
by

Niel Ramsay Louw

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Supervisor: Scarlet Cornelissen, Ph.D.

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Declaration

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Abstract

Scholars and laymen alike have in the past lamented the ambiguous and confusing nature of post-apartheid South African foreign policy, specifically with relation to humanitarian crises on the African continent. Regularly the principles of promoting human rights and democracy on the continent seemingly fall to the wayside in favour of a stubborn adherence to respecting state sovereignty and African solidarity. No two cases exemplify this more than President Thabo Mbeki’s continued reliance on the policy of Quiet Diplomacy in addressing the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe and the alleged genocide in Darfur, Sudan, both of which occurred in the early years of the 21st century. Some International Relations scholars have previously suggested the influence of Mbeki’s anti-Western-imperialist convictions as a constructivist explanation to this foreign policy ambiguity, but all of them attempt to address the ambiguity only within the specific contexts of Sudan and Zimbabwe, none attempting to create an overarching exploration of both cases. This thesis attempts to use constructivist methodologies to a) rationally establish, through a logical and structured approach, anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a common variable that was able to influence the foreign policy decision in both Zimbabwe and Sudan, and b) explain how anti-Western-Imperialism was able to exert such an influence. Firstly, a Rule Based Language Orientated Constructivist (RBLOC) approach is employed to create two language games, one for each case (Sudan and Zimbabwe), utilising primary and secondary sources to recreate verbal and non-verbal speech acts for the actors involved. Through the dialogical analysis of these language games, the common variable of ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ is identified as essential for the rational conclusion of each language game. Secondly, Securitisation Theory, extrapolated to a regional, interstate level, is used to explain how anti-Western-imperialist convictions on the part of President Mbeki were able to influence the policy responses in the respective case studies. Ultimately it is the aim of this thesis to prove that in both cases the presence of President Mbeki’s psycho-cultural disposition, a shared referent object (anti-Western Imperialism), and the securitisation of Western Imperialism can be confirmed and that the presence of these variables can be used to rationally explain Mbeki’s use of Quiet Diplomacy in those instances.
Opsomming

Die skynbaar dubbelsinnige en verwarrende aard van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, veral ten opsigte van humanitêre krisisse op die Afrika-vasteland, is deurgaans deur kundiges en leke betreur. Beginsels soos die bevordering van menseregte en demokrasie op die vasteland is op gereelde grondslag verbeur ten gunste van 'n weerbarstige aanhang van staatsoewerentiteit en Afrika-solidariteit. Twee gevalle wat hierdie verskynsel uitstekend illustreer is Pres. Thabo Mbeki se beleid van stille diplomatie ten opsigte van die politieke en ekonomiese krisisse in Zimbabwe en die beweerde volksmoorde in Soedan se Darfur-streek, albei gebeure van die vroeë 21ste Eeu. Menige Konstruktiwiste het gepoog om die dubbelsinnighede van hierdie twee gevalle aan die hand van Mbeki se toentertydse anti-Westere-imperialistiese oortuigings te verklaar, maar niemand het nog gepoog om 'n omvattende ontseling van albei gevalle te doen nie. In hierdie tesis word gepoog om twee duidelik onderskeibare Konstruktiwistiese metodologieën in te span om a) deur 'n logiese en gestruktureerde benadering te bevestig dat die anti-Westere-imperialistiese oorwegings 'n gemene veranderlike was wat 'n invloed kon hê op die uitkomste in Zimbabwe sowel as in die Soedan, en b) om te verklaar hoe hierdie anti-Westere-imperialistiese oorwegings so 'n invloed kon uitoefen. Eerstens, word 'n Reël-Gebaseerde, Taal Georiënteerde Konstruktiwistiese benadering aangewend om twee spraakspeletjies, een vir elk van die gevallestudies, te skep. Primêre en sekondêre bronne word gebruik om die spraakhandeling van die betrokke rolspelers in albei gevalle te herkonstrueer. Deur die dialogiese aard van hierdie spraakspeletjies te ontleed, word die gemene veranderlike van die anti-Westere-imperialistiese oorwegings uitgewys as onontbeerlik vir die rasonele volvoering van elke spraakspel. Tweedens, beveiligingsteorie, ge-ekstrapoleer tot interstaatsvlak in streeksverband, word toegepas om te verklaar hoe Mbeki se anti-Westere-imperialistiese oortuigings 'n invloed gehad het op beleidmaking. Die tesis voer aan dat Pres. Mbeki se keuse tot stille diplomatie in albei gevalle rasioneel verklaar kan word aan die hand van Mbeki se psigokulturele ingesteldheid, 'n gemene verwysingsvoorwerp (anti-Westere-imperialisme), en die sekuritisasie van Westere-imperialisme deur die betrokke rolspelers.
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List of Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU  African Union
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CSST  Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs
DIRCO  Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DRC  Democratic Republic of the Congo
EISA  Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
EU  European Union
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis
FPDM  Foreign Policy Decision Making
HRC  Human Rights Council
ICC  International Criminal Court
IR  International Relations
IRPS  International Relations, Peace and Security
JEM  Justice and Equality Movement
MDC  Movement for Democratic Peace
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisations
NIS  National Islamic Front
OAU  Organisation for African Unity
PCAS  Policy Coordination and Advisory Services
PCFA  Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs
PDF  Public Defence Force
RBLOC  Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism
SA  South Africa
SACU  Southern African Customs Union
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SLA Sudan Liberation Army
SPLA Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
SPLM Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1) The Ambiguity of South African Foreign Policy - Background to the Problem

“General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states” reads the noticeably brief and simple definition of foreign policy as provided by the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2013). A more comprehensive description would include: “… those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors, both governmental and non-governmental, which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy” (Carlsnaes, 2002:335). As Carlsnaes mentions, the foreign policy of a state can usually be surmised through explicit statements of adherence to certain foreign policy principles, either through official documents or speech acts. However, in certain situations these objectives or goals, which may seem harmonious in theory, become conflicting in practice. In such situations the international relations of a state can become seemingly irrational and inexplicable.

Irrationality and inexplicability has likewise been attributed to South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy which political analysts previously described as ambivalent (Cilliers, 1999) and prone to ‘ad hoc-ery’ (Evans, 1999: 624). More than ten years later experts still agree that, to the lay person, contemporary South African foreign policy remains ambiguous (Serrão & Bischoff, 2009:363), unpredictable (South Africa’s foreign policy: All over the place, 2011), baffling (Nathan, 2011:26), “… devoid of any specific direction or principle” (Neethling, 2012:34), or “… might be best described as [a policy] of disparity between commitment and action” (Borer & Mills, 2011:77). What each of these scholars is lamenting is confusion resultant from an ambiguous foreign policy in practice that reflects conflicting theoretical principles.

The confusion and ambiguity surrounding South Africa’s (SA) foreign policy, however, has not been a case of the government, the ruling African National Congress (ANC), being unclear in its explicit statement of foreign policy. For instance, when comparing South African foreign policy, as outlined in the Department of Foreign Affairs’ (DFA) Strategic Plan for 2005-2008, with that of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s (DIRCO - to which
the DFA was renamed in 2009) Strategic Plan for 2012-2017, one can easily establish a handful of foreign policy fundamentals that have, bar a few superficial changes in wording and emphasis, remained constant over the years. These fundamentals include a commitment to respecting the right of Africans to self-determination and self-governance (which can also be reworded as “respecting state sovereignty”), settling African disputes peacefully through negotiation, upholding human rights on the African continent, and lastly promoting an ‘African Renaissance’ (DFA Strategic Plan 2005-2008; DIRCO Strategic Plan 2012-2017). The ‘African Renaissance’ is of particular importance to South African foreign policy, as it is considered to be very influential in the conceptions of the other fundamental principles (Vale & Maseko, 1998; Taylor & Williams, 2001; Evans, 1999; Cilliers, 1999).

The idea of an African Renaissance was only formally introduced in a 1997 address by (then soon to be South African President) Thabo Mbeki, but the sentiment had already resonated equally strong in Mbeki’s earlier “I am an African” speech of 1996. Relevant to this analysis is the particular emphasis that Mbeki placed on the principles of African solidarity, the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights, and anti-Western-Imperialism (Mbeki, 1998). Besides promulgating the ideas of African solidarity and the promotion of democracy and human rights, all of which resonate throughout contemporary South African foreign policy, it also emphasises anti-Western-Imperialism, the importance of which will be revealed shortly. For now it is important to note the presence of the other foreign policy directives in Mbeki’s African Renaissance and their correlation with the fundamental principles of South African foreign policy, as explicitly stated in DIRCO’s strategic plans. Bar anti-Western-Imperialism, and a few other minor principles evident in both strategic plans and the African Renaissance, for the purposes of this study there are four relevant foreign policy principles: 1) Promoting and respecting state sovereignty; 2) Promoting the principle of African solidarity; 3) Promoting, upholding, and respecting human rights; and 4) Promoting democracy. Having identified four principles that are stated with clarity throughout official foreign policy documents from 1994 onwards, it is evident that the confusion regarding SA foreign policy does not stem from ambiguity in stated policy, but perhaps rather from an inherent conflict between these principles?

Examples of situations where the four principles (sovereignty, African solidarity, human rights, and democracy) have clearly conflicted include the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe post-2002
that was caused by an almost complete economic collapse and numerous political transgressions by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), as well as the humanitarian crisis, that peaked in 2003, in the Darfur region, locking Sudanese government forces and Arab rebels in a bloody civil war. In both these cases the South African government implemented meagre measures, if any, to address the humanitarian crises, which is contrary to the principles of promoting democracy and human rights and thus attracted “… a great deal of criticism from human rights groups and Western governments” (Nathan, 2011:56). Rather than intervene decisively, SA and Mbeki would, in accordance with the principles of respecting state sovereignty and African solidarity, resort to Quiet Diplomacy (refraining from public admonishment or interference in another sovereign state) in dealing with the governments of Zimbabwe and Sudan. In the 2009 Annual Report of Human Rights Watch, the adherence to Quiet Diplomacy led to the assessment that the SA government had “… consistently sided with and protected some of the world’s worst perpetrators of human rights abuses” (Lipton, 2009:331). This dichotomy between on the one hand being the champion of constitutionalised human rights and a peaceful democratic transition, and on the other hand staunchly advocating state sovereignty and unwavering solidarity with other African governments, all of which are explicitly expressed in official foreign policy documents, is what ultimately leads to the ambiguity in South Africa’s foreign policy.

For the purpose of brevity the two sets of conflicting principles will be grouped throughout the thesis: The promotion of human rights and democracy shall be henceforth referred to as Human Rights and the respect for state sovereignty and African solidarity will be called State Rights.

In the past, some scholars have, in an effort to explain the dichotomy between foreign policy in theory and in practice, investigated South African foreign policy and proposed various theories based on Middlepowermanship (Jordaan, 2012; Taylor, 2001; Cilliers, 1999) (associated with a middle power state that seeks to stabilise and legitimise the global order through multilateral and cooperative initiatives), an increased emphasis on national interest (Spies, 2011), and even the influence of class interests (Mckinly, 2004). However, a large number of scholars researching and writing about South African foreign policy, specifically where it applies to Africa, agree on two aspects: A constructivist framework is best able to explain this dichotomy and that the African Renaissance, and the principles derived from it,
are integral to such an explanation. These scholars and their views are briefly investigated forthwith.

Scholars who either write about South African foreign policy in general, such as Nathan (2011), Vale & Maseko (1998), Schraeder (2001), and Solomon (2003), or specifically investigate South African relations with other African states, namely Neethling (2012), Lipton (2009), and Taylor and Williams (2001), agree that a constructivist framework, prioritising ideals and values, is best suited to contextualise contemporary, post-apartheid, South African foreign policy. Even authors who do not advocate using a completely constructivist framework in analysing contemporary SA foreign policy, for example Serrão and Bischoff (2009), agree that “… constructivist International Relations (IR) theory offers several key insights into studies of South Africa’s foreign policy” (Serrão & Bischoff 2009:263). Within these constructivist analyses most authors make reference to the African Renaissance as the core influence that shapes South African foreign policy on the African continent, either by referring to it explicitly or implicitly by mention of all, or many, of the key principles of DIRCO’s strategic plans as derived from the African Renaissance. When reading these texts it becomes clear that they corroborate the hypothesis that the confusion about South African foreign policy, and interactions with other African states, can be ascribed to a clash between the principles of state sovereignty and African solidarity (State Rights) and human rights and democracy (Human Rights): A conflict of paradigms (Nathan, 2005), ideals and values (Lipton, 2009:342), or competing ideologies (Borer & Mills, 2011:86). Specifically, this conflict most often arises in situations where South Africa is tasked with responding to a humanitarian crisis in a (de facto) undemocratic African state which is unwilling to acknowledge, or resolve, the crisis itself.

As with the examples of Sudan and Zimbabwe, it is usually the case that the international community expects South Africa as a country with a) the political influence, b) material means, as well as c) the assumed resolve, garnered from its own relatively recent struggle against gross human rights violations and undemocratic tyranny, to intervene on behalf of those whose human rights are being violated, in adherence to its self-professed foreign policy principle of promoting and protecting Human Rights. However, instead of concerted efforts to intervene on behalf of those in need, the South African government has in the past, much to the disappointment of most of the international community, usually either engaged in very subdued and / or marginal efforts to resolve the crisis, or have in some cases even responded with open
support for the regimes who commit or facilitate the human rights violations. In these cases it becomes clear that State Rights trump Human Rights. This poses several questions: Why is this the case? And will this always be the case in all circumstances? These are the questions that this thesis proposes to address.

1.2) Mbeki and Anti-Western-Imperialism – Problem Statement of the Study

Normally, ambiguity in a state’s foreign policy is not necessarily problematic as “[p]olicymakers and scholars alike have long noted the existence of a significant gap between theory and practice in foreign policy” (George, 1993: ix). However, it does become concerning when one acknowledges that post-apartheid South Africa has become “… without doubt a hegemon in the SADC [Southern African Development Community] region and in Africa” (Ferim, 2008:181). If the role of a hegemon is considered to involve “… establish[ing] the ‘rules’ of international relations and uphold[ing] the status quo structure governing relations between states” (Szayna, Byman, Bankes, Eaton, Jones, Mullins, Lesser, & Rosenau, 2001:46) then South Africa’s uncertain foreign policy and seemingly arbitrary interactions with other states on the African continent does little to establish consistent ‘rules’ or “… structure[s] of international political and economic interactions” (Szayna et al, 2001:47) which other states in its hegemonic sphere of influence can follow or work within. Understanding why, and under which circumstances, State Rights trump Human Rights in SA’s reaction to humanitarian crises on the African continent will alleviate some of the ambiguity that political pundits have associated with SA’s foreign policy as well as expose a microcosm of rules and structures for political interactions present on the continent.

Although constructivist theorists have reached a general consensus (Nathan, 2011; Vale & Maseko, 1998; Schraeder, 2001; Solomon, 2003; Neethling, 2012; Lipton, 2009; Taylor & Williams, 2001) that the ambiguous nature of South African relations within Africa is due to the inherent conflict, in practice, between State Rights and Human Rights, none have attempted to construct a general theory describing when such a conflict will occur and under what circumstances one principle will prevail over another. For instance, very little attention has been paid to whether the presence of another variable, outside of Human and State Rights, could be tipping the favour towards State Rights. Furthermore, when authors approach a specific international relations scenario between South Africa and another African state with
the conflicting foreign policy principles as central thesis, such as Merle Lipton (2009) explaining South Africa’s use of Quiet Diplomacy during the Zimbabwean crisis from 2000 onwards, they merely conclude that “[c]onflicting ideals and values seem highly salient in this conflict, in particular, the tension between principles of sovereignty, good governance, and the respect for human rights” (Lipton, 2009:342) without reference to a hierarchy of principles. Such a hierarchy could serve as a starting point for a framework or model regarding South African interventions in the case of human rights violations on the African continent. But when such a hierarchy is formulated and proposed, as attempted by Festus Aboagye (2012), it is concluded that the principle of respecting sovereignty will always outweigh those of promoting human rights and democracy. Aboagye arrives at this conclusion by deducing that this has always been true in the past and therefore the validity would necessarily hold in the future. Although the first part of his observation is not untrue, an indiscriminate assumption that the principle of State Rights has, and therefore always will, automatically trump Human Rights is problematic in that it does not take into consideration the possibility that under some circumstances Human Rights might well prevail and what these possible circumstances might entail. There exists relevant historical evidence, discussed further in this study, which pose questions that serve to corroborate such an argument. For instance, why did the South Africa government reverse its decision to support a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya during the Arab Spring of 2011? And ten years before that, why did Thabo Mbeki and the South African government move from, as Phimister & Raftopoulos (2004:390) report, an impartial stance regarding the then unfolding economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe to an open endorsement of President Robert Mugabe and his policies by the end of 2002 whereas previously Mbeki had, on occasion, even spoken out against the situation in the neighbouring country (Graham, 2006:121)? These reversals are indicative of a variable (not one of the four core principles previously stated), common to both situations, that was the deciding factor on State Rights overriding Human Rights.

Phimister and Raftopoulos hint at the possibility of such an influential variable in their analysis of the Zimbabwe crisis: “By defining the Zimbabwean crisis as one of anti-colonial redress and land redistribution, Mugabe has very skilfully set the parameters of the subsequent debate” (Phimster & Raftopoulos, 2004:386). This would imply that State Rights do not necessarily and mechanically take priority over Human Rights in SA’s foreign policy, but that there is a possible influence of a variable that, when present, gives it enough weight to do so. This is
where the earlier reference to anti-Western-Imperialism as core tenet of an African Renaissance becomes salient. Although never explicitly stated in official documents, if one supposes anti-Western-Imperialism, apparent within Mbeki’s statements on the African Renaissance (as detailed in the previous section), to be a publicly undisclosed principle of South African foreign policy, then anti-Western-imperialist considerations becomes a plausible variable. The use of the term anti-Western-imperialist considerations is used to denote that, due to the anti-Western-imperialist sentiments of Mbeki (made apparent in his statements on the African Renaissance and discussed in-depth in Chapter 4), the foreign policy actions of Mbeki in specific scenarios (in this case humanitarian crises on the African continent) are influenced by the introduction of a Western-imperialist rhetoric, or actions, by other actors in those settings. Although a few academics have previously proposed this trend in South African foreign policy, studies are limited to specific situations. Lipton (2004), Graham (2006), and Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004) noted the influence of anti-Western-imperialist values and rhetoric in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis, Nathan (2011) in Sudan, and Neethling (2012) in Libya. These authors attempt to establish anti-Western-Imperialism as a principle of South African foreign policy, but no attempt is made to establish anti-Western-imperialist considerations as an independent variable, or to construct a theory regarding this variable and its influence on South African international relations. This includes foreign governments invoking Western-imperialist rhetoric or actions by Western governments that could be construed as imperialist.

In this thesis, ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ is used as a term to denote the hypothesised interplay between Western-imperialist rhetoric and / or actions by other African actors and Mbeki’s own anti-Western-imperialist sentiments in influencing whether State Rights take precedent over Human Rights. It appears that thus far no overarching analysis of the impact of anti-Western-imperialist considerations on South African foreign policy has been attempted, except for the work of Laurie Nathan which does share many similarities to what is being proposed in this thesis, but differs in that it does not focus (at least not as much as this study) on the use of structured, methodical approaches in establishing the presence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations or in explaining why these consideration are influential. As it is the differences in theoretical frameworks and methodology that are the most apparent in a comparison between this work and Nathan’s, such a comparison will be provided at the end of the following section - Theoretical Frameworks and Methodology.
Analysing the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism on post-apartheid SA’s foreign policy, spread across 20 years and three presidents, is challenging, the difficulty of which increases if one were to analyse a sample of multiple cases studies from each of these presidents across the full spectrum of the last 20 years. Therefore, this study will focus on the foreign policy of one South African president only - President Thabo Mbeki. The reasons why President Mbeki was selected as the subject of this study are described below. Firstly, Mbeki presided over the country and its foreign policy for nearly half of the 20 years since democracy, leaving an indelible mark. Secondly, the highly centralised nature of foreign policy constructed by Mbeki in his presidency (discussed in Chapter 3) created a marked closeness between the President and the country’s foreign policy, a situation that proves important to key assumptions throughout the study. Thirdly, the influence of Mbeki’s African Renaissance on foreign policy during his presidency serves to bolster the constructivist methodology used within this thesis by providing a tangible link between the government’s foreign policy and the President’s convictions, the latter of which is extracted from numerous explicit statements regarding the African Renaissance. And lastly, during his tenure as President, Mbeki was involved in two of the biggest foreign policy debacles in SA post-apartheid history, responding to alleged genocide in Sudan and the near socio-economic and diplomatic collapse of Zimbabwe in the early 2000s with the use of Quiet Diplomacy.

Comparing the analysis of the case studies in terms of the South African responses to the crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan will provide the knowledge needed to establish whether anti-Western-imperialist considerations can be justified as a possible variable influencing the outcome in the conflict between State Rights and Human Rights. As such the research problem for this study is to firstly establish, using a systematic approach that analyses historical cases, that anti-Western-Imperialism was a foreign policy principle adhered to by the South African government under Mbeki and was able to influence SA inter-state interactions on the African continent, and secondly, through the use of theoretical modelling and logic, deduce the reasons for it being influential.

Consequently the research question is formulated as follows:

“What influence did anti-Western-imperialist considerations have in dictating the result of the conflict between the principles of State Rights (the respect for state sovereignty and African Solidarity) and Human Rights (promoting human rights and democracy) in the South African
government’s response, under President Mbeki, to the humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan, and how can such a possible influence be rationally explained?

