. The aim of this study is an example of exploring how information –and more specifically the source- can facilitate this process. The accumulation of data and information now presents a more practical approach through the method of constructing contingency plans in the event

\(^{13}\) At the time, political risk was associated with the United States’ disengagement from the Vietnam War as opposed to the observation of political risks associated with overseas investment (Simon, 1982:62).
that political risk should affect an investment within the host country. The importance of the accumulation of information -whether qualitative or quantative- forms the basis of this study as it seems to understand how different sources of information impact and influence political risk assessments and the analysis thereof.

Political risk analysis is the action that comes from the understanding of political risks, as well as the course of actions taken by the decision makers in response. It is evident that within political risk analysis, there is a tendency to lean towards subjective understanding rather than objective processes. In order to address this, there is a need to acquire a better understanding of the differences within the political process and to explicitly identify the effect that political events might have on a firm’s operations (Kobrin 1978:121).

Within this study, the aim of political risk analysis is viewed as the process which the analyst will undergo to determine the potential impact that non-economic factors may have on foreign investment. Although this is not the only aim of the field in general, this study will narrow the conceptualisation of political risk analysis to the understanding it holds with regard to foreign direct investment. This brings into perspective the effect that the political and social climate or condition of the country will have on the foreign market. This is surveyed through the implementation of government or societal actions and policies that may stem either from within the host country or outside of it (Simon 1984:134; Simon 1982:68). Robock agrees with this definition, stating that “The decision maker’s task is to recognise the evolutionary path along which change is occurring, identify the principal motivating forces behind the change and make judgments as to timing” (1971:8).

The concern surrounding the task of analysing political risk is presented, according to Brink, through the measurement and observation of the risk. This is based on the fact that demonstrating the analysis of political risk relies on human judgment. This presents a conundrum, as it may include a great level of subjectivity portrayed by the opinions of the analyst. For this reason, political risk models are presented with the aim of balancing user subjectivity by reflecting research information that attempts to respond in a more objective manner, with the result of a more probable estimation of risk. Brink therefore calls for a model that better represents reality, with the addition of incorporating factors such as socio-cultural, political and economic phenomena, as they affect causal relationships and analytical procedures and may serve as a form of reference by which to assess political risk (2004:2-3).
There is still a lack in a universal approach to political risk analysis, which has led to scepticism concerning the operationalisation and quantification of non-economic variables, in addition to analysts’ preferences for in-depth single-country analysis (Brink 2004:5). The problem is not so much the manner in which soft data is quantified, but rather in the effectiveness of incorporating political and social indicators such as people’s attitudes, roles, assumptions and environmental factors to be empirically observed and measured into numerical terms and equations. In the past, soft data was considered indicators that could not be measured, for example, attitudes and the actions that stem from protests and riots. The advancement of political risk models has made it easier to measure indicators that were previously deemed immeasurable. This has changed the dynamic of soft data and has shifted the focus to the analysis of these indicators as opposed to the measuring thereof. In practise, this would involve analysing the trends of soft data in order to understand the point to which they project risk within the environment studied (Brink 2004:6).

Political risk analysis is a dynamic field that is fast becoming a relevant and necessary condition for businesses to utilise in order to control the possibility of risks from both internal and external sources. It places emphasis on the relevancy of political science within the economic world, as businesses have to be cognisant of the landscape in which their businesses operate. However, political risk analysis should not only be viewed in a negative sense as the observing of political risk, but as a method that presents new investment opportunities (Brink 2004:7). The relevancy of political risk analysis is portrayed by McKellar, who contends that “nowhere are we unaffected by the laws of the state, and indeed business occurs in the framework ultimately set by political authority and social consensus” (2010:7). Furthermore, McKellar elaborates on the fact that businesses need to adapt to a dynamic and volatile political landscape, especially in developing countries, where the political realm is still finding a sense of consistency (McKellar 2010:7). This is where political risk analysis plays a key role, as it can equip businesses with the necessary information to calculate risk and, in the result thereof, prepare contingency plans to avoid or lesson the risks that may be imposed on business operations.

2.2.5 Political Risk Analysis: Qualitative Data

Qualitative data, as in this study, makes use of a naturalistic and interpretive approach, with the point of understanding the meanings attached to the phenomena of the social world which are recognised as beliefs, values, decisions and actions. When these meanings are observed, they can be used to represent the social world by locating the observer in the world,
according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000:3). Bryman defines qualitative data by its central motive, identified as the interpreting of people’s social reality (1988:8). Strauss and Corbin, however, define qualitative research according to what it is not which, in this case, means that it does not make use of statistical procedures, and therefore is not based on quantifying empirical findings (1998:11).

The analysis of qualitative data focuses on the complexities surrounding both the detail and context of the data collected. Furthermore, it has the characteristic of identifying existing and emerging categories and theories derived from the data as it is being research. This is an ongoing process of research, as opposed to following the recipe of ideas and categories made prior to the researching of the data. Due to the fact that qualitative research observes the social world, it has the distinct feature of respecting the exclusivity of each case as well as conducting cross-case research analysis with the development of explanations achieved by understanding the meaning of the data rather than the cause of the research (Snape & Spencer 2003:4).

The method of obtaining data in this instance is done through the accumulation of information based on interviews, conversations, photographs, field notes, memos to self, and recordings (Snape & Spencer 2003:3). As mentioned in the previous chapter, this study will use a case study to enable multiple perspectives that are grounded within a particular context, with data ranging from multiple accounts or a collection of methods (Lewis 2003:52). By using a case study, Neuman adds that the researcher can view the social context in a manner that allows for those aspects which came before the event or which surround the focus of the study. This implies that the researcher will understand that the same events or behaviours can have different meanings within different cultures or historical eras. The researcher will also be able to view the manner in which an issue within a case(s) evolves over a period of time, thereby detecting the various process that have occurred within the case, as well as the causal relationships which are present (2006:158).

### 2.3.1 Political Participation and Habermas’ Theory of the Public Sphere

This section will conceptualise political participation by delving into Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. Whereas the previous section demonstrated the methodology of political risk analysis, this section aims to better understand online citizen journalism as a form of political participation within the framework of this study.
Political participation is defined by Brady as actions by ordinary citizens that are directed towards influencing political outcomes (1999:737). What makes this term specific is that it does not refer to political attitudes, but rather an active participation where the goal is to influence decisions made by government bodies or officials (Gustafsson 2012:1112). A more open definition by Conge explains this as actions directed by private bodies that also view public opinions as an act of political participation (1988:344). This definition differs in that it shows an understanding of the complex nature of politics and how political issues are not explicitly under state control (Gustafsson 2012:1113).

The problem with the definition of political participation is the use of the concept ‘action’ when participating for a cause. This view is introduced by new forms of participation created through the internet, which has now broadened the framework of defining political participation. There is no formal academic consensus on this matter, meaning that it is currently open to interpretation (Anduiza et al. 2007:3). Therefore, within the context of this research, the act of politically participating through the dissemination of information and news through non-traditional media such as blogs\(^\text{14}\) is viewed as an act of political participation.

The conceptualisation of political participation within this study draws on the theory of Jürgen Habermas and the emphasis he placed on the public sphere. Habermas believed that the core of a democratic society through the bourgeois public sphere was political participation, not only to sustain democracy but to bolster self-development through civic engagement in communicative processes of opinion and the formation of will (Kellner 2000:3; Susen 2011:45). The purpose of this sphere, as demonstrated in this research, is set within an environment where the aim is to mediate between the private concerns of the people within their respective familial, economic and social lives; this differs from that of the demands and concerns of social and public life (Kellner 2000:4).

It is essential for citizens in the public sphere to be provided with the necessary civil and political rights through democratic institutions, in order to shape their private and public lives

\(^{14}\) Social media is viewed as an extension of blogs, as it also makes use of interaction through a website.
and give them the opportunity to practise self-expression in society\(^{15}\) (Welzel & Inglehart 2008:130). Habermas believed the public sphere to be an area that aims to foster avenues of information and political debate in the form of newspapers and journals. Debate in the public sphere bridges the gap between the private interests of individuals in their everyday life in civil society, and the domain of the state where power is exercised; this power controls the foundation of everyday life. Habermas sought to understand the point at which these two areas could meet, in order to provide a public sphere where the needs of the individual are taken into account at the hands of those who are in power (Kellner 2000:3-4; Bolton 2005).

Habermas further elaborates on the role of the media within the public sphere. He believes that the function of the media has been fractured, as it has gone from facilitating rational public discourse and debate in the public sphere to limiting these debates according to the themes validated by media corporations. In this regard, the citizen is not an engager of public debate but a spectator of presentations brought forth by the media. Habermas does not propose any concrete strategies to address this matter, rather proposing to reinstate the role of the public by encouraging public communication through those organisations that mediatise such communication (Kellner 2000:6). The crux of his ideas regarding the public sphere mirrors the public sphere today, which has greatly transformed on the account of technology and new spaces of public interaction (Kellner 2000:7-8). Habermas’ theory, although written in a different time, mirrors many truths found today with regard to the need for citizens to engage in political debate and courses of action.

Political participation within the framework of this study emphasizes the role of citizens in the public sphere of democratic society through social media. Social media in this sense is a mechanism through which citizens can enhance the manner in which they express their views. It has the ability to empower ordinary citizens; a view believed to be the essence of democracy according to Welzel and Inglehart (2008:128).

**2.3.2 Political Participation and the Virtual Sphere**

This section will conceptualise the virtual sphere in relation to political participation. This study questions the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. It is pertinent

\(^{15}\) Within this context, self-expression is seen as a positive indicator of an effective democracy (Welzel & Inglehart 2008:130).
to understand how political participation is exercised within the virtual sphere and how the virtual sphere has added to the dynamics of political participation.

The argument against the impact of social media as a form of political participation is founded on the idea that social media is based on weak ties, meaning that the act of participation does not last long or hold a sustainable impact. This is further emphasized by Malcolm Gladwell (2010), who states that conversations on social networking sites are not enough to create successful mobilisation. Instead, it is only through strong ties, as seen in person-to-person relationships, that citizens are able to truly mobilise and actively participate (Gustafsson, 2012:1114).

Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2012) question whether social media has the ability to promote democratically desirable attitudes and behaviours when individuals specifically use such sites as a means of keeping up to date with the latest news concerning public affairs and their respective communities. By studying the variables of social capital and participation, they discovered that informational use of non-traditional media had a positive impact on the activities of individuals who aimed for increased civic engagement in the realm of politics. Social capital is viewed as a symptom of behaviour that focuses on activities for the public good, at the public and community level (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela: 2012:320-329).

Non-traditional media has the opportunity to communicate public affairs and provide opportunities to engage and discuss information concerning political topics; however, only individuals who engage in these informational sources are receptive to their messages. The power in non-traditional media lies in its ability to open communication processes among citizens which, in turn, influences people’s civic attitudes and behaviours and allows for the exchange of information to gain knowledge concerning opportunities to participate in civic attitudes. This enables the activation of mental reasoning and elaboration of news events, which subsequently has the ability to promote participation in public affairs and civic-orientated behaviour (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung & Valenzuela: 2012:321-322; Papacharissi 2002:11).

Valenzuela (2013) examines the role of social media in sparking disagreements, protests and other forms of argumentative politics. He argues that there is much evidence to suggest that individuals who engage in civic and political activities in both developing and developed countries are frequent users of social media or non-traditional media. He continues to question how and under what conditions these digital platforms relate to citizen activism and
protest politics. It has been suggested that social media has the power to influence collective actions through its provision of mobilising information and news which is not always available in other forms of media. It also has the ability to facilitate the coordination of demonstrations, which allows users to join political causes and create opportunities in which the exchange of opinions can take place (Valenzuela 2013:920-921).

When bringing the Habermasian view of the public sphere into perspective with the virtual sphere, the emphasis on communication among citizens through discursive interaction was encouraged but not always effectively executed, as the information was largely vertical and commercialised. However, the introduction of non-traditional media has transformed the public sphere, as the flow of information is no longer one that is ‘top-down’ in nature; instead, it now encourages dialogue from all areas of society, starting at the grassroots level. Internet and social media are avenues that allow for unlimited access to information and the echoes of different voices to give feedback about different situations and decisions, from the perspective of the leader and the follower (Fulya 2012:1; McQuil 2005:150-151; Papacharissi 2002:12).

According to Ubayasiri, in the context of the public sphere as put forth by Habermas, while free access has never forced every citizen of society to participate, nor has the internet-based public sphere. Although it provides a platform for discussion among those interested in engaging, one cannot expect all users of the internet to engage in dialogue that is meaningful (2006:8-9).

Social media can also be perceived as a means of surveillance, identity construction and building social relationships connected to political activities. The informational aspect of politics and social media indicates that there is an in-depth reasoning that takes place when people use social media to engage in opinions regarding political news. Opinion expression is stated to be conducive to protest behaviour, as well as other forms of political activity through discussion which is viewed as political participation. This is especially illustrated by Bimber et al. (2005), who claim that social media provides an ideal set of communication processes involving the crossing of boundaries between private and public life; a view shared by Habermas.

Shirky (2011:6) states that it is not strictly the access to information that is significant in the role of social media in civil society, but also the access to conversation. She argues that a public sphere is more likely to emerge in society as a result of people’s dissatisfaction
concerning economic day-to-day governance than the embracing of abstract political ideals. She further states that social media should be viewed as a tool to coordinate real-world action rather than a replacement thereof.

2.3.3 Non-Traditional Media, Traditional Media and Media Censorship

This section will examine media control, as this is essential in understanding the degree to which journalistic and internet freedoms are curbed. This presents an issue that affects both branches of journalism.

In terms of media control, Naím and Bennet (2015) state that the evidence is somewhat obscured, as governments are successful in controlling and even disrupting independent media when it comes to determining what information reaches society. This is also the case in countries that are poor or have autocratic regimes in which the government is more powerful and important than the internet. These governments have a greater deciding role in how information is produced, as well as who produces and consumes it.

It has been noted that journalists and media centres face risks during the spread of information, especially in countries that do not follow a democratic regime. Karr (2014) reported on a more extreme example of media censorship, demonstrated by several dozen masked gunmen, believed to be Russian militia, who stormed and seized control of the Crimean Centre for Investigative Journalism. Journalists were subsequently told to start reporting ‘true information’. In Ukraine, approximately 200 journalists and press workers were beaten, harassed and intimidated by the government since Russia overtook the Crimean parliament on 23 February 2014. It is evident in the realm of professional journalism that journalistic freedom and internet freedom are becoming a scarce resource due to the blocking of websites or the adoption of laws that limit freedom of expression and instead adopt methods of propaganda.

According to Naím and Bennet (2015), governments are also adopting other methods of limiting media freedom, by gaining influence over independent media through using shell companies to purchase the newspaper and sue the reporters. Violent measures have been witnessed, as seen in Venezuela. A group of independent United Nations (UN) human rights experts prompted the Venezuelan government for clarification on allegations of arbitrary

16 The date of this publication was 3 July 2014.
detentions and violence against journalists during the protests on 12 February 2014 (un.org 2014). Journalists covering the protests and the related violence reported that there were 17 instances in which security forces and pro-government demonstrators physically assaulted and detained journalists between 12 February and 16 February 2014 (Human Rights Watch 2014).

This section demonstrated that journalistic freedom and internet freedom are concerns that are found in both traditional and non-traditional media. The following sections will separate these two strands of journalism, by conceptualising them and isolating their differences, as well as discussing how they can merge to form a broader field of journalism.

2.3.4 Non-Traditional Media: Online Citizen Journalism

This section will conceptualise the term ‘online citizen journalism’ as a form of non-traditional media. The purpose of this is to observe the efficiency of technology through non-traditional media in the form of blogs, and how this can serve as a valuable source of information in political risk analysis; a field that relies on the availability of information in a timely manner.

According to Calcutt and Hammond, the term journalism in a traditional sense is defined as the concerted activity of reporting and commenting on recent human activity, disseminated in a well-crafted form for the benefit of others more often engaged in other activities (2011:169). With the aid of technology and the willingness of citizens to become engaged within the field, there has been a surge in what is now referred to as online citizen journalism, public journalism, digital journalism or user-generated content\textsuperscript{17} (Calcutt & Hammond 2011; Jones & Salter 2012).

Online citizen journalism is a display of the technological innovation that provides the opportunity for citizens with internet access to produce news and information (Macharakhovilli 2012:8). This has allowed citizens to bypass journalistic organisations by providing a source of information through blogs, social media and various other digital platforms. Due to the content of this type of news being written by citizens who are not professional journalists, they are able to relay information that does not require strict professional norms (Armoogum 2013). In conjunction with the associated freedom of the internet, this means that these

\textsuperscript{17} Although there are variations of this term, this research will use the term online citizen journalism.
alternative forms of news distribution are not tightly controlled\(^{18}\) (Waisbord 2013:204; Dahlberg 2001:3).

The traditional order of society has given way to a new modern media order. This means that where, in the past, journalism had limited citizen access, media scarcity and a long-term stability, technological innovation has greatly disrupted this order. In the past, citizens had greater difficulty expressing their opinions and views to journalists. Added to this, news organisations were not very receptive to the views of the audience (Waisbord 2013:204). There was much less interaction between the audience and news organisations, with the exception of letters to the editors. It is still believed that the news disseminated by traditional news organisations has an agenda (DeMers 2013; Revis 2011).

The heightened role of online citizen journalism in society questions whether everyone can be journalists, or what will happen to the traditional makeup of legacy news organisations, as barriers to this practice have been removed. It is believed that citizen journalism is not enough to credibly take over the dominant role of journalists. In the name of political participation, the informational needs of society cannot be provided by individuals who lack the proper knowledge and training (Waisbord 2013:205; Armoogum 2013; Macharashvilli 2012:28; Revis 2011).

Citizen journalism has been praised for the potential it holds for citizens, as it is believed to promote an increased interest in public life by boosting civic conversation and political participation (Paulussen et al. 2007:1). This view is contrasted by the view that professional journalism is believed to smother public expression, as the emphasis is placed on the views of the elite and commercialism, which has manifested into an apathetic spirit of public life. Citizen journalism is thus believed to be a solution to this concern, as it provides open dialogue for the opinions of the wider populace, by placing the citizen in control of the news to a certain extent (Bruns 2010; Waisbord 2013:206).

At present, more people are turning to online news, especially when it is breaking news. This is not to say that mainstream news no longer holds any ground, but rather that mainstream

\(^{18}\) Although this study mainly examines political participation through the standpoint of citizen journalism in a democratic framework, it should be noted that there are citizen journalists in other regimes, for example, autocratic regimes.
media now faces the option of working with online citizen journalists and online communities, along with their amateur footage, and the use of online platforms such as Facebook (Maras 2013:192). These online platforms will be discussed in the following section.

2.3.5 Online Citizen Journalism and the Online Factor

The online factor in online citizen journalism examines the digital methods used by citizen journalists as channels through which they are able to broadcast their news. In addition to the technological gadgets depicted, such as cell phones with built-in cameras and video cameras, are digital platforms, of which the most prominent is the method of blogging. Blogging is a method by which content can be published on an online platform. The technical manner of defining it refers to a content-management system rather than a certain kind of writing style (Briggs 2010:42). According to Briggs, a blog is classified as a frequently updated website, organised by entries that follow a reverse chronological order. The entry is called a ‘post’, and has a headline and a body. Entries are also used to provide links to other news and information available on the Web, as well as photos and other graphics. In addition, a link is provided for reader comments, allowing them to share their views on the blogger’s entry; however, not all blogs have comment links (2010:42).

Blogs are viewed as an effective means of publishing journalist’s articles as they are simple, immediate and accredited by their interactivity, which is believed to actually improve journalism by bringing the audience closer to the writer. This eliminates the constraints of time and space, which limit the journalist’s ability to engage with the audience while reporting on a story (Briggs 2010:43).

Bruns states that today’s journalism is disillusioned by commercial journalism. He explains that journalists do not cover news events in an accurate and objective manner, but instead in a way that is governed by their own agendas (2005:15). This does not assume that blogging prevents subjectivism. Instead, in the realm of blogging, objectivity is not always promoted as a clear standard and embraces opinion and subjectivity (Allan 2006:85). One would ask what role the ‘truth’ plays in the realm of blogging. The answer is rooted in Bernhard Debatin’s statement that the truth arises from the discursive process in the interaction of ideas among bloggers. This contrasts significantly with professional journalism, in the sense that the latter relies on the standard of objectivity, whereas blogging follows a combination of transparency, accuracy and advocacy (2011: 838).
2.3.6 Traditional Media

Professional journalists are knowledgeable reporters who convey information to an uninformed public. They are educated in the culture of working for the public as opposed to collaborating with the public in common endeavours (Waisbord 2013:116; Jones & Salter 2012:29). Journalists are often perceived as individuals who lack compassion, opting for neutrality. They are also believed to be ‘dictated to’ by the trusted model of professional journalism, which aims to be apolitical. In reality, this model is meant to defend public interest over subjectivism and partisanism. The notion of bringing citizens into the newsroom in the form of citizen journalism is said to have the power to greatly disrupt these ideals (Waisbord 2013:116).