To adequately answer this question, a selection of methodological tools and frameworks will be employed in this study.

1.3) Theoretical Frameworks & Methodology - Foreign Policy Decision Making, Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism, and Securitisation Theory

The following section is divided into two parts, the first explaining the theoretical frameworks employed in this study and the second detailing the methodological approaches derived from the frameworks and how they are used to answer the research questions.

1.3.1) Theoretical Frameworks

The theoretical grounding for this study is difficult to pinpoint. This study is primarily concerned with foreign policy and uses the state as the unit of analysis, yet it is not comparative in nature and thus does not technically fall under the International Relations (IR) sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) which usually covers studies on comparative foreign policy when the state is used as the unit of analysis (Smith, Hadfield & Dunne, 2012:7). Neither is this study strictly concerned with how a state creates foreign policy, but it does share similarities with the ‘middle range” class of FPA theories which seek to provide accounts “… of either foreign policies of some types of states or foreign policy in specific situations (such as crises)” (Smith et al, 2012:4). Furthermore, the emphasis on how and why decisions are made regarding the implementation of explicitly stated foreign policy principles also lends the study a tangible connection to the realm of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) theories. This statement can be justified by examining the observations made by Hollis & Smith in their article entitled Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making (1986). Hollis & Smith elucidate a less mechanical approach to the classical Bureaucratic Politics Model within FPDM that incorporates roles and reasons as integral to any decision-making, stating that “[r]ole-players each have several roles … [and] … there is no denying that conflict between roles is as common as conflict within then. When it occurs, the actor has to decide which role shall prevail. This decision cannot, in the nature of the case, be mechanical” (Hollis & Smith, 1986:276). Although Hollis & Smith are making reference to bureaucratic actors within a state, and how
they do not necessarily blindly conform to their prescribed roles when deciding on foreign policy, one can also extrapolate this analogy to the state level.

Casting the post-apartheid South African government as the main role player in practicing South African foreign policy on the African continent - an actor torn between the prescribed roles of a paragon of human rights and democracy and fervent supporter of African solidarity and state sovereignty - the parables can be drawn between it and Hollis & Smith’s conflicted ‘human’ actor. Such a state actor, like its human counterpart, has multiple roles and must eventually be able to legitimise his actions by reference to a prescribed role (Hollis & Smith, 1986:227), or roles in case of the South African government. The reasoning, or justification, behind choosing one role over the other does not have to be made clear, or even public, rather “… the true motive for his actions need not be those he professes” (Hollis & Smith, 1986: 277).

Like the bureaucratic actor, the South African government might have to legitimise its actions by referencing an explicit, prescribed role, such as advocate of state sovereignty and African solidarity, yet the decisions could stem from another, unprofessed, motive or influence. As was mentioned previously, discovering this unprofessed motive / influence for South Africa’s actions is the goal of this study. While FPDM will serve as general underlying framework grounding the purpose of the study, the combination of two other theories will be used to answer the primary research question.

Continuing the trend of previous authors on the subject, this study will be utilising a constructivist framework, emphasising the importance of values and ideas and gathered from historical frameworks to create a working theory on South African foreign relations. More specifically, the study will be using a slightly modified version of the language-based constructivist theory by Peter Howard when he rationalised the United States’ (US) foreign policy with regards to Iraq and North Korea, as well as the works of other notable language-based constructivists such as Onuf and Kratochwill. This modified framework will from now on be referred to as Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism (RBLOC) and is outlined in Chapter Two.

The rationale behind using an RBLOC approach is twofold. Firstly, it fundamentally incorporates language, in the form of speech acts, into its framework which is essential in this particular study dealing with the influence of anti-Western-imperialist rhetoric. Secondly, as Howard (2004:805) proposes: “[A] language based constructivist approach is useful for
explaining differences in international outcomes – revealing not only that they occur, but how they occur”. This is vital to creating a model that could identify and detail the effects of anti-Western-imperialist considerations, as a yet to be a seriously considered variable, on South African decision-making in the Mbeki era.

Continuing with the analogy between this study and FPDM, the RBLOC model will be constructed in such a way as to “… seek patterns in group / bureaucratic processes that can be isolated across a set of historical case studies, on the basis of which one can make both general predictions and general recommendations for present day foreign policy decision making” (Hudson & Vore, 1995:221). This entails examining two different case studies, Zimbabwe and Sudan, spanning ten years of South African foreign policy practice under the auspices of President Mbeki, in order to isolate anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a common variable in both cases.

While the RBLOC model allows for identifying and gauging the level of impact of the anti-Western-imperialist variable in each case study, it does not explain why such a variable would have an impact on the way events unfolded. For this purpose Securitisation Theory is used. Although Securitisation Theory is usually centred on intra-state level decision making, it can be moulded to the inter-state level decision-making, as shown in Chapter Two. When Securitisation Theory is broadened to inter-state relations, or perhaps in this case it would be more precise to say regional level, it corroborates the existence of anti-Western-imperialist foreign policy considerations, as well as explains, by conceptualising ‘referent objects’ and ‘existential threats’, and the relationship between the two concepts, how anti-Western-imperialist rhetoric is able to influence South African interventions in African affairs.

In conclusion, this study will be making use of the following three interconnected theoretical frameworks within IR: 1) FPDM theory is used as the theoretical grounding of the whole thesis but will not be used practically throughout the study, as the related theories 2) Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism, and 3) Securitisation will be used as frameworks which answer the questions what influence anti-Western-Imperialism considerations have on SA foreign interactions and why it has this influence.

How these frameworks are methodologically employed to answer the research questions is explained in the following section.
1.3.2) Research Methodology

To establish the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism within the stated confines of this study, two case studies will be analysed and compared. A comparative case approach is necessitated by the aim of this work which is to identify and construct an overarching framework of Mbeki’s foreign policy in Africa. Previous works on the topic of Mbeki and the influence of anti-Imperialism on his foreign policy would usually focus on a single case study and make only passing reference to other comparable situations, thereby negating the possibility of a structured and sound overarching framework constructed from a foundation of comparable case studies. Therefore, the more comparable case studies that share similar results when subjected to the specific methodological approach used within this thesis, the more convincing the argument for an overarching structure becomes. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does not allow for as many case studies as what could be considered exhaustive, but it does allow for at least two, which for the purposes of the study is adequate. These cases are South Africa’s reversal of disapproval during the looming Zimbabwean crisis in 2002 and its support of the Sudanese government’s dubious actions during the crisis in Darfur in 2003, despite the international outcry that followed.

These particular cases, Zimbabwe and Sudan, were selected because of their respective significance. Thabo Mbeki’s support of Robert Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF party during the Zimbabwean crisis, and his insistence on using Quiet Diplomacy in an attempt to mitigate the situation, is often considered one of the worst foreign policy failures of his political career therefore making it integral to any study on SA foreign policy during his term. Similarly the Darfur crisis is significant because, as with Zimbabwe, South Africa’s response was considered “… not only objectionable, but also baffling and anomalous” (Nathan, 2011:56) presenting itself as another interesting and relevant case in the search for the hidden influences behind South Africa’s ambiguous foreign policy practice.

Two separate RBLOC language games will be constructed, one for each case study. Each of these language games forms a dialogue between two or more players which consists of certain amount of speech acts (which are explicit actions, verbal or non-verbal) for each side of the dialogue. These speech acts represent alternating moves in a rationally constructed language game that seeks to emulate the actions and motives of the players concerned. The players in each game are considered to be the South African government on one side and the respective
national government from the two case studies (or other relevant actors) on the other. Although no man can truthfully profess to know the real motives of another, informed deductions and extrapolations are used in lieu of explicit statements of intent and motive. This necessitates a significant amount of background or contextual knowledge from which to construct rationally sound speech acts. This background knowledge and contextualising information is gathered from various and numerous primary and secondary sources, such as official government documents, newspaper articles, or academic journals which, when pooled together and analysed through informed opinion, can garner the insights needed to construct a rational, coherent, and insightful language game.

A typical language game will play as follows. Firstly, background knowledge regarding the specific case and the actors involved will be provided which serves to establish a set of explicitly stated rules used to dictate the interactions of the language game. These rules have to be relevant and are garnered from explicit statements made by the involved governments. For example, ‘any country is entitled to sovereignty and none should fear intervention into its domestic affairs by another’ would be a pre-conceived rule dictating the actions and responses of the South African government, as established in explicit statements on its foreign policy. Numerous rules are identified for both players and starting with the first speech act that initiates the language game, continuing thorough subsequent alternating speech acts and responses of each player, these rules are either invoked or conflicting rules refuted. Through the systematic process of a dialogical analysis that seeks to construct rational meaning from the contextualisation of background knowledge, as well as the invocation and refutation of explicit rules by the players, new ‘implicit’ rules can be established. These implicit rules are rationally formulated and constructed from analysing the interactions between the players involved and serve as game specific rules that dictate the course of that particular language game. Through the analysis of the two separate language games attempted in this study, anti-Western-imperialist considerations, as a common implicit rule, can be identified and verified for South African foreign policy under President Mbeki.

After the language games were used to identify the existence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations, Securitisation Theory and specifically the works of the Copenhagen School, will serve as corroborative proof of the anti-Western-imperialist considerations. Securitisation Theory will also function as the framework within which the influence of anti-Western-
imperialist considerations on the South African response to African crises can be rationally explained. Firstly, Securitisation Theory will be deconstructed into a linear process whereby a final positive state can be used to deduce previous variables by working backwards in a logical way, a method which will serve to complement the hypothesis that anti-Western-imperialist considerations exist. Secondly, the general framework of Securitisation Theory will serve as an explanatory framework that will enable a logical and rational explanation as to why the anti-Western-imperialist variable identified is able to influence South African interactions on the African continent. The further intricacies of Securitisation Theory and the extrapolation to the regional level will be explained in Chapter Two.

It has to be noted at this point that many correlations can be drawn between this research and the works of Laurie Nathan. Both this thesis and Nathan contend that Pretoria’s foreign policy priorities were strongly influenced by Mbeki’s African Renaissance (Nathan, 2005:371). Both also agree that the ambiguity of Mbeki’s foreign policy disappears with the introduction of anti-Imperialism (Nathan, 2011). In addition, where this thesis will look at the case studies involving crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan, Nathan has previously addressed both situations within an anti-imperialist paradigm. However, it is in the theoretical framework and methodological approach employed in this study that the biggest departure from Nathan’s work becomes apparent. Not only will structured language games be employed to more methodically reveal the existence of anti-imperialist considerations as an influential variable in Mbeki’s response to the crises in Sudan and Zimbabwe, but Securitisation theory will also be used to explain why anti-imperialism considerations are able to influence his response, an approach not attempted by Nathan.

The use of Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism and Securitisation Theory within an overarching Foreign Policy Decision Making framework will prove to be adequate in answering the central question of this study, but such an undertaking can unfortunately not be attempted, within the scope of this thesis, without certain limitations.

1.4) Limitations and Delimitations
Taking into account time and length constraints, this study will only focus on South African foreign policy, and specifically how it pertains to certain interactions within the African continent. The focus is on cases where the foreign policy ideals of State Rights conflict with those of Human Rights in response to human rights violations. Therefore, this study does not
presuppose to pertain to all relations with the rest of the world or to all manner of foreign relations throughout Africa.

Within the African continent, the study is further limited to the analysis of two case studies of South African political interactions. These two cases, involving Zimbabwe and Sudan respectively, are diverse in terms of geography and level of interaction, whilst still sharing a high level of foreign policy significance to accurately depict a holistic picture of South African foreign policy in practice during the presidency of Mbeki.

Furthermore, the two case studies are representative of the foreign policy and presidency of only one of the three democratically elected South African presidents: Thabo Mbeki. However, as noted in Section 1.2, the length of Mbeki’s term, and his undeniable influence on contemporary SA’s foreign policy can be considered indicative of contemporary foreign policy as a whole.

Also note that this study is limited to studying the influence of a single variable, anti-Western-imperialist considerations on the interplay between the South African government’s foreign policy ideals of respecting state sovereignty and respecting human rights on the continent. This is not to say that other variables or factors do not influence this relationship, merely that they have been purposefully excluded for the sake of isolating this particular variable.

1.5) Theoretical and Practical Significance of the Study

It is hoped that the results of this study and its successful application of numerous theoretical frameworks could prove to be significant in the field of IR. The possible significance, both in the theoretical as well as the practical aspects of IR, is detailed in the following paragraphs.

Firstly, the significance of working within a FPDM framework can be stated as follows:

An analysis of foreign policy decisions can uncover the cognitive processes that lead to foreign policy making and “get into the minds” of leaders who make the decisions. It can also help identify unique and general patterns of decisions and generate insights about leadership styles and personalities that cannot be revealed through a systemic approach to foreign policy analysis. Such an approach to foreign policy analysis has the potential to make a broad and important contribution to the study of international
relations. FPDM can provide deeper understandings of biases, motivations, and perceptions.

(Mintz & DeRouen, 2010:5-6)

This study, therefore, aims to provide a deeper understanding into the motives of the South African government in its relations on the African continent, at least within the context of Mbeki’s presidency. Also, to provide clarity to an otherwise ambiguous and confusing situation that is regularly perceived as a disconnection or inconsistency between South African foreign policy in theory and practice. Finally, to accomplish the previous two tasks in a manner that logically establishes anti-Western-imperialistic considerations as a variable, able to influence South African foreign policy practice in the Mbeki era, continuing the work of many great scholars before.

Secondly, the use of RBLOC theory (a detailed explanation thereof can be found in Chapter Two) to systematically and logically identify a variable such as anti-Western-Imperialism in the context of South African foreign policy appears to be a novel approach that, if successful, could possibly lay the foundation for a systemic and rule-based model within which future simulations can be attempted. Whilst it should by no means be considered a perfected or flawless model, it does provide the basis for a structured approach to IR that relies on the chronological modelling of speech acts and responses that can be supplemented in future.

Thirdly, Securitisation Theory (also detailed in Chapter Two) is used to explain the disparity between foreign policy in theory and foreign intervention in practice which plagues South African foreign policy. The results thereof add to the growing data available within Securitisation Theory for the purpose of a better “… shared understanding what is to be collectively referred to as a threat and what measures can be taken to temper such threats” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998:26), a task considered vital by the fathers of the Copenhagen School of the Securitisation Theory - Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.

Lastly, as was noted in the introduction, the fact that South Africa is accredited the status of regional hegemon in Southern Africa (and some would argue the rest of Africa) entails certain roles that the country plays in the region, one of which is “… establish[ing] the ‘rules’ of international relations and uphold[ing] the status quo structure governing relations between states” (Szayna, Byman, Bankes, Eaton, Jones, Mullins, Lesser, & Rosenau, 2001: 46). If SA
is establishing rules and dictating the ‘status quo’ governing relations between African states, then reducing the ambiguity as to what the rules are, and what influences them and why, is significant not only for the individuals that operate within the regional inter-state sphere, but also those academics that seek to study them.

The proposed significance of this study is not only limited to an improved theoretical understanding of FPDM, the viability of a RBLOC theory in the South African foreign policy context, and the applicability of regionalised Securitisation Theory, but it is also practically significant in providing individuals with a clearer understanding of the regional rules that South Africa inevitably creates in its role as regional hegemon.

1.6) Thesis Structure

The following section lists the chapter headings of the rest of this document and provides a brief description of each.

Chapter 2: Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism and Regionalised Securitisation Theory

Chapter Two of this study pertains to the explanation of the constructivist theories of Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivist and Securitisation which will be used throughout this study. Both of these theories are somewhat amended and their scopes broadened to suit the needs of the study. The details of which will be provided in the chapter, accompanied by a brief background on the historical academic underpinnings of both theories.

Chapter 3: Brief History of Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy (1994 -2008)

Chapter Three highlights the most salient principles of the first 14 years of post-apartheid South African foreign policy spanning the presidencies of both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. The pertinent information compiled within this chapter will be used as background information for the language games conducted in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4: Case Study One: The South African Response to the Economic and Political Collapse of Zimbabwe in the 21st Century

&
Chapter 5: Case Study Two - The South African Response to International Allegations of Genocide in the Darfur Region of Sudan (2003 - )

Both these chapters will follow the same outline as to how they are constructed. Background knowledge, accumulated from Chapter Three and various other primary and secondary sources, on the respective case will be provided and contextualised followed by a rationally constructed language game derived from this knowledge. A thorough dialogical analysis will follow the language game which will serve to establish certain implicit case-specific rules.

Chapter 6: Western-Imperialism – an Existential Threat Buried in the Psycho-Cultural Disposition of Mbeki

The sixth chapter will combine the results of the two case studies in the preceding chapters in an attempt to conclusively establish anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a possible variable in influencing South African foreign relations in Africa. This will be accomplished by comparing the data garnered from the case studies and conducting a comparative analysis, in order to identify the commonality of an anti-Western-imperialist variable. Thereafter, Securitisation Theory will be employed to ascertain why and how anti-Western-imperialist considerations are able to influence foreign policy.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The seventh and final chapter includes a summary of all the findings and presents them in a logically ordered and interconnected fashion.
Chapter 2: Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism and Regionalised Securitisation Theory

Two different theoretical frameworks will be utilised in this study in order to best achieve the dual objectives of 1) amassing substantial evidence in support of anti-Western-imperialist considerations as an influential variable in SA’s foreign policy context and 2) offering a rational and logically deduced reason why and how it is able to exert such influence. The first of these is a constructivist approach that is informed by the importance of language and speech acts, governed and constrained by certain social rules, and is referred to as Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism (RBLOC). The second theory is Securitisation Theory, which details the processes and relationships of the involved actors and objects in the securitisation of an issue which, if successful, concludes in political actors being freed from normal political and/or societal constraints when responding to the particular issue.

The two theories, RBLOC and Securitisation, both offer frameworks that are firmly situated in the constructivist realm of speech acts, language games, actors and audiences. Where RBLOC theory is useful in the identification of the anti-Western-Imperialism variable central to this thesis, so too is Securitisation Theory useful in explaining how and why such a variable holds influence. Furthermore, both frameworks are characterised by a structured approach that relies on logical extrapolations and deductions that are comprehensively modelled, creating a tangible structure. It is because of the shared constructivist (agreed by many experts in the analysis of SA foreign policy to be the most applicable in their field, as stated in the introduction) and structured (useful for achieving the stated goal of creating a tangible overarching framework for the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism on contemporary South African foreign policy) nature of these two theoretical frameworks that they complement each other and are therefore best suited to offer the answers that this study demands.

The theoretical underpinnings and background of both these frameworks will be discussed in this section, as well as how they are related to achieving the objectives of this thesis.
2.1) Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism

The examination of various texts regarding a RBLOC approach to International Relations uncovers a recurring trend of reference to the works of Onuf as well as Kratochwill entitled *World of Our Making* and *Rules, Norms and Decisions* respectively, both of which were first published in 1989. This comes as no surprise when one considers these books are “…widely cited as constructivism’s foundational texts” (Onuf, 2002:127). A comparative analysis of both texts suggest that international relations exists within a unique world governed by its own set of rules which not only governs the use of language but is also itself constituted by the language used by the agents within it (Onuf, 2002:126; Kratochwill, 1995:21-45). People use speech to become agents in the world of language which enables them to “…express their wishes, to translate their wishes into goals, and finally to act on their goals” (Onuf, 2002:127), all of which is only meaningful within a world of language governed by rules that creates an intersubjectively understood context (Kratochwill, 1995:24).

With regards to the aforementioned conceptualisation, Frederking (2003:365-366) asserts that rule-based, language-orientated constructivists make two fundamental claims. Firstly, that social arrangements make up the structures of world politics and that these arrangements simultaneously tell agents within these structures what is possible as well as what to do. Once again these arrangements are governed by social rules, which include beliefs, norms and identities that constitute and regulate all aspects of world politics, altogether existing in the shared meanings of their users which are subsequently reproduced through their practices. Secondly, rule-based, language-orientated constructivists assert that “communicatively rational” (Frederking, 2003:366) agents use speech acts to construct, invoke and contest social rules within any social arrangement. Communicative rationality refers to the constructivist argument that all agents are bound to implicit validity claims within any speech act, which include claims of truth, appropriateness and sincerity. An appropriate example of the implicit validity claims inherent within a communicatively rational speech act can be found in the following speech act. “The U.S. is the current global hegemon”. This assertion conveys a truth claim (that such an assertion is indeed true), an appropriateness claim (that I am right to makes such an assertion), and a sincerity claim (that I believe this assertion to be true). Others may then accept or challenge any of these validity claims. For instance another communicatively rational agent could contest the truth claim of the previous speech act and assert that America
is in fact not currently the global hegemon. A communicatively rational agent is thus an agent that performs “… speech acts, conveys validity claims, and act[s] on the basis of mutually recognised validity claims” (Frederking, 2003:366). “When actors agree to the validity claims of a speech act, the binding effect of language motivates them to co-ordinate subsequent actions with the speaker …” (Frederking, 2003:366) and it is this focus on validity claims within speech acts that allows a rule-orientated, language-based constructivist to analyse “… the process through which speech acts construct and / or challenge social rules” (Frederking, 2003:366). It also has to be noted that communicative rationality should not only be limited to verbal speech acts, but can also be applied to physical, nonverbal acts, which are usually also subject to the same inherent validity claims (Frederking, 2003:367). Non-verbal speech acts would include any acts that convey or communicate an assertion and are subject to the same implicit validity claims of truthfulness, appropriateness and sincerity that verbal speech acts are. For instance, in Chapter 4 the language game between South Africa and Zimbabwe is opened with a non-verbal speech act by the Zimbabwean government – the expropriation of white-owned farmlands. Consulting contextualising background information, it is evident that the expropriations were prefaced and indeed justified at the time by Western-imperialist rhetoric from Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and thus the non-verbal speech acts conveys a certain communicative assertion (white owned farmlands are an example of Western-Imperialism and therefore Zimbabwe is justified in expropriating them) which adheres to the validity claims of truthfulness (Mugabe believes this assertion to be true), appropriateness (Mugabe believes he is right in making this assertion) and sincerity (Mugabe believes this assertion to be true) as a verbal speech act would.

The analysis of these speech acts does not however occur with regards to a singular, isolated speech act. Rather it occurs within a constructed “language game” which strings together different speech acts in the form of a negotiation. This language game can then be analysed by using a method referred to as dialogical analysis.

2.1.1) Language Games and Dialogical Analysis

Dialogical analysis is an interpretive approach that attempts to explain particular actions of communicatively rational agents by identifying the social rules agents follow by “... showing
the coherence between speech acts and the [identified] rules within a particular social arrangement” (Frederking, 2003:369).

The works of Duffy, Frederking and Tucker (1998) and Frederking (2003) provide formal models of the dialogical process and, although each differs slightly from the other, the main concepts and steps taken remain the same. Firstly, one has to specify any background knowledge necessary to the understanding of the dialogue which is being analysed. This background knowledge serves as the underlying set of rules, or context, that governs the interactions as hypothesised by the analyst. It is the existence of these rules that will be tested during the dialogical analysis. Note, however, that these rules should be either “... (a) politically non-controversial facts or (b) beliefs of the relevant party supported by archival evidence” (Duffy et al., 1998:272).

Secondly, one has to acquire and accumulate relevant explicit interactions, verbal and / or non-verbal, which will be converted into speech acts and form part of the dialogue being analysed. Thereafter, one has to start with dialogical analysis beginning with a pragmatic analysis of these speech acts. This part of the dialogical analysis forms the bulk of the analysis. Here the analyst has to construct “... inventories of [pragmatic] propositions [which are] conveyed implicitly by each party” (Duffy et al., 1998:272). These explicit propositions must be relevant to the specific issue at hand, as well as relevant within the context of the interaction (Frederking, 2003:369-370) as defined by the established background knowledge. It is also assumed that these propositions inherently convey all three validity claims of truthfulness, appropriateness and sincerity (Frederking, 2003:370). The validity of the claims within speech acts or propositions can however be disputed by the other agent and it is these disputed speech acts / propositions that form the basis of the next step in dialogical analysis: argument analysis.

Argument analysis “... isolates and formalises the disputed propositions ...” (Frederking, 2003:370), which in turn reflects a dispute of the social rules generated in the pragmatic analysis. This analysis formalises the disputed propositions into an argument or negotiation, where assertions are made and the validity claims of these assertions are challenged, and summarises the flow of interaction. Argument analysis can also yield implicit propositions,
which are then to be added to the existing inventory of propositions derived from the pragmatic analysis.

The final step is what Duffy et al. (1998:272) refers to as “formal theory-proving”. This tests the model to see if the actual outcomes of the dialogue for a specific agent follow logically from the contents of the belief inventories (social rules). In other words, does the eventual policy position taken by an actor rationally and logically derive from the preceding dialogue? These final policy positions are also referred to as “action theorems” (Duffy et al., 1998:272). For instance, in a negotiation regarding the terms of trade between two actors, the terms accepted by actor X would be that party’s action theorem whilst the terms accepted by actor Y would necessarily be their action theorem. These action theorems are then tested against the previously established rules and the propositions that substantiate them in order to see if the action theorem is indeed the logical conclusion of these rules, thereby vindicating the existence of those rules and proving the analyst’s initial hypothesis regarding the social rules that govern that specific dialogue. A summation of the four-step process can be found in Figure 1.

The ability of the rule-based, language-orientated constructivist approach in explaining certain foreign policy actions through the use of contextual language games is what makes it crucial to this study. However, here the emphasis is not on proving the logical validity of the eventual policy actions / action theorems, but rather the implicit rules garnered in the dialogical analysis that validates the theorems. Normally such language games, at least as proposed by Howard, are aimed at “… [revealing] the different rules that create differences within a family of otherwise similar situations and the possibility of different outcomes …” (Howard, 2004:805), however for the purposes of this study, identifying the same rule within two different situations will serve to establish this, previously hidden, rule as one that remains persistent throughout the same family of games. This approach does not necessarily depart from Howard’s general theory, rather it just increases the scope. Where Howard would use language games to explain why an actor would pursue a different course of policy action in two seemingly similar situations (or ‘family of otherwise similar situations’ as he refers to it), this study will seek to establish, through the use of language games, a sub-family of situations that adhere to a specific set of common rules. In other words, if one were to consider ‘gross human rights violations’ as
a family of otherwise similar situations with an overarching set of rules, then this study seeks to identify ‘gross human right violations on the African continent with the presence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ as a sub-family of situations that will result in a different policy decision (than those taken in the main family) for South Africa, the resulting policy decision changed because of the presence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations. It is the implicit social rule of ‘anti-Western-imperialist considerations’ that needs to be identified in both language games in order to validate this hypothesis. Identifying this rule will provide the basis for the construction of an overarching social rule that, while remaining implicit in speech acts, can be considered explicit in background knowledge in a sub-family of similar games.

Once anti-Western-Imperialism has been identified as a social rule that is able to influence the foreign policy of South Africa then Securitisation Theory is employed to make sense of why and how it is able to influence.
Figure 1. Summary of the 4-Step Dialogical Process Model (Author's own design)

Step 1: Background Knowledge

Provide relevant background information consisting of:

a) Politically non-controversial facts
b) Beliefs of relevant party supported by archival evidence

This background knowledge serves to contextualize the specific dialogical game and as sources of the explicit propositions constructed in the pragmatic analysis.

Step 2: Construct Dialogue

Construct a Dialogue, in the form alternating speech acts from relevant explicit actors, verbal or non-verbal.

Example:
Actor 1 speech act: verbal
Actor 2 speech act: non-verbal
Actor 1 speech act: non-verbal
Actor 2 speech act: verbal

Step 3: Dialogical Analysis

This step consists of two stages:

Stage 1: Pragmatic Analysis

Construct inventories of pragmatic propositions conveyed explicitly by each actor. These must be:

a) Relevant to the specific issue at hand
b) Derived from the relevant background information provided

c) Assumed to convey all three validity claims of both, appropriateness and sincerity

These propositions are then used to construct the governing rules of the dialogue.

Rule X
Rule Y
Rule Z

However, the validity claim of these propositions can be contested by opposing actors.

Stage 2: Argument Analysis

Isolate and formalize disputed propositions which reflect a dispute of social rules generated in pragmatic analysis.

Formalize disputed rules into argument or negotiation where assertions are made by invoking established rules and validity claims of those assertions accepted or challenged, then recontesting these rules.

Contested rules can be used to yield new implicit propositions which in turn construct new implicit rules.

Actor 1 speech act
Proposition 1: Contest Rule X
Implicit proposition 1: Construct Rule A

New set of governing rules:
Rule X
Rule Y
Rule Z
Implicit Rule A

Step 4: Formal Theory-Proving

Test whether final policy positions (action theorems) of actors logically follow from constructed social rules.

If it does then social rules, both implicit and explicit, are considered valid.
2.2) Securitisation Theory

Securitisation Theory mainly stems from the works of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, whose collective works on Securitisation Theory has become known as the Copenhagen School of Securitisation Theory. Classical Copenhagen School of Securitisation Theory can be deconstructed into five key variables as defined by Cabellero-Anthony and Emmers (2006: 21-23):

1) **Security:** A socially constructed concept about survival wherein an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object. It is securitized when articulated by a securitizing actor.

2) **Securitizing Actor:** These are governments, international organisations or civil society actors that scrutinise an issue by articulating the existence of threat(s) to the survival of a particular referent object.

3) **Referent Objects:** These can be individuals or groups (refugees, victims of human rights abuses, etc.) as well as security issues like the state (military security) national sovereignty and ideologies (political security), national economies (economic security), collective identities (societal security), or species or habitats (environmental security) that possess a “legitimate” claim to survival and whose existence is ostensibly threatened.

4) **Specific Audience:** The act of securitization is only complete once the securitizing actor succeeds in using the language of security which is the “speech act” to convince a specific audience e.g. public opinion, politicians, military officers or other elites, etc. that a referent object(s) is / are existentially threatened.

5) **Speech Act:** This is an important part of the securitization process. According to Wæver, with the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.

‘What exactly is security?’ and ‘What makes something a security issue within International Relations?’ are the questions answered by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) in their book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. According to the authors “… security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented posing an existential threat to a designated referent
object” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:21). Besides the existential threat that a security issue poses, what differentiates it from any other political issue is that the ‘… special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:21). A security issue is thus an issue that poses a threat to the continued survival, or further existence, of a referent object and therefore justifies actions outside the normal scope of political procedure. Here an existential threat is meant to be understood “… in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:21) as the “… essential quality of existence [of the referent object] will vary greatly across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:22). A referent object in this context could include individuals or groups, the state, national sovereignty and ideologies, national economies, collective identities, or species and habitats. Lastly, it has to be noted that when speaking of the ‘normal scope of political procedure’ reference is made to the societally defined and agreed relation that any particular state and its populace has rather than any objective definition of what such a relation should be. In other words, an action that would be classified as outside the normal scope of political procedure within one country may fall well within that scope in another. The emphasis here is on extraordinary measures that depart from societally agreed norms.

Where a security issue refers to an issue that necessitates action that transgresses the normal boundaries of political action so is the act of making an issue one of security is referred to as the act of securitisation. Securitisation is performed by a securitising actor, which could be a government, international organisation or civil society, who posits an issue in the realm of security be presenting it as an existential threat to a referent object, thus necessitating the use of extraordinary measures. This move by the securitising actor is referred to as the securitisising move and constitutes one half of the act of securitisation. According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:25) an “… issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such”. Therefore, an issue can only be said to be fully securitised not merely when a securitising actor presents a threat that requires extraordinary measures to counter, but only when the target audience allows and enables these measures to be taken where it would normally constrain the actions of the actor,. “The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998:26).
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:25) demonstrate securitisation by example of an ordinary family that securitises its lifestyle as dependent on keeping a specific job, therefore validating the job holder using dirty tricks in competition at the firm in order to retain his / her position. Here the parent who has the job is considered the securitising actor who, as a securitising move, would present the issue of losing his or her job as an existential threat to the lifestyle of the family, which necessitates dirty tricks within the workplace to keep that job. The referent object is the family lifestyle, which possess a legitimate claim to survival (at least as agreed upon between securitising actor and the audience) and which is existentially threatened by the issue of job loss to the point that dirty tricks, extraordinary measures which would normally be frowned upon by family, are argued by the job-holding parent to be necessary to ensure that the threat is countered. If the other family members (the audience) are sufficiently convinced that job loss proves an existential threat to family lifestyle to the point that extraordinary measures are allowed, then one could confirm that the issue of job loss has been successfully securitised into job security, i.e. the audience has validated the securitising actor’s validity claim of an existential threat on a referent object and allows extraordinary measures. This is the crucial part of Securitisation Theory: the act (the speech act) of a securitising actor using the word job ‘security’ places the relevant development within in a sphere that allows the actor to use any means necessary to block any threats to that security. However,”… it is important to note that the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security”, but rather by the act of placing an issue within this special sphere of security, exempt from ordinary constraints, with “… a metaphorical security reference” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde: 1998:27).

For the Securitisation Theory analyst the task “… is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde: 1998:26). It is not to assess whether an issue genuinely threatens the existence of a referent object or whether a certain issue should be securitised. Also the constructivist nature of Securitisation Theory lends a versatility to the theory which is essential to the needs of this thesis as explained forthwith.

2.2.1) The Versatility of Securitisation Theory
The Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory (CSST) is able to provide a useful framework for contextualising South African actions within Africa. However, the scope of the framework needs to be broadened slightly for the purposes of such an undertaking. Three aspects of CSST
are highlighted as a measure to broaden the scope. Highlighting the first two aspects is an attempt to perceive the theory from a slightly different viewpoint, emphasising certain aspects that can be rationally deduced from the original theory and serve to bolster the contextualisation of SA’s actions in Africa. These include the usefulness of deconstructing the theory into variables and constructing a model that enables deduction of certain variables through careful analysis and also the recognition of the influence of the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience in choosing to accept the securitising move. The third aspect is an amendment to the general theory that, while still not actually changing the structure or fundamental basis of the theory, does change the scope of the theory to accommodate inter-state actor-audience relationships as is necessitated by this thesis. The three aspects are detailed in the following sub-sections.

2.2.1.1) The Value of CSST Deconstruction

The CSST is useful in that it provides contextualisation of acts that fall outside of the normal political scope, not only for the securitising actor, but also for the audience. Returning to the hypothetical family case study, it is clear that the audience (the income provider’s family) not only allowed the securitising actor (the income provider) to break normal societal constraints, but in doing so also deviated from their own normal constraints and procedures. Similarly, when the populace of a democratic country supports the invasion of a sovereign state on the basis of domestic security it defies normal procedures. Of course the act of securitisation has itself created a new context of procedure that falls outside the political norm. Here the audience’s response of empowering the securitising actor to act outside normal constraints is considered normal as they have been sufficiently convinced of an existential threat to a referent object.

The securitising move of the securitising actor and the subsequent response of the audience become part of a collection of variables that together form the entirety of the securitisation framework and therefore the theory. Deconstructing the framework into its related components - securitising actor, securitising move, referent object, existential threat, and audience response (successful or unsuccessful securitisation) - allows for the mapping of their relations as seen in Figure 2 (page 32). Presenting the theory as an equation with multiple variables that influence the outcome allows for the reverse deduction of variables.
To elucidate the idea of reverse deduction, reference can once again be made to the hypothetical situation of the family that is faced with the prospects of losing their current lifestyle due to the loss of their main source of income. In the original example, all the variables were already presented *apriori* to the reader as an exemplification of securitisation, but what if all the reader knew was who the audience was (the family) and that the audience allowed the actor to act contrary to the normal and expected constraints imposed by the audience on the actor (i.e. a securitisation has successfully occurred). The only known variables at this point are that the family is the audience and that they have allowed the income generator to play dirty in the workplace which, it is presupposed, is contrary to the normally expected reaction of the family.

For the purpose of this example, it is presupposed that condoning dirty play in the office is not expected behaviour of the audience (family), but one could also reasonably deduce the same if the audience had made previous statements to the effect that they do not condone dirty play. At this point we can only deduce that the family is the audience (as they have allowed contrary actions) and that the income generator is the securitising actor who is now able to perform the contrarian actions with the tacit support of the audience. From this series of events it can be deduced that an issue has been successfully securitised, because of the audience’s allowance of extraordinary measures. Had the issue been unsuccessfuely securitised then these allowances would not have been made. From here, however, we cannot yet say exactly why the audience (family) supports the securitising actor (income generator) in his dirty tricks (perhaps he / she takes personal pleasure in playing dirty) or identify the referent objects and existential threat, but what if one had access to communications between the audience (family) and the securitising actor (income generator)? Through analysing these communications one could pinpoint at what point the audience started condoning the actions of the actor i.e. when did the actor make a convincing enough appeal to the necessity of abnormal action to counter an existential threat to a mutually agreed referent object. For the purpose of this explanation, it is assumed that such communications are available and that these communications show that it was at a dinner table discussion that the income generator made mention that if he / she were to lose their job then the lifestyle that the family had been accustomed to would severely depreciate. If this was the point when the audience (family) started condoning the actions of the income generator then we could reasonably deduce that the current lifestyle of the family is considered a mutually referent object important enough that when threatened with an
existential threat (job loss) it necessitates the extraordinary responses of both the securitising actor and the audience.

For the purpose of this thesis it is important to highlight the following points from the above hypothetical case of securitisation. Firstly, that the act of securitisation, as well as who the audience and who the securitising actors are, can be deduced from the existence of the extraordinary allowances of the audience. Secondly, that through the careful analysis of communications, the referent object as well as the existential threat variable within the securitisation framework can be reasonably deduced. This deconstructed deduction model can be extrapolated from the hypothetical and be applied to real world situations and, granted the existence of successful securitisation and the availability of preceding communications and actions between the relevant actors and audience, can be used to deduce the objects that the audience considers to ‘possess a “legitimate” claim to survival’ (referent object), what constitutes an ‘existential’ threat to the referent object, and how securitising actors should phrase their validity claims in order for them to be accepted by the audience. All three of these variables can, if deduced from the actions of, for instance, inter-state securitisation, serve to contribute to the knowledge base within Securitisation Theory. These variables do not only serve as dependent variables consigned to one securitisation move, but are also indicative of the general psycho-cultural disposition of the actors involved, which is the subject of the second of our two deviations from the original Securitisation Theory.
Figure 2. Structured Model of Deconstructed Securitisation Variables (Author’s own design)

Unsuccessful Securitisation
The audience is unconvinced of the existential threat or does not believe in the referent nature of an object and does not allow the securitising actor to act outside of socially accepted norms.

Successful Securitisation
The audience is convinced that an existential threat to a common referent object exists and therefore the validates the securitisation of an issue and allows the securitising actor to act outside the socially accepted norms.

Securitising Actor
Actor who wishes to securitise an issue in order to convince audience that it should be allowed to act outside of societal norms.

Securitising Move: Speech act
A move or speech act whereby the securitising actor places an issue in the realm of 'security' by proclaiming the existence of an existential threat to a referent object. Used as rhetoric to convince the audience that extraordinary measures are required to deal with the threat.

Audience
Those that the securitising actor wishes to convince of the necessary existential threat to a referent object required to securitise and issue.

Existential Threat
A threat (either real or contrived) to the existence of a referent object.

Referent Object
An object that possess a legitimate (subjective) claim to survival is ostensibly threatened by an existential threat.
2.2.1.2) Discovering a Psycho-Cultural Disposition through Securitisation

One should not assume securitisation to merely be a linear and objective process of speech acts followed by audience acceptance or rejection, isolated as a singular event, but rather a “… strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq, 2005:172). Securitisation as an act is situated in a greater conflux of contextualisation between actor and audience, the identified threat, and the referent object. Securitisation, as a theoretical framework, is able to serve an alternative purpose, where a successful securitisation becomes a telling indicator of the ‘context, psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power relation between both speaker and listener’ as referred to by Balzacq (2005:172). If an audience changes its normal, presupposed, behaviour to enable a securitising actor to act outside the boundaries of accepted political action, then the analyst can infer that an issue has been successfully securitised enabling the analyst to make certain rational observations regarding the context of the securitisation event, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power relations between actor and audience.

For the purposes of this thesis, identifying the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience is important. Understanding the psychological and cultural disposition of the audience serves to contextualise a successful securitisation move by providing insights into why certain objects and threats are considered important, or more important than others, and vice versa: identifying certain objects and threats that are considered important is naturally telling of the psycho-cultural disposition of the actor. Thus being able to establish a clear relation between a fundamental convictions of an actor in the securitising framework and the nature of the referent object bolsters the validity of the deductions.

Both of the aspects of Securitisation Theory that were previously highlighted: a) using logical deduction to identify referent objects and existential threats important to the audience and b) then using these variables to deduce the psycho-cultural disposition of the same audience, are focused on the audience actor, rather than the securitising actor, in the securitisation framework. In order to cast South Africa in the role of the audience, necessary for deducing the aspects previously mentioned, the Securitisation Theory needs to be extrapolated to an inter-state level.
For the purpose of extrapolating Securitisation Theory to an inter-state level, inspiration is drawn from the works of Haacke and Williams (2008) who attempt to up-scale the securitisation framework to the regional level. Haacke and Williams focus on sovereign actors within a region combining their mutual state level securitised issues to form a coherent collective securitisation. In their work the policies of the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are analysed to identify instances of collective, transnational securitisation where the AU or ASEAN is cast as the securitising actor. However, what if, rather than up-scaling individual state securitisation to a regional level through collective securitisation, one were to up-scale the whole process to a regional level. In other words, what if within a region one state, rather than the collective regional arrangement, were to play the role of the securitising actor and another the role of the audience.

2.2.1.3) Extrapolating CCST to a Regional Level

Buzan and Wæver’s very own example of Securitisation Theory, contracted in scope to the household level, provides the precedent for the possibility of extrapolation to the regional level. Here they provide the basis for securitisation as a theory that does not just apply to the intra-state level, as long as certain key actors (specifically in term of their relationship) and variables exist. Securitisation, in its essence, concerns a securitising actor (whether a household income provider or a state) who is normally constrained in some way (societal norms, or political constraints) and who, through a referential speech act of ‘security’, creates a validity claim that suggests an issue (losing a certain job or the militarisation of a rival state) is an existential threat to a referent object (family lifestyle or sovereignty) which is then accepted by the audience (the family or the ruling elite) if they act contrary to normal expectations by allowing and enabling the securitising actor acting outside their constraints (playing dirty at work or invading another sovereign state). Using this framework one can transfer Securitisation Theory to the regional level as shown by the following example.

Suppose one were to take a regional grouping, in this case Africa, and position a single sovereign state as the securitising actor, but rather than the actions of this state being constrained by normal political restraints within the state, it is constrained by international norms (for instance the promotion of human rights or state sovereignty). This African state then attempts to securitise an external (from outside the regional context) issue by implying an existential threat to a regional referent object. Like in the example of the household, the issue
is successfully securitised when the audience (in this case the other states within Africa) act outside the expected norm in response to the issue and thereby legitimises the African state’s extraordinary response to the issue. Note that for the purpose of this thought experiment it is not important what the true motives of the securitising actor are, only that an analyst is able to identify when a securitising move is made (for whatever reason) and when, and under what circumstances, the audience accepts the securitising agent’s validity claim that an issue does indeed pose an existential threat to a referent object and thus justifies extraordinary measures.