Concurrently, a positive light is shed on the subject of online citizen journalism, through introducing the belief that citizens should be at the centre of democratic communication and that there does not have to be an ‘either-or’ situation. Instead, there is a belief that professional journalists can collaborate with citizen journalists by incorporating them into the newsroom. This is based on the analysis that professional journalists are insensitive to the needs of the public and are believed to be disconnected from citizens who are, in this context, viewed as the true heroes of civic life, according to Waisbord (2013:110).

2.3.7 The Value of Online Citizen Journalism

Online citizen journalism has the potential to play a prevailing role within the news domain, its advantage being ‘eyes on the ground’. It has the ability to present news at the moment that it occurs through the use of easily accessible footage. This not only adds to the term ‘breaking news’ through its immediacy, but allows for the monitoring of democracy through the transformation of the idea of ‘truth seeking’ in journalism. This is due to the nature of online citizen journalism, which approaches the truth in a manner that includes involvement and participation rather than distance and detachment (Maras 2013:195). It also means having the voices of the public heard through journalism by moderating and monitoring the sources of information that shape and affect the life of the citizen (Jones & Salter 2012:10).

Rosen introduces citizen journalism in a context that promotes political participation, as it challenges journalists to address people as citizens who politically participate in public affairs as opposed to being viewed as victims or spectators. Furthermore, it assists the community to act upon matters rather than learning or knowing about problems, it improves the environment of public discussion instead of having to watch it worsen, and it aids in the bettering of public life by paying attention to it (Quoted in Iggers 1998:143). It may sound
oversimplified to suggest that journalism can implement changes, although in the crux of the message, the point is to allow citizens to become part of the public life that they inhibit through the disseminating of information (Richards 2005:116).

Richard Sambrook (2005), former director of the BBC’s Global News, stated that in the case of the occurrence of major events, the public is able to offer much more information than mainstream news broadcasts and, for this reason, there should be a partnership between these two branches of journalism (Calcutt & Hammond 2011:116). He further stated that citizens promote a participatory culture and are thus able to supplement opinions and information through the participation of reporter-initiated crowd sourcing that curates news through social media. Citizen journalists also have the distinct advantage of not being constrained by logistical challenges or a lack of access, which means that they are able to report at a faster rate than mainstream journalists (Waisbord 2013:208; Jones & Salter 2012:28).

In the context of this study, the focus is to illustrate the point at which online citizen journalism can be of value to political risk analysis. This is determined by questioning the manner in which citizen journalists, through the use of non-traditional media in the form of blogs, can serve as an open means of information and data concerning political risks and events. As mentioned previously, mainstream news corporations are incorporating citizen journalists into their news teams. Citizen journalists are viewed as valuable (to a certain extent), which makes the potential for their role within political risk analysis worth examining.

Journalists – both traditional and non-traditional – as well as political risk analysts have one thing in common, which is the collection of news as it happens. The contributing factor of citizen journalism in these two cases is that citizen journalists are able to provide real-time news as it happens through the use of non-traditional media (Lewis et al. 2010).

In some cases, citizen journalism has a positive track record in terms of documenting real-time events, which may prove valuable to political risk analysts. Citizen journalists have played a role in documentation of events such as the New York terrorist attacks in 2001, the tsunami in South East Asia in 2004, the Arab Spring in 2011, as well as the death of former Libyan president, Colonel M. Gadaffi, and the severe earthquakes in Haiti, Japan, India and Pakistan (Armoogum 2013). This proves that, although citizen journalism is questionable in the sense of being accountable to a professional code of conduct, the ability to provide media coverage of events is not questionable. This is the key role that citizen journalists can provide
to political risk analysis, as they can fill the gaps that journalists miss during the coverage of events (Mythen 2010:47).

When compiling a risk report, political risk analysts generally utilise many sources from different perspectives in order to have a broad understanding of the case. It is within this process that citizen journalists can play a part, by providing information that contributes to a better and more hands-on understanding of political events. The following chapter will contextualise the case study of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests, with Chapter 4 elaborating on the roles played by citizen journalists in order to understand the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis.

2.3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a sound conceptual basis to understand the various concepts surrounding the research question, by dividing political risk analysis and political participation into two branches that can be examined from the sum of its different parts. It has also conceptualised traditional and non-traditional media by looking at various elements such as the Habermasian public sphere and the virtual sphere. By contrasting the differences between traditional and non-traditional media, this chapter has succeeded in explaining these differences, in addition to discussing the value of political risk analysis; the most important factor comprising the research question of this study.

In conclusion, it can be stated that online citizen journalists provide value to the field of political risk analysis, based on their ability to present news within the moment, the dissemination of information that takes into perspective the views of the public in political events (which proves valuable when setting up risk reports), as well as their ability to obtain more information in different forms, as they are present when events occur and are equipped with mobile devices that can show and report more information without logistical issues.
Chapter 3: Overview of the protests in Brazil 2013 - 2014

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to study the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. This study will use the case study of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup in Brazil and the subsequent protests that followed at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. This chapter will be divided into five sections. The first section will serve as an overview of civil unrest trends in Brazil between 2013 and 2014. The second section will observe the protests that took place post-2010, with subsections looking at the 2014 World Cup bid and the bid for the 2016 Olympics. The second section will also observe the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup by examining the clampdown on cities and the Brazilian government’s increased spending and economic policies. The third section will discuss the widespread protests during the FIFA Confederations Cup, while the fourth section will look at global social protest trends. The final section will describe the post-FIFA Confederations Cup situation, which will include the World Cup, Olympics and the 2014 elections that took place in Brazil. This case study serves the purpose of constructing a contextual background to research the value of online citizen journalism during times of crisis. The following chapter will provide more detail on the role that online journalists played during the above-mentioned protests.

3.2 CIVIL UNREST IN BRAZIL

The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the underlying socio-economic issues that led to the protests in Brazil in 2013 and 2014. The socio-economic reality of Brazil does not inspire optimism in terms of the responsibility the country had undertaken to host the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and 2014 World Cup. High levels of crime were a particularly concerning factor. Almost all host cities demonstrated elevated levels of crime before the World Cup, with incidents of petty crime common in urban centres. Violent crimes in lower-income areas, referred to as favelas, were also cause for concern, with most crimes occurring in the favelas surrounding the major cities, particularly in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (red24 2014; Rapoza 2014). Crimes in these areas are driven by gang activity, with rivalry between gangs as well as disputes between gangs and the police. Narcotics trafficking also occurs at the borders of Argentina and Paraguay, alongside other forms of criminal activity (red24 2015).

The nature of the violence in Brazil poses a real threat to public safety and is growing in scale, as there is a lack of punishment for crimes and corruption. Goldblatt (2013) states that
disorder and criminality is left to fester if they do not affect the elite. He also mentions that when the state does intervene, it is often with a high degree of maximum force, as demonstrated by the violence associated with the pacification of the favelas. This will be discussed further in this chapter, in addition to cases of police brutality (Goldblatt 2013).

Brazil has high levels of corruption, as indicated by the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), in which it was given a score of 43 and a ranking of 69 out of 175 countries and territories assessed. The CPI rates countries according to their perceived levels of corruption in the public sector. The scale measures a range of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (least corrupt) (red24 2015; Transparency International 2015). Corruption comes to the fore in the allocation of money. This is demonstrated in the difference in amounts allocated to pensions and infrastructure. The average Brazilian is provided with 70 percent of their final pay at age 54, billed from the national income. This amount is the same as those allocated in southern Europe; however, Brazil’s proportion of elderly people is three times that of southern Europe. Alternatively, infrastructure has a much smaller spend, only taking 1.5 percent from its GDP (gross domestic profit) in 2013, compared to the global average of 3.8 percent, despite Brazil’s stock of infrastructure valued at just 16 percent of GDP. The consequences of low-quality infrastructure weigh heavily on businesses, causing unnecessary costs. According to the World Economic Forum, Brazil is ranked 120 out of 144 countries for overall quality of infrastructure (The Economist 2013; Soto & Boadle).

Rousseff’s approval ratings have dropped since she first took office in January 2011, despite her re-election to office in 2014; this will be further discussed in this chapter. In an article written on 22 June 2013, it was recorded that Rousseff’s ratings dropped by 8 percentage points to 71 percent in June from March 201319, with other accounts by think-tank Datafolha reporting a plummet from 65 percent in May 2013 to 30 percent in June 2013 (Panja et al. 2013; Barchfield 2013; France-Presse 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). The main causes for the decline were the fast increase of inflation and inadequate public services. The accumulation of these different elements has resulted in a great amount of uncertainty for Brazil’s economic future. It is necessary to address these concerns, as a wave of uncertainty

19According to a poll commissioned by the National Confederations, published on 19 June 2013. The survey was conducted by 2,002 people from June 8 to11 and had a margin of error of two percentage (Panja et al. 2013).
in both the economic and political environments coupled with high levels of social unrest poses a very real threat to Brazil’s investment climate (Montenegro et al. 2013). In terms of the protests, which will be discussed in the following sections, these became more rampant during the hosting of the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and in the build up to the 2014 World Cup, as these times were seen as an opportunity to bring attention to issues that have long been neglected by the government, but from which the public still suffered. Socio-economic and labour concerns have been affecting Brazil since June 2013 (red24 2014; Von et al. 2014).

3.3 PROTESTS IN BRAZIL POST-2010

3.3.1. The 2014 World Cup Bid and the 2016 Olympics

The bid for the 2014 FIFA World Cup was a moment of success in Brazil, with the tournament scheduled to run from 12 June to 13 July 2014, including contests that spanned between 32 national teams, with a total of 64 matches played in 12 host cities in the country (2013 FIFA Confederations Cup).

Brazil managed to reach an impressive amount of economic stability by 2009. The economy stabilised under Fernando Henrique Cardosa in the mid-1990s, which was further accelerated under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the early 2000s. By 2010, the economy had grown by 7.5 percent per year, which served to be its strongest performance in a quarter of a century (The Economist 2013). Brazil had bidden for the World Cup while its economy was growing rapidly, following the discovery of oil at the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Despite an increase in hope and optimism, it became apparent that there would be an increase in costs to host the event (Bermingham 2014; Rapoza 2014). Another concern was the decision to host the event in 12 cities, as opposed to the initial 8, in addition to having to rebuild 9 stadiums entirely instead of making minor changes. The rush to complete these tasks led to the questioning of the safety of the stadiums (Bermingham 2014; Rapoza 2014).

At the time of the World Cup bid, Brazil was under the government of then-president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who ensured that there would be transparency on public spending (De Souza Faria 2013). With much optimism, it seemed a perfect opportunity to host the 2014 World Cup as well as the summer 2016 Olympics. This assurance has since been confronted with a hard dose of reality (The Economist 2013). According to sport ministry’s executive secretary, Luiz Fernandes, Brazil’s World Cup spending exceeded Germany’s 2006 World
Cup costs almost three-fold, when it rose to R$28 billion\(^{20}\); this will be further explained in this chapter (De Souza Faria 2013).

Brazil has been crowned a five-time world champion in football, which seemed a pleasant enough reason to host the FIFA World Cup. This notion was quickly challenged when the reality of Brazil’s civil unrest situation became a very real concern to the world. It is believed that Brazil’s title as a world champion and the country’s love of the game have been a means of distracting the population from the reality of their social problems. It is almost uncanny that in preparing for the World Cup, an opportunity was presented for the mobilisation of Brazilians to address dormant issues by the government. The civil unrest trends in Brazil, as demonstrated by the protests, have centred on the issues of corruption and the waste of public money, as mentioned in the previous section (De Souza Faria 2013; Hill 2014).

Romário De Souza Faria, former football star and current congressman of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), stated that the protests would be a means of strengthening the democratic culture of Brazil, by raising the voice of the man on the street and ultimately leading to the strengthening of the judiciary. According to De Souza Faria, corruption in Brazil has led to a weak legislation, with those committing corruption not being held accountable (De Souza Faria 2013; Kadiyah 2013). He stated that when Brazil won the bid for the World Cup, it was believed that this would generate employment as well as promote tourism and strengthen the image of the country in the international community (Bermingham 2014). In terms of generating employment, it was estimated in June 2014 that 380,000 jobs were created as a result of the World Cup (Hill 2014).

Brazil’s bid for the World Cup, although seemingly positive, had a few underlying issues. One such concern was quality control, as Brazil had a reputation for building overpriced and low-quality infrastructure. This was especially evident in May 2013, when the Maracanã stadium, a venue for both the World Cup and the Olympics, had to undergo an expensive renovation as it was ruled unsafe for play\(^{21}\) (Lundy 2013).

\(^{20}\)The initial budget was R$25.5 billion (US$11.4 billion) and included costs for stadiums, improvements in ports and airports and urban transportation (De Souza Faria 2013).

\(^{21}\) This decision was later overturned when the required documents were provided (Lundy 2013).
This is not the first time that such issues have come to the fore, as demonstrated in 2007 when Rio de Janeiro hosted the Pan American Games, an event accompanied by promises of new subway lines and the cleaning of Guanabara Bay’s pollution. However, these promises did not come to fruition. Instead, according to a Time Magazine article, despite the initial estimated amount to be spent for the Pan American Games being set at R$177 million, the final amount was 10 times this figure. As in the case of the suspected low quality of Maracanã stadium, the athletes’ village, which later became residential property, started caving in a few years after the event (Lundy 2013). Also in 2012, the economy only grew by 0.9 percent, leading to hundreds of thousands of citizens taking to the streets in June to protest dissatisfaction of high living costs, poor public services and the corruption and greed associated with politicians. One thus has to ask what problems caused a deceleration in the economy’s growth.

Despite this, it was predicted that Brazil’s economy would slow down in this period, due to the pay-off from ending runaway inflation, the opening up of trade, as well as the rise in commodity prices, large increases in consumer credit and consumption (The Economist 2013; Panja & Biller 2013). Brazil’s financial woes also stem from the fact that it had done little to reform its government when it obtained financial success. A lack of reform in the public sector has led to a heavy burden in the private sector, with companies facing a heavy tax code and payroll taxes (The Economist 2013).

In light of what transpired during the FIFA Confederations Cup and the World Cup in terms of protests, Brazil cannot afford another wave of protests during the 2016 Olympics. During the bid for the Olympics in Rio de Janeiro to the International Olympic Committee, an R$14.4 billion budget was indicated. This amount was slightly higher than the combined budgets of the other three finalists. The concern herein lies in the fact that in modern history, every Olympics has overshot its budget by a wide boundary. A working paper compiled in 2012 by Oxford University stated that every Olympics since 1960 has exceeded its budget, with an average overrun of 179 percent in real terms (Flyvbjerg & Stewart 2012). It is therefore a grave risk to Brazil to host this event, as the Olympics is viewed as one of the most financially risky megaprojects, with many cities and nations having learned from this associated hazard of overspending. This was demonstrated in the 2012 London Games where, in the bidding process, the country presented the organisers with a £2.4 billion budget which, after winning the hosting rights, increased to £9.3 billion; critics believe the costs to be even higher than this (Lundy 2013; Mayer 2014).
Protests occurred in the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup, as well as before the World Cup, as protests occurred in 12 cities a month before the tournament started. These demonstrations were smaller than those that took place preceding the Confederations Cup. They centred on the message of “Na Copa vaierluta” (The Cup will have protests), as protesters stated that the cost of refurbishing the Maracanã stadium could have paid for 200 schools (Watts 2014).

Protesters argued against the meaning of the World Cup, which they believed did not represent them as a nation, despite the fact that Brazil is a football-loving country. The negativity of the World Cup within this context refers to forced relocations and the limits on rights to protest and strike (Watts 2014; BBC News 2014). With the incredible hype surrounding the protests during the FIFA Confederations Cup, it is unlikely that the criticism of Brazil’s sporting events will subside in the run up to the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

3.3.2 Run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup

The run up to the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup was meant to be a ceremonial build up to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and an opportunity to showcase Brazil’s readiness for that event. Instead, this period became a platform for mass protests against the cost of the World Cup. The largest public dissent in decades occurred for the duration of the tournament, between 15 and 30 June 2013, in 175 major cities countrywide (Panja et al. 2013; Lundy 2013; De Souza Faria 2013; red24 2014; Levy 2013; Barchfield 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). Within the theoretical context of this study, this introduced political risk in terms of security at the World Cup and Brazil’s inability to contain large protest movements in an effective manner.

As a result of these protests, two people had died and hundreds were injured by 22 June 2014, as over 1 million Brazilians took to the streets to demand cheaper bus fares, better schools and the construction of more hospitals (Panja et al. 2013). These protests focused on the topic of the expenses associated with the hosting of the World Cup, as mentioned above. It was estimated that 30 billion reais (US$13 billion) would be allocated for preparation of the stadiums and cities; this amount was three times greater than the initial estimated figure when planning the hosting of the event, which also made it one of the most expensive World Cups recorded in history (Panja et al. 2013; Lundy 2013; Bermingham 2014).

President Rousseff was heckled at the opening of the Confederations event, during which the assumed festive spirit thereof was overshadowed by the reality of the violence that took place in Brazilian cities. In an attempt the address the protests, Rousseff pledged in a televised
address to the nation to meet with the protest leaders and, in doing so, also addressed the issue of improving public services while speaking out against the violence in the streets (Panja et al. 2013). The protests in Brazil were fuelled by various reasons, the most prominent of which was dissatisfaction with the government in terms of inadequate public services such as education and health care. However, other protests were more specific, with teachers marching for better wages and gay rights activists opposing a bill to let psychologists recommend medical treatment for homosexuality (Panja et al. 2013; Bermingham 2014).

The run up to the Confederations Cup sparked the formation of various social movements and is pertinent to this study as it provides context in its overlap with the launch of the pacification programme. The Movimento Passe Livre (Free Fare Movement) was a prominent group which protested for free public transportation. The group gained significant attention on 13 June 2013, when a peaceful protest turned violent during police intervention. Police fired rubber bullets and grenades at fleeing protesters and bystanders. Thereafter, the movement spread rapidly to other state capitals and more protests occurred simultaneously with the Confederations Cup matches. It was reported by the BBC’s Ben Smith that, in a match between Uruguay and Nigeria, “the deep rumblings, loud bangs and the crackle of police weapons could be heard in the streets nearby”. Strikes also took place at subways near the opening ceremony of the Confederations Cup in Sao Paulo. The aims of these strikes were to call for increased wages and improved working conditions; however, the Sao Paulo court ruled that striking over pay was illegal (Hill 2014).

Trends in 2013 (Levy 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013) showed an impressive reduction in poverty and inequality; however, these were initially quite high. Despite the promises made previously, Brazil has a long way to go before its socio-economic issues can be fully addressed. Despite the growth spurt of the middle class in Brazil, referred to as Class C, and the ability to increase the purchasing power of this class, these citizens found it difficult to get into elite schools, hospitals and universities (both private and public). Having risen to the status of middle class, this group of citizens felt empowered to demand access to quality services (Levy 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013; Garffer 2013). Although the Brazilian government has allocated more resources to these areas, with increased expenditure in education from 3.9 percent to 5.6 percent, and from 3 percent to 4 percent in healthcare according to World Bank Estimates in 2013, there remains a deficit in the quality of these services, which begs for better management to reduce inefficiency, waste and corruption (Levy 2013).
3.3.2.1 Clampdown on Cities: The Favela Pacification Programme

The Brazilian government introduced what is referred to as the ‘pacification’ of favelas through the use of paramilitary forces in order to drive out drug-trafficking gangs and replace them with so-called resident-friendly police units, also called Pacifying Police Units (UPPs). This pacification programme was one of the key elements in an attempt to improve public security. Residents of favelas have complained and later protested against these measures, as methods used by the police were excessively forceful (Wattsin 2013).