Speaking of the audience, Buzan and Wæver and other securitisation theorist regularly refer to ‘the audience’ as a singular entity that is able to validate the securitising actors actions, thereby finalising securitisation, but is logical to assume that the audience in most cases consist of a group of individual actors and that securitisation has successfully occurred when the majority, or at least the most powerful, have agreed to accept the validity claim rather than a 100% of the audience. Although this distinction may be unimportant when dealing with Securitisation Theory at the state level, it can be considered important to Securitisation Theory when dealing with individual states at the regional level, which constitutes the audience.

Lastly, to bring the newly formulated regional inter-state securitisation framework in line with the subject matter of this research project the following is stipulated. Within the regional African context, South Africa, as a member of the relevant securitisation audience has in the past acted contrary to the expected norm, as stipulated in previous official documents and claims of SA itself, when confronted with human rights abuses on the African continent. We can construct the reasoning as follows: that other African states have acted as securitising actors by securitising a certain issue which would solicit a response from South Africa that is contrary to what is expected. For instance, in the cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan, South Africa reacted contrary to the expectations of many IR pundits, local and international media, and as it were, the country’s own explicitly stated foreign policy. If this is incorporated into Securitisation Theory, it can be seen that it is the referent object and the specific issue that is amiss. This thesis hypothesises that the referent object is State Rights (state sovereignty and African solidarity) and the specific issue is that of Western-Imperialism. The purpose of this study is to use Securitisation Theory to validate the hypothesis that South Africa accepts the validity claim from other African countries that Western-Imperialism serves an existential threat to regional solidarity and state sovereignty within the region.
RBLOC and our newly extrapolated inter-state level Securitisation Theory are to be viewed as frameworks within which this thesis will analyse the data that is presented. These two theories complement each other in supporting and illuminating various aspects within each theory. For instance, where Securitisation Theory can be employed to explain why certain social rules within the language games created by RBLOC are able to exert a particular influence, while RBLOC theory can pinpoint the assertions that securitising actor makes in successfully securitising an issue.

For a practical example of how the two constructivist theories complement each other, refer yet again to the previous example of the family that has securitised job loss. As was noted in our previous example, it is often easy to detect that securitisation has taken place (because the audience has allowed the securitising actor to act outside of the normal social and political boundaries), but, unless explicitly stated, it is not always as apparent as to why the audience allowed the securitisation: what existential threat was proposed by the securitising actor as threatening which referent object? If we use RBLOC to construct a language games the emulates the verbal and non-verbal speech acts up until the point where securitisation occurred, we can more easily identify what the referent object was and what existential threat was proposed. For instance, if we were to construct a language game for the family faced with job loss that recreates a dinner time conversation right before securitisation occurred, then if we could show that the family did not accept the validity claim of the securitising actor until he or she stated that the loss of the job would significantly decrease the family’s quality of life (for example) then we could deduce that in this case the referent object (something that for both parties possess a legitimate claim to existence) is most likely the family’s current quality of life and the existential threat to this being the possibility the income generator losing his or her job. Here RBLOC theory has therefore assisted Securitisation Theory by identifying the most likely causes of securitisation. Securitisation Theory, in kind, can assist RBLOC in explaining, at least in this thesis, why certain variables identified and shared by specific language games is able to exert an influence by positing that variable and the accompanying explanation within the sphere of securitisation.

In this work, RBLOC will be used to logically construct coherent language games (one each for the cases studies of Zimbabwe and Sudan), constituting speech acts of the relevant actors, which when analysed, will produce the necessary evidence of the influence of anti-Western-
imperialist rhetoric in the actions and responses of the South African government (and Thabo Mbeki) to humanitarian crises on the African continent. Thereafter, Securitisation Theory will be used to explain why anti-Western-imperialist considerations has this influence by means of casting the South African government as the audience actor in a typical securitisation move and using the theory’s relational framework between a mutually agreed referent object, legitimate existential threats, and an audience’s psycho-cultural disposition.

To achieve both of these goals a certain depth of data in terms of background knowledge and inter-state communications is required, in order to inform the language games and Securitisation Theory as well as some of the assumptions used throughout the course of the rest of this thesis. For the relevant background knowledge, we turn to the following chapter, Chapter Three, which will detail the most salient parts of South African post-apartheid foreign policy between 1994 and 2008 in terms of how it was shaped under the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki.
Chapter 3: Brief History of Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy (1994 -2008)

The following is an overview and summary of South African foreign policy during the tenure of the first two post-apartheid South African presidents: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. It is not meant to be a thorough exploration or in-depth analysis of foreign policy or foreign policy decision-making of the period, but rather a brief exposition to set the context for the rest of this thesis.

Primary information and research is supplemented throughout this chapter by the works of many respected authors and scholars in the field. The focus of this chapter will be divided between the two presidential eras starting with the Mandela years (1994-1999) and following with Mbeki’s tenure (1999-2008). Although the focus of this study is on SA foreign policy throughout the years of Mbeki’s presidency, the Mandela era will also be explored in order to detail the evolution of foreign policy directly after democracy, which laid the foundation for Mbeki’s influence.

The focus of the Mandela era section is on describing the historical foundations of post-apartheid South African foreign policy by emphasising the partial inheritance of apartheid policy and the role of increased multi-literalism and regional hegemony. Furthermore the early foreign policy incongruence of displaying African solidarity versus increasing economic development (sometimes at the expense of the rest of the continent), compounded by a lack of recognition of authority by the neighbouring states, is also explored as means to contextualise the Mbeki presidency that followed.

The section on the Mbeki presidency is aimed at describing and contextualising the various aspects of Mbeki’s foreign policy that will be most salient within the methodological frameworks of RBLOC and Securitisation Theory, which will be used in this study. Therefore the Mbeki section will: eliminate any doubt of South African being an Emerging Middle Power characterised by ‘niche diplomacy’ and interfering in global issues beyond its concern; highlight the Presidentialist aspect of Mbeki’s presidency that sought to centralise foreign affairs and policy decision within the president’s office; re-iterating the undeniable influence of Mbeki’s African Renaissance on South African foreign policy; exposing the selfish
‘National interest’ of South Africa in its renewed commitment to Africa, ultimately leading to concerns of hegemonic legitimacy from the region.

The description of the two presidential eras will be structured in such a way as to illuminate the natural evolution of foreign policy through the tenures of Mandela and Mbeki and how each aspect is influenced or supplemented by the next to form the interconnected morass of presidential personality, national self-interest and geo-political considerations that would eventually lead to the great incongruence between South African foreign policy in principle and foreign policy in practice.

3.1) The Mandela Years (1994-1999)

3.1.1) 1994: Democratisation of South Africa and its Foreign Policy

Following the first fully democratic South African elections in April 1994, the newly elected ANC party, as leader of the Government of National Unity, had certain international expectations to live up to. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, head of the ANC and the first ever democratically elected president of South Africa, a country beset by a tyrannical minority rule for 46 years, was regarded as a paragon of virtue and tolerance by the international community. Whilst South Africa, situated at the tip of a continent rife with habitual warfare and conflict - a country that managed a remarkably peaceful transition from a minority ruled apartheid system to a fully-fledged democracy - was to become a beacon of hope for a Western community who had grown tiresome of the ills and ailments of the ‘Dark Continent’. The process of democratisation did not however end at the ballot box, but also spilled over into other spheres of government such as foreign policy, with an ANC promise to democratise foreign policy decision-making. A promise bolstered by initiatives such as turning the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PCFA) into a core institution for broad public participation. Displaying even further commitment to the democratisation of the foreign policy decision-making process, the DFA published a document entitled the South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document in 1996 which had solicited input from academics and non-governmental institutions alike. Such a democratisation of the foreign policy office was in stark contrast to the apartheid foreign policy decision-making process which had previously been described as ‘oligarchic-bureaucratic’ (Geldenhuys, 1984:2) where decision-making was left to a small group of senior ministers and officials.
Although the ideological differences between the pre- and post-apartheid governments could not be starker, the general foreign policy had surprisingly remained relatively unaltered after the 1994 elections. Already in 1989 did Neil van Heerden, Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, usher in South Africa’s ‘New Diplomacy’, considered a foreign policy review necessitated in response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ and its impact on Soviet-African relations (Evans, 1999:255). The apartheid government at the time was moving away from the realist ideology of dominant military might characterised by the Total National Strategy towards maintaining their regional hegemony through non-coercive policy instruments such as diplomacy, trade, and economic co-operation (Evans, 1999:255). According to Evans the central tenets of this framework was simple and included the following: “… South Africa is part of Africa, African problems must be solved by Africans, Southern African states are interdependent and their security is indivisible, [and] regional issues should be approached in a spirit of co-operation and good neighbourliness” (Evans, 1999:255-256).

It was an already Afro-centric foreign policy that the ANC government inherited in 1994 and had, according to Evans (1999:266), apart from a few rhetorical flourishes kept the same throughout their rule. The similarities between the two eras of foreign policy are easily identified by comparing the tenets core to van Heerden’s ‘New Diplomacy’ to the main principles of the post-apartheid South Africa foreign policy as stated by Nelson Mandela himself in 1993 and later to be simplified and codified in such official government documents of the time such as a Department of Foreign Affairs Discussion Document on South African Foreign Policy (1996) and the White Paper on South African Involvement in International Peace Missions (1998). The various versions of the core foreign policy principles appear in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of Apartheid and Post-apartheid Era South African Foreign Policy Principles (Authors own design)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa is part of Africa.</td>
<td>Issues of human rights are central to international relations and an understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic, social and environmental.</td>
<td>A commitment to the promotion of human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African problems must be solved by Africans.</td>
<td>Just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of democracy worldwide.</td>
<td>A commitment to the promotion of democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern African states are interdependent and their security is indivisible.</td>
<td>Considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide the relations between nations.</td>
<td>A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional issues should be approached in a spirit of cooperation and good neighbourliness.</td>
<td>That peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed.</td>
<td>A commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in our foreign-policy choices.</td>
<td>A commitment to the interests of Africa in World Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an interdependent world.</td>
<td>A commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent world.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The foreign policy principles adopted by the ANC were, like those of the ‘New Diplomacy’, representative of a changing intellectual climate in the international diplomatic sphere following the end of the Cold War. The ANC was not lax in recognizing this shift in global thinking, emphasising the emergence of a “New World Order” (ANC, 1992) in its 1992 policy document on guidelines for international relations in a newly democratised South Africa. This ‘New World Order’, according to the ANC, included elements such as: “… the collapse of the socialist community of states”, “… the emergence of a uni-polar world …”, “… the division of the world in to essentially three major trading blocs …” and “… the marginalisation of Africa” (ANC, 1992). These realisations of the changing nature of international relations came to mould the subsequent core principles of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy. The promotion of democracy internationally was a natural reaction to the acceptance of the death of the socialist ideology and was an understandable priority of a country who had struggled for so long to obtain it, which can also be said of its commitment to the promotion of human rights. Furthermore the commitment to Africa naturally stemmed from the identification of its marginalised state in international affairs. These principles were thus pragmatic in acceptance of a changing world order, but were however not indicative of unanimity of opinion amongst ANC stalwarts.

Evans (1999) identifies three distinct developmental phases of ANC ideology from liberal internationalist (1912-1960) to socialist (1960- 1993) and eventually pragmatism (1993-), and states that during the creational period of these principles there was a great division between “second phase populists and ideologues” and “third phase pragmatists and neo-liberals” (Evans, 1999:624). Evidently these ‘second phase’ socialist notions were “… widely perceived both inside and outside South Africa to be atavistic and anachronistic” (Evans, 1999:624) and would eventually be superseded by the neo-liberal post-cold war foreign policy of the 90s after a series of in-house ANC party discussion documents.

3.1.2) South Africa the Emerging Middle Power: Multilateralism and Regional Hegemony

Part of the new neo-liberal and pragmatic ANC approach to foreign policy included the rapid re-integration of South Africa back into the community of nations from which it had so long been excluded. This rapid re-entry was characterised by quick and broad admission (or re-
admission in some cases) to international and regional inter-governmental organisations and institutions including:

- re-admission to the Commonwealth;
- resuming its seat in the United Nations;
- joining the G77
- joining the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU);
- joining the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC);
- joining the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM);
- re-joining United Nations Specialised Agencies such as ILO, WHO, FAO, etc.; and
- initiating negotiations with the European Union (EU).

(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1996)

According to the Department of Foreign Affairs (1996) the number of foreign state and official visits to South Africa increased significantly right after the end of apartheid. By 1996 South Africa had more than four-fold the amount of diplomatic missions abroad than a mere six years before, increasing from 30 missions in 1990 to 124 in 1996 (Barber, 2005:1082).

The rapid admission to a host of multi-lateral organisations, coupled with the large influx of international diplomatic missions, correlated with the Department of Foreign Affairs’ early identification of “the growing importance of multilateralism” (DFA, 1996). The emphasis on multilateralism led some authors (Cillers, 1999) at the time to conclude that South Africa inspired to “middle-power leadership”, which is characterised by foreign policy behaviour that promulgates multilateralism. Jordaan (2003:165) would further argue that South Africa exhibited traits indicative of an ‘emerging’ middle power: “… semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised … demonstrate[ing] much regional influence and self-association”. Emerging middle powers differ from traditional middle powers in that they are not anti-hegemonic, in fact displaying “much regional influence” as Jordaan (2003:165) concludes, which means these middle powers often are regional hegemons themselves. This creates an inherent incongruence (at least in a South African context) between being the regional hegemon in terms of economy (and naturally the associated regional influence) and prioritising multilateralism in accordance with middle power leadership. The incongruence is
best explained and most easily observed when examining two specific tenets of anti-apartheid foreign policy: African solidarity and economic development through regional cooperation.

3.1.3) Early Foreign Policy Incongruence: African Solidarity vs. Economic Development

African solidarity or the prioritisation of African, and specifically Southern African, interests in international relations had in the early years of post-apartheid South Africa been regularly re-iterated in official state documents that included the six key foundations of foreign policy (DFA, 1996; DFA, 1998) as well as by prominent and relevant government figures including President Mandela: “Southern Africa commands a special priority in our foreign policy” (Mandela, 1993:90) and the first post-apartheid Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo: "[i]n terms of foreign policy, Africa is clearly to be a priority in the years ahead" (DFA, 1996). This prioritisation laid the foundation for the following convictions. “When policies are formulated in South Africa, role players should consider the manner in which a particular issue presents an opportunity for South Africa to promote the interests of the SADC region or the African continent” (DFA, 1996) and “South Africa should deal with African partners as equals and avoid all hegemonic ambitions” (DFA, 1996). As noble and as adherent to a middle-power / multilateral foreign policy framework as these principles might be in theory, they were not always translated in practice. Mcgowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) concluded that, as evidenced by the archaic Southern African Customs Union (SACU) providing South Africa with ‘captive markets’ (Leistner, 1995:270) in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, and with a favourable and rapidly growing trade balance of almost four times as many exports than imports (in Rand value by 1994) to the rest of non-SACU Africa, South Africa is a ‘selfish regional hegemon’ that “… seeks national rather than regional security, tight border controls, and the aggressive promotion of exports and investments for economic growth and job creation …” (Mcgowan & Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:178). Although such selfish tendencies resulted in South Africa becoming a regional economic powerhouse, it did not however translate into diplomatic power within its region.

3.1.4) South African Regional Diplomacy: Unrecognised Authority

Internationally, outside the African continent, the newly democratised South Africa and its revered leader and paragon of humility and reconciliation, Nelson Mandela, amassed a significant amount of diplomatic clout. This clout however would prove not to be forthcoming in an African context as Mandela’s diplomatic authority in the African continent would be
questioned and undermined numerous times before the end of his presidential term in 1999. For example, in 1997 the governments of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe intentionally undermined the South African president, in his capacity as chairperson of the SADC, by announcing military support for the rebel besieged Lauren Kabila in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the umbrella of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (which at the time was still un-mandated and technically in limbo), going against the wishes of Mandela and creating a wide rift between Pretoria and Harare on how the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) should be dealt with (Cornwell & Potgieter, 1998:76).

Another instance of deteriorating South African regional diplomatic legitimacy was caused by a self-inflicted diplomatic disaster that courted international criticism - Operation Boleas. In September 1998 a 600-strong South African military force entered the sovereign kingdom of Lesotho in the midst of election-related unrest, responding to a supposed written invitation by Lesotho’s Prime minister which would exonerate its actions in accordance with SADC agreements. According to Williams (2000:100) it had in retrospect become clear that SADC had not given permission for military intervention in Lesotho as the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, the only grouping with the legal mandate to authorise such an intervention, was still inactive at the time. Accordingly the ‘invasion’ attracted severe criticism from both Lesotho and international media (Poku, 2001:152).

Both the DRC and the Lesotho fiasco are examples of events that raised the levels of animosity amongst SADC members towards the biggest economic force within the region. Mandela eventually stepped down as President of South Africa after only one term, whether because of the animosity from the SADC, old age (he was 75 at the start of his first term as president), adhering to earlier promises, or another reason all together is unknown. He was succeeded in 1999 by his deputy-president Thabo Mbeki.

3.2) The Mbeki Years (1999-2008)

3.2.1) South Africa: Undoubtedly an Emerging Middle Power

By the turn of the 21st century it had become undeniable that South Africa had indeed become an ‘emerging middle power’ as Schoeman (2000) and Jordaan (2003) suggest. Defined as “… semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association”, emerging middle powers “… behaviourally opt
for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region” (Jordaan, 2003:165). Having democratised in 1994 and sporting a GINI coefficient of 63.1 in 2005, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (2014), which made it the second most materially unequal country in the world after Lesotho, South Africa definitely qualified as being recently democratised and materially inegalitarian. Furthermore although post-apartheid South Africa is cautious to explicitly articulate its claim to regional dominance due to historical legacy, it did stake its claim economically “… through SACU and SADC at the sub-regional level and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) at the continental level; and in regional security and defence issues as well, through the SADC and the African Union (AU)” (Flemes, 2009: 141).

Middle-power states also “… typically adopt an activist style in that they interfere in global issues beyond their immediate concern” (Jordaan, 2003:167). This characteristic of the post-apartheid state is highlighted by their involvement in various forms of ‘niche diplomacy’. A term coined by Australian international policy maker and politician, Gareth Evans, niche diplomacy refers the ability of middle-power states “… to concentrate their resources on a few issues they perceive as of particular importance to them” (Galligan, McAllister & Ravenhill, 1997:247). The niche international issues that the South African government had extensively pursued at this point included the extension of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1997 convention banning landmines, and the Kimberley process, aimed at halting the international trade in blood diamonds. According to Hudson, niche diplomacy in South Africa actually “… developed to counter the increased centralisation of foreign policy in the office of President Thabo Mbeki” (Hudson, 2010:113). The argument that Hudson (2010:113) makes is that a centralisation of the foreign policy decision-making in the presidency, indicative of presidentialism, necessitated the need for sub-state authorities to pursue areas of concern through transnational networks of domestic agencies, as evidenced in the increase of direct transborder links of these authorities.
3.2.2) Thabo Mbeki: Bringing Presidentialism to Post-apartheid South Africa

“...[T]he distinguishing feature of South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is how obviously policy has moved from the ministry of foreign affairs into the president’s office – particularly it seems into the hands of Mbeki” (Vale & Maseko, 1998:284)

Whereas the government under Mandela had made great strides and efforts in the democratisation of the foreign policy process through the PCFA, Mbeki sought to bring policy-making back under the sole command of the president’s office. The creation of The Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) was indicative of Mbeki’s goal of policy centralisation. Being one of the four branches of The Presidency, the PCAS was tasked with maintaining five focus areas, which were intended to mirror the Cabinet and Director General Clusters, of which ‘International Relations and Trade’ is one. The PCAS was established to provide “… support and advice to The Presidency on matters related to policy co-ordination, implementation and monitoring” (The Presidency Annual Report 2002-2003, 2003:35). The International Relations and Trade PCAS unit was meant to provide specialist support to the Cabinet Committee on International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), which it mirrored. According to The Presidency, this support was necessary in order to achieve the “… integrated planning, decision-making and implementation system …” adopted by the Cabinet Office (The Presidency Annual Report 2002-2003, 2003:32). Serving as Chair of the International Relations and Trade PCAS, Mbeki had, according to Butler (2009:212), “… dominated the cluster of International Relations, Peace and Security (IRPS), intervening sometimes heavy-handedly in foreign investment promotion, the creation of the AU, the Zimbabwe crisis, and NEPAD, among other [things]”.

Van Wyk (2004:122) confirms that the creation of the PCAS on International Relations and Trade had the net effect of “… centralis[ing] inputs into the foreign policy process, and to make it even less accessible to the public at large”. A sentiment further echoed by 2003 IRPS cluster review by the Institute of Global Dialogue, who was tasked with reviewing the government’s foreign policy over the previous ten years. During a focus group meeting held in May 2003 involving a “range of academics”, eleven foreign policy “anomalies” where identified by the group, one of which was “[t]he reluctance to fully democratise foreign policy making processes” (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2003:4).
Furthermore, although it is stated in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998) that “[t]he President, acting on advice from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence, will decide in principle whether or not to authorise the deployment of the required military forces” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:32) in practice, according to Kent and Malan, “… very little emphasis is placed on consultation and co-ordination between responsible government institutions” (Kent & Malan, 2003:1) and that to date “… decisions continue to be taken at the level of the Presidency with little or no prior consultation or input from other levels of government, state departments, civil society or Parliament” (Kent & Malan, 2003:3).

If Presidentialism should be defined as the centralisation of power in one office and person then, at least in terms of foreign policy, South Africa under Thabo Mbeki can be considered a presidentialist state.

Mbeki’s preoccupation with foreign policy and his desires to centralise it does not entirely surprise if one reflects on his early years as member of the liberation movement. During his formative years in exile he was groomed to be the “… articulate and charming face of the struggle” (Gevisser, 2010:124) and later became the ANC’s chief spokesperson in his capacity as head of the Department of Information and Propaganda. A natural born diplomat, Mbeki would travel the world in the late 1970s aside Oliver Tambo, head of the ANC liberation movement at the time, setting himself up as a highly successful public relations man. Mbeki had been inextricably involved with ANC foreign policy from a young age and had also at the same time made known his distaste for delegation, earning himself the nickname of the ‘National Interferer’ within the top structures of the ANC because of constant interference in other’s portfolios (Gevisser, 2010:166). Mbeki’s desired intimacy with foreign policy decision-making would eventually lead to the man’s own personal beliefs inevitably becoming intermingled with national foreign policy. And one would have to look no further than Mbeki’s idea of an ‘African Renaissance’ for a comprehensive summation of such private beliefs.

3.2.3) Mbeki’s Renaissance: The African Renaissance

First articulated in 1946 by the Senegalese historian, anthropologist, physicist, and politician Cheikh Anta Diop, the African Renaissance speaks of the cultural, economic and scientific renewal of the African continent and its people, overcoming all contemporary challenges in the process. This concept was renewed, 50 years later, by Mbeki who in 1996 in his now famous

Analysing five of Mbeki’s more noteworthy speeches, from 1998 – 2001 (Mbeki, 1998; Mbeki, 1998; Mbeki, 1999; Mbeki, 2000; Mbeki, 2001), on the issue of the African Renaissance the message is clearly articulated and reiterated time and time again that “… [t]he first objective we confront in this regard [the African renaissance] is that we must ourselves take on the responsibility to answer the question - what are the ways and means that we must adopt to ensure that we achieve these objectives!” (Mbeki, 2001). For Mbeki, the renaissance has always been for Africans, by Africans.

The importance that the resurgence of Africa held for Mbeki inevitably translated into the call for a renewed commitment to the African continent. A call that would become characteristic of foreign policy in the Mbeki presidency.

3.2.4) South African Foreign Policy: Renewed Commitment to Africa

The presidentialist nature of the Mbeki regime dictated that foreign policy would inevitably be moulded to the Presidents own convictions and one can easily identify the parallels between Mbeki’s idea of an African Renaissance and a national foreign policy adherence to, what Fakir (2007) refers to as, an ‘African Agenda’. While Fakir admits that the definition of the ‘African Agenda’ as a whole remains imprecise and elusive, denoting only general debates on processes to promote African democracy and governance and the challenges that they face (Fakir, 2007:1) he is however more confident in stating that South Africa’s ‘African Agenda’ “… serves an obvious and critical role of setting out the continentalist agenda of the country’s mainstream political establishment, as evidenced by the vigorous participation in and support of various
Collective activities and programmes on the continent” (Fakir, 2007:1). This vigorous participation is exemplified by the increasingly prominent role Mbeki played in continental affairs during his tenure: chairing the first session of the AU in 2002 and his involvement in “… negotiations to settle conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and the Comoros, as well as in mediation in Zimbabwe and Swaziland” (Barber, 2005:1089).

Mediating conflict on the continent related to one of the strategic goals of the ‘African Agenda’, which was the search for peace and security in Africa (Fakir, 2007:2). Mbeki had shown the willingness to achieve this lofty goal by not hesitating to commit numerous South African National Defence Force (SANDF) troops to AU and United Nations (UN) peace missions on the continent, a commitment which indicated a clear difference from the Mandela years according to Barber (2005:1090). The frequency of peacekeeping engagements on the continent was however preceded by the ‘White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions’ (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998) which was adopted by Parliament in October 1999, a document which sought to confirm South Africa’s commitment to international peacekeeping missions as well as to standardize the procedures for involvement. Although this document spoke of peacekeeping on a wholly global scale it did concede that while “… South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20).

A commitment to continental financial assistance was explicitly stated through the African Renaissance an International Co-operation Fund Act (Act No 51 of 2000), which was promulgated on 22 January 2001 and provided for the establishment of the African Renaissance an International Co-operation Fund. This fund proposed, among other things, to establish a platform for the South African government to identify and fund, in a proactive way “… [c]o-operation between South Africa and other countries, particularly African countries” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2000:1).

The vigorous involvement of post-apartheid South Africa in Africa through continuous mediation, increased peacekeeping efforts, and financial interventions provide evidence of a commitment to the prioritisation of the African continent at the time. A commitment that while first being proposed by the Mandela presidency would take on a more tangible and evident nature through the foreign policy of Mbeki. This commitment could be attributed to the
fulfilment of South Africa’s national interest as argued in a section regarding ‘Peace missions and National Interest’ in the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). Here it is stated that the key principles on which SA foreign policy is based, a “…important component of this definition of national interest…” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20), necessarily dictate that “… it is in the South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20). The Mbeki government believed that it was in the national interest of South Africa and a benefit to all her peoples that the country mediate, build peace on and provide financial support the rest of the continent. Such a declaration is not necessarily as altruistic as it would superficially appear, depending on how national interest is characterised.

3.2.5) South African Foreign Policy: the Definition of National Interest

The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions stated in 1998 that “… the level and size of South African contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to our national interests” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:3). What exactly these national interests were at the time remains a contentious issue. According to some publications from the DFA, national interest was centred around the continental African upliftment, to “… assist[ing] peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998:20) and to “… the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment, to the protection of the vulnerable and for the transformation of our continent …” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2004:7). This idealist portrayal of foreign policy was however contradicted by more realist statements such as in a 1999 address by Jackie Selebi, Director General of the DFA at the time, which identified South Africa’s national interest as revolving around two broad themes: “… namely the creation of wealth for the country and all her people, and secondly ensuring the security of the country and all her people” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999). The latter, more realist view of South African foreign policy objectives, and therefore national interest, seemed to find traction amongst academics at the time (Flemes, 2009; Alden & Le Pere, 2009; Hudson, 2010).

Some academics argued that although official South African foreign policy was dressed in the humanitarian-centric and idealist rhetoric of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, the objectives in
practice still remained the fulfilment of selfish materialist national interests such as the relative economic growth and national security. For instance, Flemes contends that Pretoria had adopted a ‘South Africa first’ regional policy, deriding the contradictory nature of country that commits itself to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment on the continent, but at the same time promotes the self-serving liberalisation of African economies while it remains “… common knowledge that a liberal market policy that neglects redistribution measures leads to income inequity with a great proportion of poverty…” (Flemes, 2009:148). This contradictory stance helped, according to others Alden and Le Pere, to establish and maintain a vast trade discrepancy between South Africa and its continental trading partners, with trade heavily skewed in its favour (Alden & Le Pere, 2009:157). And finally, Hudson would go as far as to claim that economic imperatives have overridden the moral dimension “… so much so that we can now declare that human rights are no longer the driving force behind our foreign policy – trade and economic diplomacy are” (Hudson, 2010:109).

The argument regarding the selfish economic hegemon, which was previously also proclaimed in the Mandela era, remains debatable, but for now it is pertinent to remember that despite the underlying drives behind SA’s economic growth it still remained an economic powerhouse in Southern African at the time, dominating trade and investment in the region. And that this hegemonic dominance contributed to the region’s discomfort about South Africa’s leadership (Sidiropoulos, 2008:114). A discomfort which eventually translated into regional concerns about the legitimacy of South African foreign policy.

3.2.6) South African Regional Hegemony: Concerns of Legitimacy

Although almost unanimously accepted further abroad, South Africa’s leadership remained questioned closer to home by neighbouring southern African states, some of whom viewed it as a “… selfish hegemon bent on advancing its narrow economic interest at the expense of less developed African countries” (Flemes, 2009:149). South Africa was perceived as a perpetual self-interest seeker of preferential access to developed country markets as evidenced in its participation in the US African Growth and Opportunity Act and its Free Trade Agreement with the European Union (EU) whilst at the same employing highly protectionist measures against neighbouring countries such as against Zimbabwean manufactures (Lipton, 2009:335). This approach, coupled with Western encouragement of its regional leadership, garnered South
Africa the unwelcome distinction of being referred to as a ‘lackey of the West’ by disenchanted neighbours (Schoeman, 2003:358).

This general environment of suspicion produced South Africa’s ‘softly, softly’ Quiet Diplomacy approach under Mbeki, who remained sensitive to criticisms of regional bullying (Sidiropoulos, 2008:114). The approach of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe and Sudan where characterised by “… South Africa [avoiding] flexing its muscles to compel the incumbents to negotiate a resolution in good faith …” and going to “… great lengths to protect the incumbents from sanctions or international pariah status” (Sidiropoulos, 2008:115).

Mbeki’s approach of Quiet Diplomacy in dealing with leaders perpetuating humanitarian crisis on the African continent would eventually become the policy that would embody the great incongruence between South African foreign policy in principle and foreign policy in practice.

3.3) The Great Incongruence: Foreign Policy in Principle and Foreign Policy in Practice

The examples of Zimbabwe and Sudan are indicative of the incongruence between Mbeki’s national foreign policy in principle as explicitly stated in official government communication and foreign policy in practice as witnessed in diplomatic and economic dealings in Africa. As are the contradictions between South African commitment to the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment on the African continent in principle and a seemingly orchestrated enforcement of a status quo that sees a large discrepancy in continental trade in the favour of South Africa. And again when South Africa’s principled commitment to the promotion of human rights and democracy is seemingly superseded by Mbeki’s feeble ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ approach in the practice of dealing with the gross violations of human rights and the disintegration of democracy. It is the latter incongruence, regarding Quiet Diplomacy, which is pertinent to a question that forms the implicit basis of this thesis: Why did Mbeki adhere to the failing Quiet Diplomacy despite his explicit and passionate commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights on the African continent? The answer to which is, as the research and analysis in this thesis will indicate: because of the substantial influence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations in shaping Mbeki and South Africa’s foreign policy to the African continent. And the following two case studies of Zimbabwe and Sudan will use RBLOC to gather substantial evidence to support such a claim, supplemented by the background knowledge provided within this chapter.
Chapter 4: Case Study One: The South African Response to the Economic and Political Collapse of Zimbabwe in the 21st Century.

This chapter details the first of the two case studies to be conducted in this thesis. The focus in this chapter is on the economic and political crisis that had steadily been developing in Zimbabwe since the year 2000, cumulating in an undeniable collapse of the Zimbabwean economy by 2007 and a full blown humanitarian crisis at the time. Specific focus is put on the foreign policy that South Africa had pursued during and after this collapse. The eventual policy, and thus the eventual action theorem of this language game, that Pretoria pursued under leadership of Thabo Mbeki, was one of Quiet Diplomacy. This chapter will argue that not only was Quiet Diplomacy the only viable and rational recourse left for Mbeki from a set of options, thereby reducing the perceived ambiguity of SA foreign policy, but more importantly that this was only the case because of the presence of an implicit anti-Western-imperialist principle in South African foreign policy that was triggered by the introduction of Western-imperialist rhetoric by the Mugabe. What follows is a summary of the events that occurred during this crisis and the relevant background knowledge that can be gleaned from and used for constructing the language game thereafter.

4.1) South Africa and the Use of ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ during the Zimbabwe Crisis

During the year 2000 the president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, commenced with a state sanctioned and enforced land reform program that entailed white owned farmlands within Zimbabwe being expropriated and redistributed amongst landless blacks. Some analysts believe that the land reform program was enacted to divert attention away from Zimbabwe’s troubled economy which had already entered “free fall” by 1997 (Taylor & Williams, 2002:549), whilst others argue that the government’s blatant disrespect for the law of property rights directly attributed to the ensuing economic collapse (Richardson, 2005). Regardless, by 2007 the annual inflation rate was 1,200% and 80% of Zimbabweans lived in poverty (Meldrum, 2007). The impending economic collapse that was prevalent during the land reform program from 2000 to 2003 rallied opposition parties, especially the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), within Zimbabwe to openly criticise Mugabe’s competence as ruler of the country. These criticisms however were met with large scale state sanctioned attacks and forceful oppression of the MDC and its supporters (Dempster, 2003), especially before the 2002 Zimbabwean elections, which many independent non-partisan observers believed was ruled by fear and violence (Analysis: How Free and Fair was the Poll?, 2002). It is the combination of the land reform program, the economic collapse, and the suppression and intimidation of opposition parties that came to be referred to internationally as the ‘Zimbabwe crisis’.

As the Zimbabwe crisis was unfolding, international actors looked to South Africa and Mbeki to use its considerable power within the region to address the crisis in Zimbabwe (Graham, 2006:117; Schoeman & Alden, 2003:1). Rather than intervening directly through military force or sanctions, Mbeki opted to not openly criticise Mugabe, but rather convene with him privately, a diplomatic method referred to as Quiet Diplomacy (Graham, 2006:117). However as the years passed and the crisis within Zimbabwe grew, it became apparent that Mbeki’s use of Quiet Diplomacy was not succeeding in changing the Zimbabwean domestic policies and that Mbeki had also inexplicably changed his position from non-criticism to open endorsement of Mugabe (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:390) as demonstrated by, for instance, Commonwealth meetings where he “…accused the prime ministers of the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia (Tony Blair and John Howard) of being racist and of being unwilling to let black nations take the lead” (Barber, 2005) and Mbeki fighting to protect Mugabe, even from opponents within Africa (Malala, 2005).

By the year 2008, when Mbeki resigned as president, the Zimbabwean crisis had been unfolding for the past 8 years without any significant change in Mbeki’s policy of Quiet Diplomacy. This unwavering commitment to Quiet Diplomacy however has not yet been adequately explained by realist theory. Throughout the crisis Zimbabwe had posed a significant threat to South African security: it is a politically unstable neighbouring country marred with violent opposition oppression; it has been estimated that Zimbabwe’s neighbours have lost £25 billion in revenue due to the crisis (Taylor & Williams, 2002:549); and a reported 1,5 million illegal Zimbabwean immigrants have flooded the country since the start of the crisis (Latham & Cohen, 2011). Realist theory would dictate that South Africa, with larger military and
economic capabilities, would actively pursue measures of direct intervention, if not militarily then at least economically in the form of sanctions. However, realism cannot adequately explain Mbeki’s continued use of Quiet Diplomacy coupled with explicit support for the Mugabe regime. A rule-based, language-orientated constructivist approach can.

An accurate explanation of Mbeki’s continuous adherence to the policy of Quiet Diplomacy coupled with explicit support for Mugabe with regards to the Zimbabwean crisis requires that one first provide relevant background knowledge that will provide the context for the pre-established social rules as well as the reconstructed language game itself. A pragmatic analysis of the constructed language game follows and the exercise concludes with a hypothesis test.

4.2) Background Knowledge and Context

When detailing the relevant background knowledge needed to establish a hypothesis regarding a valid set of social rules governing the South African / Zimbabwe dialogue, it is pertinent to first start with an exploration of Mbeki’s “African Renaissance”.

As previously mentioned the idea of an African Renaissance was only formally used for the first time in a 1997 address by Mbeki, but it resonated equally strong throughout Mbeki’s earlier “I am an African” speech of 1996 and since then it has been a major influence on South Africa’s African policy (Vale & Maseko, 1998:273). In a statement regarding the African Renaissance in 1998, Mbeki neatly conceptualises his idea of an African Renaissance, lambasting the popular Western view of Africa as a continent of savages and calling for a continental renaissance reminiscent of the ones in Europe in the 15th and 16th centuries (Mbeki, 1998). Besides the aforementioned speech and statement there are also numerous other explicit statements by Mbeki regarding the African Renaissance during the time period from the start of his presidency until the beginning of the Zimbabwe crisis, such as The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World (1998), Speech at the Launch of the African Renaissance Institute (1999), Address on the African Renaissance to the Ghana-South Africa Friendship Association (2000), and Address at the Third African Renaissance Festival (2001). Together these can be used to construct a comprehensive picture of Mbeki’s own convictions regarding the African Renaissance.
Although there are undoubtedly numerous principles of Mbeki’s African Renaissance apparent under close scrutiny, for the purposes of this thesis only the principles salient to the current language game will be identified. The following three principles relevant to this language game are particularly evident throughout all of Mbeki’s statements regarding African Renaissance. Firstly there is a very strong call for African solidarity throughout Mbeki’s African Renaissance: an apparent belief in an Africa for Africans, by Africans. Throughout his speeches Mbeki rarely singles out specific countries or groups on the continent, besides to lament particular atrocities that had befallen them in the past. Instead he continuously and regularly refers only to the singular Africa and the need for the continent to escape the colonialist shackles of the past and together ensure the “rebirth and renewal of our continent” (Mbeki, 1999). According to Vale & Maseko (1998: 281-282) an Africanist interpretation of Mbeki’s renaissance further consolidates the idea of African solidarity, regarding it as the only way to move the continent away from being marginalised in the internal system.

Secondly, Mbeki, within almost all of his statements on the African Renaissance, is prone to constant reminders of the role that Western-imperialists have played in the subjugation of the African continent. Mbeki makes reference to the three periods of Western control: slavery, imperialism and colonialism, and neo-colonialism (Mbeki, 1999). He laments that the “… colonisers sought to enslave the African mind and to destroy the African soul[,] [t]hey sought to oblige us to accept that as Africans we had contributed nothing to human civilisation except as beasts of burden” (Mbeki, 1999) and that the “… former colonial powers continued to hold in their hands the power to determine what would happen to the African people over whom, in terms of international and municipal law, they no longer had any jurisdiction” (Mbeki, 1998). For Mbeki the next evolutionary step for Africa is “… from neo-colonial dependence to genuine independence and democracy” (Mbeki, 2001). Furthermore he states that the history of the continent continues to be “euro-centric, colonial and racist” (Mbeki, 2000) and that the West has “… lost all sense of the noble of human solidarity” (Mbeki, 1999). These constant reminders are surely indicative of a perpetual cognisance that Mbeki has of the negative influences of Western-Imperialism and colonialism.

Lastly, it is apparent throughout Mbeki’s detailing of an African Renaissance that both the promotion of democracy and of human rights throughout the continent is crucial to the success
of the renaissance. When defining ‘genuine’ liberation, Mbeki rebukes military governments and one-party states as failed attempts at stable systems of governance on the continent and that liberation through good governance can only be achieved through the institutionalisation of democracy in Africa (Mbeki, 1998). Similarly, in terms of the promotion of human rights on the continent, Mbeki speaks at length about enhancing the capacity of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union) to promote just that (Mbeki, 1998). For Mbeki it is imperative that Africa, in its own interest, organises itself such that democracy and respect for human rights prevails (Mbeki, 2001).

However, not all the principles used for the construction of the rules inherent to this language game are as explicitly stated in Mbeki’s speeches on the African Renaissance. Some require a little bit more inference on behalf of the reader of Mbeki’s statements. For instance, Mbeki’s continued abhorrence to the ideas of colonialism, in any form, coupled with his insistence of the value of multilateral forums such as the OAU, empowered to intervene to resolve conflicts on the continent (Mbeki, 1998), belies the fact that despite the desire for African solidarity, Mbeki still strongly values individual state sovereignty and the right of one state to be free from the unilateral influences of another. Similarly the onus throughout his speeches are on the use of non-violent diplomatic measures to resolve interstate disputes, either between individual states or through continental forums such as the OAU. South African support of state sovereignty and multilateralism, and advocacy of the use of non-violence and diplomacy to resolve interstate disputes is according to Merle Lipton (2009:332) further corroborated by numerous other political analysts.

The last, but equally important, piece of background knowledge needed to fully and adequately propose a set of rules that govern the South African / Zimbabwe dialogue is the popular belief amongst some African States that South Africa is in fact an agent of the Western world. According to Lipton (2009:33), countries such as Nigeria, Angola and Libya appear to view South Africa as a pawn of Western-Imperialism, a sentiment seemingly shared by Mugabe who has uses the “ideology of North-South struggle” to brand South Africa as a “… puppet of the west and a traitor to the struggle” (Schoeman & Alden, 2003:12).
4.2.1) Rules

Considering the background and contextual knowledge previously discussed, one can legitimately and rationally construct the following set of five social rules that are relevant to the following language game between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The rules themselves are formulated based on the previously presented assumptions that Mbeki’s psycho-cultural disposition is portrayed through explicit statements regarding his ideological adherence to the African Renaissance and that the highly centralised nature of foreign policy under Mbeki naturally entails that his own psycho-cultural disposition would greatly influence foreign policy and therefore the rules of this dialogical game. Therefore, it is imperative that the rules themselves logically correspond to the main themes of Mbeki’s African Renaissance. The following five rules have been created for this language game and are hereafter presented as statements followed by the rationale for the construction of these rules.

**Rule 1: African Solidarity is a desired state in continental affairs.**

This rule is inferred from Mbeki’s perpetual call for a collective African revival, orchestrated through interdependent states within the continent.

**Rule 2: State sovereignty is highly regarded and no external state should infringe on another’s autonomy unless under exceptional circumstances.**

As mentioned previously, the clear distaste for colonialism and imperialism throughout Mbeki’s African Renaissance naturally implies a respect for the sovereignty of African states, free from the unilateral machinations of other states. This principle is further entrenched in documents such as the *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions* (1998) which “… recognises the sovereign equality of all member states …” of the SADC and the *2003 – 2005 DFA Strategic Plan* (2004) which states that the “… concept of equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations must underpin our relations”.