The pacification programme began in 2008, with the aim of building UPPs tasked with stationing policemen to reclaim territories controlled by drug gangs. Although assumed to be positive reform, the programme instigated a dangerous environment filled with corrupt and violent police forces. The claims of Rio de Janeiro being in a better standing with the programme in place have been starkly contradicted by reports which, according to the Brazilian Institute of Public Security, illustrate that the number of deaths in police conflicts rose countrywide by 69 percent between 2013 and 2014 (Froio 2014). The reality and seriousness of these killings are swiftly quashed in the Brazilian media, which has regularly regarded the UPPs as having a positive presence (Froio 2014). In reality, accounts by those inhabiting favelas, claimed that UPPs hardly patrolled at night, allowing crime to occur in the many dark alleys and streets which were left empty. Froio (2014) claims that it is becoming clear that the formation of UPPs is a public relations stunt and not a public security policy. Instead, these forces are meant to hide the high levels of violence and drive away drug gangs from places that are popular during major events such as the World Cup which followed the pacification programme.

By October 2013, 10 police officers in Rio de Janeiro had been charged with the torture and killing of a resident of the city’s biggest favela, Rocinha, which brought to the fore the issue of extrajudicial killings. One of the most prominent cases of such killings is that of a builder, Amarildo de Souza, who was classified ‘missing’ for over two months. This was soon questioned, as his disappearance was met with suspicion, due to the circumstances thereof together with the suspicion of the police’s notorious record in the favelas. This led to demonstrations which forced the authorities to act (Wattsin 2013). Eventually, 10 officers were detained on charges of torture and concealing a corpse. The local newspapers reported that the officers had killed de Souza (who suffered from epilepsy) during an interrogation which included electric shocks and the placing of a plastic bag over his head (Wattsin 2013; Froio 2014).
In May 2014 a study by Amnesty International showed that 80 percent of Brazilians feared torture from their own police when being arrested. In a survey conducted among 21 countries, Brazil was named as the one country where citizens felt most unsafe in the hands of authorities (Froio 2014). In addition, residents of Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão, Complexo da Maré and other favelas still lack basic services. A group called Rocinha Without Borders has had several attempts at establishing a dialogue between the residents and the UPP, although this was greeted with no success and reflects the problem of communication between authorities and residents in the mainstream Brazilian press. This is perceived as a reflection of the same concerns on a greater scale, illustrating a lack of communication between the government and citizens, which the protests are trying to tackle (Froio 2014).

Marcos Barreira, writer and researcher for Favela News Agency, wrote that UPPs are a form of ‘urban marketing’ aimed at uplifting public opinion instead of addressing public security reform. He further stated that peaceful favelas are located around points of tourist interest when, in reality, the cause of peace is the movement of drug gangs to other areas (Froio 2014). Instead of addressing the issue of the favelas, according to Steel (2014), the media is used as a marketing ploy to show that football is the sport of the common people, as depicted by clips of children with no shoes playing in the street with makeshift goal posts. The actual reality could not be further from this imagery. To put this into perspective, in some areas of the favelas, a wall was built between the stadiums and the favelas, so that favelas could not be seen. Furthermore, in the Favela de Metro, near Maracanã, the first hundred families were forced out at gunpoint and were moved two hours away.

Brazilians have claimed that the government used the World Cup to destroy their homes, in order for property dealers to develop the cleared land. These claims changed public perception, which was a contributory factor to the protests, as the favelas occupied prime plots of land, especially in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The protests that occurred in Brazil did not end with the FIFA Confederations Cup, as renewed violence in Sao Paulo led to the detainment of 90 people while 3 trucks and 6 buses were set alight. Police statements added that some protesters used firearms. The chaos caused by these protests, which took place on 27 October, led to a policeman fatally shooting a 17-year-old boy, labelling the incident an accidental discharge when police were called to check a disturbance in the northern Villa Medeiros. Protests occurring on the following day were led by youths who forced the temporary closure of a local highway along with other actions, including forcing a truck’s
motorist to turn back while other vehicles were set ablaze. These actions were attributed to a violent social movement called the Black Bloc anarchist group (France-Presse 2013).

The Black Bloc was a disruptive factor in these protests and has increased its actions since June 2013. The group is known for members dressing in black, wearing masks and having their heads covered with a handkerchief or T-shirt (France-Presse 2013). The Black Bloc has challenged the authority on the streets of Brazil’s major cities by inflicting violence and damaging public and private property, as well as by exploiting an already overworked and understaffed police force (Garffer 2013).

3.3.2.2 Increased spending and economic changes

Brazil’s financial sector has faced several challenges, with its stocks, bonds and currency being hit by emerging markets’ sell-offs after economic growth missed the estimate made by analysts. In 2012, Brazil was the world’s second-largest emerging market, but reached its second-worst economic performance in 13 years when inflation in June breached the 6.5 percent upper limit of the government target range (Panja et al. 2013; France-Presse 2013). According to Garffer, some of the underlying causes of Brazil’s financial problems stem from the country’s heavy reliance on commodity prices which were initially propelled by a demanding China. Unfortunately, this demand has diminished in addition to the credit-driven consumerism of Class C, which has made the country’s economy stagnant. Another source of discontent in the country lies in the fact that it has fallen short of modernising and upgrading its infrastructure (Garffer 2013).

Rousseff, a former Marxist guerrilla once imprisoned by the country’s 1964-1985 military dictatorship, vowed in June 2013 to allocate 75 percent of oil royalties to education and 25 percent to improving healthcare services. In addition, she suggested another initiative titled Mais Médicos (More Doctors), with the aim of recruiting foreign doctors to work in remote areas, in order to address the lack of medical care. Although Rousseff introduced a promise of change through implementing government policies to address these social issues, she continued to defend World Cup spending, which she believed would improve public infrastructure and allow for an investment that would stimulate economic growth (Panja et al. 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). Brazil’s economic realities in terms of health care are a serious matter, as demonstrated by the average of 1.8 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants. In terms of education, 80 percent of public schools have inadequate facilities, with one of the most prominent issues being leaking roofs (Panja et al. 2013).
Although Brazil was not the only country to be affected by the turbulence of the world economy, the government made the grave mistake of prioritising the investments in those cities hosting the World Cup over the needs of the public. In the wake of the crisis, government plans were redrafted and public investment was cut, while holding on to the commitments made to FIFA. This meant that money was being allocated towards sports projects at the expense of health, safety and education. These decisions had the distinct feature of setting off a chain of repercussions, as evidenced by a lack of investment in education, leading to an increase of citizens with no occupation which, in turn, leads to unemployment and a lack of basic security (De Souza Faria 2013).

Education and, more specifically, the condition of schools in Brazil are cause for concern. Teachers are poorly paid, and demoralised, as reported in Pearson’s education quality index which ranks Brazil second last out of 40 countries. According to the UN Development Programme’s 2012 report, one in four students starting in basic education in Brazil leave school before they have completed their last grade. In terms of public health, citizens who rely on public hospitals suffer aggravated levels of illness due to a lack of professional treatment. However, these social issues are not new; they are symptoms believed to be inherited from previous governments (De Souza Faria 2013).

The much-protested stadiums were forecast to cost R$14,300 per seat which, when contrasted with Cape Town’s costliest arena of R$10,000 per seat, raised many questions. This number is particularly high when taking into account the fact that the costs more than tripled since Brazil’s proposal to FIFA in 2007. It is believed that the high costs of the event tell a deceiving story, in which the Brazilian government aims to sell an image to the world of a modern country with new stadiums, while ignoring the needs of its own people, including those dying in inadequate hospitals. The stadiums have become a symbol of the Brazilian government’s wasteful spending and the perception that the government does not have its priorities in order (Panja et al. 2013). Despite this, this amount was not forecast to be the highest, as Brasilia’s Estadio Nacional houses 71,000 seats costing R$1.5 billion (approximately US$680 million). The problem with this stadium was that, when taking its price into consideration and comparing it with the poor attendance, it was rendered useless after the events and thus a white elephant. As such, it is now an empty building that has taken a chunk out of the pockets of taxpayers, for which they continued to pay after the event ended. This incident was not limited to this stadium, but was a result of a majority of the stadiums built in preparation for the World Cup (Lundy 2013). Another example included the
Manaus Stadium, a 39,000-seat stadium at which local games hardly attracted 1,500 spectators, partly due to the city lacking a notable soccer team, which has rendered the stadium useless after the World Cup. This was also perceived as the reason private lenders were not willing to contribute to the World Cup (Hill 2014).

It was pertinent to ask how the World Cup would be financed, as the protests centred on this very issue. The original plan included private donors financing the development and renovation of the stadiums; this was greatly diverted. In reality and according to The Wall Street Journal’s John Lyons and Loretta Chao, US$3.6 billion of the money from the 12 stadiums came from taxpayers. The opening game, which was hosted in Sao Paulo, boasted a new stadium that cost US$550 million. The stadium was to go to the Corinthian’s soccer team after the Cup had finished. This came at a great expense, as the team could not generate enough private lenders to pay for the stadium, which eventually had to come from US$200 million in tax breaks and government loans (Hill 2014; Mayer 2014).

The planning for the World Cup fell to shambles as plans to improve traffic around the host cities led to only 3 cities having stayed within their budgets and deadlines. These failed outcomes fuelled anger in the public sector and spurred popular protests (De Souza Faria 2013; Hill 2014). FIFA became a villain in the hosting of the World Cup with their announcement of making R$4 billion profit from Brazil’s World Cup, tax-free; this announcement starkly contrasted the realities on the ground. Throughout these protests, President Rousseff attempted to carry the torch of good faith, stating that Brazil would “host the best World Cup of all time”, a notion agreed with by few. It is believed that the only party to profit from this event was FIFA (De Souza Faria 2013).

 Brazilians believed their government’s responses to the protests to be superficial and insufficient. Despite this, the protests have allowed the opportunity to mobilise citizenry interested in strengthening communications with the government (Montenegro et al. 2013). Brazil’s past achievements, as witnessed in the last decade, showed considerable progress in bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, also known as the Gini index. It was reported that over 40 million citizens have risen above the extreme poverty line in a country that

22 Another article stated that the stadium was a 42,000-seat which cost an estimated US$319 million (Mayer 2014).
houses 200 million people. In the late 2000s, Brazil’s Gini index was 54.7\(^2\). In an article by Bermingham (2014), it was stated that according to The World Bank, 21.4 percent of the population lived below the poverty line, with 4.2 percent estimated to live below the extreme poverty line (less than US$1.25 a day). The presence of positive change is something that Brazilian society has already experienced, making its expectations that much more real.

3.4 WIDESPREAD PROTESTS DURING THE FIFA CONFEDERATIONS CUP

The most prominent characteristic of the FIFA Confederations Cup protests was that these took place countrywide and were not restricted to a single area. The protests that occurred during the Confederations Cup reached a high magnitude, with protesters threatening to disrupt the tournament if their demands were not met. A large-scale increase in security was witnessed as a result thereof, with the government investing over US$2.2 billion into World Cup security in 2013 (red24 2014; Ramón 2013).

Protests took place on 6 June 2013, with students in Sao Paulo marching against a 7 percent increase in bus fares (Panja et al. 2013). Approximately 1,000 people broke through the security perimeter and protested outside the gate of Brasilia’s national stadium during the Confederations Cup opening game. In addition, 3,000 people tried to break into Rio de Janeiro’s newly renovated Maracanã stadium. The protesters comprised middle-class youths who rallied against the detaining and injuring of 230 people, including 100 journalists, in Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia and Sao Paulo (France-Presse 2013).

These protests increased in number and consistency, eventually peaking on 20 June, when almost one million protesters marched throughout Brazil. These marches started peacefully but soon erupted in violence as the police clashed with protest mobs which attempted to storm government buildings. Actions quickly turned sour, as vandals looted banks and shopping centres. Some of the deaths recorded in June include those of an 18-year-old who was killed when a vehicle ran over protesters in the city of Ribeirao Preto, as well as a 54-year-old street cleaner who died of a heart attack during the protests in Belem, a city situated in the north (Panja et al. 2013; Landesman 2013).

\(^2\)0 represents perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality (Montenegro et al. 2013).
On 18 June 2013, youths clashed with the police in central Rio de Janeiro, when 200,000 people marched on the Confederations Cup. This was one of the most extensive nationwide demonstrations since the unrest began 10 days prior. This was a peaceful demonstration, although there were reports of acts of vandalism in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre. Other accounts included a protest in Rio de Janeiro, where 100,000 people marched along Rio Branco Avenue. In Brasilia, over 200 youths occupied the roof of the National Congress; this ended following negotiations with the police. Protests were not solely based on the issues of bus fares and lack of public services, as accounts show that some protesters called for the resignation of President Rousseff. In this regard, it was later estimated that 5,000 youths formed a human chain around the Congress building (France-Presse 2013).

The protests during the Confederations Cup were violent in nature and took emphasis away from the causes of the protests. On 20 June 2013, a day of celebration was held for Brazil’s defeat of Spain (3-0) to win the Confederations Cup. Clashes were reported between protesters and the police just outside the 1km FIFA exclusion zone around the stadium. A week after the wave of major social protests, violence occurred at random and several accounts of violent clashes taking place at various stadiums in the country were reported (Goldblatt 2013; Landesman 2013).

Protests were also recorded in Belo Horizonte, where an estimated 66,000 people protested according to Globo TV. Two protests also took place in Salvador, where the Brazilian football team played, attracting an estimated 5,200 people (Panja et al. 2013). Other locations included Sao Paulo’s international airport; furthermore, 4,000 protestors took to the streets of the city to demand an end to government corruption. The southern city of Santa Maria was similarly affected on 22 June 2013 (Panja et al. 2013). The protests also led to the departing of Sepp Blatter, head of FIFA, which came as a surprise to Brazilian officials, who expected him to remain for the two-week duration of the Confederations Cup. FIFA later stated that Blatter would return to Brazil on 26 June for the semi-finals (Panja et al. 2013).

On the final day of the FIFA Confederations Cup, over 5,000 anti-government protesters marched near Maracanã stadium. This protest commenced half an hour before a major international match. What began as a minor brawl between the police and protesters escalated into a violent outbreak, as police unleashed tear gas canisters and stun grenades. Protesters retaliated with Molotov cocktails and powerful fireworks (Barchfield 2013).
The Confederations Cup and the World Cup led to the formation of different social movements. The MPL is one of the groups that had been resisting neoliberal urbanism circa 2004 in Sao Paulo. The group’s protests against high bus fares in Salvador in the north and Florianópolis in the south in 2003 formed a foundation that inspired others to protest the same issue years later. The MPL is a group of urban activists originally made up of university professors, undergraduates and high school students, although this has changed as the group has expanded. This group has no appointed leader and follows a loose structure comprising a national network of affiliates in 7 cities. It is also organised according to horizontal, direct-democracy principles which are agreed upon at national assemblies but which otherwise act autonomously (Landesman 2013).

It is interesting to note that the MPL does not operate in Rio de Janeiro, which has become a monument of urban resistance (especially where the Black Bloc is concerned). However, there are talks of MPL activists organising to form a new group with Rio residents (Landesman 2013). In its mission statement, the MPL outlines that its organisation is not a means to an end, but a means to reconstruct Brazil to form another society. In the same sense, the fight for free transport for students is not a goal within itself. Rather, the group believes this to be an instrument that can be used to initiate debate about the transformation of the current concept of urban public transport by opposing market-based logic and beginning the fight for free, high-quality public transport as a right to all of society which is outside of private interests and under public control (workers and users) (Landesman 2013).

The MPL is further characterised by its suspicion of corporate media; the group prioritises alternative media for disseminating its message, as mainstream media has previously attacked the group in the media. In this regard, the MPL has been labelled as disenchanted middle-class university students lacking just cause to initiate urban disruption. In the same sense, the media, even when attacked by Sao Paulo’s military police, chose to focus on ‘acts of vandalism’ in response to violating the sanctity of private property. It was only when a journalist was shot in the eye by police while reporting on the protests that the media started supporting the protests, which were later referred to as ‘democratic’ and which condemned police violence. Thereafter, the media reported the many irregularities of the public transport system. This ultimately led to the media profiling the MPL, which subsequently became nationally famous (Landesman 2013).

In the build up to the World Cup, other social movements were established, including the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Teto (Homeless Workers’ Movement, or MTST) and the
Fronte de Resistência Urbana (Urban Resistance Front), which represented homeless citizens. These groups protested in May 2014 with 20,000 supporters. Thereafter, 12,000 participants protested in Sao Paulo on 4 June 2014, when the opening game was held (Phillips 2014). The aim of these protests was to demand answers regarding how the government had spent public funds on the World Cup (Hill 2014).

Elaborating on these social movements is key in understanding the impact of protests in society as well as the manner in which citizens are mobilised, which in most cases is through social media, a very important element in this study. These protests show a new wave of politics which will be discussed in the following section.

3.5 GLOBAL SOCIAL PROTEST TRENDS

It is notable that protests have been rampant on a global scale, increasing in magnitude in 2013. These protests have common features, including being viral, loosely organised with fractured messages, and mostly taking place in urban public locations. These protests also have the distinction of being able to make use of social media for mobilisations, as the citizenry is better educated (Beaumont 2013; Faiola & Moura 2013). The movements that drive these protests have few discernible (though not elected) leaders, and often have conflicting ideologies. In some cases, their points of reference are based less on ideologies and more on inspiration received from other protests. They are further characterised by members that are younger, better educated and wealthier members of society, although this is not always the case, as exhibited by Brazil’s protests. These protest movements present a catch-22 situation, as they require some sort of leadership, yet do not want the movement to be compromised by being affiliated with any political party (Beaumont 2013; The Economist 2013:3).

Global protests that took place in 2013 were not the first of their kind, as history reflects previous accounts of dissatisfaction and anger, as demonstrated in 1848 (the flow of European revolutions), 1968 (the global youth rejection of the established way) and 1989 (the collapse of the Soviet bloc). When using history to make sense of this, it is stated by the Washington Post’s Anthony Faiola and Paula Moura that “If the 1960s were about breaking cultural norms and protesting foreign wars, and the 1990s about railing against globalisation, then the 2010s are about a clamour for responsive government, as well as social and economic freedom” (Levine 2013).
According to Levine, this echoes the work of Samuel Huntington in the 1960s, which aimed to define why countries become violent and unstable. Huntington stated that this was due “in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.” In other words, rulers fail to keep up with their population’s pace of social, educational and/or economic advancement (Levine 2013). Mass movements have been witnessed in Britain, France, Sweden and Turkey and have been inspired by causes that include the fall of living standards, as well as authoritarian governments and concerns over immigration. However, Brazil does not fall into this category, as youth unemployment stands at a record low; in addition, Brazil has had the biggest leap in living standards in the country’s history (Beaumont 2013).

In Turkey, protests were held over the future of a city park in Istanbul, which later led to a political confrontation with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the government wanted to mow down a historical public park and build a shopping mall in its place. The unrest associated with this protest was based on concerns over the reduction of freedom of expression by an authoritarian state (Beaumont 2013; Faiola & Moura 2013). Like Brazil, Turkey has enjoyed years of swelling economic growth with an expanding middle class. Protests started on 28 May 2013 in Istanbul, where the destruction of the park was used as a platform to express resentment over the government’s growing restrictions on the media and personal freedoms (C.S. Monitor 2013; The Economist 2013:5).

Bulgaria’s previous government was brought down by public outrage over high electricity bills. Thereafter, anger was sparked when the new administration tapped a media tycoon to head the national security service; this led to activist Asen Genov posting a Facebook event calling for a protest in the nation’s capital (Faiola & Moura 2013). In the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, thousands of residents across ethnic lines went to the streets in June 2013, and proceeded to block lawmakers inside parliament for 14 hours in an attempt to protest government ineptitude during the clearing of a massive backlog of unregistered new-born babies. This was demonstrated by a viral Facebook post concerning a 3-month-old baby whose trip to Germany for a lifesaving transplant had been delayed by the backlog (Faiola & Moura 2013).

In Chile, violent protests were sparked by high education costs. In Turkey, it was the government’s intention to raze a park in Istanbul. Chinese cities protested regularly about sloppy construction, pollution and corruption; furthermore, the most famous protest, the Arab Spring, was triggered by Tunisian vendor Mohamed Bouazizi setting himself alight after
continuous harassment by government officials (Levine 2013). In recent democracies, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, Islamists are on the defensive regarding popular sentiment in favour of individual liberties and governments with checks and balances on power. The Arab Spring set down those markers for the future of the Middle East. These global protests focus on different issues, including corruption, rising prices, sexual violence or the erosion of liberties. However, one thing remains constant: people want to fix a broken democracy (C.S. Monitor 2013). These protests are believed to inspire one another, despite fighting for different reasons. For example, the protests in Brazil focused on in this chapter were inspired by the protests in Turkey (Faiola & Moura 2013).