**Rule 3: Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible**

Following Mbeki’s cognisance of the negative influences of Western colonial and imperialist influences, as portrayed through constant public statements to the effect, it is logically inferred that Mbeki believes such Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible.
**Rule 4:** Only non-violent and diplomatic means should be used in interstate disputes

As discussed in Chapter 3, South Africa had by the 21st century begun to exhibit all the qualities of an emerging middle power. An important quality of middle power foreign policy is that it seeks to reduce conflict within the global system by “involving other like-minded states (in terms of the issues at hand) in an attempt to arrive at a workable compromise, usually through multilateral channels and institutions” (Jordaan, 2003:167). This aspect of middle power foreign policy is closely mirrored in the African Renaissance rhetoric of Mbeki which espouses the virtues of collective action through multilateral channels such as the OAU. Naturally then it is logical to infer that Mbeki’s emerging middle-power brand of foreign policy would advocate only non-violent and diplomatic means to settle interstate disputes.

**Rule 5:** Democracy and human rights should be promoted and protected where possible.

This is one of the easiest rules to establish as the need for the promotion of democracy and human rights on the continent is regularly stated with clarity throughout Mbeki’s statements on the African Renaissance as discussed previously.

### 4.3) Reconstructed Dialogue and Analysis

The following represents a reconstructed language game between South Africa and Zimbabwe. It is important to note that this reconstruction is neither a verbatim exposition of any actual negotiation that occurred between the two parties nor is it supposed to reflect a single closed-door negotiation session. Rather this particular language game is reconstructed using explicit speech acts (verbal and non-verbal), garnered from a variety of sources, that span the course of Mbeki’s nine year tenure as the president of South Africa. This reconstruction is also not completely perfect in a chronological sense, as such a dialogue would be lengthy, but rather it focuses on the main assertions made by each party and their relevant responses. As such the dialogue begins with a non-verbal speech act, the expropriation of farmlands in 2000 and the ensuing suppression of political opponents, which is considered as the start of the Zimbabwe “crisis”, and ends with South Africa publicly supporting Mugabe whilst still maintaining the policy of Quiet Diplomacy. The last proposition is also the action theorem for this dialogical analysis and therefore it has to be proven that this policy can logically be deduced from the dialogue that precedes it when one takes into consideration the context (social rules) within which this dialogue takes place.
The reconstructed dialogue reads as follows:

1. **Zimbabwe**: Expropriates land and suppresses political opposition (non-verbal speech act).

2. **South Africa**: The domestic practices of Zimbabwe are steering it towards an economic and political crisis (verbal speech act).

3. **Zimbabwe**: The current domestic practises of Zimbabwe are justified and anyone who disagrees is an agent of Western-Imperialism (verbal speech act).

4. **South Africa**: South Africa will publicly support Zimbabwe, but will continue to privately influence the Zimbabwean government. (verbal speech act).

A pragmatic analysis follows that details each speech act including a brief explanation of the information and material that substantiates the inclusion of each act, the implicit propositions conveyed (referred to as implicatures), and which social rules these implicit propositions invoke, construct or contest.

4.3.1) Pragmatic and Argument Analysis

Speech Act 1: Zimbabwe (non-verbal speech act): Expropriates land and suppresses political opposition.

Starting in the year 2000, the Zimbabwean government forcibly removed white land owners from their farms in order to redistribute this land amongst landless black Zimbabweans. In a speech on the anniversary of Zimbabwean independence in the same year Mugabe spoke of the country’s victory over imperialism and colonialism, but expressed concern that some Western countries still abuse the UNSC and regional organisations in pursuit of “… subtle and dirty regime change agendas under the guise of supporting democracy, rule of law and human rights” (Mugabe, 2001). Here Mugabe refers to the “illegal” sanctions of the West in response to the redistribution of land, referred to officially as the indigenisation and empowerment policy (Mugabe, 2001). According to Richardson (2005), this expropriation of land commenced under the guise of countering the impact of Western-Imperialism as the rationale behind the land reformation was to redress the “… British seizure of fertile farmland in the late 1890s, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of blacks being, pushed onto lower grade communal lands” (Richardson, 2005:541). In the following three years, as land expropriation continued, the
Zimbabwean economy completely collapsed to a point where, in 2003, inflation had reached 500%. This economic collapse can in a large measure be directly attributed to the land reforms (Richardson, 2005:542).

Within the same timeframe as the land reform and economic collapse Zimbabwe also experienced a state imposed “draconian” security legislation which was characterised by “… overt violence, suppression of dissent, and the arrest and torture of opposition political supporters” (Dempster, 2003). Most of this political suppression was targeted towards the MDC, Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, and its supporters (Dempster, 2003). According to the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA, 2008) the run up to the July 2000 parliamentary elections claimed 34 victims, intimidation and torture of MDC members were reported, and approximately 18,000 people experienced various violations of their human rights. Although no official explicit statements were ever issued by the ZANU-PF in support of political violence or the interference in the democratic process, later legislations and amendments serve as evidence to bolster the argument that Mugabe and the ZANU-PF were actively using their governmental powers to undermine democratic practices within the country. For instance, the year 2002 saw the passing of the controversial Public Order and Security Bill and the General Law Amendment Bill. The former allowed for the fining and imprisonment of persons found guilty of “[p]ublishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the State” and / or “[u]ndermining the authority of or insulting the President” (Public Order and Security Act, 2002). The same document also criminalised the failure to produce an Identification Document at “… any public gathering or a public meeting of a political nature” (Public Order and Security Act, 2002). The General Laws Amendment Bill would amend the electoral act to disenfranchise two to three million Zimbabweans abroad, require the consent of authorities for the distribution of campaign materials and require election observers to become subject to government accreditation (EISA, 2008).

Implicatures:

- White owned farmlands are an example of Western-Imperialism and therefore Zimbabwe is justified in expropriating them (Invocation: Rule 3).
- Retaining political power is more important than the protection of Human rights and the ideals of democracy (Contestation: Rule 5).
Speech Act 2: South Africa (verbal speech act): *The domestic practices of Zimbabwe are steering it towards an economic and political crisis.*

At the start of the Zimbabwean crisis, between 2000 and 2003, Mbeki and the South African government was publicly neither overtly supportive nor critical of Mugabe and the situation in Zimbabwe. Mbeki claimed that Zimbabwe’s problems were internal affairs and that the rule of sovereignty had precluded it from interference (Schoeman & Alden, 2003:4). Early official statements by the South African president would consistently call for the peaceful and necessary resolution to the land redistribution crisis in Zimbabwe (DIRCO, 2000; Mbeki urges end to land crisis, 6 May 2000; The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 2001), but would never publicly chastise or lay the blame for the crises on Mugabe or the ZANU-PF, preferring to remind all Zimbabweans of their common responsibility to find a lasting solution to their collective problems (DIRCO, 2002).

However, if publicly South Africa did not denounce Zimbabwe, there is evidence to support that Mbeki tried to intervene privately in behind closed doors. In early 2000, Mbeki, together with Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, met with President Mugabe in a regional summit that would discuss the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe (*Zimbabwe Crisis Summit*, 2000). Refusing to accept the “… view among some people that if you shout at the President of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe government and make big press statements, big headlines, then you have done a good thing” (The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, 2001), Mbeki would rather resort to writing a 37-page “discussion paper” regarding the situation in Zimbabwe which “… set out a series of stark warnings and recommendations …” and was presented to Mugabe at the 2001 African Union Summit (Blair, 2008). This methodology is in accordance with Mbeki’s policy of Quiet Diplomacy at the time that entailed not overtly criticising Mugabe in an attempt to make ‘… President Mugabe more amenable to negotiations behind the scenes’” (Taylor & Williams, 2002:559).

The closest that Mbeki would come to publicly fault the Zimbabwean President was in a press conference held for foreign journalists at the end of 2001 where, in response to a question regarding the validity of the upcoming Zimbabwean elections, he responded by stating that “…
Clearly in a situation in which people get disenfranchised, in which people get beaten up so that they don't take an honest decision or act according to their political convictions, obviously there can't be free elections” (McGreal, 2001).

Implicatures:

- South Africa contests the validity of Zimbabwe’s proposition that retaining political power is more important than the protection of human rights and democracy (Invocation: Rule 5).
- South Africa’s respects Zimbabwe’s right to sovereignty and autonomy (Invocation: Rule 2).
- South Africa will only use diplomatic means in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis (Invocation: Rule 4).
- If Zimbabwe continues on its current path it will lead to economic and political crisis, such a crisis might lead to the exceptional circumstances needed for South African to infringe upon Zimbabwean sovereignty (Invocation: Rule 5).

**Speech Act 3: Zimbabwe (verbal): The current domestic practises of Zimbabwe are justified and anyone who disagrees is an agent of Western-Imperialism.**

Since the beginning of the land reforms and the subsequent suppression of political opposition, Mugabe and the Zimbabwean state has continuously justified its domestic practices by employing the language of Western-Imperialism (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:387). Mugabe, throughout various statements, would ask the West to stop interfering in domestic issues and “… let [him] keep [his] Zimbabwe” (Hands off Zimbabwe, Mugabe tells Blair, 2002), label Britain as “oppressors and colonials” (Warren, 2002) attempting to “re-colonise” Zimbabwe (Mugabe blames UK for crisis, 2003), and would accuse Western powers of sabotaging the country’s economy (West sabotaging Zim, 2003).

Although mostly employed to counter Western criticism of his domestic policies, Mugabe also manipulated the language of anti-Western-Imperialism to brand any African critic as an agent of Western-Imperialism. Most notably, after Mbeki’s previously mentioned statement noting his concern over the legitimacy of elections in Zimbabwe, the Herald Newspaper, a mouthpiece
for the ZANU-PF at the time (Ingram, 2002), would accuse South Africa of “…conspiring with Britain to overthrow Mugabe” (Ingram, 2002: 134) and of “…furthering the agenda of domestic and imperialist lobby” (Graham, 2006:121).

Implicatures:

- South Africa is not adhering to the principle of African solidarity (Invocation: Rule 1).
- Because South Africa is not adhering to Rule 1, it is therefore an agent of Western-Imperialism (Construction, Rule 6: Any state that does not agree with Zimbabwean domestic policy is an agent of Western-Imperialism).
- Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and no other state has the right to interfere in its domestic practices unless under exceptional circumstances (Invocation: Rule 2).
- Zimbabwe’s contests the validity of the South African proposition that current domestic policy of land expropriation and political suppression constitutes the exceptional circumstances required to justify external intervention (Construction, Rule 7: Land expropriation and political suppression does not constitute the exceptional circumstances required to infringe on a state’s sovereignty).

Speech Act 4: South Africa (verbal speech act): South Africa will publicly support Zimbabwe, but will continue to privately influence the Zimbabwean government.

By the close of 2002 South Africa government had moved away from an impartial stance regarding the situation Zimbabwe towards an open endorsement of Mugabe and his practices (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:390). In November 2002, the South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, endorsed Zimbabwe’s rationale of its land reform program as an act of defiance against Western-Imperialism. The following month, at the African National Congress’s 51st national congress, Dlamini-Zuma again expressed solidarity with Mugabe and in 2003 the South African government expressed outrage at the extension of Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:390-391).
The explicit public support for Mugabe however went hand-in-hand with continued Quiet Diplomacy as Mbeki had met personally with Mugabe on many occasions during his presidency and on more than one occasion did Mugabe promise Mbeki “good” behaviour only to renege on these promises afterwards (Graham, 2006:115-116). This policy of Quiet Diplomacy, with its balance between public support and private condemnation, continued throughout Mbeki’s tenure which ended in 2008.

Implicatures:

- South Africa accepts the validity of newly constructed rule number 6.
- South Africa is not an agent of the West (Invocation: Rule 6).
- South Africa accepts the validity of newly constructed rule number 7.
- South Africa will continue with quiet diplomatic engagements (Invocation: Rule 4).
Figure 3. Visual Representation of South Africa / Zimbabwe Language Game (Author’s own design)

2000
Start of the Zimbabwe crisis

Early 2000 – Zimbabwe expropriates white farmlands

July 2000 – ZANU-PF suppresses political opposition in run up to elections

End 2000 – Mbeki suggests that Zimbabwe election won’t be free

End 2000 – Zimbabwe accuses SA of conspiring with West and furthering imperialist lobby

2000 to 2002 – Zimbabwe accuses West of imperialism and sabotage

2000 to 2002 – Mbeki calls for peaceful and collective resolutions to Zimbabwe crisis

Speech Act
I: Zimbabwe

Speech Act
II: South Africa

Speech Act
III: Zimbabwe

Speech Act
IV: South Africa

2002

Zimbabwe

South Africa
4.4) Hypothesis Testing

An analysis of the various moves within the Zimbabwe / South Africa language game, taking into account the context within which this game was played, rationally justifies the South African action theorem which is the continued use of Quiet Diplomacy whilst publicly supporting Zimbabwe’s actions. In fact it would seem that such a policy was ultimately the only available to South Africa at the time. The main factor that limited South Africa’s possible moves was Mbeki’s strong endorsement of the African Renaissance and its principles, specifically those of African solidarity, respect of sovereignty and anti-Western-Imperialism, as will be explained forthwith.

The promotion of an African renaissance had already limited South Africa’s response to Zimbabwe’s initial act of land expropriation and political opposition suppression. We can assume that Mbeki privately did not agree with Zimbabwe’s domestic policy at that stage, as confirmed by various sources previously cited, but at the same time he could not intervene publicly or directly due to the social rules of African solidarity and the utmost respect for the sovereignty and autonomy of another state. It was a “precarious balancing act”, as Lipton (2009:333) so succinctly states it, which arose from the tensions between certain principles of the African Renaissance and South Africa’s foreign policy at the time, “… particularly with regards to sovereignty and anti-imperialism, on the one side, and the defence of democracy and human rights on the other” (Lipton, 2009:333). At this point an obvious policy solution towards Zimbabwe did not present itself to South Africa and Mbeki due to the tensions between these social rules. If South Africa did intervene decisively it would have opened previous South African verbal commitments of solidarity and sovereignty to what game theorists refer to as “cheap talk”. Cheap talk is a term that some game theorists apply to any conversational commitments, arguing that these commitments can be reneged on without any penalty to the agent that made the commitment in the first place, but as Duffy et al. argue, cheap talk might not be so cheap after all, as “… bargainers who regularly renege on their verbal commitments soon find themselves without bargaining partners.” (Duffy et al., 1998:275). Therefore one has to consider that if Mbeki reneged on his previous commitments to solidarity and sovereignty, as enshrined within his doctrine of African Renaissance, he and his renaissance might well have completely lost legitimacy within the broader African political sphere.
While the seemingly contradictory social rules of African solidarity and respect for sovereignty on the one hand and the protection of democracy and human rights on the other hand had provoked the use of Quiet Diplomacy, it would seem that Zimbabwe’s branding of South Africa as an agent of Western-Imperialism (third speech act) ultimately entrenched this policy. Fighting Western-Imperialism was another important principle of Mbeki’s African Renaissance as South Africa had previously been suspected of being an agent of the West by the larger African political community. It would seem that Zimbabwe’s construction of social rule number six: *Any state that does not agree with Zimbabwean domestic policy is an agent of Western-Imperialism*, would severely limit any future game possibilities. At this point Mbeki had to choose between either public intervention on the grounds of the protection of democracy and human rights, which would entail a complete loss of legitimacy for his African renaissance project, or to publicly support Mugabe, thereby publicly adhering to at least three out of the four social rules that he himself helped construct and promote, and privately continuing with Quiet Diplomacy, thereby trying to promote the fourth. Logically, Mbeki’s only choice in the context of this game would be the continued use of Quiet Diplomacy whilst publicly condoning the actions of Zimbabwe.

This testing of the initial hypothesis regarding the social rules that governed the speech acts between South Africa and Zimbabwe has proved coherent with South Africa’s final and actual action theorem, thereby validating these social rules. This case study therefore proves that anti-Western-imperialist considerations is a fundamental, if not officially promoted, principle of South African foreign policy and that it was only after the introduction of anti-Western-imperialist rhetoric by Mugabe that the decision to respect State Rights over Human Rights became cemented in the foreign policy regarding Zimbabwe. Although this was only one case study which could arguably be denounced as an isolated case, it does begin the lend credence to the theory of anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a variable able to influence South African foreign policy. Next we look at the case study regarding Sudan and the Darfur crisis for corroborating evidence.
Chapter 5: Case Study Two - The South African Response to International Allegations of Genocide in the Darfur Region of Sudan (2003 - ?)

The second of the two case studies analysed in this thesis, the Sudanese humanitarian crisis is one that was born out of a long-standing animosity within the country culminating in what has been described as genocide in the Darfur region. A more thorough and insightful background exposition will be given in the first part of this section which will serve as the contextual background to a language game similar to the one constructed in the Zimbabwean case, albeit with three actors this time: South Africa, Zimbabwe and the US. The final dialogical analysis of the completed language game will once again demonstrate the prevailing influence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations in the final outcome derived from the preceding speech acts.

5.1) South Africa and the Use of Multi-Lateral Forums within the United Nations during the Darfur Crisis

Straddling the divide between northern and southern Africa, accommodating both ethnic Africans and Arabs alike, it was inevitable that Sudan, like so many racially and culturally heterogeneous countries, would experience ethnic tensions throughout its history. In the region of Darfur such tensions could be traced back to the 1930s, intermittently resurfacing thereafter, and most recently in the 1980s (Dagne, 2004:5).

The current crisis started in February of 2003 with the emergence of two ethnically African rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), challenging the National Islamic Front (NIS) government in Khartoum. The rebels claimed that the government discriminated against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur and systematically targeted these groups since the 1990s (Dagne, 2004:5). The Khartoum Public Defence Force (PDF), with the help of the local Arab militia known as the Janjaweed (devils on horseback), responded with a “brutal campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleansing” (Bellamy, 2006: 31) of ethnic Africans and those supportive of the rebels in the region. In 2013, the UN estimated that as many as 300,000 people have been killed, 1.4 million displaced within
the region and countless others have fled to neighbouring countries as a direct result of the crisis in Darfur (Darfur Conflict, 2013).

The death tolls and ethnic specificity of the killings led Mukesh Kapila, UN coordinator in Sudan, to labelling the violence as genocide. The US senate would later that same year pass judgment on the role ethnicity played in the killings, declaring a state orchestrated genocide in the Darfur region. Although it would not refer to the crisis as genocide, the UN did, on the 11th of June 2004, officially recognise the crisis in Darfur by the passing of Resolution 1547, calling “… upon the parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region …” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1547, 2004:2). The fighting, however, failed to subside and between 2004 and 2005 the UN passed many more resolutions regarding the crisis in Darfur, each expressing harsher admonishments of the Sudanese government in Khartoum than the next, culminating in March 2005 with the passing of three resolutions. One, resolution 1590, authorised force to protect civilians. Another, resolution 1591, passed a travel ban on war criminals, and lastly, resolution 1593 referred Sudan to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Throughout the crisis Sudanese president Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir had denied any genocide in his country and if there was then he denied any involvement, rather blaming the West for a protracting the crisis for their own interests. In 2009 al-Bashir became the first acting president of a sovereign state to be indicted by the ICC for international war crimes.

South African involvement with Sudan had started even before the Darfur crisis had erupted into an international humanitarian concern. Pretoria had been intimately involved in the ongoing peace process in the violent south of the country, culminating in South Africa chairing the AU Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Sudan established in 2003, the first such committee of its kind. Under the auspices of this chair, South Africa, at the request of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), would embark on a very comprehensive program for the development, training and capacity building of the people of Southern Sudan aimed at expediting the process of government transition in the region. At the start of the crisis, in 2003, South Africa would spend much time elucidating the crisis in Darfur, as well as the need for a swift and sustainable resolution through official state communiqué. It was however during 2007, after South Africa’s admittance as a non-permanent
member of the UNSC, that the country would have the most international political clout to facilitate such as resolution. However, during this time international media and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would accuse SA of abusing its position in various UN forums to blindly defend Sudan and President al-Bashir. In 2008 the Human Rights Watch would write a public letter to the deputy minister of foreign affairs of South Africa expressing their dismay over South Africa’s actions in both the UNSC and the UN Human Rights Council (HRC)(Human Rights Watch, 2008). Specific mention was made of SA voting, on the 28th November 2006 at the HRC, against a draft resolution that would call “… for all parties, including the Sudanese government, to bring to justice those responsible for killing, raping, and injuring civilians in the Darfur region of Western Sudan” (HRW, 2008) only to vote for a ‘weaker’ resolution thereafter which would place no such responsibility on the Khartoum government. Further accusations of South Africa using UN forums to support the Sudanese government include the following:

In 2007, having been elected to the UN Security Council, South Africa backed Sudan in rejecting a resolution that could lead to sanctions against combatants who attacked civilians, obstructed peace initiatives, or refused to cooperate with UNAMID, the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. Pretoria also opposed a resolution condemning rape as a political and military instrument, tabled by the United States in the UN General Assembly in 2007, because it believed that the US was targeting the government of Sudan. (Nathan, 2011:56)

South Africa stood accused of having a foreign policy that explicitly supported an internationally recognised despotic regime as evidenced through their stance in official UN forums. But why would the South African government, who had thus far used all manner of diplomatic measures to solve the crisis specifically in Darfur, and in Sudan in general, seemingly exacerbate the problem by actively blocking harsher measures against President al-Bashir and the Sudanese government? This question can once again be rationally answered by analysing a detailed language game that played itself out during the period of 2003 to 2007 under the presidency Thabo Mbeki.
5.2) Background Knowledge and Context

In the interest of consistency, the context and rules of the following language game regarding the crisis in Darfur will be informed by the same principles of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, as was the case with Zimbabwe.