To put this into context, research was conducted for ‘World Protests 2006-2013’ which queried over 500 local and international news sources on the internet to analyse 843 protest events. These protests were not specified, and included all protests whether violent or non-violent, organised or spontaneous. The research measured protest events between January 2006 and July 2013 in 84 countries and over 90 percent of the world population. The aim of this study was to document and characterise expressions of protests from before the onset of the recent world economic crisis until 2013, and to examine these protests globally, regionally and based on country income levels in order to illustrate the main grievances and demands of the protesters in an all-encompassing manner, to truly understand what drives social unrest (Burke 2014).

Findings illustrate that outrage and discontent in protests were increasing on a global scale, with the leading causes being a collection of complaints related to economic injustice against strict policies demanding the reformation of public services and pensions, the creation of good jobs, and better labour conditions. Also included were the demand to make tax collection and fiscal spending progressive, as well as reducing or elimination inequality, alleviating low-living standards, introducing land reform and ensuring affordable food, energy and housing. Another noteworthy and more prominent demand is for better political representation and, more specifically, a lack of real democracy which is believed, in this context, to prevent economic justice (Burke 2014).

**3.6 POST-FIFA CONFEDERATIONS CUP SITUATION**

Many citizens took to the streets to protest the 2013 Confederations Cup, but it was a different scenario at the World Cup kick-off. The question now is what happened to the demonstrations that threatened to break out when the World Cup began? According to
Phillips (2014), Brazilians stated that they are not in favour of the World Cup, but that it was not the time to protest; instead, the protests would happen in October during the elections. However, this could indicate that the government was effective in quashing the protests. Despite this, protests did occur, although these were not attended by hundreds of thousands but only hundreds of people. One reason for this is the violence that accompanied the protests, scaring off protesters (Phillips 2014).

It is also believed that protests have dwindled as the protesters began to protest issues that were controversial, such as protesters who were victims of police violence in the city’s favelas, which alienated the middle class – the most pertinent to protesting social issues. The Brazilian government was also quick to disperse the wave of protests and strikes that occurred in the build up to the World Cup, while other strikes were suspended, as in the case of a subway strike two days before the opening game (Phillips 2014).

The protests witnessed in 2014 centred around the dissatisfaction with the manner in which the government spent money on the World Cup, instead of using the money for social services. It is reported by Von et al. (2014) that the government has never spent as much on social welfare as in the past decade, with the highest level of expenditure in 2010 going towards health care (US$30 billion) and education (US$20 billion). In addition, unemployment has reached its lowest rates in 2014 at 5 percent, from 12.2 percent in 2002. Furthermore, poverty rates decreased significantly, from 35.73 percent for poverty and 15.16 percent for extreme poverty in 2003, to a 15.96 percent poverty rate and extreme poverty rate of 5.3 percent in 2012. Von et al. (2015) also claim that the amount spent on the World Cup was relatively low compared to the total amount of social programme costs.

According to official data, the total investment in the 2014 FIFA World Cup amounted to US$11.3 billion, which came from federal, state and municipal governments in addition to private entities, with US$1.76 billion used specifically for the construction of stadiums (Von et al. 2014).

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the federal investment in stadiums (US$1.76 billion) was done by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and reflects only a small percentage of the total amount invested by the bank in 2010, which was US$260 billion. The revenue generated by the World Cup amounted to US$3.88 billion according to a study by the Institute of Economic Research Foundation (FIPE-USP). In this article, Von et al. (2014) conclude that the protesters’ concerns are understandable, with any spending on soccer
stadiums being too much within this context; however, the protests may have been less about the government spending and more about the opportunity this presented to draw attention to problems that had little to do with the tournament. In their opinion, the real source of wrath is a contracting economy and rising inflation, which are not dependent on the World Cup (Von et al. 2014).

According to Bermingham (2014), FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are monopolies which place countries against one another in the drawing of bids that are extravagant and inappropriate. China and India faced the same situation when they hosted the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, as did Russia during the Winter Olympics; however, these nations were able to keep protests at bay with their authoritarianism. FIFA has been criticised for its mismanagement of the mega-event, of being corrupt, as well as for being responsible for the building of stadiums that are rendered useless after the games. In order to address these issues, countries need to decide whether the hosting of the World Cup is a good investment by taking into account the effects it has had on host countries in the past (Bermingham 2014; Mayer 2014).

The hosting of such events begs the question of whether they hold any advantages in boosting the economy of the host country in terms of net gain. According to Lundy (2013), these mega-events are believed to have an unidentified effect on long-term economic growth. The economic professor of the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts wrote in the New York Times that if the city uses the expectation of a financial windfall as a justification for hosting the Olympics, it is sure to be disappointed, based on past experiences in hosting this event. It is believed that the assumption of these mega-events leading to a flourish in tourism is misleading. This was recorded in the UK in August, when many of the Games’ events were held amid a decrease in attendance, at 150,000 people compared to the same month the year before. The same phenomenon was witnessed in Beijing, where the Olympic Games were believed to have quashed the normal demand for both leisure and business tourism, according to a 2010 report from the European Tour Operators Association (Lundy 2013).

A more positive approach to this concern argues that these mega-events have the distinct characteristic of allowing the host country to address much-needed infrastructure projects such as improvements to mass transit, as demanded by Brazilian protesters (Lundy 2013).

In order to address the matters protested in Brazil, significant progress in reforming the economic situation of the country is necessary. The Economist (2013) suggests that Brazil
should not look to taxpayers for extra money to spend on health care, infrastructure, schools or transport (taxes are already taking 36 percent of GDP). Instead, the government should reshape public spending, especially with regard to pensions (The Economist 2013).

Prior to the elections, it was believed that the Brazilian people would no longer face the prospect of a default win, as a decline in Rousseff’s popularity awarded an opportunity for her political rivals, including former minister Marina de Silva, who launched a new political party and became the primary beneficiary of the drop in Rousseff’s approval ratings (Montenegro et al. 2013).

President Rousseff narrowly won re-election on 26 October 2014, with 51.6 percent of the vote in her runoff against centrist opposition leader, Aecio Neves, who garnered 48.4 percent of the votes, with more than 99 percent of votes tallied. According to Winter and Soto (2014), Rousseff won by convincing voters that her party’s record for reducing poverty over the last 12 years was of greater importance than the recent economic downfall in Brazil. Suffice to say, the Workers’ Party has transformed Brazil since 2003, by lifting 40 million people from poverty, reducing unemployment to low records, and making progress against hunger in one of the most unequal countries in the international community (Winter & Soto 2014).

As mentioned throughout this chapter, Rousseff has had her fair share of unpopularity, with ratings that declined when economic growth dramatically slowed down under her policies, which now begs a recall at the robust growth in the last decade. In addition, there have been corruption scandals, frustration over inadequate public services and high inflation. These concerns have led to many voters leaning towards a more pro-business agenda introduced by Neves; however, these changes were stymied by Rousseff, who told her supporters, especially the poor, that a vote for Neves would lead to the return of a less compassionate and more unequal Brazil, as experienced during the 1990s (Winter & Soto 2014).

Despite Rousseff’s win, she faces many challenges, including that she won the election by less than 3 percentage points, which illustrates that the country is divided in support for her; support is more concentrated in the poorer north and north eastern regions, while the urban classes found in Sao Paulo do not support Rousseff. In addition, Congress is more fractured and slanted to the right, which will mean having to build new alliances. Furthermore, there is the subject of corruption which, in the opinion of Winter and Soto (2014), is growing. This has been exhibited in the crisis at Petrobras, the state-run oil firm, which has been associated with financial kickbacks to the ruling party and its alliances. Allegations of wrongdoing by
Rousseff and former president Da Silva have been prevented through winning an injunction which prevented the marketing of the story; however, this has not halted the ongoing investigations. Lastly, Rousseff is challenged by the economic state of the country, with business confidence dwindling and slowing in China, which has decreased prices of iron and soy, as well as weak domestic investment and demand. Added to this was the 6 percent initial fall in Brazilian stocks after the election result was confirmed (Watts 2014).

3.7 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide contextual background on the protests which occurred at the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup as well as the protests that followed at the 2014 FIFA World Cup. This was done by providing an outline of the civil unrest trend in Brazil post-2010. The protests were discussed by observing the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup which took place in the clampdown on cities as well as the increased spending and economic policies. Ultimately this chapter serves as an introduction to the case study used in this study which is police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. It also illustrated that Brazil has suffered a turbulent time in terms of civil unrest and that the underlying causes of the protest are worth exploring. Online citizen journalists played a great role during the protests and served as a significant source of information in addition to the mainstream media. The rest of this research will now observe how online citizen journalists were able to provide information outside of the protests in order to understand its value.
Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Findings

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether online citizen journalism holds value in the field of political risk analysis, in terms of presenting itself as a source of information in compiling political risk reports. The issue of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014 will be used as a case study. The research conducted in this study will be presented as a review of reports of police brutality from the mainstream media as well as online citizen journalists. Thereafter, analysis will be carried out by using the three characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy to conclude whether online citizen journalism holds potential value as a medium of information for political risk analysis.

This chapter will be divided into four sections, with the purpose of establishing the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. The first part of this chapter will provide insight into the new voice of citizen journalism by looking at the advantages thereof and the impact of MídiaNINJA in Brazil. The second part will discuss the issue of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas by referring to the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) and Amnesty International’s report on police brutality for 2014/15. This part will also elaborate on police brutality as a source of risk in the field of political risk analysis, in order to understand why citizen journalism may be a valuable medium in the assessment of political risk. The third part will categorise the reports on police brutality according to their sources, either stemming from mainstream media or online citizen journalists. These reports will be reviewed in the fourth part of this chapter, in order to discuss and demonstrate the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis, according to the characteristics of timeliness, relevance and accuracy.

4.2. THE NEW VOICE OF ONLINE CITIZEN JOURNALISM

The aim of this section is to provide a brief outline of online citizen journalism in the context of Brazil. Initially, this section will list the advantages of online citizen journalism and the second part hereof will elaborate on the work of MídiaNINJA, which has pioneered in the field through the reporting of protests that took place in Brazil at the 2013 Confederations Cup and the 2014 World Cup. This research will also use two other sources of online citizen journalism in Brazil, Global Voices, which is in partnership with MídiaNINJA, and RioOnWatch.
RioOnWatch is an online platform for community reporting launched in May 2010 as the Rio Olympics Neighbourhood Watch, with the aim of bringing visibility to the favela community in the lead up to the 2016 Olympics. It is a news site that publishes the perspectives of community organisers, residents and international observers. In addition, it dialogues with the mainstream media and alternative press to prompt a more accurate perspective of the favelas and their contribution to the city (RioOnWatch 2015). Global Voices was established in 2005 and is a volunteer community with more than 800 writers, analysts, online media experts and translators. Its aim is to curate, verify and translate trending news and stories that might not get as much coverage on the internet (in independent press, social media and blogs) in 167 countries, translated into over 35 languages (Global Voices 2015).

4.2.1 The Advantages of Online Citizen Journalism in Political Risk Analysis

To reiterate Chapter 2, online citizen journalism holds the potential to play a prevailing role within the news domain, with the advantage of having ‘eyes on the ground’. It has the ability to present news at the moment that it occurs through the use of easily accessible footage. Online citizen journalism not only adds to the term ‘breaking news’ through its immediacy but allows for the monitoring of democracy through the transformation of the idea of ‘truth seeking’ in journalism. This is due to the nature of online citizen journalism approaching the truth in a manner that includes involvement and participation as opposed to distance and detachment (Maras 2013:195). It also means having the voices of the public heard through journalism by moderating and monitoring the sources of information that shape and affect the life of the citizen (Jones & Salter 2012:10). Chapter 2 elaborated on how citizen journalism promotes political participation by challenging journalists to address those citizens who participate in public affairs. This contrasts the idea of citizens receiving the news as spectators and, in doing so, helps communities to act upon matters instead of being made aware of problems that occur within those communities (Iggers 1998:143). Lastly, Chapter 2 touched on the idea that citizen journalists are able to offer more information than mainstream news and report at a faster rate, as there are no logistical challenges facing citizen journalists, who have the distinct characteristic of being present during the breaking of the news (Calcutt & Hammond 2011:116; Lewis et al. 2010). This proves significant as it demonstrates the extent to which online citizen journalism is timely in the dissemination of information; a point that will be further elaborated on in this chapter.

According to journalist and media professor Sylvia Debossan Moretzsohn, the MídiaNINJA (Ninja) journalists are already introducing change in the Brazilian media landscape by filling
a hole, especially through their street feature, which documents reality (Krieger 2013). In addition, they address aspects that are not part of the traditional media’s coverage or which are only covered to a minimal extent, as traditional media is held hostage by official sources and press offices. According to Krieger (2013), sociologist Venecio de Lima believes that Ninja’s reach has been exaggerated. This is based on the estimate given by members of the group, who state that they had the participation of hundreds of thousands of people at the pinnacle of the protests. De Lima further states that he does not know how these calculations were done, but that this number should be put into the context of Brazil, which has a population of 203 million people (Worldometers 2015) and that it is imperative that groups like Ninja take a more distanced approach to reporting, as it is problematic if they are the protagonists of their own stories and should therefore edit their reports in order to allow people to understand them (Krieger 2013).

However, online citizen journalism has created a niche which has sparked the interest of international news media. Citizen journalists in Brazil report on injustices in Rio de Janeiro in addition, international media aligning with citizen journalists, especially at the time of the hosting of mega-events such as the 2014 World Cup, which are perceived to impose on the rights of the citizens of Brazil (RioOnWatch 2014).

4.2.2 MídiaNINJA

MídiaNINJA is translated as ‘media independent narratives, journalism and action’ in Portuguese and was established in 2011 to address news that often failed to challenge the official story. Through the use of mobile phones and social media to live-stream events as they happened, MídiaNINJA was able to provide extensive reporting on the protests that occurred during the 2013 Confederations Cup and the 2014 World Cup. They were also able to report on social issues and sectors of the population that are usually ignored by the mainstream media. The content they reproduce comes in different formats, including live-streaming, photography, mini-documents and articles through social media (King 2014; Deutsche Welle 2015; Davis 2015).

MídiaNINJA is therefore an activist network that aims to bring together collaborators from Brazil and abroad through the coverage of a range of issues, from the struggles of the indigenous Amazonian tribes to the forced evictions of favelas in urban centres. The network has the distinct characteristic of mobilising a new generation of media activists and journalists through a platform that democratises publication of information. It partnered with the global news platform Oximité to present a news network that expands the limits of
journalism and eases sustainability for this new paradigm of journalism by making provision for donations to be given and received, as well as for the coverage of events, media, activism and the distributing of text, images and videos (MídiaNINJA 2014).

When the police attempted to frame a protestor for throwing a Molotov cocktail, traditional media agencies such as O Globo reported the allegation as it was presented. However, Ninja sent out a call for footage of the incident, which proved that the weapon was not thrown by a protestor by a plain-clothes police officer. Rafael Vilela, a reporter for Ninja, stated that the coverage of the protests exposed the failings of Brazil’s corporate media. Vilela went on to say that he thinks there are exceptional people in the mainstream media and that they are not the problem; rather, the problem lies in the structure in which they work. He further stated that Ninja is a response to the crisis of industrial journalism, which cannot cope with information that is totally free and cannot be controlled as before. He stated that, ultimately, the free media movement illustrates that there are alternative views in the world (King 2014).

Vilela also stated that media is a big business in Brazil, with only 7 families owning most of the country’s newspapers, television channels and radio stations, which they use to attack the progressive social policies of the country’s left-of-centre government. This ultimately leads to a polarisation between conservative media and the state, creating a desperate need for less partisan voices to represent the perspectives of the ordinary Brazilian. Vilela asserted that the intention of Ninja was never to compete with mainstream media, but to fill this space through the empowering of people to build a form of popular communication. Ninja is not a building of mass media but a media of the masses and therefore is not about one source talking to the population but the communication of the masses through the participation of alternative perspectives not presented in mainstream media. This approach demonstrated the value of online citizen journalism during the protests as well as the potential value this could have in political risk analysis. Vilela mentioned that while the traditional media outlets struggled to cover the demonstrations, Ninja’s network of thousands of contributors relayed information through social media networks which could subsequently be broadcasted nationally and internationally (King 2014; Bainbridge 2014; Deutsche Welle 2015).

In an attempt to bridge the gap between citizen journalism and the mainstream media, Bruno Garcez of the ICFJ (International Centre for Journalists) is helping Brazil’s top media outlets to include multimedia reports from citizen journalists on various news issues, in order to report from a different perspective; that of the citizen. He is partnering with ABRAJI (Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo), which is a leading investigative
journalism association, as well as the daily *Folha de São Paulo* to incorporate reports that have been written by trained citizen journalists (ICFJ 2015).

Although this movement requires recognition, it does have a limitation in financing its geographically dispersed citizen journalists and the burden that comes with having to maintain both the financial and human resources in order to continue to exist. Ninja has experienced problems with fundraising and the responsibility of maintaining a nationwide network while competing with other news sites that use social media formats and platforms. Although the group consists of unpaid volunteers, it does have a board of directors responsible for maintaining equipment, aiding travelling costs for training, paying for data storage and providing legal fees for arrested members (Davis 2015).

A seminar was hosted on 28 August 2014 in Complexo da Maré to launch the official publication of the Right to Communication and Racial Justice Project. This project was aimed at promoting community access to media production, in order to increase the recognition of the relationship between institutional racism and the violence experienced by Afro-Brazilians, especially those who reside in favelas. This project mapped 118 alternative or community-based media sources in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area between 2013 and 2014, with the aim of producing a report on their ability to fight racism. This report comprises case studies of media outlets, academic essays on race and gender, as well as the sustainability of community initiatives (Ed Bentsi-Enchill 2014).

Another objective of this project is to increase the depth of the 2011 Media in Favelas project, which tracks community reporting in the city. In the 2010 census, 47.7 percent of Brazil’s population identified themselves as white and 50.7 percent as black or brown. In the favela communities, only 30 percent of residents are white and 68.3 percent are black. It has been noted that while the homicide rates amongst white males have been declining for years, the opposite is observed for young black males, as rates increased from 30 to 35.9 murders per 100,000 people (in 2010), meaning that a black male was more than twice as likely to be murdered as a white male. The Favela Observatory stated that mainstream media’s lack of focus on violence affecting Afro-descent communities is part of a process that marginalised the lives of black people. In the US, the murder of Michael Brown in 2014 forced the government to confront race relations; however, in Brazil and according to Bentsi-Enchill (2014), the issue of lethal police brutality passes without consequence. As such, despite protests, the systems of institutional racism and media obstinacy continue.
The media was criticised at this seminar due to its ignorance on the issue and how this in turn reduces the issue’s importance for decision-makers and the general public. Furthermore, it is believed to indicate that violence against black people is an accepted norm, which is reflected in favelas through unjust and brutal policing which violates the rights of people through impunity. As a whole, the Right to Communication and Racial Justice Project is working to strengthen community voices, with the aim of producing and disseminating counter-narratives from other points of view. The publication included MídiaNinja as a case study for online activism. According to the Favela Observatory, MídiaNinja represents a transformation of the model of authorship that has allowed for a balance in the receiving and sharing of large volumes of information (Bentsi-Enchill 2014). This proves valuable to the field of political risk analysis, as it introduces news that provides context and insight into issues in Brazil that may be underlying causes of political risk.

4.3 POLICE BRUTALITY IN FAVELAS

This section will elaborate on the issue of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. In order to understand this concern, this section will present the 2014-2015 report by Amnesty International. It should be noted that this report covers many human rights abuses; however, for the purpose of this research, only the topic of police brutality will be examined. This section will also present research on Brazil’s Police Pacifying Unit (UPPs) from both the perspective of online citizen journalists and mainstream media.

4.3.1 Police Pacification Unit (UPP)

The inauguration of the UPP took place in 2008 and 2013. It is believed that the police had been insufficiently trained for the role but that, in general, they performed their duties professionally. However, there were a few reported counts of corruption and violence (Ashcroft 2014; Sorboe 2014). Despite recent criticism, there have been positive aspects of the UPPs, predominantly in the smaller favelas. The most noteworthy contribution was the reduction in the rate of lethal violence within the favelas. It has been reported that the homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro has almost halved since 2005 (from 42 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants to 24) in addition to the decrease in police killings from 1,330 in 2007 to 415 in 2012. The most significant impact of the UPP in terms of political risk was the gradual lowering of lethal violence and the use of guns, in order to provide an opportunity for favela communities to function without drug gang violence being the dominant feature of social control (Ashcroft 2014).
The implementation of the UPP also included opening spaces for public services, organisations, civil actors and businesses, which was not previously possible as there was no opportunity or infrastructure. However, despite these positive changes and objectives for the programme, it took one incident to turn scepticism into complete distrust; the murder of Amarildo dos Santos in 2013 when he was detained by the UPP in Rocinha. While there have been many cases of police brutality over the last 25 years, the philosophy that accompanied the installation of the UPPs in conjunction with resident reports through the use of social media meant that incidents in the favelas sparked outrage both nationally and globally (Ashcroft 2014).