5.2.1) Rules

As with the Zimbabwe case the following set of five social rules, derived from Mbeki’s African Renaissance, are relevant to the following language game:

**Rule 1:** African Solidarity is a desired state in continental affairs.

**Rule 2:** State sovereignty is highly regarded and no external state should infringe on another’s autonomy unless under exceptional circumstances.

**Rule 3:** Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible.

**Rule 4:** Only non-violent and diplomatic means should be used in interstate disputes.

**Rule 5:** Democracy and human rights should be promoted and protected where possible.

5.3) Reconstructed Dialogue and Analysis

The following represents a reconstructed language game structured as a dialogue through speech acts. It differs from the Zimbabwe case in that it follows the speech acts of three, rather than just two actors: South Africa, Sudan and the United States of America. But it is similar to the previous case in that the reconstruction is neither a verbatim exposition of any actual negotiation that occurred between the two parties nor is it supposed to reflect a single closed-door negotiation session. Rather this particular language game is reconstructed using explicit speech acts (verbal and non-verbal), garnered from a variety of sources, that span the course of Mbeki’s nine year tenure as the president of South Africa. This reconstruction is also not completely perfect in a chronological sense, as such a dialogue would be lengthy, but rather it focuses on the main assertions made by each party and their relevant responses.

The US is included in this specific dialogue as a representative of ‘the West’ and also as it has been one of the most verbal, both within the UN and in international media, opponents of the crisis in Darfur and specifically the regime of President al-Bashir. The reconstructed dialogue starts with the US labelling the situation in Darfur as genocide and ends with South Africa
using its position within UN forums to block certain resolutions against Sudan. In this case the final speech act by South Africa will once again be regarded as the action theorem for this dialogical analysis and as usual it has to be proven that this policy can logically be deduced from the dialogue that precedes it when one takes into consideration the context (social rules) within which this dialogue takes place.

Speech Act 1: United States (verbal speech act) – *The events in Darfur amount to genocide.*
Speech Act 2: South Africa (verbal speech act) – *The situation in Darfur, although serious, does not amount to genocide and should be solved through indirect diplomacy.*
Speech Act 3: United States (verbal speech act) – *Uses the UN as a platform to try and change Sudanese governments behaviour.*
Speech Act 4: Sudan (verbal speech act) – *Accuses the US and the West of imperialism.*
Speech Act 5: South Africa (verbal speech act) - *Uses its position in UN to block resolutions against Sudan.*

5.3.1) Pragmatic and Argument Analysis

Speech Act 1: United States (verbal speech act): *The events in Darfur amount to genocide.*

According to Article 2 of UN treaty 1021 entitled the ‘*Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide adopted by the general assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948*’:

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

(United Nations, 1951: 278)
In March of 2004 Mukesh Kapila, UN co-ordinator for Sudan, referred to the crisis in Darfur as “… ethnic cleansing … characterised by a scorched-earth policy [that] was comparable in character, if not scale, to the 1994 Rwandan genocide” (Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan, 2004). At the 4988th meeting of the UNSC on the 11th of June 2004, the representative of the US reiterated a statement of the day before, by the leaders of the Group of Eight, in which they “expressed their grave concern over the humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in Darfur” (United Nations Security Council, 2004:2). That same day the US voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1547, the first resolution passed in the UN referring specifically to the Darfur crisis which “… [called] upon parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region” (United Nations Security Council, 2004:2). Resolution 1547 also confirmed the UNSC’s commitment to respecting the sovereignty, independence and unity of Sudan.

On the 22nd of July 2004 the United States Senate declared, through unanimous vote, that the ‘… atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide” (United States Senate, 2004). Later that month at the 5015th meeting of the UNSC on the 30th of July 2004 the US representative laid the blame for the situation in Darfur squarely at the feet of the Sudanese government, accusing Khartoum of arming the Janjaweed militia and encouraging them to attack civilians (USNC, 2004:4). At the same meeting the US, amongst others, proposed a draft resolution which while once again reaffirming the UNSC’s “… commitment to the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and independence of Sudan …” (United Nations Security Council, 2004:1) also introducing the possibility of sanctions should the government not have complied with certain measures to ease the crisis within 30 days. The US representative expressed that, with regards to Resolution 1556 “… many people who are concerned about Darfur would say that this resolution does not go far enough …” and that those same people would want the Security Council to label the situation in Darfur as genocide as the US Senate had previously done (USNC, 2004:4).

In the first speech act of this reconstructed dialogue the US labels the situation in Darfur as genocide and places blame thereof on the Sudanese Government. It does not however suggest that the international norm of state sovereignty be broken to facilitate behavioural changes.
Implicatures:

- Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped immediately (Invocation: Rule 5).
- The events that occurred, by the end of 2005, in the Darfur Region of Sudan are to be constituted as a genocide by the official Sudanese government (Construction, Rule 6: *As of 2004 the Sudanese government is committing genocide in its own Darfur region*).
- The current genocide does not constitute an ‘exceptional’ circumstance needed to violate state sovereignty (Construction, Rule 7: *Genocide does not constitute ‘exceptional’ circumstances needed to violate state sovereignty*).
- UN members should use the threat of sanctions to try and persuade the Sudanese government to change its current policy in Darfur (Invocation: 4).

**Speech Act 2:** South Africa (verbal speech act): *The situation in Darfur, although serious, does not amount to genocide and should be solved through indirect diplomacy.*

Before the crisis in Darfur, Mbeki and South Africa had been integrally involved in the peace efforts pertaining to the war between north and south Sudan, an effort that the South African president and his government were never silent about. Presidential communiqués, official speeches, and other government documents during 2003 and early 2004 reveal the concern of Pretoria regarding the conflict in Sudan and the immediate resolution thereof. In February 2003 Dr. Dlamini Zuma, minister of foreign affairs at the time, visited Khartoum were she was informed on the peace process and settlement of the conflict in Southern Sudan (DIRCO, 2003). In March the same year Mbeki referred to the “problem” in Sudan and how it could not be resolved without an inclusive process (The Presidency, 2003). One of the explicitly stated foreign policy priorities for the South African government in 2003 was to “… continue ongoing efforts to achieve peace and stability …” in Sudan (van Nieuwkerk, 2004:96). South Africa also took the lead as chairman to the newly established AU Ministerial Committee on Post-conflict Reconstruction in Sudan in 2003.

Later in 2004 and 2005, when the situation in Darfur had become an undeniable crisis and humanitarian disaster, the South African government once more used public forums and official state documents to draw attention to the crisis in the region and the need for its
resolution. High profile official state visits were made: the two highest ranking South African government officials independently visited Sudan over the course of a month, with Deputy President Jacob Zuma meeting with Dr. John Garang, the chairperson of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), on the 3rd of December 2004 to discuss, amongst other issues, the "Darfur conflict" (DIRCO, 2004), and Mbeki meeting with al-Bashir over new year’s 2004 to discuss resolution of the “conflict situation in Darfur” (DIRCO, 2004). In official public statements, such as to the European parliament in November 2004, Mbeki expressed his conviction that under the leadership of the AU and “… whatever the current difficulties …” the conflict in Darfur will be resolved (DIRCO, 2004). Official state documents such as the Department of Foreign Affairs Annual Report 2004/05 acknowledged that “… the proportions of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur increased during 2004 and the beginning of 2005” (DFA, 2005: 144).

By 2005 South Africa had made it clear that there was indeed a serious conflict in Darfur that had amounted to a humanitarian crisis which was in need of immediate resolution. Pretoria would however not propose that Sudan’s state sovereignty be violated in order to facilitate immediate resolution, rather espousing an ‘inclusive process’ (The Presidency, 2003). Throughout this period of time the South African government would not officially make mention of the terms ‘genocide’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ with regards to Darfur, siding with the AU general assembly who in July 2004 noted that “… even though the humanitarian situation in Darfur is serious, it can not be defined as a genocide” (AU, 2004:28).

As its first speech act, the South African government would make it clear that while it was cognisant of a humanitarian disaster in the Darfur region and would use any means of indirect diplomatic measures to seek a speedy resolution thereof, it would not concede that genocide is being perpetrated nor that any direct actions that could possibly violate the sovereignty of Sudan should be pursued.

Implicatures:

- Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped immediately (Invocation: Rule 5).
- The situation in Darfur, by the end of 2005, does not constitute genocide by the Sudanese government (Contestation: Rule 6).
- The current situation in Darfur does not constitute as an ‘exceptional circumstance’ needed to violate the sovereignty of the Sudanese State (Invocation: Rule 2).
- South Africa believes that the crisis in Darfur can only be solved through indirect diplomatic means (Invocation: Rule 4).

**Speech Act 3:** United States (verbal speech act) – *Uses the UN as a platform to try and change Sudanese government’s behaviour.*

From 2005 the United States started applying more pressure on the Sudanese government in UN forums. In March 2005 resolutions 1590 and 1591 were passed by the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1591 proposed a travel ban on war criminals from Sudan and Resolution 1590, supported by the US, authorized the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMIS), acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter, to take “… the necessary action … to protect civilians under threat of physical violence” (UNSC, 2005:6). Chapter VII of the UN charter, pertaining to *Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*, asserts that if the Security Council determines the existence of any such threats it may decide to institute diplomatic measures including the “… complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”, and call on UN members to enforce such pressures on violators (UNSC, 2014). In the event that such measures prove to be inadequate the Security Council may decide to “… take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UNSC, 2014). Later that same month the US would table a draft resolution, later to be voted in as Resolution 1593, which would specifically target individuals responsible for the crisis in Darfur. The resolution stated that UN member states shall “prevent entry into or transit through their territories” of all persons, designated by a special UNSC Committee, who impede the peace process or constitute a threat to stability in Darfur as well as “… freezing all funds, financial assets and economic resources …”(UNSC, 2005:4) of said persons.

In August 2006 the US, together with ten other states, would submit another draft resolution that would eventually be adopted as Resolution 1706. This resolution called for 17,300 UN
military personnel to be deployed in Darfur to strengthen United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and authorised the mission to “use all necessary means” to support the peace process, prevent the disruption thereof and prevent attack and threats against civilians (UNSC, 2006:6).

In its second speech act, the US would utilise the full power of its resources and political clout to draft and support a range of resolutions that seek to apply even greater pressure on the Sudanese government to change its current behaviour including: economic and diplomatic sanctions against the state of Sudan; international travel restrictions and asset freezing of its highest officials; the deployment of a sizeable UN peacekeeping force authorised to ‘use all necessary means’ to maintain peace in the Darfur region.

Implications:

- Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped immediately (Invocation: Rule 5).
- The US can and will use its superior resources and political power to change the behaviour of the Sudanese government through UN sanctions, restricting state officials and the deployment of peacekeeping forces (Construction: Rule 8 – The US can and will use its multi-lateral forums such as the UN to try and change the behaviour of other states).

Speech Act 4: Sudan (verbal speech act) – Accuses the US and the West of imperialism

Not soon after the UN co-ordinator for Sudan referred to the events in Sudan as ‘ethnic cleansing’ did Sudan begin blaming the West of enflaming the Darfur situation. According to the Sudan Tribune, senior Sudanese officials had as early as June 2004, during a state visit to Cairo, accused the west of “stirring” and “exaggerating” the conflict in Darfur, explaining that the conflict was “fabricated” by the international community, particularly the West (Sudan Blames West for Darfur Conflict, 2004). Some believed that this fabrication was Western media falsely attempting to present the crisis as a race or religious war, whereas “… the people of Sudan are all Africans, be they Black-Africans or Arab-Africans” (Prah, 2004). Others such as Egypt’s Al-Ahram and Syria’s Al-Ba’ath newspapers specifically accused the US of deliberately stirring trouble in the region in pursuit of its own oil interests (Igiri & Lyman, 2004:21-22). This is a notion reiterated by Khartoum who in August of 2006 rejected UNSC
Resolution 1706 which authorised an AU / UN hybrid peace-keeping force in Darfur, describing the resolution as “… part of a comprehensive conspiracy for confiscating the country’s sovereignty” (African Union ‘will Quit Darfur’, 2006) and portraying a potential UN force as “… a tool in a Western effort to get access to Sudan’s oil” (Schneider, 2006).

During the 5153th meeting of the UNSC, in March 2005, a representative of Sudan accused the US of inflexibility in the negotiations on a draft resolution which they had proposed (UNSC, 2005). This resolution would be voted in at the same meeting as Resolution 1593 and pertained to the travel ban on war criminals. The Sudanese representative would further state that resolution 1593 was “… a resolution of the United States Congress – a Congress that does not know the history of peoples, does not read the history of other nations and does not know about the cultures of other people, because it does not read about those cultures” (UNSC, 2005).

Khartoum would continue to place the blame on Western doorsteps throughout the crisis. In March 2007, President al-Bashir, in his first interview with Western journalists in three years, would once again accuse the US of trying to seize Darfur’s oil riches (Sudan’s al-Bashir Denies Role in Darfur Violence, 2007) and in November the same year he accused British Prime Minister Gordon Brown of deliberately undermining the Darfur peace talks (Sudan Blames West for Crisis, 2007).

In this penultimate speech act the Sudanese government accuses the US of enflaming the crisis in Darfur for the benefit of its own interests and using the UN as a forum to push its own brand of neo-imperialism.

Implicatures:
- The US should not use its superior resources and political power to change the behaviour of the Sudanese government through UN sanctions, state official restrictions and the deployment of peacekeeping forces (Contestation: Rule 8).
- The current involvement of the US in the Darfur situation constitutes Western-Imperialism (Construction: Rule 9 – The US, using its clout and resources to push an agenda through UN and its media outlets is considered a form of Western-Imperialism).
• The situation in Darfur would be resolved without Western-imperialist intervention (Invocation: Rule 3).

**Speech Act 5: South Africa (verbal speech act):** *South Africa uses its position in UN to block resolutions against Sudan.*

On the 28 of November 2006 a decision on Darfur was adopted by the HRC that called on all parties to sign a Peace Agreement, noted the seriousness of the humanitarian situation in Darfur and called upon the Sudanese Government to continue and intensify its cooperation with the Human Rights Council (UNHRC, 2006). This decision was initially proposed by Algeria on behalf of the Africa group and was supported by SA. On the previous day, SA would oppose amendments, proposed by Finland and Canada, to the decision that would have “… [emphasised] the primary obligation of the Government of Sudan to protect all individuals against violations, including sexual and other forms of gender-based violence and the use of child soldiers” and called on all parties to “… [assist] in bringing to justice those responsible for grave crimes under international law” (UNHRC, 2006).

On 16 April 2007 South Africa’s representative to the U.N., Dumisani Kumalo, stated that South Africa had embraced a pragmatic foreign policy, one that urges countries like Sudan to resolve their disputes through negotiations and that the government in seeking to counter “… an imbalance of global power …” in the U.N. Security Council, where the “… United States, Britain, France, Russia and China use their authority to attack enemies and to shield friends” (Lynch, 2007).

A day thereafter (17 April 2007), President Mbeki, in a TV interview regarding a recent trip to Karthoum to meet with President al-Bashir on the issue of Darfur, expressed the need for “the Sudanese government to act against people who might have committed crimes against humanity” and that this need was shared with al-Bashir. Mbeki also related both men’s concern over disagreements between the UN, AU and Sudanese government regarding the deployment of helicopter gunships and who would be in control of them as “… they are not your normal peacekeeping military equipment, they're combat equipment” (DIRCO, 2007). The lack of clarity regarding the issue of whether the hybrid force would have two commanders, one from the AU and one from the UN, was also noted by Mbeki as being of concern as “… you can't have one military force with two commanders” (DIRCO, 2007).
In the 5717th meeting of the UNSC, on the 16th July 2007, South African Ambassador Dumisini Kumalo reported on a UNSC visit to Khartoum in which the Sudanese foreign minister as well as President al-Bashir confirmed their acceptance of a hybrid UN-AU operation should it be proposed, a statement confirmed by the representative of the UK speaking on behalf of Ambassador Jones Parry who accompanied Mr. Kumalo on the trip (UNSC, 2007:2-4). The next day however a draft proposal for an AU / UN hybrid force, which included the possibility of sanctions against Sudanese officials, was rejected by South Africa with Ambassador Kumalo warning that any talk of sanctions in the draft was "totally unacceptable" (Opposition to Darfur Resolution, 2007). Finally on the 31st of July, South Africa would lend it support and help to vote in Resolution 1769 which authorised the deployment of an AU / UN hybrid force in Darfur. This resolution would make no mention of sanctions (UNSC, 2007).

In November 2007 South Africa was accused of leading a frontal attack on a US submitted draft resolution entitled Elimination Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence in all their Forms and Manifestations, including in Conflict and Related Situations because it believed that the US was targeting the government of Sudan (Nathan, 2011:56). Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad would later rebuke these allegations claiming that South Africa had rather taken issue with the perceived “categorisation of rape” in the draft resolution that would differentiate between rape by “… military and militia groups and rape by civilians” (DIRCO, 2007). Minister Pahad called for a broad and de-politicised resolution of rape and proposed that the issue had been advanced more effectively with South Africa’s call for a better approach, rather than “… having no input and just accepting what is proposed by other countries …”, adding that “… South Africa will never accept a position that if its big countries that propose resolutions we must accept them as given” (DIRCO, 2007).

By this time, still no mention of genocide has been made with regards to the situation in Darfur, neither from the South African government or the AU.

By the end of 2007 South Africa would make it clear that while it was still actively pursuing a quick and sustainable resolution to the crisis in Darfur, it would not tolerate any interference in the peace process by Western powers acting in self-interest.
Implicatures:

- Gross human rights violations are occurring on Sudanese soil and should be stopped immediately (Invocation: Rule 5).

- The West, specifically the US, should not capitalise on its favourable position in the imbalance of global power to change the behaviour of the Sudanese government by calling for sanctions against Sudanese officials and by politicising the nature of rape in the UN (Contestation: Rule 8).

- The US in using its superior resources and political power to push neo-imperialism through the UN (Acceptance: Rule 9 – *The US, using its clout and resources to push an agenda through the UNSC and its media outlets is considered a form of Western-Imperialism*).

- Western-Imperialism should be countered where possible in multi-lateral forums such as the UN (Invocation: Rule 3).
Figure 4. Visual Representation of South Africa / United States / Sudan Language Game

2004 – Start of the Darfur crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>UN coordinator in Sudan refers to crisis in Sudan as ‘ethnic cleansing’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Sudan accuses West of exaggerating Darfur conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 2004</td>
<td>US backs Res. 1547 calling recognising situation in Darfur and calling for a halt to fighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July 2004</td>
<td>US blames Khartoum for genocide at 5015th UNSC meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December 2004</td>
<td>Zuma meets with chairperson of SPLM to discuss ‘Darfur conflict’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>US supports UN Resolution 1590: Travel ban on Sudanese war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Sudan accuses US of inflexibility in drafting resolution and of ignorance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>US proposes UN Resolution 1593: Place travel and asset restrictions on Sudanese officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>US proposes UN Resolution 1706: Reinforce UNMIS and authorise ‘all necessary means’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Sudan reduces Res 1706 as tool in Western effort to access Sudanese oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 2006</td>
<td>SA rejects UNHRRC with talk of sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April 2007</td>
<td>SA expresses its pragmatic foreign policy and warns of ‘imbalance of global power’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 2007</td>
<td>SA rejects draft proposal on AU / UN hybrid force with talk of sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April 2007</td>
<td>Mbeki notes joint SA/Sudan concern over foreign military forces in Sudan and leadership of AU / UN hybrid force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Speech Act I: US
Speech Act II: SA
Speech Act III: US
Speech Act IV: SUDAN
Speech Act V: SA
5.4) Hypothesis Testing

As with the case of Zimbabwe, Mbeki’s promotion of an African Renaissance, specifically the principles of African solidarity, respect for sovereignty and anti-Western-Imperialism, would severely limited the moves of the South African government at the time.

The African Renaissance and the fear of ‘cheap talk’ would once again limited SA’s response to the initial crisis to indirect diplomatic rather than direct military or economic response. Mbeki could not break his unwavering commitment to the respect of sovereignty and African solidarity, two integral ideals prescribed within his African Renaissance, for fear of delegitimising the whole paradigm. Therefore SA would continue its efforts of negotiating a settlement to the North-South civil war and try to use the amassed political clout thereof to seek a speedy resolution to the Darfur crisis as well. This would unfortunately not happen.

The principle of anti-Western-Imperialism would once again play an important role in the proceeding of language game, limiting South Africa’s responses along the way. Khartoum painting the US as a neo-imperialist using its superior resources and political clout to further its own interests in the region coupled with the Mbeki’s convictions regarding African solidarity and anti-Western-Imperialism would mean that the South African President’s responses were limited to being ‘supportive’ of the Khartoum. This does not mean that he would have to condone the situation in Darfur, nor that he would not privately try to sway the hand of president al-Bashir, but that in multi-lateral forum such as the UN he would have to counter perceived acts of Western-Imperialism where possible for the sake of legitimising his African Renaissance.