The increasing number of protests against the UPP has demonstrated that, as an institution, the police have not changed despite the fact that community policing involves communication with the community. The demonstrations centred on the majority of UPP officers’ activity in detaining and stopping suspects, accompanied by breaking down doors and entering houses without warning or warrant, as well as the assault of suspects (Sorboe 2014). It is perceived that the UPPs have failed to combat the deeper social problems faced in the favelas.

The programme initially intended to incorporate the UPP Social, which aimed to provide both social and economic integration in communities by creating forums to bolster community discussion and stimulate leisure and cultural activities by providing professional training programmes for youths in favelas. In reality, however, they have had little impact, which leaves the impression that it is merely a policing programme (Ashcroft 2014).

The underlying problem with this programme is that it is based on a weakened foundational structure. This foundation takes form as the deep-rooted tension between the police and the favela communities. In theory, the UPP was meant to be a programme with the potential for positive impact; however, according to Ashcroft (2014), this positivity is hampered by the fact that the UPPs are paying for the decades of neglect that came before their implementation. There was also a great deal of reluctance due to the fact that the same institution killed 1,330 people in Rio de Janeiro in 2007. The question is now whether the same programme could suddenly transform its philosophy and expect acceptance from the people. Although it is believed to create a positive and peaceful impact, it retains the same war-like tactics that were developed by the police force in the last 50 years, which disregard human rights to such an extent that the force earned a reputation as one of the most brutal forces in the world (Ashcroft 2014).
According to Italiani and Filho (2014), the lack of attention to the calls of the population was the main complaint against the civil and military police. This was evident in data released on 25 April 2014 by the Police Ombudsman of the State of São Paulo, which stated that of the 11,080 complaints made in 2013, 22.9 percent related to policing applications in both police stations and military police battalions. Second to this were complaints against poor quality of service (16.65 percent), followed by a lack of policing drug trafficking sites (12.73 percent) which was predominately pointed against the Civil Police, who have the duty of investigating trafficking but would not go to those locations where narcotics were being sold (Italiani & Filho 2014).

Misconduct is a pressing issue among the troops operating in the favelas; this has led to the increasing weariness of the residents. This is most pressing in Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha, where 8 of the 39 UPPs are located. The army’s occupation in an effort to ‘cleanse’ the territory to be taken over by state troops amounted to nothing, as drug traffickers launched attacks that included the deaths of several UPP officers. However, the UPP managed to reduce homicide rates through retaking certain areas. This led to the withdrawing of traffickers. According to Barros (2014), the UPPs were a smart response on the part of the government, although they may have an expiration date if not accompanied by social investments. However, in some areas there have been new social implementations in the form of schools, community learning centres, clinics, and housing programmes. This begs the question of what went wrong with the UPPs. According to Barros (2014), the UPP was a good solution but it imposed a top-down approach and was laden with marketing gimmicks, without considering the role of democracy and permanent dialogue with citizens.

The wave of violence in March 2014 occurred as a result of police occupation of the Vila Kennedy favela, which sparked international concern over the contradictions in the pacification programme24. According to Canofre (2014), the pacification programme is questioned within the police due to the murders of four agents in favelas in 2014. A collaborator with Global Voices, Danillo Ferreira, stated on police blog Police Approach that neither the police nor the communities are able to see an alignment between what the

24 It was reported in the daily Spanish newspaper, El País, that Rio de Janeiro found itself at a worrying crossroads where a choice had to be made between maintaining the security policy which was questionable or to re-adopt the old and failed strategy of destroying drug traffickers (Canofre 2014).
government claims through propaganda and the reality of what they experience. He added that the pressure of the World Cup\textsuperscript{25} and the Olympics will lead to the government maintaining the financing of the UPP policy as an emergency measure in an effort to contain the favelas until 2016.

\textit{4.3.2 Report by Amnesty International on Police Brutality in Brazil}

The Amnesty International report for Brazil includes human rights abuses between 2014 and 2015. It states that serious human rights violations are continuously reported, including the killings of Brazilians by police, as well as the torture and ill-treatment of detainees. In particular, young black residents of favelas, rural workers and indigenous peoples are at risk of human rights violations. Public security remained the context for widespread human rights violations. Official statistics indicate that 424 people were killed by police in Rio de Janeiro State during police operations in 2013. In the first six months of 2014, there was an increase in the number of these deaths, with 285 people killed by police; this is 37 percent higher than the same period in 2013 (Amnesty International Report 2014/15).

Secretary General of Amnesty International, Salil Shetty, demanded an end to police impunity and a greater consistency in the protection of human rights in both the favelas and the indigenous communities of Mato Grosso do Sul, which he states are weak zones of human rights, terming these war zones in which human rights are suspended. Shetty stated that the country needs to reform the police system and requires a database with cohesive information, as well as a unified police force, which helps people instead of harming them, and proper police training and judicial reform. It is stated that police officers who distrust the judicial system or view it as corrupt are more likely to take matters into their own hands (Dias Carneiro 2014; Insight Crime 2014).

Shetty further stated that Brazil has one of the highest rates of violent homicide in the world, with a significant proportion (close to 20 percent) committed by the police, meaning that the main issue is police impunity. It was reported that more than 11,000 people were killed between 2009 and 2013 by the police (Buchanan 2014; Tomlinson 2014). Shetty mentioned that the most significant problem with combating police impunity is that it is the police who conduct the investigations. Residents are scared and thus do not complain; however, when

\textsuperscript{25} The 2014 World Cup had already occurred at the writing of the paper.
they do, no investigation is undertaken. Furthermore, in the event of an investigation, no one is condemned (Dias Carneiro 2014).

4.3.3 Linking Police Brutality to Political Risk Analysis

This research has used Brazil as a case study to observe the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis and thus whether reporting by online citizen journalists proves valuable as a source of information in the writing of political risk reports. Although this study has provided information in regard to the benefits of online citizen journalism, it is essential to provide a more detailed analysis in order to succinctly examine the potential value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk analysis.

This section observes police brutality as a risk factor; within this study, risk is defined as a force that constitutes a negative outcome to another party and is therefore viewed as potentially harmful. In addition, it stems from political behaviour (McKellar 2010:3). Risk is considered a political risk if it stems from a branch of authority found within the structure of the state, thus the division of authority that has the function of protecting the state and the citizens therein. Political risk is also defined as actions by the government that are perceived to be an interference which brings forth unwanted consequences. This definition takes into account decisions made by the government but includes the significance of political events which range from a change in government to protests and riots such as those exhibited in Brazil (Fitzpatrick 1983:249). Risk within the realm of political risk analysis – as mentioned in Chapter 2 – understands the different manners in which risk acts as an obstruction between the possibility of a risk and the strategies and plans implemented to maintain a reasonable level of risk (Brink 2004:18).

Although this chapter will observe the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis, it is essential to understand the context of police brutality as a case study in political risk analysis. In the case study of Brazil, the implementation of the UPP programme in favelas is not necessarily interference by the government as its function was to restore order and security to these communities. However, the increase in cases of police brutality in conjunction with a lack of action on the part of the government constitutes a political risk. The accumulation of information about this matter is pertinent to political risk analysis. It is with this understanding that the value of online citizen journalism is researched, in order to facilitate the political analyst.
In broad terms police brutality is defined as a civil rights violation that occurs when a police officer acts with unlawful excessive force (that being more than what is necessary) against a civilian or suspect, thereby violating the rights of the individual (US Legal 2015; Grobler 2005:111). According to the US definition of police brutality, in the event that force is used between an officer and a civilian, only a minimum amount is required to achieve a legitimate purpose, despite the general broad levels of power that police officers possess (US Legal 2015; FindLaw 2015). The state has the primary responsibility, according to civil law, to protect citizens from abuses by the government; this includes police misconduct. Claims against police officers in this regard include false arrests (or false imprisonment), malicious prosecution and use of excessive or unreasonable force (FindLaw 2015). These claims have been documented in the reports of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas.

Police brutality is a security issue within a state that has the potential to greatly impact on the level of political risk. It is therefore a relevant topic that can be analysed by political risk analysts, as police brutality is associated with other factors that may impact on the level of a state’s political risk. These factors include an overall increase in the levels of crime, political instability and corruption. The outcome of political risk within the context of this study, is towards the security and sustainability of investments. When considering the weight placed on police brutality in the overall understanding of this outcome, it is evident that the increase in the level of crime, corruption and instability would be detrimental to an investment. However, it should be noted that the weight of this risk is subject to the type of investment made in the country presenting this risk factor. Thus the weight of this risk is most evident in an investment which will be greatly affected by the repercussions of violence as an outcome of police brutality, corruption and an increase in violence.

In terms of violence, Brazil demonstrates high levels of crime and drug trafficking, which have been further exacerbated through the implementation of the UPP programme (Wattsin 2013). Police brutality within this instance also presents a political risk as it is associated with an act by the government in the social system of the state (Kobrin 1976:4). In this instance, the government implemented the UPP programme with the aim of providing protection in the favelas by eradicating drug traffickers and introducing social programmes in order to address socio-economic injustices through health care and educational projects. However, the repercussions of the demise of the programme as an institution of security present it as a political risk.
Political instability within this study is defined as the outcome of an unexpected change within a state that presents an internal as well as external risk (Brink 2004:19). Despite the presence of political instability as a result of the government’s decision to implement the UPP programme in the run up to the 2014 World Cup, this action was initially meant to introduce positive change. However, it is now considered a risk as it is associated with negative repercussions on the citizens of the state, which is an internal risk. Citizens went so far as to state that the implementation of the UPP programme has turned the favelas into ‘war zones’ between the police and drug traffickers, as well as between police and civilians. Political instability is also witnessed in the increase in protests and demonstrations held by residents of favelas, which was accompanied by violence between residents and the police. The high levels of crime associated with police brutality also presented an external risk, as the 2014 World Cup led to an increase in tourism in Brazil.

Lastly, corruption is associated with police brutality as it has been reported that UPP officers act with impunity not only in the violation of residents’ civil rights through the use of violence, but through underhanded and illegal dealings with drug traffickers. The Mollen Commission (1994:47) states that police brutality does not always occur together with corrupt acts, but usually occurs to show power and force the community to respect the police venting frustrations and anger out of fear or hostility towards an individual or a community that the individual represents (Grobler 2005: 112).

According to Syed (1997) police corruption is a term with a connotation of ‘moral perversion’ or ‘depravity’ and thus stems from a moral view, which leads to an inadequate understanding of the problem and ignorance thereof26. Police corruption within this case refers to any illegal conduct, or misconduct, that involves the use of occupational power for personal, group or organisational gain (Syed 1997). Such conduct, as demonstrated by the case study of Brazil27, relates to the investigation of cases and the securing of evidence through lying (perjury) with regard to circumstances surrounding arrests, or the tampering of evidence with the purpose of securing convictions. This will be further illustrated in the reports of police brutality by mainstream media and online citizen journalism. Kickbacks are another form of corruption that are evident in this case study, as witness accounts stated that

26 This is on account of acts of corruption being debatable, as people’s moral views differ.
27 This will be further demonstrated in the following section.
UPP officers have gained the reputation of occasionally working alongside drug traffickers to secure additional means of income. In this case, drug traffickers are able to avoid law enforcement to run their operations more effectively, which has the potential to make drug traffickers more powerful than the state which, in turn, increases the level of instability as the government loses its power to enforce the law (Syed 1997; Grobler 2005:93, 96). Corruption not only increases the level of political risk on a tangible scale, but runs the risk of decreasing the morale of police officers. This has a negative impact on the organisational culture of the police and hampers the relationships and levels of trust between citizens and the police force, as the latter gains a negative reputation within communities. This in itself presents a political risk, as it has the potential to lead to dissatisfaction with the government, which implemented the programme, as well as an increase in riots and protests as witnessed in Brazil (Syed 1997). When taking into account the definition of politics as stated in Chapter 2, Lasswell et al. (1950) state that its function lies within the terms of power or authority that are exercised within relationships in society; these relationships refer to those between citizens and the government or rulers. Police brutality is a violation of power in the relationship between the authority of the police and the citizens of the state. If this issue is not identified by risk analysts in order to address it, it has the potential to further erode the authority of the government, which has the responsibility of presiding over all sectors of the state.

This brief overview indicates that police brutality presents a political risk to a state. It is also associated with other risks which have the ability to impact on the level of risk a state demonstrates. As mentioned in Chapter 2, political risk analysts accumulate a broad framework of information when conducting political risk reports in order to take all factors and political events into consideration before presenting a final analysis of political risk for a state. The following two sections will present news reports from both mainstream media and online citizen journalists in order to observe the potential value of online citizen journalism as a medium for information in the compiling of risk reports in political risk analysis.

4.4 REPORTS ON POLICE BRUTALITY BY THE MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND ONLINE CITIZEN JOURNALISTS: THE RESEARCH PROCESS

Before delving into the findings of these two sources of media, it is essential to understand the research process that was undertaken when collecting reports of police brutality in Brazil. The first step in the process included a general search of online news agencies found in Brazil.
as well as online citizen journalism sites. This was made possible through various websites that listed the online news agencies in the different areas of Brazil. When visiting these sites, a general search was conducted with the following key words and terms: UPP violence; UPP, the Pacifying Police Unit, Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, police brutality favelas, police brutality slums, police violence, and slums. The reports were then collected. The majority of the mainstream media sites and some of the online citizen journalism sites were in Portuguese, which led to a search of these terms in the translated version of the site in English. These key terms were also translated into Portuguese and searched on Portuguese sites before the results were translated into English. In total, 39 Portuguese articles were translated into English through the online program Google Translate.

The reports that were available in both categories of websites for police brutality were then listed according to the name of the victim. The fact that more information was provided by online citizen journalist sites made it possible to accumulate a list of victims. However, there were cases of police brutality that were reported by mainstream media and not by online citizen journalist during the phase of the general search, as mentioned above. The names of the victims found in both mainstream media and online citizen journalism were then searched on all the websites found. The aim of this research process was to do an extensive search to list reports on police brutality within the specific timeframe of 2014 and within a specific list of sources, in order to study the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis.

### 4.4.1 Brazil Mainstream Media: Reporting on Police Brutality in Favelas

This section will elaborate on the reporting of police brutality in 2014 by Brazil’s mainstream media. In order to conclude whether online citizen journalism is valuable to the field of political risk analysis, it is pertinent to take into consideration whether the information differs from that which was reported by citizen journalists. The reports presented within this section have been collected from Brazil’s most prominent media sources as well as additional news sites. The prominent news sites used for this section include: *Agência Brasil, Folha*, the *Folha Blog, O Globo, A Tarde, Rio Times Online, O Dia and Brasilpost*. The table below

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28 Agência estadão is one of Brazil’s main news sites, but requires a paid subscription and thus could not be included in this study; however, a tarde is affiliated with Agência Estadão.
demonstrates the reports of police brutality conducted by journalists from mainstream media, which will be explained in greater detail later in this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of Victim</th>
<th>Fatalities and Injuries</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>Claudia Silva Ferreira</td>
<td>Death, shot to the chest</td>
<td>Morro da Congonha, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (DG)</td>
<td>Death, assaulted and shot</td>
<td>Pavão-pavãozinho, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April/ 23 April</td>
<td>Edilson da Silva Dos Santos</td>
<td>Death, shot to the head</td>
<td>Pavão-pavãozinho, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>30 y/o unnamed man</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Matthew 12 y/o or 13 y/o boy</td>
<td>Death, shot to the head</td>
<td>Pavão-pavãozinho, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>Jonathan de Oliveira de Lima</td>
<td>Death, shot to the back</td>
<td>Barrinha, São Paulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Afonso Mauricio Linhares</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Manguinhos, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 July</td>
<td>Maria Victoria Souza Santos</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Amargosa, Bahia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Antônio França</td>
<td>Death, shot to the chest</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Izaquel Nogueira</td>
<td>Injured, shot; bullet grazed the eye</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 August</td>
<td>Jorge Ruan Vianna</td>
<td>Injured, shot to the shoulder</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio De Janeiro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1: Reports of Police Brutality Incidents in 2014 by the Mainstream Media*(Mainstream Media Sources 2014).

4.4.1.1 Claudia Silva Ferreira

The first case of police brutality in 2014 was the death of Claudia Silva Ferreira, who was shot on 16 March 2014 in Morro da Congonha. The only witness present at the time – a neighbour – stated that her body was abandoned in the street for over half an hour and that the military police were responsible for her death, having shot her from a distance of less than 3 metres. The witness said that she was behind the police officers, who were walking quietly until they met Claudia and must have assumed that she was a bandit; they fired 6 shots. The witness further stated that she rushed home after the shots but came out 10 minutes later to find Claudia’s dead body. Half an hour later, the same police officers returned. Silva

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29 The blank spaces indicate information that was not provided in the reports.
30 Due to the volume of information, subsections will be provided according to reports that made news headlines.
Ferreira’s body was dragged for 350 metres along Avenida Intendente Magalhães, secured by a piece of clothing (Cruz & Cunha 2014; Heringer 2014). Reports state that the 3 policemen were released on 28 March 2014 by a court decision (Fernandes 2014; O Dia 2014).

Other news reports indicate that Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged by a police car for 250 metres (Borges 2014; Savoy et al. 2014). The police officers responsible for dragging her body justified their actions by stating that favela residents surrounded the vehicle in a hostile manner (Cruz & Cunha 2014). Tais da Silva, one of Claudia’s 4 children, stated that the police took his mother like a dog. Images of the victim being dragged were released by the newspaper ‘Extra’ and were instrumental in the arrests of the police officers on 17 March 2014. These images illustrate that the police officers had known that the victim’s body was being dragged as they tried to drive over a sidewalk. The arrested police officers were Adir Serrano Machado, Rodney Miguel Archanjo and Sergeant Alex Sandro da Silva Alves (R7.com 2014). The autopsy done on Silva Ferreira’s body indicated that she had died of a shot to the chest, which caused heart and lung injuries. Several other injuries were identified as a result of her body being dragged by the police car (Savoy et al. 2014; O Dia 2014; Cruz & Cunha 2014; Borges 2014).

Different accounts of the story have been presented by the community, relatives of Silva Ferreira, as well as the testimonies of the police officers involved. The police officers claimed that they could not open the back door of the car, which led to the placement of the body in the trunk of the car. They further claimed to have placed the body in the car after the community had dispersed. Lawyer to one of the officers, Mark Espinola, stated that Silva Ferreira’s body was not placed in the back seat of the car as the seat was filled with weapons. The military police reported that the body was put in the trunk in order to leave the site quickly; however, residents claim that the car had been stationary for half an hour with the body in it. The police officers also testified that they had not seen the trunk open, although investigators stated that the noise caused by the trunk opening would have notified them, in addition to drivers on the road warning the police officers of it being open. The police officers stated that they had stopped to put Claudia’s body back in the trunk (Savoy et al. 2014; Heringer 2014).

31 This refers to Globo Extra.
32 Which witnessed the incident.
Silva Ferreira’s case was sent to the Military Court. The 3 police officers were arrested under Article 324 of the Military Criminal Code. However, the crime had to be specified, requiring research to identify whether Silva Ferreira was alive at the time that her body was placed in the trunk of the car. Thus, if she showed any vital signs, it would be considered a crime; had she been dead, no crime would have been committed. However, the officers would face procedural fraud for the dragging of her body (O Dia 2014; Cruz & Cunha 2014). Husband of Claudia Ferreira da Silva, Alexandre Fernandes da Silva, questioned the acts of the military police when they claimed to help his wife after she had been shot. More specifically, he asked why they took the Intendente Magalhães highway, as this is not the closest road leading to the Carlos Chagas Hospital in Marechal Hermes (O Dia 2014; Magalhaes 2014).

On 17 March 2014 a protest was held in a favela in Rio de Janeiro over the murder of Claudia Silva Ferreira a day prior. Julio Cesar Silva Pereira, the victim’s brother, accused the police officers of her death and stated that the police had claimed she was a drug dealer and armed, when in reality all she had had in her possession was 3 notes of reais and a cup of coffee. At the time of the incident, she had gone out to buy bread (Savoy et al. 2014; O Dia 2014; Modena 2014). The protest took place after her burial and led to Congonha residents closing the Minister Edgard Romero Avenue (Magalhaes 2014; R7 2014).

4.4.1.2 Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (DG) and Edilson da Silva dos Santos

Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira’s body was found within the walls of a public school on 22 April 2014 in Pavão-pavãozinho, a neighbourhood between Copacabana and Ipanema in Rio de Janeiro’s South Zone; there were signs that he had been beaten to death (Virgilio 2014; Iraheta 2014). According to the UPP press office, his body had no wounds caused by bullets; however, a report released by the Forensic Institute indicated that he had died after his lung had been pierced and was described as being ‘intensely haemorrhaged due to a wound in the chest’ (Noticias UOL; Virgilio 2014). Initially the police had stated that the death could be related to a fall, but a report later indicated that Douglas had been shot (Noticias UOL). His mother, Maria de Fatima da Silva, declared that she believed he was tortured by the police before he died, as residents had said they heard screams (Silveira 2014; Pragmatismo Politico

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This is based on the law which makes no provision for personal injury against a corpse (Cruz & Cunha 2014).
DG’s death was honoured on Globo Television’s Esquenta by Regina Casé, where he used to dance (Amorim 2014; Silveira 2014).

DG’s mother stated that his body was found with an injury to the head, a cut on the right eyebrow, marks on the back and a bruised nose, without any documents. He was also found in a position which suggested that he had been fighting. His identity document and passport appeared at Precinct 13 and were as wet as his body was when it was found. According to Maria de Fátima, 2 years previously when DG was working as a taxi driver, his vehicle was seized by the military police and his tank was filled by the military police with sand. Days later, his bike was stolen. According to a resident, it was taken in a truck by UPP officers (Pragmatismo Politico 2014). According to Noticias UOL (2014) the military police assaulted DG and tried to hide his body when he was identified as the dancer from O Globo.

On 23 April 2014, the General Commander of the UPP, Colonel Frederico Caldas, told GloboNews that the dynamics of the death were not yet clear from the completion of the autopsy and the testimony of the police officers. He stated that the police had received a complaint from the area and that there was a barricade 50 metres from the location. When the police approached, there was an exchange of gunfire. Three police officers testified but it remains unclear if they were told where Pereira’s body was located or if they saw the fallen man on the ground. According to Caldas, the police officers waited for the director of the school to enter, after which they removed the body (Thaise 2014). Amnesty International issued a statement on Thursday 24 April 2014 requesting a full investigation into the deaths of DG and Edilson da Silva Dos Santos, who was killed on 22 April 201434 by a bullet to the head during protests over the death of DG (Platonow 2014). At a peaceful protest on 27 April 2014 over the death of DG and Edilson da Silva dos Santos, activist Deise Carvalho stated that DG had been faced with threats since 2011 and that his bike was stolen and later recognised in the possession of the UPP. She also mentioned that DG had told her that he was being threatened by police officers (Amorim 2014; Silveira 2014; Kudialis 2014).

4.4.1.3 Other Reports of Deaths by Police Brutality

On the day of DG’s death on 22 April 2014, a protest was held by the residents of Peacock Pavãozinho, resulting in the shooting of 2 people. The arrival of the UPPs led to the shooting

34 Other reports indicate that he was killed at a protest on 23 April (Kudialis 2014).
of a 30-year-old man who was found dead in a soccer field in the favelas as well as a 13-year-old boy identified as Matthew, who was shot in the head (Pragmatismo Político 2014; Noticias UOL; 2014; Virgilio 2014). Platanow (2014) reported that the boy was 12 years old and, according to witnesses, had his hands in the air when he was shot.

Jonathan de Oliveira de Lima35, a 19-year-old boy from Manguinhos, was shot on 14 May 2014 in a confrontation with UPPs (Kudialis 2014). According to Jonathan’s mother, Ana Paula de Oliveira, police accused him of trying to shoot them. He was killed during a police operation when officers were patrolling the Barrinho locale and were confronted with armed criminals. Jonathan’s aunt stated that he had just left home when there was confusion in the community, which led to the shooting. Jonathan was shot in the back (Filho 2014). In addition, 25-year-old Afonso Mauricio Linhares died in the Manguinhos community in June 2014 when he was shot by police after being mistaken for a drug trafficker (Thayná 2014).

On 16 July 2014, baby Maria Victoria Souza Santos was hit by a bullet during a police operation conducted by two officers in Amargosa. According to the victim’s family, the police arrived already shooting and raided the house searching for a suspect. Maria was taken to the hospital by the police despite protests by the mother; the baby was dead by the time they arrived. Family members stated that the police had been using narcotics, as one of their noses showed signs of white powder and it was a known fact that police officers use drugs (Rodrigues 2014).

On 5 August 2014, 21-year-old Jorge Ruan Vianna stated at a protest on 22 August 2014 that he had been shot in the shoulder by UPP police in Complexo do Alemão and attributed this incident to racism-related violence in favelas. He added that he is a waiter and has no affiliation with the favela’s drug trafficking units. He declared in his interview with O Globo that the police mistook him for a trafficker and that the situation needs to change, as not all black youths in favelas sell drugs. Other residents fear that the continued police-drug traffic struggle will encourage future prejudice-based attacks. In an interview with The Rio Times, local resident Robson Miranda stated that this gives the police more leeway to kill people, as there is a strong prejudice against black youths and the innocent are often wrongly persecuted (Kudialis 2014).

35 Other reports record his full name as Jonathan de Oliveira Silva.
Mainstream news agency *O Dia* (2014) reported the death of 60-year-old Antônio França on 27 July 2014 after he was shot in the chest in Complexo do Alemão. The victim had left for work when the incident occurred. Freire (2014) reported in *O Dia* that 15-year-old Izaquel Nogueira was shot on 27 July 2014 in Complexo do Alemão, where it was reported that the bullet had grazed his eye. Such reports by mainstream media indicate that police brutality is a pressing concern in Brazil’s favelas. The next section will present reports of police brutality by online citizen journalists.

In order to place the information provided into better perspective, the table below illustrates the various reports conducted by mainstream journalists which were researched in this study as well as the newspapers in which they were reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Victim</th>
<th>Agencia Brasil</th>
<th>Atarde</th>
<th>Noticias</th>
<th>O Dia</th>
<th>Brasilpost</th>
<th>O Globo</th>
<th>R7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Silva Ferreira</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edilson da Silva dos Santos</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 y/o unnamed man</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew 12 y/o or 13 y/o boy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan de Oliveira de Lima</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afonso Mauricio Linhares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Victoria Souza Santos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antônio França</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Izaquel Nogueira</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jorge Ruan Vianna</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2: Reports of police brutality according to newspaper sources (Brazil Newspaper Reports 2014).*

### 4.4.2 Online Citizen Journalism: Reporting on police brutality in favelas

The purpose of this section is to outline the accounts of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas as reported by online citizen journalists. The reports of police brutality were collected from two prominent online citizen journalism sites as well as additional sources. The prominent sites include *Global Voices*, which is in partnership with MídiaNINJA, and *RioOnWatch*. As demonstrated in the previous section, the table below shows the reports of police brutality which will be further elaborated on in this section.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of Victim</th>
<th>Fatalities and Injuries</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>Claudia Silva Ferreira</td>
<td>Death, shots to neck and back</td>
<td>Morro da Congonha, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Matthew Casé Oliveira</td>
<td>Killed by UPP soldier</td>
<td>Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira</td>
<td>Death, assault and shot to the back</td>
<td>Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Edilson da Silva dos Santos</td>
<td>Death, shot to the head</td>
<td>Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>12 y/o unnamed boy</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 April</td>
<td>Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 April</td>
<td>Luiz Alberto Cunha</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Morro do Chapadão, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Carlos Alberto de Souza</td>
<td>Death, shot to the stomach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>Vitor Gomes Bento</td>
<td>Death, shot to the head</td>
<td>Morro dos Macacos, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 2014</td>
<td>Jonathan de Oliveira</td>
<td>Death, shot to the back</td>
<td>Manguinhos, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>8 y/o unnamed boy</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Northern Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Felipe Rodrigues</td>
<td>Injured, shot to the chest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>Mateus Alves dos Santos</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>Caio Moraes</td>
<td>Injured, shot to the chest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Afonso Maurício Linhares</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>Gabriel Ferreira</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>Lucas Lima</td>
<td>Death, shot</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Antônio França</td>
<td>Death, shot in the chest</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Izaquel Nogueira</td>
<td>Injured, shot to the leg and eye</td>
<td>Complexo do Alemão, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>Marcos Heleno</td>
<td>Death, shot to the chest</td>
<td>Nova Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September</td>
<td>Wesley Rodriguez</td>
<td>Injured, shot to the leg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.2.1 Claudia Silva Ferreira

On 16 March 2014, 38-year-old Claudia Silva Ferreira died when she was shot in the neck and back during a military police operation in the northern Morro da Congonha favela. Although not dead at the time (Global Voices 2014; Ninja 2014), the victim’s unconscious body was put in the trunk of a police car and allegedly taken to hospital. The police were stopped by Silva Ferreira’s neighbours and friends, who did not want them to take her body. The police officers responded by firing warning shots to disband the crowd. The officers then drove away with her but had not closed the trunk of the car, which led to her body falling from the trunk and being dragged along the Intendente Magalhães highway, secured by a piece of clothing. Her body was dragged for 250 metres before the police officers noticed what had happened or paid attention to the pleas of passing drivers and pedestrians (Global Voices 2014).

Sub-lieutenant Adir Serrano Machado, Sub-lieutenant Rodney Miguel Archanjo, and Sergeant Alex Sandro da Silva Alves were arrested the following day, but were released on 20 March 2014 by the request of prosecutor Paulo Roberto, who stated that if Silva Ferreira presented vital signs, there would be bodily harm; however, as she was dead when placed in the trunk, the police officers had not committed a crime. The officers were released on bail and are now awaiting judgement. This statement differs from the report which stated that she had been unconscious at the time the police officers put her in the trunk of the car. Thais Lima, daughter of Silva Ferreira, stated that the police officers had laughed while loading her mother’s body into the trunk of the car. Claudia Silva Ferreira’s husband, Alexandre da Silva, and his brother Julio Ferreira stated that Claudia was allegedly shot by the same police officer who had planted 4 weapons at the scene of the crime, during which she was only carrying a coffee and 6 Brazilian reais to buy food (Global Voices 2014).

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36 The blank spaces indicate information that was not provided in the reports.
4.4.2.2 Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (DG) and Edilson da Silva dos Santos

According to Parkin (2014) reporting for RioOnWatch, on Tuesday 22 April 2014, Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira’s body was found inside a day-care centre in Pavão-Pavãozinho in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. He was allegedly killed by local UPP officers; there were signs indications that he was beaten (Ninja 2014). Evidence in the form of a photo emerged which showed that DG was also shot in the back. Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira was a dancer on Rede Globo’s popular television show Esquenta. The circumstances surrounding his death, together with the fact that he was well known led to protests in Copacabana which gained international coverage (Hilderbrand 2014).

Although DG’s body was found with boot marks on the skin, suggesting that he had been kicked to death, a police report claimed that his wounds suggest and are comparable to a death caused by a fall. According to favela residents, DG had jumped over a wall to hide from a confrontation between the police and drug traffickers, while en route to Pavão-Pavãozinho to visit his 4-year-old daughter. Favela residents further stated that they believe the police confused DG with a gang member, leading to the assault. The police have not confirmed or commented on this information (Hilderbrand 2014). It was reported that DG’s death occurred during a raid targeting Adauto do Nascimento Gonçalves, a top-level drug trafficker known as Pitbull, after reports emerged that he had returned to the community (Ashcroft & Hilderbrand 2015).

Parkin (2014) also states that DG’s death might have gone undiscussed had it not been for his visibility on television. This was further emphasized by the Globo Corporation running a piece that discussed DG’s death with his family and friends, suggesting that the UPPs were currently in a ‘moment of crisis’. Parkin (2014) stated that the presenter, Regina Casé, discussed the matter in a largely sanitised manner, with little reference to the context of DG’s death, which in reality represented the problem with the UPPs, as well as the history of police violence and the criminalisation of poverty in favelas. It was reported that on the day of DG’s death on 22 April 2014, a protest was held in Pavão-Pavãozinho, which led to the shooting of Edilson da Silva dos Santos (known as Mateuzinho), who died soon after being shot in the head (Hilderbrand 2014; Parkin 2014).

4.4.2.3 Other Reports of Death by Police Brutality

The abovementioned cases were not the only cases of police brutality witnessed during the time of the World Cup. In March 2014, 17-year-old Matthew Casé Oliveira was killed in Manquinhos by UPP soldiers, as reported by Ninja (2014). On 22 April 2014, the protest that
was held for DG in Pavão-Pavãozinho and which led to the death of Edilson Silva dos Santos also resulted in the fatal shooting of an unnamed 12-year-old boy. The police claimed that the shootings that broke out were initiated by a local criminal gang, to which police retaliated with tear gas and stun grenades (Hilderbrand 2014; Parkin 2014).

On 27 April 2014, 71-year-old Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas (known as Dona Dalva) was caught in a shootout and killed in the North Zone of Complexo do Alemão. The following day, 17-year-old Luiz Alberto Cunha was killed in a shootout in Morro do Chapadão, Costa Barros. The mainstream media had muted reactions to these deaths; however, they were exposed through the reaction of the communities, leading to 9 busses being burned in protests (Parkin 2014). Protests in Alemão following the death of Dona Dalva led to shop assistant, Carlos Alberto de Souza, being shot in the stomach. What is noteworthy about de Souza’s case was that police refused to answer his family’s questions about his condition. The masses, fuelled by the fear that Carlos was being tortured or executed, attacked the UPA (Unidades de Pronto Atendimento) health centre. It was reported that Carlos was left without medical attention for at least 2 hours after being shot. The following day, the UPA centre was visited by Rio de Janeiro Mayor, Eduardo Paes, and new State Governor, Luiz Fernando Pezão, who denounced the ‘delinquents’ that had attacked the unit and were subsequently referred to as criminals interfering with the pacification (Parkin 2014).

O Globo published an article about the damage to the UPP’s reputation as well as the attempts to limit this damage at the protests, although the article was quickly and furtively taken down, followed by a statement declaring that “the Military Police requests that journalists do not accompany the operation in Alemão”. Parkin (2014) further states that a community journalist reported that journalists in Alemão were at risk, stating that independent journalists almost died the previous day during the protests; the next day, O Globo took down the article. A human rights lawyer posted an article with the comment, “the Military Police does not want witnesses to the violations committed by its representatives, the excesses in approaching [residents], and the absolute psychological lack of control in [their] war machine”. This indicates that mainstream media, although able to report acceptable facts, is not always able to delve into the true meaning of the police brutality by the UPP.

On 5 May 2014, 8-year-old Vitor Gomes Bento was shot in the head during a shootout between UPP officers and drug traffickers in the North Zone of Morro dos Macacos, in Vila Isabel. Vitor was discharged from intensive care and transferred to the children’s ward. This incident occurred the same day that Rio de Janeiro’s World Cup security operation was
implemented, in which an additional 2,000 police officers deployed on the city’s streets in response to an increase in robberies and street muggings (Clarke 2014). In May 2014 Caio Moraes was shot in the chest by a UPP officer in Complexo do Alemão as he was working. Caio Moraes was a taxi driver who had just left a passenger in the area of Grota during protests against the shooting of another resident (Paz 2014; Voz Das Comunidades 2014).

On 14 May 2014, 19-year-old Jonathan de Oliveira was shot in the back after dropping off a dessert at his grandmother’s house. When walking back, he was met with commotion in which military policemen were shooting into a crowd (Froio 2014). Also in May, MídiaNINJA reported the death of an unnamed 8-year-old boy in northern Rio de Janeiro during a shootout between the police and drug traffickers. According to their report, 3 favela residents were killed by the UPP in the city in the previous two weeks (Ninja 2014).

Becerra (2014) interviewed 21-year-old Felipe Rodrigues, a skate instructor and painter who considers himself a survivor of the Rio de Janeiro police. His run in with the police occurred on 31 May 2014. He stated that he was on his way back from his girlfriend’s birthday party at Copacabana beach. He was shot twice, with one bullet grazing and the other hitting him in the chest. The police thought that Felipe was dead and placed a bag of cocaine inside his underwear. Witnesses in the community said that the police had taken Felipe to the woods. His girlfriend found him there alive; he had been losing blood for 2 hours (Becerra 2014). On the same day, 14-year-old Mateus Alves dos Santos was killed by the police after being arrested in the city along with a friend who was suspected of theft. The two boys were put into a car, in which they passed the police station; the car stopped at the hill of Sumaré, where the boys were to be executed. Mateus’ friend survived gunshot wounds to the leg and back and pretended to be dead. His family waited several days before making a complaint, out of fear.

On 22 June 2014 preceding a protest in different parts of Complexo do Alemão, 17-year-old Gabriel Ferreira and 15-year-old Lucas Lima died in a shootout. In the previous week, 25-year-old Afonso Maurício Linhares was shot and killed by UPP police in Manguinhos while refereeing a soccer match outside his home (Sorboe 2014).

On 27 July 2014 in Complexo do Alemão, 60-year-old resident Antônio França died when he was shot in the chest by a UPP officer. On the same day, 15-year-old Izaquel Nogueira was shot by Special Operations Battalion (BOPE) officers in the leg and the eye, resulting in his loss of vision. In addition to the shooting, a resident from Complexo do Alemão stated that
the behaviour of the police officers was inappropriate and included stopping and searching residents for no particular reason, the invasion of houses without a search warrant, as well as disrespectful behaviour towards residents who has done nothing wrong. The resident added that he has witnessed the physical and verbal abuse of young residents by UPP officers (Paz 2014).

The resident further stated that the majority of those shot by UPP officers have been young people between the ages of 14 and 25. This includes Marcos Heleno, a 17-year-old boy who was shot on 27 September 2014 in Nova Brasilia. He was shot in the chest and died in hospital after being left on the sidewalk for an hour before the ambulance arrived (Voz Das Comunidades 2014). Reports by Froio (2014) state that the police would not allow anyone to help Heleno; this led to him bleeding on the street. A witness declared that the police used pepper spray on anyone who attempted to help the youth. The following day, 28 September 2014, Wesley Rodriguez was shot in the leg but survived (Paz 2014; Froio 2014; Voz Das Comunidades 2014).

In order to better understand the sources of online citizen journalism, the table below will provide the incident as well as the online platform which reported the story.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Victim</th>
<th>MidiaNinja</th>
<th>Global Voices</th>
<th>RioOnWatch</th>
<th>Voz Das Comunidades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Silva Ferreira</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Matthew Casé Oliveira</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Edilson da Silva dos Santos</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 y/o unnamed boy</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Alberto Cunha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlos Alberto de Souza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vitor Gomes Bento</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jonathan de Oliveira</td>
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<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 y/o unnamed boy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felipe Rodrigues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Mateus Alves dos Santos</td>
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<td>Caio Moraes</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afonso Maurício Linhares</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabriel Ferreira</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lucas Lima</td>
<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antônio França</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izaquel Nogueira</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos Heleno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesley Rodriguez</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5 POLITICAL RISK FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN THE STUDY

The purpose of this section is to understand the impact of police brutality on the level of political risk in Brazil. The table below includes the most significant political risk indicators identified across mainstream media reports and those produced by online citizen journalists and international news agencies, as indicated in Chapter 3. As per the table it has been witnessed that there was an increase in protests became evident as cases of police brutality increased in Brazil’s favelas. In addition to this was also the witnessing of police impunity as police brutality displays acts that are unethical and above the law; this in turn has also led to acts corruption has the police are able to get away with unethical behaviour. This in turn leads to the risk of citizens distrusting the police. The dissatisfaction that comes with the inability to trust the police in conjunction with the violent behaviour by the police and citizens has displayed an increase in crime as the drug traffickers in the favelas rebelled against the police which also led to an increase in violence during these protests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political risk indicators relating to police brutality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in protests (against police brutality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police impunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust in the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in violence (especially at protests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Political risk indicators identified as a result of police brutality (Mainstream Newspapers 2014; Online Citizen Journalist Reports 2014).