Once again, as with the case of Zimbabwe, testing of the initial hypothesis regarding the social rules that governed the speech acts between South Africa and Sudan has proved coherent with South Africa’s final and actual action theorem thereby validating these social rules. This case study, in addition to the first, shows that anti-Western-Imperialism played a major role in limiting the moves available to Thabo Mbeki and the SA government regarding a response to the crisis in both Darfur and Zimbabwe.
Chapter 6: Western-Imperialism – an Existential Threat Buried in the Psycho-Cultural Disposition of Mbeki

In both the case studies conducted for this thesis it is apparent that Mbeki’s persistent beliefs a) in combating Western-Imperialism where encountered, b) the necessity for African solidarity, and c) the unimpugnable sanctity of state sovereignty, all principles promulgated in his African Renaissance, had seriously limited the availability of rational ‘moves’ that Mbeki would be able to make in response to those of the governments of Mugabe and al-Bashir. Mbeki would not be able to openly oppose the practices of the Sudanese or Zimbabwean governments of the time for fear of contradicting the principles of his own African Renaissance and therefore risk de-legitimising the whole initiative in the eyes of the rest of the African continent. This explains the tentative ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ approach initiated in response to both cases whereby conspicuous support for the regimes was coupled with constant, but subdued, diplomatic attempts to privately resolve the issues in each country. Although the statement ‘the availability of Mbeki’s moves were limited’ can easily be misconstrued as advocacy of external limitations that forced the hand of the South African president, it is the opposite that is in reality being advocated here. In this case the ‘limitation of moves’ is meant to indicate that it is Mbeki’s own beliefs and world views that limited the number of political options available to him in dealing with the countries mentioned while still be rationally congruent. To elucidate this hypothesis RBLOC was used to show that all the actions of the president were rational in that they followed rationally from the choices that he had limited himself to. These limitations themselves are evident in the Mbeki’s African Renaissance which can be said to reflect both the psychological and cultural influences of the man himself or rather his psycho-cultural disposition if you will.

Psycho-cultural disposition is the wording used by Balzacq when speaking of the pragmatic practice of a securitising speech act that does not happen in isolation, but in a configuration of circumstances, including, but not limited to, the “psycho-cultural disposition of the audience” (Balzacq, 2005:72). The audience in this case being the ones that complete the securitisation process by accepting the validity of the securitising move of the securitising actor. With the use of security theory one can logically deduce not only certain facets of the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience (in this case Mbeki acting as SA president) at the time, but also ascertain the nature of the relevant referent objects (objects that possess a legitimate claim to
survival as mutually agreed by actor and audience) and what threats constitute an existential threat to such referent objects. How this is achieved is explained in the following section, but achieving it serves the dual purpose of not only strengthening the argument for anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a dominating factor within South Africa / Africa diplomatic relations, but also fulfilling one of the main tasks for a Securitisation Theory analyst which is “… constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998:26).

6.1) Deriving the Psycho-Cultural Disposition, Referent Objects and Existential Threats from Securitisation Theory

One would not be able to surmise the complete psycho-cultural disposition of Mbeki at any given time, at least it would be impossible to deliver a complete and perfectly accurate depiction within the scope of this study, but one could reasonably assume certain facets of his disposition at that time. Within the framework of Securitisation Theory it stands to reason that if the ‘audience’ accepts the validity claim of the securitising actor as to the legitimacy of an existential threat to a referent object, then the nature of both the threat and the object can be indicative of a certain aspect of the audience’s psycho-cultural disposition. For an explanatory example, we return to the scenario of the family that accepts and allows the father to resort to ‘dirty tricks’ in securing his job and therefore his family’s current lifestyle. Previously the family’s lifestyle was identified as being a referent object and job loss was the threat that threatened the existence of the family lifestyle (referent object) and therefore needed to be negated by any means necessary.

Knowing the nature of the existential threat and the referent object in the family scenario, one can draw certain conclusions regarding the psycho-cultural disposition of the family (audience). For instance, at the most superficial and obvious level we can say that the current family lifestyle is very important to the family, at least important enough to warrant the dad engaging in ‘dirty tricks’, which would not normally be advocated, in order to ensure the continued existence of this lifestyle. However, from this particular case we cannot tell whether the family lifestyle is more important than other threats, say for instance murder. It is uncertain whether the family would allow the dad to commit murder to ensure the family lifestyle, but what can be deduced for sure is that the family lifestyle is important enough to allow dirty tricks in order to combat the threat of job loss. This statement then becomes indicative of a
certain psycho-cultural disposition that allows for this to be true, such as that maintaining the current quality of lifestyle is considered important to the family. Perhaps there is shame in being poorer than the family currently is or that money for the education of the children is highly valued, and the dirty tricks required to negate the threat of job loss is not considered a big moral or societal sacrifice, at least not when weighed against the importance of retaining the current family lifestyle. These are all important insights into the psycho-cultural disposition of the family as deduced from the fact that they successfully accepted the validity claim of the father. This does not pretend to be a complete picture of the family’s disposition but it does highlight a few interesting facets. For a visual representation of the influence of the psycho-cultural disposition within the securitisation framework consult Figure 5.

The same principles of deducing a part of the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience from the accepted referent object and existential threat within the example of the family faced with job loss can be extrapolated to the examples of South Africa as the audience within the securitisation framework of the case studies of Zimbabwe and Sudan. But before we can deduce the psycho-cultural disposition, we have to first formulate the securitisation framework within which the variables of these case studies are placed and to identify the referent object and existential threat.
Figure 5. Visual Representation of the Influence of the Audience’s Psycho-Cultural Disposition within a Securitisation Framework (Authors own design)
6.2) Formulating a South Africa / Africa Securitisation Framework

For the purposes of the creation of a regional securitisation framework it is required that South Africa be cast in the role of the ‘audience’ within this framework. As the driver of the crucial second part of securitisation, necessary for successful securitisation, it is the role of the audience to either accept or reject the securitisation move presented by the securitising actor. Where the securitising actor uses a securitising move to make a validity claim that an existential threat to a referent object exists that necessitates measures outside the normal socially (or in this case internationally) accepted measures, it is implied that if the audience accepts this securitising move as valid and allows the securitising actor to pursue these measures, thereby successfully completing securitisation, then the ‘audience’ accepts both the claims that the referent object is indeed something that needs to be protected at all costs and that the existential threat is indeed a threat. In other words, if we can pinpoint when South Africa began to support or perhaps allow another African country (the securitising actor) to pursue policies outside its own agreed upon international norms, and we can identify the securitising move that initiated this shift, we will be able to identify not only what South Africa would consider a referent object, but also what speech acts were considered necessary by other African countries in order to create the existential threat needed for successful securitisation.

6.3) Western-Imperialism as an Existential Threat

Both of the case studies are indicative of a successfully securitised move as in both cases South Africa either implicitly allowed, or explicitly supported, certain actions by the governments of other African states that were contradictory to its own political and / or social norms. In Zimbabwe, Mbeki publicly supported Mugabe thereby implicitly supporting land distribution without compensation as well as undemocratic government policies which destabilised not only Zimbabwe but also a large part the rest of the Southern African region. In Sudan, Mbeki supported Sudanese president al-Bashir both in public as well as in within the United Nations forum, thereby implicitly supporting violations of human rights and undemocratic behaviour. All of the practices that Mbeki implicitly supported, through explicit support for the governments that perpetrated them, are in stark contradiction to the values and principles promoted throughout post-apartheid South Africa’s official government documents, speeches, policies and even Mbeki’s own African Renaissance. This suggests that Sudan and Zimbabwe, acting as securitising actors, must have made a securitising move, the validity of which was accepted by South Africa, allowing the securitising actors to act outside the boundaries of the
normally allowed scope of political actions to perpetrate these offences. Having identified the existence of successful securitisation, deductions can be made in order to ascertain the variables that concluded into such a move starting with when the securitising move was accepted by South Africa. Firstly a list of the variables that are already identified.

- In both the cases researched South Africa was cast in the role of the audience and the governments of the relevant countries, Zimbabwe and Sudan, as the securitising actors.

- It is clear that a securitising move by either of these countries has been accepted as South Africa allowed both of them to engage in practices considered beyond the norm of South African domestic and foreign policies.

This successful securitisation implies that there exists a common referent object that South Africa and the other countries consider to possess a legitimate claim to survival and in both case studies the other African countries have convinced SA that the referent object was existentially threatened. In order to ascertain the nature of the referent object or the existential threat, the identification of the securitising move and related speech act that initiated such a move is required.

In the Zimbabwean case study it was only after the Mugabe had labelled South Africa a ‘puppet of the West’ a ‘traitor to the struggle’ and accused Mbeki of ‘furthering the agenda of the domestic and imperialist lobby’, that South Africa began to publicly support Mugabe and the Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe and therefore implicitly their practices of unilateral land reforms and the suppression of political opposition. Here South Africa allowed and in some cases supported Zimbabwe in engaging in practices that fell outside what SA itself had explicitly constructed as political norms, suggesting a successful securitising move on the part of Mugabe. Similarly in the case of the Darfur crisis, Mbeki and South Africa began to lend significant support to Sudan, under al-Bashir, through its earnest opposition to various UN resolutions after the president al-Bashir began to blame the West for the troubles in Darfur. In both of these situations we can ascertain that the acceptance of the securitising move happened after the securitising actor stated that a referent object was under threat of Western-Imperialism. Therefore we can imply that Western-Imperialism was the existential threat successfully used by the securitising actors in both these situations to convince South Africa of the need to securitise. And as the legitimacy of an existential threat is informed by the psycho-cultural
disposition of the audience, in this case Mbeki, we can further infer that anti-Western-Imperialism is a part of Mbeki’s psycho-cultural disposition, necessary to allow for the acceptance of Western-Imperialism as existential threat.

Thus we can deduce two important statements from our analysis:

1) anti-Western-Imperialist considerations did indeed influence the Mbeki administration’s foreign policy actions regarding human rights violations on the African continent in the events that African countries evoked imperialist rhetoric, and;

2) the reason therefore is that, in accordance with the Securitisation Theory, the psycho-cultural disposition of Mbeki, as evident in his African Renaissance, dictated that Western-Imperialism be seen as an legitimate existential threat that when invoked through the imperialist rhetoric of an African securitising actor would ensure that SA, as the ‘audience’, would accept the validity claim of the securitising actor that extraordinary measures be employed to combat these threats.

For the purposes of this study it is not important to know the exact nature of the referent object, but reasonable deductions from the same sources that were used to deduce the existential threat points towards either African solidarity or state sovereignty, most likely a mixture of both.

6.4) Theoretical Limitations & the Possibility of Extrapolation to Contemporary SA Foreign Policy

It is by no means the purpose of this work to imply that Western-Imperialism is the only existential threat that would be accepted as valid threat by South Africa, thereby allowing for successful securitisation of an issue nor that any other state would be able to replace Zimbabwe and Sudan as securitising actor and achieve the same successful securitisation using the same rhetoric of Western-Imperialism (securitising move). For now the case studies are limited to African countries and it would be wise not to underestimate the influence of African solidarity on the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience (Mbeki) at the time. Furthermore the presidentialist nature of Mbeki’s insistence on absolute dominance over South African foreign policy at the time of his presidency also limits the findings of this research to SA under Mbeki’s rule and does not necessarily presuppose to extend this to all SA foreign policy thereafter, however such a possibility should also not be ruled out. Although the self-imposed limitations on the scope of this study attribute the analyses and observations made within to the foreign policy of President Mbeki, it is not to say that the influence of anti-Western-Imperialist
considerations cannot be transferred to contemporary SA foreign policy under Jacob Zuma. Although outside the scope and without going into much detail, a very brief and superficial look at the 2011 Arab Spring and SA’s response to the establishment of a No-Fly Zone over Libya at the time hints strongly at such a possibility.

In February 2011 anti-government protests began in earnest in Libya and were harshly met with government violence that would soon see the death toll rising to the thousands. By the following month, international condemnation for the substantial death toll would culminate in the passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 which authorised the protection of civilians by member states, established a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, and requested the enforcement of an arms embargo and the freezing of the assets of certain Libyan authorities (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Resolution 1973 was supported by South Africa who as a member of the UNSC voted in favour of the resolution. However, Mr. Sangqu, the South African representative to the Council at the time, explicitly stated at the 6498th meeting, where the Resolution was adopted, that all stakeholders should “… search for a political solution” that “… preserve[s] the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya” and that “… [a]s a matter of principle, [SA] has supported the resolution, with the necessary caveats to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya and reject any foreign occupation or unilateral military intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians” (United Nations Security Council, 2011:9-10). On 19 March 2011, only a month after the passing of Resolution 1973, and French forces started a military intervention in Libya, soon supplemented by other Western powers and eventually the whole military operation was left to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military alliance comprised entirely of Western states. Another month thereafter, on the 14th of April at the 3rd Brazil Russia India China and South Africa (BRICS) summit in China, the BRICS nations declared that “… [w]e share the principle that the use of force should be avoided. We maintain that the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected (BRICS Third Summit Sanya Declaration, 2011).

Supporting Resolution 1973 in February, followed by the contradictory denunciation of the use of force at the BRICS summit in April, was once again perceived by media and foreign policy pundits as indicative of inherent inconsistencies in SA foreign policy. Critics bemoaned the supposed contrarianism as cowardly recoiling from previous support (Fairbanks, 2011),
backtracking on decisions (Nibishaka, 2011), an about-turn on Libya (Moore, 2011), and Janus-faced (Petré, 2011). However if one were to take the principle influence of anti-Western-imperialist considerations identified within this study and applied it to the situation, whereby the use of force by Western powers were to be construed by SA as Western-Imperialism (similar to the situation in Sudan a few years earlier), then it is completely reasonable, within the foreign policy framework created here, that SA would react in opposition to the use of force and is therefore in no way unexpected or contrarian. This is just a small example of how the principles identified in this thesis can perhaps also be applied to the presidency of the current SA president and possibly the one thereafter.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to use the constructivist theories of Securitisation and Rule Base, Language Orientated Constructivism to answer the following questions: a) what influence did anti-Western-imperialist considerations have in dictating the result of the conflict between the principles of State Rights (the respect for state sovereignty and African Solidarity and Human Rights (promoting human rights and democracy) in the response of Mbeki’s South African government to the humanitarian crises in Zimbabwe and Sudan and b) how can such a possible influence be rationally explained?

The first of the research questions posed, related to the use anti-Western-imperialist considerations, which was defined in the context of this thesis as denoting an hypothesised situation whereby the anti-Western-imperialist convictions of Mbeki, as evidenced in his statements regarding the African Renaissance, is triggered by the appearance of Western-imperialist rhetoric or perceived Western-Imperialism in specific situations. Anti-Western-imperialist considerations thus becomes a variable that, it is further hypothesised, when present in a given situation is able to influence whether State Rights take precedent over Human Rights, a state which has normally been assumed as a given. The process of identifying anti-Western-imperialist considerations as an influential variable was undertaken with the use of Rule Based, Language Orientated Constructivism (RBLOC) – a theoretical model that uses background information to contextualise a semi-chronological sequence of speech acts, constructed from available and reliable primary and secondary sources, that represents a dialogue between two or more actors. The dialogue is referred to as a language game. A game which adheres to and is dictated by certain rules that are deduced and inferred from background information and various sources at the conception of the game. Throughout the course of the dialogue the validity of these rules are either accepted or denied by the actors or new rules can be created, as inferred from the actors’ speech acts. The rules limit the possible future acts of the actors and therefore also the final action or position of the actors, referred to as the action theorem within RBLOC, and if the action theorem corresponds to the actual state of events and can be logically deduced from the preceding rules through dialogical analysis, then the theory is considered proven. Within the scope of this thesis the RBLOC methodology was applied to the South African response to two humanitarian crises on the African continent within the
ontext of Mbeki’s presidency: the near collapse of the economy and democracy in Zimbabwe and the alleged genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan.

The first of the two language games involved a reconstructed dialogue between Zimbabwe and South Africa that started at the inception of the Zimbabwe crisis in 2000 with the ruling ZANU-PF government seizing white-owned farms and imposing security legislation targeting opposition parties and their supporters, and played out as follows. Firstly, the South African government and Thabo Mbeki at the time responded to the occurrences in Zimbabwe by advising Mugabe (Zimbabwean president at the time) that the current actions will lead to a humanitarian disaster, and there is evidence of Mbeki privately conferring with Mugabe with the purpose of changing his current course of actions. Soon thereafter Mugabe responded by labelling South Africa an ‘agent of the West’ for assuming to interfere in the politics of the Zimbabwe. After being labelled an agent of the West, South Africa immediately and decidedly began issuing public statements of support for Zimbabwean policies – the eventual action theorem or final policy position of the language game. Throughout the three years that this game would be played out the situation within Zimbabwe, both economically and politically, became more dire and Mbeki’s eventual response of publicly supporting Mugabe was in direct contrast to the principles of the promotion of human rights and democracy and left most observers confused to the outcome, especially as South Africa possessed the means militarily, politically and economically to impose constructive changes within Zimbabwe. However, the inclusion of anti-Western-imperialist considerations as a rule to the language game allows for a logical and reasonable explanation for the public support of Zimbabwean policies after Mugabe’s accusations of Western influence over South Africa, as the exposure of Western-imperialist rhetoric to the situation triggered Mbeki’s own anti-Western-imperialist convictions and thus introduced the variable of anti-Western-imperialist considerations. The introduction of this variable, as hypothesised, was able to influence South Africa’s international responses in the favour of State Rights over Human Rights, as proven by the rational outcome of the language game.

The second language game reconstructed a dialogue within the context of the alleged genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, this time involving three actors: the South African government, the Sudanese government (under Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir), and the government of United States of America. This particular language game starts in 2004 with the United States
stating that the events occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan is tantamount to genocide perpetrated by the government of al-Bashir. In response, South Africa, who had previously been actively involved in mediating a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the crises in Darfur, retorted that while the situation was indeed serious, it did not constitute Genocide. Thereafter the United States used its clout within the United Nations to pass resolutions that would apply economic pressure on the Sudanese government and pave the way for possible military action within the region in an effort to avert further disaster. Sudan and al-Bashir subsequently accused America and the West of enflaming the situation in the Darfur region and using the situation as a convenient excuse to act on its true motivation - accessing Sudanese oil. Concluding the language game, South Africa in 2007 would finally adopt a position of actively seeking a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation in whilst at the same time using its own clout within the United Nations Human Rights Council and United Nations Security Council to pass resolutions sympathetic to the Sudanese government and block those, drafted by Western countries, that it perceived as unfairly targeting al-Bashir. Again the South African government would settle on a policy towards the Sudanese crisis that valued State Rights over Human Rights. And again if the variable of anti-Western-imperialist considerations is introduced into the situation, through Western-imperialist rhetoric by the Sudanese government as well as the South African perception of Western-Imperialism in the actions of Western countries through the United Nations, the final action theorem of South Africa becomes rationally explainable. SA’s possible moves were limited to supporting the government by the inclusion of anti-Western-imperialist considerations.

Both the language games that were constructed from the Zimbabwean and Sudanese case studies indicated that anti-Western-imperialist considerations was indeed a viable variable shared in both situations. This thesis limits the research to two case studies, both during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, and therefore is by no means indicative of an undeniable truth within contemporary South African foreign policy. Although a very superficial application of RBLOC theory to a similar case of ambiguous SA response to a humanitarian crisis in Libya during the Arab Spring in 2011 shows that anti-Western-imperialist considerations could possibly still be influential post the Mbeki administration. If this variable is indeed as influential as presented in this thesis, the question of why it is able to influence South African responses to continental crises still remained. A logical answer to this question would be
derived from the application of Securitisation theory, specifically the Copenhagen School of Securitisation Theory (CSST).

The theoretical framework of the CSST emphasises the power of a securitising an issue, by explicitly or implicitly invoking the concept of security, a speech act conducted by a securitising actor, in convincing a target audience that extraordinary measures are allowed by the securitising actor in dealing with the securitised issue. Securitisation Theory has its roots in language theory, shared with RBLOC theory, which lends itself to complementing RBLOC theory in rationally explaining why the anti-Western-imperialist considerations, as identified through RBLOC theory, is able to influence South African responses to humanitarian crises in Africa. After extrapolating CSST to the inter-state level and highlighting the naturally deductive links of the various concepts pertinent in the theory, it was applied to the data obtained from the case studies. Application of the theory resulted in explaining that the psycho-cultural disposition of Mbeki (his anti-Western-imperialist convictions) lends itself to Mbeki, as the target audience, accepting the validity claim of the securitising actor (in this case Mugabe or al-Bashir) that Western-Imperialism poses an existential threat to the African solidarity and state sovereignty (the mutually accepted referent object). By accepting the validity of the securitising move, South Africa, according to CSST, has allowed the securitising actor to engage in extra-ordinary measures to counter the existential threat of Western-Imperialism and will themselves engage in extraordinary measures to allow the securitising actor to accomplish this goal. Thus CSST helps us to reach the rational conclusion that the reason why anti-Western-imperialist considerations are so influential is because the invocation of anti-Western-Imperialism in situations of humanitarian crises in Africa securitises the that particular crisis by claiming Western-Imperialism as an existential threat to state sovereignty and African solidarity, a claim which is accepted naturally by SA as the target audience due to its own psycho-cultural disposition towards the mutually accepted nature of the referent objects, and the extraordinary political methods that caused the crises are therefore allowed and even enabled by SA.

Ultimately the purpose of this work was to show that given the data and facts presented, it is the most logical conclusion that anti-Western-imperialist considerations did in these cases play a very important role in the muted response of Mbeki to violations of human rights within the African continent. Also to show how RBLOC theory and CSST theory complement it each
other in identifying and modelling the variables and logical steps required to confidently conclude the influence of anti-Western-Imperialism. And finally, to shed light on the possibilities of extrapolating Securitisation Theory to the regional level and contribute to the mutually referred existential threats on the African continent, and in doing so contribute to the knowledge base of the theory.


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