There has been a surge in protests against UPP units. Chapter 3 exhibited the various protests that took place in 2013 and 2014. Although these were discussed in the previous chapter, there was an increase in protests in 2014 against the violence incited by UPPs, which led to the deaths of several favela residents (as described throughout this chapter). These protests occurred near the sites of the various incidents of police brutality depicted in this chapter. Protests were particularly prominent after the deaths of DG and Claudia Ferreira da Silva. These protests also led to increased levels of violence, as witnessed at the protest against the death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas on 27 April 2014, which led to the burning of 9 busses (Parkin 2014).
According to Wattsin (2013), residents have complained about the excessive use of violence by UPPs, as evidenced throughout this chapter. Allegations of corruption and the violent use of force against residents were also reported by the Brazilian Institute of Public Security, illustrating that the number of deaths in conflicts with police across the country rose by 69 percent between 2013 and 2014, as was illustrated in Chapter 3 (Froio 2014). Other reports by residents include complaints of UPP officers not patrolling the streets at night, which does not aid the reduction of crime, but allows for an opportunity for crime to occur (Froio 2014).

The perception of the UPPs by favela residents has been identified as a political risk factor, as it demonstrates a lack of trust in UPPs. It is believed that UPPs have more of a public-relations function than a security function. Residents claim that UPPs serve the purpose of hiding the high levels of crime, especially from tourists, by driving away drug gangs from places that are popular during major events (Froio 2014). Another political risk factor that was observed in this study was an increase in violence with regard to police impunity. This was witnessed in a survey conducted in 21 countries, the result of which illustrated that Brazil was found to be the one country where citizens felt most unsafe as a result of the authorities (Froio 2014). Distrust was further exhibited through Rocinha Without Borders, which has attempted but failed several times to establish dialogue between residents and UPP officers. Perceptions of distrust have also been levelled against the government, as residents claimed that the government used the 2014 FIFA World Cup to destroy their homes in order for property developers to develop the land into attractive areas for tourists (France-Presse 2013).

Distrust was also instigated by the deployment of federal troops in favelas, which was met with mixed feelings and scepticism, as residents felt overwhelmed by the number of armed soldiers patrolling the favelas, despite their being stationed therein for the purpose of safety (Lisboa 2014). The federal armed forces were deployed due to a loss of control that led to a wave of shootings and human rights abuses committed by police. Although the UPP programme was initially praised, it is currently faced with scepticism over the future of its long-term agenda. The state and residents agree that the current solution in attempts to combat crime is not functional; however, the state’s deploy more armed forces further frustrates residents, who are calling for dialogue, participation in society and steps leading toward social justice (Kaiser 2014).

Violence was also witnessed in the occupation of militias who were dubbed ‘Rio de Janeiro’s mafia’, as they were perceived to be more sophisticated than other organised drug traffickers. The term ‘militias’ in this context refers to groups of armed, off-duty state agents that abuse
their official access to arms in order to control vulnerable low-income areas of the city. This occupation began in 2006 in the form of a ‘neighbourhood watch’. Family members of Maria Victoria Souza Santos, the infant girl who was killed in a police shootout, stated that police officers showed evidence of using narcotics by residue on their noses. They subsequently declared that it was a known fact that police officers used drugs in the favelas (Rodrigues 2014).

According to the research paper *Hidden: The Evolution of Militias in Rio de Janeiro (2008-2011)*, militias are defined by 5 criteria: micro-territorial control; the motive of profit; coercive force against residents and business owners; a narrative of liberation from drug trafficking gangs; and the participation of public armed agents of the state (which includes retired or active policemen, correctional officers, firemen, military trained state agents as well as private security personnel). The militias were initially accepted and supported by many political leaders across Rio de Janeiro. However, it was later discovered that in some places, these militias were frequently centralised and run by gang leaders, from outside the communities, who engaged in extortion and intimidation. Despite the threat of violence that accompanies such groups, the state has done nothing to combat the illicit activities across Rio de Janeiro, as armed forces are concentrated on combating the drug trafficking gangs and the militias largely comprise off-duty police (Froio 2014).

According to RioTimes, a Brazilian news site for English-speaking foreigners and residents, the military police in Rio de Janeiro were placed under investigation in February 2014 by the civil police for the suspected execution-style killings of 6 men on 4 February 2014 in the North Zone. The enquiry followed the publication of photographs on an unofficial military police social network page depicting 6 corpses in a pool of blood in Morro do Juramento, surrounded by police officers. The withdrawn photographs included captions stating that the operation was a reaction to the killing of military policewoman, Alda Rafael Castilho, on 2 February 2014. It has been reported that the military police’s counter-attack is ongoing and includes the deployment of helicopters and armoured vehicles (Rinaldi 2014).

Platonow reported on Amnesty International Brazil (AIB), clarifying the deaths in the Pavão-Pavãozinho community with full accountability lying with the perpetrators. According to the report, homicide levels were described as ‘alarming’. The report included the deaths of Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira and Edilson Silva dos Santos, and highlighted the issue of impunity in the police force (Nitahara 2015). Furthermore, it urged prompt recognition that
changes are necessary in how police are organised; this includes demilitarisation, greater transparency and effective external control of police activities (Platonow 2014).

According to Abdala (2014), the escalating violence has presented public security challenges, especially in the reduction of homicide. The Ministry of Health reported that the number of people killed in 2012 was 56,300, with over half of victims (53 percent) between the ages of 15 and 29. Sociologist and organiser of the Violence Map, Julio Jacob Waiselfisz, stated that the country needs a national police aimed at fighting violence. He further mentioned that there is a different policy in each state and that areas formerly affected were metropolitan regions such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Recife; however, the countryside and other regions are currently also affected. According to Waiselfisz, Brazil needs a national plan aimed at lowering the number of homicides. He is underway with the proposal of a document entitled Priority Agenda for Public Security, drawn up by NGOs and security experts from different states (Abdala 2014; Martins 2014). Violence and more specifically, violence against black citizens, is a serious concern in Brazil. This is demonstrated in the Map of Violence 2014, which indicates that the number of black victims is much higher than that of white victims. The report further indicated that 146.5 percent more blacks died in Brazil in 2012 than whites, during homicides, traffic accidents and suicides (Kudialis 2014).

On 23 December 2014 the law, as set forth by Law 13.060/14, stated that non-lethal weapons in the form of tear gas, rubber bullets and batons, pepper spray and tasers were to be prioritised in police operations across Brazil. This law was approved after 9 years of deliberation in Congress. The law also bans the use of guns in those instances in which the police are trying to approach an unarmed person attempting to escape or an evading vehicle, with the provision of the use of a weapon of lower calibre which does not pose a risk to the lives of the officers or the suspects. Added to this is the facilitation of injured parties by public security agents, with the provision of the appropriate medical assistance and the notification of any next of kin. This law was put into effect due to the violence often witnessed during police operations, which resulted in an alarming increase in the death toll among young people. This law aims to lower the number of severe cases which have arisen as a result of the abuse of power by public agents (Melo 2014).

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37 Published on an annual basis, with information regarding violent crime throughout Brazil (Abdala 2014).
38 As long as the lives of policemen were not at risk (Melo 2014).
4.6 THE VALUE OF ONLINE CITIZEN JOURNALISM IN POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the potential advantages of citizen journalism can be linked to the field of political risk analysis. In order for this to be established, this section will compare the case studies of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas, through news reports by mainstream media and online citizen journalists. In addition to comparing the content of these reports, this section will provide a general discussion of the value of citizen journalism in the context of political risk analysis, and will take into consideration the characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy.

Timeliness refers to the potential value of online citizen journalists having the ability to disseminate news in a shorter period of time. Accuracy will indicate value by establishing whether the news reported by online citizen journalists is more accurate than information obtained by mainstream media. This takes into consideration the value of the information as well as the source from which the information stems. Relevance observes the type of information reported and whether it is relevant to the field of political risk analysis.

As mentioned previously, the amplification of risk has been introduced through the use of technology, specifically global communications and international media. This highlights the fact that the international community is understood as an environment where the actions of one party have the ability to affect the interests of another, with political risk viewed as a useful method of anticipating how these changes can affect an investment or state (Jarvis & Griffiths 2007: 9-10). It is through this understanding that online citizen journalism can be viewed as potentially valuable to the field of political risk analysis, as it uses technological means such as social media to uncover occurrences within the state that are not necessarily reported by mainstream media. The case study of police brutality in Brazil took place during the 2014 World Cup, which meant that there were various stakes in terms of international investment. The reporting of news that is alternative to mainstream media has the potential to be more informative, as it allows political risk analysts to analyse risk through an alternative form of media that allows for greater insight into the cause and effect of the risk in question (in this case, police brutality).

In terms of the case study, the issue of police brutality breaches the civil rights of citizens. Citizen journalists in this study are seen as a response to this concern, by reporting on the matter to demand that change occur; this is done by making the government and the
international community aware of the matter. The action of reporting through social media or
online platforms is viewed as a form of political participation, defined as the actions by
ordinary citizens that are directed towards the influencing of political outcomes (Brady
1999:737; Gustafsson 2012:1112). To reiterate Chapter 2, the public sphere according to
Jürgen Habermas (2000) was believed to be an environment that harnessed the value of
political debate through newspapers and journals, in order to bridge the gap between the
private concerns of individuals and the area of the state in which power is exercised; thus it is
a sphere that takes into consideration the needs of the citizen at the hands of those who are in
power (Kellner 2000:3-4; Bolton 2005).

Media in this case plays a significant role, as Habermas believed that the function of the
media should be to foster rational public discourse and debate in order to limit the agenda
setting of media corporations, which he felt restricted the citizen from engaging in public
debate, forcing them to become a media spectator (Kellner 2000:6). Citizen journalism
provides the opportunity for citizens to speak out about their concern for police brutality in a
manner that not only reports news but indicates the reality of the situation without the
censorship of media corporations. This proves valuable to the political analyst, as it broadens
the scope of information by providing a wider angle which supplements data, as well as
alternative and additional views and opinions in order to understand and take into
consideration factors that might not have been reported by mainstream media. This will be
elaborated later in this section.

The next 3 sections will elaborate on the potential value of online citizen journalism by
observing the characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy in regard to the case
study. It should be noted that, in the event of a difference in reporting between the facts
presented by citizen journalists and mainstream media, information by the international
media was used as an informal method of fact checking. It was discovered that there were
discrepancies in some facts in reports presented by the mainstream media and online citizen
journalism. This allowed for a broader scope of the differences in facts, as international
media makes use of international correspondent journalists to report on news.

4.6.1 Timeliness

An advantage of online citizen journalism is that news reporting can be done in a timelier
manner; however, this is only true to a certain extent. Citizen journalists have the advantage
of deploying more journalists, as they are part of large networks loosely made up of citizens
reporting on political events within their communities or cities. These networks are not solely
made up of professional journalists; rather, they are coalitions of citizens who write about news and events. This type of reporting also increases the ability to cover the news from a wider scope, as all citizens with a phone are able to submit their experiences, including through photos and videos, which have the advantage of increasing the legitimacy and credibility of citizen journalists. They also make use of social media platforms to disseminate information, which is characteristically swift as it occurs in real time\(^{39}\) (Falkow 2014). Although mainstream media makes use of social media, the point of having a larger network of citizen reporters is that news has the potential to be delivered in an even timelier manner.

When using the case study of police brutality as a point of reference to illustrate the value of online citizen journalism, the value of timeliness is indicated by the observation that more reports of police brutality in favelas were recorded in the span of a year (2014)\(^{40}\) by online citizen journalists than by the mainstream media\(^{41}\). There were 11 cases of police brutality reported by the mainstream media and 21 cases reported by citizen journalists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Name of Victim</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Name of Victim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Matthew Casé Oliveira</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Gabriel Ferreira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Carlos Alberto de Souza</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Lucas Lima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luiz Alberto Cunha</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Antônio França</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Vitor Gomes Bento</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Felipe Rodrigues</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Caio Moraes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mateus Alves dos Santos</td>
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</table>

*Figure 6: Deaths that were exclusively reported by online citizen journalists for 2014 (Online Citizen Journalist Reports 2014).*

However, online citizen journalism did not exhibit timeliness in terms of reporting events in a shorter amount of time. This is due to the fact that cases of police brutality were sporadic in terms of where these occurred. This starkly contrasted the protests that occurred in 2013 and 2014, when citizen journalists were better able to mobilise and keep in contact in order to quickly document the protests. The table below illustrates the first date on which the

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\(^{39}\)Although mainstream media also makes use of social media, it is more significant in online citizen as all their reporting is done electronically.

\(^{40}\)This study selected 2014, as more cases of police brutality in the favelas occurred. In addition, the 2013 Confederations Cup took precedence over the reporting of specific social issues in 2013.

\(^{41}\)However, it should be noted that there were exceptions, with 2 incidents only reported by only the mainstream media. The first was the death of Maria Victoria Souze Santos on 16 July 2014 during a police operation in Amargosa. This story was only reported by one publication, called A Tarde. The story was not featured in international news reports. The second exception was the interview O Globo conducted with Jorge Ruan Vianna, which is also only featured on their site.
mainstream media mentioned within this study reported the case, as opposed to online citizen journalists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Mainstream Media</th>
<th>Online Citizen Journalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Silva Ferreira</td>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>30 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (DG)</td>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>26 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edilson da Silva Dos Santos</td>
<td>26 April</td>
<td>26 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew 12 y/o or 13 y/o boy</td>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>26 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan de Oliveira de Lima</td>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>18 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afonso Mauricio Linhares</td>
<td>19 June</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>António França</td>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>27 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izaquel Nogueira</td>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>27 October</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Dates of first reports on cases of police brutality in 2014 by mainstream media and online citizen journalists (Mainstream media reports 2014; Online citizen journalist reports 2014).

It has been noted in this study that citizen journalists take on a retrospective stance by reporting incidents in more depth after they have occurred. It has also been found that citizen journalists do more intensive interviewing in terms of investigative journalism, whereas mainstream media displays the function of getting the facts in a short amount of time in order to inform citizens of political events. This was especially prominent in those cases of police brutality that made headline news, such as the deaths of DG and Claudia Ferreira da Silva.

This does not take away from the fact that mainstream media also conducted interviews. This was portrayed with the statement given by DG’s mother, in which she spoke out about the fact that she felt that her son had been tortured by the police before he died (Amorim 2014).

4.6.2 Relevance

According to Chapter 2, political risk analysis is based on rational choice theory, which consists of three elements: instrumentalism, individualism and subjectivism. Instrumentalism is understood in this instance as the various socio-political relations and institutions that are dependable variables clarified by the actions of the individual self. Individualism is portrayed as an independent variable that forms the actions of the individual as rational through motivational theory (thus actions based on the motivations of the rational self in the context of making decisions). Lastly, subjectivism is the collective perception of the first two concepts by understanding that individuals make decisions according to their preferences and the value instilled in these preferences (Patrick 1988:637-638).

The practice of analysing risk is understood as measuring and observing risk through human judgement, with political risk models allowing for a sense of balance in order to avoid
subjectivity. The function of information is pertinent for this purpose, in order to allow for a more objective point of view when estimating risk (Brink 2004:2-3). It is therefore pertinent that analysts use a wide spectrum of information in order to understand the various underlying causes of risk, which makes online citizen journalism a key source, as it reports information from the stance of the ordinary citizen and not necessarily from the view of a specific agenda.

The volume of information accumulated by the analyst can take the form of either quantitative or qualitative information. This study makes use of qualitative information through a case study. Online citizen journalism makes use of both qualitative and quantitative data; however, the key to its value in political risk analysis leans more towards qualitative data through interviews, conversations, photographs, field notes and recordings (Snape & Spencer 2003:3). To reiterate Chapter 2, qualitative data allows for an understanding of meanings that are attached to phenomena within the social world, such as beliefs, values, decisions and actions (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:3) which are portrayed when reporting events. This is evident in the information presented by Brazil’s online citizen journalists that was accumulated through interviewing residents of the favelas. Not only does this allow for more understanding of the complexities of the details found within the context of the information collected, but it provides an avenue of information that came from the source; the citizens who experienced police brutality (Snape & Spencer 2003:4).

This research takes into consideration that mainstream media also conducts interviews when reporting cases of police brutality; however, when comparing the amount of cases identified by citizen journalists, it is clear that citizen journalists were better able to grasp a multiplicity of perspectives grounded within the context of police brutality (Lewis 2003:52). According to Neuman (2006), this allows the researcher, or political risk analyst, to observe the social context of police brutality as risk through the use of reports by citizen journalists, by studying aspects that were present before the event or which surround the focus thereof. This is believed to provide greater understanding that police brutality as an event – through protests against it – and its effects can have different meanings, as these evolve over a period of time, by studying the different process that have occurred as well as the causal relationships found therein (2006:158).

However, this does not detract from the fact that mainstream media conducted interviews which proved valuable. This was evident when 7 months after the death of DG, his mother complained about the interview conducted with host of Esquenta, Regina Casé. She called
the host a ‘liar’ and a ‘farce’, claiming that the rest of the family had been mistreated by the production of the show and that the host had no interest in helping them. More specifically, she reported that the media had limited what she could say at the memorial edition for DG by stating that she could only answer what they asked her. Behind the scenes, the family was placed in a room which was locked until the show started (A Tarde 2014).

Debates concerning the militarised policing of UPPs were also incited in favelas by residents who questioned that they were expected to accept the pacification programme despite the deaths of residents as a result. Some residents went as far as stating that the programme entered the favelas prepared for war and fighting (against drug gangs) but incited more war (Parkin 2014).

The death of DG manifested in protests aimed at amplifying the issue of police brutality that had been simmering for the past year, but also served to highlight that this issue was ignored by public officials and a complacent media. However, this does not mean that the matter can simply be ignored; it has led to an increasing need to expose the militarised state presence of in favelas and the consequent oppression taking place therein despite the effort of marketing the pacification as a method of introducing security to these communities, as was indicated and debated by mainstream media. According to Parkin (2014), it is only through communication from the favelas on the subject of the UPPs’ presence that the pattern of violence can be expressed and ultimately addressed.

When applying this understanding to the context of reports of police brutality, interviews found in mainstream media and citizen journalism have given reasons for the occurrence of police brutality42, identification of the victims43, as well as the social context within the relationship between UPP officers and drug traffickers as well as UPPs and favela residents. What differs in these understandings is the information presented by these two sources and the extent to which research into the matter can better provide information that is useful to the political risk analyst. In addition to interviews, online citizen journalists were able to be at the exact location of the protests that took place after the death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas on 27 April 2014. It was later reported that mainstream journalists were not given jurisdiction by

42 Based on the information provided in this chapter as a whole, it concludes that the reasons for police brutality are institutional racism, corrupt police and improper training.
43 Black individuals and individuals between the ages of 14 and 25.
the military police to report these protests. This made the information that online citizen journalists reported more relevant.

The core theory of this study involves not only political risk and the analysis thereof, but political participation in the public sphere; hence, the act of citizen journalists politically participating through the reporting of political issues and events. This study established the role of Habermas’ theory of the public sphere in Chapter 2 by illustrating this as an environment with the purpose of mediating between the private concerns of the people in their personal space and their concerns and demands in their social and public life (Kellner 2000:4). This theory establishes the importance of the public sphere, providing citizens with the required civil and political rights through democratic institutions to shape both their private and public lives with an opportunity of self-expression within society (Welzel & Inglehart 2008:30).

In the context of political risk analysis, the analyst uses subjectivism to track the decision of political actors or, in this case, uses information presented by citizen journalists to analyse and identify indicators of risk (Riker 1995:37). Within this context, the purpose of rational choice theory is for the rational agent to reduce political risk to an acceptable level, through the collection of information regarding potential risks. Online citizen journalism facilitates this process by providing a broader base of information from which to analyse potential political risk.

Within the context of the case study, online citizen journalism presented relevance in terms of providing information for the political risk analyst in compiling a risk assessment. When analysing the data collected by citizen journalists, it was established that the majority of their sources stemmed from interviews with favela residents. In this manner, they were able to provide more incidents of police brutality as well as more witness accounts. They also conducted more in-depth interviews with residents who had experienced police brutality, which allowed for a greater understanding for the causes and effects thereof. The mainstream media reported 11 cases of police brutality, whereas online citizen journalism reported 21 cases.

4.6.3 Accuracy

The value of accuracy is self-explanatory in that it observes the extent to which online citizen journalism provides value in its ability to present accurate news. Online citizen journalism through the use of social media has been perceived to be a new method of surveillance,
identity construction and social relationships are connected to political activities. It involves the posting of information for the purpose of reporting news and bolstering political participation through debate and opinion expression, which is stated to contribute to behaviour that stems from political activity through discussion, such as protest activity (Bimber et al. 2005).

To reiterate Shirky (2011:6), the significance of social media lies in its ability to access conversations more than the accessing information. In a practical sense, online citizen journalism provides an opportunity for citizens to relay their dissatisfaction with the day-to-day governance rather than abstract ideals, which allows for real-world actions as opposed to a replacement thereof. Thus, it allows citizens to speak out about issues such as police brutality in favelas. Through this viewpoint, online citizen journalism presents itself as a form of identifying issues that requires a great amount of accuracy, as it bolsters political participation which, in itself, requires a great level of accuracy in its reporting.

In terms of accuracy, online citizen journalists showed value when police attempted to frame a protestor for throwing a Molotov cocktail during a protest in 2013, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Although this is not part of the case study of police brutality, it should be taken into consideration. The report by mainstream media agency O Globo concluded that the demonstrator had thrown the Molotov cocktail; however, citizen journalists were able to quash this allegation through the use of footage that proved that the demonstrator was innocent. This incident proved the inaccuracy of the mainstream media agency. This illustrates the potential of social media as a source of surveillance in fact checking when reporting news.

It is evident in the reporting of police brutality that the mainstream media mostly accounted for those deaths that caused a big stir in Brazil and in the international community. The two instances of police brutality that received the most attention were the deaths of Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira (as he was a famous dancer on the O Globo production of Esquenta) and the death of Claudia Silva Ferreira, as the incident of her body being dragged by a police car was filmed by witnesses on the road.

There are differences in the details of these two incidents by both citizen journalists and the mainstream media. These include the distance at which Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged – with online citizen journalists reporting 250 metres and mainstream media documenting several accounts varying from 250 metres to 350 metres. Amnesty International stated in
Brazil’s 2014/15 report that the distance was 350 metres. When taking into account the facts reported by international media, BBC.com (2014) and Emily Thomas from The Huffington Post (2014) reported that Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged nearly 1,000ft, which is more than 300 metres. Brazil correspondent, Janet Tappin Coelho, reported that Silva Ferreira was dragged for 250 metres. The accuracy of online citizen journalism within this case is thus debatable; however, when comparing these facts to those presented by the mainstream media, reports indicate that Silva Ferreira’s body was dragged for both 250 and 350 metres, in addition to the differing reports by international media. Further reports indicate that her body was dragged for either 350 or more than 300 metres. However, it should be noted that the distance her body was dragged was reported by witnesses who estimated the distance.

Another example of reports that differ in detail include Global Voices and Ninja reporting that Silva Ferreira had been unconscious and not dead at the time that her body was placed in the trunk of the car. However, according to mainstream news and witnesses in the favela, she was dead at the time. When taking into consideration the impact in the different accounts of this detail, it is unfortunate to report that this did not make a significant enough impact; according to Amnesty International’s 2014/2015 report, in Claudia’s case, 6 officers were under investigation but remained at liberty. With regards to the deaths of DG and Edilson, no one had been charged with the deaths by the end of 2014.

Mainstream media reported that DG was mistaken for a drug trafficker in a confrontation between police and traffickers, leading to his death. However, citizen journalists reported that it was not a confrontation but a raid, as top-level drug trafficker, Adauto do Mascmento Gonçalves, had reportedly returned to the community. Mainstream media also reported an interview with activist Deise Carvalho, who stated that DG told her that he had been threatened by police since 2011. Despite the differences in the reports, the facts surrounding the cause of DG’s death and details regarding the perpetrators are congruent.

As mentioned previously, although there are extraordinary journalists in the mainstream media, it is not their journalistic skills that cause a limitation, but the structural framework in which they function. This was demonstrated in the protest against the death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas, which led to the shooting of Carlos Alberto de Souza and the attacking of the UPA health centre by protesters. According to Parkin (2014), a journalist for community reporting website RioOnWatch, the day after the protests O Globo published an article about the damage of the protest to the reputation of the UPP units as well as their attempts to limit the effects thereof. The article was removed from the site and replaced with
a statement by the Military Police that journalists were not to accompany the operation in Alemão. This illustrates that mainstream journalists are restricted by the structures in which they work and can therefore not always report news, as this may not be in the interest of the parties involved in the event.

An aspect observed during the research for this study that falls beyond the three characteristics of timeliness, relevancy and accuracy is the restriction on information by mainstream media websites. When searching for articles on Brazil’s mainstream news agency websites, there were two restrictions. The first was that one of Brazil’s most prominent news agencies, Agência Estado, required a paid subscription in order to read the articles. The second restriction was presented by the O Globo news site, on which visitors could only view 10 articles before a paid subscription was required. This meant that it could not be established whether online citizen journalists reported the protest that led to the removal of O Globo’s article before the mainstream media agency.

In general, this presents a limitation on researching information for writing political risk reports, where open source media is commonly used, as the researcher is limited in the accumulation of information unless the company is willing to pay subscription fees. This was especially pertinent in the research for this study, as O Globo was the only online mainstream news agency that reported the death of Arlinda Bezerra das Chagas on 27 April 2014; however, the information could not be relayed due to the restriction on the number of article viewings. This provides an opportunity for online citizen journalism to become a valuable source of information, as it is open sourced and freely available online. Sources are not restricted to articles and present different forms of media through photography, videos and live-streaming. This presents legitimate information through evidence of photography and videos and without the restriction of subscriptions.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk analysis by using the case study of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014 to demonstrate effectiveness of online citizen journalism as a medium of information. It has been demonstrated that online citizen journalism is most effective at presenting information that is relevant in terms of taking into account the opinions of citizens, or in this instance, favela residents. Its ability to conduct in-depth interviews allows for greater context into the cause
of the matter. This provides greater insight for use in political risk reports, as the analyst will gain better understanding of the underlying causes and effects of risk factors.

Online citizen journalism is also timely, as more cases of police brutality were reported in 2014 than in mainstream media. In terms of accuracy, it was found that there were incongruous facts between mainstream media and online citizen journalists regarding details in the case of Claudia Silva Ferreira. When using international media as an informal method of fact-checking, there were differing accounts of the details in question. There were also differences in the smaller details in the case of Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira. However, the most important facts regarding his death were congruent between mainstream media and online citizen journalists.

It can be concluded that online citizen journalism has the potential to be a valuable source of information in political risk analysis, as it exhibits the values of relevancy and timeliness. In terms of accuracy, it is on par with mainstream media, as witnessed in 2014 reports of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. It should be noted that this study does not detract from the fact that traditional media will always be a valuable source of information. The aim of this study is to illustrate that value can also be gained by observing alternative stories and sources of information, for the purpose of structuring well-rounded and objective political risk analysis.
Chapter 5: Findings and Recommendations

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to reiterate the findings of this study as presented in Chapter 4. The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of the argument by presenting the research questions as stated in the first chapter, as well as the study as a whole. This will be followed by an evaluation of the research, while the last section of this chapter will discuss recommendations for future research into the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis. The final section will be followed by a brief conclusion.

5.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT AND PROCESS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

The first chapter introduced the study by recognising the prominence of online citizen journalism. It is recognised as a force that has altered the relationship between news organisations and their audiences, through online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and blogs. It is also known for its ability to readily disseminate information and encourage political participation (Bruns 2010:1; DeMers 2013). Online citizen journalism is also characterised by the fact that it introduces a new method in which information can be broadcasted in a shorter duration of time by citizens as it occurs, which proves valuable in the field of political risk analysis. This is especially pertinent as online citizen journalists are able to play an active role in the public sphere, by providing crisis-related information that can be utilised by response organisations in analysing potential sources of political risk (Watson et al. 2014:294).

The first chapter outlined the research problem, which takes into perspective that the efficacy of social media in analysing political risk is a relatively new field. The most pressing concern outlined in this study is the credibility of the information relayed by citizen journalists, as they are not reporting in a professional capacity. This chapter also included the research aim, which is to research and determine the potential value of online citizen journalism in the field of political risk analysis. This chapter specified that this process would be undertaken by analysing the role of citizen journalists in reporting police brutality in Brazil’s favelas in 2014.

The rationale and significance of this study is based on the understanding that society operates within the domain of a disruptive nature, characterised by a constant overflow of
information. This overflow has both positive effects in the form of access to more information, as well as negative effects recognised in the manipulation by those disseminating the information (Shirky 2011:6). The most significant point of the distribution of information in this study is that it has equipped citizens with a greater informational foundation on which to base their decisions. This study also presents a research gap in terms of bettering the field of political risk analysis through the use of technology in order to advance its applicability. In addition, this study seeks to improve data gathering, by introducing a new avenue of information that is easy to access.

The first chapter also provided the theoretical base of this study, which identified two branches of definitions: political risk analysis and political participation with each branch consisting of its respective theoretical base. The theoretical foundation of political risk analysis is identified as rational choice theory and problem solving theory. Online citizen journalism within the framework of this study is identified as a form of political participation which is based on Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere.

In terms of the research methodology, the research design of this study includes a descriptive analysis consisting of a main methodological research question and a supplementary descriptive question. The study makes use of qualitative data that uses a single case study in order to answer both the main and supplementary research questions.

The main research question asked what value online citizen journalism has in the field of political risk analysis. The supplementary question asked what the influence of online citizen journalism has been in reporting police brutality in Brazil 2014. The purpose of the supplementary question was to provide contextual background for greater insight into the impact of online citizen journalism during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup protests.

This study indicated in chapter 2 that political risk as a discipline has not been defined according to a universal definition. According to Fitzpatrick (1983), Kobrin (1979) and Simon (1982), there is dormancy in the theory. Instead, political risk has adopted several understandings, depending on the environment in which it is applied, be it a business or political environment. However, this study acknowledges that political risk has intensified as a result of globalisation and is demonstrated through communications and the international media (Jarvis & Griffiths 2007). This particular understanding of the dynamics of political risk has provided a framework for this study. It acknowledges that political risk and the
ability to anticipate and analyse potential areas of political risk have changed according to the dynamics of technology.

Chapter 2 illustrated that political events and risk are no longer regarded as isolated events, but have the ability to affect the international community in terms of trade and interests across state lines or continents. As such, the manifestation of risk in one country has the ability to affect another country. The use of technology in the analysis of risk is now more than ever a crucial factor. This study seeks to understand how information that stems from unconventional sources is able to assist the process of compiling political risk assessments. This study understands that political risk analysis is a dynamic field in that it is always in flux. It is therefore essential to research ways of improving the study and application thereof.

It is understood that political risk analysis greatly relies on the ability to gather information in order to identify and understand potential risk factors, to provide contingency plans to address the potential implications of those factors. As mentioned in this study, it is necessary to gather a broad spectrum of information. This study has researched online citizen journalism as an additional source of information that has the potential to improve political risk analysis by providing an unconventional but efficient method, to a certain extent, that takes into consideration the impact of technology in the mitigation of risk. The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which online citizen journalists could be of value to the field of political risk analysis.

Chapter 3 had the purpose of providing contextual background for the case study used in this research. The case study used was the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the subsequent events that followed it, including the 2014 FIFA World Cup which is significant within this study as it coincided with the implementation of the pacification programme. This chapter provided various sections that elaborated on the various reasons for the protests. The case study used elaborates on the socio-economic issue of police brutality. The dissatisfaction with the government on the part of citizens over the lack of intervention was prevalent for more than one reason. The inability to address these concerns was emphasised during the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2014 FIFA World Cup, as citizens believed that the government spent funds that could have been better spent elsewhere.

Chapter 3 emphasised the various reasons for the 2013/2014 protests. One of the reasons mentioned in this study was the financial burden of these mega-events on the state’s economy. Brazil had bidden for the World Cup during a time of strong financial performance.
in its economy in 2009, following the discovery of oil at the coast of Rio de Janeiro (Bermingham 2014; Rapoza 2014). In addition, 2013 saw a reduction in poverty and inequality, from a high starting point. This meant that the growth spurt of the middle class led to an increase in purchasing power and a greater demand for access to quality services (Levy 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013; Garffer 2013).

The protests peaked in the run up to the FIFA Confederations Cup, coinciding with the tournament from 15 to 30 June 2013. Citizens were dissatisfied with the government in terms of inadequate public services in education and health care. Citizens were also dissatisfied with President Dilma Rousseff, as she continued to defend spending for the hosting of the World Cup, stating that this would improve public infrastructure and stimulate economic growth (Panja et al. 2013; Montenegro et al. 2013). Strikes and protests varied in intensity; some were peaceful while others ended in violence between protestors and police forces.

This chapter also outlined the most prominent reasons for the protests, including the clampdown on cities through the Favela Pacification Programme which started in 2008. What began as an attempt to improve public security turned into protests against the police for the excessive use of force as well as the unfair removal of citizens from their homes. As mentioned before, citizens protested the increased spending for the World Cup as well as economic changes and the increase of bus fares. This study selected one of these reasons and used it as a case study to research the value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis, due to the fact that online citizen journalists played a great role in reporting widely on these protests.

In terms of the value of online citizen journalism, it was found in Chapter 3 that citizen journalists were able to play a significant role, as they consisted of large networks of citizens who were able to quickly mobilise and gather information to report what was happening at the protests as well as engage in the protests.

The contextualisation of Chapter 3 elaborated on the various reasons citizens were protesting against the government. These included the clampdown on cities through the favela pacification programme, the increase in the spending to host the 2013 Confederations Cup and 2014 World Cup, as well as the general dissatisfaction against the government and President Rousseff. This chapter illustrated the protests as a manifestation of the dissatisfaction against the Brazilian government, presenting a political risk when protests reached a violent apex, during which protestors and the police clashed.
Due to the vastness of the information provided in Chapter 3, this study isolated one of the prominent causes for the protests in order to research the potential value of online citizen journalism. It was identified in Chapter 3 that police brutality was a concern during the clamp down on Brazil’s favelas. This was due to the police pacification units implemented in 2008, specifically in terms of the violent measures they used to patrol the favelas. The purpose of Chapter 4 was to introduce and research the case study of police brutality in Brazil in 2014 by using two branches of resources: newspaper reports from mainstream media and reports by online citizen journalism platforms. It should be noted that Chapter 3 was a compilation of international media sources, to provide a broad framework that could be further investigated.

Chapter 4 aimed to understand the extent to which online citizen journalism could be used as a medium of information in the compiling of political risk reports, according to its ability to provide information that adhered to certain criteria. These criteria included value through its ability to provide information that was timely, accurate and relevant. In terms of timeliness, online citizen journalism presented timely information; however, this was true only to a certain extent. It was able to provide more cases of online citizen journalism in terms of the amount of incidents of police brutality. However, it also did not present information that was timely as mainstream media was able to report on police brutality cases before citizen journalists. By observing the findings in this study, it can be stated that the reason for this is based on the fact that online citizen journalists do not always possess the logistical means to be present at the scene of political events in order to report on them. This starkly contrasted the third chapter, which better demonstrated the timeliness of online citizen journalism. However, online citizen journalists are better able to mobilise in order to report on political events, although in the case study of police brutality, the incidents were sporadic and occurred at different times. Mainstream media was able to better cover these incidents as soon they occurred in addition to covering incidents after they had occurred in terms of the repercussions and court cases surrounding the incidents. From the context of these findings it can be deduced that online citizen journalism is most beneficial as a source of information to those who occupy the area or neighbourhood reported on. It thus would not necessarily be valuable as a source of informational within the international context or to report on more technical or complex issues.

Relevance was also identified as a criterion to research the potential value of online citizen journalism. The relevance of information provided by online citizen journalists was demonstrated by the fact that they did extensive interviews with family members as well as
victims of police brutality. By conducting extensive interviews, they were able to gain greater insight into the occurrences of police brutality as well as the number of cases thereof through researching these incidents within the favelas, by communicating with those who were affected. The information provided through interviews was also relevant in terms of providing eye witness reports, as well as providing detailed information concerning the locations and events of instances of police brutality. In addition, online citizen journalists have the advantage of reporting cases in which mainstream journalists do not have jurisdiction, to report information from the perspective of the citizen.

Lastly, online citizen journalists were able to show value in reporting information that was accurate. The most significant factor here is that online citizen journalists greatly rely on technology in the form of cell phones and video devices to present the points of view of citizens, using the platform on which they publish their reports. This allows for more credibility and accuracy in that they are not bound by professional codes and ethics when reporting.

5.3 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

As per the conclusion in Chapter 4, it can be deduced that online citizen journalism presents value to the field of political risk analysis, but only to a certain extent. It is most effective at presenting relevant information through interviews, to gather the opinions of resident, as in the case study presented in this study. To reiterate, this is due to conducting in-depth interviews which, in this case, provided more information and insight which could be presented in political risk reports. When studying the criterion of accuracy, it was discovered that facts and some details were incongruous in two of the reports of police brutality; however, there was congruence in terms of the most relevant facts in these two cases. Online citizen journalism is accurate in general terms and is on par with mainstream media. Again, this study does not detract from the fact that traditional or mainstream media will always be considered a valuable source of information to political risk analysis.

The protests highlighted the underlying concerns of Brazilian citizens and brought these under scrutiny from the international community. This meant that the intensity of these concerns did not dwindle after these protests; the most prominent concern was the issue of police brutality in Brazil’s favelas. The protests and the case study as a whole presented a new method of surveillance in the form of online citizen journalism. This was demonstrated by the fact that more cases of police brutality were compiled by citizen journalists than
mainstream media. It was also evident that this issue was more concerning in that it was not a simple request that could be addressed but indicated a deeper concern in a culture of impunity and violence. The advantage of online citizen journalists in this case study exhibited that they are able to do longitudinal studies on the issue of police brutality which better aids in the understanding of its causes and effects. They are thus not constrained by deadlines as in the case of traditional journalists, allowing for more in-depth reporting.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study concludes that reports by online citizen journalists in the case studies observed are potentially valuable to political risk analysis, as they report information from a standpoint that provides an alternative perspective that is written with a greater scope of freedom. Although this is a double-edged sword, it does prove valuable when used in addition to mainstream journalism, in order to provide more ‘on the ground’ information from those who are more familiar with the scope and background of the story reported (Calcutt & Hammond 2011:116).

Research has pointed to the potential for online citizen journalism within mainstream media. This is due to more people migrating online to find news that is immediate and interactive. This points toward mixed news media, or the partnership of citizen journalists with professional journalists (Ward 2015). Further research in the study of layered journalism, or integrating different forms of journalism and different kinds of journalists, as well as how this affects news is another study that can be conducted to further this study, in order to gain understanding of how this solution has contributed to a better information base when compiling political risk reports, by contrasting this with news agencies which only use professional journalists (Ward 2015). This study has also witnessed that many online citizen journalists are not employed in a professional capacity; in other words, they do not always get paid. This points towards a sense of credibility, to a certain extent, as their efforts are not measured in a monetary sense (Lawal 2014).

In terms of new findings in the field of online citizen journalism, Stephan Khan (2015) points to a different outcome for citizen journalists. He believes that the term citizen journalist has a short lifespan. In his opinion, it is not so much the emphasis of online citizen journalism but the impact of technology in reporting news, such as citizens submitting footage or information to journalists who then have the opportunity to follow up on this information. This alludes to a deeper relationship between the media and the public, which is now
equipped to provide information even though these sources of information have to be verified. This in itself presents a new avenue of research and should be mentioned. However, it does not detract from the significance of this research, as citizen journalists provide a different style of reporting, which has proved valuable in this study, in the form of in-depth interviews that would not necessarily have been conducted by professional journalists.

This study takes into consideration the potential value of online citizen journalism in political risk analysis through the demonstration of a single case study. This study by no means aims to portray a generalised view of the value of online citizen journalism but is cognizant of the fact that there is potential for it within Brazil. For future study on this research topic it would be worthwhile to research it within other countries.

5.5 CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to answer the research question put forth in the first chapter of this study. This chapter coincides with the previous chapter by reiterating the findings, with the exception of providing an avenue for additional recommendations to broaden the scope of this study. This study concludes that there is value in using online citizen journalism as a medium of information in the compilation of political risk assessments. This study has established that online citizen journalism proves valuable as an additional source of information, alongside reports conducted by mainstream media. This is due to the fact that traditional journalists are better equipped to provide legitimate information, based on the protocols they are expected to follow and that they are expected to report from a neutral perspective. According to this study, online citizen journalism is timely; however, the advantage of timeliness is limited to the scope of information reported rather than the span of time it took to report the information. In terms of relevance and accuracy, online citizen journalism proved valuable. There is potential in using citizen journalists alongside mainstream journalists, in order to research information from both a traditional and alternative angle while compiling political risk reports.

This chapter has outlined the research process and findings of this novel study. In conclusion there is much value to be researched in the harnessing of online citizen journalism as an additional source of information in the compiling of political risk reports. The advancement of technology in conjunction with political participation as portrayed in this study through online citizen journalism demonstrates a shift in the gathering of information. This shift holds
the potential for more ground and scope to be covered in order to facilitate the field of political risk analysis through the dynamic use of technology.
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